HASH FUNCTIONS

SHA1 is dead ...

BIZ & IT —

At death's door for years, widely used SHA1 function is now dead

Algorithm underpinning Internet security falls to first-known collision attack.

DAN GOODIN - 2/23/2017, 5:01 AM

Rob Enderton

For more than six years, the SHA1 cryptographic hash function underpinning Internet security has been at death's door. Now it's officially dead, thanks to the submission of the first known instance of a fatal exploit known as a "collision."

Hash functions

- MD: MD4, MD5, MD6
- SHA2: SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512
- SHA3: SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512

Their primary purpose is collision-resistant data compression, but they have many other purposes and properties as well ... A hash function is often treated like a magic wand ...

Some uses:

- Certificates: How you know `www.snapchat.com` really is Snapchat
- Bitcoin
- Data authentication with HMAC: TLS, ...

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SHA = "Secure Hash Algorithm" ☺

A SHA1 certificate



SHA1 certificates no longer

May 5, 2016

Microsoft will cease support for TLS certs signed by SHA1

Greg Masters Managing Editor

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

Microsoft browsers will no longer display a lock when on HTTPS sites protected by SHA1 certs.

Microsoft announced it will soon cease support for TLS certificates signed by the SHA1 hashing algorithm, according to ArsTechnica.

After hinting in November that it might, the tech giant made it official last week. The end was expected following new research that revealed the popular cryptographic algorithm was susceptible to collision attacks – in which miscreants attempt to find two inputs producing the same hash value. Should they succeed, they would be able to forge digital signatures.

Implications for Bitcoin?



Who Broke the SHA1 Algorithm (And What Does It Mean for Bitcoin)?

Corin Faife

Feb 25, 2017 at 16:00 UTC • Updated May 19, 2017 at 17:04 UTC

FEATURE

The cryptography world has been buzzing with the news that researchers at Google and CWI Amsterdam have succeeded in successfully generating a 'hash collision' for two different documents using the SHA1 encryption algorithm, rendering the algorithm 'broken' according to cryptographic standards.

But what does this mean in plain language, and what are the implications for the bitcoin network?

Hash collisions

As laid out in a recent CoinDesk explainer, a hash function (of which SHA1 is an example) is used to take a piece of data of any length, process it, and return another piece of data – the 'hash digest' – with a fixed length.

One way that hash functions are used in computing is to check whether the contents of files are identical: as long as a hash function is secure, then two files which hash to the same value will always have the same contents.

However, a hash collision occurs when two different files hash to the same value.

Given the mathematical laws that govern hash functions, it is inevitable that hash collisions will occur for some values of input data (because the range of data you could put into the hash function is potentially infinite, but the output length is fixed).

For a secure hash function, the probability of this should be so small that, in practice, it is not possible to make a sufficient number of calculations to find it.

The significance of the Google/CWI team's results is in the fact that they were able to create a hash collision by finding a much more efficient method – 100,000 times more efficient in fact – than simply guessing every possible value of data.

Collisions

A **collision** for a function $h : D \to \{0,1\}^n$ is a pair $x_1, x_2 \in D$ of points such that

- $h(x_1) = h(x_2)$, and
- $x_1 \neq x_2$.

If $|D| > 2^n$ then the pigeonhole principle tells us that there must exist a collision for h.



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

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

We want that even though collisions exist, **they are hard to find**.

Collision-resistance of a function family

The formalism considers a family $H : \text{Keys} \times D \to R$ of functions, meaning for each $K \in \text{Keys}$ we have a function $H_K : D \to R$ defined by $H_K(x) = H(K, x)$.

Game CR_H	**procedure Finalize**(x_1, x_2)
procedure Initialize	If $(x_1 = x_2)$ then return false
$K \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Keys}$	If $(x_1 \notin D$ or $x_2 \notin D)$ then return false
Return K	Return $(H_K(x_1) = H_K(x_2))$

Let

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_H(A) = \Pr\left[\mathrm{CR}^A_H \Rightarrow \text{true}\right].$$

Collision-resistance

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The Return statement in **Initialize** means that the adversary A gets K as input. The key K here is not secret!

Adversary A takes K and tries to output a collision x_1, x_2 for H_K.

A's output is the input to **Finalize**, and the game returns true if the collision is valid.

Example

Let $N = 2^{256}$ and define

$$H\colon \underbrace{\{1,\ldots,N\}}_{\text{Keys}} \times \underbrace{\{0,1,2,\ldots\}}_{D} \to \underbrace{\{0,1,\ldots,N-1\}}_{R}$$

by

$$H(K,x) = (x \bmod K)\ .$$

Q: Is H collision resistant?

