

Spring 2015

Poujade and Poujadolf: Fears of Fascism in France's Fourth Republic

Wojciech J. Owczarek
Wojciech.Owczarek@Colorado.EDU

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses



Part of the [European History Commons](#), and the [Political History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Owczarek, Wojciech J., "Poujade and Poujadolf: Fears of Fascism in France's Fourth Republic" (2015). *Undergraduate Honors Theses*. Paper 820.

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.

POUJADE AND *POUJADOLF*:
Fears of Fascism in France's Fourth Republic

Wojciech J. Owczarek

History Departmental Honors Thesis
University of Colorado, Boulder

April 7, 2015

Advisor:

Martha Hanna | *History*

Defense Committee:

Abby Hickcox | *Honors*

Fred Anderson | *History*

ABSTRACT

The Poujadist Movement, which began as a protest of shopkeepers in southern France in 1953 and rose to national prominence in the elections of January, 1956, was, at the time of its political activity, accused by its critics of fascism. While analyses of the Poujadists have generally focused on the movement's ideological characteristics to evaluate its possible fascism or its classification as a member of the French far right, I look at Pierre Poujade and the label of fascism in the context of the postwar political climate and the politicized memory of the French Resistance. In addition to analyzing charges of fascism originating on the left of the political spectrum, among the members of the French Communist Party, I evaluate similar accusations voiced by members of the Gaullist right. Noting that the myth of the Resistance served as a source of postwar legitimacy among both the followers of Charles de Gaulle and the Communists, I argue that, by accusing the Poujadists of fascism, the two extremes of the Fourth Republic's parliament were seeking to tap into the anti-fascist narratives that informed their political lineages in order to attempt to regain governmental participation.

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:	- 4 -
FASCISM	- 5 -
INTRODUCTION	- 16 -
CHAPTER I— <i>Petit Poujade</i>	- 27 -
CHAPTER II— <i>Poujadisme</i>	- 46 -
CHAPTER III— <i>Poujadolf</i>	- 68 -
CONCLUSION	- 82 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY	- 86 -

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

I would first like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Martha Hanna, for encouraging me to write an honors thesis, then agreeing to guide me through the process of actually producing one; without her strong advice, constructive criticism, and continuing encouragement the idea of somehow developing a question about Vladimir Putin into a paper about French political culture would never have been realized. I would also like to thank Professor Fred Anderson for his encouragement and unwavering enthusiasm as well as his suggestion to choose this topic as opposed to the five or so others I at one point considered. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Abby Hickcox for agreeing to be a member of my thesis defense committee on incredibly short notice.

FASCISM

Roger Griffin, perhaps the best-known representative of the intellectual community of post-Cold War theorists of fascism, writes in the opening article of the first issue of *Fascism* that academic studies of fascism enjoy today “a prolonged spring after a winter of hard times.” Prior to the emergence of scholars such as himself, Griffin argues, “academics babbled about fascism as ‘full of contradictions’ or having ‘the form of an ideology without the content’ instead of actually bothering to engage with the fascists’ own understanding of their political goals and historical mission.”¹ In the 1990s there emerged a consensus, albeit a largely self-proclaimed one, in the study of fascism among non-Marxist liberal academics. Though the authors who represent this consensus have differing views as to what the ideological components of fascism are, they all agree with the premise that there exists a generic form of fascism, that is, one not confined temporally and spatially to Mussolini’s Italy; and, most importantly, there is a level of agreement that fascism did and does indeed have a discernable underlying ideology.² Additionally notable of the contemporary school of fascism studies is the ubiquity of its classification of Nazism within the ranks of fascist movements, a consideration that constitutes a rejection of the assertions of historians such as Gilbert Allardyce who opposed both the notion of generic fascism and the grouping of the two regimes in one category.³

According to Griffin, central to fascism is the drive for national rebirth, or “palingenesis,” that follows a period of supposed decline or destruction; because it serves as a narrative that underlies a belief system, palingenesis becomes the “palingenetic myth.” Griffin’s use of the

¹ Roger Griffin, “Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age. From New Consensus to New Wave?,” *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2012), pp. 1-17

² Roger Eatwell, “On Defining the ‘Fascist Minimum’: the Centrality of Ideology,” *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 1 Issue 3, (October, 1996) pp. 303-20.

³ Gilbert Allardyce, “What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept,” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), pp. 369-71

Greek-derived term in lieu of “rebirth” originates in the author’s wish to highlight the ideology’s reliance on the idea of crisis as “palingenesis” finds uses, albeit infrequent, in discussions such as the belief in Christ’s second coming which, depending on the interpretation of- and emphasis placed on the Book of Revelation is to follow a series of calamities. The author also de-emphasizes the regenerative nature of “rebirth” in order to stress that, unlike traditional conservatism or reactionism which both may embrace nationalism, fascism is inherently forward-looking and revolutionary and hence *not* restorationist. Furthermore, Griffin’s conception of fascism is characterized by “populist ultra-nationalism” where “populist” is meant not to signify an affiliation with the agrarianism of the late 19th century but rather to suggest that fascist movements draw their political legitimacy from the highly ambiguous *people*. Populism and the desire to create a national community, however, do not imply any substantive level of rule by consensus as self-appointed vanguards which interpret the needs of the people and of the nation are necessarily in control of fascist movements. Fascism is thus paradoxically “populist in intent and rhetoric, yet elitist in practice.”⁴

Stanley Payne’s work on the definition of fascism anticipated many assertions of the 1990s academics despite dating back to the 1970s and 80s. The conception of fascism articulated by Payne was composed of three separate necessary components: i) fascism’s unique style or praxis which encompassed violence and wide use of symbolism, ii) the various targets of its animosity such as liberalism, socialism, and conservatism, and iii), most importantly from the perspective of 90s scholars, fascism’s ideological affirmations consist of such components as

⁴ Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, (Routledge: New York, 1993), pp. 26-57

nationalism and a commendation of international conflict.⁵ In terms similar to Griffin's definition, Payne's 1995 *History of Fascism* describes fascism in a single sentence as

a form of revolutionary ultranationalism for national rebirth that is based on a primarily vitalist philosophy, is structured on extreme elitism, mass mobilization and the *Führerprinzip*, positively values violence as end as well as means and tends to normalize war and/or the military virtues.⁶

As is the case with most theories described here, Payne's is not without critics. Roger Eatwell maintains that Payne defines fascism in terms too specific to the interwar period as, for instance, emphases on empire and imperialism were largely absent from the discourse of post-1945 fascists. Similarly, the negations central to Payne's approach, argues Eatwell, varied in vehemence across not only time, but also between the fascist movements of Europe in the 1920s and 30s.⁷ In addition to proposing his own definition which stresses the differences between fascism and conservatism as well as its Third Way hostility to capitalism and socialism, Eatwell points out the shortcomings of Griffin's proposed definition, arguing that its emphasis on a myth not only confuses propaganda for ideology but also downplays the rational considerations of fascist ideology.⁸

A further contentious component of Griffin's thesis is its assertion that elements of fascism specific to the interwar period must be treated as nonessential and should therefore be distinguished from broader underlying traits useful in the formulation of an all-encompassing definition. Kevin Passmore rejects this argument and contends that the specific form of nationalism embraced by fascists (i.e. nationalism that is both illiberal and non-conservative) is a direct product of the social conditions and political climate of Europe in the two decades that

⁵ Stanley Payne, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*, (University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, 1980) and Stanley Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*, (UCL Press: London 1995), p. 3-19

⁶ Payne, *A History of Fascism*, p. 14

⁷ Eatwell, "'On Defining the 'Fascist Minimum,'" pp. 307-8

⁸ Ibid. pp. 310

followed the Great War.⁹ The central assertion of Passmore's definition is that fascism seeks to subjugate all social and economic considerations to the nation's perceived needs. This form of nationalism is therefore irreversibly opposed to socialism (and to all Marxism-inspired political leanings) and to feminism because these worldviews hold the interests of socioeconomic class and gender as overriding those of the national community. Not only is fascism opposed to such beliefs, but it is also determined to suppress them through the creation of a new political order that is often militaristic and characterized by a strong elite class. Because of the above considerations derived from its nationalism, fascism is a movement of the extreme right and of the radical right.¹⁰ Passmore and Griffin agree that political racism which at times—but certainly not necessarily—took on the form of anti-Semitism is a characteristic trait of fascist movements. Unlike Griffin, however, Passmore tends to value history over theory, meaning that, for example, he is uneasy with the exclusion from definitions of generic fascism the component of paramilitarism, as he contends that a definition without it would render impossible the differentiation of interwar fascism from other far-right movements of its time.¹¹

However internally contentious, the 1990s consensus is essentially unified in its opposition to debates of previous decades which would often revolve around questions of the political current's perceived modernity or anti-modernity. In a book that was a groundbreaking work in the study of fascism, 1963's *Fascism in Its Epochs/Three Faces of Fascism*, Ernst Nolte gathers anti-liberalism, anti-individualism and other fascist negations under the umbrella of "anti-modernism" which, he argues, characterized not only Italian Fascism, but also German National Socialism, and the French Action française. Anti-modernism thus serves as a commonality between what today would be considered proto-fascism and the fascist states of

⁹ Kevin Passmore, *Fascism: a Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford University Press: New York, 2002), pp. 23-4

¹⁰ Ibid. pp. 10-32, 88-107

¹¹ Ibid. pp. 88-91

World War II. Nolte's philosophical-historical approach sees fascism as existing in three separate environments: political, social, and metapolitical. On the political level of analysis fascism is opposed to individual and class-based liberation as advocated by liberalism and Marxism respectively while simultaneously embracing the radicalism and opposition to the status-quo of both. This assessment is to a large extent based upon Benito Mussolini's outline of the Fascist Party's ideology which attacks liberal democracy as excessively pacifist and hence not conducive to the moral development of nations.¹² On the social level Nolte's fascism embraces a reactionary willingness to defend one's interests; while on the metapolitical level it finds itself in a state of struggle against transcendence.¹³ Transcendence is here defined as the fundamentally modern social process through which human interactions are broadened while being rendered more abstract and subtle.¹⁴ So focused is Nolte's method on a philosophical analysis of disembodied ideas that economic and social explanations of the rise of fascism are therein virtually disregarded. Though the phenomenological approach used by Nolte would go on to be abandoned by historians and political theorists alike, the idea that fascism was opposed to modernity would inform the debate for years to come.

American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset saw fascism as a revolution of the middle class and argued that fascism originated not from the specific circumstances of interwar Europe but rather from more universal currents that existed within capitalist industrial society in general. In societies experiencing industrialization, Lipset argued, there would always exist disaffected elements among either the working class, independent small businessmen facing competition

¹² Indeed, Nolte's heavy reliance on the propaganda of interwar fascists has drawn the criticism of Ian Kershaw; Peter Davis and Derek Lynch, *The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right*, (Routledge: New York, 2002)

¹³ Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism*, (Widenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1965), pp. 429-30, 433-4, 450-4 in ed. Roger Griffin, *International Fascism: Theories, Causes, and the New Consensus*, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1998)

¹⁴ Ibid.

from organized labor and large bureaucracies, or conservatives interested in safeguarding the old order against socialist and liberal influence. According to this view, the inherently opportunistic fascists would appeal to members of all these groups to degrees that varied depending on specific circumstances.¹⁵ Although Lipset's analysis is not a Marxist one, it shares with Marxist definitions a level of determinism that considers fascism to be an outcome of general underlying trends rather than specific circumstances. Marxist understandings of fascism that are not explicitly political in nature (i.e. ones not originating from the interwar Communist International) are hard to come by. There do exist, however, some structural Marxist explanation of fascism, one of which can be found in the writing of Nicos Poulantzas who in the 1970s saw the emergence of fascism as a direct consequence of a crisis of international capitalism. To Poulantzas, fascism was not a deliberate emergency response of "the most reactionary, chauvinistic, and imperialistic elements of finance capital" to pre-revolutionary European developments as Moscow had suggested, but an "exceptional state," a form of capitalist society which sets aside class conflicts in order to face external crisis. Analyzing the developments in pre-war Germany and Italy, Poulantzas pointed to late-arriving industrialization as an imperative factor in the rise of fascism.¹⁶

Whereas questions of anti-modernity generally gave way to analyses of internal ideological considerations, a problem that continues to divide the historical and theoretic community lies in the challenge of classifying fascism within broader ideological currents. This question is evident in what here will be referred to as the political religions debate, a dispute that intensified in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Roger Griffin, who in

¹⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset, "'Fascism' – Left, Right and Centre," pp. 131 in ed. Griffin, *International Fascism*

¹⁶ Jane Caplan, "Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas as Historian Nicos Poulantzas," *History Workshop* No. 3 (Spring, 1977), pp. 83-100 *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*, pp. 312-9, 331-5, in Griffin, *International Fascism*

1991 argued that classifying fascism as a political religion ascribes to it a pre-modern irrationality reminiscent of Robespierre's Cult of the Supreme Being,¹⁷ has, along with Payne come to embrace the concept while Eatwell, Passmore and one of the leading historians of Nazi Germany, Ian Kershaw, tend to question it.¹⁸ The concept of secular political religion can be traced to Eric Voegelin and Raymond Aron's writing around the time of the Second World War. In 1944 Aron proposed "to call secular religions the doctrines that in the souls of our contemporaries take the place of a vanished faith, and that locate humanity's salvation in this world, in the distant future, in the form of a social order that has to be created."¹⁹ The analytical concept of political religions remained largely dormant for half a century before it reemerged in the writings of Emilio Gentile, a cultural historian of fascism, specifically its Italian iteration. In defining the generic idea of political religion, Gentile stresses the importance of a collective secular entity, a uniform and codified set of individual obligations vis-à-vis the state, an elite cadre that outlines its own mission as the betterment of the collective, as well as the primacy of mythology and secular worship of leadership.²⁰ Mussolini explicitly claimed that his political ideology was not intended to supplant the role of the Church in the hearts of the Italian people, Gentile, however, argues that the regime's recognition of the Vatican was pragmatic in nature and reflected the Fascists' use of religion as their *instrumentum regni*. Embracing the role of religion in shaping morality, fascism sacralizes the social role of the state by "[taking] upon itself the prerogative of defining the meaning and ultimate aim as regards the lives of millions of men

¹⁷ Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, pp. 30-2. Griffin and Payne have come to stress the heuristic value of the concept of political religion in understanding fascism, especially its ultra-nationalism. See: Stanley Payne, "On the Heuristic Value of the Concept of Political Religion and its Application," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* Volume 6, Issue 2, (September 2005), pp. 163-74

¹⁸ Passmore, *Fascism*, pp. 20-3; and David D. Roberts, "'Political Religion' and the Totalitarian Departures of Inter-War Europe: On the Uses and Disadvantages of an Analytical Category," *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Nov., 2009), pp. 381-3

¹⁹ Philippe Burrin, "Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept," *History and Memory*, Vol. 9, No. 1/2, (Fall 1997), p. 325

²⁰ Roberts, "Political Religion," pp. 382-3

and women.”²¹ A vital component of Gentile’s assessment is that fascism and Nazism were not the only political systems that established religious or quasi-religious ideologies to justify their mission and their very existence. Creation of similar secular cults, he argues, can additionally be attributed to romantic nationalism, liberal democracy, as well as socialism and communism.²² It is because of the above assertion that the political religions model has been accused of being a faddish reconceptualization of the earlier academic current of totalitarianism.²³

Deriving its name from the term “total state,” used during the interwar period to describe Fascist Italy, totalitarianist²⁴ theories focus on the state’s far-reaching control of the private sphere of citizens’ lives. Prominent British historian of the Third Reich and advocate of the use of political religion as a tool for understanding Nazism and fascism, Michael Burleigh echoes the totalitarianist approach in asserting that Hitler and Stalin were guilty of a strikingly similar abandonment of traditional moral norms founded on “transcendental authority or natural law” in instituting their regimes. Evidence for the Nazi and Soviet drive to create entirely new moral systems, Burleigh argues, can be found, for example, in their rejection of the privacy of familial relations.²⁵ Among the many critics of totalitarianist historiography, Passmore argues that the approach is theoretically weak when it comes to proposing reasons for the rise of fascism as it

²¹ Emilio Gentile, “Fascism as Political Religion,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 2/3 (May - Jun., 1990), pp. 229-235.

²² Ibid.

²³ Roberts, “Political Religion,” pp. 381-414. In addition to citing Ian Kershaw, Roberts himself is highly critical of the concept as he argues that by describing the phenomena of interwar fascism and Stalinism in familiar terms of religion, the theorists obscure deeper intellectual challenges.

²⁴ I choose to use the term “totalitarianist” as an adjective signifying relation to academic theories of totalitarianism so as to differentiate it from “totalitarian” which describes policy and ideology.

