Poland in WWII: Misconceptions Clarified (29 Book Reviews by Jan Peczkis)

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Hitler Was Motivated by LEBENSRAUM, and His Pretexts for Attacking Poland Were Not Even Internally Consistent

Hi Hitler!: How the Nazi Past Is Being Normalized in Contemporary

Culture Rosenfeld, Gavriel D. 2014 Holocaust Supremacy Still

Reigns. Buchanan Wrong on WWII Being Preventable. German

LEBENSRAUM ("Living Space") was the Key! Most of this book is about how the Holocaust has been treated by academia and the media, little of which involves a softening or trivialization of Nazi crimes. A good deal of it is about how Germans try to relativize the crimes of their forebears.

SINCE HITLER INSISTED ON LEBENSRAUM, WWII WAS NOT PREVENTABLE The author features numerous alternative histories revolving around WWII. For instance, Gavriel D. Rosenfeld critiques Patrick Buchanan's book, on the alleged preventability of WWII, by pointing out that Buchanan fails to appreciate the racist and expansionist nature of Nazi philosophy. (p. 54, 56). [In addition, WWII did not start over Danzig (Gdansk). That was merely a smokescreen. It was about Poland's sovereignty as a whole. In addition, Poland would have fought for her freedom even had there had been no promise of assistance from France and England.] VICTIMHOOD HIERARCHIES, VICTIMHOOD MERITOCRACIES, AND--GUESS WHAT--HOLOCAUST SUPREMACISM

Author Gavriel D. Rosenfeld includes both sides of the Holocaust uniqueness debate--a debate that he considers spent. However, he keeps falling back on the premise that the Holocaust was unique insofar as the Jews were targeted for complete annihilation. (e. g, p. 81, 110, 119). Who decides that a total genocide is qualitatively more significant, of greater moral gravity, or more deserving of historical memory, than a less comprehensive genocide? Furthermore, who decides that there should be ANY kind of meritocracy, for genocides, in the first place? Finally, it is not true that the Nazis targeted all known Jews for annihilation. Nazi leaders, including Hitler himself, deliberately spared thousands of German Jews by re-labeling them Aryans. Please read my detailed review (October 26, 2005), of HITLER"S JEWISH SOLDIERS.

My New Order Hitler, Adolf 1941 A Profusely-Indexed Source on Hitler's Speeches (1918-1941).1939 Pretexts For Attacking **Poland Were Not Even Internally Consistent!** Of all the works I have read on the subject of the Fuhrer, this one is the most profusely crossreferenced and indexed. In fact, it has five indexes--one on Hitler's Major Policies and Ideas, one on Treaties, Pacts, and Pledges, one on Arguments and Justifications, one on Speeches in Crucial Moments, and, finally, one a General Index. The time period spanned is 1918 through midlate1941 (soon after the start of Operation Barbarossa, when the hoped-for rapid collapse of the Soviet Armies failed to materialize.) This extensive indexing enables the scholar to gain easy access to Hitler's views on many different subjects. Besides obvious themes, this includes arcane information, such as Hitler's mentions of Manchuria, or Queen Elizabeth of England. Relative importance of topics is also evident. For example, there are only four entries on Freemasonry against dozens of entries on Jews. Owing to the breadth of information presented in this work, I touch only on THE GERMANS FREELY SUPPORTED HITLER a few subjects. was no marginal "mad leader". In the plebiscite of August 19, 1934, Hitler got 88.1% of the German people's votes. (p. 286). [On top of this, the reader must remember that many of those who voted against Hitler did not disagree with his policies. They disliked his person or his socio-political NATIONAL SOCIALISM WAS INDEED A FORM OF background.] SOCIALISM As a National Socialist, Hitler wanted there to be no social classes among the German people. (p. 23, 764). The Nazis observed May Day. (p. 765). Although it at times received aid from both rejected systems, National Socialism was both anti-Communist and anti-capitalist. Nor was this just a veiled form of anti-Semitism. Hitler scorned capitalists, explicitly whether they were Jewish capitalists or Christian capitalists. (p. 16, 765). In common with Communists and other socialists, Hitler dismissed the western democracies as ones where the real rulers are "gigantic capitalists", as represented by "bourgeois parties", and where the common people were sought for votes but otherwise disregarded. (p. 881). Hitler asserted that the social-welfare and workers'-protection provisions under National Socialism were hated by the western capitalists because they might give ideas to the west's working classes. (pp. 764-765).

PRAISE FOR POLAND When Hitler attacked Poland in 1939, he and the other Nazis vilified Poland as the puppet of England, the illegitimate child of Versailles, a seasonal state, a nation of incompetents ruled by corrupt leaders, a people whose only achievement was the copying of German culture, etc. Earlier, however, Hitler had implicitly praised the resurrection of Poland as an example for Germany to follow (p. 178, 312), reiterated the fact that Poland and Germany must peacefully coexist (p. 234), and (with reference to the Polish Corridor) affirmed Poland was populous enough to expect, and possess, access to the sea. (p. 520).

The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939-1941 1988 "Poles to Take Berlin" Was Read, Anthony Political Posturing: Hitler Did It Too. British Emboldened Hitler By Showing, Long Before WWII, That Their Military Promises to Poland **Were Not Serious** This work is loaded with information about personages and events. However, it is less about Hitler, Stalin, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact than it is about the events that preceded the German-Soviet conquest of Poland in 1939, through the events encompassing the early part of Operation Barbarossa---Nazi Germany having turned against its erstwhile Soviet ally (June 1941). WHENCE THE TERM SLAV The authors touch on various interesting information. For instance, consider the fact that there are many different ideas about where the term Slav came from. Authors Read and Fisher suggest that it came from the German word SLAVAN, which means silent. BRITISH EMBOLDEN HILTER BY LONG ADVERTISING (p. 8). THEIR INSINCERITY TOWARDS THEIR TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO The unwillingness of the French and British to fulfill their treaty obligations to Poland became obvious long before the start of WWII, thus encouraging Hitler to take advantage and attack Poland. For instance, the British communicated to the Germans a lack of seriousness when they refused to sell an appreciable amount of arms to Poland. (p. 195). MOTOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT: THE NAZI-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE WAS REAL AND SUBSTANTIVE During the Soviet-Nazi alliance (1939-1941), the Soviets sent millions of tons of goods to Nazi Germany. The authors tabulate this information. (p. 442). Obviously, this alliance was

"POLES TO TAKE BERLIN" serious. It was no temporary expedient. **IRONY** Political posturing, conducted by both sides, should be recognized as such. When Poles spoke of "taking Berlin" in 1939, this has sometimes been taken literally, as if Poles had no idea of their limited military capabilities. Interestingly, Hitler also spoke, in dead seriousness, of the Poles conducting fantastic military exploits (that far exceeded their capabilities), as described in the next paragraph. Thus, authors Read and Fisher describe Hitler's unsuccessful attempt, in discussions with Ambassador Ciano, to get Mussolini to join him in the upcoming attack on Poland, (quote) Hitler trotted out the usual arguments about the Polish weather forcing him to invade soon: "From September to May, Poland is one vast swamp and completely unsuitable for any military operations", he claimed. Poland could occupy Danzig [Gdansk] in October, as she probably intended to do, he said, knowing that Germany could do nothing about it, since he would naturally never bomb and destroy the city. He began to rant about the Poles, claiming that they were intent on taking the whole of East Prussia and advancing as far as Berlin. (unquote). (p. 191). Obviously, Hitler knew from his military advisors that the Poles could not possibly reach Berlin. Polish military leaders certainly knew it too.

Myth: France and Britain Were Unable to Fight in 1939

Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal Volume 15 International Military Tribunal 2010
None Other Than Top Nazi Alfred Jodl Testifies About the
Reality and Crucial Significance of the French and British Betrayal of
Poland In 1939 This volume consists largely of interviews of the
Nuremberg defendants. In one of these, Dr. Exner asked Alfred Jodl the
following question: "Did you already know during the Polish campaign what
the Fuhrer's intentions were concerning the West?" (p. 380). Alfred Jodl
replied: "The Fuehrer himself had his doubts during the Polish campaign.
He too could find no plausible explanation for the complete inactivity of the
French and English forces in France, who only staged a kind of sham war
with the help of their war communiques. In reality not a single shot was

fired at the front. But, by the end of September, if I remember rightly, the Fuehrer did realize that once England enters a war she fights it out to the bitter end." (p. 380). Obviously, the Germans as well as the Poles had expected military action from the French and British. To the surprise of both the Germans and Poles, and to the dismay of the latter, this did not materialize! (Claims about French and British being unprepared to offer Poland military assistance beg the question about their making treaty-bound assurances to Poland that they knowingly couldn't fulfill. They also beg the question as to German expectations of a French and British attack. Had the French and British been physically incapable of delivering any kind of militarily meaningful attack on the Third Reich, surely German intelligence would've known about it, and neither Hitler nor Jodl would have been surprised by the fact that it did not happen.)

Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General 1955 Manstein, Erich von The 1939 German Conquest of Poland, and the West's Unexpected Betrayal. The German Enemy **Showed More Respect For Poland Than Did the French and British** Allies. For Shame Owing to the volume of information available, I largely limit my review to the 1939 war. GERMAN IMPERIALIST PLANS AGAINST EUROPE In his discussion of pre-WWII events, von Manstein presents himself as a typical German chauvinist when he makes revisionist complaints about Poland having received German territories "to which neither historical justice nor the right of self-determination gave her any claim." (p. 24). He conveniently forgets that these "German" territories had gotten that way as a result of centuries of German conquests and Germanization policies, the latter of which had become especially intense in only the last several decades before WWII. If only recent events count, then Manstein's "self-determination" complaints ring hollow in the light of the fact that, after the 1918-era plebiscites, certain border areas whose inhabitants had majority-voted to be part of the resurrected Polish state nevertheless had remained part of Germany. TRYING TO WHITEWASH HITLER Several reviewers have mentioned Manstein's denials of German WWII atrocities. Indeed! Manstein would have us believe that Hitler's annihilate-Poles order had been misrepresented at Nuremberg, and that the Fuhrer had only been referring to the annihilation of the Polish

Army. (p. 29). What a ridiculous apologetic! Hitler had plainly ordered his forces to: "Kill without mercy every man, woman, and child of Polish extraction." So, unless the Fuehrer had been imbued with the notion that the Polish Army was full of women and children, he had to be referring to the deliberate genocide of Polish civilians, and not just the annihilation of THE BZURA COUNTEROFFENSIVE the Polish soldiers. case in later battles, Hitler didn't interfere in the actual military policies of the 1939 war. (p. 273). The German tanks moved so rapidly that the German infantry had difficulty keeping up with them. (p. 54). The Polish Bzura counteroffensive, though later dwarfed by Soviet battles, was the largest of its kind up to that time. (p. 58). THE GERMAN ENEMY PAYS TRIBUTE TO POLISH GALLANTRY Summarizing the 1939 campaign, the Field Marshall commented: "The enemy's losses in blood were undoubtedly very high indeed, for he had fought with great gallantry and had shown a grim determination to hold out in even the most hopeless situations." (p. 61). SHOULD THE POLISH FORCES HAVE TRIED TO DEFEND A SMALLER TERRITORY? In common with many analysts, Manstein contended that the rapidity of Poland's military defeat stemmed primarily from her strategy of "defending everything"--a mistake later made by Hitler himself. (p. 40, 43, 495, 522). Poland should have defended only her core territories, thereby shrinking the defensive perimeter from 1,125 miles to 375 miles. (p. 42). (However, Manstein doesn't mention the fact that, among other things, Polish leaders feared that the abandoning of Poland's peripheral regions without a fight would be interpreted by the Allies as a lack of seriousness in Polish military efforts. This could give the British and French an excuse for not fulfilling their treaty obligations to Poland [which they did not fulfill anyway]). POLAND IS OPENLY BETRAYED BY HER PRESUMED ALLIES IN 1939: GENERAL MANSTEIN PLAINLY SAYS SO Over and over again, Manstein repeated how gravely he and other German planners took the British and French military guarantees to Poland. (p. 23, 34-35, 46, 58). Contrary to revisionists who assert that France was unprepared for action, Manstein cited a study by von Tippelskirch, which noted how France had raised 108 divisions in only three weeks in the autumn of 1939, including many that consisted of well-armed, well-trained reservists. He concluded: "There can be no doubt, then, that the French Army far outnumbered Germany's forces in the west from the very first day." (p. 35). Even as the last organized

Polish resistance was collapsing, German troops were hurriedly being moved westward out of fear of a belated French-British offensive, which, to the German leaders' admitted surprise, had not materialized long before then. (p. 58). POLAND'S 1939 FATE WAS FAR FROM HOPELESS

Pointedly, Manstein believed that, had the French intervened, and had the Polish forces been defending the smaller perimeter, Poland actually stood a chance: "The bravery with which the Polish troops fought right up to the end would have been an adequate guarantee of their ability to hold on until the Allies reached the Rhine and forced the German command seriously to consider calling off the campaign in Poland." (p. 62).

