

**NANYANG  
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**SINGAPORE**

SCHOOL OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING

**CE/CZ4055 Project Report**

Side-Channel Attack Using Correlation Power Analysis

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# 1.0 Introduction

Side-channel attack is a security exploit that uses indirect effects of the system or its hardware to acquire information from the program execution of a system, rather than directly targeting the program or its code. These attacks typically aimed to exfiltrate sensitive information such as the cryptographic key. There are several types of side-channel attacks namely, cache attack, timing attack, electromagnetic attack and power-monitoring attack. This project will be focusing on performing Correlation Power Analysis (CPA).

CPA attack allows an attacker to obtain the secret encryption key that is stored in the victim's device. Generally, CPA attack consists of 4 steps:

1. Modeling the victim's power consumption
2. Victims encrypt several different plaintext and record the victim's power consumption traces during each encryption
3. Attack the key one byte at a time
4. Put together all the subkey to get the full secret key

## 2.0 Implementation

This project's implementation was separated into two parts:

1. Correlation Power Analysis
2. Data visualization

Our team has decided to build the Correlation Power Analysis in Java since it is statically typed and compiled, as opposed to Python, which is dynamic and interpreted. To speed up the analysis, the implementation will be multithreaded.

However, because we will be using libraries for plotting and interpreting graphs, the data visualization will be done in Python.

## 2.1. Correlation Power Analysis

### 2.1.1 Trace Acquisition

The executable file of the SCA328p ctrl software will be used to create the traces from the Efflux SCA Evaluation Board. The Tektronix TDS2012C scope is linked to the Efflux SCA board for the hardware setup. The scope's Channel 1 probe is connected to Pin 1 of the Efflux SCA Evaluation Board's header J2. The pin is in charge of collecting the 8-bit MCU's power leakage output. On the Efflux SCA Evaluation Board, channel 2 of the probe is connected to pin PB1 of header J1. This pin serves as the scope's trigger.

On the SCA328p\_ctrl software, the key used to generate the 100 traces is:

4C494D5348414E474D45493132333435

Figure xx shows the generated ciphertext using the key provided.




Figure xx

During the operation, we will be able to see a file being generated “waveform.csv” shown in figure xx. that will generate all the power consumption information. The first column will be the plain text while the second column will be the ciphertext and the rest of the values on the right of will be the actual trace values of the trace themselves

