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Reconciling the French Dilemma: Attitudes of the French Millennial Generation Towards Maghrebi Immigration and Assimilation in France

Brigit O'Sullivan

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by

Brigit O'Sullivan

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Certificate of Approval

This is to certify that the accompanying thesis by Brigit O'Sullivan has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in Sociology.

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Alvaro Santana-Acuña

Whitman College
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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the attitudes of the French Millennial generation towards Maghrebi immigrants in France, as well as their opinions on the related issues of ethnic diversity and the role of Islam in France. Does the French Millennial generation uphold traditional republican ideals in terms of immigrant assimilation? Having been educated in the French national school system, does this generation maintain nationalistic ideas or have factors such as growing up with access to the Internet and social media in a globalizing world allowed for different expectations of immigrant assimilation and increased acceptance of ethnic and religious diversity? Data from an electronic survey distributed via snowball sampling in February 2017 (n=190) reveal that the French Millennials of this study tend to be politically left-leaning and view immigration and diversity positively. While they continue to uphold some aspects of French Republicanism (such as color-blind policy and secularism), they also reject some republican values (such as aspects of the republican model of integration). In general, they do not see Maghrebi immigration at odds with republicanism. Additionally, they view Islam in France positively and are able to differentiate between Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb and Islamic extremists. Finally, respondents have not changed their positive attitudes towards Maghrebi immigrants or the European Union, even after several terrorist attacks in France by Islamic extremists. They are also not supportive of the growing popularity of Marine Le Pen's party, the National Front. Male respondents tended to be less supportive of ethnic diversity and immigration than females. This could simply be the result of this particular sample; however, more research into this area could

reveal if this is a significant trend and if there are perhaps reasons why French Millennial men would view Maghrebi immigration more negatively than would women.

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INTRODUCTION

The French dilemma has been described as the debate over how to reconcile French Republicanism with the cultural assimilation of foreigners in France (Streiff-Fénart 2012). There exists currently a national tension related to the immigration into France of non-white Muslims from North Africa. More specifically, these immigrants come from the area known as *le Maghreb.* The Maghreb is defined as the general region of western North Africa; however, especially when used in France, this term refers specifically to the countries of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. These three countries play an important role in French colonial history and continue to hold economic and political ties with France today. Immigrants from these countries make up a significant portion of France's population; in 2013, Maghrebi immigrants accounted for 30 percent of all immigrants in France (Insee 2016). Of these three countries, Algeria was colonized first in 1830, followed by Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1912. After colonizing these countries, France took measures to control local government and courts, enforce French language and education, and promote Catholicism, with the goal of assimilating colonial subjects to French culture. In response to growing opposition in Tunisia and Morocco, France granted these countries independence in 1956. Algeria, however, did not gain independence until 1962 following the end of the Algerian War of Independence.

In accordance with the ideals of the French Republic, full cultural assimilation is expected of immigrants in France under the framework of full equality for all citizens. French ideals of republicanism and nationalism embrace the ideal of equality for all through a strict separation of church and state (*laïcité*), color-blind census data and legislation, and nationalistic education. These policies are intended to support the idea

that if all citizens are seen and educated as equals under the law, it will create a unified country of French citizens. Although full cultural assimilation in terms of language, culture, and education is expected of immigrants arriving in France, this total assimilation becomes difficult for non-white, Muslim immigrants who do not fit the image of a French citizen and who experience discrimination, racism, and unequal access to education, jobs, and social services (Vermette 2009).

One especially problematic area within the realm of assimilation in France is amongst *les jeunes ethniques*, that is, second and third generation youth stuck between their parents' and grandparents' culture and the French culture into which they were born and raised. Unlike the United States, children born in France to non-French, immigrant parents are not citizens at birth, but rather can apply for citizenship at the age of 18. Young *beurs* (second generation youth of Maghrebi immigrant parents) must navigate their identity as young people born and raised in a country that has rejected them and pushed them to the outskirts of society (Vermette 2009). *Les beurs* tend to live in *les banlieues*[1]*,* in segregated communities of African and Arab immigrants. In the fall of 2005, riots broke out in *banlieues* across France, as second generation immigrant youth demonstrated their frustration with their position in French society and attempted to reclaim their rights as French citizens to equal opportunities, safety, freedom, equal treatment, education, and job opportunities (Vermette 2009). More recently, in February of 2017, riots broke out again in Parisian *banlieues* over the assault of a young black man at the hands of the police. These protests highlight the persistent tensions between police and residents of the *banlieues,* who tend to be of immigrant backgrounds and experience high rates of unemployment and social marginalization (Love 2017).

[1] Impoverished suburbs on the outskirts of large metropolitan areas.

There have been few opportunities for French citizens of all races and origins to come together; however, the winning national soccer team of the 1998 FIFA World Cup represented a model of excellence for cultural diversity in France. The team, recognized for its abilities but also for the racial and ethnic diversity of its players, became a symbol of ethnic and religious integration for France, inspiring the phrase "*Blacks, Blancs, Beurs*" (Blacks, Whites, and Arabs), a play on words of the national flag's colors "*Bleu, Blanc, Rouge*" (Blue, White, and Red). However, this dream of an integrated France has proven to be idealistic, as "*blacks*" and "*beurs*" remain segregated in the *banlieues* where they face high rates of unemployment and low quality public education (Vermette 2009). After the riots of 2005, some governmental efforts were made to integrate and increase opportunities for those in the *banlieues*. For example, the *Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel*[2] (CSA) attempted to increase diversity in French media to better represent the diversity found within French society. In 2008, Yazid Sabeg, a French man of Algerian origins and the Commissioner of Diversity and Equality, called for statistical collection of the ethnic population in French, in order to understand and calculate rates of discrimination and diversity in social and economic sectors. However, this proposed collection of racial, ethnic, and religious statistics failed and today it is still highly controversial to collect this type of information. If this collection were to be implemented, it would represent anti-republican ideals for many French people, and would contradict Article One of the Constitution[3] (Vermette 2009). If real changes are to be made, "the individual will of each French citizen will have to favor diversity in all

[2] Superior Council of Audiovisual Content, a French institution that regulates electronic media in France, such as radio and television.
[3] Article One of the French Constitution establishes, "France is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It respects all beliefs" (cited in Roche and Williams 2009:43).

sectors of social and economic life" (Vermette 2009:197). French resistance to diversity only pushes immigrants and their children further from French society, the same society into which these immigrants are expected to assimilate.

In upholding national ideals of French Republicanism, French citizens of European origins tend to view immigration as problematic, as generations of Maghrebi immigrants fail to assimilate to acceptable standards of "French-ness" and live in continued poverty (Brinbaum and Primon 2013). While this represents traditional and historical attitudes in terms of French nationalism, I am specifically interested in the attitudes of the French Millennial generation with regards to Maghrebi immigrants in France. Does the French Millennial generation uphold traditional republican ideals in terms of immigrant assimilation? Having been educated in the French national school system, does this generation maintain nationalistic ideas or have factors such as growing up with access to the Internet and social media in a globalizing world allowed for different expectations of immigrant assimilation and increased acceptance of ethnic and religious diversity?

To answer these questions I surveyed French Millennials aged 18 to 35 to understand how they are grappling with this very relevant issue. Invoking Merton's (1972) theory of insiders and outsiders, I found myself in an interesting position as both an insider and outsider to the group I am studying. Merton (1972) argues that the boundaries between the insider and outsider are actually quite permeable. After living in France for seven months during 2016, learning the language, and making social connections, I was partially an insider to this group. As an insider, I had more "privileged access" to my sample and may have been able to gain their trust more easily (Merton

1972:11). As an American, or non-French Millennial, I was also an outsider or a non-member to this group. As an outsider, I may have been able to observe this sociological issue with more "detachment" than a true insider (Merton 1972:34). An online survey allowed me to reach a large number of French Millennials and to understand their attitudes towards ethnic diversity and immigration from the Maghreb, in light of recent political events in France, such as terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016 and the 2017 presidential campaign.

In the subsequent sections of this thesis I will provide an overview of relevant literature on the subject and the theoretical approaches that have shaped my research. I will then explain and analyze my research methods and results with the goal of understanding how the French Millennial generation views Maghrebi immigrants in France and related issues of diversity.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The role of Maghrebi immigrants in France and the attitudes of the French Millennial generation towards these immigrants are complex issues. There are many factors affecting the reception and expectations of this immigrant group, including historical influences, governmental legislation, current politics, and the roles that religion and education play in France. For the sake of clarity, I have divided my literature review into seven sections; each section examines an important aspect of this issue and attempts to give an idea of the current discussion surrounding it. This literature review should give the reader an understanding of the various social and political influences affecting and intersecting with French attitudes towards immigration and assimilation, an overview of the historical attitudes towards Maghrebi immigrants in France, and finally, information about the French Millennial generation.

The French Republic

France's fifth and current republic was founded in 1958. Article One of the French Constitution establishes, "France is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social republic. It ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion" (cited in Roche and Williams 2009:43). According to Steele (2006), "the basis of the French Republic is the assimilation of French-born and immigrant groups into a unified society and powerful centralized state" (p. 108). An important aspect of the French Republic is the *modèle d'intégration républicaine* or the republican model of integration. The goal of this model (as established in Article One) is to treat all citizens as equals by negating the usage of certain criteria such as ethnicity,

race, and religion to categorize individuals. In fact, French law prohibits the gathering of statistics related to race, ethnicity, and religion (Pinet 2009). However, statistics on socioeconomic status, country of origin, and nationality are gathered in France.

Race and ethnicity are often conflated in France, stemming from an idea of "culture as race" (Beriss 2004:123). Race, "as either a biological determinant outside of human history or as a notion of shared descent, has served as one of the primary ideas against which this dominant notion of French identity was formed" (Beriss 2004:123). Even the notion that race exists in France is taboo, emphasizing the belief that race is "an invention by the racist" (Chapman and Frader 2004:7). By banning the collection of racial and ethnic statistics, the French government pushes back against the conception that race exists in the first place (because acknowledging racial categories would be seen as condoning racism). Much of the taboo surrounding racial and ethnic categories stems from the effects of World War II fascism and the fear of repeating that history (Chapman and Frader 2004). Racial scholars Omi and Winant (2012) argue, "from a colorblind standpoint any hints of race consciousness are tainted by racism; hence, the most effective anti-racist gesture, policy, or practice is simply to ignore race. The hope is that by ignoring race, we can transcend racism and embrace a post-racial future" (p. 227). However, this scenario, they argue, "misses the enduring persistence and significance of race, and the ways that structural racism continues to shape present conditions" (Omi and Winant 2012:227).

In theory, the French national conception of citizenship allows the state to interact with individuals independently of factors such as race, ethnicity, or religion. Public institutions and services such as schools, healthcare, and housing disregard racial, ethnic,

and religious differences with the goal of providing equal treatment for all (Oberti 2008). Along with policy of social equality comes the idea of unity and shared responsibility amongst French citizens. Oberti (2008) argues, "the idea is that being French means accepting being a part of this national community of citizens and relegating the dimensions of individual identity to the private sphere" (p. 57).

