THE PHAEDRUS OF PLATO

a Translation with Notes and Analysis by Kenneth Quandt

Preface

I present herewith a translation of Plato's *Phaedrus* with supplementary exegetical materials. The work is primarily intended to help readers of Greek to understand and appreciate the text. The translation has provided me places to hang a thousand Footnotes explaining the Greek it renders. In addition I have provided relatively extensive Analytical Summaries, of the three speeches that constitute the principal contents of first half of the dialogue and of the dialogical section with which it ends. I would not publish this new translation by itself and without the exegetical materials since my own eloquence is hardly a substitute for the original.

My notes and summaries present the results a reading by myself and also of two slow readings in Greek done with individual students[1] that took place over the course of the last four years, as well as a faster reading of the dialogue in English with a group of friends who know no Greek. In the course of writing the notes I have reviewed all translations, editions, and commentaries that were available to me, from Hermias of Alexandria (450) to Ryan and Brisson (2012),[2] and I have reconsidered all variants in the manuscripts as reported in these editions where the discrepancies among them seemed to me to affect the meaning.[3]

Plato's *Phaedrus* succeeds to do what all great works succeed to do: it creates its own horizon, reveals its meaning at it unfolds, and ultimately it interprets itself. Because the action of the conversation always seemed to be adequately motivated by the immediate dramatic context – because what Socrates and Phaedrus were made to say seemed to make sense on its own – I have not needed to refer to or worry about the relation between their conversation and other conversations Plato presented in other dialogues. I have ignored the bulk of the scholarly literature where it does not help the student understand the Greek. I have found there is as little need to refer to "Plato" in accounting for what his characters say and what happens in his drama, as there is to refer to "Shakespeare" in accounting for his.[4] On the question for instance of the "Theory of Forms," for

1 Mssrs. Jason Karabatsos and Matthew Morrissey, to each of whom I owe great thanks.

2 The list is presented below at the end of this Preface.

3 Many well-attested readings have newly been saved or defended, namely: 231D6, 232B7, 234C5, 235A2, 235D7, 237D6, 239C5, 244E3, 245D3, 245E1, 246A6, 246D8, 247B1, 249D6, 250A7, 252D3, 253C7, 255D3, 255E6, 256A2, 257D2, 258A1, 260C10, 263C1, 266A2, 266B6, 266C6, 267D2, 268A2, 268C1, 268C2, 270A4, 270C3, 272B3, 272C2, 278A4.

4 I refer to "Plato" in the Footnotes to comment on stylistic traits of the Greek (17 times) or on dramatic techniques

which the "evidence" is putatively ubiquitous in Plato's *Dialogues*, and on the dispute that started with Aristotle as to whether Socrates "subscribed" to the theory, the "evidence" that either Plato or Socrates "held" such a Theory can in the first instance be said to be weak. Besides, the question of an historical individual "holding" a theory or being "pleased" by an outlook belongs to the special science of doxography, for which there is no need as to the understanding of this work *per se*, since the dramatic problem is that the interlocutors in the dialogue understand each other. With minor adjustments they do. As to the "evidence" *within* the Platonic text for such a theory, this amounts to little more than Socrates's continual and habitual use of certain natural expressions that thought or thinking, as such, finds useful or necessary for articulating its own operation,[5] as well as his characteristic insistence at crucial points in the conversations Plato depicts him to have conducted that thoughts are real enough to be talked about.[6] I join Socrates in the major premise that discussion itself must rely upon such an assumption if it is to be taken seriously, and as a minor premise I believe that the main lesson Plato took from his personal encounter with Socrates was that discussion can and indeed must be taken seriously. The conclusion or inference is that Plato invented the dialogue genre to provide, for posterity and for those who did not know Socrates, a copious and wide ranging illustration of the point. Plato not only invented the dialogue genre but in particular continually depicted therein Socrates drawing together the dialogical and dialectical activities under a single notion denoted by διαλέγεσθαι and its cognates. Beyond this, the controversies about an ontological theory of "separately existing" ideas or forms, as Aristotle formulated the question, and of which person or persons might hold or subscribe to such a theory, themselves separate the "evidence" for such a theory from the contexts in which alone it could appear, namely the dramatic circumstances and content of the *Dialogues* of Plato, which are fictional events in which conversation characteristically discovers it must take itself seriously. Once the talk about ideas is separated and detached from the dramatic circumstances in which Plato's imitation of Socrates's conversational behavior both allows and forces it it to arise, it loses its importance as a means to conduct conversation and devolves into an empty game of words, for the Speusippuses and Xenocrateses of this world. The last thing Plato would do is write a book called "On Ideas."

My teacher, W. Gerson Rabinowitz, used to say, with his affectedly proper English, "If Plato had written in Swedish I should have been a Swedish scholar." My version is that if Plato had written symphonies I should have become a conductor so that I could perform them for an audience. It is the first and foremost of my hopes for this written work that it might make the action of the dialogue more available to you, just as it is the least and last of my hopes to try to spell out all of what the dialogue means. Its meaning may come to life only within you, through your thought and reflection upon the text, with much of this taking place *as you read it* and not just after. A good deal of your understanding will, moreover, be inextricably bound up with the idiosyncratic process by which you

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exhibited in the dialogues (11 times), or to use his works as a witness for Greek usage (about 5 times). In the majority of cases (about 20) that I have referred to him by name, it was only to deny claims by others of his involvement. In the footnotes to the translation I have attributed a belief to him on three or four occasions: nn.91, 987, 1227-1228 and 1247. In the text of my Analyses and in its footnotes I have referred to him by name about eight times, usually as dramatist but three times in the course of making a claim about what he believes or thinks (n.1445 and pp.210 and 215).

5 As the elder Parmenides is made to tell him at *Parm.*135B5-C3. I am thinking of such natural and plain terms as αὐτός, ἕκαστος, ἐνάντιον and ἕν (and therefore πολλά), by which the object of thought is described as self-identical and unique and invariant, the plainly phenomenological uses of εἶδος or ἰδέα, and the ancillary language of εἶναι by which these descriptions and mental experiences are asserted to be true or real – thought does not care which.

6 Such passages as *Phdo.*78D, 100B; *Phlb.*15B1-4,16C10-E2,18E6ff; *Rep.*475E6-476A6, 507B2-8, 596A; *Tht.*185A8-E8 come to mind. Cf., in this dialogue, 249B7-C1 and 265C8-266B1 with nn., and n.269.

come to understand what is being said (both the words and what they mean), so that your understanding of the text will itself develop and have a history. I always conceive of you as if you were reading it for the first time, and I never think of myself as sparing you the need or dispelling your desire to read it again. If, after all the stops and starts you are required to make during the first time through you feel a desire to go back and reread the whole dialogue, then my writing shall have succeeded, for in this way you will more likely get the whole sweep of the drama and will come to see why it is one of the best known and best loved books ever written. On the other hand if you look to my book to tell you straight out what the text means, you are bringing with you the very "Phaedrus problem" that Plato's drama has identified for posterity and is meant to help us to overcome. No eloquence of mine nor even that of Plato will take you there on its own; only your own desire and drive to reach a more vivid cognition of the Beauty and Truth you barely remember, whatever it takes, and a true resolve to put off the desire to "trade away the honor of the gods for honor among men," the central theme of this drama,[7] which in fact is the principle that gives the dialogue its final dramatic unity and closure.[8] Scholars keep asking why Plato wrote dialogues. I hope you will begin to ask why or how subsequent philosophers failed or avoided doing so, and what philosophy had to become, immediately after it as born, because they didn't or couldn't.

I have the great honor and pleasure of dedicating this work to Zoe Quandt and Ethan Brown on the occasion of their marriage at Santa Cruz, California, on 12 October 2014:

μακάριον μὲν καὶ ὁμονοητικὸν τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον διαγοῖεν

Introduction

The dramatic substance of the *Phaedrus* can be ascertained by the direct evidence of the text if it is read with care. In the case of my study of Plato's *Republic*,[9] a deeply unified dramatic interpretation came into plain sight, despite the fact that within the scholarly literature the search for unity in the *Republic* has by now been abandoned as hopeless. The "Unity of the Phaedrus" has likewise become a notorious problem, since the *Phaedrus* seems to have two subjects hard to reconcile, love and rhetoric; but the two subjects to consider are Socrates and Phaedrus, and once we do we will see that it is Phaedrus's very attitude toward language and speaking that itself combines the two behaviors – loving and speaking – in a way to marvel over,[10] while the peculiar subjectivity of Socrates, by which he always finds ways to draw out his interlocutor and to take his ideas even more seriously than he takes them himself, guides Phaedrus into a discussion that separates out the two elements, penetrates to their essential meanings, and then brings them back together at the end, in a vision of the love of reasoning and the rational foundation of love founded in man's orientation toward the divine. Indeed these two subjects are fully reconciled to each other at the end of the action.

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7 229C6-230A7, 242D7-243A2, 244B6-D5, 245A3-8, 245C1-2, 248A6-B5, 249C6-D3, 249D5-E4, 253C2-6, 256A7-257A2, 272B5-C4, 273E4-274A5, 275C1-4, 276D1-277A4.

8 The topic Phaedrus had evaded is finally answered explicitly at the end of the discussion: 277D6-278B4.

9 www.onplatosrepublic.com.

10 οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον, as Phaedrus says about Lysias's speech of the lying lover trying to convince the beloved to gratify him because, or although, he does *not* love him (277C4-5).

Phaedrus is enamored of Lysias's speech for the prospect it provides that a man might become able by some clever art to win love without risk. The hypothetical lover of the young boy is depicted by Lysias trying to persuade him to love him back on the combined grounds that it is more prudent to make love with a non-lover than with a lover and that he himself does not love him. Socrates replies with the candid confession that if cleverness can have its way, why doesn't Lysias do mankind the great service composing a speech that would persuade a beauty to gratify a person who really lacks the usual attractions – a poor old ugly man like himself – in short, to make the *truth* palatable! But hard upon this revealing disagreement between the two of them a more interesting problem arises. Phaedrus is elated to have spied Socrates on the path, this helpless lover of speeches, but now he demurs to perform the speech for him! Instead he plays the mincing coy, and claims he can hardly be expected to deliver in his own voice a speech by such an accomplished author. Rather than take the bait Socrates reveals the underlying truth, for he knows his Phaedrus. Like his remark about an artful speech that will make an ugly man attractive, his remark is not a counter-ploy but a true and sympathetic insight. He guesses that Phaedrus had been studying the speech all morning in the presence of Lysias who taught it to him and others, and then set forth outside the city walls to practice it in solitude, but on the way Lo and Behold! he saw Socrates coming, the very person whose desire to hear it provides him not only an ideal audience, but also a *companion*. Socrates hereby requires Phaedrus to do "what he would have done, anyway," namely, to go ahead and deliver the speech; and Phaedrus, as they walk along outside the walls, warms up to and actually begins to deliver it, but Socrates interrupts with still another guess: "Is that a copy of the speech you are hiding under your shirt? If so read it to me – why should I listen to you when Lysias himself is here?"

Because he will have to read it, they have to stop walking and sit down. What was going to be a walk-and-talk that could take them all the way to Megara has become a more stilted performance scenario; but the place where they come to rest compensates them with its beauty. The scene changes from working and thinking to lying about and reverie, and Phaedrus reads Lysias's speech, a speech than which there could not be a worse thing to read under such auspicious circumstances. It is a farrago of crabbed and toxic verbal mousetraps designed not to persuade a beautiful boy but to titillate Lysias's students of rhetoric, who had gathered at the home of an Athenian politician that morning to sharpen their tools for use in the assembly and the courts. Lysias had treated them to a sort of lagniappe to compete with Gorgias's famous *Praise of Helen*, a busman's holiday whose indirect message is that rhetorical skill might even enable a man to have his wildest wishes come true without the services of a Genie in a Bottle.

Socrates is thrilled by the enthusiasm of his companion's performance, even though he was merely reading from a book, though he surely found little to admire in the book's clever language (a topic on which he claims ignorance), nor in its range of subject matter (for if anything Lysias seemed perfectly satisfied to repeat himself). Phaedrus now baits him to do any better and Socrates demurs until Phaedrus, knowing Socrates's weakness as a "lover of logos," threatens never to treat him to another speech. Socrates readily confesses his helplessness in the presence of what he loves, as usual, and consents. His speech is orderly and deliberate but also Polonian in its style, declaring with methodological fanfare that it will begin at the beginning with a definition of love. At the moment he reaches his definition love as a sort of loss of control over one's desire for beauties, the speaker – or Socrates – loses control over his own pedantic self and must pause to take a breath, after which he returns to his oration by inferring from the definition the detriment the young man will undergo for putting himself in the hands of a man so afflicted. Pedagogical and reserved, he evaluates the effects according to the traditional categories of good – mental, bodily, and material – but soon enough the speaker (who is actually Socrates) again suddenly breaks off, afflicted now with misgivings about the whole exercise, and gets up to leave. At that very moment Phaedrus halts him, reminding him the sun

has halted in the sky overhead and he should wait for the heat of the day to pass. In this blink of an eye Socrates becomes aware of the nature of his misgivings: Phaedrus has caused him to give another speech, for in having followed suit with Phaedrus's theme in order to make a more orderly argument for it than Lysias had, he had overlooked the fact that the theme is false and even impious, so now he must unspeak that speech with a retraction before the gods strike him down!

It was the very orderliness of his treatment – the form – that brought the falseness of its content nakedly to the surface, and stirred a feeling within Socrates that something was wrong: 'Eros is a god, after all – how can a god be bad? Or at least who am I, a mere man, to say so, and say so in the audience of the god! I must compose a retraction right away.'

The motives for speaking are improving. The first speaker hoped to titillate and entertain fellow speechwriters with a farrago of virtuosities and the second to restate his thesis in a step by step way that could at least be scrutinized by the young man, but now we must speak in order to escape the wrath of the gods! The telescope has been turned around. Men, who had been worse or better artists, suddenly become the paltry playthings of the "subject" they had vied to master, namely, Eros. Socrates now begins from an entirely different ground. Those speeches had inferred love was an evil because it was a kind of madness; but perhaps not all madness is bad. Just think of the divinely transported state of a priestess at Delphi, and the Bacchic delirium that has been known to set ancestral vendettas to rest, not to mention the inspiration of the poetic soul by which the Muses may take it far beyond the orderly pedantry of the sort Socrates had sought to deploy in his First Speech. Our thesis then, will be that love is a madness sent to man by the gods, but the argument will require us to go far afield: only the wise will understand, while the clever will not believe it!

The speech Socrates now improvises must surely be placed among the greatest pages in all literature, but its effect grows on us only gradually for it starts further back than we have ever had to go. The world of motion and change that we live in must perforce rely for its constant life and durability upon a principle of motion that starts itself, or more exactly did not start but was always moving, moving both itself and everything else. Otherwise the world would have come to an standstill by now! Soul, as the mover of body, is this deathless entity that moves without relying upon another to impart motion to it. And yet what is Soul like? Perhaps a sort of chariot with reinsman and two horses all grown together into one winged organism, except that while the gods' souls have perfect horses, ours are mixed. The souls' wings enable them to fly through the heavens, moving and managing the movement of all things. In case a soul should lose its wings it falls into an earthly clod and becomes attached to a body, the attachment being what we call "being alive" though soul is actually deathless.

How then do our souls maintain their wings and stay among the divine souls? The whole procession of all souls follows in divisions behind the Olympian deities, in the train of which any and all souls are allowed to follow, and this army of souls manages all in its sojourn through the skies, as we have said; but betimes the gods soar upward to a place beyond the sky to feast, the other souls eagerly trying to follow. There they come to a halt and the rotation of the cosmos takes over moving them, in a great cycle. Beyond and above the back of the sky they behold true justice, true mindfulness – all truth indeed – with νοῦς, the part of the soul that feeds on the vision of truth. The grand rotation complete they soar back down into the skies and feed their horses on ambrosia and nectar.

But we forgot the human souls! Their mixed horses have difficulty in getting them all the way up, let alone keeping them there. Some of the souls might only get a glimpse of the verities beyond, and for more still the competition among them disables them from doing so and preoccupies them with getting ahead of each other with collisions and tramplings. Many of them must therefore settle for the nourishment of opinion. If they have glimpsed anything at all in a single cycle they will be nourished enough to stay aloft, but if they fail even at this they fall into the bodies of men, the ones who had seen and remember the most becoming philosophers and lovers of beauty, the others now

becoming other types down to the tyrant who saw and remembers the least. From earth the philosophers' souls may return to the heavens sooner than the others by regrowing their wings more quickly with a more devoted remembrance of the truth – as little as three thousand-year cycles of the life on earth, the aftermath in Hades, and the return; but the others adopt a strictly human regime of life-activities and compete with each other, so that they only more gradually and through human virtue foster the regrowth of wings strong enough to enable them to return, after ten thousand years.

Love it is, love for those best and most beautiful of things that only they remember, that refurbishes the philosophers' wings, reminded of them as they are by the visions of beauty in this world. It could have been the vision of justice or temperance but these truths shine through with less luster in this world than beauty does. Think after all how transporting it would be if justice, too, could be so vividly seen! When such a man sees a beauty his soul recoils in reverence, a sweat comes over him, and he heats up inside – while a soul whose memory is lesser simply wants to pounce. Within the philosopher's soul the influx of beauty through the eyes irrigates the pores through which the quills of the soul's feathers emerge and extend in strength: the process itches and tickles and when it occurs he undergoes the feeling we call desire. But when the reminding vision of beauty recedes, the process slows and he aches. No matter which, he is beside himself, and now he will do anything to be in the presence of the beauty.

Of men so struck their souls are unequally able to manage. Those who followed before in the train of Zeus are more able to bear the ravages but those who followed Ares are easily provoked to murderous acts by any perceived misbehavior in their beloved. In all cases their pursuit of the beloved is the ordering principle in their lives on earth because it brings to this world the inspiration they felt above. In some cases discovering their beloved can even help them realize which god it was they were following in case they had never been sure! Their worship of the beloved is like an initiation into the best of lives available on this planet – but how does the beloved come to be captured?

To answer this we need to tell more about the charioteer and his horses. For the souls that have fallen into human form the one horse is obedient to the charioteer, though still only a horse, while the other is just as unruly as an animal can be. Upon the sight of a beauty he harries the charioteer and the other horse with his desire to go the beloved's side. When once they approach him and the charioteer sees his flashing glance he is so struck by remembrance of that vision of beauty seated in permanent splendor beyond the sky that he recoils in reverence and yanks back the heads of both the horses. Still and again, the unruly one cajoles them to return; against their great resistance he grabs the bit in his teeth and drags them by main force; as they approach the charioteer recoils now with an even greater reflex and yanks loose the bit of the unruly horse and bloodies his jowls. In pain he acquiesces and now dreads the very sight of the beloved knowing it will cause a cycle that ends in his own great pain.

A lover whose unruly horse has been tamed in this way shows a gentle approach to the beautiful boy, and even though the boy has been warned against such an approach by friends and elders, with time the deeper forces involved come to light and win out: the gentle and solicitous motives of the lover touch him more deeply even than the love of his parents and now he spends more time with him. One day he looks into his lover's eyes and while his beauty enters and stimulates the lover's soul, an excess of his own beauty bounces back into his own eyes and he experiences the same effects in his own soul, effects he cannot name: he thinks it is friendship but actually it is love! Like the lover he craves that they be together and frets when they are apart. When they come together the lover's unruly horse begins to make an argument to his charioteer and the boy's bursts with desire and moves him to throw his arms around him.

If now they maintain their passion for the truth beyond that has brought them together they will live the happiest life available to humans and also will regrow their plumage and return to heaven

as soon as three lives later; but even if they slip one day and consummate their physical desires with something less than all their minds and wills, their lives will still be blessed by the degree and character of the love they have had, with all the bitter sweetness we know from love ballads, and though they will not return before the other souls, their sojourns in the afterlife between their human incarnations will be pleasant and when they do return to the heavens whence they came, they will do so together. Those who achieve no love at all will only know a common familiarity with each other, ever bound by mortal sobriety, scheming in a zero-sum economy, living a sequence of slavish lives the many cannot distinguish from virtue and self-control with darkling aimless, mindless after-lives in Hades in between.

This is Socrates's palinode, a prayer that Eros should not abandon him in anger but grant him still to garner honor in the world of beauties. He prays in closing that Eros stop Lysias from the sort of speech he had written and turn him to philosophy instead, so that Phaedrus his follower should stop wavering and devote his life to the kinds of arguments that Eros inspires.

But Phaedrus cannot quite swallow it. The worry enters his mind, or at least passes his lips, how he can convince Lysias not to turn to philosophy but to try to match such a speech as this, a worry quite irrelevant to the message Socrates has brought him. Lysias, he says instead, was lately called a pedestrian speechwriter by a big-time politician and might be chary of actually cutting such a figure and of being called a "sophist"! – and an entirely new conversation must now begin. Immediately Socrates doubts that a pro like Lysias would be fazed by such a charge. The politician only *envies* his ability, wishing all the while himself to leave behind written speeches in his own name, such as by persuading his fellow citizens to pass laws that are named after himself as their author. Surely then it is not the sheer writing of speeches that is shameful, but only the writing of speeches that are shameful and ugly rather than beautiful and artful, and so the question becomes what makes a speech fine instead of ugly?

As he often does when his interlocutor seeks to evade the substantial issue, Socrates has gone with the punch and steered the discussion to a topic that will ultimately enable him and his interlocutor to return to the crucial issue after gathering the wherewithal to deal with it somehow. This is exactly what happens in the *Republic* when Adeimantus challenges Socrates to improve upon the wisdom-poetry that he was brought up on, which he blames for failing to convince him to live a good life, or when Glaucon blames Socrates a few pages later for giving the inhabitants of their imaginary city too little "garnish." To Adeimantus's objection Socrates proposes that this goodness he fears he will not pursue in his own life is very hard to see in a thing so small as the individual soul and so they should construct an imaginary city and see where the justice might arise in it: subsequently he will allow Adeimantus to purify the wisdom poetry of the immorality he blames it for out of his own better sense of the right and true. To Glaucon's objection he grants the "garnish" and all the rest that Glaucon misses, for Glaucon in truth is discomfited by the pure justice of the simple life and feels something is missing but instead of copping to it blames Socrates for being stingy. Socrates adds the "extra something" Glaucon refuses to characterize as a pure desire for "more," and the immediate result is that they will need an army to defend themselves against invading thieves (not to mention invading their neighbors in order to secure the "more"). Fifty pages later (at the end of Book Three, 415D-417B) Glaucon will be acquiescing in the image of the guardian's simple life, the very thing he had objected to before; but a hundred and forty pages later Adeimantus's recalcitrant tendency to project his own faults on others will finally come to a head and Socrates will exclude him from the conversation about the Good. Where Adeimantus fails Glaucon succeeds, though the two brothers are beset by different problems. Two hundred and thirty pages later (588B-589B) Adeimantus has been the witness to the decline of the imaginary city they had projected but Glaucon is served up an image of the invisible inner man and will no longer be seduced by the injustice of the invisible outer man

evoked by the story of Gyges' Ring.[11] What has happened to Glaucon in between is not only his learning but also his coming to own that happiness lies within, in the order of the soul, despite the invisibility, unpopularity and famelessness of such an outlook and way of life.

Phaedrus's problem is that he "wavers," as Socrates notes at the very end of his Second Speech. We saw him wavering in the first part of the dialogue, recognizing Socrates on the path but immediately hesitating as to whether he should ask him to let him practice the speech on him, and instead slipping easily from cajolery and promises of rewards to threats and oaths never to talk to him again. In fact we might even understand his wavering behavior as the behavior of an erotic, if only we remember what we have just heard in Socrates's Second Speech. Wavering after all is just what we would expect to find going on inside a mere human being buffeted around by divine forces beyond his control! Phaedrus has come back to the topic of speechifying because it is a refuge from participation: Lysias after all is a metic and cannot even deliver a speech in the public gatherings of Athens, but only can write them for delivery by a citizen. The politician that has lambasted him is envious of his easy and safe position, free to operate as a force at a distance.[12] But this is just what so enamored Phaedrus of Lysias's speech, the power of language it revealed obviating even the need for the lover to admit he loves the boy he wants to seduce.

It is the seductive power of language and writing, therefore, that is the problem, and the thing that enables Phaedrus to remain ambivalent – or conversely that prevents him from committing himself to a more challenging path and resolving to live a better life, the life of "philosophical arguments" devoted to the remembrance of the beyond rather than the pursuit of honor among men within the immanent and manipulative economy of forgetful and oblivious human selves. Socrates has brought Phaedrus a step away from the politician's envious slur of Lysias, in the recitation of which Phaedrus had revealed his own anxiety, and has convinced him for the moment that the real question about speech and arguments is not whether they are written but how well they are written, so that a discussion can ensue about the true constituents of speakerly art. We can expect that the question of the shame of writing will return, but only after this intervening topic has equipped Phaedrus with the wherewithal to face it, the same way that the exercise of projecting an imaginary city had enabled Glaucon to find, at the end of Book Four (443C-445B), that the ideal exemplar lies within after all.

Before they begin, they formalize their agreement to discuss their topic, in a way reminiscent of their agreement at the start of the dialogue to sit and read Lysias's speech. First there is Phaedrus's extravagant praise of the topic's importance (compare Socrates's quotation of Pindar at 227B9-11), and then they look up to notice once again their enchanted and enchanting surroundings (this time Socrates telling a completely novel story about the cicadas they heard when they first arrived – that they are messengers to the Muses who will report to the goddesses how well Phaedrus and Socrates honor them with their conversation rather than simply dozing off like the common run of shepherds). With this reference to the divine audience he brings forward the criterion by which he had been wakened from the slumber of standard rhetoric by his daemon and by Phaedrus, and had been moved to compose a speech to please the gods instead: just so, he here suggests they continue to apply this higher criterion in their conversation as well.

Socrates begins with what he presents as an axiom, that for a speech to be good speech the speaker must be knowledgeable, but Phaedrus enunciates an idea he has heard from others, that persuasive speaking requires no knowledge of the subject matter dealt with, but consists merely of

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11 It is noteworthy that Socrates gracefully avoids confronting him with the fact that he has changed his mind: cf. αὐτῷ 588B6 and my n. *ad loc.*

12 Cf. 228A1. The clue that clinches this interpretation is the pamphlet *On Those who Write Speeches – the Sophists*, written c. 390BC by Alcidamas, a teacher of rhetoric who advertised himself as being able to help a politician deliver a speech – in addition of course to providing the service rendered by those who are merely sophists, namely, writing it for him.

manipulating the audience's opinions. Socrates wonders how such a good thing as art could enable a fool or for that matter an enemy to harm a city and presents a satire about a horse and an ass, which brings Madame Art on stage objecting: She never said people could be ignorant, but only that without her persuasion that is *artful*, is impossible. Socrates now seems to hear arguments that assert that a manipulative speaker cannot be said to be exerting the power of true *art* in the absence of truth: that the "art" of Madame Art can only be an opportunistic knack hardly to be admired and hardly worth paying for. Speech, and argumentation, if it is a real skill of soul-leading (ψυχαγωγία), would be one and the same skill whether used in private or in public, on large or small topics, and only as such valid and worthy of praise for the man who possesses it even if he never goes to court or becomes famous. But Phaedrus "has never heard of" this art, only the art of speaking at trial and also at the assembly. Has he not heard how Nestor and Odysseus in their spare time wrote manuals of speech at Troy? What about Palamedes's art? The arguments pro and con to baffle the jurors at court or to confuse the mob at the assembly he has heard of, but has he not heard of the speeches of Zeno the "Eleatic Palamedes" that likewise convince you all is in motion and at the next moment that all is at rest? In all these cases what is happening is that small differences are being overlooked, and only the person who has the finer focus can see the differences and manipulate an audience that cannot while keeping himself from becoming confused. It is exactly the fine points one needs to know, not the grosser beliefs of the masses.

For instance take the Speech of Lysias we have studied this morning. He begins without defining love, which is just the sort of thing people disagree about, whereas I, under the influence of the deities in this place, did do so, even if overly enthused. And not only did Lysias not start at the beginning but there was no order in the Speech: the chapters could have been placed in any order at all. The Speeches I concocted on the other hand were so sharp in their recognition of the problem of definition that they produced opposite theses based on the two definitions of which love is capable, a madness merely human and sick or a madness given by the gods as a boon to mankind. And also my first Speech at least was ordered by an operation akin to definition, namely collecting a plurality under one heading and dividing the heading into its parts.[13] It is the deployment of these operations, by my lights at least, that confers all that can truly be called *artful* onto an argument or a speech.

The teachers of rhetoric, on the other hand, whose lessons you say you have "heard," teach isolated techniques and sub-refinements with the special names they give them, often naming them after themselves the way politicians endeavor to have their names associated with laws. What *artistic* power do these teacherly techniques have to show for themselves? "A great power indeed," Phaedrus replies: "Victory in the assembly!" But, Socrates replies, if you knew how to make a person vomit would the physician Acoumenos recognize you as a true doctor? or if you could write iambics would Sophocles call you a master of the art of tragedy? Such isolated skills or techniques would at best be preliminaries and ingredients of their respective arts. Pericles arrives as the oratorical expert over against the doctor and the and tragic poet, to scold even Socrates and Phaedrus for their impatience with the writers of the *Arts of Speech*, since it is only those persons' ignorance of dialectic that enables them erroneously to think their teachings constitute the heart of the matter, and now Phaedrus vehemently agrees with him (Pericles, in Socrates's voice!), and feels compelled to ask the question Socrates had just asked: Where does the power of a Pericles come from if not from studying with such teachers?

Real skill and effectiveness, Socrates replies, will depend here as anywhere else on a man's natural gifts, his knowledge, and practice practice practice. But as for the formal training he will need

13 As with the three types of rashness and the three categories of good in the Socrates's First Speech, and in the Second his collection of two madnesses (divine and human) under one head and his subsequent subdivision of the divine madness into three types and then a fourth type (Eros).

the method of Thrasymachus and the others seems altogether wrong. If you look to the most effective orator of all, it would be the Pericles we just encountered; and for Pericles, Socrates surprisingly reveals, it was his association with the far-ranging thought and reflections of Anaxagoras that lay at the basis of his effectiveness. Likewise, a truly effective speaker will know the essentials of psychology so that his arguments can be tailored to the souls of his auditor, just as a doctor's ministrations are be tailored to the body of the patient.

Phaedrus admires the idea but doubts its feasibility and Socrates pushes back hard: any other method is not art no matter what the current writers of manuals claim: we need a manual of our own. Socrates then outlines such a manual and near the end a manual writer of the other kind intervenes to complain that all this isn't so just because they say so. Phaedrus intervenes to contradict him and now it is his turn to insist that they try, no matter difficult the task may be. So now it is Socrates's turn to say there is nothing against their looking for a shortcut, and that if Phaedrus doesn't know one he has heard of one that they should countenance as a devil's counsel, who cynically degrades both the need for knowledge of the subject matter and for this recondite science of psychology: the whole thing is finding likelihood. Phaedrus has perhaps forgotten this is the position he himself had started with! Pull out your dog-eared copy of a Tisias, Socrates suggests to him, and watch him "prove" that David could hardly have slain Goliath – just look at them! And yet the story has survived exactly because David did so, contrary to all expectations. What Tisias needs to know is that even his assessment of likelihood will require a finer understanding in the orator than his audience has lest he himself become confused, as we said before, but also that a longer study such as we prescribe is something that will please the gods while others merely seek to command the admiration of men. For it is the gods in whose trains we hope once again to follow, and it is from such a high purpose as this that true art can spring.

Phaedrus has been won over by the prospect of so high a calling. Bit by bit Socrates has shown that everything that has a claim to artfulness in rhetoric is lacking in rhetoric as it is taught, but present in philosophical dialogue: we are not reaching a new rhetoric but dropping rhetoric altogether for the sake of philosophy! And now, as we expected, Socrates can return to the original topic,the worth of writing per se, and introduces three illustrations: a story, a simile and a parable. In ancient Egypt the great wise man Theuth invented writing to make it possible for men to remember, but Ammon the pharaoh banned it, foreseeing that quite to the contrary it would lead men to believe they could put their thoughts down in writing and so they would forget them. Second, the simile likens a written work to a portrait: we think the face is about to speak and likewise we tend to think the words on the page are themselves trying to say something but like the portrait they do not and they cannot. Third, the parable compares the way the serious farmer plants his seeds in the proper season and ground and waits for their fruits to push up, with the silly practice of forcing Adonis gardens for the festival in July: the potted flowers rise up quickly only to wither in a few days. Such for the true farmer would be mere play, as would consigning his thoughts to writing be for the true thinker. At most such marks could spur his own memory of things he already knows and also that of others who also know those things. Far greater and more serious than writing is live discussion between teacher and student where the one writes ideas into the soul of the other as it were, and the other can ask and answer questions.

We might think we hear Plato confessing that his own written *Dialogues* are mere play in comparison with the sorts of live encounters he had enjoyed with Socrates during his youthful days, but his Socrates keeps moving, and now reaches the very first question by which Phaedrus drew us off course at the beginning of this discussion – or, better, began this discussion by drawing us off course – the question whether it might be *shameful* that Lysias should compose written works. Any man who has written anything, whether it be a law or a political tract, and believes it can be relied on as

something solid and substantial, but has no arguments ready to hand in himself, awake or asleep, on the important topics of justice beauty and the good, deserves only opprobrium, an opprobrium in no way diminished by whatever accolades he might garner from a mob for delivering a written speech; and conversely a man who views any written argument as a silly toy, whether he wrote it himself or it came down to him from the Grand Authors of the past, but sees such things as at best reminders of something for those of its readers that already know, and who prizes instead discussions with living men, enlivened by question and answer, and views only such ideas as he has planted in another soul under such circumstances to be his authentic children and puts no stake at all in a legacy as an author of written works – only such a man as this would you and I pray each other to become, my friend!

This is of course the very prayer with which Socrates closed his Second Speech, the great palinode and hymn to Eros, and this time Phaedrus accepts the prayer as his own without demur, so that the dialogue can end. He has embraced the vision, at least, of a life of philosophy, of the love of reasoning and the rationality of love, and now has at least imagined weening himself away from a reliance on writing, and the "security" of acting at a distance, and imagines preferring instead the sort of engagement he has just now been through – though whether he will go on with this for the rest of his life of course remains unknown.

All the dialogues end with an agreement or not, but only some of them need to point to the future as much as this one, since Phaedrus's wavering enthusiasm is the central theme of the drama. A sort of double *envoi* closes the dialogue, in which Phaedrus's choice is personified as a choice to return to his companion of record, Lysias, who only writes, in the same world where Socrates will return to Isocrates, something of a surprise since we have heard nothing about him today, for he, too has a spark of philosophy in him. Where will Phaedrus be finding himself tomorrow?

The interpretation of the action that I have reached will be seen to be new on several points. I find that the speech of Lysias is a *farrago virtuoso* meant to bowl over his students, not the Beloved; that the definition Socrates's Speaker reaches in his highly methodical First Speech is fallacious measured against the very method he espouses; that Phaedrus's mention of high noon in response to Socrates's refusal to go on with that Speech is what spurs to Socrates reverse the telescope suddenly so as to view their activity from the point of view of the gods on high; that Phaedrus's response to Socrates's Second Speech is to evade the onus it puts upon him so that the formative principle of the subsequent dialogical section is not a criticism or a new theory of rhetoric by "Plato" but is Socrates's attempt to bring Phaedrus back, in a characteristically roundabout way, to the decision to philosophize, an attempt that ultimately succeeds.

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The Footnotes present along the way the piecemeal interpretations of which this new dramatic interpretation and the Translation that embodies it are the combined result, but there is another aspect of the drama or action of the piece that needed to be treated separately, namely, the three speeches, during which the dialogical action is more or less suspended. Here, too, we have a movement of thought but it is no longer the thought "shared" by Phaedrus and Socrates, but a "disembodied" thought performed by a Speaker who is in the first case absent (Lysias or the fictional Lover he impersonates) and in the other two cases present but impersonating someone else (Socrates impersonating his lying and candid Lovers). We could use the metaphor of a "play within a play," except that the two speeches of Socrates do turn out to be *acts* of Socrates, motivated by and improvised within the dramatic context of his meeting with Phaedrus. Indeed, by the time we reach

Socrates's Second Speech, Phaedrus and he have themselves entered the fictional realm of the speeches, or conversely the speech scenario has become real, since Phaedrus has *become* the Audience (the Boy whom the other speeches had misled) and Socrates has *become* the Speaker (for he must deliver not only a speech to the Boy but also a palinode to Eros).

The manner of thought and its presentation varies greatly from one Speech to the next, and so I have gone to relatively great lengths to expose it, or allow it to expose itself, by presenting descriptions of each of them which I have placed after the Translation. These descriptions look something like rhetorical analysis but to say so rather begs the question of the dialogue as to what rhetoric is, after all. It would be more accurate to borrow a term Socrates coins in course of the conversation and call them "psychagogic" analyses,[14] since they follow how the semantics, the syntax, and even the sound of the continuous discourse of the speeches lead our consciousness along. By means of these analyses we discover more clearly than before that the first speech consists of epigrammatical mouse-traps; that the second, in a genial but sometimes pedantic way, teaches us how it will proceed right as it proceeds, though it loses control of itself right at the moment that it "defines" eros; and that the third speech presents its ideas in a strikingly naturalistic way that calls upon us to tolerate great leaps and sudden transitions which only a spontaneous understanding both of what is being said and of its significance for us can keep up with and tolerate. As such the three Speeches become examples to be contemplated in connection with the ensuing dialogical treatment of rhetoric – or, again avoid the term, of "fine speaking and writing" – as psychagogia.

As to the ensuing dialogical section, its thought should have been self-explanatory since in conversation the path of thought is continually checked and clarified by the reactions or responses of the interlocutors to each other, but at the beginning (257B7-258D11) Phaedrus chooses to evade the challenge with which Socrates had closed his great speech and for a page and a half the conversation moves in fits and starts that needed to be explained. Once a topic for discussion has formally been agreed upon, however (258E1-259D9), their conversation becomes easy to summarize (259E1-277A5), and in the end we see the action of the dialogue circling back to the question that Phaedrus evaded at the beginning (277A6-278B4). He faces it and answers it this time (278B5-6), so that the dialogue can close.

Marvelously, toward the end (271C10ff, *passim*), as the two interlocutors become more and more unanimous in their sense of what argumentation should be and what it should do, Phaedrus several times encourages Socrates to articulate their results more expansively, and elicits thereby something like continuous presentations or "speeches" from Socrates, performances in which his expression takes on a heightened psychagogical intensity or eloquence. This phenomenon has not been noticed as such and so I have added Analyses of these several flourishes, analogous to the Analytical Summaries of the three speeches. These Analyses reveal that Socrates's accesses of eloquence beautifully exemplify the theoretical conclusions the two of them have reached in the interim about how to speak well, and so with these Analyses my Commentary can close.

The most important outcome of the discussion, and the topic with which it ends, is the resolution of the existential problem represented by Phaedrus's wavering over crucial questions, not some new definition of rhetoric or proposal to reform how it is taught – these are only the putative subjects. If rhetoric is to be admired it would be because it was an art, but in every aspect it fails to be artistic when compared to skillful speaking (and thinking), rendered skillful by its devotion to a higher thing than swaying the opinions of the masses. If it is truly artful speech (and thought) that you want

14 261A8: cf. n. *ad loc.* Within the dialogue he term more properly represents the power of speech to lead and move the soul; but I wish to borrow it to denote more narrowly the way the audience's (or reader's) thought is drawn along by the consecutivity of the speech (or writing).

you will become a philosopher, and the choice to become a philosopher is discovered to be a choice that trumps all other concerns since it has to do with man's life under the gods in the heaven from which our souls came, the region emblematized for the duration of this final discussion by the cicadas listening overhead. Socrates's response to Phaedrus consists first of deflating his interest in rhetoric by comparing it with this higher activity and second, once Phaedrus shows a desire to abandon rhetoric, of treating him to a series of eloquent conceptualizations and images that exemplify, corroborate, and redeem these conclusions. The cognitive power of these outbursts of eloquence at the end make Phaedrus's conversion and acquiescence dramatically verisimilar, exactly for the way that they outstrip the set manners of exhortation that we had met in the First and Second Speeches.

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Translation of Plato's Phaedrus

Friend Phaedrus, where are you off to, and from where?[15]

"From Lysias,[16] Socrates, the son of Cephalus; and I'm going[17] for a walk outside the city wall. I've been sitting there studying[18] all morning. But I'm following the advice of my friend and yours, Acoumenos, and taking my walk along the byways: he says they're less enervating[19] than walks on city streets."

Yes he's right – but get back to Lysias:[20] I gather[21] he was up in town?[22]

"He's at Epicrates's – at that house near the Olympian Temple of Zeus that belonged to Moruchus."[23]

And so what was the *work* you were doing? Are you going to make me guess[24] that Lysias was

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15 ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν (227A1): N.B. Here as elsewhere I have adopted the typographic device of placing only the remarks of Socrates's interlocutor in quotes.

Socrates's double question asks whether is he getting away from something or is hastening toward something and stresses that he is in motion. The expression is perfectly idiomatic (cf. Ast *ad loc.* and *Lys.*203A6-B1) but soon there will be other suggestions about desire and aversions that are harder to explain away as unrelated to this picture of him, not to mention suggestions and positive expressions of desire that are not explained by the characters to each other.

16 πρὸς Λυσίου (A2): He will answer the questions in reverse order, first πόθεν (this is natural: cf. *Lys.*203B2) – but Lysias is a person not a place!

17 πορεύσομαι δέ (A2-3): The second question (ποῖ) will receive a more complete answer in the sense that it gets not only a place but a verb; but then the place (πρὸς περίπατον) dissolves into that verb: where he is going is for a walk.

18 διέτριψα (A4): Here is the interesting fact. διέτριψα already suggests Lysias was presenting a lesson: cf. *Lys.*203E7 and 204A2.

19 ἀκοπωτέρους (A6): There's something of a double negative in this desideratum: one could simply relax – but this in a sense is just what Phaedrus wants a break from: even leisure, that is, may be tedious! He goes on about Acoumenos not because he is a valetudinarian (*pace* deVries and Robin [cf.n.1499]) but in order to put off telling Socrates about Lysias.

20 ἀτὰρ Λυσίας (B2): With ἀτάρ (much stronger than ἀλλά) Socrates forcefully discards the side issue to return to the most interesting fact: *Lysias*, whom Phaedrus also placed first (by his metonymy in which the place becomes Lysias) but then suppressed in order to tease Socrates.

21 ὡς ἔοικε (B2-3): Socrates feigns to be discovering only by inference the most interesting fact, which Phaedrus had attempted to present as if in passing.

22 ἐν ἄστει (B3): Socrates remembers, and reminds us, that Lysias is a metic from the Piraeus like his father, Cephalus. As a non-citizen he cannot own property in Athens and cannot participate in political assemblies at Athens, though he can (and in fact does) write speeches for citizens who do.

23 Phaedrus now divulges *more* details than necessary rather than less. Epicrates may be the πολιτικός mentioned by Aristophanes at *Eccl.*71, a "notorious and venal demagogue" (Rogers *ad loc.*). Without further explanation we are left to presume he is a client of Lysias's, though it is also likely that he is the Epicrates later prosecuted for embezzlement in *Lysias* 27. His house retains the name of its previous owner (Moruchus) because of its, and the previous owner's, notorious opulence (for which cf. Ar.*Ach.*887, *Pax* 1008-9, *Vesp.*506). This highly suggestive nexus of facts is introduced only to be passed over in silence.

By locating his house in the neighborhood the Temple to Olympian Zeus (πλήσιον τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου), which is beneath the acropolis to the east, and by adding τῇδε, Phaedrus tells us where he and Socrates are standing. Their location in turn anticipates the gate by which they will leave the city and what they will find outside it, namely, the river Ilissus which flowed southeast, outside of the city.

24 ἢ δῆλον ὅτι (B6): Socrates moves on to the most attractive issue, the "lesson" (διατριβή) that Phaedrus was boasting he was so lucky to be tired out by.

regaling the company[25] with a feast[26] of his speeches?

"You'll get a version of it[27] if you have the leisure to come along[28] and listen."

What? Don't you imagine I would[29] count this work you and Lysias did together[30] "a thing higher still than all my other duties" as Pindar[31] says?

"Lead on, then."

If you would speak on![32]

"Come to think of it,[33] it will suit you particularly well to hear it. Let me tell you[34] that the speech we were working on was a "lover's speech" but in a confusing and amazing way.[35] Lysias has depicted[36] a man seducing a beauty,[37] but mind you not by a lover. In fact this very point was managed

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25 ὑμᾶς (B7): Socrates presumes a plurality of persons were present though Phaedrus speaks only of his own experience, more akin to the picture Socrates sketches below, 228A6-B5 (cf. n.47).

26 εἰστία (B7): The notion of a feast of argumentation is a commonplace in the dialogues (cf. 236E8; *Gorg*.447A5-6, 522A3; *Rep*.352B3, 354A10 and B1-3, 571D7-8; *Soph*.251B6; *Tim*.27B8), and subsequently (cf. Ast *ad loc*.), but here it bears the special connotation that Socrates envies Phaedrus for being privy to the event, just as Phaedrus wants him to. Compare the use at *Lys*.211C11.

27 πεύσῃ (B8): πυνθάνεσθαι is the formulaic term for asking for hearsay information, and for getting it (231E4 and my note to *Rep*.328E2). Quickly Socrates brings Phaedrus to the point.

28 προϊόντι (B8): He needs more than leisure to hear it: he needs to come along with Phaedrus! Phaedrus gets the upper hand by putting Socrates in the position of watching him unwind from hard work that Socrates was not privy to.

29 Reading ποιήσασθαι (B10), called for by ἄν. Its inferior ms. authority is offset by its presence in *Oxy.Pap*. (*apud* Robin).

30 τὸ τεήν τε καὶ Λυσίου διατριβήν (B10-11): With his artful alternation between the possessive adjective and the possessive genitive, and by connecting them with τε καί, Socrates depicts the "work" Phaedrus has had the great privilege of doing as a tête-à-tête between them – which is exactly what Phaedrus had wanted him to imagine, and envy.

31 Socrates has in mind the opening vaunt of *Isthmian* 1:

> Μᾶτερ ἐμά, τὸ τεόν, χρύσασπι Θήβα,
> πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον
> θήσομαι.

Socrates borrows the term πρᾶγμα from Pindar, as Burnet notices by his spacing, but also the Doric form of the possessive pronoun, τεήν (B10).

32 λέγοις ἄν (C2): We are left to recognize on our own that they now walk out of the city together, for there is no narrator in this dialogue (cf. further n.96). With their statement and response a deal has been struck (as again at 261A). Socrates will pay for the privilege of hearing by coming along for the walk, no matter how wearisome or relaxing it might be. It is with great art that Plato contrives to reach, so quickly and yet with such dense nuance, the dramatic motivation for the ensuing dialogue; but Socrates always makes it easy for Plato, as he also does for the interlocutors and for us, since we can rely on him to do almost anything to engage in a worthwhile conversation. It will be part of the business of this dialogue finally to teach us why he is such a lover of speeches. The very subjects of this dialogue are speeches and love. Those who knew him, either by having been a partner in such a discussion or by witnessing one, inherit a version of this desire from Socrates. After he is dead the one man will consent to tell the other about a conversation he had been witness to; the moment he agrees to go to the trouble, either of them might say to the other, "There is nothing, after all, that I would rather discuss than Socrates, whether telling or listening" (cf. *Phaedo*, *init*.; *Symp*., *init*.).

33 καὶ μήν ... προσήκουσα γέ σοι (C3): The collocation καὶ μήν ... γε, following upon the agreement (cf. prev. n.), initiates his telling of the tale in a "I'm glad you asked me that question" sort of way, with a *captatio benevolentiae* that feigns to have just now realized that the speech, an ἐρωτικὸς λόγος, will be particularly interesting to his present audience, Socrates, who as everyone knows is an "erotic." That Socrates is an "erotic" he freely confesses to many (*Charm*.154B,C; *Lys*.204B; *Symp*.177D, 212B; X.*Symp*.3.3, 8.13; *Mem*.2.6.28, and indirectly here, in his response to Phaedrus: cf. n.883), but what his confession means is less widely and less easily understood (as Alcibiades learned, *Symp*.219Bff). The question will receive its fullest answer ever in the present conversation, and already we are given a hint below when he confesses without demur a desire to hear a speech even if it does not pertain to him. For this idea cf. *Tht*.169B5-C3.

34 τοι (C4) confesses, or presumes, intimacy: "frankly."

35 οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον (C4-5) expresses admiration *despite* uncertainty as at 265B6 (cf. *Meno* 86B5, where Socrates surprises Meno [and himself: B6] by proving the immortality of soul as a corollary to his guess that learning must be

with particular subtlety: he argues[38] that one must grant favors to a person who does *not* desire him rather than to one who does!"[39]

Lysias, what a master you are![40] If only he had written that one ought do it for a man who had no money rather than rich man, and for an older than a younger, and made a similar case for all the other attributes most of us are beset with! With t*hat*[41] kind of subtlety[42] his arguments would be beneficial to society at large! Still,[43] I desire[44] to hear it so much that if your walk takes you all the way to Megara and you walk along the wall as Herodicus prescribes[45] before making your way back, there's no way I'll be left behind.

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recalling [cf. also Thompson *ad loc.*], *Gorg*.513C4-6, and ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ, 257B5). Compare Latin *nescio quid* and the French noun *je ne sais quoi*, and Engl. *ad Leg*.667A and 673A4. Phaedrus was *titillated* by the speech.

36 γέγραφε (C5): The perfect chooses to describe the composition in terms of its effect on the audience, and Phaedrus in particular. The verb is made to govern indirect discourse with participle on analogy with the use of ποιεῖν describing what the poet "makes happen" and with it carries the connotation of vivid representation ("*repraesentatio*" in the original sense). Compare the participial construction with τιθέναι at *Rep*.572DE, and contrast Socrates's construction below with ὡς (C9), which relocates the accent back to the content or theme or thesis of the speech.

37 πειρώμενόν τινα τῶν καλῶν (C5), the special language of erotic relations, with its vague, indirect, and understated diction that cloaks a very specific content: πείρασθαι = seduce (cf. Ruhnken, *Tim.Lex*.210); καλός τις = a "beauty," an attractive boy (see further n.267); ἐραστής = not a lover but the initiator of sexual contact; χαρίζεσθαι = to grant sexual favors (cf. schol. *ad loc*., Ruhnken *Tim.Lex*.274); πρᾶγμα and πράξαι denote the sex act (cf. n.123); τυχεῖν means to succeed at seducing, to "score" (cf.n.152).

38 λέγει (C7): The subject may be ὁ λόγος γεγραμμένος, or it may be Lysias by a sort of metonymy with which are are quite familiar, since we often hear that "Plato says" something.

39 To persuade the boy to grant favors while denying to love him seems to impose on the speaker an extra burden and to call for something of a *tour de force*. But in addition to the technical challenge there is the unstated psychological advantage that the speaker can proceed with his suit immune to the embarrassment of being turned down after confessing his love. This is why the speech is epideictic (it is for Lysias's professional audience) rather than deliberative (it is not for the boy). It is this mixture of virtuosity and invulnerability that underlies Phaedrus's first remark that the speech seemed erotic to him in a way he cannot describe (οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον ἐροτικός, C4-5). Cf. "Analysis of the First Speech: Setting," *infra*. We do not know whether μᾶλλον ἤ means rather than (i.e., instead of) or more than.

40 ὦ γενναῖος (C9), reading ὦ with B. On ὦ with nominative Smyth (§1288) is unilluminating; and the remark in LSJ that ὦ is used with the vocative but ὤ with the nominative is circular (How do we know the two ω's mean the same thing, in the first place?). Phaedrus's striking report makes Socrates imagine the ingenuity of Lysias himself appearing before him, and addresses him directly though he is absent (cf. also n.204). The theme of the author's half-magical presence in his work continues. γενναῖος means "gutsy:" cf. οὐκ ἀγεννῶς, 264B6 and *Rep*.414B9 and my n. *ad loc.*

41 ἦ (D1) plus optative continues the notional modality begun with εἴθε (C9) plus optative: "How much better the world *would be* if my *wish* came true!"

42 ἀστεῖοι (D1) brings forward κεκομψεύσεται. The connotation is like English "rich" in the sense of suggestive (cf. 242E5 and *Lys*.204C4 with their respective elaborations); the segue to δημοφελεῖς exploits its etymology of ἀστεῖος to make a little joke. If Lysias directed his cleverness as an orator toward persuading a boy to gratify not only himself, despite his claim he lacks desire for him, but also to gratify men who lack money or good looks *instead* of lacking love (not in addition to, *pace* Hackforth), his oration would be a public service since most men, like himself, lack these things but certainly do not lack desire. Of course this only means that Socrates wishes to get the same thing the speech is seeking, but he is frank about it: he confesses he is no more attractive than anybody else in a crowd at the same time that he confesses he is the "lover" Phaedrus assumed him to be, above. He has ignored, or feigned to ignore, the fantasy of invulnerability one entertains in claiming he does not desire the boy. Note that he has taken μᾶλλον ἤ to mean "instead of."

43 ἔγωγε οὖν (D2): The γε is limitative and the οὖν connective, *pace* Vollgraff *ad loc.*

44 ἐπιτεθύμηκα (D2): The perfect, continuing the conceit of Phaedrus's γέγραφε (C5, with n.36), is "intensive." Socrates confesses without let that he is possessed by a desire to hear the speech even though he has forgone hoping to use it, for while he lacks wealth and youth he does not lack desire.

45 κατὰ Ἡρόδικον (D4) is perhaps the newfangled physical trainer Socrates satirizes in the *Republic* (406A5-B8) for teaching his patients to be valetudinarians. Surely Phaedrus's fastidiousness about relieving the tedium of σχολή with a

"Are you kidding? that *I* should present *Lysias*?[46] It's a speech (228) he took a long time to compose, and he did so at his leisure – and mind you he's the most clever writer alive. Am I, a mere amateur, to reproduce it from memory in a way at all worthy of his skill? Far from it – though I sorely wish I could, more even than I would wish to come into a heap of gold."

O Phaedrus, if I don't know you I have forgotten my very self. But neither is true, I'm sure. To the contrary: I know that when the Phaedrus I know had a chance to hear a speech from Lysias he was not satisfied to listen to it just once but would constantly interrupt and then tell him to go through it again, and Lysias in turn would gladly comply. But even then my Phaedrus would not be satisfied. Before it was all over he would take hold of the very book and paw over the parts he particularly liked, and spend the whole morning at it without even getting up, so that he would finally have to call it quits and go out for a walk – but even then, by the Dog, I just know he'd start trying to commit the speech to memory if it wasn't too long.[47] Off he would go outside the walls of the city to practice it – and Lo! Suddenly he encounters[48] the man who is love-sick[49] to hear speeches and it

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leisurely walk in the country coddles the same contradiction Socrates there uses to describe the prescriptions of Herodicus's νοσοτροφία. The reference back to Phaedrus's opening evasive remark about "needing a walk" closes this opening round and casts all dramatic focus onto the speech Phaedrus is now about to share.

46 οἴει με ἃ Λυσίας κτλ. (227E6-228A1): Again Phaedrus places Lysias's name early (cf.227A2), and near his own pronoun, creating an untranslatable prolepsis. He builds him up at the same moment he suddenly claims himself to be unable to present the speech. Now that he has succeeded at enticing Socrates to let him deliver the speech he suddenly discovers he has the initiative to decline to do so! Moreover, he hopes to entice Socrates to insist that he do exactly what he claims he cannot do (recite it by heart), despite the fact that as we shall presently learn he has a copy of the speech inside his cloak. This is the behavior Socrates calls τρυφᾶν below (C2), and it is of a piece with the titillation he feels, and perhaps wishes Socrates to feel, at the prospect of being able to deliver a speech that would seduce a boy without revealing he wants him.

47 εἰ μὴ πάνυ τι ἦν μακρός (B5): Socrates is speaking from the perspective of Phaedrus as he imagines it, including his over-eager optimism and his sense of being the only student present for the demonstration (though cf. ὑμᾶς, 227B7).

48 ἀπαντήσας δέ (B6), aorist aspect, amidst durative verbs, to mark a transition in the narrative as ἀπειπών did (B3). This is the moment the dialogue actually began. Originally we had the impression that Socrates ran into Phaedrus rather than the other way around: Phaedrus had *us* fooled, too!

49 τῷ νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν (B6): Surely read τῷ with all mss., against Stephanus's indefinite τῳ (*pace* Thompson). Socrates is describing Phaedrus's thought from the inside (note the optatives in secondary sequence and the extraordinary anaphora of ἰδών), and the article has the essentially referential meaning noted by Gildersleeve at §666 ("Aha! that *sick* man!" Phaedrus says to himself). We have already seen Phaedrus express his awareness and interest in Socrates's "sickness" above (προσηκοῦσά γέ σοι, 227C3 and n. *ad loc.*). That ἔρως is a sickness (cf. ἐραστοῦ, C2) is something of a commonplace (cf. ὁμολογοῦσι νοσεῖν, 231D2 and the ἀναγκαῖον at 236B1; *Symp.*207A9-B1) – whether and how this is really true will become a central theme in this conversation. With the pleonasm λόγων ἀκοήν Socrates has Phaedrus stress to himself that it is not only speeches that Socrates loves, but also listening to them, which is the main point for himself.

dawns on him:[50] "Here is a fellow Corybant[51] to bring along!" So he told him to lead the way.[52] But when this lover of speeches asked him to recite it he acted coy and, if you can believe it, he made as if he had no desire at all to recite! And yet in the end[53] he was ready to force the man to hear it whether he wanted to hear it or not. And so, dear Phaedrus, ask the Phaedrus I know to go ahead and do what he was going to do anyway.

"For me – the real me – the best course of action[54] would be to go ahead and recite the thing as best as I can: clearly you aren't going to let me loose[55] until I have delivered it as well as the occasion will allow."[56]

And you've guessed right.[57]

"And so I will do it: I do confess,[58] Socrates, I am far from having memorized the speech word for word, but as to the development of its thought on each specific point, by which he distinguishes between the situation of the lover and that of the non-lover – I will go through them heading after heading giving you each argument one after the other,[59] starting from the first ..."[60]

Not until you've shown me,[61] my friend of friends, what it is that you have there in your left

50 ἰδὼν μέν, ἰδών (B7), continuing the aoristic aspect of ἀπαντήσας. μέν in the voice of the narrative calls for the next step, but the extraordinary repetition of ἰδών breaks the flow (*Rep*.608B4 is a grammatical parallel with a very different emotional effect; cf. with Heitsch, E.*Alc*.398,400; *Med*.1252; *Hipp*.1124; and A.*Ach*.971, *Nub*.818). Socrates as sympathetic narrator (A5-6) feels the significance of seeing him dawning on Phaedrus, in a "double-take." Not only somebody but just the right somebody has come into view (cf. Quintilian on this figure of *geminatio*: "*alterum est enim quod indicat, alterum quod affirmat*," 9.3.28). The significance is that he can practice the speech on the uncontrollably willing listener, Socrates, who is therefore an indispensable audience exactly because he is dispensable. Phaedrus's eagerness to be able to deliver the speech without having to persuade his audience to listen is parallel, as riskless, to the non-lover seducing the beloved without having to confess that he desires him.

51 συνκορυβαντιῶντα (B7): What are we to think Socrates means by this? Somehow he is likening both listening to and delivering speeches to an ecstatic Corybantic frenzy. From the little we know about the Corybants, the frenzy seems to involve becoming possessed by a god and freed thereby from the confines of personal ego. By adding the prefix (σύν-) Socrates suggests that the activity of listening and hearing, of giving and receiving, could be a fully occupying *shared* enjoyment, without obstruction from the corrosive and toxic mechanisms of exploitation and defensiveness. Cf. συνεβάκχευσα, 234D5.

52 προάγειν ἐκέλευε· δεομένου δὲ λέγειν (C1). The verbs quote exactly the exchange at 227C1-2, indicating that in Socrates's opinion Phaedrus's mincing begins with his description of the διατριβή (C3-8).

53 τελευτῶν (C2), as at B1.

54 κράτιστον (C6), of the "winning" course of action (cf.272B2), announces a decision or resolution.

55 ἀφήσειν (C7): Phaedrus expects Socrates will force him to recite and Socrates expects Phaedrus will force him to listen (βίᾳ, C3). What are the compulsions driving them?

56 ἀμῶς γέ πως (C8) is formulaic. The poet casts about in aporia and only with the aid of the Muses finds the place to begin (compare ἐνθένδε ποθὲν at *Euthyd*.275C5-D3 and *Symp*.178A7, and the elaborate conceit of the nuptial number with which the Muses begin their account in Book Eight of the *Republic*: 545Dff). With this formula Phaedrus suggests he will improvise the speech without consulting the text.

57 δοκῶ (C9): The retort stresses that Phaedrus knows his Socrates just as Socrates knows his Phaedrus.

58 γάρ (D1) is "programmatic:" see n.60.

59 Reading ἕκαστον (D4) with mss. TW and Oxy.Pap. (om. B), read by Burnet and Robin. He already betrays his sense, or the fact at least, that the coming speech has an episodic structure. Compare Isocrates's use of κεφάλαια at *Antid*.68 to describe his similarly episodic and loosely woven exhortation to Nicocles.

60 Starting with programmatic γάρ the paragraph by degrees reveals itself to be another exordium (cf. n.33). The confession that he does not have the speech by heart (ῥήματα) provides foil for the assertion that he nevertheless does have the sense (διάνοια: cf.*Ion* 530B10, C4; *Lys*.205B2) – indeed virtually every detail (σχεδόν alongside ἁπάντων indicates that though he might not have the *ipsissima verba* he does have the *ipsissimae res*) – and this assertion in turn provides him an opportunity to give a prothesis, a statement of what is to come, namely, that the thesis will be proven by a series of comparisons. ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου is a programmatic formula, as Jowett saw (tr. "Let me begin at the beginning"). He has suddenly made his segue to the first of these comparisons and the speech has in fact begun.

61 δείξας γε πρῶτον ... τί ἄρα (D6): Socrates interrupts (with γε) the speech that Phaedrus has begun, and ἄρα conspires by adding a tone of realism to pull Phaedrus up short.

hand under your cloak. I'm guessing it's the speech itself,[62] and if it is I'll tell you what I will do.[63] Despite my friendly feelings for you, if Lysias himself is here[64] I wouldn't even consider[65] turning myself over to you to be practiced upon! So come on, show me what you have.[66]

"I give up![67] You've dashed my hopes to practice on you![68] – Where would you like to sit down so we can read it?" (229)

Let's come off the path and make our way down to the Ilissus, and then we'll stop when we find a quiet place.

"It's lucky I'm going barefoot – though it goes without saying you are, since you always do. This way it will be easier to pick our way along the stream, not to mention the pleasure of it, especially given the season and the time of day we find ourselves here."

Lead on, then,[69] and keep an eye out where we might sit down.

"Aha! Do you see that plane tree, taller than all the others?"

Yes I do.

"It's a shady place, with a moderate breeze, and there's grass to sit on, or lie on if you want to."

Please do lead the way!

"But say, Socrates, wasn't it from somewhere around here along the Ilissus, that Boreas spirited Oreithuia away, according to the tale?"

That's the tale.[70]

"But do you think it was from *just*[71] this place? How pleasing after all,[72] how pure and clear are the waters – just the sort of place you might find maidens at play."

No. Downstream a-ways, maybe two or three hundred yards, where one makes the crossing over to the area of Agra. In fact I think there is a monument[73] to Boreas there.

"I can't quite picture it.[74] But tell me Socrates, would you swear[75] that this little tale is true?"

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62 τὸν λόγον αὐτόν (D7): I.e., a codex, another expression evincing the ambiguous "ontology" of the speech. We might compare the way αὐτός in Homer is used of the *corpse*.

63 οὐτωσί (D8), in retort to Phaedrus's οὐτωσί above (D1).

64 παρόντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίου (E1): Again (cf. 227C7), is the speech speaking or Lysias?

65 οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται (E2): For the perfect of δοκεῖν to designate a foregone conclusion compare *Rep*.450A5.

66 δείκνυε (E2): The present tense countenances that Phaedrus might bring it out slowly or reluctantly.

67 παῦε (E3): Phaedrus retorts with another present. Rowe (*ad loc.*) hears the "submission" of the wrestler.

68 ἐν σοὶ ὡς γυμνασόμενος (E4): The "exercise" Phaedrus refers to is *live delivery* of a written speech, the activity of which Alcidamas tries to make so much in his self-advertising pamphlet περὶ τῶν τοὺς γραπτοὺς λόγους γραφόντων, making the claim that unlike certain "sophists" he teaches not only how to write within the safe confines of one's study (ἐν πολλῷ ... χρόνῳ ... καὶ κατὰ σχολήν, §4: cf.228A1), but also live delivery in public with necessary adjustments *ex tempore*. For ἐν σοί cf. *Phlb*.21A4.

69 πρόαγε δή (229A7) marks the completion of the phase of the action that began when it was Phaedrus that said these same words, at 227C1. The tables have turned and Socrates has set the agenda; but as usual it is not he himself that will speak.

70 λέγεται γάρ (B6): γάρ indicates that Socrates's answer is merely "Yes." γε would have cast doubt on the proposition.

71 οὖν (B7) "focuses." The form of the question shows that Phaedrus has conflated two points, whether the story asserts it happened here and whether what the story asserts happened here. His confusion is an index of how impressed he is by the scene, which he expresses with his next remark. Meanwhile a statue of Boreas stealing away Oreithuia was erected in Delos where the wind blows all but ten days a year.

72 γοῦν (B7) of "part proof" (Denniston) shows his inference is not logical but verisimilar. The list is an "elegant triad" (cf. *Rep*.398A4-5 and my n. *ad loc.*) favoring amplitude over inner logic.

73 καί πού τίς ἐστι βωμός (C2). Socrates acquiesces, carelessly, in the customary interpretation, even if colorless, as commemorated by the marking monument.

74 οὐ πάνυ νενόηκα (C4).

75 πρὸς Δίος (C4): The invocation means "all kidding aside." Socrates's assertion it happened somewhere they cannot see, added to his deflationary and indifferent factual tone (abrupt οὐκ, insouciant που) force Phaedrus to recognize the difference between the truth of the story and the verisimilitude of the story, which the enchantment of his

Well, if I took a skeptical attitude towards it the way those clever people do[76] nobody would think me strange; and I could elaborate, in their manner, by saying that what happened to her was that a blast of Borean wind thrust her down into the stream from the rocks where she was playing with Pharmakeia; and that after she met her fate in this way there arose a story[77] that she was "carried off by Boreas" – unless of course it was from the Areopagus.[78] After all there's another story that says *that's* where she was swept away from. But instead my sense is that while this sort of work has its pleasant side, actually to carry it out calls for an awesome intellect, a lot of industry, and in fact a hapless sort of man. Just think after all[79] how he would have to go on to the case of the Hippocentaurs and give an explanation that justified[80] their appearance, and then to the case of the Chimaera and, well,[81] a whole mob of such specimens from Gorgons to Pegasuses and others would rush at him and that he would be brought to his wit's end with the number and range of frightful phenomena[82] he would have to account for.[83] All of that[84] – if he shall attempt to marshall them into a probabilistic explanation[85] and order the items one after the other by a method that is slapdash perforce[86] – that

surroundings had lulled him into overlooking, as we noticed *ad* B7. Inspiration promotes, or allows, the magical thinking that identifies meaning and fact.

76 ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί (C6). To identify whom he might mean pales in comparison with the revolutionary point for which such unnamed persons are serving as the anonymous foil. It is this vocation of Socrates that Cicero will famously praise (*Acad.*1.4.15: *primus a rebus occultis … avocavisse philosophiam et ad communem vitam adduxisse … caelestia autem … censeret … si maxime cognita essent nihil tamen ad bene vivendum*). It is not a Platonic "attack on the rationalists" but Socrates's corrective to the self-forgetting and fascinated romanticism Phaedrus has revealed by asking the same question twice. The answer he gives moreover moots the question whether he "believes" the myth or not, nor has it anything to do with the τύποι περὶ θεολογίας he concocts on the spot in the *Republic* as a response to Adeimantus's complaints about wisdom poetry.

77 οὕτω δὴ λεχθῆναι (C9), λεχθῆναι meaning the same as λέγεται above.

78 ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου (D1) is a complete shock that threatens to make nonsense of what came before; and there will be two more such shocks. The careless addition is consonant in tone with C2 (cf. n.). See next note. Socrates is backing into satire.

79 κατ' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν (D4-5) is virtually equivalent to ἄλλως μέν above (D3): cf. *Rep.*359D8-9, 449B5; *Tim.*48C4. These ἄλλως τε καί type transitions are enabling Socrates to move, abruptly, from one thought world into another very different one.

80 ἐπανορθοῦσθαι (D6), to operate upon them (ἐπί) so as to restore (ἀνά) their original correctness (ὀρθοῦσθαι). The term is approbatory and not ironically so. I take it to be a technical term used by those who practice this exercise. The notion of an original meaning later corrupted with misunderstandings is repeated by Socrates in an approbatory way below (244B6-D5).

81 καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δέ (D7) breaks the order of the list, as δέ warns. καί should be introducing the next item in the list but instead Socrates's act of listing gives way (δέ) to his experience of the beasts flowing and crowding upon him.

82 τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων (E1-2). φύσις sometimes means "creature" in a quasi-scientific, natural-historical, Ionic sort of way, as at *Rep.*588C3.

83 Reading πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι (E1) with all three principal mss. The list (D5-E2) widens by unfolding into a chaos of possibilities, from the individual case of the Hippocentaurs to another exotic individual (Chimaera) to a pair of races of strange cases that are presented (by τοιούτων) as characteristic of exoticism, which then appear to be generalized by καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων, but in fact the καί is introducing not ἄλλων but a new nominative item in the list syntactically parallel to ὄχλος, namely, πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων – a phrase that employs the commonplace hendiadys of quantity and quality with nominalized adjectives that should have modified a general noun but instead function as substantive abstractions (I dub the technique "specious genus" *ad Rep.*485C8) modified by a climactic genitive of substance, τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων. "Cumbrous," *pace* Thompson and his emendation to avoid it, is exactly what this list is supposed to be! For similar shifts in construction caused, as well as carried, by the movement of the sense cf. 239B1-3, D3-4, and 240B3-5.

84 With αἷς (E2) as his connective he can continue to explain and thereby elaborate the expanded list even further without touching down. Cf. 273E5.

85 προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκός (E2): The approbatory and technical term, approbatory for those who describe themselves with it, specifies the ἐπανόρθωσις he alluded to above (D6) and already illustrated in the case of Boreas and Oreithuia.

86 ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ (E3): We are left to strain a bit to understand the justification for this strong language. Much will

would take him a lot of time. But for myself[87] I have no time to spend on that. The reason is this: I have not yet come to know *myself*, as the Delphic inscription commands. How ridiculous it seems to me that a person[88] still ignorant of this should be investigating topics so far-flung! (230) Thus I let all those questions go and simply accept the conventional view about them, as I did just now,[89] and instead I turn my attention to investigating not those things but myself, whether I might be some sort of beast more multifarious and explosive[90] than Typhon, or a tamer and simpler animal, endowed with a divine and humbler element quite foreign to such a beast.[91] But look! We've been talking and walking, but isn't this the very tree you were leading us to?

"This is it."

By Hera the stopping place you've chosen is really beautiful! Here[92] we have our plane tree, leafed out and tall; and over here[93] a caste bush noble and dense. Since it is at the height of its bloom it

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be explained by the surprising study Socrates next describes, for which this description provides the foil; meanwhile, the σοφία in question (C6) will need to be applied *ad hoc* and interminably by the single man to each member of this immense population of fantasies which the list has just portrayed as proliferating beyond all measure. In fact, that is, the operation is not a σοφία at all, as σοφιζόμενος (C7) had already suggested!

87 ἐμοὶ δέ (E4) is something of an epanalepsis of ἐγὼ δέ (D2).

88 ἀγνοοῦντα (230A1). Given the choice between the dative (with μοι) and the accusative (subj. of σκοπεῖν) Socrates chooses the less personal construction in order to generalize the point. Contrast ἔχοντι 231D1, εὐξαμένῳ 279B6 (*pace* Bekker) and compare μυθολογοῦντα 276E3; *Rep*.558A4-8, 565E1, 586E5.

89 ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον (A2-3): This expression is often loose, as when ὅ is adverbial. Here he refers to the fact that he cited the monument as evidence of where the event with Oreithuia occurred, by way of correcting Phaedrus's enthusiastic fantasy (229C2-3). deVries notes the present νομιζομένῳ – *current* belief.

90 ἐπιτεθυμμένον (A4), probably (with LSJ) the perfect of ἐπιτύφομαι but not necessarily. Certainly we should read both mu's with all three mss. ("μ prius in ras. B," reports Burnet) since this ensures that the original stem is τυφ- rather than θυμ-, and preserves the etymological figure Socrates is playing with. He means of course "more Typhonic than Typhon," although both what or who Typhon is (I am attracted to Mr Morrissey's intuition that Typhon caps all the creatures in the previous list as the most unexplainably multifaceted, and would compare *Rep*.588C7-10) and what the verb τύφειν means are unclear. Cf. West *ad* Hes.*Th*.820-80. Most importantly, as we can see from the two pairs of terms (πολυπλοκώτερον / ἐπιτεθυμμένον // ἡμερώτερον / ἁπλούστερον), the point of the etymology is moral and psychological. The first and last show that the four are standing in chiasm so that ἐπιτεθυμμένον is standing in as the contrary of ἡμερώτερον.

91 ἀτύφου (A6): The word is rare. By itself it appears to be a synonym for τάπεινος (from the schol. and from Menander's use of ἀτυφία at fr.304 [Kock]), but in context of course it means "a-Typhonic" at the same time. With this word, as well as πολυπλοκώτερον alluding to the beast's coils, Socrates adumbrates a kind of myth-interpretation of his own, in which the myths make palpable the mysteries of the inner self, rather than giving a bungled description of physical events. The struggle between these two outlooks is perennial, between "demythologization" and "remystification," and finds new terms and a new joinder of issue in the public imagination century after century, sometimes more objective (heliocentricity / geocentricity) and sometimes more subjective (as the interpretation of dreams versus prescribing psychoactive drugs in psychiatry). In a sense the general question is whether mind's role is to free men from anxiety in the manner of Lucretius, or to heal man's alienation in an imperfect world by enhancing his participation in a world more adequate to his intuitions, in the manner of Plato. Here, Socrates articulates the problem by representing himself, and man in general, as living in a tension between what is above him and what is beneath him, between beast and god. The distinction will soon become thematic.

92 ἥ τε γάρ ... αὕτη (B2): τε indicates his account of the place's beauty will include more elements than the tall tree that drew them there from a distance.

93 τοῦ τε ἄγνου (B3): τε adds the next item in the most delicate way, because it alone among the connectives avoids to specify a logical or spatial or temporal connection. Socrates is forming the picture for us with brushstrokes. The article with ἄγνος gracefully provides it a postpositive berth. The shift to the proleptic genitive gives prominence to the fact that the caste-bush (on which cf. Pliny *NH,* 24.38) is in full bloom, which in turn sets into relief the fragrance it provides, complementing the coolness and tranquil shade that the plane tree had provided.

makes the place as fragrant as can be.[94] And here[95] a spring so very pleasant, flowing up at the foot of the tree with its waters fresh and cool, as my toes tell me.[96] Nymphs and Acheloos, I'd guess,[97] have a sanctuary here, from the dolls and trinkets I see left here. Or perhaps you'd want to stress[98] the breeze in this place, how welcoming and very pleasant it is; or how the scorched sound of summer echoes here in the chorus of the cicadas. But the finest[99] of all these things is the grass,[100] how if a man rested his head there he would be so perfectly comfortable.[101] What a job[102] you have done guiding us here!

"And you, my marvelous friend, how very strange you truly are![103] You act as if you were a stranger being guided to this place and not a local! True it is that you make no sojourns outside the

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94 ὡς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον (B5): Compare the telescoping use of optative and superlative at 231A5 and 239B2 and 3.

95 ἥ τε αὖ πηγή (B5-6): Still another τε and another article providing it a berth, this time with αὖ evincing he is conscious of his τε's. A new element will be introduced in turn, and – we might by now expect – a new bodily sense to go along with it: the touch of the skin.

96 ὥστε γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι (B7): Socrates – or Plato – brings forward the remark of Phaedrus about being barefooted, just as he (or they), bring forward his theme of the pleasantness of the waters (χαρίεντα, 229B7) with χαριεστάτη. As for ὥστε, it is the ὡς of ὡς ἰδέσθαι: its τε (*pace* Aristaenetus, Moreschini and Heitsch) is merely "sympathetic" with the one at the beginning of the phrase (ἥ τε αὖ). The intrusion of sensory details into the conversation reminds us that the discussion is taking place at some place and at some time, not just "in the outskirts of Athens one summer late in the Fifth Century" as we learned as we began reading, but in the pre-logical immediacy of space-time that could be anywhere and any place including here and now. The effect is powerful for the way it reminds us that the intentionalist horizon of the speakers' conversation has also become our own, as listeners, and that the conversation falls within the larger horizon of the pre-existing field of reality that we share even with the fictional characters of the dialogue, the horizon within which the results of the conversation will find their worth, if any.

Plato usually uses a narrator to jog us in this way, as for instance when Socrates *tells* us that he can see Hippocrates blushing in shame for having to admit he wants to become a mover and shaker (*Prot., init.*). His blush is unintentional and is external to the argument, but so is the sun which has by just that moment risen enough that Socrates can see it on his face. Thrasymachus also blushes, Socrates tells us – something he had never seen him do – and his struggle to hold his position caused him to break out into a sweat: it was hot indeed that day! (*Rep*.350C12-D3). The blushing in the *Lysis*, on friendship and love, is a thematically significant index of the erotic feelings the characters are trying to hide from each other, as are the charming descriptions of Hippothales hiding in the crowd at 207A7-B7, his unexpressible anxiety at 210E, and Lysis's unintentional blurting out at 213D.

The present case is all the more elegant for the fact that Socrates is not a narrator but is reporting to Phaedrus that the water is cold by putting his foot into it. We can think the water is cold but can't feel it with Socrates; nor can we smell the caste bush, nor hear the cicadas, nor see the visual effect of the plane tree's shade. Moreover, the access of sensory detail does not as usual place the argument into a context that reveals its truer truth, as in the case of the blushes. What importance can, or will, all this sensory detail then have on this argument? We simply must wait and see, and acknowledge that it comes as a relief after the little contest Socrates and Phaedrus have just had, and that this will have something to do with the comfort provided by these surroundings, in the bodily attitude we might take, sitting or lying down (*infra*, E3-4). The imputation of "irony" and "bathos" into this beautiful passage seems to me embarrassed and perverse, and the notion that Socrates is trying to compete with Phaedrus (Harpocration *teste* Hermeias, 32.1-3) seems far-fetched. To the contrary it is the precedent for the *locus amoenus* that subsequently became ensconced in the literary imagination (cf. citations of deVries *ad loc.*).

97 Νυμφῶν τέ τινων (B7), another τε by which to tell, next, what he *sees*. The indeterminacy of τινων conspires with the uncertainty of ἔοικεν at the end of the clause.

98 εἰ δὲ αὖ βούλει (C1) repeats αὖ but varies τε into δέ and elaborates the transition with εἰ βούλει, a formula for transition within foil that we know from Pindar (*O*.1.1-3), where the encomiast chooses from a wealth of praiseworthy things (cf. *H.Maj*.295D4, *Thg*.129A1; and compare Meno's use of it at *Meno* 71E and Socrates's satire of it at 73E3; contrast the quasi-aporetic use at 236D10; and compare related uses at *Rep*.425D1, 432A5, 584B5). Compare the alternate names of a deity invoked (237A7-8, a characteristic of the kletic hymn), and cf. ἐάν, 244B3.

99 πάντων δὲ κομψώτατον (C3), encomiastic climax with superlative, almost the only way such a list can end.

100 τὸ τῆς πόας (C3): The pleonastic formulation provides a berth for elaboration in the manner of the proleptic "lilies of the field." With the pleonasm, or metonymy, compare τοῦ ἄγνου τὸ ὕψος, above (B3-4).

city and off beyond its borders. In fact indeed it seems to me you never pass outside the city's walls!"

Try to see it my way, my good man. It's because I am devoted to learning. The fields and the trees outside the walls by their nature[104] teach me nothing (it's men within the city[105] that do);[106] yet it seems you have found the charm to get me to leave. Like people that lead hungry animals along by dangling a leaf before them or a piece of fruit, you are dangling speeches before me in books,[107] and it seems you'll lead me all across Attica in the process, and anywhere else you might see fit. But now, given the place you've brought me to,[108] my own preference would be to lie down, while you might adopt whatever position you think best for reading and then start to read.

"Here goes:"

> "You already know what my situation is, and how I believe it will be to our advantage that these things should come out this way.[109] I expect,[110] however, that I should not (231) fail to achieve[111] what I am asking for because of this,[112] that I am not

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101 παγκάλως (C4) closes the description and praise by tying the end to the beginning (καλή γε, B2). Phaedrus' prediction about the place (229B1-2) has come true for him and Socrates, regardless of the truth of the story about Boreas and Oreithuia! Moreover, by relocating the accent from how the grass is to how it would feel to a man lying down on it (not just sitting: cf. ἢ ἂν βουλώμεθα, 229B2) Socrates reveals his eagerness to assume the position, himself. As opposed to the blushes and sweatings mentioned above (n.96) the function of all the sensory detail is to inspire the participants: it presents the cause not the effect!

102 ἐξενάγηται (C5), the perfect tense for closure. Phaedrus will continue the metaphor.

103 With δέ γε Phaedrus works up a *retort* to Socrates's metaphor of the ξένος (C5), remembering also Socrates's own use of ἄτοπος at 229C6.

104 οὐδὲν ἐθέλει (D4): A personification of natural tendency, like φιλεῖν (φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, Hktl. B123; cf. *Phlb*.37B6) and ζητεῖν (*Rep*.388E6). Cf. *Soph*.252E9. Stallb. *ad Rep*.370B.

105 οἱ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἄνθρωποι (D5), not πολῖται: Socrates is not distinguishing city and country but men and trees. It is dialogue that he misses outside the city, not politics as the Straussians think. The brunt of his speech in the *Apology*, after all, was to admonish his jurors to act as the same individuals he had conversed with over the decades, rather than blending themselves into an anonymous crowd of public servants judging him on a trumped-up civil charge.

106 μέν (D4): Despite the parallelism between τὰ ... χωρία and οἱ ἄνθρωποι, the μέν (D4) is meant to set up the adversative introduced by μέντοι, not δέ.

107 λόγους ... ἐν βιβλίοις (D8), continuing the ontological paradox of the speech.

108 νῦν δ'οὖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῦρ' ἀφικόμενος (E2), in contrast with all of Attica.

109 The speech begins after it began. That is, Lysias's audience is meant to *hypothesize* that the speaker has already announced his desire to the young man and something of his persuasion. The speech is a display piece for an audience studying oratory, not a deliberative speech addressed to an actual lad. We know the speaker is making an attempt on the young man only because Phaedrus already told us so at 227C5-6.

110 ἀξιῶ (E7) introduces the *demonstrandum* of his speech and thus announces to the young man the strictly preposterous claim that he will discover that he ought to give in, rather than to expect that the speaker will attempt to persuade him.

111 ἀτυχῆσαι (231A1): Characteristically, the erotic sense is cloaked in vagueness. Cf. n.152.

112 The opening of the speech is strikingly vague because of its diction (πραγμάτων, συμφέρειν, γενομένων, ἀτυχῆσαι) and its studied insouciance as to antecedents (ὡς, E6; τούτων, E7; τοῦτο, 231A1 [taken up by ὅτι only afterward]; ἐκείνοις, A2). Other means of obfuscation will be employed in the sequel (e.g., nn.120,122, *infra*): Lysias finesses putting words into the mouth of the non-lover by which he would spell out his "situation" and his reasons for thinking an affair would be advantageous to both himself and the boy, which would not belie his claim not to be a lover; instead he requires his audience, including us, to hypothesize them.

It is not the job of the commentator to paper over the vagueness of such expressions by guessing which possible meaning is actually meant (the task Verdenius took upon himself, because of which he could produce "notes" unaccompanied by an overall interpretation), but rather to acknowledge that the Greek leaves us confused. One of the virtues of Paul Ryan's recent commentary (Norman, 2012) is that he allows things to be unclear, ee.gg. *ad* 237A5 (*n.b.* "ambiguous at this point"), *ad* 238C2, *ad* 241A4, *ad* 249E3-4. In the case of Lysias's speech, ambiguity is a positive device for leading the audience along, as we shall see. I have presented a chapter-by-chapter analysis of the method and structure of the speech, below.

in fact a person who loves[113] you.

"Since when it comes to that sort[114] they have a change of heart at a certain point in time as to whom they should benefit,[115] namely, the moment their desire abates; but for these there is no point in time when their feelings are likely to change.[116] For it is not under compulsion[117] but willingly, as one might determine and choose with a view to his own best interests, that they confer what favors they do, in proportion to what they can afford.

"And again:[118] Those who are in love tend to keep an eye out for how their own accounts have been drawn down by their love affair over against what benefactions they have conferred, and when they factor in the trouble they have taken all along the way,[119] they come to think that they have long since rendered as many favors to their beloved as they need to.[120] But in the case of those who are not in love, they cannot use being in love as an excuse for neglecting their personal welfare, nor count up[121] all the troubles they have had along the way, nor blame their beloved for fallings out with their peers.[122] Since all these evils have been shut out in the case of the non-lover the

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113 οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὤν ... τυγχάνω (A1) is different from οὐκ ἐρῶν τυγχάνω: it would be simply false for him to say he did not at the moment desire the boy since according to the hypothesis of the speech at least this is exactly his motive for speaking – though soon enough his overall strategy of comparison and parallelism will require him virtually to make this claim (οἱ μὴ ἐρῶντες, A6). The speaker suggests a distinction between feeling love (eros) for someone and being someone's lover, as if the latter were a precipitate of the former. Cf. 232D4.

114 ἐκείνοις (A2) treats the lover as a member of a category or group (cf. shift to plural at 233A5) remote from the non-lover's mind, i.e. the sort of person he is not.

115 εὖ ποιεῖν (A6) is another euphemism, for a good that is done *pro quo* (cf. εὐεργάζεσθαι, *Crito* 43A8), just as χάρις or χαρίζεσθαι is a euphemism for granting *sexual* favors (227C7).

116 ἐν ᾧ (A4) is vague, but will be clarified in the sequel. We cannot decide whether it means there is no *amount* of time during which (because a love relationship has no time to precipitate) or no *moment* during the relationship – that is, no distinct stage within a sequence of events. But in the former case the result is only not bad and in the latter it only may not be bad.

117 ὑπ' ἀνάγκης (A4) characterizes the ἐπιθυμία of the lover as a virtually external and involuntary (vs. ἑκόντες) force that causes him to love and will likewise cause him to become unloving once it abates. ἐπιθυμία is being described as being absent in the motivation of the non-lover. For him the motivation is (or more accurately, may be) entirely a matter of deliberate choice and as such is far more reliable. That is, the non-lover is a more reliable lover than the lover!

118 ἔτι δέ (A6): We had learned from what Phaedrus said at 228D3-4 that the speech took the form of a series of comparisons between τὰ τοῦ ἐροῦντος (sc. πράγματα from 230E6?) and τὰ τοῦ μή. We might therefore read into ἔτι that we are moving on to the next comparison.

119 ὅν εἶχον πόνον (A8): The Speaker by a kind of litotes encourages his audience to supply such examples as will make his point: pinings away and anxious moments and the like.

120 τὴν ἀξίαν ... χάριν (B1), ἀξίαν another euphemistic litotes. They feel they deserve a "freebee." χάριν now reverses the terminology since in this case they believe the act would be reciprocation for the favor they themselves had bestowed.

121 ὑπολογίζεσθαι (B4).

122 τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφοράς αἰτιάσασθαι (B4-5): Despite the spoon-feeding homoioteleuton of the three infinitives the diction is maximally abstract and relies on the audience to figure things out by comparing these three items to the three items above: the πρόφασις (an excuse for the lover's own bad behavior) is the total cost he has incurred (κακῶς διέθεντο, A7); ὑπολογίζεσθαι goes with the πόνοι he suffered (repeated from A8, varied with the derogatory plural and now deemed water under the bridge by the perfect participle); and this leaves αἰτιάσαθαι, varying the order, to designate a claim he can make (αἰτία) for reciprocation due to the second thing he had been "watching" (σκοποῦσιν, A7), the total gifts he has given (ἃ πεποιήκασιν εὖ, A8). We are left to reach for the explanation that the διαφοράς must designate complaints that he gave *more* than somebody else did (and τοὺς προσήκοντας would be his *rivals* who, he claims, gave less), or else the sentence means that the good deeds that he has done for the boy have made other beneficiaries (προήκοντας as *family* or *clients*) angry at him so that the boy owes him something.

only course of action open to him is openmindedly and eagerly to do whatever he thinks will please.[123]

"And again: If this is the reason it is worthwhile to prefer the lovers, that it is lovers that are said[124] most particularly to take their beloveds under their wing as friends[125] and are ready both in word and in deed, even at the expense of alienating others, to grant their favors to their beloved, then it is easy to see that to whatever extent that saying is true, it is likewise true that as soon as they become enamored with others they will subsequently prefer them, in turn, even more[126] than these, and clear that if their new beloveds wish it[127] they will now mistreat[128] these, in turn.

"And yet let me ask you, what sense it can make to subject oneself to such an activity[129] with a person beset by a malady[130] that nobody who has the least experience of such things would even try to reverse? After all, lovers themselves acknowledge that they are sick rather than sound of mind, and that they recognize they don't have a level head and just can't control themselves. So when once they *do*[131] come to their senses how could they accept an arrangement they only want when "under the influence?"[132]

"And let me add: If it is from the set of lovers that you were to choose out the best person to be your friend,[133] your pickings would be slim; whereas if this criterion

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123 αὐτοῖς (B6) goes with both πράξαντες and χαριεῖσθαι. πράξαι denotes with characteristically vague understatement the sex act (cf. 231C7; 232D5,E1; 233A2; 234A1, A3), and χαριεῖσθαι corresponds to εὖ ποιεῖν above (A8), the *quid pro quo* for sexual favors. The non-lover will be pleased by the action and will return the favor, open and shut – as if the only attribute he has as a person is the lack of the attribute, lover.

124 φασὶν (C1-2): The subject is indefinite, not the lovers. The verb designates a generally held belief or ἔνδοξον such as those adduced at 231E3-4 or 232B5ff. The lovers would not merely "say" that they are especially friendly to their beloveds – it would be a promise or a protestation in their mouths. On the other hand, an observer of the ardency of a lover would reasonably (but short-sightedly) imagine it will drive him to be a fast friend to his beloved.

125 φιλεῖν (C2) goes beyond ἔρως in the social, political, and monetary advantages the lover-become-friend offers the beloved (cf. 237C8). The semantics of ἀπεχθανόμενοι (C4) conversely denotes the inevitable trade-off according to which the granting of such limited resources to one person always entails their denial to others: one may think of "helping ones friends (φίλοι) and harming one's enemies (ἐχθροί)" as two sides of the same coin. At the same time, the syntax suggests that we compare the "unfriending" of others (ἀπεχθανόμενοι) as co-conditional with gratifying the beloved (χαρίζεσθαι, C4).

126 περὶ πλείονος ποιήσονται (C5) caps περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι (C1), not only with the comparative over the positive degree but also by placing the shoe which previously benefitted the one person, onto the foot of the other, at the first person's expense. This sort of "wrong-footing" is the favorite and constant technique of the speech.

127 ἐὰν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ (C6) spells out what ἕτοιμοί εἰσι meant at C2.

128 κακῶς ποιήσουσιν (C6) spells out ἀπεχθανόμενοι (C3).

129 πρᾶγμα (C7), the vague euphemism for engaging in sexual intercourse.

130 τοιαύτην ἔχοντι συμφοράν (D1), again metonymy for being in love, a characterization standing in for the thing itself that requires us to agree with the Speaker's evaluation (ποῖός ἐστι) in order to understand what he is referring to (τίς ἔστι).

131 εὖ φρονήσαντες (D4): The ἄν, proleptic with ἡγήσαιντο, announces the potentiality of the coming apodosis but the participle rather than a formal protasis reserves, and therefore asserts, that the modality of their coming to their senses is actual and not merely possible.

132 Reading βούλονται (D6) with BTW and defended by Stallb. (*ad loc.*) rather than Stephanus's βούλευονται or Heindorf's βεβούλευνται. Having returned to sanity the men would hardly view their previous behavior as deliberate (compare the crucially rational use of βουλευσαιντο at A5 [and 234B5] and the similarly emotional use of βουλήσονται at 232E7). The passive διακείμενοι ("affected") stands in contrast with εὖ φρονήσαντες.

133 τὸν βέλτιστον αἱροῖο (D6-7): αἱρεῖσθαι and βέλτιστον connote deliberate choice about practical goals, the sorts of benefits exchanged in friendship. For βέλτιστον cf. *Alc.*II 144D, 145C; *Gorg.*463A, 501B; *Phdo.*97D, 99A; *Tim.*48A; Xen.*Cyrop.*5.1.8. The term will figure heavily in the heavily deliberative Second Speech (i.e., Socrates's First Speech)..

were lifted[134] you would be in the position of choosing a person most perfectly suited to yourself[135] from a large group. So, your chances[136] are better that there will be a man worthy[137] of your friendship[138] among these many.

"But perhaps you are deterred by the opprobrium of the conventional outlook and fear the derogatory gossip people might heap upon you. The likelihood, however, is that (232) it is lovers, since they fancy that such action would be envied by others just as they envy it among themselves, who will be aroused by talking and trying to make a visible show to everyone that sees that the troubles they took to win the beloved over had not been in vain; whereas conversely the non-lover, master of himself as he is, will behave according to the dictates of rational deliberation and choose what is best[139] rather than put any stock in the opinion of 'people.'[140]

"And again: It is lovers the people ask about and lovers they watch following their beloved and taking great care to be seen speaking with them so that people will conceive either that they have just completed a tryst or are on the verge of enjoying one, whereas when it comes to non-lovers people will not even set about questioning their motives for being with them, recognizing it is natural that a person converses with someone out of friendship not to mention[141] that it is pleasurable to do so.

"And let me add: If you are apprehensive that it is already difficult for friendships to endure and that in general when a difference arises between friends the trouble that ensues will end up[142] being a problem for both parties, whereas in the special case in which *you*[143] might be placing everything you have into the balance, that the harm[144] that a falling out would amount to for you would be huge, then you would have very good reason to be all the more[145] apprehensive about lovers. Many things bother them,

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134 ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων (D7-8) is not identical to ἐκ τῶν μὴ ἐρώντων, though the groups are co-extensive.

135 τὸν σαυτῷ ἐπιτηδειότατον (D8), the person who is "just right" for you. The term spells out what was only alluded to by βέλτιστον (D6), now stressing the boy's rational self-interest.

136 τυχεῖν (E1) with ἐκ πολλῶν treats the choice between lovers and non-lovers as impersonal and statistical. The "qualitative" interpretations of "few" and "many" are barred (*pace* Rowe) by the absence of definite article with ὀλίγων and πολλῶν.

137 τὸν ἄξιον (E1) refers back to ἄξιον at the beginning of the argument (B7), again putting the shoe on the other foot as περὶ πλείονος (C5) had, in reference to περὶ πολλοῦ above (C1), so as again to conclude that the opposite of the thesis under review is even truer than the thesis.

138 φιλίας (E2), a euphemism for the choice to grant sexual favors (contrast the use of φιλεῖν [C2], used there to set up the contrast with ἀπεχθανόμενοι, C3). It is used here to pair up with ἐπιτηδειότατον, the *quid* of rational good that the *quo* of his grant of love might secure him.

139 τὸ βέλτιστον ... αἱρεῖσθαι (232A5-6). That the mere absence of erotic compulsion will eventuate that a man will do the best thing is flatly and implicitly assumed, in the manner of forensic argument, as if the opponent, eros, were the only evil.

140 ἀνθρώπων (A6) repeats, so as to cancel the authority of, ἀνθρώπων at 231E4.

141 δι' ἄλλην τινὰ ἡδονήν (B4-5), with ἄλλην adverbial. Among the sane, conversing is an end in itself. An ulterior motive for being (seen) in conversation does not need to be sought.

142 Reading καταστῆναι (B7) without the ἄν inserted by edd., which represents a gnomic aorist indicative in the "original" *oratio recta* (for which cf. E4-5; 233A2), while the genitive absolute διαφορᾶς γενομένης represents a vivid subjunctive protasis with ἄν. It is a present general condition.

143 Reading σοῦ (perispomenon, C1) against mss. because it is the fulcrum of the δέ-clause. To accent σοι in the next line (Yunis, Ryan, Hackforth, Ast) does the job too late and moreover is mooted if we accent this σοῦ. Compare οὔτε ... τῷ λαμβάνοντι / οὔτε σοί, 234C1-2.

144 In this second case – the δέ clause (C1-2) – the condition is ideal rather than general, προεμένου representing the optative in protasis and γενέσθαι ἄν (ἄν doubled with proleptic μεγάλην) representing the potential optative in apodosis.

145 μᾶλλον (C2), "more" than in the usual case (ἄλλῳ μὲν τρόπῳ, with ἄλλος adverbial), and by implication more than in

and everything,[146] they think, happens only to harm[147] them. This is why they are driven to direct their beloved away from associations with others – fearing as they do that men who have wealth will outdo them in lavishness, and that men who are educated will have wits more overwhelming[148] than their own. In general if a man has any other good to offer they thwart whatever it might enable him to do. Once they have persuaded you[149] to become estranged from all these, they bring it about that[150] you are completely devoid of friends, whereas in case you do keep an eye on your own interests and keep a more level head than they, you will find yourself coming at odds with them as well.[151] On the other hand, those who got their way[152] though they are not in love with you and who achieved what they asked for out of virtue[153] instead, would[154] not begrudge you the presence of companions but instead would despise those unwilling to associate with you, with the attitude[155] that by those you are being overlooked and neglected, while by your companions you are being benefitted. Thus both parties[156] have much greater hope[157] that their affair[158] will end in friendship rather than hatred.[159]

"And let me add: Although the majority of lovers desire[160] the body before they come to know the character or have met the family besides,[161] so that they have no idea whether they will still wish to be friends when the time comes about that their desire abates, (233) when it comes to those who are not lovers, if they had been

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friendships with "others" (cf. 231D8), i.e., non-lovers.

146 πάντα (C4) caps πολλά (C3).

147 βλάβῃ (C4) echoes βλάβην (C2), but it has now come to denote grounds for bothersome complaint rather than real loss.

148 μὴ συνέσει κρείττους γένωνται (C7-8). They fear not that the beloved will *learn* more from them but will be *overpowered* by them, which is the fear of the ignoramus: cf. *Rep.*547E1, 548A1-2.

149 σὲ (D2): From time to time the speaker momentarily addresses his hypothetical interlocutor directly. Cf.232B5, 233A4-5, B6, C6; 234A1; and throughout the peroration (234B1-C5).

150 καθιστᾶσιν (D2) brings forward καταστῆναι (B7), again in a wrong-footed way (cf. n.137). For the usage cf.*Phlb.*16B7.

151 διαφοράν (D4) wrong-footedly echoes διαφορᾶς (B6). Disagreements might plague any friendship; but in the very act of trying to *maintain* your friendship with them you will come into disagreement.

152 ἔτυχον (D4), more of the understated erotic vocabulary, the opposite of ἀτυχεῖν (231A1) and δυστυχεῖν (233B2) and the synonym of εὐτυχεῖν (233B3). Cf.256A5, *Lys.*205E4.

153 μὴ ἐρῶντες ἔτυχον ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν ἔπραξαν (D4-5): The argument again requires us to assume virtuous action is the sole contradictory of the erotic's behavior merely by dint of the forensic posture the Speaker has assumed (cf. n.139). Eventually we will see that this kind of identification of the contradictory with the contrary is a favorite technique of the Speaker. Cf. n.1323.

154 οὐκ ἄν ... φθονοῖεν (D5): Another mixed condition. The (indicative) protasis is taken as a fact and the apodosis (optative) as what the boy having given his favors might expect.

155 ἡγούμενοι (D6) likewise brings forward the ἡγουμένῳ of B5, above.

156 αὐτοῖς (E1) refers not the lovers nor the beloved but to both parties, conceived according to the vision of friendship above (B5-C1) as having a common stake in the success of their association. Again the tables are turned.

157 ἐλπίς (E1): Hope replaces apprehension (δέος, B5) as once again the opposite is made to seem even truer than what we originally thought.

158 ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος (E1), πρᾶγμα again for the activity of making love (cf.231C7).

159 ἔχθραν (E1) extends the sense of διαφορά as used at B6 and D5 (a "falling out" *within* friendship), to the logical outcome of the failure of friendship and its turning into enmity.

160 ἐπεθύμησαν (E4), aorist of repeated or perennially true and therefore generalizable fact: cf. *Gorg.*484A6 and B1; *Phdo.*73D7; *Prot.*342E2; *Rep.*550B5, 551A8, 566E2.

161 ἄλλων (E4) adverbial: cf. *Apol.*36B8; *Euthyd.*289A4; *Gorg.*473D1; *Phdo.*110E5; *Rep.*618A8; *Symp.*191B1. The three elements (τρόπος, σῶμα, οἰκεῖοι) compendiously represent the headings for the three categories of goods (psychic, bodily, external), on which cf. n.291.

friends[162] before they did it it is not the case that because of any enjoyment they might derive they would be any less likely to pursue friendship in addition, but rather that such would remain with them as a reminder of what the future[163] holds.

"And let me add that it is fitting for the sake of your moral improvement[164] that you accept my counsel rather a lover's. In their[165] case, both what you say and what you do they will praise, even against your best interests,[166] sometimes to avoid alienating you and sometimes themselves lapsing in judgment under the sway of their desire. For such are the evidences of Eros[167] at work: when lovers fail at their goal he makes them view things that don't even bother others as permanent afflictions;[168] but when they succeed he exacts from the lover that things hardly worthy of the pleasures served up by the beloved[169] succeed nevertheless[170] to be praised. Thus, if anything, it is more fitting for the beloved to pity them than to emulate[171] them. But if you do accept my counsel,[172] you will find my company does not devote itself to immediate pleasure but in fact[173] to benefits in the future; the company of a man not enslaved to love but master of himself; nor[174] adopting strong hatred because of small things but in the face

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162 τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσι (233A1): By dint of its parallelism with partitive τῶν μὲν ἐρώντων οἱ πολλοί, a partitive sense is carried over that qualifies the syntax of the ensuing relative, οἵ: "for non-lovers on the other hand, *of those that is* who were already friends when they have an affair ..." – for it is not the case that all non-lovers who have an affair were friends previously. Compare the similarly *ad sensum* constructions of τὰ μέν / τὰ δέ and εὐτυχοῦντας / δυστυχοῦντας, below (A7-B1, B2-5: cf. n.169), culminating in the rather forced parallelism that comes after them (οὐδὲ διά … ποιούμενος, C2-5).

163 Again an entire reversal (232E3-233A4): Whereas the lover has physical pleasure that will fail to produce friendship, the non-lover has friendship that will succeed to promise and secure future pleasure. For μνημεῖον as a memorable event rather than a memorial to a memorable event, cf. Ast *ad loc.* and compare μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι (254A6) and n.660.

164 βελτίονι (A4), and βέλτιστον below, bring back the realm of moral betterment achieved through rational deliberation (cf. n.133). The prolepsis causes the attraction into the dative of the leading construction which makes the shift to this subject all the more emphatic. πειθομένῳ – to accept counsel – functions as the passive of βουλεύομαι.

165 ἐκεῖνοι (A5), remote, relative to recently expressed ἐμοί, as at 231A2.

166 καὶ παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον (A6), not "even beyond the amount that is best" (i.e. excessively), but "even *contrary* to your best interests," with βέλτιστον indicating the terminus of the scale of moral betterment (βελτίονι, A4).

167 ὁ Ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται (B2): The expression personifies Eros (Love).

168 λύπη is capped by ἀνιαρά (B3): What others would not even notice as a symptom, the lovers take as an incurable disease. Cf.232C3-4.

169 παρ' ἐκείνων (B4): The demonstrative re-refers to the lovers who were called ἐκεῖνοι at the beginning of the capital (A5), as being still remote from the present and familiar non-lover who is speaking.

170 ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν (B4-5): Love exacts that the dishonorable treatment achieve (τυγχάνειν) praise in payment for the lover achieving his gratification (εὐτυχεῖν).

171 ζηλοῦν (B6), in the context of moral betterment (βελτίονι γενέσθαι), alludes to an expectation of benefit from the elder providing the younger with a model to emulate. Again, the lover not only fails, but succeeds only to bring about the very opposite outcome. Just why the beloved should emulate the man he gratifies has been left out: presumably it mustn't be because he loves him back!

172 Accepting ἐὰν δ' ἐμοί (B6) with the Marcianus gr.186 (conjectured by Heindorf and accepted by Ast, Stallb., Thompson, Vollgraff, Fowler, Rowe, Moreschini, deVries) despite the weightier evidence of ἐὰν δέ μοι in BTW and the Marcianus gr.185 (read by Burnet, Robin, and Yunis). The emphatic pronoun is needed because the μέν / δέ construction herewith resumed had been interrupted by the generalization about the "indicators" of eros.

173 ἀλλὰ καί (B7): The καί might be taken to suggest that μόνον is to be supplied with the οὐ of the first clause – i.e. whether the Speaker is implicitly admitting he will be devoting himself to the present pleasure "also" – but θεραπεύων denotes abject service and the καί in ἀλλὰ καί intensifies the adversative, in the manner of the ensuing clauses and, indeed, everything else he has said.

174 οὐδέ (C2): Note that the δέ, though postpositive to οὐ, links the entire antithesis (οὐ ... ἀλλά ...), not just διὰ σμικρά, to what came before.

of large things slow to anger and sparingly at that,[175] by virtue of forgiving you for unintentional wrongs and of trying to avert you from intentional ones. For these, in turn,[176] are attributes in a man that bode a long-lasting friendship.

"But if[177] you are worried[178] that a strong friendship cannot come about except with a person who finds himself to be in love with you,[179] you ought to reflect on the fact that we would not much care about our sons, then, nor our fathers and mothers, nor would we have friends that are loyal[180] – friends that got that way not from the desire that attends erotic love but from a wholly different class[181] of activities.

"And again: If one ought to grant favors to those who need and beg for them the most, then it is likewise appropriate in general[182] that one ought not to confer benefits on the most virtuous men but on the most destitute. After all, because they will have been delivered from the greatest of evils, they will feel most thankful to those who grant favors to them. And let me add[183] that for dinner parties at home it is not friends that deserve to be invited but those who importunately beg to have their bellies filled. For it is they that will be glad, they that will follow a person all around, they that will come to one's door,[184] and they that will have the greatest enjoyment and feel the greatest thanks; and many goods will they pray the gods to give him.[185] But No! I dare

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175 βραδέως ὀλίγην (C3) caps ἰσχυράν (C2) with an awkward double negation, closing the tricolon of self-praise and ushering in a new circumstantial construction in balanced μέν and δέ (C4-5). The balances are more apparent than real (cf. nn.122, 147, 150, 151) and the word choice inflates the lovers' negotiations to the broader scope of politics and war (cf. Ast *ad* ἀναιρούμενος, C2).

176 τεκμήρια (C6) varies the language of ἐπιδείκνυσθαι (B2) so as to close the argument by proving the converse. As τοιαῦτα there pointed forward, ταῦτα here chiastically points back. The units of the speech are well constructed: it is their relation to one another that is neglected.

177 εἰ δ' ἄρα (C6) connects a new heading (cf. κεφαλαίοις, 228D4) to the previous one by feigning to be reminded of it by the mention of friendship (vs. eros), with which the previous heading had ended. We must distinguish between linking one vaunt to the next with a mere segue, and the continuation of an argument by drawing a further inference. It is the former that is involved here, and again against the edd. we should insert a paragraph break.

178 παρέστηκεν (C6), the metaphor from 232B5, with the subject here left uncharacterized by an appositive predicate like the δέος placed there.

179 ἐάν μή τις ἐρῶν τυγχάνῃ (C7): He has twice referred to being in love as factitious (231A1-2, 232D4), but only this time does he exploit the lurking implication, which he has already presented as an assumption or an observation several times (esp.231B7-C7), that as such it is ephemeral in comparison to friendship.

180 πιστοὺς φιλούς (D2-3) at first appears to be a continuation of the accusatives ὑεῖς, πατέρας, μητέρας, but the adjective begins to break the parallelism and then ἐκεκτήμεθα ousts the regimen of the verb we had thought was being continued. In fact the adjective/noun pair corresponds with ἰσχυρὰν φιλίαν with which this κεφάλαιον began (C7), and that parallelism is then continued by γεγόνασιν in the relative clause (cf. γενέσθαι, C7). The unity of this κεφάλαιον, like that of the one before, is achieved by repeating what came at its beginning. We are getting a heap of well constructed – even epigrammatic – sections, rather than a systematic whole.

181 ἑτέρων (D4), mildly approbative in litotes, as it may likewise be mildly disapprobative in aposiopesis: cf. my n. to *Rep*.379D7.

182 τοῖς ἄλλοις (D6), used adverbially for generalization, as at 232B6. χαρίζεσθαι had implicitly designated granting sexual favors but it, along with δεομένοις, is vague enough to allow generalization. What recommends the behavior (χρή) is that it will be reciprocated, so that the contemplated reciprocation of the person who had been granted favors is called χάριν εἰδέναι (D8).

183 καὶ μὲν δή (D8): For once the transitional formula is used indiscriminately, now *within* a paragraph. The Speaker uses it so freely it pops into his mouth at the wrong time.

184 ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἥξουσι (E3-4): A scene not only of the beggar at your door but also of the abject lover singing a παρακλαυσίθυρον is invoked. The Speaker is suggesting that the lover is a pitiful mendicant, so as to dissuade the Beloved from gratifying him.

185 εὔξονται (E5) is bathos. The sequence of future indicatives (E3-5) is uncharacteristically straightforward and its tone derives entirely from the choice of verbs. Do we wish to be welcomed by such persons on the street, and then

say,[186] it is not appropriate to gratify the most forceful beggar but the man most able to pay for it;[187] not those who merely desire the act[188] (234) but those who deserve it;[189] not any and all who will reap the bounty of your youth but the sort[190] of person that will share with you the goods he has as you grow older; not those who once they have scored[191] use the fact to raise themselves in the estimation of others but the sort of man that has the scruples to keep quiet in the face of everybody;[192] not those who are serious for a short time but the kind that will be unvarying friends through all their lives; and not the ones who will be seeking an excuse for hating you when their desire abates but who, when your[193] youth abates, will reveal[194] their virtue.

"Indeed I say to you,[195] keep in mind what I have said but reflect especially[196] on this. Whereas lovers' very friends chastise them out of the belief that their behavior is evil, non-lovers have never heard a grumble from any of their familiars to the effect that this behavior[197] reflects poor deliberation concerning their best interests.

"Perhaps you would want to ask me whether it is each and every non-lover I am advising you to gratify. My position[198] is that I would advise that no sooner than the lover would suggest you adopt such an attitude toward each and every lover. In the eyes of the recipient[199] such behavior will not deserve as much favor in return; while for yourself, if you want to keep the others in the dark it won't be as easy. Nay, my

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followed around? Do we want them back at our door begging for more? Why after all should they suddenly go from abject hunger to the greatest of enjoyments? What value is their "knowing" thanks (εἰδέναι) if there is no action to go along with it? How many goods shall redound to us by dint of their prayers to the gods?

186 ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως (E5): ἀλλά is uncharacteristically dismissive at the same time that ἴσως voices a litotes. These stretches and strains are prepared by the fulsome exaggerations that came before. The vaguer imperative (χρή) is corrected by a sober prudential policy (προσήκει).

187 ἀποδοῦναι δυναμένοις (E7), in contrast with merely wishing and praying (εὔξονται).

188 Reading the ἐρῶσι (E7) of TW and Pap. Turner7, with Moreschini and Heitsch, over προσαιτοῦσι, the widely accepted conjecture of Ast (1830).

189 τοῦ πράγματος (234A1) can only mean sexual intercourse, confirming that it is the lover that is being cast as a beggar.

190 οἵτινες (A2) is qualitative in contrast with quantitative ὅσοι. Cf. A4 below.

191 διαπραξάμενοι (A3): with δια- a particularly callous expression. Cf. 256C4-5, *Symp*. 181B5; X. *Symp*. 4.18.

192 Rehearsing the κεφάλαιον at 231E3-232A6.

193 Reading παυσαμένου (A8) with Burnet, suggested by G. Hermann (παυσάμενοι BTW Marc. 185 : παυομένης Laur. 2643 [apud Burnet] : παυσαμένης corr. Laur. 85. 12 [apud Moreschini] : παυσαμένοις Winckelmann : *alia alii*). It achieves the best parallelism with παυόμενοι (A7) by means of an orthographically minimal deviation from the unanimous reading of the four oldest mss. The swift syntactical shift into a genitive absolute is offset by the parallelism of its early placement in the balancing second colon.

194 ἐπιδείξονται (B1) associates this remark with the κεφάλαιον in which it was expressed above (233B1-C6).

195 σὺ οὖν (B1) a direct address arrestingly emphatic by its lack of contextuality, to achieve a maximal impact on the person to whom the speech is hypothetically being delivered.

196 τῶν τε εἰρημένων μέμνησο καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι … (B1-2): The τε ... καί sets off the next point (ἐκεῖνο) from all that he has said – it is a virtual ἄλλως τε καί – and therefore lays stress upon it. The "remote" or third person demonstrative aggrandizes the coming point at the same time that it hearkens all the way back to the beginning of his speech, for the point was already made (231A4-6: compare περὶ τῶν οἰκείων βουλεύσαιντο there with τῶν οἰκείων ... βουλευομένοις here). The repetition of antitheses (in particular they are *comparationes per contrarium*: cf. 232D4-7, 233B6-C5, and n. 1553) in οὐδέ ... ἀλλά turns the entire section into a peroration. That these should culminate in a rehearsal of the first κεφάλαιον of the speech is therefore appropriate, but it is only *almost* first, and several of the other κεφάλαια are left out.

197 τοῦτο (B4), even more evasive than πρᾶγμα.

198 ἐγὼ μέν (B7) announces he will answer with a retort rather than an answer.

199 τῷ λαμβάνοντι (C1), vague for the sake of euphemism. The new term is imported in order to cover both a lover and a non-lover. Its object is to be inferred from χαρίζεσθαι.

advice is that no harm of any kind but only benefit should come from the act,[200] and so for both parties.[201]

"For my part, I think I have said enough,[202] but if you feel something is missing,[203] just ask."[204]

"How does the speech seem to you, Socrates? Isn't the manner[205] of its composition superb, especially as to its diction?"[206]

Inspired, indeed, it seemed – so much so that I was stunned.[207] And what produced this experience in me was you, Phaedrus. As you read it your face lit up[208] right before my eyes. As to the matters you ask about I was relying on your expertise[209] and was merely following your lead: all through the course of it I simply joined in the revel as a fellow bacchant,[210] my divine fellow![211]

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200 αὐτοῦ (C4).

201 ἀμφοῖν (C3): Cf. αὐτοῖς (232E1) and n.156 *ad loc.*

202 μοι (C4) is at first redundant, but then we recognize that by its addition the Speaker asserts he himself is satisfied by the speech, giving the Boy a place to reply in turn that he is as well, and in doing so to acquiesce to the thesis and say yes to the Speaker as a sexual partner.

203 Reading εἰ δέ τι (C5) with BT (Heindorf's old conjecture, εἰ δ'ἔτι, though easy, is unneeded) and reading ποθεῖς (*ibid.*) with the Ven.189 (*apud* Burnet, Robin) and Vat.228 (*apud* Moreschini) over ὑποθεις (T) and ὑποθῇς (BW *et* Vat.185 *apud* Moreschini).

204 ἐρώτα (C5): On the question of a pun on ἔρωτα see n.1339. We may take Rowe's suggestion (*ad loc.*), that the imperative addresses both the fictional Addressee and Lysias's actual audience of students, and say that Lysias herewith strips away the fiction of Speaker and Addressee and acknowledges to his actual audience that the whole speech was in truth a workshop exercise for them (cf. n.39). Compare the way Gorgias pulls back the veil at the very close of his Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον by saying with a goofy little rhyme that while for Helen it is an ἐγκώμιον, for himself it is a παίγνιον (DK 2.294.19-20). The way Gorgias there places himself as author alongside Helen his fictional subject, is mirrored by the way Lysias here places his audience alongside his fictional Addressee. The transitional connectives along the way (ἔτι δέ, καὶ μὲν δή), rather than betokening his continual failure to make the discourse continuous, can now be re-read as his means to advert the students' attention to the next sally ("And here is another one"). This is the kind of structure that Phaedrus had suggested the speech had when he described reciting it from memory at 228D4 as ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἕκαστον διιέναι (cf. n.59); and if we go back a bit further we can imagine that Phaedrus as student did still feel the sort of πόθος Lysias mentions (228A7-8).

205 ὑπερφυῶς ... εἰρῆσθαι (C7): By isolating the ὀνόματα from the λόγος (εἰρῆσθαι), Phaedrus more or less consciously distinguishes form from content.

206 τοῖς ὀνόμασιν (C7), the "words." We may presume that Socrates's remark at E7-8 (*n.b.* ὀνομάτων) is meant to describe what Phaedrus is praising. In any event it is not (*pace* Robin, p.12, n.1) the clarity or precision of the words *per se*, for these have been singularly vague. The fine points of word choice are systematically discussed in the Analysis, below.

207 ὥστε με ἐκπλαγῆναι (D1): The passive leaves unclear just what it was that stunned Socrates, which is the question he immediately turns to: that it was Phaedrus and not the speech!

208 γάνυσθαι (D3): The brightening of his face gives a point to Socrates's response (δαιμονίως, in place of Phaedrus's ὑπερφυῶς): a spirit seems to have come into Phaedrus. That his name already means "brighty" has nothing to do with this metaphor, unless he is always that way and got his name because of it, for which we have no evidence at all except that he is always causing speeches, which might be evidence enough, after all.

209 τοιούτων (D5): Again the reference of the demonstrative can be settled by taking into account its "person," which led the speaker to select it (cf. n.1301). τοιοῦτος like οὗτος is second person (vs. the first person ὅδε and third person ἐκεῖνος). Cf. οὕτω, *Gorg.*447A2: "the way *you* are acting."

210 ἑπόμενος συνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σοῦ (D5-6): The immediate reference is to συγκορυβαντιῶντα (228B7). The peculiar joint-ecstasy is continued by συν-, but the intensity has been raised a notch, or else generalized. Plato again associates the two telestic rituals at *Ion.*533E8-4A7 and *Leg.*790D-791A; cf. also the reference to Dionysus at 265B3 below.

211 θείας κεθαλῆς (D6), in apposition to the pronoun, as at *Euthyd.*293E3 (cf. *Iliad* 8.281, 23.94). In the idiom κεφαλή is otiose, as in the tragic idiom with κάρα, providing only a syntactical berth for an adjective which contains the essential predication. Socrates continues his notion that Phaedrus's performance was somehow inspired and that he passed the inspiration on to Socrates in the manner of a Corybantic daemon or Bacchant.

"So you think you should make a joke."

You think I'm making a joke and not serious in what I said?

"Oh no, not you, not at all! But tell me sincerely[212] as between friends: do you think anybody in all Hellas can deliver another speech with points so significant and more of them,[213] on this same topic?"

So now we have to praise the speech for this, too, that it is the work of a writer[214] who got the content right, and not just that other thing you were just talking about, that its words were clear and rounded[215] as if they had been turned out on a lathe? If so, then I would have to acquiesce in your opinion to gratify you, seeing that I missed entirely that this was so, given my utter incompetence. (235) I was only paying attention to the oratorical delivery[216] of it, and even on this heading Lysias himself did not seem[217] to me to be satisfied by it. In particular I had the sense, Phaedrus[218] – unless you say otherwise – that he put the same things into it two or three times, as if he wasn't particularly well supplied[219] with things to say about the one topic, unless perhaps he was not concerned with this aspect of speechmaking. In particular what came through to me was that he was making a display of his virtuosity at saying the same thing[220] over and over again in different ways, though each time as

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212 ὡς ἀληθῶς (E1), as opposed to παίζων (D7: compare *Euthyd*.283B6), strengthened by the invocation πρὸς Δίος φιλίου calling on their friendship (cf. *Gorg*.500B6).

213 μείζω τε καὶ πλείω (E3) is a doublet of quality and quantity according to the usual idiom (compare πολλὰ καί καλά, etc.), but the two adjectives are μέγα and πολύ. μέγα is a little too quantitative a quality [cf.Heitsch 81], and μέγα λέγειν is never a good thing, either. Phaedrus's term indicates he is being *bowled over* by Lysias's speech.

214 εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ (E6), a "genitive of the mark." (sc. ἐστι). The speaker is referred to as ποιητής in order to set up the use of ῥητορικόν below. For the distinction between the writer and the deliverer cf. *Euthyd*.305B4-9 (and, on the charisma of the latter, cf.305C1-2).

215 ὀνομάτων (E8) brings forward what Phaedrus had praised the speech for at C6-7. Socrates had already referred to whatever it was that Phaedrus was praising with περὶ τῶν τοιούτων at D5. Only now does he explicitly characterize Phaedrus's criteria as having to do with the "manner" of the words to the exclusion of any consideration of their meaning, borrowing the distinction between these from what Phaedrus has just unguardedly said, and making something of a joke out of the idea that words are supposed to be polished objects turned out on a lathe rather than carriers of meaning. The characterization suggests that Socrates does know something about the craft of composition.
In truth the words of the speech were anything but σαφῆ; but σαφῆ ends up being glossed with στρογγύλα and then the latter notion is explained in gratuitous detail with the reference to the lathe. Whatever σαφῆ meant, it is correctly replaced by ἀκριβῶς, even if this word is an exegetical interpolation (being absent from Plutarch's already loose quotation, *de aud*.45A), which describes the "polishing" effect of the metaphorical lathe. The words are shiny, as if they reflected light, rather than "clear" in the sense of being transparent for their meaning. The speech was in fact very difficult to understand exactly because the meanings of the words were hard to know and could receive little contextual support since the context changed with each new capital.

216 τῷ ῥητορικῷ (235A1): If he paid no attention to the formal aspects but watched Phaedrus instead (D1-6), and was moreover incompetent or unable to grasp the content of the speech (E5-235A1), his saying now that he paid attention to the ῥητορικὸν μόνον has to mean he was totally enthralled by the *performance* of the rhetor – namely Phaedrus (or Lysias in Phaedrus: see next note), *pace* deVries. For the "rhetorical element" designating the performance, cf. schol. *ad* 257C6 (quoted below in n.799) and *Gorg*.502D2.

217 Reading οὐδ' αὐτὸν ᾤμην Λυσίαν οἴεσθαι (A2) with all mss. (*contra* insertion of ἄν by edd.) and with Robin, Moreschini and Ryan, as possible and therefore preferable. οἴεσθαι represents an imperfect (*pace* Ryan) and the meaning is that Socrates got the sense that Lysias was dissatisfied by his composition from the way he was performing it (though in very fact it was Phaedrus impersonating Lysias, or Lysias's Speaker, that Socrates was watching). Without ἄν we are led to imagine how Phaedrus himself looked when, for instance, he kept saying ἔτι δέ and καὶ μὲν δή. Cf. also n.183.

218 ὦ Φαῖδρε (A3), replying with the sincerity Phaedrus had requested (πρὸς Δίος φιλίου, 234E2).

219 οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶν (A4) suggests a failure in *inventio* (εὐπορία = *copia*) and the litotes nicely catches the idiom and tone of the critic.

220 Reading ταὐτά (A7) against ταῦτα of the mss., conjectured by Heindorf, accepted by edd., and lately reported from the Coislinianus 155 (*apud* Moreschini).

astutely as the last.[221]

"Baloney, Socrates. The thing you fault it for was just the thing the speech has, and has in spades. Of all the possible[222] things worth saying[223] about the topic he left out not one – that's why I say nobody could make a speech with other things than what he put in, that would be any way as long or more worthy."[224]

Well I will no longer be able to agree with you when you go that far. Wise men and women of bygone times will rise up and refute me with what they have recited and what they have written,[225] if I acquiesce in your view just to be nice.[226]

"Whom do you have in mind? Where did you hear nobler things than these?"

I can't say, just sitting here, but it's clear to me I heard them from somebody – maybe Sappho the beautiful or Anacreon the wise or from some prose author. How can I be sure? It's just that I sense my heart is full of things that I could say besides those, different from them and no less good. And yet that these things got into my mind on my own power I am sure is not the case, conscious[227] as I am of my ignorance. The only inference left is that they came from an external source and flowed into me through my ears, filling me up as if I were a jar. Indeed it's all the more evidence of my paltriness that I've even forgotten how and from where I heard them.

"Now you've really said it![228] Drop telling me where and how you heard it, even though I asked you to, and take it upon yourself instead[229] to make good on what you now saying. Go beyond what's in the book and say things better and no worse without repeating what's there, and I in return, like the nine archons, will take it upon myself to erect a life sized statue in gold at Delphi in your honor – not only of myself but also of you!"

A friend you are, and golden in truth, Phaedrus, if you think I am saying that Lysias left *everything* out and that I could give an alternate speech that used *nothing* he said. Even the worst writer would never have *that* happen to him. Take for instance the topic of the speech. Who do you think could make the argument that one ought to gratify the non-lover rather than the lover without praising sound mindedness (236) and criticizing folly – such arguments being absolutely elementary[230]

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221 The description exactly captures our notion of independent "capitals" indifferent to each other but polished in themselves (cf. "Analysis of the First Speech"). Cf. n.59.

222 τῶν γὰρ ἐνόντων (B2) denoting either possibility (ἔνεστι ῥηθῆναι) or inherence (ἐν τῷ πράγματι) or zeugmatically both. For the expression ἔνοντα ἐν τῷ πράγματι οὐδὲν παραλείπειν, cf. Isoc.*Soph*.9. Contrast the ἀναγκαῖα (236A1) which nobody can claim to have invented, or "found" (εὕρησις).