2FC6FBD8C6A9C787F5A5951C8D612	800308455086F72000339274818A	0.5090	0.4860	0.4540	0.4820	0.4400	0.4080	0.4480	0.5000	0.4580	0.5020	0.4480	0.3980	0.4480	0.4580	0.4140	0.4100	0.4180	0.3780	0.4000	0.5020	0.4780	0.4420
9C0D80B7D327D8F83B8C96E01065786	7FFFA4826427EA43A678A785746D2B	0.4820	0.5180	0.4800	0.4920	0.4400	0.4100	0.4580	0.5000	0.4680	0.5000	0.4840	0.4380	0.4400	0.4900	0.4440	0.4320	0.4540	0.4200	0.4020	0.5380	0.5120	0.4680
9CFCB4C44449FF3755AE7BA83A3D90E	DFECC856423573181F7B7A1F4C81A52	0.5120	0.4780	0.4740	0.4580	0.4180	0.4220	0.4740	0.4980	0.4660	0.4740	0.4340	0.4000	0.4820	0.4620	0.4140	0.4600	0.4120	0.3840	0.4640	0.5080	0.4480	0.4820
5870D146348A8A8E9F86ECBA8484389C	756411DFF9433DA49620A3AB7E4A4AC	0.5100	0.4960	0.4500	0.4900	0.4320	0.4000	0.4540	0.4960	0.4720	0.4940	0.4540	0.4060	0.4620	0.4600	0.4340	0.4400	0.4220	0.3860	0.4180	0.5300	0.4820	0.4600
330E8E9F9CA1E48DA0B48A7238282E76	8438B7329A98F930CB8C6A8A6E7695	0.4600	0.5100	0.4700	0.4800	0.4400	0.4100	0.4420	0.4880	0.4820	0.4800	0.4700	0.4280	0.4200	0.4720	0.4440	0.4180	0.3820	0.4960	0.5080	0.5080	0.4580	0.4580
74F6B84F4F81D3A03132F75A1171D	8E8B81F32C0D419B70D684H8484820F	0.5140	0.4780	0.4760	0.4580	0.4120	0.4140	0.4720	0.5020	0.4640	0.4980	0.4320	0.4120	0.4780	0.4680	0.4280	0.4580	0.4220	0.3960	0.4900	0.5140	0.4640	0.4880
57F6B6A3D9A0F91A3270A15847819F7	705A2918E739D7968584128A7F7D77	0.5020	0.4760	0.4760	0.4460	0.4040	0.4180	0.4880	0.4840	0.4440	0.4960	0.4380	0.3940	0.4780	0.4440	0.4280	0.4180	0.3820	0.4640	0.5100	0.4540	0.4900	0.4900
506448D302995A179E630F3C3D51	8E32C0EA378A1CE8E0B10C277A8176	0.4960	0.4820	0.4320	0.4400	0.3900	0.3960	0.4400	0.4540	0.4220	0.4140	0.3760	0.4520	0.4280	0.4100	0.4202	0.3820	0.3780	0.4620	0.5060	0.4500	0.4700	0.4700
CA42299540E4D43E2D708F5A75	8B1A007141325D4F7DBE15D21A3A2F	0.4780	0.4820	0.4340	0.4840	0.4100	0.3960	0.4380	0.4540	0.4340	0.4480	0.4280	0.3720	0.4160	0.4480	0.3960	0.3800	0.4300	0.3740	0.3680	0.4820	0.4780	0.4440
18E7BFB78087377506D9F9685030E8	9F5D3A7C8E4DE8F8A609678F69687	0.5080	0.5040	0.4680	0.4860	0.4520	0.4080	0.4680	0.5040	0.4820	0.5140	0.4600	0.4220	0.4640	0.4820	0.4300	0.4340	0.3900	0.4140	0.5280	0.4880	0.4500	0.4500
20F8A146330847835F4E83B2F4DE03	910A8AC8222D40A3AF14F1D012E6E8	0.4660	0.5080	0.4580	0.4880	0.4400	0.4060	0.4380	0.4780	0.4680	0.4560	0.4540	0.4220	0.4240	0.4720	0.4360	0.4120	0.4480	0.4100	0.3820	0.5000	0.5060	0.4500
24E3E79954CE8FF8D10D830C8C9C	D1866782F08E4B39F073E74FD00C2	0.4960	0.4420	0.4060	0.4360	0.4020	0.3980	0.4560	0.4680	0.4420	0.4380	0.4280	0.3920	0.4580	0.4380	0.3940	0.4480	0.4020	0.3760	0.4660	0.5160	0.4520	0.4860
