

Nationalism and Annexation of Crimea

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Abstract

An explanation of how Crimea's nationalism caused Russia's annexation of Crimea will be explored through the analysis of 15 articles. These articles pertain to Crimea and its relationship with Ukraine or Russia. By comparing the findings in these articles, it can be discerned that the Crimeans had Russian nationalism before Ukrainian Independence, and the hardships placed by an emerging nation along with the attempt to assimilate the Crimean Russians was a cause for growing conflict. The conflict led to the Crimeans to vote to have their region leave Ukraine, and the positive relationship that the Crimeans maintained with Russia enabled Russia to annex Crimea.

Nationalism and Annexation of Crimea

In March 2014, a vote was cast in Crimea, which resulted in the region of Crimea leaving Ukraine (BBC 2014). This was shortly followed with Crimea becoming annexed by Russia. This event brought to question Crimean nationalism, and how certain events can change a persons' view of their country. Also in question was the reasons why Russia would annex Crimea, a region part of another country. Prior to the research, it was assumed that Crimea initially was satisfied with their relationship in Ukraine, and a chain of events led to those in Crimea to be more favorable towards Russia than Ukraine. The Ukrainians in Crimea developed a stronger relationship with Russia do to proximity, and that they started to change their nationalism to favor Russia, and eventually got annexed after voting to leave Ukraine. The thesis of this article is to identify how Crimea's nationalism caused Russia's annexation of Crimea. The research question is sociological in nature, for it addresses the topic of nationality; the title of the people in an area that gives them a history, image, and cultural identity (Hetcher 1999). This collective identity produces a sense of pride in the area, and a common way of imagining the region. This includes the culture in a society, as defined by the "knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities acquired...by man as a member of society" (Nanda & Warms 2014, 74). To investigate the research question, a literature review was conducted on 15 different articles. The key findings from these articles were then analyzed by the comparison of one article to another. The result of this analysis brought additional questions for further research, but was sufficient enough to provide a conclusive answer based on the sociological perspectives of functionalism, conflict theory, and symbolic interactionism.

Literature Review

The literature review will identify the thesis and hypothesis of 15 sources, and how the articles pertain to the research question. The type of data used will be analyzed for its research methods, level of analysis, and sample size. There will be identification of the data gathered, to include its composition and measurement. The key findings of the article will be identified, and the strengths and weaknesses from each article will be discussed.

Source 1

Written by Viktor Stepaneko, *How Ukrainians view their Orange Revolution: Public opinion and the national peculiarities of citizenry political activities* is a 2005 analysis of data and research on the Orange Revolution of 2004 (2005). The thesis of the article is that “this article is an attempt to look at the Orange Revolution not only from the experts' point of view, but also from public opinion, examining the nature and reasons for the orange political action” (Stepaneko 2005, 596). The article is relevant to this paper’s research thesis, for it analyzes the public opinion of Ukrainians from different regions and cultural identifications, and reveals that the people around Crimea culturally identified themselves as being Russian instead of Ukrainian. Although unclear, it could be disseminated that the author hypothesized the opinions of the reasons behind the Orange Revolution will differ depending on a person's involvement with the event, and the region in which they are from. He also hypothesized that the adults younger than 30 will be more involved in the Orange Revolution than the adults over the age of 55 (Stepaneko 2005).

Methodology and analysis. The author analyzed quantitative and qualitative data in this article. The quantitative analysis was completed with data that was collected by the Institute of Sociology in the National Academy of Sciences in the Ukraine. This data was an annual survey which was conducted in 2005, shortly after the conclusion of the Orange Revolution (Stepaneko 2005). The annual nationwide representative survey from the Institute of Sociology took a sample, $n=1,800$, of people who are residents of the Ukraine. Respondents represented four geographical locations: West, Central, East, and South. The

qualitative data was compiled through content analysis of several separate articles. This data provided information in regard to the political engagements that surrounded the Orange Revolution, and professional opinions to the same information gathered by the survey. The level of analysis was macro, as the goal was to understand the reasons behind a political movement that affected an entire country.

Key findings. The key findings from the quantitative data was that the opinion of the origins of the Orange Revolution corresponded with the person's attendance in the event, the region they were in, and their ethno-cultural identification (Stepaneko 2004). Most of the people who took the survey, regardless of any other stance, agreed that the Orange Revolution was an organized movement that was driven by internal means. Most of those who attended were from the Western and Central parts of the Ukraine, while most of the East and Southern parts did not participate. For every one person who attended from the East or South, three from the West or Central regions attended. There were also twice as many adults younger than 30 participating in the Revolution than there were adults over 55. The difference in age participation shows that the younger generations are more interested in politics than the older ones. For the people who attended the event, they believed that they were there fighting for their rights. For those who did not attend, they believed that the Orange Revolution was a conspiracy set up by a Western or political source. Those people of Russian ethnicity in Crimea believed it to be a coup d'etat, organized by Westerns. The key findings of the qualitative information revealed that the revolution was a civil rebellion and an anti-corruption revolution. It was seen by experts that the political event was a transition where the citizens went up against the authorities to bring a change and promote a more democratic government.