223 ἀξίως ῥηθῆναι (B2) reformulates δέοντα (234E6).

224 πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια (B4-5): Again the expression relies upon quantity (cf.234E3 and n.).

225 εἰρηκότες καὶ γεγραφότες (B8) continues the distinction drawn between composition and delivery (ποιητοῦ, 234E6 / ῥητορικῷ, 235A1).

226 χαριζόμενος (B8) repeats χάριν σήν from 234E9.

227 συνειδώς (C7), of direct inward perception, echoing the paradigmatic case of *Apol*.21B4-5. Cf. also *Rep*.607C6. Socrates voiced it above (229E4-230A6) and will voice it again (242B8-D2).

228 κάλλιστα εἴρηκας (D4), the superlative of the expression καλῶς λέγεις, which means "I'm glad to hear it!" or "What good news!" often to indicate that the speaker is helped by the way his interlocutor has put things: *Euthyd*.282C5-6, *Gorg*.460A5.

229 Reading ἑτέρᾳ ὑποσχέσει (D7) with the mss. Emending the noun into a verb with the edd. raises the problem of asyndeton with the previous clause; and the infinitive ὑπέσχησαι (Jackson) is not what Socrates was just saying, while the imperative ὑπόσχες (Badham) conflicts with the imperative ποίησον. Instead, with the mss., this is an infinitival noun phrase specifying αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεις, namely εἰπεῖν, and therefore needs no connective. If Socrates will undertake the burden of delivering better things instead of the burden of specifying where he heard them, Phaedrus will reciprocate by undertaking a corresponding burden himself (ὑπισχνοῦμαι).

230 ἀναγκαῖα γοῦν ὄντα (236A1): The term bespeaks a technical distinction between core elements of a topic and external illustrative material, analogous to the distinction between a subject's "essential" and its "accidental" attributes and analogous to the distinction between compulsory and elective elements in a modern gymnastic competition. Again

to the matter – and have something else to argue instead? No, you have to allow the speaker to use that material without holding it against him,[231] and give him points not for originality[232] but only for the way he organizes[233] it, while as to the non-essential material that takes wits to discover you should give him points both for discovery and for organization.

"I grant all you say – it seems entirely fair. And so what I will do is this: I will let you assume that the lover rather than the non-lover is sick, but if all the rest of what you say is more and better than this book of mine, let you be stood up as a statue[234] in hammered finish right beside the memorial to the Cypselids in Olympia."

You are getting all serious and ardent because I have attacked your beloved in a way that discombobulates you, and you actually think I am about to try to deliver some more dazzling alternative[235] to vie with his wisdom!

"Well as far as that goes, Socrates, it looks like the shoe is on the other foot.[236] This time it's you that have to deliver a speech 'for better or worse as ever you are able'[237] or else force us into a comic back and forth, and make me say, as you had said,[238] 'O Socrates, if I don't know my Socrates then I've forgotten myself'[239] and 'he was wanting to speak but played coy instead.'[240] Just get used to the idea[241] that we are not going to leave this place until you deliver the speech you claim to have in your chest. We are alone here, far out of the earshot of anybody,[242] and I am stronger and younger than you. In short, 'put two and two together'[243] and don't make us come to blows but give in and deliver a speech."[244]

Socrates voices a sophisticated theory of composition. To cite Isocrates and Alcidamas for such terms as ἐνεῖναι and ἀκριβεία and δέοντα (Heitsch, *passim*) only begs questions.

231 ἐατέον καὶ συγγωστέα (A2-3): The expressions suggest a convened language for evaluating or criticizing a composition.

232 εὕρεσιν (A4) = *inventio*. Cf. εὐπορῶν, 235A4, and μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς ἄλλοις εὑρίσκειν δύνασθαι, *Isoc.*Soph.12.

233 διάθεσιν (A4) = *dispositio*.

234 στάθητι (B4) is passive (Ryan), topping the language of his previous offer at 235D8-9.

235 ἕτερόν τι (B7): The notion of a ἕτερόν (235A3, C6, D7; 236B2; 264E7: contrast ἄλλα, 235B4) stresses comparison, contest and rivalry, which Socrates finally seems to acknowledge at 236B7.

236 εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας λαβὰς ἐλήλυθας (B9-C1): τὰς ὁμοίας not quasi-predicative, "a hold that is the same," but "that same hold," the article used "to quote or refer" (Gildersleeve §666), *viz.*, to 227D6-228C9. Since they have exchanged positions it does not matter whether we read the first singular (with B) or the second singular (with T), though the second singular does a better job of setting up σοί a few words later, which I read as an oxytone.

237 παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ὅπως οἷός τε εἶ (C1-2): Cf. πολὺ κράτιστον ... οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι, C6-7.

238 ἐκεῖνο (C4) refers to what is relatively remote in time, not (as deVries says) what is known by both of them (as if τόδε would be mine and τοῦτο would be yours but ἐκεῖνο would be both). The "first person" pronoun serves a plural first person just as well as a singular one. Cf. nn.641, 1137.

239 Cf. 228A5-6.

240 Cf. 228C2.

241 διανοήθητι (C7): Cf. οὐτωσί διανοοῦ, 228D8.

242 So it seems, at the moment at least, though they are not exempt from the operation of strange forces (cf. n.244, *infra*) and soon will be affected by divine ones, whose presence Socrates will explicitly announce when the time comes (258E5ff).

243 σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω (D2) = Pindar f.94 Bowra (=105 Snell, 121 Turyn). Though it is unclear what this means in its original fragmentary context and what it means at *Meno* 76D (where Socrates mentions Pindar as the source), a supercilious tone in the present case is obvious (as also at A.*Av.*945-6; cf. also Pindar's supercilious φωνάεντα <u>συνετοῖσιν</u>, *Olymp.*2.93).

244 μηδαμῶς πρὸς βίαν (D2): Socrates had imagined Phaedrus forcing him to listen to the first speech, and Phaedrus imagined Socrates forcing him to stay and deliver it (228C2-8 and n.). Now Phaedrus imagines Socrates forcing him to force him to stay and deliver a speech (C4, D2), and himself thinks up a way to force Socrates to do so (D7). Whence all these forces overdetermining everything?

But Phaedrus, my very good man, I'll come off as a ridiculous amateur[245] if I try to make something up on the spot[246] that could compare with the work of a worthy writer on the same topic!

"You know the score: spare me the pretty play.[247] In fact I have another thing I could say that would actually *force* you to speak."

Well then don't say it![248]

"No such luck. Say it I will, but rather than making an assertion I will make an oath. I swear to you, in the name of … what god shall it be? why not make it in the name of this plane tree here? … If you will not deliver the speech here in the presence of this tree, I will never again show you, nor even mention,[249] any other speech by anybody!"

Eeeeagh! Curses on you! What a talent you have to find the very thing to force a man who simply *loves* speeches[250] to do whatever you say!

"Will you never stop your twisting and turning?"

There's nothing for it, now that you've made that oath. How could I ever forgo such a banquet?

"So ... speak!" (237)

Do you know how I shall do it?

"*Now* what!?"[251]

I'll deliver it with my head covered. That way I can run through the speech quickly and not get hung up along the way by a sense of shame from looking at you.[252]

"Just give the speech – the *how* doesn't matter to me."

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245 ἰδιωτής (D5): Despite, or pursuant to, Phaedrus's admonition that the tables have turned, Socrates continues to adopt Phaedrus's role from above (227E7-8A3: *n.b.* ἰδιωτής, 228A2), though he now tones down the estimation of Lysias, from δεινότατος τῶν νῦν γράφειν (228A1-2) to ἀγαθὸς ποιητής. Moreover, the claim that he himself is an ἰδιωτής is belied by his intervening remarks about how to judge a speech and what composition consists of, which are nothing if not sophisticated (cf. nn.215, 216, 230-233). Again Plato makes Socrates too clever by half.

246 αὐτοσχεδιάζων (D5): The term is derogatory, even in Thuc.1.138.3. Implicit in Socrates's remark is that the composition of any speech that forwent being edited and pored over and revised would necessarily show its inferiority – a presumption that will be roundly refuted by *both* his speeches, both by the first which is polished, and by the second which is inspired! The term and its cognates appear in Alcidamas's short pamphlet (cf. n.801) thirteen times.

247 καλλωπιζόμενος (D6) is tantamount to ἐθρύπτετο (228C2).

248 As before, when he wished Lysias would compose an oration persuading a young man to favor him despite his poverty, bad looks and old age (227C9-D5), Socrates admits rather than trying to hide his desire. Cf. also 228B6-C1.

249 μήτε ἐπιδείξειν μήτε ἐξαγγελεῖν (E3): I take ἐξαγγελεῖν to be climactic, in concert with the heap of negatives: "I will never, never, never recite you a speech by any author whatsoever – never even let you have word of one another!" (Helmbold-Rabinowitz) as if the second μήτε were μήδε (which would have called for an αὖ [cf. Denniston, 193] though cf. οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὐδ' ὄναρ, *Rep.*382E11). Phaedrus had started by telling Socrates about Lysias's speech (ἐξαγγέλλειν) and then Socrates required him to show it to him (ἐπιδεικνύναι: cf. δείξας, 228D6).

250 φιλολόγῳ (E5): The force of the φιλο- compound is to characterize himself as a person who tends to want arguing or speaking, as though speeches were his haunt and principal pastime. In threatening to starve this desire, appetite, habit or way of being, Phaedrus can compel Socrates to do what he wants – which is to give a speech – but this is a thing a φιλόλογος would do anyway. This is why Phaedrus next thinks his complaint is a stall.

The term can be used of an affinity for argument and thinking in contrast with a desire for fame or wealth (~φιλόσοφος, *Rep.*582E8), and for an affinity between a man's thought and his speech (*Lach.*188C4-E4), or an affinity for mere talk (characterizing Athens in contrast with Sparta or Crete: *Leg.*641E5, *Tht.*161A7).

251 τοῦ πέρι; (237A3): The anastrophe indicates, or feigns to indicate, that the question has taken the interlocutor off guard. Cf. *Prot.*312B8.

252 μὴ βλέπων πρὸς σὲ ὑπ' αἰσχύνης διαπορῶμαι (A4-5): The eventuality he hopes to prevent – the reason he would be ashamed – is left vague. During Phaedrus's speech Socrates was so carried away by looking at Phaedrus delivering it (πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπων, 234D2-3) that he did not care about the content. Does he fear being moved by looking at his audience to whom he delivers a speech in the same way he was moved by looking at the speaker he was listening to? If so, why will he feel shame? And what is the ἀπορία he fears? An ἐκπλαγῆναι that would strike him dumb? Again Phaedrus thinks it is a stall and does not care why, and because of this he fails to ask Socrates the questions we need him to ask.

Come then, O Muses, Ligeans so-called, either because your voice is light or because of your kinship with the musicians of Ligeia[253] – collaborate[254] with me in my song, which this most noble man here at my side has compelled me to deliver, so that his companion, whom he judged to be wise even before, should now seem even more so![255]

Once there was a boy – a young man to be exact and very good looking. He[256] had quite a lot of lovers after him. One of these was a wheedler of words,[257] and though he was in love with the boy no less than any of the others,[258] he had convinced[259] him that he did not love him. One day he accosted him and tried to persuade him, in exactly this connection, that he ought to grant his favors to a man who is not in love instead of[260] to a lover. Here is how he made his case:

"No matter what the subject, my boy, there is only one place to begin if one intends to give counsel that is fine. One needs to know the subject that is being deliberated about: otherwise he will surely miss the boat. People in general are unaware that they do not know what things are. That's why[261] they do not take the trouble to establish an

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253 εἴτε ... εἴτε (A7-8): The dubitation is a device of amplification in the kletic or hymnal form carried forward into encomiastic poetry (*h.Hymn* i.1-6; i.20-21; iiiD.19ff, 45; iiiP.1-3, 207-216, xxx;2ff) and parodied by Aristophanes (*Ach*.566ff, *Nub*.269ff). Compare Phaedrus's elegant self-interruption at 236D10 and the use of εἰ δ'αὖ βούλει at 230C1 (with n.98). This is why λίγειαι, the invocational epithet (cf. *h.Hymn* xiv, xvii, xxi.1,3), is buried in the center of the clause.

254 ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε (A9): doubling the imperative ἄγετε without connective, an idiom common enough (cf. Smyth §1846, and 1797a and 1797b) but particularly appropriate in an invocation.

255 ὁ ἑταῖρος (A10): In the manner of the hypomnesis of a kletic hymn, Socrates's plea for a future outcome is couched in a comparison with the past, which would suggest that the ἑταῖρος he is referring to is himself as the pleader; on the other hand in adducing the fact that Phaedrus has forced him into it (ἀναγκάζει) and is "getting his way," and showing a little enervation at it (ὁ βέλτιστος οὗτος), Socrates suggests that Phaedrus's own preferred outcome might be that Lysias should come off the winner, so that the ἑταῖρος is Lysias. In its ambiguity his formulation therefore throws down the gauntlet: whichever of the two wins in Phaedrus's eyes will rise in his estimation. Contrast the plea with which Socrates rings his entire performance, at the *end* of his Second Speech which he gave under compulsion of the *divine* (257A9).

256 τουτῷ δέ (B3): To connect with demonstrative-plus-δέ in this way, as with εἷς δὲ αὐτῶν in the next clause, and with καί ποτε in the next, are features of the storyteller's economical style (λέξις εἰρομένη), where transitions move in a forward march from background to foreground, from fact to implication, from whole to part – in direct contrast with the vagueness and ancipital references of the demonstratives at the beginning of Lysias's speech (cf. n.112). When the matter is inherently consecutive, "logical" connective particles are not needed; but what makes it inherently consecutive is the choice and arrangement of the ideas. This is presumably what Socrates calls διάθεσις (236A4).

257 αἰμύλος ἦν (B4): We are told in the course of the scene-setting, and outside the *ipsissima verba* of the speech, facts that the other speech forced us to discover on our own: first, that the loving non-lover is insincere ...

258 οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἐρῶν (B4): … and second, what the speaker's true feelings are, despite what he wants the boy to believe (ἐπεπείκει, B4: cf. περὶ τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, 230E6, which only alludes to the claim that he is not in love and claims moreover [given ἐπίστασαι] that it has been proven). In the previous speech we were being lied to but in this speech we are being told the truth and shown how a liar talks.

259 ἐπεπείκει (B4): The pluperfect stresses that the wheedling strategy had two steps, first to establish the minor premise (that the speaker in particular is a non-lover), and second the major premise (that the non-lover in general should be granted favors rather than the lover). The minor premise has to come first because the speaker must hide his true nature before he makes the case that implies he himself is choiceworthy. Otherwise the case he is about to make would exclude even himself from consideration.

260 πρὸ τοῦ ἐρῶντος (B6): Socrates clearly disambiguates what Lysias, as represented by Phaedrus, had left unclear (μᾶλλον ἤ: cf. n.39). Already he only needs to show that gratifying the lover is bad on its own merits, which is all he will in fact try to prove.

261 For οὖν (C3) cf. Denniston 241.

agreement about what they are discussing at the beginning, but soon enough the chickens come home to roost.[262] As you might expect, what they say ends up being neither consistent in itself nor agreeable to each other.[263] Now let's not you and I let this thing befall us that we criticize in others. Since the problem before us is whether one should enter friendship[264] with a lover or a non-lover instead, let's first take up the topic of love – what sort of thing it is and what effect it has – and agree[265] on a definition of it as a foundation; then, let us keep this in mind all along and refer all our arguments back to it as we investigate whether love has a beneficial effect or a harmful one.[266]

"That love, first of all, is a kind of desire, every man would agree; but it is also obvious that non-lovers also desire beauties.[267] By what criterion then shall we distinguish the lover from the non-lover? Let's start again and note[268] that in each of us there is a pair of characteristics[269] that do the ruling and the leading and that we follow

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262 ἀποδιδόασιν (C4) means they later pay for the deficiency caused by starting wrong.

263 Reading ἀλλήλοις (C5) with BT and Marc.185 over ἄλλοις, with the caveat that the evidence for the latter is much greater than indicated in the Burnet apparatus. ἄλλοις is not only a correction of an original ἀλλήλοις in T but also the primary reading of W and the Vat.Palat.gr.173 (*apud* Moreschini), as well as the reading of Albinus, our oldest witness, in his quotation of the passage (*Isag.*§1). The sense is that without a solid foundation one's own thought might wander into self-contradiction, and moreover that without such a solid foundation being stipulated in advance by his audience or partner, these might later disagree with his conclusion though it is consistent with that foundation. The choice between ἀλλήλοις and ἄλλοις comes down to how remote from the speaker the "others" are conceived of being, whether closely involved such as partners in a dialogue (ἀλλήλοις) or the passive audience of an orator (ἄλλοις). Hermias's gloss (διαμάχονται πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς, 50.28) omits to mention a less actively involved audience and therefore suggests he read ἀλλήλοις.

264 εἰς φιλίαν ἰέναι (C7-8) denotes the social and political alliance that usually houses the erotic relationship of the sort with which the speech is dealing. Cf.n.264.

265 ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι (D1) compactly brings forward and stipulates the priority of the definition. This sort of compact restatement of what has been said so as to provide the basis for the next step is quite foreign from the starts and restarts of Lysias's speech, but conversely will prove to be characteristic of this speech of Socrates, culminating in its long and astounding sentence in which he finally "defines" eros (238B7-C4). Cf. nn.1301, 297, 302.

266 εἴτε ὠφελίαν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει (D2-3): By stating the essential goal of all deliberation (upon which Lysias had *implicitly* relied: cf. nn.133, 139) Socrates refers back to βουλεύεσθαι at the beginning (C1) and thus closes his exordium. The manner of the speech is deliberate whereas that of Lysias with its either/or arguments and its wrong-footing technique was forensic; but in another sense they are both "epideictic" in the sense of being display pieces for students or fellow professionals.

267 ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν καλῶν (D4-5): τῶν καλῶν is unnecessarily, and therefore suspiciously, vague. Translators have taken it to be neuter and take it to denote "beauty" (Heitsch countenances translating it with *die Schoenen* as an alternative to *das was schoen ist* but does not elaborate: cf. his n.276). In can be masculine, in the evasive manner of the erotic vocabulary (cf. 227C6 with n.37 and τὸ κάλλος below, 238C1, specified at C2), and so I maintain the ambiguity by translating it "beauties." Moreover, that a non-erotic man *does* feel desire for τῶν καλῶν implies that eros itself was a kind of ἐπιθυμία τῶν καλῶν, and that it was unnecessary to say so. Otherwise these two "obvious" observations would not still require the question they are portrayed as <u>leading</u> to (τῷ <u>δή</u>). That a non-erotic also desires beautiful boys will be evident to the Speaker's audience, namely, the καλός (B2, above) whom he had persuaded he does not feel eros for (B4-5), a fact missed by Yunis who asserts that καλῶν is neuter plural with the comment that "at this stage *Socrates* is speaking of general principles" (my emphasis).

268 δεῖ αὖ <u>νοῆσαι</u> (D6), introducing a principle or a starting point as a self-evident mental "perception." Once the principle is introduced as self-evident, a series of inferences can be drawn, details added, and subdivisions made (D9-238B5). Cf. n.256. αὖ is appropriately pedantic (as at 238B2) and should be read (against Schanz's purely stylistic emendation into δή [cf. his emendation of *Symp.*187B6] which was preferred by Heitsch [86 n.122] for its better logic).

269 ἰδέα (D6), dual. The diction prefers to be vague as to what these elements are: ἰδέα indicates only a conception not an assertion of existence. These are "in" each of us, and the dual treats them as cogeneric, but the noun ἰδέα stresses they are dissimilar only in their identifying characteristic. Such a virtual hypostasis of characteristics relies heavily on a supposition that "the rational is the real," a supposition underlying the power of dialogue and dialectic, something of

them wherever they take us; and that the one is an innate desire for pleasures, while the other is an acquired judgment[270] that pursues the best. Sometimes these two forces agree with each other, but there are times when they fall into faction, and sometimes it is the one but sometimes the other that dominates. When judgment leads us with reason's help toward the best and masters desire, we call that mastery temperance; (238) when desire drags us irrationally toward pleasure and achieves hegemony over judgment, its hegemony is characterized as rashness. But rashness goes under many names – for it is many-limbed and has many parts[271] – and whichever of its many characteristics comes to the fore, the special name by which that characteristic is called is used to characterize the person afflicted by it,[272] a characterization neither fine nor enviable. For instance, the desire having to do with eating: if it holds sway over both his reason's sense of what is best and over the other desires, this desire is called gluttony[273] and the man will be characterized analogously; if it is desire for drink that tyrannizes him and drives him with this specific desire, everybody knows what he is going to be called;[274] and so also with the other specific types of desire that might hold sway, and with their respective names: it is plain what name goes with the man afflicted by them in each case. Now, the desire[275] for the sake of which all this has been said may already be obvious, but to say it rather than not can only add clarity:[276] The desire that without reason overcomes the judgment that impels us toward what is right,[277] and is driven[278]

which Plato and Socrates are almost uniquely aware.

270 δόξα ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου (D8-9) is a peculiar expression since δόξα is "settled opinion" whereas ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου suggests that this δόξα is constantly seeking to achieve as much good as possible. We have to endow δόξα with a verbal force it does not usually have, as if it could refer to an acquired ability to "make judgments" – for example, the ability to deliberate about the ὠφελιμώτατον, the very thing we are in the midst of doing, except that ἀρίστου (repeated at E2, 238A7 and replaced by τὸ ὀρθόν at 238B8) suggests the goal is virtue (ἀρετή) rather than benefit or advantage. The distinctions about which our Speaker is careless are of paramount importance to the person who happens to be speaking, Socrates! Compare the usage of the Stranger at *Soph.*228B2, where he contrasts δόξαι with ἐπιθυμίαι.

271 Reading πολυμελὲς γὰρ καὶ πολυμερές (238A2), the emendation of Burnet,

272 τὸν ἔχοντα (A5, cf. B1): For the idiom in ἔχειν cf. 239C2, 231D1; *Rep.*575A2 (and my n. *ad loc.*), 591D9; *Leg.*731C8, 837B2, 888B8; S.*Ant.*790.

273 γαστριμαργία (B1): something like "galloping stomach," from μάργος, "rampant."

274 πρόδηλον (B5): οἰνοφλυγία (οἰνόφλυξ), from φλύω, would be a good candidate for the omitted term, more appropriate, for its derogatory vividness, than φιλοποσία (φιλοπότης). At this point we can only interpret the omission of the term as an aposiopesis.

275 ἧς δέ (B5): δέ, answering μέν (A6) and δέ (B2) above, ensures that the unexpressed antecedent is ἐπιθυμία.

276 πάντως σαφέστερον (B7): *Sic* Ven.189 and Stobaeus, read by Burnet (πᾶν πως BT). The foundation laid, the next step comes into view – and when it is taken, the meaning becomes all the more defined and articulate. By now it is clear that what was unclear in Lysias's speech was exactly its persistent and perfect silence on what the desire was for the purposes of which all that was said was said!

277 ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης κρατήσασα (B7-8), occupying the attributive position, stipulates, in language that essentially brings forward to this concluding sentence all that has been said to set it up, that the third ἐπιθυμία has already mastered δόξα so as to have become ὕβρις (cf. 237D6-238A2), and reserves predicative position for πρὸς ἡδονὴν ... κάλλους (C1), the designation of the species of ἐπιθυμία that becomes salient (ἐκπρεπὴς ... γενομένη, A4) in this third case, so as to confer on ὕβρις its specific eponym (A4-B5), which eponym is the target of this entire front-loaded sentence to reveal.

278 ἀχθεῖσα (C1): The participle simply spells out the relationship between ἐπιθυμία and the ἡδονή its seeks: desire is led to pleasure and leads the whole man. Though it appears in predicative position it is an attributive participle (the attributive position having already been devoted to depicting the victory of the desire over reason), for which cf. 247B3 and Gildersleeve §622. The relationship previously had been done with a bare objective genitive (ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, 237D8), whereas the relation between δόξα and its respective goal (τοῦ ἀρίστου) had previously been spelled out with the participle ἐφιεμένη (D8).

toward the pleasure of beauty,[279] and in turn is robustly aroused by its kindred[280] desires toward the beauty of bodies,[281] by dint of the victory it achieves, acquires the name for its leadership[282] from the very fact of that robust arousal: EROS!'"

Hold it,[283] Phaedrus! – does it seem to you as it does to me that something divine is happening to me?

"Quite so, Socrates: a rolling volubility[284] has come over you, quite beyond the usual!"

Hush then and keep listening[285] to me. Divine indeed does this place seem. If I should be carried

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279 κάλλους (C2): The background list (food, drink, sex) had led us to anticipate that this desire would be a desire for sex, but now we encounter the rather vague notion of an irrational "desire for beauty." Is this metonymy (n.267)? Euphemism (n.37)? So far we an only say that the meaning is *unclear*, just as it was when beauty was first mentioned above (237D4-5 and cf. n. *ad loc.*), where the need for a definition of eros was revealed by saying that even non-erotic persons ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν καλῶν and the expression, under the sway of the idiomatic understatement we have noticed, had to mean "beautiful boys."

280 καὶ ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν ἑαυτῆς συγγενῶν ... ῥωσθεῖσα (C1): In the first case the specific desire (eating) became salient not only by defeating δόξα but also by *defeating* all other species of desire (A6-7), but in this case the "desire for beauty" becomes salient, δόξα having again been defeated, by the *reinforcement* (ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα) offered her by the other desires. The notions are two sides of one coin but only this side enables the onomatopoetic etymologizing that is being set up.

281 ἐπὶ <u>σωμάτων</u> κάλλος (C2) goes with ῥωσθεῖσα, not ἐπιθυμιῶν. With the appearance of σωμάτων the language finally becomes explicit in describing the desire we had expected, namely the desire for sex, though still it loiters in periphrasis.

282 Punctuate with comma after νικήσασα (C3) and retain the dative ἀγωγῇ, present in all mss. ἀγωγῇ is governed by the ἐπί in ἐπωνυμίαν. The phrase climactically spells out what had been consigned to *figurae etymologicae* above (κρατούσης, τῷ κράτει [ὄνομα] 237E3; ἀρξάσης ... , τῇ ἀρχῇ [ἐπωνομάσθη] 238A1-2), and the object of νικήσασα (the whole man) is left unexpressed just as it had been in the analogous cases of ἀγούσης / κρατούσης and ἑλκούσης / ἀρχούσης (237E3-8A1). He had resisted calling "us" the object in the first instance also (237D7), preferring instead the exegesis, οἷν ἑπόμεθα.

283 ἀτάρ (C5):, a strong breaking-off (cf. 230A6) here effecting a jump-shift from Socrates's access of imagination and inspired speech to the factual present, and correspondingly a momentary stepping out of the role of orator to resume speaking in his own voice. The breaking-off occurs at a point of climax both logical and syntactical, after a great run-up (cf. n.284, *infra*), but in fact the argument has culminated in a maximum of unclarity and confusion!

284 εὔροια (C7): Socrates has undergone something (πεπονθέναι) that Phaedrus hears in the "easy flow" of his language, whence his apparent coinage, εὔροια, a further sound play on Socrates's ῥω - phonemes: "You're certainly rolling out the rhos!" There is little lexical basis for the esthetical notion of "fluency," ubiquitous in the translations: (1) εὔροος appears to mean "glib" at E.fr.439; (2) the abstract noun εὐροία is never so used; only εὔροος occurs in D.H.'s description of the γλαφυρὰ σύνθεσις [*Comp*.23]; and (3) we find εὐροεῖν used of *improvisatory speech* in Plut.*Alex*.53 and Philostr.*VS* 7.8.4. The characteristics of that last sentence, which was itself set up with a gratuitous generalization (238B3-5, for which cf. Shakespeare, *Sonnet* 91.5-6, cited below, n.1372) and a gratuitous introduction (B5-7) and then began with a bringing forward of the general language with which the whole paragraph had begun (237D6-238A2), was to postpone the climactic voicing of the third desire's name to the very end, by means of a concatenation of five participial constructions suspended, in the nominative, from the subject, one attributive and four circumstantial. Hyperbaton of the key predications (namely, κρατήσασα, κάλλους, and ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα) to the end of their participial phrases added to the elevation and suspense – and with two words it was over (ἔρως ἐκλήθη). If anything it is Socrates's unchecked volubility Phaedrus is commenting upon. Cf his later characterization, ἀμηχάνως ὡς σφόδρα, 263D4.Hence deVries's assertion that the metaphor here "prepares the way for its later use in connection with speech" both overstates the case and begs the question.

285 ἄκουε (C9), present: "Try to keep listening." τοίνυν gladly acknowledges Phaedrus's sympathetic response. Socrates will explain the command below (D5, where he reiterates the present imperative ἄκουε), after he has remarked that the divine effect he is undergoing might just be due the special surroundings after all. Still, he goes on to say, the two of them must not avert the spell. Anyone who has improvised successfully knows how a feeling of vertigo combines with an awareness that stopping will immediately lead to a fall. This is what I take to be the nature of his anxiety, not some

away as if by nymphs[286] in the course of this performance you mustn't be too surprised! Even now I've come terribly close to speaking in dithyrambs![287]

"You certainly have!"

And you're to blame![288] But hear now the rest of it before the influence might shy away from me. Whether it should or not I must leave in the lap of the gods; my job is to turn back to the Boy in our speech:

> "All right, my worthy lad, the subject of our present deliberation has been described and defined. Let's keep that definition in mind as we argue the question of what benefit or harm is likely to come to the boy from the man he grants his favors to, according to whether the man loves him or not. Clearly, the man who is ruled by desire and is enslaved to pleasure is compelled to render his beloved able to give himself the maximum of pleasure. And yet a person afflicted by illness finds something pleasurable only if it does not oppose him[289] whereas anything that is stronger, or equal for that matter, must be inimical to him. (239) Accordingly as long as it is up to him he will not abide that his beloved should be stronger than he nor equal; instead he is always rendering him weaker and needier than himself. We may class as weaker the ignorant man in comparison with the wise man, the timid in comparison with the brave, the man unable to speak with the orator,[290] and the slow-witted with the quick. All such defects and others too that fall under the heading of the mind[291] the lover will necessarily enjoy

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undefined and unasserted prejudice that inspiration is bad.

286 νυμφόληπτος (D1): Plato puts another expression into the mouth of Socrates that is too clever by half. Though perhaps the princess Oreithuia was not carried off at this very place, Socrates has been carried off by nymphs he located there by their trinkets! Again, under the power of logos (προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου), fiction threatens to become true and the imaginary to become real (cf. n.101); and at the same time we may also say of this expression that Socrates is availing himself of "myth" to understand his own inward experience, as he claimed at 229E4-230A6.

287 διθυράμβων (D3): He refers to that last sentence of his (B5-C4) which was perhaps in the manner of the ἀναβολή of a late Fifth Century dithyramb, infamous for its loose wordiness (Ar.*Rhet.*1409A and Cope *ad loc.*). Cf *H.Maj.*292C7, where διθύραμβον τοσουτονί is used to characterize a four-line answer irrelevant but euphonic, prolix, and stately (291D9-E2). Compare also the sonority alluded to by *Crat.*409C3. Dithyramb was "in full decay" by the time of Plato (deVries, citing A.*Pax* 829 and schol. *ad Av.*1393). Perhaps Socrates recognizes his answer is nonsense, while at the same time Phaedrus admires it.

288 σὺ αἴτιος (D5): He forced him to vent what was in him (236D9-E5).

289 πᾶν ἡδὺ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτείνον (E5): μή is conditional. The sense is ἡδὺ ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἀντιτείνῃ. The article makes the participle a substantive but not the subject.

290 ἀδύνατος εἰπεῖν ῥητορικοῦ, βραδὺς ἀγχίνου (239A3-4): The list began with virtues and ends with prowess: cf. next note.

291 κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν (A5): By dint of the Speaker's generalization of "things of the mind" we may already have an inkling that he is presuming the tripartition of goods (psychic, bodily, external). In any event this will soon be borne out., but in this connection it is noteworthy that the Speaker uses διάνοια rather than ψυχή. For the tripartition see, within the Platonic corpus, explicitly or implicitly, cf. *Alc.1* 130E8-1C4, 133DE; *Cleit.*407B1-408A9; *Eryx.*393C4-D6; *Euthyd.*279A4-C4; *Gorg.*467E, 477A8-C5, 503E-504B, 511D1-2, 514A5-515A1ff; *Lach.*195E10-196A1; *Leg.*631B6-D1, 660E2-5, 661A5-B4, 697B2-6, 717C2-3, 724A7-B3, 743E3-4A3, 726, 743E, 870B1-6; *Lys.*207C1-D2; *Meno* 70A6-B1, 71B6-7, 78C6, 87E-88B; *Phdo* 68C1-3; *Phdrs.*233E3-5 (with n.161) *Phlb.*26B5-7(with B1-2), 48C7-E10; *Rep.*362B2-C6, 366C, 432A4-6, 591C1-D10, 618C8-D5; *Symp.*205D1-8; *Tht.*144E5-145B6ff. Outside Plato, cf. Arist.*EE* init., *EN* 1098B12-15, *MM* 1184B1-6, *Pol.*1323A21-7; Bacchyl.10.35-49; Cic. *de fin.*3.13.43, *TD* 5.27.76 & 5.30.85, *de off.*3.6.28; D.L.3.80-1; Hdt.1.29ff; Lys.1 *sub fin.*; Plut.*de educ.lib.*5Cff; Soph.*fr.*329; Stob.*Ecl.*2.7(136W); Theogn.255-6; Xen.*Oec.*1.1.13, *Mem.*1.5.3-4; In the rhetorical treatises, cf. Arist.*Rhet.*1360B25-8, *ad Alex.*1422A4-10 (cf.1440B15-20); Cic.*ad Herr.*3.10, *Part.Or.*22.74-5, *Top.*23.89, and cf. Walz *Rhet.Gr.*4.738.14-739.1, and Cope *ad* Arist.*Rhet.*2.21.5 (2.207-8). Cf. also Thompson *ad Meno* 87E, Shorey *WPS* 629 (*ad Leg.*679B). Once the tripartite list is accepted as the the idea structuring the discourse from behind the scenes, the selection of an inability to speak in contrast with being a rhetorician as an example of psychic goods becomes an

in his beloved, whether innate or acquired,[292] and will contrive to implant in him those that are not already there, or else he'll lose his transient pleasure. He must begrudge him always and,[293] barring his access not only to beneficial associations in general[294] which are what most likely would make him grow into a man must he cause great harm to the boy, but will cause him the greatest harm by barring him from the one association[295] most likely to make him a sound minded person. I mean in fact divine philosophy, away from which the lover must keep his darling just as far as possible, desperately afraid that it will make him despise him. In general the lover is compelled to contrive that his beloved should remain ignorant of everything and for everything be dependent upon the lover, and become a person who though able to give maximal pleasure to him would at the same time be[296] completely harmful to himself. So, as a guide and companion in matters of the mind, there is no way a man who is sick with love can be of any benefit.

"As to the care and condition of the body, and how in this respect a man locked into pursuing pleasure rather than the good will care for his ward, to this we may next

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unusual guest, not unrelated to the outer topic of the dialogue. Cf. previous note.

292 With Burnet I excise τῶν (A6), following the brilliant suggestion of Nutzhorn. For the truncated style cf. my "Analysis of Second Speech" *infra*, §2.1.

293 Omit Burnet's comma before καί (B1) or relocate it after.

294 πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων ... καὶ ὠφελίμων (B1): ἄλλων is proleptic and would have been placed before μέν had it not been for the hendiadys of πολλῶν and ὠφελίμων, the doublet of quantity and quality that English does without the connective. An even stronger instance of proleptic ἄλλος with μέν is coming on the next page (240A9ff).

295 συνουσιῶν (B1): This perfectly general term can always bear the specific meaning of *studying* together. Cf. 271E2.

296 ἄν (B8) may, with Burnet, be read from the Vindobonensis 109 (om.BT), though it may also be omitted because "carried forward" from B6. Verdenius cites seven passages in Plato, Xenophon and the orators where it is absent as proof of his bald assertion that its "addition" by Burnet and Robin is "not necessary." His passages are of very uneven value. At Xen.*Anab*.4.6.13 its absence might be explained as due to "carrying forward" (cf. my note to *Rep*.382D11), as at *Anab*.1.6.2 and *Cyr*.2.4.17, 5.1.23, (though Marchant in most cases emends); at X.*Mem*.1.2.34 there is no such explanation (and again Marchant adds ἄν, following Dindorf); at Antiphon 1.25, Blass (at least) saw fit to add ἄν in his corrected edition (Teubner, 1881); at Hyperides *Epitaph*.20 the aversion to repetition seen in the phenomenon of "carrying forward" again applies (ἄν going with both συμβῆναι and νομίζοιμεν). The three Platonic passages Verdenius cites are (a) *Lys*.214D2 and *Phdo*.72C1, where the optative apodosis needs ἄν so as to be set off after protases which are also in the optative (so that Burnet adds it, following Bekker, though I sense in the latter case that its absence with ἀποδείξειεν is mitigated by its subsequent presence with φαίνοιτο: cf. Gildersleeve, *SCG* §450: "...sometimes ἄν is to be understood from a preceding passage, *or anticipated from a subsequent passage*"), and (b) *Rep*.437B4 where all editors (except Schneider, Stallb. and now Slings comparing the equally "front-loaded" sentence at *Charm*.168E-9A1, where the argument implies, if anything, not that ἄν is not needed but that the author might forget to write it) do add ἄν and Adam (*ad loc.*) goes to the trouble of citing many more passages in Plato – six where the absence of a needed ἄν can be explained as "lipographic" (though apart from *Phdo*.62C7 which involves the other ἄν, all the passages are instances of "carrying forward": *Phdo*.109E3; *Euthyd*.291E6; *Rep*.457D9, 516E4, 558E1, as at *Parm*.145AB, 148E, *Phdo*.87BC), and nine where it cannot (*Phdo*.72C1; *Euthyd*.281C6; *Crat*.389E3, 409A2; *Alc*.1.132B5, 133E5; *Soph*.266A10; *Phil*.47B5 (the conditional ἄν); *H.Maj*.295A5) – but Adam is far from saying on the basis of such superior numbers that its continual absence proves it unnecessary. The consensus of grammarians is that ἄν is not optional but necessary, though its absence is occasionally due to its presence nearby; on the other hand its unexplained absence in the better mss. of every 200 pages of Greek that have come down to us can hardly become the basis of a rule that it is "not necessary."

turn.[297] We shall see him[298] pursuing a boy pampered and weak rather than solid, a boy raised not in open sunlight but dappled shade, innocent of stalwart labors and sweaty toil but schooled instead in a regimen soft and unmanly, adorned with borrowed tints from a lack of native hue, and so on in the other departments of his behavior, which are unworthy to list in detail but are better dismissed in a single summary statement so that we can move on to something else:[299] A physical specimen of the sort that, when it comes to war or any weighty and needful task, emboldens our enemy while it fills our allies with consternation, including the lovers themselves.

"So much we can accept as obvious; next we must argue what benefit and what harm will be brought about by the tutelage and association of a lover in the realm of acquisition.[300] Immediately this much will be obvious to everybody – and especially to the lover – that of the most dear[301] and benevolent and divine possessions he would above all hope and pray that the beloved would be bereft. Of father and mother, of relatives and friends, he would welcome him to be stripped, viewing them as nothing but (240) agents of obstruction and voices of criticism against the relationship he enjoys with him, and against maximizing the pleasure it might afford him. And what wealth the beloved has, whether it be gold or some other possession, he will likewise view only as making him harder to catch or, once caught, harder to manage. Given all this there is every necessity that the lover will begrudge the beloved when he gets money but then when it disappears he'll be glad, and in addition I assure you he would hope him to be unmarried, unchilded, unhoused as long as possible, out of his desire to reap the honey he alone enjoys just long as possible.

"Now there is a category of evil things to consider[302] into which some divine

297 τὰ μέν οὖν κατὰ διάνοιαν ... τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν ... δεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν (B8-C5), the very model of a proper transition. The completion of the present topic is announced (μὲν οὖν), and the topic itself is characterized in such a way (τὰ ... κατὰ διάνοιαν, brought forward from above, A5) that the announcement of the subsequent topic will immediately be seen as its complement (τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν ...). The speaker exploits a "background list" – here the conventional distinction between mind and body – to provide him the "content;" and the particles go in tandem with this content so intimately that there is as good a reason to place a paragraph break before the μέν / δέ construction as after it, or in the middle of it as the editors do, or to omit paragraphing altogether as the original roll or codex could, and did. Such interlocking in transition is the complete antithesis of Lysias's repeated "rebootings" with ἔτι δέ or καὶ μὲν δή.

298 Reading ὀφθήσεται δέ (C5) with the mss., over the δή conjectured by Hirschig and accepted by edd. It marks the transition from program to treatment proper (Verdenius).

299 ἐπ' ἄλλο ἰέναι (D4): This time the transition is prepared without previewing the next topic. The present topic is dismissed as so worthless that it is only worth dismissing (ἄξιον, D3, both denies the worth of continuing [προβαίνειν] and asserts the worth of moving on [ἐπιέναι]), so we might be free to move on to "something else" (ἄλλο), regardless what it is.

300 περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν (E1): Because the overarching theme is ὠφελία / βλάβη (238E1), the background doublet mind / body can now give way to a larger background list, which in fact is based on it: the tripartition of goods as psychic, bodily, and external. The transition is therefore consecutive although unforeseen. For the abstract singular κτῆσις used by itself to designate the "external" or extrapersonal goods as a whole cf. *Leg.*770D2-4; and compare its use as the genus of external goods at *Rep.*443E3-4 and 547B4 (cf. κτήματα, *Lys.*211D8-E1) – but contrast below the "οὐσία of gold or some other κτῆσις" (240A2). Friends and family had been treated as κτήματα in Lysias's speech also (233D3).

301 φιλτάτων (E4): The speaker presumes a categorical and self-evident separation of φιλία and ἔρως, which we must take care to reproduce in the translation of this word and ἐρώμενον in the next line. The sense of the triad φιλτάτων καὶ εὐνουστάτων καὶ θειοτάτων escapes me.

302 ἔστι μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα κακά (240A9) = "(The three categories of good having been exhausted) there does exist (initial ἔστι is emphatic) another category of things (καί) that speaking in general (ἄλλα, with μέν, proleptic as at 239B1) are bad (κακά) though (ἀλλά) pleasurable … ." As often the point of ἄλλα with μέν remains unclear until we reach the complementary focus of the δέ clause (as at 239B1-5 and 232B6-C3). What is unusual here is only how long we have to

agency quite often mixes a strain of transient pleasure. In the flatterer for instance, clever beast and hugely harmful that he is in truth, nature has mixed a kind of pleasure not without its amusement, and a person could condemn the courtesan as harmful, and a lot of other things in this category, beasts and behaviors[303] which for a passing day at least might afford quite a lot of pleasure. But for the beloved the lover is not only harmful in the general ways we have seen but is also the most unpleasant of all things in even in this[304] nearer perspective of every passing day. The proverb says that "Like people enjoy like pleasures," but even these sooner or later tire of being together. And there is the saying[305] that the very fact of being compelled to do anything is itself loathsome, no matter what it is, which in addition to their unlikeness to each other applies to the relation of the lover and the beloved more than anywhere else. Since he is an older man associated with a younger one, he will never take his leave of him day or night. Instead he is driven and goaded by a compulsion that leads him on with pleasures at every moment, whether from seeing or hearing or touching and experiencing any sensation[306] at all of his beloved, so that he latches onto him like a devoted worshipper; whereas for the beloved what consolation or kind of pleasure can the relationship provide that will not fill those same hours he spends with him with unpleasantness beyond all measure? For sight he has that old face[307] to look at, hardly in bloom like his own, and the rest of what he sees follows suit with this, other things of which even a verbal description is hardly entertaining, let alone his constantly being compelled to deal with them in fact under that constant watchful eye ever suspicious of all others, no matter who. For hearing he has those praises unprovoked and hyperbolic or else those reproaches, unbearable when he is sober but once he is into his cups embarrassing to boot, coming from a man insatiably given over to wide open frankness.

"So we know that as long as he is in love he is harmful and he is unpleasant. Let his love abate and all you have to look forward to is betrayal, in that future when his promises were all going to be fulfilled – all those promises he made by means of which he was able to (241) perpetuate the whole burdensome affair and make it seem bearable out of the prospect of future rewards. Then it would be that the accounts would rightly be settled, but he has switched out the principle that rules and presides within him: now it is mind and temperance that rule him in place of love and madness and he has become a different man, before it even dawns on the beloved. Next the one party makes his claim for the promises of the previous time, reminding the other of each and every thing that came down and all that was said, thinking he is engaging the

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wait for it (παιδικοῖς δέ [B5] answers the μέν, *pace* Denniston, 5-6). Might the lover, whom we have shown to be bad, at least give some transient pleasure?

303 θρεμμάτων τε και ἐπιτηδευμάτων (B4): The curious doublet brings forward the two examples of flattering "*beast*" and *employed* courtesan with derogatory plurals so that they can be generalized by the equally curious demonstrative, τοιουτοτρόπων.

304 καί (B6).

305 λέγεται (C5): Cf. elegiac πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον | πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ, attributed to Evenus (of Paros) by Aristotle (*Met.*1015A29, *EE* 1223A31; quoted also at *Rhet.*1370A10) = frg. 8 Diehl (cf. Theogn.472 West).

306 καὶ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν αἰσθανομένῳ (D2-3): The general category of αἴσθησις is most often done with the pair sight and hearing (*Charm.*167C8-D10, *Euthyd.*281C8-D1, *Leg.*661A7-B1, *Phdo.*75B10-11, esp. in "epistemological" contexts as in *Rep.*507C1-5 and *Tht.*156C1-2), but of course it includes all the bodily senses, whence larger lists such as *Phd.*65C5-7; *Tht.*156B2-6, 186D10-11. ἰδεῖν / ἅψασθαι represents the entire diapason as first and last (*Phdo.*75A6-7, *Tht.*195D8). *H.Min.*374D9 (καὶ ὦτα καὶ ῥῖνας καὶ στόμα) is uncharacteristic. The context here is erotic rather than epistemological (as 255E3). For the triad as here cf. 247C6-7, 255C4 (with n. *ad loc.*); *Tht.*188E5-9A5.

307 ὄψιν (D6): Contrast the erotic power the "face" *might* have (250B6, 254B4-5).

same man in conversation. The other party meanwhile out of shame hasn't even the courage to admit he has changed, nor has he any way to prevent any attempt he might make to fulfill those promises from causing him to regress, as he now sees it, mindful and temperate as he is, and to turn back into that other man he was by dint of reverting to the old behavior. Instead he must turn coat and run from all this; defaulting on it all out of another necessity. With a flip of the sherd[308] this man that once was the lover is off and gone, a different man from before. The other party has now to play the pursuer, bothered and cursing, who from the beginning knew nothing of what was in store and that he never should have chosen to gratify the lover in the first place, whose compulsiveness drives him out of his mind, but should much sooner gratify the non-lover instead, who is in possession of his mind. Otherwise, he would now realize, he is simply putting himself into the hands of an untrustworthy cranky envious unenjoyable man harmful to his prospects of wealth, harmful to his physical well-being, and most harmful of all to the development of his soul, than which there is among men and among gods no thing more honorable nor ever will be.

"Those are the thoughts you must gather in your mind, my boy, and recognize that friendship with a lover is not a thing that comes from good intentions but something more in the manner of food, for the sake of getting one's fill[309] – and that just as a wolf welcomes the lamb[310] so is the boy befriended by the lover."

That's it.[311] You'll hear no more of it from me. That's as much of the speech as you're going to get.

"But I thought it was just at the middle point, and that the speech was about to go on and say an equal amount about the non-lover, to the effect that the beloved ought to gratify him instead, by listing off all the goods that correspond to the evils. So why do you stop now, Socrates?"

Didn't you notice I was already stirred to utter dactyls,[312] not just dithyrambs, and yet I hadn't even gotten to the positive part? If I now embark on a praise of the other man what do you suppose I

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308 ὀστράκου μεταπεσόντος (241B4) refers to a children's game of tag called ὀστρακίνδα. A white and a black team face each other and toss into the air a disk painted white on one side and black on the other. Whichever side comes up tells which team is to pursue and which to flee (cf. schol *ad loc.*). The simile is used at *Rep.*521C5.

309 πλησμονῆς (C8): For this crass and derogatory term cf. 233E2.

310 Reading ἄρνας ἀγαπῶσιν (D1) with all mss. which Bekker (1826) made dactylic with the rather ugly emendation, ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ'. Hermogenes quotes, *from Plato's* Phaedrus (περὶ ἰδεῶν 2 [= *Rhet.Att.*2.363.19 Spengel]) the phrase ἄρνα φιλοῦσ', which also scans. Hermias quotes the passage twice, first (61.7) *quoting* (n.b. τό) ἄρνα φιλοῦσιν (he may have added -ιν by dint of the ἀπό following with which he reverts to commentary), but the second time (61.26), where he comments on Socrates's subsequent remark that he has been moved to utter dactyls (241E1), his editor, Couvreur, despite the presence of φιλοῦσιν above, imports Bekker's emendation into Hermias's text over the reading of A (which for him is the archetype of all the mss. [p.xviii]), without citing ms. authority (Ast cited that ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ' from a Vindobonensis). In defense of the mss. reading, cf. n.312.

311 τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο (D2): cf. 252C2 and 256E3 for the expression. It is the "persons" of the pronouns that indicate the meaning: this thing you now see is that thing I had set out to do. Thus it is equivalent to τοῦτο ... αὐτό (second person followed by third, 230B1), set up by first person τόδε at A7. The *dramatic* reason for Socrates to quit is the misgivings (ἐδυσωπούμην, 242C8) he is already beginning to feel and give voice to.

312 ἔπη (E1). He refers to the meter of the final words, ὡς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί. As Ryan saw, Bekker's intrusive emendation of the words ἄρνας ἀγαπῶσι into ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ' in order to make a complete dactylic line out of Socrates's last words (ὡς λύκοι ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ' ὡς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί), though popular among editors, only ruins Socrates's present remark because it turns those words into something more like a quotation than a spontaneous access of poetic ventriloquism.

will be moved to compose in my discomposure?[313] Or maybe you think your original plan will come to fruition, that I will become *utterly* possessed by those Nymphs you have placed me among?[314] All I have to say is that of all the evils that have been faulted in the one, the opposite goods are to be accorded to the other. There's no need for further explanation:[315] the pair have been accounted for adequately. I'll let the story of the lover and the beloved[316] take care of itself and as for me, I'll go back across this river you brought me to and return to the city (242) before you force me to commit some deed more awesome[317] still.

"Not yet, Socrates! Not before the heat passes. Don't you see it's nearly noon, when the sun 'stands high' in the sky as they say?[318] Let's wait a while and pass the time talking about the two speeches, and then, once it cools off, we'll go."

You are like a god when it comes to speeches, Phaedrus.[319] Always you surprise me! I'd guess that of all persons[320] alive during your lifetime you have caused more of them than any other individual if I add together the ones you composed yourself with those you had a hand in[321] causing others to compose – except perhaps for Simmias the Theban. All the others you beat, hands down. Just so, it seems to me you have once again caused a certain speech to be delivered.

"I'm happy to hear it[322] – but how did I, and what 'certain speech' are you talking about?"

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313 τί με οἴει ποιήσειν; (E3) is ambiguous: 'What shall I be moved to compose?' or 'What shall I be moved to do?'

314 ἐνθουσιάσω (E5): He refers back to the nympholepsy he alleged at the middle of the speech (238C9-D2), but now he adds the allegation that Phaedrus knew it would happen all along, and indeed chose the καταγωγή (which was near the place where Oreithuia *might* have been "carried off" but probably wasn't [229B4-C3] but *palpably* feels haunted by divine presences [230B2-C5, n.b. Νυμφῶν τέ τινων, B7]), in order to contrive that Socrates be overcome by their inspiration. Again the theme of seduction and compulsion calls attention to itself exactly because it intrudes without sufficient warrant.

315 καὶ τί δεῖ (E6-7): καί along with the two καί 's below (E8, 242A1) depict mounting impatience within Socrates which culminates in his decision to "get away."

316 μῦθος (E8): That the speech was introduced as occurring "Once upon a time" (237B2-6) suggested there would be a conclusion after the speech was over, that would tell the outcome – whether the boy gratified the tricky speaker or not. Socrates here decides to let the story go on without his help.

317 τὶ μεῖζον (242A2) *must* mean "an enormity" (negative) but we do not need a parallel to tame down the idiom. The vagueness is studied, since it will end up Socrates does something "more important."

318 ἡ δὴ καλουμένη σταθερά (A4-5): Phaedrus *adds* the detail that the sun seems to stand still at noon, which is likewise why we for our part call noon "high." In addition to being the hottest time, and therefore not the time to leave the shade which is all that Phaedrus means to make of it, this is a timeless moment, when things come to a stop, like the moment when a reverse or retrograde movement could begin. These aspects of noon correspond to the sudden reversal of perspective Socrates undergoes right after he hears μήπω γε. The fact that the dialogue has no narrator to explain such matters nor even a way for Socrates to intimate to us his inner thoughts as he can when he plays narrator, leaves it up to us to make such guesses on our own; and guesses they may only be and must remain, for now.

319 θεῖός γε εἶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους (A7): His extraordinarily strong remark repeats his language about Phaedrus's "divine head" (234D6) after he had delivered Lysias's speech and therefore adds the praise (there) of his ability to deliver a speech to a praise (here) of his ability to cause one to come into being, as Socrates next goes on to say. The adjective indicates that something more is at work than Phaedrus's "ingenious insistence;" nor is its special power is diminished by the subsequent θαυμάσιος (*pace* deVries), for Socrates has added ἀτεχνῶς which indicates he is somewhat beside himself and not just playing around.

320 Reading λόγων (B1), present only in T (omm. BW), since γεγονότων is continued and repeated by γεγενῆσθαι.

321 ἐνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ (B2) = somehow: cf. *Men.*96D9; *Soph.*235A7,B6, 237D7; *Symp.*210D2-3, *Tht.*174D4.

322 οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεις (B6), explained by the paroemiographers as a litotes for the delivering of good tidings (Greg.Cypr. 2.89 [=*PG* 2.84], Apost.13.75 [=*PG* 2.596]): cf. *Leg.*702D6). Although Phaedrus does not know what speech Socrates has in mind and has to ask, deVries (*ad* A5-6) thinks he himself knows and asserts that Socrates has understood Phaedrus's suggestion that they stay and discuss the two speeches as an attempt by Phaedrus to elicit a second speech from him. Phaedrus however is ignorant of such an attempt. deVries's guess is soon shown to be wrong by the answer Socrates gives to Phaedrus's question: a divine force has intervened. "Instead of a discussion ... we are to have a third discourse. Why this must be so, Socrates goes on to explain," as Hackforth writes, quoted by deVries.

I'll tell you. There I was, about to cross the river when that voice of mine came to me[323] with its usual "message" that never does more than stop me from what I am about to do – right then I heard a sort of voice that prohibited me from leaving until I had done a purification, meaning, believe it or not,[324] the sort one would have to perform for having sinned against the divine.[325] I *am* a mantic – at least enough of one to meet my own needs, just as people who aren't so good at reading find a way to get by[326] – and so now I have come to see what the sin was. The soul, too, is mantic, you know,[327] and it was bothering me while I was delivering the speech.[328] I had misgivings that I might, as Ibycus put it, be "offending gods by trading away their honor for honor among men."[329] By now I've come to see what was wrong.

"So what *was* it?"

Horrible it was, simply horrible, that argument you brought along with you and the one you forced me to deliver, both versions of it![330]

"How?"

It was stupid and subtly[331] irreverent to boot. How could an argument be more horrible?[332]

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323 ἡνίκ' (B8), by elimination, can only refer to the very moment Phaedrus said μήπω γε (242A3) – and that's what Socrates seemed to hear. By the time Phaedrus was finished with his short speech (A3-6) Socrates had decided he had to stay (A7ff) and deliver another speech. At the very least Phaedrus's intervening admonition "Stop" and his further remarks about "high noon" and the heat gave Socrates enough pause to reflect rather than run away out of an unanalyzed aversion to what had been going on; but perhaps the voice he heard αὐτόθεν was an undermeaning he found in Phaedrus's own words, words that (predictably) encouraged him to stay and talk, and played the conduit or occasion through which a divine purpose for Socrates to speak was conveyed, so that Socrates candidly said θεῖός γ' εἶ περὶ τοὺ λόγους, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς θαυμάσιος. For another instance of the narrative re-interpreting what has just happened, compare Socrates's description of Phaedrus at 228A-C3.

324 ὡς δή τι (C3): Burnet's oxytone (ὥς) appears to be a typo, as if he inserted Proclus's δή into his text after having originally omitted it (with B T), and overlooked modifying the accentuation. δή expresses incredulity at the charge (Denniston, 230), which in turn requires Socrates to "reach back" and reflect.

325 αὐτόθεν (C2): The daimon stopped him, as it is wont to do, and *right* there (or *right* then) he seemed to hear a voice. He then attributes to himself some ability to hear such voices, a separate matter from the daimon, whose mere "holding him up" in itself requires no skill from Socrates to receive or explain. ὡς (C3) indicates that Socrates believes that the voice believes he has committed an error or sin that needs a cleansing. What remains for him to discover is what the sin or error was.

326 ἐμαυτῷ μόνον ἱκανός (C5): The sentiment is tantamount to his remark about mythology at 229E4-230A6. Just as he does not have the time to become a professional mythographer compiling and explaining stories as an expert but only wants to know how the myths might help him care for his own soul, he knows enough mantic to intuit why his daimon stopped him and what the voice meant, but won't spend enough time on it (in the manner of a σπουδαῖος) that his opinion should be relied upon by others.

327 ὡς δή τοι (C6), used to introduce a sentence as at *Rep*.366C3 and *Tim*.26B2.

328 ψυχή (C7): This is *really* the soul, the soul we experience with, not the "soul" used as a capping term in Socrates's First Speech, where the very thesis leaves no place for an underlying soul or self (241C5: cf. n. *ad loc.*). At the same time that Socrates remembers or recognizes the gods, he recognizes or remembers his self. In a sense we inwardly know why the two recognitions are connected but (again) there is nothing in the text, so far, to support or explain the connection theoretically.

329 Ibycus, frag.24 Diehl = *PMG* 310.

330 Making the subject double rather than the object enables him to treat the two speeches as one, which in a sense they were. His next comment (D7) applies to both. The anaphora of δεινόν is almost as if Socrates admonishes once Phaedrus and once himself. In any case it is very emphatic so as to create a berth for what he is about to say next. For similar preparatory expansion cf. the beginning of *Leg*.(624A3) and also *Rep*.608B4, *Tim*.22B4.

331 ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ (D7): Cf. *Gorg*.493C3 for the expression.

332 δεινότερος and τις are masculine (D7), which insists that the comment is meant to apply to arguments or speeches as such. Thus εὐήθης means the opposite of σοφός, clever. We want our speeches or arguments to please men with their cleverness, but not at the expense of offending the gods. εὐήθες therefore calls into question how he might be sacrificing the gods' favor for the favor of men, but this will soon be resolved.

"It couldn't be, if what you are saying about the argument is true."

What then? Don't you believe Eros is the son of Aphrodite and therefore one of the gods?

"So it is said."[333]

But not by Lysias, nor by your argument, which also came out of my mouth once you had drugged it into speaking. If Eros is a god, which in fact he is, or divine at least, then it follows he could not be bad; whereas the pair of speeches about him just now argued that he *was* bad. That's how the speeches sinned against Eros. As for their stupidity it's this *tour de force* by which they presented themselves as being worthy of sober attention[334] (243) even though the arguments they made were utterly unsound and untrue – as if putting something over on an audience of manikins[335] is all that was needed to win approval!

As for me, I have to cleanse myself; and there is an ancient way for people who sin in their storytelling to do this, one that Homer didn't know but Stesichorus did. When Stesichorus got blinded for his accusation against Helen he was not ignorant why it happened as Homer was. Given his musical ability[336] he was able to respond by composing that poem that begins,

> That story isn't true:
> You did not go on the strongdecked ships
> Nor did you reach the Pergamon of Troy.[337]

And immediately after he finished composing this so-called "Palinode," he got his sight back. But I will do both of them one better: I will try to compensate Eros with a palinode before anything even happens to me because of my accusation against him, this time with my head left bare, not covering myself up out of shame as I did before.[338]

"Nothing you could have said would be more pleasant to me than what you have said just now!"[339]

After all,[340] my good Phaedrus, you do recognize, don't you, how disrespectful these speeches

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333 λέγεταί γε δή (D10): Now it is Phaedrus that is called upon to countenance the conventional view as he had asked Socrates to do when they arrived at their pleasant dell (λέγεται γάρ, 229B6). There, Socrates replied with his discourse on his self-awareness (229C6-230A7). The parallel or echo invites us to watch how his use of conventional religion there will compare with his use of it here. Phaedrus's reply is conventional and proper, not half-hearted (*pace* deVries).

334 Socrates is referring primarily to the very careful and artful διάθεσις of the second speech, which we analyze and document closely, below ("Analysis of the Second Speech"). We shall note, at the height of the speaker's dithyrambic climax, that his content was not up to his form (cf. n.1376) and that in the end he was carried away by his own artfulness (cf. nn.1412, 1413, and 1414).

335 ἀνθρωπίσκους (243A1): In the anthropomorphic context, when god enters the argument man becomes a manikin – or with Heraclitus, an ape: ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν (DK22B83, quoted at *H.Maj.*289B).

336 I take αἰτίαν (A7) with both οὐκ ἠγνόησεν and ἔγνω, and I take ἅτε μουσικὸς ὤν as modifying ποιεῖ rather than ἔγνω.

337 Stesichorus f. 32 Bergk (= 192 *PMG*). The fact that the same god (Aphrodite) has to be placated in both cases is not accidental. Stesichorus's retraction consisted of saying Helen stayed in Egypt and it was only a picture of her that went with Paris to Troy, and only a picture that the Greeks and Trojans fought over. The implication of course is that it was not truly Eros that was described on the speeches so far but only a picture of Eros, and that in truth Eros was off somewhere else. But Socrates does not say that here.

338 Socrates's reason for covering his head now sounds different from the reason he gave when he did it (237A4-5). There he wanted to get through the speech quickly and was ashamed to look into Phaedrus's face but here it is shame only (cf. n.252). That he will now speak seeing and seen in order to avoid being blinded for delivering a speech he would only consent to do blind and unseen, is another of the elements that are "too clever by half," as if it were a glaring clue placed right before our eyes that solves a mystery we are not party to – another answer in search of a question, or effect in search of its cause.

339 ἄν ... εἶπες (B8): With the past contrafactual Phaedrus nails Socrates down to a promise.

340 καὶ γάρ (C1): γάρ explains the shame and lack of it; καί can add to γάρ the sense that the beginning comes before the

were, both the last one and the one you read out of the book? If a person of gentle and noble character were listening to us – a person who also had a beloved of a similarly gentle and noble character or ever had had one[341] – and heard[342] us saying that lovers are sent into a frenzy of anger over any small thing[343] and that they are envious of their beloveds and would do them harm,[344] how could he not believe that the people he was listening to had been raised by sailors[345] and had never witnessed the love of free men? How could he not be very far from agreeing with our condemnation of Eros?

"You are probably right, at that!"

So for myself it is from feeling shame in the eyes of a man like that,[346] and also out of reverence for the god Eros, that now I desire to wash the salt out of our ears, with a speech of sweet[347] water as it were. As for Lysias, I would counsel him at his earliest convenience to write an argument that one should gratify the lover as lover rather than the non-lover as non-lover.[348]

"Don't you worry whether *that* will come to pass! Once you have delivered your praise of the

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beginning – i.e., that something else should have been said or was already there to be seen, before the conclusion was presented.

341 ἐρασθείς (C4), the aorist of ἐρᾶν being supplied by the passive deponent ἔραμαι. The eavesdropper would deny both the character of the affair and of its aftermath as the speeches depicted them.

342 ἀκούων τις τύχοι ἡμῶν ... λεγόντων (C3-4): They are talking to (and delivering speeches to) each other. Perhaps we forgot they are alone (236C8). Socrates is suggesting they have been engaged in a *folie à deux*. How, we might ask, did we ever get here? How did we get started thinking eros was a bad thing? We did not consciously adopt that position – rather we were seduced by the desire to seduce a boy without admitting our love, either as an ἀστεῖόν τι (242E5, cf. κεκόμψευται, 227C7) or as a strategy by which to remain invulnerable to rejection, a desire that mortgaged eros as an evil.

343 διὰ σμικρὰ μεγάλας ἔχθρας ... ἀναιροῦνται (C5), a direct quote from Lysias's speech (233C2-3).

344 ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ φθονερῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς (C6) quotes language the peroration of Socrates's speech (241C2-6).

345 ἐν ναύταις που τεθραμμένων καὶ ουδένα ἐλεύθερον ἔρωτα ἑωρακότων (C7-8): Sailors have acquired a reputation for being uncouth from their behavior at bars in ports but this is not, *eo ipso*, the opinion of the Athenians about sailors, since after all they owe their Aegean hegemony to the citizens that plied the wings of their triremes (cf. Ar.*Pol*.1304a21ff). The often-cited reference in Isocrates (*Peace*, 48), in which the policy of using slaves and mercenaries is compared with using citizens to man their ships, proves only that he character of the sailors varied according to the policy by which they were selected (cf. *op cit*.79). Ar.*Bat*.1069ff describes the sailors of a particular ship eponymously (Paralians) rather than calling them sailors and therefore is making a point that does not pertain to sailors in general (*pace* deVries); moreover the point made about the sailors in Paralos is not that they are ἀνελεύθεροι but that are *too* "free." They opposed their master, which aligns them with the evaluation of Aristotle as democratic *radicals*, not *uncultured* persons. The sea is a bitter and salty neighbor, according to the Athenian Stranger (*Leg*.705A) because it exposes the landed city to the materialism and deceptions of the traders; his criticism of marines (*Leg*.706AD) is strictly a matter of tactics: while sailors can retreat into their ships (like the Achaeans at Troy) the land army cannot, and might be corrupted into imitating them and beat a dishonorable retreat (cf. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* 97-9).

The metaphor simply means men should be raised at home, but its imperfect contrast with "free men," is strained and therefore memorable, as is much else we have noted along the way in the text, things strange, unmotivated, fortuitous and unexplained. It behooves the commentator to notice and commemorate such details for his reader rather than to search for the least inadequate means to dismiss them or explain them away.

346 Finally we learn, though again since Socrates is silent on the point it can only be an inference of our own (cf. n.318), that Socrates's real reason for covering his head and thereby avoiding the shame of looking Phaedrus in the eye, is that he counted Phaedrus a calm and noble and free person all along, in whose eyes he believed the speech he was about to deliver would seem despicable.

347 ποτίμῳ λόγῳ οἷον ἁλμυρὰν ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι (D4-5): The speeches they have heard are "salt" not only because they come from sailors (C7) – which, incidentally, places the sailors at sea rather than cavorting around the port – but (perhaps) because they make us thirsty for more. If so, Socrates is suggesting that the speech to come will satisfy our thirst (whence what we call "sweet" or "fresh" water the seafaring Greeks call πότιμον).

348 ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων (D6) = *ceteris paribus*. παρόντος ἐραστοῦ below (A4) tells against the more recondite interpretation that Fraenkel suggests *ad Ag*.1423.

lover there is every necessity that he be compelled[349] by me to respond in turn by composing a speech on the same[350] topic."

I trust it will come to pass as long as you are who you are!

"So let her rip!"

OK, but where is that Boy of mine that I was talking to before, so that he can hear it, too, before he runs off to gratify the non-lover?[351]

"Your Boy is right here at your side, available to you whenever you wish."[352]

> This is what you must recognize, my Beauty. The former speech was by Phaedrus (244) son of Pythocles,[353] a man from Myrrhinousos, but the one I am about to deliver is by Stesichorus the son of Euphemus,[354] from Himera. What has to be argued is this: "That story isn't true," the one that asserted that although the lover was right there with you you should rather give your love to the non-lover, since the one is mad but the other is sound of mind. If madness were an evil without qualification the argument would have been fine, but the truth of the matter is that the best things in life come to us through madness, as long as[355] it is the madness given us by the gods.
>
> Think first of the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona: it is when they are in a maddened frenzy that they give us gifts many and fine, private and public, though when they return to their senses they give us little or nothing. And if we should mention Sibylla and the others that by becoming "enthused" by their mantic art have put

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349 πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ... ἀναγκασθῆναι (D9-E1): The doubling or redundancy of the necessity or compulsion begs for an explanation, but Phaedrus does not offer it. His assertion that Lysias will be compelled appears to rely on his knowledge of Lysias's emulousness, or his ability to incite it. Is he himself likewise compelled (πᾶσα ἀνάγκη) to run back to Lysias and stir him up? Such was his behavior after Socrates criticized Lysias's speech: did he take the criticism as emulous? Socrates seems to affirm all this in his response (E2).

350 περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ (E1): The expression is careless as to whether it is the same man or the same topic he will be moved to write about, and thus sets into relief the sameness. What will compel Lysias to write is not to avoid being blinded (as Socrates suggests with ὅτι τάχιστα, D5) but to compete with Socrates. The suggestion we felt in Phaedrus's behavior (on his use of ἕτερον cf. n.235) toward Socrates after delivering the first speech receives some corroboration. The compulsion to emulate and compete is somehow unavoidable (πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ... ἀναγκασθῆναι, D9-E1). An erotic compulsion is at work, not merely a sophistical penchant for competition.

351 Socrates perfects his resolution to reverse his course by returning to the Boy whose story (μῦθος) he abandoned telling a moment ago (241E8 cf. n.316).

352 Phaedrus expresses feelings of love for Socrates with great frankness, and now we see the operation of the other aspect of Socrates's alternative course, the reaction of a beloved who has been loved by a man calm, noble and free. The love needs not have existed before this moment nor needs to continue after the conversation is over, so that (*pace* deVries *et al.* – though cf. deVries's comment at the end of this speech: 257B4-5) there is no need for us to decide whether Phaedrus's "real" love is Lysias or Socrates's is Isocrates, etc. The point is that Socrates wants to turn Phaedrus's loyalty away from Lysias by reminding him of something more lovable and better.

Socrates raised the theme of a speech's effect on the love-feelings of his audience just before his First Speech (237A10-B1) and he will return to it at the end of his Second Speech in his prayers to Eros on behalf of himself (257A9), Lysias (257B2-4), and Phaedrus (B4-6), as well as at the very end of the dialogue in the conceit about Phaedrus returning to Lysias and himself to Isocrates (278B8-279B3).

353 Πυθοκλέους (244A1): The name, especially in the genitive, can suggest a "yearning for honor" (πόθος κλέους) or an "honorific gossip" (πυθέσθαι as used at 231E4) and so perhaps alludes to the motive Socrates attributes at 243A1-2 to the author of the "speech of Phaedrus" he just delivered, and to the sin that underlies it, namely, trading out the approval of the gods for honor among men (242C9-D1).

354 τοῦ Εὐφήμου (A2): In contrast to the inspiration that fathered Phaedrus's speech, Socrates's Stesichoran one will duly revere the gods.

355 μέντοι (A7) is adversative and self-corrective. Cf. *Polit.*296B2. For tucking the crucial point into a proviso, cf. φημί, 260E2.

so many people on the right path under so many circumstances, we would go on and on listing off things already known by everyone. But the following evidence is worth emphasizing: those men of former times who assigned names to things bore no ill sense against mania nor thought it blameworthy. If they had, they would hardly have worked it into the name of this finest of the arts by which the future is foretold, the *manic* art. It was out of a belief that it was a fine thing whenever it became available to men by divine dispensation that they gave this art the name they did, though men of recent times out of their ignorance of what is fine[356] added a T and started calling it "mantic." While we're at it,[357] as to the kind of investigation[358] into the future practiced by the men in possession of their wits who work with geese and other signals,[359] since they endeavor[360] to supply our need for knowledge and insight from inferences done by means of human guesswork, the men of old named it "guessifying," but the newcomers call it "goosifying," trying to make it sound more stately by lengthening the vowel.[361] In truth, just as mantic is a more perfect and honorable thing than goosification, considering their names as well as what they can do, so is madness a finer thing than sobriety – comparing, that is, the madness that comes from god with the sobriety that operates on the human level.

Second, to get back to the point:[362] for some of the greatest ancestral diseases and toils brought on and sustained in some families by offenses in former times, it was Mania that invented[363] their cure and release by visiting them as a go-between and providing

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356 ἀπειροκάλως (C4), perfectly standard terminology for vulgarity (*Rep*.403C2, 405B8; Ar.*EN* 1122A31; X.*Cyrop*.1.2.3, *Mem*.3.10.5), but pregnant with a meaning that will become clear only presently.

357 ἐπεὶ καὶ τήν γε ... (C5): On ἐπεί ... γε see Smyth §2380. With γε, ἐπεί no longer means "since" objectively ("the foregoing is true since") but subjectively ("I say that because"). The speaker interrupts the onward flow of his own argument to tell us another etymology; but he will soon find a way to return to his point (D2-5). For an important instance of self-interruption with ἐπεί γε, cf. *Rep*.358C6 and my n. *ad loc*.

358 τήν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων ζήτησιν (C5-6), omitting Burnet's comma (with Heitsch). μανική is the true name of what is now called by the benighted moderns μαντική, while at the same time the sober "research" (ζήτησιν) that moderns revere was known by the ancients to be only guesswork by human means and they named it accordingly but the moderns changed the name to make it sound more important.

359 σημείων (C7) = "symbolic instrumentalities" (Helmbold-Rabinowitz, 26 n.8).

360 ποριζομένων (C7), present, is conative.

361 Only οἰωνιστική is Greek, and its etymology – as opposed to that of μαντική – is obvious ("bird-izing"). Socrates nevertheless makes up a "truer" pre-existing term οἰονοϊστική, based on οἴησις, νοῦς and ἱστορία. The etymology is preposterous of course, and fully in line with the general "reversal of perspective" that is the present trend and theme. (As we shall see, this trend and theme is an adumbration of the equally and analogously preposterous notion, "dubious to the clever but credible to the wise" [245C1-2], that the stimulus we experience in the beauty of a boy's body is in truth a recollection of a "truer" beauty from before). He procures a basis for his etymology by a sleight of hand according to which bird-prophecy *reasons from signals* (whence διά τε τῶν ὀρνίθων ... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων, C6-7: the διά is picked up in διάνοια), in contradistinction to the direct intuition afforded by μανία, so that the results can be called, not without a significant strain in both word order and usage, οἰήσει νοῦς τε καὶ ἱστορία (C8) "guesswork's knowledge and insight." The preposterous allegation that mere men ("moderns") sought thereby to add legitimacy to their own abilities (σεμνύνοντες, D1) gains a margin of credibility from the analogous claim made a page above about the second speech (243A1-2), where it was entirely true. Of course Helmbold-Rabinowitz are right to add "merely" (*pace* deVries): the guesswork is mechanical not intelligent.

362 ἀλλὰ μήν ... γε (D5) introduces the second god-given mania by pushing off against the etymology of oionistic, which was strictly a digression. In D7-8, below, I have altered the punctuation of Burnet as follows: add comma after γενῶν, omit comma after προφητεύσασα, add comma after ἔδει.

363 ἡ Μανία (D7) is personified, praised, and thanked for her "extraordinary" efforts (καταφυγοῦσα) and the "achievement" (τυχοῦσα) they led to, which constituted a "discovery" for the benefit of mankind (ηὕρετο [E1], repeated by εὑρομένη at 245A1) – all of this in contrast to the vain attempts of the bird-augers to supply the needs of their fellow humans.

what was needed from the gods. She resorted to worshipful services and prayers for aid from the gods and chanced thereby upon purifications and initiations, by which she rendered a man immune who partook of her[364] both for the present time and into the future,[365] for she discovered a way to liberate a man who was properly maddened and possessed (245) from the evils that surrounded him.

Third, from the Muses there comes a kind of possession or mania[366] that captures an impressionable and unspoiled[367] soul and awakens a frenzy in it that is expressed in songs and all poetic forms that adorn the deeds of our ancestors so as to edify generations upcoming.[368] If a man has no such madness in him but approaches the portals of the Muses to compose poetry thinking that mere[369] technique will suffice to make him a poet, both he and his poetry will not achieve their potential but instead will be consigned to oblivion[370] for all their sobriety, in comparison with the poets whose work had the inspiration of madness.[371]

These, then, and still more things could I retail of the good works conferred upon man by mania issuing from the gods, so that the thing itself[372] we need not fear, nor therefore[373] let the argument scare us off that one ought to prefer the sober man over the man who is disturbed.[374] But let the palm be granted only when that argument has

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364 Reading ἑαυτῆς (E3) with BTW and the Marc.185 and Vat.gr.173 (*apud* Moreschini), against αὐτήν in Aristides and against Burnet's excision. For the partitive genitive cf. my n. to *Rep.*485B1-2. The vague relation of which she is here the object is same as the relation of which she was above described as being the subject (ἐγγενομένη, D7).

365 πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον (E3-4) indicates her cure was as permanent as the ancestral disease had been.

366 κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία (245A2): The former term picks up κατασχομένῳ and μανία reasserts the genus or topic. The reversal of their order helps effect the transition to the new category of μανία.

367 ἁπαλήν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν (A2): The two attributes are tantamount to the notion of the *tabula rasa*, made of wax so as to be soft (ἁπαλήν) and impressionable, and erased clean or unmarked (ἄβατον) to take a new imprint (though in the end the soul will be more a conduit than a tablet for the inspiration of mania). The point is that the human contribution is minimal.

368 κοσμοῦσα (A4): This third mania operates *through* select souls (rather than *on* select souls as the second type did, and rather than through *functionaries* as the first did), selecting them (λαβοῦσα) for the work of passing on wisdom by decorating it with beauty.

369 ἄρα (A6), even though placed within the clause that describes the uninspired man's belief, denotes the speaker's attitude toward it ("fool that he is").

370 ἠφανίσθη (A8) is gnomic. The term is used not only in reference to the poet's hope for eminence against obscurity (as the verb is used at *Phlb.*42A1, *Symp.*217E4, etc.) but more importantly of the survival of poems and even poetry as a whole as guarantor that traditional wisdom not become extinct (cf. *Leg.*678E4; *Symp.*189E2, 190C5-6; *Rep.*565E6, etc.) but continue, instead, to illumine future generations. Likewise not only is the poet unsuccessful (ἀτελής) but his poetry fails to achieve its purpose (ἀτελής), to *miscere utile dulci* as Horace put it. Technique alone can guarantee neither.

371 αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις (A7). τε καί broaches that the subject is duplex so as to enable the predicates ἀτελής before the pair and ἠφανίσθη after it to apply to both subjects. The expression therefore constitutes a chiastic binary construction of the non-distributive type (aABb), where syntactically the attributes (a,b) are attached to the two subjects (A,B) separately, but where semantically both belong to both. Cf. my n. to *Rep.*329A5. The construction is complicated by the elaboration of the second subject (ἡ ποίησις) with a clarificatory attributive participial phrase (ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος), itself elaborated by the parallel participial phrase (ὑπὸ τῶν μαινομένων), so as to effect summary and closure by bringing forward the comparison of the powers of divine inspiration and mere sobriety that is the primary theme. The madmen are in the plural because they are a class of persons affected by the Muses as compared to an individual isolated by his false outlook.

372 τοῦτό γε αὐτό (B2), i.e. μανία. αὐτό = *simpliciter*, re-doing ἁπλοῦν, 244A6.

373 μηδέ (B3). The δέ is illative, for this logos was for its advocates implied by the principle that mania is *eo ipso* bad (cf. διότι, 244A5).

374 κεκινημένου (B4): I.e., μανέντος. The metaphor has not been used of the erotic or the madman in the previous discussion.

proven in addition that it was *not* for the benefit of the lover and the beloved[375] that eros was sent to them by the gods, while we for our part must demonstrate that the very contrary is true, that it is the greatest stroke of luck[376] for mankind that this kind of mania has been granted us by the gods.[377] The demonstration will be unbelievable to the clever but convincing to the wise.[378] We must first[379] deal with the nature of soul, divine and human, and understand the truth of it by observing what it undergoes and what it does.[380] The beginning of the demonstration is as follows.[381]

Soul as such is deathless. For what is always in motion[382] is deathless, whereas what moves something else and is moved by another,[383] because it can have a cessation of motion, can have a cessation of life. Only that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself behind, never ceases being in motion, while for all other things that are in movement it is this that is the ultimate source and initiator of their being in movement. As an initiator or beginning it does not come to be, for everything that comes to be

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375 ὁ ἔρως τῷ ἐρῶντι καὶ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ (B6): The conceptual frame according to which the two have their designations from a common source rather than the beloved being merely the passive object of the lover's urge, is new.

376 ἐπ' εὐτυχίᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ (B7-C1) redoes τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, 244A7.

377 The description of the three effects of divine mania (244A8-5B2) is tantamount to an invocation of the goddess, Mania ("You who enable the priestesses to prophesy, who discovered a cure by for troubled souls *in extremis*, and who enable mere men to keep their traditions alive..."); and the speech following will be her gift in return, in which she will reveal herself operating in these three ways to reveal a fourth power of hers, Eros (cf. n.505). Compare the *envoi* to maniacal Eros at the end of the speech (257A3-B6).

378 δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή (C2): With his *paradoxical* distinction between the wise and the clever Socrates is sailing very close to the wind (deVries pointlessly collects passages where they are synonymous), as he did when (conversely and oxymoronically) he identified εὐηθεία with ἀστεία at 242E5. The purpose of paradox is to invite and require the reader to go beyond the usual interpretations. The suggestion is that the "clever," whose ἀστεία enabled them to present a meritless thesis as being worth taking seriously in Socrates's First Speech (their attitude and methods alluded to again by the gratuitous etymology of oionistic above, 244C5-D1), will recognize the art in Socrates's "demonstration" and will find sophisticated ways to doubt it, as the clever mythographers can doubt the myths (εἰ ἀπιστοίην ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί, 229C6 – where he calls δεινοί σοφοί!); the "wise" however will not be distracted by the art but see through it to the truth, though by means of *what* wisdom we have no idea! At the same time the distinctions immediately above, between the technician and the inspired poet (A5-8) and between the bird-augur and the true mantic (244B6-D5), are being adduced and aligned: the latter will be inspired by mania from "above" while the former will only build an edifice by human means. We are being *jogged* upwards and *drawn* upwards, rather than having the way paved for us in the programmatic and methodical manner of Socrates's First Speech.

379 δεῖ οὖν (C2): In contrast to his First Speech Socrates gives neither methodology nor even an excuse or explanation for his assertion about where he needs to begin (237B7-D3) or re-begin (238D8-E2). He just begins. Cf. the transition at 246A3-4.

380 ἰδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα (C3-4) is tantamount to asking what verbs soul is the subject or the object of (except for the copula), and therefore is tantamount to describing something like the life of the soul, which must be what φύσις means. Cf. the use at the beginning of *Rep.*7 (514A2) and my note *ad loc.*

381 ἀρχὴ δέ ἀποδείξεως ἥδε (C4): The language is perfunctory and oracular, avoiding the article and employing "rising" word order in the manner of the gods' speeches in Hades as depicted in the myth of Er (617D6-E5, 619B3-6). For rising and falling word order cf. the wonderful little book of Henri Weil, *De l'Ordre des mots dans les langues anciennes comparées aux langues modernes* (Paris 1944; 3rd ed.1879) tr. Charles Super (Boston 1887).

382 ἀεικίνητον (C5) is to be read over the αὐτοκίνητον of Oxy.Pap.1016 (accepted by Robin even though corrected *in margine* there with ἀεικίνητον). This is the unanimous reading of the mss. and testimonia back to Cicero (*TD* 1.23,53). As to the testimony of Hermias cited by Robin in favor of αὐτοκίνητον, his words at 104.7 and 9 explicitly state that Plato did not place the propositions in syllogistic order, which implies if anything that he read ἀεικίνητον here (which, as he argues, is the *implication* of αὐτοκίνητον). At 108.17 and 113.12 he explicitly quotes the text as containing ἀεικίνητον.

383 κινοῦν ... κινούμενον (C6): It is of course crucial to remember that whereas in English the verb "move" is both transitive and intransitive, the Greek verb κινεῖν is transitive only, so that "moving" in the sense of "being in motion" requires the passive voice (as at C8 and C9). The translator must be careful to take this into account.

necessarily comes to be from a beginning, whereas a beginning necessarily does not come to be from any thing at all;[384] for if a beginning should come to be from something, it would be something that came to be without beginning to;[385] and since it does not come to be it must necessarily not cease to be, for once a beginning had passed away, neither could it, as a beginning, itself come to be from something else nor could anything else come to be from it, if as we have said everything comes to be from a beginning. Thus, as to the beginning of motion,[386] it is the self-moving thing; and as to this beginning, as a beginning it cannot cease to exist or come into existence, else[387] all of heaven and everything that comes to be within it[388] could collapse and come to a stop, bereft of any beginning of motion from which ever again to come to be.

Now that it has become clear[389] that what is moved by itself is deathless, one will never be shamed[390] for asserting that "self-moving mover"[391] is the nature and the definition[392] of soul. For as to body, the kind whose ability to be in motion comes from the outside is called "soulless" or inanimate, whereas the kind for which the ability to

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384 μηδ' ἐξ ἑνός (D2), tmesis of μηδέν (cf. οὐδ' ἐξ ἑνός, 246C6) with μή negating the conception in addition to the fact.

385 οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο (D3), the reading of BTW Marc.185, Vat.gr.173 and Oxy.1017, as well as Stob.(*Anth*.1.332.18 Wachsmuth) and Simpl.(*Phys*.464.27) – only the Vind.phil.gr. 4 differs, reading ἀρχή in place of ἐξ ἀρχῆς. The sense is, it already was a beginning and therefore cannot begin to be, or become, a beginning. That is, there is no time before it became a beginning when it could begin to become one. But since all things become what they are by beginning to (D1-2), it cannot have begun to.

The glosses of Cicero (*Rep*.6.27: *nec enim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde*) and Tim.Locr. (*apud* Theodoret, *Therap*.2.504: εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀρχά) both replace the ideal condition with a contrafactual one, and at the same time they replace γίγνεσθαι in the apodosis with εἶναι (as Robin noticed, *ad loc*.). In this they agree with each other more than with this passage and as such cannot support Buttmann's insertion of ἔτι into it (read by Ast, Burnet, *et al*.). Iamblichus's allusion to the passage (*Nic.Arith*.111: διότι δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐκ ἂν εἴη, φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀρχὴ εἴη) is inconclusive as a witness. Hermias's interpretation (117.10-16 Couvreur) does preserve the optative formulation and gives an interpretation consistent with the mss.: if an ἀρχή should come to be from something it would be from what was not an ἀρχή (ἐκ μὴ ἀρχῆς, 14) since all genesis is from what something wasn't to what it becomes, which he reduces to paradox since the ἀρχή would then have an origin that was not an origin.

386 οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μέν ... · τουτο δέ ... (D6-7): οὕτω δή announces a conclusion rather than an inference: the μέν-clause summarizes C5-9 and the δέ-clause summarizes D1-6. Therefore replace Burnet's (and Stallbaum's, Thompson's, Fowler's, Rowe's, and Yunis's) period after κινοῦν with Robin's semicolon, or else with Ast's comma (D7).

387 ἤ (D8), "or else" in the sense of the less attractive – in this case absurd – alternative (cf. 249E5, and my n. *ad Rep*.342B1). δύνατον (not ἀναγκαῖον *vel sim*., *pace* Thompson, which would not quite follow) is carried forward from the previous clause (as ἀνάγκη was after ἤ at 239A7). The idea is that if any process is irreversible as opposed to cyclic its application would already have exhausted the supply, so that if things that die did not come back to life everything would be dead by now (cf. *Phdo*.72BC), just as by similar reasoning, if mortal things could become immortal everything by now would be immortal (cf. *Rep*.611A).

388 γένεσιν (E1), the reading of all mss. plus Hermias, Stob. and Simpl., having the sense of ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν (i.e., man, animals, and plants), for which cf. *Phdo*.70D7-9. Cicero (*Rep*.6.27) translates *omne caelum omnisque <u>natura</u>*. For the pairing with οὐρανός cf. *Leg*.889C3-5.

389 πεφασμένου (E2), in its "dialectical" sense describing something that has become clear in the course of the logos. Cf. my n. *ad Rep*.344A10. The two propositions of the μέν / δέ construction constitute the propositions of which this is the syllogistic conclusion.

390 λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται (E4): Cf. μὴ φοβούμεθα μηδέ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος ... θορυβείτω δεδιττομένος (B2-3). The references to shame and fear are not otiose but reveal that the defense of the madman has begun. The prospect of yielding to divine madness is embarrassing.

391 τοῦτον αὐτόν (E4): The antecedent is τὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον. The demonstrative is attracted into the gender of the proximate predicate (οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον). Cf. ταυτῆς οὔσης, E6.

392 οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον (E3), a spelling out of φύσις (C3), which has been made rational and true by the intervening reasoning. The two terms, and the connecting of them, is Socratic-Platonic in the same way that οὐσία (suspiciously) was, in Socrates's First Speech (237C3). Just below they will be replaced with φύσις.

move is within but is not part of itself is called "ensouled" or animate, as if on the grounds that the power to move belongs to the nature of soul. But if this is really true – that the thing that can move itself is no other thing than soul – then it follows necessarily that soul would be ungenerated and deathless. (246)

As to the demonstration of soul's deathlessness this is sufficient;[393] as to its character[394] the following must be said. Truly to describe it as it is would require a narrative utterly and in all respects divine and lengthy, but to give a likeness of it can be carried off in shorter compass by a mere man. Let us take the latter tack. It is something like[395] an engine[396] of yoked horses and charioteer grown together into a single winged organism. For the gods, the horses and the charioteer are all good and the offspring of

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393 ἱκανῶς (246A3): The transition is again unapologetic and abrupt (cf. 245C2-4 and n.), and draws a rather wrong-footed contrast between ἀθανασία and ἰδέα (itself a surprising term). As to the abruptness it is of a piece with the abruptness with which he began the whole ἀπόδειξις (245C4-5), but we have just learned that soul *is* the beginning and its immortality is predicated upon its being so, and so upon reflection we realize that as Humpty-Dumpty taught us there is no need to ask why he began with the beginning! Perhaps the present transition will likewise justify itself if only we listen patiently and learn. Cf. the next transitions at B5-6 and D3-5. As to the wrong-footedness, the fact is that we are moving from the definition and essence (245E3) of soul as unmoved mover to its imagined "quality," but because the opening assertion was soul's ἀθανασία (C5) the programmatic formula by which the transition is announced dismisses that question rather than the definition reached along the way.

394 τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς (A3-4): The peculiar diction reminds us that Socrates used the same word in his First Speech, in a similar connection but quite differently, to describe the pair of "characteristics" within us by which that speaker explained our behavior (237D6, cf. n. *ad loc.*) – what might in other words be called "the parts of our soul," though in that speech there was no single soul but only these characteristics in conflict (notwithstanding the single use of the term ψυχή at 241C5, where in the same paragraph [241A2-B5] the victory of one of the ἰδέαι over the other could only be represented as the individual becoming a different person, and the new person himself can only fear he might turn back into the old!). There, ἰδέα denoted nothing but a notion; but here the ἰδέα is an ἰδέα of the soul, a reality beyond description of which mere humans can do no more than hazard a likeness or likely notion (A4-6). This ἰδέα is identical to soul *per se*, in the same way the the ἰδέα τοῦ καλοῦ is identical to τὸ καλόν; the question "whether there is an idea of soul" only begs the question.

395 Reading ἔοικέ τῳ δή (A6), the reading of Hermias (122.16, 126.28), differing from the major mss. only in accentuation (though W and Par.1808 reverse the order of τῳ and δή). All the mss. have the iota subscript except for the corrector of W and a γράφεται in T, which have ἐοικέτω δή, the reading of Stobaeus (1.333.9 Wachsmuth). This reading does appear as a variant in one of the two quotations of the passage by Hermias (126.28); Moreschini reports it from Oxy.1017 (which Robin had found an inconclusive witness); Ficinus appears to corroborate it, translating, "*similis esto cognatae potentiae*...". In modern edd. ἐοικέτω was first "re-introduced" by Ast (*rescripsimus*), who overstated its presence in Hermias, and then it was adopted by Stallb., Thompson, Schanz, Hermann, Burnet, Vollgraff, Hackforth, Moreschini, Rowe and translators; Robin alone reads ἔοικέ τῳ ("*je ne sais quelle force*") the diffident tone of which is far preferable. For the rare and poetical position of τῳ, which echoes ᾧ from above, cf. (with Verdenius) διαβιωτέον τινὰς δὴ παιδίας at *Leg.*803E1 ("*quasdam,*" England, comparing 861D6; E. *IT* 946, S.*Ant.*158). It is virtually adverbial with ἔοικε. deVries's argument that ἐοικέτω is preferable because "highly idiomatic" has the virtue of warning editors against unidiomatic emendations, but Socrates has no interest in speaking "idiomatically" here.

396 συμφύτῳ δυνάμει (A6-7): The expression is highly abstract but alludes to the notion above that soul has the power to move itself. We may begin to muse over the reinsman causing the horses to move with whip and spur, and the horses causing the σύμφυτόν τι, including the reinsman, to move.

good,[397] but for the others the situation is mixed. Indeed[398] for us[399] the ruler likewise steers a yoked pair;[400] but of the horses the one is fine and good and the offspring of such but the other is the offspring of the opposite sort of parents and opposite. Managing the reins is for us[401] accordingly difficult and irksome.

We must try to account for how it is that animals have come to be called mortal and immortal.[402] Soul as such watches over and takes care of all that is soulless, and permeates all the heavens,[403] assuming now one and now another form.[404] When she is in perfect condition, with wings fully feathered, she makes her way through midair and

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397 καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων (B2-3): Formulaic καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός already suggests that καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων is merely a formula of praise (cf. 249E1-2 and 274A1-2; *Gorg*.512D1-2, *Menex*.237A6, *Rep*.461A8-B1; Theogn.184, P. *Olymp*.7.91, Andoc.*Myst*.109, X.*Mem*.4.3.23, Ar.*Rhet*.A.9,1367B32, f.92.2-3[Rose]), formulaic also in funerary inscriptions (*I.G.Bulg*.I^2 220.2, 221.3; *SEG* 23.155). Cf. also the phrase πονηροῖς κἀκ πονηρῶν, A.*Ran*.731 (where note the formulaic description of good men in the previous lines). The chiastic ordering of the opposite case is part of the sing-song. The expressions are not to be taken so literally as to raise the question of the figurative horses' birth or composition (e.g., *composés de bons éléments*, Robin), just as they cannot be taken literally when predicated of the gods (so Rowe, on 274A1-2).

398 καί (B1): Helpful parallels for this "explanatory" καί are supplied by Verdenius *ad loc*., e.g., *Ion* 538C1, *Lach*.181B3, *Prot*.317B4, *Phdo*.84A3.

399 ἡμῶν (B1): The prolepsis, parallel to proleptic θεῶν above, smoothly introduces "us" as the ἄλλαι ψυχαί without saying what "we" are (mortals? men? animals?), thereby continuing the vagueness of τῶν ἄλλων. Vollgraff's suggestion that ἄλλων is an error "*a compendio* ΑΝΩΝ *natus*" is misplaced ingenuity. What it means to be an ἄνθρωπος in the first place, was called into question by the distinction drawn above between divine and human soul (245C3); at this stage of the account "we" are not even mortals as yet since our souls have not as yet descended into bodies (C2-6, *infra*); are we, however, already "humans"? Or are we only "us"? The early assertion of the immortality of soul, done without warning or explanation, now has an implication: perhaps we are humans even before we enter body, and therefore we are humans *immortally*. Beginning with the soul likewise enabled (and required) us to talk about the gods before we really decided what the gods are (C6-D2). What it means to be a man will end up being determined below (248C8-D3, 249B5-C4).

400 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων (B1): μέν is concessive. The emphasis is not on συνωρίδος, as though it pointed a contrast with the gods' ζεῦγος having four horses (*pace* Hackforth, Heitsch: cf. n.431): the clause concedes that the reinsman *of course* has the job of ruling so that εἶτα can then describe the salient difference that explains how our situation is "mixed." The designation of the reinsman as the ἄρχων ἡμῶν, ineluctably recalls the language of Socrates's First Speech, and denies its thesis. There the pronoun ἡμῶν had served the Speaker to import as its antecedent a single "identity" over which the two forces within "us" were fighting for sovereignty (237D6-9), but here there is a part whose very job is to manage these forces, which are here represented or replaced by the two horses. This is a most significant difference. In the present case this same first plural pronoun (ἡμῶν), to which he sidles up after speaking of unspecified "others" (B1), enables him to talk about "our" souls before we even know what an ἄνθρωπος or even a ζῷον is – i.e., before we know what has to happen to this soul for it to become a man. In the meanwhile ἡμεῖς is hypostatized by the very event of the speech, as the personnel that are making it a real event – namely, the speaker and his audience – regardless of whether they are souls or men. Moreover this hypostatic "we" includes us, the readers.

401 ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡνιόχησις (B4): The abstract noun focusses attention on the action of the verb ἡνιοχεῖ. The reinsman has the job of ruler but what he rules is inherently difficult to rule, whereas for the gods the distribution of roles remains nominal and unproblematic. The periphrastic περὶ ἡμᾶς (contrast ἡμῶν) emphasizes that this action in "our" life is something different from what it is in the divine life, and we are likely to learn about that difference in intimate detail before long. By implication, the gods have an easy time reining in their horses, which is inferred explicitly, below (εὐήνια ὄντα, 247B2).

402 πειρατέον εἰπεῖν (B5-6): Another abrupt transition motivated by the difference that has come to light between being "us" and being gods. How can an "animal" or a man, as an ἔμψυχον (245E6), be mortal, if his soul is not mortal but immortal? And conversely how can a god be an animal if he is immortal? For compendious τε καί linking exclusive alternatives cf. 237D5; *H.Min*.366A5; *Leg*.885B1; *Prot*.313D1; *Tht*.199B9, C1.

403 πάντα τε οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ (B6-7): The anaphora of πάντα enables him to restate the entirely abstract remark about ψυχή and the ἄψυχον in more concrete or imagistic terms.

manages the entire cosmos;[405] but if her wings lose their feathers she coasts along until she runs into something solid, where now en-housed[406] she takes on an earthy[407] body, which because it appears to able to move itself, though it does so only by dint of the power that belongs only to her,[408] is called[409] generically a living "animal," whereas because the soul and body it consists of are merely attached,[410] it receives the specification "mortal." As for the alternate specification "immortal" applied to "animal", no account at all[411] exists that can survive rational scrutiny. Unjustified by knowledge[412] and with inadequate intelligibility we confabulate[413] god somehow to be an "immortal animal"[414] that as such has a soul and has a body as if in this case these have become a single nature[415] that lasts through all of time. It were better to let god be as ever he

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404 ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γιγνομένη (B7): The transition from soul in the abstract to the more concrete plurality of souls (or the pluralization of soul as many gods and as the many that we are) is itself managed in the most abstract language possible, with γίγνεσθαι and εἶδος, and thereby left still vague. All that we are allowed to imagine is that the principle of individuation is not the body (which comes next, in connection not with individuation but mortality, though this needs to be patched up in the case of the gods with the fantasy of a soul and body συμπεφυκότα [D2]: cf. n.415). We will see what these εἴδη are, soon enough (E4ff).

405 τελέα μὲν οὖν (B7-C1): Again the entirely abstract formulation (τελέα οὖσα) is filled in with imagery (cf.B6-7), introduced this time with epexegetic καί (*primum*, C1) and parallel to the imagistic specification begun above.

406 κατοικισθεῖσα (C3), constituting an etymological figure with διοικεῖ above. The soul that before was ἐπτερωμένη and active is now πτερορυήσασα and passive, and it is confined (κατά) rather than able to permeate (διά) everything else.

407 σῶμα γήϊνον (C3): The body is earthy like Adam, made of "mud" – but also earthly rather than heavenly because now it stays fixed in its "home" and no longer patrols the sky. Earth is both the solid element and the entity beneath heaven.

408 The distinction has already been broached by the difficult expression ᾧ δὲ ἔνδοθεν αὐτῷ ἐξ αὑτοῦ, above (245E5-6).

409 ἐκλήθη (C5), gnomic (so also ἔσχεν, *infra*).

410 παγέν (C5) contrasts with συμφύτῳ (A6), as is confirmed by repetition of the former notion just below (συμπεφυκότα, D2). The language of gross physical attachment of soul to body is used also in the *Phaedo* (82E2, 83D4), as Brisson notes. This mover (soul) *can* detach from and leave the moved (body): contrast 245C7-8. As the apparent self-motion of the compound is the grounds for our calling it by the general name, ζῷον, the fact that its components are (merely) attached is the reason we specify its animality as θνητόν. τε is placed not after ψυχή – i.e., at the head of the clause it connects with the foregoing – but is postponed to the governing verb (ἔσχεν) so as to underline the logic according to which the two indicatives (ἐκλήθη / ἔσχεν) present the genus and the specific differentia, respectively. Failure to recognize the semantics of παγέν and the hyperbaton of τε has led to widespread misunderstanding of this passage.

411 οὐδ' ἐξ ἑνός (C6), emphatic tmesis of οὐδέν. cf. 245D2, Stallb. *ad Phdo.*72D, *Rep.*374C6 and 516A2; *Symp.*214D7. λελογισμένου is middle, of a λόγος that presents a piecemeal and systematic account, standing in contrast with πλάττομεν. The "fabrication" we conventionally use is an unsystematic and ultimately unintelligible congeries of attributes (see next note).

412 Whether Plato wrote ἰδόντες (C7), the reading of ms. T and the edd., or εἰδότες (found in ms. B and Proclus), its particular sense depends on how it complements ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες. That we have neither seen (ἰδόντες) nor know (εἰδότες) the nature of god is forgivable; that we confabulate a picture that is essentially unintelligible (οὔτε ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες) is less so, and this is why he says that our account is *mere* confabulation. See nn. 414 and 415.

413 πλάττομεν (C7): The genitive participle πλαττομένου found in the mss. (BT) is attractive for being syntactically parallel with λελογισμένου but requires an emendation of the subsequent sentence for its nominative plural participles left without a leading verb, so that we must read πλάττομεν from Proclus (and a corrector of ms. V). It governs not an infinitive but participles on analogy with ποιεῖν when used of poetic depiction (cf. γέγραφε with participles at 227C5-6 and n. *ad loc.*).

414 ἀθάνατόν τι ζῷον (D1): τι announces that this is part of the "πλᾶσμα." On its face it is a contradiction in terms, since animals are born and therefore come to be, whereas the proof of soul's immortality, above, strongly suggested that any γενητόν would be φθαρτόν.

415 συμπεφυκότα (D2): The concept is brought forward from the metaphorical description of the immortal soul (συμφύτῳ δυνάμει, A6-7), and now applies its magic wand to invent an irrefragable unity of body and soul in the case of the gods, as if the two very different types of thing could grow into one. If gods were pure soul there would be no need to explain their immortality, but we think they are animals somehow (τι, D1) and so we arbitrarily imagine that

wishes to be and leave off our reasonings at that,[416] for it is the cause of our soul's loss of wing and how its feathers fall out that is now our business to understand.[417] And that goes something like this.

By nature, the power and function of a wing is to lead whatever has weight upward so as to make its way through the airy region where lives the race of the gods. Also by nature,[418] the one thing that has the most kinship with the divine, of all things involved in the animal body, is soul.[419] But the divine as such is beautiful, wise, good and everything like that, so that it is these things[420] that most[421] nourish the wingly appendages of the soul and make them grow, whereas the ugly and evil and[422] their opposites weaken and tend to destroy it.

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the soul and body in their way of being animals have become a single organism (συμπεφυκότα, the perfect of over-and-done-ness) so that they will not suffer the death that other mortal animals do. This theory of divinity reduces the eternal immortality of soul (of the proof above) to an imaginary sempiternity of body.

416 καὶ λεγέσθω (D3): In addition to acquiescing in the way the gods order things (ταύτῃ ἐχέτω), we need not even pursue a λογὸς λελογισμένος (C5) about them, but be satisfied by our obviously inadequate πλᾶσμα, since our own business and concerns lie elsewhere. The speaker's purpose is not to criticize conventional religion but to stress our predicament on earth and how to handle it. See next note.

417 λάβωμεν (D5) desiderates the ἀποβολὴ πτερῶν of the soul as the next topic without explanation or apology, but clearly this is the first question any of the embodied souls in the Speaker's audience would ask! The high topic of the divine is inscrutable to us, and we must now be content to face the more pressing vicissitudes of our lives as animals. Socrates used a similar transition to return to the matter of his First Speech (238D6-7), but now it is within the speech that the transition occurs. The treatment of how "we" became animals will, without warning, require us to go far afield, but justifiably and pleasantly, treating first how the wing is nourished and only then how some souls fail to maintain their diet, lose their feathers, and fall (246D6-249D3).

418 κεκοινώνηκε (D7) inherits the notion of the "true by nature" from the perfect, πέφυκε, but there is a change of subject: see next note.

419 Reading ψυχή (D8) with all mss. and Helmbold-Rabinowitz. Edd. since Heindorf have cited "Plutarch" in their apparatuses as grounds for bracketing it (Stallb., Burnet, Moreschini) or even deleting it (Thompson, Robin, deVries, Yunis), merely because it is absent in Plutarch's paraphrase of the passage at *QP* 1004C. But (1) his paraphrase is not evidence that it was absent from text that he read, and (2) of the two answers he goes on to give to the *quaestio*, the first answers in fact why Plato should have said that *soul* (not wing) is akin to the divine, and the second explains the wing as divine only by dint of its being akin to the divine element in soul. Plutarch was originally brought in by Heindorf as support for his deletion of ψυχή on the grounds that it renders the sentence "either absurd or meaningless" (*ad loc.*), because it treats the soul as corporeal, but exactly this is granted by Plutarch in his second answer. The genitive τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα is more ablatival than partitive (cf. Smyth §1434) and the emphasis is on comparing embodied soul to any other aspect of body rather than selecting it out as one of its aspects. The speaker's argument is that wings need strength and therefore nourishment to do their natural task of lifting, but that because soul more than any aspect of body is particularly akin to the divine, the *soul's* metaphorical plumage (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα), both while it was strong and more importantly afterwards, after soul descended into body, continues to receive what nourishment and strength it receives as it did before, from soul imbibing divine goodness, beauty, and wisdom; just as it was and will ever be weakened by soul imbibing the opposite. In truth the soul neither has wings nor are wings divine, but it shares in the divine more than any other aspect of ourselves. This interpretation is borne out by the restatement of the matter at 248B7-C2, where even the syllogistic consecutivity is reproduced by τε … τε. Cf. n.474.

420 τούτοις (E1): Does he mean the beautiful, the wise, and the good? or *things* that are beautiful, wise and good? Compare the similarly anarthrous αἰσχρῷ ... καὶ κακῷ below.

421 μάλιστά γε (E2): The underlying idea is that "like feeds on like:" the thing particularly akin to the divine will feed particularly on divine things. If γε is to be read (it is a corr. in B that appears also in Par.1810 and Par.1811, while B and Marc.185 have τε and TWVat.173 have bare μάλιστα), it is "causal" with ψυχῆς though it is attached to μάλιστα in order to illustrate the causal relation between soul's kinship to the divine and soul's nourishment on the divine.

422 καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις (E3): καί does not in itself "generalize" (*pace* deVries relying on a dubious claim of Verdenius), though it can add a general term to a specific one (this might be all that Verdenius means to claim). τοῖς is here possessive, referring to πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον, so that τοῖς ἐναντίοις is already generalized.

The great leader in the heavens, who is Zeus,[423] drives his winged chariot and leads the procession, managing and watching over everything. In his train there follows the army of gods and spirits in an orderly array of eleven divisions. (247) For Hestia stays in the home of the gods, alone,[424] while the other gods that hold ruling rank in the twelve groups lead their respective companies in the grand array. Many and blessed are the vistas and pathways within the precincts of the skies through which the race of the happy[425] gods circulates, each managing its own,[426] while in their train whoever[427] is willing and able may follow, since Envy is excluded from the chorus of the gods.[428] But when they would make their way to dine on festival days,[429] it is upward toward the roof above the skies that they make their way, right[430] to its outer side. Though the chariots of the

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423 The transition to the procession of the gods is abrupt and stately: there is no connective particle (nor could there be) and the hyperbaton of Zeus's name (like that of νοῦς below, 247C8) is climactic. The Speaker leaps upward, and we are jogged upward. Soon it dawns on us that we are hearing an elaboration of the flight of soul that was presented above (B6-C6), where the flight of the perfect soul that takes on many forms served as foil for the soul that loses its plumage (C2-6). Moreover, the vague remark about its many forms (246B7) is now filled in with the spectrum and array of Olympian gods and daemons, who again will serve as foil for the voluntary followers (ὁ ἀεὶ ἐθέλων ... [A6ff]) who, like the sad souls mentioned above will soon become the "us" that we now have really become, by losing their plumage. The leading topic, the loss of plumage that has made us what we now are (D3-5), has momentarily been abandoned by the leap upward only to be returned to by a re-descent. The upward register-shift resembles the sudden announcement and proof that soul is immortal at the beginning of the speech; and we will encounter another such leap just below (247C3ff). The movement of the speech, we may say, is anagogic: it moves forward by jogging us up and then coasting down to the next point, only to leap up again. The movement is quite different from the uniformly deductive and smooth order of Socrates's shallow and false First Speech. The present leap was widely remembered in antiquity – Demetr. *de eloc*.56; D.H. *Dem*.7; Hermog. *Id*. 2.290(Sp.), *Inv*.2.255(Sp.); Luc.*Pisc*.22, *Bis Acc*.33, Plut.*Mor*.1102E; Procl.*Theol.Plat*.6.14; Macrob.*Sat*.1.23.

424 γάρ (247A1) indicates there would have been twelve, one for each of the Twelve Olympians (Zeus, Poseidon, Hades, Hestia, Hera, Ares, Athena, Apollo, Hermes, Aphrodite, Artemis, Hephaestus) among whom Zeus was *primus inter pares*. That Hestia should stay (μένει) begs us to guess the reason has to do with her name (the etymon is of course στα-), which conversely suggests that the other gods are by nature in motion. To identify her with the earth beneath the heavens implies the heavens are spherical but fails to preserve her transcendence (the home of the gods is heaven: 246D7): Socrates leaves the matter open. The theme of motion and rest will become crucial in half a page, when the gods come to a stand (ἔστησαν, B7) and are subsequently borne, at rest, by "the periphora."

425 θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων (A5): εὐδαιμόνων, in the wake of the stronger term μακάριαι (A4) and placed in predicative hyperbaton, suggests that the gods are *made* "happy" *because* the sights and byways they haunt are "blessed." Cf. 250B5-6 and n. *ad loc*. and Dodds *ad* E.*Bacch*.72-5.

426 πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν ... τὸ αὑτοῦ (A4-6): The μὲν οὖν clause depicts what we might call the *general* (n.b.πολλαί) daily life of the gods "within" the ouranos with their distinct haunts or "orbits" (ἐπιστρέφεται, A5) and activities (τὸ αὑτοῦ, A6) which "others" try to follow, as foil for the times of their occasional ascent "beyond" (in the δὲ δή clause, A8), at which time keeping up with them becomes particularly difficult for those others. Emphatic δή after δέ confirms that the contrast anticipated in the πολλαὶ μέν clause has only now (not at A6) been reached.

427 ὁ ἀεὶ ἐθέλων (A6): The attributive participle allows a noun to be left out, just as ἄλλων did at 246B1, which was immediately clarified there by ἡμῶν. This soul-person (note gender and cf. n.494) is again one of "us," whatever "we" are.

428 Φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται (A7): The pleasure they take from visiting these blessed climes and byways might give them cause to deny access to others than themselves, even though their own view would not be affected by the presence of persons following behind, but Envy "stands outside" the ordered "chorus" (cf. στρατιά, 246E6) of the gods, each of whom has his own place and manages his own and minds his own business. To us humans it might occur that our own enjoyment relies on its being denied to others.

429 πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην (A8): Reading bare καὶ from B (τε καὶ T) and ἐπὶ from T and Proclus (ὑπὸ B). πρός is spatial (motion toward) and ἐπί is purposive, but what is the meaning sought by the two nouns? The phrase is almost a pleonasm (Thompson) to emphasize the shift from work to leisure: it is not just feeding but also celebration that is involved, in the manner of a festive occasion: they will feast on the meat of truth.

430 Reading ἤδη (B1) of all mss., with deVries, depicting the sudden change in direction adopted by the processions, rather

gods glide along in balance well-reined[431] and proceed with ease, the other chariots are barely able. Downward weighs[432] the horse that has a share of evil,[433] tilting toward earth and making heavy going for the charioteer by whom he was poorly trained and fed.[434] It is at this juncture that the extreme of labor with the greatest of stakes awaits the soul. For as to[435] the "immortal" souls as we call them,[436] once they have gotten to the top and made their way to the outside, they come to a stand[437] on the back of the sky, and, now at rest, it is the great revolution that bears them along, while they for their part[438] contemplate the things outside the sky.

The region beyond the sky no poet of this world has ever sung, nor will one ever sing it adequately. Here[439] is what it is like – one must have the courage to try to tell the

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than the ᾗ δή of Proclus (and edd.): the bare dative is too vague in this depiction of movement. As to the asyndeton that would follow, read the οὖν with the subsequent μέν which is quoted by Hermias 144.19 (deVries's doubts are groundless: cf. τῶν again at 144.24) and present in several minor mss. (Coisl.155, Vind.109, Stallb.'s Flor.*θ*), though these go unmentioned in Burnet's and Moreschini's apparatuses. With μὲν οὖν we again are given the situation of the gods as foil for that of the "others" (τὰ δὲ ἄλλα), who will turn out to be ourselves (cf. n.422).

431 ἰσορρόπως εὐήνια ὄντα (B2), as opposed to "our" souls whose contesting horses are difficult to rein in (χαλεπὴ ...καὶ δύσκολος ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡνιόχησις, 246B4). ἰσορρόπως suggests balance between *two* horses. If the gods had more than two horses as Hackforth allows, it should have been mentioned here as a source of their relative ease; instead it is the fact that their horses are αὐτοί τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν rather than "mixed."

432 βρίθει γάρ (B3), bringing forward ἐμβριθές from above (D6): it will be this "weighing down" that calls for the strength and nourishment of the wing.

433 ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων (B3) moves the participle into predicate position not only to tell which horse it is but also why it bears the chariot downward. Cf. ἀχθεῖσα, 238C1.

434 τεθραμμένος (B4) suggests etymologically the τροφή of the soul that strengthens its plumage (246D6-E4) but due to the plasticity of the myth the notion of nutrition in the present passage is allowed to apply directly and only to the horse. See, further, E6. I read the indicative (ἦν) of the recc. (BT have ᾖ).

435 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι … (B6): The phrase both begins an explanation (γάρ) of the great contest and struggle just mentioned and postpones it by interposing a μέν clause about the ease of the gods who are exempted from the struggle. He will return to the struggle of "the others" (τὰ ἄλλα, B2-3) below by resuming the μέν clause (οὕτως μέν, 248A1) and then moving on to the others with a δέ clause (αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, 248A1), but in the mean time he cannot resist to digress on the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος (C3-E6), which turns out to be all-important. Again it is the inherent importance of the topics as they arise that governs the order of the speech rather than a predetermined agenda of the speaker. For other such enthusiastic self-interruptions after a pressing question of human vicissitude is raised, compare 246E4ff and 250B5-C7.

436 καλούμεναι (B6), "as we call them (though we know we do not understand them and would sooner call them as ever they wish)," referring to our inability to reason through an account of the divine: 246D2-3. The sense of αἱ ἀθάνατοι καλούμεναι (sc. ψυχαί) is αἱ τῶν ἀθανάτων καλουμένων (ψυχαί), *pace* deVries.

437 ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστησαν (B7), a gnomic aorist among presents to stress the punctual aspect of their stopping, and with it the stopping of time as we know it. This στάσις ἔξω may well be the inspiration for the ἔκστασις of Plotinus.

438 αἱ δέ (C1), with δέ denoting change of subject, emphasizing the gods have switched out conveying themselves for being conveyed and gazing. The pronominal article along with the epanalepsis (ἔστησαν / στάσας) are features of the εἰρομένη style of mythical narrative. Cf. n.256 and *Rep*.359E1, 614B7, 615E1 and my nn. *ad locc.*

439 ἔχει δέ (C4): δέ is not adversative ("despite the fact there is no description I will give one"), but marks the transition from topic to treatment (cf. 239C5 and n.298).

truth, especially when the subject is truth herself.[440] The colorless, formless and intangible[441] reality, truly real, which only the governor of the soul, namely mind,[442] can behold,[443] and which is the object of the true kind of knowledge, occupies this region.[444] The divine consciousness[445] is nourished by intelligence[446] and knowledge that is pure,[447] and so is that of any soul to the extent that it cares to receive what is suitable for itself,[448] so that as the consciousness passes the time gazing at being she is glad and since it is truth she is contemplating she is nourished by it and takes satisfaction from the feast, until the great revolution has gone full circle[449] and returns her to the place where first

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440 περὶ ἀληθείας (C5): To tell about the truth *about* the truth is to move from truth as predicate (and truth as an attribute of a statement) to truth as subject (and truth as what the statement is about). The shift from the adjective to the substantive indicates or invents the notion that in the world beyond, what is true is truth "hypostatized," and that subject and predicate are one. This logically maximal category or status will be expressed with αὐτό, below. The contrast between singing the region (ὑμνεῖν) and describing it (εἰπεῖν) recalls the function of inspired poetry mentioned above (κοσμοῦσα παιδεύειν, 245A4-5) and discovers a limitation in it, but recalls also the demurral to seek a fully rational account of the gods as immortal animals (246C6-D3: λελογισμένου), by now desiderating a rational account (εἰπεῖν) as a substitute for a poetic one. The humble demurral announces another leap upward, again in strong contrast with the controlled fatuity of Socrates's First Speech. On the rational side, any person may doubt his artistic ability or lack it, but this does not exonerate him from finding and telling the truth as well as he can, and "as well as he can" will involve his reason, for as we will learn, "having reason" is an inalienable and *necessary* attribute of us as *human* beings, though at the same time it will prove *sufficient* as our means to abandon this embodiment and return to that procession in the train of the gods.

441 ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος (B6) represents the contradictory of the conventional doublet by which the visible realm is designated (*Crat.*423D4-5, 431C6; *Gorg.*465B4-5, 474D3ff; *Leg.*668E2-3; *Meno* 75A1-2; *Phdo.*100D1-2; *Phlb.*12E, 51B3-5; *Rep.*373B6, 476B5, 601A2, 616E8-7A4; *Soph.*251A9; *Tht.*163B10). The third item, the sense of touch, is usually placed last in the list of the senses (e.g., 240D2). Together the list indicates that the entire spectrum is meant. Cf. n.306.

442 νῷ (C8), grammatically appositive to κυβερνήτῃ but semantically both an interpretation of it (the governor in us is νοῦς) and an explanation why (for the νοῦς can "see" the invisible). θεατή and its cognates θεωροῦσι at C1 and θεασαμένη at E3, below, reserve for νοῦς a kind of cognition beyond ocular vision.

443 The evidence for θεατή (C7) is in the testimonia only (BTW have θεατῇ), and is uneven. CLEMENT (*Strom.*5.3 = 336.11-12 St.) quotes the passage from ἡ γάρ (C6) and ends with ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεῷ θεατή (the reading of the Laur.V3, though Stählin imports νῷ into the text for θεῷ, from "Plato"): θεῷ and the altered word order weakens his authority. ORIGEN (*c.Cels.*6.19 [=2.90.10 Koetschau]) also quotes from ἡ γάρ and has κυβερνήτῃ νῷ μόνῳ θεατή. SYRIANUS *in Met.*(=*CAG*6.4,32-3 ed.G.Kroll) quotes only from ψυχῆς: Kroll reads κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ νῷ θεατή (though the Coislinianus has νῶ θεαται [*sic*]), citing "Plato" as having θεατὴ νῷ. HERMIAS unvaryingly reports κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ <u>θεατῇ</u> (152.3,152.8 and 150.25 Couvreur) and PROCLUS (*in Alc.*1.77 Creuzer) likewise asserts that Plato calls νοῦς the κυβερνήτη of the soul and then adduces as proof ψυχῆς γάρ φησι κυβερνήτην μόνον <u>θεατήν</u> τὸν δαίμονα ἀνθρώπων ἔφορον καὶ ἐπίτροπον (Creuzer adopts this reading from ms. E: his other mss. have κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατῇ; moreover he points to *Phdr.*247C as the *locus Platonis*, which he cites in the version of TW: ψυχὴς κυβερνήτῃ, μόνῳ θεατῇ νῷ χρῆται); but Proclus's paraphrase and its elaboration in connection with the δαίμων go far afield both from the mss. readings and the context of our passage, so that we cannot even suppose he has this, let alone only this, passage in mind, and in any event his θεατήν is the noun rather than adjective θεατή – so that Burnet should not have cited him as a witness for θεατή. DAMASCIUS paraphrases (*de prin.*353 ed.Kopp) τὴν οὖσαν οὐσίαν καὶ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποτίθεται (sc. ὁ Πλάτων), which strongly suggests he saw θεατή. SIMPLICIUS (*in Phys.*546.1ff) quotes the passage but his mss. have θεατῆ (sic, Diels, who imports θεατή as "Plato"). POLLUX 2.56 (cit.Stallb.) only asserts that Plato predicated θεατή of οὐσία and is useless as a witness for this passage.

It is an overstatement to say with Thompson that θεατή is "fully supported by ms. authority" (*ad loc.*), considering its absence from all the mss. and the mixed witness of the testimonia. We need nothing less than an elaborate hypothetical theory like Alline's (*Histoire du texte de Platon*, 224-5) even to explain its absence from the mss. Luckily, however, little is at stake, since saying (with BTW, Hermias and Proclus) that νοῦς is the only θεατής (noun) that the οὐσία relates to (χρῆται *vel sim.*) is propositionally equivalent to saying that the οὐσία is θεατή (adjective) to νοῦς alone; but the adjectival expression θεατή, re-imported from the testimonia by modern editors, enables the sentence to place νοῦς in stately appositional hyperbaton, whereas the nominal formulation leaves us with a turgid heap of

she came to a stand. During the circuit she beholds justice itself,[450] she beholds temperance,[451] she beholds knowledge[452] – not the knowledge to which becoming has been added, which therefore[453] changes[454] according to the things it is in, such things as we now call real, but the knowledge that is in what really is since it is the knowledge that is.[455] And once she has likewise beheld and feasted on the rest that is real and true she glides back down to the inward side of the heavenly vault and Lo! she has made her way home.[456] Upon her arrival the charioteer[457] stables his horses and then he feeds them on ambrosia and gives them nectar to drink.[458] (248)

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nouns. The former is therefore preferable as Ast later decided.

444 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον (C8-D1) is otiose after the marveling string of attributes granted to the subject. To front-load with marvels and then complete the syntax with anticlimactic indicatives is a pattern in this section of the speech. Cf. n.1411.

445 θεοῦ διάνοια (D1), anarthrous and singular for emphasis and elevation. The substitution of διάνοια for νοῦς (C8) shades divine mind toward a divine consciousness described as undergoing an experience διὰ χρόνου (D3).

446 νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ (D1).:Exegetical τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη stresses that νοῦς now refers to the content rather than the faculty of intelligence which just gathered this content through contemplative vision (θεάσασθαι).

447 On ἀκηράτῳ (D1) cf. my note *ad Rep*.417A1.

448 ὅσῃ ἂν μέλῃ τὸ προσῆκον δέξασθαι (D2-3), reading ὅσῃ with B over T's ὅση and reading μέλῃ with Ven.54 (= Burnet's G) rather than the μέλλῃ of BT: δέξασθαι indicates choice and acquiescence, not ability. ἁπάσης ψυχῆς ὅσῃ is an emphatic singular parallel to θεοῦ δίανοια and equivalent to ἁπάσων ψυχῶν ὅσαις θεοῦ διάνοια. Under the guise of a generalization (ἄν + subj.) sandwiched in as an afterthought to the ἅτε phrase he broaches a dark admonition about (as well as to) the "other" souls – us of course – who might not be so concerned whether we receive the nourishment appropriate to us: cf. 246E3-4 and τροφὴ δοξαστή, below at 248B5.

449 The time elapsed during their journey in the region beyond time is probably none.

450 αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην (D6): αὐτήν, anarthrous and placed first, stresses that it is the *subject* justice that is being viewed, not merely something of which justice is a predicate (cf. n.440).

451 σωφροσύνην (D6): The anaphora of καθορᾷ indicates that we are to understand αὐτήν with this noun, too. The ellipsis prepares the way for a new elaboration of the third item (ἐπιστήμη) although this new elaboration is virtually equivalent in sense to αὐτήν. At the same time that the list provides three cases the characterization of the third is in fact an elaboration of the characterization of the first, and therefore of all three (*mutatis mutandis*: we would need to substitute δικαιοσύνην οὖσαν and σωφροσύνην οὖσαν for ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν). Compare "non-distributive binary structure" (cf. my notes *ad Rep*.350A5 and 452C5-6).

452 δικαιοσύνην ... σωφροσύνην ... ἐπιστήμην (D6-7): The list gives instances of subjects that had been characterized to be καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον at 246E1 (cf. n.420), by adducing a selection of the ὄντα in the huperouranion the vision of which most obviously would nourish the soul, and therefore helps make the argument that was made there (246E2) that the soul's plumage is nourished by the sight. Still, the region includes everything else for which we have a common name (and more), and accordingly by means of elaborating the last item, ἐπιστήμη, all the rest come to be included as its proper objects (D7-E3). For the logical structure cf. *Rep*.357C5-7 and my n. *ad loc*.

453 δέ in οὐδέ (D7) is illative (cf. *Rep*.341D1, 475C4).

454 ἐστίν που ἑτέρα (D7): που puts ἐστὶν into scare quotes since in all strictness it means γίγνεται.