These principles of French Republicanism prove problematic for many immigrants, however, because they discourage the assertion of separate ethnic identities. In fact, social integration for immigrants is based on the idea of cultural assimilation and "a renunciation of an individual's origins, faith, and customs" (Ware 2014:185). This explains the anxiety within French society and government caused by social and ethnic segregation, because communitarianism is perceived as a danger to social cohesion (Oberti 2008). Communitarianism "has become a term used primarily to define, symbolise and warn against perceived intent by minority groups to create distinct and separate communities and specific racial/ethnic political demands in violation of Republican norms" (Montague 2013:220). Discourse surrounding this term in France is applied primarily to immigrant communities, "as well as Muslim, black, gay and Jewish communities, among others" (Montague 2013:220). Fear of communitarianism has lead to the delegitimization of public inquiry into institutional inequality based on race and the minimization of minority political agendas. In fact, "anti-communitarian discourse asserts that recognising [minority] group demands would fracture the republican community and create discord within the nation itself. This idea is grounded in the notion that France lacks any institutional bias towards visible minorities" (Montague 2013:220).

Immigration and Assimilation

During *les trente glorieuses* (Thirty Glorious Years) from 1946 to 1975, France experienced powerful economic growth, aided by immigrants working in agriculture, industry, and the service sector. These immigrants were recruited to France due to labor shortages in the post-World War II rebuilding phase. Many male immigrants arrived in France as unskilled laborers, including Africans and Arabs from France's former colonies (Steele 2006). Immigration from Algeria to France also increased significantly following the end of the Algerian War in the 1960s. According to the 2013 census, 5.8 million immigrants live in France; they represent 8.9 percent of the total population (Insee 2016). However, African immigrants outnumber European immigrants, with 44 percent of immigrants born in an African country and 30 percent of all immigrants coming from the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (Insee 2016). Additionally, 6.8 million descendants of immigrants live in France, that is, 10 percent of the total population. Of all descendants of immigrants, 30 percent have at least one parent born in the Maghreb (Insee 2016). In sum, Maghrebi immigrants and descendants of Maghrebi immigrants make up about 5.8 percent of the total population in France (Insee 2016). "France's immigration policy has been based on integration by assimilation, called *le modèle républicain*. Assimilation is the unifying ideal of the French Republic" (Steele 2006:72). But, Pinet (2009) argues, this model of assimilation has made it difficult for immigrants and their children to fit in due to expectations that they "cast off their cultural and religious specificity" to become equals (p. 159).

Pinet (2009) claims that due to immigration, France has moved towards a multicultural society, which is seen as incompatible with universal French values held by

French natives. A study done in 2005 found that "a taboo seems to have been lifted in what concerns racial and religious tolerance", i.e., it is becoming less taboo to identify as racist or anti-Islamic (Toner 2009:172). In fact, of the French citizens interviewed in Toner's study, one in three self-declared as racist, an increase of 8 percent in one year. They also found an 11 percent decline of people who believe that immigrant workers contribute to the French economy and thus belong in France. The majority of people interviewed believed that there are too many foreigners in France and 55 percent said there are too many immigrants (Toner 2009). As seen in the results of this study, "cultural pluralism represents for France a menace to national identity and social and cultural cohesion of the country… for this reason multiculturalism does not exist officially on French soil" (Vermette 2009:189). Previously, discussions of race and ethnicity were avoided altogether under the ideals of republicanism; however, race has recently entered the realm of discussion in France relating to immigration. Today, racial discrimination is being discussed and Toner (2009) argues, "faith in the efficacy of the French model of integration has waned" (p. 176).

Attitudes towards Immigration and Foreigners

Attitudes measured in the past forty years regarding immigrants in France reveal anti-immigrant sentiments over time, especially towards North African Muslim immigrants. A survey done in 1974 attempted to understand French attitudes regarding immigration and foreigners in France (Girard, Charbit, and Lamy 1974). In surveying French citizens aged 20 and older, Girard et al. (1974) found that in general, while French citizens view immigration of Europeans positively, they view North African immigrants

negatively. While the respondents believed that European immigrants had the ability to assimilate and blend in with French society over time, over 70 percent believed that it is impossible or difficult for North Africans to assimilate in France. In addition, while the majority did not see marriage between European immigrants and French citizens as a problem, only 11 percent viewed marriage between a North African and a French citizen as positive (Girard et al. 1974). Twenty-five years later, a 1999 poll conducted by the *Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme*[4] found similar results, revealing that 61 percent of people surveyed believed that there were too many foreigners in France and 63 percent believed that there were too many Arabs in France (CNCDH 2000 cited in Lamont 2000).

Michèle Lamont (2000) conducted interviews with white working-class men near Paris in 2000 and found, similarly, that a large proportion of them view North African Muslim immigrants as unable to assimilate to French culture. She, however, argues that race is not an important basis of exclusion; rather, it is mainly due to North Africans' Muslim religion that they are construed as resistant to assimilation and culturally incompatible with French culture (Lamont 2000). There were three main arguments made by white working-class men characterizing North Africans as unable to assimilate. First, North African immigrants were viewed as lacking in work ethic and a sense of responsibility when they have access to a larger share of the collective wealth than they are entitled to (i.e., access to welfare benefits). Second, workers argued that North Africans display a lack of civility and respect, which in turn destroys French quality of life. Finally, workers perceived North Africans' inability or refusal to assimilate as a

[4] National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, a French governmental organization that makes a yearly report on the state of racism in France.

violation of French Republican ideals and as a major threat to their personal and national identity (Lamont 2002). The men interviewed in Lamont's study invoke an argument of cultural incompatibility to justify North Africans' disadvantaged place in French society. Additionally, periods of economic depression (which has been the case in Europe since 2008) can increase anti-immigrant sentiment. Fetzer (2000) argues, "immigration politics in France appear to turn just as much on whether the country's culture will remain primarily Catholic and European as on whether most native-born French workers will be able to find jobs" (p. 122).

More recently, a 2007 study interviewed 960 French residents over the phone on the issue of immigration in France (Simon and Basset 2007). The majority of respondents stated that immigration is neither a benefit nor a threat to France. However, consistent with previous studies, more than half of those interviewed believed that the majority of immigrants have difficulties with integration and that these difficulties stem from the fault of the immigrants themselves, who do not have the cultural means to integrate into French society (Simon and Basset 2007). Additionally, this survey reflects growing concern over the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in France, with 71 percent of respondents stating they believe that Islamic fundamentalism is increasing in strength and prevalence (Simon and Basset 2007).

The *Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme* has conducted several follow-up studies since that of 1999; the most recent poll was done in 2015. Racist attitudes have changed dramatically over time, with 71 percent of French citizens favoring an active struggle against racism (up from 55 percent in 2007) (CNCDH 2016). Consistent with Lamont's findings in 2000, however, Muslims are still the least accepted

minority in France, with criticism focusing on visible practices of the religion, such as wearing the hijab (CNCDH 2016). In light of the recent 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris (Charlie Hebdo in January and the Bataclan in November), this study found that reports of racist acts in France increased by 22.4 percent between 2014 and 2015 (CNCDH 2016).

The contradiction between racist attitudes and racist acts presents an interesting dilemma; is it less socially acceptable to identify as a racist person in 2016? Why do people's reported attitudes not match their actions? Mayer and Morris (1996) argue that while racist attitudes appear to be diminishing and acceptance of Muslim immigrants appears to be growing, "this does not, however, mean ethnocentrism and anti-Semitism have disappeared; they have changed and shifted their ground" (p. 125). Studies by Pierre-André Taguieff (1978) indicate a shift from anti-egalitarianism based on biology to differential racism based on culture (cited in Mayer and Morris 1996). Mayer and Morris (1996) also acknowledge the limitations of survey research; "[surveys] record only stated opinions, and actions do not always match words" (p. 126). In sum, the French tend to hold negative attitudes towards the immigration of North African Muslims in France and these views have stayed fairly consistent over time, with a possible growing acceptance of ethnic diversity and rejection of racism. I am interested in seeing if the French Millennial generation also views North African Muslims in France negatively or if they have moved towards general acceptance of diversity in France. While these sources address my research question, some are outdated and focused on a previous generation and all are focused on the general population of French citizens, as opposed to certain age groups.

Religion

As mentioned previously, there is a widespread belief in France that public or visible religion, specifically Islam, poses a threat to republican values. The French government has established a strict standard of *laïcité* (secularism) in all aspects of the public sector, banning all ostensible signs of religion, such as veils, scarves, turbans, Kippas, and crosses. The increased Muslim population in France has made it difficult for Muslim immigrants to follow the republican model of integration, due to failure to abandon their religious specificity (Pinet 2009). Islam is the second largest religion in France, after Catholicism; however, exact statistics on the numbers of Muslims in France do not exist due to the prohibition on the collection of religious statistics. Most estimates place the figure at around three million French Muslims and another two million foreign-born Muslim immigrants living in France. These high numbers are a result of immigration from the Maghreb (Pinet 2009). The tension surrounding Islam in France has become very evident in the public controversy of Muslim women wearing the *foulard* or hijab, which was banned from public schools in 2004 under the republican ideal of secularism in public schools. This controversial law appears to target Muslim women specifically, since the wording of the law permits "non-conspicuous" symbols, such as a small cross, to be allowed at the discretion of one's teacher (Pinet 2009). Former French President Jacques Chirac stated in 2003 that wearing the hijab is "a kind of aggression that is difficult for the French to accept" (cited in Pinet 2009:169). After the law was passed, some women were expelled for their refusal to remove their hijab at school; however, many cases were settled through "negotiation" (i.e., the women agreed to remove the hijab).

Although this law has received worldwide criticism, it is interesting to note that a 2006 poll of Muslims living in France found that 94 percent were in favor of *laïcité* (Pinet 2009). A study done in 2005 for CEVIPOF, the Paris Institute of Political Studies' center for political research, compared social and political attitudes of French citizens of African or Turkish origin to French citizens of French origins (Brouard and Tiberj 2005). They found that, in general, these two groups have very similar values with regards to traditional French Republican values such as equality and the right to protest (Brouard and Tiberj 2005). These findings imply that French Muslims are not opposed to or at odds with French culture; however, they are also unwilling to completely give up all aspects of their culture, such as their religion.

Education

The French system of education embodies the ideals of the French Republic. It is national, highly centralized, and based on three fundamental principles: it is free, secular, and compulsory for all children under the age of 16 (Steele 2006). The goal of this institution, which is based on intellectual merit, is to act as a social integration mechanism that guarantees equal opportunity for all, independent of social, ethnic, and religious background, wealth or privilege (Oberti 2008; Steele 2006). Civic education is important in France as it reinforces the importance of the values of the French Republic from a young age. In 2015 the Minister of Education, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, said that the objective of civic education is:

> The transmission of a common core of values: freedom, equality, fraternity, secularism, a spirit of justice, respect and the absence of all forms of discrimination. It also aims to develop moral sense, critical thinking and raise awareness of individual and collective responsibility. (Vallaud-Belkacem 2015)

Additionally, French civic education is largely focused on the construction of a national identity. O'Connor and Faas (2011) argue the French education system "has not followed the wider European trend of post-national citizenship. Instead, the 'national' space remains and ethno-cultural values determined by the history of the French Republic dominate construction of national identity" (p. 61). In fact, Ruget (2006) claims that French educators fear the "potentially devastating effects of multiculturalism" in the nation (p. 24). Civic education is therefore focused on the formation of the French citizen with reference to Article III of the 1798 Declaration of the Rights of Man[5], which argues that sovereignty belongs to the nation (Ruget 2006:24). Civic education is thus based on an idea of integration into French culture and citizenship. O'Connor and Faas (2011) argue that this idea is problematic because it marginalizes citizens of non-European migrant origin and reinforces a traditionalist understanding of *laïcité* that is taught from elementary school to high school. Traditional *laïcité* reinforces neutrality in public establishments (often using the 2004 law outlawing ostentatious religious signs as an example) and is maintained as a national identity value. The curriculum, O'Connor and Faas (2011) argue, "does not provide adequate space for democratic iteration… to fit the contemporary reality of twenty-first century France that is home to" one of Europe's largest Muslim populations (p. 59).