Strengths and weaknesses. Two strengths and two weaknesses were identified in the article. For strengths, the author incorporated his own experiences along those of other authors to bring more understanding of the events that took place during the Orange Revolution. This additional information was used alongside the data findings, as a way to explain why the data had certain results. The article also

identified a difference between those who identify themselves as Ukrainian and those who identify as Russian, and the different outlook on the Orange Revolution per the area of the Ukraine. This piece of information highlighted the largest difference in opinion of the Orange Revolution, and revealed a lot about the different mindset that varies by area and culture. For weaknesses, the hypothesis was not clearly stated, and the article remarks how a finding correlated with the hypothesis without mentioning previously what the hypothesis was. Also, parts in the article mentioned that the data supported a finding, but the data given did not prove to support the claim. The author wrote that the ages, gender, or educational background have no considerable influence on the results, while none of the data tables presented support this statement.

Source 2

Written by Roman Solchanyk, *Russians in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects* is an article that analyzed the language law of Ukraine, and how it was implemented and enforced from 1990 to 1999 (1998). The research question the author had was how had the Russian language in Ukraine changed from 1990-2000? This article is relevant because it looked at the language used in the Ukraine, and identified that despite the efforts used to push Ukrainian across all of Ukraine, the primary language in Crimea remained to be Russian (Solchanyk 1998). The author hypothesized that the use of the Russian language will have decreased, as ethnic Russians become more of a minority in Ukraine.

Methodology and analysis. Both quantitative and qualitative data was used in this source. The quantitative data was in the form of survey results, where the language of instruction in public schools across Ukraine were analyzed (Solchanyk 1998). Qualitative data in the form of historical analysis was also analyzed, to review the policy change on the language use in Ukraine, and the response that the new policy change received. The analysis level was macro, as polls were also taken to determine which language was used the most inside the home, in universities, and in mass media

Key findings. The key findings of the quantitative data show that the use of the Russian language in Ukrainian schools has decreased by 16% over the span of 9 years (Solchanyk 1998). However, when broken down into regions, the area of Crimea has only decreased by 1.8%. The key findings from the qualitative data show that mass media has increased their reporting in Russian, while still maintaining a social minority status.

Strengths and weaknesses. There were two strengths and one weakness that was identified in this source. For a strength, the research included a detailed analysis of the southern and eastern areas, which produced results that contrasted with the rest of the data. Also, the data was incorporated with the historical events that took place, giving perspective of the political events surrounding the changes shown by the data. The weakness in this article is that some of the discussed results did not include the use of a table, or revealed partial data. All that the reader had to base off of was the author's analysis, and the variables could not be assuredly identified. Those results were therefore omitted in this paper.

Source 3

Written by Jan Janmaat, *Language politics in education and the response of the Russians in Ukraine* is an analysis of a collection of data in regards to the language and nationalities of schoolchildren (1999). The thesis of this survey is to identify the responses given by the Russian schoolchildren in Ukraine about the constraints in local language and education. In order to do this, Janmaat questioned the parents' nationalities, the acclaimed language spoken at home, and the language spoken at the schools (Janmaat 1999). This article is pertinent to the student's research because this article looks at the reaction that the language law imposed upon Russians in Ukraine, and how those in Crimea reacted to the policies. The author hypothesized that the responses will be dependent upon the percentage of the population who are Russians, ethnic schism if the parents have mixed nationalities, and the local policy.

Methodology and analysis. Both quantitative and qualitative data was used in this study. The quantitative data was in the form of survey results. The level of analysis was macro as the author gathered

the data over a 14 month survey in the schools at Donetsk, Odesa, Kyiv, and L'viv in 1996-1997, where n=4400 (Janmaat 1999). The author also utilized qualitative data by expert article analysis to incorporate external factors that may have influenced the results of the surveys.

Key findings. The key findings of this article is that the areas that have the smallest Russian populations have the largest percent of Russian children attending Ukraine speaking schools. However, 77.5% of interviewed students spoke Russian at home, regardless of their nationality (Janmaat 1999). The Western area of Ukraine is the only exception, where is it believe that those Ukrainians are more enthusiastic about their nationality. In the Western area, couples with mixed nationalities speak Ukrainian at home.

Strengths and weaknesses. There were two strengths and no weaknesses that were identified in this article. The author conducted the research himself, which gave the original information with full explanations instead of another person's view of an analysis. This article was well organized, and easy to read.