455 ἀλλά (E1): By a favorite "binary" construction (cf. Riddell §§204-230), Plato denies an attribute and then affirms its contrary with ἀλλά, affording himself thereby two opportunities to say what he means. The sense of the denial and the assertion are both illuminated by the complementarity of their expression (γένεσις [D7] the complement of οὖσαν [E2]; ἐν ἑτέρῳ [E1] the complement of ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ὄν [E1-2]; νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν [E1] the complement of ὄντως [E2]). In the present case the denial is duplex (γένεσις πρόσεστιν / ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ); by an entirely usual chiasm, the converse presents the corresponding assertions in reverse order. Compare 273E5-8, and the much more elaborate comparison at 277D6-278B2. It is similar in structure (but not motive) to the *comparatio per contrarium* extensively used in Lysias's speech. The purpose here is to clarify an idea rarely if ever expressed by saying it in two ways; for Lysias the figure speciously implied the identity of the contrary and the contradictory (cf. n.1323).

456 ἦλθεν (E4), "gnomic," along with παρέβαλεν and ἐπότισεν, confers a sense of the timeless effortlessness of divine action, a feature of the heightened register.

457 ἐλθούσης δὲ αὐτῆς (E4): Both the epanalepsis (ἦλθεν / ἐλθούσης) and the pronoun (αὐτῆς) recall the narrative style

Such then is the life of the gods. As to the other souls,[459] the one that does the best at following a god and likening[460] herself to him does indeed[461] lift the head of her charioteer into the region outside of the heavens, borne along as she is by the revolution.[462] Though distracted by her horses she is able to behold the realities, but[463] barely so. Another soul raises her charioteer up but then lets him sink down,[464] and because one horse and then the other wins out, she sees some of the realities but not others. As to the rest[465] of the souls they try to keep up, covetous[466] of the upper region one and all, but because they are unable to reach it they travel around submerged,[467] trampling and bumping into each other, each trying to get ahead of his neighbor.[468] It is a scene of confusion and competition and sweat in the extreme,[469] from which because of

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and mythical tone of the sentences by which the huperouranion was introduced (B7-C2: ἔστησαν / στάσας δὲ αὐτάς): cf. n.438. In both cases the soul is allowed to be confused or interchanged with the mythical figure of the charioteer and horses. The parallelism also invites a comparison between the souls coming to a stand and subsequently feeding, and the horses later being brought to a stand (by the soul that fed in the huperouranion) and being fed by her. The comparison invites us to identify the soul with the charioteer, and also adumbrates a distinction between primary and secondary contact with truth that will structure the relation between the lover and the beloved. The stable is presumably located in the house of the gods, where Hestia stays (A1-2).

458 παρέβαλεν ... ἐπότισεν (E5-6): The chiasm and double sundesis of τε καί make a pretty closure for the sojourn, but also illustrate what might be the *proper* way for the charioteer to nourish his horses after the topic of μὴ καλῶς τρέφειν had darkly been broached above (B4-5).

459 αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι (248A1): A *nominativus pendens* to which a division into categories will soon be apposed. We should now be coming to the account of the πόνος καὶ ἀγών (247B5) promised by γάρ (247B6) but postponed by the μέν (*ibid.*), which is here repeated. That these others are we is still held in suspense.

460 καὶ εἰκασμένη (A2): The metaphor of following the gods (ἕπεσθαι A3: cf. 247A6) is now broadened or interpreted to include the notion of imitating them (cf. 250B7 and n.). Though εἰκασμένη (present in all mss.) is missing from *Pap.Ox.*1017 (cf. Jachmann, *Platontext* 310) and is expunged by edd., the notion was implicit in the explanation, above, that the gods allow others to follow them because they feel no Envy (247A7). The topic of imitation or emulation will be greatly expanded below. We might recall our question about the beloved emulating his lover (ζηλοῦν, 233B6). Cf. 252D2, *infra*.

461 ὑπερῆρεν (A2), gnomic, which along with συμπεριηνέχθη (A3) associates this soul's action with the timeless or perennial experience in the huperouranion.

462 συμπεριηνέχθη (A3): These were unable to get entirely out and "land" on the back of the heavens and are not, like the gods, borne by the περιφορά itself (ἔστησαν ... στάσας δέ ..., 247B7-C1), but by their own wings in tandem with (συμ-) it.

463 καὶ μόγις καθορῶσα (A4): With the feminine participles the charioteer is identified with the soul, which alone can see what lies beyond (247C7-8).

464 ἦρεν ... ἔδυ (A5): Again, gnomic aorists for this second class of soul, which associate her, too, with the godly train. ἦρεν is abbreviated from ὑπερῆρεν by the usual rule by which the prefix is dropped in repetition (cf. my n. to *Rep.*399E8).

465 δέ δή (A6): Again δή is added to indicate that the contrasting idea anticipated by μέν has only now (not at A5) been reached (cf. 247A8), a usage not isolated by Denniston (257-9).

466 γλιχόμεναι (A6): "*aspirent,*" Robin. "*etwas kleben ... gew. mit gen.*," Passow. "*adhaereo alicui rei (ita ut me aegre avelli patiar)*," Ast, *Lex.Plat., s.v.* The verb describes a grasping and shameless (and therefore shameful) desire. Thus *Phdo.*117A2-3, *Hipp.*226E1. For the psychology compare *Rep.*586B7-C5. We are in the realm where envy does hold sway, in contrast with 247A4-7.

467 συμπεριφέρονται (A8), no longer gnomic aorist (cf.n.460) for they follow below and "submerged," unable to see any of the ὄντα, and thus are bereft of the divine modality of that tense. A categorical difference is being adumbrated between those who have had an experience of the really real and those who have not, though they desire to.

468 ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας (A8-B1): The contrast with the behavior of the the gods (247A6-7) suggests that φθόνος has become the motive here. Why is it, we shall come to ask, that those who *have* seen τὰ ὄντα do conform, and can be held to conform, to a higher standard of behavior (253B7-C2) than those who have not? And why are those that have not seen them caught in a double bind, destroying their chances of success by contending with one another (n.477, *infra*)?

469 ἔσχατος (B2), going with all three nouns, refers them back to the πόνος τε καὶ ἀγών ἔσχατος ψυχῇ that was said

the failure[470] of their reinsmen many of the souls come out hobbled and lame, a good deal of their feathers mangled. Despite great labor they return unfulfilled from a vision of the real,[471] and upon their return[472] home they make do with the sustenance of opinion.[473]

The reason for all their eager striving to see the plain[474] where lies the truth[475] is that the pasturage suited to that best part of the soul[476] is drawn from there, while[477] it is from this in turn that the wing,[478] by which the soul is buoyed up, receives its nourishment. But here is the decree of the Ineluctable One:[479] Any soul that becomes

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above to await the soul, and which has now arrived. ἄμιλλα adds to ἀγών a definitive note of competition, drawn out of the intervening ἑτέρα πρὸ τῆς ἑτέρας πειρωμένη γενέσθαι.

470 κακίᾳ ἡνιόχων (B2): κακία continues the underlying theme of the ill effects of malnutrition upon the soul and its "parts" from 247B4 and 246E3, a connection that is utterly lost by under-translating it with an operational term like "incompetence." The charioteer, who is the cybernetic νοῦς of the soul that alone can behold and therefore be fed by the truths of the beyond (247C7), in most cases *fails* (in contrast with ἄριστα, A2) due to atrophy from his inferior diet.

471 τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας (B4), a genitive of the "filling" with preceding ἀτελεῖς at the same time that it is an ablatival genitive with subsequent ἀπέρχονται. The immediate denotation of ἀτελεῖς is "unsated" but the term's special semantics also prepares for the metaphor of mystic initiation or communion (cf. n.538) available even in this life, which will become relevant below (249C7-8, 250B5-C6). It is premature to impose this sense on the term here since the mediation and apparatus of initiation and mystical rites are things of this world, quite unnecessary in the hyperouranion where all the truths stand clearly on display.

472 ἀπελθοῦσαι (B5): The epanalepsis of ἀπέρχονται associates their return from the upward sojourn with that of the gods (... ἦλθεν. ἐλθούσης δέ ..., 247E4: cf. n.457) who succeeded where they failed.

473 χρῶνται (B5): The verb is sometimes used for euphemistic vagueness (cf. C6 below), like the English expression to "become involved" with bad things. In contrast with the charioteer of the godly soul (247E5-6) and the way he gracefully feeds the horses upon his return (cf. n.458), this charioteer eats with them, presumably out of the same trough; but the Speaker forgoes to give us a concrete visualization of this doxic "food." His story notably presumes we know what sort of thing he means – but if we do it would seem to be by dint of our experience here on earth!

474 πέδιον (B6) mildly specifies τόπος (247C3) preparing for the more concrete metaphor of the fertile λειμών in which the "mind" of the soul is presently said to browse (B7-C1). Still and again it is to the soul and its best part (its mind not its plumage, *pace* Thompson) that the food is akin, while the wing is the derivative beneficiary of this nourishment (246D6-E2: cf. n.*ad* 246D8).

475 οὗ ἐστιν (B6), the reading of all mss., constitutes a "proleptic" or "lilies of the field" construction which places the emphasis on the souls' attempts to reach the region (just as we are meant to contemplate not the lilies for themselves but for "how they grow" – i.e., the fact that they flourish effortlessly). Madvig's excision of οὗ is from the era when the scholar's ingenuity was often held to be more reliable than the continuity of the copyist tradition, and a small excision was adopted to remove a large awkwardness. But the awkward omission of the copula is intentional: cf. n.477.

476 τῷ ἀρίστῳ (B7): The article is almost demonstrative, and refers back to the specification done with διάνοια at 247D1.

477 ἥ τε ... ἥ τε ... (B7-C2): The two clauses have their subjects placed first in a sequential parallelism so as to be parallel with ἡ πολλὴ σπουδή before, and are linked by enclitic τε 's by which that parallelism is left intact with minimal interference; but the logical relation of the three clauses is a vicious circle: they strive to go to the plain because the nutrition is there that will enable them to go there. In fact they are drowning, whence ὑποβρύχιαι (A7); and meanwhile the narrator has returned to the peremptory and oracular style (cf. n.381). δή indicates a recursion to points previously made (246D7-E2 via 247D2-4) as we now discover the answer to the original question (246D3-4); and τε … τε portrays the consecutive relation of the two facts that soul feeds on what is like it, and that the wing of the soul is nourished by the soul feeding. Accordingly, κουφίζεται brings forward the notion of τὸ ἐμβριθὲς ἄνω ἄγειν from the beginning of the passage (246D6).

478 ἡ τοῦ ... πτεροῦ φύσις (C1): the pleonasm brings forward πέφυκεν ... δύναμις from 246D6, stressing the "biological dynamics" of the wing (not its "nature" in the sense of essence, *pace* deVries).

479 θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας ὅδε (C2): The parallelism, the linkage by τε, and the magisterial style is continued, but now the narrator varies the initial definite article with predicative ὅδε (the "first person" pronoun) placed at the end of the clause, to announce the arrival of the Ineluctable One, Nemesis or Anagke, arriving on the scene to restore rudimentary order among men forcibly, since their own "submerged" behavior, though completely natural, can only

companion to god[480] and catches sight of any[481] of the truths shall remain invulnerable for the balance of that cycle around, so that if she is always to do this much during each and every[482] cycle, the law is that she shall be invulnerable for ever and ever. But once she fails[483] to keep up with the train and fails to glimpse them but becomes involved in some calamity[484] and takes on forgetfulness and evil[485] and becomes heavy, and because of her heaviness and loss of her feathers[486] falls to the earth, the law is that she shall not inhabit any beastly body in her first life[487] here. Rather, the soul that had seen truth the most descends into what will be a man who loves wisdom or a lover of beauty or some kind of musical erotic;[488] and she who saw it second-most shall enter that of a lawful king or a warrior or a ruler; if third-most that of a politician or a householder or a businessman;

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make a wreckage of themselves and each other. On the "Law of Adrasteia" cf. Heitsch 103-5.

480 συνοπαδὸς γενομένη (C3) expresses the verbal notion of ἄριστα ἕπεσθαι καὶ εἰκάσθαι (A2) adjectivally, and therefore turns the soul's successful action into an attribute of itself. This lays the groundwork for the noun ὀπαδός at 252C3: cf. n.602 *ad loc*.

481 τὶ (C3) includes *both* the first two cases of soul, which were described in the singular (ἡ μέν ... ἡ δέ ..., A1-6), in contrast with the large plurality of souls (αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι, A6ff) whose fate was and is the true target of the entire account to explain (whence δή).

482 ἀεί (C4), in its continual sense ("on each occasion"), entailing ἀεί continuous (C5).

483 ἀδυνατήσασα (C5), bringing forward the ἀδυνατοῦσαι from above (A7).

484 συντυχίᾳ (C6) now characterizes the collision (συντυχεῖν) of desperately eager souls described above (A6-8) as involuntary, at least at the beginning. The expression συντυχίᾳ χρᾶσθαι is a favorite of Herodotus (1.68.1, 5.41.1; cf. 1.42.1, 3.41.2, 3.139.3, 6.70.3, 7.134.2, 7.141.1, 8.20.2, 8.87.4) and it does occur in Thuc.4.65.4, but it occurs only here in Plato, in a special usage for broaching by its etymology the idea that human competitiveness in this world (later characterized with the *coinage* ἀνθρώπινα σπουδάσματα: 249D1) is a continuation of the emulous and mutually destructive behavior that led to the "accidental" fall from heaven. For the mildly euphemistic construction cf. διαίτῃ φορτικωτέρᾳ ... χρῆσθαι, 256B7-C1.

485 λήθης ... καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα (C7), linked to the previous participial phrase by τε, now spells out the cause of the shift in the souls' intention described above, away from the sighting of truth toward competition with each other (ἑτέρα πρὸ τῆς ἑτέρας πειρωμένη γενέσθαι, A8-B1). The κακία that was left vague in B2 (cf. n.470) is now said to be the result (or the expression) of vicious oblivion in the charioteer.

486 πτερορρυήσῃ (C8) now takes us back to 246C2-4. Presumably the molting accelerates with the need to say aloft with fewer feathers. The soul's "fall" is therefore fully accounted for and we can move on to its fate once it becomes embodied.

The structure of the speech so far seems improvised. Once a large theme is posited (the ἰδέα of soul), a pressing question is discovered (why some lose their wings), and the discourse leaps upward to first causes (Zeus and his entourage) and then descends to a solution of the question (failure of non-divine souls to ascend to the feast). Along the way to answering the question a new pressing question is encountered: Now that these failing souls have become men, we naturally want to know the fate of them – i.e., of ourselves – on earth. We will have forgotten for a moment that the overall question of the whole speech is to define and illustrate the divine madness of eros, but the inherent interest in the story is enough to satisfy. Another important characteristic is that elements of the tale become more definite as the tale continues.

487 ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει (D1-2), not strictly her first "life," since she is deathless, but literally her first contact with "becoming" or attachment to body.

488 φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ (D3-4): The third item (μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ) generalizes the previous two compound terms with an hendiadys that analyzes them: τὸ σοφόν and τὸ καλόν are generalized by μουσικός τις and the φιλο- element by ἐρωτικός. The sample of love-objects brings forward the characterization of the soul's proper food, from 246E1 (καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον). The φιλο- element, which is always available in an otiose sense as means to characterize and distinguish a man from among his fellows by his *preoccupations* – as φίλιππος or φίλοινος might describe a man who hangs around horses or drinks noticeably more than others – is then ousted by the more powerful and specific term, ἐρωτικός, so as to flesh out the φιλο- characterization as an expression of the man's inner drives (cf. φιλολόγῳ, 236E5 and n.250), even to the point of courting the misunderstanding that it designates a fourth type. This is the first time that the idea of eros appears, several pages into this speech on Eros.

fourth a lover of toil or a gymnast or a person that is to become involved in healing the body; fifth the life of a mantic or some kind of mystagogue. To the soul that saw sixth-most the life of a poet or some other mimetic artist shall be fitted; to the seventh that of a craftsman or farmer; to the eighth that of a sophist or a demagogue; and to the ninth the life of a tyrant.[489]

No matter which group he is in, the man that goes on to live his life justly will enjoy a better fate next time around, and if unjustly a worse one. For[490] back to the place from which she came a soul will not return for ten thousand years, (249) since she does not regain her wings any earlier – unless she is the soul of a man who philosophizes without guile and whose love with youths is philosophical.[491] These, on the third thousand-year period, if three times in a row they choose to live such a life, become winged and return on the three thousandth year. As for the rest of them once they have completed their first life they come under judgment and the judgment sends some of them to the subterranean place of justice where they pay what they owe, while others are sent to

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489 The list (D2-E3) explicitly ranks the occupations according to how much the men have been inspired by truth, and therefore its contents and the anfractuosities of its subdivisions have since Hermias been mined (and emended!) as the testament of Socrates's or Plato's opinion of the effect of truth on life; but according to the fiction the ranking is a decree of a divine force bent on fending off human chaos and as such should seem strikingly specific, arbitrary and obscure to us humans. Indeed our very interest in the ranking may be of a piece with the competitive and relativistic ranking that preoccupies the souls who fight to see into the hyperouranion but in fact see nothing.

The streamlining truncation of expression as the list wears on and the avoidance of slavish parallelism, are typical of Socrates's conversational manner: cf. *Charm*.168B5-D1, 173D9-E4; *Crat*.390B1-C5; *Gorg*.495E6-6B5; *Leg*.813D8-E3, 862D4-7, 890B2, 956E1-7, 962E1-9; *Polit*.299B3-4; *Rep*.455E6-6A12, 463C5-7; and my notes to *Rep*.334C11, 410C8-10, 508A10-B5, and 509B4.

490 γάρ (E5), elliptical. In case you thought the fate of the soul was now sealed forever, know that it is not: she may in fact return but not right away, and what she does in the life she has fallen into will affect her future here, which next you will learn. Thus does our narrator "shoe-horn in" his next topic; and again it is human exigency and vicissitude that governs the order of treatment. The fact that ten lives are required suggests that even the tyrant can move up the nine ranks to return to the skies on his tenth life.

The ensuing account of the human life-cycle is largely consistent with that of the Myth of Er in *Republic* Bk.10 except that in the latter context the special fate of the philosophical soul had already been treated (611A10-612A7) and the myth was meant to reveal only how just behavior pays, whereas here the afterlife is described mainly for the purpose of comparing the earthly lives of the majority of mankind (for whom justice again plays the single most important role, mimicking even the role of the wing of the unembodied soul: 249A8) with that of the philosophical man (cf. C4-D3, *infra*). Compare therefore the very similar rhetoric by which emphasis is placed on very different aspects of life here (248B1ff: cf.ἔνθα δή, 247B5-6) and there (ἔνθα δή, *Rep*.618B6ff: cf.608B4-8). Similarities and differences in the overall pictures presented by the two myths are subordinate to this most important difference. It is relatively idle to point them out or worry over them. The so-called "theory of ideas" likewise appears in many dialogues for many purposes, and in that case, too, there is less profit in compiling the similarities and differences among its appearances than in recognizing its function within the particular conversation in which it appears.

491 φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας (249A1-2): This clever weave of words repeats and elaborates upon the description of the leading human life, above (248D2-4), with a contrast of the negative (ἀδόλως) and the positive (μετὰ φιλοσοφίας), rhyming participles, and a chiastic mention of philosophy, in order to associate "pederasty" – the leader's love relation with the youthful acolyte – with philosophy as a corrective to the argumentation of the "mere" pederasts portrayed in the first two speeches. Our "Speaker" (played by Socrates) is after all by the hypothesis of the speech a παιδεραστήσας; his characterization would therefore not go unnoticed by the παῖς (played by Phaedrus) who is his hypothetical "Audience." Meanwhile the eroticism of the philosopher's orientation broached above at D3-4 (cf. n.488) becomes still more explicit. I take the pair of expressions to mean that the leader in his pursuit of wisdom does not exploit his superiority in order to deceive his acolyte, and that conversely the leader's love of wisdom governs and bounds the natural attraction he will feel toward his youthful admirer – that is, he will neither seduce him nor, reciprocally, be seduced by him.

some place up in the sky, buoyed up by justice,[492] where they pass a sojourn earned by the life they had lived in human form. Then both groups of souls gather together for the drawing of lots and the choice of their second life,[493] and each chooses whatever life she will. It is here that a human soul can enter the life of a beast, and here also that from a beast's life, a soul[494] that once was a man can revert again to a human life. The one thing[495] that cannot happen is that a soul that never had a glimpse of truth can never enter the human form, and the reason for this is that to be human means to be able to construe a statement in terms of the ideas[496] that it has articulated by moving from a plurality of perceptions into a concept through the use of reasoning.[497] But this construing consists of a recollection of those great things that our soul once beheld when she proceeded in the company of god,[498] when her sights were trained above the things we now declare to be real, and when she peeped her head into the region of what is truly real.[499] This is why it was right to say that only the consciousness of the philosopher grows wings,[500] for it cleaves ever near[501] to those things as much as its

492 δίκην ἐκτίνουσιν (A7) replaces the more idiomatic δίκην διδόναι in order to re-awaken the metaphor and prepare for the converse role that δίκη plays in the afterlives of the just, where despite the capitalization of Burnet and others she is neither more nor less personified. Lightened by her they lead a life like the life they led before their fall, for it is "somewhere in the sky" (εἰς τοὐρανοῦ τινα τόπον) – in comparison with which the subterranean afterlife of the unjust resembles the life into which they first fell (cf. γήϊνον, 246C3). We might therefore go further and imagine that the punishments and rewards of the afterlife are designed to remind these unphilosophical souls of the greater hopes and struggles that lay in their larger Past and their larger Future, since after all once they return to life on earth they will again forget. It is the eschatological lessons of ten long afterlives that nourish and gradually restore the wings of the human soul. We have an inkling of this from the ennobling feelings we sometimes undergo at funerals.

493 ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν (B2): A detailed version of the process here alluded to is presented in the very different dialectical context of the Myth of Er, in *Rep*.Bk.10, but (with Heitsch, 96 n.141) the mention of the Moirai, Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos already in Hesiod (*Theog*.217-9, 904-6) indicates that the process is already known and vitiates the argument that "Plato" must be referring to his own works here.

494 The antecedent of ὅς (B4), though masculine, is really a ψυχή (cf. 247A6): the gender of the relative is virtually attracted into that of the predicate of the relative clause.

495 γάρ (B5): This clause explains in the sense of providing the one case that has not been covered.

496 κατ' εἶδος (B7): For the expression cf. below 273E1 and for κατά, cf. *Soph*.253D1-E2, 220B9; *Polit*.205A7-8; *Rep*.532E1; the singular (εἶδος) however is by comparison striking.

497 Reading συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον (B7-C1), the text of BTW Marc.185 Pal.Vat.173 (apart from οἷον for ἰόν *in marg*. B), corroborated by Hermias. The sense in which "humans" (ἄνθρωπος) *must* do this (δεῖ) is only that the other earthly animals *cannot*. The philosopher, who is spoken of as an ἀνήρ just below, does more.

498 θεῷ (C3), singular since each soul follows in the train of only one, or of "divinity as she sees it," but because anarthrous it also generalizes the life in the οὐρανός as opposed to the life here: cf. 248C3.

499 The characterization of the soul's pre-embodied life (C2-4) presented above at 248A1-B1, is now re-done in a stately manner, with three circumstantial participles linked by καί and each followed by its complement. Eliminate the comma setting off the last limb (καὶ ἀνακύψασα ...), with Robin (and Moreschini, 1985) and against all other modern editors (Heindorf [1802], Ast [1819], Stallbaum [1832], Thompson [1868], Schanz [1881], Burnet [1901], Fowler [1914], Vollgraff [1912], Yunis [2011]).

The soul's experience of the previous "life" is now being described as an event the embodied soul remembers. ὑπεριδοῦσα nicely combines the physical elevation of the soul in the previous state with its then unintentional disregard for what in mortal form it has come to be faced with as real, and ἀνακύψασα remembers the submerged souls (ὑποβρύχιαι, 248A7) it left behind when it popped its head into the huperouranion. The tension between its experiences of up and down is repeated below (D7-8).

500 πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια (C4-5): The expression likens the consciousness (διάνοια) of the philosopher on earth to that of the gods that feeds on the theoretical feast of the hyperouranion (cf.247D1 and 246D8-E2). While other souls grow wings slowly this ἀνήρ causes them to grow by his special preoccupation or fixation (see next note).

501 πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις (C5): On πρός + dat. cf. Ast *ad loc.*: *totum esse in aliqua re vel meditanda vel tractanda*. Stallb.: "*defixum*." cf. *Phdo*.84C2, *Rep*.567A2.

memory enables it to, things which make a god divine[502] for cleaving to. By disciplining himself to a proper use of the sorts of things you see here – namely, as reminders[503] – and by constantly following out their implications to completion through the worshipful rite[504] of thinking, he alone becomes complete and perfect though still a man.[505] Because he stands apart[506] from the things that humans busy themselves with[507] and tarries ever near the divine instead, he is upbraided by the crowd for being "disturbed,"[508] while in fact he is possessed by the gods in a way they fail to see.[509]

This entire discourse has now reached what was to be its subject[510] all along, the fourth type of Mania. She it is who,[511] when a person sees the kind of beauty present in

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502 θεῖος (C6): If the gods are made to be divine (θεῖος according to BT) by their proximity to or involvement with these things, the gods must be something that could be other than gods; and therefore the reading θεός, to which Hermias testifies as a variant (171.31ff: cf. also Plutarch 718F), hardly makes an iota of difference from θεῖος. The conception that something makes god a god or makes a god divine re-raises and re-ignores the theological mystery of an immortal animal, which was left up to the gods to understand, at 246D2-3, for whatever a god is, he is because of them.

503 τοῖς τοιούτοις (C6-7), a noun, contrasting with ἐκείνοις (C5, cf. C2), means the things the speaker shares with his audience. The distinction drawn above between ἐκεῖνα ἅ ποτ' εἶδεν and ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν (C2-3) has been brought forward by ἐκείνοις. The plural and disparate αἰσθήσεις of B7 are now referred to not with the substantivizing demonstrative ταῦτα but the adjectival demonstrative τοιαῦτα in the manner of the passage in *Timaeus* where the "things" of this world are said to be better described as τοιαῦτα than τάδε (49C7-E7). ὑπομνήμασιν is predicative with ὀρθῶς χρώμενος.

504 τελετάς (C7): The mediating apparatus of traditional initiative rites, whether it be sights or sounds, serves now as a metaphor for the philosopher's use of his αἰσθήσεις (B7) as ὑπομνήματα.

505 ἀνήρ (C6) stands in contrast with θεός but also in contrast with ἄνθρωπος, just as κατὰ δύναμιν (C5) forgives his inability to maintain continuous communion with truth at the same time that it stresses his devotion to the task. Even in this life this best of men can receive something of the nourishment which souls strove to enjoy in the huperouranion, and even here may achieve something of the perfecting initiation souls strive to achieve there, with varying degrees of success. Contrast τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται [C7-8] with ἀτελεῖς [248B4], where cf. n.471). Philosophy calls heaven down to earth.

506 ἐξιστάμενος (C8) echoes φθόνος ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται (247A7) but also and more exactly the ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστασαν achieved by the gods at 247B7. It is indeed human φθόνος that now motivates οἱ πολλοί to chastise *him* for standing apart, for they are reminded by his stature of the souls that flew ahead of them when they strove, submerged, to ascend to the huperouranion, an event which the narrator has just now called back to mind (C1-4: *n.b.*, ἡμῶν).

507 σπουδασμάτων (D1), an hapax in Plato and classical Greek – perhaps even a coinage – bringing forward the σπουδή of 248B6 and perhaps even the plodding and self-important methodism of the bird-augurs (244C5-D1: note σεμνύνοντες and n.361). The "society" of pre-embodied souls is being turned into an adumbration of life on earth, which is after all the life that the entire myth is meant to explain. To the extent that the souls of the philosopher's fellow men have some inkling or reminiscence of reaching the huperouranion, which after all made them the men they are, they may also remember some souls leaving them behind, submerged (ὑποβρύχιαι, 248A6) in their toils and struggles (248B1-5) as well.

508 ὡς παρακινῶν (D2), the intransitive use of the active (cf.LSJ *s.v.* II.3, as opposed to the passive, e.g., 245B4), meaning not that they disturb conventions but are themselves "disturbed" (i.e., μανικῶς διακείμενος, D8). ὡς indicates that the characterization is merely their opinion, and maybe even their term. Compare the use of ἀλλόκοτος as a slur: *Rep.*487D2 and my n. *ad loc.*

509 νουθετεῖται μέν ... ὡς παρακινῶν // ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθεν (D2-3): A sense of closure is strengthened by the chiasm superseding the expectation of parallel indicatives following μέν / δέ.

510 περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας (D4-5) is the predicate. The previous section (246D6-249D3) explained the ἀποβολή πτερῶν (246D4) which was the most vital question raised by the description of the ἰδέα of the soul (246A3-D5). The account of Eros will have come next (though we have little advance indication) because the "rites" of the philosopher we have just heard about, by which a man can hasten his return to the world above by seven thousand years, resemble the operation of Eros to stimulate the soul to gain back its wings and fly back up (D6-7), an idea that had been suggested by μουσικός τις καὶ ἐρωτικός at 248D3 and the association of philosophy with pederasty at 249A2.

511 ἥν (D5): The relative clause is immediately interrupted by a protasis in ὅταν, and in fact it never gets a construction. In the manner of a kletic hymn, the stately introduction of the "fourth Mania" is followed by a relative clause that will

this world and becomes reminded of the true one he becomes winged but[512] though his plumage is returning and he is eager to fly up, he is unable,[513] and because he gazes upward like a bird[514] ever ready to fly away from all that is below he receives the censure that he has become a maniac.[515] She, I can now say,[516] of all the kinds of inspiration[517] from the gods, is the best one of the best lineage[518] both for the man who is afflicted[519] by her and for the man who shares her with him.[520] And I say that because he has a share in *this* kind of Mania, a man who feels eros for beauties comes to be called an eroticist.[521] For the argument has shown that while the soul of man as such has beheld the real and

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begin to describe it, since Eros, as it is the burden of this speech to prove, is divine (cf. n.377). The anacoluthon (acknowledged by dashes in Burnet's edition) is a reminiscence of the hymnal form, where a subordinate relative clause is characteristically used to make the transition from invoking the god by name to narrating his attributes and wonders so as to move on to an hypomnesis and then the prayer-proper.

We see the literary precipitate of the kletic form in the *Homeric Hymns* where the narration of the god's wonders in a subordinate clause is abruptly elevated to ordinate rank and comes to constitute the principal content of the piece, usually ushering in an ordinate construction. The shift is usually effected by δέ [e.g., ii.15, iv.5, v.6], but also γάρ [xxix.4], αὐτάρ [xxvii.11], or τοὶ [xxii.4,xxiv.3]). Sometimes however the form never moves beyond the adjectival relative clauses or participial phrases [e.g., ix, xi, xiv, xv, cf. xviii, xxiii, xxix, xxxiii]), and the anticipated prayer devolves into a pale envoi (usually χαῖρε: iii.546, iv, v, vi, ix, x xiv, xviii, xix) that expresses hope that the god has been pleased by the poem (ἱλαρός: i.17, xix.48, xx.7, xxiii.4; πρόφρων: ii.494; εὐμενής: xxii.7) and might give the poet another.

Because the anacoluthon in the hymn form strikes our ears as odd, just as the present one does at D5, translators tend to replace the subordinating relative pronoun with a regular pronoun (e.g., x.1-2: Κυπρογενῆ Κυθέρειαν ἀείσομαι ἠΐτε βροτοῖσι | μείλιχα δῶρα δίδωσιν ~ "Of Cytherea born in Cyprus I will sing. She gives kindly gifts to men" (Evelyn-White, Loeb). I have adopted this tack here.

512 Reading πτερῶταί τε καὶ (D6) with all mss. and Stobaeus (*pace* Robin, Schanz, Spengel, Thompson, Wilamowitz). The verb paired by τε καί with πτερῶται is αἰτίαν ἔχει, severely postponed by four conditional participles, during which the subordination with ὅταν is forgotten and replaced so that the paired verb can be in the indicative so as to complete and close the "interruption" of the relative clause (see prev. n.).

513 ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δέ (D6-7): The extra vividness gotten by the doubled participle helps to make the concupiscent erotic resemble those "submerged" souls that could not raise their charioteers' heads into the huperouranion: cf. γλιχόμεναι μὲν ἅπασαι τοῦ ἄνω ἔπονται, ἀδυνατοῦσαι δέ (248A6-7). Like them he flails about in a frenzy, submerged in a suffocating world of appearances while he ever looks beyond to a world outside and above. Watched by those around him he seems as maddened as those flailing souls had seemed to us, his seriousness (the σπουδή described at 248B5-C2) quite a different thing from the ἀνθρώπινα σπουδάσματα (249D1) of those who watch him. For the concentration of participles as a means to effect the transition from the naming of the god to the prayer proper cf. *Hom.Hymns* ii.5, 10, 12f; iv.5, v.6, ix.

514 ὄρνιθος δίκην (D7): The point of the simile is both to acknowledge that the philosopher looks above and beyond (ὑπεριδεῖν: cf.249C3) and then to take it literally so as to dub him a μετεωρόσκοπος (as Socrates was dubbed: cf. also 270A1 and n.) and therefore it is to be associated with *Tim*.91DE. There is also the undermeaning that perhaps the philosopher is the bird whose behavior the augurs should be interpreting as a sign of something (διά τε τῶν ὀρνίθων ποιουμένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων, 244C6-7). The notion that upward gazing is an emblem of stupidity has to do with the fact that a human's mouth unintentionally gapes open when he tips his head back (κέχηνα εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν βλέπειν), but the musculature of the bird is different, so that the passages from *Aves* cited by Ast and Stallb. (*A*.50,169,264,308; cf. *Pax* 56, *Nub*.173) are not relevant. Plutarch imagines the bird about to fly away, ὡς ἐκπτησόμενοι (τοῦ σώματος!),1105D.

515 μανικῶς (D8): The *figura etymologica* (with μανίας, A5) completes the logic of the relative clause just as the shift to the indicative ἔχει completes its syntax, leaving us to construe ἥν as an accusative of respect.

516 ὡς ἄρα αὕτη (E1): Construe ὡς with λόγος. With αὕτη he returns to the invocation of the fourth Mania with which he began (D4-5). The fresh support of the intervening analogy between the philosopher's reaction to the semblances in this world and the truth to which they correspond in the other world enable him to "discover" (ἄρα) that he has the grounds to make the assertion he has planned to make all along. The assertion, bringing forward the superlatives of 245B7-C1, is something of a QED.

517 πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάσεων (E1) refers to the species of inspiration retailed at 244A8-245A8 (n.b., ἐνθέῳ, 244B4). The

the true or else it would not have entered (250) this form you see before you,[522] to succeed at remembering those things there by dint of these things here is not an easy task for any and every soul,[523] neither for those that then[524] only briefly viewed them, nor for those that after falling into this world suffered a turn of bad luck[525] so as to be seduced into injustice by bad associations and become afflicted by a forgetfulness of the things they once beheld before, sacred though they are.[526] Few indeed are the souls besides these whose memory is intact. Whenever these types see a likeness[527] of the things of that world they are driven from their senses[528] and lose control of

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genitive is strictly ablatival (cf. τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, 246D8 and n.419), since this fourth kind was not there listed.

518 ἀρίστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων (E2-3): The approbatory formula which was used in the positive grade of the gods and their chariots (246A8, B2-3), is now used in the superlative, and so with justification. For this mania *is* the best thing that can happen to men (ἀρίστη) and also is caused by the best things there are (ἐξ ἀρίστων), namely the truly real.

519 ἔχοντι (E2): The language of affliction returns from the Socrates's First Speech (231D1, 238A5, B1, etc. Cf. n.272).

520 τῷ τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῷ κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς (E2): Repetition of the article indicates that κοινωνοῦντι is not an epexegesis of ἔχοντι but denotes the ἐρώμενος (the phrase τῷ ἐρῶντι καὶ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ, 245B6 [cf. n.375] is here brought forward). αὐτῆς, moreover, goes with both participles only by zeugma (this is not the "participatory" ἔχω + gen. [244E3: cf. n.364] but the "afflicted" ἔχω + acc. [cf. prev. n.] attracted into the genitive by the second verb, κοινωνοῦντι), which themselves add new characterization to the operation of the god in the two lives. The ἐρῶν, now called ἔχων (sc. αὐτήν), is indeed afflicted by Ἔρως (as οἱ πολλοί notice) but his affliction is a gift he has been vouchsafed by the god, while by characterizing the ἐρώμενος as κοινωνῶν the idea is broached that the beloved, far from being the *possession* of the lover as the first two speeches complained, is a person the lover enables to share in the benefits Eros confers on man, an idea that was prefigured by the unexpected intertwining of philosophy and pederasty above (244C4-5, with n.491). The new characterization will be advanced further by μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς just below (250B7 with n.535), and will become explicit in the sequel to the description of the ἐρῶν as ἔχων (i.e., in the ἅλωσις τοῦ ἐρωμένου, 253C7-256B7).

521 ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐραστὴς καλεῖται (E3-4): The language provides an "etymology" alternative to the one reached in Socrates's First Speech at 238B7-C4 (Verdenius was perhaps the first to notice the etymological "reasoning" according to which the ἔρως that is the ἀρίστη μανία provides the κλῆσις of the ἐραστής – *Arch.Gesch.Ph.*[1962]147n.68). "Eroticist" speciously appears to be superlative in English just as ἐραστής does in Greek. Note that τῶν καλῶν is again ambiguous as it was in the previous etymological "definition" (in Socrates's First Speech, 237D4-5, cf. 238C1 and C2): was the expression ambiguous there, in order to save a berth for the present interpretation to redeem it?

522 τόδε τὸ ζῷον (250A1), the "first person" pronoun as if the speaker points to himself.

523 ἁπάσῃ (A2), distributive, in contrast with anarthrous πᾶσα at 249E4, which referred to soul as such in contrast with the individual souls of individual men. On the passage cf. Plut.745DE; Iamb.*de myst.*3.20, p.86.20; *Anth.Gr.*3.150.

524 τότε (A2): The slight redundancy (a mild "proleptic skew," for which cf. my n. to *Rep.*400E2-3) sets up the contrast drawn by δεῦρο πεσοῦσαι, making it a *temporal* circumstantial participle.

525 ἐδυστύχησαν (A3) repeats the allusive expression καί τινι συντυχίᾳ χρησαμένη (248C6), but now specifies the ill luck with ὥστε ... ἔχειν, making it consist of the fact that the forgetfulness with which they are afflicted is an *unintended* result of the ὁμιλίαι τινές that turned them in the direction of τὸ ἄδικον. Smyth's remarks on ὥστε at §2263 should be broadened to include this *explanatory* use. We do not need to add Robin's *assez* (~ οὕτω) to the clause before (it is the quality not the quantity of the bad luck that it articulates), nor add Scully's "naturally" for a clause of "natural result," nor go as far as Ast and say that a ὥστε construction is tantamount to a pure gerundive. It is unclear whether these unfortunate events are a continuation of or analogous to those that befell the soul before it lost its feathers, which were also unintentional (the intention or σπουδή [A6] being to reach the huperouranion), and it is unclear what corrupting ὁμιλίαι are being referred to: the human business referred to above (249D1) is surely a distraction from higher concerns but not *eo ipso* unjust. Perhaps it is to the ὁμιλίαι criticized in the first two speeches that he alludes.

526 ἱερῶν (A4) by its late placement is emphatic, and again (cf.249C2-4 and n.492) describes the world beyond as it lives in the memory of the soul embodied, which now recognizes, and must recognize, the importance for life in this world of holding such objects of experience *sacred*.

527 ὁμοίωμα (A6) is compact and pregnant. Everything in this world is already an ὁμοίωμα of originals in the world beyond. What is meant is their experience of something here *as* an ὁμοίωμα, when τὸ τῇδε reminds them of τὸ ἐκεῖ, but they are still gazing upon it so that τὸ ἐκεῖ appears to be τῇδε. Cf. predicative ὑπομνήμασιν above (249C7) and

themselves,[529] though at the same time they do not recognize what is happening to them because they cannot adequately see what is going on beneath the surface.[530]

In the case of justice and of temperance and the other realities that our souls treasure,[531] there is no dazzle[532] in the likenesses of them that we see in this world. Only through our more sluggish powers[533] do we make these[534] out, and even then only a few of us, and even these only barely, come to see in the mind's eye the original reals that they represent when we encounter their representations here. But beauty then was a bright thing for the seeing[535] – when its blessed face the souls beheld in their happy[536]

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n.503.

528 ἐκπλήττονται (A6): Lysias's speech, or more exactly looking into Phaedrus's face while he delivered it, made this happen to Socrates (234D1). The fact will be explained below. We might say that the Speaker has had this happen to him during this very speech, twice so far (246E4ff, 247C3ff: cf. nn. *ad locc.*).

529 Reading οὐκέθ' αὐτῶν (A7). The reflexive is absent from the older mss. (οὐκέτ' αὐτῶν BT) but present already in Hermias (176.6). We had heard in both the previous speeches that love puts a man out of control (Lysias: 232A4-5, 233C1-2; Socrates: 238B8, E3, 240C7-D1), to the extent that it might annul his identity (L: 231D1-D6; S: ὡς τῷ αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενος, 241A6 and the sequel); but now, in accordance with the present trend of the argument, the experience is redeemed as being the result of a divine influence.

530 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεσθαι (B1): ἱκανῶς is echoed from A5. It is not their memory but their awareness of how it works with perception that is inadequate (cf. n.524). As usual (cf.246D3-5, 247B5-6 and 248A1, 248B5) the transition to the next topic is suggested by an exigency we are meant to recognize on our own: "Why is it then," we might ask, "that they cannot 'see through'?" The answer comes with ἀμυδρῶν.

531 δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς (B1-2): These are the same "reals" that were selected to illustrate what it is that the souls of the gods feed upon in the hyperouranion (247D5-E3: on ἐπιστήμη there cf. φρόνησις at D4 *infra* and n.552). They are here called τίμια ψυχαῖς because, as there, they are qualities whose enhancements the soul will be particularly eager to enjoy (cf. n.452): hence just below they will be called ἐραστά (D6). To the same extent, therefore, that τὸ κάλλος has a φέγγος and is more visible than they, it is less important to the soul's (invisible) well-being. Cf. φρόνησις, D4 *infra*.

532 φέγγος (B3): Robin translates it *luminosité*, which lets the cat out of the bag (Moreschini rightly scales it back to *éclat*). φέγγος is only an attractive brightness, like Pindar's eye-catching gleam of gold in the night (ὁ δὲ χρῦσος αἰθόμενον πῦρ ... νυκτί, *Olympians* 1.1-2); "luminosity" already interprets the stimulus as a revelation.

533 δι' ἀμυδρῶν ὀργάνων (B3-4): For instance we ascertain the justice of given acts not by looking at them but through the laborious and imperfect process of a jury trial. Compare the way the just but inexperienced judge gradually comes to realize the man standing before him is a scoundrel (*Rep.*409B7-C1with my n. *ad* B8), and Hermias 176.19-20, and the commonplace enunciated at *Euthyphr.*7C10-D6. We may also compare the indirect methods of the bird-augur (διά τε ὀρνίθων ποιουμένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων, 244C6-7), though these "produce" (ποιουμένων and ποριζομένων, *ibid.*) a result instead of providing us an occasion to remember it.

534 αὐτῶν (B4): The antecedent is the τίμια ψυχαῖς – what souls value highly (γλιχόμεναι, 248A6) – not a proleptic partitive genitive with ὀλίγοι (*pace* Ast), which would require ὀλίγαι. ὁμοιώματα is understood and then replaced by τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος by dint of the intervening language about approaching τὰς εἰκόνας.

535 λαμπρόν (B6) of course contrasts with φέγγος οὐδέν, but with sheer τότε (supported by the precedent τότε at A4) there has also been a sudden leap from the things of this world (τὰ τῇδε) to those of the other (τὰ ἐκεῖ). The purpose of the shift as we shall presently see (μετ' ἐκείνων τε ... δεῦρό τε, D1) is that the special brightness of true beauty in the other world shows forth even here in her ὁμοιώματα (conversely stated, the special dazzle of beautiful things in this world is actually a vestige of the truth of beauty as it is in the other world) but we will not get there right away. As at 246E4 and 247C3, he postpones his immediate subject in mid-paragraph (cf. nn.435,459) due to an access of enthusiasm.

536 σὺν εὐδαίμονι χορῷ μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν (B6-7): The gradation between the blessed (μακαρίαν) sight and the chorus made happy by beholding it (εὐδαίμονι χοροῦ [sc. ψυχῶν in all likelihood: cf. 247A7]) is repeated from the original description (247A4-6: cf. n.425). The first time the Speaker became distracted from his immediate topic by a desire to describe the soul's communion with the Real (247C3-E6) he used θεωρεῖν and its cognates (θεατή, 247C7: cf. C1 and E3), but now he is moved to expand θέα by an hendiadys with ὄψις. In θεωρεῖν the viewer remains anonymous, as in a crowd at the theatre, and harvests the meaning of what he sees inwardly; but to describe the θεωρῶν as seeing

chorus, we following in the train of Zeus[537] and others following other gods, when we underwent communion[538] in the one rite most worthy to be called blessed. There[539] did we celebrate, unscathed as still we were and exempt from all the evils that lay in wait for us in later times; likewise unscathed,[540] and simple, fixed and happy[541] were the sights we were vouchsafed to see in those rites and mysteries, bathed in light unmixed and pure, pure[542] ourselves and not as yet entombed in this encumbrance we carry around[543] and call our body, confined within it like oysters in a shell![544]

By these thanks let Memory be pleased – rather much perhaps[545] – thanks she

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the *face* of beauty now broaches the reciprocal fact of his being present as a viewer. For he, too has a face which views the vision. This sense of a yoke that joins viewer and viewed provides the keynote for the sequel. To present the new item (ὄψιν) before rather than after the word it elaborates (θέαν) is an instance of "reverse καί" on which cf. n.673 and my note to *Rep*.343C6.

537 ἑπόμενοι, μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς (B7): The very verb implies devotion and heroic effort (cf. H. *Il*.16.154, the Pythagorean dictum ἕπου θεῷ, and n.441). The sudden arrival of a first person subject (ἡμεῖς, B7) is striking; then it disappears (εἶδόν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο); and then it returns (ὠργιζομεν) after which for five lines, in a climactic ecphrasis, there is no finite verb but six participles in the nominative plural, a strategy that avoids the gossip of who is who in a flood of devotion.

If we are willing to indulge the fiction of the speech at all, we have to conclude that with ἡμεῖς the Speaker is associating his Boy with himself as part of his persuasion, suggesting that the two of them are already engaged in a shared sort of life. So much he had broached to him above when, posing by the hypothesis of the speech as lover, he characterized the philosophical life as a life intertwined with pederasty (A1-2, cf. n.491). Having thereby indirectly characterized *himself* as living this philosophical life in the audience of the Boy, he then characterized that life as a human life whose goal on earth is the same as the goal of the gods' life in heaven (249C4-D3: cf. n.505), by dint of which the philosopher has a fate quite different from other men's (αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι, 249A5). If the Boy has understood this argument he has been edified into a philosophical sort of life himself and can now be included in the reference of "we." The very fact that he is assuming his (fictional) audience is understanding what he is saying evinces a presumption that the Boy has been or can be wakened to philosophical insight. Together they have come a long way since "we" meant everyone other than the gods (246B1 and B4). If anything the rhetoric should be compared to the opening of the first speech, the speech of Lysias, in which the speaker likewise presumes that his boy understands what he is talking about (230E6-231A2 and n.), though here, in sharp contrast, the presumption intensifies in the course of the speech itself, after the Speaker has surely edified his Boy enough to presume that he is "with him" rather than requiring him to assume the position with his opening gesture (cf. then 252B2).

That the Speaker should now treat this life they share (as ἡμεῖς) to be evidence of (and of course at the same time the result of) their having followed in the train of Zeus in their original unembodied lives, while other souls followed others, is a second point. Hitherto we had been told that being philosophical (though not pederastic) was a sign (and result) that in that original life they merely had beheld the huperouranion *better* than the other souls (πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν, 248D2). How then are we to understand the inference that this philosophical life the Speaker now claims to share with his beloved suggests or implies they had followed in the train of Zeus as opposed to some other god in their original lives? Zeus will called philosophical, but only later (252E3) and even there without explanation; all that he has been, for the purposes of the myth to this point, is a *primus inter pares* among the Olympians (246E4-247A4). The Speaker's second point is therefore an inference that the philosophical man, whom he has described as living a divine life on earth, was a follower of the *primus inter pares* in heaven because he is living as a *primus inter pares* here on earth – again both as a sign and a result. Life on earth, like the afterlives of those who will return to it (cf. nn.480, 513, and 544 *infra*), exhibits the same tensions and structures as the paradigmatic Life, the life of the soul, in heaven.

The commentators, sometimes seeming condescending and unaffected, feel an incumbency to guess it is "Plato" that is speaking, that he is suddenly intruding with an authorial "we" – for surely Plato would want to exploit the opportunity to claim he is a philosopher – and one commentator even argues it *cannot* be "Socrates" that is expressing this sentiment, since he is an Apollonian (Hackforth 93 n.2, citing *Ap*.23B and *Phdo*.85B), which implies if anything that to the extent Socrates is the speaker, he is contradicting himself. In truth it is the Speaker that is making this claim, and he is making it to his audience, the Boy. The extent to which that Boy "is" Phaedrus is identical to the extent that the Speaker "is" Socrates. The dramatist (in this case, Plato) brings persons onto the stage to play the fictional roles he has created exactly and only in order that we should identify with those fictional persons so as to learn something from what they are shown, with verisimilitude, to do and to undergo.

enabled us to deliver out of our yearning for those times.[546] To return to beauty, as we have just now said, brightly did it shine in the company of[547] those reals, but[548] here, too, where we have since come, it also catches our eye, that most most vivid of our senses, so vividly does it shine.[549] For sight, in truth, delivers[550] us sharper perceptions than any other bodily faculty of perception,[551] though[552] intelligence is not visible to it – awesome would be the feelings of love *this* thing would be stirring in us if it offered up a vivid likeness of itself to us through our eyes the way beauty does, this and the other things the soul loves and desires![553] The way things are in this world, it is only beauty that has

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538 ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν (B8): The reciprocal aspect of the soul's experience viewing the objects in the hyperouranion that is stressed in this passage (cf. nn.536, 540 and 542) shows that Linforth was correct in asserting that "initiate" is an inappropriate translation for τελεῖν in connection with the participatory and Corybantic sort of rites Socrates is referring to ("The Corybantic Rites in Plato" = *Univ.Calif.Pub.Cl.Ph.*13[1950]155, 160). Cf. also Dodds on E.*Bacch.*72-5.

539 ἦν (C1): The extenuation of this digression on the World Beyond by means of a relative clause again recalls the form and technique of the kletic hymn with its extended praise and description of the deity's haunts and habits (cf.249D5, *supra*), by which the poet puts himself into the mind of the god and the god is invoked and rendered ἱλαρός so that he will hear and hearken to the poet's reminder and prayer. The speaker is not spoon-feeding us but surrendering to his inspiration and best thoughts. Compare the use of the relative at 273E5.

540 ὁλόκληρα (C2): In his enthusiasm the speaker testifies to an experience of complete or perfect (ἐτελοῦντο, B8) adequation of mind and its object. For a similar outburst compare *Rep.*490A8-B7, where compare συγγενές.

541 εὐδαίμονα (C3): The state of the subject viewing (B6) is here projected onto the object viewed.

542 καθαροί (C4): The character of the objects (the φάσματα ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ) is now, in turn, conferred onto the subjects. Note how the attribute as received (ὁλόκληρα, C2; καθαροί, C4) in each case is specified by an exegesis relevant to itself (καὶ ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀτρεμῆ καὶ εὐδαίμονα regarding the objects of the vision; καὶ ἀσήμαντοι regarding ourselves as seeing). The unique suitability of subject and object, and even the experience that in their very encounter the one *constitutes* the other, is a primary theme in the theory of forms when it appears (e.g., *Rep.*490A8-B7, 508E1-509A5, 509B6-10, and 611E1-2A5 with my nn. *ad loc.*), and in the experience it symbolizes when it occurs in within us. If Plato here arrogates to this essentially philosophical experience the language and symbolism of the mysteries (μακάριος, τελεῖσθαι, ὀργιάζειν, ὁλόκληρος, φάσματα, μυεῖσθαι, ἐποπτεύειν, καθαρός, ἀσήμαντος), we may for ourselves view it as an equivalent of the insight of Paul, that "then we shall we know, even as we are known" (*1 Corinth.* 13:12; cf. also *1 John* 3.1-2).

At the same time, though we skate close to heresy in saying it, this enthusiastic terminology also seems to describe aspects of the experience we have in "sexual union," a mysterious feeling that likewise made Aristophanes's myth in the *Symposium* seem so true. Socrates is anticipating the treatment of lust, below (E3-5), and wants to arrogate sexual orgasmic experience to the realm of the soul before he gets there. Likewise, we avoid heresy by recognizing that sex is the image and this communion the original.

543 The burdensome active περιφέροντες (C5) echoes the leisurely passive συμπεριηνέχθη (248A3) describing when we were borne around by the περιφορά (247D4-5).

544 ὀστρέου τρόπον (C6): The oysters are moreover ὑποβρύχια, shells and all: cf. n.513.

545 μακρότερα (C8): The last time he interrupted himself (247C3-E6), he resumed his program by resuming the μέν clause (248A1) he interrupted; here he announces the end of his digression by apologizing for it. In both cases, of course, the emotional flight folds in ideas that the argument soon will need for its next steps: cf. nn. 540 and 423 above.

546 Μνήμῃ κεχαρίσθω (C7): Reading μνήμῃ (C7) with T over μνήμη with BW. It is a personification. Burnet prints the dative but his apparatus is empty; Robin reports the dative from T [cf. his clxxvi n.3]. The Speaker hopes, as at 246D2-3, that his words have pleased his superiors – in this case Memory who by another name is the mother of the Muses under whose maniacal inspiration he has digressed rather long – so that he can return to the human exigencies that press upon him. As in the *Homeric Hymns* the muse-goddess may be invoked to help the poet sing a certain god, but the *envoi* at the end is addressed to the god that was the subject of the poem rather than the muse-goddess that inspired it (e.g., iv, v, ix, xxxi).

547 ὅν (D1): The ἰόν of the *vulgata* has not been read since Ast. The point of stressing that the beauty we saw in the huperouranion "was with those great things" is that in this world beauty seems greater than it is.

548 I link the two clauses with "but," the Greek links them with mere τε (μετ' ἐκείνων τε ... δεῦρο τ'ἐλθόντες, D1). We rightly would expect an adversative or even a subordinate μέν / δέ construction. For τε being freighted with such a

this privilege, which accounts for the way that since it is most dazzlingly manifest[554] it is also the most stimulating of all.

Now[555] if a man's initiation and communion is not so recent or if he has since been corrupted,[556] he is not so sharply jerked away[557] from this world to that and toward beauty itself the moment he gazes upon a thing in this world that is named after it, and so he feels no reverence as he watches it.[558] Instead he gives himself over to pleasure[559] and assumes the position of a quadruped so as to mount and come into the boy.[560] He has admitted[561] rashness into his life and he feels neither awe nor shame that his pursuit

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heavy task, cf. 248B6-C2 and n.477.

549 ἐναργεστάτης ... ἐναργέστατα (D2-3): The pairing continues the theme of an attribute shared by subject looking and the object being seen, that characterized the "holistic" experience of the other world (ὁλόκληρον [C1-3], καθαρόν [C4-5]).

550 ἔρχεται (D4) broaches the notion that sensation involves motion of some sort through the body (so, too, ἰόν, D6), which will become explicit just below.

551 τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ... αἰσθήσεων (D3-4): This is both a praise of sight and a reminder that there might be αἰσθήσεις that are not bodily, such as the "sight" with which we "saw" the originals – whence the remark about φρόνησις that follows. It is not an allusion to the ἀμυδρὰ ὄργανα of B3 since these are not bodily at all (cf. n.533).

552 ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται (D4): The subordinate clause abruptly (i.e., without a qualifying or adversative particle) limits the praise of vision by noticing it cannot put us "readily in touch with" (ἐναργές, D5) likenesses of truths more important (τίμια, B2) and stimulating (ἐραστά, D6) to the soul than beauty. We (the "phenomonological we," as Hegel would put it) had spent all our lives in this world thinking beauty was the most exciting thing there is but now we are told that it is merely by dint of its special allotment that even here it might convey to us something of the splendor of the other world through our paltry sense of sight. We had not known this: only φρόνησις will enable us to recognize it and respond correctly, as we are about to "see." The height of the paradox is neither less nor more than that of the analogous paradox that sexual enjoyment is a mere shadow of the shared experience of beauty, which will be presumed below (256A7-B3 v. B7-C5, where n.b. τῶν πολλῶν,C4).

553 τἆλλα ὅσα ἐραστά (D6): I.e., the ὅσα τίμια ψυχαῖς of B2. The shift in the exemplification of the soul's favorite things from δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη there to φρόνησις here is climactic, as was the shift in the first digression on the huperouranion (247C3-E6) from δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη to ἐπιστήμη (D5-7ff, with n.452). Omit, with Moreschini, Heitsch, and Ryan, Burnet's hyphen at D6: καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἐραστά are part of the irreal apodosis, as the subsequent νῦν δέ indicates.

554 ἐκφανέστατον (D7) brings forward the notion we met above, of sights unobstructed (φάσματα, C3): unembodied, simple, invariant and happy. It is only their "transparency" for true beauty that makes the beauties of this world so desirable (ἐρασιμώτατον), for it is the truth of beauty not mere beauty that is so lovely!

555 μὲν οὖν (E1) as above (B1) introduces the next phase of the explanation of the thing the lover who is stirred by an ὁμοίωμα does not adequately understand about his experience (τὸ μὴ ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεσθαι, B1). Objectively, we have learned, the ὁμοιώματα of beauty have a special dazzle to them they inherited from beauty itself (B1-E1); now we need the subjective side of the process (E1,ff).

556 μὴ νεοτελὴς ἢ διεφθαρμένος (E1): He brings forward from above (A2-4) the two conditions (whence conditional μή) that cause some men to have a hard time remembering.

557 οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φέρεται (E2) means to deny what does happen to the recent initiates, namely, ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέθ' αὑτῶν γίγνονται (A6-7), which includes shock and passivity. Therefore the phrase here must not be translated with an active or middle formulaton such as "does not quickly rise" (Fowler) or "cannot pass quickly" (Helmbold-Rabinowitz, Hackforth), or "does not easily rise" (Jowett), "does not move keenly" (Rowe), nor surely "*wendet sich nicht schnell*" (Heitsch) or "*n'est pas vif à se porter*" (Brisson, cf. Robin) or "*ne s'élance point rapidement* (Vicaire), or "is not given to moving rapidly" (Waterfield). φέρεται is of course passive (ἀποπέμπεται, glosses Hermias, 180.22); and the point is not that he is moved slowly rather than "quickly" but that he is unaffected by any jolt. Hence translate "*celeriter … excitatur*" (Ficino), "*heftig … gezogen*" (Schleiermacher), "moved abruptly" (Nehemas/Woodruff). Cf. n.670.

558 προσορῶν (E3), of the fixing of attention. Contrast the effect of fixed attention below, 251A4.

559 ἡδονῇ παραδούς (E4): παραδιδόναι suggests an act of betrayal or derailment (cf. παρά below, 251D1). We might imagine that in the absence of the transporting force he gravitates toward pleasure.

of pleasure is an affront to the nature of things.[562] But a man (251) more recently initiated, or a man that became a "seer of many things"[563] in that world, when once he catches sight of a godlike face[564] imitating[565] beauty well, or the shape of a body perhaps,[566] at first he shivers[567] and some vestige of the former reverence creeps in upon him. As he continues to watch the face a sense of reverence[568] comes over him as for a god. If he were not afraid[569] of being thought stark raving mad, he could very well conduct a sacrifice for his beloved as if for an icon or[570] god. While he looks,[571] a change comes over him and he guesses it is caused by the shivering.[572] He has broken into a sweat brought on by a fever that he does not understand.

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560 παιδοσπορεῖν (E5): The παῖς referred to by the first part of this very rare verb is surely not a child he will be begetting but the one he fervently hopes to mount. Hence Plutarch is able to gloss the verb in the passive and say that the boy in question is willing to βαίνεσθαι ... καὶ παιδοσπορεῖσθαι (*Mor.*751DE). The ready-made double-entendre seems to be unexploited in the extant plays of Aristophanes.

561 ὕβρει προσομιλῶν (E5) exemplifies the ὁμιλίαι τινές that were left vague above (A3), with the prefix προς- now placing all the blame on himself. His lack of awe is due to his lack of memory, the unintended result of his προσομιλεῖν. The mention of ὕβρις brings forward the notion that uncritically underlay the very definition of eros in Socrates' other speech (238A2).

562 παρὰ φύσιν (251A1): The expression cannot but scandalize the modern sensibility, whether those who are embarrassed by homosexuality or its champions, both preoccupied with the ἀνθρώπινα σπουδάσματα. Our Speaker's interests on the other hand are philosophical and he has larger fish to fry. παρὰ φύσιν is not attributive with ἡδονήν but adverbial with διώκων. By φύσις he means not only the animal order but the entire setup includig both this world and the other one, and the peculiar gift that beauty has been given, that forgetful souls cannot adequately "see through" (διαισθάνεσθαι). Because of his loss of the ability to remember, the man in question is insensitive to the true cause of his excitement and becomes a fundamentalist grasping at idols and toys while the man with memory has a chance to "reach through" the instance for the original.

563 πολυθεάμων (A2) of course brings forward its opposite, βραχέως, from 250A2; but the formation of the term, an ἅπαξ in Greek, is reminiscent of πολυπράγμων, and thus negatively alludes to the πολυθεάμων's complement, who is preoccupied with the ἀνθρώπινα σπουδάσματα (249D1).

564 πρόσωπον (A2) brings forward the metaphor of ὄψις from 250B6 as well as its implication of intersubjectivity (cf.n.536). θεοειδές is a compact way of referring to the "divine" realm of the ὑπερουράνιον and its contents. Note that the "godlikeness" of the face is spoken of as a perceptible attribute, which of course it is not (cf. ὁμοίωμα [250A6] and n.524). It is exactly the perceiver's unawareness of why he is moved to characterize his experience with this maximal index that the Speaker is endeavoring to explain, and πρόσωπον, which also means "mask," gives a clue. Singling out the face among other features of the body needs no special justification – we know the "look of love" – but the face will also soon play a special role in the account (255C5ff). The participle μεμιμημένον is supplementary with the verb of perception.

565 μεμιμημένον (A3) is strictly "supplementary," in indirect discourse with ἴδῃ. This is indeed what he is seeing whether he is aware of it or not.

566 ἤ τινα σώματος ἰδέαν (A3): Sc. θεοειδῆ. τις is added to the alternative item in Riddell's "this or that" sense (*Digest*, §52). Cf. England *ad Leg.*643B7-8 and cf. *Leg.*941B4-5; *Phdr.*235C4; *Polit.*261D8, 296B7; *Tht.*174D4-5. The synecdoche isolates the visibility of the body.

567 ἔφριξε ... ὑπῆλθεν (A4), gnomic again, to depict the way his experience straddles eternity and time (cf. nn.456, 460). The aorists below – ἐτάκη (B3), ᾤδησέ τε καὶ ὥρμησε (B5-6) – describe what had happened beneath the surface that rose to become a palpable effect (μεταβολή) in the present.

568 The phrase προσορῶν σέβεται (A4) is repeated from above (250E3) to fix the comparison.

569 Reading pluperfect ἐδεδίει (A5), long ago suggested by Cobet and since found in Oxy.Pap.1017 (δεδιείη B Marc.185 [είη *punctis notatum]*, δεδίει T, δεδείη Vat.173). With θύοι ἄν (A6) the construction shifts from the contrafactual to the ideal in midstream.

570 ὡς ἀγάλματι καὶ θεῷ (A6): For καί = "or," sometimes but not always corrective as it is here, cf. *Alc.*1.107B6 (the reading of B), 110A5; *Apol.*23A7; *Gorg.*470D1, 501D1-2; *Leg.*639A5, 640D6, 640E6, 680E2, 690A2, 691C7, 696A1, 696A6, 799D1, 800C3, 843E1, 845C2, 856A6, 902A1, 920D3, 937B4; *Phlb.*16D6; *Polit.*293A3-4, cf. proverbial δὶς καὶ τρὶς τἀληθές λέγειν. καί or τε ... καί linking opposites or *exclusive* alternatives is a different idiom: cf. 246B5. The "worshipful" clinging of the lover criticized in Socrates's First Speech (ἀραρότως ... ὑπηρετεῖν, 240D3-4) is now

What has happened is that he has taken in an effluence of beauty that has flowed through his eyes[573] and then warmed[574] him in the place where the organism of the wing is irrigated. Once he was warmed, the area around the place where the feather sprouts out became wet and soft, which formerly had closed up out of dryness so as to prevent its sprouting forth. As the nourishment[575] flowed in, the staff of the feather was made to grow and swell and burst forth from its root – this process spreading through the entire figure[576] of the soul, since formerly it had been winged throughout. So at this moment the soul as a whole seethes and pulsates. Just as a person feels a kind of itching irritation [577] in the gums when his teeth are coming in, so does the soul feel when this process begins within her: she seethes, irritated and tickled, [578] as she sprouts her wings.

Now when the soul is gazing upon the boy's beauty and the effluent particles flow from him toward her (by the way, that's why the Greek word for desire is ἵμερος)[579] and she receives them, she is irrigated and heated and feels relief from her pain, and then she feels joy. But when she is separated from him and she becomes parched, the openings of the channels through which the quills are meant to spring forth shrink together and squint closed so as to bar all exit to the sprout of the quill. Now confined, the sprout pulsates like an artery and pricks at the opening, each at its own throughout the soul, so that the entire soul tingles all around and hurts, though at the next moment the memory she has of her Beauty[580] brings on a feeling of joy. As both these feelings mix within her she becomes embarrassed by the strangeness of what is happening and rages at the

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redeemed.

571 ἰδόντα δ' αὐτόν (A7): He who had been the subject is now the direct object: the shift is emphasized by hyperbaton of the verb, with pronominal αὐτός used to indicate change of subject.

572 οἷον ἐκ φρικῆς (A7): This is his first feeling (πάθος) and he guesses (οἷον) it is the cause (*post hoc ergo propter hoc*), of something he at first calls vaguely a "change" and then describes concretely by listing the symptoms in reverse order, putting the sweating before the getting hot. Clearly he does not διαισθάνεται.

573 This is what he insufficiently διαισθάνεται (B1). Such a "particulate" theory of perception is treated as familiar at *Meno* 76CD, where it is attributed to Empedocles.

574 θερμαθέντος δὲ ἐτάκη (B3): These are the θερμότης and the ἱδρώς of B1 which the afflicted man had presented backward, from effect to cause. Now that the Speaker is giving us the explanation, the cause (heat) comes before the effect (melting). The genitive participle is masculine: man and soul are again interchanged.

575 τῆς τροφῆς (B5): The effluence (ἀπορροή, B2) can now be characterized as *nourishment* because of the intervening characterization of its influx as "irrigation" (ἄρδεται, B3).

576 ὑπὸ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος (B6-7): A pleonastic synecdoche for ὑπὸ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν (cf.253E5-6), with εἶδος reminding us that the entire account of the soul with its winged horses and driver (246A3ff) is metaphoric imagery. Verdenius's interpretation (*ad loc.*) that ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος means that the process is going on beneath the "visible" surface therefore makes something go on beneath the imagery.

577 κνῆσίς τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις (C3), τε καί linking concrete and abstract.

578 ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται (C5), reversing the order of terms in a "chiasm of before and after," comparing γαργαλίζεται with κναίω. Likewise, φύουσα τὰ πτερά restates the more specific (ὥρμησε) φύεσθαι ... ὁ τοῦ πτεροῦ καῦλος above (B6).

579 μέρη ἐπίοντα καὶ ῥέοντ' (C6-7): ἵμερος comes from the ι of ἐπι<u>ό</u>ντα, more prominent than it might seem since it is the verbal root, and the <u>μέ</u>ρη <u>ῥέ</u>οντα, its rough breathing transferred to the ι.

580 τοῦ καλοῦ (D6-7), masc., a metonymy for τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς κάλλος, as before (cf. nn.1376, 279, 267, 37). The semantic metonymy, we finally learn, is a perfect expression for the confusion of the lover and for the "ontological metonymy" by which τὰ τῇδε stand in for τὰ ἐκεῖ (cf. τὴν τῇδε <u>ἐπωνυμίαν</u>, E3). Contrast the more exact expressions τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς κάλλος (C6), τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ κάλλος (E2) and τὸν τὸ κάλλος ἔχοντα (252A7), and compare the inexact but emotionally appropriate τοῦ πόθου (252A7). The lover's love may blind him from διαισθάνεσθαι.

trouble it gives her.[581] In her madness[582] she cannot sleep at night and during the day cannot stay still but runs hither and yon, wherever in her yearning she thinks she might find the person who possesses that beauty. And when she sees him and the stream of desire channels through her, she relaxes[583] the openings that had been sealed tight and takes a breath of relief from the pricks and pangs, and now she harvests that pleasure most sweet,[584] (252) transient though it may be.[585] From this time forward she is unwilling to leave his side[586] and counts nobody more important than her Beauty.[587] Mothers and brothers and all her companions she has forgotten; to squander wealth she counts as nothing.[588] Convention and appearances, with which she formerly was wont to plume herself,[589] she now despises, ready[590] instead to sink into slavery[591] so as to curl up as close to her yearning as one may allow her.[592] For in addition to being the object she reveres, she since has learned that only he can heal her greatest travails, this man who possesses the beauty.[593]

Now as for the name for this whole experience, my Beauty-boy – for it is to you after all that I am addressing this speech![594] – men call it Eros; but when you hear what

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581 ἀποροῦσα (D8), either surrounded and confined by his troubles (κύκλῳ), or unable to understand what is happening to him (ἀτοπίᾳ), or both.

582 ἐμμανής (D8): Finally, a word that connects this whole process or event with μανία.

583 ἔλυσε (E3), along with ἔληξεν (E5), gnomic of the timeless experience.

584 ἡδονὴν δ'αὖ ταύτην γλυκωτάτην ἐν τῷ παρόντι καρποῦται (E5): ἡδονὴν δ'αὖ redoes the phrase μνήμνην δ'αὖ from D6, again giving "the other side of the coin." Anarthrous ταύτην refers back to the pleasure twice denoted by γέγηθεν, above (D7, D1): there was no good place to put the article. The pleasure here denoted is purely psychic: contrast the expression τὴν τῶν πολλῶν μακαρίστην αἵρεσιν (256C3-4). The expression consciously imitates, in order to contradict, the derogatory expression in Socrates's First Speech, τὸ αὐτοῦ γλυκὺ ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον καρποῦσθαι (240A7-8), which was meant to refer to physical sex. The outer and "physical" behavior of the lover there criticized and ridiculed now receives its inner explanation and justification.

585 ἐν τῷ παρόντι (E5-252A1), ambiguous, denoting both the transience of sexual pleasure (from Socrates's First Speech, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον) but also τῇδε, alluding to the true φύσις of things, that it is not beauty after all but the vision of the truth of beauty, of the beauty we enjoyed in the huperouranion, that is the true pleasure.

586 ἀπολείπεται (A1) recalls 240C7, but is again purified of the envy that attended it there (Ryan). περὶ πλείνος ποιεῖσθαι echoes 231C5.

587 Cf. the outer descriptions at 240D3-4 (ἀραρότως), and E2-4 (ὑπερβάλλοντος), in Socrates's First Speech.

588 These are echoes from 231B4-5 and 232C6-7 about the *lover*'s family and wealth, and from 233C6-D4 (Lysias) and 239D8-240A5 (Socrates) about the *beloved*'s.

589 On love interfering with conventional appearances cf. Lysias's speech, 231E3ff.

590 δουλεύειν ἑτοίμη (A6): Omission of the copula is idiomatic with ἕτοιμος. Cf. C7 below; *Polit.*277E2; *Rep.*567A6 (and my n. *ad loc.*); Jebb *ad Ajax* 813. Contrast ἕτοιμοί εἰσι, 231C2. For the idea compare *Symp.*183A, 203D.

591 δουλεύειν (A6), a theme of Socrates's first speech, now justified. Cf. δουλεύοντι, 238E3; ὑπερετεῖν, 240D4.

592 κοιμᾶσθαι (A6): With this and οὔτε νυκτὸς δύναται καθεύδειν (251E1-2) he alludes to the literary scenario of the παρακλαυσίθυρον, the plaintive ballad the lover delivers to the beloved lying at his door in the middle of the night, redeeming thereby the abject image in Lysias's speech (233E3-4 and n.184)

593 τῶν μεγίστων πόνων (B1): I.e., the toils he has just described, which we had already met in the derogatory description of the lover given in the first two speeches. By providing the lover a cure for his toils Eros resembles the "second" Mania of 244D5-245A1.

594 πρὸς ὃν δή (B2): δή is not "half-ironical" (deVries). The Speaker suddenly admits the purpose of his speech, in case we had all forgotten. Cf. n.537. According to the fictional scenario of the speech the Speaker (played by Socrates) is addressing a Boy (played by Phaedrus), while "in fact" Socrates is really addressing Phaedrus, and for his benefit. In this the hypothesis differs from that of the first two speeches, which were mere show pieces whose audience was intended to "overhear" a lover seducing his boy (cf. nn.39, 204, and "Analysis of the First Speech: The Setting for Delivering the Speech," *passim*). The Speaker's reminder to his Boy, here, is therefore Socrates's reminder to Phaedrus that he means what he is saying. δή acknowledges the sudden intimacy of the remark.

the gods call it you will likely be amused by its novelty. The sponsors[595] of Homer tell of two verses from his more obscure works,[596] in a hymn to Eros, of which the one is quite excessive and barely scans to boot. Here are the lines they recite:

> As mortals know this god by the name of Eros the winged;
> Immortals call him Pteros for forcing wings to grow.

You can believe these men or not;[597] in any event what it is that erotic persons undergo and what causes it[598] amounts to this.[599]

Now if the man so taken[600] was, like us,[601] a companion of Zeus,[602] he can manage his encounter with the "winged" one with greater aplomb; but as for those who served Ares and[603] moved among his haunts with him, if once captured by Eros they feel they

595 Cf. *Rep*.599E6 and Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέται (*Rep*.606E1), with my nn. *ad locc*.

596 ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπῶν (B5) presumably refers to writings less well known (D.H. *Ant.Rom.* 11.62.3), rather than private writings (D.C.41.63.5), or secret writings (Plut.*Mor.*728F). For the distinction cf. J.Labarde, *L'Homère de Platon* (Liege 1949) 378-83, cited by Brisson *ad loc*. It is a joke.

597 The first line is credible (τὸν δ' ἤτοι θνητοὶ μὲν ἔρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν); but the second (ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα διὰ πτεροφύτορ' ἀνάγκην), besides its unmetrical second foot, is just as much a fabrication as the etymologies were at the beginning of the speech. Like them it explains the world we live in as a derogation of the original world (Πτέρως, a name cognizant of the effect of the original world upon our experience here, has been ignorantly shortened to Ἔρως which fails to depict the mechanism of desire). What is "hubristic" about it is that the Homerids are willing to spread a rumor about divine names merely out of their reverence for Homer, which re-raises the worry of Ibycus (242D1). Contrast the etymologies Socrates makes up (244B6-D1), which he claims are the work not of gods but men, and which are etymologies of human language and not divine names.

598 ἥ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος (C2): This peculiar doublet nicely captures the peculiar fact that humans *experience* the stirring without understanding its true *cause*. The entire passage (250B1-252B1) has since explained ὃ δ' ἔστι τὸ πάθος which those who undergo it cannot sufficiently "see through" (διαισθάνεσθαι, 250A7-B1). To explain it requires a total reversal of our point of view, and of our understanding that the world we consciously live in now (and know by our πάθος) was caused by a past (the αἰτία), a past that (subjectively) we have forgotten more or less, that we spent in a world that (objectively) is invisible! This reversal of perspective is perfectly analogous to but far grander than the claim Socrates had made about the original names of mantic and oionistic. The greatest difference between those two reversals is that while the one is a fanciful curiosity of ancient history, this grander one is a reversal that we can just believe in, because of the cognitive experience of memory, which the speech itself has succeeded to stimulate along the way.

599 τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο (C2): Socrates ends the section with the same formula he used to announce that he had delivered as much as he was going to deliver of this First Speech (241D2). Unique among his transitions-by-dismissal so far (246A3-4, 246D2-5, 248A1[a transition to resume], 249D4-E4, 250C7-8 [transition to resume]), this one announces the end without telling us what will come next. The language of πάθος and αἰτία, however, recalls μὴ ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεσθαι, 250B1. Uninstructed, we have the right to presume that, as at every transition so far in this speech, the next topic will be the most pressing and interesting one. Now that we know the experience of true love, the pressing question is, what will true lover make of it in his life?

600 ληφθείς (C3): We are meant to recognize the bare expression as resuming λαμβάνει from 251B1. It is varied by ἁλῶσι below (C6).

601 μὲν οὖν (C3), after the dismissal of the topic just treated, suggests he is looking backward in order to move forward – and indeed he is, for he is reminding us of the digression on our experience in the huperouranion where he announced, as an *obiter dictum* (μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς), that he and his beloved were, indeed, Διὸς ὀπαδοί (250B7).

602 ὀπαδῶν (C3): The new term (prepared for at 248C3: cf. n.480) now portrays the relationship from the god's point of view, as if the souls in his entourage were his companions rather than followers (see next note), and therefore took on their individual attributes (as by frequenting the same haunts: περιεπόλουν, C5: cf. n.426). At the same time that we are interpreting the lover's behavior here as a trace of his soul's life in the ouranos, we are being prepared for the description of the human ἐρώμενος following in turn and emulating the human ἐρῶν in this life.

603 Ἄρεώς τε θεραπευταὶ καὶ μετ' ἐκείνου περιεπόλουν (C4-5): The doublet of attributes in τε καί spells out the new idea broached by ὀπαδῶν. For the omission of εἰσί in the first attribute cf. Stallbaum's wonderful parallel, *Rep*.358E2: οἷόν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε.

have been "wronged"[604] by their beloved in any way, their thoughts go to murder and purging the sin by a sacrifice both of themselves and their beloved.[605] And so it goes with each of the other gods: in whichever god's chorus each man followed, it is by honoring and imitating[606] him that he lives his life, as long as he is uncorrupted and makes his way through[607] his first incarnation in this world, and it is in this manner that he treats his beloved as well as everyone else.[608] Just so, it is under the influence of his own character[609] that he chooses his Love[610] from among the beauties and because he thinks of him as being the god he followed in that world he treats him as if he were fashioning and decorating an icon to honor and worship with sacred rites.[611] Thus our men that followed Zeus the Bright[612] seek a person bright in soul to be the one who will receive their love and to this end they look for philosophy and leadership[613] in his nature. Once

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604 ἀδικεῖσθαι (C6) is likewise used of the indignant lover's complaint at Sappho 1.20.

605 The outer behavior decried in the first speeches continues to receive explanation and rectification. The willfulness of some lovers (233C2-3: cf. 243C5) may be a vestige of a sojourn in the heavens with Ares. The diction (ἁλῶσι, ἀδικεῖσθαι, καθιερεύειν) conveys their martial ethos.

606 τιμῶν τε καὶ μιμούμενος (D2): Again (cf. ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη, 248A2, and n.537 on ἑπόμενοι, 250B7) the notion of "following" or "honoring" is tantamount (note τε καί) to patterning oneself after or "likening oneself" or "imitating." τιμῶν moreover moves us further toward human relations.

607 Reading βιοτεύει (D3) with BTW Marc.185 (and Stallb.) rather than βιοτεύῃ with W (*ex emend.*) Vat.173 and corr. Coisl.155, a reading popular among editors. A comma should be placed after ἀδιάφθορος rather than after βιοτεύει. It makes no sense to think he imitates his god only during his first incarnation; and there is nothing in the Greek text to justify Robin's "*encore.*" The sense is that he (A) imitates the god as long as his memory is intact and he (B) relies on doing so for his living, which facts in turn (C) determine his behavior toward others (ὁμιλεῖ τε καὶ προσφέρεται), and in particular (D) his choice of a beloved. The structure is A καί B καί C, D τε (οὖν).

οὖν with τε (D5) is common in Plato (cf. Denniston, 441). Here it focusses attention onto the target inference (ἐκλέγεται) which can then be elaborated (D6-E1). βιοτεύειν is an hapax in Plato and is used of humans only once by Aristotle (ἀκράτως βιοτεύειν, *EN* 1114A16), but it appears 15 times in Xenophon, as often in the sense of πορίζεσθαι τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον as in the sense of *vivere* (*simpliciter*). It is absent from the orators, Herodotus, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Aristophanes; both its uses in Thucydides mean to "get on" or survive under pressure (1.11.1, 1.130.1) as also do its lone uses in Eur. (*Alc.*243) and in Pindar (*N.*4.6). Cf. τὸν βίον ποιῆται (257B6).

608 The language of habits (ὁμιλεῖ, D5) and corruption (ἀδιαφθαρμένος, D3) is brought forward from 250E1 (διαφθαρμένος), E5 (προσομιλῶν) and from 250A3 (ὁμιλιῶν).

609 πρὸς τρόπου (D6). The character that he *used* in the previous sentence (instrumental dative) now becomes the character that *leads* him (causal genitive) in this one. For the expression cf. *Leg.*655D7; for the process cf. Cf. E7-253B1, below.

610 Ἔρωτα (D5): Capitalize, with Burnet. Though an abstract noun stood in metonymy for the beloved above (τοῦ πόθου, A7) this time, *pace* Ryan, the god is the metonym. It is, after all, to the extent that he identifies the boy with the beauties of the divine world he reminds him of, that the lover feels desire for him. Contrast ἔρως-abstract functioning as metonymy for the concrete beloved at *Lys.*205A1.

611 τιμήσων καὶ ὀργιάσων (E1): His "treatment" of the boy (προσφέρεται, D5) resembles the relationship he enjoyed with the objects of the huperouranion (250B7-C2), which likewise had its "transitive" element (cf. nn.540, 542), at the same time that it spells out ἀγάλματι καὶ θεῷ at 251A6. This "religious" sort of devotion was criticized by the Speaker in Socrates's First Speech (ἀραρότως αὐτῷ ὑπηρετεῖν, 240D3-4) but now is redeemed as truly the result of divine influences.

612 οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δῖόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχήν (E1-2), the μὲν οὖν clause again starting (δή is resumptive) with the Speaker and his boy's kind, as above (C3), which already implies he will move on to the followers of another god. His opening exploits the very special word δῖος, an adjective that on the one hand seems to have an etymological connection with the name of Zeus but on the other has just what he needs to make his point, namely, a very wide spectrum of application from god to man to thing. Soon enough he will spell the matter out in explicitly psychic terms (φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ἡγεμονικός τὴν φύσιν).

613 φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ἡγεμονικός (E3): The latter characteristic of Zeus is supported by his position among the ranks of the divine processions (ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεύς, 246E4); as to his being "philosophical" the Speaker has already broached this prejudice above (cf. n.537) though not in so few words. To import a private belief of Plato's about

they find such a one their eros is stirred and they stop at nothing to make him turn out that way in fact.[614] And[615] if they have not as yet established their lifestyle it is then[616] that they set about doing it, whether with instruction from some quarter or going it alone, following out the traces they feel within themselves[617] to discover (253) the character of the god that is truly their own. They can succeed at this because of the way they had strained[618] to keep their god in sight when they were following in his train. Once they latch on to him[619] by means of memory's tracking back, they become inspired[620] and now from him[621] they take on[622] his character and his behavior, to the extent that a man can share in divinity.[623] And since they feel the beloved is responsible for this inspired experience they are pleased by him all the more.

Now[624] if from Zeus they are able to channel any effluences, as the Bacchantes can,[625] they pour it onto their beloved's soul and make him thereby as like as possible to their own god. Similarly,[626] if it was the train of Hera they followed, they seek a royal

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Zeus being a philosophical deity explains nothing but only spoils the integrity of the speech, which has created its own context.

614 τὴν φύσιν (E3) specifies still further the specification of the previous accusative of respect (τὴν ψυχήν) by singling out his *natural* psychic gifts; the lover will see to his *nurture* (παιδεία) – i.e. to the fruition of his natural potential.

615 ἐὰν οὖν (E5): We might have expected δέ answering μέν, but instead continue in the μέν-clause, with the companions of Zeus (Hera will be next: ὅσοι δ' αὖ μεθ' Ἥρας, 253B1); meanwhile this is a new point (for this οὖν cf. Denniston, 426) having to do with someone who has forgotten and not yet established his association with the gods (ἐπιτήδευμα refers to D1-5) in this life. Love will change all that.

616 τότε (E6): I.e. when he chose his Love (ἐκλέγεται, D6).

617 παρ' ἑαυτῶν (E7): In contrast with *applying* the τρόπος as it was conscientiously developed, and its functioning as their criterion for *choosing* their beloved, the τρόπος in the case of these lovers is a fainter vestige of their previous life which now finds and leads *them*: cf. πρὸς τρόπου, gen. vs. τῷ τρόπῳ, instrumental dative, above. The operation of this force within such lovers is developed below as the result of τὸ συντόνως ἠναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θέον βλέπειν during their time in the ouranos (253A1-2): presumably they were among the souls further back in the train so that rather than glimpse many of the ὄντα it was quite enough to try to keep glimpsing the movements of the god leading their choruses – like the γλιχόμεναι of 248A6.

618 ἠναγκάσθαι (253A2), referring to the desperately needful task of keeping their respective god in sight during their pre-somatic life in the ouranos (*pace* deVries).

619 ἐφαπτόμενοι (A2): The sight of the beloved jogs his memory back and he becomes reattached in this life, to his god's train.

620 ἐνθουσιῶντες (A3) corresponds to the effect, described above, that finding his beloved had on the knowing lover (ἐρασθῶσι, passive, 252E4). Finding his beloved (there) he becomes aroused; finding his god (here) he becomes enthused.

621 αὐτοῦ (A2) is now replaced by ἐκείνου (A3) as the thing they reached for becomes the awesome source of their inspiration.

622 λαμβάνουσι (A3): This is the word used also to describe eros seizing the man (251B1) but the notion is also able to describe the lover who knew what he was looking for *finding* his proper beloved (εὑρόντες, 252E4).

623 καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν (A4): Cf. εἰς τὸ δυνατόν (252D2). The limitation on perfecting the divine influence in one's life is the same on both cases, though the processes are very different. In this case the inner τρόπος enables him to realize his outer τρόπος and when he does so he is rewarded by enthusiasm just as the man who had been led by his τρόπος to find his beloved falls in love with him. Either our god gives us the means to choose our beloved and we fall in love, or our feeling of love for our beloved motivates us to remember our god and he fills us with inspiration. In both cases we respond by making our beloved resemble him as much as we can.

624 κἂν (A6): He will pass on what the god gives him just as does the man who had already patterned himself on his god, who had already "internalized" the divine influence (D1-E5, with n.607, 608, 609). Like that passage (n.607) the digression is characterized by its use of καί (253A2, A5, A6).

625 κἂν ἐκ Διὸς ἀρύτωσιν ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι (A6): Cf. *Ion* 534A4-5, ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι ἀρύονται ἐκ τῶν ποταμῶν μέλι καὶ γάλα κατεχόμενοι (of poets), and cf. the sequel, according to which the poets, like bees, pass the honey on to the rest us (B2-3).

626 αὖ (B1) resumes what had started (with μὲν δὴ οὖν, E1) as a god-by-god review of human behavior toward the

type and once they find him they do the same thing; and so it goes, also, if they followed Apollo or any of the others:[627] in accordance with the path by which they emulate their respective gods they seek their own boy to be of like[628] nature, and once they have acquired[629] him they lead him along by imitating their god in themselves and by persuading him and shaping him toward the god's ways and looks,[630] to the extent his individual abilities allow.[631] Indeed the lovers treat their boys with no envy or ill-will.[632] Their nurturing is entirely devoted to guiding them toward becoming like[633] themselves and like the god they honor.[634]

In all, therefore, the eagerness[635] that drives men who are true lovers and the initiation they provide, assuming they carry out their eagerness[636] in the way[637] I have

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beloved.

627 Ἀπόλλωνός τε καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν θεῶν (B3): The varying choice of examples and the pacing of the movement to generalization deserve comment (ἑκάστου generalizes, *pace* deVries, not τε καί: cf. n.422). The first run-through of the gods illustrated the special equipment of the lovers (252C3-E1). Zeus was the first example (μὲν οὖν, 252C3) because the Speaker and his beloved are of this group, and the second was Ares (252C4ff)). Now he repeats a run-through of the gods to illustrate how the lovers choose their beloveds, beginning again with Zeus (μὲν δὴ οὖν resuming). After an intervening digression on men who had not become committed he now goes on to a second god and it is not Ares but Hera. Such "overlap substitution" of examples is quite common in Plato for avoiding slavish parallelism or dispelling an unwanted suggestion of system (cf. my note *ad Rep*.332C11). As to the pacing of the examples, he elaborates the second case more briefly and tautologically (B2-3: compare 252AE1-3), and then moves to a third (Apollo) which is introduced, as τε καί suggests, only to make a segue to the generalization (ἑκάστου τῶν θεῶν). The "truncation" of the items (for which cf. 238A6-B5; *Leg*.627C3-5, 809B2, 816A6-7; *Rep*.396D2-3, 463C5-7; *Soph*.258B10-C3; *Symp*.183A2-3; *Tim*.82A8-B2) and the pairing of the last example with the generalizing term with τε καί (for which cf. *Leg*.694E6-7, 735B1-2, 885D5; *Phdo*.74D4-5; *Rep*.362E5-3A1, 495A7-8) together accelerate the movement toward generalization and facilitate dismissal. The Speaker was never interested in exemplifying any god other than Zeus.

628 οὕτω (B3), "respectively," with πεφυκέναι, placed early to associate it with ἑκάστου.

629 κτήσωνται (B5): "Coming to possess" him denotes that he has him on board so that he can work on improving him. To edify the boy is importantly different from wooing him, the latter to be elaborated below (cf. ἐὰν αἱρέθη· ἅλισκεται δέ ..., C6 and n.). For the verb used of personal associates cf. Socrates's First Speech (239D8-240A8).

630 μιμούμενοι αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες και ῥυθμίζοντες (B5-6): The followers (i.e., imitators: cf. n.606) guide and lead. A continuous analogy is being drawn, based on the mechanism of receiving inspiration and passing it on – God : lover : : lover : beloved. But the lover is beloved of the god for he inspires him, just as the lover inspires the beloved because he loves him.

631 ὅση ἑκάστῳ δύναμις (B7). δύναμις is not power but ability (like δυνατόν, A4 and 252D2). The concession to human limitations by which the lover was measured against the god whom he follows (A4-5) now mitigates the standard by which the lover measures his beloved.

632 οὐ φθόνῳ οὐδ' ἀνελευθέρῳ δυσμενείᾳ χρώμενος (B7-8): More echoes of Socrates's First Speech. οὐ φθόνῳ relies on the analogous behavior of the gods toward the souls that followed them in heaven (247A7), and denies the assertion of begrudging envy in the lover, contrary to 239A7ff (and 241C2), just as ἀνελευθέρῳ denies the constant allegation of slavish compulsion in the lover (238E3, 240C4-5 and D1, 243C8) and as the denial of δυσμενείᾳ denies the denial of εὐνοία (241C8).

633 εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τῷ θεῷ (B8) relies on their impulse to imitate their god, and denies any division or opposition of their interests (such as was alleged in the earlier speeches: 239A1-2, B6-9; 240A6-7; compare also πειρώμενοι here with its commoner erotic use at 227C5).

634 οὕτω (C2) semi-redundant. Cf.260D7 and n. *ad loc.*

635 προθυμία (C2) brings forward προθυμούμενος from 249D6 but also co-opts the use of it by Lysias's Speaker at 231B6.

636 Reading ἐάν γε διαπράξωνται (C3) with edd., from the Monac. (*teste* Ast) or the Coislin. (*teste* Moreschini). Hermias's quotation at 192.19 *lacks* γε according to Couvreur (*pace* Burnet). BT have ἐάν τ'ἐνδιαπράξωνται; W has ἐάν γ' ἐνδιαπράξωνται. LSJ (*s.v.*) counts ἐνδιαπραξ. a *falsa lectio.* διαπράξασθαι (like πειρᾶσθαι, above) is now given its plain meaning, redeemed from its use as a euphemism in the erotic vocabulary (234A3, cf. 231B7).

637 Reading ᾗ λέγω (C4) with edd., a guess of Heindorf, which he himself did not in the end print. Socrates is insisting on the proviso (ἐάν γε) that the eager (προθυμούμενος) lover not act as described at 250E1-251A1 (ᾗ ὁδῷ, not ᾗ

described, proves to be an admirable and happy[638] affair, brought about by a friend driven by the mania of Eros toward the person he befriended, once he has selected him.[639]

But now I must tell you how the one he has selected comes to be captured.[640] At the beginning of this story I divided[641] the individual soul into three, with two of the aspects being horse-like and the third being like a reinsman, and we said of the two horses that one is good and the other is not, but we did not spell out[642] what the goodness or virtue[643] of the good one is, nor the evil of the evil one, but now we must. It is this way: The horse on the finer side[644] of the yoke is upright in posture, well articulated in form, holds his head high with stately nose and is light in color with eyes of black. His passion is[645] for honor associated with sound temper and reverence and he is the friend of opinions that are true; without the whip[646] but merely by the bidding of the

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προθυμίᾳ).

638 καλή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονική (C4): καλή is here the opposite of αἰσχρά. The terms summarily deny the conclusion reached in Socrates's First Speech, as well as the attitude that permeated the Lysias's.

639 ἐὰν αἱρεθῇ (C6): The verb is new but it means "selected" (*eligi,* Ast), not "caught," (though it can: cf. *Lys.*205E2; *Tht.*179B3, C4) and refers back to ἐκλέγεται, 252D6. μὲν οὖν includes ἐὰν αἱρέθη in what has been said already; δὲ δή moves us to his capture which assumes he has been chosen (ὁ αἱρεθείς). For ἁλίσκεσθαι of the beloved giving in to the lover, cf. 240A3 and *Symp.*184A6 and 8. On the prior capture of the lover himself by Eros, cf. 252C6.

640 ἁλίσκεται δὲ δὴ ὁ αἱρεθείς (C6): Once again the narrative moves to the next topic without apology since the topic has just been shown to be crucial (cf. n.599). Ryan hears the subtle homoioteleuton that links the previous section, regarding ὁ ληφθείς (252C3), with with its sequel regarding ὁ αἱρεθείς, though I disagree with him on the semantics of the latter (see prev. n.). The entire attempt to persuade the Boy (though the speech is also a palinode to Eros), is now made to hinge on the fictional Audience-Boy acquiescing in the fictional advance of the Speaker-Lover!

641 Reading διειλόμην (C7) with all mss. against the first plural from Hermias, promoted by Heindorf in order to harmonize the expression to the ensuing plurals φαμέν and διείπομεν. But the "first person" demonstrative τοῦδε in a dialogical context calls for the first person *singular*, and Heindorf's argument from parallelism of person is vitiated by the non-parallel tense of φαμέν, an idiomatic present used for a position the speaker can rely on (as if it were a perfect: cf. *Rep.*507B3 [with my note], 507B9, 583C3, 603C5; cf. K.G.1.135f), as opposed to a citation of something the interlocutors might have said to each other at a previous moment (which is done with an imperfect or an aorist, as here [διείπομεν]). ταῦτα μενέτω, "let those things (you have heard) stand," effects the transition from what he said to what his audience can now be treated to be agreeing with; next comes the distinction as agreed upon serving as foil for the fact that it was not there spelled out (διείπομεν).

642 διείπομεν (D3), "serving as the 2nd aor. of διαγορεύω" according to LSJ (s.*v.* διεῖπον) though Ast classes it with διειρηκέναι (*Lex.Plat.* s.*v.* διειπεῖν). *Polit.*275A4 is an exact parallel, where διείπομεν is glossed one line below with ὅλον καὶ σαφὲς ἐρρήθη.

643 For ἀρετή (D2) as the noun corresponding to the adjective ἀγαθός cf. *Rep.*349D3-4 (and my n. *ad loc.*), 381C2 [cf.B10 and C8], 588A9-10, 601D4, 618C7; *Apol.*30B4; *Meno* 73B4ff and 87E1; *Symp.*196B5.

644 ἐν τῇ καλλίονι στάσει (D4): With Thompson, ὁ ἐν δεξιᾷ, in the "lead" position of the pair, like the δεξιόσειρος ἵππος in the team of four (cf. S.*Ant.*140 and Jebb *ad loc.*)

645 τιμῆς ἐραστής (D6), something of an oxymoron. His "lust" for honor is mediated by temperance and reverence. The asyndetic description of the horse's physiognomy with adjectives (announced by τό τε εἶδος and closed by a polar doublet [dark and light]: cf. my n. *ad Rep.*342E10-11) shifts syntactically into a noun phrase for the description of his "inner" character (in lieu of a parallel accusative of respect such as to τὸ ἦθος).

646 ἄπληκτος (D7), "unstruck," i.e., needing no goad, as κελεύσματι μόνον next explains. But in the context we cannot fail to hear the undermeaning "unshaken" (cf.E.*Rhes.*814) in connection with his steady grasp of true opinion. The list, having gone from physiognomic adjectives to characterological nouns, now ends with a verb to describe his behavior, though it is the qualifiers of the verb's subject that are the essential predication, while the verb is semantically otiose (cf. "subordinate insubordination," n.1411).

The description may well recall that of the sub-selected "more guardly" guardians of *Rep.*Bk.3 (412C-414A) and of the thumoeidetic aspect of soul to which they are made to correspond in Bks.4 (439E-441B) and 8 (547D-548B: n.b. τιμῆς), but the immediate parallel to the symmetrical pair of horses is the account in Socrates's First Speech of the two ἰδέαι of the self (as Socrates's reversion to the dual above [D4, continued at 254A7-B3] reminded us [cf. 237D6]) – which in comparison with the current conception of the self becomes a team of horses without a reinsman (cf.

reinsman's voice and thought is he steered. The other is crooked, gross and poorly composed, thick and short of neck, snub of nose, darkskinned and cloudy[647] of eye, hot-blooded,[648] the friend of excessive passion and bravado,[649] fuzzy around the ears and deaf, and only barely yields to whip and spurs.[650] So when the charioteer beholds the beloved Eye[651] and becomes suffused with warmth throughout his soul[652] and filled with the pricks and tickles of desire,[653] (254) the horse that is compliant to the charioteer then as ever[654] is mastered by his reverence,[655] and checks himself against stampeding[656] the beloved; but the other ceases to give in to[657] the spurs and whip of the charioteer and now runs rampant, borne along by force.[658] Straining at his yokemate and making all sorts of trouble for the charioteer, he tries to force[659] them to approach the boy and create a memory[660] of sexual favors previously rendered. At the beginning the two

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nn.1412, 1413).

647 μελάγχρως, γλαυκόμματος (E2-3), a contrasting doublet in dark and light parallel with λευκὸς ἰδεῖν, μελανόμματος (D5) effecting, as there, the transition from physiognomy to character.

648 ὕφαιμος (E3) *can* mean bloodshot (of the eyes) but that rather spoils the symmetrical opposition of black and white which already closed the list of external attributes as white and black had, before. Instead, ὕφαιμος means hot-blooded and makes an explicit transition from external adjectival attributes to moral phraseology with a quasi-moral adjective denoting a "humor."

649 ὕβρεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος (E3), a parallel that compresses both the ἐραστής phrase and the ἑταῖρος phrase above, ὕβρις being the antithesis of the first and ἀλαζονεία that of the second. Furthermore, ἑταῖρος with these is oxymoronic in the same way ἐραστής was with τιμῆς.

650 The second list (E1-5) progresses in parallels both semantic and syntactical with the first one (ὀρθός~σκολιός / διηρθωμένος~εἰκῇ συπεφορημένος / ὑψαυχήν~σιμοπρόσωπος) with an admixture of flaccidity (πολύς needed to set up συμπεφορημένος, the true contradictory of διηρθρωμένος; ὑψαυχήν at first answered by κρατεραύχην which sets up the truly contradictory βραχυτράχηλος). It closes with a sort of catalectic abbreviation (ὑπείκων [sc. ἡνιοχεῖται or ἐστί]).

651 ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα (E5): This synecdoche, a third instance of erotic metonymy (cf. 252D5 and 252A7, in addition to many uses of the ambiguous adjective, καλός), is entirely appropriate to the eroticism of the face – the looking from the beloved to the lover is integral to the explanation of love's dynamics and "psychophysiology" – and therefore does not need to be mitigated or neutralized by the adducing of "parallels" in Greek idiom outside this text nor obliterated in translation (e.g., "person," Verdenius). Its purpose is to initiate a rehearsal of the previous description, with *variatio* (~ πρόσωπον, 251A2ff). Contrast the metonymies involving qualities and their originals, above (250E3, 251A3).

652 πᾶσαν αἰσθήσει διαθερμήνας τὴν ψυχήν (E5-6) and the immediate sequel continues to rehearse the topic of visual perception (for αἰσθήσει cf.250D1-E1) and what happened to the more philosophical ἐρῶν when he sees beauty (for διαθερμήνας cf. 251A1-C5), now attributing this experience to the reinsman. Cf. following notes.

653 γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ πόθου κεντρῶν ὑποπλησθῇ (E6): The pair, linked by τε καί, compendiously recalls 251C4-D7, with γαργαλισμοῦ repeating γαργαλίζεται at the beginning (C5) and πόθου rehearsing οἰστρᾷ at the end (D6).

654 ἀεί τε καὶ τότε (254A2), not quite equivalent to καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν (*Phlb.*60C) and πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν (S.*Ant.*181), *pace* Stallb. and deVries since those are polar doublets in τε καί. The connective is here *illative*, linking general ground and specific inference. Cf. *Gorg.*523A6; *Phdo.*58B3; *Rep.*334D3, 335B4, 391D1-2, and my n. *ad Rep.*331D7.

655 αἰδοῖ (A2) now suggests a comparison of the good horse with the philosophical lover (who also reacts with reverence, but reverence toward his memory of true beauty: 251A1ff) as opposed to the lover who has forgotten (250E1-251A1). There is something of an oxymoron in the notion of being quelled by reverence, but what moral virtue a horse can have will always be oxymoronic.

656 ἐπιπηδᾶν (A2) recalls βαίνειν 250E4.

657 ἐντρέπεται (A4) echoes παραδούς (250E4) in contrast.

658 βίᾳ φέρεται (A4): Force has moved from the verb (βιαζόμενος, A2) to the dative that motivates it (contrast dative αἰδοῖ, A2).

659 ἀναγκάζει (A5), conative present, as at B1 and D1. Contrast the aorist at D5.

660 μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι (A6): The etymological play suggests a contrast with ἐφαπτόμενοι μνήμῃ (253A2-3) and with μνήμη ... ἠνέχθη just below (B5-6). My guess as to the meaning is that his memory does not take him back and away from what he sees before him to the truth it embodies, but instead he wishes to create a memorable event within the immanent medium that he will later repeat. He looks forward to "commemorate" his desire, perhaps never to be

become angry and pull against him in twain,[661] feeling they are being compelled to do something horrible and lawless;[662] but when at last it seems there will be no end to the trouble he makes[663] they go along and proceed in the direction he leads them, having given in and agreed to do his bidding. Now they have come[664] into the presence[665] of the boy and they are stunned by the sight of his face, flashing like lightning.[666] The experience of the charioteer upon seeing him was that his memory was borne toward the nature[667] of beauty: she viewed it once again, seated calm and steady[668] for once and for all in its unsullied[669] firmament beyond this world. The vision made her shudder. Awed, she fell backward.[670] Falling,[671] she was forced to yank back on the reins with such strength that both the horses tumbled back onto their haunches, the one willingly because it does not resist, but the excessive one quite unwilling. When later the horses had moved away some distance, the one out of shame and astonishment[672] drenched the entire soul with

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turned back by his memory again. Cf. παιδοσπορεῖν (250E5) and recall also the argument in the First Speech, at 233A1-4 (*n.b.*, μνημεῖα [233A3] and n.163 *ad loc.*).

661 τὼ δέ (A7): Article plus δέ for change of subject. The dual is now used of the very *heterogenous* charioteer and good horse (set up by τε καί and non-repetition of article in the expression τῷ σύζυγί τε καὶ ἡνιόχῳ above, A5) because of their moral alliance in opposition to the lusty horse, where before the dual had served to link the horses (253C8), which corresponded to the twin "aspects" of Socrates's First Speech (237D6-E2), co-specific pairs in both cases.

662 ὡς δεινὰ και παράνομα (B1): ὡς purports to quote their thoughts. The two terms depict the overlap or fellow feeling shared by the charioteer and the better horse. Cf. n.672, *infra*, on θάμβος, which is not unrelated to δεινά here.

663 κακοῦ (B2), tantamount to saying they find his behavior "insufferable." For κακόν cf. n.673. The expression continues to be emotional and exasperated (as was πάντα, A4).

664 The choice of tenses now becomes noteworthy. The shift into a gnomic aorist for the gnostic experience (ἐγένοντο, B6) is by now wholly familiar (cf. 248A and nn.461, 464, 467). We stay in this tense until ἔλκει (D7) which in the context of aorists registers as a vivid "historic present," after which we drop back into the aorist (καθήμαξεν, ἔδωκεν, E4-5).

665 πρὸς αὐτῷ (B4): The dative with πρός was used to describe in a very abstract way the kind of proximity to the source of inspiration that makes god divine, and that gives the philosopher wings and drives him to "ecstasy" (249C5-D1: cf. n.501). The bad horse is thinking in the accusative (A6).

666 ἀστράπτουσαν (B5), supplementary in indirect discourse. Objectively described it was a flow of particles (251B1-2), but from the soul's phenomenological vantage point the beam appears as a lightning flash. The erotic sense of the metaphor is new (contrast A.*P.V.*156). The magic of the "look of love" finally becomes thematic (cf. nn.651, 564) – after all, it is soon to be elaborated (255C1ff)!

667 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν (B6): In all strictness it would have sufficed to say πρὸς τὸ κάλλος, but the Speaker is intent upon distinguishing the charioteer's reaction from that of the forgetful man who οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φέρεται by his memory (250E2: cf. ἠνέχθη here) but instead, like the bad horse, βίᾳ φέρεται (A4 above). The periphrasis with φύσις not only admonishes us to remember the difference between ἐνθένδε and ἐκεῖ, but also adds vividness and life to the true beauty he remembers (cf. nn.499, 527, 535), a vividness that strictly belongs only to his experience of it when he glimpsed it in the huperouranion, which is next described.

668 μετὰ σωφροσύνης (B6-7): κάλλος viewed in and by itself is not the near occasion of sin it can be when viewed in a body. The soul merely beholds it in its seat of splendor. Cf. προσορᾶν, 251A5.

669 ἐν ἁγνῷ βάθρῳ βεβῶσαν (B7) recalls ὁλόκληρα ... καὶ ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀτρεμῆ ... ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ (250C2-4), and with μετὰ σωφροσύνης recalls the harmony between the subjective and objective poles of the experience there described (cf. nn.536, 538, 540, 541, 542, and 542).

670 ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἔδεισέ τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα ἀνέπεσεν (B7-8): Alliteration and homeoteleuton mounts, and σεφθεῖσα is a virtual epanalepsis of ἔδεισα, the two indicatives with their participles linked by τε καί. The terms were used of the philosopher at 251A4-5 but take on a physical character here. What is being described is the ὀξέως φέρεσθαι (on which cf. n.557) that the forgetful man does not experience (250E2). The shift to the feminine indicates it is his memory that is affecting him, which makes his action all the more involuntary.

671 ἅμα ἀναγκάσθη (B8): ἅμα indicates that the charioteer-soul's pulling back on the reins is an unintentional side-effect of his falling backward. Compare ἀπὸ ὕσπλαγος below, E1.

672 ὑπ' αἰσχύνης τε καὶ θάμβους (C4): These are the emotions the nobler horse feels that are close enough to those of the charioteer that he can be his ally (θάμβος is new but belongs in the same family as αἰδώς, δέος); he is ashamed and stunned (τε καί) by the *dishonorable* (cf. τιμῆς ἐραστής, 253D6) act he has become party to.

sweat, but the other, now released from the pains it suffered from the bit and from its fall, heaped angry rebukes upon the charioteer and his yokemate as soon as he could get his breath, berating[673] them for their timidity and cowardice, and how they abandoned their posts and broke their agreement! All over again, themselves now unwilling, he tried to compel them to draw near, giving in only at the last minute to their pleas[674] that they postpone the return to a later time.[675] When the time which they had bargained[676] for arrived they acted as if they had forgotten and he, reminding them, neighing and pulling,[677] forced them once again to come into the presence of the boy[678] for the same reasons[679] as before. As they came near he lowered his head, raised his tail, and took the bit in his teeth. He gives all he has to drag[680] them forward shamelessly. But the charioteer had the same reaction as before, only stronger: he fell backward once again as if the trap had been triggered,[681] and all the more violently jerked back the bit and loosed it from between the horse's teeth, so as to bloody his bad-mouthing tongue[682] and jaws and

673 κακίζων (C7): The diction indicates that the lusty horse is repairing to the behavior described at A7-B3 (*n.b.* κακοῦ, B2). In anger he now overstates his case in the belief (note subjective ὡς) that the behavior of the charioteer and nobler horse is tantamount to abandoning one's post in battle out of cowardice. The exegesis of τάξιν with ὁμολογίαν [D1] refers back to ὁμολογήσαντε ... τὸ κελευόμενον (B3), by a sort of "reverse καί" (cf. *Rep*.343C6-7 and my n.). His gloss of δειλία with ἀνανδρία (C8) reveals his insensitivity to and misinterpretation of the charioteer's reaction to the sight of Beauty (contrast the way δειλία 's cognate verb ἔδεισε was correctly glossed with σεφθεῖσα in the description above, B7). His emotional pairing of reinsman and horse with the dual (merely because they are both his enemies) stands in contrast with the dual used of the two horses above on the rational basis of their being cogeneric.

674 Reading δεομένων (D2) with all mss. There are parallels for everything that is unusual or objectionable about the genitive here. For the genitive absolute without expressed subject cf. *Phdo*.96A6 (to which compare Xen.*Cyrop*.3.1.9), *Rep*.557E4 (a weak example since the subject is supplied in the nearby parallel, τῶν ἄλλων ἀγόντων, E5), D.18.322, Thuc.1.3, X.*Anab*.5.4.16. For the accusative object of a verb subsequently expressed in a genitive absolute, cf. Thuc.5.56. For the genitive absolute used in place of a dative (*pace* Heindorf: cf. ap.crit.), cf. Thuc.3.13. In general cf. Smyth §§2073a and 2073b. But all these explanations are unnecessarily fine: what is striking is way the opposing actions of the two factions within the soul – of the bad horse and of the charioteer in league with the good horse – are continually being expressed as taking place simultaneously. See next note.

675 καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἐθέλοντας προσιέναι ἀναγκάζων, μόγις συνεχώρησεν δεομένων εἰς αὖθις ὑπερβαλέσθαι (D1-2): Cf. προσποιουμένω ἀναμιμνῄσκων, D3-4. The word order nicely depicts the tugging back and forth. The subjects of the participles are adequately determined merely by the numbers of the participles. This time a little progress has been made, since the κακίζειν does have a πέρας (contrast B2).

676 συντεθέντος (D3) again represents the lusty horse's presumptuous attitude, over-reading their plea for postponement (εἰς αὖθις is merely dismissive) as if it were a promise and compact (as if "not now" = "then"), while προσποιουμένω represents the Speaker's better understanding of their motives. Indeed the questions are broached, Which part of the soul is telling this story? and Which part is listening to it?

677 The asyndetic rush of participles (D4) now vividly depicts the "κακόν" he inflicted on the charioteer and better horse, of which they could see no end (B2).

678 προσελθεῖν τοῖς παιδικοῖς (D5), the dative again (cf. B4 and n.). The Speaker knows what is going on better than the bad horse.

679 ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους (D5-6), not *by means of* an argument, but *for the purpose of* (ἐπί) what he had been thinking about! The goal is all he will "think" about. Compare the contrast between μνεία and μνήμη (cf. n. 660).

680 ἕλκει (D7): Climactic "historical" present. It is noteworthy that the gnomic aorists are aoristic enough to enable the present to "register" the same way it does in an historical narration of the past.

681 ἀπὸ ὕσπληγος ἀναπεσών (E1). Whatever sort of contraption is meant by ὕσπληξ, the simile is meant to emphasize that the charioteer's reaction is involuntary (this is the point of ἀναπεσών, repeated from B4). He is not the opponent of the lusty horse but the devotee of the κάλλος he recalls from its embodiment (cf. n.671). The greater vehemence of his backward recoil is another sign of progress, but the forces at work are perennial and go beyond the little world of the "personality."

682 κακηγόρον γλῶτταν (E3-4): κακ- continues the notion of κακόν (from B2). At some point the mouth becomes separated from the mind and needs to be dealt with on its own terms (here, with the bit). Similarly, in Book Eight of the *Republic*, the man-eating tyrant tastes the blood of his adversary with the same tongue he had used to ruin him in

bring both his forelegs and haunches to the ground, inflicting great pain upon him.[683] Once[684] the base horse undergoes this effect several times and his violent lust abates, he takes to relying on the prudence[685] of the charioteer, and now when he catches sight of the Beauty[686] he is unthewed with apprehension, instead.[687] From that day forward the lover's soul can follow[688] her beloved in reverence and awe. (255)

Since the Beauty is now being cared for as in every way the equal of a god by a lover not posing or acting[689] but himself truly in the grips of love, and is after all suited by his nature to be a friend[690] to the person caring for him, even if he *had*[691] in former times caved in to the prejudicial pressure of his schoolfellows or certain others[692] telling him

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the court of public opinion (565E6-7).

683 ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν (E5): The expression resembles the Homeric phrase ὀδύνῃσιν ἔδωκεν (*Il.*5.397, *Od.*17,567) but is more a Homeric "reminiscence" (Moreschini) than a "formula" (*pace* Robin), since the Attic dative doesn't scan. For the idiom cf. θανάτῳ δίδοται *Rep.*566C8, ἐνδείᾳ δούς *Rep.*571E1, πληγαῖς δοῦναι, *Rep.*574C3-4. The peculiar construction recalls and comments on the converse outcome in the case of the forgetful man who gave himself over to pleasure, above (ἡδονῇ παραδούς, 250E4).

684 ὅταν (E5): With ἄν we already know we have moved out of the register of the gnomic aorists and their intra-psychic titanomachy (B3-E5: note ὅταν just before, B2-3), for these needed participles to form their conditions. The outcome and the "moral" of the cognitive struggle can now be described with generic presents in present general conditions (ὅταν, *bis*; and ἕπεται, διόλλυται, συμβαίνει, E7-8). συμβαίνει τότ' ἤδη (E8) is like "ever since that day" at the end of a fable.

685 τῇ τοῦ ἡνιόχου προνοίᾳ (E7), a striking synecdoche for the charioteer that invests ἕπεται with the greater meaning it had pregnantly borne above in connection with the soul following its god (n.460 *ad* 248A2). Though the bad horse, *qua* horse, cannot *imitate* the charioteer (just as the good horse, *qua* horse, can only *happen* to share overlapping feelings with him: cf. *supra* nn.662, 672), he can "follow" him with the belief that the charioteer knows better and sooner what needs to be done, and in doing so he joins into the τάξις governed ultimately by the vision of Truth, even though unawares.

686 τὸν καλόν (E8), adjective for noun, again (cf.n.580). The Beauty (ὁ καλός) stimulates the lusty horse to remember the pain of the bit rather than to remember Beauty (κάλλος).

687 φόβῳ διόλλυται (E8): He has learned enough that he does not need to be brought down with the bit – he has been habituated into an apprehension of it (φόβος) – but he will never know the awe (δέος) of the charioteer nor even the shame and related shudder (αἰσχύνη τε καὶ θάμβος) of the other horse.

688 ἕπεσθαι (255A1) again, or analogously, or as a result: cf. n.685.

689 ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου (A2) had been reported from the Monacensis by Ast and was subsequently printed by all edd. except Vollgraff and Robin, in the face of the report that T (and perh. the corr. of B) read ὑποσχηματιζομένου and B read ὑποσχημένου. Moreschini however now reports ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου to be the reading of TW Vat.173 and the corrector of B, ὑποσχημένου to be the reading of B as well as Marc.185, and the compound to be the reading of Hermias only. Hermias in context gives less than dispositive support to either expression (his ὑπό in *paraphrase* at 199.28 is counterbalanced by his προσποιούμενοι καὶ ὑποσχηματιζομένου in *exegesis* at 200.8). It is hard not to take ὑπό as introducing the agent of the foregoing passive participle (only several syllables later do we learn it might be a prefix). In either case the reference is clear: the lover is not "striking a pose" as the lover of the first two speeches had. ὑπό as preposition adds syntactical bones to the contrast being drawn between lover and beloved, but Robin's ὑποσχηματιζομένου has the advantage of clinching a stronger (because more vivid) criticism of the speakers as actors ("*l'amant ne joue pas la comédie*"). The meaning was broached by ἀδόλως, 249A2.

690 φύσει φίλος (A3): In his very nature he is a "friend" to the lover because the lover has selected him for the inner potential he shares with him κατὰ τὸν θεόν (253B3-5: *n.b.* πεφυκέναι). Contrast the prejudice of Socrates's First Speech (n.284).

691 ἄρα (A4) suddenly recalls and confronts the conventional reaction, in the midst of this very unconventional account of the psychology of eros.

692 συμφοιτητῶν ἤ τινων ἄλλων (A4-5): There is aposiopesis in τινων ἄλλων, for it is the family's objections to the ἐραστής, in addition to those of his "classmates," that might have put him off. deVries, Thompson and Heindorf insist that διαβεβλημένος means deceived rather than slandered, but this interpretation loses the pressure he felt that he must acquiesce in the "deception," for which the hint is given by who was doing the "admonishing," namely his peers and "certain others," namely his family (whence "*circonvenu*," Robin – a little too strong): the prejudice is a topos in the

that it is shameful to come near[693] a lover, and had for this reason pushed the lover away from him – despite all that,[694] with the tincture of time his maturity and the deeper rightness[695] of things come to lead him[696] to admit the lover into his company.[697] For just as bad men are fated to fail at friendship so shall the good sooner or later become friends with the good.[698] Having admitted him and taken in the way he talks to him and treats him,[699] he now feels the lover's good will up close[700] and is shocked[701] to recognize[702] that whatever boons he receives from friends and family are all together as nothing measured against those of this friend that has a god in him.[703] Then, as he passes more time with him and he comes near him and touches him, during gymnastics and the other activities they do together,[704] the thing begins.[705] A spring of that effluent[706] that

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first two speeches (233C6-D4, 234B2-5, 239E3-240A2). Contrast τὶς infixed at 251A3 (and n.).

693 ἐρῶντι πλησιάζειν (A6): The verb describes, from the point of view of his συμφοιτηταί, the observable aspect of their association – their "being seen together" – which infamously results in the sort of gossip mentioned in Lysias's speech (231E3-232B5, 234B, 240A1), but also has a new poignancy now that we realize that his approaching the lover (note the fateful dative) is tantamount to the lover also coming into his presence (cf. προσελθεῖν πρὸς τοῖς παιδικοῖς [D5: cf. n.656], πρὸς αὐτῷ ἐγένοντο [B4]).

694 προϊόντος δὲ ἤδη (A7): "Apodotic" δέ (Denniston, 177-181) signals the long-awaited main clause.

695 ἥ τε ἡλικία τε καὶ τὸ χρέων (A7): This striking expression relies upon the compound ἅτε clause (A1-4) for its meaning. It dawns upon the beloved, despite the conventionalist buzz of his οἰκεῖοι, that because of his inner nature, which this lover has seen, he is destined (τὸ χρέων) to accept and receive his guidance as from an elder (whence ἡλικία).

696 ἤγαγεν (A7): Finally the main verb comes, after seven lines, and it is an aorist depicting a result inevitable because it has already taken place.

697 ὁμιλία (B1) is finally given a good sense and redeemed (contrast 250A3, E5, and 240A2).

698 εἵμαρται (B1): More is involved than some theory of like to like, such as the one Robin compares from *Lysis* 213C-215C. The remark dwells upon the allusion to τὸ χρέων and asks the audience to look within and realize that the false motives of the first two Speakers cannot support an enduring friendship, a boon they themselves had raised as the very *contrary* of love (232B5-E2; 239E2-240A2, 241A4-B5).

699 προσεμένου (B3): Sc. αὐτόν, in epanalepsis from B1 (where, with edd., I read προσέσθαι from Paris.1808 and corr. Coislinianus 155). καί (*primum*) leaves us to associate λόγον and ὁμιλίαν as an hendiadys that is the object of δεξαμένου. The τε καί of TW and Vat.173 (rather than bare καί of B and Marc.185, read by edd.) helps guide us to do this and so, with deVries, I read it. As the bad ὁμιλίαι of the fallen soul might weaken the her ability to remember the huperouranion, the good ὁμιλίαι of the philosophical lover will help the beloved to waken to the knowledge of what he remembers.

700 ἐγγύθεν (B3): Cf. *Rep.*550A7 for the sense.

701 ἐκπλήττει (B4): His reaction to the lover's approach (proximity leading to shock) is quite similar to the charioteer's upon approaching the Beauty (B3-C4) and to the remembering and philosophical soul's upon catching sight of the Beauty (250A6-B1, 251A3ff).

702 διαισθανόμενον (B5) applies the idea expressed at 250B1 – i.e, that the *failure* of erotic relationships is due to the lover's failure to see through the surface to the underlying significance of his attraction to Beauty – to the role played by the beloved's *success* at seeing through to the meaning of the lover's advances.

703 φίλοι τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι (B5-6): The beloved undergoes, at the beginning of his exposure to love, the realization the lover underwent as the final outcome of his exposure to beauty (252A2-3), which exposure is thereby recalled, which suggests we are about to hear a reversal of that event now taking place between the beloved and the lover. The tension between the erotic relation and the ties with family and friends was topical in the first two speeches (cf. n.1351).

704 ταῖς ἄλλαις ὁμιλίαις (B8), ταῖς possessive. The plural makes the ὁμιλία of B3 concrete; the point is that they are now doing things together.

705 τότ' ἤδη (C1): Cf. τότε, 250B5.

706 τοῦ ῥεύματος ἐκείνου (C1), referring back, now explicitly, to the lover's exposure to beauty (251A3-252B1, esp.251C5-7), where the etymology of ἵμερος was given. The reference to Zeus recalls *Iliad* 20.213ff. Ganymede is mentioned perhaps to mitigate the conventionalist opprobrium against homosexual love (cf. *Leg.*636CD), but also perhaps as the bearer of a beauty beyond his station, being a mortal that attracted Zeus just as in the present context a young boy attracts the "worship" of a grown man.

Zeus named "yearning" when he felt love for Ganymede floods forth and is borne toward the lover. Some of it sinks into him[707] but once he is filled it overflows out of him. Just as a breeze, or an echo too,[708] bounces off slick and solid surfaces and is borne back to the place from which it came, so does this effluence of beauty bounce back toward the Beauty and flow through his eyes to that place in his soul where nature means for it to go[709] and once it gets there it refurbishes[710] her wings. It irrigates the passageways of the quills and starts the wings growing so as now to fill up the soul of the beloved, in his turn, with love.[711] Love he feels[712] though for whom or what he knows not,[713] and neither[714] does he recognize what he is really undergoing nor has he the words to

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707 εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδυ (C3): The result and effect of τὸ κάλλος flowing into the lover was already described in great detail (251A3-252B1), and the language of that passage guides the interpretation of the present passage (C1-E1).

708 πνεῦμα ἤ τις ἠχώ (C4): The pair correspond to touch and hearing, ushering in the reflexion of beauty which is *visible* (completing therefore the usual triad for αἴσθησις: cf.240D2 and n. *ad loc.*). Infixed τὶς here is to be distinguished from that at 251A3, 248D5, and 230D7: it is meant to peak the attention and invite it to linger (cf. 248E1, 261C2; *Leg.*633B8, B9 and D2, 889C5-6; *Phlb.*21C6-8, 56C1; *Polit.*311A8-9; *Rep.*443E3-4; *Symp.*221E4-5) rather than, as in those passages, to express indifference as to which. Distinguish also τὶς added to an item late in a list to prepare for closure (*Leg.*715C1-2, 898B5-8, 902D7-9, 916E6-7, 933D7-E1; *Phdo.*65C5-7, 85E5-86A1; *Phlb.*42C10-D1, 56C1; *Polit.*305B8-C1) and τὶς added early to break the ice or shoehorn in an argument (*Alc.*I 109B1; *Leg.*712C3-4, 734E6-7, 808D2-4, 933A2-3; *Lys.*216C6-7; *Phlb.*51C3-5; *Rep.*351E10, 444D13-E2, 459E5-6).

709 ᾗ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰέναι (C7): Cf. ᾗ ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται, 251B2-3.

710 ἀναπτερῶσαν (C7): The active is explained by the passive at 249D6 so that the emendation against all mss. (and Euseb.*Pr.Eu.*13.20.1ff) by Heindorf (ἀναπληρῶσαν), though orthographically easy and accepted by Robin and Moreschini, is unneeded. The soul is its object, unexpressed, not the δίοδοι, which do not become winged or feathered, but moist and pliant (as object of ἄρδει): cf.251B3-4 and D4-5.

711 τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερῶν ἄρδει τε καὶ ὥρμησε πτεροφυεῖν τε καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρομένου αὖ ψυχὴν ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν (D1-3), accepting the comma placed before τὰς διόδους by all modern editors except Fowler in the Loeb. After the simile (C4-5) and the pendant nominative phrase in three participles (C5-D1: ἰόν, ἀφικόμενον, ἀναπτερῶσαν) describing the approach of the ῥεῦμα, comes this list which depicts its effects in sequence by making it the subject of three verbs (one present indicative and two aorists). In the first case (ἄρδει) the verbal complement precedes, in the second (ὥρμησε) it follows, and in the third (ἐνέπλησεν) it again precedes; the connective between the three clauses in both cases is τε καί.

