

# THE ACHILLES' HEEL OF CFI

演讲者：张云海



## 关于 CFI

### CFI 是什么

2005年微软研究院联合学术界提出的一项漏洞利用缓解技术  
用于防御利用内存破坏漏洞来获得软件行为控制权的外部攻击  
确保程序执行时的控制流转移符合事先确定的控制流图

# 关于 CFI

## CFI 的实现

Clang CFI

Microsoft Control Flow Guard

Intel Control-Flow Enforcement Technology

Microsoft eXtended Flow Guard

## Clang CFI

### Clang CFI 如何工作

- fsanitize=cfi-cast-strict: Enables strict cast checks.
- fsanitize=cfi-derived-cast: Base-to-derived cast to the wrong dynamic type.
- fsanitize=cfi-unrelated-cast: Cast from void\* or another unrelated type to the wrong dynamic type.
- fsanitize=cfi-nvcall: Non-virtual call via an object whose vptr is of the wrong dynamic type.
- fsanitize=cfi-vcall: Virtual call via an object whose vptr is of the wrong dynamic type.
- fsanitize=cfi\_icall: Indirect call of a function with wrong dynamic type.
- fsanitize=cfi-mfcall: Indirect call via a member function pointer with wrong dynamic type

# Clang CFI

## Clang CFI 如何工作

```
.rodata:00000000004020D8 `vtable for'Derived dq 0          ; DATA XREF: main+50↑
.rodata:00000000004020D8
.rodata:00000000004020D8
.rodata:00000000004020E0      dq offset `typeinfo for'Derived
.rodata:00000000004020E8      public __typeid__ZTS4Base_global_addr
.rodata:00000000004020E8 __typeid__ZTS4Base_global_addr dq offset Derived::~Derived()
.rodata:00000000004020F0      dq offset Derived::~Derived()
.rodata:00000000004020F8      dq offset Derived::printMe(void)
.rodata:0000000000402100      dq 0
.rodata:0000000000402108      dq 0
.rodata:0000000000402110      dq 0
.rodata:0000000000402118 `vtable for'Base dq 0          ; DATA XREF: Base::Base(void)+C↑
.rodata:0000000000402118
.rodata:0000000000402118      ; offset to this
.rodata:0000000000402120      dq offset `typeinfo for'Base
.rodata:0000000000402128      dq offset Base::~Base()
.rodata:0000000000402130      dq offset Base::~Base()
.rodata:0000000000402138      dq offset Base::printMe(void)
.rodata:0000000000402138 _rodata    ends
```

## Clang CFI

### Clang CFI 如何工作

```
.text:0000000000401480 ; ====== S U B R O U T I N E ======
.text:0000000000401480
.text:0000000000401480
.text:0000000000401480 int_arg      proc near          ; CODE XREF: main+1AC↑p
.text:0000000000401480                      ; DATA XREF: main+180↑o ...
.text:0000000000401480         jmp    int_arg_cfi   ; Alternative name is '__typeid__ZTSFiiE_global_addr'
.text:0000000000401480 int_arg      endp
.text:0000000000401480
.text:0000000000401480 ; -----
```

## Clang CFI


### Clang CFI 的问题

适用的场合受限

缺少对 Backward-Edge 的保护

# Microsoft Control Flow Guard

## CFG 如何工作



## Microsoft Control Flow Guard

### CFG 的问题


CFG 是一个粗粒度的 CFI 实现

已知多种针对 CFG 的绕过技术

缺少对 Backward-Edge 的保护

# Intel Control-Flow Enforcement Technology

## CET 如何工作



# Intel Control-Flow Enforcement Technology

## CET 的问题

依赖特定的硬件

IBT 也是一个粗粒度的 CFI 实现

多数针对 CFG 的绕过技术也适用于 IBT

# Microsoft eXtended Flow Guard

## XFG 如何工作

### Introducing: XFG

Goal: Provide finer-grained CFI in a way that is efficient and compatible

Concept: Restrict indirect transfers through type signature checks

#### Call Sites

```
((void*)(int, int)) funcptr(0, 1); —————→ void function_A(int, int) { ... }  
                                         int   function_B(int, int) { ... }  
                                         void function_C(Object*) { ... }
```