Steele (2006) argues that the educational goals of equal opportunity and social integration are "rarely achieved by working-class children in comparison with children of the bourgeoisie" and have "become unattainable with the huge influx into the schools of

[5] Article III states, "The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation."

children from immigrant families" (p. 131). Despite all students being taught the same course content nationally for each subject and taking the same national examinations, "the education system is failing in its role of integrating the children of immigrant families [*les beurs*] into a cohesive society that respects the values of the republic and state institutions" (Steele 2006:131).

A 2008 study of second-generation French youth aged 18 to 35 found that *les beurs* are more likely to repeat grades in elementary school and are less likely to have a high school diploma compared to students of French descent (Brinbaum and Primon 2013). Additionally, French students with parents from the Maghreb were three times as likely as students of French origin to report discrimination at school due to their ethnic origin or nationality (Brinbaum and Primon 2013). The irony of the republican model of education becomes evident when looking at who succeeds in school. Baudelot and Establet (2009), two sociologists of education, argue that French schools actually fare quite poorly in international comparisons (cited in Ahearne 2011). France holds the world record for the number of 15-year-olds who have had to repeat at least one year of schooling, "an indication of a continuing mismatch between the demands of the curriculum and the cultures of less advantaged pupils" (Baudelot and Establet cited in Ahearne 2011:434). Most concerning, they argue, is "the country where the strongest claims are made for republican meritocracy is also one of those where academic destinies are most strongly linked to social origins and the cultural capital of families" (Baudelot and Establet 2009 cited in Ahearne 2011:434). While the republican education system has positive goals, the reality is that many students are being failed by it.

Generation Y or Millennial Generation

Since the baby-boomer generation, *les jeunes* (youth) have been an influential group in French society; "they have been more open to American pop culture than their parents and to educational and economic opportunities in the European Union" (Steele 2006:132). Additionally, France has one of the highest birthrates in the European Union, ensuring that the social and cultural influence of French youth remains important over time (Steele 2006). Galland and Roudet (2001) find that youth in France tend to share liberal values, are pro-European, and generally are more accepting of homosexuality. Protesting is (and historically has been) an important part of French youth culture; 62 percent have signed petitions and 41 percent have participated in a protest. Finally, they find that rural youth tend to have similar values to those from cities; this is an important finding because the rural/urban divide was quite pronounced for previous generations (Galland and Roudet 2001).

The exact dates defining the Millennial generation vary widely depending on source. However, most sources tend to categorize those born between the early 1980s and the late 1990s as members of this generation. Olivier Rollot (2012), author of *La Génération Y,* defines this cohort as those born between 1981 and 1999. In 2015, there were 16 million Millennials in France, accounting for 40 percent of the working population (Rollot 2012). This generation is marked by several important socio-political distinctions. While the oldest members of this generation were not necessarily born into the digital era, they enjoyed easy access to computers and mobile phones by adolescence. The younger end of this generation was born into the Internet age, in a "hyper connected and multicultural society" (Rollot 2012:5). These "digital natives" are the first generation

to test-drive the "civilization of the internet" in which boundaries and knowledge have reached new dimensions in a globalizing world (Rollot 2015). The Internet has also provided a platform with which Millennials make themselves heard regarding social and political issues (Rollot 2012). Also called the "Facebook generation," 94 percent of French youth aged 15 to 24 years old reported having membership in at least one social networking website in a 2010 study (Rollot 2012).

The Generation Y is an international generation, with many French students studying abroad through the Erasmus Program[6] and travelling throughout Europe as ease of travel increases with budget airlines. The Internet also allows for increased global communication. French universities, especially business schools, attract a sizeable number of international students. This diversity allows French students to experience and understand multiculturalism without even leaving France (Rollot 2012). Additionally, the French Millennial generation is increasingly interested in and aware of the importance of politics, when compared to the previous generation, the Generation X. A 2011 study found that over half of French youth had participated in a protest and that 70 percent of youth with at least a bachelor's degree reported interest in politics (Rollot 2012). Furthermore, online activism has become prevalent for this generation and has allowed them to be connected to international movements such as Occupy Wall Street. However, youth (especially those from *les banlieues*) have not turned out to vote in large numbers for non-presidential elections. When this generation does vote, however, it is characterized by its centrism. For example, in presidential elections, candidates such as Francois Hollande are attractive to this generation for their moderation (Rollot 2012).

[6] A European Union student exchange program established in 1990 that allows EU citizens to study abroad in other EU member states.

The Millennial generation is more highly educated and qualified than previous generations; in fact, an "academic inflation" has occurred as this generation obtains more and more degrees to remain competitive in the job market. However, the Millennial generation in France is "paradoxically more precarious" than previous generations (Rollot 2012:188). Unemployment has affected them disproportionately and they have been subjected to poverty more frequently than any other age group. In 2015, youth unemployment was 24.7 percent and a 2011 survey found that 57 percent of youth aged 18 to 25 believe that France's economy is poor (Eurostat 2015; Rollot 2012).

Increased access to the globalizing world through the Internet and ease of travel may signal greater tolerance within the Millennial generation towards foreigners or those with cultural differences. However, the economic precariousness affecting this generation might lead to greater apprehension towards immigrants. My research attempts to understand how these factors affecting the Millennial generation have influenced their attitudes towards immigrants in France. The current political climate in France has certainly been influenced by factors such as globalization and unemployment and has lead to the growing popularity of the far-right political party, the National Front.

Populism and the National Front

Reynié (2016) argues that a new form of populism has emerged on the political right in France (as well as throughout Europe and the United States). Proponents of this new populism emphasize the protection of heritage[7] by combining "hostility toward elites with opposition to the European Union, immigrants, and Islam" (Reynié 2016:47). This

[7] Heritage is defined as "a set of values, principles, and rules that supposedly inhere in the European or Western way of life, such as individual freedoms, gender equality, and secularism" (Reynié 2016:51).

populism, she argues, represents the anxiety felt by Westerners as globalization redistributes worldwide power and the Western world fears the loss of their economic and cultural influence (Reynié 2016). In France the political party *le Front National* (the National Front) and its leader, Marine Le Pen, has become the face of this brand of populism. Marine Le Pen runs on a platform emphasizing national solidarity and the task of "defending our culture, identity, values, and republic" (Reynié 2016:53). She is anti-globalization, anti-immigration, and anti-European Union. Additionally, she has criticized a decline in secularism in France "that she ascribed solely to the influence of Islam" (Reynié 2016:53).

France has recently been targeted by several terrorist attacks claimed or inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), with much attention focusing on the Charlie Hebdo attack of January 2015, the Paris attacks of November 2015, and the Nice attack of July 2016. These terrorist attacks have played a role in strengthening Le Pen's populist message and creating fear towards Muslims in France. A December 2016 poll conducted by Odoxa, a French polling company, found that more than one in three French millennials (aged 18 to 34) do not have a preference for any political party. However, for those who did have a preference, the National Front came out ahead of all other political parties, with 19 percent of young people saying they felt the closest to it. On the other hand, two thirds (67 percent) of youth surveyed had a "bad image" of the National Front (LeParisien 2016).

The political leanings and attitudes towards immigrants of the French Millennial generation may have been affected by recent terrorist attacks in France. Additionally, political discourse surrounding the role of immigrants and Muslims in France,

particularly on the far right, could have influenced both how this generation affiliates politically and how they personally view Muslim immigrants in France. In the following section I will provide an overview of the theoretical approaches that influenced this research and helped me understand the role of generations, religion, and nationalism in a broader context.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Four theories shaped the scope of my research into this issue— theories of immigrant assimilation, Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism, Rogers Brubaker's theory of religion and language in nations, and Karl Mannheim's theory of generations. Understanding assimilation expectations for immigrants and their children in France is important because this shapes their success in the French Republic. French Republicanism is very much tied to nationalism; understanding the process of nation formation and the development of nationalism in a society helps to explain assimilation expectations for immigrants in France. Religion, specifically Islam, also plays an important role in the reception and expectations of immigrants in France. Brubaker's theory is useful in understanding why religion can be such a contentious topic in modern, Western societies. Mannheim's theory explains that generations can be defined as bounded groups, which may hold different nationalistic views based on the socio-political climate of their youth. I am specifically interested in the nationalistic views of the French Millennial generation. Like any generational group, the French Millennial generation has specific defining points; however, they have also been educated in the standardized, nationalistic, French education system, which reinforces certain ideals of homogeneity. How does this generation see itself and understand itself in relation to others?

Theories of Immigrant Assimilation

The national models theory of immigrant integration argues that ideologies or public philosophies of immigrant integration are rooted in a nation's cultural and historical traditions (Alba and Foner 2015). Often this theory is used in comparative

research between different countries because it seeks to explain why different countries have developed different immigrant integration policies. In France, assimilation is understood in terms of the republican model of integration and strong assimilationist principles (Alba and Foner 2015). The national model in which a country functions determines how immigrants will become a part of their new society, "because the models not only shape the willingness of nation-states to acknowledge immigrants as ethnic minorities with distinct needs and cultural rights, but also influence policies and political decisions that have wide-ranging effects" (Alba and Foner 2015:9). Essentially, social reality in a given nation is partly shaped by pre-existing ideas of a nation's self-understanding. These ideas frame social interactions, institutional arrangements, and policy outcomes (Alba and Foner 2015). In France, we can then understand the republican model of integration as a policy that shapes the social reality of immigrants' assimilation pathways.

Portes and Zhou (1993) argue that the context into which immigrants arrive in their new country plays an important role in the course of the lives of their offspring, or the second generation of immigrants. This context includes variables such as the policies of the host government and the values and prejudices of people living in the host country. However, Portes and Zhou (1993) argue that there are three aspects of this context into which immigrants arrive that can create vulnerability and lead to downward assimilation for the second generation—color, location, and absence of mobility ladders. The majority of contemporary immigrants are nonwhite and while "prejudice is not intrinsic to a particular skin color or racial type," moving into a new social environment, especially one like France where the majority of the population is white, can lead to the redefinition

of physical features as a handicap (Portes and Zhou 1993:732). Location, or the concentration of immigrant households in cities, can also lead to vulnerability because "it exposes second-generation children to the adversarial subculture developed by marginalized native youths to cope with their own difficult situation" (Portes and Zhou 1993:732). The socialization of second generation Maghrebi immigrant youth tends to take place in concentrated immigrant communities of the French *banlieues,* reinforcing common feelings of marginalization and rejection from French society. Finally, vulnerability can emerge due to the lack of occupational ladders for intergenerational mobility in a society. Upward mobility for the second generation becomes difficult when their immigrant parents work low-wage, labor-intensive jobs (Portes and Zhou 1993). This theory, while aimed at immigration in the United States, is useful in understanding why the second generation of Maghrebi immigrants continues to be socially and economically disadvantaged in France and how their failure to assimilate to French expectations may lead French citizens to view this group negatively. People living in France are expected to conform to a collective French culture, which is reinforced through nationalistic education and social norms. The following theory of nationalism helps explain why a dominant culture exists in nations like France.