²⁵ Michael Burleigh, “Brotherly Enemies” in *Moral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II*, (Harper Perennial: New York, 2011), pp. 76-114. Burleigh points out parallels in the scientific, or scientising, foundations upon which Nazism and Soviet Communism were founded, writing that the vocabulary of Marxism and Nazism mimicked science in “in the way that kitsch mimics art. (p. 81).” The Nazi state’s control over the German family is detailed in “Part III” of Burleigh and Wolfgang Ippermann’s *The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945*, (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1993), 199-304

focuses almost exclusively on the policy and ideology of fascists already in power.²⁶ The approach enjoyed a much greater level of popularity in the 1980s when totalitarianism informed the stances of right-leaning historians during the German *Historikerstreit*, or historians' dispute. The quarrel, though concerned primarily with the origins of the Final Solution and the relationship between history and identity, saw conservative historians (including the above-discussed Ernst Nolte) invoke ideas of totalitarianism to draw lines of comparison between Nazi and Soviet crimes while their left-wing opponents proposed that the Holocaust was a product of the unique evil of Nazi fascism.²⁷

When the vitriolic letters to the editor of the *Historikerstreit* were being published, the popularity of totalitarianism was already waning after it vied for academic hegemony with theories focused on modernity in the 1960s and 70s. Karl Dietrich Bracher, for example, argued that threats to liberty and democracy originated on both the right and the left of the political spectrum. It is imperative to note that totalitarianism was, during pre-Détente Cold War, both an analytical tool and a political weapon. The totalitarian minimum put forth by Carl Friedrich holds that totalitarian systems are characterized by the indistinguishability of the ruling party and the government, the use of police state tactics, government control of information outlets, central economic planning, and an elaborate underlying dogma.²⁸ It may well be true that fascist states and the USSR did share these aspects, but the conscious reduction of the systems to the above characteristics allowed anti-Communists to exploit the near-universal moral opposition to fascism that characterized postwar democratic Europe to marginalize its erstwhile Soviet ally and its supporters. This assessment of Cold War historiography has gained almost universal acceptance, even among non-Communist (or perhaps anti-Communist) historians like Michael

²⁶ Passmore, *Fascism*, pp. 18-23

²⁷ Burleigh and Wippermann, , pp. 19-21

²⁸ Passmore, *Fascism*, pp. 18-9

Burleigh.²⁹ Nevertheless, the academic study of fascism owes much to the idea of totalitarianism as Hannah Arendt's 1951 book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is often credited with being the singularity from which sprang the interdisciplinary interest in fascism. Totalitarian movements by which Arendt generally means Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany (although she does write that Fascist Italy joined their ranks in 1938 with the adoption of racial laws) are characterized by a tendency to organize allegedly politically indifferent masses. As an alliance of an elite vanguard and an often nihilistic but always disaffected mob, totalitarian movements rely on the power of propaganda and terror to secure mass support.³⁰ Once in power, writes Arendt, totalitarian movements aim to maintain continual instability and regress down a road of increasing oppression that culminates in the destruction of humans as moral beings.³¹ While *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is widely considered influential, it is important to note that it would take until the late 1950s for writers such as Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski to publish their works inspired by Arendt's theories and until the next decade for early comparative studies of fascism (such as Nolte's) to emerge.³²

Indeed, the period of roughly a decade that separated Allied victory in Europe and the crystallization of totalitarianist thought following the Soviet Invasion of Hungary in 1956 was a time when fascism and any interest therein faced such overwhelming moral condemnation that it was in effect relegated to what Nolte described as "extra-terrestrial exile."³³ Much of what follows is an analysis of the use of the term "fascist" during this interval, a period when memory

²⁹ Allardyce, *What Fascism is Not*, p. 371; Burleigh and Wippermann, p. 21

³⁰ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (The World Publishing Company: Cleveland and New York, 1958), pp. 306-88

³¹ Ibid. pp. 392-459

³² By this I do not mean in any way that scholarship regarding the Second World War and Nazism/fascism did not exist in the war's direct aftermath, rather that studies of fascism as a political ideology (not as a concept tied directly to the person of Adolf Hitler, such as Alan Bullock's work) did not yet emerge.

³³ Nolte, "The Problem of Fascism in Recent Scholarship," in Henry A. Turner, *Reappraisals of Fascism*, (New Viewpoints: New York, 1975), pp. 26-42 cited in Davis and Lynch, *Fascism and the Far Right*

of the recent war's immense destruction provided the foundation upon which the meaning of fascism was constructed. The following is an analysis of the concept of fascism as a term of abuse in political discourse, a concept warned of by fascism theorists with ubiquity similar to their rejection of Cold War totalitarianism.

INTRODUCTION

“A fiery movement / was born in Saint-Céré,” proclaim the opening lines of a song co-composed by Pierre Poujade and an author whose name has been lost.¹ Located in the department of Lot in southwestern France, the town of Saint-Céré is home to around 3,500 people, a population level largely unchanged since the French Revolution. One hundred miles from Bordeaux to the west and Toulouse to the south, it is a picturesque town built in the foothills of the Massif Central on the waterfront of the Céré River, its setting and architecture earning it the moniker of *la Petite Venise Lotoise*. Site of the 1953 tax revolt that became Le Mouvement Poujade,² the town has a rue Pierre Poujade though it is not one of its many cobblestone avenues but rather a forest road with only three street addresses. Saint-Céré’s official website is further indicative of an uneasy relationship between the town and one of its most famous modern sons: a list of notable local personalities features renaissance poets, a host of military personages, and a Belgian inventor who died in Saint-Céré; Poujade’s name, however, is nowhere to be found.³

Poujade’s political party, Union et fraternité française (UFF), an extension of his protest movement of small shopkeepers and artisans, Union de défense des commerçants et artisans (UDCA), burst onto the political stage of France’s Fourth Republic (1946-1958) on January 2, 1956 when close to 13% of the electorate sent 52 of his partisans to the Palais Bourbon’s *hémicycle*. In *Le Figaro*, the results of the election were published next to a photograph of flames spewing forth from the uppermost level of the Eiffel Tower, meanwhile, news of the subsequent investiture of Guy Mollet’s cabinet was published among reports of a cold snap that froze the

¹ “Hymne de Marche de l’U.D.C.A.,” *infos28Paris*, <http://www.idhm.eu/infos28>

² “Le Mouvement Poujade,” “UDCA” and “Poujadists” shall in this paper be used interchangeably.

³ “Un peu d’histoire,” <http://www.saint-cere.fr>

Seine to depths not seen since the Great War and allowed Warsaw and Moscow to boast of higher temperatures than Marseille and Toulouse.⁴ The bitter cold and burning landmarks only made tangible and visible a much larger crisis facing France. French control of Indochina was already lost, Algeria's war of independence was in full swing, and the Republic's parliamentary system's hopeless ineffectiveness was growing more demonstrable with every new prime minister: Mollet was the twelfth in ten years. In search of a solution, the French electorate turned to the extremes. With a platform consisting of one, rather obscure goal - the convocation of the Estates General-- the Poujadists' unique antiparliamentarism and the more well-established antiparliamentarism of the communist left accounted for over a third of the vote. Support for the French Communist Party (PCF) would never again represent a plurality and the Poujadists would quickly slide into obscurity. The various catalysts of Le Mouvement Poujade's rapid growth, from issues of decolonization, to the social changes that accompanied France's postwar modernization, to persistent governmental instability overshadowed the movement's activity in its time and have likewise come to greatly diminish the level of attention devoted to the UDCA in histories of the Fourth Republic.

Pierre Poujade, a man who, in the words of the *Hymne de marche de l'U.D.C.A* set out to "Save the Republic / and the Nation's honor," occupies in the history of postwar France a place comparable to that of a remarkably quotable footnote. Poujade left behind a political legacy that amounts to little more than his last name being the grammatical root of *poujadisme*, a term used to mockingly describe right wing populist attitudes built on fears of social and economic change. Right wing populist political parties like Nigel Farage's United Kingdom Independence Party or decentralized movements such as the Tea Party protests of the first decade of the twenty-first

⁴ *Le Figaro*, Jan. 4 and 20-24, 1956; I must admit, I owe the idea for this characterization of January, 1956 to Alistair Horne and his masterful *Savage War of Peace*, p. 126.

century have often been—notably by Robert Zaretsky in a 2010 *New York Times* editorial—compared to, or rather accused of, Poujadism.⁵ In the mid-1950s, when the label Poujadism was understandably not yet conceived of, Pierre Poujade’s movement was, at the highpoint of its political popularity, accused of fascism, an ideology which in hindsight seems by all measures far more sinister. It is with these accusations that this thesis is concerned.

The first historical study of the UDCA and of Poujadism was published only months after its electoral success. Stanley Hoffman’s *Le Mouvement Poujade* emphasized the movement’s anti-modernism and anti-elitism which according to the author were rooted in ‘nostalgia for a golden age when the little Poujade could work in a little garden in his little village without any contact with overarching state structures.’ In his chronology of the movement’s growth and development, Hoffmann emphasizes its “attacks on the *pays légal*,” thus implicitly linking its ideology with the political philosophy of Charles Maurras.⁶ The book is composed of two distinct parts, the first of these provides a chronological analysis of the movement’s growth and development, exploring its tactics of recruitment and strategies of expansion; the second provides an investigation of the movement’s ideological framework and political makeup. Charges of fascism directed at the movement are difficult to avoid and Hoffmann addresses these briefly, suggesting that the Poujadists’ fundamentally negative view of the state as a political actor rendered its ideology wholly incompatible with fascism which he defines as a political system constructed around a cult of the state. The France of the “*petits*,” he argues, was

⁵ Matthew Goodwin of the *Financial Times* in “Labour cannot be complacent about Ukip’s advance,” for example, evaluates the recent application of the Poujadist label to UKIP. Though in recent years Front National rhetoric has grown increasingly similar to that of Farage, accusations of Poujadism are generally not levelled against UKIP’s closets counterpart across the Channel, most likely because of the party’s inextricable association with the person of Jean-Marie Le Pen whose split from Poujade was a crucial turning point in the early stages of his political career. Robert Zaretsky, “The Tea Party Last Time,” *The New York Times*, February 2, 2010. Zaretsky’s argument is grounded not in a comparison of particular traits of the two movements but contends rather that “despair and disconnect with politics seem similarly great and real, as does the common tendency to grasp for simple solutions to complex problems.”

⁶ Stanley Hoffman, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, (Armand Colin: Paris, 1956), pp. 387-90, 27-80

incapable of accommodating fascism as it was too closely in line with the girondist tradition of revolutionary republican conservatism.⁷

Sean Fitzgerald's 1970 study, "The Anti-Modern Rhetoric of Le Mouvement Poujade" can inform, albeit indirectly, an analysis of fascism accusations leveled against Poujade. Fitzgerald highlights the many, at times contradictory, elements of the Poujadist platform and argues that internal ideological inconsistencies can be resolved by emphasizing instead the 'common denominator provided by anti-modernism,' a trait which at the time of the Movement's activity few devoted much attention to as the political implications of its potential success were scrutinized more widely than its ideological motivations.⁸ Anti-modernism was most clearly expressed in Poujade's allusions to the omnipresent specter of the System, a diabolical, inhuman force associated with international financial organizations and 'anonymous and vagabond capital.' So ubiquitous was the inherently capitalist System's control in the eyes of Poujadists, writes Fitzgerald, that even the Kremlin was of its creation at a time when France, 'having become the laughing stock of the entire world ... [found] herself at the total mercy of Anglo-Saxon imperialism or Russian imperialism.' According to this rhetoric, French humiliation began in 1940, was further manifest in Indochina, exacerbated by the emergence of Arab Nationalism, and continued with the loss of national sovereignty at the hands of NATO, the United Nations, and European organizations. This steady decline was not of French making but was rather a product of the System's collusion with the international community to 'dispose of France and her riches.'⁹ In March, 1955, *Fraternité française*, the UDCA's print publication proclaimed that the

⁷ Ibid. pp. 381-95

⁸ Sean Fitzgerald, "The Anti-Modern Rhetoric of Le Mouvement Poujade," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1970), pp. 167-8, 188

⁹ Ibid. pp. 171-3

world which the System sought to create was one where ‘[the machine was god] and production the religion. The soul, the sentiments, tradition, [and] Man will simply matter no more.’¹⁰

In *Petits Bourgeois en Révolte?*, Dominique Borne provides an historical analysis similar to Hoffmann’s in both structure and conclusion. What differs, however, is the amount of time elapsed since the Poujadists were active and the perspective offered by its 1977 publication allows Borne to consider Poujadism in the additional contexts of the Algerian War and the rise of de Gaulle, both of which helped bring about UDCA’s rapid descent into obscurity. Borne’s account concludes with an attempt to locate Le Mouvement Poujade within some ideological continuum, whether among the far-right antiparliamentary leagues of the interwar period, the current of French radicalism or reactionism, or among fascist and neo-fascist movements. With aspects of all above ideologies discernible within Poujadism, Borne selects neither.¹¹

James Shields’ “The Poujadist Movement: a Faux ‘Fascism,” is the only academic inquiry to address directly the question of whether Le Mouvement Poujade was indeed a fascist program. Shields outlines the movement’s history and its ideological transition from an economic protest to a political party whose national agenda ranged from combating a corrupt system, to the reassertion of the importance of traditional French values, to a wholehearted commitment to all that *Algérie française* stood for.¹² The shift from economic activism to political campaigning brought about the exodus of communists who had joined the UDCA (*Union de défense des commerçants et artisans*) in large numbers in its early days. Once free of its ideologically incompatible Communist associates, “Poujadism began to serve as a magnet for

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Dominique Borne, *Petits Bourgeois en Révolte?: Le Mouvement Poujade*, (Flammarion: Paris, 1977), pp. 181-99

¹² James G. Shields, “The Poujadist Movement: a Faux ‘Fascism,” *Modern & Contemporary France*, Vol. 8, Is. 1 (2000), p. 19

ex-Vichyites, neo-fascists, and ultra-nationalists wishing to destabilize the regime and keen to exploit the “fascist tendencies” of Poujade’s movement.”¹³

Within the party’s ideology Shields sees further evidence of tendencies that could potentially strengthen the case of those seeking to brand the movement as fascist. Heightened nationalism, exemplified by the Poujadists’ staunch opposition to decolonization, serves as one piece of such evidence. Moreover, Poujade’s references to Maurice Barrès’ romantic anti-intellectualism and Maurras’ distinction between a “real” national community and the artificial state structure imposed thereupon suggest that the movement can be placed within the continuity of the French radical Right. Shields also discusses Poujade’s Anti-Semitism at length, this trait serves as a further connection between Poujade and the anti-Dreyfusard Right as attacks on Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France often paid little attention to his leftist political alignment and focused rather on his Jewish identity.¹⁴

In the end, having demonstrated Poujade’s sympathetic view of French democratic traditions and his purge of the most radical Right-wing members of the party, Shields, much like Hoffman before him, arrives at the conclusion that Poujadism was “too Girondist to accommodate any sympathy for a totalitarian state” and that it was not fascist “in the sense of combining nationalism with socialist economic principles.” Poujadism was internally contradictory, attempting to bridge the gap between two distinct currents in traditional French politics, revolutionary republicanism and conservative nationalism. Shields is therefore inclined to echo Maurice Bardèche—an author who would have presumably known the subject well as

¹³ Ibid. p. 28

¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 24-6

his 1961 book opens with the words “*Je suis un écrivain fasciste*”—in dubbing Poujadism a “faux fascism.”¹⁵

James Shields revisited the topic in 2004, shortly after the movement celebrated its semicentennial. In “An Enigma Still, Poujadism Fifty Years On,” the historian is less concerned with the accusations of fascism of the 1950s than he is with later academic applications of such a label and with his own attempt to classify the movement within some political framework, be it right wing, extreme-right, or right wing populist. Unable to locate the movement definitively within Jacobinism or “classic xenophobe anti-parliamentarism (of the left or right)”, Jean Touchard and Pierre Milza both argued that, if Poujadism wasn’t fascist, it was at least potentially fascist. Shields maintains that such a suggestion overlooks three objections: Poujadism lacked a clear ideological doctrine, it defended “a backward-looking status quo,” while its audience was largely apolitical and held an attitude that was ‘at its core one of indifference, suspicion or hostility’ toward the state and politics.¹⁶ The argument that Poujadism lacked a level of ideological conviction necessitated by fascism (also used by Shields to push against Seymour Martin Lipset’s assertion that the UDCA’s ‘ideology was like that of the Nazis’) again echoes Bardèche who saw its doctrinal roots in democratic-Marxist civic activism and not in the fascist political projects of the interwar years.¹⁷ ‘*Nous sommes inclassables*’ was Poujade’s assessment of his movement’s location on the political spectrum; Shields tends to agree, writing that the movement was a “classically contradictory” populism. The UDCA’s fiftieth anniversary commemoration in Saint-Céré was a perfect illustration of this populist inclination as trade unionists shared a room with business owners while paramilitary activists of

¹⁵ Ibid. pp. 28-31

¹⁶ James G. Shields, “An Enigma Still, Poujadism Fifty Years On,” *French Politics, Culture & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 1, (Spring 2004), p. 42

¹⁷ Ibid. pp. 41-4

the *Organisation de l'armée secrète* and *Front National* politicians (Jean-Marie Le Pen, notably, was not invited) mingled with former Gaullist deputies.¹⁸

The purpose of this paper will not be to reexamine the philosophy of Poujadism for the purpose of definitively establishing whether the accusations of fascism leveled against Le Mouvement Poujade were indeed valid. Its goal shall instead be to examine both the movement and the accusations leveled against it at the time in their historical context in order to determine how the use of the concept of fascism was influenced by the realities of the 1950s. Although, as historians have suggested, some charges of fascism directed against the UDCA and the Poujadists were factually grounded, I contend that there was also an entirely baseless category of such accusations. Because academic inquiry into its nature was yet to develop as a subfield of history and social sciences, fascism in the context of the 1950s was an idea even more nebulous than it is today; this consideration combined with the *résistancialist* anti-fascist ideological foundation of the Fourth Republic's marginalized parliamentary extremes to create a setting where fascism was more of a malleable tool of political discourse than a representation of a real set of political beliefs.

My analysis will consist of three parts. The first section will present the social, economic, and cultural circumstances that helped bring about the rise of the UDCA. Additionally, this section will provide a basic biographical sketch of Pierre Poujade and will examine the characteristics of the movement at a time when it garnered neither widespread media attention nor political opposition. This corresponds roughly to the period between the summer of 1953 and the early spring of 1955 when Poujadism began to evolve into a political program with national ambitions. Poujade wrote two autobiographies, *J'ai choisi le combat* (1955) and *A l'heure de la colère* (1977). In writing this chapter I will rely heavily on the latter and will contextualize its

¹⁸ Ibid. pp. 51-2

accounts vis-à-vis histories both of the movement and the Fourth Republic. Because it functions as an outline of the ideological considerations of what I will refer to as political Poujadism, Poujade's earlier work will figure more prominently in the second chapter. *J'ai choisi le combat* will be supplemented with newspaper accounts from the two French papers of record, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, as well as the Communist *l'Humanité* where available. This second section will analyze Poujadism during 1955, between the February rally at Vel' d'Hiv and the election of January 2, 1956, as it was during this period that the Poujadists attempted to enter national politics and general criticisms as well as accusations of fascism grounded in their ideology, membership, and tactics emerged. Finally, the third section will introduce the Résistance Myth and propose that in the context of the Fourth Republic, it was this continued recourse to the Resistance that accounted for the anti-fascism which informed the use of the word fascist as a general term of abuse.