EEEC3E34C818747674D758D1389480	C3170EED3E8E4B819393FAE128A51	0.4680	0.5120	0.4500	0.4960	0.4480	0.4060	0.4420	0.4820	0.4620	0.4540	0.4540	0.4060	0.4200	0.4200	0.4440	0.4060	0.3740	0.4940	0.4880	0.4880	0.4520	0.4520
308E8E67818A4C886716E87F7A271	C2E271688C4867F97B028C3081F8	0.4720	0.5020	0.4780	0.5060	0.4500	0.4180	0.4820	0.4820	0.5020	0.5020	0.4380	0.4080	0.4820	0.4580	0.4280	0.4820	0.4280	0.3820	0.5140	0.5180	0.4740	0.4740
38A2418263869F9C15E6328F188448	A3A520E1E8A7D0C40750215887D2A8F	0.5060	0.4960	0.4460	0.4820	0.4440	0.4000	0.4520	0.4840	0.4660	0.4800	0.4440	0.4000	0.4420	0.4580	0.4240	0.4160	0.4140	0.3960	0.3960	0.5300	0.4860	0.4540
D018DFF73CF39A88867EC0A0A0E89CF2	3C10A15D08C68C3C719AA4218A878	0.5180	0.4880	0.4660	0.4840	0.4380	0.4040	0.4640	0.5080	0.4800	0.5100	0.4520	0.4220	0.4700	0.4640	0.4220	0.4480	0.4380	0.3940	0.4140	0.5360	0.4960	0.4680
4A8B77D5A74E6D9467C03D7E9279960	8788148582C678B0107387D78D38218	0.5020	0.4680	0.4700	0.4400	0.4060	0.4100	0.4700	0.4880	0.4520	0.4580	0.4280	0.3940	0.4600	0.4380	0.4020	0.4280	0.4080	0.3780	0.4700	0.5100	0.4560	0.4880
738517F987604D303587C0E0F8D1	348BF40CA8E18A103B32DEAF8D10C	0.5080	0.4520	0.4680	0.4380	0.3820	0.4240	0.4600	0.4800	0.4500	0.4540	0.4180	0.4020	0.4780	0.4280	0.4280	0.4380	0.4160	0.3720	0.4780	0.4940	0.4500	0.4800
40F332E46A8D48C18E3D7177AE8A48	CA08D40A2D067AF78E878DA04A340E	0.4960	0.4700	0.4680	0.4360	0.4080	0.4200	0.4820	0.4740	0.4460	0.4640	0.4280	0.3900	0.4680	0.4380	0.4140	0.4520	0.4180	0.3840	0.4640	0.4980	0.4560	0.4860
8A149F52487A12B198C87677E721C9	8B30K17E444D908D8E3E3C8AC3D5A	0.4680	0.5180	0.4600	0.4900	0.4420	0.4120	0.4540	0.5020	0.4660	0.4940	0.4320	0.4100	0.4360	0.4660	0.4380	0.4180	0.3380	0.3960	0.5200	0.5000	0.4520	0.4520
26A80770C2E15A8D8A2845C8C9FDD	3A07F3676D35387116863861561CC	0.5000	0.4780	0.4620	0.4880	0.4180	0.3980	0.4540	0.4580	0.4220	0.4820	0.4240	0.3760	0.4820	0.4580	0.4280	0.4240	0.3820	0.4500	0.5140	0.4580	0.4880	0.4880
73FA8F1F1A8D4E8647E10F6368732A	1D8917218A4032C0E02A0F87F879	0.4920	0.4680	0.4300	0.4520	0.4100	0.3980	0.4440	0.4840	0.4560	0.4820	0.4480	0.3960	0.4660	0.4500	0.4140	0.4280	0.4080	0.3720	0.4420	0.5160	0.4540	0.4780
8C0A5F43C0E3E33D708F5A75	341F3E3090CF3C90E8D10F12A51A0	0.4660	0.5080	0.4600	0.4960	0.4560	0.4120	0.4400	0.4880	0.4640	0.4700	0.4620	0.4200	0.4140	0.4780	0.4460	0.4000	0.4420	0.4080	0.3780	0.4980	0.4920	0.4500
90731D084B3A0E346C814BC10DE089	9C44F678D85F70873A068C7EE3E80	0.5080	0.4940	0.4620	0.4700	0.4300	0.3880	0.4780	0.4980	0.4500	0.5000	0.4480	0.4100	0.4580	0.4660	0.4180	0.4480	0.4300	0.3900	0.4340	0.5120	0.4760	0.4540