THE GERMAN ENEMY SHOWS MORE RESPECT FOR POLAND THAN THE BRITISH OR FRENCH. FOR SHAME! The German enemy, as embodied by Manstein, showed more respect for Poland than did the Allies when he asked: "Who could have guessed that the Western Powers would let Poland down so ignominiously after giving her a guarantee?" (p. 81). Excellent question! THE OUN-UPA AND THE GERMANS Fast forward to 1944, and Manstein's stay near Lwow (Lviv), shortly before he was recalled. He characterized the local guerilla forces as follows: "The Soviet variety fought against the Germans and terrorized the local population. The Ukrainians fought the Soviet partisans, but usually released any Germans after first disarming them. Finally, there were bands of Polish partisans who fought both Germans and Ukrainians." (p. 532). Obviously, the OUN-UPA, when not collaborating with the Germans, had less enmity against them than against the Soviets (and Poles).

Myth: Polish Cavalry Charged German Tanks

Poland Betrayed: The Nazi-Soviet Invasions of 1939 Williamson,
David G. 2009 Polish Cavalry Charging German Tanks Myth. A
New Look at Poland's 1939 Defensive War against Nazi Germany

This comprehensive book discusses such things as the background to WWII, the Poles' cracking of the ENIGMA Code, Polish alliances and preparations for war, the Polish Air Force and Navy, the course of the 1939 campaign, the German and Russian occupation zones of Poland, biographies of key figures, survivors' reminiscences, etc. Unlike most other

books on this subject, Williamson gives significant details about the Russo-Polish war in eastern Poland in 1939, countering the mistaken notion that Poles offered almost no resistance to the invading Soviets. EARLY POST-WWI GERMAN AND RUSSIAN IMPERIALIST DESIGNS ON POLAND No sooner had Poland been resurrected in 1918, in the wake of WWI, than the Germans and Russians began planning to destroy the new Polish state. Writing in 1922, at a time when Hitler was barely a blip on the political screen, General Hans von Seekt, the Commander-in-Chief of the German army, stated that Poland's existence was intolerable to both Germany and Russia, and that Poland must disappear. (pp. 6-7).

POLAND MODERNIZES, DESPITE HER MEAGER RESOURCES Although Polish industry was too small to even begin to match the modernity and quantity of German war production, a bright spot was the existence of a number of arms factories that earned the praise of British visitors. (pp. 27-29). For instance, the Stalowa Wola steel mills had been made from scratch just 18 months before Colonel Sword's visit, with the first gun rolling off the assembly line only several months later. It had a high standard of works and plant that was far superior to the parent Bofors equipment factories in Sweden. (pp. 28-29). The author includes discussion of Polish civil defense before the war. He quotes a British observer who was impressed with it. (pp. 47-48). POLAND'S AIR FORCE NOT PROMPTLY DESTROYED Williamson debunks the myth of the Polish Air Force getting destroyed on the ground in the first day or two of the war. The planes had been scattered to secret airfields to avert such an occurrence. (p. 70). He provides examples of Polish aerial combat against the Luftwaffe and against German military objectives. THE MYTH OF POLISH CAVALRY CHARGING GERMAN TANKS As for another perennial Polonophobic myth, Williamson comments: "Far from charging tanks and armoured cars, Polish cavalry was trained to withdraw to cover and use their anti-tank guns." (p. 83). Also: "The cavalry, far from indulging in useless deeds of derring-do, were often used effectively. Armed with antitank rifles and dismounted, cavalrymen were able to surprise and destroy German armoured units." (p. 167). Examples of cavalry success are included. (p. 88, pp. 93-94). THE BZURA COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Several temporary Polish combat successes are noted, such as the Battle of Mokra and the Bzura counteroffensive. The Poles also managed to blow up the Tczew bridge near the Corridor despite the herculean efforts

of the Luftwaffe and German commandos to prevent it. For this, the Germans later murdered 19 Polish officials and railwaymen in reprisal. (pp. 80-81). Poland was overwhelmed by the two military giants. However, some 100,000 Poles managed to escape into Romania, Hungary, and the Baltic States. (p. 136). They continued the fight for Poland. FOR ONCE, THE FRENCH GIVE DUE RECOGNITION TO THE POLES

Williamson touches on the Polish forces fighting in 1940 France, and comments: "The final praise of the Polish fighting man was given by no less a person than Marshall Petain in June 1940, when he told Sikorski that he had witnessed the 1st Polish Division on the eastern front in France drive back four German divisions. He added that 'if there had only been ten Polish divisions, victory would have been certain." (p. 169).

Poland 1939: The birth of Blitzkrieg Zaloga, Steven J. 2002

Poland's Defense Against Nazi Germany's Aggression, Against Impossible Odds, and Furthermore While Betrayed by Her French and British Allies. The Immortal Polish Cavalry Charging German Tanks Canard There are several good reviews of this book in existence, and I focus my review mostly on details not covered by them. This review is based on the 2004 hardback edition. NO COMPARISON BETWEEN GERMANY'S AND POLAND'S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES

Industrial capacity is the key to modern warfare, and the extreme asymmetry (using modern parlance, and not Zaloga's) favoring the Germans began at that stage. Up to WWII, Germany had manufactured 1.4 million motor vehicles against Poland's 33,000 (p. 32). Germany was in a position to outspend Poland, in military matters, at 30:1 (p. 22), despite Herculean efforts by the latter. Nominal static asymmetry in such things as airplanes, tanks, and artillery favored the Germans at approximately between 4:1 to 8:1 (p. 23, 31). But, since German weapons were more modern, the effective static asymmetry was easily 10:1 or more. Since only 65% of Polish forces had been fully mobilized (p. 39: as a result of western pressure for Poles not to "provoke" Hitler), the effective static asymmetry became even greater. Finally, owing to the fact that the German forces enjoyed greater mobility and modern communication (e. g., p. 32, 67, 70), they could use their arms more effectively than the Poles could whatever little they had. Owing to these tactical advantages, the dynamic asymmetry

favoring the Germans became much greater than the effective static asymmetry already in their favor. GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE WELCH ON THEIR TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO POLAND Zaloga discusses the failure of the British and French to live up to their treaty obligations towards Poland in 1939: "Hitler had hoped that Britain and France would abandon Poland altogether. Their timid response left the Poles to their fate. France threw away one of its great strategic opportunities, as German forces in the west were too thin to repulse any full-scale assault. German officers interviewed about the campaign after the war expressed their firm belief that if France had struck with force in September 1939, its army would have reached the Rhine in a couple of weeks, and possibly won the war. France would have faced a far different army in 1939 than the one it confronted a year later." (p. 65) IMMORTAL TALE OF POLISH CAVALRY TAKING ON GERMAN PANZERS Ironic to the "Polish lancers charging German tanks" canard, the Polish cavalry had actually discontinued the use of lancers well before WWII (p. 7, 30)! Zaloga traces the origins of the German-propaganda tale (pp. 42-43), which unfortunately has proved to be so enduringly believed. (Myths survive when they meet needs. This one fulfilled the need of Poles to remember their struggle against a vastly technologically superior foe. It also met the needs of Polonophobes, as it ostensibly supported their prejudicial views of Poles as impetuous, stupid, and otherwise unworthy of having an independent nation-state.)

Myth: Polish Air Force Destroyed on the Ground in the First Two Days

The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II

Bekker, Cajus 1964 German Scholar Debunks the Canard of the Polish Air Force Destroyed, Largely on the Ground, in the First Two Days of the 1939 War I limit my review to the German blitzkrieg against Poland in 1939. This review is based on the original (1968) edition. THE "POLISH AIR FORCE CEASED TO EXIST WITHIN 48 HOURS" CANARD What has found its way into innumerable books and encyclopedias is a German fairy tale. Bekker comments: "Despite all assertions to the contrary, the Polish Air Force was not

destroyed on the ground in the first two days of fighting. The bomber brigade in particular continued to make determined attacks on the German forces up to September 16th. However, the Polish aircraft, inferior both in numbers and in design, could hardly contest the supremacy of the Luftwaffe in the air." (p. 59). The Polish aircraft had previously been scattered to secret airfields and camouflaged (there are photos--not in this book--of the planes covered with sod or branches). So what did the Luftwaffe's first-day hoped-for knockout blow against the Polish Air Force actually accomplish? Not much, according to a secret report cited by Bekker: "All the aircraft destroyed on the ground were old training machines...As for the attacks on the aircraft industry, they had done more harm than good, for now the Germans could not use it themselves. The report, of course, remained top secret. The public was kept in complete ignorance. They were told only of the non-stop bombing raids, the peerless power of the Luftwaffe, and above all the morale-shattering effect of the dive bomber." (p. 38) EFFECTIVE--THOUGH INEVITABLY BRIEF--POLISH MILITARY RESISTANCE IN 1939 Despite the extreme asymmetry favoring the Germans (using modern terms), the conquest of Poland was no cakewalk. Bekker continues: "The `lightning campaign' against Poland was no easy undertaking. The Poles put up stubborn resistance, and although the campaign lasted only four weeks in all [actually five--and then not counting the subsequent large-scale guerilla warfare], the Luftwaffe lost during this time no less than 743 men and 285 aircraft, including 109 bombers and Stukas...(p. 59). An additional 279 German aircraft were damaged enough to be reckoned lost (p. 364). It is sobering to realize that the German enemy had a greater respect for the Polish fighting forces than did the English and American so-called allies! For shame. Although Polish communications had inevitably been paralyzed by relentless German bombing (part of the "shock" in the modern phrase "shock and awe"), the Polish Air Force nevertheless managed to deliver some militarily-significant blows against the invading German land forces. Bekker writes: "But now, having overcome its first bewilderment, the Polish bomber brigade also made itself felt. Taking the defenses unawares, the squadrons launched a number of attacks on the spearhead of the German armored forces...The following day the 1st and 4th Panzer Divisions, pushing ahead of the 10th Army suffered heavy losses from the air on reaching Radomsko, and likewise called for help from the Luftwaffe." (p.

37). POLAND'S FRENCH AND BRITISH ALLIES WELCHED ON POLAND...BUT WHAT IF THEY HADN'T? What if France and England had actually fulfilled their treaty obligations to Poland and attacked western Germany in September 1939? It would have made for a more interesting war, to say the least, because the Luftwaffe was unprepared for such a development. Bekker admits: "...at this early stage of its build-up, when Hitler chose to go to war, it was fit for a short blitzkrieg on ONE front." (p. 24; emphasis is Bekker's). A COLD-BLOODED DENIAL OF GERMAN CRIMES AGAINST POLISH CIVILIANS Unfortunately, Bekker would have us believe that the Luftwaffe attacked only military targets in Poland, and that civilian casualties were solely the result of collateral damage (p. 57). The truth is entirely different. The Luftwaffe in fact systematically bombed civilian targets (including national shrines) that had no military significance of any kind (see the Szymon Datner study summarized in the Peczkis review of HANS FRANK, by Martyn Housden).

With Great Sacrifice and Bravery... Knoblock, Glenn A. 2008 The 1939 War Canard of the Polish Air Force Destroyed on the Ground. The French Have to Eat Their Words After They Had Scoffed at the Brevity of Polish Resistance Contrary to the myth of the Polish Air Force (PAF) being largely destroyed on the ground during the first day of the 1939 War, the PAF (among them Lapkowski) flew 105 sorties that first day. (p. 30). As late as Sept. 8-9, Lapkowski's unit alone shot down three German planes over Lublin. (p. 32). Approximately 80% of PAF personnel managed to flee Poland before the German-Soviet conquest became completed. (p. 34). FRANCE BELITTLES POLISH MILITARY PERFORMANCE IN 1939, AND THEN FOLDS LIKE A STACK OF CARDS This work provides insights into the 1940 German-French war. IN 1940! France, though much more powerful than Poland, [and, not mentioned, facing only one enemy] lasted only three more days than did 1939 Poland. The French did not even use much of their forces, and only a fraction of the available Polish pilots ever got to see action. (p. 41). After being evacuated to Great Britain, the Polish airmen remained there for the remainder of the war, and guite a few of them, unwilling to return to Soviet-ruled Poland, settled there permanently. OTHER DETAILS This book is different from most other ones on the Battle of Britain in several respects. To begin with,

it views the Battle through the experiences of one man (Lapkowski), devoting two chapters to this battle. It does not stop there. It continues describing Allied missions into German-held Europe into mid-1941, overlapping the start of the Germans' attack on their erstwhile Soviet ally. This book is quite atypical in that it includes a helpful glossary of aviation jargon, several reproduced combat report sheets, biographies of several different Polish pilots, etc. It also discusses postwar archeological dig-ups of fallen airplanes decades after the events. One of these was Lapkowski's Hurricane, out of which he had managed to bale out of, during the Battle of Britain. (p. 51). It was in mid-1941 that Lapkowski was killed in combat. Up to that time, he had destroyed seven (shared-destroyed another two) German planes, and damaged three more of them. (p. 139). Three of the total was in the 1939 war, one was in France, two were in the Battle of Britain, and six were in 1941 over German-occupied continental Europe. Lapkowski was repeatedly decorated for his achievements.