Newspapers form the majority of primary sources on which this thesis will rely. Considering that papers have well-established political leanings—if not levels of open partisan affiliation—there is always present a certain amount of partiality that one has to be aware of. Although by sheer volume, there is a rather large amount of information on Poujade and on accusations of fascism available in *Le Monde* alone, the right-leaning *Le Figaro* was selected to provide a degree of balance. While newspaper bias is generally not stated forthrightly, it is more obvious than in autobiographical works. Because two such books will be utilized in this paper, a discussion of their potential bias is in order. As is corroborated by the fact that historians have used it sparingly, the narrative portion of *J'ai choisi le combat* is not of great value as it deals predominantly with the campaigning of the early UDCA. More important for this paper's purposes is the collection of articles and open letters that comprises its second half. *A l'heure de*

la colère, Poujade's second book provides useful information on the early life of the UDCA president but in its treatment of the movement it, at times, verges on being autohagiographical; this might lead one to question the utility of such a work and of autobiographies in general within historical research. Like Poujadism itself, the book should be regarded as a response to its time. Where the revolt at Saint-Céré was a protest against the economic crisis facing the 1950s *commerçant*, the 1977 book was part of an attempt by Poujade to end his *traversée du desert* and reenter the French political stage in the aftermath of the economic crisis that accompanied the end of the prolonged postwar boom. The book's final chapters are especially valuable when it comes to identifying a motive for its publication. After blaming the loss of Algeria on the government's indecisiveness and on the officers' misplaced political ambition, Poujade goes on to declare that he had shared the communists' opposition to de Gaulle's constitutional referendum. What is notably missing from the account of the period between 1958 and the epilogue's concluding declaration that "the clock has again struck the hour of rage," are the events of May 1968, together with the reassertion of his opposition to the Fifth Republic, this can be interpreted as Poujade's declaration of his openness to lead once again an anti-establishment popular movement.¹⁹

When analyzing an autobiographical document such as *A l'heure de la colère*, it is crucial to keep in mind that intentional distortion of facts is certainly a possibility. An autobiography or memoir is therefore a unique literary genre that straddles the gap between what can conventionally be considered primary and secondary sources, it is history interpreted by one of its actors. *A l'heure de la colère* is an insight into how Poujade, in the specific context of the 1970s, would have liked the historian to view his life and his movement. Whether Poujade and his fellow sympathizers of General Franco took time off from school to fight "co-cos" in

¹⁹ Ibid. pp. 207-51

Aurillac is as important as the fact that, forty years on, Poujade believed such a narrative to be important in forming his own and the UDCA's political identity. A.J.P. Taylor famously remarked that "written memoirs are a form of oral history set down to mislead historians."²⁰ Though this is true, if potential instances and sources of bias or even outright manufacture of storylines are determined, an autobiographical work is not "useless except for atmosphere."²¹ The use of Poujade's book is also necessary beyond the biographical background in order to provide an account of Poujadism's early days because the only newspaper to devote any attention to it before the fall of 1954 was *La Dépêche du Midi*, a Toulouse-based publication evidently not accessible even to the two major histories of the movement, Stanley Hoffmann's *Le Mouvement Poujade*, published in 1956, and Dominique Borne's 1977 *Petits Bourgeois en Révolte?*.

²⁰ Cited in Paul Thompson, *Voice of the Past: Oral History*, (Oxford University Press: New York, 2000), p. 94

²¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER I—*Petit Poujade*

Son of an architect and active member of Action française, Pierre Poujade was born in Saint-Céré in 1920. His political activism began not long thereafter. *A l'heure de la colère* traces Poujade's dissatisfaction with the rigid right-left divide to a single day in 1936 when, while loosely associated with Jacques Doriot's Parti Populaire Française, at age fifteen, he observed that,

[political divisions] are absurd: I have communist friends, some of whom would consider me to be their friend. The difference between us is miniscule. It is however in the name of this difference that we try to kill one another. It was at that moment that I laid the framework for 'Poujadism'.¹

Earlier in 1936, Poujade had received his initiation into the world of politics as he and his fellow supporters of Francisco Franco on one side and French backers of Republican Spain on the other would go to the movie theatre in the nearby town of Aurillac to turn it into a battlefield of the Spanish Civil War. It was there that Poujade was for the first time referred to as a "fascist" to which he and his compatriots would respond with cries of "co-cos"; oftentimes brawls would ensue.²

As Poujade entered adulthood he worked in Carcassonne in the overland shipping industry, an episode which physically "made him a man [...] equipped to do great things, but where," he wondered, "had gone the crusading atmosphere of 1936 which so animated [him]?"³ Then, when he was twenty, war broke out and shortly before France capitulated in June, 1940, Poujade attempted to enter a regiment of irregulars to "fire off some of the campaign's last cartridges," but instead of ammunition the colonel at Cahors offered him a despondent piece of

¹ Poujade, *A l'heure*, p. 43-4

² Ibid. p. 36

³ Ibid. p. 46

advice: “*rentrez chez vous. C’est fini.*” “Paul Reynaud’s [June 6] speech and candles at Notre-Dame all proved useless in stopping Panzers,” writes Poujade, “Pétain spared us the worst.” It was *le Maréchal* to whom the future UDCA leader would give his service until November 11, 1942. After a brief period of training, the twenty year old Poujade became leader (in his estimates the youngest) of a rural company of Compagnons de France, the official youth organization of the Vichy Regime, seen by Pétain as the prospective “avant-garde of the National Revolution.” As Robert Paxton notes, there were according to German intelligence only 8,000 Compagnons, far short of the intended 25,000. Aiming to save youths of fifteen to twenty years of age from unemployment and political opposition, rural companies of Compagnons put young men to work on farms while their urban counterparts served to “unite all social classes.”⁴ Both the Compagnons and the larger Chantiers de la jeunesse française (French Youth Projects) accomplished little in the way of youth indoctrination as “a good amount of time was spent producing a desperately needed substitute fuel, charcoal.”⁵ It was in fact to charcoal production, *charbonisation*, that Poujade’s company was assigned near Figeac in his native Lot. So successful was his company that after *La Dépêche du Midi* devoted ten pages—of what Poujade was proud to dismiss as propaganda—to praising the company’s productivity it became to the Massif Central what Stakhanov was to the Urals, travelling the region’s villages to help farmers during the day and to put on theatrical performances in the evenings. Believing that the goal of Vichy youth organizations and the Vichy state in general was in fact to rebuild France and her society so that at some point down the road they could militarily throw off the German yoke,

⁴ Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*, (Columbia University Press: New York, 1982), pp. 161-2, 3.

⁵ Ibid. Paxton argues that a degree of indoctrination was indeed the goal of Vichy youth organizations as its senior leadership positions were often staffed with active members of the anti-parliamentary Right like, for instance, Jean Ybarnegaray, Pétain’s first Youth Minister, who in the 1930s actively participated in the La Rocque’s Croix de Feu and Parti Social Français.

Poujade's guiding principle was, according to his later autobiography, "*pour le Maréchal—contre les Nazis.*"

In a 1950 statement that sparked a national controversy, Gilbert Renault—known to his fellow members of the French Forces of the Interior as Colonel Rémy—proclaimed that "the France of June 1940 needed both Marshal Pétain and General de Gaulle."⁶ Poujade, or at least the Poujade of 1977, would have disagreed. The Résistance so closely associated with the person of Charles de Gaulle plays a rather negligible role in his discussions of the war. Moreover, all resistance groups are categorized as communist:

The Résistance existed [in Lot] too: in the rare instances that the *maquisards* actually took on the Germans militarily (like in the Vercors), the rare times when 'Résistance' confronted regular enemy troops instead of plunging bullets in the back of the nearest bourgeois simply because he was an anticommunist, only in these rare instances were these guerillas not simple bandits.⁷

For Poujade at least, support for the Marshal was the only course of action a self-described patriotic Frenchman fortunate enough to reside in the Free Zone could take. "True resistance" was not an option because, according to Poujade, it hardly existed. Nonetheless, when the Germans and Italians jointly occupied all of Vichy France beginning in November of 1942, the successful Compagnon leader crossed the Pyrenees. The trek was supposedly made unnecessarily difficult because Poujade refused to pay a guide who "called himself a patriot but sought compensation for his patriotism."⁸

After internment in Franco's Spain, Poujade made his way to Algiers which thanks to the success of Operation Torch was under Anglo-American occupation and had, alongside London, become one of the two capitals of the Free French organization. In part thanks to an illness

⁶ *Le Carrefour*, April 11, 1950. Cited in Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1990), p. 33

⁷ Poujade, *A l'heure* p. 57

⁸ Ibid. pp, 61-5

prevented him from actively supporting the Royal Air Force which he had joined shortly after arrival, Poujade met Yvette Seva, a daughter of a *Pied-Noir* family, whom he would marry in 1944. Though Yvette had been baptized a Catholic, her father was a supporter of the French Communist Party. Her marriage to Poujade thus became, in the judgment of historian Dominique Borne “an early example of Pierre’s affinity for political syncretism.”⁹ Such an assessment may be ascribing too much to the couple’s union, but Poujade’s new family connections might well have provided him with the affinity for colonial control of Algeria that in a decade later would be central to the Poujadist espousal of the ideas of “*Algérie française*,”

When World War II ended Pierre, Yvette, and their two young children returned to Saint-Céré. Poujade then bought the 70 square-foot boutique which in less than a decade’s time would be the birthplace of his movement. “Every patriot,” writes Poujade, “whether he was a Gaullist from the beginning or loyal to the Marshal, whether he confronted the enemy in the sands of the desert or in the skies over England, in Tunisia, in Italy, or in German prison camps, whether he fled our county immediately or—like my friends and I—prepared *le revanche* on the home front, had ‘his own’ idea of [postwar] France.” Despite his acknowledgement that France was a “complex, contradictory, and perpetually divided society,” Poujade’s “idea” was that of national unity. However, just as they had done in 1918, politicians stole the victory from France’s soldiers and appropriated it for their own purposes. It was therefore with rage that Poujade responded to an article in *Le Patriote*, southwestern France’s communist-leaning Resistance newspaper, which he believed “insinuated” that low ranking Vichy activists including leaders of Les Compagnons were guilty of collaboration.¹⁰ As the newspaper’s “attacks” ceased, Poujade’s

⁹ Borne, *Petits Bourgeois en Revolte*, pp. 14-5. This being southwestern France is particularly notable as Henry Roussio mentions that the activity of the communist party in that region shortly following the war gave rise to rumors of “red soviets” making political threats, *Vichy Syndrome*, p. 21.

¹⁰ Poujade, *A l’heure*

anger with the postwar political order persisted; foremost offender was the PCF, which began to brand itself the “party of 75,000 *fusillés*” in reference to the number of communists killed by the German occupiers. For Poujade, however, the Communist résistants were not heroes but thugs and vigilantes, responsible for the anarchy that plagued 1945. This “anarchy” is undoubtedly a reference to the purge of collaborators known as *épuration*, which in its early stages amounted to a wave of summary executions in an atmosphere of general anger. Especially common in the southern départements that had comprised the Free Zone, the wave of violence encompassed not only executions but also the shaving of women’s heads should they have been compromised with the enemy and the painting of swastikas on the houses of alleged collaborators.¹¹ The “unofficial” stage of *épuration* was quickly reined in by the Liberation government which, Jean-Pierre Rieux argues, could have also inflated the numbers of people summarily executed, exaggerating the extent of the chaos and thus convincing the population to acquiesce to the new leadership.¹² In his account of the immediate postwar period, however, Poujade suggests that the extrajudicial purges were not just a product of communism run amok (as early Cold War propaganda interpretations would have it), but stemmed also from the weakness of the Provisional Government.¹³ Poujade’s concern with the feebleness of the postwar French state is hence evident even before the formation of the Fourth Republic.

“I have a way of ‘feeling’ my country and my country was not doing well,” wrote Poujade in his 1977 autobiography. Reflecting on the events of twenty years earlier he noted that “the French empire was falling apart”: this was evident in Indochina where a full-scale war was raging, in Algeria, which was a powder keg waiting to explode, and in the French protectorate of

¹¹ Jean-Pierre Rieux, *The Fourth Republic: 1944-1958*, (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1987), pp. 29-32

¹² Ibid. The example given is that of a figure provide by Taxier, the minister of the interior, who estimated the number of killed at over 100,000 without subtracting the number of people killed by the Germans and the Vichy *milice*.

¹³ Poujade, *A l’heure*, pp. 86-7

Morocco, one of Poujade's wartime homes, where king Mohammad V had just been deposed. Perhaps even more alarming, "France too was breaking."¹⁴ It was, however, only hindsight that allowed Poujade to portray the foundation of his movement as a response to the many crises of postwar France. Though the movement would go on to embrace the struggle to save France and the "French empire," it began more modestly, as a protest against the perceived excesses of the Fourth Republic's domestic fiscal policy and more broadly against the socioeconomic conditions facing France's lower middle class.

One July evening in 1953, having finished his day's work at around 10 p.m., Pierre Poujade locked the doors of his book store and was engaged in a street side discussion with his fellow storeowners on the rue de la République when his "*collègue de gauche*," a man named Frégeac, an active local communist, jumped off his bike with a terrified expression on his face. Addressing Poujade as *monsieur*, which the former took as an affirmation of the distance between their political leanings, Frégeac displayed a government letter announcing an upcoming audit, *contrôle*, of his shoe store.¹⁵ *Contrôles* were a dreaded aspect of the postwar French tax system, instituted to combat widespread tax evasion which had made of France a "land of excessive taxation fortunately tempered by fraud." Opposition to taxation in the decades preceding the Second World War had in fact been so widespread that it reputedly made it impossible for the state to balance its budget.¹⁶ As the postwar government adopted an archaic tax system that made the café owner subject to fifteen different tax statutes while the garage owner had to deal with twelve, tax evasion continued. According to a 1950 study, as many as 80 percent of small shopkeepers were engaged in some form of tax fraud, and this figure would not

¹⁴ Pierre Poujade, *A l'heure de la colère*, (Albin Michel: Paris, 1977), pp. 96-7.

¹⁵ Ibid. pp. 100-101

¹⁶ Roger Eatwell, "Poujadism and Neo-Poujadism: From Revolt to Reconciliation," ed. Philip Cerney, *Social Movements and Protest in France*, (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1982), pp. 70-5

have included such dubious-but-legal practices as paying taxes a year after their due date so as to take advantage of high rates of inflation. Though evasion was certainly prevalent, writes Roger Eatwell, the popular impression (which he argues permeated into academic circles) that shopkeepers were “men of money who paid few taxes” was not entirely correct, for the tax system which the *commerçant* had to navigate was excessively convoluted making accurate assessments of liability problematic. Not only was the tax system complicated and simply difficult to follow, but the controllers sent from Paris to enforce it were just that: controllers from Paris, officials who “had little understanding of the small, rural shopkeeper, a man who lived out the ideal of the self-sufficient economic man rather than the profit-maximizing entrepreneur.”¹⁷

According to Poujade, the audits were an inevitable consequence of a “weak state” because in such a state “the men who pretend to govern” have to resort to tyranny, in this case, the tyranny was fiscal. “With spite and malicious pleasure,” he continues, “the state looked for money where it could not possibly find it: among the shopkeepers and artisans.”¹⁸ While it may be rather difficult to assess how much enjoyment government controllers extracted from their audits of small-businessmen, it is true that the 1950s brought about a gradual decrease in the economic wellbeing of minor proprietors. In an analysis of the economic causes of the rise of Le Mouvement Poujade, Dominique Borne presents the deteriorating circumstances someone like *le petit papetier de Saint-Céré* would have faced as Europe entered the second postwar decade. In 1950, there were in France nineteen small commercial establishments per 1,000 inhabitants, in West Germany and Great Britain there were only twelve.¹⁹ Small businesses had in fact increased in number in the immediate aftermath of the war as general shortages fostered artificially large profit margins. Coupled with steady increases in prices independent of inflation,

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Poujade, *A l'heure*, pp. 98-9

¹⁹ Borne, *Petits Bourgeois en Révolte?* pp. 46-57

shortages allowed some *commerçants* to amass considerable wealth which in turn brought about accusations of black market profiteering. Hence a “largely unfavorable public image of the profession” was in place by the early 1950s. In the 1950s, however, the retail market share held by chain stores steadily increased from under ten percent in 1950 to over thirteen by 1958, the number of various small shops decreased commensurately. Around 20,000 (6%) grocers left their trade federation in the interval, the decrease was even more dramatic among bakers (10,000—32%) and café owners (49,000—26%).²⁰

To the shopkeeper, the small shop was not just a source of livelihood but also an inherently French institution, an aspect of culture with which the supermarket or chain store (generally identified as “American” with no real consideration of its actual ownership) could simply not be reconciled. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War anti-Americanism was primarily associated with the French Communist Party (PCF) and more generally with the anti-capitalist left. This sentiment would reach its apex in 1952 with communist-led demonstrations against the visit of General Matthew Ridgeway and the subsequent *affaire des pigeons*, an episode which resulted in the arrest of Communist leader Jacques Duclos, in the trunk of whose car a crate of pigeons allegedly used to communicate with Moscow had been found. Though the affair—rather surprisingly—discredited the Communists and not the Pinay cabinet,²¹ anti-American sentiment remained, and it was not solely an attitude of the working class and their representatives but also that of the middle class artisans and shopkeepers who constituted the core of Poujade’s supporters. The *coq gaulois* of the UDCA emblem might have faced off against the American eagle, as Rod Kedward puts it, but it should be stressed that when Poujade spoke of France becoming the laughing stock of the entire world

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Rod Kedward, *La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900*, (Allen Lane: New York, 2005), pp. 376-7

and “[finding] herself at the total mercy of Anglo-Saxon imperialism,”²² he was playing on an attitude already well-established among his movement’s supporters.