#### Call Targets

```
obj->method1(); —————→ void Object::method1() { ... }  
                           void Object::method1(int, int) { ... }  
                           void Object::method2() { ... }  
                           void Object2::method1() { ... }
```

# Microsoft eXtended Flow Guard

## XFG 如何工作

### XFG design: basics

Assign a type signature-based tag to each address-taken function

For C-style functions, could be:

`hash(type(return_value), type(arg1), type(arg2), ...)`

For C++ virtual methods, could be:

`hash(method_name, type(retval), highest_parent_with_method(type(this), method_name), type(arg1), type(arg2), ...)`

Embed that tag immediately before each function so it can be accessed through function pointer

Add tag check to call-sites: fast fail if we run into a tag mismatch

#### CFG instrumentation: Call Site

```
mov rax, [rcx+0x98]           ; load target address
call __guard_dispatch_icall_fptr
```

#### Target

```
.align 0x10
function:
    push rbp
    push rbx
    push rsi
    ...
```

#### xFG instrumentation : Call Site

```
mov rax, [rcx+0x98]           ; load target address
mov r10, 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef   ; load function tag
call __guard_dispatch_icall_fptr_xfg ; will check tag
```

#### Target

```
.align 0x10
dq 0xffffffffffffffffffff ; just alignment
dq 0xdeadbeefdeadbeef ; function tag
functions:
    push rbp
    push rbx
    push rsi
    ...
```

# Microsoft eXtended Flow Guard

## 如何绕过 XFG？


控制流图中 fan-in fan-out 的数量会显著影响 CFI 的有效性

Variable Arguments

Generic Function Object


# JavaScript Function

```
function f() {  
    alert("This is a JavaScript Function.");  
}  
  
var o = f;  
o();
```



# JavaScript Function

## JavascriptFunction



# JavaScript Function

## 如何调用

```
template <class T> void OP_ProfileCall(const unaligned OpLayoutDynamicProfile<T>* layout) {
    OP_ProfileCallCommon(layout, OP_CallGetFunc(GetRegAllowStackVar(layout->Function)), Js::CallFlags_None, layout->profileID);
}

template <typename RegSlotType> Var InterpreterStackFrame::GetRegAllowStackVar(RegSlotType localRegisterID) const {
    Var value = m_localSlots[localRegisterID];
    ValidateRegValue(value, true);
    return value;
}

RecyclableObject *InterpreterStackFrame::OP_CallGetFunc(Var target) {
    return JavascriptOperators::GetCallableObjectOrThrow(target, GetScriptContext());
}
```

# JavaScript Function

## 如何调用

```
template <class T> void InterpreterStackFrame::OP_ProfileCallCommon(const unaligned T * playOut, RecyclableObject * function
, unsigned flags, ProfileId profileId, InLineCacheIndex inlineCacheIndex, const Js::AuxArray<uint32> * spreadIndices) {
    FunctionBody * functionBody = this->m_functionBody;
    DynamicProfileInfo * dynamicProfileInfo = functionBody->GetDynamicProfileInfo();
    FunctionInfo * functionInfo = functionBody->GetTypeId() == TypeIds_Function ?
        JavascriptFunction::FromVar(functionBody)->GetFunctionInfo() : nullptr;
    bool isConstructorCall = (CallFlags_New & flags) == CallFlags_New;
    dynamicProfileInfo->RecordCallSiteInfo(functionBody, profileId, functionInfo,
        static_cast<JavascriptFunction*>(functionBody) : nullptr, playOut->ArgCount, isConstructorCall, inlineCacheIndex);
    OP_CallCommon<T>(playOut, functionBody, flags, spreadIndices);
    if (playOut->Return != Js::Constants::NoRegister) {
        dynamicProfileInfo->RecordReturnTypeOnCallSiteInfo(functionBody, profileId, GetReg((RegSlot)playOut->Return));
    }
}
```