Source 4

Written by Paul Kubieck, *Regional polarization in Ukraine: Public opinion, voting and legislative behavior* is a data analysis on public opinion, electoral results, and voting by Parliamentarians from 1989-1996 (2000). The thesis of this article was to study the political trends of Ukraine to conclude if Ukraine's socially different regions could come together over time. This article is relevant to the students research thesis because as it discusses the political opinions across Ukraine from 1989-1996, it reveals Crimea's political opinion (Kubiecek 2000). The author posits three hypotheses. First, the regions will eventually come together over time, and show Ukrainian nationality. The second hypothesis is that the differences in the regions will not change. The third hypothesis is that the differences in the regions will get worse.

Methodology and analysis. Quantitative data from polling surveys are used for this study. This covers the period of 1989-1996. The level of analysis was macro as the data was retrieved from the F-4 center in Kiev along with *The Ukrainian Economy*, *Post-Soviet Geography*, and *The Human Development Report* (Kubiecek 2000).

Key findings. The key findings are that between 1991 and 1996 there has been increasing more positive thoughts on Russia, and Crimea especially has demonstrated increasing negative reports towards the Ukraine (Kubiecek 2000). There was no identified trend over all the regions, but political party references could be mapped by region. It was speculated that the areas that lost the most during post-soviet Russia still retained the most sympathy for Russia.

Strengths and weaknesses. Two strengths and one weakness was identified in this article. For strengths, Crimea was separated into its own group and compared independently with the other regions due to their large population of Russians. This disallowed their contrasting opinions to be incorporated with the rest of the opinions of southern Ukraine. Also, there was a lot of data that was gathered for the analysis, and the content appeared to be accurate and easy to read. For the weakness, the author displayed ethnocentrism by using the terms fairness and human rights as exclusive characteristics of Western thought, without defining why people would disregard human rights for Russian thought.

Source 5

Written by Wilson Andrew and Sarah Birch, *Voting stability, political gridlock: Ukraine's 1998 parliamentary elections* analyzes the data gathered on the 1998 primary elections in the Ukraine, focusing on each region's party nominations (1999). The source also shows how party factions are then formed following the election. The thesis of this article was to find out what affects vote choice in the Ukraine. This article is relevant to the student's research because it discusses Crimea's political choices in the 1998 primary elections, which reveals the political identity of those in Crimea (Wilson & Birch 1999).The

hypothesis of the author is that a voter's choice in a party is greatly influenced by their individual national identification.

Methodology and analysis. Both quantitative and qualitative data was used in this article. The quantitative data was collected by a nationwide survey conducted on the last two weeks of the 1998 campaign in Ukraine (Wilson & Birch 1999). The participants in this study were interviewed in 25 different cities, N=1742. The qualitative data was a review of historical literature, to identify the history of the different political parties. The data was analyzed on a macro level, to identify what affects Ukrainian votes.

Key findings. The key findings in this article are that the gap in the popular votes widened from the 1995 election, with more people supporting the communist party (Wilson & Birch 1999). The region that a person is in has the greatest relation to who they voted on. While the hypothesis was verified, it was also determined that language was a better predictor of a vote choice, over that of a person's nationality.

Strengths and weaknesses. One strength and no weakness was identified in this article. The strength was that this article listed every major region and their party affiliation, equally detailing the regions to provide a complete report.

Source 6

Written by Oleksandr Hrytsenko, *Imagining the Community: Perspectives on Ukraine's Ethno-cultural Diversity* maps out the minority groups in the Ukraine, including the new immigrants and their spoken languages (2008). The thesis of this article is to determine how the ethnic groups are socially divided in the Ukraine. This source is relevant to the student's research because as Crimea is primarily composed of ethnic Russians, a minority group in Ukraine, the identification of the rights of minorities in Ukraine will assist in establishing their SES as a minority group. This article is pertinent to the time between 1989-2001 (Hrytsenko 2008). The author hypothesized that most areas in Ukraine will be multiethnic, multicultural, and bilingual.

Methodology and analysis. Both quantitative and qualitative data was used in this article's research. The quantitative data was from Ukraine's national census, N=47,998,100 as the total population of Ukraine in 2001 (Hrytsenko 2008). The qualitative data was taken from referenced articles, which served to provide explanations to the data received. As the research was for identification of ethnic groups in Ukraine, the data was analyzed on a macro level.

Key findings. The 3.5 million decrease in Russians between 1989 and 2000 is largely due to the people altering their ethnic identifications (Hrytsenko 2008). What people identify as their native language is actually the language they ethnically identify with. The primary language spoken across all ethnic groups is Russian. As the qualitative information stated that there are no privileges allowed upon a person's race, there is no protection for minority groups. Major disputes have also broken out in regards to the use of the Russian language

Strengths and weaknesses. Two strengths and one weakness were identified in this article. For strengths, the article was formatted in a manner that was easy to read and understand. The analysis of the quantitative information was detailed, and called upon a lot of resources. For the weakness, the author demonstrated a bias against the ethnic majority of Ukrainians. This bias behavior made some of the conclusions seem to have been led, instead of them being the result of an unbiased investigation.