Anti-Americanism among the French can be traced as far back as the July Monarchy when egalitarian ideas of European proto-socialism were first regarded as antithetical to American individualism. The sentiment would subsequently be adopted by elements of the reactionary right opposed to the increased American influence that accompanied the industrial boom of the Gilded Age. Following the Wall Street crash of 1929 there would emerge references to *le cancer américain*.²³ In a 1952 article on French anti-Americanism, Arnold Rose cited a series of public opinion polls according to which 50 percent of respondents from all walks of life no longer saw France as an independent nation in terms of foreign affairs while only 25 percent saw Marshall Plan aid as a “good thing.”²⁴ In addition to a degree of latent pro-Russian (though not necessarily pro-Soviet) sentiment, Rose points to the inherent conservatism and traditionalism of the entirety of France’s non-communist political spectrum as a cause of opposition to American influence and the country’s industrial backwardness alike.²⁵ Accounts of this conservatism, asserts Rose, can most notably be found in Marc Bloch’s *Strange Defeat* wherein the historian and *résistant* argues that ideas of agrarian utopianism and denunciations of progress predated the defeat and the Vichy state.²⁶

The decline in the number of small shopkeepers was not only a function of their inability to compete with larger merchants, but resulted also—specifically in rural regions—from the country’s rapid and profound modernization. A crucial aspect of France’s postwar recovery and

²² *Fraternité Française*, April 19, 1958, cited in Sean Fitzgerald, “The Anti-Modern Rhetoric of Le Mouvement Poujade,” *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1970)

²³ Michel Winock, *Nationalisme, antisémitisme, et fascisme en France*, (Seuil: Paris, 1982), pp. 47-79

²⁴ Arnold M. Rose, “Anti-Americanism in France,” *The Antioch Review*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter, 1952), p. 471

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 481

²⁶ *Ibid.*

the subsequent period of economic growth was a quick return to prewar agricultural outputs which would then go on to double over the Fourth Republic's brief period of existence. By mechanizing farms and through an effort, albeit slow, to bring together small plots of land, yields of French farmland caught up with those of the rest of Western Europe almost immediately after liberation. Every year beginning in 1950 one percent of the French population would leave the agricultural workforce, and as Jean-Pierre Rieux writes, this development "indirectly helped progress elsewhere in the economy."²⁷ While those who remained in the agricultural sector became comparatively better off, the converse was quite predictably the fate of other sectors of the rural economy. As erstwhile peasants moved to cities and towns, rural shopkeepers lost their sources of revenue to depopulation; it was among these comparative losers of modernization and industrialization that Poujade would find a base of supporters. Stanley Hoffmann's *Le Mouvement Poujade* corroborates this with a chart showing that of Poujade's first twelve "conquered" départements all but two experienced a decline in population ranging from -2.6 percent in Dordogne to -9 percent in Lozère.²⁸ What should be noted here is that early Poujadist protests were strictly a reaction to the economic conditions facing the rural lower middle class of the Fourth Republic; they were not part of a grand political project. France in the 1950s was a state where despite the return to power of liberal politicians and the re-emergence of strong capitalist tendencies, the state pursued a strongly interventionist economic policy.²⁹ It was only in 1955 that the Poujadists began to focus their attacks on specific politicians (most notably Pierre Mendès-France) under the slogan of *sortez les sortants*. The early Union de défense des commerçants et artisans defended its members against the disembodied concept of fiscal oppression.

²⁷ Rieux, *The Fourth Republic*, pp. 317-20

²⁸ Stanley Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, (Librarie Armand Colin: Paris, 1956), p. 12

²⁹ Rieux, *The Fourth Republic*, pp. 336-43

On October 19, 1953 after the initial success of the movement in bringing about an end to audits across Lot, the protesters, not known as the UDCA or even Poujadists quite yet, held their first major party meeting in Gramat, a town five miles southwest of Saint-Céré. The main accomplishment of the conference was its adoption of an eight point platform. The first point called for equal taxation of all shopkeepers and artisans while point two demanded that small shopkeepers' tax dues be equal to those of stores with multiple branches because, "while *commerçants* have to buy a license to sell a product, large stores do not pay more than the value of two of these licenses to sell several dozen of an article;" equal taxation was also called for *vis-à-vis* cooperatives, especially those in part supported by the state. Third on the platform was a call for a single tax base, a simplification of the tax code would curb fraud, the document argues, while at the same time reducing paperwork and the need for audits; a tax allowance of 360,000 francs was also to be granted to "all qualified shopkeepers." Next came a call for a complete end to all fiscal controls and for immediate tax amnesty, and finally a demand for equal rights and responsibilities with regard to social security and more broadly "the development of a system founded on the equality of all Frenchmen."³⁰ The demands of the Gramat congress were related strictly to the economy and almost exclusively to fiscal concerns while it also called for a second assembly to take place in Cahors in late November in order to officially constitute a political movement.

November 29, 1953 marked the official beginning of operation of *Union des commerçants et des artisans du Lot*. It was at Cahors that Poujade was elected to lead the movement in what was notably not a unanimous decision: some of the older members of the *Union* deemed the stationer too young, too inexperienced, and lacking the proper manners

³⁰ "Annexe I" in Stanley Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, p. 53

necessary to negotiate with the upper echelons of French politics.³¹ The Cahors Municipal Theatre was the site of what Poujade casts as the most important decision in the movement's short history, the creation of a newspaper which was initially met with fierce opposition as it required all members to pay a single 300 francs due. With the motion adopted, the newly-appointed president proceeded cry "*à la préfecture!*" Requesting that the prefect of Cahors recognize and register the movement was a *pro forma* action that in Poujade's judgment was to place the movement within a continuity of spontaneous revolutionary manifestations which always "demanded the approval of the prefect."³² When a clerk informed the crowd that the government official was busy, Poujade climbed a scaffolding that surrounded the tower of the Cahors Cathedral and proceeded to shout the Union's policies directly into the window of the official's house. With the theatre located almost exactly between the Prefecture du Lot and the Cathedral, the group of 300 delegates who attended the assembly would have marched back and forth down Léon Gambetta Boulevard, the town's main artery, and together with the large police presence undoubtedly provided quite a curiosity on a quiet Sunday afternoon. If later criticism of Poujade was well-grounded and the movement was in fact classifiable as part of the extreme right, it seems highly ironic that such a movement would have been founded in the birthplace of- and on a street named after Gambetta, one of the founders of the Third Republic, a political entity whose perceived decadence drew critics from across the right for seventy years.

Cahors was not only the legal birthplace of the Poujadist movement but also the site of the first noted dissent in its ranks as Hoffmann cites a speech given by a Saint-Céré pharmacist named Dafour, one of the most active participants in the protests of the preceding summer, who invoked the fable of a jay dressed in a peacock's plumage and warned the assembly that Poujade

³¹ Borne, *Petits Bourgeois*, pp. 28-9; Poujade, *A l'heure*, pp. 115-7

³² Poujade, *A l'heure*, pp.119-20

would take the shopkeepers further than any of them would ever want to go.³³ Rare instances of dissent notwithstanding, the remainder of 1953 and the beginning of 1954 were a time of uninterrupted success for Poujade and his movement. Two weeks after Christmas of 1953 the elections to chambers of commerce across Lot marked the first electoral successes of the Poujadist movement. The four-man list headed by Pierre Poujade received 60% of the vote in Cahors: “the four musketeers crushed their spineless adversaries.” A week later the fifth and final seat was up for election and a personal friend of Poujade named Vert defeated his incumbent opponent, receiving 80% of the vote and leading the party leader to proclaim that, “[t]he impossible had been realized, the shopkeepers were unleashed and took down the mandarins.”³⁴ The tactics used by the Poujadists (and in particular their leader) were called into question in the aftermath of the election when the president of the Lot Chamber of Commerce Roger Estival accused Poujade of using the discontent of the middle class for personal gains while at the same time showing no restraint in appealing to communists for support.³⁵ Poujade is forthright about his cooperation with PCF members in the movement’s early days, writing that it was during this period that “the Cossacks,” as he referred to them, taught him the strategies he would go on to use in his fight against international trusts.³⁶ Between January and early May Poujade travelled between the departments adjacent to Lot, setting up provisional bureaus that local activists would then turn into unions which in policy and structure resembled that established in Cahors: under the direction of Francis Bos in Aurillac the *Union du Cantal* was constituted in early April, Aveyron followed days later. It was perhaps in Poujade’s hands-on

³³ Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, pp. 46-8

³⁴ Poujade, *A l'heure.*, pp. 120-1

³⁵ Borne, *Petits Bourgeois*, pp. 28-31

³⁶ Pierre Poujade, *J'ai choisi le combat*, (Saint-Céré: Société Générale des Editions et des Publications, 1955) pp. 72-3

approach to expansion and the lack of regional autonomy that early accusations of an authoritarian party structure were grounded.

The movement's expansion across the southwest of France went largely unnoticed from the point of view of large national newspapers, until, that is, it moved northward into Corrèze. After giving speeches in small towns along the southern boundary of the department Pujade travelled to Allasac, a town of close to 4,000 inhabitants, where 400 shopkeepers and artisans took to the streets to protest against fiscal excesses (*contrôles* began in the region in early 1954). Three days later, on April 24, Pujade made his way to Brive, a town of close to 34,000, by far the most populous in the department and the biggest to hold a Pujadist rally until that point. Concerned with the possible spread of anti-tax protests to the city, the Brive Chamber of Commerce requested that the French National Assembly "study the problems facing small business owners."³⁷ No large rally materialized as only 300 people from northern Corrèze were in attendance.³⁸ Pujade suggests that the movement grew rapidly in the early parts of 1954 because France was surpassing all imaginable limits of national humiliation as the situation in Southeast Asia—and at Dien Bien Phu in particular—was unraveling.³⁹ However true this assertion may be, the failure of the Brive rally suggests otherwise. In towns similar in size to his native Saint-Céré, Pujade's speeches attracted a class of shopkeepers disenchanted with- and disaffected by the Fourth Republic's rapid modernization; places like Brive or Tulle (which Pujade visited in early May) were, by contrast, in almost the opposite situation in terms of postwar economic developments. Between the end of World War II and 1954 the population of Brive increased by 7.7% while the period between 1954 and 1962 saw an 11.4% population

³⁷ *Le Monde*, April 26, 1954. Concerning dates in *Le Monde* citations: the newspaper is published daily at midday and the issue is assigned the following day's date, the above article, for example, would have been published at midday on Sunday, April 25.

³⁸ Borne, *Les Petits Bourgeois*, p. 32

³⁹ Pujade, *A l'heure*, p. 124

increase (2.4% and 3.4% above the French average, respectively).⁴⁰ Saint-Céré, meanwhile, had a population that has fluctuated between 3,500 and 4,000 since the 18th century when statistics were first kept.⁴¹ The early UDCA platform addressed almost exclusively a set of issues that affected only a particular demographic within the larger economic category of rural France's *commerçants*.

Disappointment in Brive did not derail Poujade's plans as a Corrèze branch of the UDCA was established in May; furthermore, the chambers of commerce in larger towns, responding to pressure exerted from the countryside, recognized Poujadist economic goals.⁴² Most of southern France was incorporated into the movement's structures by the summer; Île-de-France was now the target, "it was time [Paris] finally knew who we were and what we wanted," wrote the leader; July 5 was scheduled as the date when regional representatives of the movement were to descend on the French capital. Reporters from *Le Figaro*, *France-Soir*, and *Paris-Match* would call Poujade and ask where the meeting would be held; tired of responding with "well, nothing is set yet," he finally replied with "I am a peasant, I don't know Paris." To this one reporter then suggested that the conference center of Maison de la Mutualité might be the right venue as it held 2000 people. "We had 2000 at Cahors last November!" laughed Poujade. The next suggestion was the concert hall of Salle Wagram, which could comfortably hold 6000 attendees; it too was deemed too small as "there were 8000 at Rodez." The reporter then proposed the Vélodrome d'Hiver, an indoor racetrack—infamous as the site of France's biggest roundup of Jews in the Second World War—that could accommodate around 20,000 people, "*Voilà, ce qu'il me faut!*" replied Poujade.⁴³ The attendance figures at Cahors and Rodez are not corroborated by

⁴⁰ "Brive-la-Gaillarde," <http://cassini.ehess.fr>

⁴¹ "Saint-Céré," <http://cassini.ehess.fr>

⁴² Borne, *Les Petits Bourgeois*, p. 35

⁴³ Poujade, *A l'heure*, pp. 130-5

either Hoffmann or Borne, but that is of rather minor importance, what matters is that while writing his biography two decades later Poujade sought to portray the selection of Vel' d'Hiv as purely incidental or even not entirely his own. In addition to the 1954 meeting, the Poujadists would hold two more rallies at the velodrome, one in February, 1955 and one in October, 1957, of which the former would attract the most widespread condemnation.

Was Poujade unaware of Vel' d'Hiv's infamous reputation or did he agree to the site knowing full well its role in the Holocaust? On July 16 and 17, 1942 over 13,000 Parisian Jews and Jewish exiles from Eastern Europe were arrested and brought to the track where they were held for a week with almost no food or water and no sanitation. The prisoners were subsequently moved to Drancy and other French concentration camps from where in August all but 4,000 children were sent to Auschwitz.⁴⁴ Operation Spring Breeze, as the action was codenamed, was notable not only because it marked the beginning of the Final Solution in occupied France but also because its SS orchestrators relied on the active participation of thousands of French police officers and the French public which notably included upwards of three hundred young men wearing blue shirts and armbands bearing the initials of Jacques Doirot's *Parti populaire française* (of which Pierre Poujade was briefly a member).

Earlier in the war, shortly after France's alliance with Poland necessitated a declaration of war against Germany, the velodrome served as an assembly point for interned German nationals, most of whom, according to Michael Marrus, were Jewish refugees. Earlier still, in July of 1937, the track was the site of a large anti-Semitic demonstration that broke out when Charles Maurras, leader and ideological architect of the anti-parliamentary *Action française*, was released from prison to which he had been sent for making death threats directed at Prime Minister Léon Blum. In attendance were the future Vichy commissioners-general for Jewish affairs, Xavier Vallat and

⁴⁴ Susan Zuccotti, *The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews*, (Basic Books: New York, 1993), pp 104-17

Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, as well as Pétain's propaganda minister, Philippe Henriot.⁴⁵ Though a distinction between French anti-Semitism rooted in Catholicism and nationalism and Nazi, racial, anti-Semitism which informed the Holocaust and the Vel' d'Hiv roundup should be drawn, anti-Semitism and the extreme Right cannot easily be separated from the racetrack's identity. The racetrack, however, attracted anti-parliamentary organizations from both extremes of the political spectrum: it also served as the venue for the Communist Party's March 10, 1953 meeting in commemoration of the death of Joseph Stalin.⁴⁶ Poujade most likely chose the site because it was easily the largest indoor venue in postwar Paris. However, he would undoubtedly have been aware of the venue's ignominy as the 1954 UDCA rally took place during a summer recess in the trial of *Höherer SS-und Polizeiführer* Carl Oberg and his adjutant Helmut Knochen, the latter being the main orchestrator of the 1942 roundup.

The July 5, 1954 Poujadist rally at Vel' d'Hiv was a failure. Of the major Parisian newspapers only the Communist *L'Humanité* noticed the "15,000 shopkeepers and artisans who came from all over France to enthusiastically and resolutely reassert their goal of bringing about veritable fiscal justice."⁴⁷ The issues that Poujade would subsequently claim to have been campaigning about -- the string of military defeats in Indochina and governmental instability-- had a hold on the public's attention that the UDCA's anti-fiscal platform could not breach. The 1951 legislative election had marked the victory of a centrist coalition, the Third Force, which emerged in the late 1940s as a means of excluding the Communists, who held a plurality in the National Assembly, from cabinet positions. To the left of the Third Force again sat the Communists and to the right members of Charles de Gaulle's Rally of the French People

⁴⁵ Micheal Marrus, *Vichy France and the Jews*, (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1981), pp. 250-3; Paxton, *Vichy France*, pp. 175-80, 249; and Philippe Valode, *Les Hommes de Pétain*, (Nouveau Monde: Paris, 2011), pp. 501-6

⁴⁶ *L'Humanité*, March 6, 1953; "Le Parti communiste lance une 'promotion Staline,'" *Le Monde*, March 13, 1953

⁴⁷ *L'Humanité*, July 6, 1954;

(*Rassemblement du peuple français*—RPF), the former opposed to republicanism in general as an expression of its proclaimed Stalinism, the latter seeking to rewrite the Republic's constitution and establish a presidential system.⁴⁸ With dissolution of the Assembly a constitutional impossibility⁴⁹ what resulted was a revolving door of cabinets with the longest governing for thirteen months.

⁴⁸ Rieux, *Fourth Republic*, pp. 151-66

⁴⁹ Article 50 of the 1946 constitution allowed for dissolution in the event of two no-confidence votes in the span of eighteen months. The process would be initiated by the President of the Assembly and decided on by the council of ministers. "Constitution de 1946, IVe République," conseil-constitutionnel.fr

Top Left: UDCA button, the rooster's forward foot corresponds to the location of Saint-Céré


Top Right: Pierre Poujade, ca. 1955

Bottom: Poujadist rally; the sign describes the French rooster once again singing "cocorico" and not "Coca Cola"



50

51



52

⁵⁰ Pascal Favre, "Epinglette de l'Union de Défense des Commerçants et des Artisans.jpg," *Wikipedia.fr*

⁵¹ "Pierre Poujade," *les-yeux-du-monde.fr*

⁵² "Aux armes, citoyens!" in Poujade, *J'ai Choisi le Combat*

CHAPTER II—*Poujadisme*

On New Year's Eve, 1955 the *Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans* (CNI) held its final pre-election rally at the Salle Wagram, an 8,000 seat concert and events hall located within sight of the Arc de Triomphe. Characterized by conservative liberal views, the party was the rightmost component of the fragile Third Force coalition. The CNI's social conservatism sparked conflicts with the SFIO on such issues as funding for religious schools while its free market liberalism stood in opposition to the interventionism that would characterize the Fourth Republic. A representative of one of the three lists grouped together under the CNI banner in the Parisian electoral district was delivering a speech when he was interrupted by a cry of "Vive Pétain!" to which a man at another end of the ballroom responded with "Vive le Roi!" another still exclaimed "Vive Poujade!" Several fights subsequently broke out in the rear of the auditorium. Most likely because of their overwhelming numerical advantage, the CNI supporters had no problem subduing the men behind the disturbance, one of whom sustained minor injuries after being thrown down a set of stairs. *Le Figaro* characterized the intruders as Poujadists, Maurrassians, and perhaps most curiously as members of the *Rassemblement national populaire*, a collaborationist party disestablished in 1944.¹

In attendance at the rally was Jacques Isorini, a CNI deputy to the National Assembly who in 1951 was one of the founding members of the Association for the Defense of the Memory of Marshal Pétain (ADMP) and in the 1960s would go on to defend General Raoul

¹ *Le Figaro*, January 1, 1956. While the connection between Poujade and the Poujadists is obvious and that between *le Roi* and Maurras is intuitive, no other thesis altogether might be needed to establish a connection between "Vive Pétain!" and membership in a wartime party which used as its emblem what can best be described as a stylized swastika in the three colors of the French Republic.