3320B80C8F70C3728596F3D6E44C7A	78484828E828235F57D0F7D0A4D5873	0.4600	0.4880	0.4500	0.4780	0.4380	0.4020	0.4440	0.4820	0.4640	0.4660	0.4560	0.4160	0.4240	0.4680	0.4240	0.4180	0.4000	0.3860	0.5100	0.5040	0.4580	0.4580
145C4EFD4E8F877CA8B868533CD1E	703648808A8C8B775597F3E4E8DEE1	0.5000	0.4720	0.4560	0.4900	0.4120	0.4540	0.4580	0.4220	0.4500	0.4420	0.3860	0.4780	0.4360	0.4100	0.4000	0.4180	0.3780	0.4580	0.5200	0.4660	0.4900	0.4900
82D8D3F1A87D2A48198C780F7F48328F	7FACDF0E7F3D3A9398FCECAFCD8F90	0.5160	0.4740	0.4960	0.4560	0.4140	0.4360	0.4840	0.4980	0.4560	0.4660	0.4280	0.4140	0.4800	0.4520	0.4000	0.4080	0.3880	0.4840	0.4960	0.4880	0.4880	0.4880
774FCB3A02D0D106807857911858	76D33D7F4E1D4A855687B128B0C6E	0.4880	0.4640	0.4020	0.4480	0.3960	0.4040	0.5000	0.4720	0.4480	0.4520	0.4240	0.3920	0.4560	0.4280	0.4000	0.4460	0.4020	0.3780	0.4520	0.4960	0.4560	0.4840
4E6A8C16CAB0E804152387A3A6A	7275A70A9D323D9A30E3A2C3B86F0	0.4840	0.5100	0.4580	0.4840	0.4340	0.4120	0.4600	0.4820	0.4620	0.4740	0.4440	0.4000	0.4320	0.4480	0.4260	0.4140	0.4240	0.3840	0.3980	0.5080	0.4760	0.4420
D13A6843E7D086781D21C7C023890E	7828B8322C8C9F8932141E829A814	0.5060	0.4780	0.4380	0.4700	0.4200	0.4440	0.4800	0.4800	0.4500	0.4800	0.4340	0.3880	0.4500	0.4480	0.4120	0.4160	0.4140	0.3640	0.4140	0.5160	0.4680	0.4360
4E0D3F68F703C4AC0F4E3E128E1A77	7F7E1E1D07203F94874D8D78273E	0.5040	0.4820	0.4620	0.4480	0.4300	0.4080	0.4620	0.4720	0.4440	0.4780	0.4300	0.3860	0.4600	0.4580	0.4220	0.4200	0.3860	0.4280	0.5000	0.4580	0.4440	0.4440
0E3D10CDA0789F8A823686A8487218E0	811FA7F02784E7F2E38686CF77718A	0.4700	0.5120	0.4740	0.4980	0.4340	0.4160	0.4360	0.4880	0.4680	0.4840	0.4720	0.4340	0.4380	0.4720	0.4460	0.4640	0.4100	0.3820	0.4980	0.5060	0.4880	0.4880
20A4F78D89123A72043A3F3801C07	438E18F9A86C254BC4F8C8E0AEEC03	0.5220	0.4760	0.4540	0.4820	0.4240	0.4080	0.4820	0.4900	0.4600	0.4820	0.4400	0.4060	0.4700	0.4640	0.4160	0.4080	0.4140	0.3820	0.4560	0.5180	0.4600	0.4640
86B9BA81847E86732388A89050E	82C7878E329828B8A2E8CA8C3D1285	0.4600	0.4940	0.4580	0.4780	0.4440	0.4080	0.4340	0.4780	0.4640	0.4580	0.4680	0.4360	0.4540	0.4580	0.4220	0.4080	0.4480	0.4080	0.3880	0.4880	0.5040	0.4480
8678D896488F5A8A78168D591A	8A0E770F7511C41FF70A835A1A	0.4820	0.4840	0.4460	0.4800	0.4280	0.3960	0.4300	0.4400	0.4480	0.4360	0.4280	0.3860	0.4500	0.4520	0.4140	0.3960	0.4180	0.3780	0.4960	0.4700	0.4020	0.4020
2A88CEA07F3A5791D6F7A8E2A8E	263288F5E0D7E2AEC863D2DA0A5	0.4680	0.4740	0.4360	0.4600	0.4020	0.3940	0.4440	0.5000	0.4660	0.4880	0.4580	0.4180	0.4300	0.4400	0.4200	0.4120	0.4380	0.3800	0.3780	0.5140	0.4660	0.4440