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$$H(K,x) = (x \bmod K)\ .$$

Q: Is H collision resistant?
A: NO!
Why? $(x+K) \bmod K = x \bmod K$

adversary $A(K)$
$x_1 \leftarrow 0$; $x_2 \leftarrow K$; Return x_1, x_2

$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_H(A) = 1$

Example

Let $E\colon \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a blockcipher.
Let $H\colon \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^{2n} \to \{0,1\}^n$ be defined by

Alg $H(K, x[1]x[2])$
$y \leftarrow E_K(E_K(x[1]) \oplus x[2])$; Return y

Let's show that H is not collision-resistant by giving an efficient adversary A such that $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_H(A) = 1$.

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Idea: Pick $x_1 = x_1[1]x_1[2]$ and $x_2 = x_2[1]x_2[2]$ so that

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$$E_K(x_1[1]) \oplus x_1[2] = E_K(x_2[1]) \oplus x_2[2]$$

adversary $A(K)$
$x_1 \leftarrow 0^n 1^n$; $x_2[2] \leftarrow 0^n$; $x_2[1] \leftarrow E_K^{-1}(E_K(x_1[1]) \oplus x_1[2] \oplus x_2[2])$
return x_1, x_2

Then $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_H(A) = 1$ and A is efficient, so H is not CR.

Note how we used the fact that A knows K and the fact that E is a blockcipher!

Exercise

Let E: $\{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^l \to \{0,1\}^l$ be a blockcipher. Let D be the set of all strings whose length is a positive multiple of l.

Define the hash function H: $\{0,1\}^k \times D \to \{0,1\}^l$ as follows:

Alg $H(K, M)$
$M[1]M[2] \ldots M[n] \leftarrow M$
$C[0] \leftarrow 0^l$
For $i = 1, \ldots, n$ do
  $B[i] \leftarrow E(K, C[i-1] \oplus M[i])$; $C[i] \leftarrow E(K, B[i] \oplus M[i])$
Return $C[n]$

Show that H is not CR by giving an efficient adversary A such that $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_H(A) = 1$.

Keyless hash functions

We say that H: Keys $\times D \to R$ is keyless if Keys $= \{\varepsilon\}$ consists of just one key, the empty string.

In this case we write $H(x)$ in place of $H(\varepsilon, x)$ or $H_\varepsilon(x)$.

Practical hash functions like the MD, SHA2 and SHA3 series are keyless.

SHA256

The hash function SHA256: $\{0,1\}^{<2^{64}} \to \{0,1\}^{256}$ is **keyless**, with

- Inputs being strings X of any length strictly less than 2^{64}
- Outputs always having length 256.

Alg SHA256(X) // $|X| < 2^{64}$
$M \leftarrow \mathrm{shapad}(X)$ // $|M| \bmod 512 = 0$
$M^{(1)}M^{(2)} \cdots M^{(n)} \leftarrow M$ // Break M into 512 bit blocks
$H_0^{(0)} \leftarrow$ 6a09e6677 ; $H_1^{(0)} \leftarrow$ bb67ae85 ; $\cdots$; $H_7^{(0)} \leftarrow$ 5be0cd19
$H^{(0)} \leftarrow H_1^{(0)}H_2^{(0)} \cdots H_7^{(0)}$ // $|H_i^{(0)}| = 32$, $|H^{(0)}| = 256$
For $i = 1, \ldots, n$ do $H^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathrm{sha256}(M^{(i)} \,\|\, H^{(i-1)})$
Return $H^{(n)}$

sha256: $\{0,1\}^{512+256} \to \{0,1\}^{256}$ is the **compression function**.

Padding, and initialization vector $H^{(0)}$

Alg shapad(X) // $|X| < 2^{64}$
$d \leftarrow (447 - |X|) \bmod 512$ // Chosen to make $|M|$ a multiple of 512
Let ℓ be the 64-bit binary representation of $|M|$
$M \leftarrow X \,\|\, 1 \,\|\, 0^d \,\|\, \ell$ // $|M|$ is a multiple of 512
return M

The 32-bit word $H_j^{(0)}$ was obtained by taking the first 32 bits of the fractional part of the square root of the j-th prime number ($0 \le j \le 7$).

Compression function sha256

Compression function sha256: $\{0,1\}^{512+256} \to \{0,1\}^{256}$ takes a $512 + 256 = 768$ bit input and returns a 256-bit output.