Salan of the *Organisation de l'armée secrète*, who stood trial for treason.² With the skirmishes over, Isorini took the stage and resumed discussion of the topic that had been interrupted: Algeria, soon to become the graveyard of the Fourth Republic. “Misery,” he said, assessing the situation in France’s nearby overseas department, “is the chief stimulus of nationalism.”³ Two days after the CNI rally, for the fifth time since the Liberation, the French electorate headed to the polls to elect a National Assembly. By then Le Mouvement Poujade was already associated with nationalism and the radical right, but had “misery”—which initially brought about the shopkeepers’ movement—also been a leading cause of their shift toward what their critics saw as fascism?

The aims of this chapter are first to provide an account of the development of what I choose to refer to as “political Poujadism,” which began shortly after the investiture of the new cabinet in the summer of 1954, lasted through 1955 when the simultaneously grandiose and substanceless UDCA aim of convening the Estates-General emerged, and culminated in the Poujadists’ electoral success in January of 1956. My second aim is to examine the critical assessments of the movement including accusations of fascism which began to emerge as Poujadism transitioned from being a fiscal protest to a political movement and party. The accusations of fascism can be divided into two categories distinguished by their grounds: some claimed that the movement was fascist because various individuals in the UDCA had long-established associations with the French far right while others argued that the political ideology and tactics of Poujadism were similar to, or indistinguishable from, fascism.

Two months after assuming office, in August, 1954, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France fired what Poujade considered Paris’ first salvo directed at the UDCA. Named after

² Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, pp. 43-9; James Shields, *The extreme right in France: from Pétain to Le Pen*, (Routledge: New York, 2007), pp. 115-6

³ *Le Figaro*, January 1, 1956.

Henry Dorey, an MRP deputy and the National Assembly's fiscal expert, the Dorey Amendment allowed law enforcement to prosecute "anyone who prevented the exercise of government audits or participated in a collective action to prevent said operation."⁴ With discussions of the amendment underway in the Palais Bourbon, Poujade penned an open letter to all the deputies and senators wherein he accused them of betraying France by being unwilling to engage in any dialogue with the growing fiscal revolt. Justifications for the law and a broader fiscal overhaul promised by Mendès-France such as "national productivity and international productivity," were to Poujade empty phrases used by government figures to conceal the "materialism and inhumanity" that in reality motivated their actions. The amendment, Poujade argued, was a threat to the solidarity of France and to its cohesiveness as a nation, not just to the livelihood of a few *commerçants* whose arrests would serve to augment the movement's martyrology.⁵ After deliberations regarding the amendment began in July, all votes regarding its language and final passage would see all 103 Communist deputies consistently abstain in order to echo their solidarity with the shopkeepers and artisans of France.⁶ Communist resistance was, however, more a protest than a real attempt to affect policy as passage of the bill was a foregone conclusion and it was adopted on August 15, passing by a comfortable margin of 366 to 116.

While Poujadism in its first year of existence saw as its goal the general betterment of the social and economic conditions of the self-employed middle class, the investiture of the Mendès-France government and passage of the Dorey Amendment provided a stimulus for the UDCA's transformation into a movement of organized political opposition. In early November of 1954 several hundred regional deputies travelled to Algiers to attend the first national congress of the

⁴ *Le Monde*, August 16, 1954

⁵ Pierre Poujade, "Lettre ouverte à MM. les Députés et Sénateurs," in *J'ai choisi le combat*, (Société Générale des Éditions et Publications: Sait-Céré, 1955), pp. 248-9

⁶ *Le Monde*, July 8, 1954

shopkeepers' and artisans' organization. It is entirely unclear why the Algerian city was selected as the site of the meeting (Dominic Borne speculates in jest that Poujade simply wanted to visit his in-laws).⁷ Poujadist rallies and meetings had a tendency to coincide with- and be obscured by events of much greater importance, and the Algiers congress was no exception: the Algerian War is often seen as commencing on November 1, 1954 or "Red All-Saints' Day."⁸ UDCA representatives most likely arrived in Algeria in the first week of November, a week which began with an extraordinary session of the General Council of the Department of Algiers which unanimously ordered that "the guilty, whoever they are, be exemplarily punished." What ensued was a wave of random arrests and police reprisals against the Muslim population which Alistair Horne in his historic classic, *Savage War of Peace*, saw as evocative of Claude Rains' "Round up the usual suspects!" at the end of *Casablanca* and, more significantly, of a pattern of French and British brutal treatment of outbreaks of colonial nationalism.⁹ The unrest was not limited to the North African colony; in Paris, despite declaring Algeria "irrevocably French," Mendès-France and his minister of the Interior, François Mitterrand -- who proclaimed that "the only possible negotiation is war" -- avoided a no-confidence decision by 29 votes.¹⁰

Regardless of the tumult around them, the Poujadists gathering in Algiers focused on a set of rather quotidian matters. A year earlier, in Cahors, when the UDCA was constituted and Poujade declared its leader, the new president's first decision was to create *L'Union*, the movement's newspaper. Because the paper's sales were dismal, questions about Poujade's

⁷ Bourne, *Petits Bourgeois en Revolte*, p. 90-1. Dates of the Algiers congress are difficult to estimate as neither Poujade nor his earliest historical analysis conducted by Stanley Hoffmann offer no precise date but rather mention only "November." Based on articles in *Le Monde* (Nov. 11, 1954), however, this paper sees it as opening on November 7.

⁸ Indeed, four years later Poujade would author a supplement to *Fraternité Française*, entitled "Poujade Told You So..." wherein he suggested that the UDCA congress was the birthplace of the concept and rallying cry of "*Algérie française*."

⁹ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, (Penguin Books: New York, 1977), pp. 83-104

¹⁰ Ibid.

appropriation of finances—and more generally about his leadership—were raised at a “pre-congress” in Saint-Céré and persisted in Algiers.¹¹ A group of “renegades from Limoges” prepared a declaration, provocatively entitled “J’accuse,” which criticized the UDCA president’s wrongdoings, but before it could be presented, Poujade denounced his critics as subjects of manipulation and financial corruption by outside political parties.¹² With the internal opposition expelled, the Algiers congress approved additional funding for a newspaper and began the printing of *Fraternité Française*, subtitled “*La Tribune de Pierre Poujade*.” While analyzing the importance of the newspaper, Borne argues that its publication was integral to the growth of Le Mouvement Poujade beyond the circles of disaffected shopkeepers as evidenced by the paper’s frequent overtures to peasants, intellectuals, and the French public at large.¹³ The newspaper’s first issue was published in January, 1955 and contained a series of appeals made by Poujade to different elements of France’s society, each stressing that insofar as the shopkeeper and the artisan represented the collective interests of the Nation (“*nous—les commerçants et artisans—sommes le carrefour de la nation*”), their struggle was also the struggle of all other walks of life.¹⁴ “People of France,” concludes the address to intellectuals, “our country has a place for everyone but we must first bring order to our home, our interests are the same, we must be mutually understanding and united.” In addition to the expansion of the Poujadist print publication, the Algiers conference also decided upon some far-reaching changes in policy: most notably, a radical shift in attitude vis-à-vis organized labor as well as the French Communist Party.

¹¹ Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, pp. 58-60.

¹² Poujade, *A l’heure de la colère*, pp. 130-5.

¹³ Borne, *Petits Bourgeois en Révolte?*, pp. 89-91

¹⁴ Pierre Poujade, “C’est ton esprit à toi,” in *J’ai choisi le combat*, p. 236

It was the UDCA's newfound animosity towards labor unions that gave rise to the first accusations of fascism leveled against the organization. On March 23, 1955, Robert Bothereau, general secretary of *Confédération Générale du Travail - Force Ouvrière* (General Confederation of Labor - Workers' Force—FO) addressed representatives of the American press community. The FO was founded in 1947 when Bothereau, dissatisfied with the level of direct PCF control over France's organized labor organizations, created a non-Communist alternative, allegedly receiving substantial CIA financial support to do so.¹⁵ Bothereau insisted that the measures campaigned for by the Poujadists, specifically their calls for major changes to the tax code, could not be implemented unilaterally. Presumably because he expected France's national expenditures to not decrease at the same rates as taxation, the FO leader stated that any cuts in taxes affecting business owners would inevitably result in increased taxation of employees. Bothereau therefore insisted that his organization "had to take a strong stance against le Mouvement Poujade." This "strong stance" involved the declaration that, "we [the FO] worry about some of [the movement's] clearly fascist aspects—its glorification of the leader, its methods of direct action, etc.—but we believe that these characteristics originate from [Poujade's] staff, Poujade himself is too frightened by his own success."¹⁶ Bothereau's assessment of the fascistic inclinations of the Poujadists provides a useful framework for the analysis of other left-wing criticisms of the movement. Affiliation with known members of established political entities of both the right and the left, political campaign methods, as well as ideological concerns shall be examined separately to determine the basis for early criticism of Poujade and the UDCA.

¹⁵ Jean-Paul Revauger, "Social Policy and the Challenge to the Republican Model," in ed. Alistair Cole, *Redefining the French Republic*, (Palgrave: New York, 2006), pp. 117-9

¹⁶ *Le Monde*, March 24, 1955

When Bothereau argued that the “clearly fascist aspects” of Poujadism originated among the UDCA’s high-ranking members, he would have most likely been referring to figures such as “the green führer,” Henri Dorgères. In the 1930s, Dorgères’ *Défense Paysanne* was a notable feature of the French political landscape as it transcended the role of a rural pressure group and engaged in *bona fide* political action supported by a private militia clad in green shirts. Though the agricultural demographic disaffected by the Great Depression from which the organization drew its support was different than that of the rural middle class of the UDCA, its marches promising to “clean out the Parisian nest of bureaucrats” would go on to be echoed by the rallying cry of “*sortez les sortants*” that Poujade would adopt in the months preceding the legislative election.¹⁷ Even if cooperation between Dorgères and Poujade would culminate in the election of the former to the National Assembly on a Poujadist ticket, it is crucial to note that—especially in the first few months after the Algiers congress—the relationship between the two was rather tenuous. In the 1950s Dorgères attempted to rebuild his prewar organization and by 1956 the reconstituted *Défense Paysanne* claimed 75,000 members. When in *Fraternité Française* Poujade called on the peasants of France to support his movement “before it was too late” and when he framed the decision between supporting the UDCA and not doing so as a choice between freedom and slavery, he was in fact competing for supporters directly with Dorgères.¹⁸ If the relationship between Dorgères and Poujade can be labeled as one of political exploitation, it was Poujade who reaped the benefits as the alliance with the *Défense Paysanne* allowed his UDCA to expand into the historically right-leaning regions along the lower Loire.¹⁹

¹⁷ Robert Paxton, *French Peasant Fascism: Henry Dorgeres Greenshirts and the Crises of French Agriculture 1929-1939*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) , and Paxton, “Return to the Soil” in *Vichy France*, pp. 200-209

¹⁸ Pierre Poujade, “Peuple de France, redresse-toi!” in *J’ai choisi le combat*.

¹⁹ Alain Murcier, *Le Monde*, March 5, 1955

Equally worthy of consideration as the UDCA's association with established members of the radical right is the evident Communist sympathy and support the movement received in its first two years. Whereas support by right wing figures could, and did, persist, communist support would have to disintegrate dramatically before the majority of fascism accusations could be leveled. As the election of 1956 approached, the major political parties made their final overtures to the French voters. Published in *Le Figaro*, the CNI's final appeal was critical of both the Socialists and Radicals, chastising Mendès-France's for his inadequate fervor in denouncing the possibility of including Communists in the cabinet. CNI criticism of the Poujadists, though not pervasive, was rooted in a similar concern: its "indirect cooperation with muscovite candidates."²⁰ Cooperation between Poujade and the Communists is well documented. Hoffmann credits the Communist *L'Humanité* with being the first nationally-circulated newspaper to take a keen interest in the anti-tax protest staged by the Poujadists in early 1954;²¹ a look at the electoral map of France's southwest can help explain why this was the case. In the legislative election of 1951 there were only two departments where the fragmented non-Gaullist right obtained an absolute majority of the vote: Aveyron and Cantal—the latter also being the only department south of the Loire to favor the right continually since the proclamation of the Third Republic in 1870.²² Together with Corrèze and Lot, these departments constituted the four initial "conquests" of the Poujadists. The voters of Lot were split virtually evenly among all the political parties, though a rightward inclination was noticeable and can be traced back to before the First World War.²³ Corrèze, meanwhile, was one of only five French departments where the

²⁰ *Le Figaro*, January 1, 1956

²¹ Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, pp. 349-51

²² François Goguel, *Géographie des élections françaises*, (Librairie Armand Colin: Paris, 1952), p. 103, 121

²³ *Ibid.*

PCF received over a third of the vote; indeed, in Corrèze the Communists virtually controlled the leftist vote with the SFIO receiving fewer than 5%.²⁴

Because of its appeal on the basis of economic hardship to a population disillusioned with the government, the Poujadists could challenge the Communists' hegemony on the radical left of the political spectrum. Considering that early Poujadist rhetoric was generally apolitical and hence not directly antagonistic to the doctrine of the Communist Party, the latter sought to support the shopkeepers' movement so as to steer it in a direction that would not threaten its electoral interests. This in turn helps explain the large number of known former and active Communists within the ranks of the early UDCA.²⁵

Second on Bothereau's list of concerns were "direct action methods" employed by the Poujadists. The meaning of the generic concept of direct action is difficult to pin down as it encapsulates anything from marches, strikes, and civil disobedience to rioting, street fights, and other forms of political violence. If the broadest definition available is adopted, one could accuse Bothereau of a degree of hypocrisy as not only did his early syndicalist predecessors rely on violence, but more importantly, organized strikes provide perhaps the most basic form of trade union pressure. Bothereau, however, was most likely alluding only to the violent end of the spectrum as it encompasses the sorts of "activism" generally associated with the rise of Nazism and Fascism in the 1920s and 30s. Contemporary critics often echo this theme of 1950s criticism and find evidence of Poujadist "fascistic tendencies" of direct action in the tactics of Jean-Marie Le Pen whose youth wing of the UDCA would often disrupt opponents' political engagements. In his study of French electoral politics Philip Williams describes how Le Pen and his "rowdies," mostly university students, would attend rallies organized by opponents across the political

²⁴ Ibid. pp. 105, 114-6

²⁵ *Le Figaro*, January 6-7, 1956. Jacques Duclos is listed as a prominent member of the PCF who joined the movement in the early days of its existence.

spectrum and “drowned out the speakers’ voices with shouts—or by cowbells, drums, loudspeakers, hunting horns, and alarm clocks, [while] elsewhere speakers were bombarded eggs, fruits and vegetables, and even cream cakes.”²⁶ Though he notes that, at worst, Poujadist activists would cut lighting cords and instruct electricians not to install faulty sound systems, Williams is careful to note that such tactics were reminiscent more of audacious student pranks than of interwar Brown- or Black Shirt tactics.²⁷ Just as it is imperative to echo Williams’ sentiments when evaluating criticisms of Poujade from a 21st century perspective, it is worthwhile to consider how such tactics would have looked from the point of view of someone who did not possess the benefit of knowing that the UDCA was less than two years from fading into obscurity. Indeed, the lack of coverage Poujade and his movement’s exploits in newspapers of the time provides a reason explaining why it would have been easy for critics to antagonize the UDCA or see it as potentially threatening.

On January 5, 1956, two days after the legislative election, *Le Monde*’s Alain Murcier asked “*Qui est M[onsieur] Pierre Poujade?*” In the article that follows, Murcier provided readers with a brief biography of the UDCA leader and a paragraph devoted to how the “young, eloquent, and dynamic” stationer from Lot came to lead a program of militant shopkeepers into the National Assembly.²⁸ Similarly, *Le Figaro*, introduced Poujade and his movement to its readers only after their electoral success was secure.²⁹ The fact that Poujadism had to be introduced to the national audience when 51 UFF deputies were already on their way to Paris suggests that accounts of their previous activity received almost no attention. As I have submitted in discussions of the first Vel’ d’Hiv rally and the Algiers congress of the UDCA, this

²⁶ Philip M. Williams, *French Politicians and Elections 1951-1969*, (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1970), pp. 39-63

²⁷ Ibid. p. 47

²⁸ Alain Murcier, *Le Monde*, January 5, 1956

²⁹ Ronald Bochin, *Le Figaro*, January 4, 1956

lack of media coverage may to a degree be attributed to a series of concurrent but entirely unrelated events that tended to overshadow Poujadist rallies. For example, when representatives of the shopkeepers' movement returned to Vel' d'Hiv on February 15, their rally was once again overshadowed by the drama in Palais Bourbon as for the better part of two weeks the front pages of the major dailies announced the cabinet to be put up for the Assembly's approval that day.³⁰ Nor did international developments help the UDCA's efforts to secure the French public's attention: tensions in the straits of Taiwan and the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu gave rise to American Cold War brinksmanship and provided yet another subject to relegate brief stories of the rally to back pages. Poujade spent much of his two hour speech at Vel' d'Hiv discussing what he saw as deliberate media neglect of UDCA rallies. All representatives of newspapers and radio in attendance were invited to take the stage to see the 20,000 Parisian shopkeepers who made their way to the racetrack so that "they could have no excuse to claim only 7,000 people had come." "When you, the journalists," Poujade addressed his co-occupants of the stage, "announce all across your front pages that little Prince Charles peed next to his pot, we are all greatly interested; we would, however, appreciate it if your accounts of our protests were not confined to twenty five lines next to the obituaries."³¹

Poujade's claims that the nation's papers refused to print stories attesting to the movement's high levels of popularity were most likely made in reference to the coverage of a 120,000-man-strong march that the UDCA held in southern Paris three weeks earlier (on January 25, 1955). In this instance, stories of the march were brief—if at all printed—as the event coincided with a flood of the French capital. As a photograph included in Poujade's *J'ai choisi le*

³⁰ Rioux, *The Fourth Republic*, pp. 234-41.