Figure xx

## 2.1.2 Model Trace Matrix Initialization

A 2D Array with the size of [ a ][ b ] was used to create the model trace matrix.

a: the total number of traces in a sample

b:  $2^8 = 256$  is the number of potential values for one byte of the key.

```
public static int[] sBox = {0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76,
    0xBA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0,
    0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15,
    0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75,
    0x09, 0xB3, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84,
    0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF,
    0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8,
    0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2,
    0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0
```

### 2.1.3 Data Preparation

```
//variables
int marg = 60;
public float [][] powerMatrix;
public String[] plainText;
public float [][] hammingPowerMatrix;
public float [][] correlationMatrix;
private int numPowerTracePoint;
private int numPowerTrace;
public String fileName = "waveform.csv";
public String originalkey = "Key.txt";
private String[] key = new String[16];
public String[][] plot1 = new String[16][256];
public String[][] plot2 = new String[160][256];
public String[] keyByteList = new String[160];
```

Figure X shows the variables we created to store the data generated. We created arrays for power matrix, hamming power matrix, correlation matrix and also plot 1 and 2 to store the data for plotting of graph.

### 2.1.4 Compute Hamming weight

```
public void createHammingPowerMatrix(int num) {
    int sBoxValue;
    hammingPowerMatrix = new float[numPowerTrace][256];

    for(int i=0; i<numPowerTrace; i++)
    {
        int plainTextOneByte = Integer.parseInt(plainText[i].substring(2*(num-1),2*num),16);

        for (int count = 0; count<256; count++)
        {
            sBoxValue = sBox[plainTextOneByte^count];
            hammingPowerMatrix[i][count]= Integer.bitCount(sBoxValue); //to get hamming weight
        }
    }
}
```

Figure X shows the code snippet to compute the hamming weight. We loop through the number of plain text (100 plain text in this case) and work 1 byte of the plain text at a time. The hex value of will be converted into integer. To compute the hamming weight of each key bye, we find the corresponding sbox value by xor-ing 1 byte of plaintext with every possible key byte from 0x00 to 0xFF (or 0-255 in decimal). After finding out the sbox value, we find the hamming weight by counting the number of 'binary 1' in the sbox value by using the bitCount() function.

### 2.1.5 Pearson's Correlation Coefficient

To find the correlation between the model trace matrix and the actual trace matrix, Pearson's Correlation Coefficient equation was utilized. The correlation ranges from -1 to 1, where 1 indicates a strong positive correlation while -1 indicates a strong negative correlation and 0 being no correlation at all.

$$r = \frac{n(\sum xy) - (\sum x)(\sum y)}{\sqrt{[n\sum x^2 - (\sum x)^2][n\sum y^2 - (\sum y)^2]}}$$

Where,

- $r$  = Pearson Coefficient
- $n$  = size of array
- $\sum x$  = summation of elements in array  $X$
- $\sum y$  = summation of elements in array  $Y$
- $\sum x^2$  = summation of elements squared in array  $X$
- $\sum y^2$  = summation of elements squared in array  $Y$
- $(\sum x)^2$  = summation of elements in array  $X$  squared
- $(\sum y)^2$  = summation of elements in array  $Y$  squared

Figure X shows the formula for Pearson's Correlation Coefficient.

```
public float pearsonCoeff(float[] x, float[] y, int n) {  
    float sumX = 0, sumY = 0, sumXY = 0;  
    float sqSumX = 0, sqSumY = 0;  
  
    for(int i=0; i<n; i++)  
    {  
        sumX += x[i];  
        sumY += y[i];  
        sumXY += x[i]*y[i];  
        sqSumX += x[i]*x[i];  
        sqSumY += y[i]*y[i];  
    }  
  
    float correlation = (float) (n*sumXY - sumX*sumY)/ (float)(Math.sqrt((n*sqSumX - sumX*sumX) * (n*sqSumY - sumY*sumY)));  
    return correlation;  
}
```

