

## LAB: Environment Variables and Set-UID Programs

\*\*\*\*\*

Lab Files: myprintenv.c, myenv.c, system\_env.c, setuid\_env.c  
mys.c, ls.c, catall.c, cap\_leak.c

### Task 1: Manipulating Environment Variables and Shell Variables

=====

#### #### Printing environment variables

```
$ printenv
```

```
$ printenv PWD
```

```
$ printenv | grep PWD
```

```
$ env
```

```
$ env | grep PWD
```

#### #### Printing shell variables

```
$ set
```

```
$ set | grep PWD
```

#### #### Accessing value of any shell or environment variable

```
$ echo $PWD
```

#### #### Creating shell variables

```
$ VAR1='Hello World!'
```

```
$ echo $VAR1
```

```
$ set | grep VAR1
```

```
$ VAR2='Bye World!'
```

```
$ echo $VAR2
```

```
$ set | grep VAR2
```

#### #### Creating environment variables

```
$ printenv VAR1          # no output displayed; VAR1 is not an environment variable yet
```

```
$ export VAR1            # turns it into an environment variable
```

```
$ printenv VAR1          # should display the value of VAR1
```

```
$ export | grep VAR1     # should display the value of VAR1
```

#### #### Demoting and unsetting variables

```
$ export -n VAR1         # change it back into a shell variable
```

```
$ printenv VAR1          # no output displayed
```

```
$ export | grep VAR1     # no output displayed
```

```
$ unset VAR1             # unsetting shell or environment variables
```

```
$ unset VAR2
```

```
$ echo $VAR1
```

```
$ echo $VAR2
```

### Task 2: Passing Environment Variables from Parent Process to Child Process

=====

file: myprintenv.c

- Uncomment call to `printenv()` for "child process code"
- Comment out call to `printenv()` for "parent process code"
- Compile and run the program using the commands below

```
$ gcc myprintenv.c -o myprintenv
$ ./myprintenv > child
$ ls -l child      # verify file is created
```

- Comment out call to `printenv()` for "child process code"
- Uncomment call to `printenv()` for "parent process code"
- Compile and run the program using the commands below

```
$ gcc myprintenv.c -o myprintenv
$ ./myprintenv > parent
$ ls -l parent
```

Compare the two output files using the "diff" command to check if the parent's environment variables are inherited by the child process or not.

```
$ diff parent child      # there should be no difference between the two files
```

### Task 3: Environment Variables and `execve()`

=====

file: `myenv.c`

#### First Run:

Uncomment the first `execve()` statement and comment out the remaining two `execve()` statements in the code.

Compile and run the program using the commands below.

```
$ gcc myenv.c -o myenv
$ ./myenv
```

The program should not produce any output.

#### Second Run:

Uncomment the second `execve()` statement and comment out the remaining two `execve()` statements in the code.

Compile and run the program using the commands below.

```
$ gcc myenv.c -o myenv
$ ./myenv
```

The program should output a list of environment variables and their values.

#### Third Run:

Uncomment the third `execve()` statement and comment out the remaining two `execve()` statements in the code.

Compile and run the program using the commands below.

```
$ gcc myenv.c -o myenv
$ ./myenv
```

The program should output only two environment variables - AAA and BBB

### Task 4: Environment Variables and `system()`

=====

file: `system_env.c`

Note: `system(command)` actually executes `"/bin/sh -c command"`

```
$ gcc system_env.c -o system_env
```

```
$ ./system_env
```

The program should output a list of environment variables and their values.

#### Task 5: Environment Variables and Set-UID Programs

file: setuid\_env.c

Compile setuidenv.c and make the executable a root owned set-uid program

```
$ gcc -o setuid_env setuid_env.c
$ sudo chown root setuid_env
$ sudo chmod 4755 setuid_env
```

Let's modify (and/or create) the following environment variables and export them.

```
PATH
LD_LIBRARY_PATH
MY_NAME
```

```
$ OLD_PATH=$PATH
$ export PATH=$PWD:$PATH
$ echo $PATH

$ OLD_LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
$ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$PWD:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
$ echo $LD_LIBRARY_PATH
```

```
$ export MY_NAME='John Doe'
```

```
$ ./setuid_env > setuid_env_result
```

```
$ env > env_result
```