Theory of Nationalism

Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism has been useful in understanding and explaining the process of nation and nationality formation in France, as well as to better understand the mindset of a young person who has grown up in France. Nationalism is "the principle of homogenous cultural units as the foundations of political life, and of the

obligatory cultural unity of rules and ruled" (Gellner 1983:125). This theory argues that nations are born out of the transition from agricultural to industrial societies. Gellner (1983) contends that industrialization has brought people together— in shared languages, cultures, and systems of education. Industrial societies are marked by a "complex and persistently, cumulatively changing" division of labor, in which nationalism is rooted (Gellner 1983:24). This division of labor leads to a certain kind of egalitarianism, where there is more room for economic mobility (because positions are no longer transmitted from father to son). For Gellner, another important tenet of an industrial society is universal literacy, and stemming from that, the right to an education. Universal, standardized, and generic education plays an essential role in the working of a modern society. In fact, Gellner (1983) repurposes Marx's idea of the mode of production of modern society, and calls this centrally guaranteed education the "mode of reproduction" for a modern society (p. 29). In this mode of reproduction an educational agency "takes over the preparation of the young humans [in a modern society]… and eventually hands them back to the wider society to fulfill their roles in it" (Gellner 1983:30). When the state holds a monopoly over the system of legitimate education, the imperative of nationalism can be understood as being rooted in a "pervasive social order" (Gellner 1983:34). Nationalism is then "the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures" (Gellner 1983:48).

Nationalism, Gellner (1983) argues, is "the general imposition of a high culture on society" (p. 57). This high culture can be understood as the imposition of a normative set of principles for all citizens, at the hands of the elite. We see this phenomenon happening in France, as French culture is imposed on immigrants from other cultures.

There are several factors that contribute to the making of a modern society, according to Gellner. The first is power, in the sense that "modern societies are always and inevitably centralized" (Gellner 1983:88). The enforcement of the social order is concentrated in the hands of a few members of society who wield this power. The second is access to education, where this normative culture is reinforced. Finally, the third factor is a shared culture. In an industrial society, Gellner (1983) claims, culture is no longer linked to a faith and a church, rather "the culture is sustained *as* a culture" (and not as an accompaniment of a faith) (p. 141). In the French Republic, secularism is maintained as an important principle of the nation and plays an important part in French nationalism. Gellner (1983) argues, "the state is, above all, the protector, not of a faith, but of a culture, and the maintainer of the inescapably homogenous and standardizing education system" (p. 110). This idea is demonstrated in the French national education system, which instills republican ideas from a young age. Standardized education is one of the most important factors leading to nationalism, according to Gellner. The education system is entrusted with a task:

> To turn out worthy, loyal and competent members of the total society whose occupancy of posts within it will not be hampered by factional loyalties to sub-groups within the total community; and if some part of the educational system… actually produces internal cultural differences and thereby permits or encourages discrimination, this is counted as something of a scandal. (Gellner 1983:64)

In sum, internal cultural differences within a nation can be seen as not only deviant, but as a failure of the nation's educational system.

In applying Gellner's theory to current nationalistic government, goals, and education in France, one can see why immigrants are expected to assimilate into French culture and why they face backlash when they fail to achieve these expectations of

assimilation. Gellner (1983) posits, "nationalism tends to treat itself as a manifest and self-evident principle, accessible as such to all men, and violated only through some perverse blindness" (p. 125). If a society, such as France, is based on the ideas of homogenization, standardization, and centralization, those who fail to fit in become problematic to those who fit in easily. I will use this theory to understand why French citizens continue to have difficulty accepting diversity and cultural differences in France.

Theory on the Intersection of Religion and Nationalism

Rogers Brubaker builds on Gellner's theory of nationalism, specifically Gellner's argument that universal language is at the heart of nation formation. Language is deeply engrained in the identity of a nation—it is a "universal and pervasive medium of social life" (Brubaker 2013:5). Language allows for ease of communication, associations with literate high cultures, and socialization through state-organized schooling (Brubaker 2013). Brubaker (2013) argues, however, that in modern Western liberal democracies (such as France), "religion has tended to displace language as the cutting edge of contestation over the political accommodation of cultural difference" (p. 16). This is a reversal of Gellner's argument and the longer-term process through which language was the primary focus of contention in a nation.

Brubaker (2013) argues that we can understand nationalism and ethnicity in terms of both language and religion: they are "arguably the two most socially and politically consequential domains of cultural difference in the modern world" (p. 2). Both language and religion sort people into "distinct, bounded and largely self-reproducing 'communities'" (Brubaker 2013:3). However, religion and language are politicized in

different ways. Language is outwardly politicized by the state and by the media, both of which must privilege a particular language or languages, but they need not privilege a particular religion. While the state cannot approach neutrality in terms of language, it can in terms of religion. Strict *laïcité* in France attempts to neutralize religion in French public life; however, Brubaker (2013) reminds us that pervasive traces of Christianity remain engrained in the public life of Western liberal democracies—for example, in the organization of calendars and holidays.

In contrast, in today's Western nations, language is a less complex and controversial subject than religious pluralism when it comes to grappling with forms of diversity. Religious pluralism is more easily reproduced than linguistic pluralism, since religious socialization tends to occur within the family and local communities. Linguistic socialization, on the other hand, occurs in centralized, state-controlled schooling, rendering the survival of minority languages difficult beyond the second generation of immigrants (Brubaker 2013). Religious pluralism, as in the case of Islam in France (a supposedly neutral or secular state), presents complex questions such as how states should subsidize Islamic schools, where subsidies are provided for other religious schools.

Brubaker (2013) argues, "the accommodation of religious pluralism in liberal politics is… more likely to generate difficult and sometimes intractable problems of…'deep diversity'" (p. 12). Language conflict, he argues, has lost some of its intensity in recent decades, while conflicts over religion have intensified. One of the reasons behind this conflict is that religion, unlike language, "often involves an authoritative, binding and comprehensive set of norms" which regulate not only private behavior, but

also "reach into the public realm, addressing such matters as gender, sexuality, family life, education, social policy, the economy and even international affairs and war" (Brubaker 2013:14). This, of course, challenges the state's monopoly on the regulation of public life and often sparks conflicts of principle over fundamental differences of worldview between religion and the state. In France, conflict between Islam and the state has provoked questions of principle. As Brubaker (2013) puts it, "liberal states may be obliged to accommodate forms of religion that promote illiberal ideas or practices; or they may be obliged to act illiberally in restricting religious or other freedoms in the name of other values" (p. 15).

This theory is useful to understand the tension surrounding Islam in France and how this tension impacts Maghrebi immigrants in France, who tend to be Muslim. Since immigrants from the Maghreb tend to speak French, language is less of a point of contention for this immigrant group. The Islamic religion, however, is often invoked in the sense of cultural incompatibility when discussing these immigrants. *Laïcité* in France also plays an interesting role in this issue because public religion is highly discouraged and some aspects of Islam are more publically apparent than Christian religions. I am, of course, interested in how a specific generation, the Generation Y, interprets issues such as religious tension surrounding Muslim immigrants in France. The following theory allows me to understand how generations form worldviews on these issues.

Theory of Generations

Karl Mannheim's theory of generations helps to explain and support my decision to focus on one specific generation (the Generation Y or Millennial generation) for my

research. He argues that people are influenced by the socio-historical environment of their youth, which then leads to the formation of social cohorts or generations (which develop based on shared experience). These social generations are distinguished from kinship (the family). He says, "individuals who belong to the same generation, who share the same year of birth, are endowed… with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process" (Mannheim 1952:290). This theory argues that social change, which occurs during a generation's youth, brings these social cohorts together. This social change can occur during times of accelerated social and cultural transformation and does not necessarily need to reflect major historical events (Mannheim 1952). However, he argues, "the quicker the tempo of social change and cultural change is, then, the greater are the chances that particular generation location groups will react to changed situations by producing their own entelechy" (Mannheim 1952:310). Mannheim (1952) argues that in every era, young people are susceptible to socio-historical triggers (or events), as their worldviews are in the process of forming. He says, "early impressions tend to coalesce into a natural view of the world. All later experiences then tend to receive their meaning from this original set" (Mannheim 1952:298).

It is important to note that this theory is centered on Western values and that members of a certain generation are "internally stratified" by their location, culture, and class. In other words, each generation is not totally homogenous; they view different events from different angles, but they are "in a position to experience the same events" (Mannheim 1952:297). Additionally, Mannheim argues that not all generations are necessarily politically engaged. In fact, he disputes the belief that young people are

always more left-leaning than older people. “Nothing”, he states, “is more false than the assumption that the younger generation is ‘progressive’ and the older generation *eo ipso* conservative” (Mannheim 1952:297). This insight supports my decision to research the French Millennial generation and understand how they view issues of immigration, given the fact that they may not necessarily view these issues progressively simply due to their youth.

I have chosen to study this generation specifically because I am interested in how the social changes (such as increased access and dependency on technology and social media, an increasingly globalized world, an economic crisis, and high rates of unemployment) and events experienced during this generation’s childhood (such as recent terrorist attacks) have affected their views on immigration and diversity in France. As the first generation of “digital natives,” this social cohort presents a unique worldview.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodological Approach

My research question asks how the French Millennial generation views the Maghrebi immigrant population in France and related issues of diversity and religion. I decided to answer this question with an electronic survey[8] distributed via snowball sampling. This method allowed me to reach the French Millennial population, since I was in the United States during the research and I have a relatively small number of personal contacts in France. I distributed my survey through the social networking websites Facebook and Twitter and via email to my personal contacts in France. Additionally, I asked my American friends and Facebook contacts to share the link with any French friends they may have. Originally, I did not think I would yield many responses due to my distance from France and my relatively limited connections to French people. However, I believe I greatly underestimated how far and wide information can spread through social media. I received a total of 214 responses to my survey.

My survey was released on February 2nd, 2017, and stayed open for nineteen days, until February 21st, 2017. I should note that I released this survey while two influential political events were occurring in France. On February 2nd, 2017, a young black man in a Parisian suburb was arrested and assaulted by the police, sparking protests and riots across France in the weeks following the incident. Additionally, the French presidential election campaign was ongoing and gearing up for the April election at the time of this survey. Of the 214 respondents, 104 accessed the survey through social media (Facebook or Twitter) and 110 accessed it through an anonymous link, which I distributed via email.

[8] My survey was created using Qualtrics software. See Appendix A for an English translation of the survey.

I deleted data from 24 respondents—two respondents were under 18 years old and sixteen respondents were 36 years old or older. I deleted data from six additional respondents who began the survey (i.e., accepted the consent statement), but did not actually answer any questions on the survey. This left me with 190 responses to analyze. Of these, 152 respondents completed the entire survey and 38 partially completed it.