# JavaScript Function

## 如何调用

```
void InterpreterStackFrame::OP_CallCommon(const unaligned T * layout, RecyclableObject * function, unsigned flags  
, const Js::AuxArray<uint32> * spreadIndices)  
{  
    ...  
    flags |= CallFlags_NotUsed;  
    Arguments args(CallInfo((CallFlags)flags, argCount), m_outParams);  
    AssertMsg(static_cast<unsigned>(args.Info.Flags) == flags, "Flags don't fit into the CallInfo field?");  
    argCount = args.GetArgCountWithExtraArgs();  
    if (spreadIndices != nullptr)  
        JavascriptFunction::CallSpreadFunction(function, args, spreadIndices);  
    } else {  
        JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<true>(function, function->GetEntryPoint(), args);  
    }  
    ...  
}
```

# JavaScript Function

## 如何调用

```
000000001802BF670 amd64_CallFunction proc near ; CODE
000000001802BF670
000000001802BF670
000000001802BF670 var_28      = qword ptr -28h
000000001802BF670 var_20      = byte ptr -20h
000000001802BF670 arg_20     = qword ptr 28h
000000001802BF670
000000001802BF670     push    rbx
000000001802BF671     push    rsi
000000001802BF672     push    rdi
000000001802BF673     push    rbp
000000001802BF674     lea     rbp, [rsp+20h+var_20]
000000001802BF678     sub    rsp, 8
000000001802BF67C     mov     rbx, r9
000000001802BF67F     mov     rax, rdx
000000001802BF682     mov     rdx, r8
000000001802BF685     mov     r10, 0
000000001802BF68C     mov     rsi, [rsp+28h+arg_20]
000000001802BF691     cmp     rbx, 2
000000001802BF695     jg    short loc_1802BF6A1
000000001802BF697     jz    short loc_1802BF6E5
000000001802BF699     cmp     rbx, 1
000000001802BF69D     jz    short loc_1802BF6E9
000000001802BF69F     jmp    short loc_1802BF6EC

000000001802BF6EC loc_1802BF6EC: ; CODE XREF: amd64_CallFunction+2F↑j
000000001802BF6EC     sub    rsp, 20h
000000001802BF6EC     call   cs:_guard_dispatch_icall_fptr
000000001802BF6F0     mov     rsp, rbp
000000001802BF6F6     pop    rbp
000000001802BF6F9     pop    rdi
000000001802BF6FA     pop    rsi
000000001802BF6FB     pop    rbx
000000001802BF6FC     pop    rbp
000000001802BF6FD     retn
000000001802BF6FD amd64_CallFunction endp
```

# JavaScript Function

## 如何调用


```
JavascriptMethod RecyclableObject::GetEntryPoint() const {
    return this->GetType()->GetEntryPoint();
}
```

```
inline Type* GetType() const {
    return type;
}
```

```
JavascriptMethod GetEntryPoint() const {
    return entryPoint;
}
```

# JavaScript Function

## Js::ScriptFunctionType



# JavaScript Function

## Js::ScriptFunction

```
0000022d`d0656d20 00007ffd`3c381cb0 chakra!Js::ScriptFunction::`vftable'  
0000022d`d0656d28 0000022d`d06f0f40  
0000022d`d0656d30 00000000`00000000  
0000022d`d0656d38 00000000`00000000  
0000022d`d0656d40 00007ffd`3c51bdf8 chakra!Js::ConstructorCache::DefaultInstance  
0000022d`d0656d48 0000022d`d0709100  
0000022d`d0656d50 00007ffd`3c512d50 chakra!Js::NullFrameDisplay  
0000022d`d0656d58 00000000`00000000  
0000022d`d0656d60 00000000`00000000  
0000022d`d0656d68 00000000`00000000
```