Figure X shows the code for calculating the correlation using the Pearson's Correlation Coefficient equation.

```

public void createCorrelationMatrix() {
    float powerMatrixColumn[] = new float[numPowerTrace];
    float hammingPowerMatrixColumn[] = new float[numPowerTrace];

    for (int i=0; i<correlationMatrix.length; i++)
    {
        //get hamming version of power matrix for each column
        //too many loop so this one do in function lol
        hammingPowerMatrixColumn = hammingPowerMatrixAtColumn(i);

        for(int k=0; k<numPowerTracePoint; k++)
        {
            //get actual power matrix for each column then calculate coefficient with hamming version column by column
            powerMatrixColumn = powerMatrixAtColumn(k);
            correlationMatrix[i][k] = pearsonCoeff(powerMatrixColumn, hammingPowerMatrixColumn, numPowerTrace);
        }
    }
}

```

Figure X is the code snippet to calculate the correlation matrix. We compute the correlation matrix by using the Pearson's correlation function above by passing in the actual power matrix for each column, and the hamming weight of the power matrix for each column and number of traces.

## 2.1.6 Finding correct key

```

public String guessKey(int row) {
    float max = -1;
    int key = 0;
    //here we check one by one and get the highest correlation
    for (int i=0; i<256; i++) {
        float maxRowCor = -1;

        for (int j=0; j<numPowerTracePoint; j++)
        {
            if(correlationMatrix[i][j]>maxRowCor)
            {
                maxRowCor = correlationMatrix[i][j];
            }
            if(correlationMatrix[i][j]> max)
            {
                max = correlationMatrix[i][j];
                key = i;
            }
        }

        if(numPowerTrace == 100) {

            plot1[(row+1)/10-1][i] = maxRowCor+ "";
        }

        plot2[row][i] = maxRowCor + "";
    }

    keyByteList[row] = max+ "";

    return Integer.toHexString(key);
}

```


In this function, we find the highest correlation for all the traces and store the data in plot1 and plot2. The highest value from the correlation matrix are also stored inside the key byte list.

### 2.1.7 Number of bytes recovered

```
//Calculate the number of bytes recovered as number of traces increase|
int numberOfBytesRecovered[] = new int[16];;
StringBuilder b4 = new StringBuilder();
for(int i=0;i<10;i++) {
    for(int j=1;j<17;j++) {
        if(key[j-1].equalsIgnoreCase(Allkey[j][i])) {
            numberOfBytesRecovered[i] = numberOfBytesRecovered[i] + 1;
        }
    }
    b4.append(numberOfBytesRecovered[i]);
    b4.append("\n");
}
BufferedWriter w4=null;
try {
    w4 = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter("numberbytesrecovered.csv"));
    w4.write(b4.toString());
    w4.close();
}
catch (IOException error) {
    error.printStackTrace();
    System.exit(0);
}
```

Figure X depicts the code to get number of correct key bytes recovered as the number of traces increase. We compare the correct key array with all the generated keys array, if there's a match with the key, the number of bytes count increase by 1. Next, we write the array of number of correct bytes recovered into a csv file for plotting later.

### 2.1.8 Running the Java file

The image shows a screenshot of a Java application's console window. The title bar indicates the application is 'CPAProject [Java Application]' and the path is 'C:\Program Files\AdoptOpenJDK\jdk-11.0.8.10-openj9\bin\javaw.exe'. The console output shows the number of power traces (100) and points in a trace (2500). It then displays the original key as a hexadecimal string: '4C 49 4D 53 48 41 4E 47 4D 45 49 31 32 33 34 35'. Finally, it shows the recovered key, which is identical to the original: 'The key recovered is: 4C 49 4D 53 48 41 4E 47 4D 45 49 31 32 33 34 35'.

```
<terminated> CPAProject [Java Application] C:\Program Files\AdoptOpenJDK\jdk-11.0.8.10-openj9\bin\javaw.exe (Apr 15, 2022, 6:18:40 PM - 6:19:35 PM)
No of Power Traces: 100 No of Points in a Trace: 2500
The original key is: 4C 49 4D 53 48 41 4E 47 4D 45 49 31 32 33 34 35
The key recovered is: 4C 49 4D 53 48 41 4E 47 4D 45 49 31 32 33 34 35
```

Figure xx: Recovering secret key using Java file



By running the written java programme, we will be able to see from figure xx that the secret key originally generated is able to be recovered.