The survey consisted of close-ended questions (with the exception of one open-ended question at the end) and contained a combination of multiple choice questions and Likert (1932) scale questions. The multiple-choice questions were used primarily to collect demographic information from participants, including, but not limited to, their age, gender, nationality, and location. The Likert scale questions, which asked participants to rank their level of agreement with certain statements, were used to understand survey takers' attitudes towards various issues relating to my research question, such as the role of Maghrebi immigrants in France, the role of Islam in France, and their agreement with various statements representing republican values. The majority of my statistical analysis was done through descriptive statistics. When discussing results from my Likert-scale questions, I divided statements into four categories: Diversity, Integration and Assimilation, Republican Values, and Religion. These categories helped me to understand different aspects of a larger question. The organization of the categorized questions can be seen in Appendix B. I also performed cross-tabulations to compare various independent variables such as age, gender, and location to dependent variables from my Likert scale questions.

Insider and Outsider Status

Because of my unique status as an insider and outsider to the population I was studying, I may have been able to gain interesting insight into this issue to which a non-foreigner may not have access (Merton 1972). After spending seven months in France in two different regions (Pays de la Loire and Nouvelle-Aquitaine), I have a decent grasp of the language, an understanding of everyday life in France, and connections with French people who live in several regions of France. I also blended into French society easily due to my physical characteristics as a white person. I believe these aspects of my insider status allowed me to reach and gain the trust of a large population with my survey. However, I am still clearly a foreigner to this population (and I made this clear in the consent statement of my survey). My role as an outsider is two-fold. First, I do not have the same mindset as French youth. Having grown up in the United States and been educated in the American educational system, I view issues related to racial and ethnic diversity differently than French people do. I cannot claim to understand how issues relating to immigration, race, and ethnicity affect everyday interactions between individuals in France. Secondly, my survey respondents knew and were aware of my position as an outsider. While I had only one short-answer question on my survey, respondents may have taken the time to explain more thoroughly their opinions relating to this issue so that a non-French person could better understand their answer.

Ethical Concerns

My position as an outsider to this group and social issue meant that there was a potential to offend people taking my survey. The subject of attitudes toward immigration

and diversity is a sensitive issue in general and some of the statements on my Likert-type scale were controversial. For example, one such statement read, "It is dangerous to accept any Muslim immigrants into France at this time." While I did not claim to be an expert on this subject or to understand the social and political difficulties facing France at this time, I think there is always the potential to offend or make participants uncomfortable as a foreigner researching a controversial and sensitive topic. To help combat this issue, I gave participants the option of skipping any questions that made them uncomfortable.

I additionally made the choice to include a question asking for my participants' racial identities. This question had the potential to offend or make my participants uncomfortable because racial categories do not exist officially in France (they are, however, often used in casual language). French people are not accustomed to answering questions related to race and/or ethnicity on surveys or questionnaires. I worded the question carefully, eventually eliminating the word race from the question.[9] I additionally created response categories appropriate to the French context, i.e., response categories represented races of common immigrant groups found in France. However, as I will discuss in my results section, several people wrote in answers such as "human" or explained that they do not identify themselves by the color of their skin.

Limitations

Due to my geographic distance from France, my limited French contacts, and my outsider status, I believe I faced several limitations in distributing my survey. First, I was essentially confined to survey methods for my research. However, I think an electronic survey was the most appropriate way to reach a wide variety of French millennials

[9] The question read, "How do you identify yourself?"

because one can distribute information so easily through the Internet. I think qualitative interviews could have added more information to my data since this is a nuanced and difficult topic, but this would have been logistically difficult. There is also always the possibility that respondents do not answer survey questions completely honestly. However, the benefits of survey research in this case outweighed this risk. Keeping the survey anonymous hopefully encouraged respondents to answer the survey as truthfully as possible. Additionally, my personal friends and contacts in France are based primarily in two regions, Pays de la Loire and Nouvelle-Aquitaine. I thought that this would be a significant limitation, but due to snowballing, I was able to reach French youth living in almost every region of France with my survey.

One of the main limitations of my choice to use snowball sampling is the generalizability of my survey. Did I simply reach people who all tend to think similarly because they are friends? While I set out to survey people aged 18 to 35 years old, the majority (79 percent) of my respondents were 18 to 25 years old. The majority of my personal French contacts are in this 18 to 25-year-old range (especially those with whom I am friends on Facebook), so it was logistically more difficult for me to contact the 26 to 35-year-old age group. The Generation Y is defined as those aged approximately 18 to 35 years old, so my data are skewed towards the younger half of this generation. Furthermore, about 10 percent more females than males responded to my survey, making my data less generalizable to the overall French population, which is split about 50/50 between males and females.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

My sample included a total of 190 respondents (after deleting data for 24 respondents). The following information describes the demographic characteristics of my sample:

Table 1.		
Age		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
18	12.11%	23
19	17.89%	34
20	12.11%	23
21	7.89%	15
22	7.89%	15
23	10.53%	20
24	6.32%	12
25	4.21%	8
26	2.11%	4
27	2.63%	5
28	4.21%	8
29	1.05%	2
30	3.16%	6
31	1.05%	2
32	0.53%	1
33	1.58%	3
34	2.63%	5
35	2.11%	4
Answered Question		**190**
Skipped Question		**0**

Table 2.		
Gender		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Female	55.11%	97
Male	44.89%	79
Answered Question		**176**
Skipped Question		**14**

While my goal was to survey the Generation Y age group in its entirety (those aged 18 to 35 years old), the age of my sample is skewed heavily towards the 18 to 25-year-old portion of this generation. My sample is therefore not necessarily representative of the entire Generation Y, given that 78 percent of respondents were between the ages of 18 and 25 years old. My sample is more illustrative of the younger half of this generation (of those born between 1992 and 1999). I did, however, receive at least one response from every age category.

In terms of gender, my sample is slightly skewed towards women. About ten percent more women than men answered my survey, with 55 percent of respondents identifying as female and 45 percent identifying as male. When compared to the French census of January 1, 2017, in which 48.5 percent of the population is male and 51.5 percent is female, my sample is not completely representative of the French population in terms of gender distribution (INED 2017).

Table 3.		
Nationality		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
French	98.31%	174
Category not mentioned above	1.69%	3
	Answered Question	**177**
	Skipped Question	**13**

The vast majority (98 percent) of respondents have French nationality. The majority of respondents reported having parents with French nationality, too. Ninety-three percent reported their father's nationality as French and 95 percent reported their mother's nationality as French. Foreigners (non-French citizens) made up six percent of the French population in 2013, so my sample is fairly representative of the population of

French citizens in France, if maybe slightly skewed towards French citizens (INED 2013).

Table 4.		
Race[10]		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
White	77.97%	138
Category not mentioned above	9.04%	16
Prefer not to respond	2.82%	5
White, Arab or Berber	2.26%	4
White, Category not mentioned above	1.69%	3
Indian	1.13%	2
Afro-Caribbean	1.13%	2
Arab or Berber	1.13%	2
White, Asian	0.56%	1
White, Asian, Category not mentioned above	0.56%	1
Asian	0.56%	1
Arab or Berber, Prefer not to respond	0.56%	1
White, Prefer not to respond	0.56%	1
Black	0.00%	0
	Answered Question	**177**
	Skipped Question	**13**

The majority (78 percent) of respondents self-identified as white. The second highest category chosen after "white" was "category not mentioned above," with over nine percent of my sample choosing this answer. This category gave participants the option to write in an alternative response. The most common write-in answers included "human" and "human being" (45 percent), "mixed-race" (25 percent), and "I do not identify myself by the color of my skin" (20 percent). Additionally, some respondents wrote in their nationality in this category. So, I can see here that by rejecting the racial categories provided, some respondents have internalized the French Republican value

[10] Racial categories were created based on those used in this peer-reviewed study: Simon, Clément and Héran (2006).

that discourages racial categorization in the name of equality. Because the French government does not collect racial statistics, I do not have official data with which I can compare this information.

Table 5.		
Location of K-12 Schooling		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Metropolitan France	94.38%	168
French Overseas Territory	1.12%	2
Category not mentioned above	4.49%	8
Answered Question		**178**
Skipped Question		**12**

Table 6.		
Highest Level of Education		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Less than high school diploma	0.00%	0
High school diploma	13.48%	24
1 year of undergraduate degree	14.61%	26
2 or 3 years of undergraduate degree[11]	35.96%	64
Master's degree	34.83%	62
Doctorate	1.12%	2
Answered Question		**178**
Skipped Question		**12**

In terms of education, the majority (94 percent) of respondents completed their K-12 schooling in metropolitan France.[12] Additionally, my sample is a highly educated group with 100 percent having at least a high school degree and 72 percent having completed at least two years of university. In 2012, 43 percent of 25 to 34-year-olds in

[11] A French undergraduate degree is typically three years.
[12] Metropolitan France comprises mainland France and the nearby island of Corsica. This term excludes the five French overseas territories of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion, Guyane, and Mayotte.

France were graduates of higher education, so my sample represents a more highly educated group than the national average (OECD 2014).

Table 7.		
Size of City		
Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
A big city (population >1,000,000)	23.56%	41
A medium-sized city (population between 1,000,000 and 250,000)	27.59%	48
A small city (population between 250,000 and 25,000)	29.89%	52
A village/rural region (population <25,000)	18.97%	33
	Answered Question	**174**
	Skipped Question	**16**

My sample is split fairly evenly between the four size options of city. The majority of the respondents (81 percent) live in some sort of city (as opposed to a rural area). In 2015, 79.5 percent of the French population lived in an urban area, so this urban/rural distribution is fairly representative of the total population in France (World Bank 2016).

Figure 1. Regions of France (% of respondents)



Answered Question	**127**
Skipped Question	**63**

In terms of regional distribution (see Figure 1.), my sample is skewed towards the regions of Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, Nouvelle-Aquitaine, Île-de-France, and Bretagne. These data are therefore quite unrepresentative of regional populations in France, where Île-de-France (the Parisian region) is home to 19 percent of the French population, Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes holds 12 percent of the total population, and Nouvelle-Aquitaine only 9 percent of the population (INED 2016). Furthermore, none of my respondents live

in a French overseas territory, meaning that my sample represents only metropolitan France. Interestingly, 63 respondents or 33 percent of the sample chose to skip this question asking about the region in which they reside. French regional boundaries were recently redrawn and renamed in 2016, sparking nation-wide controversy over the change. Perhaps respondents skipped this question because they do not feel a strong attachment to their newly assigned region or because they identify more closely with their local department (which delineates a smaller geographic region).