The list-form A τε καί B καί C is very common – probably even more common than A καί B καί C – but I do not know of a list in Plato of the form A τε καί B τε καί C (Robin alone omits τε after πτεροφυεῖν with Euseb. against all mss., restored by Moreschini [Budé] and later re-excised by Heitsch). It is true that τε may be infixed in a variety of places within a list for a variety of reasons, as for instance to announce that the two subsequent items are a pair or sub-pair (*Crat.*407E6; *Leg.*733E1-2, 894B10-11, 950E5-6; *Meno* 75C8-9; *Rep.*431B9-C1, 568E2-3; *Symp.*206D3-5, 213D3-4; *Tht.*149D1-3, 156B2-6) or of a new category (*Leg.*899B3-4; *Rep.*343C1-2; *Tht.*146C8-D1), or to announce that the generalization is coming (*Leg.*735B1-2, 848D5; *Polit.*288B2-4), or after generalizing ἄλλος to formulate the criterion of the list with an hendiadys or even a sub-list (*Leg.*699C2-3, *Prot.*316D2-3; *Rep.*519B1-2; *Symp.*188A5-6), but none of these special reasons is operant in the present case. We may observe, however, that the items A B and C each consist of a verb and its complement, with the order of the two alternating, so that the structure would be more exactly described (majuscules designating the controlling verb and miniscules their complements): aA τε καί Bb τε καί cC. This refinement in the description of the structure enables us to see that the τε και 's are "epanaleptic," the doubling of the link analogous to the epanaleptic repetitions of a κλῖμαξ ("Tinkers to Evers and Evers to Chance" instead of "Tinkers to Evers to Chance"). We may compare the τε at *Rep.*357C6, at *Leg.*828B4, and in the alliterative κλῖμαξ at *Tht.*176C3-4. The thought-form is ultimately analogous to the very common alternation of opposites in lists regardless of the connectives used (e.g., τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, *Crito* 47C9-10: cf. *Gorg.*459D1-2, 474D1-2; *Leg.*714E4-5; *Phdrs.*277D10-E1; *Rep.*419C9-D1, 430A6-B2).

712 ἐρᾷ μὲν οὖν (D3): By the single word ἐρᾷ is imported the mighty description of 251B1-D6, short of the lover's being reminded of the beauty beyond (D6-7).

713 ὅτου δὲ ἀπορεῖ (D3): The beloved has been caught! The term invites a comparison with the lover's aporia (251D7-E3): The lover is completely aware of the problem.

714 Reading οὔθ' ὅτι with the mss. (D3) against the emendation of Buttmann (οὐδ' ὅτι, accepted by Schanz and Vollgraff,

describe it. As if he had caught an eye disease by looking into the eyes of another, he can't explain what is happening to him.[715] In truth when he looks at his lover it is actually himself that he sees, unbeknownst, as if he were looking in a mirror.[716] All he knows is,[717] whenever that man[718] is present his own pain abates the same way the lover's does[719] and when he is away from him he yearns just as he is yearned for by the love-sick lover,[720] afflicted as he is by a reflection of love, an "echo-love."[721] He calls this feeling friendship rather than love[722] and[723] that's what he thinks it is. He desires the same things as the lover, to see and touch and kiss and lie together,[724] but less fervently; and as you might expect it is only a matter of time before he ends up doing these things.

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and now by Moreschini and deVries), *praeter librorum fidem et nulla urgente necessitate* (as Stallb. said of a similar emendation suggested by Bekker at *Apol.*19D8). οὔτε unambiguously announces a second item is to come whereas οὐδέ would suggest contrast or emphasis prematurely. On switching from τε to δέ, by which "contrast is added to the original idea of addition" (Denniston, 513), cf. *Crito* 52E6-53A1; *Leg.*627E5-28A3, 949C6-7; *Meno* 93C6-7; *Polit.*270D1-3; *Rep.*367C6-7, 394C4-5; *Symp.*186E4-5; *Tht.*182E3-4;*Tim.*20A1-6ff (Τίμαιός τε ... Κριτίαν δέ). Switching to δέ for closure, so as to cap a series of τε 's (e.g., *Rep.*370D10—E3, 382E9-11, 395C4-5, 608B5-7) or to a subdivide a final item into its opposite aspects (*Polit.*271E1-2, 305B8-C1) are quite different matters. For more parallels cf. deVries.

715 ὀφθαλμίας (D5): Some Greeks thought that diseases of the eye were communicated by looking into the sick man's eyes (the mechanism of vision involving streams of the sight-image flying from object seen to the eye of the seer): Porph. *de abs.*1.28; Plut.*Mor.*53C, 681D. The beloved is looking into the very eyes into which he has sent a beam of his own beauty and when it is reflected back the stream of beauty stirs an uneasy feeling inside him: he blames the feeling on the fact of his looking.

716 ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ (D5-6): That is, his beauty has bounced back like an echo, as a counter-effluence from the (shiny and smooth) eyes of the lover, so that looking into the lover's eyes he thinks he is seeing the lover but in fact his eyes are receiving an reflected effluence of his own beauty and passing it into his soul. Though the effect of his looking at the lover makes him think he loves the lover, it is really his own beauty that is stirring him and in this sense the lover's eyes are functioning as a mirror and he is "seeing himself." We know the experience from the expression "the apple of my eye."

717 καί (D6), as at D3 and at E4 below, indicating the next thing to say without indicating why it needs to be said, imitates the hobbled understanding of the beloved. Cf. n.723.

718 ἐκεῖνος (D7) depicts the combination of empirical certainty and lack of understanding in the beloved's mind.

719 ὅταν μέν ..., ὅταν δέ ... (D6-8): His experience mirrors that of the lover (251C8-D7).

720 κατὰ ταὐτὰ ποθεῖ τε καὶ ποθεῖται (D8): The coupling of active and passive varies what was just said by κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ (D7), but also states what is truly happening unbeknownst to the beloved. He desires and is being desired at the same time not only because he desires the lover at the same time that the lover desires him, but also in the sense that his desire is a desire for the "himself" that he sees in his lover's eyes.

721 εἴδωλον ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων (E1): The verb ἀντεράω does exist, meaning in the active "loving someone who loves you" (A.*Ag.*544) or in the passive "being loved back" (X.*Symp.*8.3 ἐρῶν τῆς γυναικὸς ἀντερᾶται; Bion frg.8.1: ὄλβιοι οἱ φιλέοντες ἐπὴν ἴσον ἀντεράωνται), and also in the active "loving in rivalry with another lover" (E.*Rh.*184, ἐρῶντί γ' ἀντερᾷς ἵππων ἐμοί, of Dolon's desire, in rivalry with Hector's, for Achilles's horses). But lexicography is powerless here. This new noun is a coinage minted to designate a phase or moment in a psycho-physical conception of the love-process of action and re-action that is entirely novel. As to the word and its whole phrase there are two possible interpretations:

(1) The participial phrase goes with both the μέν and the δέ clauses (D7-8) and coins a substitute for the phrase ἔρωτα ἔχειν, to be love-sick, modified to express the fact that the beloved's eros, aroused by the sight of the lover's eyes, is a *derivative* version (εἴδωλον) or bounce-back (ἀντι-) of the eros his own beauty aroused in the lover. Beauty begets eros and eros begets "anti-eros." The "beloved" is not a lover but a lover-in-return (a requiting lover if you must, though it is the original lover that experiences requital: cf. the *passive* uses of ἀντεράω noted above): the notion was prepared for by the active-passive formulation (D8).

(2) Alternatively the participle goes only with the δέ clause and describes the aftermath of the beloved-lover's aloneness that corresponds to the aftermath of lover's aloneness as described at 251D6-7: μνήμην δ'αὖ ἔχουσα τοῦ καλοῦ γέγηθεν. In this case, when the lover is absent the beloved is left with (ἔχει: cf. ἔχουσα) an afterimage of what caused him to feel eros (εἴδωλον ἔρωτος), an empty outline or anti-image of the sight he loved. He is less conscious of what is happening to him, and rather than remembering the lover (as the lover remembered the beloved) he only feels

Now[725] when they lie together the lover's incorrigible horse[726] does have something to say,[727] claiming that in exchange for the many pains[728] he has had to endure he deserves a little enjoyment,[729] (256) but the beloved's lusty horse has no time for words. Fit to burst[730] and at his wit's end[731] he leaps forward to embrace the lover[732] and kisses him, and hugs him for the person of such tremendous good will[733] that he is, and when they lie down he feels it would[734] go against his very nature to deny his favors to the lover as far as it is up to him,[735] if only the lover should ask for it;[736] and still, that horse's yokemate and the charioteer respond to the situation[737] by opposing him with their

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his absence and "misses" him. I feel that the chiastic rhythm of the phrase favors this second interpretation.

722 αὐτόν (E1): Sc. ἀντέρωτα. This strange feeling (ἄντερως) that has been aroused in him the beloved tries to describe. Based on his sense of what is happening he chooses to call it friendship, which denotes something not strange but something common. That is, the sentiment that has been explained by a complicated psycho-physiological process is something we have indeed felt and give a common name to despite our ignorance of the underlying process. For true ἔρως turning out to be closely akin to φιλία, cf. 253C2-6 and contrast 239E4 (with n.301 *ad loc.*). Like the lover at 250B1, the beloved does not "see through" the surface to what is happening "underneath."

723 καὶ οἴεται (E1): He calls it friendship, though it isn't, because he thinks it is. To remark that the καί is "explanatory" (deVries) is circular (as is his notion of "generalizing" καί: cf. n.422). The point to make is that here as throughout this passage the Speaker prefers to present the facts about the confused state of mind in a "phenomenological" way rather than explain them (as οἰόμενος would). Compare, e.g., καί at 255B3 (*primum*), C4, D3, D6, E4. Compare similar use of καί at 252D1, 253A5, 254B3-4 (and deVries's better comment there, that the καί 's "bring out the strong emotion," comparing *Symp.*220C2-5, *Euthyd.*273AA3-6 [facts rushing on]), and 256C5 below. The feeling or the "disease" he is afflicted with goes deeper than what he can articulate or understand. I would add Glaucon's outburst at *Rep.*473E6-4A4, where καί is not involved nor has to be, but where description again runs ahead of syntax. The maximal expression of this tension between experience and understanding, however, is asyndeton, which comes next.

724 ὁρᾶν, ἅπτεσθαι, φιλεῖν, συγκατακεῖσθαι (E3): In substance and form the list recalls and thereby redeems the climactic lists in hyperbaton of the Second Speech in which the perception of the beloved (240D6-E2) was set into the strongest contrast with that of the lover (240D-3: ὁρῶντι, ἀκουόντι, ἁπτομένῳ καὶ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν αἰσθανομένῳ τοῦ ἐρωμένου), but this time the list is not euphemistically generalized (πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν αἰσθανομένῳ) but spelled out, beyond the diapason representing the senses (ὁρᾶν and ἅπτεσθαι are usually the first and last: cf. *Phdo.*75A6-7, 79A1-2; *Tht.*156B2-6,186D10-11; cf. 247C6-7 and n.441) to the consummation, which is the true subject that the other list avoided – though at the same time with the understated synecdoche of φιλεῖν ("kiss"), the supra-erotic intention and meaning of the sensation (οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν, E1-2) is preserved. The direct object of these verbs is omitted because the psychic power of the experience depends not on the personal object but on the power of the value they share passing back and forth between and within them. For omission of direct object with long series of verbs to portray a very different psychological affect cf. *Rep.*565E3-566A1 and my n. *ad loc.*

725 οὖν (E4): Again the transition simply follows the line of interest.

726 ἵππος (E5): Effortlessly the Speaker segues from the mechanics of psycho-physiology (C1-E1) to the chariot model he had refined (253C7-255A1) for the very purpose of explaining how the beloved "gets caught" (τοιῷδε τρόπῳ, 253C6).

727 ἔχει ὅτι λέγει (E5-6): i.e., ἔχει τι λέγειν ὅτι λέγει (with Stallb.), reading λέγει with all mss. (except Vat.228 which [*apud* Moreschini] reads λέγοι) and Eusebius, rather than Bekker's λέγῃ, accepted by edd. For the idiom cf. *Lys.*222B4 (reading either BW or T). The verb is a bit of a surprise, but the λόγος is something less than a rational argument, as ἀξιοῖ (E6) soon reveals. The use of καί rather than γάρ with ἀξιοῖ shows that the point is not so much to assert he has an argument worthy of our consideration as to throw the claim in so as to set up the contrast with the beloved's lusty horse who is speechless (in contrast with his honorable horse and charioteer: cf. μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου, 256A6 and n.738).

728 πολλῶν πόνων (E6): These are identical to the μέγιστοι πόνοι of 252B1.

729 καὶ ἀξιοῖ ἀντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ ἀπολαῦσαι (255E6-256A1): The "claim" reproduces the cajoling rhetoric the bad horse used before. He has taken his cue from Lysias's bad lover: καὶ ὃν εἶχον πόνον προστιθέντες ἡγοῦνται πάλαι τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδεδωκέναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις (231A8-B2: cf. τοὺς παρεληλυθότας πόνους ὑπολογίζεσθαι, B3-4). We thought we had left such cajolery behind.

730 σπαργῶν (A2) = *ubera lacte distendi* (*Rep.*460C9, *Symp.*206D8; E.*Bacch.*701), whence *semine surgere* (Ruhnken *ad* Tim.Soph.*Lex.Plat.* s.v. citing also *Leg.*692A4). The precedent for the term is ζεῖ ... καὶ ἀνακηκίει, 251C1.

reverence and their reason.[738]

Now if at this moment[739] the nobler aspects of mind that lead toward moderation and philosophy[740] win out, then the life they have in store for them in this world is blessedly happy[741] and harmonious,[742] masters of themselves as they are and moderate,[743] having enslaved[744] that part of soul where evil can grow and having liberated the part where virtue thrives. But also once they have finished this life,[745] because they have become winged and light[746] they will have achieved a victory in one of the three falls of the contest that truly deserves to be called Olympian,[747] than which neither human

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731 ἀπορῶν (A2) has bothered edd. but is the unanimous reading of the mss. (Robin cites Hermias as a witness for reading ἐπιθυμῶν instead, without sufficient warrant since καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν at 203.11 [Couvreur] may only be an epexegesis of the metaphorical term, σπαργῶν). ἀπορῶν here compares the bafflement and paralysis of the beloved (ἔχει μὲν οὐδέν εἰπεῖν) with that we had seen in the lover (cf. ἀπορῶν, 251D7-8). The beloved finds himself bursting with desire but waiting to be asked (whence the sequel, linked hereto by τε: cf., with Hermias, the passage at *Symp*.218C3 where Alcibiades gingerly says, Σώκρατες, καθεύδεις;), whereas the lover found himself disoriented by his desire (ἀδημονεῖ) but unable to ignore it. deVries predictably invents "adversative" καί (citing Denniston 292), but what we have in this text, still and again (cf.n.723), is the preference to represent the confusion experientially rather than explain it. The one thing that can be said about καί in every instance is that it is *proleptic*: it directs the mind to move to something it claims to be immediately next, and the mind complies by orienting itself to the absorption of whatever this will be, on whatever terms necessary. It is the character of the term the mind is being directed to add that gives καί the "meaning" it has in specific cases, but καί is merely the catalyst and not the carrier of this meaning.

732 περιβάλλει (A2) corresponds to the ἐπιπηδᾶν that the nobler horse sought to avoid at 254A2. We cannot have the horse "throwing his arms" around the beloved, but that is the picture the Greek creates. This is the phase of ἅπτεσθαι, to be followed by φιλεῖν and αυγκατακεῖσθαι, in accordance with the list above.

733 ὡς σφόδρ' εὔνουν (A3), with ὡς designating that it *his* thought. The horse is remembering the soul's initial experience of the lover's εὐνοία as worth more than that of all his friends and family put together (255B3-7).

734 Reading ἄν (A4) from T (*om*. B Marc.185 Eusebius). With οἷος potentiality is already there, but ἄν creates a berth for the protasis that comes at the end.

735 τὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος (A4) expresses his anxiety at having to wait to be given a chance to reply ("I thought you would never ask!"): cf. n.731.

736 εἰ δεηθείη τυχεῖν (A5) for "asking to score," to achieve or win the boy's favors, now recalled from Lysias's speech (231A1, ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι: cf.n.152) and redeemed for a higher vision.

737 πρὸς ταῦτα (A6), parallel to τοῦτο in τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο (255E4).

738 μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου (A6), reading λόγου from the Par.1808 and corr. of Coisl. (all other mss. have λόγους). αἰδώς is brought forward from the see-saw battle described above (254A1-255A1, esp. A2 [αἰδοῖ], B1 [δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα], B7-8 [ἔδεισέ τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα ἔπεσεν]). But λόγου is almost new to the context and conspires with the rather unexpected expression above, ἔχει ὅτι λέγει (255E5-6: cf. ἔχει ... οὐδέν ... οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, A1), which it now shows to have been a proleptic skew (cf.n.524), while at the same time it begins to recall the formulation of the contending ἰδέαι (namely, ἐπιθυμία and δόξα) presented in Socrates's First Speech (237D6-9), esp. 237E3, 238A1, 238A7, B7-8 (and cf. n.1368, which is just about to be brought up (A7-8).

739 νικήσῃ (A9), punctual aorist, but the apodosis will end up being general instead of future vivid, since this initial victory of the better part will lead them toward adopting a δίαιτα βίου which (whence the present διάγουσιν, B1).

740 νικήσῃ, φιλοσοφίαν, τῆς διανοίας and ἀγαγόντα (A7-8) all strain the context again, to bring forward the ideas and formulation of Socrates's First Speech (νικήσῃ: 238C3, which itself capped several uses of κρατεῖν above it; φιλοσοφίαν, which obtruded itself at 239B4; διανοίας, which characterized the psychic goods at 239A5 [cf. C1]). These terms do not bespeak an unconscious "Platonic prejudice" bleeding into the text from its hidden author, but Socrates's conscious and artful back-reference to, and correction of, "his" previous speech. The philosophical orientation in question was described *within* this speech, at 249A1-5, C4-8.

741 μέν (A8): At the moment this μέν appears to resume and re-enforce the μέν above (A7): cf. n.745. μακάριον ... βίον is an intensification of εὐδαίμων. Note and compare the overblown superlative below (C4).

742 ὁμονοητικόν (B1) brings forward ὁμονοεῖτον from the Socrates's First Speech (237D9), now giving some substance and basis for the agreement to be reached.

743 ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτῶν καὶ κόσμιοι (B1-2) redoes and brings forward σωφροσύνη from 237E3. For κόσμιος being

temperance nor any madness inspired by a god can procure[748] a better boon for a man. If on the other hand they take up[749] a regime more vulgar that loves not wisdom but being honored instead,[750] they run the risk that the unruly horses in their two yoked pairs might on occasion of too much drinking or some other such moment of inattention catch their souls off guard and draw the two of them into concourse[751] with each other: They chose that fateful act that is counted by so many to be the most blessed[752] and they carried it out with abandon.[753] Once they have done the deed, it becomes their usage to repeat it[754] but only occasionally since it was not by a settled

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synonymous with σώφρων cf. my comment on *Rep*.329D4.

744 δουλωσάμενοι (B2): Compare and contrast the enslavement of the lover (238E3), which made all his behavior necessary and therefore predictable so that it served as the guiding principle in the deliberation in Socrates's First Speech.

745 τελευτήσαντες δέ (B3): The word before it indicates that this δέ answers the μέν of A8 and not that of A7. We discover that the μέν clause begun at A7 is being subdivided, and we are moving into the rhetorical manner of Socrates's First Speech (cf. 239A4-B6 and Analysis *ad loc.*), just as we have already resumed aspects of its thought and diction.

746 ἐλαφροί (B4), like κουφίζεται (248C2), is the metaphorical contrary of ἐμβριθές (cf.252C3, 247B3-5, the term first introduced at 246D6).

747 τῶν τρίων παλαισμάτων ... ἕν (B4-5): Cf. *Rep*.Bk. 8, 583B2 for the reference. Winning three in a row constitutes complete victory in wrestling at Olympus (*schol. ad* Aesch.*Eum*.589): cf. *Euthyd*.277D1. The reference has special relevance since the charioteer is "wrestling" with his horses, but ὡς ἀληθῶς asks us to find a novel meaning, and probably refers to the "Olympian" trains of the gods the victor will finally rejoin, something deservant of immortal fame. We should compare the Speaker's special provision for the philosophical soul (249A1-5, cf. also τὴν τῇδε πρώτην γένεσιν, 252D3, to which he is now referring): his choice of the philosophical life a *third* time becomes his final choice (τελευτήσαντες, B3) since it gains him an early return to the hyperouranion. The contest between the speeches by the non-lover and by the lover (φερέσθω τὰ νικητηρία, 245B5) has come to be subsumed into a contest between the lives of the lover and the beloved in the truest sense, as a pair, against those of the lover and the beloved in the lesser senses of love.

748 πορίσαι (B7), the verb for securing for man the saving boon used even of the bird-augurs hoping to secure them by merely human measures (ποριζομένων, 244C7): it is the *divine* mania of eros that gets the palm, in a reversal depicted by the chiasm (σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη / θεία μανία). That divine madness cannot do better reminds us that of the four divine manias Eros is the best (249E1-3, originally asserted as a *demonstrandum* at 245B7: εὐτυχία ἡ μεγίστη). This greatest boon it can confer is of course the winged return, after victory in the third round, to the divine procession in the sky, with its ascent on festival days into the hyperouranion to feast upon the noetic viands there on display. Compare the order of the soul, "than which there neither is nor will be any more valuable thing among gods and men" (241C5-6).

749 χρήσωνται (C1), again punctual aorist, is more than mere *variatio* of νικήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας from the μέν clause: the "good fight" has been abandoned for a mere *Lebensmittel*. For the euphemistic pleonasm in χρᾶσθαι compare 248B5 (and n. *ad loc.*), where the same verb is used to describe an analogous "step down" early in the soul's earthly life.

750 φιλοτίμῳ δέ (C1): ἀφιλοσόφῳ contrasts with φιλοσοφίαν above (A7), and therefore again recalls the description of philosophic souls at 249C4-9. It is in the sequel to that passage that we encountered the attitude of οἱ πολλοί toward the philosopher, whom they upbraid for being mad since he "stands apart from" the activities they think important (249C8-D3 [n.b., ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων, and contrast ἀμελείᾳ with ἀμελῶν at 249D5-E4]). The φιλοτιμία here mentioned is a preference to achieve public eminence in these σπουδάσματα *rather than* pursue the life of "philosophy" and therefore, looking back over this whole myth, recalls the fateful distinction between the souls striving to glimpse the objects in the huperouranion (248A1-6) and those that find themselves competing with each other instead (248A6-B1), the distinction between the δεινοτής that would not believe this myth over against the σοφία that will (245C1-2), the manic mantic over the self-important bird-augur (244B6-D5), Πυθοκλής over Εὔφημος (244A1-2 cf. n. *ad loc.*), the εὐηθεία ἀστεία that seeks εὐδοκιμία among ἀνθρωπίσκοι (242E5-243A2), the man who θεοῖς ἀμπβλάκων τιμὰν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείψει (242C9-D1), and by implication the celebrated and clever mythologists over the man who like Socrates prefers to study myths for his personal betterment (229C6-230A6: compare his

resolution[755] embraced by the entirety of their rationality that they took up the practice.[756]

Now these, too, share a life of friendship with each other,[757] here, though a lesser one so than those do, both during their love affair and after they have gone their separate ways. They have an abiding sense that they have given and received the greatest confidences that men can share, and that[758] it would go against the most basic of laws ever to betray each other's trust and fall into enmity.[759] The final outcome[760] in store for them is that although they have no wings they have begun at least to sprout them at the time they leave their bodies at death, so the reward they take away from their share of erotic mania[761] is not insignificant, since it is unlawful that those who have once embarked on the heavenward journey[762] must ever again enter the darkness of the sojourn under

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attitude toward mantic [242C3-5]). The dynamics of this slip from the best love of the aristocrat to the philotimic man's "better love than others" is gently and accurately depicted in *Rep*. Bk.8, 547B-550B (esp. 549C2-550B7), where the medium of the investigation is the relation of father and son rather than lover and beloved, but it is the notion of φιλοτιμία developed by the present Speaker in this speech that is operant here. He repeats the theme below (ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην, E6).

751 The duals (C2-3) now describe the pair of lusty horses, and then (εἱλέσθην τε καὶ διεπραξάσθην) the pair of persons whose souls they have come to speak for and dominate.

752 τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρίστην αἵρεσιν (C3-4): Conversely, the love called Platonic is not ascetic and repressed as some imagine, but enlightened and free. It is an index of the height reached in the speech that sexual pleasure can be demoted at all, just as the beauty available to sight could be demoted above (250D3-E1: cf. nn.552, 554).

753 εἱλέσθην τε καὶ διαπράξασθην (C4-5). With Burnet and Robin I read the two dual aorists of Eusebius against variants in B and T. The aorists are gnomic, depicting fateful and permanent effects (τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη). The erotic sense of διαπράττεσθαι (cf. 234A3 and 253C3 with n.636) creeps back in and weights the description of the experience toward its forgetful somatic tendency and orientation.

754 χρῶνται (C5), again (cf. C1).

755 πάσῃ δεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ (C6): It is only by the participation of the διάνοια that the course of action they are carrying out (πράττοντες) *could* be called δεδογμένα, as πάσῃ placed before it in prolepsis helps to emphasize. The phrase brings forward διάνοια from above (A8) as well as bringing forth the language of δόξα and διάνοια as they were used in Socrates's First Speech (237D8: cf. n.270). The dative is agental with the perfect passive.

756 πράττοντες (C6): Cf. διαπραξαμένω. The dual that represented the pair of lovers now yields to a more general plural that embraces all lovers of their kind. διά is dropped, as usual, in repetition.

757 καὶ τούτω (C7): Cf. 255E1-2. The position of ἀλλήλοιν is awkward. Is it in hyperbaton with φίλω or in prolepsis with γενομένω? φίλω is the essential predication and the syntactically ordinate διάγουσιν is otiose, as often elsewhere (*Rep*.548A2 with my n. *ad loc*.) and as in the parallel μέν clause above (B1). Indeed the parallelism with that clause is continued with the explanatory participial phrase (ἡγουμένω: cf. ὄντες, B1-2) extenuated by a relative clause (ἅς, D3: cf. δουλωσάμενοι ... ᾧ, B2-3).

758 εἶναι (D3) is governed by ἡγουμένω.

759 The themes of this paragraph (B7-E2) are the very stuff of sentimental and bittersweet love songs. "It was just one of those things," "Fly me to the moon," "We'll meet again," "They can't take that away from me," "Where or when," etc.

760 ἐν δὲ τῇ τελευτῇ (D3-4): The narrative compares them to the others that chose otherwise, with two sets of μέν / δέ clauses dealing first with of the rest of their lives (διάγουσι, D1: cf. B1) and then with their afterlives (ἐν δὲ τῇ τελευτῇ, *hic*: cf. τελευτήσαντες, B3).

761 οὐ σμικρὸν ἆθλον (D5): Even these receive an endowment from the divine, though a lesser one in comparison (B5-7) – a further proof that eros is the greatest of the manias sent to men from the gods. The present Speaker's outlook (*pace* Wilamowitz, *Platon* I.468-9) has nothing to do with that of the Athenian in Plato's *Laws* (e.g., 837C, 841DE).

762 κατηργμένοις ἤδη ὑπουρανίου πορείας (D7): The sheer presence of Eros in their lives has oriented them (ὡρμηκότες) toward becoming winged again. Despite the absence of philosophy in their daily regime (διάγειν) they qualify for inclusion among those who have embarked already (κατηργμένοις ἤδη) on a "heavenish" path (ὑπουράνιος, with ὑπό denoting "small degree" [LSJ *s.v*., E.II]) and as such they are exempt from the subterranean punishment in the afterlife, but will enjoy "bright" (φάνον) sojourns between their lives embodied, and in each other's company. φάνον alludes to the better afterlife "in some place in the sky" described above (249A5-B1, esp. εἰς οὐρανοῦ τινα τοπόν), which itself was an adumbration of the soul's final return to the heavens (cf. n.492). In that passage the destiny of

the earth. Instead, they are allotted a happy[763] sojourn[764] together in bright climes, with the destiny to regain their wings together when at last the time for that arrives.[765]

As many things and as divine as this,[766] my Boy, will the friendship that comes from the erotic lover confer[767] upon you. But what familiarity[768] you can achieve with[769] the non-lover, with its tincture[770] of mortal sanity and its management of things with a pettiness mortal and ingrown,[771] engendering in the soul of his favorite[772] an illiberality that the mass of men praise as virtue – all this will consign[773] that soul to nine more journeys of a thousand years,[774] (257) and mindless wandering[775] in the byways and the

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philosophical persons was compared with that of non-philosophical *persons* both virtuous and vicious; here the destiny of philosophic lovers is being compared with that of non-philosophical *lovers* (as the counterpart to the non-philosophical virtuous), creating a berth for *non-philosophical non-lovers* as the counterpart to the non-philosophical vicious, a berth that will be filled just below (E4-257A2). The heavenishness (ὑπουράνιος) of the lovers' earthly life bleeds into the heavenishness (φάνον) of their afterlife and together these constitute a pilgrimage of nine more thousand years toward the Great Return to the οὐρανός and even the ὑπερουράνιον, to which the fate of the non-philosophical non-lover will presently be contrasted.

763 εὐδαιμονεῖν (D8): A human sort of happiness in the afterlife for the non-philosophical lovers, in contrast with the divine sort of blessedness enjoyed even in this life by the philosophical lovers (μακάριον, A8). On the gradation of these terms cf. n.425, *supra* and *Rep*.335E9 with my n. *ad loc*.

764 διάγοντας (D8): Though in the immediate context this verb has been used for the durative aspect of life embodied (B1, D1), it had been used of the sojourn in the afterlife in the first description further above (249A8). Indeed it is the brunt of this passage to suggest that the quality of the afterlife corresponds to that of the embodied life lived before it (cf. nn. 762, 775, 776).

765 ὁμοπτέρους (E1): This reference to the ultimate Return closes the question raised by τελευτῇ at the beginning of the sentence and immediately problematized there, by ἄπτεροι (D4).

766 τοσαῦτα ... καὶ θεῖα (E3): The pairing or doubling of quantity and quality, idiomatic in Greek (e.g., n.213) but not in English, may be allowed to show through in the paraphrase nevertheless, as here, for the elevation it confers. The quality he selects – the "divinity" of the gifts – is integral to the hypothesis he set out to prove (244A7-8, cf. 245B7-C1). For "this is that" in closure cf. 252C2, 241D2 and n.599.

767 δωρήσεται ἡ παρ' ἐραστοῦ φιλία (E3-4): The diction (δωρήσεται from διδομένη, and παρ' ἐραστοῦ for παρὰ θεῶν) stresses the continuous analogy: the god Eros affects the lover as the lover affects the beloved. Cf.n.630.

768 οἰκειότης (E4), in contrast to φιλία, makes another strong point in an understatement by means of closely adjacent terms (they were *associated* at 255B5-6). True φιλία has been revealed to be more than it is usually thought to be, based on a kinship of divine potentialities within the lover and the beloved (φύσει φιλος, 255A3: cf. also n.724 on φιλεῖν). The unerotic association lacks this transcendent mediation and so it takes on the aspect of a closed system like a household (οἰκονομοῦσα, E5), and operates perforce more on the model of a zero-sum game. Indeed, οἰκειότης is the familiarity that breeds contempt. Compare the sentiment in the First Speech at 231A5, and the opposite presumption of the Second at 239E3-5.

769 ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος (E4) contrasts with παρ' ἐραστοῦ as exchange of goods for goods (ἀπόδωσις) contrasts with an inspiration received and passed on.

770 κεκραμένη (E5): The term *can* be derogatory (though cf. *Rep*.441E8-9 and my n. *ad* 548A5), but the two ingredients being blended (claustrophobic οἰκειότης and human σωφροσύνη) are already second-rate and hardly "sully" each other, so in the present passage it needs not be derogatory (*pace* Ast, Stallb.). What is being criticized is rather the fragility of the mixture, and perhaps even the clever mendacity by which it is maintained (whence "flavored," Hackforth). In this particular case, as in the case of poetic inspiration (245A7-8), σωφροσύνη is inferior to its standard opposite, μανία.

771 οἰκονομοῦσα (E5), by the *figura etymologica*, continues the suggestion of a claustrophobic zero-sum game introduced by οἰκειότης, while φειδωλά reveals that "mortal" temperance necessarily gravitates toward stinginess, the way the thrifty oligarch in *Rep*.Bk 8 (φειδωλός, 554E7) keeps himself clear of honorific activities to the point that he ἠττᾶται καὶ πλουτεῖ (555A5-6).

772 τῇ φίλῃ ψυχῇ (257A1): The old Homeric sense of φίλος as possessive adjective bleeds through: the love (φιλία) closes upon itself as a love of *oneself* (ἡ φίλη ψυχή).

773 παρέξει (A2): For the construction with accusative (αὐτήν) plus predicate adjective (κυλινδουμένην ... καὶ ἄνουν), cf. 274E6, 277A2.

bowels[776] of earth.[777]

There you have it,[778] friend Eros,[779] as fine and good a palinode as we[780] can dedicate to you in recompense. If it was especially poetical in its diction[781] Phaedrus's insistence is to blame. But now, out of forgiveness for what came before and out of thanks for what I have just now done, be well disposed toward me and be appeased.[782] Do not out of anger diminish or amputate[783] the erotic inspiration[784] for art that you have granted me! Grant[785] me instead[786] that I might be held in higher esteem than before among the Beauties. If in the earlier argument[787] we have said something to discomfit you,[788] Phaedrus and I, then blame Lysias, who was after all its progenitor, and cause him to

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774 ἐννέα (A1): This first life of his with its coming punishment or reward in Hades will be followed by at least nine more. By denying philosophy he does not shorten his stay on earth, but by denying love as well he is deprived even of the adumbration, in his afterlife, of the Final Return to the heavens, which was granted to the second-rate lover above (256D6-8).

775 περὶ γῆν κυλινδουμένην / ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνουν (A1-2), a non-distributive binary construction (both adjectives going with both prepositional phrases: cf. my nn. to *Rep*.329A5 and to 451C5-6). ἄνουν *interprets* the metaphor κυλινδουμένην (disoriented), which itself is a climactic antonym to ὡρμηκότες (256D4). Just as ὡρμηκότες (256D4) implied that the non-philosophical lovers were at least set upon a pilgrimage (ὑπουράνιος πορεία, 256D6), κυλινδουμένην indicates that the non-philosophical non-lovers are not even on a path.

776 περὶ γῆν ... καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς (A1-2): The paired prepositional phrases characterize both the life and the afterlife of the non-lover as "earthly" (one "in the environment of" earth and the other "beneath" it), in contrast with the characterization of both the life and afterlife of the non-philosophical lover as "heavenly," above (256D7-E1: cf. n.762).

777 The condemnatory δέ-clause of this sentence (256E4-257A2), with its accumulation of three front-loaded participial phrases culminating in a climactic ordinate construction elevated by a binary construction with the final word delivering the governing indicative, resembles in its structure and rhetoric – but not in its sense and cogency – the triumphant nonsense with which Socrates's First Speech completed its "Definition" of eros (238B7-C4).

778 Αὕτη σοι, ὦ φίλε Ἔρως (A3) almost mockingly repeats the terms with which the Speaker addressed the Boy a few lines above (ταῦτα τοσαῦτα, ὦ παῖ), by which Socrates jolts us into recognizing that it is no longer the Speaker but himself that is speaking.

779 ὦ φίλε Ἔρως (A3). The epithet is no longer otiose (cf. n.768).

780 ἡμετέραν (A3): Once he has given his *envoi* to the Boy, Socrates's role as Lover-Speaker and Phaedrus's role as his Boy-Audience are played out. They now revert to their identities as Socrates and Phaedrus and become a "we" who had offended the god with their discussion and the two speeches that Phaedrus had "compelled" Socrates to listen to and deliver.

781 τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν … (A4-5): The ἄλλως τε καί and ὀνόμασι echo Phaedrus's praise of the First Speech (234C7). For the sense cf. n.215. Socrates characteristically finishes up by removing himself from consideration.

782 χάριν ἔχων, εὐμενὴς καὶ ἵλεως (A7), the formulaic terminology of the "literary" kletic hymn (cf. nn.511, 785).

783 μήτε ἀφέλῃ μήτε πηρώσῃς (A8), general concept paired with metaphorical particular. πηρώσῃς includes an allusion to castration; the question of being *blinded* by the god seems forgotten (this would require a second direct object, με, *pace* Fowler; blinding his poetical art, *pace* Rowe, is not of course the blinding that the poets Homer and Stesichorus suffered, nor therefore the blinding Socrates has sought to avoid). The "prayer" resembles Sappho's μή μ' ἄσαισι μηδ' ὀνίαισι δάμνα, | πότνια, θῦμον (frag.1, 3-4).

784 τὴν ἐρωτικήν μοι τέχνην (A7-8), the reading of B (τήν μοι ἐρωτικήν, T). The pronoun by a reverse of "incorporation" is drawn out of its relative clause in prolepsis. The interruption of attributive position makes ἐρωτικήν more predicative: it does not according to the idiom denote the subject of the art, as for instance ἡ ἰατρική or ἡ πολιτική (*pace* Fowler), but means his ability to craft a speech under the inspiration of Eros. The fact that Socrates elsewhere claims among interlocutors to be a master of ἡ ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη *vel sim*. (e.g. *Symp*.177D, 212B; *Lys*.204BC: cf. n.33) sheds no light on his remark but only philological *similia*. Those remarks are quite irrelevant to his present purpose which is to thank Eros for the inspiration that produced this fantastic speech. In averring his reliance on inspiration over mere τέχνη he refers back to his preamble (245A1-8) and effects closure. Moreover in adducing the erotic "expertise" that Phaedrus had relied upon him for, at 227C3-5, he effects a segue to the positive request of his prayer to Eros, and the primary purpose of the entire speech: that Phaedrus be converted away from the speech-manipulation of Lysias to a life of philosophy.

785 δίδου (A9): After εὐμενὴς καὶ ἵλεως one hears in this imperative the voice and request of a prayer, as to a god (cf.

desist from arguments of that sort. Turn him instead toward philosophy, as his brother Polemarchus has been turned, so that his lover here[789] might no longer vacillate and dissemble as he has just now, but might make his way through life[790] with a sincere and simple[791] stand toward[792] Eros, occupied with speeches and arguments that are philosophical.

"I join in your prayer to Eros[793] that this should come about, Socrates, if such a life would be[794]

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h.Hymn. *passim*; *Leg*.712B5, X.*Cyrop*.1.6.2, 2.1.1, 3.3.21). Eros after all was "addressed" at the beginning, though we took him for the boy and not the god (for the opposite metonymy cf. 252D5). The present section (A6-B2) is an hypomnesis leading to a second request (παῦε, B2: τρέψον, B4).

786 δίδου τ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ... τίμιον (A9): I read τ' (with T, followed by Burnet) rather than the δ' of B. This τε answers the two μήτε's of the protasis and means "but instead" (cf. Denniston 515). His request closely echoes the request he made at the beginning of his First Speech, and thus brings forward the theme of the erotic powers of his speech, for there he prayed that his speech on behalf of the non-lover would make Phaedrus's associate seem to him all the more wise (ὁ ἑταῖρος ... νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον [sc.σοφὸς] δόξῃ : 237A10-B1), but it was altogether unclear whether it was Lysias or Socrates that was the "associate" in question (cf. n. *ad loc*.). Now he hopes his speech in the role of ἐραστής will make him more honorable among the beautiful, i.e., among the "beloveds." He has raised the stakes from mere companionship, which might even cover the professional relationship among rhetoricians, to the psychic and more "essential" plane of eroticism.

787 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ... λόγῳ (B1), the first "argument" – i.e., the thesis that Eros is a bad influence – carried out in Lysias's speech and in Socrates's competing version of it. For the singular (essentialistically) denoting the argument instead of (numerically) denoting a single and distinct performance, cf. 242D11-E1 and 265C6.

788 Reading ἀπηνές (B1) from BT, read by all edd. except Burnet who introduces ἀπηχές from Hermias (Bekker did report ἀπειχές from Par.1825 and ἀπαχές from Par.1827). Although the metaphor of echoing bears a loose analogy to the "echo" of the love-look (255C4-5 and D5-E1) and although the analogy is tightened if we bring in the healing power of ecstatic rites that may likewise have relied on such a correspondence, the historical authorities for the text are a prior consideration (indeed, Hermias is not quoting for he says τούτεστι: 208.6). On the sense ἀπηνές cf. ἄγριον καὶ ἀπηνές, *Leg*.950B1.

789 ὁ ἐραστὴς ὅδε αὐτοῦ (B4-5): Thompson here argues that ἐραστής can be used of unerotic admiration (citing *Meno* 70B3) but the very notion is anathema in this context and hardly appropriate in a conciliatory prayer to Eros. That Phaedrus is an ἐραστής of Lysias was asserted by Socrates earlier, when he said Lysias was Phaedrus's παιδικά (236B5-6) in connection with his own attack upon Lysias's speech, which Phaedrus was defending and promoting.

The entire passage from 257A6 forward in fact alludes to the hopes Socrates expressed just before giving his First Speech against eros and just before his Second Speech on behalf of Eros, regarding the erotic effect the coming speech might have upon its audience, namely, Phaedrus. The intervening speech, which tells the truth about Eros and intends to persuade Phaedrus of it, has discovered how Eros structures both the teacher's lesson for the student and the student's interest in being taught. Thus, he now acknowledges Phaedrus's sense that he is an ἐραστής (from 227C3-5), and admits that he hopes his speech will have encouraged οἱ καλοί, the beloveds, to honor him (257A9-B1), among whom Phaedrus is included by the hypothesis of the present speech (cf. 243E4-8 with n. 352). Phaedrus's love for Lysias boils down simply to his love for the anti-erotic thesis of the speech which has led him to waver: Socrates is speaking to Eros on Phaedrus's behalf and blaming Phaedrus's anti-erotic derailment on Lysias's seductive speech. His substitution of the erotic vocabulary for the professional (ἐραστής for ἑταῖρος) evacuates the professional relationship of any significance other than the erotic, since any relationship of which ἐραστής and παιδικά might be used could only be this relationship or a derailment of it.

790 τὸν βίον ποιῆται (B6) literally means to "make a living" (e.g. Thuc.1.5.1, X.*Oec*.6.11). The noun recalls the *Lebensmittel* one adopts out of inspiration from his god (βιοτευῇ, 252D3: cf. n.607), the βίος of Phocylides's saw (*Rep*.407A8), and the "livelihood" of βίος καὶ δόξα at *Gorg*.486D1. The expression seems to contrive to avoid meaning φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου (e.g., *Symp*.207D7). Socrates is criticizing the professional advantages accruing to an orator who, like Lysias of the First Speech, is willing to use his rhetorical skill in a way that abuses the god or the truth about eros.

791 ἐφαμφοτερίζῃ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς … (B5): The terms refer both to the inner feeling (as for instance insecure reluctance vs. the unstinting surrender of the beloved) and the outer behavior toward Eros (as for instance deception

better for us as you say.[795] But quite apart from that I have to say that I have been admiring your speech[796] all along, and how you have composed a thing so much finer than your previous one. I shudder to contemplate how pedestrian Lysias would seem in my eyes[797] if he *did* try to write a counter-speech in response. In fact the other day some politician in the city was casting aspersions on him, criticizing him for being just this[798] and peppering his criticism with the slur that he was a 'speechwriter.'[799] So chances are he will hold off from writing a speech out of fear for his reputation, and will leave us high and dry."

What a laughable opinion you have formed, my young fellow, and how greatly you underestimate your friend if you think he would so easily be spooked by such a remark! Next you'll be telling me you

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by depicting the god as bad vs. an ascent in the devotion to truth). Phaedrus has exhibited both these "conflicted" attitudes from the first page of the dialogue, the former evinced by his playing coy with Socrates (cf. nn.20, 28, 33, 46, 50, 52, 60, and "Analysis of the First Speech: The Setting for Delivering the Speech," *passim*) and the latter by his titillated admiration for the "thesis" of Lysias (ἀλλ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμψευται … , 227C6-8: cf. n.35), and subsequently by his attempt to manipulate Socrates into making his First Speech. καθάπερ νῦν (*pace* Rowe) means "up to now." I sense that Socrates's choice of the "first person" demonstrative, ὅδε, alongside αὐτοῦ, is meant to suggest Phaedrus's dilemma: "this lover of his here at my side." In the end, as we shall see, the dilemma will be recast as a choice between his return to Lysias and Socrates's return … to Isocrates!

792 πρὸς Ἔρωτα (B6): In the context of ontological metonymy that has come to dominate the meaning and expression of this speech there is by now little profit in distinguishing between ἔρως and Ἔρως; but for the sake of the prayer we should imagine Socrates is speaking about the god. The purpose clause is in truth an admonition to Phaedrus.

793 συνεύχομαι (B7): Cf. n.785.

794 εἶναι (C1): If it is (sc. ἐστί) better that this be (εἶναι) the case, I pray that it come about (γίγνεσθαι).

795 εἴπερ (B7): With the addition of περ, εἰ does not so much introduce a condition as it emphasizes the grounds for agreement, but Rowe is right to notice that it leaves things open. Already, Phaedrus ἐπαμφοτερίζει. Placement of the proviso clause in the midst of the sentence rather than at the end likewise blunts the conditionality with pseudo-deference.

796 τὸν λόγον δέ (C1): The postponement of δέ to third position after article *and* substantive (on which cf. Denniston 186) is rarer than asyndeton and therefore at least as emphatic. With τὸν δὲ λόγον Phaedrus would have drawn a contrast without supplying a previous term; by the postponement he emphasizes that λόγος is the term that needs the contrast, and therefore indirectly reveals that the term would have been εὐχή, since his previous sentence was a response to Socrates's final prayer, to which he now wishes to contrast with the speech as a whole. The effect is virtually to turn his first remark into a concessive μέν-clause, but that would have been too obviously dismissive. The inchoate comparison is then reinforced by πάλαι, referring to the duration of the entire λόγος, which also implies an unstated contrast with νῦν, the time of the εὐχή with which it ended. Phaedrus is trying to get off the spot and change the subject.

797 μοι (C3): Phaedrus responds to Socrates's remark before his *First* Speech (!): νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον δόξει (σοφὸς εἶναι αὐτῷ), 237B1. In Socrates's Second Speech Phaedrus has seen something both new and absent from that First Speech, in comparison with which Lysias's response can only be expected to seem pedestrian or crass. This indicates that Phaedrus knows Lysias's gimmicks and limitations so that he can predict what kind of thing he will do. Socrates's Second Speech has deflated Phaedrus's hopes of controlling Lysias: cf. πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ... ἀναγκασθῆναι 243D9-E1 and n.349.

798 αὐτὸ τοῦτο (C5): The antecedent must be that he is a ταπεινός (rather than a σοφός), and immediately Phaedrus chooses to illustrate his meaning by citing the politician's derogatory charge, which he had not mentioned before, that Lysias is a λογογράφος. That is, to be a λογογράφος is ταπεινός in the eyes of the politician. Yunis has no grounds to interpret Phaedrus's remark as a mere fabrication designed to exonerate Lysias from mounting a reply.

799 λογογράφον (C6): The Scholiast explains the term but only suggests why it might be used in derogation: λογογράφους γὰρ ἐκάλουν οἱ παλαιοὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ μισθῷ καὶ πιπράσκοντας αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαστήρια, ῥήτορας δὲ τοὺς δι'ἑαυτων λέγοντας. For the derogatory use LSJ cites Din.1.111, Aeschin.3.373 and Hyp.*Ath*.3, all later. That it might be *mere* badmouthing is proved by Dem.*de Fals.Leg.*274 (=19.246); but exactly what if anything is ταπεινός about being a λογογράφος *in the politician's eyes*, is the very gravamen of the discussion at this point. The dramatic circumstances afford us a minimal opportunity to learn why, because the charge is made by somebody who cannot be examined, and because rather than ask what it means Socrates categorically dismisses the charge as irrelevant in the first place, with the argument *ad hominem* according to which the politician's behavior proves it hypocritical or insincere. Usener's tantalizing idea that the politician was an opponent of Thrasybulus's motion to grant Lysias citizenship (*Rh.Mus.*

think this critic actually *believed* the accusation he was making![800]

"That's how it seemed, Socrates. Also, I have to assume you are as aware as I am that the bigger names among the movers and shakers in the political world are ashamed to write speeches and to leave behind written works in their own names for fear they might come to be called 'sophists' in future generations."[801]

You don't realize that the "cute bend" people speak of refers to that large turn in the Nile,[802] just as you don't realize that exactly the people who have the greatest ambition in politics are especially enamored of speechwriting and eager to leave behind a corpus of writings. After all whenever they write a speech they are so eager to have admirers that they write them in first,

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[1879]150) would cast a blazing light on the whole dialogue, for thereby Lysias the metic writer could become a live orator!

800 Reading νομίζοντα (D2) with TW and Hermias (ὀνειδίζοντα νομίζοντα B : ὀνειδίζοντα *coni.* Postgate *legunt edd.*). Socrates can hardly challenge the fact that Phaedrus is reporting, i.e., the fact that the politician was *berating* Lysias (ὀνειδίζοντα). Instead he doubts the politician's *sincerity* (νομίζοντα). ὀνειδίζοντα in B is perhaps an exegetical gloss on νομίζοντα. By choosing to question the politician's sincerity Socrates pushes away still further the need to discuss why being a λογογράφος should be ταπεινός, leaving us in the dark. Yunis simply adopts the emendation and takes Socrates to mean that λογογραφία merits no criticism.

801 μέγιστον / σεμνότατοι (D5): Though Socrates thinks Lysias is enough of a "pro" to finesse the politician's complaint (D1-2: *pace* Yunis, it is the *man* Phaedrus misunderstands not the distinction Yunis himself presses between epideictic and deliberative oratory), Phaedrus recognizes that Lysias will countenance the politician's opinion since the politician is his prospective client. It was at the home of one of these in fact that Lysias had spent the entire morning (cf. 227B4 and n.23). His superlatives stress a factor that he had expressed unemphatically in his first remark, with the general designation (πολιτικῶν, C5). We may take the new tone and emphasis of his restatement to indicate that it appears to Phaedrus likely that the politician is sincere in his criticism because the politician wishes thereby to differentiate himself as a "doer" rather than a mere talker (a "sophist"), though in truth the politician needs to be both. All along, after all, he will be relying on the λογογράφος to write his speech for him which he must then "make his own" in the delivery. His criticism is therefore hypocritical, even in the original sense of hypocrite, for he is an actor performing someone else's lines. The problem of "ventriloquism" that we met on the second page of the dialogue reappears (Why should Socrates abide Phaedrus delivering Lysias's speech when he has "Lysias himself" hidden in his shirt?); and even there Socrates was very much moved by Phaedrus's delivery (what he called to τὸ ῥητορικόν, 235A1: cf. n. *ad loc.*) rather than by the writing of Lysias. What comes into focus is that Socrates's Second Speech was improvised but Phaedrus believes that if he went back to Lysias for a response-speech, Lysias would *write* it.

The politician's sentiment is captured by our proverb, "Those that can, do; those that cannot do, teach." It is noteworthy that directing this self-aggrandizing criticism at Lysias is particularly unfair, since as a metic he may not address the public in Athens even if he wanted to and were able – but fairness was never the issue here. Meanwhile, it was exactly in order to pay solicitous heed to this vulnerable and embarrassed position the politician finds himself in, and thereby to drum up business from him, that Alcidamas wrote (!) his pamphlet, περὶ τοὺς τῶν γραπτῶν λόγων γραφόντων, where he argues that "speechwriters" are sophists who need to be brought down a notch since delivery and improvisation are more difficult and require greater talent and preparation (παιδεία and ἱστορία, §1: ed.Muir) than merely sitting on the sidelines and composing a written work (one may compare the emphasis that Isocrates places on τολμᾶν at *Antidosis*, 192: cf. D.H. *Isoc.*1). Alcidamas does not leave off, however, without intimating that he does teach writing, too (§29). The politician might well see in Alcidamas a more sympathetic person, and will certainly see in him a more obsequious person, to write that speech he has to deliver – and he might hope for a few tips from him on how to deliver it, to boot. For the entire complex of relationships cf. K.J.Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley 1968) ch.8, "Client and Consultant," esp. pp.158-9.

802 γλυκὺς ἀγκών (D9): for the proverb cf. Zenobius 292 (*Paroim.Gr.* 1.55-6, with note). The words ὅτι ἀπό ... ἐκλήθη are bracketed by Heindorf (also Schanz, Fowler, Robin) as a gloss (like the suspicious 229D1-2), but (1) λέληθεν needs a construction, (2) it is unclear where to start and end any such bracketing, (3) the more that is taken out the more the second λανθάνει σε becomes awkward, and (4) these words have now have been found in the very old *Pap.Ant.*77. Therefore I leave the text intact.

Socrates accuses Phaedrus of missing that a person might say the opposite of what he believes. Just as the proverbial expression "a sweet bend" refers to a bend in the Nile that is not sweet but long, the critic's real feeling is the opposite of what he is saying about Lysias: he envies his ease – even worse he relies on it. But also packed into the

depending on who they are on the given occasion![803]

"What do you mean by that? I don't get[804] what you are saying." (258)

You don't know that at the beginning of the political man's writing the one who will praise it is written in by it, right at first?[805]

"Huh?"

'It was the opinion of the *counsel*,' he says, or 'of the *deme*' or both; and then '*He* declared,' referring to himself formally in the third person, after which he is off and gone on an unstinting display of his own wisdom to his admirers,[806] not seldom making a good and long script of it.[807] Or do you think such a speech differs somehow from a scripted argument?

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proverb, as with all proverbs, is an allusion to the undermeaning, in this case the reason a person asserts the opposite. Among the interpretations of this undermeaning for which there is ancient testimony I prefer "sour grapes" or envy (Libanius, *Epist.*46, spoken by an old man: ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰς τέρψιν ἔρχεται τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ γλυκὺς ἀγκὼν διὰ τὴν ἀσθενείαν). In our case, the pot is calling the kettle black. This interpretation is borne out (while perhaps the entire controversy is mooted) by the fact that it is emulous envy that Socrates goes on to attribute to the politician, though Phaedrus fails to understand this. Cf. n.818.

803 οἳ ἂν ἑκασταχοῦ ἐπαινῶσιν αὐτοῖς (E6): Socrates is telling a riddle. With ἑκασταχοῦ he is setting up the distinction (ἑκαστ-) between *places* (genitival -αχοῦ) where written motions might be introduced, namely, the council and the assembly (βουλή and δῆμος, which come in the "punch line," 258A4). For the alternative reference to the various public gatherings as *times* rather than places cf.268A2-3 and n.*ad loc.* For προσπαραγράφειν cf. Dem.39.9, 52.4 (cit. deVries). Phaedrus is appropriately confused (E7) and then Socrates tightens the expression of the riddle the way riddle-makers do (258A1-2), so as to set up the punch line (258A4ff). It is by means of the riddle that he is able to "shoehorn" in his novel and warped claim that the politician does share with the speechwriter an influence that survives the performance. Yunis rightly cites the monograph of C.J.Classen (*Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft Platonischen und Sokratischen Philosophierens* = *Zetemata* 22 [Munich 1959]), which finally gave scholarly legitimacy to something all interpreters of Plato have had always had to recognize if they were to understand his works at all, namely his skewing of terms for theoretical segue. Cf. the uses of αἰσχρόν below (258D1-5, with n.821) and my notes to *Rep.*400E2, 492A7, 508B3, 535A11, 555C8, 585A3, 590E2-3, 601E1.

804 οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω (E7): For the idiomatic use of μανθάνω as recognizing an undermeaning, as in the case of a riddle, cf. 263A5; *Euthyph.*3B5, 9B6,13D7; *Gorg.*447D3-6, 474C9; *Phdo.*117C1; *Phlb.*16A6; *Rep.*332A11, 351B6, 372E2 (and my n. *ad loc.*), 511B1; Ar.*Av.*1451-63,1529; *Lys.*1008; *Batr.*65,195,1444-5.

805 Reading ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀνδρὸς πολιτικοῦ συγγράμματι (258A1-2) with all best mss. (and read by Bekker, Stallb., Buttmann, Thompson, Hermann, Fowler). συγγράμματος is cited by Moreschini as a reading of the Escorial (Y.I.13: "*vulg.*" in Burnet and Vollgraff; "*in libris paucissimis*," Stallb.) and was defended as an emendation by Bergk (*Hermes* [1883]517); it is read by Heindorf, Ast, Vollgraff, Robin, Hackforth, deVries, Nehemas/Woodruff. But it is ugly with the other genitive. I find it easier to imagine the dative as the instrument or agent with the perfect passive than to accept the poorly attested and ugly genitive. Deletions (of ἀρχῇ by Madvig Schanz Moreschini Heitsch, of ἀνδρός by Herwerden, of συγγράμματι by Burnet) are even less attractive since all the words are necessary for Socrates's riddle. We need the high priority suggested by ἐν ἀρχῇ, we need the redoubtable ἀνήρ and we need the overly writerly *figura etymologica* συγγράμματι γέγραπται just as much we need the continued reference to the praiser (ὁ ἐπαινετής), though that part of the sentence is syntactically inoffensive.

Of course it is a strain for Socrates to treat a legislative "bill" as a σύγγραμμα but it is exactly by means of this riddling stretch of normal usage that he intends to smoke out the real issue. Surely the mover and shaker will have his name on the law forever, so why does he include mentioning it if he truly fears a reputation for λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπειν (D6-7, cf. E3)? The answer is, it is not writing but the *sophistic* aspect of writing that he fears having associated with his name (257D8), that "*logographic*" aspect of writing that he has criticized in the work of Lysias (257C6). Socrates overinterprets his opposition to λογογραφία for the same reason he overinterprets Thrasymachus to mean that justice consists of eating a lot of meat since doing so is in the interest of a strong weight-lifter (338C4-D6): it is to provoke the need for a *distinguo* – that the mover and shaker cannot assert that writing *per se* is shameful (αἰσχρόν, D2) as Socrates continues to illustrate (B2-C5), so it must be γράφειν αἰσχρῶς, writing shamefully, which he then identifies with writing poorly (μὴ καλῶς ... ἀλλὰ ... κακῶς, D4-5: on the logic, cf. n.821).

806 τοῖς ἐπαινέταις (A7): Athetized by Vollgraff who misses the jocular circularity of the whole process (ἐπαινέτης, A2), wondering why a πολιτικός would take the trouble to display his wisdom to his admirers.

807 σύγγραμμα (A8): ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ and τῷ δήμῳ (A4) indicate that Socrates is referring to the writing of resolutions

"No I don't."

So if his argument is allowed to stand[808] our poet exits the theater[809] rejoicing, whereas if the speech is erased and fails to achieve written codification or proves unworthy of being written up, he leaves lamenting and woeful, as do his allies.[810]

"You bet he does!"

And the reason is not that he despises the occupation: to the contrary he is dazzled by it.[811]

"Quite so."

And isn't it the case that whenever he[812] becomes so[813] adequate a man of state or king[814] that by acquiring the power of a Lycurgus or a Solon or a Darius[815] he is able to become a speech-writer of immortal fame in his city, isn't it the case that he not only counts himself equal to the gods while he lives to see it but also comes to be accounted so by persons of future generations, when they pore over his writings?[816]

"You bet!"

You think that one of these sorts, whichever one he is and however ill-disposed he may be toward Lysias, was censuring[817] him merely for being a *writer*?

"Well it's hardly likely, given what you are now saying, for then he would be casting aspersions on the very thing he himself desires."[818]

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which, if enacted, would become laws and thereby "stay on the books" for posterity to see. They are essentially monuments to their author's influence as a politician and orator rather than to his art as a writer (whence Socrates notes that they *sometimes* become displays of "cleverness") and so he needs to ask Phaedrus to allow him to call them συγγράμματα, just as it was a bit of a stretch for him to interpret their reference to the council and the deme as flattery. Once the dialectical use for it is exhausted by effectuating the transition to the question of καλῶς γράφειν, this type of "writing" disappears from the argument (258D8-11, 261A8-9) until the very end of the dialogue, when it reappears merely for exhaustive generalization and closure (277D6-8, 278C3-4).

808 ἐμμένῃ (B2) of a proposal that survives opposition: cf. *Euthyd*.288A3; *Gorg*.480B3; *Leg*.839C2.

809 ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ ποιητής (B3): Though ἐμμένῃ is the language of a statute being adopted by the βουλή or the ἐκκλησία (A4), and ἐξαλειφθῇ ("erasure") is conversely the expression for the failure of a motion (cf. Andoc. 1.76), our lawmaking λογογράφος (B4) now exits the "theatre" as a "poet" who has won a competition. Socrates continues with the strategy of broadening λογογραφία to include any composition delivered to any audience, *mutatis mutandis*.

810 οἱ ἑταῖροι (B5): With the mention of his political ἑταιρία (replacing ἐπαινέται) Socrates gives the lie to his own conceit that this politician is a poet.

811 τεθαυμακότες (B7), overcome with awe (intensive perfect), as Phaedrus was by Socrates's Second Speech (πάλαι θαυμάσας ἔχω, 257C1-2).

812 γένηται (B10): Sc. αὐτός (with Ast).

813 ἱκανός (B10) functions as οὕτω, with ὥστε. Cf. deVries *ad loc.* and Stallb. *ad Prot.*338C.

814 ῥήτωρ ἢ βασιλεύς (B10): I take the pair to represent political prominence in general by means of a polar doublet representing the spectrum of political forms from democracy to monarchy. For ῥήτωρ as politician rather than rhetorician or (mere) speechwriter, cf. *Euthyd*.305B5-9 and 306B2-C5; and cf. also *Gorg*.479A2-3, *Tht*.167C, *Symp*.215E5.

815 Lycurgus, Solon, Darius (C1), lawgivers for Sparta (*Rep*.599D7, *al*.), Athens (*Rep*.599E3, *al*.), and the Persians (*Leg*.695C6-D1), respectively. The triad is meant to be exhaustive (Yunis *ad loc.,* citing *Leg*.Bk.3).

816 ἰσόθεον (C2): The mover and shaker desires not only to avoid the infamy of being a sophist but also desires a fame equal to the gods'. It is his personal hypocrisy that Socrates is taking lengths to depict, not an opinion of Plato's about the decline of oratory (*pace* Yunis *ad* 257E1-258D10).

817 ὀνειδίζειν (C8): The present infinitive represents the imperfect at 257C6. οὖν is quasi-interrogative, in what Denniston calls an "answer-question" (425).

818 Phaedrus, so skilled at inciting emulation, shows the blind spot that is prerequisite for doing so without compunction: he is able to act as if, and even to believe that, envy is not real (cf. n.801). The underlying anxiety that motivated the evasive behavior of the mover and shaker has become moot – but is it gone from the drama? Of course not (cf. n.1177)! Phaedrus thought Lysias guilty of the charge, else he would not have imagined Lysias would be reluctant to compete with Socrates; that the charge may now prove hypocritical does not change that. Moreover, Phaedrus associated the charge with the appearance Lysias might make trying to compete (αὐτὸ τοῦτο, 257C5) and even this has been lost in the shuffle.

Be that as it may,[819] anybody can see that the mere act of writing down arguments is not a source of shame.

"Clearly."

Whereas I need no special argument[820] to think it is shameful to give or write a speech that is not fine, but ugly and bad.[821]

"That much anybody can see."[822]

So then what is the characteristic of writing that makes it fine or not?[823] Don't we need to examine Lysias on this ground, or any author of the past or the future, whether his writing be political or private, or written in verse in the manner of poetry or in meterless[824] prose?

"You ask whether we *need* to? Nay,[825] for what purpose does a person even live and breathe, so to speak,[826] if it is not for the sake of such pleasures as these? Certainly not for the enjoyment of the pleasures that require pain in advance without which they are not even pleasurable, as almost all the

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This opening page of the "second section" is as dense with dramatic undercurrents as was the first page of the dialogue, and for the same reasons. Just as in the opening of Book Two of the *Republic*, it is from a rich nexus of half-understood feelings half-articulated that Plato creates the motivation and goal for a conversation; and indeed we shall see that the purpose of the ensuing conversation is not to provide "Plato" a chance to reform the art of "rhetoric" and present some cherished theory, but for Socrates to resolve the half-understood issues in Phaedrus's mind so as to bring to an end his ambivalence (ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, 257B5), by liberating him from the taunting and vaunting world of ἀνθρωπίνα σπουδάσματα.

819 μὲν ἄρα (D1): Concessive μέν glances back to agree in part, but forward-looking τοῦτο ἄρα effects a transition to the new point that eclipses it, guiding the discussion to the more substantial question.

820 ἤδη (D4), in contrast with quasi-temporal ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις (C9).

821 μὴ καλῶς ... ἀλλ' αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς (D4-5): Socrates moves out of the thicket of gossip and half-understood feelings with a statement that presents itself as "analytical" (ἤδη); and so it would be if αἰσχρόν in D4 had the same sense as αἰσχρῶς in D5, but it does not because of the intervention of καλῶς – the "fine and the competent" – in between, which shades αἰσχρῶς away from the shameful and toward the ugly. Thus αἰσχρῶς needs to be spelled out by κακῶς with τε καί, which mildly claims that the two are interchangeable or bi-conditional. Ambiguous αἰσχρός is a common affair in the dialectic of Socrates, and here it is employed to dispense with the opprobrium of the movers and shakers in order to clear the way for a less charged and more leisurely study of writing – nay, arguing in general – and its inherent virtues. Hence we immediately get μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν ἀλλ' αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς, and then, at the beginning of the study itself, the inverse of that formulation into ὅπῃ ... καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπῃ μή, 259E2). Equivocation is a small price to pay for reaching a safe topic, as was the shakiness of the argument by which Socrates shifts the focus away from the quagmire of personal morality revealed in the speeches of Adeimantus and Glaucon, in which he suggests they look for justice in an imaginary and invisible city because it is bigger there (cf. my n. *ad Rep*.368D5).

822 With δῆλον (D6) Phaedrus brings forward δῆλον, the criterion of universal agreement, from D1.

823 τίς οὖν ... γράφειν; (D7). This question was attributed to Phaedrus in the mss. but Ficino in his translation switched the attribution to Socrates and the editors have followed suit ever since. To the extent that our decision whether to revert to the original attribution or not depends on our understanding of Phaedrus's personality and orientation, we quickly become aware of how little we commentators have reached a consensus about him (Ryan says yes because Phaedrus likes to produce speeches, while deVries says no because it is not characteristic of Phaedrus to "take the initiative"). My view of Phaedrus's personality is based on his behavior in the first pages of the dialogue and the first pages of this dialogical section, on which see my "Analysis of the Dialogical Section," *infra* (esp.n.1499). According to that interpretation I retain the attribution of Ficinus. Socrates is here compensating for Phaedrus's reluctance to speak in his own voice (he is eager to represent the opinions of absent others, instead), by suggesting the inquiry and immediately diverting the questions away from him and toward "Lysias or anybody else who composes" in order to keep Phaedrus in the game on whatever terms he requires; and this explains why Phaedrus responds so warmly to the suggestion (E1-5).

824 ὡς ἰδιωτής (D11) is redundant after ἄνευ μέτρου, but Socrates continues to broaden the scope of λόγοι they are to study, and with the the two ἰδιο- words stresses the inclusion of non-professional λόγοι (Ryan).

825 μὲν οὖν (E1) is "corrective" as at 234D1 (deVries).

826 ὡς εἰπεῖν (E2): On the semantics of this expression see Ast, *Lex.Plat., s.v.* εἶπον.

bodily pleasures do, whence they are rightly called slavish pleasures."[827]

Time and leisure we have, as it would seem. And at the same time[828] I get the sense that the cicadas, singing in their breathless way and (259) talking with each other over our heads, are watching us also. If they should catch sight of[829] us doing what most people do at midday, not talking with each other but nodding off instead, enchanted by them out of laziness of mind, they would have good reason to ridicule us, taking us to be slavish creatures[830] that came into this shady refuge to pass the middle of the day like sheep and doze off beside this spring. But if instead they witness[831] us engaged in discussion with each other and endeavoring to sail around them as one would sail past the Sirens unseduced, then that great reward which they have been granted by the gods to bestow upon men they just may bestow upon us, out of admiration and approval.

"And just what is this reward they have to bestow? It seems this is something I have never heard tell of."[832]

Really, any man who cares about culture and the Muses should have heard tell of this! The story is that in former times before the Muses were born these cicadas were men, and that once the Muses came to be and song arrived, some of the men of that time were so struck by the pleasure it brought them that they sang and sang and cared not at all for food and drink, so that in their distraction they withered away and died. The result was that the race of cicadas came to be, who received from the Muses the reward that they had no need for nourishment once they were born but were able from the first to sing right up until the day they died, and after that were to go back to the Muses and report which of the people they had seen in this world honored which of the Muses. To Terpsichora for instance they would endear those men who, they could report, had honored her in dances, and to Erato those who honored her in erotics, and so on with the others, in accordance with the kind of honor the men bestowed. It is to the oldest of them, Kalliope, and to Ourania who is next after her in age, that they report back about the men who spend their time with philosophy and with honoring their kind of music, these Muses who have to do more than the others with heaven and with

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827 Phaedrus's gratuitously formal (E1-2), gnomic (E2-5) and enthusiastic elaboration, and Socrates's subsequent mention of σχολή (E6), announce that the characters are agreeing to commit themselves to a discussion of indeterminate length, as they did at the beginning of the day's discussion (227B8-C2, where compare Socrates's enthusiastic ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον). For the σχολή topic cf. (with Heitsch) *Euthyph*.6C5-9; *Ion* 530D4-9; *Leg*.738B2, 781D9-E3; *Phdo*.66D2-7; *Polit*.263B1, 272B8-C1; *Rep*.376D4-10; *Tht*.154E7-8, 172C2-D8, 180B6, 187D10. At the same time, Plato indicates to us that we are moving away from transitional issues and toward something with which his characters will tarry.

828 καὶ ἅμα (E6): The surroundings again play the role of auspicious conspirator, but now Socrates will elaborate on and even personify the cicadas that he mentioned only in passing before (230C2-3).

829 ἴδοιεν (259A1), a "conceptual" optative in the aorist. In an *Augenblick* they will have enough evidence to take them to be (ἡγούμενοι) the usual, lazy θρέμματα.

830 ἀνδράποδ' (A4): The neuter, ultimately justified by προβάτια, is derogatory in the meanwhile. It is as if Socrates has made something pertinent of Phaedrus's aversion to slavish pleasures expressed above (258E5), as also does his description of those ancient men who were so affected by the pleasure of song as to forget the bodily desires for food and drink (B8-C2). Thus his slightly corrective πολλῶν ἕνεκα at D7, by which he means to add something to Phaedrus's τίνος ἕνεκα of 258E1.

831 ὁρῶσι (A6): The "vivid" present subjunctive suggests the interest we can anticipate the cicadas would take in watching them converse.

832 ἀνήκοος γάρ (B3): We revert to a mythologizing conversation about the natural surroundings and attending spirits, as when we first arrived at the καταγωγή (229BC), which had then focussed upon what habits of life lead to a person's knowing what and thinking what (229C-230A). Before. Phaedrus came up with a myth for which he craved the underlying cause; this time the myth arises out of what is happening. The reference to the surroundings again provides an imaginative frame for the contents and intentions of the conversation to a greater degree than elsewhere in the Platonic corpus (cf.n.96).

discourses divine and human,[833] and who let loose[834] the most beautiful of voices. So it is for many good reasons, indeed,[835] that we must converse and must not fall asleep during midday.

"Speak we must!"

So this thing we just set before ourselves to investigate – how an argument is artful whether written or spoken and how it is not – ought we investigate this?[836]

"Obviously."

Can't we take it[837] that for something to be argued well,[838] the mind of the writer making the argument must be aware of the truth about his subject?

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833 The generalization of the well-recognized principle that the Muses govern their own special provinces from the two cases of Terpsichore and Erato is adduced with some reliance or corroboration from the transparent etymologies of their names, in a way that would not have gone through if the cases of Klio or Melpomene had been suggested. The principle having been reached, Socrates next reverts to two different specific Muses (Kalliope and Ourania), selected at first on the basis of the qualitative superlative πρεσβυτάτην to apply the same principle on the same etymological basis, but drawing meanings for the etyma of their names from themes of the great myth of his Second Speech. In that context, Ourania, the Muse of "astronomy," is now imagined as a divine agency that might aid the embodied soul's return to the ouranos; and Kalliope though traditionally the Muse of epic poetry (the κάλλος ἔπων) is now reassigned the province of κάλλος λόγων instead (D6), or καλῶς λέγειν (through the periphrasis with καλλίστη φωνή), which is the topic to which Socrates and Phaedrus have just now chosen to devote their attention (for ἔπος as synonymous with λόγος cf. *Euthyd.*295C6, *Leg.*879C7, *Phlb.*18D6, *Rep.*494E4). The novel association of Kalliope and Ourania (n.b., μετ' αὐτήν, D3) is also borrowed from that Speech, where the practice of philosophical λόγοι is shown to invigorate the growth of the soul's plumage for returning to heaven. That the Muse of καλὸς λόγος should be the oldest here functions as a mythological symbolization for the logical priority of λόγος *per se* to all kinds and genres of λόγος (public or personal, in verse or prose: 258D9-11); and the generalization of λόγος *per se* is represented in mythological language with the exhaustive doublet θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους.

For another case of generalization of parallel examples before moving on to the target case, cf. 238A6-B7ff. For an analogous sort of "up and down" movement within a list cf. *H.Maj.*298AB, 295CE; *Leg.*759A2-4, 813D8-E3, 847B8-C4; *Phlb.*11B7-8; *Polit.*288D7-E4; *Rep.*466A8-B2, 475D1-E1, 529E1-3, 610B1-3; *Soph.*265C1-2; *Symp.*207D8-E3.

834 ἶᾶσιν ... φωνήν (D7): This is the etymological argument from Kalliope. For the expression cf. *Euthyd.*293A1; *Leg.*890D4, 934D8; *Rep.*475A1, 617B6.

835 πολλῶν δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα (D7): In referring back to Phaedrus's ἕνεκα of 258E1-2, Socrates more or less consciously acknowledges that his tale about the cicadas is an elaboration and corroboration of the values Phaedrus had there advocated (cf. n.830), but he has also brought forward the crucial desideratum with which he ended his Second Speech, that Phaedrus and he participate in truly philosophical λόγοι, though his obscure and novel redefinition of Ourania and Kalliope only alludes to, and does not insist upon, that recommendation.

836 προυθέμεθα (E1): Both parties having resolved to discuss the matter, Socrates in his usual manner formally announces the beginning of the σκέψις proper (cf. *Rep.*358D8, 550D1-7, 583C1, 595C5, and my n. *ad* 523A8.). The scope of the inquiry is here generalized, as well it might be, to include writing and speaking as if for the moment they were interchangeble or else parts of the same thing (note τε καί). He opens with a question, which wrong-foots Phaedrus into the role of answerer.

837 ὑπάρχειν (E4) indicates that Socrates thinks he is proposing something axiomatically true (cf. *Rep.*458A5, 467C5; *Tim.*41C8) – in the manner that Aristotle was wont to approach a question by assembling τὰ ὑπάρχοντα before even considering his predecessors' views (e.g., *Phys*4.4, *Meteor.*1,12, *GC*1.5: cf. *An.Po.*81B23; SE 183A37, B20; *Cael.*297B22; *GC* 316A8-10; *Meteor.*353B17-35; *de Mem.*451A18; *HA* 491A7-14; *Rhet.*1396B6-15; and cf. Olymp.*in Meteor.*3.2 [=*CAG*12.2.217.23-7]: ὑπάρχοντα· τοῦτ' ἐστι τὰ ἀξιώματα).

838 εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς ῥηθησομένοις (E4): γὲ stipulative (cf. 253C3, 266D5 with n.,270E1; Rep.334D3, 379B1, 398D10, 462E3, 524B10, 529A1, 587D11 [and my n. *ad loc.*], 592A5, 597D7, 598C2 [and my n. *ad loc.*], 613E3). The adverbs translate and correspond to καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, the least specific and most non-committal way of saying "good," in the open manner of the question (E2; cf. 258D4-5). In the adverbial version the order of the terms is reversed for euphony (cf. *Rep.*400E2-3 and 348D3-4 and my nn. *ad locc.*). ῥηθησομένοις does not connote the speech, writing, or argument of a ῥήτωρ, though the etymology of this part of the defective verb λέγειν might, and in any event this is the way Phaedrus will take it (cf. n.841, *infra*).

"What I have heard about this,[839] my friend, is the following.[840] It is not necessary for a man who intends to be an orator[841] to learn (260) what is truly just but only what the mass of men who will be passing judgment[842] believe is just, nor the truly good or fine[843] but only[844] what they judge it to be, since it is from opinion that persuasion arises, not from the truth."

Overlook no utterance that falls from the lips of the wise, as the proverb goes,[845] but all their sayings must checked for truth. Just so in the present case let's not pass over this assertion.

"A correct method."

I'll suggest how to examine it.

"How?"

If I tried to persuade you to ward off the enemy by acquiring a horse, but neither of us knew what a horse is, except that I did know this about you, Phaedrus,[846] that you think that a horse is that certain domesticated animal that has the largest ears …

"That would be quite droll and ridiculous."

But I'm not finished: if I in all seriousness tried to persuade you, by composing a praise-speech[847] for the donkey, calling the donkey a horse and arguing that this animal is most valuable both

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839 τούτου (E7): The demonstrative is loose: Phaedrus speaks about neither the λόγοι nor the criterion for their being well argued, but about the rhetor and the criterion for his being successful.

840 ἀκήκοα (E7). It is noteworthy that Phaedrus answers a question "No" by saying he has heard something else from someone (or some*thing* – it might be a book he has heard as we shall see) who is not present; and it is more noteworthy that Socrates does not ask him who. It is Phaedrus's beliefs Socrates must deal with and he accepts this evasive response in stride. As to where Phaedrus has heard this description, it is nothing strange. Cf. for example Gorgias's remarks at *Gorg*.452E1-4. The identity of the source will be revealed later but for the present it is quite irrelevant.

841 τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσεσθαι (260A1) evinces Phaedrus's narrow presupposition as to the sense of Socrates's future participle, ῥηθησομένοις.

842 δικάσουσιν (A2) is something of a pun or even an incipient argument, less evident in English than in Greek, according to which the *just* is what *judges judge* it to be. The Laws that speak to Crito at the end of the Crito likewise begin by presuming without argument that τὸ δίκαιον (which Socrates and Crito had left undefined [49E5, 50A3]) is identical to αἱ δίκαι δικασθεῖσαι (50B8), using a similar figure. It is not that Phaedrus is a legal positivist (the Laws by nature are so!) but that he wants to change the subject from truth (the truly just) to success (winning the judgment). See next note.

843 ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλά (A3): Once τὸ δικαιόν is dealt with separately in order to enable the etymological figure with δικάζειν, the complementary elements in the triad of μέγιστα can be added. For the triad (καλόν / ἀγαθόν / δίκαιον) cf. *Rep*.451A7 and my n. *ad loc*. Hermias *ad loc*. (219.11-14) interestingly associates them with the three classes of oration – epideictic, deliberative, forensic.

844 ὅσα (A3) replaces intension (essence) with extension (a factitious set).

845 οὕτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος (A5): Cf. *Il*.2.361, οὔτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος ὅττι κεν εἴπω (spoken by Nestor; cf. also *Il*.3.65 [Alexander to Hector on the gifts of the gods]). Whom "Plato" might have in mind is irrelevant: it is Socrates who says this, and he does so because he is acutely sensitive to the evasiveness of Phaedrus's answer and now engages the position Phaedrus has heard on the merits, as if it were the opinion of a σοφός, in order to avoid a confrontation with Phaedrus as they scrutinize the idea, but at the same time to hold him in the position of answerer, while continuing to speak of their inquiry as a joint effort (σκοπῶμεν, A9). After all, it is not insignificant that Phaedrus has now countenanced the contradictory of the opinion that had led Socrates to compose his palinode (242E5-243A2).

846 Φαῖδρος (B3): Socrates has succeeded in bringing Phaedrus back in as answerer by asking about a imaginary event rather than about the topic of good speeches. The index of his success is that Phaedrus is so eager to answer that he interrupts even before the question is finished (B5).

847 λόγον ἔπαινον (B7): ἔπαινος is an attributive appositive analogous to the appositives of age, rank, trade (e.g., ἄνδρες βουλευταί: cf. Gildersleeve §487). This expression, as well as συντιθείς (on which cf. Ast *ad loc*.) and κατά with the genitive of topic, suggests a classroom assignment, as does Phaedrus's use of the expression at *Symp*.177D2. The ensuing description of the "praise-speech" (we use a similar attributive appositive in English) sketches how the assignment might in fact be met.

at home and at war, being useful to fight off of,[848] able to carry equipment to boot, and beneficial in many other respects ...[849]

"Completely droll that would be."[850]

But isn't it better for it to be friendly and droll rather than clever and inimical?[851]

"I guess so."

So now imagine the rhetorician[852] who is ignorant of good and bad taking in hand to persuade a city that is likewise ignorant. If he composes not an asinine praise[853] of a horse but a praise of evil as if it were good, and by paying close attention to the city's beliefs about what is good and what is bad, and succeeds to persuade[854] them to do evil instead of good, what sort of harvest do you think his rhetoric reaps[855] from the persuasion it sowed?

"Nothing at all decent!"[856]

But perhaps, my friend, it is uncouth of us to cast such aspersions on what is in truth the high art of argument.[857] Mightn't she say[858] on her own behalf, "What are you strange men blabbering about? I have in no way required that a person who learns to speak be ignorant of the truth, but – if my advice is to be consulted – that he take up my art only after[859] he has acquired that. What I do boast, to be sure,[860] is that without me, simply knowing the truth will not at all avail[861] a person to

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848 ἀποπολεμεῖν (B9), meaning, with Heindorf, πολεμεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ: cf. *Prot.*350A3, ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων πολεμεῖν.

849 Quickly (B9-C1), with his three infinitives and their corresponding neuter adjectives (reaching a climax in the generalization, ὠφέλιμον) including *variatio* in the connectives (reading Thompson's bright emendation πρός γ' ἐνεγκεῖν), Socrates outlines the structure of the praise-speech.

850 παγγέλοιον (C2): What makes it *utterly* droll is the compounding the ridiculous thesis with polished rhetoric.

851 Reading γελοῖον καὶ φιλὸν ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρόν (C3-4), with Burnet. Socrates effects the transition from his imaginary case, a congenial joke, to the harmful cleverness one actually encounters in politics.

852 ὁ ῥητορικός (C6): Socrates takes a step away from Phaedrus's term, ῥήτωρ (260A1), to isolate the skill that makes him an orator (compare the uses at Gorg.455B4 and C2, and 456C2-5, and compare the argumentative technique at Rep.374B1-D6 and my nn. *ad loc.*), whence τήν, below (C10), is possessive.

853 περὶ ὄνου σκίας (C7): In the context of the previous example Socrates exploits the nearby idiom of the ὄνου σκία, proverbial for a thing not worth taking seriously. Cf. schol. *ad loc.* and Zenobius 6.28 (=*Paroim.Gr.*1.169-70).

854 πείσῃ (C9): Note the shift to aorist from the conative present above (C7).

855 Reading ποῖόν τινα οἴει (C10) with the mss., rather than Hirschig's insertion of ν (ποῖόν τιν' ἂν), followed by edd. The question is in the form of a present general condition.

856 οὐ πάνυ (D2): Phaedrus's litotes connotes something ominous in contrast with παγγέλοιον.

857 τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην (D4): τήν is "referential" (cf.n.49 *ad* 228B6). The whole expression is pregnant: "In making fun of this orator and casting aspersions on the famous *art* of composing speeches are we coming off as insensitive rubes?" It is the first time τέχνη is used in the dialogue (apart from Socrates's passing reference to his own "erotic competence" at the end of his great speech, 257A8). With a fanfare of self-deprecation Socrates introduces her high name; next she will come onstage and defend her honor.

858 εἴποι (D4): The subject is of course ἡ τέχνη, Madame Techne, whom Socrates treats as an imaginary interlocutor, in part to avoid putting Phaedrus on the spot (cf. n.845), and in part to enable her to make the vaunt of sophistication in her own voice.

859 οὕτως (D7) is semi-redundant, stressing as often the priority (as before vs. after, condition vs. result, prerequisite vs. prerogative) of the previous clause despite its subordinate syntactical status. Cf. *Rep.*368D6 and my n. *ad loc.* The shift to the indicative (λαμβάνει from the Bononiensis 3630, along with the nominative κτησάμενος of all mss.), for which Hermias's gloss gives some support (222.5-7) and which is read by Stallb., is preferable since the teacher is not after all saying he compels the student to take him up, though as Ast remarks we could very well be expected to supply a verb complementary to ἀνακάζω, such as κελεύω. For such zeugmatic complementarity in οὐδέν ... ἀλλά, by which in addition ἕκαστος is to be supplied in the positive alternative cf.*Rep.*366D, 382E, 438A, 561B; *Symp.*192E; *Tht.*157B. Little is at stake as to the meaning.

860 δ'οὖν (D8) insists on the independent importance of the point it introduces, in contrast with γοῦν which adduces an independently true point as mere corroboration of what came before.

861 οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον (D8-9), designating logical independence as in the skeptical trope (cf. *Rep.*340B4 and my note *ad loc.*).

persuade *artfully*."[862]

"And isn't she correct in arguing this?"[863]

I say yes,[864] if the arguments that are now coming to attack her can corroborate that it *is* "artfully."[865] For[866] I seem to hear arguments approaching that will testify, *in limine*[867] as it were, that she is lying[868] instead, and that she is not an art but an artless knack, whereas to master the genuine[869] art of speaking without a grasp on truth is neither possible nor will ever become so, as the Spartan would say.[870] (261)

"We need[871] these arguments, Socrates! Bring them forth and test what they are saying and how they argue for it."

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862 τέχνῃ (D9) is emphatic by position and constitutes the vaunt (μέγα) of the art, meaning literally "with art" but the sense is "professionally" (as with the preposition in ἐπὶ τέχνῃ vs. ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ: *Prot.*312B3-4) It adduces and embodies the justification of the τέχνη's charge that Socrates and Phaedrus's objection is crass (ἀγροικότερον), but since it is Τέχνη that is speaking the claim is purely circular (*pace* Heitsch, 128 and n.248), as Τέχνη herself fairly acknowledges with the words εἴ τι ἐμὴ συμβουλή.

It is noteworthy that this noun in the anarthrous "adverbial" dative of means or manner, *when modified*, becomes semantically otiose, as in the idioms πάσῃ τέχνῃ or ἰθέῃ τέχνῃ (cf.Hdt.1.112.1, 9.57.1, and cf. the adverbial acc. τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην, *Leg.*657A1: cf. LSJ *s.v.* I.3); but when unmodified, as here, the inner meaning of technique comes back to the fore (cf. Iliad 3.61; *Euthyd.*282D8; *Ion* 532C6, 536D2; *Polit.*278E10, 294D7, 310A3; *Rep.*381B1; *Symp.*223D5; *Tim.*50E6; Thuc.5.8.2, 5.18.4 [where the modifier is predicative]: cf. LSJ *s.v.*, II.), as it does when constructed with various prepositions (ἐκ τέχνης: 245A6, *Ion* 533E6, *Tim.*33D1; ἄνευ τέχνης: *Phdo.*89D5; ἐπὶ τέχνῃ: *Prot.*312B3, 315A5; ἐν τέχνῃ: *Prot.*319C8). For the expression used as a vaunt, which was apparently noticed by Cicero (or. 13,40: *traduntur arte quadam verba vinxisse*), cf. Gorg.*Hel.*13 (=DK 2.292.9).

863 οὐκοῦν (E1) indicates that Phaedrus expects a yes-answer, which suggests that he believes the assertion of Madame Τέχνη, which is of a piece with the self-definition of rhetoric that he has already "heard" (259E7-260A4, esp. A3-4; cf. also the continuation of Gorgias's remarks at *Gorg.*452E4-8, which he proudly elaborates at 456A7-C6). Socrates is sailing close to the wind and now introduces an extraordinary evasion in order to avoid confrontation, the conceit of a group of personified arguments coming on the attack (ἐπιόντες, E2) – or, occurring to him (! cf. ἐπίον, 264B6).

864 φημί (E2): Socrates begins by granting rather than resisting what his interlocutor wants, and playing along with him as his ally rather than confronting him as his enemy. Thus he introduces his own argument as a third party just as he had introduced Phaedrus's argument as a third party, above (cf. A5 and n.845).

865 τέχνῃ (E3) is *not* an accusative predicate attracted into the dative by the αὐτῇ of the leading construction (in the manner of the attraction at 262C6: cf. n.906). Rather, it repeats the vaunting dative Madame Techne had just used. We may understand τὸ πείθειν to be the subject (from D9) of εἶναι, or even τέχνη. The very vagueness of the retort emphasizes the circular elusiveness of her vaunt. To test its validity will now become the gravamen, with Socrates continually holding Techne's bare dative responsible to "justify" itself (the very rare expression is used seventeen times below: 261B4, D7, D10; 265D1; 266D2; 267C8; 270B6, E1, E3; 271B8, C4; 272B1, E2; 273C5; 276B7; 277B1, C4).

866 γάρ (E3) explains his assertion that arguments are approaching (*pace* Ryan). Socrates has now attributed both sides of the argument to imaginary interlocutors in order to neutralize Phaedrus's tendency to pit one person against another. Instead Phaedrus will find himself side by side with Socrates as a partner in the inquiry (cf.269A8-B5, 272B2-6, n.858 and nn. 1039, 1125, 1172, *infra*). The bad side of Phaedrus's ability (or desire) to incite others to speak is that he is unable (or unwilling) to take a position on his own, but Socrates's dialogical purpose is to get him to stop flip-flopping and think for himself. His standard way of doing this is to cast his interlocutor into the formal, and therefore to some extent safely impersonal, role of answerer in dialectical inquiry (cf. n.836 *supra* and n.874 *infra*). For the metaphor of an argument he sees approaching cf. *Tht.*163C6.

867 διαμαρτυρομένων (E4), of testimony taken in advance of the trial impugning the legitimacy of the case being brought (Rowe, citing LSJ *s.v.* διαμαρτυρία). Socrates uses the priorities of legal procedure as a metaphor for logical priority: how can the τέχνη ῥητορική provide a πείθειν that is τέχνῃ (E3) if she is not a τέχνη in the first place?

868 ψεύδεται (E4): That the "art" is lying is a stronger charge than that she is incorrect; but more pertinently to lie is an attempt to persuade, whereas the issue of truth is now being adduced as an issue that is logically prior.

869 Though ἔτυμος (E5) is rare in Plato and may be common in the Doric dialect, this word is not repeated in Plutarch's "Laconian" version of this proverb. Perhaps it is here meant to echo Stesichorus's palinode where ἔτυμος appealed to a higher standard of truth (οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος λόγος οὗτος, 243A8 *supra*), and Hesiod's use of the term to draw a contrast between the likely, human story that pleases humans (i.e., Homer) and the truth that an account of the gods requires

Come forth then, my noble beasts,[872] and persuade Phaedrus, the spawner of beautiful children,[873] that if he does not practice philosophy adequately he won't be qualified to speak adequately on any topic. Let's have Phaedrus play answerer to you.

"Ask away."[874]

Now isn't it the case on the whole[875] that rhetoric would be, as art,[876] a sort of soul-leading[877] by the vehicle of argumentation, not only in the courts and all the other public gatherings[878] but also in private conversation, being one and the same art whether the topic is minor or major,[879] the correct deployment of which is no more honorable in connection with serious affairs than insignificant

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and deserves (ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα | ἴδμεν δ'εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι, *Th.*27-8.).

870 φησὶν ὁ Λάκων (E5): Plutarch includes almost exactly this (...τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἧφθαι οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτε μήποτε γένηται) in his collection of *Laconic Sayings* (=*Mor.*233B: Aristotle also refers to such a collection and characterizes them [*Rhet.*1394B35ff]). It is not a particular personage for us to track down that Socrates seems to hear, but a Spartan *sentiment*, tantamount to the Elder Cato's sobering admonition, *rem tene verba sequentur* – an aggressive riposte to the self-advertised sophistication of Madame *T*έχνη who had just found their objection crass.

871 Reading δεῖ (261A1), with T over the δή of B, though I cannot make out the sense of it (sc. ἀκούειν?). Perhaps he is echoing the terms by which he agreed to the question in the first place (δεόμεθα, 258E1). His exhortation that Socrates interrogate them (A2) again suggests he thinks it will be they rather than himself that will be undergoing the ἔλεγχος (cf. Λυσίαν ... ἐξετάσαι, 258D8 and n.823).

872 θρέμματα γενναῖα (A3): This fanciful conceit of addressing the arguments brings to the fore the personification of arguments that had peeked through at 259E4; and characterizing them as live animals represents how they operate in the mind. The latter idea will become thematic later on, in the notion of arguments living in the soul (276A5-9) and in Socrates's disappointed expectation that portraits with suggestive looks on their faces might talk with him (275D4-9). γενναῖα warmly welcomes them as if they were guests, who now will be treated with a certain deference – namely, that Phaedrus will answer them!

873 καλλίπαιδα (A3), perhaps referring not to Phaedrus's personal beauty (Vollgraff, citing E.*Or.*964) but his "progeny" of λόγοι (cf. 242A8-B5, Plut.1001A), still more of which he just now has called into existence (τούτων δεῖ), after thinking his hopes would be slim at getting Lysias to respond to Socrates's Second Speech, though in fact the present discussion was called into existence exactly by his less than articulate worry about Lysias's fame (cf. nn.818, 801).

874 ἐρωτᾶτε (A6). These "arguments" will "persuade" Phaedrus by asking him, not by telling him: again Socrates moves him into the role of answerer, and so in a sense he will persuade himself by coming to answer "yes" to them. The shift from discourse to question-and-answer, and Phaedrus's acquiescence in the method by asking them to start asking, formally announces the regime of dialectical investigation for a second time (cf. n.836; *Rep.*358D8, 550D1-7, 583C1, 595C5, and my n. *ad* 523A8). The first attempt immediately derailed at 259E7-260A4 when Phaedrus unnoticingly changed the agreed-upon topic, good speech, to the topic of being a good rhetor (cf. n.841).

875 τὸ μὲν ὅλον (A7): μέν creates a berth for δέ, and so its ὅλον suggests that a δέ clause will make a statement about ἡ ῥητορική that is κατὰ μέρος (*pace* Heitsch, n.253 followed by Yunis, *ad loc.*; *silent alii*). Speaking more technically, in the expression ἡ ῥητορική the understood feminine noun is the genus and the -ικός adjective denotes the species. But Phaedrus's objection interrupts the proposed movement from genus to species and μέν ends up being "*solitarium*" (compare Denniston's remark *s.v.* §III.5.iv: p.382).

876 ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη (A7): The hyperbaton of τέχνη is awkward and therefore emphatic. By the time we read the copula we had already supplied it (cf. *Gorg.*449C9-D1) and instead we are surprised by the copula being "ideal" (ἂν εἴη) and are forced to supply a protasis or a condition. As with τὸ μέν ὅλον (see prev. n.) Socrates is broaching a focus on the putatively *artistic* aspect of ῥητορική, whatever else it might be, by suggesting that *as such* it would have certain categorical attributes of τέχνη *per se*, which he now adduces (A8-B2) – but he does quite make the logic of his question explicit.

Yunis, more interested in the history of rhetoric than the *Phaedrus*, (cf. his earlier work, *Taming Democracy* [Cornell 1996] ch.7), takes the time at the first use of the term ῥητορική (260C10), to forewarn us that "Plato" will be using the term in two senses, one his own special meaning (barely distinguishable from rational conversation) and the other denoting the sophistic teachings – but Yunis's preoccupation with the latter meaning dampens his perception (his inconclusive n. 1, p.173 [*op.cit.*] notwithstanding) that exactly the claim that it is a skill imports categorical attributes to it that will vitiate and whittle away to nothing the extra meaning that Madame Techne and the sophistic "technicians" want it to carry, which is Socrates's point here and going forward.

ones?[880] Or what have you heard along these lines?[881]

"Not exactly *that*, by Zeus, is it said and written to be,[882] but especially about lawsuits artfully,[883] and also is said to be about large assemblies. Of a further application I have not heard."[884]

Have you only heard of Nestor's treatises on the craft of argument and those of Odysseus, which the two of them wrote during leisure moments in Troy,[885] but not about Palamedes's stuff?[886]

"By Zeus I have to say that even of Nestor's I haven't[887] unless you are making Gorgias into a Nestor, nor Odysseus's unless you mean to dress up Thrasymachus or Theodorus as an Odysseus."

Could be, but rather than play with names let's stick with you and me.[888] Tell me, what it is that

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877 ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων (A8): This stab at a definition of the "rhetorical art" (n.b., τις) is a provisional filler for investigating its claim to be a τέχνη in the first place (i.e., *in limine*) which is the gravamen of the argument brought by the "approaching" λόγοι. For the nonce this *definiens* combines the "logical" aspect (διὰ λόγων) that Socrates had pointed to (at 259E5-6), with the persuasive aspect (ψυχαγωγία) that Phaedrus had pointed to in response (τὸ πείθειν, at 259E7-260A4), so as to cast the focus elsewhere, i.e., onto τέχνη. As before (cf. 259E4-6) Socrates is trying to begin with essential ὑπάροντα, this time the attributes of "art" as such.

The fact that Aristophanes's use of the verb ψυχαγωγεῖν has Socrates as its subject (*Av.*1555), in its old sense of ushering disembodied souls through Hades or into upper climes (cf. A.*Pers.*687, E.*Alc.*1128), is entirely irrelevant to the present passage, where τις apologizes that the term is being given a different sense for the purposes of the present context. Socrates's use is similar to the use of the verb at Xen.*Mem.*3.10.6 – the sculptor's ability to make his statues look alive (ζωτικὸν φαίνεσθαι) is said μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους – where the parallel construction with διά and the genitive suggests that διὰ λόγων, here, is the *vehicle* by which the soul is led (*pace* Vollgraff *ad loc.*, p.148, who takes διὰ λόγων to mean διὰ ῥωμὴν λόγων). For later uses cf. *Minos* 321A4-5, Isoc. *Evag.*10 and *Nic.*49 (of capturing the attention of the audience with tragic diction, with rhythm and music, and with fiction when the arguments are unappealing or the style is weak); Aristotle (*Po.*1450A34,B17) and Timocles's wonderful remark (frg.6.6 [=*CAF* 2.453 ed.Koch]), ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ἰδίων λήθην λαβών | πρὸς ἀλλοτρίῳ τε ψυχαγωγηθεὶς πάθει | μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀπῆλθε παιδευθεὶς ἅμα. The passages from *Minos*, Isoc. *Nic.*, Timocles and Xenophon vitiate deVries's flat claim (*ad loc.*) that διὰ λόγων is meant to distinguish rhetoric from the ψυχαγωγία of *music*. The thematic parallel between Xenophon's passage and the discussion of ζωγραφία near the end of the dialogue (275D4-9) is fortuitous but significant.

878 καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι (A8-9) is a *generalization* (*pace* Yunis who wants it to refer only to δημηγορική, citing *Soph.*222C9, which is not parallel). Socrates abruptly generalizes from the single instance of forensics to all public gatherings (σύλλογος is from λέγω "collect:" cf.*Leg.*935B5-8 and compare συνόδοις, 268A4), so that he can move on to the supplement he is insisting upon – discussion outside the political venues (cf. n. on the plural ἀκούουσι at 261D7). For fuller lists of σύλλογοι cf. *Rep.*492B5-7 (which includes theatrical gatherings and armies) and *Gorg.*452E2-3 (where Gorgias elaborates *three* kinds of speaking scenarios with *figurae etymologicae* and then *generalizes* with πᾶς σύλλογος).

879 μεγάλων (B1) does respond to Phaedrus's description of rhetoric as dealing with τὰ μέγιστα, just above (259E7-260A4: cf. n.843), but is meant here not so much to correct the inflated respect he feels for public speakers as to carry further the point that true skill is as such universal in application and therefore applies to large things as well as small (*pace* Yunis *et al.*).

880 The shift (A9-B2) from περί with the genitive of the topic to the more general περί plus accusative is mere *variatio*, and σπουδαῖα / φαῦλα varies σμικρῶν / μεγάλων. The latter come from Phaedrus's remark above (cf. prev. note) and the former come from Socrates's two examples in his intervening criticism of rhetoric as based on likelihood (260B1-D2). I take τὸ ὀρθόν to be nominative and its article to be possessive; γιγνόμενον refers to the *deployment* of the art and focuses on the effect it, as such, brings (cf.277D2). The entire phrase is epexegetical to ἡ αὐτή. τὸ ὀρθόν suggests a specification of the vague τέχνῃ. γε again (259E4) presents the crucial proviso or fulcrum of the argument.

881 ταῦτ' ἀκήκοας (B2), almost taunting Phaedrus for his reliance on hearsay, as again B5, B7, B8, and recalling even the demonstrative he used in order to change the subject (cf. n.839). The perfect Phaedrus used of himself at 259E7 and the adjective he used of himself at 259B3 (ἀνήκοος) treat what he has heard as a *fait accompli*. Socrates is continuing to hold Phaedrus to what he has heard although he has exonerated him from taking responsibility for its truth with the method of οὐκ ἀπόβλητον ἔπος (260A5), in order to keep Phaedrus conversing with him.

882 λέγεταί τε καὶ γράφεται (B4) reveals that what Phaedrus "has heard" includes what he has read (γράφεται).

883 τέχνῃ (B4) Socrates's question was just vague enough to allow Phaedrus again to evade its theoretical substance expressed in the "ideal" optative ("What in conception are the ὑπάρχοντα of τέχνη as such?") with an empirical

the opposing lawyers in a trial are doing. They are antilogizing, in very fact, aren't they[889] – or what?

"This is just what they do."

On questions of justice and injustice?

"Yes."

Now the speaker that does this artfully – will he be able to make one and the same thing appear just on one day and unjust to the same men on the next, if he wants?

"Obviously – go on."

And likewise in the case of public speeches will he lead the city to judge the same things to be good on one day and not on another?

"Just so."

And have we not seen the Eleatic Palamedes[890] argue with such skill that the same things seem to his audience[891] now similar and now different from themselves, or both one and many, or both at rest and in motion?

"Quite."

So the art of antilogy or contrary argumentation is not just about[892] the courts and public

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answer in the indicative; but in the course of doing so he also reverts to the vaunting dative τέχνῃ, again in final position, ignoring Socrates's suggestion to specify its meaning with τὸ ὀρθόν. The vagueness is here maximal: he does not even supply the already vague εἶναι from 260E3.

884 οὐκ ἀκήκοα (B5): Phaedrus now adopts *non*-hearing by himself as a dispositive criterion (οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, B3) for *falseness*, but only after stating in his own voice the thesis he *has* heard (B3-5). It is important to recognize that the others he has heard from (or read) are absent, else Socrates would be able to examine them. Moreover his remark corroborates the conclusion we drew above that Lysias's speech was itself a mere lagniappe or busman's holiday.

885 σχολάζοντες συνεγραψάτην (B7): Socrates notices Phaedrus include what he has *read* (γράφεται) within what he has heard, and produces another riddle. Nestor and Odysseus are the paradigmatic orators in the *Iliad*; the ridiculous and absurd picture that they scribbled in their tents (cf. Brisson n.328), evoked with the precious dual, continues the play on Phaedrus's reliance on hearsay. We are not meant to be sucked into solving a riddle by guessing as Phaedrus does which λογογράφοι are here made to borrow their names, but are supposed to imagine the absurd figure of the λογογράφος, whom Phaedrus resembles and finds a little more familiar than he wants to admit, working among men of action. They are the models of persons able to sway σύλλογοι one way or the other, and serve as foil for the still more fantastic riddle whereby the Palamedes of Homer will be conceived of as an Eleatic. The riddle enables him to extend rhetoric beyond the parochial self-definition as public oration, to which Phaedrus has restricted it, to include other scenarios of argumentation. And above all it invites Phaedrus finally to name his sources. Surely, we are meant to gather, he has seen the treatises of Gorgias and Thrasymachus.

886 τῶν (B8) is more likely the idiomatic vague neuter like ταῦτα (e.g., B2) than feminine, which would require a plurality of treatises by this paradoxical figure.

887 καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δι' ἔγωγε (C1): On ναί cf. Shilleto *de Fals.Leg.* Appendix C: "to strengthen the words coming from the preceding speaker by way of taking an objection to their sufficiency." Cf. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία at B3: Phaedrus is warming to the role of interlocutor.

888 σὺ δ' εἰπέ (C4): The play with names has gotten off the point; he will bring it back (in the "personage" of the Eleatic Palamedes) after he has secured Phaedrus's dialectical agreement (whence σύ) to the substantive point that forensics is analogous to antilogy.

889 ἀντιλέγουσιν (C5): ἀντίδικοι each deliver λόγοι and so they ἀντιλέγουσιν. The etymological "argument" (pointed up by μέντοι) justifies a segue (cf.n.803, *supra*) to still another species of τέχνη that goes beyond what Phaedrus has heard is included in ῥητορική, namely Zeno's technique of ἀντιλογική (D10). Yunis (184) again shows his preoccupation with the history of oratory by characterizing Zeno's λόγοι as "private:" cf. n.891, *infra*.

890 Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην (D6): Now Socrates does use the autonomasia that Phaedrus had suspected him of using above (C1-3), widening open the horizon of "rhetoric" so-called (cf.nn.809, 876). He is referring to the antimonies of Zeno.

891 τοῖς ἀκούουσι (D7): His audience is plural: "private" means unpolitical.

892 περὶ δικαστήρια (D10): In his return to the original point now refuted Socrates as usual quotes his interlocutor's words closely – in this case Phaedrus's inchoate use of the prepositional phrase in περί as a predicate (sc. εἶναι) at 261B4-5. δικαστήρια by an idiomatic metonymy replaces the nature of the meeting with the place of the meeting. Cf.

assemblies. Instead it seems that this would be[893] a single and selfsame art – assuming that it *is* an art[894] – about all kinds of argumentation and will make a man as able as a man can be[895] to make anything seem similar to anything else, as well as[896] to expose his opponent's attempt to hide that he is doing so.

"But what do you mean by this last thing?"

'Here is the way I judge it will become clear to those who seek it:'[897] Does deception and confusion occur between things that differ a lot or a little? (262)

"A little."

And it is by small steps that you will better evade the audience's notice as you move from a thing to its opposite rather than by larger steps?

"Of course."

Thus a man that is thinking of[898] deceiving and confusing another man and avoiding to become deceived himself[899] will need to see the similarity and the dissimilarity of things with perspicuity and accuracy.

"Necessarily, I would aver."

Now if he is ignorant of the truth about some certain thing,[900] will he be able to distinguish which of its points of similarity to and difference from other things are large and which of them are small?

"Impossible."

When it comes to people who hold opinions contrary to the truth and are confused, is it clear that this state of mind creeps in on them because of certain similarities?

"That's what happens at least."

So is there any way that a person can skillfully and at will[901] walk his audience along leading them from the truth toward its opposite by small steps through the exploitation of similarities, or can himself avoid this happening to himself, assuming he lacks settled knowledge[902] of the distinct

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temporal metonymy with πότε at 268A2, and n. *ad loc.*

893 ἂν εἴη (E2): With the ideal construction and semi-appositive τέχνη he reverts to the theoretical manner of his original question (261A78ff: cf. n.876) which had been derailed by Phaedrus's empirical response (cf. nn.883, 875).

894 εἴπερ (E2): περ is truly stiplulative (cf. 257B7 and n.), acknowledging the objection above, that what is called rhetoric might be a mere τριβή (260E3-5). πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα and πᾶν παντί again stress the universality of art as such (cf. σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι [A9-B1] and n.879).

895 τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν (E3): Art (τέχνη) does not make the impossible possible but enables the artist to do everything that *is* possible (cf. e.g., Isoc.*Soph.*10). Yunis *ad loc.* narrows the art to a sophistic one and struggles with "Plato" 's definition of ἀντιλογική in other dialogues, but these concerns are irrelevant to the transient dialectical use Socrates is making of the term and its meaning in order to widen the scope of the designation "τέχνη" λόγων.

896 καί … (E3-4): The addition might be meant to bring forward the competitive scenario of ἀντίδικοι with which he shoe-horned in the logical sense of ἀντιλογία (C4-5), but in addition to that it draws out another ὑπάρχον of τέχνη as such, that as a μία δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων it enables the exponent to achieve as well as to combat ὁμοιοῦν.

897 τῇδε δοκῶ ζητοῦσιν φανεῖσθαι (E6): Ast and Heindorf hear a dactylic hemistich and the proleptic formality of the phrase does bring Parmenides to mind. Isolating the logical aspect of ἀντιλέγειν instead of the competitive is exactly the essence of the matter.

898 μέλλοντα ἀπατήσειν (262A5): With future inf. μέλλειν tends to denote thinking; with present, willing (Smyth §1959a). Contrast 263B6.

899 ἀπατήσεσθαι (A6), middle in both form and sense (*pace* Yunis): αὐτόν is subject as in αὐτὸς τοῦτο διαφυγεῖν below, B7.

900 ἀλήθειαν … ἑκάστου (A9) as well as ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων repeats the language of Socrates's First Speech (237C3), as well as the language of the "forms," showing how natural that language is (cf. nn.5, 1058, 1353).

901 ἑκάστοτε (B6) asserts the broad application inherent in the skill as a skill (τεχνικός) temporally instead of extensionally (as with πᾶν παντί above, 261E3).

902 ὁ μὴ ἐγνωρικώς (B7), μή conditional and ἐγνωρικώς perfect. The reversion to the adjectival participle recalls the

characteristics of the things in question?

"No way, assuming that."

And so, my companion and helpmate, the skill of argumentation[903] that a man will provide who does not know the truth but is merely occupied with sniffing out opinions[904] is a ridiculous and unskillful skill.

"That might just be true."[905]

What do you think about looking into the speech of Lysias you are carrying with you as well as into the speeches that I delivered for some examples of the skillfulness or lack of it[906] we are talking about?

"More than anything I would, since our argument is very abstract and lacking in adequate illustrations."

Well in fact the pair of speeches[907] that were delivered did present[908] illustrations of how a person who knows the truth could play around with arguments so as to mislead his audience. Indeed for my own part in the matter I would attribute it to the gods that haunt this place. Maybe even the Muses' spokesmen, these singers we hear above us, granted me such an inspiration – since I at least possess no skillful art of speaking.

"Let all that be as you say: just[909] tell me about the examples you referred to."

Alright, just read me off the opening of Lysias's speech.

" 'You already know what my situation is, and how I believe it will be to our advantage that these things should come out this way. I expect, however, that I should not fail to get what I am asking for because of this, that I am not in fact a person who loves you. Since when it comes to that sort they have a change of heart at a certain point …' "

Stop there. We have to say how he errs and falls short of skillful procedure, don't we? (263)

"Yes."

Now wouldn't you say that the following point is clear to all, that about some of these kinds of things[910] we are in unanimity whereas in others we are at odds with each other.

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opening question, which Phaedrus had denied (259E5).

903 λόγων ... τέχνην (C1): This new and completely natural expression makes explicit what had remained idiomatically implicit in the feminine phrases ἡ ῥητορική or ἡ ἀντιλογική (cf. n.875) and in the pendant appositives at 261E3 and 261A7. καί at C2 is inferential: his laughable confusion will hardly appear skillful.

904 δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς (C2) telescopes the reach of the present criticism (which began at 261B6) to include the "technician" Phaedrus had described at the first go-through (259E7-60A4, n.b. δόξαντα, δόξει).

905 κινδυνεύει (C4): To the conclusion, which flies in the face of what he has heard, Phaedrus acquiesces with some reluctance, so Socrates will now illustrate it.

906 ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων (C6): The predicates are attracted to the case into which the relative was attracted (ὧν = τούτων ἅ). Socrates is again interested in the element of skill and art, and Yunis again shows his preoccupation with Oratory by asserting in his advance summary of the passage (*ad* 262C4-266D4) that "Socrates undertakes to discover the presence or absence of *rhetorical* art" (my emphasis).

907 ἐρρηθήτην (C10), passive, again preferring to make the speeches the subjects. He refers to all three speeches (οἷς at C6 shows Socrates means to include both his speeches). The pairing of the dual number may as well represent the pairing of their theses as being for and against Eros, as the pairing of the authors (Lysias / Socrates), which is the way they were introduced just above and as they are described at 264E7 (cf. n.944). Cf. also the distinction drawn between essentialist and numerical use of λόγος at n.787). The putative implication, worried over by Nehemas/Woodruff and Rowe, that Socrates might thereby be allowing Lysias to be a "knower" is remote from the immediate context, but is not implied in Socrates's remarks anyway, since the pattern of an unintentional error may well to used to illustrate an intentional deception.

908 For καὶ μήν ... γε (C10), cf. 227C3 and n. *ad loc.*

909 μόνον (D7): Compare Phaedrus's sense that Socratic was beating around the bush at 237A6.

910 Reading τοιούτων (263A3) with the mss. (ὄντων corr. Coislinianus). First person τοιόνδε already points forward and so does τοιούτων in its wake (*pace* Richards, *Plat.*162). Compare, with Ryan, *Phdo.*73C5-7. Phaedrus *interrupts* what he is

"I think I know where you are going but make it clearer anyway."

When somebody says "iron" or "silver" we are all put in mind of the same thing, aren't we?[911]

"Exactly."

But what if somebody says "just" or "good?"[912] Isn't the mind of one man sent off in one direction and the mind of the another in another, so that we find ourselves on opposite sides both with each other and also in ourselves?[913]

"Very much so."

And so in some cases we are in harmony but in others we are not?

"Just as you say."

In which of the two, then, are we more prone to be deceived? In which, that is, is rhetoric capable[914] of the greater effect?

"Obviously in cases where we are adrift."

So mustn't the person who is going to pursue rhetoric as an art[915] come to distinguish these methodically and fix upon the character of each category, by which to determine in which cases the mass will necessarily be adrift and in which which they will not?

"He will have recognized a very useful[916] aspect[917] indeed who comes to recognize *that* one."

And second I would think that as he becomes involved in a specific topic he does not forget to ask but unerringly perceives to which category the topic that has come up for him to talk about in fact belongs.[918]

"Obviously."

So as to the topic of eros, into which of the two categories shall we place it, the disputed or the non-disputed?

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about to say and it is only the reference of the demonstrative that he needs clarified.

911 διενοήθημεν (A7), "gnomic" aorist, as if as soon as the question is asked, the answer has appeared. Contrast present φέρεται, below as if to say in that case, "Come to think of it, we do."

912 δικαίου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ (A9): He repairs to the same two μέγιστα as before (261C8-D4).

913 ἀμφισβητοῦμεν (A10) repeats the political notion of στασιαστικῶς with the spatial conception of taking different paths (its etymon being βη- [βαίνω]) introduced by the intervening metaphor of ἄλλῃ (sc. ὁδῷ) φέρεται, which concretized the abstract passive διενοήθημεν. We are treated to an instantiation of the technique of substituting synonyms that is here being associated with the art of argumentation and are left to ask ourselves whether these are are virtually equivalent or whether the terms have effected a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος right before our eyes. On the possibility that the speaker ignorant of fine distinctions might not only fail to convince his audience but might also succeed to confuse himself, cf. 262A5-6 and B7, and also the beginning of Socrates's First Speech, 237C2-5.

914 δύναται (B4), absolute. The sense is that as a skill rhetoric would confer some ability onto its exponent: cf. τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν, "the effectiveness that belongs to art as such," 268A2.

915 τέχνην ῥητορικήν (B6) again makes explicit the underlying feminine noun, presumed just above by the expression ἡ ῥητορική, and moreover places it first for emphasis. Cf. 261A7 and E2 and nn. 876, 893. The subsequent expressions likewise belong to the vocabulary of scrupulous study (μετιέναι, ὁδῷ) and dispositive results (the *perfect* infinitives, and ἀνάγκη), as do καλόν and the perfect κατανενοηκώς in Phaedrus's reply.

916 καλόν (C1) in the sense of what is effective – i.e., done according to art (e.g. *Rep*.353A4).

917 Reading εἶδος with all mss. (C1). With an easy-going substitution of terms, Phaedrus refers to the χαρακτήρ of B8, as is guaranteed by the repetition of λαμβάνειν, *pace* Richards, Vollgraff, Ritter *et al.* There is no "irony" in Phaedrus's reply (*pace* Rowe): the τε ... καί construction asserts that the χαρακτῆρ or εἶδος by which to distinguish the confusing and the simple terms and topics is dispositive. The expression implies consciousness not only of public opinion but of its specific limitations.

918 τυγχάνει (C5) along with ἑκάστῳ and γιγνόμενον stress the fortuitous individuality of the case encountered in the field. τέχνη also requires the technician to be effective in applying it. Exactly the same ability to effect the transition from the general ideas to the case at hand, without which the theoretical training would be useless, is described in similar language below (271D7-E2: n.b. ὀξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει). The entire duplex phrase (περί ... ἐρεῖν / ποτέρου ... γένους) has a pedantic ring to it with its proleptic ordering and alliteration, and even has a "rhythm to its reason": ⏑ ⏑ — — — ⏑ ⏑ — / ⏑ ⏑ — — — ⏑ — — ⏑ — .

"The disputed no doubt. How else do you think it was possible for you to argue as you just did that it is harmful to the beloved and the lover, and then in the next moment[919] the greatest good there could be,[920] in very fact?"

A perfect answer, but now answer me this – I confess I can't remember since I was under the influence. Did I *define* eros at the beginning of my speech?[921]

"Yes, by Zeus, with a stunningly forceful[922] definition at that!"

Alas! Behold how much more skillful you find the Nymphs of Acheloos and Pan the son of Hermes to be than Lysias the son of Cephalus, when it comes to speeches![923] Or am I quite wrong: did Lysias also at the beginning of his love-speech require us first to take Eros to be the distinct thing[924] what he intended him to be, and once he had set this out use it to organize all that he went on to say?[925] Shall we read his opening once more?

"If you want to, but what you are looking for is not there."

Go ahead and recite so that I can hear it from the great man himself.

" 'You already know what my situation is, and how I believe it will be to our advantage that these things should come out this way. I expect, however, that I should not fail to get what I am asking for because of this, that I am not in fact a person (264) who loves you. Since when it comes to that sort they have a change of heart at a certain point in time as to whom they should benefit, namely, the moment their desire abates …' "

Yes, it seems he is far from doing what we are looking for if he begins not at the beginning but at the conclusion, and tries to swim through his argument[926] on his back upstream, beginning as he does

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919 αὖθις (C11): For the purpose of showing how ἀμφισβητήσιμον is the meaning of ἔρως Phaedrus treats Socrates's two theses as separated only by time from one another, since they were the work of the same speaker, rather than as belonging to two speeches with two very different intentions by a speaker who had changed his mind.

920 Taking ὡς (C11) with μέγιστα rather than as a repetition of the subordinating ὡς above, echoing the emphasis with which the conclusion was reached, at 256B5-7.

921 ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου (D3): The article is possessive. With the singular Socrates accepts Phaedrus's overformulation of the two theses belonging to the same speech. The claim that he cannot remember whether he defined it since he was under the force of inspiration suggests it is the beginning of his bad speech that he is talking about. Only later, *pace* Hackforth, does he use the singular for both his speeches, and so for his own reasons: in between, he will still speak of them in the plural at 264E7. To speak of them as one λόγος awaits the articulation of their dialectical relationship (265C5-6ff) and itself begins to detach the thinking that lies behind performances from the performances themselves. As to the act of defining the topic at the beginning, Yunis (again without warrant) identifies this element as a "rhetorical" virtue (189) while in fact it is merely λόγος and not τὸ ῥητορικόν that is at stake: it enhances consecutivity not persuasiveness.

922 Νὴ Δία ἀμηχάνως ὡς σφόδρα (D4): In truth there was more heat than light in the definition, as Phaedrus's remark suggests, but it did provide the basis for the argument, for it implied the key principle that lover's disposition is enslaved by his passion (238D8-E4ff). From this single ill, all the deleterious sequelae followed.

923 τεχνικωτέρας (D5), since whatever Socrates got right was the work of the local deities (262D2-6). Again the focus is on the element of competence or τέχνη.

924 ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων (D8-E1). The expression is an equivalent, though a rude one, of τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστου in Socrates's First Speech (237C3), just as ἀναγκάσαι ὑπολαβεῖν just below is a rudely articulated equivalent of ὁμολογίᾳ θέσθαι ὅρον (237D1).

925 πρὸς τοῦτο ... <u>συνταξάμενος</u> ... πάντα τὸν ὕστερον λόγον διεπέραντο (E1): This also repeats rather rudely the methodological desideratum of Socrates's First Speech: cf. εἰς τοῦτο <u>ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες</u> τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα … (237D1-2).

926 διανεῖν ... τὸν λόγον (264A5-6): διανεῖν redoes, and corrects, διεπεράνατο (263E2). The metaphor of swimming through an argument is a peculiar metaphor of Plato's (cf. *Parm.*137A6, *Rep.*529C2-3, and the waves of paradox that threaten to sweep Socrates and Glaucon away, in *Rep.*Bk. 5; and cf. my n. *ad Rep.*441C4). Brisson cites a proverb according to which a person who cannot write or read might be likened to a person who cannot swim (*Leg.*689D), and moreover notes that when a person swims on his back he can see where he has been rather than where he is going (his n.345 *ad loc.*).

with what the lover would say to the beloved right at the end of his speech! Or am I all wrong, Phaedrus my dear?[927]

"I daresay it *is* the end[928] for the sake of which he composes the speech."

What about the rest of it? Does the content[929] of the speech seem to have been thrown together at random? Or does the second argument seem to be placed second out of some necessary connection with what came before? Or any of the others for that matter? The impression I got, who know nothing, is that the writer gave voice to[930] whatever popped into his head.[931] Or perhaps you can cite some *compositional*[932] exigency that led the great man[933] to place the arguments one after the other in the order he did?[934]

"Always my ally,[935] thinking as you do that I could analyze the great man's work with such polished exactitude!"

But I imagine you would be willing to aver this much, that like an[936] animal a speech must stand

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927 φίλη κεφαλή (A8): For the expression, taken from Homer (*Il.*8.281), cf. 234D6 and *Ion* 531D12.

928 τελευτή (B1): Phaedrus joins in Socrates's naïve play on the ambiguity of the term (the speaker's personal goal vs. last component or theme of his speech): in a logically ordered presentation these would come to the same thing. Perhaps his retort includes a gratuitous sound play on κεφαλή: cf. 267C4,6 infra and nn.

929 τὰ τοῦ λόγου (B3-4) is intentionally vague: to speak of parts or sections would beg the question. But τἆλλα just before lightly alludes to the notion above (263E1-2) that once a definition is promulgated the balance of the speech (πάντα, 263E1) must be organized to suit it.

930 οὐκ ἀγεννῶς (B6): Of confidently speaking out. Cf. *Charm.*158C7; *Gorg.*492D1, 521A7, A9; *Rep.*529A9 (with my n.) The ironical litotes expresses the same thing he expressed with νεανεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος at 235A6-8.

931 τὸ ἐπίον (B6), "whatever *occurred* to him" as we say, with a similar metaphor, in English. Likewise the arguments Socrates described as belligerently "approaching" Madame Techne at 260E2, were also "occurring" to him: cf. n.872, *ad loc.*

932 τινα ἀναγκὴν λογογραφικήν (B7): We have no evidence of an earlier use of the adjective and may as well regard it as being coined here. The immediate inspirations for the phrase are ἀνάγκης at B3 plus the phrase εἰρῆσθαι (~λογο-) τῷ γράφοντι (~ -γραφική) just above. Socrates's feigned ignorance and Lysias's extraordinary *tour de force* have conspired to provide an occasion for the conception to be given a name. Despite the tergiversations of the commentators, the phrase can only mean the incumbency on the writer to write something consecutive or logical (ἀνάγκη bearing its logical sense) in order to be understood. It will be the work of artfulness (τέχνη) to discover and achieve such consecutivity, and so ἀναγκὴ λογογραφική is nothing but an aspect or dimension of the true τέχνη λόγων.

933 ἐκεῖνος (B8): Socrates gives Lysias the benefit of the doubt over against his own unprofessional opinion (ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότι B6).

934 ἐφεξῆς παρ'ἄλληλα ἔθηκεν (B8) articulates the alternative to χύδην βαλεῖν (B3).

935 χρηστὸς εἶ (B9): The expression is here congenial and jocular (as at *Tht.*161A7), answering Socrates's conciliatory φίλη κεφαλή above, and is therefore different from the sarcastic use of Demosthenes (e.g., *de Cor.*30, 89, 318, with which compare 266E6 and *Tht.*166A2). For Phaedrus's diffidence about judging the great Lysias (whom he, too, here calls ἐκεῖνος), compare his reluctance to quote him from memory at 227E6-228A3. We are being reminded not only of his technique of keeping his sources offstage (nn.840,866,884) but also of his loyalty to Lysias (cf. E3, below), which set into relief the resistance he might feel toward reaching a derogatory evaluation of Lysias's teaching. His congenial tone, however, shows some daylight.

936 ζῷον (C3): I take the analogy to be intentionally unsophisticated for the sake of being obvious after Phaedrus's demurral, and it succeeds as such since Phaedrus replies, πῶς γὰρ οὔ; To adduce (beginning with Ast) an "*immense fortune*" (Brisson) of later elaborations on something so plain does not forward our understanding of the argument. Ryan's admiring remark about the "truly organic" sounds better than it means. Yunis's list of things the analogy "asserts" (193) goes far beyond even what it suggests. He likewise overstates the case by adducing Socrates's later argument about the priority of knowledge to technique (268A1-9C4) as somehow borrowing from this organic metaphor as if he were there "consider[ing] ... closely the relation between the design of a complex entity and the function of its parts" (*ibid.*). The language here (πρέποντα, C5: cf. 268D5) as well as in Aristotle's elaboration of the idea (in *Po.* ch.7) does not suggest organic functionality but consecutivity (δεύτερον, B4 and 5; cf. Ar.*Po.*1450B7-31, 1459A19-21) and balanced proportion (1450B26-7). An organism as such would not, after all, be able to "walk around without a head" (*Gorg.*505D1; cf. *Leg.*752A2). It is pertinent to remark that Socrates's great Second Speech, with its leaps upward, itself *lacked* the kind of unity envisioned here, though his First Speech certainly had it.

together as being in possession of its body,[937] not to lack a head at one end and feet at the other but instead should have both middle parts and extremities proportioned to one another and to the whole, in the way they are written up.[938]

"Of course."