## 3.0 Results

### 3.1 Plot 1

The code snippet in Figure xx will be used to generate the correlation plot for plot 1.

```
44     for i in range(0, 16, 1): #byte 0 to 15
45         plot.figure()
46         plot.plot(plot1[i]) # plot1 correlation values for key from 0x00 to 0xFF for current byte
47         plot.xlabel("Possible Key Bytes")
48         plot.ylabel("Correlation Values")
49         #plot.savefig(f'correlation_plot1_for_byte_{index//2}')
50
```

Figure xx: Code snippet for generating plot 1

Assuming you get a paste in order of the figure generated, each graph represents 1 byte of the key. The correlation plots for all 16 key bytes are shown in Figures XX reading vertically down. The key is 4C494D5348414E474D45493132333435,




Figure xx: First 9 Key Bytes




Figure xx: Last 7 Key Bytes

Figure XX and XX shows the correlation coefficient vs hypothesis for 100 traces.

## 3.2 Plot 2

The steps for making correlation plot 2 are similar to those for making plot 1.

```


step_list = [i for i in range(10, 110, 10)]

l = 0
for j in range(0, 160, 10):
    plot2list = []
    for k in range(0, 10, 1):
        plot2list.append(plot2[j+k])
        # print(plot2list)

    plot.figure()
    plot.plot(step_list, plot2list, 'o', color='blue') # plot
    plot.plot(step_list, keyByteList[l], 'o', color='red') #
    plot.xlabel("No. of traces")
    plot.ylabel("Correlation Values")
    l+=1

```

Figure xx: Code snippet for generating plot 2






Figure xx: Correlation Plot with Variable Trace

Figure XX shows the correlation of correct key byte vs number of traces for all of the individual byte of the key. From the observation of the plots, the correlation coefficient eventually converge and the correct key byte starts to emerge as the number of traces increase.

### 3.3 Plot for Correct bytes recovered

```
with open("numberbytesrecovered.csv") as file_name:
    recoveredlist = np.loadtxt(file_name)

#Recovered bytes
step = [i for i in range(10, 110, 10)]
plot.figure()
plot.plot(step, recoveredlist)
plot.xlabel("Number of traces")
plot.ylabel("Number of correct bytes")
```

Figure X shows the code to plot the graph for the number of correct bytes against the number of traces. Firstly, we open the csv file generated earlier by running the java program. Next we plot

the number of traces on the x-axis and the list of number of recovered correct bytes on the y-axis.




Figure X shows the plot for number of correct key bytes recovered against the number of traces. From the plot, we can see that as the number of traces increase, the number of correct bytes increase as well.

## 4.0 Countermeasures against Power Analysis Attack

The countermeasures against power analysis attacks are a series of strategies designed to make the power consumption of cryptographic devices independent of the data they process. Both hardware and software can be modified or improved to counter power analysis attacks. Hardware provides more variety of solutions to avoid leakage of information as compared to software countermeasures.

The following countermeasures can be split into 2 parts:

1. Hiding
2. Masking

### **Hiding Scheme**

The hiding schemes randomly change the execution times of the operation to be attacked or the vertical height of the side-channel signals of the operation to be attacked. The goal of this

scheme is to make the power consumption of cryptographic devices independent of the performed operations and the processed values.

Some techniques that the hiding scheme uses are random insertion of dummy operations and shuffling of instructions to ensure that in different executions the same operation does not happen at the same moment in time.

### **Masking Scheme**

The masking schemes modify the intermediate value randomly by adding random values as masks so that the attacker cannot guess intermediate values. Masking prevents power analysis attacks because the randomly masked intermediate values cause a power consumption that is not predictable by the attacker. The goal of this scheme is to make the intermediate values that are processed by the device independent of the intermediate values of the algorithm.

## **5.0 Conclusion**

Power analysis attacks are frequently undetectable by the affected device. Because the attack is non-invasive and the power consumption monitoring is passive. As a result, cryptosystem engineers are continually improving countermeasures to ensure that power analysis attacks can be prevented by making an attack difficult enough that the reward for breaking the system is less than the cost of doing so.