Davy Perlman

Professor Vandiver

WRI 144: Rebellion and Recognition

May 10, 2013

Dear Prof. Vandiver,

In this revision, I made my thesis more multifaceted to better address the motive I pose in my introduction. The internal motive of this paper is that South Africa under apartheid had all the right conditions for a violent civil war, but instead it peacefully transitioned to nonracial democracy, and continues to remain stable 20 years out. In order to address this motive, I bring in a scholar who shows the link between peace and stability, so I first argue that it was peaceful because of its emphasis on stability. In essence, my motive asks “Why was South Africa’s power transition peaceful?” I then answer that it was peaceful because it was stable, leading to the question of “Why was it stable?” I brought in the ideas of other scholars to establish the scholarly ballroom in which I am arguing. I bring in people who give all the credit of stability to Mandela’s leadership, as well as people who give all the credit to the culture of forgiveness established by the southern African philosophy of Ubuntu. I refine the two, saying that only the two together were able to make South Africa’s transition stable, and therefore peaceful and lasting, and I demonstrate this by showing the effectiveness of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I argue that the TRC is heavily influenced by both Mandela’s moral righteousness and the culture of Ubuntu, so the success of the TRC was therefore dependent on both Mandela and Ubuntu.

In our conference, we talked about adding that the anti-apartheid movement was successful because it was just. While I agree that this is a very compelling argument, I decided against putting it into my revision because I felt that judging something as “just” would be subjective, and therefore less compelling. I say this because there were groups that felt that the TRC was not just, in that it attacked whites too much, while others felt it was not just, in that it did not do enough to fix the structural problems of apartheid.

I focused on expanding on my explanation of Mandela’s leadership through his moral capital by showing how he gained the trust of both black South Africans, through his prison time, and white South Africans, through his denunciation of more radical anti-apartheid factions in South Africa. I felt that this refined analysis of Mandela’s moral capital made the link to stability more clear than my draft did.

I also revised my analysis of the TRC to more clearly show how both Ubuntu and Mandela first influenced it, and then how because of that influence it was able to increase the stability of the transition.

In regards to structure, I added in section headings, which I felt made it both easier to write and easier to follow as a reader. I’m satisfied with the new structure of this paper, as I feel it more clearly lays out the argument in a logical manner.

If allowed to further revise, I expand on the link between peace and stability. While I address it in a paragraph after I set up the internal motive, if I were able to further elaborate, I feel like I could make the connection between my internal motive and thesis even stronger.

Overall, I felt that this draft was a big improvement from my last, and I am happy with my work. While reading, I will ask reader to watch my stitching and topic sentences to ensure that I make my argument as clearly as I can.

Best,

Davy Perlman

**The Symbiotic Role of Nelson Mandela and Ubuntu in Creating**

**Lasting Peace in South Africa**

Much of the decolonization of the twentieth century has been defined by violence. Influenced by the rhetoric of revolutionaries Karl Marx and Frantz Fanon, colonies across the globe took up arms in the name of self-determination. However, after years of bottled up anger and resentment of colonial rule and inequality, violence in the name of independence often metamorphosed into violence in the name of revenge, casting fledgling nations back into chaos and poverty. In Zimbabwe, violence against Ian Smith’s white minority government descended into civil war between competing factions. Congo’s transition to democracy in 1960 led to the almost immediate execution of then Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Rwanda’s tribal conflicts, exacerbated by colonial rule, ultimately resulted in the genocide of nearly one million Tutsi Rwandans. Given the precedence of violence as a means of relinquishing colonial rule in Africa and settling disputes with rival tribes, South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s appeared to have the right conditions for bloodshed. South Africa under apartheid rule shared many properties that had led to violence in its neighboring countries. Under apartheid, officially established in 1948 by the Dutch descendant Afrikaners, “hundreds of apartheid laws were put on the statue books to control and disadvantage Black South Africans from the cradle to the grave”[[1]](#footnote-1). Blacks under apartheid were not granted basic rights, such as the right to vote, to receive equal education or career opportunities as their white counterparts, or even to live in cities. Furthermore, the historic “rivalry between the Xhosa and Zulu [was] encouraged by the White regime to show the world that Blacks were not ready to rule South Africa”[[2]](#footnote-2). The conditions for resentment and anger, the precursors to violence, were so prevalent that “many commentators in South Africa and elsewhere, especially in the West, feared an unprecedented bloodbath in that country, especially if the black population were to take over the reign of power”[[3]](#footnote-3). South Africa, however, did not fall into chaos; it instead peacefully transitioned from white-minority rule to lasting nonracial democracy.

