

KOLE REDDIG

Contact Information

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Education

Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University	Pittsburgh, PA
Ph.D. Economics (Minor in Marketing)	2020 (expected)
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University	Pittsburgh, PA
M.S. Economics	2017
George Mason University	Fairfax, VA
B.S. Economics and Mathematics	2014
<i>summa cum laude</i> , Honors in Mathematics	

Fields of Interest

Health Economics, Industrial Organization, and Applied Microeconomics.

References

Prof. Martin Gaynor (co-chair)
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Carnegie Mellon University
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Carnegie Mellon University
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Job Market Paper

“Designing Contracts for Multitasking Groups: A Structural Model of Accountable Care Organizations.” ([Link](#))

Abstract: This paper studies how multitasking and free-riding determine the performance of agents in an incentive program and how accounting for these things in payment contracts improves overall program outcomes. I study this in the context of Medicare’s Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), which are groups of healthcare providers that receive incentive pay for spending below a cost target on shared patients. Providers in ACOs are paid based on group performance, so free-riding within ACOs may hinder cost savings. Moreover, if providers can achieve cost savings by decreasing the quality of care they provide to patients, poorly designed incentives will lead to decreased patient health. Finally, a provider’s decision to join an ACO is voluntary, so anticipated earnings must be generous enough to encourage participation. By building and estimating a structural model of ACOs that takes this setting into account, I find free-riding within ACOs and the tradeoff between decreasing expenditure and improving quality of care play meaningful roles in ACO outcomes. Counterfactual simulations indicate the contract that maximizes the monetary savings of the incentive program increases savings by over \$700 million per year, but decreases quality of care by two standard deviations. Free-riding within ACOs decreases program savings by over \$1 billion per year.

Other Working Papers

“Spillovers between Medicare and Medicaid: Evidence from the Supply-Side and Payment Parity.”

Teaching Experience

Instructor

Regression Analysis (Undergraduate), Summer 2017

Overall teaching evaluation: 4.7/5.0 (100% of students responding)

Teaching Assistant (* denotes recitation leader)

Regression Analysis (Undergraduate), Spring 2016*, Fall 2016*, Fall 2017*, Fall 2018*, Fall 2019*

Statistical Decision Making (MBA), Spring 2017*, Spring 2018, Spring 2019

Economic Principles of Policy Analysis (Masters), Spring 2018*

Microeconomics I (Ph.D.), Fall 2015*, Fall 2016*

Microeconomics II (Ph.D.), Fall 2015*

Conference Presentations

2019: ASHEcon (Washington D.C.), IIOC Rising Stars Session (Boston), H2D2 Research Day (University of Michigan)

2018: Southeastern Health Economics Study Group Conference (Atlanta)

Other Experience

Research Assistant for Prof. Rebecca Lessem, Spring 2019
Research Assistant for Prof. Karam Kang, Spring 2016, Spring 2017

Selected Awards and Honors

William Larimer Mellon Fellowship	2014-2018
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University	
Phi Beta Kappa	2014
George Mason University	
First Place, Physical Sciences Undergraduate Research Colloquium	2014
College of Science, George Mason University	
Outstanding Academic Achievement Award	2014
Department of Economics, George Mason University	

Other

Computer Skills: Matlab, Stata, Python, R, Eviews, SAS, L^AT_EX, Microsoft Office
Citizenship: United States