Source 7

Written by Karyna Korostelina, *Concepts of national identity and the readiness for conflict behavior* is about a study on the impact that nationalism had on the readiness of ethnic minorities in Crimea to engage in conflicts (2008). The thesis of this article is to identify the reaction that the concepts of nationalism had on the internal conflicts in Crimea. This source is relevant to the student's research because this article studied nationalism in Crimea, and the types of conflicts that were documented in a 2003 survey (Korostelina 2008). The author had three hypothesis. The first hypothesis is that ethnic nationalism will increase a group's willingness to fight out-groups, and increase the groups' national

identity, ethnocentrism, and economic deprivation as a reason to fight. The second hypothesis is that the multicultural concept of Ukrainian nationalism will reduce the minorities desire to fight. The third hypothesis is that the civic concept of nationalism will strongly reduce a minorities' desire to fight.

Methodology and analysis. Quantitative data was used by taking representative samples from various towns in Crimea, N=830 (Korostelina 2008). The source of analysis in this research was macro, for it analyzed groups of people within Crimea to formulate a concept on different types of nationalism.

Key findings. The key findings were that the Russian's ethnic concept of nationalism made them more prone to fight against people of other ethnicities, while Crimean Tartars are less prone to fight over ethnicity (Korostelina 2008). The multicultural concept of nationalism reduces the Russians desire to fight, but increases the Crimean Tatars desire to fight. A civic concept of nationalism reduces both the Russians and Crimean people's desire to fight. However, the ethnic Russians in Crimea primarily identified with the ethnic concept of nationalism.

Strengths and weaknesses. There were two strengths and no weaknesses identified in this article. The strengths were that the article went over a lot of the concepts of nationalism, and broke down nationalism into three different perspectives. This provided a lot of new information of the Crimean people's different perspectives on nationalism. The article was well labeled and easy to read, and contained well defined concepts.

Source 8

Written by A.P. Khrienko, *Metamorphoses of the Religious and Moral Determination of the Consciousness of Young People* is about a survey on religious and moral affiliation of young adults in Crimea (2009). The author's thesis is to identify the various aspects of religion and morality that are being recognized by the young adults in Crimea. This article is relevant because this source shows the different religions in Crimea in 2006, as compared to the rest of Ukraine. The author hypothesized that the morality and religion in Crimea will be seen to be in a decline (Khrienko 2009).

Methodology and analysis. Quantitative data was collected in this analysis by surveys of upper level division students at Crimea's universities, N=1520, in 2006 (Khrienko 2009). As the intention of this analysis was to detect a moral decline in Crimea, this was a macro level of analysis.

Key findings. The key findings were that while 73% of people in Crimea believe in God, 20% do not have a specified religion, and only 30% of the surveyed population observed all the rites of their declared religion (Khrienko 2009). The primary religion of those in Crimea is Russian based Orthodox, which contrasts the rest of Ukraine and their Kiev based Orthodox.

Strengths and weaknesses. There was one strength and two weaknesses identified in this article. For the strength, the article was clearly written and well organized. For weaknesses, the data was used in the conclusion to determine the loss of morality in Crimea, and to include a reference to the loss of soul and the antichrist. Before linking religious morality to anomie, there should have been at the very least comparative data on morality from a region that is more religious. The analysis of the data uses vague terms, such as 'very small' and 'large', instead of scientific ones.

Source 9

Written by Alexandru Constancioara, Simona Bodog, Nicoleta Bugnar, and Liana Meşter, *The cost of job loss in a transition economy. Evidence from Ukraine* is about the costs of worker displacement and an analysis on Ukraine's displaced workers (2009). Certain demographics are listed, to include ethnicity, to monitor the rate of reemployment over the period from 1992-2000. The thesis of the article is to identify the incidence and cost of displacement in Ukraine (Constancioara et. al. 2009). This source is relevant because the article breaks down the displacement rates of Russians in the Ukraine 1992-2000, showing how much economic stress they may have felt and the ethnic discrimination that took place. The hypothesis of the article is that the majority of those who have been displaced continue to go without a job.

Methodology and analysis. The level of analysis was macro, as the data was analyzed for information in regards to the economic status of people in Ukraine. Quantitative data of the 2003 Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, N=6389, was gathered for analysis (Constangioara et. al. 2009).

Key findings. The key findings are that of the ethnic Russians who were displaced, only 1/3 of them found a replacement job within the first 3 months (Constangioara et. al. 2009). Over 50% of the people displaced were without a job for over one year. There was a 14% difference in unemployed ethnic Russians and unemployed ethnic Ukrainians, implying that there was job discrimination towards ethnic Russians.

Strengths and weaknesses. One strength and one weakness was identified in this article. The strength was that the article was well organized and included headers. The information was well documented. The weakness was that the content covered a great amount of information with a very short article. More information regarding the amount of displacement per demographic could have been made.

