

# SECURE OPEN ID CONNECT IMPLEMENTATION USING AZURE ACTIVE DIRECTORY AND ASP .NET FRAMEWORK

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ABSTRACT. In this manuscript secure Open ID Connect implementation using Azure is discussed.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Your introduction here. Include some references [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Lorem Ipsum is simply dummy text of the printing and typesetting industry. Lorem Ipsum has been the industry's standard dummy text ever since the 1500s, when an unknown printer took a galley of type and scrambled it to make a type specimen book. It has survived not only five centuries, but also the leap into electronic typesetting, remaining essentially unchanged. It was popularised in the 1960s with the release of Letraset sheets containing Lorem Ipsum passages, and more

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recently with desktop publishing software like Aldus PageMaker including versions of Lorem Ipsum.

OAuth 2.0 flow diagram





Figure 1. OAuth 2.0 with PKCE flow diagram.

2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

3. AUTHENTICATION FLOW

Authentication flow diagram



**Figure 2.** Authentication flow diagram.

- (1) Frontend application sends request to <https://localhost:4200/api/isAuth> API method to validate authentication
- (2) API method <https://localhost:4200/api/isAuth> returns `true` if authentication valid, otherwise `false`
- (3) If authentication invalid then browser redirects to <https://localhost:4200/login>, otherwise no action taken
- (4) Login redirects browser to authorize url  
[login.microsoftonline.com/tenant\\_ID/oauth2/v2.0/authorize](https://login.microsoftonline.com/tenant_ID/oauth2/v2.0/authorize)
- (5) If user is logged in then browser is redirected to fallback url with cookies already set for <https://localhost:4200> domain
- (6) Request is sent to validate authentication <https://localhost:4200/api/isAuth>, now it returns `true`
- (7) Frontend at <https://localhost:4200/app> sends request to the <https://localhost:4200/api/OtherApi1/products>

- (8) Cookie exists for `https://localhost:4200/app` so that  
`https://localhost:4200/api` attaches it as header to request via YARP and sends  
request with token to the external resource `OtherApi1/products`
- (9) If response code is 401 at step (8) then repeat step (1)

#### 4. REFRESH TOKEN FLOW

#### 5. CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions of your manuscript.

#### 6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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