# JavaScript Function

## Js::ScriptFunctionType

```
0000022d`d06f0f40 00000000`0000001a
0000022d`d06f0f48 0000022d`d0670000
0000022d`d06f0f50 0000022d`d0651210
0000022d`d06f0f58 00007ffd`3c09f880 chakra!NativeCodeGenerator::CheckCodeGenThunk
0000022d`d06f0f60 00000000`00000000
0000022d`d06f0f68 00007ffd`3c50d068 chakra!Js::DeferredTypeHandler::defaultInstance
0000022d`d06f0f70 00000000`00000101
0000022d`d06f0f78 0000022d`d068df00
```

# JavaScript Function

## NativeCodeGenerator::CheckCodeGenThunk

```
000000001802BF880 public: static void * NativeCodeGenerator::CheckCodeGenThunk(class Js::RecyclableObject *, struct Js::CallInfo, ...)  
000000001802BF880 ; DATA XREF: Js::CrossSite::CommonThunk(Js::RecyclableObject *,void * (Js  
000000001802BF880 ; NativeCodeGenerator::GenerateFunction(Js::FunctionBody *,Js::ScriptFunc  
000000001802BF880  
000000001802BF880 var_8    = byte ptr -8  
000000001802BF880 arg_0    = qword ptr 8  
000000001802BF880 arg_8    = qword ptr 18h  
000000001802BF880 arg_10   = qword ptr 18h  
000000001802BF880 arg_18   = qword ptr 28h  
000000001802BF880  
000000001802BF880     mov    [rsp+arg_0], rcx  
000000001802BF885     mov    [rsp+arg_8], rdx  
000000001802BF88A     mov    [rsp+arg_18], r8  
000000001802BF88F     mov    [rsp+arg_18], r9  
000000001802BF894     push   rbp  
000000001802BF895     lea    rbp, [rsp+8+var_8]  
000000001802BF899     sub    rsp, 20h  
000000001802BF89D     call   NativeCodeGenerator::CheckCodeGen(Js::ScriptFunction *)  
000000001802BF8A2     mov    rcx, rax  
000000001802BF8A5     call   cs:_guard_check_icall_fptr  
000000001802BF8AB     add    rsp, 20h  
000000001802BF8AF     mov    rax, rcx  
000000001802BF882     lea    rsp, [rbp+8]  
000000001802BF886     pop    rbp  
000000001802BF887     mov    rcx, [rsp+arg_0]  
000000001802BF88C     mov    rdx, [rsp+arg_8]  
000000001802BF8C1     mov    r8, [rsp+arg_18]  
000000001802BF8C6     mov    r9, [rsp+arg_18]  
000000001802BF8CB     jmp    rax
```


## JavaScript Function

### Js::ScriptFunctionType

```
0000022d`d06f0f40 00000000`0000001a
0000022d`d06f0f48 0000022d`d0670000
0000022d`d06f0f50 0000022d`d0651210
0000022d`d06f0f58 0000022d`e3f90000
0000022d`d06f0f60 00000000`00000000
0000022d`d06f0f68 00007ffd`3c50d068 chakra!Js::DeferredTypeHandler::defaultInstance
0000022d`d06f0f70 00000000`00000101
0000022d`d06f0f78 0000022d`d068df00
```