Myth: The German Fifth Column Was Just Polish Imagination

The Black Brigade Kurcz, F. S. 1943 **German Fifth Column Real. The French Scorn Poland, and Soon Have to Eat Their Words. Polish Army Combat Action in 1939 Poland and 1940 France**

This book on the 1939 campaign is unusual in a number of respects. First of all, it describes the war against the Nazi German invaders from the viewpoint of a soldier. Second, it includes a sizeable description of the combat operations of the Polish forces in 1940 France. Owing to the fact that the book was published soon after the events, it was not colored by subsequent political and military developments. The combat operations of the Black Brigade began near Krakow, then proceeded almost due east to the Rzeszow area, and finally to the Lwow area. On September 17th, the USSR stabbed Poland in the back. The Black Brigade moved from the Lwow (Lviv) area south, and crossed the border into Hungary. There the troops were eventually disarmed and interned, but managed to evacuate to France. In the first several days of the 1939 war, the Brigade had successes against the invading Germans. Kurcz comments: "The men fought splendidly. Corporal Dziechciarz alone knocked out with his gun no

less than seven enemy tanks and did not give up the fight until he was attacked simultaneously by three tanks using incendiary ammunition. He was burned and carbonized." (p. 24). Also: "We discovered that, although the enemy had a tremendous superiority in aeroplanes, tanks, and guns, we could put up a very effective resistance. The soldiers proved splendid fighters, without a trace of any inferiority complex or 'armour panic'. Especially the anti-tank units did extremely well, while their Polish 37 mm anti-tank guns confirmed the hopes we had placed in them. Some of the 37 mm guns knocked out several German tanks each, while their crews fought to the bitter end, until their gun was smashed by a shell, until all the men were killed by enemy fire of crushed by the tanks." (p. 26). Kurcz encountered a Messerschmitt that had just been shot down. (p. 33). He came across the dead and dying crew members, and had thought about his own brother that, as he later learned, had suffered a similar fate. Ironic to the absurdity about Polish cavalry charging German tanks with lances and sabers. Kurcz contrasted the 1939 war with the 1919-1920 one. In the latter, there had been almost no planes, almost no armoured vehicles, and cavalry that had still used lances and sabers. (p. 98). GERMAN 5th COLUMN WAS ALL TOO REAL Kurcz encountered several instances of German fifth-column activity. For instance, he wrote: "There were some villages with German farmers in the neighborhood of Jaroslaw and they formed a strong fifth column. Parachutists dropped by the enemy reinforced their ranks. Sometimes we saw them coming down and in Jaroslaw three of them came straight down into the hands of our soldiers." (p. 84). WEATHER HELPED HITLER In common with many authors, Kurcz points out that the absence of rain in the first few weeks of the war had facilitated Luftwaffe attacks, and had made the water levels of rivers so low that they could easily be crossed by the enemy. (p. 116). The constant movement of refugees clogged the roads, hindering the movement of troops. (p. 64). The Polish troops experienced extreme fatigue and sleepiness caused by being forced to be constantly on the move in order to avoid encirclement by fast-moving motorized German columns. THE ARROGANT ANTI-POLISH FRENCH HAVE TO EAT THEIR OWN WORDS When in France, the Polish troops were subject to humiliating comments regarding the rapidity of Poland's 1939 defeat. Unfavorable comparisons were made with the Finns' resistance to the Soviets, even though the events were not remotely comparable. (p. 136). For a time, the

Polish soldiers feared that they would be sent into combat without an adequate period of training on how to use French military equipment. (p. 155). In the actual combat, Kurcz found French resistance inadequate, as when he commented: "We asked him [a French commander] to explain why the whole Corps found itself unable to hold a front which could be easily held by a small Polish Brigade." (p. 174). In the end, the Poles were the ones surprised (and chagrined) by the rapidity of France's very rapid defeat.

The German Fifth Column in Poland Polish Ministry of Information "Poland's German Minority Had it Bad" Myth. The **Undeniable Military Significance of the German Fifth Column in 1939** This small 1941 book is packed with facts POLAND'S GERMAN MINORITY (LIKE POLAND'S JEWISH MINORITY) HAD FALSELY WHINED ABOUT HOW BAD THEY HAD IT IN POLAND from being oppressed, the prewar German minority enjoyed, besides wide cultural autonomy, a very disproportionate land ownership and membership in co-operatives. (pp. 24-25). Its leaders were two-faced. For instance, Senator Wiesner pledged German loyalty to Poland while simultaneously justifying the existence of the Hitlerjugend among Poland's Germans at least two years before the war. (pp. 30-31). During the later German occupation, he hurled the vilest invectives and accusations against Poles. BYDGOSZCZ (BROMBERG) The events of "Bloody Sunday" (Blut Sonntag), elaborated in my detailed English-language review of DYWERSJA...are confirmed. (p. 50-on). At Bydgoscz (Bromberg) itself, German fifth-columnists killed in the fighting and executed by Poles total less than 400 (p. 50), and more like 160 (p. 61), with no harm done to uninvolved Germans. Various eyewitnesses including Baker-Beale, a Briton, confirmed the later murderous conduct of the regular German forces near and within Bydgoszcz (Bromberg). They murdered Poles fleeing the town and those in it, including many Boy Scouts. Soon, German propaganda made their bodies out to be those of German civilians massacred and mutilated by Poles. (p. 57). Goebbels' lie about massive Polish atrocities against German civilians wasn't even internally consistent. It grew taller and taller: From 2,000 purported Germans murdered in western Poland, to 5,800, then 32,000, and finally, in the spring of 1940, to

SCALE OF GERMAN 5TH COLUMN ACTIVITIES IN THE 65,000. (p. 21). 1939 WAR German settlements all over Poland became loci of fifthcolumn activities, and also served as refuges and bases for the operation of German commandos who had infiltrated or been parachuted-in. German snipers emanated from German colonies located in otherwise German-free THE SOWING OF DEFEATIST regions of Poland. (p. 17). PROPAGANDA There are many eyewitness reports of Polish-speaking German commandos, often wearing Polish Army uniforms, spreading demoralizing reports about the collapse of Polish military resistance. (e.g., p. 108). [Evidently, this was standard practice. I knew an eyewitness, Paul Szews, from childhood. He told me that, upon entry into his town, the German Army announced that Polish military units throughout Poland had surrendered. This was disinformation. It was not to happen for another 3 THE GERMAN FIFTH COLUMN CANNOT BE DENIED weeks.]

Alfred Maurice de Zayas has denied the existence of a German fifth-column in Poland, and asserted that no Germans were ever honored for any such activities. De Zayas has not done his homework. In actuality, Hitler awarded the leaders of the German minority with gold medals for their fifth-column activities, and a photo of this was shown in Voelkischer Beobachter. (see facing p. 134). Perhaps the strongest proof of the fact that the German fifth column was no Polish imagination or exaggeration is provided by some 1940 articles in Swiss and Italian newspapers. (pp. 46-48). They wrote that German fifth column activity performed by the German minority in Poland, notably the tracking of Polish troop movements by short-wave transmissions, played an unappreciated role in the rapidity of Nazi Germany's victory over Poland in 1939!

The Mermaid and the Messerschmitt Langer, Rulka 2007 German Fifth Column. Insights into the 1939 Siege of Warsaw, the Early German Occupation of Conquered Poland, and the Beginnings of the Polokaust I am delighted to see this book back in print (but my review is of the original 1942 edition). It describes the German rape of Poland through the eyes of a Varsovian (note that the mermaid is a symbol of Warsaw). Owing to the fact that the author managed to leave German-occupied Poland in early 1940, this book is not colored by later military and political events. In common with many Poles, Langer had long believed that

Hitler was bluffing about his aggressive intentions towards Poland, and that the French and English would give effective aid to Poland were she in fact attacked. The mobilization of Polish forces had been incomplete before the German attack (p. 145) [owing to western pressure for Poland not to "provoke" Hitler]. **GERMAN TERROR BOMBING IN 1939** The Luftwaffe bombed obviously-nonmilitary targets (e.g., pp. 70-71), and systematically strafed columns of fleeing civilians. However, they failed to knock out a bridge despite repeated bombing runs. (p. 155). The rain-free weather in the first weeks of the war was an asset to Germany, so much so that the Germans called it "Hitlerwetter". (p. 173). THE GERMAN FIFTH COLUMN WAS VERY REAL This book gives some insight into 1939war espionage and counterespionage. East of Brzesc, Franek reported seeing someone giving flashlight signals from a church steeple to German planes overhead. (p. 300). At one point in time, Langer herself had been suspected of being a German spy or commando, owing to such things as her inquisitive behavior, then-lack of personal identification, and the wearing of non-Polish shoes. (p. 133-135). Her shoulders were checked for bruises. (p. 135). This would've been a telltale sign of a German commando who had been parachuted-in, since parachute openings jerk on the straps and produce bruises. Her identification was located, and she was freed. POLISH HEROISM AGAINST IMPOSSIBLE ODDS The author observed the evacuation of the Polish government. Warsaw's Poles remained defiant despite the mounting casualties and the overwhelming military superiority of the German invaders. The semi-invalid Franck said: "I still can shoot a rifle, and as long as I have to die some day anyway, I may as well die now fighting the Germans." (p. 68). When leaflets were dropped calling on Warsaw to surrender or face complete destruction and complete extermination of her people, Poles scoffed at it. (p. 220). Towards the end of September, German units had completely surrounded Warsaw, and the bombing and shelling of the capital were now occurring nonstop. Electricity and water were knocked out, preventing the fighting of fires. People had to eat pigeons (p. 206). The lack of water was the official reason given for Warsaw's surrender. The estimated number of Varsovian civilians killed in the 1939 war ranged from 17,000 to 185,000. (p. 264). [If I remember correctly, the currently-accepted death toll is 40,000]. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE POLOKAUST The end of the 1939 War was only the beginning of Poland's agony. The brutalities of the German occupation

soon began. All the priests were arrested. (pp. 298-299). Shortly thereafter, teachers met the same fate. (p. 305). In time, some of these were released. High schools remained closed, because: "Inferior races do not need higher education." (p. 307). The Germans took everything of value for themselves. Of course, this was only the beginning of German cruelties.

Myth: The Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) Massacre

Dywersja Niemiecka i Zbrodnie Hitlerowskie w Bydgoszczy...