Given this information, my sample represents a majority white, majority French citizen population. Because most respondents reported that both parents were also French citizens, I can infer that there are few immigrants or second-generation immigrants represented in my sample. For the most part, respondents were educated in France and have generally attained a high level of education. When interpreting my data, the demographics of this sample should be kept in mind, as they represent a particular segment of the French Millennial generation.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

I have divided my results into several sections, each addressing a different aspect of my research question, in the attempt to understand how the French Millennial generation views Maghrebi immigrants in France. The first section focuses on interactions with Maghrebi immigrants and reveals that, while respondents do interact with Maghrebi immigrants and view these interactions positively, they do not tend to have many close friends from the Maghreb or of Maghrebi origins. I then move on to four sections into which I have divided my Likert scale questions. These four sections focus on diversity, integration, republican values, and religion. In general, respondents view Maghrebi immigrants, ethnic diversity, and Islam in France positively. However, they continue to uphold some of the most important tenets of French Republicanism. I then discuss respondents' voting habits and political leanings; they tend to vote and affiliate with left-leaning political parties. Finally, I look at respondents' attitudes towards Maghrebi immigrants, the European Union, the National Front, and the Socialist Party in light of recent terrorist attacks on French soil. In general, respondents do not report having changed their positive attitudes towards Maghrebi immigrants and the European Union or their negative attitudes towards the National Front after the terrorist attacks.

Interactions with Maghrebi Immigrants

I asked respondents about the frequency of their day-to-day interactions with Maghrebi immigrants or descendants of Maghrebi immigrants to understand how often my sample comes in contact with this immigrant group. The majority (59 percent)

reported interacting with Maghrebi immigrants or descendants of Maghrebi immigrants every day or almost every day. Additionally, 67 percent of respondents indicated that these interactions tend to be positive or mostly positive. However, when I asked how many of my respondents' close friends were from the Maghreb or of Maghrebi origins, 34 percent reported having no close friends and 50 percent reported having one to three close friends from the Maghreb or of Maghrebi origins. Only 16 percent of respondents reported having four or more close friends from the Maghreb or of Maghrebi origins.

In sum, these findings show that the French Millennials in my sample (the majority of whom identified as white) tend to have frequent interactions with this immigrant group and see these interactions as positive. However, this group of Millennials does not tend to have many close friends from the Maghreb or of Maghrebi origins. This may mean that interactions between respondents and Maghrebi immigrants or descendants of Maghrebi immigrants tend to be more casual or less in-depth.

The French Millennial Generation On Issues of Diversity

I used Likert scale questions to understand respondents' attitudes towards issues of diversity and immigration related to Maghrebi immigrants in France. Statements on my Likert scale aimed at understanding questions of diversity included, "Ethnic diversity benefits France as a country," "There are too many immigrants from the Maghreb in France," and "Immigrants in France diminish the jobs available to my generation." As Table 8. shows, the majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that ethnic diversity benefits France as a country. When asked more specifically about Maghrebi immigrants in France, the majority of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with

this statement: “There are too many immigrants from the Maghreb in France.” Finally, a strong majority disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that immigrants diminish the jobs available to their generation. It is possible that respondents’ disagreement with this statement was mitigated by their high degree of educational attainment. Perhaps a sample more representative of the French working class would view this statement differently. In general, it appears that my sample is supportive of the idea of ethnic diversity in France and of Maghrebi immigrants in France.

Table 8. Diversity

	Agree/ Strongly Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ Strongly Disagree	Prefer not to respond
Ethnic diversity benefits France as a country	81%	11%	6%	2%
There are too many immigrants from the Maghreb in France	11%	20%	66%	3%
Immigrants in France diminish the jobs available to my generation	6%	12%	79%	3%

When cross-tabulating these results with the independent variable of gender, I found that men tended to be less accepting of ideas of diversity in France than women. While the majority of both genders agreed that ethnic diversity benefits France, men were 13 times more likely than women to disagree or strongly disagree with this statement.

Table 9. “Ethnic diversity benefits France as a country”

	Men	Women
Agree/Strongly Agree	68%	92%
Neither agree nor disagree	16%	7%
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	13%	1%
Prefer not to respond	3%	0%

This gender divide is also evident when looking at the statement "There are too many immigrants from the Maghreb in France." In Table 10., men agreed with this statement 11 times more often than women, while women overwhelmingly disagreed with this statement (at a rate of 1.6 times more than men).

Table 10. "There are too many immigrants from the Maghreb in France"

	Men	Women
Agree/Strongly Agree	22%	2%
Neither agree nor disagree	23%	18%
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	51%	79%
Prefer not to respond	4%	1%

Additionally, while the majority of both men and women disagreed with the statement that immigrants diminish jobs available to their generation, men were 9.7 times more likely than women to agree with it. This gender divide is unexpected and while it could simply be a product of this particular sample, it could also represent some larger issue driving French Millennial men to view immigrants and diversity more negatively than women. Perhaps the high unemployment rate has affected men more strongly than women.

Table 11. "Immigrants in France diminish the jobs available to my generation"

	Men	Women
Agree/Strongly Agree	12%	1%
Neither agree nor disagree	13%	12%
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	71%	86%
Prefer not to respond	4%	1%

Integration and Assimilation

Four of my Likert statements aimed to understand the Millennial generation's attitudes towards integration and assimilation of Maghrebi immigrants. Gellner's (1983)

theory of nationalism argues that nationalism forms out of the imposition of a high culture in a society. In France, French culture could be considered the high culture of the society and immigrants are expected to conform to this culture through cultural assimilation (Ware 2014). Understanding Millennials' attitudes towards the integration process of immigrants (specifically those from the Maghreb) can help to understand how this generation upholds nationalistic viewpoints.

Table 12. Integration and Assimilation

	Agree/ Strongly Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ Strongly Disagree	Prefer not to respond
The French government must do more to integrate immigrants from the Maghreb	58%	22%	18%	2%
Some immigrants from the Maghreb do not want to assimilate to French culture	64%	24%	11%	1%
Immigrants from the Maghreb assimilate less quickly than those from European countries	31%	24%	40%	5%
Immigrants from the Maghreb can integrate better than asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, and/or Sudan because they speak French	38%	29%	29%	4%

The statement "The French government must do more to integrate immigrants from the Maghreb" attempted to understand if French Millennials are placing the blame on immigrants themselves for failure to integrate or if they believe that the government should be doing more to aid in this issue. The majority (about 58 percent) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, indicating that they believe the government should share in the responsibility of integrating Maghrebi immigrants. I provided the statement "Some immigrants from the Maghreb do not want to assimilate to French culture" because this statement places more blame on the immigrants themselves for not

integrating into French culture, making this a question of personal choice, rather than of ability to integrate. The majority of respondents (64 percent) agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. It is interesting that the majority of respondents agreed with these two different statements. It appears that respondents do believe there is a need for more governmental intervention in assisting with the assimilation of Maghrebi immigrants. However, they also believe that some Maghrebi immigrants do not want to integrate to French culture, so perhaps the idea of cultural incompatibility (Lamont 2002) or resistance to assimilation of Maghrebi immigrants is prevalent within the French Millennial generation.

When asked to compare the rate of integration of Maghrebi immigrants to immigrants from other European countries, respondents' answers were fairly split. Almost 40 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement "Immigrants from the Maghreb assimilate less quickly than those from European countries." However, 31 percent did agree or strongly agree with this statement. This statement is true, according to existing research (Vermette 2009), yet about 10 percent more respondents disagreed with this statement than agreed. Perhaps respondents do not perceive a large difference between the integration patterns of Maghrebi immigrants and European immigrants. However, respondents could also have disagreed with this statement with the goal of trying to appear unbiased towards or accepting of Maghrebi immigrants.

When asked to compare the assimilation ability of Maghrebi immigrants to that of asylum seekers based on language spoken, 38 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, "Immigrants from the Maghreb can integrate better than asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, and/or Sudan because they speak French."

However, almost 29 percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. Interestingly, another 29 percent of respondents reported neutral feelings on this statement. Responses to this statement were fairly split. Perhaps, comparing immigrants arriving in France for mostly economic reasons to asylum seekers was not an easy or fair comparison to make.

Is this Generation Upholding Traditional Republican Values?

Four of my Likert statements aimed at understanding how this generation understands traditional republican values. Republican values, enforced through French education, are strong indicators of nationalism.

Table 13. Republican Values

	Agree/ Strongly Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ Strongly Disagree	Prefer not to respond
Secularism in schools is beneficial because it equalizes all students	79%	10%	10%	1%
Immigrants from the Maghreb would adapt more quickly if they adopted French lifestyles	36%	37%	24%	3%
Immigration from the Maghreb to France is a threat to the values of the French Republic	11.5%	11.5%	75%	2%
Immigrants who retain their language/culture/religion from their previous country can still be successful in France	57%	17%	24%	2%

When asked about secularism in schools, one of the most important tenets of the French Republic (Pinet 2009), the majority of respondents saw this as beneficial and as an equalizer of students. The Millennials of this sample appear to strongly support this aspect of French Republicanism. Additionally, I asked respondents if they believed the

usage of racial categories (such as the ones I provided on the survey when asking about race) could be useful in France. The majority (72 percent) of respondents answered no. Racial statistics and racial categories do not exist officially in France, upholding the republican value of treating all individuals as equals by negating differences based on race, for example (Oberti 2008). This color-blind ideology is very prevalent in France and the French Millennials surveyed appear to uphold this aspect of French Republicanism.

Another important tenet of French Republicanism is the republican model of integration, in which foreigners in France are expected to culturally assimilate (Pinet 2009). The statement, "Immigrants from the Maghreb would integrate more quickly if they adopted French lifestyles" attempts to touch on this aspect of republicanism. Interestingly, most respondents (37 percent) reported neutral feelings towards this statement. This was followed closely by 36 percent of respondents who agree or strongly agree with this statement. It is unclear why so many respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement. Perhaps the wording of the statement was not clear or the controversial nature of the statement discouraged respondents from taking a stance on the issue.

The majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, "Immigrants who retain their language/culture/religion from their previous country can still be successful in France." This statement also attempts to access attitudes of Millennials towards cultural assimilation in France and the republican model of integration. In this case, respondents seem to believe that any immigrant (not necessarily

Maghrebi immigrants[13]) can retain aspects of their previous culture such as language, culture, and/or religion and succeed in France. It is interesting that the majority of respondents agreed with this statement, because it represents a rejection of traditional republican expectations towards immigrants in France, who are expected to set aside their cultural specificities and instead assimilate to French culture. The majority of respondents also rejected the idea that "Immigration from the Maghreb to France is a threat to the values of the French Republic," with 75 percent of respondents disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with this statement. This sample of the French Millennial generation does not see immigration from the Maghreb at odds with French Republican values and perhaps does not uphold traditional republican values related to immigrant assimilation.

Islam in France

Two questions on my survey asked specifically about Islam in France. Because the position of Maghrebi immigrants in France is strongly tied to Islam and because the role of Islam in France is quite contentious, I wanted to understand how this generation views Muslims in France.

Table 14. Religion

	Agree/ Strongly Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ Strongly Disagree	Prefer not to respond
Being Muslim can hinder an immigrant's success in France	56%	22%	20%	2%
It is dangerous to accept any Muslim immigrants into France at this time	10%	13%	76%	1%

[13] I should note that in a few Likert scale questions, I referenced immigrants in general, as opposed to Maghrebi immigrants. There is the possibility that respondents assumed I was continuing to ask about Maghrebi immigrants, even if I did not specifically refer to them.

The majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, "Being Muslim can hinder an immigrant's success in France." Unfortunately, the ambiguity of this statement means it is unclear why so many respondents agreed with this statement. Respondents agreeing with this statement could be invoking an argument of cultural incompatibility of Islam in French culture, rendering Muslims less successful in France due to their religion. However, respondents could also agree with this statement because they are aware of religious discrimination against Muslims in France and understand that being Muslim in France may not lead to success due to larger structural or institutional reasons. Brubaker (2013) argues that conflict over religious pluralism in Western liberal democracies such as France has intensified in recent decades, often due to conflicts of principle. While it is not clear why respondents believe being Muslim can hinder an immigrant's success in France, it is clear that respondents are aware of tensions between Islam and dominant French culture and that these tensions may hinder a Muslim's success in France.

Most respondents (76 percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, "It is dangerous to accept any Muslim immigrants into France at this time." This statement attempts to access potential concerns related to radical Islamic terrorism in France. Based on these results, respondents are, therefore, able to distinguish between Muslim immigrants and radical Islamic terrorists and understand that not all Muslim immigrants pose a threat to France.

I cross-tabulated this statement with the independent variable of education level. I found an interesting trend in which level of agreement with this statement decreased with level of education. Twenty percent of respondents with a high school diploma agreed

with this statement, while only six percent of respondents with a master's degree and zero percent of respondents with a doctorate agreed. In using level of education as a proxy for class, it may be the case that higher level of education (and therefore higher socioeconomic status) is correlated with more positive attitudes towards Islam in France. Further research in this area could be beneficial.

Table 15. "It is dangerous to accept any Muslim immigrants into France at this time"

	Agree/ Strongly Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ Strongly Disagree	Prefer not to respond
High School Diploma	20%	20%	60%	0%
1 year of undergraduate degree	14%	18%	68%	0%
2 or 3 years of undergraduate degree	11%	12%	73%	4%
Master's Degree	6%	9%	85%	0%
Doctorate	0%	0%	100%	0%

Does this Generation Vote? If so, how?

I asked several questions on my survey about voting habits and political affiliations. The majority of respondents (81 percent) reported that they vote or have voted in the past. My sample tends to be politically left-leaning with a little over half (52 percent) of respondents reporting that they vote left-wing or far-left. Only 22 percent of respondents reported voting right-wing or far-right. Additionally, about 40 percent of my sample supports a left-leaning political party. However, over 30 percent of my sample reports no political affiliation.

When cross-tabulating this question about political party affiliation with various independent variables, I found that men tended to be more politically right-leaning than women. For example, 10 percent of men reported affiliation with the far-right party, the

National Front, while only one percent of women reported supporting this party. Men were also more likely to have no political affiliation; 44 percent of men compared to 18 percent of women reported having no political affiliation. When using city size as the independent variable and cross-tabulating with questions about voting habits, I found that respondents from the "village/rural region" category were the least likely to vote, with 30 percent reporting that they do not vote. Voting frequency increased with size of city; 88 percent of respondents from the "large city" category reported voting.

Respondents from the "village/rural region" and "small city" categories were the least likely to have political affiliations when compared to respondents living in larger cities. About 39 percent of respondents from these two categories have no political affiliation, while only 17 percent of respondents from large cities have no political affiliation. Finally, the older half of my sample was more likely to vote than the younger half; 100 percent of respondents aged 25 and older report that they vote or have voted. Of the 18 to 24-year-old age group, an average of 77 percent reported voting. Only 15 percent of 18-year-olds reported voting. However, because the legal voting age in France is 18, this age group may not have had an opportunity to vote yet at the time of the survey. Finally, 100 percent of highly educated respondents (those with a master's degree or a doctorate) and 89 percent of those who had completed least 2 years of an undergraduate degree reported voting. On the other hand, only 50 percent of respondents who had completed one year of an undergraduate degree and 41 percent of those with a high school diploma reported voting.

Millennial Attitudes Post-Terrorist Attacks

France has recently been targeted by several terrorist attacks claimed or inspired by the Islamic State, notably, the attacks in Paris of November 2015 and the attack in Nice in July 2016. Mannheim's (1952) theory of generations argues that major historical events that occur during a generation's youth (such as these terrorist attacks) bring generations together and affect the formation of their worldviews. I wanted to know how these recent events have affected the French Millennial generation and if they have caused French Millennials to change their attitudes towards Maghrebi immigrants and other groups. Because these events happened in the past, I had to rely on respondents' self-reporting of their change in attitudes.

When asked if their attitudes towards immigrants from the Maghreb changed after the Paris attacks of 2015 and the Nice attack of 2016, the majority of respondents (86 percent) said no, their attitudes had not changed.

Table 16. Attitudes towards Maghrebi Immigrants Post-Attacks

Did your attitudes towards immigrants from the Maghreb change after the Paris attacks of 2015 and the Nice attack of 2016?	
No	86%
Yes	7%
Don't know/no opinion	7%

When asked why their attitudes had not changed, the majority stated that they continue to view Maghrebi immigrants positively, even after the terrorist attacks. This generation's positive attitudes towards Maghrebi immigrants were, for the most part, not affected by attacks in France carried out by radicalized Islamic terrorists. Of the small minority (7 percent) who reported that their attitudes did change after the attacks, the majority (almost 73 percent) said that they now view Maghrebi immigrants more negatively or

slightly more negatively than before. These terrorist attacks negatively impacted the attitudes of a small percentage of respondents.

The recent terrorist attacks have sparked populist messages throughout France, including anti-European Union sentiments and support for the extreme-right political party, the National Front. I asked respondents if their attitudes towards the European Union and the National Front changed after the attacks.

Table 17. Attitudes Towards the EU and FN Post-Attacks

Did your attitudes towards the European Union change after the Paris attacks of 2015 and the Nice attack of 2016?	No	75%
	Yes	16%
	Don't know/no opinion	9%
Did your attitudes towards the National Front change after the Paris attacks of 2015 and the Nice attack of 2016?	No	76%
	Yes	18%
	Don't know/no opinion	6%

Again, the majority of respondents reported that the recent terrorist attacks did not cause them to change their attitudes towards the European Union or the National Front. When asked why their attitudes towards the EU did not change, the majority (63 percent) reported that they continued to view the EU positively post-attacks. Similarly, a large majority (88 percent) reported that they continue to view the National Front negatively post-attacks. Of the 16 percent who reported that their attitudes towards the EU did change after the attacks, the majority (88 percent) said they view the EU more negatively or slightly more negatively post-attacks. Interestingly, of the almost 18 percent of respondents who reported that their attitudes towards the National Front did change after the attacks, most respondents (78 percent) said they now see the National Front more negatively or slightly more negatively.

So, we can see that the majority of my sample reported that their attitudes towards the EU and the National Front did not change after the attacks. Of the minority whose

attitudes towards the EU did change after the attacks, most now view it more negatively than they did before the attacks. This finding is in line with the recent rise in populist and anti-EU sentiments in France. However, of the minority whose attitudes towards the FN did change after the attacks, most now view it more negatively than before. This finding is interesting because it means respondents of my sample may be pushing back against the rising popularity of the National Front. Perhaps the way in which National Front dealt with or spoke out against these terrorist attacks turned young people against the party.

Finally, I asked respondents if their attitudes towards the Socialist Party had changed after the attacks. The Socialist Party is currently in power in France and was the political party in power at the time of these attacks.

Table 18. Attitudes Towards the Socialist Party Post-Attacks

Did your attitudes towards the Socialist Party change after the Paris attacks of 2015 and the Nice attack of 2016?	
No	64%
Yes	23%
Don't know/no opinion	13%

The majority of respondents said that their attitudes towards the Socialist Party did not change after the attacks. Opinions towards the Socialist Party appear to be more polarized than those towards the National Front. Of the majority who reported not changing their attitudes towards the Socialist Party post-attacks, almost 40 percent report that they continue to view this political party negatively and less than 30 percent report that they continue to view this party positively.

Almost a quarter of respondents said that their attitudes towards this party did change after the attacks. The majority (74 percent) of these respondents report that they now view the Socialist Party more negatively or slightly more negatively than before. We can see that opinions towards the Socialist Party amongst respondents are mixed.

However, the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016 (and perhaps the way in which the Socialist Party handled the attacks) appear to have diminished the popularity of this political party among some French Millennials.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

The French Millennials in my sample tend to be politically left-leaning and view immigration and diversity positively. While they continue to uphold some aspects of French Republicanism, they also demonstrate a rejection of some republican values. In general, they do not see Maghrebi immigration at odds with republicanism. Additionally, they are able to differentiate between Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb and Islamic extremists. Finally, this generation has not changed their positive attitudes towards Maghrebi immigrants or the European Union, even after several terrorist attacks in France by Islamic extremists. They also do not support the growing popularity of Marine Le Pen's party, the National Front.

These findings are interesting, but perhaps not especially surprising, given certain social and political factors affecting this generation. If social change that occurs during a generation's youth affects their world view, increased globalization and access to information through the Internet and ease of travel may have led this generation to view diverse groups of people positively (Mannheim 1952). However, this generation has experienced some social change that could lead to potentially negative views of immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants, in France. An economic crisis since 2008 and high rates of unemployment plague the youth of the Millennial generation in France, but respondents overwhelmingly rejected the notion that immigrants in France may be taking jobs from their generation (Eurostat 2015). Additionally, factors such as rising populism in France and recent terrorist attacks could have affected how this generation views Muslim immigrants. However, the majority of respondents rejected the far-right, anti-immigrant, and anti-Islam party, the National Front.

Centralized, standardized education is an important aspect of French Republicanism that creates and reinforces nationalism within a society (Gellner 1983). Knowing that the vast majority of my sample was educated in France, I expected to find that this generation continues to support republican values, due to the emphasis placed on these values in French education. I found that respondents continue to strongly support aspects of French Republicanism such as secularism and official color-blind ideology in France. These aspects of French Republicanism are presented and emphasized as equalizers for all members of French society. It is interesting, however, that this generation strongly supports the idea of ethnic diversity in France, yet rejects the idea of racial categories in France. These two findings seem almost contradictory.

The French Millennials of my survey do seem to be pushing back against some traditional republican values. The republican model of integration emphasizes the homogenization of immigrants as they integrate into French society. By putting aside their cultural specificities, immigrants can therefore integrate fully into dominant French culture (Pinet 2009). My sample seems to disagree with this aspect of French Republicanism, as respondents rejected the idea that immigrants must lose cultural or religious specificities to be successful in French culture. They do not seem to view the immigration of North Africans or Muslims as at odds with French Republican values. Perhaps social changes experienced by this generation, such as increased access to information about different cultures through the Internet, have lead Millennials to view diversity in France, whether ethnic, cultural, or religious, as positive and have weakened the role of republicanism enforced in French society through education.

While Millennials strongly support the value of secularism in France, they also appear to be accepting of Muslims in France. A lot of conflict in Western societies stems from religious tension (Brubaker 2013). In France, this tension tends to surround the role of Islam in greater French society. Among the French Millennials of my sample, there was awareness of this conflict and of the fact that being Muslim in France can hinder an immigrant's success. However, respondents did not view Islam negatively, and most importantly, were able to differentiate between Muslim immigrants and Islamic extremists.