³¹ *Le Monde*, February 16, 1955. Poujade's charges do not seem unfounded as, for example, an account of a UDCA rally a month before the election of 1956 appeared in *Le Figaro* next to a story of 18-month-old Katia who with her 18-month-old mutt won a dog show in a Parisian suburb.

combat suggests, members of the Union de défense des commerçants et artisans came to Paris to defend the interests of shopkeepers but wound up physically defending their property from floodwaters while posing with copies of *Fraternité française*.³² The Paris rally may not have met Poujade's expectations as the event that would give the movement national exposure, it did, however serve to provide some further glimpses of the "direct action" and "glorification of the leader" alluded to by Bothereau.

The theme of a direct, uncompromising approach to politics is evident not just in the fact that the Poujadist held a large-scale protest to voice their demands, but also in that the only tangible piece of UDCA policy relating to the march is a January 21 survey authored by Poujade. The document, sent out to all members of the Senate and the National Assembly, was an eight point questionnaire asking the deputies whether they supported or opposed individual points of the Gramat platform modified to include as its first issue the immediate repeal of the Dorey amendment, and as its last full amnesty of anyone punished by the law.³³ The aim of this strategy was chiefly to force Socialists and Radicals to either respond "no" to some points or refuse to respond altogether in order to discredit them in the eyes of UDCA members in attendance at the rally.³⁴ After the crowd jeered the results of the parliamentary survey, Pierre Poujade took the stage.

A round of roaring applause filled the convention center of Parc des expositions near the Porte de Versailles metro station. After a rendition of La Marseillaise, the "black haired, bright eyed young man with broad shoulders," as *Le Monde* characterized Poujade, began his oration. Though the speech commenced with an anti-fiscal tirade about statisticians with brains overflowing with numbers, it quickly transitioned to tender evocations of the "wives and mothers

³² Uppermost Photograph, Fourth Insert

³³ Pierre Poujade, "Questionnaire," in *J'ai choisi le combat*, pp. 198-9

³⁴ *Le Monde*, January 26, 1955

of France who ensure the sustainability of the country.” Feeding off the crowd’s enthusiasm, Poujade proceeded to describe an ideal France, a country where “artisans and shopkeepers thrive in the shade of the Tree of Liberty.”³⁵ Standing under a large banner reading “*Union de défense des commerçants et artisans / mouvement de Saint-Céré / Pierre Poujade*” with the words “Pierre Poujade” in a serified font twice the size of the first two lines, Poujade’s speech lasted for over an hour and a half. On all posters or banners, in addition to the *coq gaulois*, Poujade’s name was virtually omnipresent, thus giving rise to accusations of a degree of leadership worship. This supposed personality cult might best be explained with the notion of stardom as developed by John Gaffney and Diana Holmes in their *Stardom in Postwar France*.

As an advanced capitalist society, France, the authors argue, was in the 1950s and 60s a society conducive to the emergence of a star system that existed outside the world of the arts as evidenced in academics such as Lévi-Strauss and Sartre who enjoyed celebrity status. This development was in large part driven by the same socioeconomic characteristics of life in postwar France that influenced the rise of Poujadism: modernization, profound political division, the continued juxtaposition of economic prosperity and colonial decline, as well as the need to rectify the differences between visions of peacetime society with memories of military horror as experienced either in the Second World War, Indochina, or Algeria. Because it creates archetypes, Gaffney and Holmes write, “a star system helps a society reconcile or appear to reconcile contradictions” such as those listed above.³⁶ Using the example of Charles de Gaulle, Gaffney proceeds to propose the concept of political stardom founded not only on ideas of celebrity status but also on the “singular nature” and “preoccupation with the personalization of

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ John Gaffney and Diana Holmes, *Stardom in Postwar France*, (Bergham Books: New York, 2007), pp. 7-25, 219-222.

leadership” inherently characteristic of French political culture.³⁷ While comparisons of de Gaulle and Poujade shall not delay us here, it is worth noting that political stardom may provide an explanation of the latter’s popularity and the UDCA’s allegedly authoritarian party structure.

Le Monde noted that at the January 25 rally, in addition to criticism of France’s fiscal system, Poujade made repeated, personal attacks on Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France. In the fall of 1954, Mendès-France launched a dual campaign to curb rates of alcoholism. Its first component was an increase in the rate of taxation that owners of bars or *bistrot/bistros*, and small-scale bottlers of wine and liquor were liable to pay. Second was a public relations effort whereby the Prime Minister would walk the proverbial walk and opted to drink milk at state functions and in the chamber of the national assembly. On the fiscal front, the campaign served to further increase Poujade’s base of supporters as home distillers, *bouilleurs de cru*, began to join the ranks of the UDCA in large numbers. It was the campaign of drinking milk, however, which would attract noteworthy opposition from Poujade as well as lighthearted derision from *Le Figaro*’s cartoonist, Jean Sennep, who depicted the newly-appointed President of the Assembly and third generation wine-maker, Pierre Schneider, as a personified bottle of champagne glaring menacingly at a glass of milk in the middle benches occupied by Mendès-France’s Radicals.³⁸

Personal attacks on Mendès-France serve as the best-documented expressions of Poujade’s thinly veiled anti-Semitism. Following the UDCA’s 1955 Paris rally, *Le Monde* published an anthology of derisive and in some cases anti-Semitic excerpts from Poujade’s addresses. “Our fathers who would go to *bistros*, they are the ones who secured victory at Verdun; and Mendès? He wasn’t even there!” “The corner bar,” he continued, “is the victim of the anti-alcoholic frenzy of the government and of its head, ‘Mendès-Lolo,’” generally translated

³⁷ John Gaffney, “The Only Act in Town: Charles de Gaulle,” in *Ibid.*, pp. 199-218

³⁸ Jean Sennep, *Le Figaro*, January 14, 1955. Similar cartoons include the representation of a cabinet shakeup with an image of Mendès-France churning butter in a large courtyard.

as “Milky Mendès.”³⁹ The “France” in Mendès-France was often a target of Poujade’s mockery as he deemed it to be a facetiously patriotic attempt at establishing national belonging. Mendès-France was indeed the descendant of an immigrant family of Sephardic Jews, his ancestors, however, had migrated to France from Portugal in the 16th century, meaning that their relocation predated that of Poujade’s Spanish ancestors by about three hundred years. Poujade’s next gush of vitriol was directed at Henri Ulver, the Jewish Minister of Industry and Commerce: “Mr. Ulver, who was parachuted into the cabinet, was only a second generation Frenchman, his parents were scratching off fleas on the banks of the Danube.”⁴⁰

The very fact that *Le Monde* chose to publish these generally unrefined statements without any commentary suggests that, at least among its moderately left-leaning readership, these would have been considered offensive, meaning that there were certain groups in France for whom anti-Semitism was worthy of criticism. On the other hand, it should be noted that in the right wing *Le Figaro*, cartoons of Mendès-France and their emphasis of the Prime Minister’s facial features would today be widely viewed as generally offensive and perhaps racist.⁴¹ Many historians point to Poujade’s anti-Semitism in their discussions of his potential belonging to the lineage of the French far right or even fascism.⁴² The relationship between Poujade’s comments and fascism is a complex one and the connection is arguably impossible to make. Anti-Semitism is not generally regarded as a requisite trait of fascism while in the 1950s it perhaps would not have even been considered an integral aspect of Nazism. In *Fascism and Neofascism*, Angelica Fenner and Eric Weitz write that, until the aftermath of Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 trial in Jerusalem, the Holocaust played only a minor role in understanding National Socialism and the

³⁹ *Le Monde*, January 26, 1955

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ *Le Figaro*, January 15, 17, 1955

⁴² See James Shields, “Poujadism, a faux fascism.”

extermination of Jews was deemed but one of many of Adolf Hitler's crimes against humanity.⁴³ The almost simultaneous publication of Raul Hilberg's *Destruction of the European Jew* which famously saw the Holocaust as "the culmination of a cyclical trend" of persecution that the Nazi regime certainly completed but did not initiate, put the Final Solution into a political context which allowed it to exist independently of Hitler's personal fanaticism.⁴⁴

At the time of Poujade's political activity, the most frequent charge brought up in relation to his anti-Semitism was one of racism. Charges of racially-driven anti-Semitism may lead one to make the connection to German Nazism as Robert Paxton describes the anti-Semitism that characterized Vichy policy as one rooted in staunch Catholicism and nationalism as opposed to a level of perceived racial superiority.⁴⁵ This, however, does not mean that Poujade was accused of Nazi anti-Semitism. Racial theories can be found in the writings of the anti-Dreyfusard right including in one of its ideological sources, Edouard Drumont's *La France Juive* which differentiates the "chivalrous, disinterested, frank and trusting to the point of naivety" Aryan from the "scheming, subtle and cunning" Semite.⁴⁶ In comparison, it becomes immediately evident that Poujade's anti-Semitic comments, though sometimes vulgar, did not come close to the vitriol of earlier French anti-Semites. To Poujade, charges of racism, and the propagation of "isms" in general, were an example of "the biggest moral swindle France has ever known." He then outlined the logic behind accusations he had heard leveled against him:

You believe in having a basic responsibility to the nation? Fascist! You care deeply about the fate of those weaker and less fortunate than yourself, as any righteous man—and

⁴³ Angelica Fenner and Eric D. Weitz, *Fascism and Neofascism: Critical Writings on the Radical Right in Europe*, (Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2004), p. 4

⁴⁴ Jeremy Noakes, "Hitler and the Third Reich," in ed. Dan Stone, *Historiography of the Holocaust*, (Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2004), pp. 24-53

⁴⁵ Paxton, *Vichy France*, pp. 178

⁴⁶ Peter Davies, *The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: from Maistre to Le Pen*, (Routledge: New York, 2002), pp. 73-8

especially a Frenchman—ought to do? Communist! You claim to be the master in your own home? Racist!⁴⁷

Poujade's defense against allegations of anti-Semitism and racism does not delve any further into what he perceived to be the logical flaws of his opponents' arguments, but he instead points to the fact that an *israélite* named Kauffman was one of the most senior members of the UDCA and served as its regional president in Bas-Rhin.⁴⁸ While Poujade's defense is not highly convincing, ascribing Poujade's criticism of Mendès-France solely to Poujade's anti-Semitism overlooks the classical liberalism and perhaps even anti-statism that underlay Poujade's opposition to the anti-alcohol campaign as the UDCA president often supported his comments by arguing that the government should not concern itself with the health of France's citizens and of their children.⁴⁹

If general criticism and accusations of fascism were few and far between through the first half of 1955, their volume and ferocity increased gradually throughout the fall as the elections approached. Here, Poujadist tactics and ideology were once again to blame. In early June, the UDCA convened in Saint-Céré for a party congress Stanley Hoffmann describes as rivaling in importance the meeting in Algiers in the preceding autumn. It was in Saint-Céré that the vague rhetoric of *fraternité française* became a political goal: *Unions de défense* parallel in structure and motivation to that of the UDCA were to be established among other professions of the lower and middle class in order to prepare France for the convocation of the Estates-General.⁵⁰ The Estates-General of the Poujadist platform would have held as its aim the creation of an economic program that would “enrich the people; boost industrial production; liberate commerce; open a market outlet for agricultural goods” but also “remake of France an independent world power

⁴⁷ Poujade, “Racisme, etc...” and “Toujours les mêmes...” in *J'ai choisi le combat*, pp. 229-34

⁴⁸ Ibid. The term *israélite*, writes Willa Z. Silverman in “‘Sad Era, Villainous Affair’: The Dreyfus Affair in the Notebooks of Henri Vever,” was at the time of the Dreyfus Affair a more genteel term for a Jew than was *juif*.

⁴⁹ Poujade, “Mendès et sa clique,” in *J'ai choisi le combat*, pp. 109-16

⁵⁰ Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, pp. 95-102

and strengthen the French Union; ensure a prosperous future for France's youth; return to us our freedom."⁵¹ In short, it was to accomplish something positive for everyone and hence the Estates General became the centerpiece (if not the entirety) of the movement's electoral platform.

Attempting to synthesize a coherent political ideology out of Poujade's conception of the Estates-General is a difficult task that produces highly contradictory results. Because the French political system as the Poujadists saw it was rife with "individualistic egoism" and did not adequately represent the "particular interests of France's society," the Estates-General of 1956 would have circumvented—if not toppled—the parliamentary arrangement of the Fourth Republic.⁵² Considering that French society was not formally divided into estates as was the case in 1789 when the body last convened, and because the stated goal behind the UDCA's Estates General was to unify French society, not to divide it,⁵³ Poujade's project would have resembled its revolutionary predecessor in name only. Furthermore, there exists no stated practical outline for the formation of the council although it may be speculated that the regional, occupation-specific *Unions de défense* were meant to later elect representatives to the national meeting of the Estates General. The project's lack of substance or even impossibility were not a major issue to the majority of Poujadists as allusions to "*États Généraux*" appear on almost every one of their campaign posters.⁵⁴ It is also in these posters that further reasons for criticism of the movement can be found.

"If you are satisfied with your elected representatives; if you have resigned yourself to living in a decadent society, stay home," opens a poster promoting the "Parliamentary List of Union et Fraternité Française presented by Pierre Poujade." "However, if you do not accept

⁵¹ Pierre Poujade, "Manifeste pour les Etats Généraux," in *J'ai choisi le combat*, pp. 247-8

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, p. 145, 158.

France's decline, if you oppose fiscal tyranny and the exploitation of man by his fellow man, wake up! [...] Like you, we want justice: fiscal justice for taxpayers, social justice for workers, and military justice for traitors." Besides "justice" and the Estates General, the poster notes nothing that the movement is supportive of, only a list of entities it is committed to fighting such as "vagabond financial trusts" and "electoral swindles."⁵⁵ Another poster includes in the center a picture of a smiling Poujade below a large heading of "Warning! This man is dangerous." The electoral advertisement then proceeds to explain how Poujade is a threat to the left because he "opposes the exploitation of human misery for political ends," to the center because he "opposes the destruction of the French empire and seeks to combat the mismanagement and treason that caused it," and to the right because "he forcefully attacks stateless trusts and financial organizations."⁵⁶ In embracing opposition to parties across the political spectrum and adopting the image of someone dangerous to the political establishment at large, Poujade, who did not seek election to the National Assembly, provided his political opponents with printed evidence of what could be interpreted as anti-parliamentarism or anti-republicanism. Combined with the overall vagueness of the Estates-General project, Poujade's anti everything image would have allowed his critics to project onto his person and his movement any meaning or ideological stance that, while it could have never been provable, would have likewise not have been deniable.

As elections neared, profound divisions within le Mouvement Poujade began to emerge. In an open letter, Francis Bos, whom we have already encountered as the founder of the UDCA branch in Cantal, after resigning his vice-presidency of the movement, accused the Estates-General project's aim of fostering national unity in all aspects of life of being "absolutely

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 145

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 158

incompatible with [the UDCA's] means and possibilities.”⁵⁷ Similarly, UDCA committees in Brive and Tulle voted almost unanimously to distance themselves from the national bureau over its insistence on pursuing the project's realization as they deemed “too adventurous and political” as well as a threat to the basic integrity of the Union. After the 138-6 vote, Monsieur Quincy, a representative of the central committee of the UDCA was expelled from the hall “not without having been somewhat abused.”⁵⁸

The results of the January, 1956 election help confirm that the Mouvement Poujade that secured close to 12% of the national vote was radically different than that which sought to protect the interests of the disaffected rural middle class beginning in 1953. Areas where the UFF received over 15 percent of the vote were limited to an east-west band between Marseille and Toulouse and the area between Laval and La Rochelle in the northwest. The latter corresponds to an area highly supportive of de Gaulle's RPF in the 1951 election. The southern band meanwhile, with the exception of Vaucluse, was an area of longstanding support of the left. In his native Lot, Poujade's party received around 8 percent of the vote, meanwhile in Corrèze the percentage was closer to 5.⁵⁹ In the immediate aftermath of the January 2 election, the loudest voices of criticism originated beyond France's borders. Due to preexisting Cold War attitudes, the American press generally expressed anger at the success of the PCF which together with the Poujadists constituted a “French SNAFU,” a concept which the foreign press review section of *Le Figaro* had the awkward task of explaining.⁶⁰ While in Moscow *Pravda* hailed the success of Maurice Thorez's PCF, the Western European press voiced serious concern about the Poujadists'

⁵⁷ *Le Monde*, October 1, 1955

⁵⁸ *Le Monde*, October 26, 1955

⁵⁹ Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, pp. 198-201

⁶⁰ *Le Figaro*, January 4, 1956

far right characteristics.⁶¹ Summing up the elections, London's *The Times* noted that the parties of the two extremes which together accounted for nearly forty percent of the vote 'would destroy parliamentary institutions;' if the Poujadists followed through on their electoral promises the article argued, France was to become a political vacuum which 'a force unworthy of the Fourth Republic' could fill.⁶² This force, according to *The Daily Mail*, would not be dissimilar from that once headed by 'a little house painter from Austria,' the Labour Party's *Daily Herald* expounded on this dismal prognosis by suggesting that Poujade might well turn the National Assembly into a beer garden.⁶³ It was also around this time that a cartoon depicting Adolf Hitler and his supposed ideological descendant, "Poujadolf" was published in the *Daily Mirror* before being translated and reprinted in *Paris-Match*. Though foreign observers are equipped with a level of distance conducive to objectivity, it is also true that coverage of the development of Poujadism was so sparse in the American press that the UFF's electoral success would have seemed to have developed almost overnight. However rapid, the rise of the UDCA/UFF was far from instantaneous. Poujade's appearance on a March cover of *Time* magazine and the accompanying multi-page feature that was far more complimentary than disparaging suggest that, given time and exposure, to an objective foreign audience Poujade became far less threatening than his Communist adversaries portrayed him to be at that very time.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² "Shade Of Hitler Seen In French Election Vote," *Associated Press*, 5 Jan 1956.


⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ "Foreign News: An Ordinary Frenchman," *Time*, Monday, Mar. 19, 1956:
<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,824029,00.html>

Top Left: “Poujadolf” from *Daily Mirror*


Top Right: March 19, 1956 *Time* cover

Bottom: Map of Poujadist and “droits divers” vote in the 1956 legislative election



1956 Legislative

% vote for the Poujadists and far-right



⁶⁵ Victor Weisz, “Poujadolf,” *Daily Mirror*, Jan. 6, 1956, cartoons.ac.uk

⁶⁶ “France’s Pierre Poujade,” *Time*, Mar. 19, 1956, <http://content.time.com>

⁶⁷ “1956 Legislative Election,” uselectionatlas.org

CHAPTER III—*Poujadolf*

A recent development in the field of history is attention to the concept of collective memory. As an approach to history, memory emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War as the European intellectual community sought to understand how the recent experiences of the war and of the Holocaust shaped the collective identity of Europe and the identities of its various national components. The concept of historical memory has its roots in the inherently postmodern and poststructuralist theory of social constructionism as Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth report the widespread acceptance of the notion “that the writing of history is less a matter of the unproblematic discovery of a past ‘out there’ by means of refined techniques of source criticism and is more something dependent upon the context of the present in which questions about the past emerge.”¹ Unlike individual memory, the authors contend, collective memory is an intrinsically discursive construction.² Collective memory is a useful tool in historical analysis for the very reason that it is constructed, at times deliberately. Inaccuracies in representation thus become not simple errors but expressions of a desired alternate reality. In the remainder of this paper I will consider how the constructed and politicized memory of war and the Resistance influenced the way in which the French of the 1950s understood Poujadism and how they categorized it.

Henry Rousso’s acclaimed *Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*, utilizes an “event-oriented” approach to assess the prevalence and trace the development of politicized memories of occupation and Resistance across almost half a century of French

¹ Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth, *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance*, (Berghahn Books: New York, 2010), p. 4

² Ibid. p. 1-16

history. Rousso's analysis subdivides the period between liberation and the book's 1987 publication into four distinctive phases and employs movies, official celebrations, and scholarly publications as tools for distilling the national memory he is after. Memories of the Vichy regime's acts and influence, argues Rousso, have proven time and again to "[play] an essential if not primary role in the difficulties that the people of France have faced in reconciling themselves to their history."³ The deep divisions that characterized French society from the Dreyfus Affair through to the Popular Front era persisted through the war and well into the second half of the 20th century; furthermore, Rousso contends, threats to reignite the *guerre franco-française* informed the politics of memory with regard to Vichy.⁴ While Rousso's somewhat contradictory conclusion which declares that deeper social and political structures did not disintegrate as a result of "the Vichy crisis" somewhat undermines his earlier claims of profound political division, the work is generally held in high regard and cited almost ubiquitously.⁵ An inseparable element of the Vichy Syndrome is what Rousso refers to as *résistancialisme*, or the Resistancialist Myth which held as a "quasi-sacred symbol" the clandestine struggle of the French nation in the years separating the debacle of June, 1940 and liberation.⁶

Résistancialisme is *not* the tangible legacy of the Resistance that was manifest in the relative political accord of the first few years after liberation, but rather its politicized collective memory; although it is a deliberately constructed collective memory, it is important to remember that the Resistancialist Myth's origins are in a real struggle of the French to fight either the Nazi occupier, the Vichy state, or both. Though members of the Resistance shared an enemy, it was

³ Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, p. 9

⁴ Ibid., e.g. p. 205, 251, events that threaten to ratchet up tensions in French society include the trial of Klaus Barbie as well as the increased academic output of works related to the Vichy period in the 1970s.

⁵ Bertram M. Gordon "The 'Vichy Syndrome' Problem in History," *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 495-518

⁶ Rousso outlines this idea early in the book (p. 8, 9, pp. 18-19) and then traces its influence on the political life of France in the following years.

far from a united movement, the divisions that characterized Popular Front era France persisted in wartime. The Communist party, well trained in clandestine tactics and underground means of existence, was one of the first major sources of opposition. Perhaps the single biggest reason for the emergence of Communist Resistance was Hitler's decision to launch Operation Barbarossa. Until the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union commenced in June of 1941, the French Communist Party found itself in the precarious position of attempting to reconcile its well-established anti-fascism with the recent fact of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the subsequent joint invasion of Poland.⁷ In wartime, PCF resistance tended to tone down its partisan rhetoric so as to not alienate elements of local populations, the decentralized nature of irregular combat was instead emphasized as the name "Francs-Tireurs" was chosen to describe Communist resistance groups, invoking the defense of France in the Franco-Prussian War.⁸ While this highlighting of the Resistance's transcendence of party politics was perhaps motivated by pragmatic goals of securing broad support, Kedward demonstrates that there did in fact emerge a genuine Resistance mindset. This Resistance *esprit* was characterized by a level of "left-wing humanism" characterized by the defense of "human values threatened with extinction by the unacceptable forces of darkness."⁹

In the French capital, as the Allied armies neared in the summer of 1944, a general strike and police revolt (with the town increasingly abandoned by German forces) transformed into an armed uprising. Barricades were erected and street combat flared up in the few days before Generals de Gaulle and Leclerc received Eisenhower's approval for the 2nd Armored Division's detour from the road to Berlin in order to liberate the city.¹⁰ With the French *tricolore* raised atop

⁷ Ibid. and Judt, *Past Imperfect*, pp. 15-25

⁸ Kedward, *La Vie en Bleu*, pp. 286-9

⁹ Ibid. 292-4

¹⁰ Kedward, *La Vie en Bleu*, pp. 303-9

the Eiffel tower, de Gaulle entered the city on August 25 and at the Hôtel de Ville delivered the second of his two famous wartime speeches, The Resistance Myth is generally traced this speech:

Paris! Paris humiliated! Paris broken! Paris martyred! But Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, by its own people with the help of the armies of France, with the support and aid of France as a whole, of fighting France, of the only France, of the true France, of eternal France.¹¹

Even the most superficial analysis of the 1944 campaign to liberate France will immediately lead one to conclude that this account is far from factually correct as France's "dear and admirable allies" did much more than play a supportive role in liberation. Originating in the speech, *résistancialisme* refabricates the memory of the Resistance in two distinct ways. First, it attempts to create an inherently militaristic ideal type of *résistant* where one cannot be historically demonstrated. The proposition that one could take up resistance through organizations other than those loyal to the government-in-exile or the PCF is virtually disqualified.¹² Even though distinct political ideologies persisted in wartime, the mythical Resistance was one of profound unity.

Second, the Resistance Myth retroactively ascribes to all of France a level of support for the minority position that was open struggle against the Nazi occupier, thus attempting to secure the political unity of the nation. Notions strikingly similar to de Gaulle's assertion of France's liberation "with the support and the help of *all* France" can be found in a series of Jean-Paul Sartre's essays in *Combat*, one of the literary organs of the Resistance.¹³ Detailing the Parisian revolt of mid-August, these articles provide, for example, accounts of street combat after crowds

¹¹ "Speech of De Gaulle 'Martyred Paris, but liberated Paris' (1944)," YouTube video, 0:43, posted by *Archives at Risk*, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=makDyycHvmw&feature=fvhl>.

¹² A notable example of a resistance movement loyal to an entity far different than Charles de Gaulle or the PCF can be found in Waldemar Grabowski, "Konspiracja Polska we Francji," *Zeszyty Historyczne*. 2009, Iss. 170, pp. 89-119, which details the role of Polish resistance fighters in World War II France.

¹³ Susan Suleiman, "Choosing Our Past," in *Crises of Memory and the Second World War*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 13-35

decided to take fate into their own hands as “[t]he road that leads from painful docility to insurrection has finally been run.” An even more forceful affirmation of the French public’s collective role in the liberation of their country can be found in Sartre’s description of the wartime France, *La République du Silence* which concludes that “[t]his Republic without institutions, without an army, without police, was something that at each instant every Frenchman had to win and to affirm against Nazism. No one failed in this duty, and now we are on the threshold of another Republic.”¹⁴

Factors explaining the popularity of the glorified image of the Resistance are many and vary according to the different political elements utilizing it. Across the political spectrum, references to wartime resistance were generally motivated by a desire to wipe the slate clean and construct postwar society in a way that would rectify the wrongs of the interwar period; the slate, writes Tony Judt, would only be truly wiped clean in Central and Eastern Europe where Soviet influence would render a return to status quo entirely impossible.¹⁵ For the left, resistance against Nazi occupation was an expression of anti-Fascism and thus a successful conclusion of the struggle that from the point of view of the European left began in Spain in 1936. For the French left the beginning of the battle falls on February 6, 1934 when riots orchestrated by members of far-right anti-parliamentary *ligues* brought about the resignation of the Édouard Daladier government. The rioters were labeled “fascist” by their contemporaries and the event stimulated the establishment of anti-fascist political organizations; whether the *ligues*, specifically the Croix de Feu, were indeed fascist remains a topic of debate.¹⁶ This mutually reinforcing nature of anti-

¹⁴ Jean-Paul Sartre, “Republic of Silence” trans. A.J. Liebling (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1947) pp. 498-500, found in Suleiman, *Crises of Memory*.

¹⁵ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*, (The Penguin Press: New York, 2005), pp. 64-6

¹⁶ William Irvine, “Fascism in France and the Strange Case of the Croix de Feu,” *The Journal of Modern History* Vol. 63, No. 2, A Special Issue on Modern France (Jun., 1991), pp. 271-295. Irvine outlines the historiographic controversy on p. 271 and writes that “most historians concur that to include the Croix de Feu/PSF among the ranks of French fascists is to adopt uncritically the partisan labels of the interwar Left.”

fascism and *résistancialisme* is further evident in Judt's account of the Marxist flirtations of France's intellectual community in the two decades after liberation. Revolution, so closely associated with political Marxism, was, albeit in a more abstract form, framed by Sartre as unconditionally obligatory. According to Judt, to the intellectuals of the 1940s and 50s, the concept of resistance was closely associated with revolution because resistance is at the most basic level "the condition of being anti-something."¹⁷ Fascism became the target of this condition among French Marxist and Marxist-sympathizing intellectuals. This, however, was not on the grounds of Marxist theory as echoed in the definition of fascism outlined by the Communist International, but because of the thinkers' recent experience of war and occupation:

[World War II] taught them something of the shocking specificity of fascism; more violent, more extreme, more total in its convictions than anything they had previously encountered, it was the true and ultimate force of evil. To the struggle against fascism, all else must be subsumed.¹⁸

The conceptualization of resistance as a notion analogous to revolution allows one to frame *résistancialisme* within the broad context of French political culture. Kedward relates that 1942 saw the publication of a newspaper using the title of *Le Père Duchesne*, thus deliberately drawing a connection to a radical paper first printed in 1793 then imitated during both 19th century revolutions and the Paris Commune. *Résistants*, he continues, "were partly a rebirth of the patriotic 'gun-behind-the-door' mentality of barricades and revolt."¹⁹ In his *Divided Memory*, Olivier Wieviorka chronicles the continued influence of memories of the Second World War on French politics and society. Despite the efforts of historians in the 1980s to argue otherwise,

¹⁷ Judt, *Past Imperfect*, pp. 26-60

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 221

¹⁹ Kedward, *La Vie en Bleu*, p. 293; the overarching theme of the Resistance being a defense of inherently French ideals of republicanism can be seen to this day in history textbooks, a Gaullist "Thirty Years' War" undertone can also be detected as the fight to defend democracy is framed as a continuation of the Great War: Keith Crawford and Stewart Foster, *War, Nation, Memory: International Perspectives on World War II in School History Textbooks*, (Information Age Publishing: New York, 2007), pp. 63-83

France's role in the war viewed in strictly military terms cannot provide a narrative of heroism as battlefield casualties, a supposed measure of fearless patriotism, of the May-June campaign were not close to surpassing those of the fall campaign of 1914. Additionally, Wieviorka argues, allowing the crystallization of national memory to run its course unimpeded would have entailed that, at best, the French would assume the identity of powerless victims, at worst, that of the enemy's active accomplices. The inability to extract narratives of military valor and the ambiguity of occupied France's role in the war led the successive governments of France (and of the Benelux countries) to embrace narratives of heroic resistance.²⁰

The period in French history that saw the emergence of Poujade and Poujadism was actually a low water mark when it comes to the volume and intensity of *résistancialist* rhetoric emerging from the upper levels of government.²¹ Between the election of 1951 and the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958, official state commemorations focused not on the Second World War but rather on the First (to the extent that Pétain and the collaboration he personified could be avoided).²² Accusations of fascism following the election of 1956, however, did not originate among the governing parties of the center-left; their source was rather among the two opposing political blocs that shared not only their exclusion from cabinets, but also their *résistancialist* source of legitimacy: the Gaullist right represented after 1954 by the National Center of Social Republicans (*Centre national des républicains sociaux*—RS) and the Communists.

The PCF daily *L'Humanité*, which had for months ratcheted up its anti-Poujadist rhetoric, compared the electoral popularity of the UFF to that of the Croix de Feu and its offshoot Parti

²⁰ Olivier Wieviorka, *Divided Memory: French Recollections of World War II from the Liberation to the Present*, trans. George Holloch (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 170-1.

²¹ Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, pp. 32-58, and *Ibid.* p. 43.

²² Wieviorka, *Divided Memory*, p. 46 In fact, reliance on the memory of the Great War can be observed in a Poujadist poster which begins with the words "*Ils ne passeront pas..*" before comparing the dangers facing France in 1956 to those defeated at Verdun in 1916.

Social Français in the 1930s. Similarity in circumstances called for similar solutions as the article proceeded to argue for the creation of a Popular Front government because the “swamp” that was the victorious Republican Front could not, without the help of the Communists, halt the rise of fascism.²³ In an article written by an author seeking to remain anonymous, *Le Figaro* proposed a rather far-reaching conspiracy theory that “*L’Humanité* refused to publish. Because prominent members of the Communist Party like Jacques Duclos were sent to infiltrate the structures of the UDCA in its early days, the PCF was in fact pulling the strings all along. It was according to the cunning plan of the Communists that the Poujadists began to display their anti-parliamentary traits. Because Poujade could be labeled a fascist threat to the Republic, the centrist coalition would be forced to turn to the far Left and its anti-fascist experience to combat this danger, thus allowing the PCF to hold a prominent government role for the first time in a decade.”²⁴ Far-fetched though this proposition may be, its existence suggests that the press of the moderate right, and in turn the public, would have been keenly aware of the Communists’ tendency to turn to their anti-fascist history as a source of political legitimacy.

The Communists’ commitment to anti-fascism was further evident during the first half of February as the invalidation of newly-elected Poujadist deputies was debated. Invalidation was first proposed on January 25 on the grounds that the three parties grouped together in the parliamentary group of Union et fraternité française (UDCA, Union de défense des agriculteurs—UDAF, and Action civique—AC) were not properly registered under the terms of 1951’s *loi des apparentements*. The law allowed parties to unite as coalitions at the level of electoral constituencies. If a coalition secured over fifty percent of the constituency vote, it would receive all the National Assembly seats on the line. Historians are in agreement that the

²³ *L’Humanité*, January 7, 1956, cited in Ian Birchall, “2013: Poujade and the French Left: Paper given to a seminar of the London Socialist Historians Group in November 2013;” <http://grimanddim.org/historical-writings>

²⁴ *Le Figaro*, January 6-7, 1956

law was intended as a means for the centrist Third Force coalition to lessen the influence of the Communist and Gaullist extremes of the 1950s.²⁵ *Apparentements* explain why in 1951 the PCF's victory in the popular vote did not correspond to a plurality of seats in the National Assembly. In the months preceding the election of 1956, electoral reform proposals encompassed a potential re-imposition of two round voting which would have further marginalized the extremes in addition to suggestions of abolishing the *apparentements* system; both reforms failed to attract sufficient support, the latter notably attracting overwhelming Communist support.²⁶

The Communists'—arguably justified—history of opposition to the Fourth Republic's electoral system becomes quite noteworthy when one examines the debates that surrounded the invalidation of Poujadists on the basis of *apparentements* when it was the PCF that most vociferously supported their application. Eleven UFF deputies faced invalidation when the National Assembly met on February 16. After a heated debate that saw Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, two future right wing presidential candidates, call for the resignation of André Le Troquer, president of the National Assembly, over his support for the unconstitutional invalidation, the Communist-drafted proposal was put to a vote. Before the procedure could commence, however, Jean Damasio, a Poujadist deputy from Paris sprinted atop the podium, to shout “*on ne votera pas!*” After a Communist speaker attempted unsuccessfully to forcibly remove Damasio, benches at opposing extremes of the *hemicycle* emptied onto the tiled floor that surrounds the speakers' platform and a brawl commenced.²⁷ A cartoon on the front page of the following day's *Le Figaro* depicts Le Troquer addressing rows of bedridden deputies captioned “[f]or: 326 fractures; against: 315 miscellaneous injuries; the motion of invalidation is

²⁵ Rioux, *The Fourth Republic*, pp. 164-5; Serge Bernstein, Pierre Milza, *Histoire de la France au XXeme siècle*, (Editions Complexe: Paris, 1999), pp. 69-73

²⁶ *Le Figaro*, November 1, 1955 and *Le Monde*, December 2, 1955; these articles detail two distinct instances of the proposed reform's rejection.

²⁷ Marcel Gabilly, *Le Figaro*, Feb 17, 1956

adopted.”²⁸ The cartoon does not address the paradoxical fact that members of the Communist party were willing to use physical force (and in a few cases get arrested) to defend the enforcement of a law passed specifically to lessen their political influence.

The following day the debate resumed and the anti-fascist motivations of the Communists became evident yet again. In their biography of Jean-Marie Le Pen, Gilles Bresson and Christian Lionet recount a scene in which the young Poujadist was accused of being a fascist and an agent of the Gestapo, to which he responded by reminding his accusers that his father had been killed by the Nazi police before accusing the Communists of fascism - both sides demonstrating the tendency to use the term rather arbitrarily.²⁹ The invalidation of Poujadist deputies did indeed succeed while its consequences further reinforce the notion that Communist support for the measure was motivated by anti-fascist dogma rather than by political pragmatism as the vacated seats wound up being given to Socialists and Radicals.