Then study your associate's[939] speech to see whether it meets this criterion or not. If you do you will find that it is no better than the inscription people say is written on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

"Whatever inscription is that? And what am I to find it having in common with it?"[940]

Well the inscription goes as follows:

> A bronze maiden am I; on Midas' grave I lie;
> As long as water flows, as long as tall trees grow,
> Here remaining cemented on this tomb much lamented,
> I'll announce to all who come near that Midas the King lies here.

I imagine you recognize that it doesn't make any difference which line comes first and which last[941] …

"You're trying to *ridicule* our[942] speech, Socrates."

Alright then let's drop his speech if the criticism bothers you (though I do think it presents a host of models that one would profit to un-model himself upon[943]) – and let's turn to the alternate[944] speeches instead, for they do present an element, I think, that will be appropriate for students of arguments to investigate. (265)

"Just what element is that?"

The way they made a pair of opposites. The one argued it was the lover and the other the non-lover that should be gratified.

"And in a really manly way!"

I thought you were going to say not "manly" but "*maniacally*," which would have been the truth. Regardless, what I was searching for was just that – for we had said that eros was a kind of mania,

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937 Reading σῶμά τι (C3) with DTW rather than σώματι with B (as reported by Moreschini correcting, as Robin had before him, the report of Burnet [σῶμά τι t : σώματι TW]). As for the doublet αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, like an animal the λόγος both *is* itself (αὐτόν) and *has* its (articulated) body (σῶμα αὐτοῦ) – the paradox of the whole and its parts, a double relation more fully spelled out just below with ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ.

938 γεγραμμένα (C5) is something of a surprise and almost an afterthought: "in the way they are written up." It is as if the "parts" or "content" of the speech are the λογικόν and the arranging of these parts is the γράφειν, which two elements are compounded in the new expression, λογογραφική, above (B7).

939 With ἑταίρου (C7) Socrates depicts Phaedrus as the equal of Lysias, which Phaedrus had denied in his evasion just above, but Phaedrus's use of ἡμῶν below (E3) shows that he was right to do so. Phaedrus's wavering is an index of the progress Socrates is making with him.

940 τί πεπονθός (D1): The participle continues the construction of εὑρήσεις διαφέροντα. Lit., "By finding the epigram to suffer what, will I come to find that Lysias's speech differs not at all from it?" I.e, "In what connection will I find them indistinguishable?" The sense of πεπονθέναι τι is identical to and repeats that of ἔχειν πως above.

941 Socrates's choice of a dactylic epitaph, or of an epitaph because epitaphs are dactylic (D3-6), helps him make his point about interchangability since dactyls are monostichic. The uncertainty whether in the third line αὐτοῦ is adverbial (doubling τῇδε) which by then we would expect since the syntax of all the hemistichs has been self-contained, or if prepositional whether πολυκλαύτου goes with it or with τύμβου, adds to the failure of the logos especially since these questions barely affect the sense, anyway.

942 ἡμῶν (E3): Phaedrus now allies with the great superior whom a moment ago he could not defend.

943 μὴ πάνυ τι (E6), something of a παρὰ προσδοκίαν after παραδείγματα, βλέπων, and μιμεῖσθαι, which constitute the language of the student and the models he is meant to imitate. Socrates again moves away from personalities to the theoretical issues (cf. Hermias 231.24-6; and 261C4, and 258D1-2 [with 211.24-8]).

944 τοὺς ἑτέρους λόγους (E7), not just the "other" (ἄλλους) but the "other set" of speeches – that is, on a first take, the speeches by the other author, Socrates – since Phaedrus feels defensive about his author, Lysias. Cf. n.907.

right?

"Yes."

But[945] that there were two kinds of mania, the one caused by human disease and the other by a divine release from our usual conventions.

"Quite."

And the divine kind of mania we divided into four types corresponding to four divinities, positing the mantic mania as an inspiration from Apollo, from Dionysus[946] the telestic type, from the Muses the poetic, and fourth we posited as an inspiration from Aphrodite and Eros the erotic madness and[947] asserted it is the best.[948] And by coming up with a sort of imagistic account[949] of the experience of eros that I can hardly explain,[950] touching perhaps upon the truth though we might just as well have been borne off on some tangent,[951] and blending together a speech that was not altogether devoid of persuasiveness, we composed a sort of mythical prayer rendered in all moderation and reverence as a blandishment[952] to Eros, this master you and I share, my dear Phaedrus, who watches over beautiful children.[953]

"And let me say it was a speech far from unpleasurable[954] to hear!"

So let us focus on just this point, how the argument was able to effect a shift from criticizing

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945 δέ γε (265A9), effecting a transition as to the minor premise (*pace* deVries). For the usage cf. *Rep*.332A4, 335D9, 338E1, 349D3, 352A10, 376B8 (with my n.), 411E5.

946 Διονύσου (B3): In fact there was no explicit mention of Dionysus *per se* at 244D5-245A1, but neither was the other eros explicitly said to be the result of human disease (A9-10). The present purpose is to both to organize the division and to stress the divine orientation of his Second Speech.

947 I would move Burnet's comma before ἐρωτικὴν μανίαν (in B5) after it. The statement articulates an etymological justification for the posit.

948 ἀρίστην εἶναι (B5), asserted at 249E1-4.

949 ἀπεικάζοντες (B6), recalling the theme of Socrates's Second Speech that humans can only give an εἰκών (246A3-6 with nn.394, 395 and n.576) and must be satisfied to face and deal with human exigencies instead of the questions that occupy the divine (246C6-D3). Cf. n.952, *infra*.

950 οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ (B6): Socrates uses the same bewildered phrase to describe his own speech that Phaedrus had used (227C4-5) to describe the speech of Lysias that started the whole discussion.

951 καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι (B7-8): ἄλλοσε goes with παραφερόμενοι more than with ἀληθοῦς. The words are not "Plato's usual disclaimer as to the literal truth of his myths" (Hackforth, deVries, Ryan) but *Socrates*'s recollection and acknowledgement of the accesses of inspiration that continually drove him off course during his Second Speech (e.g., 247C3-248A1, 250B5-C8; and cf. φέρεται, 250E2). Cf. "Analysis of Third Speech: Initial Reaction and Summary."

952 προσεπαίσαμεν (C1): At last an indicative comes, after four circumstantial participial phrases of varying modality. The first participle comes at the end of its phrase (οὐκ οἶδ'... ἀπεικάζοντες, B6), as do the second and third whose phrases form a balanced pair in μέν / δέ and noticeable homeoteleuton and isocolia (ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτόμενοι / τάχα δ'ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, B6-8). The fourth participle comes first in its phrase (κεράσαντες ... λόγον) and picks up the description (ἀπεικάζοντες) of the speech begun in the first phrase, which was interrupted by the middle two phrases, and thereby closes the set of four phrases with a chiasm. A merely grammatical analysis of the passage (Yunis *ad loc*.) though helpful, ignores its rhetoric.

For the sense of προσπαίζειν cf. *Epin*.980B4, where θεοὺς προσπαῖσαι serves as a compendious restatement of παιδιᾷ καλῇ χρᾶσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν θεούς (A9-B1): Even though humans must take their endeavors seriously (803B3-8) their endeavors remain mere play to the gods (C2-C6); and still it is a high act of piety that men should consciously play along with the situation they find themselves in (C6-8). Cf. also *Leg*.644Dff. Any notion that play can be serious ultimately rests on this idea. The very characterization of Socrates's Second Speech by this sentence, with its brevity and light touch along with its suddenly subtle structure and dramatic postponement of the indicative, strikes the same balance between piety and playfulness that it attributes to the Speech. In the end Socrates will characterize their entire séance in the glade as παιδιά (278B7).

953 καλῶν παίδων (C2-3): I.e. λόγων (Stallb.: cf. my n.873). Mr Morrissey astutely notes that Eros controls the ἐρασταί and protects the ἐρώμενοι.

954 ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀηδῶς (C4): With the litotes he confesses a good deal more admiration for the speech than he claimed with more straightforward praise to feel, at 257C1-2. Phaedrus's attitude is changing and his candor along with it.

Eros to praising him.[955]

"And how would you describe that?"

My sense is that although the whole speech was composed in play, it just happens that of certain things that were said two[956] elements in particular would repay us to grasp *skillfully*[957] in their full potential if we are able.

"Just what elements?"

Leading together[958] under a single character things widely dispersed so that by defining it as a distinct thing[959] a person can make clear the subject he wants to teach us about, whatever it is. As in what was said just about eros, what it is having been determined[960] whether by better or worse argumentation[961] – the speeches achieved whatever clarity and internal consistency[962] they achieved because of that.

"And what was the second of the two elements, Socrates?"

The ability conversely to divide up the whole, cutting according to the types at its natural joints,

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955 ὁ λόγος (C6): The singular now treats Socrates's two Speeches as continuous with one another. Socrates having dismissed all the imaginative art of his Second Speech now turns to the logic that lay behind its conception, the dialectic of the rhetoric if you will.

956 τούτων δέ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν (C9): After the dismissive foil of the τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, the δέ clause *begins* to focus (τινων is resistantly indefinite) by saying that of all the things that were said (the genitive is partitive) it would particularly repay to know about two. ἐκ τύχης distinguishes between the whole agenda of the speech, which the μέν clause characterized as play, and Socrates's present agenda (compare κατά τύχην at 262C10), which is broached by what he has singled out, the δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, the duals compactly indicating that the things he is selecting are a logical pair (δυοῖν) if seen in their essential character (εἰδοῖν). The dual is genitive introducing a proleptic lillies-of-the-field construction from the syntax of which its case is derived. Such an extensively proleptic sentence might be translated in reverse order: 'It would repay a person if he could articulate skillfully the power of two aspects of the things the speech chanced upon in its playful course.' The use of εἶδος is a saliently abstract way of describing "the things" (neuter τά and τούτων: cf. τὰ περὶ ἔρωτος, D5) and introduces the "language of the forms" (repeated below at E1, E4, 266A3 and expanded with μία [D3, E4], ἰδέα [D3]; ἕκαστον [D4], and ὃ ἔστιν [D5]: cf. n.5).

957 τέχνῃ (D1): The use of this dative is not meant to strike a contrast with τύχη above, which would be pointless, but to emphasize that Madame Techne's vaunted criterion of her rhetoric, which rhetoric has continually failed to satisfy (cf.nn.862, 867, 876, 895, 906, 932) is now being used to measure something else, in fact a different τέχνη λόγων.

958 εἰς μίαν τε (D3): Socrates answers Phaedrus without a connective by telling one of the things. His dual above (C9), though not repeated in Phaedrus's question, had already suggested that there will be a second thing that will somehow end up making a pair with the first. With τε he re-asserts that suggestion. Such a highly proleptic τε (in fact it ends up going unanswered) deserves to be called "τε - solitarium."

959 ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος (D4): ἕκαστον is predicative with the understood object of ὁριζόμενος just as δῆλον is predicative with the (same) understood object of ποιῇ.

960 ὃ ἔστιν ὁρισθέν (D5-6), a circumstantial participial phrase in pendant nominative that "resumes" in the passive the active participial phrase ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος from above. In the language of the forms ὃ ἔστιν covers almost the same ground as ἕκαστον, whence an expression like ἡ οὐσία ἑκάστου (237C3).

961 εἴτ' εὖ εἴτε καλῶς ἐλέχθη (D6) modifies the pendant nominative ὅ ἔστιν ὁρισθέν, not τὰ περὶ Ἔρωτος (which is an accusative of respect). Therefore I would place a single dash after ἐλέχθη. Again (cf. 263D1-4 and nn.921, 922) Socrates demurs to approve the definition he was moved to present in his First Speech.

962 τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ὁμολογούμενον (D6-7): It is γοῦν that breaks the construction. Whatever else might be said about the definitions, it was the fact that there was a definition at all that gave the logos its ability (ἔσχεν,C6) to say something clear and consistent. The same two benefits were attributed to definition, at the beginning of Socrates's First Speech, with οὔτε ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦσιν (237C5). τὸ σαφές here corresponds to ἀλλήλοις there, as what gets the speaker and his audience onto the same page; and τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ὁμολογούμενον corresponds to ἑαυτοῖς, as what gives the speaker's account its internal consistency.

rather than setting about mutilating[963] the distinct character of any part like a slovenly butcher,[964] just as for example the two arguments just now took up the irrational aspect of mind as a single common characteristic and then, just as nature has endowed (266) a single body with homonymous parts that come in pairs designated as the right and left, they each assumed mental disturbance to be an element[965] that occurs in our nature, but then the one proceeded by dividing[966] and moving toward the left of its parts, and then divided that part in turn and did not give off searching until it had come upon something called eros of a leftward[967] sort and gave it a full lambasting, very justly so, while the other led us along through divisions toward mania's parts on the right until it discovered something homonymous, as "eros," but of a divine sort instead, and adopting this as its subject[968] praised it as being the cause of mankind's greatest boons.

"Exactly correct!"

Well it is of these things that I am a lover,[969] Phaedrus – divisions and gatherings[970] – for the way they enable me to speak and think.[971] Anybody else[972] that I come to believe has the ability to see how

963 καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν (E2). Neither "trying not to mutilate (or shatter or splinter)" (Yunis, Nehemas/Woodruff cf. Robin, Vicaire, Brisson) – for μή goes with ἐπιχειρεῖν – nor "not trying to mutilate" (Fowler, Rowe, Heitsch) – for even the poor butcher does not *try* to mutilate), but "not putting one's hand to mutilating a part." For this sense of ἐπιχειρεῖν with the negative, cf. 232B3. Hackforth's "to try to hack off parts," and even Scully's attempt to improve it with "to try to hack *through* any part" do not quite succeed at articulating what is wrong, as Helmbold/Rabinowitz very amply do with "avoiding the attempt to shatter the unity of any natural part" at the expense of turning μή ἐπιχειρεῖν into something more like μὴ ἐπιχειρήσῃ.

964 κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον (E3): For the periphrasis with χρᾶσθαι in derogation cf. 248B5 and C6, and n.473. The ζῷον used above in a commonsense illustration of compositional unity (264C-5: cf. n.936) is now getting cut up into its natural parts, in a similarly commensensical, if crass, illustration of diaeresis.

965 Reading ὡς ἐν ἡμῖν (266A2) with BT.

966 τεμνόμενος (A4): My periphrastic formulation translates the middle voice. Once the logos gets started it makes its second division with the active (τέμνων, A4). In the first speech παρανοία (i.e., ἐπιθυμία, as the irrational contrary of δόξα) of the victorious kind is ὕβρις, and then among the many "species" of ὕβρις, ἔρως is found as a third type; in the second, παρανοία (i.e., μανία) is divided to the right – toward the divine type – and by a second division, eros is reached as a fourth type.

967 σκαιόν τινα (A5) imports the notion that the left is the bad or sinister side (despite its apotropaic synonym ἀρίστερον). The designations of right and left in this context refer to the good and the bad rather than referring to the asssertion and negation of the specific differentiae, in the methodical manner of the Stranger in the *Sophist* and *Politicus (Soph.*264E1). According to this means of designation the divisions of Socrates's First Speech were not to the left but "ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ" as we saw (cf. n.1361). The paragraph is a full articulation, with the benefit of hindsight, of the logical problem Socrates described from the inside out at the beginning of his Second Speech – that eros is not "simple" (244A5-8; cf. 245B2-C1). Hackforth's improvements upon it (p.133, n.1) are gratuitous.

968 προτεινάμενος (B1) = proposing as a subject, as at *Gorg.*518B2, *Leg.*895D7, *Rep.*525D8, *Soph.*247D5. Thompson compares ἐπιδεῖξαι at *Soph.*265A1 and ἀποφῆναι at 235C1. Ryan's "mercantile" metaphor of showing one's wares does not belong here (though it may at 230D8).

969 ἐραστής (B3): The diction is striking, and ἔγωγε αὐτός (continuing ἐμοὶ μέν above, C8) stresses his candor. We have heard (252E3, 256A7) and will hear (278D3-6) of a "friendly love of wisdom" but an "erotic desire and pursuit of divisions and gatherings" describes a more vital emotion directed toward a much more recondite object. Cf. *Phlb.*16B6.

970 The usual chiasm of before and after in summary of what he has just gone through, above.

971 λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν (B4-5): The hendiadys is a striking reminder, after λέγειν has been so often paired with γράφειν in this conversation, that speaking has something to do with thinking!

972 ἐάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον (B5): τε corresponsive with τε in αὐτός τε ἐραστής (B3). Socrates's dialectical eroticism extends to chasing after or pursuing any man that he deems competent at dialectical divisions as if he were following a god. He depicts himself in terms that loosely but unmistakeably reminiscent of the erotic dynamics described in his Second Speech, combining the lover's sense of a divine element inhering in the beloved (252D6-E1), his tracking of the half-known by dint of an inward sense (252E7), the soul following in the train of a chosen god toward a vision of truth in the hyperouranion (247A8-E6), and the prospect of the lovers' philosophical intercourse (256A7-B3). But in addition to this his confession explains his general "philologia" (236E5) upon which Phaedrus relied in order to seduce him into the countryside in the first place, and also his unslakable appetite for conversation without which the fictions of Plato's

in their essential nature things gather together into one and disperse into a plurality,[973] him do I follow "as if tracking the footsteps of a god."[974] And those who are able pull this off I am proud to call "dialecticians"[975] – god knows whether rightly or not, but I have done it up to this very day. But your thing – the thing people are currently learning from you and Lysias[976] – tell me what *that* is to be called? Or is it just this thing that we have heard of[977] as the "art of speaking" which has enabled Thrasymachus and the rest themselves to become clever at speaking, as well as to make others so if only they are willing to pay them a kingly[978] tribute?

"Kingly indeed are these redoubtable[979] fellows though they lack mastery in what you are bringing up. As for that, I think you are giving it the correct name when you call it 'the dialectical,' whereas 'the rhetorical'[980] seems still to have eluded us."[981]

What are you saying? A fine[982] thing it would be, I presume, if there is something else left over

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Dialogues as we know them would not exist.

973 Reading singular πεφυκός (B6) with BT and Stobaeus 2.16.15 (and Robin, Nehemas/Woodruff, Scully). The parts of the "one" toward which thought moves are its parts φύσει. For plural predicated of singular cf. *Parm.*129C4 ἕν ... ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά.

974 διώκω (B6): The quotation is an Homeric formula (*O.*2.406, 3.30, 5.193, 7.38) pressed into new service. The "following" will be along a path of divisions upward or downward in search of a final term. This and μετ' ἴχνιον continue the hunting metaphor of ἐφευρών.

975 διαλεκτικούς (C1): His "uncertainty" about the propriety of the name indicates only that he has tentatively adopted it as a technical term out of respect for its possibilities, as Hackforth's gratuitous and labored attempt to compare the method described here with the very different methods associated with the term elsewhere in the *Dialogues* proves. His diffidence about his own use of the term is foil for the (ironic) notion that perhaps this is what the rhetoricians already have in mind in their own teaching.

976 σοῦ τε καὶ Λυσίου (C1-2) continues the taking of sides that Phaedrus had broached above when he objected to Socrates's satire of "Lysias'-and-his" speech (λόγον ἡμῶν, 264E3), now that Socrates has finished analyzing what, alternatively, is to be learned from his own (264E8). He is placing the shoe back onto the other foot.

977 τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο (C2): Is that thing we have heard so much of (ἐκεῖνο) as their "art of speeches" this thing we have just now been considering (τοῦτο) – i.e., the thing Socrates calls dialectic?

978 ὡς βασιλεῦσιν (C5): Gifting kings is proverbial: cf. Hesiod *apud* Pl.*Rep.*390E (=frg.361 Merkelbach-West) and A.*Av.*507.

979 Reading ἄνδρες (C6) with the mss. (*contra* Bekker's orthographical suggestion ἆνδρες accepted by Thompson, Schanz, Burnet, Fowler, Robin, Hackforth, Yunis) since it is a predicate with βασιλικοί only. They may be redoubtably kingly but they are not redoubtably competent at dialectic. Cf. "They are royal men all right but certainly not versed in the matters you ask about" (tr. Helmbold-Rabinowitz). We know that mss. often fail to report the presence of the article from cases where meter indicates the α is long (e.g., S.*Aj.*9,324,738 al. – cit. Jowett-Campbell, *Rep.*2.190), but must ask whether ἀνήρ when transmitted anarthrous is predicative, which ἀνήρ has a definite idiomatic tendency to be, before considering to modify the accent as Bekker perhaps too readily did. Similarly *Lys.*204A6, where edd. write ἀνήρ against the ἀνήρ of BTW.

980 διαλεκτικόν, ῥητορικόν (C8): Socrates has said, 'The dialectical skill surely deserves the name of art; is this perhaps the artful element you and Lysias are pursuing in your τέχνη λόγων?' This Phaedrus denies by identifying what they teach as τὸ ῥητορικόν, something distinct and separate from τὸ διαλεκτικόν, and says the former element has so far evaded them. He uses the -ικός expression on analogy with Socrates's masculine plural adjective διαλεκτικούς, and this, as well as his use of εἶδος, illustrates (*pace* Heitsch, 151 and n.292) that has caught on to the technique of dialectic that Socrates is here describing and using (n.955).

As to the "reference" of τὸ ῥητορικόν, Socrates had casually used the term above to refer to *delivery* (235A1), and we cannot exclude that Phaedrus at least has this in mind. The distinction between the writing (the συγγραφεύς) and the delivery of speeches (by the ῥήτωρ or πολιτικός) is after all a force operating beneath the surface of this investigation of theirs. But, as often, the discussion quickly and easily makes a detour away from the "one" (τὸ ῥητορικόν) to the "many" (τὰ συχνὰ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις βιβλίοις, D5-6), and the question about τὸ ῥητορικόν *per se* is shelved or postponed.

981 διαφεύγειν (C8): Phaedrus also imitates Socrates's hunting conceit (cf. ἐφευρών, A7; μετ' ἴχνιον, B6-7). The rhetorical element keeps eluding the hunters just as the "sophist" evaded the interlocutors in another dialogue.

982 καλόν πού τι (D1): Again καλός has the sense of praiseworthy competence, the sort of thing only art can produce (cf.263C1 with n. and nn.806,821).

after we subtract[983] these dialectical elements that requires *skillful*[984] management – a thing for sure you and I must not despise![985] Instead let us now identify this element in the rhetorical art that we have left out.[986]

"There are lots of things, I presume,[987] that could be mentioned, Socrates – indeed, all the things treated in written manuals on the 'art'[988] of speaking."

Good job, indeed,[989] reminding me. The "proem" needs to be presented at the beginning of the speech. That's the sort of thing you are speaking of, no? The fine points of the art.

"Yes."

Second[990] would be the "narration" with "witnesses" interspersed, and third would be "proofs" and fourth would be "likelihoods." And "corroboration" and "re-corroboration" would be mentioned by that Byzantian Daedalus[991] of speech-fashioning.

"You refer to our worthy Theodorus?" (267)

Of course. And then "refutation" and "re-refutation" and how these need to be included in both

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983 τούτων ἀπολειφθέν (D1): τούτων refers to dialectic in the plural because it is bifold (collection and division), although Phaedrus had just referred to it in the singular (τοῦτο, C7) since he had gathered the two methods under one head in order to suggest a dichotomy between dialectic and rhetoric. Socrates infers from Phaedrus's expression that for him the rhetorical element is entirely distinct from the dialectical element, as if dialectic could be removed from artful speaking (ῥητορική, D4: cf. n. *ad loc.* below), and now asks how, to the contrary, the specifically rhetorical element could still be artful in the absence of the dialectical. In doing so he demotes Phaedrus's notion of τὸ ῥητορικόν to the λειπόμενον of the τέχνη ῥητορική.

984 τέχνῃ (D2): Still and again (260D9, 260E3-7, 261B4, 265D1) a "loaded" term, especially in the dative (on which cf. n.862). The paid teachers use it to advertise their services as something recondite and to justify their fees thereby, but Socrates will hold them to a strict and proper – dare I say "technical"? – definition.

985 οὐκ ἀτιμαστέον (D2), like οὐκ ἀπόβλητον ἔπος (260A5: cf. n.845).

986 τῆς ῥητορικῆς (D4): Sc. τέχνης, of course (from C3) but Socrates's use of the bare feminine adjective subsumes Phaedrus's use of the bare neuter τὸ ῥητορικόν as referring to a distinct element within the art as a whole, which in turn provides Phaedrus a segue away from that essential element to the books called τέχνη (sc. ῥητορική) τῶν λόγων.

987 καὶ μάλα που συχνά (D5): By answering the question about a singular (λειπόμενον) with a plural (συχνά) Phaedrus has slipped away from the dialectical focus, as Socrates's interlocutors often do, and adduces an empirical plurality rather than isolating the single characteristic. He accompanies his switch from the one to the many with a retort of Socrates's που as if he were going *pari passu* indicates that he has an inkling that he is not.

988 With γε (D5), *vi termini* (*pace* deVries), Phaedrus acknowedges that the fact they are listed in the written manuals entitled "Τέχναι" is his only grounds for saying they are τέχνῃ λαμβανόμενα (D2). It is an overstatement to say that he "misunderstands completely" what Socrates means, as Socrates's response moreover reveals (cf. next note).

Note that all the "doctrines" we are about to hear about are casually said to exist in *written* form (βιβλίοις ... γεγραμμένοις). The topic of writing rather than delivering speeches has been dropped since early in the discussion (cf. 258D1-2: it is gone at D4-5); but now Socrates will bring the issue into view and hold it there (cf. n.980 above and nn.1139,1218 below). The commentator must resist the temptation to spend large efforts and space illustrating the technical terms and identifying the persons whom Plato in this passage mentions only to dismiss, lest he come to resemble too closely the latter.

989 καὶ καλῶς γε (D7), restoring (with Robin, Moreschini, Heitsch) the καί of the mss.bracketed by Hirschig, Vollgraff, and Burnet. Socrates acknowledges Phaedrus's argument by echoing both his καί and his γε., just as Phaedrus had echoed his που (D5: cf. D1).

990 δεύτερον (E2): By not only listing but *counting* Phaedrus's συχνά Socrates is perhaps illustrating the way dialectical diaeresis might reduce a swarm or a heap to an ordered series.

991 τὸν βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα (E5): The coined nickname (λογοδαίδαλον, an hapax in Greek remembered by Cic. [*Or.*12.39] and Quint. [3.1.11] – though note Ausonius's unrelated λογοδαιδαλίη [*Ep.*10.26]) plus the superlative (βέλτιστον) inaugurates a series of pairings between technical specialities and their "inventors" (ηὗρεν, A4; ἀνηῦρον, B2). The reference to Daedalus perhaps refers to the refinement of parts as though the finished logos were a machine. For Theodorean distinctions between X and ἐπί-X, cf. Ar.*Rhet.*3.13. To characterize the passage as an early example of the History of a Science, even in outline (Heitsch, 152) seems an overstatement to me. What finally brings the collection to an end is only that speeches themselves come an end, with the devices of recapitulation (267D3-9), just as Socrates began the collection with the devices of the proemium (D7-8).

accusation and defense. The most fine Evenus of Paros shall we forgo to mention,[992] who invented "implicit indication" and "indirect praise?" According to some he also presented the technique of "indirect criticism" in meter so that it would be easily memorized, the clever fellow. And likewise we'll leave Tisias and Gorgias undisturbed, who knew that the likely is to be held in higher honor than the true, who can make the small appear large and the large appear small by the power of speech and treat what is novel in the traditional mode and make a novelty of tradition, who invented brevity of expression as well as boundless expatiation on any topic – though once Prodicus laughed when he heard me say this about them and told me[993] that *he* was the sole inventor of the art of correct[994] speeches, namely those that are neither long nor short but just the right length!

"Most cleverly put, dear Prodicus!"

Are we not to mention Hippias? I imagine our visitor from Elis would cast the same vote as he.[995]

"Why not?"

And the productions[996] of Polus – these collections[997] of sayings such as the "Double Sayings" and the "Gnomic Sayings" and the "Simile Sayings" – and of Likymnian[998] words of high poetic diction

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992 ἐς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν (267A3): The present asks for a decision on the spot: "are we not to bring forth Evenus?" (cf. Smyth §1879a), with οὐ expecting a yes answer. The idiom is very common with λέγομεν, as below at B7 (cf. *Crat.*425C7; *Gorg.*480B2-3, 513C3; *Leg.*649A6; *Phdo.*75B2, 79B12; *Rep.*377E5, 530D9 [ποιοῦμεν]).

993 ἀκούων ποτέ μου (B2-3): Socrates recounts a privileged conversation he had with Prodicus off the record, in which Prodicus told him a joke that fairly debunks the whole parade at the same time that it keeps him in it, as if he were the inventor of moderation.

994 ὧν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην (B4): The accusative of BT, athetized long ago by Ast and recently by Heitsch and Yunis, is corroborated by the Pap.Mediolanensis (*apud* Moreschini, CCXXIV) and has a plain meaning. Just as the recondite designations of the other rhetoricians evince artfulness it appears that their promulgators may very well ignore a τέχνη that decides πῶς δεῖ λέγειν. Prodicus's great claim that he discovered it – namely, μετρίως λέγειν, for which compare the equally platitudinous statement at *Prot.*337C-8C – is a bathetic joke at their expense, which explains the reply of Phaedrus (B6).

995 σύμψηφον (B7): If we are to adduce Hippias's remarks at *Prot.*337B-338C as evidence why he should "vote with Prodicus" it is not because he, too, speaks in platitudes there (*pace* de Vries), for Prodicus is delivering a bathetic joke not a platitude; nor because he happens there to advocate speaking at moderate length (which is a passing remark in the context and not a general thesis), but because he there advocates the largeminded perspective of wise men that enables them to agree with each other on wholes (whence the voting metaphor, here) rather than squabbling about bits and pieces, an attitude that comes up for caricature in the *H.Maj.* also (301B2ff., 304A4-6: cf. *H.Min.*369B8-C2). Hippias seems moreover to have an objective theory of a natural wholeness of things, evidenced in his use of expressions like μέγαλα καὶ διανεκῆ (*H.Maj.*301B6) and μέγιστα καὶ ὁμόφυλα (*Clem.Strom.*6.15 = DK 2.331.18): the evidence is intriguing but scanty. In any case to bring in Hippias adds nothing but more personnel to this assemblage of rhetorical κομψά.

996 τά ... Πώλου (B10): Cf. τῶν, 261B8. and n. *ad loc.*

997 μουσεῖα λόγων (B10): Hermias explains μουσεῖα as an approbative metonymy by Plato (ἐκάλεσεν *sc.* Plato) for decorative balanced phrasing (πάρισα) which he attributes to Polus (239.6-7), and the schol. supplements the attribution with an example from Isocrates (*Helen* 17); but against this, ὡς means "such as" answering πῶς, and the three -λογίαι are species within the gallery or collection. Perhaps (with Heindorf, Ast, Robin, Hackforth: cf.Brisson) Μουσεῖα was his *title*.

998 Λικυμνίων ὀνομάτων (C2): Licymnius was perhaps a pupil of Gorgias and, as the subject of ἐδωρήσατο, a teacher of Polus. He wrote a Τέχνη (Ar.*Rhet.*1414B17). He is known for his ideas about and coinages of names, to-wit: (1) he introduced figurative or impressionistic nicknames for the parts of an oration (Ar.*Rhet.*1414B17, where Aristotle criticizes them for their failure to be dialectically sound in the very sense Socrates establishes here in the *Phaedrus* [δεῖ δὲ εἶδός τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφοράν ὄνομα τίθεσθαι]!); (2) he argued that the virtue of a name lies both in its sound and its sense (Ar.*Rhet.*3.2.1405B7); and (3) he introduced a classification of nouns including primary (κύριος), metaphoric, compound, synonymic (ἀδελφά), supplementary (ἐπιθετά: cf. Quint.8.6.40), and others (according to the schol.*ad loc.*), a division taken for granted by Aristotle in *Rhet.*3.2-3. He may also be the dithyrambist Aristotle mentions at *Rhet.*1413B14, whose fragments are collected at *PMG* 768-73 (Page). It is something of a joke that Socrates here uses

that their namesake presented to him.

"But weren't there some Protagorean[999] ones of these?"

A "Proper Usage,"[1000] my boy, and lots of other fine stuff.[1001] And don't forget the artful[1002] mastery of the wailings drawn forth by old age and poverty as mastered by the thews of the Chalcedonian,[1003] a man redoubtable for his ability to rouse a large crowd[1004] to anger and then to calm their rage with a spell, as he said, most powerful as he is to pull up what is needed[1005] for slandering and at the next moment for defending against it. And as for the ending of speeches[1006] all the masters appear to share the same teaching, some calling it the "recapitulation" and others something else.

"You mean recalling for the audience all the main points that have been made, at the end of the speech?"

Yes, that and[1007] anything else you might want to add to the "Art of Speech."

"Little or nothing worth mentioning." (268)

If it's little let's let it go. We need to shine a bright light[1008] upon the techniques we have assembled and ask what power of art they have, and under what circumstances.[1009]

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and eponymous adjective to name the names he made up after him.

999 Πρωταγόρεια (C4): Phaedrus plays along with Socrates's conceit of the eponymous adjective.

1000 ὀρθοέπεια (C6): A rhyming adonian to match Phaedrus's Πρωταγόρεια, placed likewise in first position and followed by γέ τις in playful retort, funnier still in the context of "Likymnian names" if it is a title, which it may well be. γε confirms the tone of insistence expressed by μέντοι in Phaedrus's hunch about Protagoras.

1001 καὶ ἄλλα πόλλα καὶ καλά (C6-7) is dismissive.

1002 τέχνῃ (C8), the dative emphatically postponed, again (cf. 260D9 and n.862).

1003 τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος (C8-9), a doubly indirect appellation for Thrasymachus, compounding synecdoche with an eponymous geographical adjective. The emphasis on his forceful manner (κεκρατηκέναι, σθένος, κράτιστος) suits very well the manner and the message of the Thrasymachus we meet in the *Republic*. Perhaps the description includes a parody of his heavily rhythmatic style (so E.Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa* 1.43). To describe him with such elevated language is mockery, as Thompson notes, but compared with the others Thrasymachus stands out as a dangerous force, like the unfriendly orator alluded to at 260C3ff, and caps the list of persons.

1004 Anarthrous πολλούς (C9) emphasizes the widespread effect of Thrasymachus's power.

1005 Reading ὅθεν δεῖ κράτιστος (D2) with BT (sc. ὤν, causal) over ὁθενδή (sc. ἐστι) of the Par.mss. (Par.1808 [Burnet]; Par.1811, Par.2011 [Moreschini]). ὅθεν as connective, especially when modified by δή, should not be so late. The construction and semantics of the relative clause in ὅθεν are similar to ὧν δεῖ above (B4). Thrasymachus's *claim* (ὡς ἔφη) is after all not the cause of his strength but vice-versa.

1006 τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος (D3): With δή we are told we have reached what we expected would come sooner or later, the end – whether of the list or of the oration. The list has reverted to its original organizing principle – parts of an oration from beginning to end (cf.266D7-8) – and thereby enables itself to drop the conceit of attributions which in fact revealed the pride of the specialists as inventors (cf. n.991). Hence the redundant doubling of κοινῇ πᾶσι – as if peroration were something they all share and share alike. But still, they might differ as to the name (D4), which points up if anything that their contributions all along have been nothing but names anyway. Nobody can say they *invented* the *praeteritio*.

1007 καὶ εἴ τι (D7): The slight telescoping of the logic is dismissive: there is no need for Vollgraff's addition of εἰπέ before εἴ τι.

1008 ὑπ' αὐγὰς ἴδωμεν (268A1): The idiom is rare (e.g., E.*Hec*.1154; A.*Thesm*.500; Plut.462D, 623C; cf. Ruhnken *Tim.Lex*.264-5) and occurs only here in Plato. It alludes to the inspection of wares at market. Perhaps light is thought of as coming from "above" because in order to scrutinize the wares one needed to go outside into the sunlight (*sic* Paley *ad* Eur.*Hec*.1154).

1009 τίνα καὶ πότ' ἔχει τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν (A2): Reading πότε with BT (ποτε vulg.). πότε is a legitimate question (*pace* deVries) as *Rep*.492B4ff shows, and (*pace* Ryan) Phaedrus answers accordingly both the πότε question (with the venue) and the τί question (with μάλα ἐρρωμένην: cf. n.803). Socrates is looking for an εἶδος, an element of *artful* power that gathers and deploys this heap of techniques (i.e., the δύναμις τῆς τέχνης as opposed to τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης: 266D9): that is, he is returning to the question raised but shelved above (266C8-D6: cf. nn.980,987), what is τὸ ῥητορικόν, the *oratorical* element? τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν = "the power we associate with and expect from real skill": τῆς is generic not demonstrative. Cf. ἡ ῥητορική ... δύναται, absolute, at 263B4.

"It's a very robust[1010] power they have, Socrates, when the public is gathered in assembly."[1011]

So it is – but my spirited fellow,[1012] look and see whether for you, too, the weave of their fabric seems awfully loose.[1013]

"Just show me where."

Answer[1014] me this. If a man came up to your friend Eryximachus or his father Acoumenos[1015] and said, "I know how[1016] to administer drugs to persons that will make them get hot or will make them shiver if I wish, and if I have a notion I can make them vomit something one day or void it on the next, not to mention causing a host[1017] of other effects. Because I know how to do all this, I count myself a physician and claim I can make anybody else a physician by passing on my knowledge to him." What do you think Eryximachus and Acoumenos would say to him?

"What else but to ask whether he knows in addition just who needs to have these things done and when they should be done, and to what extent."[1018]

But say he replied by saying, "I don't know that at all, but I expect that the person who learned all those techniques from me has the ability on his own[1019] to do[1020] what you ask." What then would they say?

1010 μάλα ἐρρωμένην (A3): Phaedrus understandably answers Socrates's "τί question," which is searching for an εἶδος, with the much awaited assertion, carried by μάλα ἐρρωμένην, that the attraction of rhetoric is the celebrity and power embodied in the figure of the political mover-and-shaker, the rhetor speaking in the assembly. But in dialectical terms Phaedrus has given the οἷον rather than the τί, and moreover the venue, the genre and even the gravity of subject matter had already been declared irrelevant to the art *qua* art (258D9-11, 262A8-B2). Socrates's interlocutors often answer his questions with praise or blame in this way (their error is not logical but axiological, though it is logic that Socrates uses to clear it up – something he learned from Parmenides when he was young [*Parm*.130A7-E4]), since after all the subject they are investigating is one that is thought important or else they would not be discussing it. Indeed in the present case it is the attraction of celebrity and power that has kept Phaedrus wavering between speechwriting and philosophy.

1011 ἔν γε δή (A3): He is saying under what circumstances by saying where (cf.*Rep*.492B5). To label the γε "emphatic limitative" (deVries, citing Denniston 245) is no more dispositive than saying it is "purely emphatic," also to be found on Denniston 245.

1012 δαιμόνιε (A5): Socrates acknowledges the admiration (μάλα ἐρρωμένην) with which Phaedrus alludes to the redoubtable shenanigans of public assemblies, in order to turn his attention to the essential point.

1013 διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ ἥτριον (A6): The ἥτριον is the warp, or a thin fabric. Schleiermacher: "*das ganze Gewebe … lose erscheint.*" Socrates continues the metaphor of holding the rhetoricians' wares up to the light (A1). One is reminded of his warning to Hippocrates at the beginning of the *Protagoras* that the mercantile sophist's wares, as opposed to the wares of a fish-monger, must be ingested rather then carried home and looked over before being cooked up and eaten (313C4-314B4).

1014 εἰπὲ δή μοι (A8): Again Socrates answers by asking (cf.261A5-6 and n.). This will be one of his usual sort of epagoges.

1015 Acoumenos (A9) was referred to as an ἑταῖρος upon whose expertise Phaedrus did indeed rely, at the beginning of the dialogue (227A5). One need not go so far as to say that Socrates is contriving to start his epagoge with a profession that Phaedrus *idiosyncratically* respects: everybody needs a doctor.

1016 ἐπίσταμαι (A10): The new term specifies and therefore separates out the *knowledge* that τέχνη provides, in distinction from its *power* (δύναμις) to create arbitrary effects (twice at B1, stressed in repetition), though the ensuing examples of the pretender's vaunt embody only the latter (ἐὰν βούλωμαι (B1); ἐὰν μὲν … εἰ δὲ αὖ [B1-2], spelled out the vaunts of with opposite effects). The division is continued below (ἐπιστήμη: B3, B4, B6, C6, D8 / arbitrary power: C1, C7, D8).

1017 ἄλλα πάμπολλα τοιαῦτα (B2): The vaunt is longer on quantity (doubled πάμπολλα) than quality (mere ἄλλα τοιαῦτα).

1018 οὕστινας … καὶ ὅποτε … καὶ μέχρι ὁπόσου (B7-8): The dialectical process has led Phaedrus to articulate the πότε he took too narrowly above (A2).

1019 αὐτόν (C1). Cf. κτήσαμενον, 260D7. The teacher does not care whether the student is inherently able or has acquired the ability, as long as nobody "counter-expects" (like his ἀξιοῦν) himself to teach it. Cf. αὐτούς … παρ' ἑαυτῶν … πορίζεσθαι, 269C4.

1020 Reading ποιεῖν (C1), athetized by some edd.

"I'd guess he would say[1021] he was a madman, and that by dint of hearing something written in a book[1022] or some experience he happened to have with some medicament or other[1023] the man thinks he has become a physician although he has no real knowledge[1024] of the art."

And what if somebody went up to Sophocles or[1025] Euripides and said he knew how to compose the longest of speeches[1026] on a very minor matter and on a major matter quite short ones, and to compose laments at the drop of a hat and the very opposite, fearsome and forbidding speeches and all the rest, and said that because he could teach these things to others he was able to pass on the art of tragedy?

"I think these two would likewise laugh at a person who thought that a tragedy was something other than the arrangement of these things in proper relations and proportions to each other and to the whole because of the way they are arranged."[1027]

But I would guess they wouldn't berate him so crassly.[1028] Instead just as a musician encountering a man who fancied he was a composer merely because he happened to know how to

1021 Reading εἴποι (C2) with all mss. as well as the Pap.Mediol. *apud* Moreschini (εἴποιεν Stephanus Thompson Vollgraff Moreschini : εἰπεῖν Burnet). οἶμαι is parenthetical as often and the shift to the singular is easy since the tit for tat of dialogue is naturally imagined as between two, with Phaedrus's εἴποι ἄν a retort to Socrates's εἰ εἴποι. Compare the singling out below (269A1-2) of Sophocles and Acoumenos as the proponents of positions they share with their respective partners (σφισιν). In defense of the singular Ryan waxes ("It lies close to the outer edge of the kind of syntactical inconcinnity that Plato allows himself in the name of conversational artlessness"), and I agree.

1022 ἐκ βιβλίου ποθὲν ἀκούσας (C3): Compare *Phdo*.97B8-C1. ἀκούσας is an index of the fact that reading was done aloud at this time (Brisson), but more pertinently his guess reveals that Phaedrus is aware, or becoming aware, of the limits of his own erstwhile criterion of "having heard" (cf.nn.840, 881, 884). The notions here that the written word can fall into the wrong hands and be misunderstood, as well as the pairing of that notion with the power of a drug to overwhelm rationality, are adumbrations of the argument with which the discussion will close (275E1).

1023 φαρμακίοις (C3): The diminutive is derogatory.

1024 ἐπαΐων (C4), of "savvy" or "knowing what's what," designating the ready reaction of a competent man as observed by a man who knows nothing of his specialty (234D4, 268E5). Conversely the model of the οὐδὲν ἐπαΐων is the painter who misportrays the craftsman at work (*Rep*.598C1, 601A1, C10). The identification of τέχνη with knowledge continues.

1025 καί (C5) meaning "or," as at *Gorg*.470D1, 501D1-2; *Leg*. 639A5, 640D6, *al*. [cf. England's Index *s.v.* καί 2.660], *Polit*.293A3-4, and in lists of the form A καί B ἤ C (*Charm*.161D6-7, *Leg*.801C8-D1, *Parm*.130C6-7).

1026 ῥῆσεις (C6), the technical term for a speech (λόγος) delivered by a character in a play. Cf.*Gorg*.506B6; *Rep*.393B7-C3, 394B4, 605D1. παμμήκεις echoes the incompetence of the boaster to speak qualititatively about what knowledge he has, which we met above, in παμμήκεις (B2).

1027 τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην (D4-5): Phaedrus is remembering, with well-instructed accuracy, Socrates's description of real composition where the parts are said to be πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα (264C5). With scrupulous parallelism, πρέπουσαν here is an exegesis of συνισταμένην as πρέποντα had there been an exegesis of γεγραμμένα. He remembers because he understood, and now he uses what he has learned in a criticism of the false tragedian that would also apply by analogy to his false "rhetorician"!

1028 ἀγροίκως ... λοιδορήσειαν (D6): Socrates recalls how "lowbrow" his criticism might have seemed to Madame Techne at 260D3 (ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν) and therefore associates this passage with that. There, Madame Techne defended her expertise in response to the attack brought by the non-experts, Socrates and Phaedrus, that one needs to know the truth of what he is talking about, by saying that her students must come already equipped with such knowledge. Here the attacker is making the argument Madame Techne made in her own defense – that her expertise consists of the ability to deploy an arsenal of tricks – and the experts (the redoubtable Eryximachus, Acoumenos, Sophocles and Euripides) are making the argument that Socrates and Phaedrus had made there against Madame Techne – that the ability to deploy skillful tricks could only be identified with true expertise by a person ignorant of the expertise (C4) and its object (D3-4), and that this ability is at best a mere preliminary to the deployment of the expertise itself (E5-6), an expertise the pretender reveals himself to lack exactly because he claims he doesn't. What takes the cake is that while τέχνη is being redefined as something substantial instead of merely graceful and clever (the κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης, 266D9), Socrates suddenly perceives himself as graceless in the company of his four redoubtable experts and invents an imaginary expert to make his own case (E2-6) more calmly and musically (E2) – a backhanded compliment to the sophisticated but potentially evasive smoothness of a rhetorician.

tune a string very high and very low would not rashly[1029] say, "Wretch! Are you cracked?"[1030] but since he's a devotee of the Muses[1031] he would be more gentle and say, "My good fellow! I grant that it's necessary to know how to do those things if you are planning to be a composer, but there's nothing to keep a man who knows how to do what you can do[1032] from having a little familiarity with harmony, too – since what you do know is a necessary preliminary[1033] to the study of composition but is not composition itself."[1034]

"Quite right." (269)

And likewise Sophocles would tell the man who vaunted his abilities to him that he knew the prerequisites of tragedy but not tragedy, and Acoumenos the preliminaries to medicine but not medicine.

"Exactly right."[1035]

And what about "honey-tongued Adrastus"[1036] or our man Pericles for that matter? If these two heard about these wondrous techniques we have just listed off – the brachylogisms and imagisms[1037] and all the other things we set down for close investigation – do you imagine they would abrasively hurl an unpolished utterance[1038] at these men, as you and I might do out of a lack of sophistication,[1039]

1029 Read ἀγρίως (E1), with all mss. (ἀγροίκως *coni.* Osaan), the opposite of πρᾳότερον to which it is presently opposed (E2).

1030 μελαγχολᾷς (E2) = "avoir l'esprit détraqué" (Brisson, citing the derisive language of comedy: A.*Av.*14, *Eccl.*251, *Pl.*12,366,903). Socrates combines and brings forward into this third example the two answers Phaedrus had supplied for the first two examples (i.e., μαίνεται [C2] and derisive καταγελῷεν [D3]). He is setting up the upbraiding he and Phaedrus will *jointly* receive from the cultured genius, Pericles (cf. n.1039).

1031 μουσικός (E2): It is almost a pun to say the musician is a μουσικός, but the correction comes with the more specific expression, ἁρμονικός. The idea is that a technician in the true sense that Socrates has been insisting upon all along, becomes so out of devotion to the muses rather than to ἀνθρωπίνα σπουδάσματα.

1032 τὸν τὴν σὴν ἕξιν ἔχοντα (E5): The expression countenances tautalogy in order to avoid hazarding a name for what this person can do.

1033 τὰ ... πρὸ ἁρμονίας ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα (E5-6): For the expression cf., with Heitsch, *Leg.*643A3-4, 967E1-2.

1034 Rather than λοιδορία (D6), which term recalls the opaque slurs cast at Lysias by the politician (257C4-6), Socrates goes beyond name-calling to give an articulate criticism of a sort that might have cleared things up there, if it had there been forthcoming. And in fact the critical response is quite similar to what the politician might have meant by using λογογράφος as a slur since the writing was a mere preliminary to pulling off the speech in public. Cf. nn.799 and 801.

1035 παντάπασιν (269A4), acknowledging that Socrates has just reviewed *each* of the parallels (cf. n.1211). That his review works through the cases in reverse order (Sophocles, Acoumenos) and abbreviates or truncates the exemplary material (leaving out Euripides and Eryximachus) is entirely in keeping with his style in the epagoge. Cf. *Rep.*327B1 and 333C11-12 and my nn. *ad locc.*

1036 τὸν μελίγηρυν Ἄδραστον (A5): The great exponents of oratorical art are finally brought onto the stage. Tyrtaeus speaks of an Adrastus as the model of effective delivery in similar terms (γλῶσσαν δ' Ἀδρήστου μειλιχόγηρυν, 12.8 West) – alongside the Cyclopes as strongest, Midas as richest, and Pelops as kingliest. Tyrtaeus needed to say no more and neither did Socrates, so neither do we. That orator (cf. also P.*O.*6.13-18) is added to the real and contemporary man of action, Pericles (καί signifying the categorical shift, with Thompson), in order to provide a pair of witnesses corresponding to the pair of tragedians and the pair of doctors adduced above. The byplay about the names of Nestor and Odysseus (261B6 and n.885) is too inconclusive and too remote from this passage to suggest we are meant to play at a *roman à clé* here, where, moreover, the accent is upon power: Adrastus as a powerful speaker and Pericles as an effective politician.

1037 τεχνημάτων – βραχυλογιῶν τε καὶ εἰκονολογιῶν (A7): Use of the verbal noun (cf. σπουδάσματα, 249D1 [and n.]; δοξάσματα, 274C3), the plural number, and a senseless pairing and juxtaposition of examples (with common -λογία), are all derogatory. No less than *Pericles* now derides the "rhetorical element" (cf. also τὸ τῆς τέχνης below, C7) that Phaedrus had produced at 266D5ff.

1038 ῥῆμα (B2), of a belligerent or stinging word that might escape the ἕρκος ὀδόντων. Cf. *H.Maj.*292C5; *Rep.*473E6, 562C3 (and my note); Proclus *in Remp.*2.269.4-5 Kroll. He is referring to "ὦ μοχθηρέ, μελαγχολᾷς;" at 268E1-2.

1039 σοφωτέρους (B3): Socrates now brings on stage the more graceful and musical orator he had needed at the beginning (cf. n.1034), once again positioning himself alongside Phaedrus so that once again they can be humbled together by an

for writing up and teaching these things[1040] under the name of rhetorical art? Given the fact that they are wiser than we they might chastise even us by saying, "Now Phaedrus and Socrates, one mustn't be abrasive but sympathetic when people who don't know how to converse dialectically[1041] should prove unable to define what rhetoric is, and consequently on he basis of possessing the prerequisites of the art should imagine that in these they had founded the art itself, and that in teaching these things to other men should complacently believe that these others have now been turned out finished in rhetoric under their tutelage, and that the ability to present all these techniques persuasively and organize their speech into a unified whole[1042] is not at all hard,[1043] but something for their students to work at acquiring on their own in the course of composing their own[1044] speeches."

"But my gosh, Socrates, this is just the aspect of the 'art'[1045] that these men are teaching and writing[1046] their treatises about, under the name of rhetoric, and what you have said about them seems to me true. But then[1047] the question remains how or from what quarter a person could succeed to 'acquire'[1048] the art of what is truly rhetorical and persuasive[1049] in composing his speeches."

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imaginary interlocutor (cf. 260D3-9 and. n.858), this time one in whose opinion, which happens also to be the opinion of Socrates, Phaedrus might particularly easily acquiesce, an orator greater than any of those technicians and speechwriters! It will be such a man as Pericles that can be relied upon to *deliver* a speech when the time comes.

1040 γεγραφότες τε καὶ διδάσκοντας (B2): The written version (perfect tense) provides the basis for their teaching. Cf. 266D6.

1041 διαλέγεσθαι (B6), with ὁρίσασθαι, refers to the very art that Socrates has just claimed might be the entirety of a τέχνη λόγων. Lacking this (i.e., διαλέγεσθαι) the teacher of rhetoric is not even qualified to argue his opinion (διαλέγεσθαι)! Mr Morrissey notes the stately rhythm and striding complexity of line B6.

1042 τὸ ... πιθανῶς λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι (C2-3): τε καί indicates that for a mover and shaker like Pericles (he represents the persons who berated Lysias: 257C4-258C10), speaking is doubtless for persuading (not merely for showing off techniques), and that a speech doubtless needs to be organized in order to persuade, just as medicine needs its essential and organizing element in order to heal and music to be harmonious. Pericles identifies this persuasive element with the very ability to create a unity that Phaedrus, echoing 264C2-5, had identified as lacking in the budding tragedian at 268D4-5 (cf. τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην). Moreover his remark is constructively a direct denial of the claim of Madame Techne who claimed at 260D9 that it was *she* that conferred the power of πείθειν τέχνῃ (if, that is, the teachers she is thinking of are the same as the ones Pericles is here apologizing for). Neither the term πείθειν nor its cognates have in fact been used since then, apart from the litotes with which Socrates described his own Second Speech in passing, (ἀπίθανον, 265B8). Pericles's remarks confirm what Socrates has been arguing about the need to organize a speech and reveal a practician's awareness of the need for what Socrates has called dialectic. By referring back to that his remark prepares the way to treat the new topic, the source of rhetorical power, which was Phaedrus's first interest at the beginning of the dialogue.

1043 οὐδὲν ἔργον (C3), the reading of BT. Heindorf's addition of ὄν, accepted by some edd., is unneeded, given (with Thompson *ad loc.*) its analogous absence with ἀνήνυτον κακόν at *Gorg*.507E1-3 plus other passages cited by Thompson.

1044 σφων (C4) is redundant with possessive τοῖς, but the rhetorician wishes to distance himself as far as possible from any incumbency to help in this regard. Cf. n.1019.

1045 τὸ τῆς τέχνης (C7): Phaedrus again employs an "essentialist" expression in the dialectical manner, and therefore remains a competent partner for a critical discussion (διαλέγεσθαι, B6) of rhetoric (though in all strictness his relative ἥν should perhaps be ὅ).

1046 ὡς ῥητορικὴν διδάσκουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν (C8), retaining Socrates's τε καί but reversing the order of the terms (cf.B2-3) in a chiasm of response, a version of the "chiasm of before and after" (cf. n.578 and my n. to *Rep*.327B1).

1047 ἀλλὰ δή (A9): ἀλλά repeats the self-correcting adjustment he already expressed with ἀλλὰ μήν κινδυνεύει γε and emphasized with the redundant remark ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ εἰρηκέναι. Phaedrus is finding himself separated from from what he had believed about those teachers.

1048 πορίσασθαι (D1) repeats conative πορίζεσθαι at C4 with complexive aorist: cf. πείσῃ, 260C9 and n.854.

1049 τὴν τοῦ τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην (C9-D1). With his two neuters (cf.n.980) Phaedrus is again taking sides with Socrates and dialectic against the masters of rhetoric by allowing dialectic to become the criterion of their putative art. Moreover in repeating Pericles's τε καί from C3 he has noticed and accepted the direct connection between the element that underlies rhetorical power (τὸ ῥητορικόν) – which is organization (τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι, C3) as the epagoge has shown (268D4-5: cf. 264C2-5) – and the element of "persuasion," though he reverses the order

As to the ability to acquire it,[1050] Phaedrus, so as to become a polished adversary,[1051] it is likely and perhaps even necessary that what obtains here is the same as what obtains everywhere else. If[1052] it is part of your *nature* to have the rhetorical element, you will become a notable orator only if you add *instruction* and *practice*,[1053] and conversely, whichever of these three you leave out, in that respect you will fall short. But as to the "art" of it your are asking about acquiring,[1054] the path Lysias and Thrasymachus[1055] lead their student upon does not seem to me to be the proper method.[1056]

"But how would you suggest?"

My good man, wouldn't you say that Pericles[1057] is the most polished orator we have ever seen?

"And..."

All the greater arts require us the supplement that we spend some time (270) in free-wheeling

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of the terms in order to stress that their relationship is that of cause and effect.

1050 τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι (D2): With μέν Socrates divides the verb δύνασθαι (sc. πορίσασθαι) from it object, τέχνην, which he will treat separately (ὅσον δέ αὐτοῦ τέχνη, D6ff).

1051 ἀγωνιστήν (D2) = *orator* (Ast, adducing *Tht.*164C, just as a trial is an ἀγών: so Brisson n.391) not a (theatrical) "performer" (Thompson), in contrast with a κριτής (cf. LSJ *ss.vv.*). Cf. ἄμιλλα, 271A1; κρατεῖ, 272B2. In this μέν clause (D2-6) Socrates is talking turkey, not mere sophistication.

1052 εἰ μέν σοι (D4) repeats μέν from above (*pace* Ryan): the generalization that follows concedes convention in order to focus upon the controversial point in the δέ clause, namely the artfulness *per se*, the *object* of Paaedrus's question as distinct from the ability to acquire it (τὸ δύνασθαι, cf. δύνατο).

1053 φύσις, μελέτη, and ἐπιστήμη (D4-5) is the stable and conventional account, in general (n.b. ὥσπερ τἆλλα), of the specific "whences" Phaedrus has just asked for (πόθεν, D1) – i.e. the sources of human ability. It is enough of a commonplace (cf. P.Shorey, *TAPA* 40[1909]185-201 and my nn. to *Rep.*366C7) that it can be introduced only to be passed by, in a concessive μέν clause. Socrates readily declares that the ability comes not only from a paid teacher but also from within, an answer also consistent with the limitations in the curriculum of the teachers they are criticizing; and next he will correct even these limitations.

1054 ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη (D6): Sc. τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ from C9. The controversial element now reappears in the δέ clause, namely, the path of skillful training or curriculum to be followed out by the student, which is just what Phaedrus has differentiated out in his question above (*pace* Yunis and Ryan, who see τέχνη as focussing on ἐπιστήμη in the intervening μέν clause just above), though surely these intervening remarks on ability already suggest that training, τέχνη, ought to have to do with ἐπιστήμη, as a component of the whole man alongside the other two (φύσις and μελέτη), rather than being the handy arsenal of tricks on the basis of which the rhetoricians call themselves technicians.

1055 Λυσίας τε καὶ Θρασύμαχος (D7): Polar τε καί, bringing together the individual cases with which the list of technicians began (266C1-5) and ended (267C8-9). Cf. *Rep.*517A5.

1056 μέθοδος (D7), as well as πορεύεται, isolates the durative aspect of the study – the teacher's "approach," the direction he is going, and the sequence of his "curriculum" – in contrast with the ability to enact it (i.e., τὸ δύνασθαι).

1057 ὁ Περικλῆς (E1): Once again two examplary characters (A5-6) are reduced to one (cf. A1-3 and n.1021), but this time it is for a re-use: Pericles will now be the paradigm not just for the notion that an oration needs overall unity but also for the kind of training that actually produces the oratorical power that such organization can produce.

discussion and speculation[1058] about *inner nature*.[1059] It is from this that that sublime and fully perfect aspect of his[1060] seems to derive. Besides all his natural gifts Pericles acquired this, too, for he spent time with Anaxagoras who was a person that did just that sort of thing, and by being filled up with speculative thoughts and having reached thereby a conception of the inner nature of the mind and the mindless[1061] – matters about which Anaxagoras was writing that long tract of his – he was able to derive the key ingredient[1062] to administer to the speakerly "art."

"How do you mean?"

The way it is with the art of medicine is the same as it is with the art of rhetoric.

"Just how?"

1058 ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας (270A1): Both terms are almost always derogatory (*Phdo*.70C1-2; *Polit*.299B; *Rep*.488E,489C6; A.*Nub*.1480,u1485; Eupolis frg.352 [=*CAF* 1.351-2 Koch], of Socrates; Plut.400E; cf. *Apol*.18B7-8, 19B4-C5; A.*Nub*.228, 360, 1284; *Pax* 92; X.*Symp*.6.6) though always expressing the opinion of the ignorant (*Apol*.23D4-6: Socrates's remark at *Tht*.195C1-2 is self-deprecating irony). They are sometimes, as here, used together (*Crat*.401B7-8; *Polit*.299B; *Rep*.488E (ship of state), 489C6; cf. ἀδολεσχεῖν τε δοκῶ καὶ ἀερομετρεῖν, X.*Oec*.11.3). The term μετεωρολεσχής (*Rep*.489C6, borrowed by Plut. at 400E) appears to pour the two terms into one. The concept was broached in Socrates's Second Speech (249D7-E1).

In the present case they are given a positive sense, indeed they are "paraded with a kind of defiance" (Thompson), as at *Crat*.401B7-8 (οὐ φαῦλοι ἀλλὰ μετεωρόλογοι καὶ ἀδολεσχαί τινες) and *Parm*.135D5, a positive sense that is elsewhere revealed only *per contrarium*, namely, at *Rep*.488E, of the ignorant crew that view the captain as an impractical μετεωροσκοπός and at *Polit*.299B2-8, in which the nightmare of legalized literalism in the arts and sciences is imagined to include a law against ζητεῖν παρὰ τὰ γράμματα καὶ σοφίζεσθαι ὁτιοῦν, according to which the man who behaves this way is to be denied the name of scientist but called instead a μετεωρόλογον, ἀδολεσχήν τινα σοφιστήν. The present passage stands alone in spelling out the positive sense outside the context of opposing the masses and indeed achieves a certain elevation exactly by ignoring them. To steal Pericles from the λογογράφοι and appropriating him to the camp of philosophy (on the argument stargazing is the source of his power) is the height of paradox and as such it constitutes Socrates's knock out punch against Lysias and his influence over Phaedrus.

It is not beyond Plato's art, especially in this dialogue (cf. n.318 on the noontime connected to 247C1) to suggest here that we should remember Socrates's myth of the soul (mentioned here by Brisson) and its deep cognitive power in explaining eros. But psychology is an abstruse topic and one unneeded in addressing the mass since the mass has no single soul.

1059 φύσεως πέρι (A1): The noun is used anarthrously here and several times below, for which compare the expression of the opening proof of the soul's immortality (cf. n.381, 247C5, 247D1), and also the very similar idea as expressed anarthrously at *Tht*.174A1 and at *Lys*.214B4-5 (περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου). Of course it cannot go unnoticed that περὶ φύσεως was, or at least came to be, the proper name for the scope of Ionian "research" (ἣν καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν, *Phdo*.96A7-8), and as such φύσις means the "inner truth" of things, the aspect that according to Heraclitus "loves to hide" (DK22B123): if we apply this almost adverbial sense, below (i.e., "essentially"), we get the sense we need. The same thing is gotten at by ὅλον below, and the theme is continued by the use of πέφυκεν, drawn out of περὶ φύσεως, (D4, D7, 271A6, A11), supplemented by the more commonsense language of ἀκριβεία (E3, 271A5) as well as the language we associate with the "Theory of Ideas" (εἶδος [D1,D5, 271A7], ἕκαστος [D6,271B3], αὐτός [D4, D7], εἶναι, 271B3).

1060 τὸ ὑψηλόνουν τοῦτο (A2): The demonstrative, because of the ensuing exegesis of πάντῃ τελεσιουργόν (a continuation of the essentialist neuters), seems to point back to the aspect of Pericles that made him πάντων τελεώτατος (269E1-2), which itself referred back to ταύτῃ ἀτελής at D6 (where compare the dative) and τέλεον γενέσθαι at D2 (compare γενέσθαι with the -ουργός element, here). But the language is new: ὑψηλόνους occurs only here and in passages that allude to this passage (Plut.*Pericl*.8, Them.*Or*.18.222B, 26.329C) and τελεσιουργός is extremely rare (Polyb.2.40***).

1061 ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας ἀφικόμενος (A5-6), the reading of BTW and Hermias at 244.15 (διανοίας Vind.109 Aristides Burnet : ἐννοίας corr.Par.1808). ἀφικόμενος ἐπί suggests Pericles reached a terminal point *ne plus ultra* in his understanding, which in the case of Anaxagoras is the beginning principle of his "long treatise" (τὸν πολὺν λόγον): ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν· νοῦς δὲ αὐτὰ διέκρινε καὶ διεκόσμησε (DK 59A46 = 2.19.4-5). This is the connection between Anaxagoras's mind (νοῦς) and Pericles's highmindedness (ὑψηλόνουν): the fact that νοῦς is the leading principle of Anaxagoras's account has nothing to do with the psychology that Socrates's scientific orator will be seen to use as those who read διανοίας might think (that interpretation would in fact *defeat* and obviate Socrates's proud advocacy of

In both arts, distinctions must be drawn about inner nature[1063] – about the nature of body for the one and about the nature of soul for the other – in order that not just by trial and error or guesswork but by skill the body should be administered drugs and nourishment in such a way as to produce health and therefore vigor, and the soul[1064] should be administered arguments and lawful practices[1065] in such a way as to produce conviction[1066] of the sort you might wish to produce in it[1067] and virtue.

"This seems likely."

Now would you suppose it is possible to achieve an intelligent understanding of the inner nature[1068] of soul without having grasped the inner nature of it as of a whole entity?[1069]

"If[1070] you listen to Hippocrates of the school of Asclepias it would not be possible to

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stargazing!). Rather, from Cicero's reading of the passage, Pericles's learning to think about recondite and unmanipulable things in general was a *thinking skill* he could *transfer* to thinking about forensic situations (*eruditus excertationem mentis a reconditis abstrusisque rebus ad causas forensas popularesque facile traduxit*, *Brut.*11.44; *cum alia praeclara quaedam et magnifica didicisset uberem et fecundum fuisse* … , *Orat.*4.14). Cf. Hackforth 149.

And finally Rowe's *obiter dictum* that ἀνοία might be a veiled criticism of Anaxagoras (for the sake of importing into this discussion the disapproval of his theory that Socrates reports having reached in the *Phaedo*) as well as his worry (voiced also by others) that "Plato" should not be found praising Pericles (given Socrates's criticism of him in the *Gorgias* – [contrast Plut.*Peric.*4-6 and 8], on which note deVries's pertinent remark that in *Gorg.* it was his policies and not his "rhetorical gifts" that were criticized – and let us add in particular his ability to deliver speeches no matter who wrote them: cf. n.1036) do nothing but weaken, for no purpose, the idea, already almost unarguable, that Socrates is trying to shoehorn into Phaedrus's imagination, here and today.

1062 πρόσφορον (A7): This restates the notion of ὃ αὐτοὺς δεῖ πoριζεσθαι from 269C4, shifting from the point of view of the student needing to supply it to the rhetorical techniques, to the rhetorical techniques that need it supplied to them. The term is, moreover, commonly used of medical recipes and thus helps the segue into medicine.

1063 φύσιν (B4): I adopt this paraphrase to designate the peculiarly anarthrous use of φύσις (cf.A5), which in the ways it is used here will seem to give it an adverbial force.

1064 ψυχῆς δέ (B5): The connection between the medical and rhetorical arts is new to Phaedrus, who has not read the *Gorgias* as the commentators have. Socrates's purpose for what is here a far-flung analogy is to drive the final nail into the coffin of rhetoric as an art, by means of an analogy between body and soul (the imperfect correspondence between the analogy as presented here and as presented in the *Gorgias* is of no importance at all). If rhetoric is to be an art of persuasion, in the true sense of art, it must be ready to wander far beyond the horizon of the usual political discussion and take into consideration the nature of what it is persuading – the soul; but as soon as it does so it can no longer be a science of speaking to crowds since crowds do not have a soul (though perhaps a mob does have a "psychology" that even the rhetoricians understand admirably well and readily manipulate though they do not admit it: cf. παγκαλῶς, 271C3: cf. n. *ad loc.*).

1065 λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις (B7-8): Sc. προσφέρων. These are meant to correspond with φάρμακα and τροφή but the correspondence is not one-to-one. Moreover, λόγος is to ἐπιτήδευσις as ἐπιστήμη is to μελέτη.

1066 πειθώ (B8), the state of mind brought about by persuasion, i.e. conviction or obedience: cf. LSJ *s.v.* §4.

1067 ἣν ἂν βούλῃ (B8): The art, as art, empowers the speaker to persuade his audience to believe whatever he wants them to (the idea is repeated from 268B1: cf. n.), but just as the doctor provides drugs and nourishment to create health and strength, respectively, Socrates has imported the assumption that the artful rhetorician will provide arguments that will induce the soul of his auditor to adopt not just any beliefs but healthy ones (πειθώ as the state of mind that finds the healthy to be "sweet") and, for those who are already healthy, arguments that will inspire them to moral strength and virtue (ἀρετή).

1068 ψυχῆς ... φύσιν (C1): φύσις is again anarthrous.

1069 τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως (C2): I.e., the "inner nature" of soul as ὅλον τι (τοῦ is quasi-possessive), as a thing that exists on its own terms quite apart from those aspects or parts of it that the rhetorical art might wish to manipulate (the article is used with φύσις [previously anarthrous in this sense] only to establish attributive position for τοῦ ὅλου). Phaedrus's response (C3-5) indicates that this is how he takes the meaning, for he refers to the enlightened doctor's holistic approach to bodily health mentioned for instance at *Charm.*156B3-C3 (though cf. Brisson n.397). He suggests that if Socrates's parallelism between medicine and rhetoric holds (note οὐδέ, C4), it should hold in this respect also: the rhetorician needs to know the soul *per se*.

1070 Reading μέν (C3), the reading of all mss. except Par.1810 which has μὲν οὖν. Phaedrus dispenses with a connective

understand the inner nature of body, either, without hewing to this method."[1071]

And he is right to say so, but we will have to examine our own argument and see whether it, too, agrees with Hippocrates.

"I agree."

So let's consult what Hippocrates and the true argument assert about inner nature.[1072] Mustn't one think in the following way about the inner nature of anything, no matter what? First is to determine if it is uniform or manifold, this thing that we are planning to master and of which we intend to make another man a master. Second, if it is uniform, we must determine its power – what ability it has, by nature, to affect what or be affected by what; and if it is manifold, to list off[1073] its many forms and then ask that same question about each of them: by virtue of[1074] doing what or undergoing what does it have its distinct nature

"I suppose so, Socrates."

Obviously taking a path[1075] that did not include these steps would be like a blind man's walk. But we mustn't find the man who is skillfully tracking something down to resemble a blind man or a deaf man.[1076] Clearly if someone means to pass on argumentation to someone in a skillful[1077] way, he will do a polished job of showing the essence and truth of the nature[1078] of that to which the person will be administering his arguments – i.e., the soul.

"Obviously." (271)

And all his striving to win[1079] is directed toward this thing, since it is in this thing that he is trying

because he is volunteering his special way of saying yes (i.e., quoting others), and Socrates notes his enthusiasm.

1071 ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης (C4): As ἄνευ indicates, the μέθοδος is again (n.1056) a step-by-step process added and *interposed* so as to reach a sure result or outcome or ability. As if to prove the point, Socrates now insists that Phaedrus and he not merely accept the point on hearsay but themselves interpose an investigation of it to see if Hippocrates is correct (C6-7). The dramatic business is not so much for the sake of depicting Phaedrus's dependency on authority (deVries) as for providing Socrates an opportunity to pick up on Phaedrus's enthusiasm and invite him to a fuller participation in the thought and the discussion. Thompson at the end of his long note (p.125b) guesses correctly that what Socrates and Phaedrus are talking about is abstract essentialism (i.e., what is represented by the notable expression, περὶ φύσεως σκοπεῖν), whose μέθοδος is division and collection.

1072 περὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως (D1): φύσις again saliently anarthrous, noted this time by Helmbold-Rabinowitz (tr.): "Then see what it is that Hippocrates and truth mean by the phrase 'about a nature'."

1073 ἀριθμησάμενον (D6), the reading of Galen (ἀριθμησάμενος BT : καταριθμησάμενον Hermias [245.21]: ἀριθμησαμένους *coni.*Stephanus), accepted by Heindorf and Burnet. Stallb. reads the nom. sing. of the mss., citing the nominative λέγων at 241D6 as a similar *constructio ad sensum* (where the adjacent inf. χαρίζεσθαι defeats Thompson's argument about the nearby inf. ἰδεῖν in our passage), as do Ast and Moreschini. Rowe reads Stephanus's conjecture without argument. Little or nothing is at stake as to the meaning.

1074 τῷ τί ποιεῖν (D6-7): In the second statement of the question about δύναμις he specifies that not only does the thing by nature have its distinct δύναμις, but also that it is by virtue of having that δύναμις that it is of that nature – which may come to the same thing.

1075 μέθοδος / πορείᾳ / μετιόντα (D9-E2): Socrates "strips the technical veneer from the word μέθοδος" (Ryan) which he introduced at 269D7-8 and which was brought forward by Phaedrus's reference to Hippocrates's μέθοδος (C4).

1076 οὐ ... τυφλῷ οὐδὲ κωφῷ (E1-2): The blind man walks without (seeing) a path (adding deafness reminds us that the art under consideration is audible). Conversely, a man who works skillfully takes a path by definition (τόν γε τέχνῃ μετιόντα, with γε *vi termini*), i.e., he works *methodically*.

1077 λόγους τέχνῃ διδῷ (E3): λόγους is pregnant for λέγειν λόγους and the controversial term, τέχνῃ, is adverbial with διδῷ. The phrase means the skillful teaching of speaking and is spelled out below as σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῷ (271A5) and τέχνῃ γράφειν (271C4). The skill that is in question for the moment is in the teaching (ὅσον δὲ τοῦτο τέχνη, 269D6), whereas the skill of the finished speaker has for now been shelved (by the formula φύσις / μελέτη / ἐπιστήμη in the μέν clause at 269D2-6). DeVries follows Thompson in taking σπουδῇ to mean *ex cathedra* or "as a professional teacher" but the non-professional Socrates hardly takes professionalism seriously.

1078 τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει … τῆς φύσεως τούτου (E3-4): οὐσία τῆς φύσεως τούτου is a periphrasis for (anarthrous) ὁτουοῦν φύσις (D1).

1079 ἅμιλλα (271A1) denotes not only striving for a goal but competition with others as if only one could achieve it (cf.

to create persuasion, isn't it?

"Yes."

It is clear therefore that Thrasymachus,[1080] or anyone else who is serious about teaching[1081] the art of rhetoric, must first[1082] write up an argument that will enable his reader to see[1083] whether soul is single and uniform, or multiform as the body is. For this is what constitutes "demonstrating the inner nature"[1084] according to us.

"Completely so."

Second, in turn, to tell and show that by virtue of what it affects or what affects it, it has its distinct nature?

"Obviously."

And third, once he has set into an array the types of arguments and the types of soul, he will go through all[1085] the causes of the effects that the several types of soul undergo, by linking each with each and teaching what causes a certain type of soul necessarily[1086] to be persuaded by certain type of argument, and what causes another type of soul to fail to be persuaded by it.

"No question this would surely be the finest[1087] conceivable state of affairs."

You can be sure that if it is done otherwise, whether displayed or argued and whether spoken or written,[1088] it will not be an *artful* job, in this field or any other.[1089] To the contrary, the men that write[1090] these days, whose "Arts of Speech" you speak of having heard,[1091] unscrupulously seek to conceal the truth, knowing perfectly well about the issue of the soul that I have raised.[1092] Until they

248B2 and n.469): the basis for this new idea will be reached below (C2).

1080 ὁ Θρασύμαχος (A4): One for two again (cf. 269D7 and n.1068).

1081 For διδῷ (A5) in the sense of διδάσκω, cf.*Rep*.365D4-5 (deVries).

1082 πρῶτον (A5): Not only must Thrasymachus or anybody else include a study of the soul in his τέχνη λόγων, but he must place it first so as to keep himself from wandering off the path (270D9-E5) – i.e., in order to be "methodical." Suddenly what the epagoge above (268A8-269C5) had shoe-horned in as *supplementary* (προσεπίσταται, 268B5; understated with οὐδὲν κωλύει, 268E4-5; continued with προσδέονται, 269E4), becomes *prerequisite* to all the rest.

1083 γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ἰδεῖν (A5-6), τε καί linking cause and effect (cf. my n. to *Rep*.330D7). The writing is meant to cause its reader to understand (ἰδεῖν is brought forward from 270D6). Cf. γεγραφότες τε καὶ διδάσκοντας (269B2, with n.). Socrates continues to underline the difference between the writing and its content or meaning (λόγος).

1084 φύσιν δεικνύναι (A7-8): Note reversion to the (abbreviated) anarthrous formulation in the restatement of the concept from 270E3-4ff, to which his present remarks now point back.

1085 Reading πάσας (B2) with TW and edd. (τάς B).

1086 ἐξ ἀνάγκης (B4): The necessity of the outcome is an entailment of the artful understanding of "inner nature."

1087 κάλλιστα γοῦν (B6): καλός again in the sense of the admirably effective (cf. 263C1 and n.916). γοῦν plus the optative indicates Phaedrus is not sure it is possible, eliciting Socrates's strong rejoinder that any other teaching would fail to be "artful." Contrast Phaedrus's remark below according to which he no longer cares whether it is possible (272B5-6).

1088 λεχθήσεται ἢ γραφήσεται (B8): The polar doublet is part of the generalization, along with ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον and οὔτε τι ἄλλο οὔτε τοῦτο; but in both cases the more essential question, argumentation, trumps the issue of writing or making a display.

1089 οὔτε τι ἄλλο οὔτε τοῦτο (B8-C1): Rhetoric (= τοῦτο) must know the inner nature of soul as medicine must know the inner nature of body or as any study or practice that is truly "artful" (τέχνῃ) must know the inner nature of the object it works on.

1090 γράφοντες ὧν σὺ ἀκήκοας τέχνας λόγων (C1-2): The participle emphasizes even more that they teach by writing treatises (cf. A5-6, 269B2). For ἀκήκοας in connection with written books cf.268C3 and n. *ad loc*.

1091 ὧν σὺ ἀκήκοας (C1): Socrates remembers Phaedrus's attempts to quote them as if he did not "necessarily" agree (cf. nn.840, 881), but now the perfect has a preteritive cast to it, since Phaedrus has left them behind.

1092 πανοῦργοί εἰσιν καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται (C2): They fail to deal with psychology although they are perfectly knowledgeable of it (εἰδότες ... παγκάλως) and recognize its importance to persuasion (ἄμιλλα, 271A1). They claim to be teachers of the τέχνη but fraudulently keep their knowledge of psychology secret. παγκάλως, though often ironic (e.g., 269A5), is not ironic here (*pace* Scully, Yunis), but is an overstatement to stress their mendacity. A speech delivered to a crowd tries to persuade a plurality of souls of different types at one and the same time. Socrates's point is that the rhetorician knows enough of people's common foibles to seduce them as a mass, the kind of seduction

argue or write[1093] a rhetoric in this manner, let them not persuade[1094] us that they are writing *artfully*.

"What is this "this"?[1095]

The very words of it are not ready to hand, but I am willing to try to tell[1096] how to go about writing them,[1097] to the extent that writing can be done in a truly artful[1098] way.

"Go ahead!"

Since the power[1099] of speech is, in fact, due to its being a soul-leading,[1100] it is essential for a person who is preparing to be a master of rhetoric to know the soul[1101] and how many types there are. Thus, the treatise would say that there are so many of this and this kind and so many of that and that,[1102] whence we find among ourselves people of this kind and that kind. The types of persons

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deployed in Lysias's speech that Phaedrus so admired (227C3-8: cf."Analysis of First Speech: The Setting for Delivering the Speech"). The eager students of such elite teachers, then as now, already share their cynical presumptions about *hoi polloi*: this is why they are ashamed to admit they want to study with them. Meanwhile, the initial assumption that rhetoric deserved to call itself a τέχνη λόγων has moved Socrates farther and farther from the scenario of oratory and closer and closer to that of rational conversation between two persons of the sort we are witnessing – i.e. philosophical dialogue.

1093 λέγωσί τε καὶ γράφωσι (C4): The order stresses that the thought comes before the write-up of the thought. We will have an example of this presently (271B10-272A8).

1094 μὴ πειθώμεθα (C4): Our insight immunizes us from their vaunted ability to persuade us they are artful (τέχνῃ), vitiating the circular argument of Madame Techne.

1095 τίνα τοῦτον; (C5): Phaedrus refers to Socrates's τοῦτον (C3), which appropriately points backwards to what he has spelled out in three steps above (A4-B5). The sense of his question becomes evident in Socrates's reply (αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ ῥήματα εἰπεῖν οὐκ εὐπετές, C6): he wants the "prolegomena of any future presentation" (γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει, 271A5-6) fleshed out in the present. His request seems unjustified after Socrates has just spelled things out (A4-B5), but we heard at the beginning he likes his teacher to repeat himself (228A7-8). His request is therefore a dramatic index that he his shifting his alliance toward Socrates (*pace* Heitsch 240). He will do it again at 277B4 (cf. n. *ad loc.*).

1096 λέγειν (C8), conative present in contrast with the aorist εἰπεῖν (C6).

1097 αὐτὰ τὰ ῥήματα (C6) points to, but does not explain, a distinction between a set of words and how to write them (πῶς δεῖ γράφειν), but in addition the question is introduced whether *any* writing can be fully "artful," after all, in the new sense he insisted upon above (τέχνῃ, B8). For ῥήματα connoting finished *formulas* cf. *Ep.*7.341CD (Brisson); and for the distinction compare Phaedrus's distinction at 228D1-5. The manner or style of the following paragraph shall show how living speech might differ from a write-up. Rowe, I think wrongly, places the entire paragraph (C10-272B4) into quotes, turning Socrates's λόγος into the *ipsissima verba* spoken by a συγγραφεύς after all (cf. n.1125, *infra*).

1098 τεχνικῶς (C7), *variatio* for τέχνῃ, stressing the sense over the formula. With καθ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, writing *per se* is again brought into focus.

1099 λόγου δύναμις (C10): The phrase replaces τέχνη ῥητορική as the *definiendum*, bringing forward the new focus on the power of speech to persuade that was broached at 266C8-3, introduced as such at 268A2, continued by Pericles's remark at 269C2-3, Phaedrus's question at C9-D1, Socrates's δύνασθαι at D2, and by the focus on the soul as locus where persuasion does its work (270B1-E4) and the characterization of the oratorical ἄμιλλα at 271A1-2. ἀνάγκη (D1) is now logical or "essential" necessity, as at B4.

1100 ψυχαγωγία (C10): The provisional characterization Socrates adopted at 261A6ff in order to stipulate to Phaedrus's notion that rhetoric is an art of *persuasion* (259E7-260A4) in order to focus on whether it is an *art* in the first place (cf. nn.876, 877) now returns. By now it has turned out to be (τυγχάνει ... οὖσα, C10) a valid characterization of the art (or power) of speech (λόγου δύναμις) because, given his altogether new idea of requiring the rhetorician to study the *soul* (ψυχή), an idea that derives from the decision to speak περὶ φύσεως, the notion of soul-leading has been given a scientific foundation.

1101 ψυχή (D1): the nominative is proleptic and therefore emphatic, evincing that the argument (from ψυχαγωγία) is true by definition. We may characterize it as a "The lilies: see how they grow" construction. For this proleptic *dis*-incorporation of the subject of the relative clause, cf. *Meno* 81E2 and *Lach.*199E11.

1102 τόσα καὶ τόσα / τοῖα καὶ τοῖα (D2): All the demonstratives can be expected to be "first person" (for which "the following" is an appropriate transl.) since Socrates is imitating the speaker instructing his audience (though consider the technical caveat in the next note). His summary way of speaking loosely mixes quality and quantity, because dialectic does both in the way it counts (270D6 – i.e., lists off) the qualitatively distinct types. What is casual or vague would need to be specified and cleaned up in a final version; but at the same time, if we can keep up, a final version would not

having been secured,[1103] the treatise would in turn[1104] move on to arguments, and say there are this many and that many types, with characterizations of each;[1105] and would say that this and that sort of man will be persuadable to do so-and-so[1106] by this and that sort of argument for this or that reason in this or that connection, whereas the following other types will be intransigent to them for the following reasons. Once all those characteristics are firmly grasped[1107] it is necessary, next,[1108] to observe them[1109] as they are present and enacted in practice,[1110] and to be able to keep track of them with sharp perception, or else all the lecturing[1111] one sat through[1112] beforehand will never reach the threshold of being[1113] any benefit at all to him. And once he has achieved the competence[1114] to tell what sort of person is persuaded by what sort of argument, and once when someone approaches him he is able to discern and note for himself (272) that the man is of this or that type[1115] – i.e., which nature of man among those[1116] that were described in words earlier, the type now being present to him in deed – to which type one must administer the following sorts of arguments for persuading him

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be necessary – and this is one of the things Socrates is illustrating. As a performance his speech is necessarily inferior by his omissions but the audience makes up for that. If the natural kinds of soul here imagined are to be aligned with those of Socrates's Second speech – and the conversation in no way requires us to do so – they would correlate to which god they had followed in the ouranos and thereby formed their inner nature (248A2), not (*pace* Yunis) the "social" types of men they became when they fell into the flesh, which types only reflect how much or how little they remember (248C8-E3).

1103 τούτων οὕτω διῃρημένων (D3): Both demonstratives are second person, designating what the student can now be expected to have understood – which is the "first" of three steps in the description above (271A4-8) – so that he is ready to move to the second.

1104 αὖ (D4), stressing the logical order of the treatise.

1105 τοιόνδε (D4), "first person," of the *new* point. The formulation with ἕκαστον is a free variation from the alternative formulation, οἱ μὲν τοιοίδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε (D3). Though the expression is free its sense is transparent.

1106 ἐς τὰ τοιάδε (D6): Just as the expression is compendious and quick, he adds a gratuitous elaboration. His use of the shorter form ἐς (read by edd. from B, whereas T has the facilior εἰς) is part of the rhetoric. Compare the foreshortening of the δέ clause (D6-7).

1107 ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα (D7) corresponds to τούτων οὕτω διῃρημένων in that it denotes the next step, but it stresses mental cognition that will next be supplemented with practical application. Thus the distinction is being drawn between ἐπιστήμη and μελέτη, study and practice.

1108 μετὰ ταῦτα (D7-8) again stressing the requisite order of study.

1109 αὐτά (D8), the reading of the corrector of the Marcianus 186 accepted by edd. (αὐτόν BTW : αὐτό Galen), stresses the self-identity and therefore the intelligibility of the εἴδη especially when located in the systematic array.

1110 ἐν πράξεσιν ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα (D8-E1) is like εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν at *Phlb.*16D2.

1111 ὧν τότε ἤκουον λόγων (E2), compendious by "incorporation" (Smyth §2537) for τούτους τοὺς λόγους ὧν ἤκουον τότε. The expression is imported from the remark to Phaedrus above about the lectures he had attended (perfect ἀκήκοας), and backhandedly suggests that the lecturers Phaedrus might have heard as such make no provision for the practical application of seeing through to the psyches within concrete individuals as they were classified in lecture.

1112 συνών (E2): Here is the verb for participating in a συνουσία – i.e., a session of live discussion and study such as Phaedrus had had, "all morning," with Lysias (cf. *Gorg.*455D2), and which he, and Socrates after him, had called a διατριβή (227A3, B6, B11), from which Socrates's method of discussion is so different (contrast the use at 239B1).

1113 Reading ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι (E1-2) from Galen with edd. (ἢ μηδὲ εἰδέναι TW : ἢ μηδὲν εἰδέναι Hermias 248.12 : εἰ μὴ εἰδέναι BD). Robin saves εἰδέναι by emending αὐτῷ (mss.) to αὐτόν (αὐτῶν Galen).

1114 εἰπεῖν τε ἱκανῶς (E3), marking the next prerequisite level or phase of competence (cf. ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, D7; and τούτων οὕτω διῃρημένων, D3-4), but this time the completed step is elaborately spelled out (E3-272A3) since this is his final opportunity to stress the all-important psychological aspect of the method *per se* before going on to integrating the techniques found in the manuals (A5-6), though these, too, will have been refined by the psychology.

1115 οὗτός ἐστι (272A1): The conception is entirely that of a one-on-one personal encounter, not of an orator looking out onto the mass (cf.n.1064): the more scientific the τέχνη λόγων, the further it is from "political discourse" and the closer it is to dialogue (cf. n.1092).

1116 φύσις (A1): What was above the type of soul (τόσα καὶ τόσα [sc. εἴδη], D2) that made the man what sort of man he is (τοιοίδε ... τοιοίδε, D3) is now called the nature (φύσις) of the man, recalling the language of the σκέψις φυσέως πέρι, above.

toward acting as follows[1117] – by the person who has once achieved all this,[1118] when he is able in addition[1119] to choose the right times[1120] to speak and the right times to be silent, and, as for[1121] brevity and pathos and cleverness and each and all of the types of techniques of speech he has learned, is able to distinguish the right time to use them from the wrong time,[1122] by this person has the skill at speaking finally been developed to competence and perfection, then and no sooner! Whereas if one leaves out any of these elements, whether as a speaker or as a teacher or as a writer, but claims he is speaking "artfully," the person who refuses to follow his advice[1123] will be the one who wins out, hands down.[1124] "What's all this?" that writer of manuals may object:[1125] "Must we accept that sort of training

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1117 προσοιστέον ... ἐπὶ τὴν τῶνδε πειθώ (A2-3): The language of administering speech as a doctor administers a drug (προσφέρων ... πειθώ, 270B6-9) returns.

1118 ταῦτα δ' ἤδη πάντα ἔχοντι (A3): The phrase resumes the protasis with which this elaborate description of the third step opened (ἱκανῶς ἔχει, 271E3) though the nominative has been replaced by the dative under the force of proximate construction of dative οἱ with παροῦσα. For "resumptive δέ" cf. Denniston, 183. ἤδη, like αὖ and μετὰ ταῦτα, again stresses the prerequisite completion of the step.

1119 προσλαβόντι (A4): The dative participle is placed obtrusively early, to add what must be the next step (since the immediately foregoing ἔχοντι summarized what came before). Hitherto the logical dependency of the new step on the previous step had been emphasized by programmatic remarks in complex syntactical constructions (cf.nn.1103, 1107, 1114) and by discourse markers (nn.1104,1108), but this time the construction depicting the new step is merely a (coordinated) subordinate participle. Indeed the only indication we are moving on, besides the semantics of ἔχοντι, is the *absence* of a connective particle. What for these reasons appears to be added as merely supplementary (n.b., προσ-) turns out to be nothing other than the tricks of the trade (and then some), the bread and butter of the existing τέχναι λόγων relagated to a clause subordinate to an circumstantial participle. Conversely, what had before been characterized as the supplement (cf. n.1082) has now become the central matter. Speaking περὶ φύσεως has reversed the order.

1120 καιρούς (A4): The plural immediately threatens to demote the subject matter to the level of the τεχνήματα of the rhetoricians, as it had at 269A6-7 (cf. n. *ad loc.*), but by now these come into view as not mere tricks but applications of the theory and practice of psychology, which will enable and even guarantee their use as being τέχνῃ, truly artful.

1121 βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καί … (A5): The list of genitive *singulars*, which come to fall under the governance of εἴδη, endows what had been a hodge-podge of τεχνήματα (expressed above with derogatory plurals: 269A7) with theoretical standing and even suggests that in the writing Socrates is describing they will be set out in a dialectically perspicuous array.

1122 τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διάγνοντι (A6-7): Reversion to the ordinate dative participial construction of the entire phrase from A4 after the subordinate protasis (ἑκάστων τε ὅσα ἂν εἴδη μάθῃ λόγων), as well as the abstract singulars, reintroduce the sense of dialectical orderliness in the contemplated treatise. Once the techniques are learned they will be brought under the head of καιρός, itself determined by the souls of the audience. The mention of καιρός as the governing criterion both before and after the reference to the hodge-podge of techniques further emphasizes that in themselves they are not truly "artistic" by setting them apart.

1123 ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος (B2), pregnant, as πειθώ was at 270B8, meaning the person who is not taken in by the school's ἐπάγγελμα and therefore refuses to join the school. It repeats μὴ πειθώμεθα τέχνῃ γράφειν from above (271C4), just as the entire systematic statement restates with majesterial polish (and with the subsumption of their τεχνήματα by the mastering of καιρός) the three step admonition to the rhetoric teachers (271A4-B5).

1124 κρατεῖ (B2); The "contest" one wins may only be an imaginary creature of the idiom (for which cf. 228C6, *Leg.*772D4, 839A4; *Phlb.*15C8; *Tim.*54A) as at 242B4 (so Heindorf; cf. *Ep.*7.343D4), but as we have just heard, skillful success will come to the person who has learned and can bring into practice when and how to deploy all those techniques rather than only to learn them from specialists who do little more than vie to get them named after themselves (266D5-267E9). The idiom therefore fulfills the promise of the ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον of 269D2 and the challenge of the ἅμιλλα of 271A1.

1125 ὁ συγγραφεύς (B2): Socrates invents a response by "Thrasymachus or anyone else who may set about passing on the rhetorical art in earnest" (271A4-5) – these unscrupulous writers (γράφοντες ... πανοῦργοι, 271C1-2, whence συγγραφεύς here), who are surely not acting in earnest, to whom he has been dictating for a whole page, even though unlike them he has demurred to produce a writing of his own (271C6) to set up against theirs – and he puts the response into the mouth of one of them in order to give Phaedrus an opportunity to part company with those whom he "had heard" (271C1), i.e., had been hearkening to (n.1091) and to confirm, in a dramatic way, his agreement with

simply because it is set out by you, or might we accept one that has been set out in another way?"[1126]

"Any other way is impossible – and yet this way appears to be no small undertaking."[1127]

You are right. And because of what you say one ought to work backwards and forwards[1128] through all arguments about speaking to investigate whether there might be some easier or quicker way to achieve the art and to avoid embarking[1129] needlessly on a long and rough excursion when there might be a shorter and smoother way. So if you can offer any help – perhaps something you heard at the feet of[1130] Lysias say or somebody else – try to remember what it was and tell us.

"I would try if I had anything[1131] but I haven't."

How about if I tell you an argument I have heard from certain men in this field?[1132]

"What?"

You know how they say the wolf's complaint was justified ... [1133]

Socrates instead (for the technique cf.269A8ff and n.866 *supra*), relying on the fact that he has presented the method in outline (271A4-B5) and then at Phaedrus's request restated it in a way that fleshes out what Phaedrus had already understood (271C10-272B2). Hence the objector here refers to the two of them with τε καί. The idea that he is a final "editor" (Rowe, Brisson, al.) of a treatise that Socrates has just presented in outline is out of place here and even more out of place in the sequel. The article (ὁ, B2) is "referential" (cf. n.49), not possessive.

1126 Reading ἤ (B3) with the mss. (μή *coni.* Burnet), by which the "treatise writer" *challenges the assent* of Phaedrus and Socrates. The adverbs go with the genitive absolute λεγομένης which drew the object of ἀποδεκτέον out of the accusative, in a squinting construction.

1127 ἀδύνατόν που ... ἄλλως (B5): The other shoe has dropped. Even if the method Socrates has presented had seemed to him only conceptually realizable just above (κάλλιστον γοῦν ἂν ἔχοι οὕτως, 271B6: cf. n. *ad loc.*) Phaedrus now, following the syntax of the question, avers that accepting a "method argued differently," would be impossible.

1128 ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταστρέφοντα (B8): Having secured Phaedrus's assent to the necessity of trying to doing it this way even though it may not be possible, Socrates can now voice the wish it could be otherwise, a wish Phaedrus himself was on the verge of expressing just a moment ago (271B6: cf. n.1087). By granting that all (possible) *arguments* (λόγους) should be consulted in case there is an easier path, he reminds Phaedrus that it is by argument that they reached the present conclusion, and now consoles him for accepting what he had admonished him to accept just above (271B7-C4). Ast distinguishes three senses for ἄνω κάτω: (1) inventive universality or inability to decide, as here and *Gorg.*481D7-E1, 511A4-5; *Ion* 541E8; *Lach.*196B1-2; *Phdo.*96B1 (πολλάκις ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν), *Tht.*195C2-3, and *Ep.*7.343E1 (*grâce à* Brisson); (2) disorderly fluctuation (*Gorg.*493A5; *Phdo.*90C5; *Phlb.*43A3, *Rep.* 508D8; *Soph.*242A11-B1); (3) confusion topsy-turvy (*Crat.*386E2, *Prot.*356D5, *Tht.*153D4-5). The use at 278D9 seems to combine both (1) and (3). For μεταστρέφοντα cf. *Tht.*191C2: πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον.

1129 Reading ἀπίῃ (C2) with the mss., often emended. The offending accusatives are adverbial.

1130 ἐπακήκοας (C3): With the perfect Socrates again playfully taunts Phaedrus with his hearsay evidence, helping him to carry forward the realization that they have gone far beyond what he started with. The prefix (ἐπί) suggests scrupulous attention being paid (cf. *Prot.*317D3, *Soph.*227C10).

1131 ἕνεκα μὲν πείρας (C5): For ἕνεκα = *quod attinet ad*, cf. *Alc.1*.127E, *Polit.*304A, *Rep.*337D, *Tht.*148D. Phaedrus now less willingly begs off giving his opinion.

1132 ὧν τῶν περὶ ταῦτά τινων ἀκήκοα (C7-8): Construe, with Ast, as ὧν ἀκήκοά τινων τῶν περὶ ταῦτα (sc. ὄντων), which is corroborated by Phaedrus's response below (273A2-3: ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοί). For οἱ περὶ ταῦτα absolute Ast cites 273A5, *Soph.*241E4 (of τέχναι); X.Oec.2.16 For bare περί τινα as a predicate with εἶναι cf. *Rep.*485D11. Now it is Socrates who adduces hearsay, but it is the same hearsay argument with which Phaedrus started the whole thing off!

1133 τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν (C10): Socrates finds another proverb to justify another invention of an imaginary interlocutor (cf. 260A5 and n.), but by now he can assume that Phaedrus will find this interlocutor to be a wolf instead of a wise man. The proverbial λύκου ῥήματα (for which cf. *Paroim.Gr.* 2.78=GC[Leidensis] 2.68, etc.) are the wolf's words when he comes upon the shepherd eating one of his sheep: "What a hub-bub you would have raised if *I* were doing that!" Hermias interprets Socrates to mean that if the rhetoricians he is criticizing had expatiated at such length on their curriculum as he has just done on his (271B10-272B2: note λεγομένης, B4, and his apologetic remark at B7-C2), Socrates would have raised a ruckus. Now, however these critics argue that he has given his scientific approach too much justification (μακράν περιβαλλομένους, D3), as the articulation of their own approach will show. Commentators too hastily substitute the "devil's advocate," which is a different notion. Socrates now countenances the opposing view for the sake of corroborating Phaedrus's new agreement, skirting as long as possible to confront him directly with what

"So go ahead and play the wolf."

Alright, then. They assert that one shouldn't make such a big deal[1134] about the things we have brought up – that there is no need to go all the way back to basics[1135] and gird oneself up for every eventuality,[1136] since as we said at the beginning of our[1137] discussion, there is entirely[1138] no need to have any knowledge of the truth about just and good actions[1139] nor indeed[1140] about which men are just and good and whether they are so by nature or nurture,[1141] if one is trying to become a competent rhetorician. In the law courts nobody cares a whit[1142] about the truth in these areas, but only about the persuasive and believable. The persuasive or believable is the likely, so it is to the likely

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he himself had thought before. From here on out the conversation nails down and broadens out what Phaedrus has agreed to.

1134 οὐδέν ... δεῖν σεμνύνειν (D2): The expression grants that what Socrates has brought up is inherently legitimate and serious – that it has σεμνότης – as does the subsequent remark about ἀνάγειν ἄνω, in order to complain that in practical fact all this fine preliminary study and preparation is irrelevant to "what is actually going on" in public assemblies.

1135 ἀνάγειν ἄνω (D3): Leading the argument "back and up" to *basics* (cf. deVries and trr. Jowett, Fowler, Rowe). There was and has not been as yet any "exaltation" (Ryan) nor anything "heavenward" (Yunis) in Socrates's description of the τέχνη λόγων.

1136 μακρὰν περιβαλλομένους (D3): Referring to the elaborate and thorough τάδε's and τοιοίδε's of Socrates's account. I follow Ast and say the metaphor is from the orator's girding up his garment before he speaks (cf. Quint. 11.3.156, and *pace* Thompson, περιβαλλομένους is middle). The glosses of Hermias (κύκλῳ περιέρχεσθαι) and LSJ ("circumlocute"), and the expression κύκλῳ περιβαλλόμενος ("beating around the bush," *Symp*.222C, adduced by edd.), are not pertinent, since Socrates's longish statement is neither circular nor dilatory nor prolix, but thorough. Hackforth's "fetch such a long compass on an uphill road" is a paradigm of obscurantist slang for which the English show a tribal weakness. Plato could have but has not written παραβαλλόμενος (cf. *Lys*.203B3). Whatever the meaning, Socrates has already granted he would prefer a shorter way (B7-C2), so that to the extent Tisias is charging they are boasting about their roundabout manner (σεμνύνειν, D2) the charge has been pre-empted.

1137 τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου (D4): We become inured to the fact that the first and second persons in the conversation are the speaker and his interlocutor, but the "plural" first person (i.e., "we") demonstrative is appropriate where it refers to the pair of interlocutors as a "we" in distinction from a "him" that has been brought in as an imaginary interlocutor (i.e., Phaedrus and Socrates as opposed to the imaginary interlocutor Socrates has just introduced). For this "plural" sense, cf. n.641. With κατ'ἀρχὰς Socrates refers to 259E7-260A7 where he had tried to begin their investigation of good speaking and writing by adducing ὑπάρχοντα (cf. n.837).

1138 παντάπασιν (D3): The broad generalization, emphatic negation (οὐδέν), and confident tone were absent in what Phaedrus had them saying before (259E7-60A4), and adds the sense of a nostrum being delivered, which continued below (τὸ παράπαν, D7; πάντως, E4; ἅπασαν, 273A1).

1139 δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων (D5): Socrates with characteristic accuracy in back-reference (cf. *Rep*.340C9 and my n.) singles out exactly the same two elements of the triad of μέγιστα that Phaedrus had used above (260A1-3), just as his subsequent τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι clearly refers to Phaedrus's words τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσεσθαι there (260A1), with the small but crucial modification of ῥήτωρ into ῥητορικός (on what is at stake cf. n.841). The addition of πραγμάτων to δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν in hyperbaton and with anastrophe or πέρι creates a berth for the subsequent broadening of his argument (ἤ καί ... γε) to include ἄνθρωποι, on which see the next two notes.

1140 καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε (D5-6): γε signals the realization that to the earlier denial of a need for objective knowledge can now be added a denial of a need for the psychology that has been discovered in the interim.

1141 ἀνθρώπων τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἢ τρόφῃ (D6): With τοιούτων the advocate with his nostrum mimics Socrates's use of demonstratives as place-fillers in his outline above (271D2-7: it has no antecedent, *pace* edd.), but just after evinces a gross and insouciant misunderstanding of what he is criticizing, for he mistakes φύσις in Socrates's conception of a περὶ φύσεως or *essentialist* knowledge of soul (cf.n.1116), for the *inborn* characteristics of a man (as his gratuitous elaboration of φύσει with τρόφῃ reveals).

1142 Reading μέλειν (D9), the reading imported from Ficinus by Stephanus (μέλει mss. and Hermias 250.2).

that a skillful speaker will give his attention.[1143] Often in fact you *mustn't* tell what really happened[1144] if the truth is not likely sounding, but tell a likely story instead, whether as the accuser or the defendant.[1145] All through what you say it is this element of, yes,[1146] likelihood that you must pursue, whereas often in what you say it will only be "good-bye" that you will say to the truth.[1147] For (273) it is by achieving this element all the way through that your speech will have all the art it will ever need.[1148]

"You've used their very words, those people who try to make themselves out to be 'artful'[1149] at speaking. I remember we touched upon an argument like this in passing, before.[1150] This is the be-all and end-all[1151] in their view."

But please, you know your Tisias backwards and forwards.[1152] Let him answer this question of ours: Is "the likely" anything other than "whatever the masses opine"?[1153]

1143 τέχνῃ ἐρεῖν (E2): With τέχνῃ the Speaker brings forward the vaunt of Madame Techne, who was first to use this bare dative. The advocate reveals that even for himself, "artful" is merely a vaunt for effectiveness. There is in his nostrum no claim of researched "technical" competence (neither recondite and showy but superficial τεχνήματα, nor philosophical ἀδολεσχία dialectically reasoned out and applied) but merely a canny and unscrupulous "artifice" tailored to the peculiar circumstances of a public gathering, in which the "public mind" gravitates toward consensus in a way that ousts whatever reflective thinking might have gone on in the minds of the individuals that make up the mass (as we know already, and hardly need be reminded of by Socrates at *Rep.*492B5ff). Cf. the expression τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην below (and n.1148).

1144 Reading αὐτὰ τὰ (E2) from Heindorf (αὐτά B : αὖ τά T). The αὖ, defended by Stallb., Thompson, deVries, and Rowe, and read by Robin (though his translation has, "*L'acte en lui-même, il y a des cas où* …), Moreschini (though he translates "*il y a même des cas*") and Heitsch (though he translates "*nicht einmal das sagen was geschehen ist*"), is awkward after οὐδὲ γάρ (unexampled in the *similia* offered by deVries). Moreover we need not iteration (αὖ) but climax (αὐτά). Not only is truth never needed: sometimes untruth is needed instead.

1145 Cf. above, 255A4; illustrated below, 273B6-C4.

1146 δή (E4): With the particle the advocate emphasizes that he has made his point, *pace* Denniston (333), who failed to see that it is his thoughts and words that are being represented here – i.e., that Socrates is playing the wolf – with a telling accuracy that moves Phaedrus to praise (273A2).

1147 πολλὰ εἰπόντα χαίρειν τῷ ἀληθεῖ (E5): πολλὰ εἰπόντα echoes πάντως λέγοντα. To the confident nostrum that The Likely is *all* (παντός) you will say (continuous present) you will *often* (πολλά) be saying goodbye to truth (punctual aorist).

1148 τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην (273A1), something like "all the art you'll ever need," continuing the rhetoric of the nostrum. Art, all through the account, has been supposed to be the source of power and effectiveness, but this more cynical account is now claiming that knowing the εἰκός *replaces* the need for art, principles, talent, discipline, and practice. All that is just a lot of self-inflated pomp and foolery (272D2-3).

1149 τεχνικοί (A3): For the first time Phaedrus begins to separate true τέχνη from those who pretend to it, to separate which has been Socrates's constant theme and method throughout the argument.

1150 ἐφηψάμεθα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν (A4): The "words" in question (αὐτά, A2) were first voiced by Phaedrus himself at 259E7-260A4, though πάμμεγα and τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι also suggest he is conflating them with the *ipsissima verba* of the vaunt by Madame Techne, as presented by Socrates a moment later (260D3-9: n.b. μέγα, D9). The feigned diffidence in his allusion to that nostrum shows both that it was Tisias all along that he had "heard from" and that he has come over to Socrates's side, so that Socrates can now stress without risk how devoted Phaedrus had been to Tisias's view.

1151 πάμμεγα (A5): Phaedrus picks up the manner of the nostrum with this idiomatic expostulative.

1152 πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς (A6): Cf. A.*Av.*471, where the perfect is also constructed with the acc. of the author's name. The perfect echoes the perfects Phaedrus has used (ἀκήκοα, *passim*) as somehow making his attitude an unquestionable *fait accompli*, but identifies Tisias as the unnamed source of what he "had heard." It turns out Phaedrus has another book "up his sleeve"! Socrates corrects Phaedrus's feigned diffidence in the representation of the nostrum (his corrective ἀλλὰ μήν objects to βραχέως), and instead imagines the likely event of Phaedrus – the Phaedrus he knows so well – working over the physical object of Tisias's book (codex or scroll), the way he imagined him to have worked with Lysias's book that morning (228B1-2). αὐτόν here portrays the readerly objectification of Tisias in his book, for which cf. αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον, there, where Lysias's writing (228D7-8) was being identified with Lysias himself (παρόντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίου, 228E1).

1153 τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν (B1): With Ast I take this to be a byword from Tisias's book. This sort of "operative" definition,

"What else indeed?"

In fact, having discovered just that clever tit-bit[1154] he immediately wrote up a virtuoso display,[1155] according to which if a weak but brave man assaulted a strong but cowardly one and stripped off his cloak or some such thing, and is dragged into court, neither the accuser nor the defendant should tell the truth about the case, but the cowardly one should say that the brave one was not acting alone, while the other should attempt to refute that allegation and assert that only the two of them were there, and then make the argument "How could I, being of this and this sort" (he fills this in),[1156] "have attempted such an assault upon a person of this and this sort?" (which he goes on to describe), whereas the other man will not cop to his own faults[1157] but instead would try to counter his opponent with some lie that in all likelihood would provide him the grist to defeat him.[1158] This illustrates what in all such cases constitutes for him the *skillful* element of argumentation. Or am I wrong, Phaedrus?

"No, you're right."

My gosh! How cleverly has a deeply hidden skill been dug up by our Tisias, or whoever it was and wherever he is pleased to claim he hails from![1159] But we[1160] for our part have a ready message for him, don't we …

"What?"

This: "Tisias, it happens that for some time – before you arrived,[1161] in fact – we have been arguing that this element of likelihood you speak of in fact shows up in the opinion of the many

intended in large part to debunk and scandalize the thoughtful work of others, is the just sort of thing that comes to be attributed to a particular person. Compare the assertions that justice is whatever the rulers say it is (cf. *Rep*.338C2 and my n. *ad loc*.) or whatever the judges say it is; or that knowledge is nothing but perception (*Tht*.151E2-3) that emotions are nothing but electrical discharges in the brain.

1154 τοῦτο ... σοφόν (B3), derogatory in tone: cf. *Rep*.502D4.

1155 τεχνικὸν ἔγραψεν ὡς (B3): The adjective τεχνικόν continues to bear their vaunting sense (cf.A3 and A1 and n.1143).

1156 τοιόσδε τοιῷδε (C1): Socrates reverts to the language of the first person demonstrative reminding us of the very sort of analysis he himself had just advocated. Cf. n.1108.

1157 τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάκην (C2): The reflexive indicates why he will not – for it is *unlikely* that a speaker should criticize himself.

1158 τάχ' ἂν ἔλεγχόν πῃ παραδοίη (C3): This outcome is a bit paradoxical (πῃ) due to the fact that, as Brisson sensitively notes (n.419), this pairing off of speeches *pro* and *con* (as exhibited for instance in the *Tetralogies* of Antiphon), lacks the question-answer give-and-take of *dialectical* elenchus, in which such a turning of the tables would be nothing more than a passing moment: in a set series of speeches it would prove dispositive if it was the last word. Socrates has put his finger on the principle by which Phaedrus could generate speeches endlessly, and in particular how his method relies for its continuation upon the absence of one of the contending parties; but at the same time he has criticized the method of likelihood for its own likely outcome (τάχ' ἂν)!

1159 ὅποθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος (C9): Socrates alludes to the self-advertising name-styles we saw in the attributions of the rhetorical τεχνήματα (266D5-267D4). Cf. nn.998,1003, and 1195. There is no need to bring up Corax and his infamous name (Hermias, Thompson, Heitsch n.406). Moreover, the comparison (Ast, Thompson, deVries, Brisson, Yunis, Ryan, and Heitsch) with the hymnal formula that aporizes on how a god might wish to be addressed (alluded to at *Crat*.400E2-3 and *Euthyd*.288B1) is not pertinent, as Ast's own reference to *Prot*.358A shows. It would not then be the sophist being parodied but his admirer, whom we would have to imagine seeking to address him as a god, but this image hardly suits the context. φεῦ and ἀτάρ are indices of Socrates's *outrage* at the perversity of the arguments κατὰ τὸ εἰκός, an emotion poorly suited to joking that the person he is criticizing inventor is a like a god.

1160 ἡμεῖς (C9): For the first time Socrates braves the initiative of assuming that Phaedrus and himself, with whom he several times has allied himself by imagining a third interlocutor, have now achieved unanimity in their dissatisfaction with the claims of "oratorical art." The preposterous account of the method of likelihood has teed up the opponent for a real upbraiding, and this is what comes next (D2-274A5), Socrates's longest speech of the afternoon with the exception of the summary of the true τέχνη λόγων just above (271C10-272B2).

1161 παρελθεῖν (D2) refers to his arrival as an interlocutor newly arrived in the presence of Socrates and Phaedrus, again conceived of as an allied pair, stressing further the distance Phaedrus has come (cf.nn.1137, 1125, 1039 and 858). The verb choice also suggests that he is a *parvenu*.

because of the resemblance of the likely to the true. But as to resemblances, we just now have worked it out that in all fields it is the man who knows the truth of things that is the most deft[1162] at isolating and selecting them.[1163] So, if it is to some other aspect of the art of speeches that you are referring, we would welcome hearing from you, but if not we will instead believe the arguments we have just been through:[1164] that unless a person can list off the natures of the souls that will be hearing his speech, and can divide his subject matter into its several kinds and can gather together with one idea all the distinct aspects,[1165] he will never be skillful at speeches to the extent that it is possible for a human being to be.[1166] And yet he will never succeed to acquire this ability without a great deal of work, so great an amount that a sober man would never pursue and carry it out merely to maneuver[1167] among men, but only for the sake of becoming able to speak in a way that pleases the gods and in general to behave in a way as pleasing to them as one may.[1168] After all, Tisias, wiser men than we[1169] aver that an

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1162 κάλλιστα (D6), of effectiveness, again (cf.n.982), one of the principal signs of skill or art.

1163 τὰς δὲ ὁμοιότητας (D4-5): Compare τοῦτο δ'εἶναι, 272E1, introducing the middle term. Socrates here syllogizes from εἰκός to ὁμοιότης to ἀλήθεια in parallel with but in the opposite direction of the "Tisian" argument of D7-E2, which went from ἀληθές to πιθανόν to εἰκός.

1164 πείσομεθα (D8): The prediction ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ (272B2: cf. 271C4) is coming true.

1165 τῶν τε ἀκουσομένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμήσεται καὶ κατ' εἴδη ... περιλαμβάνειν (D8-E3): Climactically Socrates brings together under one head both the subjective and the objective dialectical components the mastery of which are prerequisite to true speakerly art. The need for knowledge about the objects argued about had been brought in at the beginning (260B1-262C3), before the two techniques of dialectic (divisions and gatherings) had been explicitly described (265C8-266C1); and these in turn served to describe the knowledge of the subjects being argued to, the souls of the auditors (270B1-272A8). Only here does he bring both kinds of knowledge into a single dialectical methodology. Moreover, this "bringing under" is effected by a non-distributive binary construction (where both predicates go with both subjects: cf.*Rep*.451C5-6 and my n. *ad loc*.), in which the dialectical method is referred to compendiously in connection with the souls of the subjects to be spoken to (τὰς φύσεις διαριθμήσασθαι holds the whole method in a nutshell: cf. 270D6, 271D2, D4) in the context of which it was first formulated, whereas the method is spelled out in full dyadic detail (κατ' εἴδη ... περιλαμβάνειν, E1-2) in connection with the objects to be spoken about, where it had not as yet been articulated. In such binary constructions τε καί is of course to be expected.

1166 οὐ ποτ' ἔσται (E3): This "*sine qua non*" admonition occurs at the end of every serious statement of methodology (272A8-B2, 269D5-6, 261A4-5, 260E1-3; and cf. 277B5-C6, below) and may as well be interpreted as a formulaic credential for a combination of thoughtfulness and empirical experience in the methodology's very advocate. Cf. the parallel admonition in Anon.Iamb. DK89: 2.400.7-8, Simulus *apud* Stob.60.4.8-9; Isoc.*Soph*.18, *Antid*.187-8; Plut.*Mor*.2B. This and many other parallels between this treatment by Socrates and those found in the writings of near contemporaries of Plato evinces only that the ideas are in the air and does not call for *Quellenkritik*, as Shorey argued (cf. n.1053).

1167 λέγειν καὶ πράττειν (E5): something of an hendiadys to describe political maneuvering in a democracy (cf. *Rep*.492B8, 494E3-4, and 564D9 with my n. *ad loc*.; *Prot*.325C; Thuc.1.139.4; Xen.*Cyn*.1.18, *Mem*.4.2.1,4,6; Aeschin.*Ep*.11 init. [=*Orat.Att*.2.151 Muller]; D.3.15, Plut.*vit.Philopoem*.§16; and λέγειν καὶ πολιτεῦεσθαι, Isoc.*Soph*.14. Cf. also Isoc.*Ant*.36, 187, 236, 271), whence the ῥήτωρ is the paradigm of the man of power in a democracy (cf. 258B10 and nn.980, 1010, 1036, 1042). Socrates is aiming directly and unabashedly at the much-respected career of the influential politician.

1168 κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν / κεχαρισμένως δὲ πράττειν (E7-8) breaks the hendiadys back down into its elements but keeps them together by means of the anaphora κεχαρισμένα / κεχαρισμένως. The overall effect is not only to revivify the formula but also to magnify man's relation to the gods with a doublet. Terminal doubling of δύνασθαι / εἰς δύναμιν adds to the stateliness of the phrase. The notion of pleasing the gods with a speech was of course the entire motive for Socrates's Second Speech, as he explicitly reminded us at 265B2-C3. Cf. nn.946 and 952. And the choice to please the gods as much as one is able rather than to curry favor among men, was broached at 249C8-C3. For anaphora in μέν / δέ, cf. *Rep*.431C7 and Denniston 370.

1169 σοφώτεροι (E9): To ask whom Socrates might be quoting, Pythagoreans or otherwise, is far less important than noticing that he has once again introduced the divine index (the gods are wise, not man: 242B8-243A1, 258E6-259B2, 265B2-C3), so as to redeem the discussion from the low point of bringing on the cynical Tisian (cf. n.1159). Nehemas/Woodruff point to the sentiment of Antisthenes speaking about who should teach his son (fr.125 Mullach = *FPG* 2.292): εἰ μέν θεοῖς μέλλει συμβιοῦν, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα – but Socrates is saying that a sound-minded man will please the gods rather than man, no matter what. Compare the duty to tell the truth when the topic is

intelligent man must not (274) devote his efforts to pleasing his fellow slaves except as a byproduct of devoting his efforts to pleasing masters goodly through and through.[1170] Therefore if the path that truly conveys us to the finish[1171] is long, don't be surprised. One needs go the long way around for great purposes, though you think otherwise.[1172] And things will come out as fine as they can to boot,[1173] as reason has shown, if only a person has the will."

"You've described the finest possible result, Socrates, if in fact a person should be able to achieve it."[1174]

But remember my friend:[1175] *If a man is making a try at fine things, whatever happens to him will be fine!*

"Quite so!"

So have we done enough investigating about what makes a speech skillful or unskillful?[1176]

"So that..."

What remains to investigate is the proprieties and improprieties of writing *per se*,[1177] how the process of it might be fine and how it might be improper.

"Yes."

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truth, at 247C3-6 (with n.440).

1170 ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν (274A2): Cf. n.397 *ad* 246A8.

1171 περίοδος (A2): The conceit of a long, circuitous, or rough route to the true art in contrast with a straight and simple path to the false art has been continued for pages, including the assertion "μακρὰν περιβάλλεσθαι," to which in particular the present term, περίοδος, may allude (though cf. my interpretation at n.1136). In tandem with the present allusion to pleasing the gods, the term is more strongly reminiscent of Socrates's Second Speech where the περίοδος was the great and *timeless* cycle (cf. n.449) that sustains the soul's life in the hyperouranion (248C4, 247D5), of which the sojourns in Hades between its embodiments in human existence while it awaits its return to the gods are the homonymous shadow (249A3).

1172 ὡς σὺ δοκεῖς (A3) is addressed to Tisias. deVries, somehow missing the fact that Phaedrus's attitude has changed, wonders whether perhaps Socrates's next remark is an "aside" to Phaedrus alluding to his assertion at 272B5. But Socrates invented this imaginary interlocutor and distinguished him from Phaedrus exactly in order to pounce on him with Phaedrus's help (cf. n.1161).

1173 κάλλιστα (A5) counters the claim τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην made by the Tisian adversary at 273A1 and redeems the merely artistic sense above (273D6) in the light of the higher purpose of serving the gods.

1174 εἴπερ οἷός τέ τις εἴη (A6): We may compare the phrasing and word order of this unstinting and sincere agreement with those of his formulaic and empty acquiescence at 257B-C1 (cf. n. *ad loc.*).

1175 τοι (A8) "confidential" (Starkie *ad* A.*Vesp*.1192, *apud* deVries). Socrates acknowledges and confirms Phaedrus's strong and sincere agreement (παγκάλως, A6). His following words, the end of which constitute an iambic trimeter, sound proverbial.

1176 τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων (B3): After several climactic remarks Socrates points back to 258D4-11, to close the section. The only theme or topic that is earlier than that, in this second section of the dialogue, is the back and forth about Lysias being berated by the politicians for being a λογογράφος.

1177 τὸ ... εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας ... λοιπόν (B6): That this is "left" proves that the question still to be dealt with is the criticism of Lysias as λογογράφος, with which this dialogical section of the dialogue began (257C4-258D2). There the issue was shelved with the statement that writing in itself at least is not shameful (αἰσχρόν, 258D1), which left room for a qualification according to which writing might deserve opprobrium for being shamefully done, i.e. uglily (αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς, D4-5) i.e., not finely done (μὴ καλῶς), which immediately raised the issue of artfulness (whether in speaking or writing [D4-5], brought forward at 259E2), which issue has occupied us ever since (cf. n.821). In truth it was not the artlessness of speech that the movers and shakers had criticized but the profession of writing per se (and if anything its too-great sophistication: *n.b.*, μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται, 257D8), though their reasons were never revealed since before getting that far Socrates disqualified them with the charge of hypocrisy. His new term, εὐπρεπεία, which has more to do with behavior and comportment than art, and his shift from λόγοι (which includes γράφειν and λέγειν indifferently) to γραφή in particular (B3, B6 – *pace* Rowe *ad loc.* and Heitsch 122 n.237) indicate he is reaching back through artfulness and τὸ καλόν in order to make a segue to the mover-and-shaker's claim of the shamefulness of writing *per se*. The distinction between writing and speaking that has been kept alive throughout the conversation, even with some awkwardness (cf. nn.821, 980, 1010, 1036, 1040, 1042, 1083, 1088, 1090, 1093, 1097, 1167) finally pays off.

Do you know how you might be most pleasing to gods[1178] in the matter of speeches, whether it be measured in word or deed?[1179]

"I have no idea – do you?"

Well I am able to report something I know only by hearsay from our forebears. As to its truth only the gods can aver it, but if we could discover that it is true by our own lights why would we still feel any compunction about the vagaries[1180] of who said what to whom?

"That's a ludicrous question – just tell me what you've heard."

Alright. I heard that at Naucratis in Egypt there was a certain god among the ancient ones of that place, the one to whom a bird called Ibis was sacred. The divinity's name was Theuth, and he was the first to discover number and calculation, as well as geometry and astronomy and checkers and dice, and above all, *writing*. At that time Thamus was the king of all Egypt, seated in the great city of the upper portion which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes (and their name for the godly king[1181] is Ammon). Theuth came around to visit the king and showed him his arts and said they ought be distributed to all the Egyptians. Thamus asked him about the benefits of each of them and when Theuth answered Thamus responded with his own view about how well or poorly Theuth's arguments struck him, criticizing some and praising others. To tell you everything Thamus said to Theuth as to the pros and cons of each of the arts would make for a long discourse. When they got to the value of writing Theuth said "This study, my King, will make the Egyptians wiser and more able to remember. An elixir for memory and wisdom has been found!"[1182] but the king's reply was, "My most skillful[1183] Theuth! We may look to one[1184] to give birth to an art, but must look to another to judge what benefit or harm lies in store[1185] for those who will use it. Just so in the present case (275) you are the Father of Writing, but despite your good intentions the very opposite of what you say is the effect it will likely have. Far from memory, this study of yours will instill *forgetfulness* in the souls of the men who learn it, stemming from a *disuse* of memory, remembering by a reliance upon an external[1186] writing done with arbitrary ciphers, rather than from within, unaided and with their own resources. So what you have discovered is not an elixir for memory but for reminding. As for the students' wisdom, it is

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1178 θεοῖς (B9) is "reported" in paraphrase by Hermias (253.16-17, cf. 253.11-14 and 254.2-7). The mss. have θεῶν and Stobaeus has θεῷ, which is accepted by most edd. Hermias's plural is however more consonant with 273E7 (θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα, also anarthrous) and gives αὐτοί, below, a proper antecedent. Therefore with Vollgraff (p.152) I read θεοῖς. The gods whose authority Socrates is worrying about are soon exemplified in Thamas and Theuth.

1179 χαριῇ λόγων πέρι πράττων ἢ λέγων (B9-10): The topic of χαρίζεσθαι, which arose *obiter* in his upbraiding of Tisias (273E5-8), is now isolated and brought forward, with its subdivision into speech and action (cf. nn.1167 and 1168), as the criterion for the next question. The fact that the political movers and shakers who originally brought the charge have been ousted by the gods as the arbiters of the propriety of writing almost goes unnoticed. The huge shift, according to which men are to be judged by gods and not other men, is analogous to, and in fact an effect of, the shift from Socrates's First Speech to his Second Speech.

1180 δοξασμάτων (C3): For the derogatory plural of the verbal noun compare τεχνημάτων at 269A7 and the coinage σπουδάσματα (249D1 and n.). With this he categorically dispenses with the opinions of the movers and shakers, but it is Phaedrus who failed to understand their true significance. Again (cf. n.1132) it is Socrates's turn to introduce hearsay argument, this time the absent witness authorities being divine.