Serwanski. Edward 1984 **German Fifth Column at Work:** September 3, 1939: BLUT SONNTAG (Bloody Sunday) Myth of Polish Massacres of German Civilians. The Very Real Wehrmacht Murder of Title: THE GERMAN FEINT AND HITLERITE CRIMES 10,000 Poles AT BYDGOSZCZ IN THE LIGHT OF THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1939. This work has enduring value. Consistent with revisionist attempts to convert Germans from aggressors into victims, the existence of a German fifth column is commonly denied. (p. 10, 50). [Also by Alfred Maurice de Zayas]. Goebbels' lie about 60,000 German civilians massacred by Poles is still sometimes repeated. THE MYTHICAL VICTIMIZATION OF POLAND'S PRE-WWII GERMAN MINORITY Consistent with the Germans-as-victims myth, accusations were and are being made of the prewar German minority suffering oppression under Polish rule. Just the opposite. Having retained many of the privileges of previous Prussian rule, many Germans were wealthy, and possessed better churches, homes, and schools than the Poles. Far from being repressed, the Germans became bolder and more arrogant in response to Polish forbearance. Many refused to learn to speak Polish, and engaged in openly provocative activities, including marches that became openly pro-Nazi. (p. 61-62, 75, 93-94,193-194, Photo 2). Another aspect of Germans-as-victims whining is the complaint of preventative arrests of Germans by Poles on the first day of the war--an act done by all warring nations. Actually, this amounted to a pittance--a few hundred Bydgoszcz Germans, most of whom were released shortly thereafter. (p. 102). GERMAN FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES AT BYDGOSZCZ IN THE 1939 WAR An obviously-organized wave of shootings, directed at Polish soldiers and indiscriminately against Polish

civilians (p. 117), suddenly began at 10 AM on Sept. 3, 1939 at Bydgoszcz (Bromberg), days ahead of the arrival of the German Army. The silly notion that Polish forces imagined 5th column activities, or mistook friendly fire for German fire, is refuted by the many armed Germans that were captured (mentioned by too many eyewitnesses to list). Also, the fact that the snipers at Bydgoszcz were not only German commandos from elsewhere, but local Germans engaged in 5th-column activities, is proved by eyewitness accounts of specifically-recognized local Germans among the snipers and captured or dead armed men and women. (p. 139, 187, 202, 271, 320, 349). One of them, for example, was a known HAKATA member. (p. 139). During the later German occupation, some local Germans acknowledged, in conversations with the Poles, their involvement in the fifth-column activities. (p. 335). Among prominent Germans, von Hassel admitted the existence of a German fifth column. (p. 13). THE ATTACKED POLES FIGHT BACK Numerous Poles recount the shooting directed at them from properties owned by Germans, and especially from the towers of several Lutheran Churches. Polish forces torched the one at Leszczynski Street to destroy the nest of snipers. (Photo 23, p. 268, 348-349). Another one, at Szweder Street (219, 288), included eyewitness accounts of the explosions of stored ammunition as it burned. (p. 181). Later, German propaganda twisted these events into indiscriminate Polish arson of THE GHASTLY GERMAN REPRISAL FOR POLES German properties. **DEFENDING THEMSELVES** The local hospital had wounded Poles and Germans. (239). A knowledgeable eyewitness estimated that no more than 300 German irregulars died during the combat, or execution upon capture. (p. 261; see also pp. 57-58). No killings of uninvolved Germans were seen. (p. 84, 97)(also confirmed by eyewitness Stefan Marcinkowski, whom I knew from childhood, and with whom my adult self had endless discussions about the war). The Poles even spared and freed captured German fifth-columnists. (p. 299, 320). These (e. g., p. 374, many specifically-named individuals) returned the favor by helping the German occupants murder an eventual 10,000 Bydgoszcz Poles (p. 261), along with many Jews. (p. 359, 372, 376). NAZI PROPAGANDA ABOUT THE POLISH VILLAIN GOES INTO OVERDRIVE To facilitate the propaganda about 60,000 innocent German civilians slaughtered by Poles, German photographers took photos of the bodies of Poles killed in the fighting (p. 119), supplemented by the bodies of Poles recently shot by the

German Army, and misrepresented them as Germans. (p. 87). To add to the effect, the Germans desecrated the bodies as "proof of Polish cruelty". Ironic to all this, early-1940 German records indicate a total of 4,830 German civilian AND soldier deaths in the entire region of west Prussia (the Pole-delegitimizing term "Wartheland"), of which only 379 occurred in Bydgoszcz. (pp. 10-11). The figures by serious postwar German scholars are widely contradictory, the lower of which overlap the quoted value. [e. g., Hesse, at 4,809 (p. 13); Aurich at 5,000 (p. 17)]. This is trivial compared with the 4-5 million Poles murdered by the Germans during WWII.

Poland Fights Back Pruszynski, Ksawery 1944 Fills-in the Gap Between the 1939 War and the 1940 Battle of Britain. Jewish-Polish **Relations in WWII Palestine** This gem of a book covers a lot of 1939 WESTERPLATTE ground, and I focus on a few items. Here is a direct quote: "The tiny garrison of Westerplatte resisted furious attacks for seven days. Of its three officers and 165 men only 59 remained alive, 32 of them were wounded. The Germans attempted several times to take the Polish position by storming it, but each time were drive back by the withering fire of the defenders. Finally the fourteen-inch guns of the battleship SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN and the dive-bombers reduced the heroes of Westerplatte, who had no artillery, to honorable surrender." (p. 31). 1939 HEL PENINSULA Here is another direct quote: "Its isolated position and concrete fortifications allowed the garrison to hold it until September 28. The attacks of the German dive bombers against Hel were invariably defeated by its excellent anti-aircraft artillery. The German cruisers shelling Hel for days were kept at some distance by the Polish guns. As for the German infantry, who tried to attack along the sandy strip of land connecting Hel with the main coast, it paid a heavy price for this attempt. Hel, under Rear-Admiral Joseph Unrug, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Navy, held out as long as Warsaw itself, although it had been surrounded and cut off in the first days of the war." (p. 32). THE UNDAUNTED POLES FIGHT ON Most books about Poland in WWII focus on the 1939 invasion of Poland, and then jump to the Battle of Britain. This one, in contrast, tells us of the exploits of the Polish submarines WILK and ORZEL, notably the sinking of the German troop-carrying ship, the RIO DE JANEIRO, by the latter. (p. 94). This work especially details the Polish

forces fighting in France and in Norway. In fact, when Poles defeated and captured a German contingent at Narwik, the local Germans believed that they had been captured by British or French soldiers, and, having long been fed the line that Poland was irrevocably defeated and gone forever, could not believe that the Poles were still fighting. (p. 51). German propaganda tried to convince the Poles that they were fighting a futile war on behalf of the British and the Jews. (p. 52). AERIAL BOMBING: REPAYING THE HUN Polish pilots played a major role in the Allied bombings of Germany. An unidentified old Polish airman, interviewed by the author in 1941, said, "Soon we shall exceed the weight of bombs dropped by the Germans on Poland during that tragic September campaign, in which they had such a superiority in the air. We shall have settled our 1939 account and we will begin to pay out interest." (p. 142).

POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS IN WARTIME PALESTINE author describes the reaction, to the Polish soldiers, by the Arabs and the Palestinian Jews (most of whom had emigrated from Poland) in these direct quotes below: "The Arabs looked with amazement at Poles who were not Jews. They had been accustomed to regard as Poles the Zionist Jews who came to Palestine from Poland as settlers." (p. 126). "The Polish Jews, of whom several hundred thousand are living in Palestine, soon forgot their old feuds with the Poles. Besides, they were soldiers fighting against Hitler. The clever Jewish tailors and hatters started making Polish uniforms and four-cornered caps of the traditional pattern, work with which they were familiar, for they had done it in Poland before going to their own country...The Brigade stayed in the Holy Land for several months...Everyone in Palestine was sorry to see them leaving." (p. 127). "We are losing the Poles, they are good soldiers," sighted the Jews, who preferred the company of their former Gentile hosts to a tete-a-tete with the Arabs. "We are losing good customers," said the tradesmen and entertainers of Tel Aviv. (p. 128).

Myth: The Chaotic and Cowardly Abdication of the Polish Government

The Polish Underground Army, the Western Allies, and the Failure of Strategic Unity in World War II Peszke, Michael Alfred 2004

The 1939 Polish Government Abdication Was Planned (Not Panicky), and It Remained Fully in Control (It Ordered the Surrender of Warsaw From a Remote Location) The title of this book is a little misleading, as it discusses all aspects of Poland's involvement in WWII, and not only the Underground under German occupation. THE 1939 ABDICATION OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WAS A PLANNED ACT

Seldom-mentioned information is included. For instance, the hasty departure of the Polish government days after the German attack in 1939 has been misrepresented as some kind of cowardly or panicked flight that spoke volumes about Polish imcompetence, and which abandoned the Polish fighting forces to their fate. It was not! In fact, the surrender of Warsaw was ordered, from a remote location, by Marshal Smigly-Rydz. His personal emissary, Major Galinat, flew in to Warsaw from Romania with Smigly-Rydz's order to surrender. Warsaw could have fought longer, but Smigly-Rydz did not want any more loss of life and property. (pp. 20-21).

POLISH GUERRILLA WARFARE BEGAN IN 1939 AND ONLY **GREW** Aspects of Polish Underground activity discussed include early post-1939 resistance (e. g., Hubal), Operation Wachlarz ("Fan": Polish saboteurs working in the Soviet Union behind German lines), the foundation and operations of the AK (A. K., or Armia Krajowa), Operation Wildhorn (or Mosty, that is "Bridges": the landing of light Allied aircraft in German-occupied Poland, the last of which involved the transfer of the captured V-2 rocket mechanism to England), attempts to negotiate with the Soviets, and the unwarranted arrest of the 16 Polish Underground leaders THE ALMOST-JOCULAR BRITISH SUPPORT FOR by the Soviets, etc. Facts and figures are provided on the POLISH GUERRILLA ACTION meagerness of British airdrops of arms to Polish guerrillas. (pp. 120-121). Very few of even these airdrops had been accomplished by the Spring of 1943, the time of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. Jewish complaints about the "stinginess" of Polish armed support are—once again, shown to be clearly SECOND-GUESSING, ONCE AGAIN, THE SOVIETunwarranted. BETRAYED WARSAW UPRISING Although several decades have now passed since the event, the wisdom or folly of the 1944 Polish Warsaw Uprising continues to generate heated discussion. Peszke has the following take on the matter: "As the old saying goes, victory has a thousand fathers but defeat is an orphan...For the Poles to refuse to fight would have been a terrible political and public relations defeat, one which would never be

easily explained to one's own countrymen, let alone to one's allies. To sit passively while the miniscule but vociferous Communist groups liberated Warsaw and imposed their own authority was just not possible. Without direction, there was also every reason that the populace would go to the streets." (pp. 156-157). THE UNFOLDING BRITISH AND AMERICAN SELLOUT OF POLAND Much of this book focuses on the geopolitical issues surrounding Poland's borders and the kind of Polish state that would emerge after WWII. The west's betrayal of Poland at Teheran and Yalta began much earlier. While the author notes the Soviet geopolitical advantage caused by the USSR doing most of the fighting and the Red Army's possession of Poland, he did not seem to consider whether or not the conditional provision of Lend-Lease aid could have been used as a tool to enforce proper Soviet behavior towards Poland. Early failures of the west to stand up to Stalin only emboldened him. Peszke comments: "As Stalin realized that his behavior did not elicit any rebukes or negative consequences but rather extravagant adulation, while the Poles who, opposing his policies, were condemned, Soviet policy became aggressive and brutally disdainful." (p. 71). And how could it be otherwise?

POLAND BECOMES THE LEFTMEDIA SCAPEGOAT Opinion-forming outlets in the west tended to paint the Soviet Union as a benign socialist nation. The Polish government-in-exile was demonized as one consisting of privileged landowners, and Poland was increasingly portrayed as a nuisance in Soviet-western relations. The British were not unilaterally indifferent to their Polish ally, but this did not matter. Peszke concludes: "It is beyond doubt that many Britons were in fact quite ashamed of their passive role. Lord Ismay wrote, "'Nobody can deny that the failure to secure freedom and independence for Poland has brought shame on the western Democracies.' But shame only lasts a short time and, as the saying goes, people move on." (p. 7). This book concludes with a profuse bibliography for further study or research.

Myth: "Poland Too Far Away" for British Airdrops to Polish Guerillas

Warsaw 1944: Poland's bid for freedom Forczyk, Robert 2009

Debunks the "Poland Too Far Away To Aid" Myth, With a

Concise History of the Soviet-Betrayed Warsaw Uprising (1944) in **Outline Format** This work is guite compact. There are separate chapters on the origins of the campaign, the opposing forces, the opposing leaders, the opposing plans, the battle itself, etc. The actual 63-day combat is divided into 2-5 day segments. Old pictures are included, as well as novel 3-D block diagrams depicting some of the combat actions. "POLAND TOO DISTANT": THE FALSE, CANNED EXCUSE FOR THE MEAGERNESS OF BRITISH AIRDROPS IN SUPPORT OF POLISH **GUERRILLAS** Throughout the German occupation of Poland, she, unlike Greece and France, for example, got only a pittance of airdrops of arms and ammunition in support of guerilla warfare. Forczyk unmasks the argument about Poland being "too far" from England for substantive airdrops of arms and ammunition. (The real reason, of course, was the chumminess of Great Britain with the Soviet Union). In terms of specifics, author Robert Forczyk points out that 170 Lancaster bombers had recently traversed the 1.354 km distance from Lincolnshire to Koenigsberg, each dropping 2.5 tons of bombs, then returning home. The distance was only 74 km less than that of Lincolnshire to Warsaw. (p. 62). CALLING A SPADE A SPADE: THE SOVIET BETRAYAL OF THE WARSAW **UPRISING** Forczyk rejects any attempts at creating a false ambiguity about Soviet conduct towards it. The fact that the Soviets wanted the Uprising to fail is obvious by such things as their refusal (until the very end, when the Uprising was already doomed) to allow Uprising-aiding Allied planes to land on Soviet-held territories. (p. 37). Also, temporary setbacks for the Red Army, just east of Warsaw in early August 1944, were no excuse for them not taking Warsaw long before the Uprising ended. (p. 50).

