KOLE REDDIG

Contact Information

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Education

Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University — Pittsburgh, PA

Ph.D. Economics (Minor in Marketing) — 2020 (expected)

Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University — Pittsburgh, PA

M.S. Economics — 2017

George Mason University — Fairfax, VA

B.S. Economics and Mathematics — 2014

summa cum laude, Honors in Mathematics

Fields of Interest

Health Economics, Industrial Organization, and Applied Microeconomics.

References

Prof. Martin Gaynor (co-chair)

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Prof. Maryam Saeedi (co-chair)

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Prof. Rebecca Lessem

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Job Market Paper

"Designing Contracts for Multitasking Groups: A Structural Model of Accountable Care Organizations." (Link)

Abstract: This paper estimates a structural model of multitasking agents to investigate the cost-quality tradeoff in healthcare and design contracts for a large physician incentive program. The setting involves Medicare's Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), which are groups of healthcare providers that receive incentive pay for spending below a cost target on shared patients. I incorporate three important aspects of this setting into the model: (i) healthcare providers make multitasking effort choices concerning quality of care and cost reduction; (ii) providers in the incentive program are paid based on group performance, so they act strategically and may free-ride; and (iii) a provider's decision to participate in the incentive program depends on anticipated earnings. By estimating the model, I identify the tradeoff between quality of care and reducing cost, and I show that multitasking plays a large role in determining agent decisions. Counterfactual simulations indicate the contract that maximizes only the monetary savings of the incentive program increases savings by over \$700 million per year, but it decreases quality of care by two standard deviations. Another counterfactual shows free-riding within ACOs decreases program savings by over \$1 billion per year.

Other Working Papers

"Spillovers between Medicare and Medicaid: Evidence from the Supply-Side and Payment Parity."

Teaching Experience

Instructor
Regression Analysis (Undergraduate), Summer 2017
Overall teaching evaluation: 4.7/5.0 (100% of students responding)

Teaching Assistant (* denotes recitation leader)
Regression Analysis (Undergraduate), Spring 2016*, Fall 2016*, Fall 2017*, Fall 2018*, Fall 2019*
Statistical Decision Making (MBA), Spring 2017*, Spring 2018, Spring 2019
Economic Principles of Policy Analysis (Masters), Spring 2018*
Microeconomics I (Ph.D.), Fall 2015*, Fall 2016*
Microeconomics II (Ph.D.), Fall 2015*

Conference Presentations

2019: ASHEcon (Washington D.C.), IIOC Rising Stars Session (Boston), H2D2 Research Day (University of Michigan)

2018: Southeastern Health Economics Study Group Conference (Atlanta)

Other Experience

Research Assistant for Prof. Rebecca Lessem, Spring 2019
Research Assistant for Prof. Karam Kang, Spring 2016, Spring 2017

Selected Awards and Honors

William Larimer Mellon Fellowship	2014-2018
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University	
Phi Beta Kappa	2014
George Mason University	
First Place, Physical Sciences Undergraduate Research Colloquium	2014
College of Science, George Mason University	
Outstanding Academic Achievement Award	2014
Department of Economics, George Mason University	

Other

Computer Skills: Matlab, Stata, Python, R, Eviews, SAS, LaTeX, Microsoft Office

Citizenship: United States