Before we address the issue of the causes of South Africa’s unique political transformation, we must properly establish the relationship between peace and stability. According to scholar on sustainable development Jon Barnett, “the problems of economic development and prosperity, social order and liberty, and international relations and war are…closely interdependent”[[4]](#footnote-4). Because Barnett defines peace as “the absence of war,”[[5]](#footnote-5) peace is correlated with economic and social development. Intuitively, this is agreeable, because as the distribution of economic and social opportunities develops and becomes more equitable, the public as a whole has less desire for radical change, as they become satisfied with the status quo. Using the direct correlation between peace and stability I have outlined, I will argue that South Africa’s peaceful political transition is derived from its emphasis on future stability.

The source of this stability, however, is a much-debated topic among scholars. While many factors contributed to South Africa’s enduring political change, for the sake of this essay, I will focus on two arguments. The first, articulated by South African journalist Mark Gevisser and supported by Nelson Mandela’s biographer, Anthony Sampson, is that Mandela, “having negotiated apartheid out of power…navigated South Africa through its transition to democracy”[[6]](#footnote-6). Mandela was able to use his moral capital[[7]](#footnote-7) to lead the nation from racial oligarchy to nonracial democracy. Gevisser, however, fails to take the culture and historical traditions of South Africa into account when he ascribes the success solely to Mandela, as it is ultimately the people, not the government, who determine a nation’s stability. Tim Murithi, Head of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, argues the opposite extreme, claiming that it was “the cultural values and attitudes held by South Africans that enabled a spirit of forgiveness and a willingness to move beyond the legacy of the apartheid state”[[8]](#footnote-8). This culture of forgiveness is derived from the southern African philosophy of Ubuntu, which emphasizes the humaneness of all men. While both scholars are indeed correct arguing the importance of Mandela and Ubuntu, respectively, in South Africa’s stable political transition, their arguments alone fail to adequately address the issue. In this essay, I will argue that it is in fact the combination of South Africa’s culture of Ubuntu with Nelson Mandela’s extensive moral capital, and their influence in creating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, that allowed for a peaceful transition and enduring political change in South Africa.

In order to investigate the causes of South Africa’s peaceful revolution, we must first establish the pillars of the southern African philosophy of Ubuntu. However, as we do so, we will see that Ubuntu’s emphasis on reconciliation is transnational, and therefore cannot alone explain South Africa’s unique success. In order to explain the South African phenomenon, we must look to the actions and rhetoric of Nelson Mandela where we will see that his leadership, combined with the culture established by Ubuntu, created the apt conditions for a peaceful revolution. His vast moral capital increased his legitimacy with both the South African public and while negotiating with the apartheid government. After establishing the roles of Ubuntu and Mandela in South Africa’s transition, we will see how the synthesis of their ideas was the basis for South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is arguably the world’s most effect truth commission to date[[9]](#footnote-9). In evaluating the Commission, we will see that while it was far from a perfect institution, it laid the foundation for national reconciliation, and by extension, stability and peace. Finally, after showing how South Africa peacefully transitioned to democracy with the aid of Ubuntu and Mandela’s moral capital, we can refine the established Western definition of revolution to be more inclusive of peaceful transitions of power.