NOT ONLY JEWS SUFFERED: A SAMPLING OF THE GERMAN TERROR — As soon as the Uprising began, the Germans began murderous reprisals against Polish civilians. Forczyk puts this in perspective: "During the course of 5-6 August, Reinefarth's troops murdered between 30,000 and 40,000 civilians at Wola--exceeding the total of 33,741 Jews killed at Babi Yar outside Kiev in two days in September 1941. The Wola Massacre was the worst single battlefield atrocity committed in Europe in World War II, but it did not produce the effect that Hitler had intended. Instead of terrorizing the population, the indiscriminate murder of thousands of civilians drove the rest of the population into full-hearted support of the AK." (p. 54). The Germans

subsequently scaled back their murders of Polish civilians, realizing that the Varsovians would not surrender if they knew that they would all die POLISH URBAN GUERILLA WARFARE anyway. Forczyk traces the battles step by step. He also comments: "Polish snipers became adept at firing from concealed positions within buildings, which made them very difficult for the Germans to spot and suppress." (p. 61). In the end, the overwhelming German superiority in arms and ammunition and the absence of substantive outside assistance made the defeat of the Uprising EVEN IN DEFEAT, THE WARSAW UPRISING an inevitability. ACHIEVED A WORTHY GOAL Forczyk believes that the Uprising softened the intensity of the subsequent Communist puppet government FOR FURTHER STUDY forced on Poland. (p. 92). The end of the book contains a list of books and websites devoted to the Uprising. [For additional materials, see the Peczkis Amazon Wish List: THE FORGOTTEN WARSAW UPRISING (POLES AGAINST GERMANS) IN 1944].

Katyn: An Update

Katyn: Stalin's Massacre and the Triumph of Truth Paul, Allen Katyn Was Genocide. The Sikorski Airplane 2010 "Accident". Kresy Misconceptions Need Correction Allen Paul not only discusses the genocidal Katyn massacre itself in considerable detail, but also gives a thorough review of Polish history in WWII and the immediate aftermath. Unfortunately, his work is cheapened by rather glaring misconceptions, and I address some of them. 1939 WAR OFT-REPEATED FABLES REFUTED German-Soviet collaboration and mutual military assistance had long predated Hitler's coming to power in 1933 (p. 57). Paul is perceptive in his repudiation of oft-repeated canards regarding Polish conduct during the German-Soviet attack in 1939. He realizes that the Polish Air Force was not destroyed on the ground in the first days of the war (p. 23). (Functional Polish airplanes had earlier been scattered throughout secret airfields for this very contingency). He knows that Polish cavalry did not charge German tanks (p. 30). It was simply a canard from German propaganda that became "true" through retelling.

ALTHOUGH NOT DESCRIBED AS SUCH, THE KATYN MASSACRE PARTOOK OF GENOCIDE Paul provides graphic detail on the Katyn massacre itself. It was not just a cold-blooded shooting of captive enemy officers, but a systematic destruction of the very cream of Polish society--in effect a "beheading" of Poland. (Being unmistakably a nationcrippling act, it was clearly a form of genocide). Some Poles valiantly resisted getting shot point blank, as indicated by the tied-up corpses (p. 353). Forensic evidence alone put the blame for this crime squarely on the Soviets (p. 229). There is riveting testimony provided by Stanislaw Swianiewicz, one of the few surviving eyewitnesses (pp. 103-on). THE MYSTERIOUS DEATH OF WLADYSLAW SIKORSKI Paul provides a good description of the "airplane accident" that claimed the life of Wladyslaw Sikorski on July 4, 1943: "Coming when it did, only weeks after the discoveries at Katyn, Sikorski's death seemed too convenient. Evidence of sabotage was not found, but conclusive proof of an accident was not found either. Continuing doubts persisted. On November 12, 1952, Sumner Welles, who was U. S. under secretary of state at the time of the crash, told a House committee investigating the Katyn murders, 'I have always believed that there was sabotage.' Welles noted that Sikorski had narrowly escaped death in a similar incident the year before in Montreal. `To put it mildly, it would be an odd coincidence,' Welles concluded." (pp. 239-240). EXCUSING THE TEHERAN-YALTA CHURCHILL-ROOSEVELT BETRAYAL OF POLAND Unfortunately, there is an undercurrent of blame-the-circumstances thinking behind Paul's depiction of the sellout of Poland by Churchill and Roosevelt in the events leading up to and including Teheran and Yalta. Yes, the Soviet Union had done the largest share of the fighting, but that does not entitle her to criminally deprive other nations of freedom. Yes, there was little the western Allies could have done once the Red Army had re-entered Poland (1944), but the Soviet Union was also heavily dependent upon western Lend-Lease aid, which could have been judiciously dispensed to force Stalin to recognize Poland's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Yes, the west feared the possibility of a Soviet-Nazi separate peace if Stalin did not get his way, but Stalin was saddled with an identical fear of a western-Nazi separate peace! **BLAMING THE VICTIM** Paul also implies that the Polish

BLAMING THE VICTIM Paul also implies that the Polish government-in-exile should have been more flexible, and more willing to compromise with Stalin. But, apart from the repulsive blame-the-victim

character of the premise, what evidence is there that Poland's postwar fate would have been any different had it in fact been more "realistic"? With Hitler in 1939, the real issue had not been Danzig and the Polish Corridor. but the existence of Polish sovereignty. Likewise, with Stalin in 1941onwards, the real issue had not been the location of the Soviet-Polish border but the existence of Polish sovereignty. REPEATING THE SOVIET LINE ON THE KRESY Paul has a mistaken understanding of Poland's prewar eastern half (the Kresy) (p. 248). He says that, in principle, the Soviet Union had just as much right to the territory as Poland because it "had been neither Polish nor Russian". That is manifestly incorrect. The Kresy had been part of Poland for centuries before the Partitions, and parts of it had a large ethnic Polish minority going back to prehistoric times. The prewar Kresy had hardly been "non-Polish": It had a 25-40% ethnic Polish minority (depending upon whose figures one believes). In contrast, the percentage of Russians, outside of western Byelorussia (if one counts Byelorussians as Russians), was negligible. Nor is it correct that the non-Poles of the Kresy had "chafed under Polish rule." This was true only of some of them. In any case, few of them willingly preferred to be part of the Soviet Union. Ironically, Paul demolishes his own argument when he cites Sikorski, who, in retort to Maisky's assertion about Poland needing to be strictly limited to so-called ethnographic frontiers, pointed out that the ironic fact that the Soviet Union was itself a multi-ethnic, multi-national federation! ONLY 50 YEARS LATER, THE USSR ADMITS ITS (p. 158). Touche! GUILT--BUT WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIVE ACTION At the time this book was written, the Soviet Union had finally acknowledged blame for the Katyn Massacre. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national-security advisor to then President Carter, said in December 1990: "Recently, several direct participants in the mass murder of the defenseless Polish officers in Katyn and elsewhere--15,000 of them [now known to be 22,000] shot one by one in the back of the head--have been identified. If Gorbachev has totally broken with Stalinism, why has not a single one of them been put on trial? The Eichmann of the operation, a former NKVD major by the name of Serepenko who was in charge of the 'logistics' of the operation, lives comfortably in Moscow." (p. 340). NAZI MASS MURDERERS AND COMMUNIST MASS MURDERERS--THE STANDARD DOUBLE STANDARD Numerous Nazis have been found and punished for their crimes, but not a single Soviet Communist has been punished for his

crimes. THAT is perhaps the greatest, and cruelest, legacy of the Katyn massacre.

God's Eye: Aerial Photography and the Katyn Forest Massacre Fox. Frank 1999 **Aerial Photography Alone Debunks the Soviet Blame-Shifting to Germans** This work honors the work of Polish-American photo-interpreter Waclaw Godziemba-Maliszewski, whose painstaking work was exploited by others without proper attribution or credit. Aerial photography, originally done for military-intelligence purposes, was put to a very different use. Patches of aerially-recognizable disturbed ground take around 140 years to disappear. (p. 43). THE SOVIETS DID NOT WANT THE GERMANS TO KNOW Boxes of declassified captured Luftwaffe photos happen to include the Katyn area, which is located only 13 km west of militarily-significant Smolensk. The pioneering work of Robert G. Poirier, an outstanding CIA photo-interpreter, showed that the Katyn area showed no changes in 1941 until just before the Soviet retreat, consistent with Soviet attempts to hide something before the German invaders took possession of the area. (p. 1). THE SECOND ATTEMPTED SOVIET COVERUP Luftwaffe photos after the 1943 German retreat, continuing up to June 1944, progressively show the disappearance of the memorials, and the Soviets using bulldozers to reexhume the bodies and destroy other evidences of their crime with great MORE SITES OF THE MURDER OF POLISH urgency. (pp. 2-3). OFFICERS AND INTELLECTUALS ARE DISCOVERED

Maliszewski subsequently built upon Poirier's work, deducing the existence of previously-overlooked Katyn burial sites (p. 52), as well as the sites probably used by the Burdenko commission. (pp. 135-136). Later, the unheralded Maliszewski helped pinpoint the Katyn burial sites for the early-1990's exhumations (pp. 50-52), despite the half-century of local changes and Soviets' deliberate relocation of many local markers in order to misdirect those looking for the burial sites. MANY KATYN POLES, ABOUT TO BE MURDERED, FOUGHT BACK Fox provides many seldom-told tidbits of information in his narrative. For instance, in one of the Katyn burial pits, 200 victims had been comprehensively tied up--for apparently resisting. (p. 77). Surviving Russian perpetrators provided other details--such as the NKVD's use of German revolvers because the Russian

ones tended to quickly overheat with prolonged use. (p. 95). A FEW OF THE MURDER SITES BEYOND KATYN ITSELF Emphasis, especially among the photos shown in the back of the book, is given to the WWIIunknown murder sites near Kharkov (Starobielsk victims: e. g., pp. 43-44) and Miednoje/Kalinin/Tver (Ostaszkow/Ostashkov; e.g., pp. 48-50). The Kharkov murder location first came to general Polish attention when some Polish workers, building a hotel near Kharkov, came across a bazaar at which Polish military medals and buttons were being sold. (p. 43). SECOND KATYN NEAR RZESZOW A "mini Katyn" occurred in 1944 at Trzebuska near Rzeszow, where the NKVD murdered about 150 AK officers, soon after disarming them. (pp. 60-61)[According to some accounts, the victims' throats had been cut so as to avoid alerting the nearby Polish population by gunshots.] Of course, there were many additional Katyns, notably during the Soviet imposition of the Communist puppet state on Poland (1944-on), notably the war against the ZOLNIERZE WYKLECI.

The Murder of General Wladyslaw Sikorski, and British Coverup

Secret agents, spies & saboteurs: secret missions of the Second World War Piekalkiewicz, Janusz 1969 The Probable Murder of General Sikorski (and Ongoing British Obstruction of Justice). A Captured German V2 Rocket--A Spectacular Polish Intelligence Coup

This work consists of numerous, separate chapters, each of which describes a particular event. Topics include Operation Sea Lion (details given on the planned German invasion of England in 1940), the Czech-partisan assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, the D-Day deception (which fooled Germans as to the locations of the Allied landings), the Battle of Kursk in detail, the Soviet-betrayed Polish Warsaw Uprising of 1944, the German commandos during the Battle of the Bulge, the mythical Bavarian redoubt towards the end of the European war, and much more. THE DEATH OF GENERAL WLADYSLAW SIKORSKI--NO ACCIDENT This work provides seldom-told information regarding the probable murder of General Wladyslaw Sikorski in an airplane crash on Gibraltar on July 4, 1943. It turns out that there had been earlier attempts on his life. While

halfway across the Atlantic in March 1942, an incendiary bomb--the kind used by the RAF to destroy a plane's contents if it is about to fall into enemy hands--was found under a sleeping bag. The Pole who found it belatedly claims to have planted it, and done so in order to "alert the authorities as to the possibility of an attempt on Sikorski's life". He is declared insane. The plot thickens. Soon thereafter, this man is run over by a vehicle, in broad daylight, and killed. (pp. 320-321). Later that year (November 1942), Sikorski flies again to North America. As his airplane takes off from Montreal, the engines suddenly stall. The pilot manages to keep control, and soft crash-lands the plane. Sikorski, only slightly injured, suspects sabotage. (pp. 321-323). Then comes the Katyn revelation in spring 1943. The Soviets, emboldened by recent military victories, become more overt in their hostility to a future sovereign Poland. Sikorski is seen more and more as a nuisance in Soviet-western relations. Sikorski's assassins are finally successful on what appears to be their third try. Again, the plot thickens. Kim Philby, a British Communist serving the Soviets, was in charge of the Gibraltar area at the time. (p. 332). No post-mortem is allowed on Sikorski's body. (p. 333). Douglas F. Martin, the sole eyewitness to the plane crash, is not questioned. It turns out that security measures had not been enforced before the fateful flight. Oddly enough, a piece of luggage is found on the runway at the spot where the engines of the plane had been tested before the flight. (p. 336). And so on. ONGOING BRITISH OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE Here we are, 75 years later. The British refuse to declassify their materials on Sikorski's death. What are they still hiding? OPERATION WILDHORN: POLISH SPIES CAPTURE A FALLEN GERMAN V2 ROCKET This work elaborates on the unmasking of the German V-2 rocket project. Poles provide the intelligence data on their manufacture at Peenemunde. (p. 408-on). The British bomb the place, and German rocketry is thereby set back several months. The Germans relocate their rocket testing to occupied Poland, then out of range of British planes. Polish intelligence tracks these developments. (p. 434-on). A crashed V-2 rocket near Blizna is hidden, recovered, and--in what must be one of the greatest intelligence thrillers of all time--its steering mechanism is shipped through an eventually-arriving Dakota plane (July 26, 1944) which--worthy of the drama of a movie-encounters repeated difficulties taking off in the mud just as the nearby

Germans are closing in. (pp. 441-443). Two days later, the precious cargo is safely in London.

