

# Tales of Favicons and Caches: Persistent Tracking in Modern Browsers

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
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
# What is a Favicon?

- Introduced in Internet Explorer 5, 1999
  - "Favorite website icon" → Favicon
  - Small icon associated with a webpage
- Different icon formats
- Supported by all browsers and devices
- Part of websites' branding identity



# Favicon Storage & Cache

- Automatically requested and fetched
- **Dedicated Favicon Cache**
  1. Page URL
  2. Favicon ID
  3. Expiration Time (TTL)
  4. Dimensions



```
<!doctype html>

<html lang="en">
<head>
  <meta charset="utf-8">

  <title>Test </title>
  <link rel='shortcut icon' type='image/x-icon' href='/favicon.ico' />

  <link rel="stylesheet" href="css/styles.css?v=1.0">
</head>
```

# Favicon Cache Policies

ID	Page URL	Favicon ID	TTL	Dimensions	Size
1	foo.com	favicon.ico	5000	16x16	120
2	abc.foo.com	icon.png	1000	32x32	240
3	foo.com/path	favicon2.ico	25000	16x16	180

1. Requirements for creating an *entry*
  - I. Favicon not already exists
  - II. Favicon URL is valid
  - III. Icon renders properly

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2. Subdomains and inner paths create different entries



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## 3. Access Control

- Incognito mode can read and not write


# Favicon Supercookie

- Leverage favicons to create **persistent tracking identifier** for user across visits
- Attacker website
  1. Encodes chain of subpaths as a vector : <pathA, pathB, pathC , pathD>
  2. Serves different favicons for each path : <iconA, iconB, iconC, iconD>
  3. Stores browser identifier as favicon cache entries



# Threat Model

Victim visits website and the identifier is automatically stored






# Write Identifier

**Victim  
Browser**

**attacker.com**



# Write Identifier




# Write Identifier




# Write Identifier



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





# Write Identifier




# Write Identifier




# Write Identifier




# Write Identifier




# Write Identifier



# Write Identifier



# Write Identifier





# Read Identifier

**Victim  
Browser**

**attacker.com**




# Read Identifier



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
# Read Identifier




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


# Read Identifier







# Read Identifier




# Read Identifier




# Read Identifier




# Read Identifier




# Read Identifier



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


# Affected Browsers and Modes

	Incognito	Clear Browser Data	Anti-Tracking Extensions	VPN
Chrome	✓	✓	✓	✓
Safari	✓	✓	✓	✓
Edge	✓	✓	✓	✓
Brave	✓	✓	✓	✓




# Baseline Attack Performance



- Write Identifier  $\leq 2.5$  sec
- Read Identifier  $\leq 5.5$  sec
- Average tracker overhead  $\geq 10$  sec [M. Hanson et al., Tech.Rep.18']

➤ **Can we do better?**

# Baseline Attack Performance




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➤ **Can we do better?**

# Optimization: Fingerprints and Favicons

- Browser attributes that are immutable over time [Vastel et al., S&P 18']
  - Cookies Enabled, Local Storage, DNT, Ad Block, Platform, Encoding, Language, WebGL, Canvas
- Browser Fingerprint dataset `amiunique.org` [Lapperdrix et al., S&P 16']
  - Calculated Fingerprint Entropy of the available attributes

# Optimization: Fingerprints and Favicons



- Lower: **16 bits**
- Higher: **26 bits**
- 50% desktop devices: **19-24 bits**

➤ **Combine Browser Fingerprint with Favicon Identifier**

# Optimization: Fingerprints and Favicons

- Fingerprint generation overhead  $\leq$  **200 ms**
  - Cookies, Local Storage, DNT  $\leq$  2 ms
  - Canvas, WebGL  $\leq$  100 ms
- Reconstruct 32-bit ID with less redirections
  - **20 bits** Browser FP + **12 bits** Favicon ID  $\approx$  **2 sec**
- Anti-Fingerprint tools
  - Randomize WebGL- Canvas: **18 bits**
  - Brave defense: **12 bits**  $\rightarrow$  Full ID reconstruct  $\approx$  **3 sec**

# Network Effects

- Web server and client located in the same city
    - **27%** faster ID Generation
    - **35%** decreased read-ID time
  - **Optimal** attack time with redirection overhead
    - Write  $\approx$  **1.5 sec** – Read  $\approx$  **3 sec**
- Large-Scale attack: dedicated CDNs and servers across locations

# Proposed Countermeasures

1. Incognito mode should use an isolated cache instance
2. Default “Clear browsing data” should also clear Favicon Cache

- Notified vulnerable browsers
  - Confirmed and acknowledged
  - Brave deployed countermeasure



# Summary

- Demonstrated novel persistent favicon tracking technique
  - Breaks incognito mode
  - Robust against anti-tracking defenses
  - Long-term identifier
- Browser FPs a powerful optimization mechanism for augmenting other tracking vectors
- Extensive experimental evaluation under different network/device/browser conditions
- Mitigation needs redesign of policies and browser architecture. Remediation under way.



# Thank you!

Feel free to reach out with any questions:

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