Source 10

Written by Fenella Fleischmann, Maykel Verkuyten, and Edwin Poppe, *Ethnic and Republic Identification in the Russian Federation and Ukraine: A Social Dominance Perspective* is about the nations just outside of Russia that still maintains Russian nationalism (2011). These nations are applied to the Social Dominance Theory to identify any correlations with group dominance, and to predict the future relations these nations may have with Russia. The thesis of this article is to conclude if the differences in personal and contextual intergroup relations explain the differences in subordinate and dominant group identifications (Fleischmann, Verkuyten, & Poppe 2011). This source is relevant to the student's research because the article shows the exact percentage of Crimean people who claimed their nationality to be Russian in 2005 and 2006, and compares it with the Social Dominance Theory. The hypothesis of the

article is that the differences in personal and contextual intergroup relations can explain the differences in subordinate and dominant group identifications, as predicted in the Social Dominance Theory

Methodology and analysis. The quantitative data was taken from a nationwide survey conducted in Russia in 2005 and in the outlying countries in 2006, N=5,557 (Fleischmann, Verkuyten, & Poppe 2011). As this survey is to understand how intergroup relations affect group identifications, the author used a macro level of analysis

Key findings. The key findings are that the more dominant the ethnic group is, the more socially stronger they are and the more positive outlook they possess in regards to their ethnicity and republic identification (Fleischmann, Verkuyten, & Poppe 2011). Those of Russian ethnicity in Crimea are dominant in Crimea, while less dominant in Ukraine. This means that the Russians in Crimea follow the dominant group theory, while the Russians in the rest of Ukraine do not.

Strengths and weaknesses. Two strengths and no weaknesses were identified in this article. This article covered in depth a theory, and scrutinized it well. It was well written and easy to follow.

Source 11

Written by Yulia Mikhailova, *Electronic media and popular discourse on Russian nationalism* is an analysis of letters to an editor of the coverage of the 2006 riot and 2010 subway bombing in Russia (2011). These letters are compared to identify popular opinion of nationalism in Russia. The thesis of the article is to identify what the current identification of nationalism in Russia is. This article is relevant to the student's research because it identifies Russian nationalism, and shows how those in Russia may have looked upon the ethnic Russian in Crimea. The author hypothesized that Russia is starting to show proof of civic nationalism.

Methodology and analysis. Quantitative data in the form of sociological surveys from the online magazines Gateta.ru and Komsomolshaia are used, N=1,367, alongside a sourced narrative (Mikhailova

2011). These surveys were analyzed on a macro level, to identify the popular opinions of Russians towards other ethnicities.

Key findings. The key findings of this article are that an ethnic identification of Russia is still prevalent, as most letters referred to being Russian by the ethnic term (*russkie*) and not the civic term (*rossiane*) (Mikhailova 2011). Over the course of the study, results have shown that more people are using the term *rossiane* and are beginning to get less aggressive against other nationalities. The definition of *russkie* is not constricted to modern state borders. Those in post-soviet regions like Crimea are still referred to as *russkie*, and thought of to be brethren Russians.

Strengths and weaknesses. One strength and one weakness was identified in this article. For the strength, the author was well written, and made a study that was easy to follow. For the weakness, although identified, internet users were still minority at the time of the data collection. This resulted in a very small representation of the population.

Source 12

Written by Leno Surzhko-Hamed, *Liberal nationalism, nationalist liberalization, and democracy: the cases of post-Soviet Estonia and Ukraine* is about nationalism as a positive item in statehood (2010). Nationalism was looked upon as a political tool, and the nationalism of the countries of Estonia and Ukraine was studied. The thesis was to identify conditions in which nationalism played a positive role in the democratic process. This source is relevant because it goes over the opinions of the people in Crimea in regards to their statehood in 1999 (Surzhko-Hamed 2010). The author hypothesized that nationalism benefits democratization by serving as a political tool in reviving civil and political societies.

Methodology and analysis. Quantitative analysis of data was taken from the 1999 Crimean Center for Strategic Research, and Ian Bremmer's 1994 public opinion study among Ukrainians ethno-national groups, N=329 (Surzhko-Hamed 2010). As this research was to identify nationalism to be a positive aspect, the analysis was conducted on the macro level.

Key findings. The key findings in this article are that most of the areas of Ukraine and Estonia support the hypothesis that a groups' nationalism can activate politics and get more people involved in democratization (Surzhko-Harned 2010). However, the area of Crimea did not support this. The nationalism in Crimea was pro-Russian, and did not have much interest in Ukraine. This demonstrates the strong amount of Russian nationalism which was prevalent in Crimea, for their nationalism did not support the nationalism of the rest of Ukraine.

Strengths and weaknesses. There was one strength and two weaknesses identified in this article. For the strength, the article was well organized. For weaknesses, the data was taken from various sources, and not all the information regarding the surveys were present. The author included the non-negative answers as a positive answer ('I don't know', and 'other') in his conclusion in order to support his hypothesis when Crimea disproved the hypothesis.