Polish Intelligence Achievements, Including the Cracking of the "Invincible" German ENIGMA Code

Intelligence Co-operation between Poland and Great Britain during World War II: The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee Stirling, Tessa 2005 Volume 1 Not Only ENIGMA: The Many Polish Espionage Successes in WWII. Poland's Reward? **Betrayal** The average reader not have imagined half of the information contained in this first volume! This brief review is necessarily limited. British Prime Minister Tony Blair comments: "The Polish Intelligence Services made a unique contribution to Allied victory in the Second World War. This Report brings to light for the first time the true extent of that contribution. This is about a part of history that is not usually told."(p. xii). SUCCESS IN CRACKING ENIGMA WAS INDISPENSIBLE TO THE Before and during WWII, Polish mathematicians broke the "invincible" German ENIGMA code, enabling the Poles to locate 80-90% of the German forces about to attack their nation in 1939 (Ciechanowski, p. 447). Ciechanowski also addresses the fallacies of the many books which ignore or minimize this Polish breakthrough (pp. 32-34) and comments: "There is no proof that the British would have been able to break the Enigma code and to discover how the machine worked, if on the eve of the war the Poles had the same low level of knowledge in these matters as did their French and British colleagues."(p. 34). Gill Bennett (p. 440) calls the Polish ENIGMA success an "outstanding Polish contribution" without which the war might have lasted longer. The screen character of a Polish traitor among the ENIGMA specialists is pure fantasy (Ciechanowski/Tebinka, p. POLISH INTELLIGENCE KEPT TABS ON OPERATION 455). BARBAROSSA Polish intelligence anticipated the German attack against its erstwhile Soviet ally at least several months before it actually happened (Andrzej Peplonski, p. 414). Subsequent information included such details as the presence of several thousand severely-frostbitten German soldiers in a hospital at Wilno (Vilnius)(ibid, p. 429). Based on the monitoring of

railway traffic, Polish intelligence correctly deduced the fact that the German objective on the Russian Front in 1942 would be the Caucasus area, not Moscow (ibid, p. 425). The processing of German correspondence from the eastern front indicated that, by 1944, some 90% of German soldiers no longer believed in victory, and that depression, suicides, and attempted avoidance of duty were taking their toll. Allied bombing raids against Germany itself also sapped the morale of frontline German soldiers. (Adam Grzegorz Dabrowski, p. 533). Direct British-Polish cooperation included the following: "Assisted by SOE supplies and training, Polish saboteurs played a major part in disrupting Nazi railway traffic on the Eastern Front, destroying or seriously damaging an estimated 6,000 locomotives. In the autumn of 1941 they came close to assassinating Hitler when he was traveling on his personal train, the Fuhrerzug, to his headquarters in East Prussia, the Wolfschanze ("Wolf's Lair"). (Christopher THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE POLOKAUST Andrew, pp. 56-57).

This book includes some insights into Poland's wartime situation, including the fact that almost 40% of Poland's wealth had been destroyed by the Germans (Daria Nalecz, p. 53). THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN Of the 1,733 German planes shot down during the Battle of Britain, 203 were shot down by Polish pilots (Christopher Andrew, p. 54). VERY MEAGER BRITISH SUPPORT FOR POLISH GUERRILLA WARFARE Merely 666 tons of weapons were ever dropped by the British into German-occupied Poland against 10,000 into France and 18,000 into Yugoslavia (Eugenia Maresch, p. 209)[not from "technical difficulties" as much as a Sovietappeasing mentality]. POLISH WARNINGS ON JEWS IGNORED

Polish warnings about the extermination of Jews fell on deaf ears (Jan Ciechanowski, pp. 540-541). [But, wouldn't you know it, Poland is blamed for "not doing enough" to rescue Jews.] OTHER POLISH ESPIONAGE ACHIEVEMENTS Polish intelligence regularly monitored German industry and Polish agents stole the plans of a specially-designed high muzzle velocity German antiaircraft gun (Andrzej Chmielarz, p. 410). Polish naval intelligence scored impressive successes in uncovering such things as German coastal batteries as well as the vulnerabilities of Allied shipping and port facilities (Gill Bennett, p. 165). The Poles kept the British abreast of German progress in the development of jet aircraft (Chmielarz, p. 410). Polish intelligence played a decisive role in the unmasking of Germany's secret rocket program. This included the discovery of the

Peenemunde testing site (leading to its subsequent bombing), the identification of the new German testing site (Blizna, near Tarnow), and the pinpointing of a cave in France in which the Germans hid their V-1 rockets for subsequent attacks on London (Rafal Wnuk, p. 244). Samples of rocket and fuel were stolen and analyzed by Polish agents. In time, an entire fallen rocket was camouflaged by Polish intelligence and subsequently disassembled and (in part) flown to London (Operation WILDHORN III)(Gill Bennett, pp. 441-442). Polish agents played a major role in deceiving the Germans as to the correct location where the D-Day landings of June 1944 would take place (Wnuk, p. 234). They also set the stage for, and subsequently monitored the results of, the Allied bombings of the important Ploiesti (Ploeste) oil fields (Tadeusz Dubicki, pp. 315-316). Polish intelligence also worked to split the German alliance. Jan Stanislaw Ciechanowski focuses on the activities of Lt-Col. Jan Kowalewski in this regard: "Col. Kowalewski's idee fixe was to pull Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Finland away from Germany. He attempted to do this by showing their representatives various ways in which their countries might join the other side, and by building up their skepticism as to the possibility of the final victory by the Third Reich."(p. 520). Unfortunately, Allied politics got in the way: "The formula applied to the German satellites turned out to be shortsighted. The western Allies had no concept of how to involve these countries in an anti-Hitler coalition. A more flexible policy...might have shortened the war. Lack of such a policy meant that Kowalewski's mission was doomed to failure." (p. 526). General Hayes A. Kroner, Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence Division, told General Wladyslaw Sikorski that: "The Polish Army has the best intelligence in the world. Its value for us is beyond estimation." (Ciechanowski, p. 352). In like manner: "According to Sir John Colville, Prime Minister Churchill's trusted wartime secretary, Polish intelligence was the best among all the secret services of the countries participating in the war against Germany: 'the Poles were possibly the best players in this intelligence game." (Ciechanowski, p. 145). For all this (and more) the western Allies betrayed Poland to the Soviet Union!

The Enigma War Garlinski, Jozef 1980 Spy Thriller! R. V. Jones, ENIGMA-Codebreaking Participant, Affirms the Crucial Pioneering Successes of the Poles This fascinating book is of

enduring value. Nowadays, British films and articles about Enigma typically downplay or ignore the pivotal role of the Poles, or overemphasize the work of gay mathematician Alan Turing in order to promote the acceptance of THE FOUNDATIONAL POLISH ACHIEVEMENT homosexuality. cracking of the "invincible" German code ENIGMA was surely one of the greatest intelligence achievements of all time. In his Foreword to this book, Professor R. V. Jones, a participant at Bletchley, gave unstinting credit to the Poles: "The Poles were said to have somehow stolen the wheel; this would have been a marvelous cloak-and-dagger exploit, but the truth as told in this book is even more remarkable...By 1937 the Polish cryptographers had succeeded first in working out the connections and then in deciphering German messages; they even designed a machine for this purpose. Some measure of their feat is provided by the fact that their British counterparts were still, two years later, some way from success." (p. ix; my review based on 1979 edition). POLES HAD BEEN BREAKING GERMAN CODES LONG BEFORE WWWII Author Jozef Garlinski places the ENIGMA-code breaking process in the context of developments before and during WWII. The reader learns that German-speaking Poles were already working on German codes not long after WWI. (pp. 18-19). This book contains many photos and diagrams of the relevant persons and code machines. For instance, the alphabetical sheet-overlays are included (p. 37). An appendix contains much technical information on ENIGMA.

Seizing The Enigma: The Race To Break The German U-boat Codes, 1939-1943 Kahn, David 1991 **Non-Polish Author Gives Unstinting Credit for Cracking ENIGMA To Where It Belongs--The** Nowadays, many British productions ignore or downplay the **Poles** Polish achievement in cracking Enigma. The focus is customarily on gay British mathematician Alan Turing, in an effort to promote acceptance of homosexuality. POLAK POTRAFI: THE POLES DID IT In contrast to some English-language books on this subject, Kahn gives credit squarely where it is due. He emphasizes the fact that the Poles cracked the German ENIGMA code, and that "Poland did what no other country had done--and what the Germans believed impossible." (p. 67). Kahn recognizes the fact that Polish mathematician Marian Rejewski was the "solver of ENIGMA." (p. 323). He even calls Rejewski one of the "greatest cryptanalysts of all

time". (p. 66). OTHER WWII-RELATED EVENTS Kahn emphasizes the codes used by the German Navy, but also touches on other aspects of WWII. He notes the Katyn massacre, wherein the Soviets murdered tens of thousands of disarmed Polish officers and intellectuals. He points to the irony of the Germans exploiting this tragedy for propaganda purposes while at the same time having killed many more Poles and Jews. Kahn believes that the ULTRA was the greatest WWII secret after the atom bomb. However, he rejects the premise that the cracking of the "invincible" German codes by the Allies enabled them to win the war. Instead, he supposes that the Allied victory in the European theater would have been delayed by about a year, and with much greater casualties, had the Allies not broken the German ciphers.

Poles Unambiguously Took Monte Cassino

Cassino: Portrait of a Battle (Cassell Military Classics) Majdalany, Fred 1957 British Eyewitness: Poles and Monte Cassino

Author Majdalany begins with a history of the monastery at the top of Monte Cassino. The Benedictines put it there not only for religious purposes, but also because they realized that its location, surrounded by steep cliffs, would make it hard to take by any invaders. Nevertheless, the monastery was, in time, destroyed by the Lombards and then by the Saracens. For centuries, it had peace. Then the Germans put it to use for their own strategic purposes. The author describes the carnage around Monte Cassino. The effects of the German rocket-mortar nebelwerfer, a horrible weapon, are elaborated. (p. 134). [The Poles knew it all too well from the Warsaw Uprising, and called it the "roaring cow".] The Polish soldiers are described as impetuous, animated by hatred against Germans, and taking too many casualties because of their attitude. (pp. 87-88). [Based on what evidence?] The battle plan was for Majdalany's forces to advance up to Monte Cassino from one direction, and the Poles from another. (pp. 107-108). It worked. The Germans were defeated, the bodies of Germans littered the hillsides, and the Poles took the monastery at the top of Monte Cassino. (p. 147).