# DOM Function

```
window.alert("This is a DOM Function.");
```



# DOM Function

Jst::JavascriptExternalFunction



## DOM Function

### Js::JavascriptExternalFunction

```
00000150`ce47c3f0 00007ffd`3c383028 chakra!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::`vtable'  
00000150`ce47c3f8 00000150`ce3fc980  
00000150`ce47c400 00000000`00000000  
00000150`ce47c408 00000000`00000000  
00000150`ce47c410 00007ffd`3c51bdf8 chakra!Js::ConstructorCache::DefaultInstance  
00000150`ce47c418 00007ffd`3c50d828 chakra!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::EntryInfo::ExternalFunctionThunk  
00000150`ce47c420 00010000`00000589  
00000150`ce47c428 00000000`00000000  
00000150`ce47c430 00000000`00000000  
00000150`ce47c438 00000000`00000000  
00000150`ce47c440 00007ffd`3cc2d1f0 edgehtml!CFastDOM::CWindow::Profiler_alert  
00000150`ce47c448 00000000`00000000  
00000150`ce47c450 00000000`00000001  
00000150`ce47c458 00000000`00000000
```

## DOM Function

### Js::Type

00000150`ce3fc980	00000000`0000001a
00000150`ce3fc988	00000150`ce3f0000
00000150`ce3fc990	00000150`ce3d1210
00000150`ce3fc998	00007ffd`3bea89a0 chakra!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk
00000150`ce3fc9a0	00000000`00000000
00000150`ce3fc9a8	00007ffd`3c50d068 chakra!Js::DeferredTypeHandler::defaultInstance
00000150`ce3fc9b0	00000000`00000101
00000150`ce3fc9b8	00000000`00000000

## DOM Function

Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk

```
00000001800C8B6D loc_1800C8B6D:          ; CODE XREF: Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk
00000001800C8B6D      mov    [rbp+57h+var_58], r12b
00000001800C8B71      mov    [rbp+57h+var_78], rbx
00000001800C8B75      movzx r13d, byte ptr [rbx+139h]
00000001800C8B7D      mov    [rbp+57h+var_70], r13b
00000001800C8B81      mov    byte ptr [rbx+139h], 1
00000001800C8B88      mov    r10, 0C98CBECA14D74170h
00000001800C8B92      mov    r8, [rbp+57h+var_B0]
00000001800C8B96      mov    rdx, [rbp+57h+arg_8]
00000001800C8B9A      mov    rcx, rsi
00000001800C8B9D      mov    rax, [rsi+50h]
00000001800C8B9D ; } // starts at 1800C8AF6
00000001800C8BA1
00000001800C8BA1 loc_1800C8BA1:          ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00000001806C0974↓o
00000001800C8BA1 ; try {
00000001800C8BA1      call   cs:_guard_xfg_dispatch_icall_fptr
```

## DOM Function

### Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::ExternalFunctionThunk

```
00000150`ce47c3f0 00007ffd`3c383028 chakra!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::`vtable'
00000150`ce47c3f8 00000150`ce3fc980
00000150`ce47c400 00000000`00000000
00000150`ce47c408 00000000`00000000
00000150`ce47c410 00007ffd`3c51bdf8 chakra!Js::ConstructorCache::DefaultInstance
00000150`ce47c418 00007ffd`3c50d828 chakra!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::EntryInfo::ExternalFunctionThunk
00000150`ce47c420 00010000`00000589
00000150`ce47c428 00000000`00000000
00000150`ce47c430 00000000`00000000
00000150`ce47c438 00000000`00000000
00000150`ce47c440 00007ffd`3cc2d1f0 edgehtml!CFastDOM::CWindow::Profiler_alert
00000150`ce47c448 00000000`00000000
00000150`ce47c450 00000000`00000001
00000150`ce47c458 00000000`00000000
```

# DOM Getter/Setter Function

纵横

```
var s = document.createElement("script");
s.async = true;
```

## DOM Getter/Setter Function

### DOM Object

```
00000265`386773c0 00007ffd`3c383378 chakra!Projection::ArrayObjectInstance::`vftable'  
00000265`386773c8 00000265`38687180  
00000265`386773d0 00000000`00000000  
00000265`386773d8 00000000`00000000  
00000265`386773e0 00007ffd`3c9b8070 edgehtml!CJScript9Holder::CBaseFinalizer  
00000265`386773e8 00000000`00000000  
00000265`386773f0 00000265`384ff1d0  
00000265`386773f8 00000000`00000000
```