1181 Reading τὸν θεόν (D4) with all mss. The pharaoh was viewed as a god. Postgate's emendation (to Θαμοῦν) begs the question whether Plato's reader would recognize this and supply the identification on his own.

1182 ηὑρέθη (E7): The passive construction as well as the very tricky notion of a φάρμακον gives Thamas's assertion the tone of a nostrum, in the manner of the ἐπάγγελμα of Tisias Socrates imitated above. Cf. nn.1138, 1147, 1148.

1183 τεχνικώτατε (E7): The theme of skill is brought one step further and we learn that τέχνη left to itself cannot be relied upon to know its own limits!

1184 ἄλλος μέν (E7): Do not supply "man" in translation (Fowler, Robin, Helmbold-Rabinowitz, Hackforth, Nehemas/Woodruff), since Theuth is not a man but a god.

1185 μοῖραν (E8), as at 255B6.

1186 ἐν ψυχαῖς (275A2): It is the mention of souls as a location that grounds this distinction between inner and outer.

merely the *belief* they have it that you are conveying, not the true possession of it. They will become "hearers of much"[1187] without undergoing real teaching, thanks to you,[1188] and therefore will come to think themselves "knowers of much,"[1189] although most of the time unknowers in truth, and difficult companions for purposes of discussion,[1190] since they will have become not wise but wise in their own conceits.[1191]

"Socrates, you have such an easy time making up tales about Egyptians or any other exotic[1192] types you might wish!"

But my friend, they have said[1193] that in the sanctuary of Dodonian Zeus the first of all prophetic sayings came out of an *oak*! And the people of that time, lacking the wisdom you moderns[1194] have, were naïve enough not to worry that oak and stone should be the source of prophecy as long as the oak and stone spoke the truth. For you it seems to make a big difference who said it and where he hails from.[1195] Don't you care more whether the saying is true or not?

"You're right to scold me,[1196] and I agree that the situation with writing is just what the Theban says it is."

So the man who thinks he is leaving behind real art in what he writes down,[1197] and the man who picks it up thinking something definitive and final comes forth from the letters, are both beset with naïveté and totally ignorant[1198] about what Ammon foresaw, thinking as they do that there is

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1187 πολυήκοοι (A7) and πολυγνώμονες illustrate the immediate tendency for πολλά to be derogatory in Greek. Cf. proverbial οὐ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ πολύ, and *Rep*.425E5 with my note *ad loc*.

1188 σοι (A7), ethical dative designating the chickens coming home to roost: the effect of the invention upon the students will be on Theuth's head. Thamus is enacting the monitory role of the judge of μοῖρα.

1189 πολυγνώμονες (A7): That the man who has "heard" something should claim *eo ipso* to be a knower is exactly the criterion of knowledge (or means of avoiding responsibility) Phaedrus had been relying upon during his argument with Socrates (cf. nn.840, 884, 1071, 1095). Again Socrates has found a roundabout way to respond to the crucial detail!

1190 συνεῖναι (B2) suggests study and dialogue. Cf. συνών (271E2) and n.

1191 δοξόσοφοι (B2): This oxymoron is immediately understandable even though a coinage, because theory has expanded the usual horizon. It sets up the introduction of φιλόσοφος, below (278D4). Compare the coining of φιλόδοξος as the counterpart of φιλόσοφος at the end of *Rep*.5 (480A6).

1192 ὁποδάπους (B3) suggests the exotic: cf. my n. to *Rep*.381E3-4. Phaedrus playfully threatens to withhold his agreement by raising the question of the source not long after he had agreed with Socrates that the source was never the criterion anyway, but always the authority of their own research (270C6-7 and αὐτοί, 274C2). The byplay indicates how patently controversial is the thesis.

1193 ἔφησαν (B6): In response to Phaedrus's complaint of a recondite source Socrates in his usual manner adds another far more recondite, but for all its strangeness the method bears a humble message very close to home: the plain truth is all that matters.

1194 ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι (B7): To "personalize" the gibe gives it a bit of an edge, as did Socrates's remark above about Phaedrus's well-thumbed copy of Tisias (273A6-B1), since within their conversation a distinction between ancient and moderns can only recall Socrates's satire of modern ignorance at the beginning of his Second Speech (244B6-D5).

1195 τίς ... καὶ ποδαπός (C1) brings forward the false pride of the technicians (ὅστις ... καὶ ὅποθεν, 273C8-9 and n.1159) in order to dismiss the question of authority that has been only a hindrance or a distraction along, and to bring Phaedrus back into the dialogical σκέψις that has lately been so successful, focussing on the thesis and relying on his own power to judge things.

1196 ὀρθῶς (C3): Socrates at last calls Phaedrus out for his evasive behavior (after his sustained play on the theme and notion of hearsay embodied in the perfect, ἀκήκοας: cf. nn. 840, 881, 1091, 1132, 1152), and Phaedrus now for his part explicitly acknowledges he is correct!

1197 τέχνην (C5) is again strong (no longer a book title) and denotes more than a "written manual" (*pace* Hackforth). καταλιπεῖν brings forward Phaedrus's description of the movers-and-shakers' anxiety (and desire: cf. its use at 257D6, E3, and cf. 258C3-5). The true grounds for opprobrium against λογογραφία *per se* is the writer's vanity and ignorance, but the mover and shaker envies and resents him anyway because he needs him.

1198 εὐηθείας / μαντείαν (C7-8): Both terms are borrowed from the tale of Dodonian Zeus and the tables are turned. It is the sophisticated writers that are naïve and they that miss the admonition of prophecy, where the simpler men had received and accepted it. Here is the grounds for opprobrium against sophistication. The contrast between the

something more to written arguments than this power to remind a man of what he already knows about the subject.

"Quite right."

Writing has something[1199] tricky to it – something it shares in fact with painting. The artifacts of the painter stand there at the ready as if they were living persons, but once you put any question[1200] at all to them they take on a haughty silence. And so it is with arguments.[1201] You get the sense that they intend some serious message[1202] but if you put some question[1203] to them in hopes of learning what they are trying to say, they just keep pointing, fixedly, to one and the same thing.[1204] Moreover, once it gets written into a set of words,[1205] the argument, no matter what it means, circulates far and wide[1206] just as much among people who get its meaning as among as those it should never have approached. It is bereft of its mastery and its awareness of to whom it should speak and to whom it should not, and now, because it is treated carelessly and is unfairly berated, it forever needs its father[1207] to come to its

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sophisticates of the pseudo-art and the plain speaking Laconian who insists only on truth (260D3-E7) returns.

1199 τοῦτο (D4) points forward to something Socrates presumes that Phaedrus knows. γάρ (D5) is programmatic and καί is emphatic.

1200 ἀνέρῃ (D6): the sort of questioning that is an overture to discussion. Cf. *Prot.*347E4, and *Rep.*454C1 with my n. It is perhaps noteworthy that ψυχαγωγία, which Socrates has in this discussion identified with the process and dynamics of argumentation (261A7, 271C10), is elsewhere associated with the very effect of painting that he here isolates: cf. n.877. To the extent that such associations belong to the usual use of the term, it is something of a joke that Socrates imagines himself interrogating the painting the very moment the painter intends his audience to be spellbound by it instead. We should expect nothing less from this φιλόλογος (236E5).

1201 οἱ λόγοι (D8): Do *not* "improve upon" the text by supplying γεγραμμένοι in translation (e.g., Robin, Helmbold-Rabinowitz, Chambry, Rowe, Nehemas/Woodruff, Scully), for it is in fact absent. Socrates is avoiding to pre-empt the "phenomenology" of the experience, the sensation that even a written λόγος is talking and trying to say something to us. Hence αὐτούς (D8) and ὅς τι φρονοῦντας (D7). See n. below.

1202 τι φρονοῦντας (D7): The expression is ambiguous as to whether it means to stress the object (what it is they are thinking: τὶ) or the subject (that they have something in mind to say: φρονοῦντας), the latter sense continuing the idea of σεμνῶς, as if they are serious and preoccupied with the thought they wish to express (cf. μέγα φρονεῖν).

1203 ἔρῃ (D8) is identical to ἀνέρῃ, the prefix omitted in repetition by the Indo-European rule (cf.n.464).

1204 σιγᾷ, σημαίνει (D5-9): Socrates's hypothetical viewer or reader attributes life and intention to the drawn face or the written argument, while it is of course himself that is alive. In particular he thinks them alive because he has been stimulated into thinking by them. Behind his eyes is his mind thinking about what he sees, and so behind the face in the picture there must be a mind that is trying to tell him something. He conceives that he is "with them" in the sense of having a discussion (e.g., 239B1-4, 275B2, *Gorg.*455D2; *Prot.*336B2; *Symp.*176E8). He is so ready for dialogue and absorbed in thought that he fails to notice that the stimulus of his thought is inanimate! Instead, when and because it fails to continue to try to say what it seemed to have been trying to say to him, he attributes empty gestures to it instead – it falls mute for some solemn reason, or like the Sibyl of Heraclitus it οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει (DK22B93). His failure to notice that it is and always was inanimate is therefore an index of the rapid animation and responsiveness of his own thought. Otherwise his impression that they fall mute or point fixedly is pure nonsense. To compare this passage with the remarks at *Prot.*329A, where the live speaker answers with nonsense, is both pointless and only casts darkness on this passage. To say a poor speaker is like a book is different from saying that a book is like a poor speaker. Much more pertinent, as Brisson notes (n.444), is *Tim.*19B4-C1, where again the realism prompts the viewer's desire to engage more fully.

1205 ἅπαξ (D9) means that even though the author might have second thoughts about the words, the writing is already off and gone.

1206 κυλινδεῖται (E1): The notion underlying the metaphor appears to be that the object becomes subject to forces outside itself (οὐκέτι ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν ἀλλὰ φέρεται, Hermias 259.24), so as to roll away down a slope. It is used both of betrayed or forlorn hopes and of lost understanding. Cf.257A2 and n. *ad loc.*, A.*V.*492, and *Rep.*432D8 with my n. *ad loc.*

1207 πατρός (E4): The metaphor is strained since a written work is not a person, but as always the strain will soon be justified by exactly the fact that the written work is like a bastard child of the thinking and living father whereas the presence of his argument in the living soul of another person is a legitimate one (276A1-3). Brisson notes the paradox that Lysias as metic likewise writes speeches to defend someone else that cannot defend themselves – i.e., he cannot be present to defend them. But there is more: Phaedrus himself has continually been praised as a progenitor of speeches

aid, unable as it is to aid and defend itself.

"This too is quite right." (276)

And so does another argument come into view[1208] which is the legitimate brother of that one? Do we see how it is generated and how much stronger and more able its origin and growth makes it?

"What argument is this and what is the manner of its generation that you are talking about?"

The one that is written, yes, but with learning and in the very soul[1209] of the student, able both to defend itself and knowing before whom it should speak or remain silent.

"You are talking about the argument of a man who has knowledge, an argument alive and ensouled, in comparison with which the written version, one could fairly say, is a masquerade."[1210]

Your elaboration[1211] is exactly correct, so answer me this. Would a farmer who is mindful and who cares about his seeds bearing fruit seriously pursue the act of planting them during summer in Adonis-gardens[1212] hoping to see the gardens bloom beautifully in a mere eight days, or would he view that as a mere gimmick, something he might do in play or to provision a festival,[1213] if for that matter he did it at all, but would[1214] pursue the art and science of agriculture seriously and plant the seeds the

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(261A3 and n.) but during this entire discussion his hearsay representation of others' arguments has continually left those arguments undefended, while on the other hand it is Phaedrus in his full presence that is agreeing with Socrates's new ideas.

1208 Reading ὁρῶμεν (276A1) with BT and edd., though Hermias has ἐροῦμεν which Burnet also reports from V (Vindob.109) and Robin/Moreschini from W. We may compare this "sighting" of arguments to "hearing" them approach at 260E2-4. It is a continuation of the personification of arguments from above, culminating in Phaedrus's metaphor of "live" argumentation (A8-9). Socrates extends the metaphor of the father into a *parable* about his son(s). Now that the written logos has been separated from its father he asks what son the father could have that was not "separable" in that way.

1209 γράφεται ... ἐν τῇ τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ (A5-6). The metaphor of writing *onto tablets* within the mind is already present, in high poetry, usually in admonition – cf. A.*Prom*.789, μνήμοισιν δέλτοις φρενῶν; *Eum*.275, δελτογράφῳ ... φρενί; S.*Triptol*. f.8 θὲς δ'ἐν φρενὸς δέλτοισι τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους – as is writing in the mind *simpliciter* – A.*Cho*.450, ἐν φρεσὶν γράφου (text uncertain); S.*Ph*.1325, γράφου φρενῶν ἔσω; P.*O*.10.3 πόθι φρενὸς ἐμᾶς γέγραπται – though even in the latter cases something like a tablet is implied since storage and retrieval is assumed. Socrates's metaphor is different, as Phaedrus affirms in his response. The λόγος is not fixed in a tablet and preserved for retrieval but alive and virtually able to speak for itself (ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον vs. γεγραμμένος) as we had hoped the person in the portrait would be, so that the paradoxes of retrieval we meet in the *Theaetetus* are not invoked.

1210 εἴδωλον (A9): In the relation between original to likeness Phaedrus has found an "equivalent" for Socrates's metaphor of the relation between the real and supposititious son.

1211 παντάπασι (B1) is not otiose but is characteristically used in answer for corroborating the respondent's voluntary expansion of what the speaker has said, in particular Phaedrus's resolution of Socrates's parable of the bastard and true blue λόγοι. Cf. n.1035 and *Rep*.376C4, 400E4 (with my n.), 424A3, 442D10, 444A3, 452E3, 507B11.

1212 Ἀδώνιδος κήπους (B3): An Adonis-Garden is a sort of window-pot in which plants are force-grown for the immediate demand of the (brief) festival of Adonis, which takes place at the rise of Sirius near the end of July (cf. A.*Lys*.387-98). Later accounts made Adonis-gardens proverbial (e.g. Plut.*Mor*.560C; cf. Zenob.1.49 [=*Paroim.Gr*.1.19 and note]) for the fast growing and still immature plants, but this sheds little light on Socrates's allusion. These flowers perish quickly as Adonis had, avenged for his love of Aphrodite by Artemis. The man who knows important things (C3-5) does not want to submit his ideas to such a fate; analogously the soul that remembers true beauty uses its powers to bring its beauty-beloved along gradually and with patience rather than to spend its seeds on a pleasurable but short-lived παιδοσπορεῖν (250E5: cf. n.560) that like plant forcing is essentially παρὰ φύσιν (251A1: cf. n.562).

1213 παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἑορτῆς (B5): τε καί linking general idea and specific example: cf. *Rep*.330D7 (with my n.), 339E2, 374D1-2, 381A4 and A8-9.

1214 χρώμενος ἄν (B6): Early ἄν announces that the true alternative to πότερα σπουδῇ ἄν has begun, the μέν clause having intervened, allowing the postponement of the governing optative ἀγαπῴη so as to create an early berth for the two phrases, γεωργίκῃ χρώμενος τέχνῃ (parallel to θέρους, the wrong time to plant things) and σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσῆκον (parallel to εἰς Ἀδώνιδος κήπους). That the parallel governing optative has been reached (ἀγαπῴη, parallel to χαίροι) is then confirmed by the repetition of ἄν.

proper soil, happy to wait eight months[1215] to watch all the seeds he planted to come to maturity?

"He would take the latter seriously and take the other quite otherwise,[1216] just as you say."

And the man who knows things about the just and the fine and the good[1217] – would he be any less mindful than the farmer about his own respective "seeds"?[1218]

"Hardly."

So he will not seriously entertain the idea of writing them in water – that kind of black water[1219] that comes through a quill – with[1220] arguments unable to come to their own aid and unable to teach the truth of what they are saying?

"In all likelihood, no."

No he wouldn't. Rather, he will likely plant such gardens of writings in play only, if he writes at all,[1221] so as to store up reminders for himself, should the "forgetfulness of age come upon him,"[1222] and for any other person who is thinking along the same lines. He will be glad when he sees them blooming soft and supple; and[1223] while other men engage in other playful pursuits, regaling themselves with drinking parties and other[1224] pastimes of that ilk, our man instead of that will likely pass his time[1225] with the activities I describe in play.[1226]

"You describe an altogether fine kind of play over against a paltry one, Socrates, this pastime of a man able to play at written arguments, spinning tales about justice and the other topics you just

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1215 ἀγαπῴη ἄν (B7) is parallel with χαίροι above, and its complement is θεωρῶν understood from above, its direct object being the unexpressed antecedent of ὅσα (compendious for τοσαῦτα ἅ,). The participle λαβόντα is indirect discourse with the verb of perception. ὅσα rather than ἅ indicates that the mindful farmer is keeping track of his yield. τέλος raises the goal from the pretty (καλούς, B4) to something more substantial and nutritious (*viz*., ἔγκαρπα [B2]). The essential predication is carried by ἐν ὀγδόῳ μηνί, which trumps ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὀκτώ.

1216 ἑτέρως (C2) in mildly derogatory aposiopesis (n.181).

1217 δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν (C3): Finally all three μέγιστα are brought in (cf. nn.843, 912, 1139), serving as an index that we have left mere estheticism and professionalism behind. Socrates is talking about how to be a serious thinking man, not merely a speaker or writer. Brisson (in his n.453) aptly remembers the presence of these μέγιστα in the vision in the huperouranion (247D, 250B).

1218 ἐπιστήμας (C3), a plural for the sake of the analogy with seeds, not to "specify" that his knowledge is partial (*pace* Rowe).

1219 ἐν ὕδατι γράψει μέλανι (C7): Socrates (Plato) doubles the metaphor – black ink illustrated by "writing in water" (καθ' ὕδατος γράφειν, Lucian, *Catapl*.21; cf. Diogenianus 5.83 [=*Paroim.Gr*. 1.267, with n.]; analogous to "sowing in water;" extending the notion to writing may have come later) – just as he had in the case of the horse and donkey illustrated with ὄνου σκίας (260B1-C1, then C7) and the Dodonian oaks illustrated with oak and stone (275B5-6, then B8). Thompson (*ad hoc loc*.) nicely describes the Plato as "sliding in a proverbial phrase by way of additional illustration."

1220 μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων ... (C8) serves as an exegesis of the converse phrase, μετ' ἐπιστήμης (A5), which had been vague. The idea of teaching that accompanies the flat recitation of a logos was broached by ἄνευ διδαχῆς at 275A7.

1221 Omitting δέ (D2) with Bekker and edd., though it is present in all mss (Heindorf emended to τε and Schanz to γε).

1222 λήθης γῆρας ...ἵκηται (D3-4) certainly sounds like a quote but the source is unknown.

1223 Reading δέ (D5) from Par.1811 (*omm*. mss.) with edd.

1224 ἑτέροις τε ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά (D7), the other ways of the *alternative* kind (cf. 264E7 and n.), reinforced by the assertion that they are related to themselves (ἀδελφά). According to the pun on ἄρδειν, in these sorts of pastimes the men irrigate themselves rather than the seeds they have planted. Note again the derogatory euphemism in χρᾶσθαι (cf.248B5, C6; 256C1, 265E3).

1225 διάξει (D8): Gently we have circled around to the final vision of Socrates's Second Speech, and how the divine erotic *lives his life* (διάγειν) differently from other men (μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποιῆται, [257B6]: cf. also βιοτεύει [252D3] and n.). Moreover, in the philosophical man's use of writing as ὑπομνήματα we hear an echo of the philosophical soul's attitude toward the world around him (ὑπομνήμασι ὀρθῶς χρώμενος, 249C7), and in the jocular contrast drawn between the philosophical man watering plants and the other men "watering" themselves we hear an echo of the contrasting reactions of less and more philosophical souls to the vision of beauty (250E1-251A3ff).

1226 οἷς λέγω παίζων διάξει (D8): The participle may, and I think does, go with either or both: Socrates's metaphorical and parabolic description is as much a kind of play as the activity he attributes to the ἐπιστήμας ἔχων.

mentioned."[1227]

Yes it is so, Phaedrus, but I believe the *serious* treatment of these topics is a thing far finer, when a man by employing the dialogical skill[1228] and by addressing a soul appropriate in character plants or sows the seeds of arguments that have the accompaniment of knowledge,[1229] and are therefore adequate to come to their own aid (277) for the man who plants them and are themselves are not barren of fruit but bear seeds of their own, from which in turn other arguments can take root in other kinds of souls, able therefore to render the seminal idea immortal and to make a man who has the seed as happy as a man can be ever be.[1230]

"Yes, this thing you describe is far finer."

Are we able at last to pass judgment on that old question, now that we have reached all these agreements?[1231]

"What question would that be?"

The question our desire to answer led us all the way to this point, our purpose, as we then conceived it,[1232] of assaying the censure Lysias underwent for his writing of speeches, as well as speeches *per se* and whether they are written with skill[1233] or without skill. As to the matter of skill or the lack of it I judge we have done a fair job of making that crystal clear.[1234]

1227 ὧν λέγεις (E3): I.e. the μέγιστα mentioned at C3. A reference to the persistently high mission of Socrates's discussions as represented by Plato's own written works peeks through these lines, as Thompson and Brisson feel, but there is no need to point to an individual work (δικαιοσύνη is mentioned only to allude to all three μέγιστα). μυθολογοῦντα (E3) is accusative with the infinitive (*pace* Richards): the construction prefers the subject accusative to the governing genitive δυναμένου since μυθολογοῦντα describes the game he is playing (παίζειν) rather than his ability (δυναμένου) to play it. Cf. ἀγνοοῦντα, 230A1 and n.88. I sense no inadequacy in Phaedrus to grasp what Socrates is saying (*pace* deVries).

1228 τῇ διαλεκτικῇ χρώμενος (E5-6): With this Plato refers no longer to himself as writer, if he had, but to the Socrates he depicts speaking live in his dialogues with another man whose soul is suited to the conversation he manages.

1229 μετ' ἐπιστήμης (E7), finally explicit as to the meaning (cf. C8 and n.). After all, the λόγος that is well organized by the step by step analysis of dialectical division and collection almost teaches itself, as we saw in Socrates's First Speech (indeed this fact about it will determine the form taken by our Analysis of it, *infra*). To the extent that dialogue and dialectic overlap or even are identical, both in depicting and in following the supple movement of thought (ἁπαλούς, D5), the unifying principle for each of Plato's own dialogical works comes into view.

1230 εὐδαιμονεῖν ... εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν μάλιστα (277A3): The "professional" field of rhetoric has been widened to the field of all intelligent participation in reality, and this is now widened into a vision of the best human life. A similar "zooming out" was done in Socrates's prayer at the close of his account of true love: 256A7-B7. Cf. n.1225.

1231 νῦν δὴ ἐκεῖνα ἤδη (A6): Again climax follows climax, in style and substance, to bring the section to its end. Once again (cf. 274B7 and n.1177) we must look farther backward to see what the antecedent of ἐκεῖνα will be. If they have treated the question of writing *per se*, what is left is the reason for the calumny Lysias suffered, Phaedrus's report of which (257C4-6) brought the whole thing up. The original exchange about calumny had, after all, been inconclusive: the charge against writing was never articulated (though Socrates's remarks suggested it was envy) but shelved (because Phaedrus failed to recognize that suggestion and simply dismissed the critical politician's attitude as self-contradictory), so that even the reason the politician might envy the speechwriter was left behind. Cf. nn.799, 818, 1028, 1034.

1232 ὅπως (A10) reformulates the resolution (βουληθέντες) they adopted at the beginning of this section, as now being purpose for their entire discussion (for ἐξετάσαιμεν cf. ἐξετάσαι, 258D8). Socrates's optatives (replacing aorist subjunctive ἐξετάσωμεν in the purpose clause and by attraction even the present indicative γράφονται in the proleptic "lilies of the field" construction dependent upon it [for which cf. Smyth 2677]) stress to Phaedrus that he is pointing to the crucial past moment that he might in the interim have forgotten (namely, 258D1-5: cf. n. *ad loc.*), namely that they decided to predicate the question of any ὄνειδος accruing personally to Lysias upon an impersonal assay of speeches *per se* (hence αὐτούς, B1), whether they were done poorly or well. The enitre discussion of "rhetoric" was occasioned by the politician's querulous censure of Lysias.

1233 τέχνῃ (B1) returns!

1234 μὲν οὖν (B2) indicates Socrates is about to make a transition to evaluating the ὄνειδος, as if he will infer it from the criteria of good speaking and writing. Hearing this Phaedrus interrupts (B4) to have him state those criteria one more time. The δέ clause will come at D1.

"That matter has indeed been settled[1235] but remind me how."[1236]

Until a person knows the truth of whatever subject he argues about or writes about, and proves able to define it in itself as a whole, and having so defined it proves competent at breaking it back down[1237] into its types to the point that he reaches types that cannot be broken down into subtypes,[1238] having likewise[1239] achieved the ability to draw similar distinctions about the inner nature[1240] of soul, then[1241] discovers which matter fits which nature of soul and on this basis lays down and orders[1242] his argument, presenting to a complex soul arguments more complex and more chromatic and a simple argument to the simple soul[1243] – until then, we agreed,[1244] he will not be able skillfully to manage the field of argumentation[1245] so far as nature will allow, neither for the sake of teaching nor for the sake of persuading,[1246] as the foregoing discussion as a whole has told us.[1247]

1235 ἔδοξε (B4): By shifting the tense of Socrates's δοκεῖ μοι and adding δή he indicates his agreement in terms that smack of a measure adopted impersonally by the deme; but with γε he holds Socrates back from moving on to the second point, since Phaedrus wants first to make sure the λόγος is truly present in his own mind.

1236 ὑπόμνησόν με πῶς (B4): The living λόγος is present in the speaking Socrates. We can expect that Plato has created an opportunity for Socrates (and himself) to restate the result in a new and interesting or improved way. Compare Phaedrus's request for restatement at 271C5 (and n. *ad loc.*). Thompson perhaps unconsciously calls the presentation "singularly pregnant and neat." Socrates (and Plato) here proves himself capable of what he will call below "outdoing one's own words" (cf. 278C6-7, *infra*). Drama (as often) precedes dogma (cf. my nn. to *Rep*.335E7, 525D5, 531D8, 533A8-9). Disposing of the passage with a syntactical analysis (Ryan) is insufficient: cf. my fuller analysis below ("Socrates's Rhetorical Flourishes" #5).

1237 πάλιν (B7) = "going *back* in the other direction" (*pace* deVries, who wants "next" which he finds in LSJ): division is the opposite of collection.

1238 ἀτμήτου (B7): That there should be a limit to the differentiation is a new idea but is implicit in the requirement that he find all the types, and so his use of the term represents a refinement of the methodology.

1239 περί τε ψυχῆς (B8): The τε connects this aorist participial phrase with the prior subjunctive, ἐπιστηθῇ, swiftly applying the requirement of the two-part understanding that constitutes dialectical knowledge to the soul of the audience in addition to the subject matter; present ἀνευρίσκων is then proleptic with the subjunctives τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῇ, introduced by οὕτω.

1240 φύσεως (B8), again anarthrous (cf. n.1059).

1241 ἀνευρίσκων (C1): The shift from the aorist to the present participle marks the step to the second stage, confirmed by the semi-redundant οὕτω that follows.

1242 τιθῇ τε καὶ διακοσμῇ (C1): τιθέναι denotes the thesis (the *utile*), διακοσμεῖν the pleasantry of presentation (the *dulce*), an elaboration unprecedented in the conversation, though the latter would include proper management of the καιροί mentioned at 272A4 and related decorations mentioned at A5-7.

1243 ποικίλῃ / ἁπλῇ (C2-3): To place souls on a spectrum of simple to complicated is new, offering some concrete embodiment to complement the arid and purely dialectical notion of a διαρίθμησις of types (270D1-6) – hence my colorful translation. There is no need to puzzle over the sense of "simple" and "variegated" nor to try to correlate this spectrum with the Olympian varieties of soul imagined in Socrates's Second Speech: correspondence of argument to soul-type is the only issue here. The decorative chiasmus is almost to be expected.

1244 οὐ πρότερον τέχνῃ δυνατὸν ἔσεσθαι (C3-4): The governing construction of Socrates's longish answer comes in an infinitive of indirect discourse governed by ἔδοξε (B4). On οὐ πρότερον, another admonition *sine qua non*, cf. n.1166. τέχνῃ, which has now been appropriated to Socrates's own uses (cf.B1), is emphatic in hyperbaton (deVries).

1245 With LSJ, *s.v.*, I take μεταχειρισθῆναι to be a passive deponent, active in sense.

1246 πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι / πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι (C5-6): Under the force of his references to the live scenario of teacher and student, above (276E4-277A4), Socrates now expands the field of argumentation beyond oratory. The distinction will become something more like a division, below (277E8-9, 278A2).

1247 μεμήνυκεν (C6): the assertion of a fixed understanding (note the perfect) could not be stated in a stronger or more stately manner, but in the context the avowal can only point to the event of the dialogue rather than to the writing we have read. Plato again peeks through to tell us that his own writing is less important than the ideas he has contrived that we should think while reading it. I take up the topic in an Appendix at the end on the "Criticism of Writing."

"All of that[1248] in this full restatement of yours has indeed became plain[1249] to us."

So to move on to the other question, whether it is fine or shameful[1250] to deliver or write speeches, and whether it deserves censure or not by the way it comes about,[1251] isn't this likewise fully resolved[1252] by the things we argued a few moments ago?

"Which?"

That if Lysias or anybody else[1253] ever wrote or ever will write anything whether for private use or for public use, as for instance to set down laws,[1254] on the belief that the act of writing up a political tract confers some great permanence or determinacy[1255] onto his argument, this behavior[1256] is a cause for censuring the writer, whether anybody declares it openly or not.[1257] The reason is[1258] that for a man to be ignorant about the topics of the just and unjust and the bad and the good even when he is

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1248 μὲν οὖν (C7): Phaedrus's μὲν οὖν echoes that of Socrates (B2) and therefore authorizes him to go on to the second matter, evaluating the ὄνειδος. We must receive the balance his remark as an unstinting statement of gratitude to Socrates. On παντάπασιν cf. n.1035.

1249 ἐφάνη (C7) dialectical, as at 261E7 and 245E2 (cf. n.389).

1250 αἰσχρὸν εἶναι (D1): The focus now reverts from the second question, τὸ αἰσχρῶς (uglily) τοὺς λόγους γράφειν καὶ λέγειν (258D7ff), which has dominated the entire second part, to the first question, αἰσχρὸν (shameful) τὸ λόγους γράφειν (257C4ff) with which Phaedrus opened it. On the equivocation cf. n.821 above and n.1260 below. Socrates has not forgotten: the equivocation has served its purpose.

1251 ὅπῃ γιγνόμενον (D2) moves from the "essentialist" examination of artful speech per se (ἐξετάσαι αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους) to some larger or external context within which the art is put into practice. For this use of γίγνεσθαι cf. 261B2 and n.880.

1252 δεδήλωκεν (D3): The perfect echoes δεδηλῶσθαι (B3), continuing the garnering of results. Burnet and Robin (followed by Moreschini and most translators and commentators) insert a dash and interpret Phaedrus's τὰ ποῖα as an interruption, but there is nothing in what Socrates says that warrants such an interruption. We may just a well give a pregnant sense to the "garnering" perfect.

1253 εἴτε Λυσίας ἤ τις ἄλλος πώποτε (D6) decouples the personal application of the principle from the principle itself, just as ὅστις καὶ ὁπωστιοῦν δύσνους Λυσίᾳ had at a corresponding moment in the opening of this section (258C7-8). At the same time Phaedrus, having gained some theoretical distance from that companion of his, is now ready to take Socrates's lesson as applying to *himself* as the relevant ἄλλος of Lysias. The theme becomes explicit at 278B8-C1 (where again we have Λυσίᾳ τε καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος).

1254 ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ νόμους τιθείς (D7): The formulation of the question hearkens back to the original expression at 258D8-11 (repeated and further generalized at 261A7-B2) and the movers and shakers. The writing of laws was the first type of λογογραφία Socrates brought up in his riddle, as the type of writing in which the biggest movers and shakers are *eager* to engage (257E1-258B5: *n.b.* οἱ μέγιστον φρονοῦντες, 257E2). Cf. 278C3-4 and 278E2. He has that opening moment of the dialogical section in mind.

1255 βεβαιότητα ... καὶ σαφήνειαν (D7-8), bringing forward σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον (275C6) with a retrospective "chiasm of before and after." τινὰ expresses lightly derisive skepticism as at 246D1.

1256 οὕτω (D9) answering ὅπῃ γιγνόμενον (from D2).

1257 εἴτε τίς φησιν εἴτε μή (D9-10): I.e., τὸ ὄνειδος (*pace* Heitsch, n.476), referring back to the misdirection of the γλυκὺς ἀγκών (257D9: cf. n.), the derogatory remarks of the politician that had misled Phaedrus. Socrates has identified what such people criticize, even if they only criticize it in others. φησὶν is the correct word (*pace* deVries), for it focusses on the claim rather than the true intention of the person making it.

1258 γάρ (D10), *pace multis praestantissimisque*, indicates that it is not merely the belief that writing is somehow solid (ἡγούμενος, D8) that is opprobrious, but the complacent acceptance of this notion while being utterly in the dark about what a man *should* be worrying about – an ignorance explicitly condoned by Phaedrus at the beginning of the conversation (259E7-260A4) – as though the accolades of the audience one has succeeded to persuade compensate him for it. ἡγούμενος suggests complacency and τινά is incredulous and even a bit derisive, but the *necessary* condition for the opprobrium to accrue (n.b., οὐκ ἐκφεύγει) is that a person with this attitude does not even dream about serious matters, satisfied as he is by the public approval of his writings. That this is the opprobrious sin is confirmed by the upgrade to the superlative, ἐπονείδιστον (E2), in the explanation. The other man, described below in the δέ-clause below, is conversely praiseworthy not only because he attributes no solidity to writing but also because he "kisses off" (ἐῶν, B2) all desire for fame.

asleep[1259] will always deserve censure in truth, even if the crowd heaps unanimous praise upon him for this very reason.[1260]

"Even if they do."

Conversely,[1261] the man who presumes that in any argument he has written up[1262] there is inevitably a good deal of frivolousness no matter what the topic, and that no argument consigned to writing, whether in prose or verse – nor for that matter recited as rhapsodes do,[1263] without giving a place for answering questions[1264] or expounding what they mean but only for persuasion – has ever been worth taking seriously, but presumes instead that in truth even the noblest of written arguments are merely a means to remind men who already know,[1265] (278) but as to the teacher's arguments, presented for sake of learning about the just and the beautiful and the good and written into the student's very soul, presumes that in[1266] these alone is found any clarity and perfection[1267] that is worth serious consideration; and that the arguments that may be attributed to his own authorship as being his own legitimate sons are first an argument he finds within himself, and second the offspring or brothers of this that might have taken root in the souls of other men that are worthy of them:[1268] all

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1259 ὕπαρ τε καὶ ὄναρ (D10): For the expression cf. *Phlb.*36E5, 65E5; and ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ, *Tim.*71E7. Socrates abruptly abandons the external claims of professionalism and fame to declare, in the manner of the Laconian (260E5), what a man must be in truth. The one thing the teachers of rhetoric take for granted and do not teach is the only thing that matters. He directs his declaration to the conscience of Phaedrus alive or awake, and unable to hide. The adverbs indicate that the ἄγνοια in question is not merely being wrong or lacking information on some point, such as for instance the deficiency of writing, but a deforming disengagement from conscientious living.

1260 αὐτό (E3): It is to some extent his ignorance (ἀγνοεῖν) that enables him, and perhaps even motivates him, to craft and deliver a speech aimed only at pleasing the crowd (cf. the expression εὐηθεία ἀστεῖα, 242E5). Socrates has now reverted, as we expected him to (cf. 258D1-5 and n.821), from the topic of the art and artlessness ($\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu_2$) to the moral shamefulness ($\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu_1$) of writing speeches – and to bring everything around to the beginning he discovers exactly the same fault in it that he brought against their first two speeches, though he puts it in different terms. For in both cases the fault is to curry favor among mere men at the expense of neglecting the approval of the gods (242C3-243A2), an idea that appeared also at the climax of Socrates's Second Speech (256B7-C1: cf. n.750).

1261 δέ γε (E5), answering μέν (D9).

1262 ἐν ... τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ (E5): By dint of the parallelism with D7 we must take τῷ as possessive. γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ replaces σύγγραμμα πολιτικόν γράφων (D7), for this man discerns the λόγος in the written document.

1263 ὡς οἱ ῥαψῳδούμενοι (E8): With Brisson (and Ast and Schanz) I suspect this specification might be an interpolation though it is present in all mss. Hermias gives no indication either way.

1264 ἀνακρίσεως (E9), ἀνά from ἀνερωτᾶν, κρίσις from ἀπο-κρίνομαι of which this is the obverse, *pace* Heindorf, Stallb., Robin, and LSJ, *s.v.* Thompson hears a hint of this sense at *Charm.*176C7, though its denotation there is legal; Fowler, Helmbold-Rabinowitz, Hackforth, Rowe, and Nehemas/Woodruff translate with "questioning." This is the accompaniment of the teacher's set lecture with the give and take of question and answer, expressed above as μετ' ἐπιστήμης (276E7, 276A5), with its inverse expressed as ἄνευ διδαχῆς (275A7) and playfully depicted in the comparison of written work to portraiture (274D4-E5), which serves as the guarantee that the truth represented by the written work will "get through" (ἱκανῶς τἀληθῆ διδάξαι, 276C9). There isn't enough room in the economy of the sentence and its thought to import a recondite legal metaphor (e.g., *examen préalable* [Brisson]; cf. Heitsch n.481 [but also his p.281]), though there will be in the sentence at 278C5-6 (εἰς ἔλεγχον ἰών).

1265 ὑπόμνησιν (278A1), just as Socrates's speech was for Phaedrus, just a moment ago (277B5-C6: n.b. ὑπόμνησόν με πῶς, B4).

1266 ἐν μόνοις (A4): I read the ἐν of all mss. against Heindorf's conjecture to delete (followed by edd.) as a perfectly harmless resumption of ἐν from A2, after so many intervening words, to give clarity and emphasis to the crucial predication, μόνοις. Thompson's supplementary τουτοῖς is not really needed.

1267 τό τε ἐναργὲς εἶναι καὶ τέλεον (A4-5): The doublet continues the theme of σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον (275C6D8-9, 277D8-9), but steps the two terms up to the perfect degree of perfect art, every vestige of which it is the burden of Socrates's argument to strip away from the "art" of the rhetoricians that Phaedrus had sought to hide behind. Only this second man knows what βεβαιότης and σαφήνεια would really be and therefore sees the faults of writing, while the first only guesses at them (μεγάλην τινά, 277D7), while his mind is really on achieving the accolades of the crowd.

1268 κατ' ἀξίαν (B1), with ἄλλαισιν, corresponds to προσήκουσαν at 276E6. Cf. *Rep.*498A, 535C.

other arguments he freely casts aside.[1269] This is the sort of man, Phaedrus, I'll guess that you and I would pray for each other to become.[1270]

"Unreservedly[1271] do I want and pray for what you describe."

So let us declare our play[1272] on the topic of speeches to be done. Next, you must go back and tell Lysias[1273] that the two of us settled down into[1274] to the gallery of the Nymphs near the spring and encountered[1275] some arguments that told us to report back to Lysias and anybody else who composes speeches, and to Homer as well and anybody that composes poetry[1276] whether in verses or in stanzas, and to Solon, too, and whoever else has written political tracts that he referred to as "laws" – and to tell them this: If the man did this composition in awareness of how things hold with written works and proves able to support what he wrote in cross-examination and able by his live speech to demonstrate how his written words are deficient as such,[1277] one ought not name such a man after the various kinds of composition[1278] as we usually do. He ought rather to receive a

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1269 αὐτοῦ (A6): The question of "ownership" or "authorship," ignored ever since it was broached at the beginning of this conversation in connection with the politician's grandiose dream that the writings he leaves behind (καταλείπειν γράμματα ἑαυτῶν, 257D6-7, cf.E3-4) might secure him immortality (ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι λογόγραφος ἐν πόλει / ἰσόθεον …, 258C1-2ff) suddenly returns (though cf. n.1197), only to be dismissed. Our philosophical man relies not at all upon such a monument to himself in this world but kisses all this goodbye (τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους χαίρειν ἐῶν, B2), since his braver goal is to return to the immortal world. deVries rightly stresses that the participle ἐῶν is syntactically parallel with ἡγούμενος.

1270 ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εὐξαίμεθ' ἂν σέ τε καὶ ἐμέ (B4) brings forward the prayer with which Socrates ended his Second Speech broadening the relevance of their study to its effect on one's life (cf.257B5-6 and 256AA8-B3), with explicit stress (achieved through the interchange of the persons before and after the verb) on their praying *on behalf of each other* by dint of their dialogical adventure together. Compare and contrast Phaedrus's easy but unenthusiastic συνεύχομαι with εἴπερ [257B7 and n. *ad loc.*]). Socrates has described nothing but the philosopher, and in doing so he has cranked himself up to a breathless height, both in style and substance, for a sixth time (compare 277B5-C6, 276D1-277A4, 273D2-274A5, 271B10-272B2, and 265B2-C3), this time bringing their investigation to a close. A rhetorical analysis is given in the Appendix below ("Socrates's Rhetorical Flourishes"). This time there is *almost* nothing further back to revert to and so they are done (ἤδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως, B7, *infra*) – but cf. n.1273, *infra*.

1271 παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν (B5): This time there is a μέν (contrast 277C7) even if *solitarium*: Socrates has said more than Phaedrus feels he can respond to. With this unconditional avowal from Phaedrus (compare again 257B7-C1) the goal of the discussion has been achieved. Rhetoric and its claims and value have been replaced by philosophy, and its. Meanwhile, deVries *ad loc.* groundlessly doubts (*where* do "some doubts remain" as he puts it?) whether Phaedrus fully understands what he vociferously agrees to.

1272 ἤδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως (B7) is virtually equivalent to saying τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο or ταῦτα τοσαῦτα (cf. 256E3, 252C2, 241D2 and nn. *ad locc.*; and cf. A.*Thesm.*1227, *Nub.*1511). The notion of their conversation being παιδιά was broached and defined at 265C1 (cf. n.952) and this remark brings that theme forward. The reader who is disappointed or puzzled that Socrates should call such a powerful and meaningful discussion mere play might be taking *himself* too seriously, for as that passage indicated we men are at best mere playthings of the gods.

1273 ἐλθών (B8): Socrates now reaches as far back as can be (cf. n.1231), to the opening lines of the dialogical section where Phaedrus evades his incumbency to respond by worrying how Lysias will respond if he hears, or would respond if he had heard, Socrates's Second Speech (257C2-4). To *tell Lysias* is the opposite of *hearing from others*. Phaedrus will represent and "own up to" what he and Socrates have discovered.

1274 καταβάντε (B8), referring to καταγωγή (230B2).

1275 ἠκούσαμεν λόγων (B9): The genitive continues the conceit of personifying the λόγοι, as if they were speaking.

1276 καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος (C1): Homer serves as the prototype of the poet for Socrates/Plato (Brisson). The reversion to cases and proper names is typical in closure.

1277 αὐτός (C6): τά with γεγραμμένα denotes the class; αὐτός stresses that in his *personal* performance the *merely written* character of what he wrote will become palpable. It is not that he will be asked to prove the deficiencies of his own writing, though this also he could in all likelihood do.

1278 τῶνδε (C7) is used to draw a derogatory contrast with ἐκείνων at D1 (as at 250A1, 250B3 *versus* D1), not to point to Lysias's scroll one more time (*pace* Ryan), since after all Socrates was not holding it. In his description of the types of composition above (C1-4) Socrates had scrupulously avoided to use the eponyms to which he now refers – i.e., as we see below, λόγων συγγραφεύς, ποιητής, νομογράφος (E1-2). He avoided these ready-to-hand terms exactly because

designation based on those greater things that he has proven to take seriously.

"What then are the designations[1279] that you would allot to him?"

To call him "wise," Phaedrus, seems too much to me, and suited only to god; but to call him "wisdom-loving" or something like that not only describes him better but is also more seemly.

"And is no way offensive."

Whereas the man whose personal awareness and orientation[1280] deserves no more honor than what he composed or wrote, twisting this way and that all along the way,[1281] and cutting and pasting this part to that, would it be right and fair to call him a "poet" or a "speechwriter" or a "scrivener"?

"Of course."

So tell that to your companion.

"And what about you[1282] – what will *you* do? We mustn't leave out *your* companion any less than mine."

And who would that be?

"Isocrates the fine.[1283] What will you be taking to *him*? And what designation[1284] shall we use for *him*?"

Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus. But I am willing to say what I see in his future.[1285](279)

"What indeed?"

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the mere act of composing this or that type of λόγος is not an adequate criterion for describing a person who may well have written something but has a higher purpose than to produce writings – i.e. who ἐσπούδακε ἐφ' ἐκείνοις ("third person" demonstrative in approbatory contrast) – a purpose that requires him to keep his thought alive. It is in terms of this higher interest that we should designate him. The implication of the entire argument is not only that rhetoric or speechwriting must be philosophical in order to be called an art, but that philosophical thinking and dialogue vacate any independent claim these have to the title of art, a conclusion that had been broadly asserted at the very beginning of this dialogical section (at 261A4-5) and refined along the way (at 266D1-4).

1279 ἐπωνυμίας (D2), plural. Phaedrus imagines there will be several designations because Socrates has just matched the derogatory plural τῶνδε with the approbatory plural ἐκείνων. His presupposition sets into relief the implication of the entire argument, that there is only one supreme pre-occupation and activity, which Socrates now seeks to name.

1280 τιμιώτερα (D8), comparative *adverb* with ἔχω. Its semantics depend on φαῦλα and the evaluative uses of τῶνδε and ἐκείνων and the plural just above (C7-D1: cf. nn.1278 and 1279). The τιμῶντες implicit in the term are Socrates and Phaedrus, who would pray for each other (B3-4) to be like the man had there described (277E5-278B3).

1281 ἄνω κάτω στρέφων / κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν (D9). Cf. 272B7-C1, but compare also Socrates's guess, which came still further back, about the herky-jerky way Phaedrus would have worked with Lysias's *written* speech that morning, even in the presence of its author (228A6-B4). The point is that the thought is reified in written objects that can be moved around. I neither see nor feel any allusion to Plato's own writing, or his thoughts about his writing, that others here see and feel: *ars celare artem*.

1282 τί δὲ σύ; (E5), fulfilling the complement of καὶ σύ τε ἐλθών (B8) promised there by τε. In asking this Phaedrus is once again re-asking Socrates something (as at 271C5 and 277B4), this time that he fill out a description of the activity and life he has advocated as the alternative.

1283 τὸν καλόν (E8): Based on its use elsewhere (e.g., of Philebus, Callias, Euthydemus, Critias and now Isocrates) it might mean "cultured" rather than "beautiful" or "young" (Thompson).

1284 τίνα (E9): As at *Gorg*.447D1 the interrogative asks for a designation such as that of a profession (ἐπωνυμία, C7). Cf. *Rep*.438C8 with my n.

1285 μαντεύομαι (E10).

He seems to be have a better natural talent than what you see in Lysias's speeches,[1286] tempered[1287] with a more noble character, so that it would be no surprise as he matures, to measure by the speeches he is now able to produce, that he should outstrip anyone who has yet taken up speechwriting more than a man outstrips a child;[1288] and furthermore that if speech writing does not quite satisfy him a more divine motivation could lead him to still greater achievements. For there is a natural wisdom-loving[1289] element in the man's way of thinking. This is what I will be reporting from the gods of this place to my beloved Isocrates, and do you also report what we have said to your beloved Lysias.

"So we shall. Let's be off, since the heat of the day has passed."

But shouldn't one pray[1290] to the gods of this place before going?

"Of course."

Dear Pan, and all the other gods of this place, grant that I become beautiful within. Let my outward bearing[1291] be amicable[1292] with what I am, on the inside. Let me count wealthy[1293] only he who is wise, and as for gold grant me only as much as a temperate man can manage.[1294] – Do we need anything more, Phaedrus? I've made a sufficient prayer.

"Let me share the prayer with you,[1295] since friends share all that friends possess."

1286 κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Λυσίαν ... λόγους (279A3-4): Still further back can Socrates reach, after all. His response to Phaedrus's suggestion that he will "return" to Isocrates enables him to invent an external criterion by which to measure Lysias, with whom the dialogue began (παρὰ Λυσίου, 227A2), so that the entire dialogue can now be brought to an end. That Plato the author of this very great dialogical drama suddenly to inject some opinion of his, formed decades later, about a contemporary and rival, could not have been as important as to create a verisimilar and all-embracing closure. It is impossible to read the *Phaedrus* without recognizing that Socrates's παιδικά is Plato. In this context, which witnesses once again (alongside the other *Dialogues*) the scale of Plato's devotion to Socrates, any such attribution as Phaedrus's is ridiculous! Instead, I have the sense that Socrates is describing two possible outcomes for Phaedrus presented as places to go in contrast with where he was coming from at the beginning: either to revert to Lysias after he parts company with Socrates, or to move on to the imaginary company *Socrates* will next share with "Isocrates" where Isocrates represents a step in the right direction that Phaedrus could now wholeheartedly take. Cf. n.791. Conversly, if there is a paradigm of the man between two stools it is Isocrates, as Socrates elsewhere says (cf. *Euthyd*. 305E5-306D1)!

1287 κεκρᾶσθαι (A4), positive, as at *Leg*.961E2, *Ep*.7.326C4; P.P5.*init*. and cf. κεράσαντες, 265B8.

1288 πλέον ἢ παίδων διενέγκοι (A6-7), compendious comparison (deVries). For the proverbial παιδὸς μηδὲν διαφέρειν (*vel sim*.) cf. *Prot*.342E4, *Tht*.177B6, *Ep*.4.320C4. Ficinus (tr.): *magis, quam viri pueris*. Cicero: *cum aetate processerit … tantum quantum pueris reliquis praestet omnibus* (*Orator*,13.41).

1289 ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία (A9) suggests that he might be a candidate for the designation, φιλόσοφος, and thereby answers Phaedrus's question τίνα αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι (278E9).

1290 Reading εὐξαμένῳ (B6) with all mss. The dative is predicative with πρέπει (sc. τινὶ, *pace* deVries). Socrates asks one final time for Phaedrus's fullest resolve in the least intrusive possible way. Cf. n.1295, *infra*.

1291 ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω (B9): ὅσα is adverbial with ἔχω, representing not the quantity of his possessions but the degree of his beauty, strength, and health – i.e., the second of the three categories of goods that are always in the backgroun in the *Dialogues* (the tripartition structured Socrates's First Speech). The soul and its goods are here being made the measure of all three, as in the formulation of *Alc*.1 – αὐτός, τὰ αὑτοῦ, τὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ (133D12-E2).

1292 φίλια (C1): Minding bodily goods can be inimical to minding those of the mind: cf. 258E2-5, the sentiment which provided the energy for this second section of the dialogue. The "outside" was hardly amicable with the "inside" in Alcibiades's account of Socrates in the *Symposium*: that passage is quite foreign to the present thought.

1293 πλούσιον (C1): With this we reach the expected third category of goods, but learn that what is good about wealth is that we first think it as consisting of wisdom, and let gold be only gold and not good.

1294 μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν (C2): Heindorf and Ast distinguish this, comparing *Leg*.817A5-6, X.*Cyrop*.3.3.2, from the military expression ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν (cf. also *Cyrop*.5.4.29 and Plut.*Mor*.486E). It must mean "manage," not "plunder." Cf. England *ad Leg*. 817A (cit. deVries): "an instance of Plato's fondness for familiar phrases even where they are not used in the ordinary sense." The notion of the σώφρων is brought forward from the climactic substitution of the divine for the human measure in the upbraiding of Tisias (273C6).

1295 συνεύχου (C6): Phaedrus closes this second part with the same thought and wish and hope with which he closed the

Let's be off.

END OF PLATO'S PHAEDRUS

first (συνεύχομαι, 257B7), except that there it was conditioned (εἴπερ ἄμεινον ταῦθ' ἡμῖν ἔσται). Here, his confession that the possessions of friends are held in common (foreshadowed by 278B3-4 with its interchange of pronouns) removes the condition and places the seal onto Socrates's hope that their lives and their relationship with each other will both be devoted to the erotic music of philosophy (257B5-6). He has been persuaded against ἐπαμφοτερίζειν (257B5: cf. n.818) by Socrates's Second Speech and the conversation that ensued, but only for the present.

Analysis

The First Speech

The Setting for Delivering the Speech: 227A1-230E5

In the course of the opening exchanges between himself and Phaedrus Socrates learns that Phaedrus had busied himself working (διατριβή: 227B6) on speeches all morning, with Lysias no less, and imagines it was quite a feast (imperfect εἱστία, B7). Phaedrus offers to tell Socrates more about what they did on the condition that Socrates accompany him on a walk that he needs to take after all that work (διέτριψα, A4). Socrates will surely come on the walk because, as he says, there could be no higher *business* he could pursue than the *leisure* activity to learn about the work they did (διατριβή, B11), and, the condition that he follow being fulfilled, Phaedrus agrees to tell him about it. We might note the detail that Phaedrus does not say "Come along, then" but asks him to lead the way (πρόαγε δή, C1), to which Socrates replies by asking politely that he for his part begin telling the story (λέγοις ἄν, C2).

The telling Phaedrus begins is succinct but immediately complicated (227C3-8). He recommends the speech to Socrates's attention as if for reasons that have only now occurred to him (καὶ μήν, C3): "Now that I think of it, it is particularly suited to you since it was a speech about love, in a way – though I can't quite say how (οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον, C4-5)." The ensuing description lays out certain facts, as follows. First, it was a "set speech" – that is, the topic for the speech they worked on was merely hypothetical, in contrast with a political speech, whether deliberative or forensic or epideictic, which an orator has been hired to compose for an actual occasion – which is the actual business of oratory. As such it is merely an exercise, meant to be heard and studied and admired solely by other practitioners and students of the art. Second, the topic of the speech is not only hypothetical but is also non-political, like the recondite exercise of composing a praise of salt or the difficult exercise of praising Helen despite what she did. The set task is to apply the rhetorical art – in particular the methods of deliberative oratory – to persuade not a jury or an assembly but a fictional "Beauty" about what he should or must do (χαριστέον, C7). Third, the setting prescribes the speaker's role to be unusually personal. He is to speak not on behalf of a client but on behalf of himself, and his job is not only to persuade the boy with deliberative oratory what sort of man he should gratify but to *seduce* him – that is, to persuade him to gratify the speaker himself. This personal involvement of the speaker brings together two things that are usually kept apart in the "professions." A speaker usually lends his ingenuity and his voice to someone else's cause or interest and is subsequently compensated for his efforts with a fee, but on the present hypothesis Lysias's speaker is speaking on his own behalf (or interest, or cause) and will himself enjoy the fruits of the speech rather than being paid for it. Phaedrus's awareness and sensitivity to this unusual coincidence or conspiracy between

skill and self-interest is revealed by the way he chooses to describe the speech by *depicting the speaker in action* (the participial construction with γέγραφε, C5). To the extent that the true professional or technician is disinterested – i.e., practices his art for the sake of the client and not for himself – the hypothesis of the set-speech condones, even if only in fiction, an abuse of the *art* of rhetoric, since we are meant to take it for granted that to succeed at seducing the Beauty is in the speaker's interest. Finally, fourth, the setting requires the speaker to freight himself with a certain handicap in his attempt to pull off the persuading and the seducing. He has to seduce the Beauty into gratifying him on the principle that it is better for a Beauty to gratify a person who is a "non-lover" than a "lover," which suddenly but only implicitly indicates that he will be depicting himself as not desiring the boy while at the same moment he does in fact desire him. This last requirement reveals that the speech is a display speech for the benefit of Lysias's "students" rather than (or in addition to) being a model of a deliberative speech advocating what is best for the imaginary audience, i.e., the beloved.

In addition to these complications – or more exactly because of them – Phaedrus is *titillated* by the setting Lysias has invented. With the very formula by which he reveals this ("in a confusing and amazing way:" οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον) he also demurs even to try to say why, but this is exactly the way that being titillated expresses itself.

We could just move on, as most commentators have done, but it will be better to focus upon this point since it ends up being the crux of the ensuing drama. He is not titillated because it is a set speech (item 1 above), though we can see that he was already "stimulated" by the opportunity to work so closely with Lysias (as though he were alone with him, though note that Socrates's plural ὑμᾶς presumes there were others, 227B7). Nor is he titillated simply because (item 2) the speech was about love rather than something political, for the topic of love is not inherently titillating. In fact it was the way the speech was *not* simply about love that constituted the "*je ne sais quoi*" or indescribable aspect of Phaedrus's experience. This leaves us the last two points, (3) and (4), which are in fact bound together. The speaker is to seduce the boy for his own use (3), and is to do so without admitting, but in fact by means of denying, that he wants him (4). What is exciting about this to Phaedrus-the-speechifier is the prospect of wooing the boy without having to move into the vulnerable middle zone: to compel his assent from the sidelines, instead. He fears he will be denied the object of his desire.

We recognize the age-old anxiety that underlie this solicitation of love from the fairy-tale of the frog that turns into a prince when he is kissed but has an iron-clad excuse if he is passed over, as well as the underlying fantasy of love by remote control from the stories involving a love elixir that both attracts and repels, but the present case goes us one better: it will be by the deployment not of some external magical potion or instrument that the result will be achieved but by the deployment of the very art that Phaedrus shares with Lysias, which they possess *within* themselves. They have taken a "busman's holiday" to use their rhetorical skills to play at seducing an imaginary Boy. The very tongue with which alone the speaker could tell the truth and reveal his feelings to the Beauty will *lie* to the Beauty and *hide* his feelings instead. He hides the elixir in his breast.

From here on it only gets uglier. Since the speaker will be denying that he wants the Beauty, he (like the frog) will suffer no embarrassment in case the Beauty turns him down (does not kiss him). But when Phaedrus spies Socrates his agenda becomes confused. Here comes a man who will *join* him in his love of speeches, a "sunkorubant" (the word is here coined by Plato). Having feared he would be denied he now recoils at the prospect of being fulfilled! We are in the midst of that dilemma of desire according to which one wants to have his cake and eat it, too. That is, he wants not to eat it so that he can eat it; he wants to have it so that he can still lose it. There is a greek verb for the way a person behaves when he is caught in this vortex of contradictory emotions, and it is τρυφᾶν – to "play the mincing coy." The last thing the τρυφῶν will do is simply eat the cake, and the thing he will never stop doing is talk about and extenuate his dilemma. This final step in our analysis of this dense few lines

takes us to the most embarrassing and mortifying fact of all. Behind the *je ne sais quoi* always lies a *nous le savons assez bien*: Phaedrus and Lysias have not the slightest intention of using this speech on a Boy, even though on the surface the only thing that makes the exercise interesting at all is that they could, and might. Instead it is merely a school exercise! What Phaedrus actually wants to do is to lose himself in the preparatory stage by vying with Lysias to *perfect* the speech (that it be clear and agreed by both in advance which of the them is "in charge" – which the teacher and which the student – is a prerequisite to the whole charade, though which of them is in charge is a matter of complete indifference). Perhaps there is an ingredient of professional frustration over constantly selling their abilities and employing their own skills to provide contents for the voices of others that in the saying will make them famous and successful. Each of them, teacher and student, realizes for a moment in the presence of the other that he might have an opportunity to deploy his skill to achieve the object of his own desires, and thereby be envied or even desired by the other. In truth they do not want that object but want to want it. It is each other and what they share that they truly want, and they can pursue and postpone facing this fact as long as they have placed the distancing mediation of their shared study of rhetoric between them, this art that has a power akin to that of an elixir, though it resides within them rather than being held in a vial locked away in a chest. As "rivals" they must act as if they do not love each other but only their art, so that the converse of this becomes the highest mission of their art: to use their art to deny that they love each other. The teacher and the student share a secret they have tacitly agreed to keep very well!

The proof that all of this is going on within Phaedrus is that though the speech has been perfected, Phaedrus does not now look for a Beauty to use it on but is heading out of town to *practice* it and make it *entirely* his own, which in truth is a strategy of postponing the encounter with the Boy at the same time that it perpetuates the fantasy that he might actually deploy it. These fugitive emotions he is undergoing as he leaves the session with Lysias give special poignancy, in retrospect, to the question ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν with which Socrates had greeted him at the beginning of the dialogue.[1296] That he must get out of town after the session with Lysias "on doctor's orders" is transparently obscurantist: he already blames his body for the excitement that is properly within his soul. That he cannot understand or refuses to understand what has transpired in company with Lysias (227A2-C2) then leads up to the description of the work in which his dilemma finally becomes entirely clear, as we have now seen because we stopped and thought it through.

In paying attention to his remarks we have ignored for a moment the fact that they were not addressed to us but to Socrates. Perhaps with his dense but highly charged description of the work with Lysias Phaedrus is hoping to inveigle Socrates into being a partner in his confusion. That he might wish to do so would not be unlikely given all we know, and all he knows, about Socrates. *Our* job, on the other hand, is to watch and see whether he succeeds at this, and to see how Socrates replies to what on the surface was a *je ne sais quoi* but underneath it all may have been a very sincere confession of darkly mixed feelings – the *nous le connaissons déjà bien* – confessed to the only person Phaedrus knows that might be able to acknowledge what is going on inside him without ridiculing him, and who might be willing to talk the matter through to boot.

Socrates's response (C9-D5) repays the trouble we have taken because it hits Phaedrus's dilemma right between the eyes: "If only Lysias had composed a speech that could persuade a boy to grant his favors to a man that lacked money or good looks rather than lacking desire! *That* would be the sort of public service we might expect from a skillful orator, and a real boon for the common run of mankind!" It is not desire for young boys Socrates lacks but the money and good looks that might attract them! In one fell swoop Socrates both admits his attraction to boys without shame or fear or

1296 Though the greeting ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν is not unique to this passage (cf. *Lysis* 203A6-B1).

rejection and confesses why he might feel timid or foolish about approaching them frankly: they have good reason to reject him since he is an ugly poor old man! Rather than tarry on this topic he confesses another desire, the desire to hear the speech anyway, even if he has to walk all the way to Megara.

But now the teasing escalates: Phaedrus has captured Socrates's attention so now he can play coy and evade him. "So you think I can deliver his speech, the work of the greatest orator alive, all by myself from memory?" But Socrates calls him on it. If he "knows his Phaedrus," he knows Phaedrus is putting him on and wants nothing else than to practice his skills on Socrates. In fact he knows more. He knows everything that has transpired all the way up to this moment and even what is going to happen next: how Phaedrus had ardently listened to Lysias and made him repeat every line, how he finally insisted upon getting a physical copy of the speech, but even then he could not get enough of studying it but decided to go off by himself and memorize the speech outside the city walls where he would not be seen. But Lo! he bumped into Socrates on the way (though the dialogue has Socrates see him first and hail him on his way!) and with a double-take (ἰδὼν μὲν, ἰδών, 228B7) said to himself, "This is just the person who won't be able to resist playing my listener!" He has found the man who cannot, and will not, refuse to allow him the pleasure of practicing the speech on him, which is what he really wants more than he wants to seduce a boy. He asks him to lead the way and when the other asks him to deliver the speech in return he begins to play coy and acts as if he does not desire to deliver it after all. His sudden change is an index of his defense against being rejected!

With this narrative Socrates has brought us up to the present moment, since what he says next is what Phaedrus is *about* to do.[1297] In the last three lines of this account (B5-C1: ἐπορεύετο …) he has retold all that has happened so far in the dialogue we have just been reading. With characteristic linguistic accuracy he recounts the moment one page ago when Phaedrus told him to lead the way (προάγειν ἐκέλευε [C1: cf. πρόαγε δή, 227C1]) and he replied by asking him to begin telling the speech (δεομένου δὲ λέγειν [C1: cf. λέγοις ἄν, 227C2 – incidentally, δεομένου tells us the force of that optative with ἄν which we called "polite" above]); and thereby he pinpoints the moment when Phaedrus began to play coy as being the very moment he described the διατριβή (227C3ff). The playing coy (ἐθρύπτετο, C2) as such includes two steps: first to stimulate Socrates's interest and desire to hear it, and second to act as if he does not desire to fulfill the desire he has just aroused in him. Clearly the first step occupies 227C3-D5 and the second occupies 227D6-228A4. With his interpretation of the byplay up to this point Socrates is therefore alleging that in addition to all its complexity Phaedrus's description of the διατριβή was also an attempt to seduce him into desiring to hear it. And so Socrates now confirms for us that we were right when we began to guess that Phaedrus was trying to inveigle him into a partnership in his own confusion, his own *je ne sais quoi*.

Socrates then completes the account, and ends the conceit of talking to Phaedrus in the second person about Phaedrus in the third person, by saying what the latter "did" next. "In the end it became clear that he was thinking all along he would deliver the speech to his auditor even if he had to force him to listen. So, Phaedrus, please ask him (δεήθητι, C4 [cf. δεομένου, C1]) to get on with it and do the thing he is going to do anyway." In predicting this outcome he merely narrates the final stage of the manipulation that we call "playing coy" (τρυφᾶν): the manipulator becomes enervated and resorts to the use of force. By separating the Phaedrus who has behaved this way from the Phaedrus he is talking to, Socrates makes it possible to analyze the very ugly behavior without confronting the Phaedrus that acted that way, and averting such behavior away from the subsequent conversation with the Phaedrus who will be his interlocutor.

Phaedrus replies both as and on behalf of the person being begged to speak and acquiesces to

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1297 Though he continues with the conceit of the imperfect (ἔμελλε, 228C3).

Socrates's request on the very same grounds that Socrates had acquiesced to listen, namely that he will be compelled to do so in any event – for he says in his turn that he might as well try to tell it from memory because it is clear Socrates will not let him go until he does. The claims are congruent, or they cancel each other out, or both – it doesn't matter any more – and Phaedrus now (as I show in the footnotes) actually begins to deliver the speech with an improvised exordium (228D1-5). Just when he has got the ball rolling and is on the point of beginning the speech proper, Socrates interrupts (D6-E2): "First let me see what you have inside your shirt: I'd guess it is the speech itself, and if it is I am hardly willing to hear you improvise when we have Lysias himself to listen to – so show me what's in your left hand." He had already "predicted" as much when he told us that what "his Phaedrus" had done that morning included getting his hands on the book itself (παραλαβὼν τὸ βίβλιον, B2).

Phaedrus is utterly deflated. His entire strategy of inciting a desire in Socrates that would compel Socrates to compel himself to recite the speech from memory has exploded (ἐκκέκρουκάς με ἐλπίδος, E3). Nobody is pushing anybody around any longer. The affect and fetishizing has now been detonated. "Where," he says, "shall we sit down and read it?"

Section by Section Analysis: 230E6-234C5

The speech he goes on to read[1298] consists of parts of varying length that are simply set down beside each other with a connective particle in between. Their relation to one another is not expressed, nor is it even implied. The structure and the diction of each is centered on *itself* with the result that each must find its own strategy for closure. In so doing each expresses its distinctive tone. Thus my treatment section-by-section consists first of a paraphrase of the capital and then an analysis of its structure, its diction, and how it closes. I adopt the name "capital" for the sections, from Phaedrus's use of the term at 228D4.[1299] We will review the appropriateness of that term once the section-by-section analysis is complete.[1300]

1298 The speech has not been given the study and attention it needs, let alone deserves, since H. Weinstock *de erotico Lysiano* (diss. Monasterii Guestfalorum, 1912) esp.pp.7-26. The later Moreschini ed. (1998) goes so far as to announce there will be no exegetical notes on it (166) since it clearly falls short of the criteria for proper speeches that Socrates/Plato later establish. It is embarrassingly difficult Greek. It thwarts the resolutions that we crave from commentators as to what the semantically darker passages "of course" mean. At first pass Phaedrus's *praise* of the speech for its ὀνόματα (234C7) is all the more appalling because exactly the wording is what is so intractable for us. In my own study of the speech I finally resorted to breaking it down to fundamentals in order to analyze it, and then this extreme measure happened to yield an interpretation.

1299 Cf. also Isoc. *Antid*.68.

1300 Hermias (34.9-35.12) breaks the speech into ten ἐπιχειρήματα (which occupy 231A-233C6) and three ἀνθυποφοραί (which occupy 233C6-234C4), but within his group of ἐπιχειρήματα there are three ἀνθυποφοραί (231B7-C7, 231E3-232A6, 232B5-E2) and within his ἀνθυποφοραί there is one ἐπιχειρήμα (234B1-5), though in his summary he places it *after* them and says it caps the whole speech off (35.9).

Heindorf (1802) broke the speech into eleven chapters (though not paragraphs), at 231B6, 231D6, 232A6, 232B5, 232D4, 233A4, 233B6, 233D5, 233E5, and 234B1. Ast (1819, followed by Hermann [1855]) made breaks at 231E3, 232E2, 233E5 only. Stallbaum (1832) broke it into four chapters, at 231E3 at 233A4, and at 234B6 (for the peroration if you will) but only two paragraphs (breaking at 234B6. Schanz (1881) broke it only at the peroration (234B6).

Of the Twentieth Century editors, Burnet, Robin, and Fowler inserted paragraph breaks at 231E3, 232E3, 233D5 and 234B6; Moreschini (1985, 1998) adds to these another break at 232A6; Yunis (2011), and many translators also, forgo trying to collect the paragraphs into groups but treat each of twelve sallies as a separate paragraph. The relative unanimity on the break at 231E3 is due to the presence of τοίνυν there.

Rowe (1988) presents a relatively detailed breakdown of the speech, into an opening statement followed by five sections, which correspond to the paragraphing of Burnet that faces his translation, and then subdivides these into five, two, three (?), three (?), and two sub-sections, respectively (the question marks are his) – but once he imposes this order onto the speech he finds that the speech barely meets it and that it exhibits only "some sort of" order (143-4).

Capital I (230E6-231A2)

"What you need to know is that it will be beneficial to love me even though I do not love you."

STRUCTURE: The sentence throws down the gauntlet, his paradoxical assertion that being a non-lover does not disqualify him, and thereby sets the program for the speech. He may prove this by proving that contrary to expectations being a non-lover is a positive credential, or that being a lover is a drawback, or both. μέν / δέ are used to balance two clauses both of which consist of duplex "proleptic" (or "lilies of the field") constructions: περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι – i.e., ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν τούτων γενομένων ἀκήκοας, and ἀξιῶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι – i.e., ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστής ... τυγχάνω. But the structure of the argument is different from the syntactical structure: the ὡς clause within the μέν clause, enabled by περὶ μέν ... ἐπίστασαι, is parallel to the ὅτι clause within the δέ clause, which introduces the knockout punch, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστής ... τυγχάνω. The syntactical form is A_1 B_1 / A_2 B_2 but the logical form is A B_1 B_2 C, to-wit, 'You have heard that I think it advantageous to get together which provides sufficient grounds to expect you will not be deterred by my being a non-lover.'

DICTION: The tension between the syntactical and logical structure is strengthened by the use of demonstratives and the choice of the demonstratives used. τούτων really has no antecedent, just as τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων, which is already ambiguous as to its sense (*Sinn*), has no reference (*Bedeutung*). We might guess the phrase refers to the kind of love-making (for this is what πρᾶγμα will come to mean in the speech) this particular person does, so that γενομένων τούτων would mean love-making without being in love. We are forced to imagine something has been said before the speech began (the something, indeed, that Socrates will take the trouble to make explicit in his version [237B2-6: where n.b. the pluperfect, ἐπεπείκει]), at the same time that by concessive μέν we are told it does not matter. And yet despite their vagueness the two sentences do declare (or claim, or assert, or enjoin) that the person to whom the speech is addressed *does* understand. τούτων, if we may call it the "second person" demonstrative,[1301] suggests to us who overhear the speech that the Addressee knows, but then with the τοῦτο in διὰ τοῦτο he misdirects even his addressee since the reference of the demonstrative is to something he has not said but is about to say, namely, that in fact he does not feel love for him. The Speaker chooses this demonstrative to suggest to his Addressee that he already realizes what the Addressee might have thought and so it already broaches his objection to it.[1302]

The proleptic or "lilies of the field" construction allows the Speaker to identify the subject before making an assertion about it – to point to the subject before giving it a predicate. The

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My very flat interpretation merely finds fourteen sallies, as did Weinstock's (21-2), plus the opening and closing remarks: 230E6-231A2, 231A2-6, 231A6-B7, 231B7-C7, 231C7-D6, 231D6-E2, 231E3-232A6, 232A6-B5, 232B5-E2, 232E3-233A4, 233A4-C6, 233C6-D4, 233D5-234B5, 234B6-C4.

1301 The "persons" of the demonstrative is an old pedagogical idea (e.g., St.George Stock *in Apol.*17C [1887]), based on the scenario of speaker (first person), his interlocutor or audience (second), and everybody else not immediately involved in the conversation (third). The speaker points to something of his own with ὅδε ("this thing of mine"), something of the interlocutor's with οὗτος ("that thing of yours") and something equally remote to both with ἐκεῖνος. By this simple idea much is disambiguated, as we immediately recognize because of the confusion caused exactly by the fact that Lysias's Speaker employs it in an unusual way. His first τούτων indicates that the things in question are something his Addressee already knows about (though we do not); but τοῦτο in the next line points forward, as both his addressee and we can only learn by waiting, though even then, after reading ὅτι, we are left to guess whether the ὅτι is causal or introduces indirect discourse. On the Speaker's affected use of demonstratives cf. Stallb. *ad* 232D6.

1302 Compare 231B7, 233C6.

technique is used again in the next capital (231A5), at the beginning of Cap. 6 and at the end of Cap. 12 (234B2-3). The device can enable the speaker to characterize rather than name what he is talking about, and affords him to do so twice (since the predicate can also be a characterization of an unspoken but anticipated predicate), requiring his audience to infer the denotation (the actual subject and the actual predicate, uncolored) from the hints given by the double characterization. We will see that its powers are analogous to those to another device the Speaker favors, the *comparatio per contrarium* (an inchoate version of which is used in the next capital).

The overall effect of this opening sally is to put the Addressee off guard, and to "wrong-foot" him, for it would be a contradiction that the happenstance of the Speaker's being a non-lover should result in his missing his chance with the Addressee (ἀτυχῆσαι, τυγχάνω). At the same time its use of demonstratives divides ourselves, Lysias's actual audience, from the Addressee to whom Lysias's Speaker is addressing these remarks. These are therefore hypothetical persons, and this is why I will be referring to them with capitalized names rather than seeing the speech as units of persuasion delivered to an actual beloved.

CLOSURE: Achieved by the parallelism of μέν / δέ. The verb ἀκήκοας had occurred at the end of the first and so with the verb τυγχάνω we know we are at the end of the second.

Cap. 2 (231A2-6) – connected to the foregoing by ὡς

> *"If you are worried that your lover might turn fickle, choose a non-lover: only a lover's love can abate (the non-lover has no love to abate); and since he is free from the compulsion of love the non-lover can be relied upon to act sanely, which means to do at every moment what is beneficial."*

STRUCTURE: The overall structure consists of μέν / δέ clauses that present a comparison of lover and non-lover followed by γάρ clauses that explains them. The ὡς with which the sally begins ends up having to mean "since." It attaches the argument to the opening assertion, which constitutes Cap. 1, which also was structured by μέν / δέ. Just as ὡς was at first unclear, the ensuing plural pronoun ἐκείνοις has no obvious antecedent. We must rely only on the remote "third person" character of the demonstrative and infer that it stands for a set of people being contrasted with the single person who just spoke in his own voice, i.e., its antecedent is the people he is not, namely the ἐρασταί. Since ἐκείνοις is followed by μέν we already assume these will be contrasted with non-lovers in the δέ clause, so that when we read τοῖς δέ a line below we are able to infer that this "demonstrative article" (if we may so style it) refers to the group of persons who do not love, or who are non-lovers. The Speaker himself as a non-lover (οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὧν σου τυγχάνω, 231A1) is therefore replaced by a plurality of non-lovers, or by the non-lovers as a group of which the Speaker is a member.[1303] What he goes on to say about the non-lover – that there is no moment at which his love can go fickle – can therefore be presented not as an assertion about himself, which would be a promise, but a general truth about people of his type. Once the comparison is made he offers a justification or explanation of it with a γάρ-clause that indirectly asserts that the lover is, as such, out of control,[1304] merely as foil for asserting that the non-lover, who as such is unaffected, is therefore capable of having a rational relationship.

1303 For the shift to the plural cf. 233A5. Conversely, toward the end of the speech the category of non-lovers is replaced with or embodied by the Speaker himself (in Cap.11 and at the close, in Cap.15).

1304 The insinuation is achieved by metonymy of ἀναγκῆς for ἐπιθυμίας. The only way to make sense of the sentence is to assume that the ἀναγκή is ἐρωτική (as opposed to the geometrical sort: cf. *Rep.*458D5).

DICTION: The μέν / δέ comparison employs subtle diction to insinuate its point into the mind of the Addressee. μεταμέλει depicts the change in the lovers' cares or feelings about whom they shall benefit (εὖ ποιεῖν) and the assertion is that such a change automatically occurs when their desire abates, though the assertion that the result is automatic has not explicitly been made. In contrast the term for the non-lovers' attitude is μεταγνῶναι, which insinuates that the non-lover has not mere feeling (μέλειν) but judgment (γνῶσις), a rational attitude; as such his attitude is not subject to feeling. The way this is said however is distinct and unexpected: that there is no *time* (χρόνος) at which it *fits* (προσήκει) for his judgment about the beloved to change. The term χρόνος indicates that the much looser term ἐπειδάν in the μέν clause was only temporal (and not, for instance, causal): this is what reveals the thitherto implicit notion that the lover's change of feeling is automatic. As to the fittingness (προσήκειν), since the non-lover is being depicted as rational rather than emotional he would be able to choose what his attitude about the beloved will be. That his criterion would *of course* be "fitness" brings to the surface the thitherto implicit assertion that the non-lover is, in fact rational.

What is merely implied in the articulation of the comparison becomes explicit in the next clause which now claims (with γάρ) to justify what has already been asserted but in fact merely takes it further. Not under the *compulsion* (of what had thitherto been depicted as an merely *automatic* mechanism) but out of choice, and as to how best their private things might be planned, do the non-lovers confer what benefits lie in their power to confer. The formulation οὐκ X ἀλλα Y, which as we shall see is a favorite of the Speaker, blurs the distinction between contrary and contradictory by laying the suggestion that it is logically equivalent to asserting "Y and therefore not X", i.e. that it is because of being Y that it is not X. In truth, the fact that the non-lover's behavior is not under love's compulsion (not X) is insufficient grounds to infer that it is not subject to some other compulsion and therefore freely willed (Y), though the converse would follow, that if it were freely chosen the behavior would *eo ipso* not be under compulsion. We shall see more of this figure later.[1305] The ensuing περὶ οἰκείων is entirely vague – it could mean they plan their personal affairs in general but its potential meaning is to make a plan about things that belong to them that they have not made public – how, that is, to dispose of their wealth. This does seem to end up being the meaning because of the mention of "good deeds" that ensues, closing the sally right where it opened (εὖ ποιοῦσιν, A6: cf. A3), and because of the locution τὴν δύναμιν τὴν αὐτῶν there, which more explicitly brings to the surface the question of their own resources.

CLOSURE: Because the sally is brought to a close with the re-mention of benefits conferred we discover we have undergone a double refutation of the notion that the non-lover should not be gratified which we noted above, for we have been told that although we might look to the lover for benefits he would be willing to give, his will is subject to feeling; whereas reason can (and therefore does) determine the non-lover's decision about how to dispose of his wealth.

Cap. 3 (231A6-B7) – ἔτι δέ

> *"The lover keeps tabs and gets ahead of you and thus thinks you 'owe him' and mistreats you; but the non-lover 'keeps no tabs', so that, such evils pre-empted, his treatment of you after you gratify him will be to please you with enthusiasm."*

STRUCTURE: The opening words are ἔτι δέ. These are ambiguous since at first we will give them the plainest sense they can have, which is that the Speaker is about to make a further point about the

1305 Cf. 232D4-7, 233B6-C5, 233E5-234B1.

fickleness of the lover and the rationality of the non-lover – that is, that he will continue Cap.2. The ensuing words (οἱ μὲν ἐρῶντες) revise that expectation since they redirect our attention to the *beginning* of that previous capital (ἐκείνοις μέν, A2), and so we are free to allow this to be a third capital on its own, proffering another proof of the opening assertion that the non-lover is not disqualified or unqualified, again by the vehicle of comparison with μέν / δέ. For what it is worth, we may note by now that the lover is being placed first in the μέν clause.

DICTION: The first striking word in the μέν clause is σκοποῦσιν (A7): the lovers watch, investigate, question. The ensuing τε / καί tells us that what they are watching consists of several things – the cost of mismanaging their business for the sake of the affair and the quantity of goods they have given over (to the beloved) – and when they "add" (προστιθέντες) the discomfort of it all, a third addend in their accounting, they reach the conclusion that they have long since (πάλαι) rendered all the thanks the beloved deserves. The framing of the statement is very clever. At first we are to get the headings under which they are making their accounting entries and it seems καί before ὃν εἶχον πόνον is adding a third one, their trouble, discomfort, and pain; but suddenly with προστιθέντες this third heading becomes a mere transition to a new indicative (ἡγοῦνται) that is *syntactically* parallel to σκόπουσιν but *logically* a result of their having completed the σκοπεῖν. The conclusion they reach is not just an inference but already a *settled outlook*, unshakeable as such (this is the sense of ἡγεῖσθαι). The words that follow ἡγοῦνται then express the indignation the lover feels for having done so much: πάλαι means he has gotten far ahead[1306] of the beloved's reciprocal gifts; τὴν ἀξίαν countenances and even invites an argument he is ready to have with the beloved that he is justified in his anger; and the perfect ἀποδεδωκέναι means not that he has paid his way during the relationship but that he has done so much paying that the relationship from now on should consist of nothing but the beloved "reciprocating" – that is, paying him back!

The crucial ambiguity that enables this shift from accounting to recriminating is the καί before ὃν εἶχον πόνον. Because it introduces a relative clause with suppressed interrogative pronoun antecedent, just as καί had introduced the similarly un-antecedented ἃ πεποιήκασιν εὖ which was itself parallel to the un-antecedented relative clause ἅ τε κακῶς διέθεντο, we initially think the καί is parallel with the τε and καί that link those two and that it is adding a third heading the lover is keeping count of. But with the appearance of προστιθέντες, the implication of which – that the lover is adding things up – already suggests he is losing his patience, we realize that instead of being a third object of σκόπουσιν, ὃν εἶχον πόνον has provided that surprise participle with a direct object so that its καί can no longer be adding a third object to σκόπουσιν. The καί becomes a sort of free agent in the sense that we will have to wait and see what it is adding to what, and soon enough we do. According to our implicit assumption that it will add syntactically coordinate items to each other, we anticipate that it must be a third person indicative it is adding to σκόπουσιν, which is the only foregoing word that is not part of a relative clause.

Thus the μέν clause (A6-B2) insinuates into our minds the picture of the lovers watching something carefully (σκόπουσιν) and then merely by the act of watching becoming impatient and unilaterally adopting a resentful prejudice (ἡγοῦνται is strong) toward the beloved. It never was mere watching, after all: that vague verb had hidden an ungenerous motive that time alone brought to the surface.

What of the δέ (B2-5) clause, where the non-lovers will be showcased, in contrast and in turn? In their case there will be three denials (οὔτε, οὔτε, οὔτε). We naturally imagine they correspond to the

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1306 The primary sense of πάλαι is to characterize something in the past as remote only in the sense that it belongs to a situation that has been superseded in the present. The remoteness is qualitative not quantitative. Cf. my n. *ad Rep.*392B9.

three headings the lovers were watching over.[1307] First (οὔτε, B2), for them a neglect of personal matters cannot be explained away by using love as an excuse – which clearly denies ἅ τε κακῶς διέθοντο τῶν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα; nor (οὔτε, B3) will it be possible (ἔστιν understood because this phrase also is infinitival) for them to keep scrupulous accounts of the discomforts they had undergone and absorbed and in a sense stored up (perfect παρεληλυθότας) – which appears to correspond to the third not the second of the lovers' headings (ὃν εἶχον πόνον); nor (οὔτε, B4: now we expect the lovers' second category, the gifts they had given!) will it be possible (again ἔστιν understood) for them to "complain about the differences against appropriate persons" (τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφορὰς αἰτιάσαθαι). This third item does not correspond with the remaining item in the lovers' list and, worse, its diction is vague in a way we may by now say is characteristic of the Speaker. As such it is on the verge of being a failure of communication, but along the way we will have noticed something new during the δέ-clause, something only mildly present in the μέν clause: the close *parallelism* of the three οὔτε clauses:

οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἔστιν προφασίζεσθαι
οὔτε τοὺς παρεληλυθότας πόνους ὑπολογίζεσθαι
οὔτε τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφορὰς αἰτιάσασθαι

Aside from διὰ τοῦτο ἔστιν which governs all three but stands within the first only, the three phrases are scrupulously parallel. Homoioteleuton of infinitives in -σθαι terminates the phrases with its objects placed before them; each object has an article establishing attributive position for a descriptor; and the syntax of the descriptor is varied (objective genitive, participle, prepositional phrase). Whatever the third clause means it is parallel to the other two in a way that makes it altogether likely to *seem* true so that the onus is placed upon the Addressee to discover or invest its abstract language with an appropriate denotation that will make it so![1308] The first and last verbs particularly pertain to the give-and-take of an established relationship (seeking an excuse in the face of another, lodging a complaint at the door of another) and the middle one implies a relationship to the extent that ὑπό connotes that he is quietly making a case to use against someone at some point (compare my remark on πάλαι, above).

Beyond this I do not know what the third clause means.

The three points having been made it is time to see the resultant state in the non-lovers that corresponds to the resentful attitude the lovers had formed, which had been slipped in by the participle προστιθέντες. In the present case the result is presented without a trick, totally above board, with ὥστε (B5): so many evils have now been brought under control (perfect περιῃρημένων,[1309] the passive construction totally exonerating the non-lover from any involvement, as if it is not that he has brought them under control but that the very absence of irrationality pre-empts them from arising), that – as before – there is nothing left for them (i.e., the non-lovers) to do,[1310] assuming they have done the deed (πράξαντες), but move forward with their will untrammeled by doubts (προθύμως) onto whatever course of action they deem will please them (i.e., the beloveds). In other words the non-lovers will not open a tab for their beloveds and will not accumulate an account against them but will pay cash for services rendered as they go – for this is all on condition of "the

1307 And we have been forewarned by the οὐκ X ἀλλα Y formulation above that the Speaker might rely on a denial of the contradictory case (that the non-lover is not like the lover) to warrant an assertion of the contrary (that the non-lover is *eo ipso* the opposite of the lover in any and every way).

1308 The technique of patching over a poor argument with musical parallelism is described by Isocrates at *Evag.*10.

1309 Cf. n.1347.

1310 The contrary indeed being identical to the contradictory!

deed being done" as the sudden insertion of euphemistic πράξαντες indicates. The euphemism feels a little peculiar for the fact it expresses what had hitherto been conceived of as undergoing the receipt of a gift with πράξαι, an active (and usually transitive[1311]) verb.

CLOSURE: Once again the closure is achieved by the repetition of a term that tells us how far we have come: it is χαριεῖσθαι, the good deed repaid by the non-lover, to be compared with the lover's angry use of the term at 231B1, where he says to himself he has repaid enough "gifts" to the beloved. We should note before going on that in both cases the language is inverted, during this capital. χάρις properly refers to the sexual favor, not the benefit provided by the lover in consideration for which the beloved bestows upon him this favor. The pursuer's action is, has been, and will properly be called εὖ ποιεῖν.[1312]

Cap. 4 (231B7-C7) – ἔτι δέ

> *"You would make much of a lover on the advice that his love makes him your most ardent ally and that he will please you even if it makes him an enemy to all others. But for this very reason his love would cause him to make still more of the next beloved, and dump you at his behest, perfectly willing to make you an enemy and do you ill."*

STRUCTURE: This capital does not, like the others, argue both the superiority of the non-lover and the trouble one has with the lover. It only shows that a common reason the Addressee might have for gratifying a lover will lead a beloved to grief. The procedure (called ἀνθυποφορά) is to hypothesize the common belief[1313] and then to show it is wrong, a procedure that will be used several times below.

DICTION: τοῦτο is again used to point forward (B7), again as if the Speaker knows what is in his Addressee's mind. ἀπεχθανόμενοι is the pivot, and it is drawn out of φιλεῖν. εὖ ποιεῖν is what we expected but this is interwoven and we get euphemistic χαρίζεσθαι instead, denoting an expression of gratitude or reciprocation which does not sit so well with the notion of alienating absolutely everybody else. ὅσων ἄν repeats ὧν ἄν but the quantitative formulation is an insult (the beloved had thought not only that his gift would "keep" the lover but that he is the "one and only"). The comparative περὶ πλείονος then trumps περὶ πολλοῦ and therefore turns the tables on it: the beloved "makes much" of the lover but the lover ends up "making more" of somebody else. Then there is a stepping-up from ἀπεχθανόμενοι (the *subjective* anger of the others) to κακῶς ποιοῦσιν (*objective* harm to the others who are now *you*), replacing χαριεῖσθαι.

If it were an argument he would have to say that despite your making much of him he *might* jump to another and at that time all bets would be off because love is a madness. Instead of taking that admonitory and rational path, he assumes the trusting state of mind of the beloved and invites it overreach and take one extra step – to believe that the lover will be so enthralled he will be willing to alienate all others on the beloved's behalf. As to the eventuality that the lover might jump to another, which his own remarks up until then have consigned to the most remote of likelihoods, he now blandly *assumes* it will happen, echoing the formula he had used of the lover's love for the original beloved (genitive plural relative pronoun with unexpressed antecedent). In short he lures the beloved into an overstatement of his hopes so as to catch him up with their own unforeseen reversal.

1311 Transitive in the sexual meaning at 232D5, 233A2; intransitive here and at 234A3. Cf. n.123.

1312 χάριζεσθαι is granting sexual favors and εὖ ποιεῖν is paying for them: cf. 231A2,A6.

1313 φασίν (C2) is "people say." (cf. n.124). In the other ἀνθυποφοραί the *refutandum* is presented impersonally (νόμος in E3, the perfect παρέστηκεν at 232B5 and 233C6, and χρή at D5) or attributed directly to the Addressee (ἔροιο, 234B6).

CLOSURE: Done by trumping of the opposite: περὶ πλείονος vs. περὶ πολλοῦ and καί ... κακῶς vs. χαριεῖσθαι.

Cap. 5 (231C7-D6) – καίτοι πῶς εἰκός

"What reason can you have to take a chance on something nobody with any experience would ever choose to risk if he were in control of himself, when even the person you are taking the chance on is rational enough to know, at the time, that he is insane? And how quickly will he drop this misconceived association of his once he becomes rational?"

STRUCTURE: The capital consists of a double argument *a fortiori*: you should not rely on sanity in an area in which nobody thinks there is a cure, including the very man who though now sick will think himself to have been mad once he gets better.

DICTION: The language of this capital is steeped in rationality and prudence. The two τοιοῦτος's represent not only an unstated but confident evaluation but even a relative weighing; προέσθαι and συμφοράν, ἔμπειρος and ἀποτρέπειν, are taken from the language of risk evaluation and avoidance; ὁμολογεῖν with καί and αὐτοί extends rationality even to the beset lover – referred to indirectly, as usual, with a derogatory characterization (the ἔχων συμφοράν) – as does the self-awareness of his confession that he cannot control himself. προέσθαι is the opposite of ἀποτρέπειν, so that the beloved is being spoken to as an ἄπειρος. The construction with the participle, εὖ φρονήσαντες, in lieu of εἰ plus optative, more strongly suggests that he *will in fact* sooner or later come to his senses, rather than entertaining it as a possible or conceptual eventuality; just as in the previous capital the question of his love jumping to another, though set up as a most remote possibility in the mind of the beloved, was blandly broached with a relative clause instead of being spelled out with a protasis. The sane man will recognize that his love was only an ill disposition (οὕτω διακείμενοι) and disown whatever wishes he undeliberatively[1314] adopted under its influence, including as a mere correlate not worth singling out his relation with the beloved.

In this case the Beloved, the person being addressed, is made to feel isolated as the only irrational person left. Both the Speaker and the lover are more rational than he is. Indeed as καὶ γάρ indicates even the lover joins the group of the ἔμπειροι envisioned in the previous sentence. Again, however, it is not an argument that one should be rational as much as it is an attempt to cajole him to join the non-lover whose essential rationality even the lover shares.

CLOSURE: ὥστε leading to the inverse inference on the lover's idea about the object.

Cap. 6 (231D6-E2) – καὶ μὲν δή

"If it is from the persons that love (you) that you choose the one most choiceworthy, your choice will be from few; but if from out of the others you choose the one most suited to your personal situation it will be from many. The likelihood you would chance to find someone worthy of your gift of friendship from the many is greater."

STRUCTURE: Comparison of the lover with the non-lover is again done with μέν / δέ. The suppression of the object of ἐρώντων helps to mask the fact that the lovers might choose their

1314 Reading βούλονται (D6) with BTW: cf. n.132.

beloved with the care he is advocating the beloved should exercise in choosing his lover. We always sense, or hope, that when someone loves us it is because they *do* truly know us and care about who we are (the ἐπιτηδές) – this is why rejection is so painful.

The order of the expression is almost slavishly parallel:

ἐκ τῶν ἐρώντων // τὸν βέλτιστον // ἐξ ὀλίγων
ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων // τὸν σεαυτῷ ἐπιτηδειότατον // ἐκ πολλῶν

This parallel ordering sets into relief the variation of τὸν βέλτιστον with τὸν σεαυτῷ ἐπιτηδειότατον, suggesting that the first choice (though βέλτιστον abstractly denotes a choice reached by deliberation) is distracted from the true goal, which is a customization of suitability (stressed by σεαυτῷ and by the objective notion of τὸ ἐπιτηδές). ἄξιον should have been ἄξιον σεαυτοῦ but instead it is τῆς φιλίας: the term now standing in for the sexual favors he can give in order to secure the alliance (the correct, and the previous meaning, given to φιλία). τυχεῖν indicates it is a toss of the dice either way and has forgotten forever the possibility that the man who has chosen to love the boy is the best possible person for him.

CLOSURE: Effected by truncation (of αἱροῖο and then of ἄν σοι ἡ ἔκλεξις εἴη) made possible by the parallelism.

Cap. 7 (231E3-232A6) – εἰ τοίνυν

> *"If you fear the settled belief and custom of our city, and that the gossip of men may heap opprobrium upon you, note that whereas lovers, thinking others would be as envious of them as they are envious of each other, will likely be aroused by talking and proudly making a show, to one and all, that the troubles they have taken to secure the beloved were not in vain. The non-lovers on the other hand, who are in control of their behavior, will in all likelihood pursue what deliberation dictates to be best rather than concern themselves with the opinion and accolades of the men around them."*

STRUCTURE: Hypothesizing a common belief (formulated with the proleptic construction) followed by a μέν / δέ comparison of lover and non-lover that proves it wrong and suggests the opposite is true. τοίνυν in the transitional formula has motivated several editors to insert one of their relatively infrequent paragraph breaks here.

DICTION: νόμον is strong language; with καθεστηκότα it almost means statutory law rather than mere custom. The perfect participle suggests that custom is settled and therefore legitimate, in contrast with the flighty behavior of giving in to the fleeting importunities of the solicitous lover. It is then allowed to enclose as an equivalent to itself the opprobrium of gossip, but as for gossip it is lovers that are stimulated to brag, thinking others envy them as much as they envy each other, about their conquests, whereas the non-lover will be able to keep quiet, and will in fact be free to deliberate and decide on the best thing without the distractions of busy gossip among the many – a kind of behavior, indeed, that fosters a stable outlook.

CLOSURE: Achieved by the sequence and order of ideas. The capital opens with opinion and fear and closes with deliberation and confidence. In fact it is a complete ring. As in Cap.2, the outer structure of two parallels (AB / AB) becomes the vehicle for a content whose logical order is AB BC: Decided attitude, gossip, fear of opprobrium, (lover's envy & stimulation to talk and show), non-lover's self control, decided attitude, facing up to opinion and gossip. Closure is also strengthened by

syntactical chiasm: although the two limbs are parallel in having a circumstantial participle (οἰομένους / κρείττους ὄντας) followed by an infinitival outcome ἐπαρθῆναι / αἱρεῖσθαι), the infinitive (ἐπαρθῆναι) stands at the head of the μέν-construction about the ἐρῶντες and at the tail end of the δέ construction about the οὐκ ἐρῶντες (αἱρεῖσθαι).

Cap. 8 (A6-B5) – ἔτι δέ

> *"When it comes to lovers it is inevitable that many will gossip and watch them following their beloveds about, even making a sport of it, so that when they are actually caught talking with each other they think, 'Aha! they are together: their desire has just arisen or just been slaked.' When it comes to non-lovers people do not even start to ask why they might be talking with each other since they are aware that all it takes to make a person talk with somebody else is friendship or because it is pleasant for some other reason."*

STRUCTURE: Like Cap.3, this capital quickly breaks into ἐρῶντας μέν right after ἔτι δέ, and therefore initially seems to be a corollary to the previous capital. The question of its relation to that capital is however trumped immediately by a greater question, the syntax of πολλούς. Up until now the μέν / δέ constructions, where used, have placed the lovers and non-lovers into syntactically unambiguous roles (231A2/A3; D6/D7; 232A1/A4) even if the syntax was not parallel (231A6/B2). In the present case it will turn out that the accusative τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας is a direct object of the verb and the anarthrous accusative plural adjective πολλούς, although ἐρῶντας agrees with it in case, number and gender, is not its predicate but will be a subject accusative of the dependent infinitive verb of which τοὺς ἐρῶντας is the object! Truly there is no way to foresee that this is what will happen; our only compensation might be that we have seen this phenomenon before in the speech.[1315] There are similar ambiguities in the use of "third person" pronouns as well as changes of subject which only trial and error can resolve. Once we surmount these syntactical and semantic barriers we will see that the basic structure is again a comparison in μέν / δέ, between the effect upon one's reputation of associating with lovers and that of associating with non-lovers. Therefore, for what it is worth, the capital *does* continue the theme of the previous one after all.[1316]

DICTION and CLOSURE: πυθέσθαι suggests a connection with the previous capital that ends up being valid. The bulk of both the μέν and δέ clauses become infinitival under the force of similar leading constructions (ἀνάγκη [sc. ἐστί] and ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι) but as soon as we see this, we notice that the notion of necessity operating in the two cases is very different. In the case of the lovers the attraction to gossip is uncontrollable; in the case of the non-lovers the reasons for people talking to each other are necessarily *insignificant* – an explanation is *absolutely* not needed. οὐδ' (B3) suggests there is another infinitive than αἰτιᾶσθαι but we realize it goes with ἐπιχειροῦσιν once we get that far, and that it is meant to stress the contrast of the οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν of the many when they observe the non-lovers conversing with their ἔργον ποιεῖσθαι when they observe the lovers. The generalization of the partner in the non-lovers' conversation with the indefinite τῳ[1317] is a masterful touch of dismissal that makes possible the remark ἢ δι' ἄλλην τινὰ ἡδονήν, which can then with utter insouciance sail close to the wind with the term ἡδονήν, where we would in any event have expected δι' ἄλλην τινὰ λόγον.

1315 With ὅτι at 231A1; ὡς at 231A2; καί at 231A8.

1316 And it is for this reason that many editors have not placed a paragraph break here. Cf. n.1300.

1317 τῳ (B4) is the reading of the correctors of BT and surely right in my opinion.

Cap. 9 (232B5-E2) – καὶ μὲν δή

"One is rightly apprehensive that for both parties friendship is hard to maintain; if you are to invest and risk your all, it is all the more formidable. Your vulnerability is only increased by entering such a relationship with a lover, for a lover will tend to foreclose your future opportunities. If you choose a person who does not love you because of his virtue you won't need any future friends since the friendship between you has the best chance of lasting."

STRUCTURE: Although much has recently been made about the presence of καὶ μὲν δή in this speech[1318] we should note this is only the second time it is used for transition in nine capitals. What we notice instead is that the new capital it announces begins, once again, by entertaining a commonsense hypothesis (εἴ σοι δέος παρέστηκεν, 232B5: cf. Cap.7: 231E3, Cap.4: 231B7). This time the hypothesis is complex and occupies five lines (B5-C2) so that its articulation makes the adoption of a μέν / δέ comparison inconvenient. Instead, the case of the lovers is treated, without μέν, as an apodosis to the hypothesis, and itself is complex, occupying ten lines (C2-D4). Only after he has exhausted the case of the lovers can he move on to the non-lovers for six lines (D4-E2). In short, form yields to substance in this capital, which is easily the longest one so far.

DICTION: Certain terms must be noted. If you fear that friendship (φιλία) is generally hard to maintain since differences can arise (διαφορᾶς γενομένης) that both parties must deal with, but under the special circumstance where you are surrendering (προεμένου δὲ σοῦ[1319]) what matters to you the most, you might fear you are risking disproportionate harm (βλάβη) to yourself, you would have good reason to be "more fearful" of lovers. βλάβη indicates a deliberative anticipation (the goal of deliberation is to foresee βλάβη and ὠφελία and act accordingly); προεμένου is the same euphemism for self-surrender we saw at 231C7 but its object is now described as ἃ περὶ πλείστου ποιῇ in order to provide a quantification for βλάβη (that it would be μεγάλη). Most important is φιλία, and the way that after he has planted it in the background he goes on to avoid naming the erotic relationship that is the target of his advice, but instead merely escalates the risk involved from διαφορᾶς γενομένης to the parallel genitive absolute προεμένου δὲ σοῦ, which indicates that the relation has become an erotic one without his having to say so. The problem with the Speaker's mendacious "position" (he is αἰμύλος, 237B4) is that a relationship between a beloved and a non-lover can only be called φιλία because, we are meant to believe, the non-lover does not feel love for the beloved. Conversely he cannot quite advocate that the Addressee should not be *friends* with a person who happens to be a lover, since if only friendship is involved the mistreatment from the lover he goes on to predict (C3-D4) would only consist of the διαφοραὶ γενόμεναι. The eroticism of the relationship therefore consists only in the fact that the beloved grants sexual favors to the friend; and the Speaker is telling the Addressee that as long as the friend is only a friend and not a lover – as long that is as he does not *want* the Addressee – the love relationship will be safe. But in this case the original model of friendship as a joint enterprise vulnerable to a shared failure in case a disagreement arises (B6-C1), is vitiated after all. The erotic relationship, that is, is *not* an intensified version of a friendship. The original term

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1318 Denniston's notice that Lysias favored this collocation of particles became part of the subsequent argument as to whether the speech is actually Lysian or whether Plato might be imitating him (Weinstock 26-51 is still the most thorough treatment I know of). But so far it hardly even seems to be a speech. Weinstock's method of analyzing the speech according to the school categories of *figurae* (7-13), *numeri* (13-15), *compositio verborum* (16-18), and *delectus verborum* (19-21) so marginalizes the issue of overall unity that in his final overview (*de toto genere dicendi*, 21-26) he justifies all his other work by positing that the orator is inflicting a sort of artless congeries (ἀφελεία, 23) on the youth.

1319 σου (C1) should be accented σοῦ.

φιλία remains the default name for all the relationships; the construction in μέν / δέ as well as the parallelism of the genitive absolutes enable him to focus on the erotic relationship without naming it, as if it were a mere stage of friendship.

The troubles he predicts the lover will give the beloved are presented with uncharacteristic amplitude (C3-D4). First he generalizes (C3-4): 'Many are the things they are bothered by, and by their lights everything that happens redounds to their own disadvantage,' where βλάβῃ answers the deliberative assessment that above had given the beloved pause. The compound statement moves from weaker πολλά to stronger πάντα, the first statement being an exaggeration by the Speaker and the second a "paranoid" exaggeration by the imaginary lovers themselves, which reflects back upon the first statement and reveals the Speaker did not believe it after all but was already quoting them satirically (the prolepsis of αὐτούς almost says, "many are the troubling things *in their opinion*"). Next he shows how these "beliefs" of theirs, the satirical description of which reveals they are actually the mere products of an emotional state, *affect* (n.b. δι' ὅπερ) their behavior toward the beloved (C4-D4). We are back to the emotional lover out of control we found ourselves watching in Capp.2,3,4, and 5.

Immediately we get καί (C5) and we will have to wait to know whether it will correspond with another καί later or whether it is emphatic.[1320] In either case, it introduces a complex and initially ambiguous noun: τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ἐρωμένων συνουσίας, and we are told that the lovers avert these from occurring. We had met the erotically charged notion of συνουσίαι in the previous capital (232A8-B2). The term can always have an erotic denotation and clearly this is what bothers the lover. It is only this jealous paranoia of the lover that resolves the syntax of the terms that stand in the attributive position: the ἄλλοι are others than the lover himself and the genitive τῶν ἐρωμένων is subjective with συνουσίας. They fear certain persons (φοβούμενοι pairing off with the φόβος of the beloved above) but μέν immediately following tells us there will be several kinds of persons for them to fear: first, the possessors of wealth where the fear is lest their wealth exceed the lover's own; second, the educated, lest their wits turn out to be more powerful than the lover's own. It is worth remarking that the Speaker imagines that paideia will make a man more *powerful* than themselves (κρείττους), and the dative of respect συνέσει explains why: it means "smarts" or cunning, the ability to put together what is going on and respond quickly.[1321] Given the two kinds of men he might fear, the Speaker shifts to a generalization with τῶν δέ, the shift indicated by varying the case of the definite article (τούς) to the genitive: whatever other "good" someone might have "attained," the lover guards against it. And now the inference is drawn and drawn in a strikingly new way: 'Having persuaded you to break your alliance with these people the lover will bring about (καθιστᾶσιν) a dearth of friends, whereas if you look out for your own interests (σκοπῶν: the word used in Cap.3) better than those people (ἐκείνων) do, it will be *you* that will cause the disagreement with *them*.' It is the first time since the moment he began the entire speech that the Speaker addresses his Addressee in the second person. He is owning up to advising him personally. The advice is that if he tries to be agreeable to lovers out of loyalty for the friendship they will ruin his future, but if he looks out for his future he will have to betray their friendship. Another way of putting it is that the further the friendship gets the worse off he will be.

The recursion at this point to the language of διαφορά (cf. B6) and καθιστάναι (cf. B7) achieves closure of the treatment of the lovers, and we have no place else to go than to a comparison with the non-lovers. As such, ὅσοι δέ (D4) is quite enough to effect the transition. He refers to them as μὴ

1320 Cf. n.1315.

1321 συνέσει (C8), in the lover's mind (which is being quoted) perhaps connotes the "savvy" Thucydides often invokes (27 times) with the adjectives ξυνετός and ἀξύνετος. Plato never uses these adjectives (though he does use σύνεσις). Cf. σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω (236D2) and n.243. Hence it is κρείττους (C8), not βελτίους, that the lover fears their knowledge will make them, just as it is against their δύναμις (D1) that he feels he must guard.

ἐρῶντες τυχόντες, a formulation on first view quite near the way he described himself at the beginning of the speech (231A1-2). But μὴ ἐρῶντες is conditional not supplementary and τυχεῖν is another evasive euphemism.[1322] The meaning ends up being "those who get sex although they are non-lovers," but instead (ἀλλά) "succeeded in their requests because of virtue" (δι' ἀρετὴν ἔπραξαν ὧν ἐδέοντο, D4-5), and we are back to the οὐκ X ἀλλά Y formulation we first noticed in Cap.2: The actual reference of this protasis is to persons who score because of their virtue rather than their desire, but we are supposed to identify this group with the category of non-lovers. Non-lovers may indeed not feel desire, or claim not to, but their lack of desire hardly implies they are gratified, if gratified at all, for being virtuous. We are required to supply the unstated steps in the thought – that we cannot even presume to measure the lover's behavior as an expression of his worth since he is sick, whereas the non-lover, being non-sick, is inherently choiceworthy for the beloved. What leads us or suggests that we add these unstated propositions, crucial as they are to the Speaker's argument, is the sheer form, οὐκ X ἀλλά Y. We are supposed to receive this protasis as the equivalent of "If you gratify the non-lovers" and then move to the apodosis. Here, too, we find the οὐκ X ἀλλά Y formulation as a vehicle for turning the contradictory into the contrary: the gratified non-lover would not begrudge his companion (as the lover would) but would despise those who are unwilling (which is the contrary behavior, which we are to accord to him merely on the grounds that the non-lover is the lover's contradictory), thinking that the beloved is being ignored by the latter but benefitted by the former.[1323]

CLOSURE: The conclusion ties all this together by going back to the initial worry about friendship (B5-C1). Instead of that worry there is a much greater hope that they (i.e. the beloved and the non-lover) will end up being friends (φιλίαν, E1) with each other if they do the deed (ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος), rather than enemies. But all he has argued is that the deed (πρᾶγμα) might not affect their friendship, that the escalation from friendship to the love relationship is not an increase of risk for the beloved, as long as the non-lover he gratifies continues not to love him. The noun πρᾶγμα again achieves the euphemistic vagueness he got with absolute πράξαι as we saw above (232D5, cf. 231C7).

Cap. 10 (232E3-233A4) – καὶ μὲν δή

"Most lovers are attracted to the beloved's physique rather than his true personality so they have no way of knowing if they will still want to be friends with him when their desire abates; but non-lovers, who move from friendship to a sexual relation with the boy, have already proven that

1322 τυχεῖν here means "to score." Cf. 256A5, ἀτυχῆσαι (231A1), and cf. δυστυχόντας / εὐτυχόντας (233B2-3), where as at 256A5 it is used absolutely, as πράξαι was at 231B7.

1323 We stopped to notice the *logical* problem in Cap.2 (231A4-5). It was operating in the background in the series of negations that ended Cap.3 (231B2-5), and it will become fully explicit as the full-blown deployment of *comparatio per contrarium* in Cap.11 (233B6-C5) and more extensively in Cap.13 (233E6-234B1). G.E.Dimock (*AJP* 73(1952)381-96, *passim*) notices what he calls "eliminative ἀλλά" but treats it as a quirk of Lysias's diction being imitated by Plato and fails to see its larger logical role. The characteristic of the figure is that the alternative *trumps* the original. My favorite example comes from Augustine, quoted by Eric Voegelin as the motto of his large study, *Order and History:* ...*in quorum (sc.creaturarum) consideratione non vana et peritura curiositas exercenda est sed gradus ad immortalia et semper manentia faciendus* (*de Vera Relig.* 29,52). Surely *curiositas* has never heard of the *gradus ad immortalia*: the figure contrasts for its reader something he has heard of with an inkling, recalled by *gradus ad immortalia*, that might lurk within him and might become available to him if he turn his back on the other. In Augustine's case the figure uses the known as a springboard for the hoped for, but in the case of Lysias's speaker the inverse is the case: the *fugienda* of a relation with the lover provide the model for turning the absence of such *fugienda* in the relation with the non-lover into an empty boast *eo ipso* they are positive *petenda* – i.e., into turning the contradictory into the contrary. Socrates uses the figure to the higher Augustinian purpose near the end of the dialogue (273E5-8: cf. n.1553). Cf. also 277D6-278B2.

their friendship has an ethical basis, which their sexual relation will only foster."

STRUCTURE: After the long preceding capital, this one is open and shut, consisting of a single μέν / δέ sentence. We are back to the simple method of the balanced contrast, where the argument is carried by contrasting terms. It is clear from the fact that ἐρώντων μέν can follow immediately upon καὶ μὲν δή that this collocation of connectives is connecting paragraphs and is entirely external to the sentence it is introducing.

DICTION: The contrast between the emotional reaction (ἐπεθύμησαν) and the rational evaluation (ἔγνωσαν, ἔμπειροι ἐγένοντο) is repeated from Cap.2 (231A2-4) as is the expression τὰ οἰκεῖα (231A5) denoting a man's real assets and position in life – a prudential category consisting of the things to be minded rather than squandered under the influence of emotional escapism. The lover's future consists of what he will want (βουλήσονται: E6, cf. 231D6 [mss.]) and he cannot foresee it, rather than consisting of what his current planning (βουλεύεσθαι, as in Cap.2 [231A5] but only implicit here) has the power in all likelihood to bring about. In the case of the emotional lover his pleasure will be forgotten by the time he gets to know the boy, but in the case of the non-lover who already knew him when he first did this act with him (ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, A2), the pleasure will endure in his memory and bring ever more rewards to the beloved.

The capital re-uses ideas already introduced to answer a question related to the last capital, about what lies in the future once "the deed is done."

CLOSURE:

The capital opened by comparing an earlier time to a later (when the lover desires the body to when he comes to know the beloved's character) and closes by comparing later to earlier, predicting future behavior as following from past behavior.

Cap.11: (233A4-C6) – καὶ μὲν δή

> *"It is only appropriate that by trusting and believing me rather than a lover you will receive greater benefit. Those lovers will condone anything to avoid your displeasure and themselves tend to loose track of what matters: in general love makes then treat minor discomforts as disasters when they are turned down and when they do succeed to praise treatment so bad the pleasure they receive does not really compensate for it – so that far from emulating them the beloved should pity them. But if you are persuaded by me, I can promise that, first, my association with you will not consist of coddling immediate gratification but also long term benefit, who am not quelled by love but master of myself, who am not aroused to raging hatred by small things but manage to be slow to anger over even the larger ones, forgiving of errors unintended and seeking ever to dispel intentional wrongs. These are the marks of a friendship that will last a long time."*

STRUCTURE: The capital, though introduced indifferently with another καὶ μὲν δή and structured by another μέν / δέ comparison of lover and non-lover (A5-B6, B6-C6), is entirely different from the preceding ones for its rhetorical balance and its elevation in thought and tone. A propositional summary does not do it justice as the foregoing paraphrase suggests. It is appropriate that it should have this tone since its topic is explicitly the moral betterment, rather than the mere self-interest, of the young man (announced at the very start with βελτίονι, A4). And at the same time that the Speaker has moved to a higher concern, he refers to himself for the first time since the opening not only as the impartial advisor of the Addressee that his speech has portrayed him to be all along, but as the opponent of the nefarious lover.

DICTION: Now that he has brought himself into the argument, the lovers are again called ἐκεῖνοι (cf. 231A2). βελτίονι (233A4) immediately invokes the realm of deliberation so that what is παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον contravenes proper planning (the superlative implies deliberation leading to choice of the *best* alternative). That the lover wrongly praises both words and deeds is a gratuitous amplification (it was similarly gratuitous in Cap.4, at 231C2-3). The contrast and juxtaposition of ἐπιθυμία and γνῶσις (B1) are likewise topical (repeated from Cap.2, 231A3-4). τοιαῦτα (B1) once again points in the wrong direction: though its plain sense is to point backward (and the immediate context allows it to), the asyndeton in the ensuing μέν clause (B2-3) proves that it was meant to point forward. This discrepancy sets into relief an unexpected passage in which he takes the opportunity to generalize the behavior of the lover (B2-5), according to which it becomes clear he should not only be avoided but pitied rather than emulated (ζηλοῦν, B6); after which he will contrast the corresponding behavior of the non-lover (B6-C5) – i.e., himself! The purpose of taking the opportunity to speak generally is that since he has brought himself in, a broadened treatment provides him an amplified opportunity, subsequently, to praise himself.

As to the narrative about the "signs" of love, δυστυχόντας and εὐτυχόντας are euphemisms for being denied and being granted sexual favors (cf. ἀτυχῆσαι, 231A1; ἔτυχον, 232D4) and the language of λυπή for the "bothersome" effect of being denied is repeated from 232C3, as is the notion that love exaggerates it (compare ἀνιαρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν [B3] with πάντ' ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῶν βλάβῃ νομίζουσι at 232C3-4). The ensuing τὰ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἄξια παρ' ἐκείνων is vague but we are lucky enough to get its sense from the contrast announced by μέν / δέ and the opposition of εὐ- and δυσ-: if failure leads them to play up their imaginary discomforts, success might lead them to play their real discomforts down. But the actual expression is that love "requires that things not worth pleasure from them get praise." παρ' ἐκείνων is vague until we remember that the lovers have been so designated in this section (A5) in contrast with the non-lover "I" who is speaking. The meaning is, lovers are not only willing to suffer but must even praise abusive mistreatment from the beloveds such as would lead a respectable and upstanding person to choose to forgo the pleasure the beloveds can provide (ἄξια is moral like βελτίονι: cf. ἀξίαν, 231B1). Hence the ensuing statement that from the moral point of view they are to be pitied rather than emulated. The periphrasis ἐπαίνου τυγχάνειν, enables him ruefully to compare the praise the lover must render of the beloved's bothersome behavior, with the sexual favors (εὐτυχόντας) he buys with it.

Next we get the δέ clause, to-wit, 'If you take my advice instead (the advice of the non-lover) ...'. The μέν clause (A5), about the lover, had given way to the narrative about the marks of love (B1-2) and now the δέ clause will end up being a narrative of the marks of non-love, postponing by means of chiasm to announce that this is what it is doing (C5-6). The first thing the Speaker does is suggest to us that his list will be long (πρῶτον μέν, B6): 'It will not be, first of all, to foster immediate pleasure that I will associate with you (συνέσομαι), but also future benefit.' The reason he then gives is a description of his own disposition which ousts the promised description of his behavior. It is carried out with a series of nominative participles that describe *himself* rather than his behavior, in the form οὐκ X ἀλλά Y. It will be these that are the marks of non-love: that he is not bested by love but master of himself, that he is not aroused by small things to great enmity but manages even large things with an anger that is slow, that he forgives unintended wrongs and endeavors always to conjure away intentional ones (C1-5). The balance and rhythm of the duplex clauses (no less than four) [1324] is the mark of the *comparatio per contrarium*; the passage constitutes the largest flourish of the speech so far;

1324 τὴν παροῦσαν ἡδονήν / τὴν μέλλουσαν ὠφελίαν; ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἡττούμενος / ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν; διὰ σμικρὰ ἰσχυρὰν ἐχθρὰν ἀναιρούμενος / διὰ μεγάλα βραδέως ὀλίγην ὀργὴν ποιούμενος; τῶν μὲν ἀκουσίων συγγνώμην / τὰ δέ ἑκούσια πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν. Note that the sequence of οὐκ ... ἀλλά comparisons is closed by a final comparison which is done with μέν / δέ instead, for which compare 232D6-7.

and though the subject of these assertions is *himself* (nominative participles θεραπεύων, ἡττούμενος, κρατῶν, ἀναιρούμενος, ποιούμενος, ἔχων, πειρώμενος), he closes the capital by saying these are the (converse) traits not of the non-lover, as his μέν / δέ construction had led us to expect, but of 'a friendship destined to last a long time,' which serves as a *predicate* of the relation with himself as non-lover.

CLOSURE: With this chiastic ordering of program and content (τεκμήρια, C6, placed before / ἐπιδείκνυται, B2, placed after), we recognize that the capital comes to a close.

Cap. 12 (233C6-D4) – εἰ δ' ἄρα

"But if perhaps you are apprehensive that a strong friendship cannot evolve unless it starts as love, it would be appropriate that you reflect on the fact that we would never then care about our relatives nor have acquired trusted friends, our associations with all of whom we owe to occupations quite separate from this."

STRUCTURE: Like several other capitals (i.e., 4, 7, 9) this capital entertains a commonsense attitude and then refutes it, this time employing the logic of a *reductio ad absurdum*, and the syntax of an irreal condition. Its content is unrelated to the last in both in thought and language – the Speaker speaks as though the attitude has just occurred to him[1325] – and yet the topic had been raised before, in Cap.4 (though it was there disposed of differently).

DICTION: Like Cap.9 this one presents the commonsense attitude as *lodged* in the consciousness of the Addressee (perfect παρέστηκεν). ἰσχυράν is an unexpected and general expression with friendship (perhaps an unconscious echo of its use with ἐχθράν in the previous capital [C2]), and is broad enough to cover both the strength of emotion (ἔρως) and the deeper ethical meaning of family relationships (which he then generalizes with πιστούς, D2, thereby strongly distinguishing these from erotic connections) so that he can use the latter as counter-examples in his *reductio*. The general term for purposive action, ἐπιτηδευμάτων (D4)[1326] enables him to use ἑτέρων, which avoids defining the true purposes of relationships by boasting that the non-erotic ones constitute a legitimate category of their own without having to say why or how with a more specific noun.[1327]

CLOSURE: γενέσθαι (C7) opens the capital by broaching the notion of the unknowable vicissitudes of the future, and then is trumped by the perfect γεγόνασι (D3), describing known and unexceptionable outcomes, with which it closes.

Cap.13: (D5-234B1) – ἔτι δέ

"If it is the most ardent requests that one should requite, one should likewise in principle

1325 This is the force of ἄρα (C6), but the Speaker's sudden realization is an event feigned by Lysias the author. Rowe's inference that Lysias's use of the adjective ἰσχυρός in the previous section "prompts" him to move to the topic of family relations, which are likewise "strong," forgets the difference between the two: it is more a matter of a specious segue. We need an un-method to guide ourselves against taking παίγνια too seriously.

1326 Verdenius *ad loc.* (271), finding in the spectrum of Greek usage that ἐπιτηδεύματα *can* mean "aspirations," smooths the awkward obscurity of the passage, while the Speaker's agenda *relies* on such vagueness and indeterminacy. The ἐπιτήδευμα from which the ἐπιτηδεύματα that establish familial bonds and trusted friendships are of another sort (ἕτερα), is making love, as it is at 234B3.

1327 ἕτερος here used in approbative litotes: cf. my note to *Rep.*379D7.

benefit not the noblest but the most incompetent, since the benefit will be the greater and they will be the more thankful. Likewise when one throws a party in his home he ought to invite not his friends but those who pester him with requests and beg to be fed. Those are the ones after all that will then greet him, and will swell his entourage, and ever appear at his doors, and will derive the greatest pleasure, and will feel more than an evanescent thankfulness to him, and will pray that great goods accrue to him. But perhaps the opposite is appropriate, that we should gratify not the ardent beggar but the man most able to return the favor; not those who merely desire it but those who also deserve the deed; nor those who will enjoy your younger years but who will share their wealth with a person when he becomes older; nor those who upon having gotten their way will brag about it to others but who will feel enough modesty to keep silent before everyone; nor those who are eager for a short time but who will be friends uniformly at all times throughout their lives; nor those who once their desire abates will search for some grounds for enmity but those who once your youth abates will then reveal their own inner virtue."

STRUCTURE: The capital broods, as all of them do but now more dubitatively, over what sort (or sorts) of person the beloved should gratify. It begins (D5-E2) by entertaining the policy of gratifying the most ardent or (and?) neediest suitor, and pushes on[1328] to the paradoxical extreme of inviting the hungry rather than one's friends to a dinner party at one's home, listing six ways (E2-5) the gratifier might be gratified in return by the such as these for having adopted this policy (or these policies). But then the Speaker suddenly entertains as "perhaps fitting instead" a policy (or policies) that appears to be the contrary or the contradictory of this (these), done in six parts likewise (E5-B1) with unprecedented elaboration and elegance, and then the capital closes upon itself.

The six by six pairing offsets the need, or distracts us from the hope, that the Speaker will articulate the two policies in generic terms, but by now it is clear anyway that the two overarching categories of persons are, still and again, the lovers and the non-lovers, so that the specifications that are looking for a genus, or the tactics that are looking for a strategy, are in the event elaborations of the choice between gratifying the lover or the non-lover. Because the structure enables him to put the onus on his audience to supply the underlying generalizations, he is free to indulge instead in characterizations, a tendency we have seen before;[1329] but exactly because, or to the extent that, we do this work for him we are supplying the subject for his predications,[1330] to-wit, that the lover is a needy and unqualified sort of beggar who craves only to be filled up,[1331] and whom we would indisputably *not* want to invite into our houses and who, if we did, would indeed never leave us alone but make an embarrassing show of fealty to us, whereas in contrast with that person, the "non-lover" – and in fact any "normal" person, since the characterization is only negative – can as such be imagined to be (1) more likely to *repay* us just as the lover is likely to be ardent in his *pleas*, (2) *worthy* of gratification rather than only *needy* for it, (3) less interested in exploiting *your* youth than sharing *their* wealth when you have *aged*, (4) less likely to *advertise* their conquest but *discreet* enough to keep it quiet, (5) not merely serious for a *short* time but ready to be friends with equal sincerity for their *entire* lives, and (6) not prone to come up with some *excuse* for alienating their affections when *their* desire abates but ready to *reveal* their true colors when *your* youth abates.

1328 This technique of overdrawing the hypothesis so as to bring on its own demise we saw in the framing of the hypothesis in Cap.4 (231C2-4). The overdrawing is enabled by the vagueness of the erotic vocabulary, which replaces denotation with characterization (δεῖσθαι for requesting sexual favors and χαρίζεσθαι for granting them): in their primary meaning these terms mean to beg *in general* and to do *any* graceful favor, which now opens the floodgates to the second and third cases (D6-E2).

1329 In Capp. 1 and 5 *supra*.

1330 This is the strategy of his use of the proleptic "lilies of the field" construction (Capp.1, 15).

1331 πλησμονῆς (E2) is a particularly callous characterization of the beggar's need for food.