Source 13

Written by William Zimmerman, *The diminishing burden of the soviet past: Russian assessments of Russian-Ukrainian linkages* is about the view Russians have of Ukraine, and if they want Ukraine reunited with Russia (1998). A comparison of the Russian public opinion and the elite opinion was made, and the elite's military opinions were analyzed. The thesis of this article is to identify which Russians prefer to see Ukraine back with Russia, and how far they are willing to go to reunite Ukraine. This is relevant because it shows how those in Russia viewed Ukraine, and the sympathies Crimea had from Russia in 1994 and 1995 (Zimmerman 1998). The hypothesis of the article is that most Russians will want to see southern and eastern Ukraine as part of Russia. Those elites who want Ukraine back with Russia are willing to legitimize military force in pursuit of their interests.

Methodology and analysis. In this analysis, quantitative data from 1994 and 1995 omnibus surveys were analyzed, N=799 (Zimmerman 1998). Respondents were from major cities in Russia. This information was analyzed on a macro level.

Key findings. The key findings are that Southern and Eastern Ukrainians had a strong desire to be a part of Russia: 6 out of 7 on a Likert scale (Zimmerman 1998). This correlated with the opinions of the Russian mass public and the Russian elites. Central and Western Ukraine did not share in this desire. 70% of those who completed the survey in Russia believed that the US is a threat and that Russia should follow its own political, nondemocratic path. 91% of the Russian elites stated that they believe that the use of military force in the protection of Russian territory is legitimate, and 86% percent see legitimacy in the protection of the state. 44% of elites believed military force in defense of ethnic Russians in former Soviet states was also legit.

Strengths and weaknesses. One strength and one weakness was identified in this article. For the strength, the analysis of the data was thorough. For the weakness, the article was not clearly written, and the hypothesis not clearly defined.

Source 14

Written by Peter Rodgers, *Understanding regionalism and the politics of identity in Ukraine's Eastern Borderlands* is about the importance of regions in Ukraine, and the different opinions on politics (2006). The thesis is to identify the difference on Ukrainian politics and society between the areas East and West of the Dnipro River. This is relevant because this source analyses the different views that Ukraine had, and brings to perspective what Pro-Russian Crimea thought of west Ukraine (Rodgers 2006). The author hypothesized that the region in which a Ukrainian lives is very important in determining their political and societal views.

Methodology and analysis. Quantitative data was taken by group session interviews at educational facilities across Ukraine in 2003, N=75 (Rodgers 2006). As the research was to analyze data to finding a link between Ukrainian region and views, it was conducted on a macro level.

Key findings. The historical perspective of the East is that Russia was an ally and are still brethren. The west sees the invading Russians as the enemy (Rodgers 2006). Many people in the Eastern

parts of Ukraine do not see a need for there to be a Russian border, as there were no divisions to be seen between the Russians in Ukraine and the Russians in Russia, and many had familial ties across the border. The western Ukrainians have an individual mentality, and the Eastern Ukrainians have a brethren mentality. The Russian language is a large dividing factor in Ukraine, as the Eastern Ukrainians identify themselves more with the Russian speaking Russians than the Ukrainian speaking western Ukrainians. The Eastern Ukrainians also did not feel that their political needs were being heard, and felt stigmatized for speaking Russian and wanting friendly relations with Russia.

Strengths and weaknesses. Two strengths and two weakness was identified in this article. For strengths, the information from the interviews were very detailed, and the data had an abundance of notes. For the weakness, the number of interviews conducted was very small, and while it confirmed previous studies it should have been more representative. Also, the educational facilities were all taken on the East side. Only half of the story of Ukraine was given due to this.

Source 15

Written by Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme Robertson, *Do Crimeans actually want to join Russia* is an analysis of data collected from Ukrainians on the topic of language, identity, and region (2014). This information is focused on Crimea, to analyze their current stance, and if there is evidence of them wanting to join Russia. The thesis is to discuss the issues of language, identity, and region in Crimea that separates it from the rest of Ukraine. This article is relevant to this paper's research because it analysed the 2013 opinion of Crimean people in their view of statehood (Pop-Eleches & Robertson 2014). The author hypothesized that there will be a significant amount of Crimean people who favor the transition to Russia due to similarities in its language and identity.

Methodology and analysis. Quantitative data from a 2013 survey at the Razumkov Center in Kiev was analyzed at the macro level (Pop-Eleches & Robertson 2014). N=1800 respondents represented west Ukraine, central Ukraine, east Ukraine, and Crimea.

Key findings. The key findings of this article are that 55% of Crimean people identified their homeland as Crimea, over any official nation (Pop-Eleches & Robertson 2014). Over 50% of Crimean people had a geopolitical orientation with Russia. 100% of the people in Crimea still spoke Russian at home, and favored Russian to be the official state language.