Le Pen, who would hold the title of youngest modern member of the National Assembly until his granddaughter's electoral success in 2012, functioned as Poujade's parliamentary spokesman and closest confidant. On March 5, 1956 he and eight other UDCA members headed to Toulouse to attend a rally in an industrial area of the city. Missing service at Dien Bien Phu by mere months, Le Pen and his fellow Poujadists found themselves besieged soon after arriving in the southwestern town. A Communist counter-demonstration transformed into a 5,000-strong mob armed with bottles and construction tools. The former paratrooper and his fellow deputies broke off chair legs, fashioning clubs to match crowbars, and batted their way out. With the intruders gone, the mayor of Toulouse, Raymond Badiou, led the crowd in the *Internationale* and

²⁸ Jean Sennep, *Le Figaro*, Feb 17, 1956

²⁹ Gilles Bresson and Christian Lionet, *Le Pen : Biographie*, (Éditions du Seuil: Paris 1994), p. 124

the *Marseillaise* before re-interpreting the words of Philippe Pétain at Verdun in proclaiming that “in Toulouse, as in all France, Fascism will not pass.”³⁰

Marginalized in the parliament since 1947, the French Communist Party’s policy in the 1950s aimed at regaining the support of the French electorate lost in part due to an emergent Cold War mentality and because of its continued espousal of Stalinism which became less and less palatable. Describing the Poujadists as fascist allowed the PCF to forcefully associate them with the wartime occupier and with an ideology against which French communists had fought for two decades, thus invoking the image of the party as defenders of the Republic and not the allies of a foreign power. By forcefully combatting the supposed fascist threat posed by the deputies sitting opposite them, the Communists sought to conjure up images of the wartime struggle which legitimized their role in the government during the period of *Tripartisme* (1944-47). Not characterized by the same physical violence as the Communist struggle against the Poujadists, opposition from the Gaullist right did exist, though it has not been noted by scholars of the period.

Son of a World War I era radical-socialist, Michel Maurice-Bokanowski was elected into the National Assembly in 1951 as one of the 121 members of de Gaulle’s *Rassemblement du peuple français* (RPF), after the party’s breakup he joined the *Républicains sociaux* on whose ticket he was reelected in 1956. As the several-week-long invalidation debate was commencing, Bokanowski voiced his strong opinion against the proposition though not because he deemed it illegitimate or because he supported the policies of the UFF. “Invalidation,” he argued, “would inevitably give rise to martyrs.”³¹ “For the first time in the Republic’s history,” he continued, “fifty-three fascists occupied seats in the Chamber of Deputies;” Bokanowski then informed the

³⁰ “An Ordinary Frenchman,” *Time*, and *Le Monde*, March 7, 1956

³¹ *Le Monde*, January 19, 1956

media of his intentions to establish a Committee for the Defense of the Republic.³² The defense, however, was not to be put up against Poujade himself but rather against the “hidden forces” that controlled the UDCA leader and would one day ask that he take action and seize power. Justifying the existence of defense committees, Bokanowski explained that,

If in Germany and Italy apolitical defense committees had responded to fascist tactics in kind, if they had opposed violence with equal violence or responded with tenfold reprisal, if fascist boycotts had been countered with boycotts of fascist businesses, the threat would have been stopped in its tracks.³³

As had been the Communists, members of the Gaullist right were kept out of government since 1947 despite always controlling over a quarter of the vote. In fighting against what they dubbed fascism, these marginalized deputies would have likewise sought to conjure up images of the Resistance. However, while the Communist myth of the Resistance focused specifically on continued combat and their anti-fascist pedigree, the Gaullist myth was focused on national unity.

One of the main features of de Gaulle’s conception of postwar reconciliation was his framing of the profoundly ideological struggle of the Second World War as a much simpler interstate conflict and the culmination of the “Thirty Years’ War.” Describing the period between 1914 and 1945 as a single long war against Germany had a multifold effect. First, it allowed the debacle of 1940 to be glossed over as a lost battle in a much larger war. Second, it likened the liberation of 1944 to the victory of 1918, meaning that all the ambiguity of a war where a notable part of the French population collaborated with the enemy was equated with a more clear-cut battlefield victory.³⁴ Finally, the Thirty Years’ War narrative reduced the complexity of World War II and hid the political divisions that characterized interwar France as the country was

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Robert Gildea, *France Since 1945*, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1996), pp. 10, 61-2

instead portrayed as persistently united against a common foreign enemy.³⁵ Rousso's *guerre franco-française* could thus be obscured behind a façade of an international war. Because of the premises of the Thirty Years' War narrative, homegrown fascism ascribed to the Poujadists became a foreign entity in a struggle against which the Gaullists could have seen an opportunity for promoting national unity.

To understand how such a seemingly paradoxical assertion makes sense, a final brief departure is in order. Published in 1954 and republished several times since, René Rémond's *Les Droites en France* (originally *La Droite en France de 1815 à nos jours*) is considered one of the most important works concerning French political theory and culture. In his profoundly controversial analysis of fascism, Rémond argues that, because a mature fascist party never emerged in France, the country was inherently immune to fascism as it constituted a foreign ideology that the French right could not accommodate.³⁶ In addition to being the source of the immunity thesis, *Les Droites en France* is the origin of the codified separation of France's traditional right into three distinct currents: Orleanism, Bonapartism, and Legitimism. Orleanism, corresponds to liberal conservatism, Bonapartism, a term also used in the writings of Karl Marx, refers to statist populism (like that of de Gaulle); finally, Legitimism corresponds to reactionism or political traditionalism.³⁷ Poujade, though generally associated with the parliamentary right, cannot intuitively be classified in either of these categories. Gaullist claims of Poujade's fascism function in a way very similar to the immunity thesis. Because "all of France" had been united in the Resistance, within the Gaullist ideology of the Thirty Years' War fascism was conflated with belonging to the German nation or at least with foreignness. Accusing the UFF deputies of

³⁵ Rousso, *Vichy Syndrome*, pp. 17-8

³⁶ René Rémond, *Les Droites en France*, (Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1982), pp. 231-8; for criticism of Rémond, see among others, Michel Dobry, "French Society's Allergy to the 'Fascist Revolution,'" in ed. Brian Jenkins, *France in the Era of Fascism*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), pp. 133-47

³⁷ *Ibid.* pp 73-120

fascism, therefore, provided the right with an enemy that resembled the wartime adversary in a struggle against whom the Nation had once been united. Much like the second Popular Front that the Communists purportedly tried create by uniting against alleged parliamentary fascists, Bokanowski's Committee for the Defense of the Republic aimed to attract members from across the political spectrum in a struggle "against renascent fascism."³⁸

Portraying Poujade and his followers as fascists, either domestic inheritors of the Vichy regime and the Nazi occupiers or adherents to an entirely foreign ideology, allowed the PCF and the fragmented Gaullist right to not only harness the power of their respective visions of the Resistance Myth but perhaps to tap into a larger ideas pervasive in the French mentality. Portraying themselves as defenders of the Palais Bourbon or of the Republic, opponents of Poujade would have tapped into a glorification of defense described by Roland Barthes in his 1957 work, *Mythologies*. Describing press portrayals of the Paris floods of 1955 Barthes notes a quality similar to the "myth of 1848." By avoiding images of basements being pumped and focusing instead on the "nobler" barricades constructed by Parisians, the press (predominantly *Paris Match* and *Le Figaro*) provided imagery highly evocative of the city's history of urban resistance. A focus on defensive imagery allowed what was seemingly a catastrophe to be portrayed and consumed as more of a celebration.³⁹ Not only did the Myth of Resistance accomplish political goals in the postwar period, it was perhaps a mainstay in conceptions of what it meant to be French.

³⁸ *Le Monde*, February 24, 1956.

³⁹ Roland Barthes, "Paris Not Flooded," in *Mythologies*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011), pp. 62-5

CONCLUSION

The Poujadist crusade that began when a Lot stationer usurped control of an ongoing wave of anti-fiscal outbursts flew largely under the national radar for two and a half years until its representatives, seemingly out of nowhere, arrived in Paris to kick down the doors of the Palais Bourbon. Once inside, however, the 51 deputies largely sat quietly as political instability, which was in part a root cause of the popular dissatisfaction that helped elect them, persisted around them. Fostered by the lack of national exposure to the movement's growth, some well-founded criticism of the movement's structure and creed emerged. Because of its ideological vagueness that at times ranged into professed opposition to everything, the political Poujadism that emerged in 1955 was an empty vessel that meaning could be poured into according to one's political motivations. A common theme that emerges in criticisms of the Poujadists voiced before and after their electoral success is that of fascism; a distinction, however, should be drawn between accusations of fascism founded in assessments of the movement's unseemly ideological components or its allegedly authoritarian tactics. Both categories are useful in discerning elements of 1950s French political culture as well as determining how interpretations of fascism would have been constructed in the immediate postwar period, a time characterized by such pervasive moral condemnation of fascism that its academic studies were virtually nonexistent.

In 1956 the two loudest parliamentary critics of Poujade and his movement were both at a crossroads. The Communist Party, so vehement in its criticism of the Poujadists, would soon experience its most profound internal crisis as its support of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in late October and early November would effectively discredit it in the eyes of all but the most staunchly pro-Soviet voters. The decline of the PCF was so thorough that it would take until 1978 for the party to secure even half the number of seats in the National Assembly that they

controlled in 1956. The Gaullists, meanwhile, once again led by the General, would, following the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958, be the single largest force in the French legislature for over two decades. Though the popularity of the Gaullist right and of the Communists was to soon take opposite trajectories, in 1956 the two parties exhibited two fundamental similarities. First, because the two political extremes shared a level of deep-seated opposition to the Fourth Republic's political institutions, they had both been excluded from the formation of governments since the beginning of the decade. Second, the Gaullist right and the PCF shared a history of anti-fascism and founded their postwar aspirations to govern on their membership in the Resistance.

My aim was not to portray Poujade as the first person ever to be called a fascist with the term functioning as a term of abuse or insult not reflective of its addressee's political stances, it was rather to provide a case study for this phenomenon. In a famous 1944 article, George Orwell noted that,

as used, the word 'Fascism' is almost entirely meaningless. In conversation, of course, it is used even more wildly than in print. I have heard it applied to farmers, shopkeepers, Social Credit, corporal punishment, fox-hunting, bull-fighting, the 1922 Committee, the 1941 Committee, Kipling, Gandhi, Chiang Kai-Shek, homosexuality, Priestley's broadcasts, Youth Hostels, astrology, women, dogs and I do not know what else.⁴⁰

In a way, the case of fascism-as-an-insult being directed at Poujade is an exceptional one as it relies not just on the morally repulsive connotations of fascism and Nazism, but is rather an expression of underlying lineages of political parties and of their deliberate politicization of memory and history. If anti-fascist rhetoric directed against the Poujadists is viewed as an expression of the Resistance Myth, the parliamentary arguments and fisticuffs that followed the election of 1956 are a valuable glimpse of the *résistancialisme* during a period when, as

⁴⁰ George Orwell, "What is Fascism?," *Tribune*, 1944.

historians have demonstrated, invocations of the Resistance were at an all-time low before they would reach an apogee during de Gaulle's presidency. Furthermore, although this was not a study meant to compare accusations of fascism across national borders during the postwar period, if the charges against Poujade are viewed as attempts at establishing political legitimacy by locating parties or movements within a continuity of pre-World War II and wartime anti-fascism, the case of Pierre Poujade might provide some insight into such propaganda concoctions as Berlin's *Antifaschistischer Schutzwall*, known to most as the Berlin Wall.

While the UDCA continued its operation, the UFF disintegrated; in 1958 its reelected parliamentary representatives would have come either from de Gaulle's Union for the New Republic or the National Center of Independents and Peasants. While de Gaulle's populism would have appealed to the more poujadist UFF affiliates, the CNI attracted the more radically right-wing members of the movement (including Jean-Marie Le Pen). The relationship between Poujade and Le Pen provides a glimpse into the causes for the decline of Le Mouvement Poujade. Pierre Poujade never ran for elected office at the national level, Le Pen, on the other hand, has been a prominent feature of French presidential elections since the mid-1970s. In 2002, as Le Pen prepared to face off against Jacques Chirac in the second round of the presidential election, London's *The Guardian* interviewed "the man who launched Le Pen on to France's national political scene," at the time 81. Poujade promptly declared that his backing of the Front National leader in the heyday of Poujadism was "the worst thing I did in my life. It would have been better if I'd broken my leg." Poujade then chastised Le Pen for "living in his chateau at Saint-Cloud, spending the millions he got by heaven knows what means and [not representing the interests of or] caring about the little man."⁴¹ While the early UDCA could accommodate members of Rémond's legitimist right such as Le Pen, deep fissures emerged as political

⁴¹ Paul Webster, "Le Pen's ex-mentor regrets rise of 'liar,'" *The Guardian*, April 27, 2002

Poujadism began to crystalize around the time of the outbreak of the Algerian War. Being a self-described man of the people, Poujade sought to cater to the desires of everybody in his movement, thus leading to the adoption of the movement's seeming opposition to everything summarized in the slogan on the podium in Victor Weisz's "Poujadolf" cartoon as well as its commitment to the Estates-General project in all its nebulousness. Poujade's unrelenting populism led to the movement's spectacular rise and it was his populism that led to its slide into obscurity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES:

“Brive-la-Gaillarde,” <http://cassini.ehess.fr>

“Constitution de 1946, IVe République,” conseil-constitutionnel.fr

Le Figaro (microfilm).

“Foreign News: An Ordinary Frenchman,” *Time*, Monday, Mar. 19, 1956:
<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,824029,00.html>

“Hymne de Marche de l’U.D.C.A.,” *infos28Paris*, <http://www.idhm.eu/infos28>

Le Monde (online archive, lemonade.fr).

Orwell, George. “What is Fascism?,” *Tribune*, 1944.

Poujade, Pierre. *A l’heure de la colère*. Paris : Albin Michel, 1977.

---. *J’ai choisi le combat*, Saint-Céré: Société Générale des Editions et des Publications, 1955.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. “Republic of Silence” trans. A.J. Liebling, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1947.

“Saint-Céré,” <http://cassini.ehess.fr>

“Speech of De Gaulle ‘Martyred Paris, but liberated Paris’ (1944),” YouTube video, 0:43, posted by *Archives at Risk*,
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=makDyycHvmw&feature=fvhl>.

“Un peu d’histoire,” <http://www.saint-cere.fr>

Webster, Paul. “Le Pen’s ex-mentor regrets rise of ‘liar.’” *The Guardian*, April 27, 2002.

Zaretsky, Robert. “The Tea Party Last Time,” *The New York Times*, February 2, 2010.

SECONDARY SOURCES:

ARTICLES:

- Allardyce, Gilbert. "What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), 367-88
- Burrin, Philippe. "Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept," *History and Memory*, Vol. 9, No. 1/2, (Fall 1997), 321-349.
- Caplan, Jane. "Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas as Historian Nicos Poulantzas," *History Workshop* No. 3 (Spring, 1977), 83-100.
- Dobry, Michel. "French Society's Allergy to the 'Fascist Revolution.'" in ed. Brian Jenkins, *France in the Era of Fascism*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2005.
- Fitzgerald, Sean. "The Anti-Modern Rhetoric of Le Mouvement Poujade," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1970), 167-190.
- Eatwell, Roger. "On Defining the 'Fascist Minimum': the Centrality of Ideology," *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 1 Issue 3, (October, 1996), 303-20.
- . "Poujadism and Neo-Poujadism: From Revolt to Reconciliation," ed. Philip Cerney, *Social Movements and Protest in France*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
- Gentile, Emilio. "Fascism as Political Religion," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 2/3 (May - Jun., 1990), 229-251.
- Grabowski, Waldemar. "Konspiracja Polska we Francji," *Zeszyty Historyczne*. 2009, Iss. 170, pp. 89-119.
- Griffin, Roger. "Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age. From New Consensus to New Wave?," *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2012), 1-17
- Irvine, William. "Fascism in France and the Strange Case of the Croix de Feu," *The Journal of Modern History* Vol. 63, No. 2, A Special Issue on Modern France (Jun., 1991), 271-95.
- Payne, Stanley. "On the Heuristic Value of the Concept of Political Religion and its Application," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* Volume 6, Issue 2, (September 2005), 163-74.
- Roberts, David. "'Political Religion' and the Totalitarian Departures of Inter-War Europe: On the Uses and Disadvantages of an Analytical Category," *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Nov., 2009), 381-414.
- Rose, Arnold. "Anti-Americanism in France," *The Antioch Review*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter, 1952), 466-85

Shields, James. "An Enigma Still, Poujadism Fifty Years On," *French Politics, Culture & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 1, (Spring 2004), 40-62.

---. "The Poujadist Movement: a Faux 'Fascism,'" *Modern & Contemporary France*, Vol. 8, Is. 1 (2000), 19-35.

BOOKS:

Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958.

Barthes, Roland. *Mythologies*. New York: Hill and Wang, 2011.

Borne, Dominique. *Petits Bourgeois en Révolte?: Le Mouvement Poujade*. Paris : Flammarion, 1977.

Burleigh, Michael. *Moral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2011.

--- and Wippermann, Wolfgang. *The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945*, New York: Cambridge University Press: New York, 1993.

Davies, Peter, *The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: from Maistre to Le Pen*, New York: Routledge, 2002.

--- and Lynch, Derek. *The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right*. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Gaffney, John and Holmes, Diana. *Stardom in Postwar France*. New York, Bergham Books, 2007.

Gildea, Robert. *France Since 1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Griffin, Roger ed. *International Fascism: Theories, Causes, and the New Consensus*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

---. *The Nature of Fascism*. New York: Routledge, 1993.

Goguel, François. *Géographie des élections françaises*, Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1952.

Hoffmann, Stanley. *Le Mouvement Poujade*, Paris : Armand Colin, 1956.

Horne, Alistair, *A Savage War of Peace*, New York: Penguin Books, 1977.

- Jenkins, Brian, ed. *France in the Era of Fascism*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2005.
- Judt, Tony. *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956*. New York: New York University Press, 1993.
- Kedward, Rod. *La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900*. New York: Allen Lane, 2005.
- Passmore, Kevin. *Fascism: a Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Paxton, Robert. *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
- Payne, Stanley. *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980.
- Rémond, René. *Les Droites en France*, Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1982.
- Rieux, Jean-Pierre. *The Fourth Republic: 1944-1958*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Rousso, Henry. *The Vichy Syndrome*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Suleiman, Susan. *Crises of Memory and the Second World War*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Wieviorka, Olivier. *Divided Memory: French Recollections of World War II from the Liberation to the Present*, trans. George Holoch, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.
- Winock, Michel. *Nationalisme, antisémitisme, et fascisme en France*. Paris: Seuil, 1982.