Alg sha256($x \| v$) // X=512, v=256
$w \leftarrow \mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{sha256}}(x, v)$
$w_0 \cdots w_7 \leftarrow w$ // Break w into 32-bit words
$v_0 \ldots v_7 \leftarrow v$ // Break v into 32-bit words
For $j = 0, \ldots, 7$ do $h_j \leftarrow w_j + v_j$
$h \leftarrow h_0 \ldots h_7$ // $|h| = 256$
Return h

Here and on next slide, "+" denotes addition modulo 2^{32}.

$\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{sha256}}$: $\{0,1\}^{512} \times \{0,1\}^{256} \to \{0,1\}^{256}$ is a **block cipher** with 512-bit keys and 256-bit blocks.

Block cipher $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{sha256}}$

Alg $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{sha256}}(x, v)$ // x is a 512-bit key, v is a 256-bit input
$x_0 \cdots x_{15} \leftarrow x$ // Break x into 32-bit words
For $t = 0, \ldots, 15$ do $W_t \leftarrow x_t$
For $t = 16, \ldots, 63$ do $W_t \leftarrow \sigma_1(W_{t-2}) + W_{t-7} + \sigma_0(W_{t-15}) + W_{t-16}$
$v_0 \cdots v_7 \leftarrow v$ // Break v into 32-bit words
For $j = 0, \ldots, 7$ do $S_j \leftarrow v_j$ // Initialize 256-bit state S
Fot $t = 0, \ldots, 63$ do // 64 rounds
  $T_1 \leftarrow S_7 + \gamma_1(S_4) + Ch(S_4, S_5, S_6) + C_t + W_t$
  $T_2 \leftarrow \gamma_0(S_0) + Maj(S_0, S_1, S_2)$
  $S_7 \leftarrow S_6$; $S_6 \leftarrow S_5$; $S_5 \leftarrow S_4$; $S_4 \leftarrow S_3 + T_1$
  $S_3 \leftarrow S_2$; $S_2 \leftarrow S_1$; $S_1 \leftarrow S_0$; $S_0 \leftarrow T_1 + T_2$
$S \leftarrow S_0 \cdots S_7$
Return S // 256-bit output

Internals of block cipher $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{sha256}}$

On the previous slide:

- $\sigma_0, \sigma_1, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, Ch, Maj$ are functions not detailed here.
- $C_1 = \texttt{428a2f98}$, $C_2 = \texttt{71374491}$, ..., $C_{63} = \texttt{c67178f2}$ are constants, where C_i is the first 32 bits of the fractional part of the cube root of the i-th prime.

SHA256 hash calculator

`http://www.xorbin.com/tools/sha256-hash-calculator`



Usage of hash functions

Uses include hashing the data before signing in creation of certificates, data authentication with HMAC, key-derivation, Bitcoin, ...

These will have to wait, so we illustrate another use, the hashing of passwords.

Authentication via passwords

- Client A has a password PW that is also stored by server B
- A authenticates itself by sending PW to B over a secure channel (TLS)

$$A^{PW} \xrightarrow{\quad PW \quad} B^{PW}$$

Problem: The password will be found by an attacker who compromises the server.

These types of server compromises are common and often in the news: Yahoo, Equifax, ...

Hashed passwords

- Client A has a password PW and server stores $\overline{PW} = H(PW)$.
- A sends PW to B (over a secure channel) and B checks that $H(PW) = \overline{PW}$

$$A^{PW} \xrightarrow{\quad PW \quad} B^{\overline{PW}}$$

Server compromise results in attacker getting $\overline{PW}$ which should not reveal PW as long as H is one-way, which is a consequence of collision-resistance.

But we will revisit this when we consider dictionary attacks!

This is how client authentication is done on the Internet, for example login to `gmail.com`.

Birthday collision-finding attack

Let $H : \{0,1\}^k \times D \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a family of functions with $|D| > 2^n$. The q-trial birthday attack is the following adversary A_q for game CR_H:

adversary $A_q(K)$

for $i = 1, \ldots, q$ do $x_i \xleftarrow{\$} D$; $y_i \leftarrow H_K(x_i)$
if $\exists i,j$ $(i \neq j$ and $y_i = y_j$ and $x_i \neq x_j)$ then return x_i, x_j
else return $\perp$

Interestingly, the analysis of this via the birthday problem is not trivial, but it shows that

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_H(A_q) \geq 0.3 \cdot \frac{q(q-1)}{2^n} \ .$$

So a collision can usually be found in about $q = \sqrt{2^n}$ trials.