Strengths and weaknesses. One strength and two weaknesses have been identified in this article. For the strength, the article thoroughly analyzed the data, and had a well formulated conclusion. For the weakness, the article had N=93 of Crimean people (Pop-Eleches & Robertson 2014). While they say it should not have significantly affected the results, there should be a more equal representation. The article also lacked a clearly defined hypothesis.

Discussion

Russians originally identified themselves with one word, *russkie*, which meant ethnic Russian (Mikhailova 2011). This word predates the word for Russian citizen, which did not come in effect until after the dissolution of the USSR, and is currently used to distinguish Russian citizens who are not ethnically Russian. Crimean people, who were in USSR before the term Russian citizen existed, still call themselves by the same identifying term *russkie*, which shows that their nationality preference is still the same; they still refer themselves as being Russian. Russia had a desire for Ukraine to be a part of Russia, as did Crimea (Zimmerman 1998). The language used by those who are ethnic Russian show that the people who retained the use of the word for ethnic Russian are identifying with Russian nationalism. There is no other way to distinguish a Ukrainian from a Russian in ethnicity, other than by their own proclamation. This proclamation can be seen in Crimea's lack of enthusiasm to be a part of Ukraine, as only 32% of Russians living in the Crimean region had enthusiasm about living in Ukraine, and 27% of Russians in Crimea wanted to be Ukrainian citizens (Surzhko-Harned 2010). During this time only 31% of the Russians and 40% of the Ukrainians in Crimea did not share the idea of Crimea seceding from Ukraine.

Many people in Russia did not even realize that Crimea was not still part of Russia (Zimmerman 1998). This finding shows the social expectations that Russians had with their ethnic brethren in Crimea, for it was assumed that Crimea was going to remain a part of Russia. Comparing this to Kubiecek's article, we get to understand a relationship between Russia and Crimea. While Russians did not even fully realize that Crimea was not a part of them, those who were in Crimea preferred Russian political systems and displayed pro-Russian movements (Kubiecek 2000).

The religion of Crimea was primarily Russian Orthodox Patriarchate Moscow. As religion is a way people identify their culture, the Moscow based religion goes to show that most Crimean people identified their morality with that of Russians, over the Ukraine. The religious identity goes together with the rest of the national identity that Crimean people predominantly had (Stepaneko 2005). Both being Russian in origin, this further demonstrates the ties that Crimea had with Russia.

Crimean people had very little attachment to their Ukraine nation, and had very strong identification with Russia due to their shared language and geopolitical orientation (Pop-Eleches & Robertson 2014). The issue of language choice was prevalent in Crimea, as the capital of Ukraine promoted the Ukrainian language over Russian. This shows not only preference to Russia, but turmoil against Ukraine. When compared with the article written by Rodgers, the issue of language and national identity has been active in Crimea since Ukraine became an independent nation in 1991 (2006). This has led to tensions between the western Ukraine, with its European influence and desire to establish its own nation away from Russia, and Crimea which experienced economic loss during the change and had ethnic and familial ties to Russia. While the rest of Ukraine slowly accepted being Ukrainian, Crimean people still identified themselves as being ethnic Russian, and did not see any support from Ukraine. The rules implied to nationalize the regions only led to more dissatisfaction from Crimea.

In 1998, the Crimean Communist Party became the largest party in Crimea (Wilson & Birch 1999). The strengthening of the communist party in the wake of democratization shows that Crimean

people were growing in their preference to Russian nationalities. The discrimination that was placed against those who were Russian or spoke Russian can be seen to have resulted in the bringing up of a political party that would represent their rights as ethnic Russians (Hrytsenko 2008). Crimean people preferred to have a political system similar to Russia, with them favoring communist parties and Pro Russian movements. (Kubiecek 2000).

As of 1998, the number of Russian people who were unemployed was higher than that of the Ukrainians (Constangioara et. al. 2009). This means that there were more Russians than Ukrainians who were enduring economic hardships. A correlation with the job availability and Crimea wanting to be Ukrainian can be found, as the 1999 key finding showed that less than 30% of the Russians in Crimea wanted to be citizens in Ukraine (Surzhko-Harned 2010). However, the idea that the relationship between one's ethnic identity and nationalism is not dependent upon job loss can be understood at the careful comparison of Fleischmann, Verkuyten, & Poppe's article with that of Constangioara et al. When the Crimean people experienced the greatest job loss, they were a minor region in the Ukraine (Constangioara et. al. 2009) The economic issues that the Crimean people had was with Ukraine, for a lot of revenue was lost after Ukraine became separate from USSR. When Fleischmann, Verkuyten, & Poppe's poll was taken in 2006, Crimea was formed into an autonomous Republic and still had increasing negative feelings towards Ukraine (2011). Stepaneko's key findings also show that the Crimean people still identified Russia over Ukraine despite the unemployment rate decreasing (2005). This means that while economic loss may have attributed in Crimea's negative feelings towards Ukraine, it was not the main factor and the increase of employment did not significantly alter the feelings of those in Crimea.