The Soviet-Betrayed Warsaw Uprising

Warszawa '44 : Propaganda Wokol Powstania Jako Narzedzie Dawnej i Wspołczesnej Polityki Zebrowski, Leszek 2018 How the Soviet-Betrayed 1944 Warsaw Uprising Continues To Be Misused **Today By Those Who Harm Poland** Book title: PROPAGANDA SURROUNDING THE UPRISING AS A TOOL OF OLD AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS Historian Leszek Zebrowski reminds us that, "History is a tool of politics." (p. 13). That is why we hear about "Polish death camps" and "Polish fascists". (p. 13). [Zebrowski does not go far enough. That is why we also hear about "incurable Polish anti-Semitism" and "Polish complicity in the Holocaust".] This book contains photos, text, and scanned copies of actual bulletins, brochures, and pamphlets, from around the Uprising, of Soviet, German, and Polish origin. Owing to the fact that Zebrowski specializes in the history of the NSZ, he presents many details about it in relation to the Uprising. For instance, an NSZ-ONR bulletin, from January 1945, advocates respect for the A. K. (ARMIA) KRAJOWA) and its soldiers, despite disagreements with such things as its Soviets-are-Poland's-allies political orientation. (p. 239). Since so much has already been written about the Warsaw Uprising, I focus my review mostly on recent matters and on information that I have not seen mentioned in earlier works on the Uprising. SCALE OF OVERALL ORGANIZED POLISH UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY Zebrowski estimates that 7% of the Polish population was involved in Underground activity of some sort under the Nazi German occupation. This encompassed clandestine education as well as military, political, and counterpropaganda activism. (p. 207). More Poles were not involved as a result of fear for their lives, and the desire to keep a low profile so as to survive the brutal, demoralizing German occupation. [Ironic to the perennial Jewish accusation that "most Poles did nothing" to rescue Jews, most Poles also "did nothing" to actively oppose the Germans--and for the same fear-based reasons!] THE MYTH OF THE MYTH OF THE COLD-BLOODED SOVIET BETRAYAL OF THE WARSAW UPRISING Historian Leszek Zebrowski not only shows that Stalin could have made the Warsaw Uprising a success had he wanted to, but that he could have done so without necessarily involving any Soviet ground troops at all! (p. 88-on). The Soviet Union, by mid-1944, had

enjoyed overwhelming air superiority over the Luftwaffe. (So the Soviet Air Force could have swept the skies over Warsaw of the Stuka dive bombers. The Stukas were shooting and bombing, at will, the defenseless Polish military and civilians, moreover from low altitudes, thanks to a lack of fear of anti-aircraft weaponry, which the Warsaw insurgents did not possess.) The Red Army also had crushing superiority in artillery. It could have destroyed the German artillery that was freely pounding defenseless Warsaw. If nothing else, Stalin could have allowed the western Allied supply planes to land in an airfield, behind Soviet lines, in a timely manner. Instead, Stalin only allowed it once the Uprising was almost defeated.

THE "LACK OF COORDINATION" SOVIET EXCUSE The "lack of coordination" exculpation for Soviet inaction, to the extent that it is true at all, is also bogus. The uprising in Paris is instructive. Despite the lack of coordination of the Parisian insurgents with the Allied armies, and moreover despite a relatively small contingent of French insurgents facing a comparably-sized (to Warsaw) German garrison, the uprising was a success thanks to the fact that the Allied armies redirected their movements to liberate Paris once news came that the uprising had broken out. THE LOSS IN LIVES Leszek Zebrowski supports a total Warsaw Uprising death toll of as much as 200,000, although accurate numbers will never be known. (p. 12). However, the 200,000 figure does not include the multitudes of civilian Warsaw Poles, deported to Nazi German concentration camps after the capitulation of October 2, 1944, that died there before the end of WWII. NO BLAMING THE VICTIMS was not only the Soviets that cynically blamed the ARMIA KRAJOWA for precipitating an Uprising that killed so many civilians. The cynical Germans, exhibiting crocodile tears, did also. For instance, German General Reiner Stahel, while already in Soviet captivity in 1945, waxed eloquent about his moral misgivings regarding the A. K. thrusting Warsaw's population into a hopeless fight. (p. 200). More recently, Piotr Zychowic, in his extraordinarily-shallow OBLED '44, took an even more comical "blame the victim" approach. He dismissed the Uprising as "a present to Stalin", and, what's more, "an irritation to the Western allies."(p. 219). TWO UPRISINGS IN WARSAW? The Jews' 1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising has been so overhyped that most Americans, upon hearing the phrase "Warsaw uprising", think that it is referring to the Jews' 1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising instead of the incomparably-larger and organized Poles'

1944 Warsaw Uprising. Zebrowski (pp. 137-on) challenges this. He suggests that an uprising is a valid one only when there is a definite military chain of command, which was not the case with the Jews' insurgency in 1943. (p. 139). Zebrowski also cites Holocaust survivor Eli Gat, who considers the Jews' Uprising greatly overhyped, as it never had more than a few hundred armed insurgents. (p. 140). [For more on this, see my review of Eli Gat's NOT JUST ANOTHER HOLOCAUST BOOK]. THOSE IMMORTAL POLONOPHOBIC TALL TALES OF POLES KILLING **FUGITIVE JEWS** Decades ago, Reuben Ainsztein (p. 129) called the Warsaw Uprising insurgents (what else?) "Polish fascists", and made the amazing claim that the Polish soldiers killed thousands of fugitive Jews! Maybe in another universe. More recently, Michal Cichy, writing in the George Soros funded leftist GAZETA WYBORCZA, repeated similar accusations. These have soundly been debunked by historian Zebrowski. See my review of his PASZKWIL WYBORCZEJ. Another Poles-Killed-Jews accuser is caught in a flat lie. A certain Baruch writes as though he had seen everything. He also claims to have fled the Uprising for the Chojnowski forest, were he was accosted by NSZ commander Szary. Impossible. That NSZ commander, Szary, was not in any forest, and moreover had been killed in combat, in Warsaw itself, on the very first day of the Uprising! (p. 184). MORE ON ADAM MICHNIK VEL SZECHTER GAZETA WYBORCZA, a classic manifestation of cultural AND HIS RAG Marxism, runs down everything in Polish patriotism--in an obvious attempt to discredit it in the eyes of the Polish population. (p. 186). But wait it gets even better. GAZETA WYBORCZA equates Polish patriotism with racism. (p. 211). Adam Michnik vel Szechter is the long-term editor of GAZETA WYBORCZA. As recently as 1978, which was only 25 years after the death of Stalin, Adam Michnik vel Szechter was still praising the Stalinists. (p. 174). Michnik vel Szechter recently met with Zebrowski (p. 177) and exhibited a dismissive attitude towards Michal Cichy's falsehoods. Adam Michnik vel Szechter showed not the slightest "moral reckoning" or "coming" to terms with the past" regarding the criminality of his brother, Communist Judge Stefan Michnik. [For one thing, Judge Stefan had sentenced Warsaw Uprising hero Andrzej Czaykowski, to death. (p. 173).] PUTTING POLES AND NAZIS ON THE SAME SIDE Towards the last months of WWII, German propaganda tried to entice the Poles to join them to fight the Soviets. (p. 244). The Poles refused. But no matter. Communists and other

LEWAKS accused them anyway of doing so. [So, effectively, do some Jewish authors.] ON THE EVE OF DEFEAT, THE GERMANS PROMISED TO RETURN. THEY DID As the Germans were finally forced to retreat from Poland, under pressure from the advancing Red Army, their propaganda promised a German return. (pp. 209-210). They did--decades later--in the form of the European Union. [My opinion: Polexit now!]

Panzer Leader Guderian, Heinz 1950 **Nazi-Soviet Alliance** Was Real. Nazi German General Gives Credit to Poles. Warsaw Uprising Betrayed. Hitler 1944 Bomb Plot Had No Chance of Success

This book touches on several important issues, which I discuss. THE 1939-1942 MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT HAD BEEN REAL AND SUBSTANTIVE Guderian recognizes the fact that the Soviet Communist alliance with the Third Reich had not been simply an innocent, time-stalling tactical move: "On September 29th, 1939, Russia signed a pact of friendship with Germany and at the same time made a trade agreement that was of considerable value to the Germans in the economic prosecution of the war." (p. 140). A HOARY 1939 WAR MYTH REPEATED Guderian claims that the Pomorska Cavalry Brigade charged German tanks with lances, "in ignorance of the nature of our tanks" (p. 72). This contrasts with western accounts, which blame Polish impetuousness and foolhardiness for this supposed act. In actuality, the Polish cavalry had discontinued the use of lances well before WWII (see the Peczkis review of Poland 1939: The Birth Of Blitzkrieg (Campaign)).

THE GERMAN ENEMY GAVE MORE CREDIT TO THE POLISH ARMY THAN DO MANY WESTERNERS Otherwise, General Guderian shows more respect for the much-maligned 1939 Polish Army than did the British and Americans. "The first serious fighting took place...the leading tanks found themselves face to face with Polish defensive positions. The Polish anti-tank gunners scored many direct hits." (p. 70). He writes of the "fierce battles for Warsaw" (p. 84), and characterizes the Poles as "a tough and courageous enemy." (p. 73).

INDIRECT EVIDENCE FOR THE SOVIET BETRAYAL OF THE POLES' 1944 WARSAW UPRISING General Heinz Guderian mentions the losses which the Germans had just inflicted on the Red Army. (p. 359).

(This setback has been distorted by Soviet apologists into proof that the Red Army was thereby immobilized, and thus unable to aid the Warsaw insurgents.) To begin with, Guderian was referring to the period around August 1, 1944--certainly not the entire 5.5 months that the Red Army sat idly on the eastern bank of the Vistula. Moreover, Guderian's information is instructive. Throughout the first half of 1944 (in what includes Operation Bagration), the Red Army had been routing the Germans with its "considerable superiority in strength" (p. 327), causing the total destruction of 25 German divisions (p. 336). Then, on the outskirts of Warsaw, the Soviet apologists would have us believe, the Red Army suddenly and conveniently lost all its strength for no less than 5.5 months (August 1, 1944--January 12, 1945), only to magically regain it (and more) in the form of a 20:1 advantage in guns and 7:1 advantage in tanks, after the Uprising. KAMINSKI WAS EXECUTED—BUT NOT FOR HIS CRIMES (p. 382). TO POLES Guderian claims credit for talking Hitler into recognizing the Warsaw combatants as regular soldiers (p. 356)--otherwise they wouldn't surrender knowing that the Germans would kill them all anyway. He mentions the frightful atrocities of the Dirlewanger and Kaminski units. Against the impression that Bach Zelewski had executed Kaminski for his crimes against Poles, and as a matter of principle, we find that nothing so noble was at work: "Von dem Bach took the precaution of having Kaminski shot and thus disposed of as a potentially dangerous witness." (p. 356).

THE 1944 HITLER BOMB PLOT WAS FOREDOOMED, EVEN IF HITLER HAD DIED The much-romanticized Hitler bomb plot never had a chance (pp. 344-345). There was no means of destroying the many pro-Hitler leaders. And, when Stauffenberg flew into Berlin with his mistaken announcement that Hitler was dead, he found no significant following.

1956 POLAK POTRAFI: Warsaw's Historic Center Re-Created Almost From Scratch after WWII THE REBUILDING OF THE OLD TOWN OF WARSAW is the title of this Polish-language work. Warsaw's Stare Miasto had many centuries-old buildings. Many of them were destroyed during the Soviet-betrayed Warsaw Uprising of 1944, but the remainder of them were deliberately burned and blown up by the Germans, for no military reason whatsoever, between the surrender of the

Uprising (October 2, 1944), and the six-months-delayed entry of the Red Army. (January 17, 1945). SCOPE OF THE GERMAN-CAUSED DESTRUCTION There were 226 buildings in the Stare Miasto. (p. 23). The book has many architectural drawings and descriptions, and requires some knowledge of architectural terms in order to appreciate fully. There is an atlas of the ruined buildings and their rebuilt versions. In addition, sketches numbered 90-108 show the street-view facades of the historic buildings, before 1939, with darker-line superimposed sketches of the outlines of the fragments of the walls that survived the war. In most cases, only the first story of the wall survived. Below each sketch is another one, showing the rebuilt building. It is obvious that the reconstructed versions were not always identical to their prewar counterparts. THE STAGES OF THE PAINSTAKING REBUILDING PROCESS The reconstruction of the Old Town occurred in three phases. (p. 8). The first one (1945-1947) included a survey of the destruction, and placement of scaffolding to prevent solitary walls from falling. (See also p. 17). During the second phase (1947-1950), the earlier procedures were continued, while rubble was removed and some buildings rebuilt. In the final phase (1950-1954), the remainder of the buildings were reconstructed, and the new Stare Miasto made fit for public access. THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES PREVENT THE REBUILDING OF THE ROYAL CASTLE IN WARSAW

At the time of the publication of this book (1956), the massive project was reckoned finished. However, the Royal Castle, destroyed by the Germans as a symbol of Polish nationhood, had not been reconstructed by the Communist authorities for obvious political reasons. It was not to be rebuilt until the 1970's.