**The Role of Ubuntu in South Africa’s Peaceful Revolution**

The southern Africa philosophy of Ubuntu and the tradition of reconciliation that it fostered made reconciliation with past abuses possible. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, while defining Ubuntu, explains that it is “the very essence of being human…[If someone has Ubuntu,] this means they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. They share what they have. It also means that my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up in theirs”[[10]](#footnote-10). Ubuntu is the intrinsic human decency that acts as a connection between all men. When applied to the reconciliation process, Ubuntu advocates “the principles of reciprocity, inclusivity and a sense of share destiny between different peoples”[[11]](#footnote-11). Because each man is connected to every other man through Ubuntu, his well-being is intertwined with the well-being of his peers, so only through empathy and forgiveness can the victim and perpetrator resolve conflicts. In fact, according to Tim Murithi, Head of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, this method of conflict resolution has its roots in the Xhosa culture. Influenced strongly by Ubuntu, the Xhosa society created inkundla/legotka forums to allow for community involvement in the conflict resolution process. Because tension between two people or groups hurts the whole community, it is the responsibility of the whole community to mediate conflicts and seek their resolutions. In Xhosa society, reconciliation was a multistep process, involving acknowledgement of responsibility, a demonstration of remorse, a request for forgiveness, reparations for harm done, and finally, reconciliation[[12]](#footnote-12). Studies analyzing the efficacy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission[[13]](#footnote-13), an organization with similar goals and processes as the inkundla/legotka forums, show that Black South Africans were overwhelmingly more likely to respond positively to the Commission than their white counterparts. The tradition of Ubuntu and history of reconciliation in southern African indigenous societies helps to explain this discrepancy between races, as Black South Africans were more familiar with restorative justice practices instead of the traditionally Western practice of punitive justice. However, Ubuntu alone is unable to explain the peaceful revolution witnessed in South Africa, because the philosophy, in various forms, transcended national boundaries. Ubuntu is derived from the ethnic Bantus, whose influence expands to violence-stricken nations such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Ubuntu and its emphasis on reconciliation, while a crucial factor in ameliorating resentment and ensuring post-transition stability, is unable to fully explain South Africa’s revolution.

**Nelson Mandela’s Acquisition and Use of Moral Capital**

While the philosophy of Ubuntu laid the foundation for reconciliation and future stability, growth towards a truly unified South Africa was only made possible through Nelson Mandela’s leadership. While the public sentiment existed, it still needed to be harnessed, as “without a trustworthy leader, mere empathy alone cannot take any society closer to understanding and reconciliation”[[14]](#footnote-14). In order to gain the trust of the public and the international community, a leader “must…establish a moral grounding,”[[15]](#footnote-15) or commit themselves to goals or purposes greater than just increasing their own authority. Nelson Mandela firmly established this moral grounding with both white and black South Africans, and therefore was able to effectively relieve racial tensions and lead South Africa’s transition to stable democracy.

Mandela’s exemplary actions increased his moral capital with South Africans fighting to end apartheid. As a young man, Mandela showed his commitment to ending apartheid by helping to establish the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the movement’s militant wing. While not a proponent of violence, Mandela argued that the “ANC had been forced onto this road by the violence and repression of the government that made any other means of resistance impossible”[[16]](#footnote-16). By supporting a violent agenda, Mandela appealed to the increasingly frustrated and militant black population. However, while a leader of the African National Congress before his arrest in 1962, it was his imprisonment that truly made him “the exemplary martyr to his cause”[[17]](#footnote-17). Mandela proved his commitment to ending apartheid by spending 27 years in prison. He was even offered conditional releases, but refused, claiming he (and by extension the Black South Africans he represented) could not negotiate as a captive. With the help Oliver Tambo and the ANC leadership-in-exile, Mandela’s imprisonment was heavily publicized and personalized so that upon his release, Mandela had acquired vast amounts of political capital with Black South Africans, and was able to seamlessly lead of the anti-apartheid movement.

In advocating reconciliation, Mandela effectively gained moral capital with the white apartheid government as well, allowing for a negotiated peace. Because the transition was the result of political compromise, Mandela needed support, or at least trust, from both sides in order to successfully reach an agreement. In advocating reconciliation over retribution, Mandela assured the white minority that they would not become victims of violent revenge. When leading, moral grounding is crucial, as “the perceived character [of the leader]…is a significant factor in the way they are appraised or dealt with, not only by supporters and followers, but even by political opponents”[[18]](#footnote-18). In showing himself as a man who “emphasized tolerance, [had] a magnanimous spirit, [and] a willingness to look constructively forward rather than vindictively backward,”[[19]](#footnote-19) Mandela demonstrated that he would focus on future stability as opposed to past injustice, proving his character to skeptical white South Africans. And his focus on multiracial democracy rejected the “Africa for black Africans” mantra supported by the Pan Africanist Congress. His rejection of more radical and racially retributive groups further demonstrated to the apartheid government his commitment to peace instead of revenge. Negotiation depends on trust, and because of his massive accumulation of moral capital, even among his opponents, Mandela was effectively able to negotiate with President De Klerk the end of apartheid.