SYNTAX AND DICTION: ἀλλ' ἴσως προσήκει (E6) is an unexpected *volte-face* but ἴσως immediately mitigates it and προσήκει suggests a saner prudence has arrived[1332] to correct the shortsighted desideratum expressed with the vaguer χρή. The subsequent series of six correctives (233E5-234B1) continue this adversative ἀλλά with the form οὐκ X ἀλλά Y, in an extensive and triumphant deployment of *comparatio per contrarium* with its characteristic confusion of contradictory and contrary and its trumping of the *fugiendum* with a *petendum*. The correctives correspond in number to the foregoing six reactions of the gratified "underdog" (who is actually the lover), recommending the "opposite" sort of person (who is actually not the contrary but the contradictory type: the non-lover) as a person whose reactions will be more attractive. Since he does not tell us the identity of the person to whom he is attributing these better reactions (even if he had said so it would have told us nothing about the person since the characterization is only negative), it becomes necessary that he instead portray the reactions as the contraries of the lovers' reactions, and in particular as better where they are worse, attractive where they are ugly, and beneficial where they are detrimental. In short he needs to come up with pairs of terms that are logically contrary as a pair (a *relative* relation) at the same time that they are have opposite value (which is absolute) so as to deserve opprobrium or praise. Here are the terms that provide the skeletons of the pairs:

1. σφόδρα / δεομένοις	μάλιστα / δυναμένοις
2. ἐρῶσι μόνον	τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίοις
3. τῆς σῆς / ὥρας / ἀπολαύειν	πρεσβυτέρῳ / σφετέρων / μεταδιδόναι
4. διαπραξάμενοι/πρὸς ἄλλους/φιλοτιμήσονται	αἰσχυνόμενοι/πρὸς ἅπαντας/σιωπήσονται
5. ὀλίγον χρόνον / σπουδάζειν	διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου / φιλοῖς
6. παυόμενοι/ἐπιθυμίας/πρόφασιν/ζητήσουσιν	παυσομένου/ὥρας/ἀρετήν/ἐπιδείξουσιν

In the *first* pair we have logical opposition in σφόδρα and μάλιστα, but both logical and qualitative opposition in δεομένοις / δυναμένοις. Note that the dependent infinitives (χαρίζεσθαι / ἀποδοῦναι) come before and after their dative participles so that homoioteleuton in the two limbs is avoided for the sake of allowing the two limbs to open and close with mild chiasm.

The *second* contrasts desiring only with being worthy of the desired act, and again the verbal complements (μόνον / τοῦ πράγματος) are chiastically ordered. Its virtue lies in its brevity – the object of ἐρῶσι, though already understood, echoes in the genitive τοῦ πράγματος.

Now that we are underway a more elaborate contrast can be hazarded in the *third*, involving now *three* items. In this third, the logical relations are carried by all three pairs (τῆς σῆς / σφετέρων ; ὥρας / πρεσβυτέρῳ ; ἀπολαύειν / μεταδιδόναι) but the "valences" are also perfectly managed: τῆς σῆς is what the former *takes* while τά σφέτερα (ἀγαθά) is what the latter *gives* and ἀπολαύειν is selfish where μεταδιδόναι is generous. Note again that the order is varied within the two clauses, this time to place the future verbs at the end but to complicate the relation between the other pairs of terms.

The *fourth* pair on the other hand uses exact syntactical parallelism (participle, πρός phrase, future middle verb) that supports or enables a compensatory inconcinnity in diction: διαπραξάμενοι ("once they have really scored") stands in contrast with αἰσχυνόμενοι, but let us remember that *both* of the men have "scored:" the point is that the latter man has a sense of shame or decency that endures the enjoyment. The second item of the pairing is stepped up in the second clause from ἄλλους not just to πάντας but ἅπαντας; and the third items in the pairing do produce an homoioteleuton, while the two clauses (measuring 16 and 15 syllables) are virtual isocola as well.

1332 Note that προσήκει was used likewise above, to infer the fatal general principle (προσήκει δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, D6) implied by the initial notion of pleasing the ardent beggar.

The musical element now having been aroused and called into play, we revert to semantic substance in the *fifth* pair, pitting short-lived ardency with life-long friendship. The close logical contradiction in the lengths of time are enough to leave it to us to recognize the difference between the datives σπουδάζουσιν (verbal and transient) and φιλοῖς ἐσομένοις (adjectival and essential).

The *sixth* and final pairing discovers still another way to pull off the contraries that is maximally elaborate and something of a *tour de force* – participles of the *same verb* both placed at the beginning but with different persons (παυόμενοι and παυσομένου). The disarming musicality of the rhyme effects closure of the list.[1333]

CLOSURE: One can say that the *tour de force* involved in the sixth is enough to exhaust the imagination set up by the former five and that closure of the entire capital is achieved by a kind of exhaustion of correspondences. But it would also be instructive to notice that the inner structure of this capital resembles the structure of the entire "speech" of which it is one of fourteen parts. Topic follows topic with no progression but mere juxtaposition; the sense it makes is the sense the parts make separately, and they owe their separate sensefulness to the fact that they open and close themselves. Moreover, we begin to notice that several of the points being made epigrammatically recount the contents of the distinct chapters we have been through. The *first*, that the non-lover is more able than the lover to repay, corresponds to none of the capitals (though δυναμένοις echoes δύναμιν in Cap.2, 231A6): it is based on the false inference that the emotional neediness of the lover implies he is financially needy; but the *second* redoes Cap.6, the *third* redoes Cap.10, and the *fourth* redoes Cap. 7. Thereupon, the *fifth* finds a way to restate Cap.10 a second time, and the *sixth* combines the negative characterization of the lover from Cap.4 with the positive characterization of the non-lover from Cap.11. By the end of it we have revisited some but not all of the capitals and have done so in no particular order, so that we are left in the dark whether it was a peroration or not. All we can do, as we have been forced to do throughout, is to wait to see what the Speaker does next.

Cap. 14 (234B1-5) – σὺ οὖν

> *"So you must keep in mind what has been said and contemplate this: while lovers are upbraided by their friends on the grounds that their activity is bad, non-lovers have never been faulted by their familiars for managing their interests badly because of this."*

STRUCTURE: In place of a proclitic connective (καί or ἔτι or δέ) he turns to his addressee directly (σύ) and achieves the connection by the (new) inferential particle, οὖν. The reference to what he has said (τῶν εἰρωμένων) paired by τε ... καί with the single argument he is about to make suggests that the previous capital was indeed a sort of peroration and that he is closing the speech with a final point. As to the capital's structure, which will consist of his arguing this point, he reverts for the eighth time to a comparison in μέν / δέ (Capp.2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11): lovers are criticized by their associates in a way that non-lovers are not. This assertion repeats the content of Cap.3, which had not been repeated in the previous capital, so to the extent that that capital was a peroration this might appear to be its climax.[1334]

SYNTAX AND DICTION: If τῶν εἰρημένων is meant to be a reference to all (else) he has said, or a reference to the summary he has just given of it in the previous capital, the sentence would be tantamount to an ἄλλως τε καί construction effecting a transition to a special point. Adding ἄλλων,

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1333 Contrast closure achieved above by shift from οὐκ ... ἀλλά to μέν / δέ: n.1324.

1334 In fact the majority of edd. have set this capital and the previous one into a single paragraph.

πάντων or τούτων to τῶν εἰρημένων would have helped make that clear; instead all the work is being done by the emphatic gradation of the demonstrative ἐκεῖνο.[1335] The μέν / δέ clauses that now present this special point are closely parallel in syntax, with the result that variations in their terminology are set into starker relief. At the head of both clauses are the lovers and non-lovers, functioning as direct objects and followed by semantically correlated verbs (νουθετοῦσιν / ἐμέμψατο); the clauses are then completed by circumstantial participial phrases. In both cases it is unclear whether the participles are causal (telling what moves the associates to criticize or not) or whether they represent the content of the chastisement in virtual indirect discourse, in the manner of the proleptic "lilies of the field construction." The use of ὡς with both participles only strengthens the ambiguity. The present indicative in the first clause represents a loose generalization (ἀεί *vel sim.* is forgone), capped by the aorist in the second, which because negated by οὐδεὶς πώποτε is a stronger assertion by virtue of being an understatement: it adduces a universal observation about the past in order to suggest it is an absolute truth.

As to the diction, the μέν clause asserts that lovers' *friends* (φιλοί) *upbraid* them (νουθετοῦσιν), on the grounds of their being involved in a *behavior* (ἐπιτήδευμα) that is *bad* (κακόν); the δέ clause asserts that none of non-lovers' *familiars* (οἰκεῖοι) have ever yet *faulted* them (ἐμέμψατο) for handling their private *business badly* (κακῶς βουλευομένοις) because of it (διὰ τοῦτο). The variation from φιλοί to maximally general οἰκείων is an opportunistic strengthening of the already capping δέ clause (a second noun would not have been needed except for the shift from casual generalization to the negative οὐδείς). The variation from νουθετεῖν to μέμφεσθαι shifts the character of the criticism from the condescending admonition of a superior to the bad-mouthing of a peer or even an inferior that might in fact be nothing more than a grumbling expression of envy (μῶμος). In the first clause he names the behavior being criticized an ἐπιτήδευμα. This term has been used once above, as the most general term for occupations or habitual behaviors that include but are not limited to love affairs (ἑτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, 233D4).[1336] It is a most general term therefore, but it here refers only to the occupation or behavior that has been called τὸ πρᾶγμα or τὸ πρᾶξαι above because its construction in a genitive absolute phrase can only refer to the ἐρῶντες as ἐρῶντες (whether as being the cause of the criticism or its content). In the δέ clause we find not that the non-lovers are involved in a bad behavior but that they are never bad-mouthed in a certain way because of this behavior (διὰ τοῦτο). At the same time that the Speaker avoids the facially self-contradictory assertion that non-lovers *do* do the same thing that lovers by virtue of being lovers do, he asserts that if (and when) they do do this, such behavior does not elicit criticism. This leaves him to match the badness asserted of the act of love-making in the μέν clause, and he does this with the long phrase διὰ τοῦτο κακῶς βουλεύεσθαι περὶ ἑαυτῶν. In place of friendly admonition that rabid love-behavior is a moral degradation, we now learn that though a person might envy him nobody ever finds the opportunity to *fault* a person who has succeeded to score at sex for failing to achieve his rational self-interest!

CLOSURE is again automatic once the slots in the μέν clause are filled by their parallels in the δέ clause.

Cap.15: (234B6-C4) – ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἔροιό με

"Am I advising you to gratify any and every non-lover? I'd say even a lover would not advise you so about all lovers. Whichever of us gets you will not value it as highly; and if you want to hide

1335 The use of the persons of the demonstratives for emphasis and insinuation at the risk of unclarity can by now be identified as a feature of the speaker's style (cf. nn.112, 1301).

1336 Cf. n.1326.

it you will have a harder time doing so. Nay it is not harm but benefit for both that is the outcome we need."

STRUCTURE: The previous capital turns out not to be the last after all – the Speaker wants to anticipate one more question that might be arising in the Addressee's mind. We may view this one as a sort of loosely attached coda. Once again the segue to a new argument is achieved by anticipating a thought in the Addressee's mind (cf. Capp. 1-2, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13), but for the first time the thought, and its being thought, is entertained much more dialogically, as a question the Addressee might be wanting to ask the Speaker. The personal scenario between the Speaker and Addressee has increasingly come to the surface as the speech has approached its close (Capp. 11, 14), to the point that the Speaker is now himself the representative of the class of non-lovers, just as he was at the very opening, so that it is with the advice of lovers that his own advice can now be compared and contrasted (cf. ἐμοὶ πειθομένῳ in Cap. 11, 233A5). The argument will assert that he does not advocate universal gratification of his own kind because *nobody* would, and then it tells why: because in either case it would lead to a situation that would fail to satisfy the original motives for the sexual exchange.

SYNTAX AND DICTION: With παραινῶ, which should be rendered with a progressive present in English, the Speaker insinuates not only that his entire speech is a παραίνεσις rather than an attempt to seduce the Addressee, but also that the Addressee conceives of it as such. The question that he imagines occurring to the Addressee is something of a challenge to the Speaker, and he immediately defuses any contentiousness in his reply by prefacing it with ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι: οἶμαι is modest after παραινῶ and the μέν will be *solitarium*, meaning "I for my part". His portrayal of the lovers' advice as κελεύειν presents an attenuated parallel for παραινεῖν though he does not go so far as to deny that their advice is rational as he had done before.

The argument according to which neither party – i.e., nobody – would advise that the beloved gratify everyone of their type first articulates the different effects such behavior have on the pursuers and on themselves and then asserts that such effects are the contrary of what is to be wished. The clauses describing the distinct effects are parallel, beginning with the interested party in the dative (τῷ λαμβάνοντι / σοί) and a neuter predicate (agreeing with χαρίζεσθαι, understood from B7) relative to that party; the copula and perhaps ἄν along with it, are left to be understood.

He solves the problem he avoided in the previous capital (the problem of providing a common term for the lover and non-lover, which is now needed in the first of these clauses), with the new verb λαμβάνειν in the conative present. As to the clause describing the impact of widespread gratification on the gratifier (who can be addressed as "you," the Addressee, just as the non-lover was the Speaker himself), assuming you want (βουλομένῳ is conditional) to hide the increased number of affairs (in order to forfend against the diminution of returns just mentioned) this will be much harder. In both clauses the relationship is being analyzed in purely mercantile terms but in both cases this fact is being suppressed: the value of the object pursued is derogated by widespread gratification (and therefore the pursuer will not compensate the pursued as handsomely), and the beloved will wish to hide it (in order to forfend against the diminution), so that both the pursuer and the pursued would be harmed (βλάβη) by such a program whereas what is needed is mutual benefit (ὠφελία). By characterizing the pursuer's compensation as χάρις (rather than the more frank εὖ ποιεῖν used above, 231A6 cf.231C6) he fleshes out the underlying notion of reciprocation presented in the rest of the clause by the terms ἄξια[1337] and ἴσης at the same time that he suppresses its reductively mercantile character; and he continues the euphemism by cloaking the pursued's merely financial and the pursuer's merely hedonistic losses and gains with the terms βλάβη and ὠφελία.

1337 For ἄξια cf. the use at 233B4 above.

Cap.16 (234C4-5) – ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν

"For my part I think I have said enough but if you lack anything just ask me."

STRUCTURE: The previous capital was complete, and once again he continues speaking. In Cap.14 he had made the segue to the new idea of Cap.15 by turning to his Addressee with σὺ οὖν; this time, maintaining the dialogical tone lately introduced, he turns to himself, to dismiss himself from further speaking unless the Addressee has some other question beyond the one he had just imagined on his behalf (ἔροιο, B6). The new remark is again formulated in terms of μέν and δέ, but now the division is not between lover and non-lover but Speaker and Addressee.

CLOSURE: Syntactically the closure is achieved by a μέν / δέ combination, but now for the first time the closure will be also an end. Lysias has managed this double problem with particular artfulness as we quickly see once we imagine the circumstances of the performance. All along Lysias is impersonating the Speaker.[1338] Within the hypothesis of the performance, when the Speaker closes by inviting the Addressee to ask him any other question that he might have[1339] – more exactly, whether there is anything he lacks and feels he needs (ποθεῖς[1340]) – he is placing an onus onto the Addressee either to object or grant his request. But performatively, when the Speaker stops Lysias stops; and while the Speaker is looking at his Addressee and waiting for him to raise a further point and is met with fictional silence, Lysias is looking at his students who find themselves looking back at him in real silence. For a moment they are divided: they may either go over to his side and praise him for silencing the Addressee, or they might just persist in the posture of audience and raise an objection[1341] on behalf of the Addressee. They become conscious of being part of the fiction at the very moment the fiction disappears, in a way analogous to the way Gorgias finishes his praise of Helen by saying that whereas for her it was a defense, for him it was a παίγνιον. In case one of them does ask for more[1342] or does improvise a new hypothesis for him to answer, Lysias would presumably be ready and able to tack on another improvised capital.[1343]

Conclusion

The speech is just a series of sixteen distinct units varying in length from two to twenty lines. The first and last units open and close series, framing fourteen inner units. Generally, the propositional

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1338 Phaedrus stresses this fact about the speech in his first enthusiastic description of it at 227C5-8). where he uses the vivid participial construction with γέγραφε (cf. n.36).

1339 ἐρώτα (C5). There is no recognition of a pun in the Greek testimonia or scholia. ἐρώτα looks, more than it sounds, like ἔρωτα. If it were a conscious pun it would "go somewhere" but as the text stands, it doesn't. Maybe we are missing something lost by the corruption of the words before it (the best mss. have a compound in ὑπό that we cannot make sense of). Cf. n.204.

1340 The text at C5 is uncertain: ποθεῖς Ven.189 (*apud* Burnet, Robin) Vat.228 (*apud* Moreschini) : ὑποθεις T : ὑποθῇς BW *et* Vat.185 *apud* Moreschini. See next note.

1341 Given this performance scenario we may now hazard to say that perhaps the forms of ὑποτιθέναι that are peeking through in the better mss. at C5 represent an invitation to Lysias's auditor(s) to proffer up another hypothetical scenario or question (ἀνθυποφορά is Hermias's term: 35.2) to which he could tack on a response.

1342 Cf. 228A6-8 and n.204.

1343 Cf. 228A8-9. Indeed the ability to answer questions on the spot is part of the ἐπάγγελμα of the sophist Gorgias (Gorg.447E6-8A5, cf. Cic. *de Fin.*2.1).

content of these consists of denying the presumption that Gratifying a Lover is a Good thing to do in some Respect, and then asserting that Gratifying a Lover is Bad in that Respect, whereas Gratifying a Non-Lover is Good in that Respect: A is B for R_i is false; the truth is, A is ~B for R_i and ~A is B for R_i.

Considered not propositionally but as speech acts, these units are distinct sallies.[1344] They raise a plausible belief only to dismiss it; they open with a question only to answer it; they open by saying, "Perhaps you are hoping that A is B," and then discover that A is not B. But the *tour de force* consists of making the further point that the initial reason for believing that A is B in fact implies that it is ~A that is B. The refutation that denied the predicate was a corrective admonition, but this further point reveals that the initial presumption was a matter of mistaken identity – that it is to a different subject, indeed the "opposite" subject, that the desired predicate in fact belongs – in short, that it is the *non*-lover that the Addressee must gratify.

There is a rhythm in the ordering of the capitals but it is barely noticeable. Comparison in μέν / δέ is the predominant structure (Capp. 2,3,6,8,10,11,13,14) but is relieved, at fairly regular intervals, by the method of floating and then refuting commonsense views (Capp. 4, 7, 9,12,15). In addition to these there is one capital (Cap.5) that is *sui generis* – a sort of *reductio* – which in fact might be an appendix to the previous capital.

Because what is happening in each sally is the inverting, reversing, or subverting of words – a sort of zero-sum linguistic game – there cannot be a true carry-over or continuity of thought from one sally to the next. Moreover, the Speaker shows no compunction about this. He forgoes to mitigate the unconnectedness with such ready techniques as the sort of epanalepsis used in retort in which a word is repeated with a different meaning so as to create a false but apparent "segue," or by an organization of the content from top to bottom or left to right by relying, for instance, on a background list. Instead he flatly announces an external connection between the capitals with connective formulas that he shows little concern even to vary, including ἔτι δέ (Capp.3,4,8,13), which connects the segments by referring to a time-scale outside them in which they exist, and καὶ μὲν δή (Capp.6,9,10,11,), a wrong-footing collocation that moves forward (with καί), then recedes (μέν), and then moves forward (with δή). Each new quip is a "chapter" or heading of its own (n.b., κεφαλαίοις, 228D4: cf.235A6-7 and n.221). Head follows head and there is a tail or coda at the end (Cap.15) but we never get the neck, the body, or the limbs.

The device or mechanism by which these reversals within the capitals are achieved is primarily the clever substitution or counterbalancing of terms managed and reinforced by rhythm, paronomasia, isocolia, parallelism and antithesis.[1345] For many of these the natural vehicle and device is the *comparatio per contrarium* (οὐκ X ἀλλά Y), by which the contradictory is easily confused with the contrary. The thirteenth unit (Cap. 13: 233D5-234B1) includes a climactic deployment of this device and its powers. Like Capitals 4,7,9, and 12, it presents a view in order to refute it but this time the view is not just floated or hypothesized but granted (though only ironically) and then elaborated to patent absurdity, at which point the speaker breaks off and says "But perhaps instead of all that" (ἀλλ' ἴσως, 233E5), as if he will next relieve the strain of bafflement and incredulity he has inflicted on us by offering us a modest proposal: "Nay perhaps it is A rather than ~A that we would prefer, and B rather than ~B (six antitheses are amassed); and it is here (233E4-234B1) that we witness the fullest deployment of the Speaker's linguistic acrobatics in the shortest compass.[1346]

The logic of the reversals relies not upon a definition of love (*quid sit*) but upon

1344 Hermias (34.10) calls them ἐπιχειρήματα.

1345 Weinstock catalogues all of this (8-19, Appendix 1) but does not walk us through the speech as I have.

1346 A similar technique of pairing terms is famously deployed by Thucydides at 3.82 and also, less famously, by Plato in *Republic* Bk.8 (560D).

characterizations of love (*quale sit*) as impatient, needy, insane, and unreliable, which characterizations are then allowed to imply what the lover's behavior is likely to be. In this, the logic of the speech resembles what we find in the *Tetralogies* of Antiphon. It is this method of characterization that provides the logic for "arguing from likelihood" which the commentators often mention, for if one argues from essence and definition instead, the implications are essential. Moreover it is crucial to recognize that since the non-lover is as such non-characterized and uncharacterizable, there is no corollary prejudice about how he for his part *will act*. Immune from characterization he is quietly assumed to be "normal,"[1347] or by the easy fallacy of identifying the contrary with the contradictory, to *possess* the virtues that love putatively destroys in the lover. [1348]

The six antitheses of Cap. 13[1349] are set forth with as little relation to each other or sequence in their logical content as the capitals themselves exhibit and therefore represent in microcosm the overall architectural failure of the entire speech. There is a hint that he is summarizing all he has said before, but the hint is not carried through, so that, as at many junctures of the speech, we are again left to make what we will or what we can of what is going on and what is intended.

So much can be said of the speech on the hypothesis that it is a deliberative speech delivered by the Speaker to the Addressee. But as it turns out it is merely a schoolmaster's virtuoso display[1350] for an audience of students, as becomes clear in the last line when the Speaker who asks his Addressee if he wants more collapses into the Lysias who has all along been speaking to his audience of students. The peculiar effect is that the audience who had been safely eavesdropping as if they were not the Addressee suddenly find themselves cast in the position of respondent and are "put on the spot." This is the effect that moved Phaedrus to speak of a *je ne sais quoi* when he first described the speech to Socrates, and Socrates's response in the ensuing lines of his reaction to the speech (234D) will immediately bear witness to the operation of this same effect upon himself, for he has just played the same role as audience that Phaedrus had played for Lysias's presentation. Lysias's rhetorical skill had enabled him come off the winner, unscathed and in fact insulated from any vulnerability to the beloved's rejection, in the eyes of Phaedrus; and now Phaedrus has similarly come off in the eyes of Socrates.

1347 τοῖς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος (Cap. 2: 231A3); οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται ἀλλ' ἢ ποιεῖν ... (Cap. 3: 231B6, cf. main text at n.1309 on passive περιῃρημένων); the non-lover needs no special motive to speak with the beloved exactly because the lover does have one (Cap. 8: 232B3-5); etc.

1348 εὖ φρονεῖν can be assumed to obtain once love ceases (Cap.5: 231D4); the non-lovers will include the ἐπιτηδειότατον (Cap.6: 231D8) merely because love does not limit them; non-lovers can be assumed to be κρείττους ἑαυτῶν (Cap.7: 232A4: cf. 233C1-2) exactly and only because lovers are not, and are therefore to be *able* to choose the best merely because they are *free* to do so (232A4-6, cf. 231B6-7); the non-lover scores *although* he is not a lover and therefore *because* he is virtuous (Cap.9: 232D4-5); exactly because the non-lover is *unable* to counsel the boy well and maintain a cool demeanor, the non-lover will be *able* to do so (Cap.11: 232B6-C5). By the end of the speech the non-lover will be *qualified* in every way the lover is *disqualified* by his love (Cap.13: 233E5-236B1).

1349 233E5-234B1.

1350 Cf. Stallb. *ad loc.* (p.32): *legimus potius aliquam* μελετήν *rhetoricam.*

The Second Speech

Socrates has advertised this speech as a restatement of everything Lysias put in that first speech, which, we discovered, was a series of clever verbal mousetraps. We shall proceed to read it step by step, allowing the discourse to reveal those steps to us, as we did with the Lysias's speech.

Preamble: 237A7-B6

Socrates begins with an invocation of the Muses, something we are likely to take for granted as a literary device, a mere *proemium* (indeed this what the prayers came to be called [e.g., *Phdo*.60D2; Thuc.3.104.4]) like the brief invocations asking the Muse for a poem that begin the Homeric epics. Indeed such a poet's prayer could become even more literary as a detachable piece unto itself in the genre of the "Homeric Hymn," where elements of the prayer form (particularly the elaboration of eponymns and the hypomnesis) are developed for their own sake whereas the prayer-proper devolves into nothing more than an announcement of the close, consisting more often than not of a perfunctory request for *another* song some other time or a promise to sing one. But, also in Homer, (and elsewhere) we already encountered the "authentic" prayer, of which his invocations of the Muse are an abbreviated species, prayers including the invocative naming of the god and an appropriate hypomnesis, followed by the prayer itself – like the one Chryses addresses *in extremis* to Apollo after Agamemnon callously rejects his request to return him his daughter, in the First Book of the *Iliad*. What we encounter in the present case, despite its modernity, is more like the latter than the former, since Socrates's prayer for the Muses' aid (ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε, 237A9), complete with its modified sort of hypomnesis,[1351] is sincere. In the sharpest of contrasts with Lysias's speech and Phaedrus's manner of studying it, he is improvising the speech as an amateur (ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων, 236D5) in the original sense of the term (for he is a φιλόλογος, 236E4). He not composing within his workroom a verbal instrument consisting of professional tricks by which to ambush an innocent young man into betraying his own best interests, but rather is braving a live performance because of his love of λόγοι and Phaedrus's threat to cut him off.

After the invocation he begins a "once upon a time story." He has turned Lysias's unannounced hypothesis of a lying lover into an explicit fiction; and only then does he let the Speaker begin. Thus Phaedrus, the audience, is listening to Socrates tell a story in which both are aware that a Speaker is being imitated at length, whereas in the case of Lysias's speech Lysias was acting as a sort of ventriloquist. In fact he was performing for his audience of students, as we see at the last moment when the jig is up and he disarmingly asks them if they have anything to add.[1352]

Socrates's fictional Speaker begins by telling his young friend how to avoid an error, so that he already repays him for listening to him. All good deliberation begins by knowing what it is we are talking about! Others fail to do this and in the end they pay the price of contradicting themselves as well as each other. We can avoid that error if, in our present problem of deciding whether to go to the lover or the non-lover we agree on a definition about what love is and what are its inherent powers, and then keep our eye on that definition and refer our remarks back to it in our decision as to

1351 Cf. n.255.
1352 Cf. n.204.

whether it confers benefit or harm.

The Speaker has effortlessly announced the genre and therefore set the scenario of his speech. It is a deliberative oration of the sort addressed to a group (this is implied by βουλή) that will vote in order to reach and agreement and act (this is the implication of the references to ὁμολογία). Immediately he reveals that the deliberative oration will have a structure and what that structure will be: to convene a definition of eros and then to infer whether it will have a beneficial or deleterious effect in a relationship.

Even the proposing of this methodology is handled in a methodical way. The first two words περὶ παντός recommend what he is about to say as universal, the second two (ὦ παῖ) address the boy as the audience he is taking the trouble to teach, and τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι states the purpose of the lesson – to do a good job of deliberation. We know that the things we deliberate about belong not to the present or the past but to the future, and we know that the criterion for choosing a path, the standard we use in conducting our deliberations, is the question of harm (which we will always avoid when we can) and benefit (which we will always seek). By referring to these two categories a few lines down (D2-3) he indicates that his methodological preamble is done and therefore that the argument itself can begin.

Before he gets there he has to articulate more clearly what was left unclear by the vague expression, περὶ οὗ (C1). To "know what the deliberation is about" in itself might mean knowing what the topic is or knowing what the nature of the topic is. He cannot say everything at once and at first the vagueness was acceptable because either way it would be nonsensical to skip the step, but his description of the error he accuses the others of making immediately begins to disambiguate the expression. The majority are ignorant of the "essence of each" (οὐσία ἑκάστου, C3). Whatever this expression means,[1353] it does not mean they do not know what the topic is for the day's deliberations (that would be the ἕκαστον), so already we know that περὶ οὗ means more than that. Moreover, as we next learn, this περὶ οὗ needs not only to be announced like the topic of the day but must be "agreed upon through some kind of negotiation or argument" (as διομολογοῦνται indicates, C3),[1354] or else the ensuing discussion will never "agree with" with itself nor will the group "agree with" each other.

These expressions clarify the ambiguity of περὶ οὗ – a definition of the essence of the day's topic must be hammered out – but introduce unexplained and implicit premisses of their own. While it is easy enough to see that the argument of the individual speakers might fail to be "internally consistent" (ὁμολογεῖν ἑαυτοῖς) if they do not articulate their underlying premises and derive what they say from them, the idea that the speakers will for the same reason not "agree with each other" (ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις) is unclear both as to its meaning and its grounds.[1355] The connectives οὔτε ... οὔτε (C5) portray the two "failures of consistency" (if we may be allowed this expression for the moment until we find out what ὁμολογοῦσιν at C5 means) as being logically on a par. Since the former clearly indicates that the speeches will not be internally consistent, there is the suggestion that the latter means the speakers will disagree with each other; but all that would ensue from their lack of agreement as to the nature of the subject under discussion is that they will be talking about different things. Surely the scenario our speaker has invoked, of a deliberative body deciding what policy to

1353 The use of ἕκαστον here (237C3), even more than the term οὐσία, verges on the language of the "theory of forms." It bespeaks the distinct character of any object of thought clearly seen, which by virtue of its invariant self-identity has to be recognized as οὐσία. Cf. 266A3, 277B5; *Rep*.533B2, 507B2, 476A6 and the comparative ἑκάτερον at *Rep*.476A2. For the surpisingly Socratic/Platonic philosophical language of looking back (ἀποβλέπειν) and tying the inferences (ἀναφέρειν) to the definition, cf. *Phdo*.75B,76D; *Rep*.484C. The dialogical language hardly suits this context!

1354 The prefix alludes to the steps that need to be taken to produce an agreement. The term primarily belongs to Socrates's vocabulary of dialectical conversation, which (again) hardly belongs here. Cf. *Euthyd*.282C3; *Phlb*.11D2, 20C8; *Rep*.507A7 (and my n. *ad loc.*), 527B3, 603A10 and D4; and ἀνομολογούμενοι at *Rep*.348B3.

1355 The reading ἀλλήλοις (C5) is not certain: cf. n.263.

adopt, envisions also a series of speeches in which different speakers present differing views and then the entire group reaches a consensus, for instance by voting. That these speakers' speeches shall or should agree with each other is contrary to the hypothesis (so that in that case ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις must mean that the speakers are not talking about the same thing, which is different from "disagreeing"), but since the scenario also envisions a vote being taken and an agreement among everybody who has something to say being reached, it might be the following that οὔτε ὁμολογοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς is asserting: that unless they agree on the nature of the topic under deliberation, whatever internal consistency or "self-agreement" their individual speeches might achieve will not produce an agreement among the speakers since there will be no argumentative consistency among the speeches. It goes without saying, however, that this scenario quite ignores what happens in real deliberative bodies, where the speakers are more interested in winning the majority than in unanimity amongst themselves.

In either case, the syntactical parallelism of the expression οὔτε ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις is deceptively simple because it is semantically unclear. Too much is being packed into the phrase, just as too much was packed into the phrase εἰδέναι περὶ οὗ,[1356] and perhaps for the same reason: that one cannot say everything at once, especially at the beginning. The ambiguity of περὶ οὗ was disambiguated only a moment after we noticed it, and the same thing happens with this problem of ὁμολογία. By the very next words the third-person deliberative group of the scenario is replaced by ἐγώ ... καὶ σύ, emphatically so since the pronouns are repeated (C5): "Let's not *you and I* suffer what we criticize in those others: for *you and me* the topic that lies before us is whether one should go to the lover or the non-lover, and so it is about love that we must determine what sort of thing it is and what its tendencies are," and "having agreed to posit this as our definition" (ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον, D1), to investigate what benefit or harm it holds in store "by looking off to that and referring all our deductions back to it" (εἰς τοῦτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες, D1-2). The problem is solved: here are the two ὁμολογίαι explicitly spelled out, if not in the preliminary general statement, at least in the specific instance before us: we will posit the definition by agreeing to it (ὁμολογίᾳ, D1, hearkening back to διομολογοῦνται, C3) and then construct an account that is inspired by it (ἀποβλέποντες) and inferred from it (ἀναφέροντες). These two participles specify how the definition is the basis for ἑαυτοῖς ὁμολογεῖν just as the participial phrase ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον specifies the basis for ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογεῖν.

The chiastic order by which ἑαυτοῖς is explained second and ἀλλήλοις first, exhibits the speaker's consciousness that his explanation of the present case includes an exegesis that his expression of the general error needed; and by placing all this methodological explanation into proleptic circumstantial participial phrases he saves a syntactical berth to make his close with a relatively otiose programmatic invocation: τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα εἴτε ὠφελίαν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει. Closure is achieved both by the periphrastic reference (εἴτε ὠφελία εἴτε βλάβη) back to deliberation (βουλεύεσθαι) with which the paragraph began since benefit and harm are its criteria, and by discharging the leading syntactical rank with a statement of the obvious (τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα).

The paragraph exhibits a style or method whose leading characteristic, as we have already seen, is the scrupulous management of our anticipation including an internal component (inside out) that draws us forward toward a needed explanation immediately supplied and an external component (outside in) that indicates the structure to come and announces the fact that it has been reached. This is skillful *dispositio* or διάθεσις.[1357]

1356 Not to mention the strained expression τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστου (C3).
1357 Cf. 236A4.

Section 1 – Definition: 237B7-238C4

In keeping with this inside-out and outside-in method of the Speaker, we may now designate what we have gotten so far as a preamble, and also may designate what we are about to be given as the first "chapter" or capital of the speech, a preliminary definition of eros, which will be followed by a second chapter, the strictly deliberative section deciding whether eros is beneficial or detrimental. The following structure is unfolding before our eyes:

Preamble: 237B7-D3
Section One of Two: Definition (237D3- ___)
Section Two of Two: Deliberation Proper (___ - ___)

Here is a paraphrase of the coming section, which we now conceive of as Section One of two:

> *Eros is a kind of desire, but even non-erotic persons desire beauties (as erotics do), and so how do we differentiate the erotic man from the non-erotic? In each of us there is a pair of "characteristics" that rule or drive us, and all of our behavior is the result of their influence. The one is an inborn desire for pleasures and the other is an acquired ability to judge that seeks what is best. These sometimes agree but sometimes they battle[1358] with each other, and when they do, sometimes the one and sometimes the other conquers. When it is opinion that conquers its mastery gets the eponym "moderation;" when it is desire that achieves rulership its regime is called "rashness." As to rashness, since it is many limbed and many parted, it takes on many names, receiving as its eponym whatever becomes its most salient kind, an eponym given also to the man who is so afflicted. If it is eating the eponym is gluttony; if drinking it is a name we need not repeat; finally, when the mindless desire that conquers the opinion that strives for the right itself is driven toward the pleasure of beauty and aroused even further by its cogener desires to the point that it is driven to the desire for the beauty of bodies and masters them as their arch leader, it gets its eponym from that very arousal and is called eros.(237B7-238C4)*

The "definition" begins with an assertion that (because of μέν, D3) reveals that another is to come before it even recommends itself as obvious (ἅπαντι δῆλον, D4); this second assertion (δ'αὖ, D4) lays claim to the same credential of self-evidence though in different terms (ἴσμεν). In logical terms, though the logical vocabulary is not used, he has identified the genus and because he has recognized that the *definiendum* is only a species of that genus he has now asked for the specific differentia.[1359] To take this step, in turn,[1360] will require a bit of insight that might not be obvious but will

1358 στασιάζετον (E1) rather than μάχεσθον indicates both that the tension takes place within a whole person and involves all of him so that it threatens the unity of the person, even though the concept of a whole person is only casually presumed, *grammatically* by the use of a dual and *semantically* by some unreflective sense of self-identity expressed in the pronoun, ἡμεῖς (as well as by the implication, latent in the metaphor ὁμονοεῖτον by which their agreement is described, that in addition to these two we have a νοῦς). The pronoun however implies that we are neither the sum nor an epiphenomenal result of the two forces, though below not only the force but the whole man will be named by the type of "hubris" within him that wins out.

1359 For all his methodicality, however, he has forced us to disambiguate the way he expressed the desire of the erotic from that of the non-erotic. The most direct way to construe his two "obvious" postulates (D3-5) is that eros is desire *for beautiful boys*: only under this interpretation does the fact that non-erotics also love "beauties" imply that we do not already know how to distinguish the erotic from the non-erotic.

1360 αὖ (D6) is the reading of all mss., "improved" by Schanz into an orthographically proximate δή, but αὖ illustrates the avowedly pedantic manner of this speaker and should be kept.

become so if we think about it (as νοῆσαι, D6, asserts, acknowledging a comparison with the two self-evident assertions). The progress of the argument is perfectly "logical," employing division "to the right;"[1361] and the division of desires into those for food, drink, and "beauty" relies or at least brings into play the conventional division of bodily pleasure into eating, drinking, and sex.[1362]

Agreeing – Contending

Opinion winning – Desire winning

Food – Drink – "Pleasure of Beauty"
(Gluttony) (Dipsomania) ("Eros")

All along, the sequence of the ideas, as well as the word order, syntax, diction and connectives employed direct and then fulfill our anticipation as to the meaning. The sequence of ideas flows easily because the divisions are to the right, and consistently so, and because he employs the conventional or "background" list of pleasures – food, drink, sex. The difference from Lysias's speech could not be greater. As to the grammar we have the dual to embody the rivalry of the two forces, and then an extensive use of parallelisms in word order, syntax and diction to compare the two. On the other hand exactly because these parallels are so salient our attention is drawn to certain imperfections in them. As we noticed in the preamble the aspect that makes sense brings into relief the aspect that is incompletely clear. The packaging is a little more orderly than the contents. We need to move through the words to feel the tension between what we expect and what we see.

The two elements that we all have in us are at first characterized by two dual participles in predicative position, ἄρχοντε and ἄγοντε, which almost rhyme and are linked with colorless καί (D7). The former suggests authority and the latter suggests physical force. Both are transitive but neither has an expressed object, though the unexpressed object of the first, would be human whereas that of the latter would more likely be animal. In lieu of direct objects we are given a relative clause where they appear as the *subject* of the verb (οἷν ἐπόμεθα), declaring not that they rule and force us but that we follow them wherever they lead. The total effect is to avoid introducing and insisting on some special theory of psychodynamics and keep things appealingly vague. His careful handling of our attention makes it easy for us to continue along rather than to stop and think.

The two "elements" are then described and named with two phrases linked by μέν and δέ, a completely natural way of spelling out the dual. The descriptions are

ἡ μὲν ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν
and
ἄλλη δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου

Since the notion of congenitality (ἔμφυτος) is new, ἔμφυτος cannot be attributive with ἡ but must be predicative with οὖσα, (ἡ pronominal with μέν): it is a *predicate* of the first "element" ('the one, which is inborn') and not its determinant attribute ('the inborn one'). The fact that the ἰδέα is congenital is presented first and only then is its identity given (by ἐπιθυμία) as well as the qualification of that identity with an objective genitive (ἡδονῶν). The three-part template -- predicate, identifying noun,

1361 By division to the right (ἐπὶ δεξίᾳ) I mean the kind of division that finds an attribute and its privation and places the privation on the left so as to proceed along the right slope. I use the term here not to associate this passage with the development of dialectic in other works of Plato or others (cf. n.967), but only because we need a term for the pattern that the divisions in the present passage are consistently following. Contrast the language Socrates adopts at 266A3-B1.

1362 For a list of passages employing this triad cf. my comment *ad Rep.*329A5-7.

qualifier of noun – is then repeated in the δέ-phrase with ἐπίκτητος, δόξα and ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου. The limbs have the grammatical parallel of the participle but the parallelism is deceptive since the semantics of the participles work differently in each. In the first the participle comes before the noun and is a copula asserting that the predicate ἔμφυτος is a predicate, but in the second the parallel "assertion" about the corresponding predicate ἐπίκτητος is already achieved by the grammatical and alliterative parallelism of the two adjectives, and the participle (ἐφιεμένη), comes *after* the noun, this time to establish the relationship between the identifying noun (δόξα) and its qualifying object (τοῦ ἀρίστου) which only happens to stand in the same case (i.e., the genitive) as its parallel object (ἡδονῶν). Once again there is a tension or inconcinnity between packaging and content.

Next we may note that the perfectly natural use of division to the right – i.e. subdivision of the second member which naturally imports the smooth order of a κλῖμαξ [1363]– might in repetition have become tediously sing-song but for the fact that the standard word order associated with μέν and δέ is varied: ἡ μέν is followed by ἄλλη δέ (rather than ἡ δέ) at D7-8, τότε μέν with ἔστι δὲ ὅτε at D9-E1, and τότε μέν with ἄλλοτε δέ at E1-2.[1364]

These divisions bring us to a division between the two outcomes – judgment overcoming desire and desire overcoming judgment – where the purpose is now to name these two outcomes, the "masteries" (κρατεῖ, E2) of the two forces, which are then given specific names, just as the two forces were given specific names above. Here are the two balanced clauses that give the masteries their names:

δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον λόγῳ ἀγούσης καὶ κρατούσης τῷ κράτει σωφροσύνη τὸ ὄνομα
and
ἐπιθυμίας δε ἀλόγως ἑλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη

The standard order of μέν and δέ returns (the terms being contrasted are both now placed before them), and the "achieving of conquest" by each is described in both limbs with καί plus a second, supplemental participle (κρατούσης and ἀρξάσης respectively), but only after the items are each more fully described by his bringing forward what has been said above and also by adding a new attribute. δόξα, first, is re-described as the element that leads toward the best (ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον ... ἀγούσης) but at the same moment there is the elaboration that it does so by means of reason (λόγῳ); and when its leading achieves mastery (this is done with καὶ κρατούσης, the participle pointing back to κρατεῖ), to its mastery belongs the name *temperance*. Second, ἐπιθυμία is first re-described, again partly with repetition (ἑλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονάς) and partly with a new elaboration (ἀλόγως, answering λόγῳ); and then, once its pulling (ἑλκούσης varies the ἀγούσης used of δόξα above) achieves rule in us (the eventuality again done with καί plus second participle, here the participle varied from present κρατούσης to inceptive aorist ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν), to its regime is applied the name *rashness* (ὕβρις). The new items in each clause – rationality and its absence – are positioned chiastically, first after and second before the respective goals. In both cases the verb used for the achieving of hegemony is then drawn forward by a noun (τῷ κράτει, τῇ ἀρχῇ) denoting the mastery that receives the new eponym.

We by now expect another division to the right – a subdivision of rashness rather than temperance – and the expectation is acknowledged with δή (A2). The ἐπι- in ἐπωνομάσθη (A2) had made explicit that the divisions we are making create a new item (or εἶδος) at each step, to which (ἐπί) a name or label can be attached. The fact that divisions lead to names is immediately taken up by

1363 I.e., "An A that is B and a B that is C and a C that is D."

1364 We will see enough instances of non-parallel terms before μέν and δέ (239B1-3, C7-D1; 240A5, A9-C1, D6-E1, E5) to warrant considering the usage a feature of this speaker's style.

the remark that rashness has many names *because* it has many kinds. The logic of the inference (γάρ) is suggested by pairing πολυώνυμον with two other adjectives in πολύ-, namely πολυμελές and πολυμερές.[1365] Like ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε above (D7) these virtually rhyming words are a pleonasm to avoid exactitude – in this case the logical niceties of differentia and species – though immediately the various forms or species of rashness are referred to as ἰδέαι (238A3).

This statement seems to threaten the smooth continuation of division to the right. Instead of dividing, he asserts that whichever polymorphous rashness comes to the fore will confer its special name on the man who is afflicted by it, as well as a paronymous name on the state he is in – a name hardly estimable to acquire (238A2-6).[1366] Rather than make a division he has made an assertion in the form of a litotes, that the names are not estimable ones. His next step must therefore be not to make a subdivision but to prove the assertion by revealing the derogatory names. He proceeds to prove (γάρ, A6) they are demeaning by giving us to believe he will go through the various rashnesses one by one: so much is implied by the μέν in περὶ μὲν γάρ ἐδωδήν. ἐδωδή already by itself suggests what the other cases will be, for it is the first part of the traditional tripartition of pleasures into food, drink, and sex. Perhaps then he is presenting a subdivision of rash desire after all! The litotes should have tipped us off: it was nothing but a conceit for continuing whereby to continue the technique of subdivision without becoming tedious.[1367]

So for the case of food he will announce what name a person gets who has become afflicted by a "rash" desire for it, and does so in a way that is similar to the two-step way he announced the names of the two masteries, above (237E2-238A2). He announces the name only after he re-describes the item in question, bringing forward what has been said before and perhaps adding a little more:

> περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ λόγου τε τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστριμαργία τε καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κεκλημένον παρέξεται.

The desire must not only "master" the δόξα in the factional battle within us (237E2-238A2, with κρατοῦσα referring directly and securely back through the variant ἀρξάσης [238A1] and through κρατούσης [237E3] to the original expression, κρατεῖ [E2]), but also must master "the other desires." This latter mastery had been expressed just above in different language ("become *conspicuous* among the kinds of desire" ~ τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκπρεπὴς ἢ ἂν τύχῃ γενομένη, A3-4). At this point, that notion is re-expressed in the same language of mastery that was used of the former, and the reformulation occurs without apology or warning, as if the two conquests were unproblematically similar. The reason the assumption is so easy to make is that the idea behind the passage, despite the conceits in the way it is being expressed, is nothing but another division to the right. We may commemorate discovering this by revising our diaeretic chart, but only slightly, with the addition of the word "winning" (κρατεῖν) to the three pleasures:

1365 πολυμελὲς ... και πολυμερές (238A3), the reading of Burnet, nicely juxtaposes an old epic term with the new language of diaeresis (πολυμερές or πολυειδές), as do all of the transmitted readings except that of T (πολυμελές ... καὶ πολυειδές B Stob. : πολυμερές ... καὶ πολυειδές T : πολυειδές ... καὶ πολυμελές V). Again the language is alive with "philosophical" conceptions (cf. nn.1353, 1354, 1356).

1366 τὸν ἔχοντα: cf. n.272. The expression is consistent with the fact that it is not the man who is mastered by the rashness, but the other desires; just as it was not the man who was mastered by desire or reason but reason and desire that were mastered; and yet he in some sense should not therefore deserve the name as much as the rashness he "has" deserves it. One might begin to wonder whether he has it or it has him, but this is exactly what the idiom of ἔχειν, "being afflicted by a disease," obscures.

1367 Compare this device, therefore, with his *variatio* in the use of μέν and δέ mentioned above *ad* 237D7-E2. He is very preoccupied by his packaging but wants to keep this from becoming obvious.

Agreeing -- Contending

Opinion winning -- Desire winning

Food Winning – Drink(?) Winning – Sex(?) Winning
(Gluttony) (Alcoholism?) (Eros?)

What had been expressed above as the δόξα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον λόγῳ ἄγουσα is now abbreviated to ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἀρίστου. Reason (and unreason), which had been the new items above (237E3, 238A1), now replace the original item (δόξα).[1368] The expression asserting the paronymy in naming the rashness and characterizing the man afflicted by it is restated without significant change (τὴν αὐτῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ὀνομαζόμενον τὸν ἔχοντα παρέχεται, A4-5 ~ τὸν ἔχοντα ταὐτον τοῦτο κεκλημένον παρέξεται, B1-2).

Next we have the second case, drink, introduced with a δέ clause parallel with περὶ μέν ... ἐδωδήν:

> περὶ δ'αὖ μέθας τυραννεύσασα τὸν κεκλημένον ταύτῃ ἄγουσα,
> δῆλον οὗ τεύξεται προσρήματος (238B2-3)

This entry for "drinking" is striking for its brachylogy. The other pleasures to be mastered are demoted to the status of unexpressed objects of the participle τυραννεύσασα[1369] while τὸν κεκλημένον ταύτῃ ἄγουσα is doing the work of τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἀρίστου κρατοῦσα, the dative ταύτῃ referring to the idea of dipsomania, the correlate to γαστρομαργία, which is suppressed in this sentence, as is the name of the dipsomaniac also, by an aposiopesis[1370] that exploits the excuse that it is obvious (δῆλον).

That the second item can be treated in a truncated manner suggests (or presumes) we have gotten the drift and might be ready to generalize, even though we have yet not reached the third item we have been anticipating – sex. Still, generalization is what we get, introduced by καί ... δή as if we knew it was coming, but then we get even more:

> καὶ τἆλλα δὴ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ ἀδελφῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀνόματα
> τῆς ἀεὶ δυναστευούσης ᾗ προσήκει καλεῖσθαι πρόδηλον. ἧς δ' ἕνεκα
> πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν εἴρηται σχεδὸν μὲν ἤδη φανερόν, λεχθὲν δὲ ἢ μὴ
> λεχθὲν πάντως σαφέστερον. (238B3-7)

The generalization comes before the third item not because the third item is going to be forgone and passed over, but in order to *postpone* its arrival.[1371] Even the fact that it is coming next becomes thematic, for this third item or rashness is now announced as being the purpose of all that has been said up to now – all, that is, from the start of the Definition at 237D3. The principle that

1368 λόγου ... τοῦ ἀρίστου (A7), though he reverts to calling this ἰδέα in us ἄνευ λόγου δόξα ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμῶσα, below (B8). On the imperspicuous wavering cf. n.270.

1369 Note again the inceptive aorist of a verb that, like ἀρξάσης (A1), refers to the office.

1370 He already told us the eponymns are nothing to be proud of (οὔτ' ἐπάξιον κεκτῆσθαι, 238A5-6). For aposiopesis in the mention of dipsomania cf. *Rep.*439C2 and my note *ad loc.*

1371 The prolepsis in ἧς (B5) is repeated with ἡ (B7) which gets its noun eleven words later. The generalizing sentences before are gratuitous: their function is to postpone and therefore magnify the climactic third kind of ἐπιθυμία, which we have already know will be τὰ ἀφροδίσια.

determines the name of the kinds of rash desire is restated in general terms: the cogeneric types (ἰδέαι, 238A3) of desire which had been referred to only as αἱ ἄλλαι (A7) are now called siblings (ἀδελφῶν, B4) and the formulation of one of them "becoming salient" (A4) is replaced with the metaphor that it becomes the head of a dynasty (δυναστευούσης, B5 – dynasty being monarchy by inheritance), which incidentally and quite gratuitously continues the metaphor of family. Then we are served up the idling truism that although we might already know what he will now say, it is better that he say it clearly than not at all (as if there had ever been a chance he wouldn't).[1372] After all this preamble we can expect the sentence with which he will now complete the section on Definition (for this is what he has just announced he is about to do) by telling us what name is given to the third desire that conquers judgment and becomes rash and wins out over its cogener pleasures of food and drink and any others – that this sentence will be a real doozie. Here it is:

> ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους καὶ ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν ἑαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα νικήσασα, ἀγωγῇ ἀπ'αὐτῆς τῆς ῥώμης ἐπωνυμίαν λαβοῦσα ἔρως ἐκλήθη.

His warmup has been so extensive he needs γάρ to announce that he is beginning to fulfill his own promise.[1373] As we have seen before he reaches back before he goes forward, now reincorporating the old language of δόξα but using completely new language also (ὀρθόν, ὁρμώσης). In this case the "front-loading" reaches a syntactical extreme, for he packs the entire matter of the conflict and resolution within us into the attributive position of the victorious desire (ἡ ... κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία, B7-8), and only then designates the nature of the third type of desire, as now a desire that is not just "about" something like the other two (περί: A6, B2) but is itself driven (ἀχθεῖσα) to its something. As to the something, the usual way to refer to it alongside ἐδωδή and μέθη (or σῖτα and ποτά), is τἀφροδίσια, but the expression for it here, despite all the climactic buildup, is a strikingly vague periphrasis: ἡδονὴ κάλλους (C1). The immediate context ensures he means sexual pleasure, so that at one stroke we have a solution as to what the phrase means here and a confirmation of what the expression at the beginning of the Definition meant, when he said that "even non-erotics desire beauties (τῶν καλῶν)." The adjective there was masculine, as we inferred, and referred to boys, just as it was and it did at 227C6. We may take it to be another instance of the discreet understatement of the erotic

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1372 For another such intervening generalization cf. 259D2-3 and n.833. One may also compare the two step transition Shakespeare inserts into the middle of *Sonnet 91* to introduce and also build up to his climax, which consists not only of a generalization (in two lines) but also an idling reprise of his main theme (I have placed these in italics).

> Some glory in their birth, some in their skill,
> Some in their wealth, some in their body's force,
> Some in their garments, though newfangled ill,
> Some in their hawks and hounds some in their horse:
> *And every humor hath his adjunct pleasure,*
> *Wherein it finds a joy above the rest;*
> *But these particulars are not my measure:*
> *All these I better in one general best.*
> Thy love is better than high birth to me,
> Richer than wealth, prouder than garments' cost,
> Of more delight than hawks or horses be;
> And having thee, of all men's pride I boast:
> Wretched in this alone, that thou mayst take
> All this away, and me most wretched make.

1373 This is "programmatic" γάρ, which Denniston classes among its "explanatory" uses (59).

vocabulary.[1374] The present passage extends that vocabulary by calling the sexual enjoyment of boys the ἡδονὴ κάλλους.

The periphrasis πρὸς ἡδονὴν κάλλους does the work of περὶ ἐδωδήν and περὶ μέθας, but the extra participle ἀχθεῖσα introduces an aspect of passivity into desire[1375] though it had hitherto been described only as active and dominant. The passive participle broaches the *process* that the specific desire undergoes, as we learn in the immediate sequel, by which it becomes salient, an event that had been referred to only externally above (ἐκπρεπής ... γενομένη, A4) and had not yet been explained, though he had begun to flesh things out when he introduced the metaphor of a family dynasty in the generalization of the principle (B3-5). Again, alongside the old he gives us something new. This passive element is now revealed to be a process by which this third desire becomes the leading desire not merely because its "cogener" desires (συγγενῶν, a term that nicely melds the family metaphor with the underlying logical idea of species and genus) recede but because they underpin it and support it from beneath so as to raise it up and strengthen it, in the manner of family solidarity. Though we may presume this process is the same for all three special desires becoming rash, the process is particularly relevant to the third kind, he tells us, since it happens that it is from this very process of strengthening it undergoes (ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα, C2) that this third desire, the desire for the pleasure of beauty, gets its eponym or proper name, "eros."[1376]

In lieu of giving us a definition he has given us an etymology![1377]

Section 2 - Deliberation Proper: 238D8-241D1

After a brief interlude[1378] Socrates resumes. We may note that there is no part of the man left out of the process once he has fallen in love. The rational orientation as well as all the other irrational drives have been dominated or called into the service of eros. With this Definition of "what we are

1374 Cf. 227C5; 231A6, B1, C7; 234B4, C1, and nn. *ad locc.*

1375 In contrast with ὁρμᾶν, which had here been used, for the first time, of judgment's active and voluntary impulse, ἀχθεῖσα also introduces a note of external compulsion (passive) rather than choice. The question broached but ignored by the pair ἄρχειν / ἄγειν at the very beginning almost comes back to the surface but the speaker shows no awareness of it.

1376 αὐτῆς (C3), by stressing that the sheer intervention of the co-specific desires gives this third desire its name, actually draws attention to the fact that the intervention has the effect of *masking* what this desire is truly a desire for (contrast γαστριμαργία and revisit in your mind whether the omission of a specific term in the case of drink was an aposiopesis after all!) and thereby implies that its eponym is a *misnomer*. The etymological climax is a triumph of style over substance. We are left in the dark not only about the logical relation between κάλλος *per se* (C1) and σωμάτων κάλλος (C2), which we were left to guess were identical (cf. n.281, *supra*), but also as to whether the non-erotic desirer of beauties (237D3-5), from whom to distinguish the erotic desirer was the purpose of this entire passage (237D5), is non-erotic because his desire for "beauty" (of bodies) does not reach the stage of rashness, or because a desire for "beauty" (*per se*) in him does not, by becoming rash, become a desire for "beauty of bodies." The latter might very well be what the speaker has in mind, but if so his efforts have only raised the question whether there does exist a non-somatic ἐπιθυμία κάλλους that can stand alongside the ἐπιθυμίαι ἐδωδῆς καὶ μέθων. Indeed it is as if the speaker fails to distinguish, or feels no reason or need to distinguish, beauty *per se* and beauty embodied.

1377 The fact that the Socrates's Speaker does not make good on his own method did not deter later authors from quoting the passage here as if it were a thesis of Plato's (e.g., *Anon.Proleg.*21.3-5 [Westerink]; Albin.*Isag.*§1; Simpl.*Phys.*75.4; Philop.*De An.* 33,21, 43.8; David *Prol.*9.21 Elias *Isag.*41.4, *Categ.*127.7). Conversely, Dionysius of Helicarnassus recognized through all its "empty wordiness" (κόμπον ὀνομάτων πολὺν νοῦν δὲ ὀλίγον ἔχοντες) the passage only shows how the word ἔρως came to be associated with "passion" (*Demosth.*7).

1378 The interlude does intimate that Socrates's definition was over the top (cf. nn.284, 286, 287). Except for the diffident remarks at 263D1-6 and 265D6 Plato has left it up to us to realize the definition is illogical and a mere etymology

deliberating about" we can now move on to the Deliberation proper and investigate what harm or benefit comes to the beloved from gratifying the lover or the non-lover. Before summarizing the next part we can update our previous outline by filling in a couple of gaps:

Preamble: 237B7-D3
Section One of two: Definition (237D3-238C4)
Section Two of two: Deliberation Proper (238D8-??)

Here is a summary of this entire section:

> *What benefit or harm is a person likely to receive if he gratifies a lover and if he gratifies a non-lover? Given that an erotic lover is a slave to pleasure he will be compelled to do whatever he can to make his beloved as pleasurable to himself as possible. Since he is sick with love, like all sick persons only those things that do not oppose him will be pleasurable whereas anything that is stronger or equal to himself will be inimical. Thus he will attempt to weaken his beloved, so as for instance to make him ignorant instead of wise and afraid instead of brave, and so forth in other mental measures, or else his immediate pleasure will be endangered. Many benefits will he deny him therefore, not least the one that most could make him a sound-minded man, namely associations with divine philosophy. His physical condition also he will manage to maximize his own pleasure rather then maximize benefit to the boy, keeping him soft and indoors and a lot else: in short he will make him physically the first person his enemies would love to see enlisted in the army and his allies including the lover himself would not dare to put there. As to what he owns, he will wish him bereft of family who only obstruct his approaches, while any wealth he had could only make him harder to control. Besides these goods there is also pleasure to consider, for what it is worth, but there is only displeasure in consorting with an older man and in being the object of his compulsive desire to see his beloved and hear him and touch him and be with him. Finally, when his erotic desire abates the old man will turn into a different man both unwilling and even unable to make good on the promises by which he had held him. The tables are turned: he who pursued is on the run and he who was pursued is chasing him down to make good on his promises. The lover loves the beloved the way a wolf loves sheep. (238D8-241D1)*

Since deliberation chooses the beneficial and eschews the harmful, and the beneficial is the good, what we are ultimately deliberating about is the good. Of goods there is a background list of three types – psychic, somatic, and external – and it is with these three headings that the Deliberation will occupy itself. A "structure of anticipation" has been set up, which will set into relief any unanticipated deviations or modifications, as will the re-use of old ideas with new terminology[1379] or the old terminology used for ideas that are new.

The principle of the treatment will be the Definition of eros, as the Preamble advocated, and here that Definition provides the foundation in the form of a characterization of the erotic lover (rather than eros) as ὁ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχόμενος δουλεύων τε ἡδονῇ (238E2-4), a chiastic hendiadys whose content is derived from the closing sentence of the Definition, according to which the desire for beauty has conquered reason and absorbed into itself the strength of all the other irrational desires (above, B7-C4). Everything in the man has therefore been conquered so that he is ruled by this desire (ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ, E3) as if by a tyrant (B2) or a dynast (B5) as we have already heard, which is tantamount to saying something that we have not yet heard, that he is *enslaved* to the

1379 Such as for instance his use of διάνοια where we might expect ψυχή (239A5).

pleasure it affords (δουλεύοντι ... ἡδονῇ, E3). That his eros is a sort of sickness or affliction was suggested by the use of ἔχω in the Definition (238A5, B1) and that notion, too, is now brought to the surface. A sick man finds anything that opposes him hateful and whatever gives in to him pleasurable. Thus, the erotic will not willingly abide the beloved to be stronger or equal to himself but will work to make him weaker and more needy (238E4-239A2). As to the weaknesses he will promote, the speaker without warning embarks on a list: ignorance vs. wisdom, fear vs. bravery, incompetence at public speaking vs. oratorical skill, slow wits instead of quick wits. The general idea embodied by the list is not immediately recognizable – this is not a "background list"[1380] – and while we are wondering what might be governing the order and selection of the items he moves on to generalize (as we gather from the expression τοσούτων ... καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων) by saying that for all these "evils in respect to one's mental attitude" the lover will be compelled to take pleasure on the one hand over those that arise in him or are there by nature, but on the other hand to foster the rest at the risk of being deprived of his pleasure. With κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν the speaker has announced the category that governed the list, but by opening with the genitive τοσούτων he has left us waiting to find the governing construction. Before we find it, we reach ἀνάγκη (A5) which already suggests an infinitival predicate (the idea of enslaved compulsion being brought forward from 238E2-3 above), and then we reach γιγνομένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐνόντων which further extenuate the opening genitive with a pair of circumstantial participles that constitute something of an exhaustive polar doublet (for things either arise or else they were inborn – something like environment and heredity). Next we encounter what we might have least expected: μέν (A6) followed by only one word (ἥδεσθαι), and as soon as we learn we are in a μέν / δέ construction the δέ clause begins with τὰ δέ, and ends with παρασκεύαζειν, an infinitive parallel syntactically with ἥδεσθαι here and semantically with παρασκεύαζειν at 238E4, above. ἥδεσθαι closes the construction introduced by ἀνάγκη with the infinitive we were expecting and we are left to look backwards for a construction for the genitive, unable to wait any longer. We can only view the entire genitive phrase as a genitive absolute; but at the very next moment we are asked to imagine other evils having to do with mental states besides these, which the lover will "prepare." Because of the concessive force of μέν,[1381] the notion that the lover will necessarily take pleasure in the evils that are already there by dint of heredity or environment is cast into the background at the same moment that it is expressed: all this was mere preamble to the δέ clause, according to which the lover will be compelled to render the beloved mentally weak in any way that he is not already so. But this is exactly what the speaker already told us at the beginning of this paragraph, as the ἀνάγκη construction reminded us along the way – that because the lover is a slave to pleasure he will be compelled to make his beloved as pleasurable to himself as possible (ἀνάγκη ... παρασκευάζειν, E2-4) – and he now reminds us of that principle governing the lover's behavior, by adding "or else be deprived of his immediate pleasure" (A6).

We have not seen a construction as telescoped as this in the speech so far. We needed a generalization in order to get the drift of the set of examples of weakness, but at the same moment that he discharges that needful task he has embarked onto a larger assertion, that of such mental weaknesses as these the lover will add any that nature and nurture have not already inflicted on the beloved. The task of generalization already contained the seed of this elaboration by beginning with a

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1380 The list of psychic goods is usually identical to the list of four virtues: wisdom, bravery temperance and justice. The present list appears to start with the first two but then we fall off the track with the quite alien and unexpectedly specific virtue of oratory and the ability to think on one's feet. Again, enough is suggested at the start to enable us to notice what is missing.

1381 To say μέν is concessive, as we often do, might only be to say that it downplays the independent value or importance of the clause it introduces, since it announces before the clause has even been presented that there will be a second clause

genitive. That is, τοσούτων κακῶν καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν revealed itself to be a generalization semantically but not syntactically. It was the pleonasm κακῶν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν that enabled the speaker to do both at once – to introduce a genitive (κακῶν) that pointed forward at the same time that he provided a generalizing criterion (διάνοια) that looked backward.

One of the results of this passage is that he can now speak of the lover's pleasure as παραυτίκα (A7) for he can contrast his enjoyment with the more or less permanent damage he will inflict on the mind of the beloved. The transience of the lover's pleasure was not explicitly mentioned in the Principle above (E2-4), which ἢ στερεῖσθαι brings forward as corroboration. As usual, restatement enables or occasions elaboration.

He now continues (A7ff) with the compulsion that drives the erotic. Begrudging therefore he will be compelled to be. The δή is inferential in its special way as giving the obvious substance or concretization of the idea that came before. Now he breaks into another μέν / δέ construction, but this time, in the more usual way, he announces it at the beginning:

> φθονερὸν δὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν ἀπείργοντα καὶ ὠφελίμων ὅθεν ἂν μάλιστα ἀνὴρ γίγνοιτο μεγάλης αἴτιον εἶναι βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη· τουτο δὲ ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὂν ἧς ἐραστὴν παιδικὰ ἀνάγκη πόρρωθεν εἴργειν, περίφοβον ὄντα τοῦ καταφρονηθῆναι. (239A7-B6)

The construction is another surprise from a speaker who so far has been leading us by the hand and requiring us to do only a minimum of work. With the last sentence he has made us hold our breath a little longer than before, but the following sentence will be even worse. He begins with an easy step, as δή suggests – in particular a continuation of the ἀνάγκη construction. We then get καί which has only φθονερόν (εἶναι) that it can add anything to, but before we get a parallel accusative we get πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν. πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων already announces that the μέν clause will be foil for a δέ clause; in addition the phrase introduces, syntactically, another proleptic genitive we will need to construe and, semantically, the noun συνουσία, which constitutes an announcement of the general subject of this sentence, as well as because plural suggesting that the δέ clause will single out one certain association. ἀπείργοντα then provides syntactical governance for the genitive but importantly does not provide an accusative we can pair up with φθονερόν since it is a circumstantial participle and not a predicate adjective.[1382] "Yes," (we so far understand) "his compulsion will require him to begrudge the beloved and, by denying him many associations but in particular … ." The δέ clause will of course tell us which association the speaker wishes to focus on, but before he gets there he elaborates on the notion of associations by adding another καί that adds something not to the ἀπείργοντα that it immediately follows but to συνουσιῶν which came before it, since it introduces a genitive (ὠφελιμῶν) instead of an accusative. By now characterizing the "many other" associations as ὠφελιμαί he asserts and secures their relevance to the task of deliberation, but before continuing to the association he wants to focus on, let alone giving us something to pair up with φθονερόν, he inserts still more. The usefulness of associations is that they maximize a youth's chances of growing into a man.[1383] μάλιστα, that is, justifies his decision to focus on συνουσίαι in general, so that the δέ clause we are waiting for will introduce a topic doubly important for deliberation, a most important association among associations which as a group are already the most important prerequisite to maturation. This additional fact is added by a relative clause introduced not by a relative pronoun (e.g.,

1382 It is not impossible but only unlikely that it is a predicate. Anarthrous participles can be used as predicates (as for instance κυλινδουμένην, 257A2), not to mention the periphrastic constructions with copula (Smyth §§1961-5).

1383 μάλιστα (B2) is modifying the modality of the potential optative: cf. 230B5, 231A5.

ἐξ ὧν) but a relative adverb (ὅθεν). Because an even more important instance of συνουσία is being postponed for the δέ clause, it is justified that the expression for the outcome at risk – "becoming a man" – should be attenuated as it is, since this leaves room for a climax, even though the climax we are waiting for had to do with the identity of some certain συνουσία.

We next get not the δέ clause but the words, μεγάλης αἴτιον εἶναι βλάβης. After so many intervening words and constructions, it will take us a moment to recognize we have finally been given what the proclitic καί (*primum*) at B1 promised – something to pair up with φθονερόν (ἀνάγκη) εἶναι. The hyperbaton of this complement is extreme. ἀπείργοντα now falls into place as a circumstantial participle that is the cause of this "being to blame." Our evolving paraphrase becomes, "Yes, his compulsion will require him to begrudge the beloved and, because he will deny him many associations which are the things most likely to make him a man, he will be compelled to cause him great harm … ." The "great harm" settles the matter of deliberation raised by ὠφελιμῶν since βλάβη is, conversely, what deliberation eschews. Indeed the very thing we would encourage the young man to pursue as useful his lover will prevent, causing him therefore a harm to which we should dissuade him to expose himself.

It is only now that we get the δέ clause (μεγίστης δέ, B3), but if we had gotten it any earlier we would not have understood it since the emphatic first position, before δέ, is given not to the climactic συνουσία we have been waiting for the speaker to single out, as the placement of πολλῶν (sc. συνουσιῶν) before μέν had promised (B1), but to μεγίστης, the superlative of the very proximate μεγάλης (B2), with which it also shares gender, number and case. It appears that the contrast will not be between other associations and a single one after all, but between his causing great harm and his causing the greatest harm. The way he will cause this greatest harm will be by denying (causal circumstantial ἀπείργοντα needs to be understood between μεγίστης δέ and τῆς) the beloved the one association (συνουσία must be understood with τῆς[1384]) that has the maximal potential of making him not just a man but an *intelligent* man. The superlative φρονιμώτατος corresponds with the superlative μάλιστα: its grammar as a superlative borrows the adverbiality of μάλιστα from the parallel ὅθεν clause despite its syntax as an adjective, and its semantic content, in the positive degree, is all that is being attributed to the boy that has become a man (ἀνήρ is implicitly brought forward). Our paraphrase has now evolved further, "Yes, his compulsion will require him to begrudge the beloved and, because he will deny him many associations which are the very things most likely to make him a man, he will be compelled to cause him great harm; but of the greatest harm he will (also) be the cause since he will deny him the one association most likely to make him an *intelligent* one." It is only now that we are given what we had expected to get before the δέ, namely, the singled-out association; and now we get it as the answer to a question the speaker has inserted before telling us, so that we can crave to hear it even more: What after all *is* the association most likely to make a man *intelligent*?

The question makes the answer a foregone conclusion, for clearly it will be something like philosophical associations that will make a man intelligent. But another question is being begged: why would preventing him from being intelligent constitute the greatest harm the lover could do? Implicitly our speaker believes that the greatest good[1385] – the ὠφελιμώτατον – is mindfulness (not only among the various mental virtues he has listed but also as opposed to other worthwhile things like health or wealth); and it is this belief that is responsible for his use of the adjective θεία, which is here striking

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1384 As the antecedent to the article (*qua* demonstrative by the old usage) itself functioning as the antecedent to a relative clause: the compression is extreme.

1385 τυγχάνει ὄν (B4) is a sort of indignant litotes, asserting that mindfulness and philosophy are the greatest things whether the lover knows it or not. Again a "philosophical" prejudice and ability seems to be operating behind the scenes.

because it is being used only as an index of praise, albeit the highest index.[1386]

Having at last completed his point he can now coast back through the sentence to remind us of its frame: this association the lover is compelled (ἀνάγκη) to deny (πόρρωθεν εἴργειν caps ἀπείργειν used at B1) his beloved, out of an overpowering fear of being looked down upon by a person intelligent enough to understand the behavior to which he is enslaved (B4-5). The prefix περι- in περίφοβον, alongside ἀνάγκη, repeats the theme of his being overmastered; and the etymon of καταφρονηθῆναι reveals the connection between the boy's becoming intelligent (φρόνιμος) and the feelings such dreaded intelligence would enable him to develop about the lover.

We can catch our breath to notice that the overall structure of the deliberative investigation has been broached: the Speaker has isolated one of the traditional categories of good and run through its spectrum, and so we can add something to the outline that is emerging in the course of our hearing the speech:

Preamble: 237B7-D3
- Section One of two: Definition (237D3-238C4)
- Section Two of two: Deliberation Proper (238D8-??)
  - Dianoetic Goods (239A1-??)

2. 1 "Dianoetic" Goods

As soon as we discover our Speaker has "defined" the spectrum of goods κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν by claiming which of these is the highest, we realize that he has completed the task of deliberation about them by determining that in respect to this highest of dianoetic goods the lover will attempt to deny it to the beloved. This climactic case was introduced by a sentence made strikingly complex by the shifting of the focus of the construction from "many other" συνουσίαι, to great blame, and then to greatest blame, and then back to the one συνουσία. A movement of two forward waves promised by the μέν / δέ construction with which the sentence began was replaced along the way, because of the shift of focus onto blameworthy harm, resulting in a sort of chiastic "ebb and flow" of ideas (συνουσίαι ἄλλαι / μεγάλη βλάβη // μεγίστη βλάβη / φιλοσοφία).

After such a display we can expect him to close, and he does so with a summary restatement:

> τά τε ἄλλα μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἂν ᾖ πάντα ἀγνοῶν καὶ πάντα ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἐραστήν, οἷος ὢν τῷ μὲν ἥδιστος, ἑαυτῷ δὲ βλαβερώτατος ἂν εἴη. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐπίτροπός τε καὶ κοινωνὸς οὐδαμῇ λυσιτελὴς ἀνὴρ ἔχων ἔρωτα. (239B6-C2)

The closure of the previous sentence prepares us for a dismissive generalization and τά τε ἄλλα announces and begins it. μηχανᾶσθαι gives negative specification to the notion of κατασκευάζειν, with which the passage opened, so as to emphasize the lover's underhandedness that we have now witnessed. πάντα ἀγνοῶν generalizes the effect of his campaign to weaken all mental strengths in the beloved; the anaphora of πάντα indicates that ἀποβλέπων is a result of πάντα ἀγνοῶν; τῷ μὲν ἥδιστος repeats the original motive ὡς ἥδιστον ἑαυτῷ (E4) but adds, as the δέ

1386 Once again a Socratic sort of sentiment is being expressed by our hooded speaker, indeed three sentiments: (1) that φιλοσοφία is a συνουσία (packed into a metonymy), which suggests *dialogue* as the philosophical activity (as did his definition of proper deliberation: cf. n.1354); (2) this notion that φρόνησις, rather than oratorical skill and the ability to think on one's feet, "is virtue" (cf. n.1380); and (3) even the notion that philosophy is "divine" (whether in the compact formulation of the Delphic ὑπηρεσία he mentions at his trial or the flighty myths and theories he is made to express in the *Dialogues*). In any event the term θεία is a reach and exceeds the scale of the context.

clause, ἑαυτῷ δὲ βλαβερώτατος, which describes the actual outcome for the beloved, which after all is the proper object for deliberation, and concludes that it is unacceptable. The μέν / δέ construction repeats the irony that the lover will do the greatest harm to the beloved in the area where the beloved could most benefit (B1-4), by asserting its contrapositive, that the lover will act to maximize his own benefit in a way that will most harm the beloved. As for the lover the closing characterization of him not as ἐραστής but as an ἀνὴρ ἔχων ἔρωτα brings forward again the crucial ingredient that has driven this account, the fact that his enslavement to pleasure is a sickness.

With τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ διάνοιαν he dismisses, by repeating its name, the category of goods that came into focus on the way,[1387] and because of μέν we begin to presume he will move on to other categories, and even that these others will be the complements of the first of three types of good (i.e. the psychic goods), and that the Deliberation will go through them one by one. Meanwhile, to characterize the lover as an ἐπίτροπός τε καὶ κοινωνός – a person to rely on in addition to being a companion – is new. It was broached by the lover contriving that the beloved come to need his support (ἀποβλέπων) but immediately becomes a ground for declaring his companionship utterly unprofitable – i.e., in no way choice-worthy for purposes of their Deliberation.

At the same time that the οὖν added to μέν makes the μέν clause dismissive, the μέν itself indicates a coming δέ, which we already know will introduce the next topic or area of goods in which benefit and harm will be deliberated over, and we already suspect it will be τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα and so we can add more to the outline that is emerging:

Preamble: 237B7-D3
- Section One of Two: Definition (237D3-238C4)
- Section Two of Two: Deliberation Proper (238D8-??)
  - Deliberation as to "dianoetic" goods (239A2-C2)
  - Deliberation as to somatic goods (239C3-??)
  - Deliberation as to external goods (??-??)

2.2 Somatic Goods

The treatment of somatic goods can be summarized as follows:

> *The lover's compulsion to pursue his own pleasure will require him to pursue a soft and sheltered boy who needs make-up to look good and a lot of other things unworthy of mention. In short he would be the sort our enemy would hope to see and we – even the lover – would fear to see, in our army on the battlefield.(239C2-D7)*

The opening is as follows:

> τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν τε καὶ θεραπείαν οἵαν τε καὶ ὡς θεραπεύσει οὗ ἂν γένηται κύριος, ὃς ἡδὺ πρὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἠνάγκασται διώκειν, δεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν.

The sentence is essentially programmatic. That we already guessed what it will announce is an index of the speech's careful management of our attention and anticipation. Characteristic also is that the expression stresses what we already know at the same time that it adds new accents. In place of τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα (the anticipated parallel for κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν) we have the slightly pleonastic but

1387 Dropping the definite article (κατὰ διάνοιαν, B8-9: cf. κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, A5) is natural in back-reference.

entirely relevant expression, ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἕξις τε καὶ θεραπεία, which expands on the point made at the very end of the last section, that in our deliberations we will be evaluating the lover for his worth as ἐπίτροπός τε καὶ κοινωνός. What kind of "therapy" will he be likely to render so as to enhance the strength and health and beauty[1388] of the beloved, given the fact that according to the principle enunciated at the beginning of our Deliberation the lover will by definition be compelled to pursue his own pleasure before conferring any beneficial good onto the beloved? That the principle is secure is stressed by the perfect ἠνάγκασται, but the notion of his "pursuing" (διώκειν) is new. Finally, the programmatic formula δεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν shows how well, and how deliberately, the speech is controlling us and itself.

In order to answer the question the Speaker immediately puts the lover before our eyes, chasing[1389] a boy that is "a soft sort of person and not solid" (μαλθακόν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεόν). This brief and redundant opening figure is then elaborated as follows:[1390]

> οὐδ' ἐν ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ τεθραμμένον ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ συμμιγεῖ σκιᾷ, πόνων μὲν ἀνδρείων καὶ ἱδρώτων ξηρῶν ἄπειρον, ἔμπειρον δε ἁπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διαίτης, ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χήτει οἰκείων κοσμούμενον ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται πάντα ἐπιτηδεύοντα ...

The figure is repeated (now as a denial of sunlight and an assertion of shade) so as to explain why he is soft instead of solid, but the figure is greatly varied by an elaboration and specification vivid and metaphorical and chiastic, which contrasts the chastening purity (καθαρός) of sunlight with the variegated indeterminacy (συμμιγής) of shade in the environment of which[1391] the young man has been nourished (τεθραμμένος), as if in hiding. Although we are now dealing with the somatic weaknesses the lover will be looking for we can understand from the treatment of the dianoetic ones why the young boy we see him pursuing had there been raised in hiding, held away from associations.

We next are served up another early genitive (πόνων) that is proleptic since there is as yet nothing with which to construe it. It is made even more proleptic by μέν, which indicates there will be a δέ clause even further along. Though the syntax of πόνων is unknowable its semantics already connect it with the purity of sunlight, and given the μέν which is virtually enclitic the immediate impression is that the redundant pairing of positive and negative will now be replaced with a more formal pairing of the same contrasting ideas – strength and health versus softness and sickliness – by phrases or clauses in μέν and δέ with πόνων on the side of strength. The sequel confirms this suspicion with an elaboration of the one limb – πόνων μὲν ἀνδρείων καὶ ἱδρώτων ξηρῶν – that is even more elaborate (two nouns and two adjectives forming an hendiadys consisting of abstract and concrete) and more vivid and metaphorical (given the oxymoron "thirsty sweatings"), and then the μέν clause is completed by ἄπειρον which reveals the syntax of the extended genitive the clause consisted of, and at the same time associates the entire phrase with τεθραμμένον and the accusatives before it that describe the boy we see the lover pursuing. The δέ clause now ensues and we have, once again, the abandonment of the original plan of the μέν and δέ clauses under the force of the intervening construction.[1392] Rather than the anticipated genitive with δέ corresponding to πόνων with μέν we

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1388 These are the three major goods of the body that lie in the background and therefore structure our anticipation: cf. *Rep*.329A5-7 and my n. *ad loc.* The doublet ἕξιν τε καὶ θεραπείαν stresses that the state of the body is variable according to the attention given to it.

1389 Repetition of διώκειν as desiderative *petere* (C5) with διώκων as literal (indeed, visible) *persequi* (C6) is bathos at the expense of the lover.

1390 μαλθακόν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεόν (C6) with τινὰ creating a berth for further specification or exactness.

1391 For ὑπό with the dative cf. *Rep*.558D4C1 and my n. *ad loc.*

1392 Compare πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν ... αἴτιον μεγάλης βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ (sc. αἴτιον) τῆς (sc. συνουσίας),

have ἔμπειρον δέ, the negation of the final term of the μέν clause, now *followed* by the genitive. A structure or a motion of two parallel waves once again gives way to a single wave in chiastic ebb and flow. Corresponding to ὑπὸ συμμιγεῖ σκίᾳ we get the elaboration ἀπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διαίτης, two adjectives and a single noun (as if a sort of catalectic truncation), the adjectives corresponding to the two items in the μέν clause in chiastic order (ἀπαλῆς ~ ἱδρώτων ξηρῶν // ἀνάνδρου ~ πόνων ἀνδρείων). The closing noun (διαίτης) is entirely general so as to enable it to govern all the terms being compared.

But we are not finished: the Speaker has more wind in him than we thought, for he now continues with some kind of an explanation starting with a dative (ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι). The catalectic foreshortening of the δέ clause, like the indeterminate brevity of the phrase μαλθακόν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεόν, leaves an empty beat that itself provides him a berth for another elaborate participial phrase that ignores all the balance that he has achieved at this point simply because more needs to be said: ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χήτει οἰκείων κοσμούμενον. Because he is nourished in darkness and subjected only to a soft regime of exercise he lacks natural beauty and needs to be dolled up with cosmetics.[1393] The etymological figure as well as the syntax of the dative both being achieved by the single participle κοσμούμενον marks a sort of completion and the Speaker begins to dismiss the matter with a generalization (ὅσα τε ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.) introduced, as before, with mere τε.[1394] In lieu of articulating a general term for these aspects of the beloved's faulty regimen he characterizes them as unworthy of a complete description, even though he himself just went further than need be, and desiderates instead to move on to the next topic after summing them up with a "definitive" dismissal:

> ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται πάντα ἐπιτηδεύοντα ἃ δῆλα καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον περαιτέρω προβαίνειν ἀλλὰ ἓν κεφάλαιον ὁρισαμένους ἐπ' ἄλλο ἰέναι.

Instead of continuing with a list and instead of characterizing the examples with a general formula he refers to them as a group (ὅσα ... ἕπεται) and will sum them up with a remark (ἓν κεφάλαιον ὁρισαμένους).[1395] His programmatic scrupulousness almost gets in its own way by begging the question as to whether the κεφάλαιον is a generalization or what.[1396] The point is, he has a bit of a surprise in mind, which he introduces with programmatic γάρ (D4), namely that he will sum everything up with a dismissive epigram – that the bodily strength of the beloved will make him the sort of man enemies would choose to see and his fellow citizens, including the lover himself, would choose not to see on the battlefield (D4-7).

2.3 External Goods

Of course we are finished deliberating about the "bodily" outcome the lover's interest is likely to produce. That we shall be moving on was already announced in the course of the speaker's dubitations about moving beyond talking about the body (ἐπ' ἄλλο ἰέναι, D4). What remains to deliberate about is the effect that gratifying an erotic will have on the beloved's *external* goods. We will

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239B1-3.

1393 With this phrase we could insist we have now encountered all three conventional somatic goods – health, strength, and beauty – but there is no need to.

1394 Cf. τά τε ἄλλα, 239B6 above.

1395 ὁρισαμένους (D4). The accusative plural reminds us that the Speaker uses a plural to represent himself and his Auditor, the boy he is helping to make the right choice (cf. ἡμῖν, 239E1 below).

1396 Compare the waffling uses of generalization to delay the appearance of eros above (238B3-7), and of the boy's experiences below (240D7-E2).

follow our method of updating the outline before summarizing the section:

Preamble: 237B7-D3
Section One of Two: Definition (237D3-238C4)
Section Two of Two: Deliberation Proper (238D8-??)
Deliberation as to "dianoetic" goods (239A2-C2)
Deliberation as to "somatic" goods (239C3-D7)
Deliberation as to "external" goods (239D8-??)

Summary of the Deliberation on External Goods:

The lover would sooner have his beloved be an orphan bereft of friends; and wealth will only make him harder to catch and keep.(239D8-240A8)

The section begins with another over-muscularly programmatic remark that repeats the language of the foregoing argument:

> τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὡς δῆλον ἐατέον, τὸ δ'ἐφεξῆς ῥητέον, τίνα ἡμῖν ὠφελίαν ἢ τίνα βλάβην περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν ἡ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ὁμιλία τε καὶ ἐπιτροπεία παρέξεται. (239D8-E1)

Almost every word is predetermined. μὲν οὖν dismisses; δῆλον repeats δῆλα from above and ἐατέον restates the rejection (οὐκ ἄξιον) to continue with unseemly details. That he can refer to what he is about to do as τὸ ἐφεξῆς evinces his reliance on our anticipating the third category of goods,[1397] which he now characterizes as ἡ κτῆσις. τίνα ὠφελίαν ... παρέξεται brings forward the original language he used to describe the goal of the Deliberation from 238E1-2,[1398] and ὁμιλία τε καὶ ἐπιτροπεία brings forward the hendiadys ἐπίτροπός τε καὶ κοινωνός from 239C1.

Now that he has slowed things down with predictability he can speed things up with a surprise. The first time he had set out his topic (mental goods) he followed by flatly asserting that the erotic would be compelled to begrudge the beloved (φθονερόν, 239A7); the second time (somatic goods) he followed his setting out by telling us what we would see the lover doing (ὀφθήσεται δέ, 239C5); this time (in connection with external goods) he follows by telling us what is obvious to all (σαφές δὴ τοῦτό γε παντὶ μέν, 239E2-3), but especially to the erotic – but this obvious thing is at first a παράδοξον:

> ὅτι τῶν φιλτάτων τε καὶ εὐνουστάτων καὶ θειοτάτων κτημάτων ὀρφανὸν πρὸ παντὸς εὔξαιτ' ἂν εἶναι τὸν ἐρώμενον· πατρὸς γὰρ καὶ μητρὸς καὶ συγγενῶν καὶ φίλων στέρεσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν δέξαιτο, διακωλυτὰς καὶ ἐπιτιμητὰς ἡγούμενος τῆς ἡδιστῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμιλίας. (239E3-240A2)

That the lover would single out[1399] the most friendly, well-disposed and divine of possessions as the ones of which he would in particular hope and pray that the beloved be bereaved, is the diametric opposite of the attitude one would expect in a companion and guardian (n.b., ὁμιλία τε καὶ

1397 Just as τὰ λοιπὰ λεγώμεν relied on our recalling the program set out at 237C8-D3.
1398 παρέξεται (239E2) hearkens back to παρέχει at 237D3.
1399 This is the force of πρὸ παντός (E5).

ἐπιτροπεία, reasserted just above, E2). Moreover, the three superlatives he chooses do not indicate what κτήματα he might be talking about so much as they amplify and extenuate the paradox. The rhetorical strategy of postponement is identical to that he used in the case of great and greatest blame above (239B1-6), and once again the very thing that is best for the boy is shown to be worst for the erotic and vice-versa. The answer to the riddle is now introduced by γάρ: it is his father and mother, his relatives and friends – and the erotic would abide the beloved losing his relations with them all merely to maximize the pleasure of his own relationship with the beloved, since from his point of view[1400] they would only thwart and remonstrate against his "ὁμιλία" with him, the positive term again being used of the perverted relationship with biting irony (240A2: cf. 239E2).[1401]

The paradox resolved, the speaker can move on to another subcategory of external goods, wealth,[1402] which he presents with a mild periphrasis (οὐσίαν ... χρυσοῦ) and then generalizes dismissively and a bit insouciantly (ἤ τινος ἄλλης κτήσεως).[1403] His attitude about the boy having any of this is that it would only make him harder to catch than he would otherwise be, and harder once caught to keep under control. The result is again a perfect reversal of the attitude one would expect in a companion: the erotic man will be compelled to begrudge the boy any wealth he might gain but if it should then be lost he will cheer, and once again we have the interlaced or chiastic construction in μέν / δέ with its ebb and flow, which by now we may count as a stylistic trait of the Speaker:

> φθονεῖν μεν οὐσίαν κεκτημένοις ἀπολλυμένης δε χαίρειν (240A5)

But he also wants to depict his thought about the beloved's family with an equally strong inversion:

> ἔτι τοίνυν ἄγαμον ἄπαιδα ἄοικον ὅτι πλεῖστον χρόνον παιδικὰ ἐραστὴς εὔξαιτ' ἂν γενέσθαι, τὸ αὐτοῦ γλυκὺ ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον καρποῦσθαι ἐπιθυμῶν. (240A6-8)

The asyndeton and parallelism of the three privatives is striking enough to indicate we are approaching a major closure. ὅτι πλεῖστον and ὡς πλεῖστον on the other hand repeat and bring forward the image of the erotic man contriving to maximize his pleasure (239B7-8, 240A1). That pleasure, which had in every case above been referred to with the categorical term ἡδύ, is now given derogatory specification[1404] by being replaced with the merely gustatory γλυκύ; and the unnatural and perverse attitude of the erotic who wishes to hold back the course of nature just as long as possible is now endowed with the ironically approbatory term καρποῦσθαι. Nevertheless, desire has the final word (ἐπιθυμῶν, A8).

1400 This is the force of ἡγούμενος (240A1).

1401 Compare the description of the lover as ἐπίτροπός τε καὶ κοινωνός (239C1) just after he has done maximal harm to the boy's chance of becoming intelligent and has made him turn to himself for help out of his ignorance (βλαβερώτατος, ἀποβλέπων).

1402 When the external goods (τὰ ἔξω, the goods besides those of body and/or soul) are represented by a single item, the item is wealth (πλοῦτος: 495A7-8, *Euthyd*.279A7ff, 280D2; *Gorg*.467E4; *Leg*.631B6-D1, 660E2-5, 661A5-B4; χρήματα: 443E3-4, *Leg*.870A; *Phlb*.48E1-9A2). When represented by a set of items the characteristic ones are πλοῦτος and γένος (491C1-4, *Charm*.157B7-8; *Phdrs*.239-40A8), πλοῦτος and ἀρχή (445A6-8, *Prot*.354B3-5), or πλοῦτος, γένος, and ἀρχή (494C5-7, 618C8-D5; *Alc.I* 104A4-C1; *Tht*.175D3-5A5). In dialectically outlying contexts we find clothing (*Phdo*.64D), οἰκία and πλοῖον (*Gorg*.504A7-10), δόξαι, τιμαί, δωρείαι (*Rep*.366E4-5), and horse, dog, gold, honor, friends (*Lys*.211D8-E1).

1403 The re-use of κτῆσις now (240A3) to designate a species of the genus it designated above (κτῆσιν, 239E1), shows if anything that he is ready to dismiss both genus and species with a single stroke.

1404 For the concept of the derogative specificity and some examples, cf. *Rep*.421A3 and my note.

2.4: Pleasure

If the three categories of good have been exhausted, what areas of ὠφελία or βλάβη are left to deliberate about? "Now besides the goods there do exist evils into which some demonic force has nevertheless mixed a transient pleasure. For instance in the flatterer, clever beast and a great menace that he is,[1405] nature has mixed in a certain pleasure that is not without its special charm. Along the same lines[1406] when it comes to a courtesan one could censure her as harmful, and many other types of beasts and behaviors that nature has provided with a pleasure of even the greatest degree though transient." Our deliberation is not finished, therefore: we have another category of quasi-goods, and our outline now looks like this:

Preamble: 237B7-D3
- Section One of Two: Definition (237D3-238C4)
- Section Two of Two: Deliberation Proper (238D8-??)
  - Deliberation as to "dianoetic" goods (239A2-C2)
  - Deliberation as to "somatic" goods (239C3-D7)
  - Deliberation as to "external" goods (239D8-240A8)
  - Deliberation as to *pleasure* (240A9-??)

Here is a summary of the deliberation on the pleasurable evils:

> *Besides the goods to be gained and the evils to be avoided some place should be given to consider the pleasure such a relationship might afford. For the beloved the relationship is not only harmful but the most unpleasurable thing there is, because of their difference in age and because the lover is compulsive in his manner. What the erotic man enjoys in the relationship gives only displeasure to the beloved. (240A9-E7)*

The transitional sentence roughly paraphrased above is most interesting (my punctuation):

> Ἔστι μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἀλλά τις δαίμων ἔμειξε τοῖς πλείστοις ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ἡδονήν· οἷον κόλακι, δεινῷ θηρίῳ καὶ βλάβῃ μεγάλῃ, ὅμως ἐπέμειξεν ἡ φύσις ἡδονήν τινα οὐκ ἄμουσον, καί τις ἑταίραν ὡς βλαβερὸν ψέξειεν ἄν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων θρεμμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἷς τό γε καθ' ἡμέραν ἡδίστοισιν εἶναι ὑπάρχει.

The statement asserts there exists a paradoxical category of things that are basically bad but that convey some momentary pleasure. Two examples are given and then they are generalized. At first their paradoxical nature is attributed to the operation of some δαίμων that mixes pleasure into these bad things (A9), but a moment later it is "nature" that mixed it into them (B2) – or more exactly it is in their nature to be that way – and finally their pleasurability is said to be *inherent* in them (ὑπάρχει, B5), which drops the embarrassed metaphor of nature mixing. The first example, introduced by οἷον (the word that more than any other means "for example" in Greek) is the flatterer. Given the lee-way of the flatterer's paradoxical nature the Speaker can first condemn him and then acknowledge the pleasure he can provide. The second example is introduced by a completely different technique: an imaginary person – no longer the Speaker – might condemn the courtesan or "many other things belonging to the categories of similar beasts and behaviors" in whose nature there is at least an

1405 δεινῷ θηρίῳ καὶ βλάβῃ μεγάλῃ (B1-2).
1406 καί (B3) introduces a new sentence as if it were entering an additional item in the list.

ephemeral pleasure that can be very great. The example of the courtesan as blameworthy is associated with all other blameworthy examples one might name before her specific ephemeral pleasure is described, as the flatterer's was.[1407] But it hardly needs describing and before we know it the speaker passes over describing it and instead refers to all other such evils, only then to express the general principle of ephemeral pleasure so as to cover them all. The notion of ephemerality (καθ'ἡμέραν, B5) is a development of the original characterization of the pleasure involved as temporary (ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα, B1).

The formulation of the generalization is striking for its use of τοιουτοτρόπων, pedantic and rare, and for the doublet, θρεμμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων. The expression ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων is just long-winded for πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, the doublet of quantity and quality so characteristic in Greek. The shift to the genitive is gratuitous except to set apart slightly the qualitative range of this category of things, expressed with the doublet, which generalizes the negative characterizations of the two examples of the flatterer (n.b., θηρίῳ, B1) and the courtesan. The choice of the term ἐπιτηδεύματα suggests the person receiving the courtesan's pleasure has in that case chosen a path of behavior.

The new category of value – i.e., of what is at stake – having thus been established (i.e., the περὶ οὗ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι), we may now investigate whether gratifying the erotic provides the beloved with any gain or benefit in this category. Immediately this is denied: παιδικοῖς δὲ ... ἀηδέστατον (B5-C1). If we had forgotten that the opening assertion, that there was a category of bads that were pleasurable, was introduced by μέν, the δέ with παιδικοῖς now reminds us that it was. After a kind of front-loading that has been characteristic of the speech but is here more extended than before,[1408] we now discover that ἄλλα was again proleptic-adverbial. Though a thing that is bad might under some circumstances be pleasurable at least for a day, for the beloved the lover in addition to being bad and therefore harmful is most unpleasant to spend any time with at all. Again the exact inverse of what is wanted is the actual outcome. The hinge on which the reversal depends is the pair of terms καθ'ἡμέραν and συνημερεύειν: "As for 'pleasures of a day,' each day he spends with the lover will be the most unpleasant day of his life!"

It is the burden of the rest of this section to prove this assertion by viewing the daily life up close and personal. First, persons of the same age, like the birds of the proverb, flock together, although even these don't want to spend every minute with each other. Add to that the proverbial wisdom that anything you are compelled to do is *eo ipso* burdensome. The beloved, in addition to being deprived the benefit of the former, is subject to the latter in spades. The elder will never be willing to leave him during any day, not to mention the nights, for he himself is compelled and driven as by a goad,

> ὃς (sc. οἶστρος) ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἡδονὰς ἀεὶ διδοὺς ἄγει, ὁρῶντι ἀκούοντι καὶ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν αἰσθανομένῳ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, ὥστε μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀραρότως αὐτῷ ὑπηρετεῖν· τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐρωμένῳ ... (240D1-4)

Under the pretense of describing the goad that drives the lover he describes, in a μέν clause, what is going on within the lover, for this is the determinant. It is the goad, not the beloved, that drives him, and the beloved himself appears as merely the direct object of the lover's sensory experiences.[1409] The climactic terms are ἀραρότως and ὑπηρετεῖν which describe an attitude of obsessive worship.

1407 For the shift in construction midstream cf. 229D4-E2, 239B1-3 and D3-4, with notes.

1408 Cf. 240E3-5, 239D2-4, 239B1-3, 238B3-B5, B5-C3, 237C-D2 and the exegesis of them above.

1409 The background list of pleasures (as opposed to desires) is not uncommonly divided among the senses: *Phdo*.81B5-6, *Phlb*.51B3-5.

But what of the lover on the other hand (τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐρωμένῳ)?

> τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐρωμένῳ ποῖον παραμύθιον ἢ τίνας ἡδονὰς διδοὺς ποιήσει τὸν ἴσον χρόνον συνόντα μὴ οὐχὶ ἐπ' ἔσχατον ἐλθεῖν ἀηδίας, ὁρῶντι μὲν ὄψιν πρεσβυτέραν καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὥρᾳ, ἑπομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων παύτῃ ἃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐστὶν ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερπές, μὴ ὅτι δὴ ἔργῳ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ προσκειμένης μεταχειρίζεσθαι ... (D4-E2)

"What encouragement or pleasure will that goad give to the beloved," he asks, with parallel construction of the participle, "so as to produce any other effect but that he be taken to the limit of *dis*pleasure from spending this same amount of time with the lover? What pleasure to him who as for sight (μέν) looks upon a face that is old and unlike his own is past its prime, while what else he sees follows suit with this, unpleasant even to put into words let alone to deal with them in deed and constantly to be beset with being compelled to handle them?"

Again the theme of inversion and the stressing of opposition drives the form and the expression, with parallelism (διδούς, ὁρῶντι) enabling the speaker to contrast the outcomes, and with similarities (τὸν ἴσον χρονόν) enabling him to stress the differences (ἀραρότως ὑπηρετεῖν vs. ἐπ' ἔσχατον ἀηδίας ἐλθεῖν, and the litotes οὐκ ἐν ὥρᾳ). He establishes the comparison between what the two of them sense only to abandon the account of the beloved's experience with a dismissive generalization as being something unpleasant for his audience to hear, but then returns to it[1410] by telling us the beloved doesn't only have to hear in words it but has to deal with it in deeds, day in and day out without let. And then rather than spare us as he suggested he might, and did once before (239D3), he exemplifies the beloved's onerous experience in copious detail after all:

> φυλακάς τε δὴ καχυποτόπους φυλαττομένῳ διὰ παντὸς καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἀκαίρους τε ἐπαίνους καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντας ἀκούοντι ὡς δ' αὕτως ψόγους νήφοντος μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτούς, εἰς δὲ μέθην ἰόντος πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἀνεκτῷ ἐπαισχεῖς, παρρησίᾳ κατακορεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένῃ χρωμένου; (240E2-7)

This list of the events that occupy the beloved's sensory field is strictly unexpected, and tacked onto the dismissal with τε, proleptic, so that we moreover have no idea how many items are coming nor, given δή, how they will be structured (contrast the inkling we would have had if it had been μέν). With the second item, tacked on again with a parallel τε, we have the grammatical repetition of an initial accusative (ἀκαίρους) though the syntax is varied from internal accusative to direct object and the order of adjective and noun is reversed. In place of the doubling of πᾶς (διὰ <u>πάντων</u> καὶ πρὸς <u>ἅπαντας</u>) we have a logically analogous doubling of the adjective (ἀκαίρους temporal / ὑπερβάλλοντας quantitative). The second item (ἐπαίνους ... ἀκούοντι) is then suddenly extenuated by a replication of ἐπαίνους into its opposite (ψόγους) which then governs a second subdivision, the unbearable criticisms he hears from the lover both when sober and when drunk, both unbearable and embarrassing. The divisions become subdivisions, from praise to its opposite, blame, and then to blame broken in half by sober vs. drunk. Finally he closes by characterizing the drunk subdivision with a climactic noun (παρρησίᾳ) to which he gives two adjectives, quantitative and qualitative again, and ends the construction with the syntactically governing but semantically empty term, χρωμένου.[1411]

1410 Compare 239D2-4 (and n.1396) for a similar move away from the topic and back to it.

1411 For closure with a term colorless in itself and functioning merely to give syntactical governance to the terms that came before, which had already conveyed the meaning though they were syntactically subordinate, cf. τὴν σκέψιν ... παρέχειν, 237D2-3, and my exegesis; δεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν, 239C5; διαίτης, 239D1 (with exegesis); κοσμούμενον,

This climactic extenuation of the beloved's displeasure with the lover comes to an end by lasting longer than we thought it would, or even could. What comes next is simply added with flat καί (καὶ ἐρῶν μὲν βλαβερός τε καὶ ἀηδής, 240E8). It is from the semantics rather than the connective that we immediately know that he has finished with the present division (the evaluation of pleasure: ἀηδής) just as he had finished with the first section of the deliberation (the evaluation of ὠφελία and βλάβη according to the categories of good). The back references to those sections of the speech observe the order in which they occurred and give the impression of being a summary.

2.5: Long-term Effects

What, then, will come next? All that we can anticipate at this moment is that it will be announced in the δέ clause. The transition from the deliberation about the categories of good to the category of pleasure was effected by the clever segue through a class of things bad rather than good but pleasurable at least; the present segue is as follows:

καὶ ἐρῶν μὲν βλαβερός τε καὶ ἀηδής, λήξας δε τοῦ ἔρωτος εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄπιστος...

The deliberation about pleasure consisted of an evaluation of the transient and everyday contents of the beloved's life with the lover rather than the benefit or harm that might result from it. In one sense, deliberation is about benefit and harm, but in another it is about the future; and the truth about the daily life of their relationship is that it will end some day, so that it falls within the scope of a thorough deliberation also to ask what life for the beloved would be like afterward. The two participles ἐρῶν and λήξας are temporal and divide these two periods that deliberation must prospectively evaluate in order to make the decision whether to gratify the erotic.

We may therefore update our evolving outline as follows:

Preamble: 237B7-D3
- Section One of Two: Definition (237D3-238C4)
- Section Two of Two: Deliberation Proper (238D8-??)
  - Deliberation as to "dianoetic" goods (239A2-C2)
  - Deliberation as to "somatic" goods (239C3-D7)
  - Deliberation as to "external" goods (239D8-240A8)
  - Deliberation as to pleasure *during the relationship* (240A9-E7)
  - Deliberation as to the *aftermath* of the relationship (240E8-??)

And here is a summary of the section:

> *All the promises the lover made so as to keep the beloved in his hands he will need to forget once the compulsion of his love abates, whereas the beloved will at that moment be expecting his payoff. The lover will have come back to his senses and to the extent that he remembers the promises he made at all he will have to avoid making good on them for fear of reverting to his previous ways. Who once pursued now flees, while the sought-after now tracks him down to collect compensation, and is left to realize only that he should never have gratified the erotic, who had wanted him only as a wolf wants a lamb. (240E8-241D1)*

As in the case of the segue from the goods to pleasure (240A9-B5) the opening sentence turns

239D2. I call it "subordinate insubordination." Cf. nn.444, 646, 757. The opposite effect is achieved by the final placement of subordinate ἐπιθυμῶν at 240A8.

away from the previous topic (the time during the love affair) and toward the new one (the time afterward) by defining the matter that next needs to be deliberated over (240E8-241A2). There he elaborated on a kind of evil that might be pleasurable; and here he expatiates on the body of promises that would survive the abatement of the lover's sickness, which he introduces by the assertion that the lover, once his love abates and the affair is over, will prove not only to be harmful and unpleasurable but also untrue:

> λήξας δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄπιστος, εἰς ὃν πολλὰ καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν ὅρκων τε καὶ δεήσεων ὑπισχνούμενος μόγις κατεῖχε τήν γ' ἐν τῷ τότε συνουσίαν ἐπίπονον οὖσαν φέρειν δι' ἐλπίδα ἀγαθῶν. (240E8-241A2)

"The future" (τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον) exhausts the scope of deliberation and so we already suspect this will be the last section, but the expression is immediately qualified (by εἰς ὅν) as the time during which the many promises by which he had held the beloved under control during the affair would be fulfilled. We had not heard about these promises but we had learned how needful they would be, given the onerousness of the beloved's relationship with the lover, which the speech has just now allowed us to witness "up close and personal." It will be this discrepancy in the two men's points of view that will structure the coming section.

At the time his love abates the promises will come due, but the lover, having switched out the principle that rules and governs him and having put mind and temperance where love and madness used to be,[1412] has already become a different man before the beloved even notices (241A2-4):

> καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτὸν χάριν ἀπαιτεῖ τῶν τότε ὑπομιμνήσκων τὰ πραχθέντα καὶ λεχθέντα ὡς τῷ αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενος, ὁ δὲ ὑπ' αἰσχύνης οὔτε εἰπεῖν τολμᾷ ὅτι ἄλλος γέγονεν οὔθ' ὅπως τὰ τῆς προτέρας ἀνοητοῦ ἀρχῆς ὁρκωμόσιά τε καὶ ὑποσχέσεις ἐμπεδώσῃ ἔχει, νοῦν ἤδη ἐσχηκὼς καὶ σεσωφρονηκώς, ἵνα μὴ πράττων ταὐτὰ τῷ πρόσθεν ὅμοιός τε ἐκείνῳ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πάλιν γένηται. (241A5-B3)

To stress the discrepancy in outlooks he refers to the two men in the barest terms as ὁ μέν and ὁ δέ. The one, as he says with great acuteness, will be ashamed to brag that he has become a different man; and now that he has secured mind and temperance he knows he lacks the power to prevent the fulfillment of the promises he had made under his mindless regime from causing him to revert to his previous self by dint of acting the same way "that man" did.[1413] He had become a spurner of all that; now compelled into betrayal though he once was devoted, the shoe is on the other foot and he is off

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1412 The pairs of terms help to make the argument. That the lover now has a ruling principle that is called a προστάτης indicates his life has come to be governed rationally – but is there a part of himself with which he has made the decision? This new direction is then spelled out with an appositive, νοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἀντ' ἔρωτος καὶ μανίας. Since σωφροσύνη is truly the opposite of μανία, νοῦς is being pressed into service as being the opposite of ἔρως ("tempered mind rather than insane desire") – pressed, but without any supportive argument. The notion more than the terminology of the two types of rule or mastery recall the distinction between two forces within, drawn at the beginning of the speech (ἐπιθυμία and δόξα, 237D6-9), and suddenly it dawns on us this man has no self. He is not a changed man but a different man.

1413 ἐκείνῳ (B2). The remote demonstrative "quotes" the reformed man trying to distance himself from – himself. The theory of two forces, though it presupposed a single person or identity somehow holding them together (whence the metaphor of στάσις: cf. n.1358), neglected to acknowledge or articulate the nature of any such third element, and now finds itself just as unable as the man himself to describe what has happened except by the magic thinking of rhetorical exaggeration. The Speaker's art has outstripped his own thinking!

on a jag (ἴεται φυγῇ) to get away, a different man. It is the other that is now driven to do the chasing, not begging and hoping but angered and calling him names, this beloved who only now realizes he never ought to have gratified a man driven into mindlessness by necessity but quite the opposite a man unafflicted by love, and mindful instead.

2.6 Peroration

The symmetry of the two parties is complete, but now the Speaker spoils the symmetry for the sake of a segue, as he has done several times before:

> εἰ δὲ μή, ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἐνδοῦναι αὐτὸν ἀπίστῳ δυσκόλῳ φθονερῷ ἀηδεῖ, βλαβερῷ μὲν πρὸς οὐσίαν, βλαβερῷ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν, πολὺ δὲ βλαβερωτάτῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παίδευσιν ἧς οὔτε ἀνθρώποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμιώτερον οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται. (241C1-6)

The list recaps the topics he has covered in the Deliberation, in almost slavishly reverse order, listing them in asyndeton, from this last one (ἀπιστός: 240E8-241C1) through the penultimate topic of his disagreeable and invidious unpleasantness (ἀηδής: 240A9-E7), and then back through the three areas of actual harm (the proper subjects of deliberation), also in reverse order: possessions (239D8-240A8), body (239C3-D7), and mind (239A2-C2). These three are set apart by the anaphora of βλαβερός in a tricolon crescendo that culminates with the superlative βλαβερώτατος corresponding with the topic he had placed first – the effects on the "mind" – which he had called διάνοια and now refers to more properly as ψυχή, not without amplificatory periphrasis (ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς παίδευσις).[1414] And even here he is not finished but extenuates the last item mentioned by a subdivision: this παίδευσις, he now says, is the most honored thing there is among men and among gods, and not just now but also in the future.

The asyndetic list resembles the one he used at the completion of his treatment of the goods-proper (240A6-8). For amplificatory periphrasis of the final item compare ἡδονὴ κάλλους at 238C1 and θεία φιλοσοφία at 239B4. The extenuating subdivision of the final item (the παίδευσις ψυχῆς) resembles the one he used at 240E2-7 at the end of his treatment of unpleasantness, where again[1415] he began by tacking on an elaboration we had been given reason to think he had forgone (guardings), and then added a second item (praises) and replicated it with its opposite (blame), and then subdivided blame into sober and drunken ones and elaborated the drunken ones with a double climax: οὔτε ἀνθρώποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμιώτερον (to which compare πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἀνεκτῷ ἐπαισχεῖς) and οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται (to which compare παρρησίᾳ κατακορεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένῃ χρωμένου).

We know he is finished but now he closes with an apothegm: "friendship" with a lover is not a matter of good will but, in the manner of eating, a matter of satiation: As the wolf welcomes the lamb so does the lover welcome his beloved.

1414 For such periphrasis in climax cf. 238C1 and 239B4; and compare the postponements at 238B3-7 and 238B4-5. At the same moment that he achieves his tricolon crescendo with the term ψυχή, the author fails to notice that his own account allows no place for there to be a single central self or soul to be educated!

1415 Compare unexpected tackings-on at 238B3ff (with καί), 239B6ff (with τε), 239D2ff (with τε), 240A6ff (with ἔτι), 240B3-5 (with καί), 240D7-E2 (with ἑπομένων δέ).

The Third Speech

Initial Reaction and Summary

The speech is a mammoth of beauty, inventiveness, and cognitive or anamnetic truth in the aftermath of which we can barely remember the other two speeches. To the extent that we try to remember them we feel ourselves being dragged back to a world we thought we had left behind. The telescope has, after all, been turned around, and we have been given to see our lives "here" from the vantage point of the gods and their cosmos, the ultimate frame of all of life and time and reality, with which the cajolery and negotiation over sexual favors between lying lovers and their opportunistic darlings has nothing to do. If we succeed to re-enter the world of those speeches with our wits still about us, what now comes into view is that their Speakers were quite unaware what they were talking about; that they were the puppets of a foolish and faulty recollection of their own former life, living in a present that has forgotten its own source and lost its original orientation but that nevertheless relies on what little it can remember of it even to conceive a desire to flail about as it does, with a memory that has forgotten much more than it remembers and therefore founders among mere icons of what is actually moving outside and even within them. We may even begin to understand the back and forth between Socrates and Phaedrus that came before, with its dodgings and parryings, and its coyness and compulsion, and Socrates being stunned by looking into Phaedrus's face as he presented Lysias's speech as well as his decision to cover his own face when he delivered his treatment of the same topic to Phaedrus. No less than this should we have hoped for in this "palinode," this hearty attempt to right our perspective and place human life into the context of the life it once shared with the gods.

We must attempt an analysis of the speech to place alongside the analyses of the previous two. Those analyses were very different from each other because the mental experience we underwent and mental work we had to do to follow the speeches were very different. The key to analyzing the first speech came from our recognition of the epigrammatic structure of the capitals alongside the corroborating fact that these capitals were joined externally by connectives like ἔτι δέ and καὶ μέν δή. The second speech immediately revealed itself to be a lesson in presenting an argument at the same time that it presented an argument, announcing and revealing to us its structure as it went along.[1416] Even its individual sentences, as we noticed along the way, were structured to shepherd our attention from one point to the next, with momentary releases of control for emphasis.[1417]

If we likewise allow the third speech to present itself and reveal its structure, first for summary and then for analysis, we would have to say its salient feature is that it leaps, jerking us upward without warning, to a higher vantage point than we are used to or than we expected – some great principle or insight – and then describes this inherently important or interesting thing without telling why, nor even what it has to do with Eros. This fact about the speech will become immediately obvious if we attempt to make a consecutive summary of its contents, since in the course of producing such a summary we will continually be forced to ignore these salient and memorable leaps upward – to-wit, something like the following:

1416 As in the manner of the rule of composition we were taught in the lower schools: 'Tell them what you will say, then say it, then tell them you have said it.'

1417 Cf. 239B1-3, 240A9-B5; nn.1364, 1367, 1408.

CONSECUTIVE SUMMARY

The speech is framed by the purpose of proving that the madness of which love was accused by the other speeches to be a kind might not be bad but might be good, like the madness of the priestess, the maenad and the poet – in which case eros could be good and not bad (243E9-245C4). The proof that it is, is as follows:

Soul is immortal (245C-246A), and patrols the skies, but according to a likeness of its true nature as a charioteer drawn by two horses, some souls are subject to a metaphorical "fall from the sky" if their "wings" become weak (246A-D) out of a lack of the nourishment they can receive only by flying to the top of the sky and feeding on a Vision of the Truth beyond, a flight that is easy for the souls of the easy-living gods but harder for those whose horses are of mixed character (246D-247E). In case a soul fails in the ascent it becomes weak, falls toward earth, and becomes embodied (248A-248C). Some souls fall further and some come to be held more fastly to their new life because of their histories above, the soul that becomes a philosopher least of all because most able and ready to remember (248C-249D). The relevance of all this to love is that the excitement all men feel at the sight of beautiful things in this world is due to the fact that Beauty Itself – one among many Originals the Vision of which maintained our strength to stay aloft in our previous life – is alone granted the privilege of being particularly visible in its likenesses here (249D-250D). More forgetful souls, in seeing beautiful things, feel the effect of Beauty but fail to realize that in truth real Beauty is beyond, and lurch forward in lusty ignorance to master the beautiful boy, who is only its embodiment. The more philosophical soul, made so by her sojourn before, in the train of Zeus, is stimulated by the nourishment she receives, reminded of the nourishment she shared with the gods in the vision of the huperouranion, but is also stayed from pouncing on the boy by her reverence for the true Beauty of which the beautiful boy is only a vehicle. She feels a special vexation at the boy's power both to cause her desire and to assuage it! (250E1-252C2). The love affair between embodied souls in this world (i.e., humans) therefore provides both lover and beloved a life-practice that can foster their return to that blessed state, for the lover in his choice and solicitation of a beloved and for the beloved in his acquiescence to him, as an enlightened description of such affairs illustrates, so that our final destiny depends upon the god of Love (252C3-256D)!

<u>Psychagogic Summary of Third Speech: 245C5-257B6</u>

The "consecutive summary" sets into relief how our *experience* of being led along through the speech with its leaps and digressions was something quite other than being ushered through "argument" in the manner of Socrates's First Speech. Let us next allow it to move us in its own time, rather than summarize it from a retrospective vantage point that studiously abandons the process we underwent. Let us, that is, accumulate that experience from the inside out, as it actually unfolds, in the same manner we have done with the other two speeches.

Introduction: 243E9-245C4

The speech begins with the very straightforward argument that if all madness were bad there would be no basis for a palinode but if some mania were good, even the best of goods, sent to men by gods, then there would be room for Eros to be a good mania. We know of such divine mania in the case of the useful predictions of the Delphic priestess and other so-called "mantic" figures, in comparison with which mere sobriety yields nothing. But now the Speaker digresses to complain that modern men have foolishly come to call "mantic" what the original sages who made our language called "manic." In their ignorance of fine things they have added a T to make it sound more important. But the manic is better than mantic, just as (the Speaker continues digressing) this thing that is now called oiOnistic with an important sounding long O originally had a short o: the sense is not the silly science of bird signs they now call "goosework," by which men boast to use ratiocination to predict the future, but "guesswork," as the original sages had it, who saw it for what it really was.

These preposterous etymologies combine the playful with the serious, since they measure the present against an enlightened past that has been forgotten. A second Mania is then retailed, she who can bring about a catharsis of ancestral curses through a man's surrender to a higher insight; and a third, the madness of the poet, by which men are given the divine power to isolate the perennial aspect of human action ("the past") and secure its meaning for future generations.

The three examples not only prove that madness can be good but also present with humor and an eloquence that is inherently entertaining certain dimensions of the goodness of which mania is capable, which will in fact become thematic in the case of the fourth mania, eros – including the notions of a forgotten enlightened past dimly perceived in the merely human present, of the sense that humans are the playthings of gods, of a release from the curse of human existence, and of an access to some great sort of knowledge that constitutes the real and perennial meaning of the life in which we plod along on earth, in the thrall of circumstance. With such ideas in the background we feel something of a thrill over the paradox with which he next introduces the argument itself, rather than merely being confused by it: that the coming argument will be "incredible to the clever but trustworthy to the wise."

Soul is Immortal: 245C5-246A2

The proof that the madness of love might be divine and good rather than bad and sick begins with a huge and awesome assertion for which no context at all is prepared: all soul is immortal. What follows is an argument that for good measure goes even further upward and backward to first principles than this assertion. We had to be told that this assertion and its proof was the beginning of the speech[1418] because otherwise we would have no idea what is going on. On the other hand, we may soon notice that this beginning point of the speech is also a sort of beginning point of all reality, since all that is moved is moved by soul which nothing started into motion; and then we might reflect on the fact that the announcement that this is the beginning of the speech (ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως) might also be taken to mean that it is the *origin and principle* from which the ensuing *argument* is derived. Contrary to the pedagogical requirements represented by the commonplace distinction between the "order of learning" and the "order of nature," according to which the last thing we learn is the first thing we need to know, this presentation conforms to the order of nature and requires us somehow to grant those last things at the beginning. The speech is not "teaching" us in the same pedagogical

1418 ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἥδε, 245C4.

way that Socrates's First Speech did.

The presentation of this proof could not be less spare. It is pure logic presented in the oracular style. As to the sentences themselves, the copula tends to be omitted; the distinction between subject and predicate is indicated by the article or in anarthrous cases merely suggested by word order. As to the logical relation between one sentence and the next, we come to recognize a pattern that we infer from the propositional content itself. The first sentence presents a *demonstrandum*, and the second sentence begins with γάρ (C5); subsequent sentences together prove the second by introducing subordinate premises with circumstantial participles. The proof of that *demonstrandum* complete, a new *demonstrandum* is laid down (ἀγένητον, D1), anarthrous like the first one, and it in turn is followed by a sentence in γάρ (D1) that is then proved by a *reductio*. A third *demonstrandum* (ἀδιάφθορον, D4) is then put down (as inferable from the last one), again followed by a sentence in γάρ (D4) and followed by a proof.

The entire argument is then telescoped into a συμπέρασμα introduced by οὕτω δή (D6-7): What moves itself is immortal and the source of all other motion. A fourth *demonstrandum* then asserts that this self-mover is identical to soul (E3-4), followed by a sentence in γάρ (E4) that proves it (soulless body has its source of motion outside whereas ensouled body has its source of motion within itself). A final inference can then be drawn which asserts the *demonstrandum* at the beginning: the soul, as self-mover, is immortal – QED.

Soul is a Winged σύμφυτον of Charioteer and Horses: 246A3-D5

Once the soul's reality as the immortal principle of motion is established, the Speaker blamelessly moves on to tell us what it is like (its ἰδέα), almost as if to move from *an sit* to *quid sit*. We are told that soul is like a charioteer and his two horses, grown into a single winged organism that flies through the sky – we had never heard anything like this – and then we hear that "our" souls (for of course there are the souls of the gods as well as "our" souls, though we are left to infer it) might lose their feathers, fall to earth, and become embodied as human animals. The question whether the gods are to be thought of as animals of some kind might come to mind, but that question is beyond our ability to answer and besides it is impertinent for us even to ask, for the question that concerns *us* is how it comes about that *our* souls should ever lose their feathers.

How a Soul Loses its Feathers: 246C6-248C2

In order to answer that question we are jogged upward and told how it was that souls received the nourishment that kept them buoyant when they did live up in the sky – that life we had never heard of. Soul, we are told, is more akin to the divine than any other element in this human animal that we have become, and since like is nourished by like, the soul feeds on divine things such as beauty, wisdom and the good. By partaking of these her wings remain strong whereas if she fails to partake or falls back into the pack of souls and becomes trampled in the flailing stampede to behold them her wings become weak or mangled and she falls to earth.

These assertions satisfy our need to know how soul might lose her wings, but the explanation is an *obscurum per obscurius*: what could this imbibing of divine beauty wisdom and goodness really be? The discourse will answer this question next, or more exactly will have answered it, but not before it

jogs us *literally* upward, so suddenly that at first we think we have missed a warning:[1419] "That greatest leader in the sky, Zeus, driving his winged chariot, leads the procession in the heavens ordering all and making all his care. Followed he is by an army of gods and spirits ordered in their eleven divisions." Other souls follow in the train of the gods' procession as best they can. When the gods suddenly swoop upward to feast on the vision of things in the world beyond – another thing we never heard about before! – the other souls have particular trouble keeping up with them: their mixed horses make it a rough go. Indeed at this moment the fate of a soul lies in the balance.

Clearly the question of *our* soul's ability to be nourished and its implications for losing our feathers is what he has reached, but instead of going on to that topic he tarries, in a μέν clause, with his description of the *gods*' sojourn.[1420] Once they reach the outer back of the sky they come to a stand, and the revolution of the sphere is now doing the moving, having become their vehicle while they rest and look into the beyond. Though we still expect a δέ clause about *us* and our "ultimate labor and test," he continues instead with the gods and what they behold, "The region beyond (δέ) has never been properly described... ." The δέ clause abandons the immediate context to deal with the admittedly great topic of the world beyond – great just as the gods' ascent was great – and now he will devote a leisurely page to this topic before he returns to "us" with a renewed δέ clause at 248A1ff.[1421]

These two interposed passages expatiate, respectively, upon the life of the god-souls *per se* (246E4-247B2) and upon their special theory-feasting on the realest of the reals (247C3-E6). The Speaker does not forget the main thread of the discourse and will return to it in due time (248A1ff), but we must tarry long enough to notice the great elevation in style with which the flight of the god-souls is described. The leap in the discourse upward to Zeus with which the first digression begins was widely remembered and praised in antiquity.[1422] The name of Zeus, the first subject, is climactically postponed (E4); his verb – that he moves through the sky – is sandwiched between circumstantial participial phrases that describe how he moves (by chariot: ἐλαύνων) and why he moves (to confer order on the the cosmos: διακοσμῶν). His entourage is then announced, by the old narrative epanaleptic use of article for pronoun (τῷ δὲ ἕπεται, E6): they constitute an army of gods and daimons arrayed behind each of the Olympian gods in an order emphasized by redundancy (τεταγμένοι ... κατὰ τάξιν ἣν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη, 247A3-4). Their pathways are then described with doubling amplitude in adjectives (πολλαὶ ... καὶ μακάριαι) and nouns (θέαι τε καὶ διέξοδοι) and the redundant perfection of their ordering is then spelled out by granting to each its respective duty and competence (πράττων ἕκαστος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ, A6). Doubling amplitude continues with the mention of anybody "able and willing" to follow. When suddenly the gods soar upward to "dine and feast" they have arrived at the top of the sky before we know it,[1423] though the other chariots lag behind.

1419 The connective is μὲν δή, not impossible: cf. 240A9. Burnet, Robin, Fowler allow the surprise full force by not inserting a paragraph break; Moreschini, Yunis, and especially the translators (Helmbold-Rabinowitz, Brisson, Nehemas/Woodruff) do insert one despite the weakness of the connective. The editor and even more the translator has to resist the temptation to allow his reader read the text rather than reading it for him. We saw a similarly wide variation in the paragraphing of Lysias's speech, but surely not in the case of Socrates's First Speech, which so explicitly and even pedantically told us what was happening at every turn.

1420 He introduces it with μέν (247B6) which is almost always concessive in force if not at least in tone, and thereby continues to promise that his "real" purpose is to move on to the δέ clause in which he will deal with the fate of "our" souls and their ability to feast. μέν is wonderfully ambiguous since any concession could turn out to be a *praeteritio*. Because it comes early in its clause it announces in advance that its clause is dismissible at the same time that it buys a purchase to interpose it; once it has, the interruption might continue indefinitely as it does here (from 247C3 to 248A1).

1421 In fact he needs an analepsis of the μέν clause (248A1) to do so.

1422 Cf. n.423.

1423 This is the importance of ἤδη (B1): cf. n.430.

The reference to the "others" resumes the thread of the argument, namely, how it is that "our" souls lose their feathers. To succeed at the ascent is the ultimate trial and test of any soul. But just as quickly as he returns to "us" the Speaker leaves us behind again and follows the gods instead, who now come to a stop on the back of the sky. Having stopped (a stately epanalepsis [ἔστησαν – στάσας, B7-C1] completes their movement) they now gaze into the beyond. The reference to the beyond stimulates a second digression, for this realm has "never yet been sung by the poets of this world nor will it be with any adequacy," an announcement in which doubling amplitude returns in the binary construction (the poets going with both limbs and the inadequacy with both). He will try to tell us nevertheless, since nothing less than the truth is his theme.