Birthday attack times

Function	n	T_B
MD4	128	2^{64}
MD5	128	2^{64}
SHA1	160	2^{80}
SHA256	256	2^{128}
SHA512	512	2^{256}
SHA3-256	256	2^{128}
SHA3-512	512	2^{256}

T_B is the number of trials to find collisions via a birthday attack.

Design of hash functions aims to make the birthday attack the best collision-finding attack, meaning it is desired that there be no attack succeeding in time much less than T_B.

Compression functions

A compression function is a family $h : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^{b+n} \to \{0,1\}^n$ of functions whose inputs are of a fixed size $b+n$, where b is called the block size.

E.g. $b = 512$ and $n = 256$, in which case

$$h : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^{768} \to \{0,1\}^{256}$$



The MD transform

Let $h : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^{b+n} \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a compression function with block length b. Let D be the set of all strings of at most $2^b - 1$ blocks.

The **MD transform** builds from h a family of functions

$$H : \{0,1\}^k \times D \to \{0,1\}^n$$

such that: If h is CR, then so is H.

> The problem of hashing long inputs has been reduced to the problem of hashing fixed-length inputs.

There is no need to try to attack H. You won't find a weakness in it unless h has one. That is, H is *guaranteed* to be secure *assuming* h is secure.

For this reason, MD is the design used in many hash functions, including the MD and SHA2 series. SHA3 uses a different paradigm.

MD setup

Given: Compression function $h : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^{b+n} \to \{0,1\}^n$.

Build: Hash function $H : \{0,1\}^k \times D \to \{0,1\}^n$.

Since $M \in D$, its length $\ell = |M|$ is a multiple of the block length b. We let $\|M\|_b = |M|/b$ be the number of b-bit blocks in M, and parse as

$$M[1] \ldots M[\ell] \leftarrow M \; .$$

Let $\langle \ell \rangle$ denote the b-bit binary representation of $\ell \in \{0, \ldots, 2^b - 1\}$.

MD transform

Given: Compression function $h : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^{b+n} \to \{0,1\}^n$.

Build: Hash function $H : \{0,1\}^k \times D \to \{0,1\}^n$.

Algorithm $H_K(M)$
$m \leftarrow \|M\|_b$; $M[m+1] \leftarrow \langle m \rangle$; $V[0] \leftarrow 0^n$
For $i = 1, \ldots, m+1$ do $v[i] \leftarrow h_K(M[i] || V[i-1])$
Return $V[m+1]$



MD preserves CR

Theorem: Let $h : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^{b+n} \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a family of functions and let $H : \{0,1\}^k \times D \to \{0,1\}^n$ be obtained from h via the MD transform. Given a cr-adversary A_H we can build a cr-adversary A_h such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_H(A_H) \leq \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_h(A_h)$$

and the running time of A_h is that of A_H plus the time for computing h on the outputs of A_H.

Implication:

$$\begin{aligned} h \text{ CR} &\Rightarrow \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_h(A_h) \text{ small} \\ &\Rightarrow \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_H(A_H) \text{ small} \\ &\Rightarrow H \text{ CR} \end{aligned}$$

How are compression functions designed?

Let $E : \{0,1\}^b \times \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a block cipher. Let us define keyless compression function $h : \{0,1\}^{b+n} \to \{0,1\}^n$ by

$$h(x \| v) = E_x(v) \; .$$

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$$E_{x_1}(v_1) = E_{x_2}(v_2) \; .$$

Answer: NO, h is NOT collision-resistant, because the following adversary A has $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cr}}_h(A) = 1$:

adversary A

$x_1 \leftarrow 0^b$; $x_2 \leftarrow 1^b$; $v_1 \leftarrow 0^n$; $y \leftarrow E_{x_1}(v_1)$; $v_2 \leftarrow E^{-1}_{x_2}(y)$
Return $x_1\|v_1$, $x_2\|v_2$

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$$h(x\|v) = E_x(v) \oplus v \; .$$

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$$E_{x_1}(v_1) \oplus v_1 = E_{x_2}(v_2) \oplus v_2 \; .$$

Answer: Unclear how to solve this equation, even though we can pick all four variables.

The Davies-Meyer method

Let $E : \{0,1\}^b \times \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a block cipher. Let us define keyless compression function $h : \{0,1\}^{b+n} \to \{0,1\}^n$ by

$$h(x \| v) = E_x(v) \oplus v \ .$$

This is called the Davies-Meyer method and is used in the MD and SHA2 series of hash functions, modulo that the $\oplus$ may be replaced by addition.