Mandela continued to use his moral capital to advocate stability even after he successfully negotiated the end of apartheid with De Klerk. After a white supremacist’s assassination of Chris Hani, the leader of the South African Communist Party and chief of staff of the ANC’s militant wing, South Africa had the potential to collapse into a state of chaos[[20]](#footnote-20). The crime was clearly racially motivated, and brought back memories of apartheid era abuses. White South Africans, in condemning the murder, implicitly condemned their own past compliance with apartheid. The anger among blacks, mixed with the shame that the murder evoked among whites, had the potential to act as an impetus for racially motivated crimes and retaliation. Mandela, however, in addressing the nation, channeled his moral capital through his rhetoric and pushed for solidarity among all South Africans. Rather than capitalizing on the racial tensions that Hani’s death evoked to further the Black South African agenda, Mandela emphasized that every South African had the right to mourn the death of a fellow human being, and that while a white man, “full of prejudice and hate”[[21]](#footnote-21) had committed the murder, it was an Afrikaner woman who risked her life to inform and bring him to justice. In making the crime not based on race, but instead on hate, Mandela successfully used his moral capital to stabilize an extremely volatile situation and keep South Africa on the road of stability through racial reconciliation.

**The Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Synthesis of**

**Ubuntu and Mandela’s Moral Capital**

Restorative justice, the basis for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), has its roots in Ubuntu traditions. In its report detailing its concepts and principles, the TRC “seeks to redefine crime: it shifts the primary focus of crime from the breaking of laws or offences against a faceless state to a perception of crime as violations against human beings, as injury or wrong done to another person”[[22]](#footnote-22). The emphasis on ameliorating human suffering, as opposed to criminal prosecution, speaks strongly to the philosophy of Ubuntu, which is “generally translated as ‘humaneness’”[[23]](#footnote-23). The TRC’s emphasis on restorative justice has its roots in the inkundla/lekgotla forums of the Ubuntu-minded Xhosa society. In Xhosa society, the forum “was communal in character in the sense that the entire society was involved at various levels in trying to find a solution to a problem which was viewed as a threat to the social cohesion of the community”[[24]](#footnote-24). The goal of the inkundla/lekgotla forums was not to punish the perpetrators of crimes, but to restore the unity of the community that the crime divided. Similarly, the TRC attempted to unify South Africa after artificial racial barriers had segregated the population for centuries. Even the basic tasks assigned to the TRC––prosecution, reparations, reconciliation and reintegration­­­[[25]](#footnote-25)––are linked to the inkundla/lekgotla forums. The very concept of the TRC, with its heavy influence on human dignity, would not have been possible without the historical tradition of Ubuntu.

The TRC was also the product of political compromise, which, as I have argued, was only possible because of Mandela’s successful use of his moral capital. At the time of Mandela’s negotiations with De Klerk and the apartheid government, South Africa’s transition was stuck in what Mandela describes as an “irresolvable stalemate”[[26]](#footnote-26). The nation was suffering from global economic sanctions and ostracization, sending their economy into free fall. The only condition for relaxation of such sanctions, however, was to end the policy of apartheid, which whites feared would lead to large-scale revenge against the white community. Mandela, seeing that waiting for unconditional democratic elections would hardly resolve the nation’s gridlock, agreed to a compromise with the white apartheid leaders. In exchange for democratic elections, Mandela and the ANC agreed to grant amnesty for politically motivated crimes[[27]](#footnote-27). However, granting blanket amnesty would fail to provide the appropriate closure and unveil the truth of apartheid era human rights abuses. Instead, in the name of compromise, the TRC was created to uncover the truth, allowing victims to come to terms with the past, while forcing perpetrators to either admit wrongdoing and face the shame of doing so, or risk prosecution for their past actions. While certainly not the Nuremberg-like trials that many thought apartheid-era leaders deserved, it was the only possible way to resolve South Africa’s inaction with regards to apartheid. The TRC, in conditionally granting amnesty for perpetrators while still focusing on the needs of the victims, was in effect a compromise only made possible through Mandela’s use of moral capital.