## DOM Getter/Setter Function

Type

00000265`38687180	00000088`000010df
00000265`38687188	00000265`22bb1d00
00000265`38687190	00000265`22c57f80
00000265`38687198	00007ffd`3c0bf2b0 chakra!Js::RecyclableObject::DefaultEntryPoint
00000265`386871a0	00000000`00000000
00000265`386871a8	00000265`22c8db10
00000265`386871b0	00000000`00000101
00000265`386871b8	00000001`00000381
00000265`386871c0	00000265`3850b0c0
00000265`386871c8	00000000`00000000

## DOM Getter/Setter Function

### Prototype

```
00000265`22c57f80 00007ffd`3c383378 chakra!Projection::ArrayObjectInstance::`vftable'  
00000265`22c57f88 00000265`38687280  
00000265`22c57f90 00000265`22c47780  
00000265`22c57f98 00000000`00000000  
00000265`22c57fa0 00007ffd`3ca4fc60 edgehtml!CPrototypeTypeOperations::CPrototypeTypeFinalizer  
00000265`22c57fa8 00000000`00000000  
00000265`22c57fb0 00000000`00000000  
00000265`22c57fb8 00000000`00000000
```

## DOM Getter/Setter Function

### Functions

00000265`22c47780	00000265`22c7f690
00000265`22c47788	00000265`38686e00
00000265`22c47790	00000265`38686e70
00000265`22c47798	00000265`38686ee0
00000265`22c477a0	00000265`38686f50
00000265`22c477a8	00000265`38688000
00000265`22c477b0	00000265`38688070
00000265`22c477b8	00000265`386880e0

# DOM Getter/Setter Function

## Setter Function

```
00000265`38686e70 00007ffd`3c383028 chakra!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::`vftable'
00000265`38686e78 00000265`22c6bf40
00000265`38686e80 00000000`00000000
00000265`38686e88 00000000`00000000
00000265`38686e90 00007ffd`3c51bdf8 chakra!Js::ConstructorCache::DefaultInstance
00000265`38686e98 00007ffd`3c50d828 chakra!Js::JavascriptExternalFunction::EntryInfo::ExternalFunctionThunk
00000265`38686ea0 00010000`00000681
00000265`38686ea8 00000000`00000000
00000265`38686eb0 00000000`00000000
00000265`38686eb8 00000000`00000000
00000265`38686ec0 00007ffd`3cc10af0 edgehtml!CFastDOM::CHTMLScriptElement::Profiler_Set_async
00000265`38686ec8 00000000`00000000
00000265`38686ed0 00000000`01000001
00000265`38686ed8 00000000`00000000
```

## 如何利用 DiagnosticsResources

### DiagnosticsResources object

08/04/2017 • 2 minutes to read

Object that enables access to functions related to resources such as indexedDB or localStorage.

**Note:** These APIs can only be used with F12 developer tools and the Diagnostics Script Engine, and can't be called from JavaScript.

# 如何利用 alwaysRefreshFromServer 属性

## Properties

The DiagnosticsResources object has these properties.

Property	Access type	Description
<a href="#">alwaysRefreshFromServer</a>	Read/write	Forces Internet Explorer to bypass caches.