In particular the compression function sha256 of SHA256 is underlain in this way by the block cipher $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{sha256}} : \{0,1\}^{512} \times \{0,1\}^{256} \to \{0,1\}^{256}$ that we saw earlier, with the $\oplus$ being replaced by component-wise addition modulo 2^{32}.

Cryptanalytic attacks

So far we have looked at attacks that do not attempt to exploit the structure of h.

Can we get better attacks if we *do* exploit the structure?

Ideally not, but hash functions have fallen short!

Cryptanalytic attacks against hash functions

When	Against	Time	Who
1993,1996	md5	2^{16}	[dBBo,Do]
2004	MD5	1 hour	[WaFeLaYu]
2005,2006	MD5	1 minute	[LeWadW,KI]
2005	SHA1	2^{69}	[WaYiYu]
2017	SHA1	$2^{63.1}$	[SBKAM]

Collisions found in compression function md5 of MD5 did not yield collisions for MD5, but collisions for MD5 are now easy.

`https://shattered.io/`.

2017: Google, Microsoft and Mozilla browsers stop accepting SHA1-based certificates.

The SHA256 and SHA512 hash functions are still viewed as secure, meaning the best known attack is the birthday attack.

SHA1 collision

Here are two PDF files that display different content, yet have the same SHA-1 digest.



Flame exploited an MD5 attack



Crypto breakthrough shows Flame was designed by world-class scientists

The spy malware achieved an attack unlike any cryptographers have seen before.

DAN GOODIN - 6/7/2012, 11:20 AM

Enlarge / An overview of a chosen-prefix collision. A similar technique was used by the Flame espionage malware that targeted Iran. The scientific novelty of the malware underscored the sophistication of malware sponsored by wealthy nation states.

The Flame espionage malware that infected computers in Iran achieved mathematic breakthroughs that could only have been accomplished by world-class cryptographers, two of the world's foremost cryptography experts said.

"We have confirmed that Flame uses a yet unknown MD5 chosen-prefix collision attack," Marc Stevens wrote in an e-mail posted to a cryptography discussion group earlier this week. "The collision attack itself is very interesting from a scientific viewpoint, and there are already some practical implications." Benne de Weger, a Stevens colleague and another expert in cryptographic collision

Flame

Revealed: Stuxnet "beta's" devious alternate attack on Iran nuke program

Massive espionage malware targeting governments undetected for 5 years

Iranian computers targeted by new malicious data wiper program

New in-the-wild malware

Cryptographer job-performance evaluation

Why don't cryptographers build secure hash functions?

Cryptographer job-performance evaluation

Why don't cryptographers build secure hash functions?

Assess their job performance in light of attacks by selecting a grade below:

A – Cryptographers are doing super well
B – They are OK
C – They suck
F – Just fire them all and give the job to AI

Cryptographers' tightrope

Why don't cryptographers build secure hash functions?

Cryptographers' tightrope

Why don't cryptographers build secure hash functions?

Cryptographers seem **perfectly capable** of building secure hash functions.

The difficulty is that they strive for VERY HIGH SPEED.

SHA256 can run at 3.5 cycles/byte (eBACS: 2018 Intel Core i3-8121U, https://bench.cr.yp.to/results-hash.html) or 0.6 ns per byte, and hardware will make it even faster.

It is AMAZING that one gets ANY security at such low cost.

If you allow cryptographers a 10x slowdown, they can up rounds by 10x and designs seem almost impossible to break.

SHA3

National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) held a world-wide competition to develop a new hash function standard.

Contest webpage:
`http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/index.html`

Requested parameters:

- Design: Family of functions with 224, 256, 384, 512 bit output sizes
- Security: CR, one-wayness, near-collision resistance, others...
- Efficiency: as fast or faster than SHA2-256

SHA3

Submissions: 64

Round 1: 51

Round 2: 14: BLAKE, Blue Midnight Wish, CubeHash, ECHO, Fugue, Grostl, Hamsi, JH, Keccak, Luffa, Shabal, SHAvite-3, SIMD, Skein.

Finalists: 5: BLAKE, Grostl, JH, Keccak, Skein.

SHA3: 1: Keccak

SHA3: The Sponge construction



f: $\{0,1\}^{r+c} \to \{0,1\}^{r+c}$ is a (public, invertible!) permutation.
d is the number of output bits, and $c = 2d$.

SHA3 does not use the MD paradigm used by the MD and SHA2 series.

$\mathrm{Shake}(M, d)$— Extendable-output function, returning any given number d of bits.