**The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Role in National Reconciliation**

Because of the nature of compromise, the evaluation of the TRC is mixed, with some claiming it to be successful, while others say it failed to adequately address the problems created by apartheid. Elizabeth Stanley of the Centre for Studies in Crime and Social Justice at Edge Hill University, in her evaluation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, claims that the TRC failed to “sufficiently challenge the structural inequalities which contextualized apartheid policies…[because] many areas…remain characterized by poverty, lack of good housing, poor education, limited health services and unemployment”[[28]](#footnote-28). Stanley continues that because of the TRC’s emphasis on human decency, perpetrators receive amnesty in exchange for a half-truth, as there is little incentive to fully admit to wrongdoing[[29]](#footnote-29). Furthermore, victims of human rights violations did not receive reparations for being wronged immediately, while perpetrators received instant amnesty, cultivating the sense that the TRC “opened old wounds without proper support for healing”[[30]](#footnote-30). Many victims of abuse were not given enough support, and were therefore individually unable to reconcile with their past. However, while Stanley’s critique of the TRC is valid, and the concerns she raises are certainly applicable, she misevaluates the scale on which the TRC was attempting to achieve reconciliation.

The TRC was established, contrary to Stanley’s perception, to pursue national reconciliation, not individual reconciliation. Because reconciliation with those who have directly caused pain and suffering is a personal issue and requires that individuals come to terms with the past, the TRC “cannot command reconciliation”[[31]](#footnote-31). Instead, it was “designed to conduct hearings with [a] social and judicial focus” as opposed to a “psychological and personal focus”[[32]](#footnote-32). While the personal focus may have aided individual reconciliation, the focus of reconciliation on a larger scale allowed the nation as a whole to reconcile with its past. The TRC special reports were aired weekly on the television and radio, making the suffering of thousands of victims well known to the South African public. Furthermore, it “did not engage in a ‘witch-hunt’”[[33]](#footnote-33) of the white population, but instead acknowledged that all parties had committed atrocities. The TRC’s unbiased approach increased its legitimacy, and educated both blacks and whites about the atrocities that their own party had committed. The promulgation of the truth of past abuses was perhaps the TRC’s most important role, because “once one concedes that the other side has legitimate grievances, it becomes easier to accept some of its claims and, ultimately, to affirm the new political dispensation”[[34]](#footnote-34). By establishing the truth, the TRC showed that the blame for past grievances was shared between the apartheid government and the groups fighting against it. While such blame may not have been shared equally, it set the foundation for empathy and ultimately reconciliation. Through Ubuntu’s emphasis on human decency and Mandela’s strong moral grounding, the TRC successfully set the foundation for national reconciliation, alleviating the need for violence and stabilizing South Africa’s political transition.

**A New Kind of Revolution**

South Africa created a new type of revolution. Mandela’s focus on restorative justice through Ubuntu gave it a means of establishing meaningful change without the violent stigma often associated with revolution. Revolutions, according to sociologist Jack Goldstone, are “rapid changes in the institutions of government, carried out by non-institutional means”[[35]](#footnote-35). Sociologist Misagh Parsa adds that they are “characterized by the forcible transfer of state power”[[36]](#footnote-36). While South Africa’s transition of power partially fits Goldstone’s definition of revolution, in that the process occurred quickly, it is fundamentally different than the Western conception of revolution, epitomized by the violent and bloody French and Russian Revolutions. Instead, South Africa’s reliance on Ubuntu allowed for a negotiated revolution based on mutual trust, where the transfer of power fundamentally changed the political and social structure of the nation, but through institutional means and without the forcible transfer of power that Goldstone and Parsa claim to be necessary. South Africa’s ability to peacefully reconcile with its violent past allows for a redefinition of revolution, where empathy, rather than violence, is the keystone to success.

**Bibliography**

Axelrod, Ruth H, "Truth and Reconciliation." In *Political and Civic Leadership: A Reference Handbook*, edited by Richard A. Couto, 375-81. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010.

Barnett, Jon, “Peace and Development: Towards a New Synthesis,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 45, January 2008: 75-89.

Doxtader, Erik and Phillipe-Joseph Salazar, comp., *Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa: The Fundamental Documents,* Institute for Justice and Reconciliation: 2007.

Eze, Chielozona, “Nelson Mandela and the Politics of Empathy,” *African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review,* Vol. 2, Spring 2012: 122-135.

Gevisser, Mark, “Strange Bedfellows: Mandela, De Klerk, and the New South Africa,” review of *Mandela: The Authorized Biography* by Anthony Sampson, and *The Last Trek: A New Beginning: An Autobiography* by F. W. De Klerk. *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 79, Jan.-Feb. 2000: 173-179.