When asked to compare their attitudes towards Maghrebi immigrants (the majority of whom are Muslim) after the recent 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks in France, French Millennials surveyed reported that their attitudes were mostly not affected by these events and that they continued to view Maghrebi immigrants positively. They additionally reported that their attitudes towards the European Union and the National Front were also mostly unaffected by the terrorist attacks. This is interesting because these terrorist attacks could have been influential, worldview-shaping events for this generation, and the attacks have been used to the political advantage of far-right political parties in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim campaigns. However, this group's reported attitudes towards several issues have, so far, remained largely unaffected by these events. Perhaps larger, macro-level societal changes, such as increased access to a globalizing world through the Internet, simply have had a greater influence on this group, even more so than several specific events, such as these terrorist attacks. It is also possible that this generation's worldview has not yet been affected by these events due to the recent nature

of the terrorist attacks. It may take more time for the influence of these terrorist attacks to really take shape in the worldview of French Millennials.

There is the possibility for future research into this subject, particularly around the gender divide I found. The men of my sample tended to be less supportive of ideas of ethnic diversity and immigration than the women. This could simply be the result of my particular sample; however, more research into this area could reveal if this is a significant trend and if there are perhaps reasons why men would view immigration more negatively than women. Do men tend to be more politically right-leaning in France? Have specific factors such as unemployment affected Millennial men more than women in France? Future research along the lines of socioeconomic class and differences in educational attainment could also be useful. Perhaps more highly educated people do not feel threatened by immigrants in terms of job opportunities. However, people working in the service sector may experience the effects of unemployment more severely or feel more in competition with immigrants from the Maghreb for jobs.

Concluding Thoughts

I was pleasantly surprised to discover that the French Millennials of my sample tend to view Maghrebi immigration in France positively. Despite having been affected by factors and events that could lead to more negative attitudes towards Muslim immigrants in France, this generation appears to value diversity and to actually push back against some of the most fundamental aspects of French Republicanism that would perhaps lead them to reject ethnic diversity. This has been a fascinating project to complete as an American, because it can be challenging to try to pull myself out of the American

mindset and try to understand the French Millennial generation, which has been influenced by policies and a system of education that strongly emphasize conformity and suppression of individual specificities.

It will be interesting to see how the growing Western trend of populism continues to affect France and the French Millennial generation in the coming 2017 presidential election, and if French Millennials will continue to stand by their positive attitudes towards diversity and immigration when they vote. We cannot ignore the growing influence of the far right in France and increasing backlash against globalization and immigration. The French Millennial generation will be moving into positions of political power and influence in the next 10 to 20 years, so this generation will be an important one to continue to study and understand, especially in terms of their attitudes towards immigration and globalization. Recent events such as terrorist attacks and growing populism may end up shaping the worldview of this generation in the years to come, so follow-up studies of this type could be useful as the French Millennial generation matures and takes on influential roles in the political sphere.

APPENDIX A—English Translation of Survey



4/10/2017 Qualtrics Survey Software

Default Question Block

Hello and thank you for taking this survey! I am an American university student writing my sociology thesis. I am studying the opinions of French people towards Maghrebi immigration. If you are between the ages of 18 and 35 and live primarily in France, I invite you to take my survey, which has been approved by the Whitman College Institutional Review Board. This survey should take between 5 and 10 minutes of your time and should not present any risks or discomforts outside of what you would find in your everyday life. Your participation is voluntary and all responses will be kept anonymous. This survey does not ask for any information that could identify you individually. Please answer the questions to the best of your ability and as honestly as possible. You may refuse to participate in this study and may discontinue the survey at any time with no adverse consequences. Feel free to skip any questions that you would prefer not to answer.

I want to reach as wide an audience as possible, so please share the survey link with your friends and family. I will be collecting responses until February 20th, 2017. If you have any questions regarding the survey or your rights, please feel free to contact me, Brigit O'Sullivan, via email at osullibm@whitman.edu.

Thank you for your time and participation!
Brigit O'Sullivan (Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washington, USA)
+1 (509) 527-5111

By clicking "begin survey", you are consenting to participate in my research project.

- Begin survey

What is your age?

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female
- Category not mentioned above

Where did the majority of your K-12 schooling take place?

- Metropolitan France
- French Overseas Territory
- Category not mentioned above

What is your highest level of education attained?

- Less than a high school diploma
- High school diploma

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- One year of undergraduate degree
- 2 or 3 years of undergraduate degree
- Master's Degree
- Doctorate
- Category not mentioned above

What is your nationality?

- French
- Category not mentioned above
- Prefer not to respond

What is your father's nationality?

- French
- Category not mentioned above
- Prefer not to respond

What is your mother's nationality?

- French
- Category not mentioned above
- Prefer not to respond

How do you identify yourself? (Check all that apply)

- White
- Arab or Berber
- Black
- Afro-Carribean
- Asian
- Indian
- Category not mentioned above
- Prefer not to respond

Do you believe the usage of racial categories (such as the racial categories mentioned above) could be useful in France?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know/no opinion

In what region do you currently live?

You live in a:

- Large city (population >1,000,000)
- Medium city (population between 1,000,000 and 250,000
- Small city (population between 250,000 and 25,000)
- Village/rural region (population <25,000)

Where do you to get the majority of your news or political information?

- Television
- Social Media (i.e., Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
- Newspapers/Magazines (paper or electronic)
- Radio
- Category not mentioned above

How often do you use social media (i.e., Facebook, Twitter, etc.)?

- Everyday
- Often (almost everyday)
- Sometimes (at least once per week)
- Rarely (a few times per month or less)
- Never

How often do your parents use social media (i.e., Facebook, Twitter, etc.)?

- Everyday
- Often (almost everyday)
- Sometimes (at least once per week)
- Rarely (a few times per month or less)
- Never

How often do you come across non-French media content on your social media websites (for example: foreign news on your Facebook, Twitter, etc.)?

- ○ Everyday
- ○ Often (almost everyday)
- ○ Sometimes (at least once per week)
- ○ Rarely (a few times per month or less)
- ○ Never

Do you vote or have you ever voted?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No
- ○ Prefer not to respond

If yes, how do you tend to vote?

- ○ Extreme left
- ○ Left wing
- ○ Center
- ○ Right wing
- ○ Extreme right
- ○ Category not mentioned above

Which political party do you currently support?

- ○ Gauche
- ○ Front de Gauche
- ○ Parti Socialiste
- ○ Europe Ecologie/Les Verts
- ○ Modem
- ○ Droit
- ○ UDI
- ○ Les Républicains
- ○ Front National
- ○ No political affiliation
- ○ Category not mentioned above

How often do you interact with immigrants or descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb in your everyday life?

- Everyday
- Often (almost everyday)
- Sometimes (at least once per week)
- Rarely (a few times per month or less)
- Never

Do these interactions tend to be...

- Positive
- Somewhat positive
- Neutral
- Somewhat negative
- Negative
- Don't know/no opinion

How many of your close friends are Maghrebi immigrants or descendants of Maghrebi immigrants?

- None
- 1-3
- 4-6
- 7 or more

Rank the following statements about immigrants in France.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Prefer not to respond
Immigrants from the Maghreb will be most successful in France if they adopt French lifestyles quickly	○	○	○	○	○	○
Being Muslim can hinder an immigrant's success in France	○	○	○	○	○	○
Ethnic diversity benefits France as a country	○	○	○	○	○	○
The French government must do more to integrate immigrants from the Maghreb	○	○	○	○	○	○
Some immigrants from the Maghreb do not want to assimilate to French culture	○	○	○	○	○	○
Immigration from the Maghreb to France threatens the ideals of the French Republic	○	○	○	○	○	○
Immigrants from the Maghreb may not assimilate as quickly as those from European countries	○	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Prefer not to respond
There are too many immigrants from the Maghreb in France	○	○	○	○	○	○
Immigrants who retain their language/culture/religion from their previous country can still be successful in France	○	○	○	○	○	○
Immigrants in France diminish the jobs available to my generation	○	○	○	○	○	○

Rank the following statements about politics in France.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Prefer not to respond
Secularism in schools is beneficial because it equalizes all students	○	○	○	○	○	○
I tend to disagree with my parents on social issues such as immigration	○	○	○	○	○	○
My generation is more accepting of cultural and ethnic diversity than that of my parents	○	○	○	○	○	○
My parents and I vote in a similar manner	○	○	○	○	○	○
I feel more connected to people of my generation than those of older generations	○	○	○	○	○	○
I view immigrants from the Maghreb more positively than asylum-seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, and/or Sudan	○	○	○	○	○	○
Immigrants from the Maghreb can integrate better than asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, and/or Sudan because they speak French	○	○	○	○	○	○
It is dangerous to accept any Muslim immigrants into France at this time	○	○	○	○	○	○

Did your attitudes towards immigrants from the Maghreb change after the Paris attacks of 2015 and the Nice attack of 2016?

- ○ No
- ○ Yes
- ○ Don't know/no opinion

Why "no"?

- ○ I still view immigrants from the Maghreb negatively
- ○ I still view immigrants from the Maghreb positively
- ○

Category not mentioned above

Why "yes"?

- I view immigrants from the Maghreb more negatively
- I view immigrants from the Maghreb slightly more negatively
- I view immigrants from the Maghreb slightly more positively
- I view immigrants from the Maghreb more positively
- Category not mentioned above

Did your attitudes towards the European Union change after the Paris attacks of 2015 and the Nice attack of 2016?

- No
- Yes
- Don't know/no opinion

Why "no"?

- I still view the European Union negatively
- I still view the European Union positively
- Category not mentioned above

Why "yes"?

- I view the European Union more negatively
- I view the European Union slightly more negatively
- I view the European Union slightly more positively
- I view the European Union more positively
- Category not mentioned above

Did your attitudes towards the Front National change after the Paris attacks of 2015 and the Nice attack of 2016?

- No
- Yes
- Don't know/no opinion

Why "no"?

I still view the Front National negatively

I still view the Front National positively

Category not mentioned above

Why "yes"?

I view the Front National more negatively

I view the Front National slightly more negatively

I view theFront National slightly more positively

I view the Front National more positively

Category not mentioned above

Did your attitudes towards the Socialist Party change after the Paris attacks of 2015 and the Nice attack of 2016?

No

Yes

Don't know/no opinion

Why "no"?

I still view the Socialist Party negatively

I still view the Socialist Party positively

Category not mentioned above

Why "yes"?

I view the Socialist Party more negatively

I view the Socialist Party slightly more negatively

I view the Socialist Party slightly more positively

I view the Socialist Party more positively

Category not mentioned above

Do you have any further comments you would like to add regarding immigration from the Maghreb into France?

APPENDIX B—Organization of Likert Scale Questions

Diversity

Ethnic diversity benefits France as a country

There are too many immigrants from the Maghreb in France

Immigrants in France diminish the jobs available to my generation

Integration and Assimilation

The French government must do more to integrate immigrants from the Maghreb

Some immigrants from the Maghreb do not want to assimilate to French culture

Immigrants from the Maghreb assimilate less quickly than those from European countries

Immigrants from the Maghreb can integrate better than asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, and/or Sudan because they speak French

Republican Values

Secularism in schools is beneficial because it equalizes all students

Immigrants from the Maghreb will be most successful in France if they adopt French lifestyles quickly

Immigration from the Maghreb to France threatens the ideals of the French republic

Immigrants who retain their language/culture/religion from their previous country can still be successful in France

Religion

Being Muslim can hinder an immigrant's success in France

It is dangerous to accept any Muslim immigrants into France at this time

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