The level of discrimination that occurred in Ukraine was directed not only towards those who were not 'Ukrainian' but to those who only spoke Russian (Hrytsenko 2008). These minorities were excluded from powerful political positions. This discrimination could lead to isolation, as more Crimeans felt socially closer to Russian than Ukraine. While most people did not actually go to church often, their

identifying religion shows the culture they morally identify themselves with. As a Russian minority, it coincides with their identifying religion to be Russian based Orthodox. This brought more discrimination as religion also set them apart from Ukraine (Khrienko 2009).

In Crimea, the majority of the people spoke Russian over any language, regardless of their nationality or the language law of Ukraine (Janmaat 1999). The refusal of Crimea to alter their language requirements can be compared to the findings of Surzhko-Harned, as the view of the Crimean people was Pro-Russian (2010). As Crimea did not have Ukrainian nationalism, there was not much civic interest to alter their spoken language. Despite a law to make Ukraine the official language, the area of Crimea retained its tradition of teaching its children Russian (Solchanyk 1998). This shows that the residents in Crimea identified themselves as Russian before Ukrainian, as they continued to have their children taught in a minority language in the face of a law. While a separate survey showed that 78% of students in Ukraine spoke Russian at home, that survey grouped Crimea together with eastern Ukraine (Janmaat 1999). When comparing this survey to the findings of this Solchanyk, which included a separate survey for those in Crimea, we can see that there was only a 1.8% change in the schools in Crimea teaching in Ukrainian instead of Russian, and 100% of Crimeans spoke Russian.

The Russians in Crimea maintained a strong sense of ethnic nationality, which had them not only retain Pro-Russian ideologies, but discriminate against those who did not share the same ethnicity (Korostelina 2008). This demonstrates the Social Dominance theory, as the Russian Crimean people demonstrated ethnocentrism in their Russian identification (Fleischmann, Verkuyten, & Poppe 2011). The discrimination that Crimean people had against those who were not ethnic Russian was reciprocated, as those in the eastern parts of Ukraine discriminated the Crimean people, who maintained a friendly relationship with the invading Russians (Rodgers 2006).

Crimea's differences in national identity and political beliefs steadily increased over the span of a decade before the people in Crimea voted for their region to be separated from Ukraine (Stepaneko 2005).

This alludes that a conflict in national identity may be a precursor to annexation. The Crimean ethnocentrism which was documented in Stepaneko's survey shows up in the Orange Revolution (Korostelina 2008). This comparison reveals another explanation for the Crimean non-involvement with the Revolution; they felt themselves superior to the rest of Ukraine, and did not feel that the political activity pertained to them.

As of 2003, the relations the Crimea had with Russia was still closer than its relations with Ukraine, as internal tensions between language use and the opinion of Russia grew to violent proportions (Rodgers 2006). Due to their friendly relationship with Russia and their language, Russians in Ukraine were looked down upon as enemy fraternizers by western Ukraine. As compared with findings from Janmaat, Crimean people fought the language law for several years (1999). As time progressed, and more of Ukraine started speaking Ukrainian instead Russian, discrimination against Crimea was a norm. Western regions saw Crimea as an area that was refusing to cooperate with Ukrainian nationalism in favor of Russia. Crimea saw the Ukraine as implementing language as a way to culturally override their ethnicity. This created a lot of tension between the areas, and violent demonstrations would occur.

Future Research

During this period of research, new questions developed that were not answered in the literature review. As all the research on this paper was taken before the annexation took place, new research into Crimea to discover the popular opinions as to why they voted to leave Ukraine should be conducted. This analysis should investigate if Crimean people see the vote as a choice in the preservation of nationalism, to the betterment of economy, or one of political gain. The relationship between Crimea and Russia should also be analyzed by a survey into the opinions of the people in Crimea as to why Russia annexed their region. This will reveal if the public feels that they were always a part of Russia symbolically and were finally able to become part of Russia, or if they feel that the annexation was solely a way for Russia to acquire more resources.

Conclusion

On a functional perspective, Crimea was a dysfunctional region in Ukraine. This was due to their loss of economy, contrasting political views, and language difference. The Crimeans desired to return to the state of good function that they remembered having with Russia. From a conflict theory perspective, Ukraine's attempts to become more Ukrainian oppressed the ethnic identification of the Russians in Crimea. The Crimeans met the assimilation attempts with resistance and violence against Ukraine. On a symbolic interaction perspective, the Crimeans identified with Russia more than Ukraine. Their language, culture, heritage, religion, political party views, and collective mentality was the same as Russia. Introducing hardships and attempting to assimilate a nationality made the people in Crimea more resolved and aggressive in preserving their Russian nationalism. As the conflicts between Ukrainians and Crimeans escalated, Crimea voted to separate their region from Ukraine. Once separated from Ukraine, Russia annexed Crimea. This annexation meant that those in Crimea can retain their nationality without facing discrimination in their nation.

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