Gibson, James, “The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50, June 2006: 409-432.

Kane, John, *The Politics of Moral Capital*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Murithi, Tim, “An African Perspective on Peace Education: Ubuntu Lessons in Reconciliation,” *International Review of Education,* Vol. 55, May 2009: 221-233.

Stanley, Elizabeth, “Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol. 39, September 2001: 525-546.

Vora, Jay A. and Erika Vora, “The Effectiveness of Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner and English South Africans,” *Journal of Black Studies,* Vol. 34, January 2004: 301-322.

1. In this essay, this and all subsequent citations of Jay and Erika Vora will come from Jay A. and Erika Vora. “The Effectiveness of Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner and English South Africans,” *Journal of Black Studies,* Vol. 34 January 2004: 304. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Ibid., 303. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. In this essay, this and all subsequent citations of Chielozona Eze will come from Eze, Chielozona, “Nelson Mandela and the Politics of Empathy,” *African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review* Vol. 2, (Spring 2012): 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Jon Barnett, “Peace and Development: Towards a New Synthesis,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 45, January 2008: 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid., 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Mark Gevisser, “Strange Bedfellows: Mandela, De Klerk, and the New South Africa,” review of *Mandela: The Authorized Biography* by Anthony Sampson, and *The Last Trek: A New Beginning: An Autobiography* by F. W. De Klerk. *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 79, Jan.-Feb. 2000: 173-179. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. In *The Politics of Moral Capital*, John Kane argues that because power is the basis of politics, leaders need something to keep them rooted to the people. He calls this moral capital, and “this they do by avowing their service to some set of fundamental values, principles and goals that find a resonant response in significant numbers of people.” This excerpt is taken from Kane, John, *The Politics of Moral Capital*, Cambridge University Press: 2001, 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Tim Murithi, “An African Perspective on Peace Education: Ubuntu Lessons in Reconciliation,” *International Review of Education,* Vol. 55 May 2009: 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Axelrod, Ruth H, "Truth and Reconciliation." In *Political and Civic Leadership: A Reference Handbook*, edited by Richard A. Couto, 375-81. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. This citation of Desmond Tutu is taken from Murithi, Tim, “An African Perspective on Peace Education: Ubuntu Lessons in Reconciliation,” *International Review of Education,* Vol. 55 May 2009: 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Murithi, “An African Perspective on Peace Education: Ubuntu Lessons in Reconciliation,” 227. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Vora and Vora, “The Effectiveness of Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner and English South Africans,” 309. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Eze, “Nelson Mandela and the Politics of Empathy,” 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Kane, *The Politics of Moral Capital,* 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid., 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Ibid., 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid., 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid., 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Eze, “Mandela and the Politics of Empathy,” 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Nelson Mandela in Eze, “Mandela and the Politics of Empathy,” 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. In this essay, all primary source documents from the Truth and Reconciliation Final Report, as well as some primary sources from Mandela, will come from Doxtader, Erik and Phillipe-Joseph Salazar, comp., *Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa: The Fundamental Documents,* Institute for Justice and Reconciliation: 2007. This specific citation is from Doxtader and Salazar, “Concepts and Principles” from the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Murithi, “An African Perspective on Peace Education: Ubuntu Lessons in Reconciliation,” 228. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Axelrod, Ruth H, "Truth and Reconciliation." In *Political and Civic Leadership: A Reference Handbook*, edited by Richard A. Couto, 375-81. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Nelson Mandela in Doxatader and Salazar, “Letter to State President B W Botha,” 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Vora and Vora, “The Effectiveness of Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner and English South Africans,” 302. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Stanley, Elizabeth, “Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol. 39, September 2001: 527. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Ibid., 539. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Vora and Vora, “The Effectiveness of Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner and English South Africans,” 318. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Stanley, “Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” 543. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Vora and Vora, “The Effectiveness of Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner and English South Africans,” 318. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Gibson, James, “The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50, June 2006: 416. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Ibid., 417. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Goldstone, Jack A. "Revolution." In *The SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics*, edited by Todd Landman and Neil Robinson, 319-48. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Parsa, Misagh. "Revolution." In *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, edited by Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Leonardo Morlino, 2313-18. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)