Note that the program setuid\_env.c (a set-uid process) will not inherit the the environment variable LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH (as shown below):

```
$ cat setuid_env_result | grep LD_LIBRARY_PATH      # should be no output
$ cat env_result | grep LD_LIBRARY_PATH              # should output one line
$ cat setuid_env_result | grep MY_NAME              # MY_NAME=John Doe
$ cat env_result | grep MY_NAME                    # MY_NAME=John Doe
$ cat setuid_env_result | grep ^PATH                # PATH=...
$ cat env_result | grep ^PATH                      # PATH=...
```

IMPORTANT: revert changes to PATH and LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH environment variables

```
$ PATH=$OLD_PATH
$ LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$OLD_LD_LIBRARY_PATH
```

#### Task 6: The PATH Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs

files: myls.c and ls.c

Compile myls.c and make the executable a root owned set-uid program

```
$ gcc -o myls myls.c
$ sudo chown root myls
$ sudo chmod 4755 myls
$ ls -l myls      # myls should appear with red background with "s" bit
$ ./mysls         # should see the listing of current directory
```

```
$ gcc -o ls ls.c
$ ./ls
```

Should produce three line of output as shown below:

```
You are running my ls program!!
My real uid is: 1000
My effective uid is: 1000
```

Let's modify PATH environment variable as follows:

```
$ OLD_PATH=$PATH
$ export PATH=$PWD:$PATH
```

```
$ ./mysls          // runs ls program in the current directory in non-privileged mode
```

system("ls") call in myls.c executes /bin/sh program first, and then asks this shell program to run the "ls" command. In Ubuntu 20.04 (and several earlier versions), /bin/sh is actually a symbolic link to /bin/dash. The dash shell program has a countermeasure that prevents itself from being executed in a Set-UID process. The shell program /bin/zsh does not have such a countermeasure.

Switch the default shell from /bin/dash to /bin/zsh:

```
$ sudo ln -sf /bin/zsh /bin/sh
```

```
$ ./mysls          // now runs ls program with root privilege with the following output
                  // notice the effective uid is now 0
```

```
You are running my ls program!!
My real uid is: 1000
My effective uid is: 0
```

IMPORTANT: Let's revert the changes made using the commands below

```
$ sudo ln -sf /bin/dash /bin/sh
$ PATH=$OLD_PATH
```

#### Task 7: The LD\_PRELOAD Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs

!!!! SKIPPING THIS TASK !!!!!

#### Task 8: Invoking External Programs Using system() versus execve()

file: catall.c

Uncomment "system(command)" statement and comment out "execve(v[0], v, NULL)" statement. Compile and make it a root-owned set-uid program

```
$ gcc catall.c -o catall
$ sudo chown root catall
$ sudo chmod 4755 catall
```

Make two new files: "seedfile" owned by seed user and "rootfile" owned by root user

```
$ echo "This file is owned by seed user" > seedfile
$ cat seedfile
```

```
$ echo "This file is owned by root user" > rootfile
$ cat rootfile
$ sudo chown root rootfile
```

```
$ ./catall "seedfile;rm rootfile"
```

```
$ ls          # rootfile is removed
```

Comment out "system(command)" statement and uncomment "execve(v[0], v, NULL)" statement.  
Compile and make it a root-owned set-uid program

```
$ gcc catall.c -o catall
$ sudo chown root catall
$ sudo chmod 4755 catall

$ echo "This file is owned by root user" > rootfile
$ sudo chown root rootfile

$ ./catall "seedfile;rm rootfile"    # should generate an error
```

#### Task 9: Capability Leaking

=====

files: cap\_leak.c

Create the file /etc/zzz:

```
$ ls -ld /etc                # check directory permissions
$ sudo touch /etc/zzz
$ cat /etc/zzz               # empty file is created
$ echo aaaaaaa > /etc/zzz    # /etc/zzz: permission denied
```

Compile cap\_leak.c and make the executable a root-owned set-uid program

```
$ gcc cap_leak.c -o cap_leak
$ sudo chown root cap_leak
$ sudo chmod 4755 cap_leak
$ ls -l cap_leak

$ ./cap_leak
fd is 3
$ echo aaaaaaa > /etc/zzz      ; permission denied
$ echo aaaaaaa >& 3
$ cat /etc/zzz
aaaaaaa
$ exit
```

Note: To mitigate capability leaking, the file descriptor should also be closed along with downgrading the privileges.