Mowi Jozef Swiatlo. Za Kulisami Bezpieki i Partii 1940-1955 Swiatlo, Jozef and Blazynski, Zbigniew 1985 Jewish Communist From Poland Defects(?) to the USA. Jewish Complicity in the Soviet Betrayal of the Poles' 1944 Warsaw Uprising JOZEF SWIATLO SPEAKS is the title of this Polish-language work. It features Jozef Swiatlo (Izaak Fleischfarb, or Lichstein: p. 320), a high-ranking Jewish officer in the hated Communist security forces (U. B., or Bezpieka) of Soviet-ruled Poland. Swiatlo's motives for defecting to the West, in December 1953, are unclear. (p. 14-on). He left behind a wife and two

children in Poland (p. 13), and had a sister who eventually moved to Israel. A SELFISH OPPORTUNIST? Swiatlo was no recentlyenlightened anti-Communist. He professed to favor a "national" Communism (p. 14), perhaps even to the extent exemplified by Tito. He may have sensed that he was in danger (p. 14), possibly related to the winds of change in the wake of Stalin's death several months earlier. [Some have suggested that Swiatlo was an opportunist with ephemeral loyalties. Having made his mark under Communism, he left his victims behind, and now set out to make his mark in the West. Many other Communist Jews later left for the west, notably in 1968. They rebranded themselves victims of Communism and (what else?) Polish anti-Semitism.] In any case, Communism commonly split Jewish families in other contexts. For instance, super-Communist Jakub Berman's brother Adolf, an active Zionist, moved to Israel, while some other close relatives of Jakub were successful in the USA. (p. 39). THE SHAM 1947 ELECTIONS Poland, the Communists "legally" came to power through elections, notably in 1947. Not only were the elections falsified, but Swiatlo implicated himself as a participant in the falsification process. (pp. 194-on). NO REPENTANCE FOR COMMUNIST CRIMES Incredibly, Swiatlo denied torturing or killing anyone (p. 8). So what were the Communist security forces for--picking flowers? Swiatlo showed no remorse for his services in the dreaded Bezpieka. (p. 10). He asserts that 40% of those arrested and tortured by the Bezpieka withstood the tortures, and did not "confess" to their accused crimes. (p. 221, 223). SHAM EGALITARIANISM: THE EARLY NOMENKLATURA For all of its lofty promises of egalitarianism and identification with the working class, Communism created a privileged as well as totalitarian ruling class. Swiatlo focused on the "more equal" status of Communist leaders. For instance, U. B. leader Radkiewicz received a very high wage, free apartment, four cars, etc. (p. 92). Bierut enjoyed such things as a luxurious villa with 300 servants, and his own tailor, barber, etc. (p. 95). Earlier, while in Moscow, Swiatlo had met with leading Communist Adolf Warski [Jerzy Adolf Warszawski] for a large banquet. The former professed feeling discomfitted by the fact that Russian workers went hungry while they were feasting. (p. 100).

COLLABORATION OF COMMUNISTS AND NAZIS AGAINST POLES It hardly news that the Communist forces sought to destroy the non-Communist Underground, notably the A. K. (ARMIA KRAJOWA), but

also the BCh (BATALIONY CHLOPSKIE). (p. 116). What may surprise the reader is the extent to which the Soviets collaborated with the German Gestapo in this regard. (pp. 103-on, 117, 125-on, 138-139, 207 etc.). Interestingly, at one time it backfired. The Communist GL-AL tipped off the Gestapo about the location of an A. K. printing press, but, owing to a mistake, a nearby GL-AL press was liquidated instead. (p. 107).

COMMUNISTS ALSO MURDERED JEWS: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION Accusations of the AK (A. K.) and NSZ (N. S. Z.) gratuitously killing fugitive Jews have long been a staple of Communist propaganda and of Holocaust-related writings. The Communist GL-AL professed to welcome Jews and to be an aggressive foe of anti-Semitism. Interestingly, Swiatlo testifies to the fact that the GL-AL murdered Jewish partisans, and did this on a "massive scale". (p. 102, 120-122). This fact has subsequently been confirmed by archival information. See the Peczkis review of: Tajne oblicze GL-AL i PPR: Dokumenty (Polish Edition). [The existence of pogroms is one of the exculpations for the Zydokomuna. But Jews had no problems supporting Communism despite its share of pogroms!] JEWISH COMPLICITY IN THE SOVIET BETRAYAL OF THE POLES' 1944 WARSAW UPRISING Throughout this book, Swiatlo focuses on Communist personages, and provides interesting perspectives on various events. He gives his take on both Gestapo and Soviet involvement in the MIECZ i PLUG organization. (p. 108-on). It turns out that the removal of General Zygmunt Berling from his post, for coming to the aid of the Soviet-betrayed Warsaw Uprising, was carried out by Roman Zambrowski [Rubin Nussbaum]. (p. 49). THEN THE COMMUNISTS. NOW THE LEWACTWO: THE WAR AGAINST POLAND'S CATHOLIC CHURCH We learn that the arrest of Cardinal Wyszynski was a direct order of Moscow. (p. 25; see also p. 75, 185-189). However, the Communists realized that the Catholic Church was too influential in Poland to destroy primarily by direct, frontal attacks. Hence, they sought to undermine it from within. Swiatlo testifies (p. 120) that the Communists had sentenced Boleslaw Piasecki to death, and that he had to cooperate in his front activities in exchange for saving his life. The Communists also cultivated so-called progressive Catholics for their own ends (p. 174), or, failing that, at least for weakening the Church by sowing division within it. (p. 182). [The informed reader realizes that the post-Communists and LEWAKS are using the same tactics today in cultivating "progressive

Catholics" (KATOLEWICA) for use as a tool against patriotic Catholics (e. g., RADIO MARYJA), and as a means of dividing the Church from within.]

RAF Air Marshall Slessor Vehemently Condemns Soviet Perfidy

The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections Slessor, John 1956 Sir John Slessor, Air Marshal of the RAF, Squarely and Forcefully Confronts the Perfidy of the Soviet Betrayal of the Poles' 1944 Warsaw Uprising, and the Persistent British Softness on This thick volume raises many topics, and includes a Communism profuse index. I focus on a few items of lasting interest. A GEM: THE BOTTOMLESS PERFIDY OF THE SOVIET-BETRAYED WARSAW UPRISING (1944) Some authors have created a false ambiguity about Soviet conduct towards the Warsaw Uprising. Slessor will have absolutely none of that. He writes, "It is a story of the utmost gallantry and selfsacrifice on the part of our air crews, R.A.F., South African and above all Polish; of deathless heroism on the part of the Polish Underground Army fighting against desperate and increasingly hopeless odds in the tortured city of Warsaw; and of the BLACKEST-HEARTED, COLDEST-BLOODED TREACHERY ON THE PART OF THE RUSSIANS. I am not a naturally vindictive man, but I hope that there may be some very special hell reserved for the brutes in the Kremlin who betrayed Bor's army, and led to the fruitless sacrifice of some two hundred airmen of 205 Group and 334 Wing." (p. 612; Emphasis added). Well said! But don't forget the 200,000 German-slain Varsovians. Slessor is, at first, critical of Polish leaders for not having pre-planned the Uprising with the Allies [How could it then have been kept secret? Besides, the Soviets HAD been informed, and had even encouraged an uprising. He then qualifies his views: "Even he [Sosnkowski] perhaps may be forgiven for failing to foresee the depths to which Russian Communist treachery would descend." (p. 616). No kidding. RAF Marshal Slessor, recounting his earlier position that the airdrops were a waste of lives in support of a hopeless undertaking, now recognizes the fact that the Uprising was supposed to be a few-day rational military act, not a 63-day quasi-suicidal agony: "But at the beginning it did not seem to me possible that the battle could last more than a few days--indeed, but for

the Russian treachery, it could hardly have done so..." (p. 615). Right SLESSOR CONDEMNS BRITISH SOFTNESS ON again. COMMUNISM Slessor incisively comments, "How, after the fall of Warsaw, any responsible statesman could trust any Russian Communist further than he could kick him, passes the comprehension of ordinary POLAND WAS THE CANARY IN THE COAL men." (p. 612). Indeed! MINE IN TERMS OF HER RAPID DEFEAT IN 1939 Slessor comments, "Poland was overwhelmed far more easily and quickly than anyone had thought possible by the blitzkrieg, which should have taught us more than it did about what to expect when the enemy turned against the West." (p. 236). THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF POLISH PILOTS IN THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN (1940) Slessor comments on Polish pilots in the RAF: "During the battle of Britain I had watched 303 Squadron pile up their magnificent record of achievement and sacrifice...The Poles may have been tactless and often stupid, but they were indomitably brave." (p. 611). [How were the Poles "tactless and stupid"? Was it because they wanted freedom? Or was it for loudly protesting western inaction towards, and later sellout of, their treaty obligations to Poland?]. ALLIED SATURATION BOMBING WAS NEITHER UNPRECEDENTED, NOR INEFFECTIVE, NOR IMMORAL (COMPARED TO OTHER WARTIME ACTS) Ironic to the armchair moralizing, in recent years, about Allied WWII area bombing, this issue had been effectively settled before the war. International law didn't govern aerial bombing. Then German bombing conduct set the precedent (p. 216). Besides, the rather abstract distinctions between military and civilian targets, artificial to begin with (p. 213), proved totally unworkable during the air war. (pp. 238-239). Finally, nighttime area bombing had become compelled by the fact that daylight bombing of individualized targets had proved too costly (p. 429), and nighttime bombing usually couldn't destroy individualized targets. (p. 295). Slessor could have made his argument stronger by pointing out that the lost productivity caused by the disruptions of area bombing was more important than the lost productivity caused by the deaths and destruction itself.

Poland's Tragic Fate Illustrated By WWII Humor

Laughter in Hell: Use of Humor During the Holocaust Lipman, **Humor Directed Against Nazi Germany, Nazi** Steve 1991 This work is not just a collection of Personages, and German Policies jokes. It also traces their purposes, and the psychology behind them. Some jokes were forms of satire, and passive resistance--the kind directed against all totalitarian regimes. Others were a means of coming to terms with the situation--such as GALGENHUMOR (gallows humor). (pp. 63-on). Still others were a form of resistance against oppressive conditions and impossible situations. They often raised the morale of the suffering. They could even be said to be a form of optimism--in that evil would not finally triumph. Some jokes were about politics and political systems. For example: What is the difference between Communism and National Socialism? Under Communism, if man has a cow, it is taken away from him. Under National Socialism, he is allowed to keep the cow and feed it-only the milk is taken away." (p. 91). What is the difference between National Socialism and Communism? It is colder in Russia. (p. 105). Some of the jokes touched on religious themes. For example: What is the difference between Christianity and National Socialism? In Christianity, one man died for everyone. In National Socialism, everyone has to die for one man. (p. 91). What is the difference between a missionary and the Reich Bishop? The missionary makes the savages devout, the Reich Bishop makes the devout savage. (pp. 98-99). NAZI PERSONAGES Many jokes poked fun at leading Nazis. For example: Goering and Goebbels die and go to Hell. Their punishment: for Goering, 1,000 new uniforms and no mirrors; for Goebbels, 1,000 radios and no microphone. (p. 52). The definition of a German Christmas goose: Fat as Goering, cackling like Goebbels, plucked like the German people, and brown like the party. (p. 76). WAR-RELATED JOKES As the war began to turn against Germany, some of the jokes alluded to this fact. For example: What does life in Berlin look like? The Germans rule the cellars, the foreigners rule the streets, and the British rule the air. (p. 81). THE POLISH EXPERIENCE

A number of the jokes included in this book were by peoples who had been conquered and occupied by Germany or the USSR. Examples: "There's a German living in my house." "Hush. If Hitler hears about it, he'll annex the whole district." (p. 88). A German asks a Pole, "You Poles don't

want us Germans to stay here in Poland forever?" "Why not? You are very welcome...six feet under the earth." (p. 110). Two ghosts meet in the Soviet Union in 1945. "Where did you die?" the first one asks. "1941, in Stalingrad, and you?" "1943, on a collective farm." A third apparition enters. "Where did you die?" the first two ask. "I'm not a ghost," the third forms answers. "I just came from a Russian gulag." (p. 75). THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE

Part of this book is about Jewish humor. Author Steve Lipman points out that the Jewish element was very strongly represented in pre-WWII European cabaret. (p. 118). Here are some examples of jokes told by Jews, as described by the author: Humor was a popular pastime in the Warsaw Ghetto, largest of the voluntary enclaves. "Nalewski Street looks like Hollywood nowadays" it was said there. "Wherever you go you see a star." Jews in the ghetto were required to wear an armband bearing the sixpointed Star of David. (p. 147). Elie Wiesel's classic NIGHT contained a sardonic passage... "I've got more faith in Hitler than anyone else. He's the only one who's kept his promises to the Jewish people." (p. 151).