## 如何利用

### CFastDOM::CDiagnosticsResources::Profiler\_Set\_alwaysRefreshFromServer

```
__int64 __fastcall CFastDOM::CDiagnosticsResources::Profiler_Set_alwaysRefreshFromServer(
    __int64 a1,
    unsigned int a2,
    __int64 a3)
{
    return CFastDOM::CDiagnosticsResources::Trampoline_Set_alwaysRefreshFromServer(a1, a2, (_QWORD *)a3);
}
```

## 如何利用

### CFastDOM::CDiagnosticsResources::Trampoline\_Set\_alwaysRefreshFromServer

```
__int64 __fastcall CFastDOM::CDiagnosticsResources::Trampoline_Set_alwaysRefreshFromServer(
    __int64 a1,
    __int64 a2,
    __QWORD *a3)
{
    unsigned int v4; // ebx
    __int64 v5; // rax
    void *v6; // rcx
    __int64 v7; // rsi
    unsigned int v8; // eax
    int v10; // [rsp+50h] [rbp+18h] BYREF
    CBase *v11; // [rsp+58h] [rbp+20h] BYREF

    v4 = a2;
    v5 = CFastDOM::ValidateCallSetterT<0>(a1, a2, *a3, 0x1078, &v11);
    v6 = (void *)a3[1];
    v10 = 0;
    v7 = v5;
    v8 = JsStaticAPI::DataConversion::VarToBOOL(v6, &v10);
    if ( v8 )
        CFastDOM::ThrowDOMError(v7, v4, v8, v11, CFastDOM::CDiagnosticsResources::Profiler_Set_alwaysRefreshFromServer);
    else
        CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::SetAlwaysRefreshFromServer(v10 != 0);
    return 0i64;
}
```

## 如何利用

### CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::SetAlwaysRefreshFromServer

```
void __fastcall CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::SetAlwaysRefreshFromServer(unsigned __int8 a1)
{
    int v1; // ebx
    const char *v2; // rcx

    v1 = a1;
    EnterCriticalSection(&CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::_cs);
    if ( !_CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::_refCount )
        goto LABEL_5;
    if ( v1 == (_CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::_lpThunkOriginalHttpOpenRequestW != 0i64) )
        goto LABEL_10;
    if ( !(_BYTE)v1 )
    {
        if ( CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::_lpThunkOriginalHttpOpenRequestW )
        {
            if ( !_SetRelocPtr(
                    CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::_lpThunkOriginalHttpOpenRequestW,
                    ( __int64 )HttpOpenRequestW ) )
                Abandonment::AssertionFailed(v2);
            CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::_lpThunkOriginalHttpOpenRequestW = 0i64;
            goto LABEL_10;
        }
    LABEL_5:
        Abandonment::AssertionFailed();
    }
    CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::_PatchHttpRequest();
    if ( !_CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::_lpThunkOriginalHttpOpenRequestW )
        goto LABEL_5;
LABEL_10:
    LeaveCriticalSection(&CDiagnosticNetworkPatch::_cs);
}
```

# 如何利用 SetRelocPtr

```
int64 __fastcall SetRelocPtr(LPVOID lpAddress, _int64 a2)
{
    unsigned int v4; // ebx
    DWORD Protect; // ecx NAPDST
    int v6; // ecx
    int v8; // ecx
    struct _MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION Buffer; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-38h] BYREF
    DWORD fOldProtect; // [rsp+78h] [rbp+20h] NAPDST BYREF

    if ( VirtualQuery(lpAddress, &Buffer, 0x30ui64) )
    {
        if...
        v6 = Protect | 0x40000000;
        if ( (Protect & 0xFFFFF0F) != 0 )
            v6 = Protect;
        v4 = VirtualProtect(lpAddress, 8ui64, v6, &fOldProtect);
        if ( v4 )
        {
            *(_QWORD *)lpAddress = a2;
            v8 = fOldProtect | 0x40000000;
            if ( (fOldProtect & 0xFFFFF0F) != 0 )
                v8 = fOldProtect;
            VirtualProtect(lpAddress, 8ui64, v8, &Protect));
        }
    }
    else
    {
        return 0;
    }
    return v4;
}
```

## 总结

- CFI 是一项有效的漏洞利用缓解措施
- 目前的 CFI 实现都只是某种程度上的近似
- 完整实现的 CFI 依然不能解决所有问题

# 感谢观看！

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