To narrate the divine souls' vision he reverts to the abstract and quasi-oracular style of the proof. We begin with an extended series of phrases in the nominative, beginning first with a triplet in attributive position (asserting its non-sensibility, C6-7), followed by a causal circumstantial participle (ὄντως οὖσα, asserting its real and true existence) that is meant to give the reason for still another attribute (θεατή, the participial copula understood, its behold-ability only by the charioteer of the soul, which is the νοῦς), and then a relative clause (ἥν ...) that explains that assertion (being as it is the proper object of *noetic* knowledge). Finally we reach the predicate, which is otiose: "it occupies this place" (τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον, C8-D1). What follows in the next sentence is another front-loaded nominative phrase describing not the object viewed but the subject that views it – the διάνοια of the soul. The phrase goes on for three lines (D1-3) and leads again to an otiose predicate done with a logical triplet of verbs: thought enjoys the view, receives nourishment from it, and passes into a state of euphoric satiety (D3-4) until it finishes its stately ride through a complete revolution. During the revolution "It beholds her, Justice! It beholds Temperance! It beholds Knowledge!" The anarthrous αὐτήν with δικαιοσύνην expresses shock at the naked vision of justice (rather than an inference that it is purely and only she, which is what αὐτήν in predicate position established by the article would have expressed). Of course the shocked experience goes with all three but the anaphora of καθορᾷ is repetition enough. Likewise, the elaborate expatiation upon the "Knowledge" that διάνοια sees – that it is not the knowledge of this world varying in its embodiments but selfsame and unchanging – applies, now backwards, to all three objects viewed, another amplitudinous binary construction. Finally, with more front-loaded nominative participles (θεασαμένη καὶ ἐστιασθεῖσα in doubling amplitude which combines the metaphors of viewing and feasting, and then δῦσα πάλιν which retraces the upward soar with which this tale began), he dismisses the sojourn of the soul with another otiose predicate, οἴκαδε ἦλθεν. He closes the movement as he opened it, with a stately epanalepsis (ἦλθεν - ἐλθούσης, E4) adding that the soul's charioteer does not forget to stable his horses, to feed them ambrosia and with nectar to water them, the chiasm annealing the close.

The vignette has created a "spot of time"[1424] that he now dismisses with a μέν clause (248A1) that resumes the μέν clause that enabled him to begin the digression (247B6), so that he can return to his main theme with δέ, namely, the fate of "our" souls which are hardly able to make this glorious ascent that the god-souls make so easily.[1425] He reverts to a simpler narrative style. Few indeed achieve a continuous view of the things beyond or even catch a glimpse of them, while most find themselves in a rat-race with each other in which their feathers are mangled by incidental contact. The reason for their struggle, this "ultimate labor and contest" he had referred to a page earlier is, as he had said above, that here alone is the vision of these realest of reals that nourish the soul, as the divine feeding on the divine, which therefore keeps their wings strong, without which they will fall. The reference

1424 Cf. Wordsworth, *Prelude* (1805) 11.257. Part of the de-temporalizing is effected by the gnomic aorists we encountered at the opening and at the close: cf. nn.437 and 456.

1425 The Homeric epithet "easy living" of the gods is given a new and concrete meaning.

back, at 248B1-2, to the ultimate labor[1426] skips backward over the intervening "spot of time" in the huperouranion (247C2-E6), and the ensuing reference to the nutrition of the soul (248B7-C2) skips back still further, over the intervening account of the divine procession (246E4-247B2) to the passage with which this section of the speech opened (246D6-E4), so that the entire passage has now completed a ring. The digressions in this section are given more space (36 lines) than is given to the announced and projected topic (29 lines), namely, how and why "we" lose our feathers.

The Fall of the Soul into Body: 248C2-249D3

Because a ring has been completed we know he will move on to a new topic, and if we ask what it will be, we will hope it again has to do with what has now come into view as the most pressing question, namely, what happens after "our" souls fall. And so it will be, but notice that the Speaker moves on to this topic without even pausing for breath.[1427] The transition to the new section resembles the transition to last one, at 246D2-5, where the next topic is again the pressing question just now recognized. One of the guiding principles for the structure of the speech is therefore the relevance of its subject matter to "us," but at any moment the speech might be interrupted by a leap "upward" to issues, entities, and realities that are inherently more important than "we" are.[1428] The relation between these two movements, now that we have recognized them, will become clearer as the speech continues.

"We" descend into bodies and the sorts of persons we shall become is already determined by the amount of the truth we had seen beyond, before we lost our feathers. The soul that saw the most[1429] will become "a lover of wisdom or a lover of beauty or any sort of erotically musical person."[1430] We might notice the passing reference to eros (since this is the projected topic of the speech!) but the Speaker moves on to the other souls who will take on the lives of other sorts of men. The goal is of course to return to the heavens with our wings restored but this takes no less than ten lifetimes for the common lot of men. Suddenly we are given an account of the cycle of *their* lives, from this earthly life to the life still lower below according to the judgment in Hades, and their return to an embodiment they now are allowed to choose so as to move on to a second embodied life above Hades on earth. There is a beautiful detail in that the man who lived a just life on earth is rewarded with a sojourn "somewhere in the sky" buoyed up by his "justness"[1431] – something of an adumbration of a future return to the *real* sky buoyed up by his own regrown wings, but the description of the mass of mankind is primarily foil for that of the musical erotic, the one who had seen "the most" in the life above, who is now characterized as "loving wisdom undeceptively and feeling eros for boys philosophically."[1432] While all men have the innate ability to make sense of their

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1426 θόρυβος ... καὶ ἄμιλλα καὶ ἱδρὼς ἔσχατος (B1-2): Cf. πόνος τε καὶ ἀγὼν ἔσχατος, 247B5.

1427 Again a paragraph break in the text is possible, and more warranted here than at 247C3 and at 246E4, unless with Burnet we are waiting to see transitional particles that would indicate or require such a break. The present section, though completely new in substance, is introduced by the weakest connective, τε (C2)! We each will remember the thrill of an artistic performance we can just keep up with – as for instance a performance of almost anything by Beethoven.

1428 We may classify as upward leaps, so far, (1) the very beginning of the argument (245C5ff), (2) the leap to the nourishment of soul (πέφυκεν, 246D6ff), (3) the leap to the gods' procession (246E4ff), and (4) the description of the hyperouranion (247C3ff).

1429 πλεῖστα (D2).

1430 Cf. n.488 for the interpretation of 248D3-4.

1431 εἰς τοὐρανοῦ τινα τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης κουφισθεῖσαι διάγουσιν (249A7-8).

1432 Cf. 249A1-2 and n.491 *ad loc.*

experience due to their having had a glimpse at least of the terms that endow the phenomena of this world with what unity and meaning they embody – an ability that consists in remembering those glimpses which their life in this world has left behind – the *philosophical* man, by dint of hovering ever near such divine recollections and adopting the discipline and orientation of using the experiences in this world as memoranda of the previous one, is able to regrow his wings three times more quickly than the others.[1433] Although the others, preoccupied with the rat-race that they jealously think of as normal life, might look down upon him as an incorrigible fool, he in fact is living a life divinely inspired, a fact of which they have no inkling (248C2-249D3).

With this passage the speech has reached the world to which the *psychic* "we" descend, the world in which the *actual* we already live. It speaks as if we had just come to live in it, and indeed describes the "we" that we become in categories of human types that the actual we recognize, and yet the description owes half of what it now says about this world to the new orientation that was provided by the histories of "our" souls (the psychic we) in the other life, importing and imposing as that history does its own hierarchy onto the pursuits of men in this world. The speech then closes with this theme by telling us that though the regime of "human" strivings (ἀνθρώπινα σπουδάσματα[1434]) marginalizes the philosopher in its midst, he is the real man (ἀνήρ) by whom others are to be measured and thereby judged *merely* human, closure being effected by the juxtaposition of the two types in chiastic order with μέν / δέ.[1435]

Nature of Erotic Madness: 249D4-252C2

The closure causes us to stop and when we do we might realize that we have no concept what will come next. If there is any place to introduce a paragraph break in the speech so far, this is it! As our mind casts back we will finally ask the first question we had asked ourselves when the speech suddenly began with its highly abstract disquisition on the nature of soul, namely, What has this to do with the problem of *eros*? If we do ask this, we will be pleased that the next thing we hear both acknowledges our confusion and answers just this question: 'All we have said brings us now to an encounter[1436] with Eros as the fourth mania, for it is this that inspires a man to be moved to what seems madness to others when he beholds beauty in this world' (249D4-E4). With the re-entry of Eros into the discussion, the two previous speeches come back to mind and we must and will notice parallels to them in language and theme.[1437] The work of the speech has now become to "save the phenomena" of the erotic's immanent behavior as it was described in those speeches, but by means of the perspective from the beyond that this speech has now shoehorned into our self-understanding (for the two "we" 's are ultimately one), to the extent at least that eros and the erotic man have been properly characterized by those speeches, let alone defined.

This erotic who is so moved is human like other men: that is, like all men he has been vouchsafed *some* access to the truths beyond. What makes him different is that his memory is stronger than theirs, or has not been here so long, so that when he sees a correlate here of the realities beyond

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1433 More exactly, he can leave after three lives rather than ten: the significance of this fine point can be postponed.

1434 The striking coinage, σπουδάσματα (249D1), compares and contrasts with the futile σπουδή of these same souls in their flight above (248B6). Can it be that they learned to compete with each other in this life as a reminiscence of their clambering and trying to get ahead of each other up there (248A6-B5)?

1435 νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ... ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθεν τοὺς πολλούς (D2-3).

1436 On the character of this sentence as an expression of religious intuition cf. n. 575.

1437 That the erotic is "mad" (μανικῶς διακείμενος, D8: cf. 236D1) was the fertile topos from which both speeches drew most of their negative characterizations of him; for τῷ ... ἔχοντι (E2) cf. n.584.

he is stunned and no longer in control of himself.[1438] The worldly versions of justice and temperance, on the one hand, – of the great originals the gods were described as seeing during their sojourn atop the back of the ouranos – have no dazzle in this world; but beauty, on the other hand, then shone bright, when we were in the huperouranion ... (249E4-250B5ff).

We may and we must stop to notice that we have been served up another mismatch of μέν and δέ. We were given to believe a contrast would be drawn between immanent versions of justice and temperance and immanent versions of beauty, for this was the thing that was being imagined to bedazzle the erotic, but instead we get a double shift, across and upward, from immanent justice and temperance to *transcendent* beauty. The shift is abrupt and at first the only indication of the shift is the unobtrusive adverb τότε (B5) with its less than emphatic placement.[1439] The abruptness of the transition resembles that of the transition at 246E4; and the misdirecting use of μέν / δέ that pulls it off resembles the wrong-footing μέν / δέ at 247B6-C3ff. Once again the δέ clause abandons the immediate context to deal with the inherently great but strictly irrelevant topic of the world beyond. The very mention of the transcendent beauty, like the mention of τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ at 247C2, reminds the Speaker of the entire experience of the world beyond, to the extent that any human here can remember it.[1440] The Speaker does not suppress the memory so as to guarantee and maintain the consecutivity of his discourse, but allows himself to be borne off by it and tarries there for nine lines (B6-C6). The Speaker himself has been driven off course by his own erotic reaction to what he is remembering![1441]

The stately digression on Zeus and the gods, above (246E4ff), was surprising but inherently fascinating and important. In the case of the ensuing digression on the huperouranion the Speaker went to the trouble of announcing it by advertising that the theme had never been adequately treated before (247C3-6). But this time he just flies off as if ἄκραν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψῖδα πορευόμενος πρὸς ἄναντες ἤδη,[1442] and at first it is only with difficulty that we can follow him. His blessed digression suddenly recounts the experience of noetic communion with the truly real, but now it is from the *subjective* point of view whereas in the digression on the huperouranion we only watched the divine souls watch. Furthermore, in the present case it is only *afterward* that he even acknowledges that it was a digression, when, in a resumptive μέν clause (C7) that resumes the μέν at 247A4, rather than apologizing to us for the jarring shift he expresses the hope that the digression was pleasing to the god of Memory, who is the god that granted it to him after all.[1443] The distinction he has drawn between persons with better or worse memories now threatens to become a distinction among the persons in his audience – indeed, ourselves! If what he has said in his digressions has rung a bell, we will have found ourselves moving right along with him; but if conversely we still conceive of ourselves as sitting in his audience across from him and listening while he talks or reading what he writes, we will have become confused and perhaps a little peeved. For purposes of exegesis I will hypothesize that both these descriptions are true of us – i.e., that we are somewhere in between these two states of mind. The rhetoric or art of the piece would then consist of closing the gap and making the difference within us vanish. In any event during this last digression the Speaker has divulged that he conceives of his *fictional* audience, at least, i.e., the Boy to whom he is addressing this speech (a role being played by

1438 οὔκεθ' ἑαυτῶν, 250A7: cf. n.52971.

1439 The only emphatic placement would be before δέ, but κάλλος has been given that privilege. The Speaker is making a double shift but there is only one position before the δέ! Helping him is that τότε had been used twice, just above, as an index of the transcendent world (at A2 and A4).

1440 It affected also his recollection of recollection at 249C2-4. Cf. n.499.

1441 We might be tempted to contrast the Speaker of Socrates's First Speech who likewise lost his self-control in an access of nonsensical "volubility" (εὔροια , cf. 237C7 and n.284) when he reached the definition of eros.

1442 247A8-B1: Cf. also n.430.

1443 It is noteworthy that by addressing the god he in effect apologizes to us for the digression.

Phaedrus just as Socrates is playing the Speaker) to be able to follow him, to be "like" him in the experience he had in the world beyond, for he reminds him that "we," as he puts it, "were then following in the train of Zeus" (250B7).

With the resumptive μέν (C7), he brings himself back to the position he was in at the end of the μέν clause at 250B1-5, and with the subsequent δέ clause he picks up the thread of the argument (ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, C8), in which he was drawing a distinction between the way beauty is embodied in this world and the way the great virtues of soul are here embodied. Beauty not only shone there, in the company of the other forms: here, also, we perceive its very gleam making its way to us most powerfully through the most powerful of our senses, namely sight, which for us in our bodily form is the sharpest of the senses that get through to us[1444] – by which, he again cannot resist suddenly to add, *knowledge* is not seen: "Formidable indeed would be the erotic madness we would suffer if *Knowledge* were to provide some easy image of herself to pass into us through our vision, or any of those other things that stimulate the soul!" To some extent the three digressions have conspired to remind us of our previous life so that we can now accept this amazing argument – perhaps the most radical "inversion" or "transposition"[1445] in all of Plato – that beauty is so exciting to us in this life because it is especially visible, but that if the things even closer to our souls[1446] were visible we would be jumping out of our skin! Even if the joggings upward have not prepared us to take this leap they have shown us why the *Speaker* believes it – that is, they evince the emotional consecutivity of the discourse and therefore that I should adduce them here constitutes an interpretation of the speech.

Having completed the distinction between the types of things and how they appear in this world he has reached a basis for explaining what is happening to the man who remembers, this thing that the man did not adequately "see through" (διαισθάνεσθαι, 250B1), and so now he can revert to the distinction between the types of persons that came before (249E4-250B1).[1447] The persons whose memory has become weak are indeed affected by the φέγγος of beauty in this world but since their memory is weak it fails to transport them to a reverent contemplation of true beauty and instead they give themselves over to pleasure, and in a sense betray[1448] the underlying truth about themselves and the world, by adopting a four-legged position and seeking to mount the beauty. Consorting as they have consented to do with a violent and unbridled way of life they have no sense of awe toward the gods nor even feel shame in the eyes of men for betraying the deeper truth of nature merely for the sake of an ersatz pleasure. The description is not only reminiscent of the behavior of the "lover" criticized in the two earlier speeches, but also functions as foil[1449] for the ensuing description (251A1ff) of the man whose memory has not been destroyed by such "consorting"[1450] – who, it is the burden of this section of the speech to argue, is the true lover (ἐρῶν) exactly because he is vulnerable to the madness of "eros for the best things."[1451] The Speaker had begun the section by baldly asserting that erotic madness accelerates the regrowth of the soul's feathers so that it can return to the sky early (249D5-7), i.e., that eros is a peculiar affliction of the philosophical type who alone may be able to

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1444 I owe to Mr Morrissey the insight, which he inferred from the subsequent relative clause, that this is less a praise of the eyes than a criticism of all the bodily senses. Beauty owes some of its power to the peculiar acuity of sight.

1445 I borrow the term from A.Diès, *Autour de Platon* (Beauchesne, 1926) Bk.4.

1446 Since justice temperance and intelligence (or knowledge [247D7], or wisdom) are virtues of the soul.

1447 The movement is annular just as were the description of the huperouranion (cf. n.457) and the explanation of losing feathers (cf. n.477).

1448 This is a second connotation of παραδούς, 250E4.

1449 Besides depicting the bad lover of the speeches and serving as foil it raises a question about bad motivation that will become the central problem in the final section of the speech, in the fuller description of "our" soul's bad and good horses (253D3-255A1).

1450 Cf. προσομιλῶν (250E5) with the ὁμιλίαι of 250A3.

1451 ἐραστὴς καλεῖται (249E5): On the sound-play cf n. *ad loc.*

return in only three life cycles. Now he will justify or fill in that bald assertion. The man who does remember – i.e., the philosopher, who tarries always on the things divine by keeping to the discipline of viewing the things of this world as ὑπομνήματα (249C4-8) – recoils in reverence when he sees the face of a beauty or his body. The recoiling, an essentially ethical response, now receives a fanciful neuro-physiological description of the process that underlies it and is its corollary (the physiological man shudders, heats up, and breaks out in a sweat). which explanation itself segues into a description of the psychic events as if they in turn underlay the physiology, psychic events articulated in terms of the image of the soul as winged and having to do with the nourishment and strengthening of its feathers (251A3-C5).

Thus there are three levels that are unapologetically presented as if each underlay its predecessor: the man's ethical consciousness (A3-7), the man's physiology (A7-B1), and the image of the feathered soul with its mechanics (B1-C5).[1452] The strategy of presenting the levels of analysis in order to connect what seems to him to be happening with what underlies it, is effectuated by synonyms. The *ethical* shrinking (σεβᾶν) corresponds to a physical frisson (φρίκη); the essentially *epidermal* sequelae of fever and sweat then give way to a *psychic* irrigation and lubrication attaching to the feathers' pores (τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκφυσιν), thitherto dried out and hardened, through which the quills could now sprout as they swell and start (A7-B7: n.b. ᾥδησέ τε καὶ ὥρμησε). The soul as a whole is now described as boiling and bursting (ζεῖ ... καὶ ἀνακηκίει [C1], a less euphonic re-do of ᾥδησέ τε καὶ ὥρμησε above) to push its quills through these pores, inflicting upon itself a sensation akin to the bothersome itch one feels when cutting teeth (C1-3). Though the feeling is attributed to the soul that is sprouting its wings (C4), the overarching metaphorical purpose of the analogy is to invoke the sexual itch that exists on the second and first, physiological and conscious levels. The metaphorical connections can go upward just as well as downward. The "boiling" of the soul (ζεῖ, C1 and C4) is then restated so as to incorporate the intervening analogy of teeth-cutting: the soul boils and is bothered by *tickling* (γαργαλίζεται, C5) rather than itching (κνῆσις, C3). The difference between tickling and itching is served up to us by the parallelism with ἀγανάκτησις, but is left unexplained.

With μὲν οὖν (C5-6) a new paragraph is announced. By now we anticipate that it will both restate what came before and take it further. Restatement comes in the terms βλέπουσα (cf. ἰδόντα, A7 and προσορῶν, A5), δεχομένη (cf. B1), ἄρδηται (cf. B3), and θερμαίνηται (cf.B3); but the "taking it further" is done by λωφᾷ τε τῆς ὀδύνης καὶ γέγηθεν, which describes the after-effects of ᾥδησέ τε καὶ ὥρμησε φύεσθαι (B5-6): what follows the sprouting of the quill is now described as a surcease of pain and an onset of joy, so that the relation between itching and tickling is "explained." But the explanation only works because we recognize the phenomenon as analogous to experiences we know on the higher physiological and cognitive levels that this fanciful image of a feathered soul has been invented to explain.

The description morphs the metaphor of quills sprouting with the attending sensations of itching and release in a way that combines the feelings that attend sexual arousal with an imaginary mechanism of sprouting feathers. He next describes the mechanism of the perception of beauty that causes this reaction (251C5ff) as an influx of particles of beauty flowing into him from the beautiful boy, confirmed again with a fanciful etymology of ἵμερος, desire.[1453] Conversely when he does not see the beauty of the boy, the feathering process cools down and dries up, so that the process causes him pain that might still be interrupted by recollections of beauty and its pleasure. The whipsawing leaves him quite beside himself. The erratic and egregious behavior of the lover condemned in the first two speeches returns, but now now make a re-appearance in a completely new light as the outer result of

1452 The Speaker is careful to remind us he is relying on the image with the periphrasis τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος (251B7). Cf.n.576.

1453 Cf. n.579.

an involuntary psycho-physiological process that involves his recollection of the *Jenerwelt*. This time we *sympathize* with him when we hear that he "harvests sweet pleasure," an expression that seemed so selfish and exploitative when we encountered it in Socrates's First Speech.[1454] *Of course* he gloms onto the Beauty; *of course* he forgets his family, counts his money worthless, throws honor, convention and appearances to the winds, and makes himself a "willing slave" to beauty – all the things the lying non-lovers who spoke in the other speeches had castigated the lover for doing and being.

We have reached the description of the lover as μανικῶς διακείμενος, to use the expression with which he began this section (249D8) which is now complete. He formally concludes it by turning to his Boy (252B1-C2): 'This then is the inner nature of the experience the man with a memory is vulnerable to have, the feather-sprouting stimulus of the god Eros that puts a man at the mercy of only the best things.' The closure is then annealed by another "fanciful etymology" according to which men call this god Eros but the gods call him Pteros (Winged).

How the Lover Chooses his Beloved: 252C3-253C6

We can stop a moment and look back to describe the way this speech is being structured. In addition to the enthused jerks upward, we have noticed ring structure within the last two sections, and now is the time to point out the relationship between these two phenomena or structural features. The jerk upward introduces *a priori* truth, the "first things" in the order of truth or nature (the Alpha), and then the ensuing discourse finds a way to return to them as conclusions, or "last things" in the order of learning (the Omega). The "hypothesis" (we may loosely call it) of a quasi-divine[1455] pre-embodied life is posited *a priori* and without justification but then the description of our life here that it enables us to carry out discovers or reveals that the true meaning of this life has all along consisted of striving to return to that one. Thus, in particular, the sudden description of the subjective experience of the beyond (250B5ff) provided the support we needed a page later to believe the radical new argument that beauty is less thrilling than justice would be, if only justice had the gleam beauty happens to have been accorded in this world (250D4-6). Likewise, the digression previous to that one, which described the huperouranion and the gods' objective experience of eternal truths (247C3ff), provided the ontological support for the radical and new notion that human soul, though by nature nourished by the sight of such divine objects, has fallen on bad times in this world and needs to repair to that world in order to regain substance for all its strivings – in other words that the philosopher is the ἀνήρ among ἄνθρωποι (248C2-249D3). Third, even earlier, the sudden vision of the army of god-souls flying in the heavens (246E4ff) provided the context in which the failure of human striving could turn into a rat-race of mutual destruction in pursuit of derogated versions of the original goals (248A6-C2).

This double movement that first posits the preposterous and then justifies it by means of the edifying illumination it provides about the world we know all too well, is exactly what the Speaker had in mind when he warned his Boy at the beginning that his "demonstration" would be incredible to the clever but trustworthy to the wise (245C1-2). In the hands of the clever type, ring structure was mere semantic play (as we saw in the epigrammatic Capitals of Lysias's speech); but here it is a vehicle for turning the *a priori* into an *a posteriori*. The inspired up and down movement of the thought in the

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1454 ἡδονήν ... γλυκυτάτην ... καρποῦται (251E5-252A1), echoed from τὸ ἑαυτοῦ γλύκυ ... καρποῦσθαι ἐπιθυμῶν (240A7-8), there derogatorily specific (cf. n.1404).

1455 The myth envisions a state in our existence for which the term ἰσόθεος, elsewhere hyperbolic (e.g., 258C2), is almost literally true, since the god-souls ungrudgingly allow the other souls (i.e., "us") to follow in their trains and emulate them (246A6-7).

present speech, yielding to inspiration and then finding the grounds for trusting it in the things it illuminates, was in Socrates's First Speech replaced by a monotonic downward movement from premise to conclusion by division to the right that had neither any means nor any need to rise above its own prior belief but could only deduce a story that was consistent with it.[1456]

To return to the speech (252C3ff), if the Speaker has proven that the ἐραστής is truly an ἐρῶν τῶν ἀρίστων (249E1-4),[1457] it remains for him to prove to the Boy that somehow it will benefit him to consent to become his beloved,[1458] but the definition of divine erotic madness has so radically revised the commonplace notion of lover and beloved as they were presented in the first two speeches that the entire relationship needs first to be redefined from scratch. During his enthused digression just above on the soul's sojourn in the world beyond (250B5-C8), the Speaker had interposed the remark to the Boy that they had been together in the train of Zeus (250B7), and this is where he begins the redefinition (252C3).

Followers of Zeus, he tells the Boy (and us), can bear the heavy bother of eros-anxiety with relative equanimity, while the followers of Ares fly off the handle at the least provocation; and so with the others, each manages the bittersweet toil of being captured by love according to the personality he has taken on as a result of his emulation of this or that god during his sojourn above, unless he has become corrupted. That orientation will guide him in his life's career on earth as well as in his choice of associates, including whom he loves. Herewith the articulation of the divine procession into its Olympian twelve-fold division narrated above (246E4-247A7) is given its application and purpose: the character of the god we followed in our unembodied existence bleeds through as an effect in this life so as to produce the empirical spectrum of human personalities and propensities. The lover will espy in somebody the embodiment of that same god and this will qualify that somebody to be his beloved. He will care for him just as one worships a god, fostering his beloved's resemblance to the divine. In case he has not already fastened onto a lifestyle, his constant contact with the Boy he is attracted to will reawaken in him some traces in his memory of the god he followed that will guide him, for once, to his own proper *Lebensmittel*. The characterology of love affairs is thus explained, how one man chooses a beloved that is regal like Hera and another an Apollonian type. The *benefit* the lover offers the beloved is that his love leads the beloved, with generosity and the absence of all envy, to foster his own very best instincts and potentials – the "god within him" – with generosity and the absence of all envy, indeed just as the gods in heaven allowed souls to follow them without envy.[1459] Though the lover's behavior is solicitous and devoted its motive is quite the opposite of the behavior the first two speeches could only understand as selfish, obsessive and controlling. If in the end the boy and the lover do make love, the boy's affair with this "mad lover" will not be an ugly and loathsome thing but happy and beautiful[1460] – if, that is, the lover does choose the boy.

How the Beloved is Captured: 253C7-255E4

1456 The corollary between these movements and the movements upward toward the ἀνυπόθετον as opposed to the movement downward from an unexamined hypothesis to its implications, as described at the end of *Rep*.6, is obvious.

1457 Cf. n.521.

1458 The promise to treat this topic was broached in passing at 249E2 (καὶ τῷ κοινωνοῦντι).

1459 253B7-8: Cf. 247A7. The relation between the unembodied soul in the heavens and the god it followed, is the model of the beloved's relation with the beloved!

1460 253C2-5.

The sudden proviso clause ἐὰν αἱρεθῇ[1461] placed at the end of this blissful description (C5-6) marvelously turns the tables on the Speaker's audience, namely the Boy his speech is meant to "seduce." Rather than the posture of *blasé* indifference we saw in the self-styled non-lover of Lysias's speech, we now see in the lover the careful reserve of a man who has the most precious of all boons to bestow on the young man that he finds eligible – a character in fact not all that different from the gentle and solicitious character that was the Speaker in Socrates's First Speech. If it is *possible* that a grown man should not have identified the divine spark within himself and might be led to find it by his beloved (252E5-253A5), it is not only possible but even *likely* that the young man he is addressing feels he is walking around full of undiscovered potential that a more adult man might more easily see and bring forth out of him.[1462] By thus focussing on the question whether the Boy will have the good sense to acquiesce once he has been chosen out, the Speaker has transformed the attempt to persuade the Boy to agree into an admonition that he must not fail to do so. In this way his rhetoric borrows the indirect method of the non-lovers we heard in the first two speeches, without taking on the mortgage of committing blasphemy against the god! And at the same time Socrates comes closer to persuading Phaedrus to decide on a different direction in his own life.

In order to make the case the Speaker hearkens even further back than he just had in the last section when he recalled the procession of the gods. Now he reaches all the way back to the beginning of his myth and the image of the soul as charioteer and horses that were somehow eternally grown together.[1463] Finally this striking and unexplained opening description will be given its use and application. The horses of "our" souls – i.e., of the souls that may someday become human – were not both good like the horses of the gods's souls. We had said one was bad and other was good and that this was the reason we had difficulty following the gods to the huperouranion, and why we ever even descended into the human bodies we find ourselves within, but we never described the horses' virtue and their vice, and in particular how these affect the embodied phase of our lives! This the Speaker now proceeds to do, in an allegorical mode. Their looks express their characters, the one obedient and white, the other unruly and black. When the charioteer espies his beloved and the heat spreads through the soul to its two horses (διαθερμήνας, 253E6, according to the physiological process we have just learned about), the two horses react differently. The good one, then as always, remains obedient to the charioteer, but the other lunges toward the beloved and threatens to trample him so as to leave a mark on him by which to commemorate the joy of sexual pleasure.[1464]

This latter aspect of psychic behavior is just what must have taken over the man whose memory had been corrupted and who tried to "mount" the Beauty two sections ago (250E1-251A1)! We are about to be entertained by an account of the inner toils we constantly feel in this life, entertained because the ethical struggle will be mediated for us by the speculative allegory of the charioteer and horses within.[1465] The other two elements of the soul now battle the bad horse, abhorring to commit such a deed; but the bad horse will simply not let up and at his behest they finally acquiesce in approaching the Boy. The whole soul now sees his visage and is struck by his flashing glance. The charioteer's memory jerks his consciousness back to that vision of beauty in the huperouranion, temperate and stately in its primal form, and he recoils, just as the *remembering* man had been

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1461 On the meaning of αἱρεθῇ (253C6) cf. n.639.

1462 Surely, by the way, this is the case with the indecisive Phaedrus! The two alternatives show how he might be both the protégé and the dévoté of Lysias and/or Socrates.

1463 246B1-3.

1464 μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χάριτος (254A6-7): For my guess as to the sense of this phrase cf. n.660 *ad loc.*

1465 Much of the language is borrowed from the description of the men at 250E-251A. What were metaphors there now "come true" with more concrete meanings. See notes *ad locc.*

described to recoil above (251A3-5), except that for a charioteer to recoil means that he falls backward and yanks back the reins! The horses suddenly stall and then back off from the beloved, the good one breaking into a sweat from shame but the bad one as soon as he gets his breath beginning to lambast the others for their unmanly failure of nerve. Relentlessly he cajoles them to go back to the Beauty but they beg for time. He remembers just how much time they begged for and when it has elapsed he renews his cajolery, he groans, he tugs at them, and finally bites down on the bit and drags them toward the Beauty by main force. Upon the sight of the Beauty the charioteer again recoils, only more strongly, and this time he yanks back the reins so hard they yank the bit loose from the lusty horse's teeth and bloody his jaw. Backward he stalls once again, giving himself over not to pleasure but to the pain of the bit (ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν).[1466]

The repetition of the idiom in διδόναι, done now in the gnomic aorist, creates a kind of closure for the comparison between the internal psychic battle which has now come to an end, and the external reactions of the two men that was its thematic precedent in the narrative two sections before. The bad horse has been quelled and the soul can now "follow" the beloved in unanimous reverence. The pursued beloved now palpably feels the lover's pure and good intent; bad rumors he had heard about lovers in general now melt away; time passes and by a conspiracy of his fate and his age he admits the lover into his company. It dawns upon him that divine forces are at work beneath the surface, and now it is his turn to be stunned.[1467] In contrast his other friends and relations sink to the category of the merely human. And one day the stream of desire that had flowed from his eyes into the eyes of the lover and had enflamed him, overflow the lover's eyes and redound back to the beloved: it is a physiological and mechanical process and as such he feels its effects but does not understand what is going on. He is in love, a reflected love, though he calls it friendship: he feels toward the lover what the lover feels toward him but not as strongly. He wants to see him, to touch him, to kiss him, to lie down with him – and soon enough these desires are enacted.

The account of their tryst now shifts from the mechanical and involuntary physiological plane to the metaphor of the charioteer and horses, which now serves as the vehicle for describing the voluntary and ethical dimension of erotic experience. The lover's black horse might have a remark – that for all his trouble he finally deserves a little pleasure – but now the beloved's black horse is speechless and bursting with desire. He simply throws his arms around the lover, confused and at a loss. As they then lie together this horse has nothing with which to resist the further advances of the lover, in case he asks to take him, whereas this horse's yokemate and charioteer oppose him out of reverence and reason.

The beautiful and happy relationship promised at the end of the previous section about the lover's pursuit has now come true in the description of the beloved's acquiescence, and the section is closed. The Speaker achieves this moving and delicate description of what turns out to be not the beloved's seduction and capture so much as his awakening and conversion, by recurring to his opening image of the soul as charioteer and mixed horses. In place of an external description of two men who have better and worse memories and their two reactions to the sight of beauty and the two very different kinds of lover they become, he has now interposed an internal and ethical description, through metaphors, of what is going on within the souls of both of those men and of anybody else who has been ever or will ever become a man, but now he applies the description to the beloved.

Love-life: 256A7-E2

1466 In his failure he "gives himself over" to pain (ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν (254E5), whereas the forgetful man in victory "gave himself over" to pleasure (ἡδονῇ παραδούς, 250E4). Cf. n.683.

1467 ἐκπλήττει, 255B4.

Now that they have found each other their love-life must be described, in contrast with the horror stories of the first two speeches which in fact depicted any continuing love relationship as unbearable for the beloved. If the lover's and beloved's better parts do win out and the relationship is moderate and philosophical they will be not only be happy but blessed also, for they will have enslaved the part of the soul that lets evil in and will have freed the part that promotes virtue. The outcome will be that their souls will become winged and light, a boon far greater than any that can be accorded to a man by any merely human sanity or even by divine madness. But if they adopt a crasser regime for themselves and turn from the love of wisdom toward the love of honor there will come a moment when they will be caught unawares, when the lusty members of their teams will take control and lead them to indulge in the activity that the general run of mankind think of as the most blessed of pleasures. From that day forward their life together will change. They will indulge themselves again but not often since the other parts of themselves never really approved. Friends they surely will remain. Since they have shared the ultimate intimacy they will never descend into unmitigated enmity. As to the outcome they will remain unwinged but ready to become so when they leave their bodies again, and by dint of the love they have shared will have embarked on a path to becoming winged together.

It is striking that the less inspired physical reaction to the authentic and essentially psychic relationship is not roundly condemned but accorded a measure of praise. Even the derogated erotic connection has value or goodness for the two parties, though in itself it stops their advance toward the heavens. The relationship that ensues from their experience together of what we would today call "casual sex," even if only once, establishes for them a permanent though fruitless bond that endures through their sojourn in the human world, neither taking them far nor leaving them destitute of hope. Love is bigger than they are! Suddenly we are struck by the realization that this middling sort of existence is not so easy to distinguish from the life and the relationship that the non-lovers of Lysias had advocated their beloveds to share with them. Yes, it avoids the obsessive work and commitment of a real love affair; and No, it doesn't go anywhere. But Lysias's non-lover has gone further: he has betrayed the truth of love, which is bigger than he is, and he will have a different fate. It is as if he has only listened to his dark horse, and hears only the cajoling arguments he concocts to get his way, of which we saw an example above,[1468] and gives over his mouth to voice them. How different from the person who has at least been baptised in the knowledge of Beauty's Nature but one day slips.

The Double Peroration: 256E3-257B6

The Speaker now announces to the Boy that he is finished: "So many as these, my Boy, and so divine are the gifts that the friendship of a lover will confer upon you. The friendship of a non-lover (and now he is referring directly to the first two speeches and what they advocated) will afford you only mixed boons and can only inspire you to a slavish sort of human virtue that will leave you plodding aimlessly through the earthly cycles for thousands of years." Without warning but with a parallel formula that gives us a double-take,[1469] Eros is next apostrophized, for the speech is not only the Speaker's attempt to persuade the Boy about the value of love. The Speaker is also Socrates's ventriloquist for his palinode to Eros, to remove the offense of his first speech. To the extent that the speech has, in fact, been a hymn to Eros it is time for the formal *envoi*, and the language of the kletic hymn or prayer comes into play. "Be well-disposed and pleased toward me; do not deprive me of what

1468 254C5-D1, D2-4; and 255E5-256A1.
1469 Cf. n.778.

erotic art I might possess; let it be no less honored by beautiful boys than ever.[1470] If we had spoken ill of you before, blame not us but Lysias who sent us on that tack, and make him stop and turn instead toward philosophy; and let his lover here waver no more but live his life in honest and pure devotion to Eros with thoughts and speeches that are philosophical."

Phaedrus had played the part of the Boy for the sake of Socrates's performance in the role of the Speaker; but now, still within the performance but at its end, Socrates speaks in his own voice, so that Phaedrus the spectator is forced to become Phaedrus himself, and is no longer allowed to play (and hide within) a role. We saw a similar move at the end of Lysias's speech when Lysias's Non-lover asks his beloved, but at the same time Lysias asks his audience of students, to ask him a question if he has left anything out, with the disarming sound-play, ἐρώτα – a closing twist that went back to Gorgias's *Praise of Helen*.[1471] In Socrates's hands however the trick has a purpose more noble than the merely disarming titillation that Phaedrus had confessed to Socrates he had felt during Lysias's performance during the morning.[1472] There the titillation was caused by the prospect of manipulating a beautiful boy without risk of humiliation – a power-play by a stunted soul – but the prospect Socrates has in mind for Phaedrus, as he says at the very end, is to become engaged with all his soul in living the life of real love, i.e., philosophy, as the most edifying and happiest life of all.[1473]

Retrospective Reaction to the Third Speech

The first two speeches – the speech of Lysias and Socrates's technically improved version of it – and in particular the problems they raise but fail to solve and misgivings they arouse but fail to relieve, provoke the Third Speech. Indeed the very orderliness of disposition in the Second Speech (first the definition and then the evaluation) and the seeming perspicuity of its conceptual scheme (the conventional exhaustive lists, the smooth logical movement of division "to the right," and the explicit programmatic remarks) are what prompt and enable us to realize what is inadequate and inarticulate in its argument that eros is bad. Much that was ambiguous in that speech, and much that was confusing or half-baked in the first speech by Lysias, becomes amenable to clarification and improvement only now, with the Third Speech, which the two of them called into existence.

At the same time that the Third Speech resolves the theoretical problems raised by the two speeches, it sheds light on the motivations for some of the conversational behavior of Socrates and Phaedrus before and between the speeches, which had remained obscure. It is a truism that drama precedes dogma in Plato's dialogues,[1474] but in the present case the Third Speech brings that truism more intensely true than anywhere else in the corpus, because of the darkness of the drama on which the light comes to be shone. The characters already "act out" before they have become aware of what is going on inside themselves and can take responsibility for the effects they are having on one another – in particular their own erotic confusions and enthusiasms. Exactly because they do not know what is

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1470 Cf. nn.782, 783, and 785.

1471 234C5: Cf. "Analysis of the First Speech: Cap.16" *supra*, and Gorgias's closing characterization of the entire λόγος as if from the outside: Ἑλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον, ἐμὸν δέ παίγνιον (DK 82B11 [2.294,19-20]). The joke is that he becomes as fictional as his subject matter and his subject matter becomes as real as himself – a double comparison achieved with μέν / δέ and the parallelism of the possessives ἐμόν and Ἑλένης. It is a self-advertising signature.

1472 οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον (227C4): Cf. nn.35 and 39, and "Analysis of the First Speech: The Setting."

1473 μηκέτι ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ κάθαπερ νῦν ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς πρὸς Ἔρωτα μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποιῆται (B5-6): Cf. βιοτεύῃ (252D3) and n.607.

1474 Cf. my nn. to *Rep*.335E7, 525D5, 531D8 and 533A8-9.

going on but only react to each other, they find themselves driven into a deeper investigation than they had contemplated, not about oratory and writing but about the nature of eros. What is unique in the present case is that what they discover about eros supplies *us* with an explanation of the things we had found strange in their behavior along the path that led them to Socrates's Second Speech, an explanation that also clarifies the residual questions we had when Socrates and Phaedrus seemed to be speaking a private language to each other – obscurities which at the time of our reading we may well have blamed on Plato, the dramatist, and dismissed and then forgot.

I will illustrate these broad and somewhat novel claims about the Third Speech with the analysis of two passages, one that illustrates how the speech clarifies *theoretical* difficulties in the first two speeches and one how it clarifies the *action and behavior* of the characters.

The *theoretical* example is the confusion we encountered in the definition of eros in the Second Speech. The Speaker at first had been entirely *unclear* about τῶν καλῶν (237D4-5):[1475] Was this objective genitive (dependent on ἐπιθυμεῖν) masculine or neuter, so that even non-erotics desire beautiful things (or "beauty" *per se*) though perhaps not boys? Or was it masculine in which case not only erotics but non-erotics, too, desire beautiful boys? The logic of the passage preferred the latter interpretation because only if the non-erotic and the erotic were indistinguishable as to their desires would it follow that we needed to decide how to distinguish them: if the non-erotics love beautiful things but the erotics love beautiful boys in particular we have the distinction already. A similar ambiguity occurs within the climactic definition, where the third sample of hubristic desire is trotted out and begins as a desire for the pleasure of "beauty" but in the next line when it is strengthened by the other desires it is described as a desire for the beauty of bodies (238C1,C2). Was the "beauty" already meant to be the beauty *of bodies*, so that the erotic is the man whose desire for bodily beauty overcomes all his other desires so that it becomes ἐκπρεπής and leads to him getting the name "erotic?" Or was there at first an irrational desire for beauty *per se*, that subsequently is intensified into a more narrowly directed desire for the beauty *of bodies*? The language again allows us to imagine there is a desire for beauty *per se* (whether expressed as τοῦ κάλλους [sc. αὐτοῦ] at 238C1, or as τῶν καλῶν [understood as neuter] at 237D4-5) but that the truly erotic person desires only a beauty of bodies (σωμάτων κάλλους).

In addition to these frustrating, or perfectly executed, ambiguities there is the glaring problem that this third kind of hubristic desire already has to be the desire for what is usually called τἀφροδίσια, in order for the elaborate and careful parallels with eating and drinking to go through in the first place. The canonical desires are for food, drink and sex; the excesses of these desires are here said to get derogatory names. The first name is actually presented – namely, γαστριμαργία – and the second is passed over in what appears to be an aposiopesis (οἰνοφλυγία is what I would supply, dipsomania not being ancient Greek). As to the third, what we today might imitate Greek by calling satyriasis or nymphomania, receives instead and yet climactically "the name for the sake of which the entire run up has been conceived" – namely, "eros" held out to the end of the sentence so as to be its climactic last word. The names are meant to designate the specific category of desire in its extreme form, but "eros," the name for hubristic or rash *sexual* desire, is here said to come from the fact that the other desires enforce it, a fact that is equally true, *mutatis mutandis*, of any and all other hubristic desires and in fact the reason that they severally become salient in comparison with the others. By the same argument he gives, gluttony could have been called eros and dipsomania could have been called eros. But the Speaker is too excited by his own rhetoric even to notice: he is bearing witness to the desire he is describing by being overcome by it; and in the course of describing this desire to the Beloved who is his audience, he forgets the distinction between the beauty of the beloved and the

1475 Cf. n.267.

beauty of the beloved's visible body for the same reason. And the reason is, he is erotically aroused.

When we first read his speech we could only describe the state of mind he was in as "inarticulate" or "confused;" but once we learn the vagaries of life in the aftermath of the soul's experience peeking up into the huperouranion, the Speaker's confused state of mind becomes entirely understandable. The beauty he sees in the boy (ὁ καλός) reminds him of the true beauty he had seen before, but because his memory is weak (besides his bad horse being improperly managed or poorly nourished) the stimulus of the reminder drives him not toward a μνῆμα τοῦ κάλλους but a μνεία τοῦ κάλλους:[1476] not to a transporting recollection but to action and conquest of the ersatz beauty of the body he sees before him.

If this analysis illustrates how the Third Speech resolves a *theoretical* problem in the first part of the dialogue we may turn to a passage that sheds light on the *action* that led up to the Third Speech, and in particular Socrates's sudden decision to stay and present a palinode rather than leave. The incumbency to compose it occurs to him suddenly and intrusively but he reveals his sense of it in stages, during which stages the discussion between himself and Phaedrus moves in fits and starts (241D2-242D2). He quits the Second Speech abruptly and begs off continuing on the pretense that he will be carried away (241D2-E5), although it is unclear what would be so bad about being carried away.[1477] Instead of explaining why, he resolves that in addition to stopping he will "get out of there pronto" (E5-242A2). Phaedrus arrests him: "Not yet!" and presents the less than compelling reason that he stay until the sun has passed the meridian – its stopping place in the sky – when the heat will have abated (A3-6). Immediately (though the reason is unclear) Socrates replies that Phaedrus has a divine sort power in regard to speeches, having caused so many to be composed, and has even now caused still another one to be composed, a speech to be composed by Socrates himself (A7-B5). When did Socrates feel this compulsion (προσαναγκάζοντα, 242B2)? He tells us immediately (B8-C1): It was when he was about to leave just now, at which moment he heard from his daimon to stop. But if we look above a few lines, we see that "that moment" could not be before Phaedrus said "Not yet!" since Phaedrus's remonstrance was an immediate response to his resolve to leave. In other words, he thought he heard his daimon at the same time he heard Phaedrus's prohibition. In Phaedrus's "No!" he heard his daimon say "No!" and the "divinity" he now attributes to Phaedrus (A7-8) is a spontaneous recoil and expression of his sense that some deeper influence or force came over him, which upon reflection he can attribute to Phaedrus as its mouthpiece or spokesman, at the moment that he was ungenerously and fearfully trying to "get out of there."

By the time he brings up the daimon a few lines later, he has become aware of the influence that has come over him and he articulates his realization in his usual self-deprecating way as a sort of guess based on his own personal mantic ability, "not professional but good enough to serve his needs" – which comes to saying that he has enough inward sensitivity or conscience to know when he is doing something wrong. He is saying to Phaedrus quite the same thing he said to him earlier about the interpretation of myths, that he is not interested in professional proficiency but only in knowing as much as he needs to know to live his life properly (229C6-230A7). In the present case he has intuited that he must perform some kind of purification as if he had committed blasphemy. And to focus this feeling that he is now undergoing, he describes a certain discomfort he felt in his soul during the speech he was giving – for the soul, too, is mantic, as he explains. This feeling clinches his suspicions and now he can make a declaration. The error he committed was that he "slighted the gods in his effort to achieve honor among men," as Ibycus once put it. That is, he spent his intelligence trying to

1476 Cf. 254A6 and n.660.

1477 This reaction is stronger than a similar reaction he suffered in the middle of the speech immediately after delivering himself of his voluble "definition" of eros, which as we have seen just above was aroused by his (or his Speaker's) feelings for the Boy.

improve on Lysias's speech – and we have seen in some detail that he did indeed make it better and how he made it better – but in accepting Lysias's premise that eros is a bad thing for men he has all along been blaspheming Eros in the process, who is a god. Once this divine point of view is introduced, the improvement of Lysias's speech in his own speech becomes a paltry exercise of words that can impress only the ignorant, as he says further down.[1478] Socrates will prefer to do an about-face and fix his gaze upon the divinity as a corrective to the effort of re-assembling the downward looking and downward directed rhetoric of the loving non-lover trying to seduce the boy, expressed most accurately, or appropriately, in the speech of Lysias.

We cannot know he has secured his footing in the divine so surely, but neither can he for that matter! The proof of his reformation can only come in the retraction itself. Immediately he warms up by arguing the contrary of the conventional view, proving that madness is not in itself an evil since it can be a boon sent to mankind by the gods, which then enables him to argue that the god, Eros, sends his own particular kind of divine madness to men for their benefit. To reverse our perspective in this way he must begin by disengaging us from our conventional beliefs, and he begins to do so by these fantastical etymologies (244C1-D5), according to which "mantic" was originally "manic:" moderns just as foolish as that speechwriter he just tried to imitate added a T out of their ignorance, an ignorance he happens to describe with the term "unfamiliarity with the beautiful" (ἀπειροκάλως, 244C4); and a second etymology, according to which "oionistic" was originally a *derogatory* term, oio-no-istic, meaning "fancying that human ratiocination is dispositive," a criticism which again the ignorant moderns failed to understand. Instead they obliterated any trace of its derogatory meaning by ignorantly lengthening the O so as to make the word sound more important – the same motive of self-aggrandizement that Socrates confessed had motivated him to improve upon Lysias and compose that First Speech of his.

The etymologies loosen us up at the same time that they redirect our attention to a wiser time prior to ours of which our time, we are meant to see, is a derogated precipitate. With this keynote he will go on in his huge speech to present a far-ranging account of our worldly experience similarly based on and structured by a past we hardly know because we can barely remember it and find in the dealings of this world no incentive, or perhaps even a disincentive, to try. The truth and rhetorical power of this account, depicting our "pre-somatic" experience, consists entirely in its inherent cognitive value and "authenticity" that we can be aroused to feel in it, even in this world, a feeling mediated by or in our memory, and not at all in its likeliness as an historical or scientific account in the manner of the mythologists Socrates criticized at the beginning of the conversation, or or the augury of bird-signs he has just mentioned in this preamble.

Because Socrates has suddenly undergone and has taken refuge in this reversal of perspective and now endeavors to lead Phaedrus (and us) to do so in turn, the transition away from his paltry First Speech to the Myth is dramatically the most important event so far. It begins to dawn on us, too, who had been drawn into the unspoken confusions of the ego and had been left to navigate by dead reckoning the vortex of eros through which the action was moving (I refer to the interpersonal behavior of Socrates and Phaedrus up to this point) that the world we live in is *merely* human, and that what sense it has and what sense we can make of it comes from viewing it as a precipitate or a shadow of a divine life that pre-exists it.

And now we come to the magical event, the way the myth explains the halting action between Phaedrus and Socrates that occurred before Socrates conceived of delivering it. In Socrates's Second Speech we hear first about soul *per se*, and then about the souls of the gods and those of "us," and then how the souls of the gods fly up to the outer boundary of the sky[1479] in order to feed on the

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1478 242E5-243A2.

1479 With the exception of Hestia, who stays at home: cf. 247A1-2 and n.424.

sights beyond, subsequently to return calm and satisfied to their homes and feed the horses that drew their chariots with ambrosia and water them with nectar. In the midst of this narrative we encounter a most arresting image. It is the moment when moving beyond the sky with their easy and balanced team the gods reach its outer back and *come to a stand*. The moment is frozen in our minds by a sudden gnomic aorist (ἔστησαν, 247B7); and at this point though they have come to a stop they begin again to move, conveyed now by the very rotation of the outer sphere or περιφορά. Now at rest, they gaze upon the constellations of the forms beyond. It is striking and plain that this coming to a stand for the gods is the "original" of which the moment of high noon and the sun standing still is the correlate within the realm of human experience, the moment at which Socrates was inspired to abandon his intentionalistic (self-moved) project of improving Lysias's speech and to allow the inspiration of the gods to move him instead. Phaedrus just happens to mention this special designation of noon, μεσημβρία – as "the so called stopping point" (ἵσταται ἡ δὴ καλουμένη σταθερά, 242A4-5). Because the significance of this metaphor is unclear to Phaedrus and only subconsciously clear to Socrates (it is the subconscious reason, I submit, that he replies that Phaedrus is "divine on speeches") there is nothing in the text to indicate, at that point at least, what its significance is supposed to be for us, either. Busy hands have emended the phrase out of the text,[1480] but there it is, an adumbration of what is to come. We were *supposed* to be uncertain what it meant so that the advent of the myth could answer the question for us.

The foregoing account of these theoretical and dramatic issues exhibits that we can, and therefore must, read the Third Speech as a revelation of the inadequacies and confusions in the action and thought that brought it on. In other words we need to reverse our ground and orientation just as Socrates did when he decided to unsing what he had sung, with a palinode. We must unread what we had read. In order to understand the three speeches we have to read them backwards; but as soon as we do we will remember that it was only because we read them forwards that we recognized there were problems we had to understand.

With this shift in our point of view a wealth of other details in the thought, speech, and action become luminous. For instance, throughout Socrates's Second Speech there are peculiar echoes of the language used in his First Speech (as well as echoes of Lysias's Speech), noticeable and peculiar because the same words have an entirely different application or meaning. The parallelisms and the echoes continually remind us how far we have come and how great is the change in perspective – indeed the *reversal* of perspective – brought about by Socrates's intuitive recollection that Eros is a god after all and as such must be good. And yet, although Socrates is the Speaker of both speeches, he never seems to notice or cop to the fact that he is using the expressions again and in a different way – so that the recognition of it is made, by Plato, to belong to us alone.[1481] To us alone belonged similarly a strange phenomenon we noticed in Socrates's First Speech – uniquely Socratic ideas and expressions right alongside their own misinterpretation, as when the speaker used certain terms in a

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1480 *Seclusit* Ruhnken *apud* Burnet, followed by several editors.

1481 ἰδέαι of the "self" (237D6) vs. the ἰδέα of soul (246A3): cf. nn. ad locc. // ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων (246B1) disagrees with the two ἰδέαι of 237D// τὸ γλυκὺ καρποῦσθαι (240A7-8) vs. ἡδονὴν δ' αὖ ταύτην γλυκυτάτην ... καρποῦται (251E5) // διαπράξασθαι at 234A3 vs. διαπράξασθαι at 253C3// σπουδάσματα ἀνθρώπινα in the Second Speech vs. σπουδαῖος in augury (σεμνύντες, 244D1) and in Socratic mantic (242C4). The last thing we should do is suppress or moderate these strange back-references. E.g., on ἰδέα at 246A3 cf.n.394; or as to ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων (246B1) Vollgraff reads ἀνθρώπων, Ast imports νοῦς βασιλεύς as a gloss, Fowler translates ἡμῶν as "human" and Rowe as "our driver" (possessive?).

way only Socrates would,[1482] but then became confused in a way only Socrates wouldn't.[1483] I would suggest that if we possessed only this First Speech of Socrates and had lost the rest of Plato's *Phaedrus*, and tried to "ascertain" according to standard philological methods "whose speech it is" by the same means we currently seek to "ascertain" who wrote the speech Phaedrus attributes to Lysias, we would probably conclude that it is an ignorant imitation of *Socrate*s, and have to choose as its author somebody who knew him but did not understand him so well. Isocrates would perhaps be the guess as to who wrote it, and the speech would be placed alongside his *Panathenaicus*.

The interludes between the speeches also place words and expressions into the mouths of Socrates and Phaedrus that were noticeable because peculiar, but which in the light of Socrates's Second Speech take on a "final" (quasi-teleological) significance that they can hardly have known or intended, at least consciously.[1484] Still other comments they make, make sense emotionally both to themselves and to us[1485] but then the myth ends up revealing why. And even within the action that led up to and motivated Socrates's large speech the same kind of thing had happened. What they had

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1482 Positive resemblances: his insistence on defining terms and on dialogical agreement, including the dialectical vocabulary (cf. nn.1353, 1354).

1483 Negative outcomes: the slovenly ambiguity of εἰδέναι περὶ οὗ (237C1); the deceptive parallelism of οὔτε ... ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις; the ambiguity of τῶν καλῶν (237D4: cf. nn.267, 1359); the crucially slovenly choice of the term, δόξα (237D8 *et seq.*: cf. n.270, notwithstanding the misbegotten attempts by commentators to justify it); the failure of parallelism between the "definition" of eros and the other two rashnesses (cf. n.1376) which vitiates his "definition" (238B5-C4) after all the fine diaereses that led up it (237D6-238B5), to the point that it devolves into a mere etymology.

1484 Examples can only be fanciful by the nature of the case, and may be multiplied at will. I would mention (1) the ambiguity of μεῖζον at 242A2, a peculiar expression whose plain sense ends up coming true, *if we haven't already explained it away* (cf.n.317); (2) the unclarity, when Socrates interrupts himself after his foolish definition of eros, as to whether what is happening is a good thing or a bad, *unless we decided and moved on* (becoming enthused we later learn is both a reason to stop and also a reason to continue: only later do we understand the anxiety); (3) the way Phaedrus's exegesis of μεσημβρία with σταθερά, *if we have not condemned it as a gloss*, "comes true" in πρὸς ἄκρῳ … ἔστησαν regarding the gods' souls (247B6-C2); (4) the fact that Socrates's Corybantic and Bacchic metaphors having to do with his enjoyment of speeches (228B7, 234D5) are given a real explanation in the division of divine mania (244D5-245A1) and later in the cross-contagion where the beloved both leads and follows the lover (252E5-253B1), *but we are left to notice this on our own*; (5) the fact that we are likewise left to notice on our own that the bird augurs criticized in the proem to Socrates's Second Speech (244C5-D5) were at least looking in the right direction for the truth of human destiny (upward) but tried to infer the invisible (the future) from the visible (the birds as σημεῖα, as Mr Morrissey notices [244B7]) rather than deriving the visible (present) from the invisible (past) before our souls were embodied—while later we learn it is the philosopher perhaps whose behavior they should be observing (ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, 249D7: cf. n.588); (6) that the palinode of Stesichorus might be taken to suggest that Socrates's retraction will consist of saying that, like Helen and Troy, only an εἴδωλον of Eros was present in those first speeches, whereas the real Eros was off somewhere far away; (7) the benighted attitude Socrates casts off as the sort of thing a person would believe if raised by sailors, which needs fresh water to wash out salt out of his ears (243C6-D5), has a parallel metaphor in the flight of the souls that fail to see the huperouranion but remain (ὑποβρύχιαι, 248A7); (8) the way Socrates's First Speech begins with a methodological justification where to begin (namely, to define the subject), and then fails to do so; but his Second Speech flatly announces it must begin with soul (but this is because soul IS the first thing) and succeeds to describe it fully enough to explain everything else, ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες εἰς τοῦτο (as he says at 237D1-2). Overall there is a ring structure wherein things mentioned earlier and earlier in the myth (e.g., the two horses [246B3] and the variegated subdivision of the Olympian deities and their lack of envy [246E4-247A6]) come to bear on the later and later aspects of the story (the account of the beloved being caught [253C7ff]; the account of the lover's personality and preferences as well as his lack of envy toward the beloved [252C3-253C2]).

1485 The inspiring *sensory* beauty of the καταγωγή; the double-take ἰδὼν ἰδών (idea and expression; sensation and meaning); the stimulus and fear of looking into each other's faces; the telestic dimension of the Corybantic and Bacchic enthusiasms, *passim* (cf. n.51); and the drama of force and compulsion, human and then divine, all through the two interludes.

entertained in their imaginations, only magically, later became actual;[1486] the Second Speech (Socrates's First) brought the scenario of the First Speech (Lysias's) before our eyes;[1487] the motivation within Phaedrus to present the speech is reversed by his desire to get Socrates to speak; Socrates's reason for covering his face becomes articulable only after he "wakes up."[1488] In general, the life depicted in the conversational action and speeches of first part of the dialogue becomes true, or transparent for its meaning, in the myth.

Phaedrus's attempts to "compel" Socrates to compete with a speech "better and longer on the same topic" (as well his plan to compel Lysias to do so once Socrates has done a new speech, 243D8-E1), along with his mincing evasiveness to present Lysias's speech to Socrates (227D6-228A4) and his projection of this same motive onto Socrates (236B9-D2: that the λαβαί are ὅμοιαι [B9-C1] is his interpretation and is not true) exhibit a sort of asymmetric but mimetic eroticism, as Socrates says (236B5-8) and Phaedrus knows (236D7) and shows (with his threat of physical reprisal at 236C6-D3); and yet his playing coy, his cajolery, and the motive for emulation are left unexplained.

Socrates, in the face of Phaedrus's continual cajolery, continually *confesses* his feelings. He wishes Lysias had written a speech for an ugly lover or an old lover like himself; he converts Phaedrus's interest in mythologists into a opportunity to confess his desire for self-knowledge; and despite Phaedrus's smokescreen he correctly guesses what is going on inside him. Moreover, he confesses that during Phaedrus's speech he was looking into his face rather than listening closely and that this inspired him as if Phaedrus were a corybantic liturge. It is again his sensitivity and willingness in the manner of a good psychotherapy patient to admit what is going on inside him even if he does not understand it, that leads him to insist there is a better treatment than Lysias's that he must have heard somewhere. There is no reason to doubt his claim that he is reluctant to hold forth and improvise a better love-speech, and that he is willing to acquiesce to Phaedrus's will in the face of the one threat Phaedrus can make, never to tell him another speech (though it is far more likely that Phaedrus will not be able to withhold telling him a speech when he gets one!). Subsequently it is out of shame that he covers his own face to avoid looking at Phaedrus during his speech, a shame that he feels even though he could not explain it until later. And most of all he confesses and then interprets the feelings he has been having, including the sense of shame, and "composes" an entirely new speech out of what he feels is a duty not to emulate a man but to serve a god, in which all the feelings they have each and both undergone are redeemed as indications of their erstwhile sojourns with the gods in the huperouranion.

The hinge by which Socrates's Second Speech turns everything around is the soul. This unique entity is at once the I, the phenomenological self to whose operation within him Socrates keeps bearing witness in the first part, and which also drives the action and interaction between Socrates and Phaedrus, but is also and at the same time the principle of life even here on earth. By starting his speech with the abrupt assertion that "soul as such is deathless," he announces a proof that will entail that this assertion itself always had to be the first principle of any account. The proof proceeds

1486 Socrates's account a moment later of the feelings inside Phaedrus at the séance with Lysias and of the motivations for the behavior we have witnessed over the last page (228A6-C2 ~227A3-4); his highly inspired redescription of the καταγωγή by which Phaedrus's previous description (229B1-2) "comes true" (230B2-C5) *unless we have dispelled this as "ironic;"* the nympholepsy of Socrates (238D1-2) by the nymphs earler said to haunt the καταγωγή (230B7).

1487 Socrates's version announces outside the speech what Lysias's speech studiously required us to guess on pain of not knowing what he was saying at first (cf. n.112), and it confers enough order into the argument of Lysias's speech that we can begin to see its shortcomings and the questionable premises on which it relies.

1488 His shame is unexplained until he brings up the sailors (243C1-D1): he felt it before he understood it, but perhaps we were just puzzled.

without the use of bird-signs or the standard rhetorical exordium, but – in sharp contrast to Socrates's First Speech – by a method unannounced, for this time the method is nothing but thinking (λόγος), which announces itself by its very action.

Once the theory of soul and of beauty and of love is laid out the utterances in Socrates's First Speech prove to be adumbrations, though paltry in themselves, of an underlying truth of which that speech is only partly aware. I personify the speech because we cannot safely attribute the words of the speech and their meaning to its author, Socrates. We have to receive those words as if they had a mind of their own. Still, what this mind of theirs is doing is ultimately the work of Socrates.

In the largest view, what has happened in this great speech is not that Eros has been assuaged, or that the fictional Lover has corrected his advice to the Boy, but that Socrates by inventing these conceits has turned Phaedrus's attention away from the titillation of Lysias's speech and has enabled him to gain control over the confused lurching of the two horses in his soul, through a process that takes several steps. For Lysias's Speaker, the thesis that love is evil was merely the vehicle for an attempt to seduce the imaginary Boy. Socrates's First Speech presents a rationalization and objectification of that thesis not because it deserves to be rationalized but because rational oratory is better than irrational, as oratory. The unintended result, which in fact causes Socrates to stop halfway through, is that as the thesis becomes clear its heinousness comes more plainly to the surface. Despite its oratorical virtues the speech is an abuse of the god, requiring the next step, a "palinode." On the pretext of assuaging the god the palinode elevates the discourse to the level on which the divine forces operate, and into an imaginative "investigation" that discovers human existence to be a shadow or image of the life divine that was our alpha and promises to be our omega. Our erotic urges in this life are discovered to be impulses, mediated by recollection, to return to that life; and the practice of human love that pays homage to the higher objects of such erotic impulses is discovered to be the means to hasten our return.

The tables have been turned on Phaedrus the same way they were once turned on Alcibiades, as he confessed with such candor that night at Agathon's. The rituals of foreplay, coyness, suggestion, and teasing by which people test the waters before taking the risk of meeting in the center are present in both Phaedrus's and Alcibiades's dealings with Socrates, but both of them know in advance they can rely on Socrates not only to confess candidly his own desires and erotic weaknesses and vulnerabilities (this is the meaning of his happy reputation for being an expert in love), but also not to take advantage of the self-exposure they hazard in the very act of approaching him. Behold how, as they move further into sharing what really matters, Socrates gently recedes as if he began to hear a different voice from theirs!

The Dialogical Section

Transition from Performance to Conversation: 257B7-258D7

Phaedrus responds to the speech cordially but avoids consenting to make the change Socrates prayed he would make. Nor does he even talk about the new life Socrates has suggested, or acknowledge or assess its importance to himself; nor does he voice any regret about his original behavior. All this he avoids by *shelving* Socrates's suggestion (with εἴπερ, which is more evasive than stipulative) and bringing forward the former persona of his non-committal self, reverting to the role he can expect us to expect of the person who incites others to speak.[1489] He informs Socrates that he has something of a problem running that routine this time because Lysias might come off poorly even in his own eyes, and may not even consent to his stimulus and try to write a counter-speech. In short, Phaedrus shirks his own incumbency to answer what Socrates has proposed by asserting that *Lysias* has a problem (though he does leave a bit of daylight in confessing that even to him [μοὶ, 257C3] Lysias might seem pedestrian.

Passing it off on Lysias in this way is merely an evasion. After all, there is no written version of the speech and Lysias has not heard it, so how in the first place could he acquire enough evidence to make the decision Phaedrus predicts he will make, namely, to demur trying to compete with it? Are we to imagine Phaedrus going back to him reporting Socrates's speech? If so, will he recite it, or retell it, or summarize it? From all the work he had done that morning memorizing and conning the written text of Lysias's much shorter speech we see that it is inconceivable that Phaedrus could pull off reporting the speech to Lysias from memory well enough that he was deterred from trying to respond. It is easier to imagine that Phaedrus has *imagined* Lysias undergoing the experience he himself has undergone, and just knows that his fellow rhetorician *would* shy away from it. He has enough fellow feeling with his "companion" to know how he will take it: this is the sort of thing that comes from studying together and it is the justification for holding the student responsible for the sins of his teacher.[1490] But he cannot quite confess all this to Socrates (beyond the *obiter dictum*, μοὶ) because saying so would be tantamount to confessing how much he was himself moved by Socrates's speech so that, again, he would have to accept and aver Socrates's claim that only the philosophical life is worth living, which is the one challenge or commitment he wants to avoid. Thus, instead of describing why he himself might find Lysias pedestrian, he expatiates on Lysias's likely (though totally imaginary) response by giving still another reason for him to be reluctant, a reason that removes the conversation still further from Socrates's prayer that he reform his own life. For in fact, Phaedrus has a politician speak for him: the reason Lysias will be all the more reluctant is that it happens he was accused recently of just this charge (i.e., of being pedestrian) by one of the politicians in Athens, who berated him for being a (lowly and pedestrian) "speechwriter."

1489 He promised he would go back and compel Lysias to compose a second speech, at 243D8-E1. On the transition effected by postponement of δέ in τὸν λόγον δέ (257C1) cf. n.796.

1490 Such a companionship and "partnership in crime" Socrates just now spoke of dissolving when he referred to Phaedrus and himself offending Eros with speeches of which Lysias was the "father" (257B1-2). Contrast his formulation before the palinode, at 242D11-E1 (ὑπό γε Λυσίου, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου). The question of whose companion Phaedrus will be comes up again at the very end.

When Socrates's interlocutors are evasive in this way Socrates tends initially to "roll with the punches" (boxing) or "go with the pitch" (baseball), only to bring things back to the challenging choice or question later on.[1491] One of the more extended examples of this roundabout way of responding to his interlocutor's reluctance or evasiveness comes in Book Five of the *Republic*, where Socrates's waves of paradox about the equality of women and the community of wives are mere preparation to bring Glaucon, and as much of the company as will follow him, back to the difficult decision to accept the conclusion they had just reached at the end of Book Four, that virtue lies within and external show and status does not matter (even the ideal state they had constructed thereby becoming moot) – a conclusion that Polemarchus and Adeimantus sought to avoid facing by making up the complaint that Socrates had left out details in the construction of the state. Glaucon falls in with them and now Socrates will take him the long way around in order only to bring him back, later, to a still more severe formulation of that conclusion, challenging Glaucon to step up and make his decision: if we really do care about politics, we will need to find either kingly philosophers or philosophical kings. The others remain silent until ten pages later when Adeimantus interrupts and criticizes both the conclusion Socrates and Glaucon reached and Socrates's method of leading his interlocutor down the garden path to reach such conclusions (487).[1492]

Here, likewise, Socrates does not push Phaedrus to answer whether his very eloquent speech has convinced him of something, nor even challenge the impossible scenario of his going back to Lysias without a written version, but focusses instead on that *last* remark in Phaedrus's evasive reply as though he took it seriously: "Lysias wouldn't be scared off by that sort of charge – and besides you don't believe the politician was really sincere and thinks speechwriting a shameful profession, do you?"

Why does Phaedrus evade the challenge and change the subject? Now that Socrates has allowed him to do so we left to stop and decide on our own, or else simply read on and be cut off from the dramatic tension of the situation, which we must not do or else we will soon find ourselves just listening to people talking about things that for all we know do not concern themselves, or us for that matter. Such talk may seem like "doing philosophy" to many readers but Plato the dialogue writer would not be one of them, nor would Socrates the dialoguer. Moreover if we acquiesce simply to move on and "see what comes next" we will be giving up the opportunity to understand the continuity of the work: if we do this, we will have forfeited the sole means available to us for discovering its unity, which is the most infamous difficulty in the interpretation-history of the *Phaedrus*.

We had similar difficulties in the first pages of the dialogue, where again the conversation had moved along a bit ahead of our understanding.[1493] The characters spoke and responded to each other without needing to make their true thoughts completely explicit to each other, nor therefore to us. We had to stop and reflect in order to fill things in and we were right to do so: Plato did not after all make things any easier by giving us a narrator! By reflecting rather than just plowing forward, we found that Phaedrus was trying to seduce Socrates into the countryside with a speech that had itself titillated Phaedrus for the way it might give a clever speaker the power to seduce a boy without even admitting he wanted him (227C5-8). The prospect of such a speech was less attractive to Socrates: if

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1491 The examples are rife and comprise many of the subtler and less understood transitions in the *Dialogues*. In the *Rep*. for example his response to Glaucon at 372E2ff is misunderstood; its purpose is exhausted by the return to the vision of the simple beds of the guards at the end of Book Three. Parallel also is the entire issue of the digression of Book Five (starting at 450B1-2, cf. my note), and his response in Book Six to Adeimantus at 487D10-11,E6 – all with my notes. In fact it is characteristic of him not only to accept his interlocutor's objection but to take it one step further (372C4ff, 420A2 with my notes).

1492 See my *Commentary* for a detailed presentation of these interpretations.

1493 Cf. "The Setting for Delivering the Speech" within my "Analysis of the First Speech," *supra*.

the author is that smart why doesn't he write a speech helping an old man or an ugly or a poor man seduce a boy (C9-D2)? Socrates's frankness set into relief the fact that Phaedrus wants to have his cake and eat it too – he has been seduced by the prospect of having his desires satisfied without having to admit that he has the desires. His attempt to hide his desires requires him to speak ill of them; he hides his desires because he fears being turned down; his fear leads him to blame the god Eros for making him love-sick.

He had hoped to deliver the speech live to Socrates so as personally and in his own voice to lure or force him into this same state of mind. The speech, that is, is actually an epideixis, a display for the titillation of its audience of speech-writing colleagues, not a deliberative oration to be delivered to a young boy as it portrays itself to be. He had planned to practice it in solitude outside the city. Perhaps he would learn it well enough that he could use it on a boy? I doubt it. No, he wanted to become able to create his own desire in an audience of speech-writers and therefore become their master.

Phaedrus *reads* Lysias's speech – for if there is to be a speech *writer* (for instance, the metic Lysias who in fact will never deliver a speech in Athens) there still needs to be a speech *speaker*. Socrates has been seduced, or feigns to have been, by Phaedrus the speaker rather than the speech, by dint of looking into his face as Phaedrus read it.[1494] (234D1-4). That he was ashamed to be so moved by such a manipulative speech is shown by the fact that when he consents to deliver his version of the same speech he covers up his own face. If he sees Phaedrus while presenting it he will be ashamed by the effect that seeing him might have on himself (237A4-5). If it had been somebody else's speech he was presenting he might not have been so ashamed: the greatest shame is that he is composing the speech and delivering it too,[1495] whereas Phaedrus merely read a speech written by someone else who is absent, as Lysias the metic will always be.[1496] Socrates's speech is more truly a deliberative speech, even if only for displaying what a deliberative speech should be. Its virtues, that is, are the virtues of a deliberative speech, such as an exhaustive argument that proceeds by definition and deduction. As such it becomes analyzable and evaluable in a way that Lysias's was never meant to be.

Lysias as λογογράφος is a force acting at a distance. By a sort of ventriloquism the power of his writing can come to be owned and embodied by the speaker who has memorized the speech and delivers it by heart, or even reads it, in the presence of an audience. As writer Lysias can appear to others to be hiding out, never vulnerable to the rejection or ridicule the live speaker must constantly brave. He composes his speech at leisure[1497] (as in the shade of the *locus amoenus*) rather than *ex tempore* (as in the dust and sun of the forum). These topics become visible in the pamphlet of Alcidamas who wants real politicians to know that he knows and appreciates the difference between the protected environment of his writing studio and the pressure of live speech before an assembly of citizens, where improvisation, and courage in general, is needed. The question of improvisation is overemphasized by Alcidamas in order to flatter his client, the politician that might hire him as a "consultant."[1498] The flattery is belied at the end of his tract when he does not forget to aver that in addition to being able to help teach live delivery he of course can also provide help writing the speech, as the other consultants already do.

So our pause to analyze the dramatic segue from the palinode into the ensuing discussion has revealed the nexus between the "two topics" of the dialogue, the topics of eros and of speechwriting.

1494 234D1-4; cf. 235A1 and n. *ad loc.* on τὸ ῥητορικόν.

1495 He seeks to exonerate himself by asserting Phaedrus put the speech into his mouth 242D4-5, D11-E1.

1496 He was delivering his lessons in a private house, presumably for a fee.

1497 As Phaedrus jealously asserts: ἐν πολλῷ χρόνω κατὰ σχολὴν συνέθηκε, 228A1. Cf. Alcid. *Soph.* §1-4.

1498 "Consultant" is the term adopted by K.J.Dover in his study of the circumstances of Lysias's profession (*Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* [Berkeley 1968])

In Lysias's written speech the two themes are inextricably bound together. The evasive hiding and operating at a distance is both the natural circumstance or "occupational hazard" of the λογογράφος that wrote the speech – especially if he is a metic like Lysias – but also the strategy employed by the "lover" within the speech, who by manipulating others maintains an illusion and an appearance of autonomy despite his own inner awareness that he is helpless in the face of his desires. Hatred or discomfort about his own desire requires him to treat Eros as a shameful sickness, but as Socrates somehow suddenly remembers, at high noon, Eros cannot be bad since he is a god, and so we humans must go back to the drawing board. The palinode then discovers and redeems the true nature of Eros and its operation in men. True Eros is found to be a noble urge within, only accidentally going afoul, and will perforce create Anteros in the beloved under the influence of the lover's devoted and moderate care, so that the beloved will come to love the lover in return and share with him the happiest of lives.

The two themes that had been conflated in the speech that Phaedrus had been studying all morning have now in the leisure of the glade become available for separate treatment, one at a time, which is the only way they can be disentangled and resolved. What is still left standing, after the treatment of Eros in Socrates's grand palinode, is the record of Phaedrus's ability and desire to stimulate people to compose speeches, which had produced the entire first half of the dialogue. As we have seen it is just this aspect of his own behavior that he *hides behind* in his initial reply to the palinode (257B7-C7). Moreover we can now see that this desire to stimulate others to compose is another desire of the same type that had been thematized in Lysias's speech, since it is not Phaedrus's opinions that are being presented – opinions the sponsoring of which might leave him vulnerable to ridicule or shame – but always the opinions of the person who has just composed a speech, which Phaedrus quotes or describes so as to stimulate another person to write another speech, with Phaedrus being the stimulator but not the stimulus. It is of a piece with his evading to participate and to tell Socrates what he himself thinks that Phaedrus quotes others, especially others who are not present, or talks about what he has heard or read rather than replying in his own person; and so is his zealous behavior to con the speech and hide it under his shirt, rather than take the chance to reproduce it *ex tempore* out of his own chest (228A6-B5: cf. 235C5-6).[1499] Socrates is completely aware of this aspect of his behavior and personality, just as at the beginning he had averred that he "knows his Phaedrus" (228A6-7) and there goes so far as to divide the Phaedrus he knows from the Phaedrus he is talking to and tells the latter to do what the former was going to do anyway (228C3-5)! He continues to minister to this trait of Phaedrus's at least as much as he focusses on anything else in the

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1499 The gravamen or test of the commentator's opinion about the character of Phaedrus lies in the decision he makes about the attribution of 258D7 (cf. n. *ad loc.*). deVries for instance decides *ad loc.* without argument that for Phaedrus to take the initiative of making such a suggestion is out of character, since he is stupid and lazy – a baseless judgment from which he refuses to release Phaedrus at all costs (cf. his remarks ad 257B7, 270B6-7, 271B6-7 [ignoring 272B5-6], 273C6, 276A9. 276E1-3 [particularly perverse]), so that when Phaedrus wholeheartedly accepts Socrates's conclusion in the end he allows that "Here at least Phaedrus seems to have been seriousy converted though some doubts remain about the degree of his understanding" (*ad* 278B5-6) – doubts that are only his own.

The fullest description of his character, upon which recent commentators rely, usually without attribution, is that of Robin (1929) in his introduction to the Budé *Symposium* (xxxvii), a description he avers to be borne out in both the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*: *préoccupé de sa santé, attentif à son hygiène, plein de foi dans les théoriciens de la médicine et aussi bien de la rhétorique ou de la mythologie, curieux de savoir mais dépourvu de jugement, superficiel dans ses curiosités et naïf dans l'expression de ses sentiments, admirateur fervent des réputations dûment cataloguées et consacrés*. But it is really in the present dialogue, which is named after him, rather than in the *Symposium* that his own personality and anxieties become the central problem of the dialogue and its plot. These characteristics Robin attributes to him in fact *derive* from the erotic disposition I have now described, with corrections: his faithfulness in theoreticians, his paradoxical mix of curiosity and a lack of judgment or superficiality or naivete, and his reliance on reputable sources are all aspects of his hope to avoid responsibility for and even the exposure of his opinions and inner feelings.

second, dialogical part of the dialogue.[1500]

Socrates has allowed Phaedrus to avoid the question of his reaction to the palinode and instead pursues his remark about the politician. He denies the sincerity of the politician's charge that Lysias's profession in itself makes him a pedestrian type as well as denying that Lysias would be fazed by it in the first place. His denials require Phaedrus to clarify his meaning. The bigger movers and shakers in politics, he asserts, are very reluctant to leave written works behind lest they get the reputation of being sophists. But Phaedrus is unaware that they do not mean what they say, as if he took seriously that name of the treacherous bend in the Nile that has come to be called "sweet." The truth is that politicians, too, are very eager to leave speeches behind. Witness for instance how far they stoop to flatter the very persons who have it in their hands to make their writings permanent, the citizens seated in the ἐκκλησία and the counsellors in the βουλευτήριον. Phaedrus at first doesn't understand and neither do we since it is a riddle. Socrates means that the real politicians (as opposed to the men that might write speeches for them) wish, no less than they, to be commemorated as the authors of writings that will be set in stone as law. How then can they truly believe that writing is bad? And Phaedrus agrees by saying "They couldn't since in that case they would be castigating the very thing they desire!"

The complaint the politicians had was an expression of their mixed feelings of superiority to and dependence upon a speechwriter like Lysias. They envy him his ease sitting there writing when they have to pull the thing off live and in person. The standard way of expressing the politician's special virtue is that even if someone writes his speech for him he still has to improvise and mold his delivery to unforeseen circumstances the day he presents it. I believe that the politician in his pride overrates this difficulty just as he underrates the speechwriter as being *eo ipso* pedestrian or nothing more than a "sophist."[1501] The key to understanding his attitude is the appearance of the pamphlet of Alcidamas, "On Sophists."[1502] In fact the politician *envies* the man who can make a name for himself by producing works in the calm of his study. The real gripe he has is that the speechwriter operates at a distance – the same old problem we have been seeing all along! Phaedrus does not recognize that these are the feelings at work but accepts that Socrates's *ad hominem* argument disqualifies them from criticizing Lysias,[1503] and the whole matter is dropped.

By accepting Socrates's argument he provides him with an easy segue to asking under what circumstances writing might be shameful or praiseworthy, or[1504] ugly or fine, since we no longer need to believe that it is shameful always, and to suggesting that we must ask Lysias to tell us this, and anybody else who writes, no matter what he writes for what venue (public or private). Phaedrus, perhaps conceiving Socrates is about to carry out and display both sides of the conversation, and now completely clear of any onus to respond to Socrates's prayer, is eager to spend his time on a topic that is so useful and so pleasurable. He echoes Socrates's acceptance of his own proposal, back at 227B9-11, to present Lysias's speech to him (258E1-5), where Socrates had quoted Pindar about the importance of leisure. In an unexpected outburst of eloquence, the way Socrates had quoted Pindar, Phaedrus now makes the argument that any other pleasure than the pleasure of leisure activities relies

1500 Socrates finally criticizes the behavior and Phaedrus apologizes for it, near the end (275C1-4): cf. n.1196.

1501 The sense (*Sinn*) of two reproaches (τάπεινος, σοφιστής) could not be more different even if their reference (*Bedeutung*) is the same – for the reproach is driven by frustration and envy. Compare, conversly, the emulous irony and confusion of the λογογράφος who speaks to Crito at the end of the *Euthydemus* (304D4-305A8), including Socrates's analysis there (305C5-306D1); and Adeimantus's remarks, particularly his use of ἀλλόκοτος, at *Rep.*487B1-D5 (cf. my notes *ad loc.*), including Socrates's surprising remarks to him about σοφισταί a few pages later (493A6-9).

1502 *Alcidamas. The Works and Fragments*, ed. J.V.Muir (Bristol 2001). The date of composition is thought to be c.390 BC.

1503 Notwithstanding what Phaedrus says at 258C9-10, people *very often* derogate the things that they desire!

1504 On the *glissement* from shame to ugly to fine (i.e, competent, artful), cf. n.821.

on prior pain and is a there a pleasure enslaved to pain. Socrates then waxes for a moment, as he had waxed before the speech contest began in the first part (230B2-C5), with a description of the surroundings. There it was about the sights and smells and sounds and the feeling of the place, but here he singles out the noise made by the cicadas. For they are agents of the Muses watching us and we would, indeed, do well to pursue the work of leisure that is the mark of a free man rather than slavishly nap in the heat of the day.[1505]

By the pairing of these digressions Socrates and Phaedrus formally indicate to each other for a second time, as they had before, that both of them intend to spend whatever time their topic will require. Thus, a topic for dialogical investigation has been isolated and established, and a new discussion can begin – though for all that, we can hardly believe that Socrates will forget the issue that he had allowed Phaedrus to evade a moment before, which in fact brought this discussion on. Indeed we shall find that the entire discussion of rhetoric to which he has effected this segue, like his admission of luxuries into the state in Book Two of the *Republic* and his digression on the community of wives and equality of women in Book Five, will serve as a roundabout way to bring Phaedrus back to that problem and the decision which he has just shirked, the question of his wavering (ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, 257B5) – but he will do so only after providing Phaedrus with the understanding that he *needs* to face it. For the dialogue will indeed end with a criticism of the man who is satisfied to act at a distance by producing a written work rather than requiring himself to have live ideas of his own.

What Makes Writing and Speaking Fine? 259E1-274B5

Socrates formally restates the question. In a sense the answer is of course τέχνη, since whatever will be fine about writing and speaking λόγοι will, virtually by definition, be the work of a τέχνη λόγων to achieve. But Phaedrus is preoccupied with the question of oratory instead, and what he has heard about it from the likes of Gorgias or Tisias, so that he continually pushes the question toward *that* "art."

We may summarize the ensuing discussion in very short compass. Socrates opens with something he views as axiomatic, that to be well done, arguments will require their arguer to know the truth about his subject. Phaedrus objects that a well turned out *orator*, at least, needs only to persuade, and that to do this he only needs to know the opinions of the mass. But, Socrates points out, if the orator does not know the truth about important matters but persuades the mass by repeating their opinions to them, he will harm the city by enabling them to adopt ignorant and incorrect policies. Lacking knowledge, the orator will be *harmful* (260A11-D2).

The "art" of rhetoric, if it could speak, will object to this far too fundamentalistic view by saying that even the truth will not be persuasive without artful presentation; and yet if art must insist on its artfulness, a sober Lacedaemonian might retort that any "art" that is disengaged from Truth is counterfeit; or, to use Socrates's language, a person will never be good at arguing unless he practices philosophy. A genuine *art* of rhetoric will be a leading of the soul through argumentation on any subject large or small, in public or private, the praiseworthiness of the art consisting not in the

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1505 Socrates's talk about the cicadas overhead is an elaboration on the precious insight spurred by Phaedrus's arresting remark that the sun had come to a stand overhead (242A3-6), making Socrates realize that their statements about Eros were being witnessed by the gods overhead: cf. nn.318 and 323, and *supra*, "*Retrospective Reaction*," in my *Analysis of the Third Speech*.

magnitude of its subject matter but the correctness of its deployment as art. If Art objects that this is too broad, let it recognize that the forensic art of arguing pro and con, a type of art that it does include in its self-definition, is the same as the philosophical art of Zeno's paradoxes, the "art" of it consisting in the ability to recognize how things differ and how they are the same in the finest point, and knowing this in a finer grain than the masses do, who live in a crasser world of opinion. If he lacks this ability, so that he might even lead *himself* astray, the orator would be *ridiculous* (260D3-262C4).

Lysias's speech for example did not define what Eros is, even though the question whether it is good or bad is controversial as the other two speeches showed, but this is just the sort of issue the orator must know and command better than the masses in order to proceed *artfully*. Moreover the organization of the speech exhibited no art. Socrates's two speeches on the other hand happened to reveal a very important principle, in the way they came to discover opposite Eroses: it was a matter of dividing madness into all its kinds that brought this to light, and a similarly important role was played, conversely, by collecting all the different versions of things under one head. For Socrates these two abilities of division and collection constitute an art of argumentation (a τέχνη λόγων), a very high one indeed, an art he has seen fit to call the *dialectical* art (263C5-266C1).

"In contrast with this, what shall we call the art that the rhetoricians offer to convey for such a huge fee? After you subtract my art of dialectic from the τέχνη λόγων is there anything distinctly "rhetorical" left behind?" Their treatises of rhetoric define and illustrate many of the partial functions of a speech, such as preambles and perorations, and they name the techniques after themselves, but these techniques have none of the power that stems from true *art*, any more than being able to cause a man to vomit makes one a doctor or being able to write a long speech on a small topic or to write words that make the audience cry makes him a tragedian. If you asked a true *artist* (not ourselves, surely!) he would say these were preliminaries to the art of tragedy but not the art itself (266C1-269A4).

A genius-orator like Pericles might upbraid us for expecting rhetoricians to argue on the level we are contemplating, rather than pardoning them, in their ignorance of the arts of dialectic and definition, for assuming that their own teachings constitute the real art of rhetoric in total ignorance that the thing they overlook and pass off on their students to acquire on their own is the one ability that really and truly does give arguments their organization and persuasive force.

On this suggestion Phaedrus now and for the first time in the conversation leaves his associates behind and expresses an earnest desire to learn from Socrates what is the truly artistic element involved in rhetoric that gives a speech its persuasive effectiveness, and how a person can become able to acquire this (269C6-D1). While any ability comes from nature, nurture, and teaching, we can call again on Pericles to show us the crucial element Phaedrus asks after. In Pericles's celebrated case it came not from studying a grab-bag of techniques but from a large-minded and comprehensive study of "the nature of things"[1506] to which he was exposed during his association with the cosmologist, Anaxagoras. This element provides or inspires one to recognize the deeper nature of soul, something most men would insouciantly pass over as idle speculation, even though it is soul to which speeches and arguments minister, after all, just as the doctor's art ministers to the body. Nobody thinks such a general knowledge of body is idle nonsense – we know so much from the great Hippocrates and the other Asclepiads – but we need to make the argument our own in the case of souls and the art of λόγοι. We need to know the nature of soul, whether it is simple or complex, what are its types, and to know thereby how it will react to one argument as opposed to another. Lacking this an orator's activity would resemble the walk of a blind man (270D9-E1).

If on the other hand we are serious about teaching a τέχνη λόγων as an art, we must first

1506 φύσεως πέρι, 270A1: cf. n.1059.

teach about the soul in its essential nature, then ascertain how, given its nature, it is affected, and finally associate different arguments or kinds of arguments with their respective effects. It seems a redoubtable task but anything short of it is sham, such as we find in the current exponents of the art whom you have listened to up until now who in fact know all the psychology they need but don't cop to it. If you me ask for a manual to pair up against theirs, I have not written one but I can spell out what it would contain. Description of soul and souls, then identifying which kind of soul is actually sitting before you, then deciding which kind of argument is appropriate to that soul. Only after this comes the *ad hoc* deployment of all those techniques you find in the existing manuals (270E1-272C2).

In addition to the development of the argument there is a development in the drama. Phaedrus is coming to agree with Socrates and to abandon his alliance with Lysias and the others he has been quoting. Just so he now insists, to the objection of a imaginary representative of that group, that rhetoric must indeed do what Socrates has said, long and arduous route though it may be (272B5-6). It is now Socrates's turn to feign despondency. Hasn't Phaedrus heard of an easier way to go? Phaedrus demurs and Socrates suggests he has heard somebody – even the devil's advocate deserves a hearing, lest we overconfidently forget ourselves.[1507] For the third time we meet the claim that the rhetorician can persuade without knowing the truth, but this time the idea receives a certain refinement this time: the orator needs to know the public's beliefs but what they believe is "the likely," and this time the tone of the rhetorician's self-description is not masterful but cynical, and the assertion is not that the "art" is, as such, admirable but that knowing the εἰκός is effective down-and-dirty and "gives you all the art you need."[1508] This advocate of likelihood not only admits he must lie but sounds overall like a reprobate and even a criminal. Phaedrus recognizes this as the claim they had countenanced before,[1509] but he no longer describes this profession of theirs as a challenge to Socrates but rather as an empty boast of theirs – as a claim of "those who *portray* themselves as artful (τεχνικοί) about arguments." Socrates suggests that Tisias (and he reminds Phaedrus that Phaedrus is intimately familiar with his book) is just such a rogue, with his reductionist doctrine that "the likely" is identical to "what the masses think," and then he describes a likely version of a lesson by such a person, which in fact exhibits how the method does resemble the movement of a blind man, since its deployment is even perfectly *likely* to provide the opponent with material for a counter-offensive (273C2-3)! Disgusted by his own description[1510] Socrates then turns upon this Tisias and upbraids him in the strongest and most eloquent terms. A man must try to please the gods in what he says and does, not merely manipulate humans (273D2-274A5). This is the first[1511] of several long and sweeping statements Socrates makes during these pages, now that Phaedrus has come on board with him. Phaedrus unreservedly agrees with him, no matter how hard this higher charge might be to pull off (272C2-274B5).

1507 See 272C10-11: It is not quite "devil's advocate" as the commentators say but close to it (cf. my n. *ad loc.*). Likewise, Aristotle famously aporizes over (his versions of) his predecessors' views in advance of presenting his own as a solution (he calls this διαπορεῖν), but less famously he also might adduce (his versions of) their views *afterwards* so as to corroborate his own theory by using it to refute them (*Phys.*1.8; *EN* 1.8-9, 6.13; *EE* 7.5).

1508 Cf.273A1 (τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην) and n. *ad loc.*

1509 In fact he was first to bring it up (259E7-260A4), though his reference is to the language of the imaginary interlocutor that Socrates brought up at 260A5ff, who was in fact the τέχνη herself. Cf. n.1150.

1510 φεῦ (273C7); ἀτάρ (C9: cf. n.1159). In contrast with what they have been discussing this is merely a bag of tricks (ἄτεχνος τριβή, 260E5).

1511 Actually the first was his proud summary of the contents of an ideal manual, 271C10-272B4. Coming up, in addition to his far flung story about Egypt (274C5-275B2) and his analogies between writing and painting (275D4-E5) and between writing and planting (276B1-D8), are four other triumphant outbursts of eloquence, which we shall review in detail, below ("Socrates's Psychagogical Flourishes").

The Proprieties of Writing: 274A6-279C8

Socrates announces that they have reached a consensus as to what the artfulness of a τέχνη λόγων truly consists of and then recalls the narrower, previous question they had raised, about the proprieties of writing. Here too we may use the pleasing of gods as the criterion, and though we cannot be sure what is their pleasure there is an old story that might illustrate what it is, the discussion between Thamas the divine ruler of Egypt and the god Theuth who invented writing among other powerful intellectual skills like geometry. The pharaoh surprisingly warned Theuth that far from helping them commemorate the past, writing would *destroy* their ability to remember. Too heavy a reliance on the written version will give men the feeling they know simply because they have heard something being read, just as it had Phaedrus in the current conversation! Better than such false sophistication is the simple piety of our forefathers who believed the prophecies of Dodonian Zeus, though they came out of oak and stone, for the fact that they were true, just as the λόγοι that came upon us a half an hour ago had put it in their Laconian manner (260E). Writing like sculpture or painting stimulates its audience to try to engage in conversation with its speaker or the person depicted, but No! they cannot talk back after all! A thinking man realizes that the written version of the thought, like the mere picture of a man, is like a bastard brother of the thinker's true son, his thought. Nor will a live thinker be satisfied to abandon his thoughts to a written version that might have some immediate appeal or effect in a public festival, like those special pots of flowers you see at the festival of Adonis, quickly grown and then thrown away before spawning seeds of their own, but which in the end will not bear proper witness to thought but wither and die just as fast as they pushed up. If he writes at all it will be as a playful pastime on a par with the way others play at drinking.[1512] His serious attention he will save for conversing with a soul that is suited to the activity,[1513] planting ideas that he in turn can pass on to others, with both participants edified by the activity to enjoy a life that affords the greatest happiness available to man (274B6-277A5).

The vehemence with which Phaedrus applauds each of Socrates's sweeping statements through this passage reaches something of a climax in his response to this last one: "That last remark of yours was even finer than fine!" (277A5).[1514] Socrates recognizes that the time is ripe to return to the question that brought all this up, Phaedrus's sense that Lysias should be embarrassed at being called a λογόγραφος, but Phaedrus asks him first to remind him what they have agreed to, providing Socrates an occasion to improvise a fifth sweeping statement (277B5-C6) in which he gracefully retails the elements of dialectic and psychology, which are the objective and subjective aspects of the art. Once Phaedrus has accepted this version of their position unreservedly (παντάπασι, C7), Socrates delivers a sixth masterful statement in which he infers what is shameful and what is praiseworthy in the practice of writing. The greatest shame redounds upon the man who holds the view that by consigning his thoughts to a written form he has thereby made them something solid and clear, even though he does not have an account of justice and the good ready in his consciousness to deliver *ex tempore*, whether waking or sleeping – regardless of how much a mass audience might praise him. Conversely, the man is to be admired who holds the view that written works are nothing more than a game and of no great worth whether written in prose or verse; that because it is intransigent to

1512 Such as the written work of Plato that we are reading.

1513 Such as the conversation Socrates is represented to be having with Phaedrus, right now.

1514 Just above he had characterized Socrates's idea of playing at writing up discussions with the virtual superlative παγκάλην (276E1) and now he tops that with πολὺ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔτι κάλλιον λέγεις (277A5).

scrutiny and exegesis by question and answer, the best a written work can do is jog the reader to recall what he already knows; and that truly clear, complete and serious articulation of thought on important matters is achieved only in live discussion, in which the ideas are written live onto the soul as it were, to take root there and be passed along to other souls. He puts no stake at all in the fame of authorship. "I daresay, my dear Phaedrus, this is the kind of man we would pray for each other to become, you and I" (277A6-278B4).

Phaedrus unreservedly avers that he does hope and pray for this (βούλομαί τε καὶ εὔχομαι, 278B5) and the work of the dialogical section is entirely done, since he has removed the gratuitous stipulation he introduced at its very beginning (συνεύχομαι ... εἴπερ ἄμεινον, 257B7-8). Socrates follows up by returning to the very question by which Phaedrus there evaded to respond more directly (What should he report back to Lysias?) and now offers him an answer, though the truth of the matter is that he is telling Phaedrus what message he should take away for himself from the conversation. A man who writes, but can improve upon what he writes in conversation because he is more serious about the ideas than their degraded encasement in writing, deserves a special appellation. If like the metic Lysias whom Phaedrus so admires it is only his writing he is concerned with let him be known as poet or a scrivener or a speechwriter, depending upon the sort of thing he has written; but if he cares for the ideas we should call him – well, not "wise," for this appellation must be reserved for the gods but a "lover of wisdom," a philosopher. And now Phaedrus wants to know what *Socrates* will be saying when he returns to *his* companion, whom he says is Isocrates, and more exactly what denomination *he* will deserve. Plato's allowing Phaedrus to assign Isocrates as Socrates's companion is something of a surprise but Socrates passes over the pertinence or validity of the assignment and gives him an answer, anyway, for once again he is really talking about Phaedrus to Phaedrus. He knows his Phaedrus and knows that at just this moment Phaedrus would prefer not to go back to Lysias, but forward with Socrates. So it is this alternate path that he describes in the person of Isocrates, for Phaedrus to emulate. Isocrates, Socrates can say, shows something better than the likes of Lysias, for being driven by a more divine sort of impulse. There is some element of philosophy in the manner of his thinking and he almost deserves that appellation. The description is mild enough to make it easy for Phaedrus to imagine emulating it with success, and to imagine Socrates, the lover, helping him in the future.

Socrates's "message to Isocrates" is really an elaboration of his send-off of Phaedrus, having to do not with Lysias where he came from today (πόθεν), but with where he (not just Socrates) might go from here (ποῖ); and after this *envoi*, just as at the end of his Second Speech, he follows up with a second *envoi* directed to the gods, a prayer to the tutelary deities of this place who inspired the discussion that enabled Phaedrus (and us, to the extent that we identified with Phaedrus) to undergo this change within.

Socrates's Psychagogical Flourishes

Phaedrus's progress to this conclusion rests on the argument-events that led him to embrace it both emotionally and rationally. We may take a lesson from the discussion and call this leading ψυχαγωγία. Now that we have summarized the argumentative content, we need to "ride through" the argument-events as they took place, in language at least, so that we might feel how they might have felt to Phaedrus and thereby assess the dramatic verisimilarity of his acquiescence. But with this we reach

a crucial issue bearing on the interpretation of Plato's *Dialogues* in general. To the extent that they are argument-events involving concrete persons where the criterion for truth is nothing but the agreement of the two parties, their conversation might devolve into a *folie à deux*. Most readers would agree that what keeps this from happening is this special individual, Socrates, and the way he prevents the argument from devolving into such a folly by keeping his eye on the real questions and directing the discussion back to them. But this is not quite enough, for if his interlocutor were an utter fool even Socrates could not be expected to bring the conversation very far. The character and personality of Socrates's interlocutors is therefore another crucial precondition and determinant of the value of any agreement that might be reached.

It is here that interpreters begin to part company with each other. Some for instance view Phaedrus as a person preoccupied by this or that idea, or as a person of this or that temperament or this or that social description,[1515] and then they position themselves as if they were watching the interlocutor over Socrates's shoulder while Socrates ministers to his idiosyncratic foibles (most commonly the foible is that he is not "philosophical" enough!). Others, hoping for something more than ministrations *ad hominem*, imagine themselves watching Socrates, the philosopher, over the interlocutor's shoulder and hoping for a chance to do one better than the interlocutor. Their "interpretation" of the dialogue is actually an alternative dialogue they propose between themselves and Socrates, that never takes place. My own sense of the problem is a little different. It is not the idiosyncrasies of the interlocutor that Plato has elected to depict Socrates ministering to, for this would lead to a result of very narrow importance; nor does he place an interlocutor before Socrates who is a cardboard cut-out representing a certain type of person that we the readers of course are not, leaving us little to do besides feeling superior. I find in fact that the interlocutors characteristically approach Socrates with some anxious desire to talk that embodies or exhibits a recognizable and common attitude about, or way of dealing with, a generic problem everybody faces, such as the relation of fathers and sons (like the cases of Lysimachus and Melesias in the *Laches* and of Adeimantus in the *Republic*) – an attitude that even the interlocutor realizes needs to be improved upon or healed or even tamed, but worries he can't. The interlocutors' hope for help, and fear they are hopeless and helpless, explains the push-and-pull attitude they continually exhibit when they come within earshot of Socrates.[1516] Conversely, it is the absence of the person of Socrates and the absence of interlocutors with anxieties of this generic sort that accounts for the flatness of all subsequent "philosophical" dialogues. In Cicero a person's only "problem" is that he is a Stoic sitting next to a Skeptic, and the only reason it is a problem is that the other party present is a Skeptic instead of a Stoic.

Because or to the extent that Plato is depicting the interlocutor and his anxieties realistically, the interlocutor will reveal only indirectly the underlying attitude that is the source of his anxiety. People do not say what they mean! In fact a person's attitude might even manifest itself in flat denial. For instance, Glaucon in the *Republic* is so envious of the man who is "good for goodness' sake" that he imagines heinous tortures for him (361E3-362A3)! Socrates, and we also, can only discover this problematic attitude, therefore, by seeing through the interlocutor's speech and behavior with empathy – and in following this aspect of the dramatic development we are looking over the shoulder of Socrates. But we empathize only because we recognize the problem in ourselves, and so at the same time we find ourselves looking over the interlocutor's shoulder back toward Socrates as the therapist that will find the wisdom that will heal not only him but us. It is in this way that we become fully involved in the *Dialogues* and feel their greatness to such an extent that we can become grateful that Plato wrote them for us. The fact that the *Dialogues* have been preserved finally makes sense. In

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1515 Cf. for example n.1499.

1516 To ask who are the individuals that contront Jesus in the Gospels would help to focus the problem, *mutatis mutandis*.

the same way, for instance, that Socrates suggests to Adeimantus that the two of them construct an ideal state and look for justice to arise in it so that he can move the focus away from Adeimantus and provide him with the theoretical distance that will enable him to develop a sense of justice before the implications redound upon himself, so is Plato, in showing us Socrates talking to an interlocutor with a problem we recognize in ourselves, also providing us with a theoretical case that we, too, can watch to our benefit at a safe distance. It is Adeimantus, not ourselves, that faults his upbringing as an excuse for taking the low road to the heights of success; it is Phaedrus, not ourselves, who is fascinated by the prospect of a skill that will compel a person we love to grant us his or her favors rather than having to move into the vulnerable "grey area" of asking.[1517] But we listen because we know that tomorrow it will be us. Glaucon conversely attempts to build a fire under Socrates with his story of Gyges (359B6-C6), to get him to feel as compelled as he does to be unjust, but Adeimantus interrupts before Socrates gets to reply directly (362D1-9). Socrates remembers the temptation, however, and brings it back into the conversation in Book Nine when he has Glaucon imagine the little man within, visible to our conscience even if the outer man were made invisible by a ring![1518]

The drama of the dialogue is thus not whether Phaedrus in fact acquiesces (this would rely too heavily on the vagaries of will – one thinks of Hegel's remark that the science of physiognomy could be set back centuries by a single willfully meaningless smirk) but whether it is *verisimilar* that a person with Phaedrus's problem *would* acquiesce, and in the way Phaedrus does; and the only index we have for judging this question is to ask ourselves whether we, having put ourselves, through empathy, into the position of the person that comes with Phaedrus's problem, would acquiesce as he does. Moreover, to acquiesce does not mean to give in to Socrates, but to accept the gift of release he brings and no longer to be in the grips of the problem or at its mercy.[1519] We must *feel* Phaedrus's confessions of more and more enthusiastic agreement with Socrates's several attacks on rhetoric, and his increasingly vociferous agreement with Socrates's broadening advocacy of the pursuit of philosophy, to be indices that the underlying problem is quieting down or losing its hold upon such a person as Phaedrus – i.e., such a person as we have imagined ourselves also perfectly able to be – and we must experience Socrates's raising of the registers of eloquence and vividness in the articulation of his remarks about the alternative as a triumph we are undergoing, or would be undergoing, in ourselves. This is the criterion I propose for evaluating the efficacy of Socrates's several "accesses of eloquence" toward the end of the dialogue; and it is tantamount to discovering and undergoing the way the λόγοι move our own souls, i.e., what we may now call their ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων. Thus we will end our commentary with a psychagogic analysis (now that we now what psychagogia is) of these eloquent flourishes with which the dialogical section culminates, analyses to be placed alongside the analyses of the three speeches presented above.

The first example of this upping of the register within the dialogical section comes (1) at 265B2-C3, where he takes a moment to characterize his Second Speech. But several pages later, as the unanimity with Phaedrus accrues, comes (2) the "spelling out" of the truly psychagogic rhetoric at 271B10-272B2, in response to Phaedrus's eager request,[1520] and then (3) the indignant *ad hominem*

1517 Cf. Timocles's insightful remark about the power of fiction, quoted above in n.877: ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ἰδίων λήθην λαβών | πρὸς ἀλλοτρίῳ τε ψυχαγωγηθεὶς πάθει | μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀπῆλθε παιδευθεὶς ἅμα (frg.6.6 [=*CAF* 2.453 ed.Koch]).

1518 *Rep*.588B6-E1. The various aspects of this interpretation of the *Republic* are fully developed in my commentary on the text, at www.onplatosrepublic.com.

1519 Though, like some of us, a "patient" like Apollodorus never quite believes he can do without his master: *Symp*.173D4-10. The psychological insights of Jacques Lacan come to mind, as to whether the patient truly wishes to be healed.

1520 271C5-9.

response to the corrosive devices of Tisias (273D2-274A5). His immediately subsequent remarks increase in imaginativeness rather than pure eloquence of expression,[1521] in his exotic story about the Egyptians (274C5-275B2), his subtle analysis of the phenomenology of painting (275D4-E5), and his simile about the Adonis Gardens (276B1-8); but the last of these then gives way (4) to elaboration with eloquent expression (276D1-277A4), an eloquence continued (5) in his review of the ground they have covered (277B5-C6), again at Phaedrus's request,[1522] and then culminating (6) in his articulation of the conclusion that follows from it (277D6-278B4). As we have already noted, Phaedrus agrees at each stage with increased vehemence and no trace of his characteristic reserve,[1523] to the point that in the final case he joins Socrates in the prayer that the two of them might become philosophers, the very prayer he had sidestepped at the beginning of the dialogical section.[1524]

(1) Retrospective Description of the Big Speech (265B2-C3)

Phaedrus has asked Socrates to lay off using his associate Lysias's speech as a negative example for the study of good or bad art[1525] and so Socrates turns to his own. For himself, his two speeches exemplify the important principle of division. They could stand in direct opposition to each other because of the distinction between the mania that is merely a human disease and the mania that is a divine release from human conventions. He then begins a vaunting description of his Second Speech that starts by recounting with overstated elaboration[1526] the speech's further use of division:

> "After positing the mantic madness as an inspiration from Apollo, from Dionysus the telestic, from the Muses the poetic, and fourth as the inspiration of Aphrodite and Eros the erotic madness, this last one we asserted was the best, and with a bewildering imagistic account of what it means to undergo eros, touching perhaps in part on truth but just as likely blown far off course, concocting an account not entirely unpersuasive, we rendered a measured and reverent tale and hymn to Eros, that despot mine and yours, Phaedrus, the warden of beautiful children."

The point that Socrates is in the process of making is that the speech proceeded by dividing mania into a good one and a bad one and instantiating the good one with three recognized types, in order then to argue that eros is a fourth cogener of the three; but in the midst of making this point he suddenly allows himself an access of eloquence in describing the speech in general, as if moved by his very recollection of it.[1527] That it was a flight of fancy partly true and partly false but not entirely unpersuasive, and that the speech was rendered for the sake of placating the god have nothing to do with his point. The immediate purpose of the summary is to introduce an example of division that can then be used as a basis for a general statement of the method of division and collection (265C5-266C1).

The most striking element in the summary is its loose weave of two indicatives with five

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1521 But images, too, have a distinct power to move the soul! Cf. nn. 877 and 1100, and X.*Oec.*17.15.
1522 276B4.
1523 Cf. 265C4, 272B5-6, 274A6-7, 275C3-4, 275E6, 276E1-3, 277A5, 277C7, and finally 278B5-6.
1524 βούλομαί τε καὶ εὔχομαι ἃ λέγεις, 278B5-6. Cf. 257B7-C2 and nn.795 and 796.
1525 Proposed and agreed to at 262C5-9.
1526 Cf. n.946.
1527 As the Speaker of the speech himself had been, every time he recollected the vision of the huperouranion: 247C3-E6 cf. n.435; 249C2-4 with n.499; 250B5-C8 with nn.535 and 545; 254B6-7 with nn.667 and 669)

circumstantial participles, in the midst of which two are balanced. It is as if Socrates in remembering the speech for its dialectical content is himself re-inspired and unexpectedly driven off course.

(2) Description of the Art of Logos (271B10-272B2)

Socrates has already presented in dialogue three steps any "artist of speech" will follow if he is to compose a speech *artfully* and as such they have agreed upon the points one by one (271A4-B5), but Phaedrus now asks him "what the method is." Socrates takes him to be asking for a finished statement of the method[1528] which of course he does not have not ready to hand, but he is willing to try[1529] to describe it, and he *improvises* a continuous and uninterrupted statement almost a whole page long.

Such a *presentation* differs from dialogical conversation, since conversation consists of question and answer and this presentation is neither. Yes, it is a response, but a response to a request rather than to a question. A true *answer* to what is truly a question is delimited by the horizon of the question. It must yield to the conception of the question and must make space not only for the question but for the questioner, too, in case he interrupts. Conversely, the criterion of both the consecutivity and the completeness of a *presentation* is determined by the topic, even if the presenter runs the risk of losing the audience along the way. Indeed, the difference between the two is the problem of μακρολογία that Socrates raises at the beginning of the *Gorgias*, since Gorgias tends to think that all the questions he is being asked are requests that he speak and perform. When he says he has never been asked a question that was "new" (καινόν, 448A2) he means not that he is omniscient but that there was never a request he could not satisfy.[1530] The fact that satisfying the questioner conveyed the impression also that he was omniscient is an index of the audience not a description of Gorgias.[1531] The aftermath of such a presentation is, moreover, is not a follow-up question, but applause.[1532] Conversely a person participating in a dialogue would break the rules if he decides unilaterally to make a presentation. Such a holding forth is inherently inappropriate since interrupting it threatens to spoil it, whereas in dialogue the answerer must try to answer any question no matter how badly formulated, and might be interrupted with a new question along the way, even though it may be formulated still worse.

A presentation must therefore manage its own consecutivity with great care so that it will not need interruptions for clarification, but will make sense immediately. We saw an ideal example of consecutivity-being-managed in Socrates's First Speech. If anything it was overdone, both in its programmatically explicit transitions and in its exploitation of background lists that effortlessly conferred organization onto its content and its sequence of treatment. Similarly, the salient feature of Socrates's present flourish is the way that it insists on the order that the speech writer must follow, but in this case the crucial consecutivity is managed much more swiftly and confidently,[1533] in particular by the use of participles,[1534] inferential and illative particles,[1535] and the "persons" of the demonstrative.[1536] After all, in Socrates's First Speech the ideas were relatively new, whereas in the

1528 So must we understand αὐτὰ τὰ ῥήματα εἰπεῖν at 271C6. Cf. n.1095.
1529 λέγειν at 271C8 is conative: cf. n.1096.
1530 Cf. n.1343.
1531 *Pace* Philostratos, *VS* 1.1 (=DK82A1a).
1532 *Euthyd.*276B7, 303B3; *Prot.*334C7; cf. my n. *ad Rep.*338A6-7.
1533 Cf. n.1102. and overall nn.1114 and 1119.
1534 Cf. nn.1103,1107.
1535 οὖν, δή, αὖ, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἤδη.
1536 Cf. nn.1102,1105,1107,1108,1118,1122.

present case Socrates is only organizing into continuous presentation a set of ideas that he and Phaedrus had already reached and agreed to through dialogical question and answer.[1537]

The orderly articulation of the three major steps in composition (271C10-272A3) stands in contrast with the articulation of a newly included fourth one (A3-7), which imports into the basic schema of artistic composition the various special techniques invented and even named after the famous teachers, which were reviewed at 266D5-267E9. Phaedrus had adduced these as the very substance of rhetorical art,[1538] but here they are characterized as merely supplementary[1539] and moreover subordinate to the general criterion of καιρός.[1540] This fourth category is not dignified with an indicative construction of its own but is tucked into a circumstantial clause that at first appears to be a mere exegesis of the transitional clause in ἔχοντι, the indicative being reserved for something else; but the "something else" ends up being a semantically otiose and therefore anticlimactic closure of the statement as a whole (A7-8), so that the effect is as follows: 'if one has mastered these three steps, adding the variety of minor techniques as governed by καιρός he will have a fully polished art.'[1541]

(3) The Dismissal of Tisias (273D2-274A5)

The thorough and orderly method of composition having been articulated and unreservedly approved by Phaedrus (272B5-6), Socrates now turns back to the definition of rhetorical art that Phaedrus had proffered at the very beginning of this conversation (259E7-260A4). In tandem with strengthening their embrace of the new idea, he intends to strengthen their rejection of the old, the shortsighted doctrine which he now associates with Tisias according to which one needs none of this panoply of technique, since persuasion is entirely a matter of telling likely stories even if they are false. When Phaedrus first introduced this doctrine not as his own but as what he "had heard" (ἀκήκοα, 259E7), Socrates countenanced it to be worthy of consideration on deferential supposition that it had fallen from the lips of the wise.[1542] Now that they have done their own work and embraced a very different idea he receives it as worthy of consideration for exactly the opposite reason, that it is only fair to give the "wolf" a hearing after the shepherds have had the floor for so long.[1543] First he takes it upon himself to articulate (272C7-E5) what it was that Phaedrus "had heard," this cynical and superficial ἐπάγγελμα of Tisias[1544] whose book he imagines Phaedrus – the "old" Phaedrus – to have pawed over,[1545] according to which all the "belt and suspenders" of Socrates's method is unneeded.[1546]

His account of the doctrine is derogatory and satirical (273B3-C5) and his reaction to it (D2-274A5) is indignant.[1547] He unleashes a response as if he and Phaedrus were speaking directly to

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1537 Cf. nn.1099,1100. We are approaching the idea of the written logos as memorandum!

1538 Cf.266C8-9 and D5-6.

1539 N.b., προσλαβόντι (A4) and nn.1119,1120,1121,1122.

1540 Their subordination is emphasized by their being confined between two mentions of καιρός (A4, A6-7: cf. nn.1120, 1122).

1541 For continued participial constructions giving way to the indicative in otiose closure, cf. *Rep*.540B6-7 and 550B4-5, and my nn. *ad locc*.

1542 οὗτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος (260A5).

1543 τὸ τοῦ λύκου (272C10-11). On the sense of the proverb cf. n.1133.

1544 Cf. 273B3-4 and nn.1148, 1153.

1545 πεπάτηκας (273A6): cf. n.1152. Socrates likewise imagined Phaedrus pawing over the book of Lysias earlier that morning (228A6-B1).

1546 On περιβαλλομένους (272D3) cf. n.1136.

1547 Cf. nn. 1147, 1159, 1160.

Tisias. It is another continuous performance, but this time an harangue to a third party who is absent. Phaedrus is cast into the role of a fellow speaker with Socrates rather than that of a fellow listener with Tisias. In fact, Socrates is seeking to persuade Phaedrus to embrace even more resolutely a preference for philosophical study over a career of verbal manipulation by projecting his own former belief onto the person of an enemy and berating that enemy with all the better ideas they themselves have agreed to, through dialogue, so far.

Because they have reached these ideas since Phaedrus first adduced the position, he begins the harangue by upbraiding Tisias as a *parvenu*.[1548] He and Phaedrus have already dealt with the notion of likelihood and showed it is not a given but rests on a better or worse prior knowledge of similarities and differences, so whatever is masterful in what Tisias has to teach rests upon mastery of the science he belittled, their own science of dialectic (D2-E4). Now that the tables have been turned they do not need him.[1549] The only argument left for Tisias's method is that it is ready at hand (D2-8), in contrast with the larger and perhaps even impossible and perhaps even superhuman undertaking, of which Socrates had earlier confessed nevertheless to be an eager lover.[1550] Socrates now brings forward the divine index, admonishing Tisias that a *temperate* man will devote his efforts to what will please gods (to the extent this is humanly possible), not men (E4-8). It is Phaedrus's eros that Socrates is now seeking to awaken – eros for a doctrine and a pursuit he has already reminded him of and helped him to accept through argument – and to persuade him to abandon his erotic drive (in the frustrated sense of eros) to manipulate a human audience. This is what the intervening argument has enabled him to add: the doctrine of likelihood had already been relativized right at the beginning of the present discussion (260A9-260D2).

He initiates his attempt to arouse this higher sensitivity with an admonitory κλῖμαξ of *sine qua non*'s. One will *never* be a true artisan of arguments unless he master dialectic to the extent humanly possible, and he shall *never* achieve this unless he expend great effort (E3-5). Socrates then continues the κλῖμαξ by directly appending an epexegesis on this "great effort," with a relative clause: 'to which (effort) a person ought *not* devote all his labor for success in the political arena, if he is temperate.'[1551] This time, however, the negation does not lead, foot over hand, to another negation.[1552] As ἀλλά announces, it serves as foil for a positive alternative that trumps it, by a familiar figure we have called *comparatio per contrarium*:[1553]

> ἦν οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεῖ
> διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρονα ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα μὲν
> λέγειν δύνασθαι, κεχαρισμένως δὲ πράττειν τὸ πᾶν εἰς δύναμιν.

The genitive τοῦ placed immediately after ἀλλά indicates by its placement that we are to understand and bring forward ἕνεκα to govern it, and that are to look for an articular infinitive parallel to, and probably contrary to, λέγειν (or to λέγειν καὶ πράττειν). But the next word is θεοῖς instead of an infinitive and we now sense that the adversative clause promised by ἀλλά will adduce a contrast between men (ἀνθρώπους) and gods (θεοῖς) rather than between the articular infinitives for the sake

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1548 On παρελθεῖν cf. n.1161.

1549 273D6-7ff.

1550 At 266B3-C1, where note ὥστε θεοῖο (B7). The strong term there, ἐραστής (B3), imports the suggestion that he perceives himself to *lack* the dialectical ability, according to the deeper understanding of eros articulated in his Great Myth – and also at Agathon's house, on another occasion.

1551 ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους (E5): On the sense of this doublet cf. n.1167. It is coextensive with the ἀνθρωπίνα σπουδάσματα of 249D1.

1552 The metaphor of the κλῖμαξ (ladder) is that foot replaces hand on the rungs.

1553 οὐκ X ἀλλά Y. It was a favorite of Lysias's Speaker. Cf. n.1323.

of which a temperate man "ought to expend effort" (δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι, governing ἥν [sc. πραγματείαν] as "internal accusative"). With so much of an inkling we can begin to construe the ensuing κεχαρισμένα (with θεοῖς) as a neuter accusative nominal object of the anticipated infinitive promised by τοῦ and venture forward. But μέν now intervenes, broaching an entirely new and unforeseen construction or idea – a promise in particular of some term that will stand in *contrast* with its immediately antecedent θεοῖς κεχωρισμένα – but what could this term be? We can only read on, and now we get the infinitive we were waiting for, but it is λέγειν, repeated from above, rather than some new and contrasting action we had been led to expect by οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν ... ἀλλὰ τοῦ ... . The contrast between men and gods continues to trump that original anticipation, and (repeated) λέγειν conversely becomes the fixed rather than the varied term. But just as soon as we might be satisfied to view the contrast as between striving to speak things pleasing to gods as opposed to striving to speak (and act) in the arena of men, we get another infinitive, δύνασθαι. It is not merely speaking (to men) that we are endeavoring to do, but *becoming able* to speak (pleasing things to gods). The temperate man who by nature observes measure devotes immeasurable effort because now the measure is god, not man. As we construe and begin to absorb this variation or refinement of λέγειν, we notice the absence of the second infinitive from above, πράττειν. Rather than getting καὶ πράττειν again (i.e., λέγειν δύνασθαι καὶ πράττειν, *vel sim.*), we get κεχαρισμένως δέ, and once again (as with λέγειν) the term we expected to be a contrasting term collapses into a term repeated in anaphora (κεχαρισμένως, though adverbial rather than nominal). Only now do we get πράττειν but its predicate τὸ πᾶν εἰς δύναμιν turns it into a *generalization* of λέγειν and swiftly closes the sentence, with εἰς δύναμιν repeating in *variatio* the idea of reaching beyond the usual human range (δύνασθαι), this aspiration that drives the temperate man to act, we may almost say, intemperately.

The intervening and unanticipated μέν / δέ construction has transmogrified the hendiadys λέγειν καὶ πράττειν (denoting the business of politics) into an expression of how a man might strive to reach beyond himself and please the gods, in his speaking (and thinking) and in all other actions. The dead metaphors are brought back to life and given meanings inconceivable to Tisias who only lately arrived in the discussion, though Phaedrus has been present to understand what Socrates is referring to and what they really mean, and therefore has no trouble following the presentation. θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα λέγειν becomes the act of analyzing and articulating reality through dialectic – whether in thought or speech does not here matter – under the purview of Calliope and Urania;[1554] and κεχαρισμένως πράττειν τὸ πᾶν means to make such a study the primary *activity* of one's life. Together they constitute what Socrates prayed for at the end of his Second Speech, namely, that Phaedrus might μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων (~λέγειν) τὸν βίον ποιῆται (~πράττειν) (257B6).

Socrates then continues the conceit of admonishing Tisias, though of course it is the Phaedrus he is helping Phaedrus leave behind that he is truly admonishing. Now that the telescope has been turned around and god instead of man has been introduced as the true measure (the very thing that happened in Socrates's Second Speech), we humans all move into the position of fellow slaves, and the question becomes, Why would a man with his wits about him devote his studies to pleasing these, rather than the godly masters we all serve, who are wholly good?[1555] The question restates the content of the complex relative clause-sentence we have just analyzed (E5-8),[1556] and this content is now shown to imply what had above been presented as leading to it in the κλῖμαξ of preconditions

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1554 259D3-7: N.b. προσφιλεστέρους, D1.

1555 With ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν (274A2) he reminds us of the phrase he used to distinguish the gods' superior souls from "our" souls (246A7-B1), a speech for which Tisias was again not present although Phaedrus was, so as to remind Phaedrus (and us) of our permanent inferiority to the gods but at the same time to recall their ungrudging willingness, nevertheless, that we might follow in their trains and emulate them (247A7).

1556 χαρίζεσθαι is actually repeated; μελετᾶν ~ διαπονεῖσθαι; τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ~ τὸν σώφρονα.

(namely, E4-5). That the circuit[1557] we must traverse to achieve this (i.e., the work of achieving dialectical competence) should be long is no surprise, for the stakes, Tisias, are far greater than the goal you have in mind. Socrates's performance then closes by drawing, again as an inference, what had been the *first* precondition in the κλῖμαξ above (E3-4), that only from dialectical competence can the most polished (κάλλιστα[1558] – i.e., truly artistic) results be achieved.

This tightly worded and ultimately annular passage requires for its understanding many ideas that Tisias is not privy to, but Phaedrus is privy to them, as we know since we also are privy to them – including the thought of Socrates's Second Speech (the image of the περίοδος and the closing prayer combining λόγος and πρᾶξις), as well as the myth of the cicadas and Socrates's more recent remarks about dialectic being somehow akin to a divine pursuit, or a pursuit of the divine (266B). Indeed it is upon these prior remarks that Socrates's performance *relies* for its continuity, as well as its complicated management of hyperbaton and prolepsis which we have analyzed above.

Phaedrus has followed perfectly, for in his enthusiastic acceptance (παγκάλως) of Socrates's statement he focusses on the most important point, the aspiration regardless of its practical possibility (εἴπερ οἷός τέ τις εἴη, 274A7).

(4) The Comparison of Writing to Speaking (276D1-277A4)

Socrates now continues to illustrate and corroborate his thesis that truly artful rhetoric is identical to philosophical study with a rapid and sustained display of imaginative vigor – first his Egyptian parable about the limits of writing (274C5-275B6), then his comparison of written work to still-life painting (275D4-E5), and finally his analogy between the teacher who consigns his thought to writing and the less than serious farmer who wastes seeds on Adonis gardens (276B1-C6). He nails down the last of these analogies with an eloquent statement of its application to the teacher (276D1-8). If he does plant (write) gardens of written works, it will only be as an amusement, for the sake of storing up the treasures of his thoughts in case his memory fails him, for himself or for another man who can track the same line of thought; and he will derive enjoyment from seeing his arguments live and grow, supple rather than stiff. When other men chose their other pastimes, whether to water themselves at drinking parties or the other kinds of pastimes akin to these, at such times we will find our man occupied not with these but with the pastimes I am describing instead.

The eloquence consists of the suppleness of the expression with which he describes the thinker at play. The syntactic structure of the paragraph consists of a future apodosis (σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράψει, D2) followed by a subjunctive protasis as a sort of proviso (ὅταν γράφῃ, D2), with the apodosis then expanded by an interestingly structured circumstantial participial construction (ἑαυτῷ τε ... θησαυριζόμενος ... καί παντὶ τῷ ... μετιόντι, D3-4) and finished off with a parallel future apodosis appended to the foregoing with τε (ἡσθήσεται τε, D4-5). A second sentence ensues, seemingly adversative to the first insofar as it opens with an adversative protasis (ὅταν δέ, D5), which itself is elaborated with a similarly constructed circumstantial participle construction (συμποσίοις τε ἅρδοντες... ἑτέροις τε ... ἀδελφά, D6-7), which then gives way to a future apodosis that restates the content of the apodosis with which the paragraph opened (τότ' ἐκεῖνος ... διάξει, D7-8).

1557 περίοδος (274A2): Though Tisias cannot know it, we cannot fail to follow out the suggestion of the crucial role that a vision of the forms in the disembodied state, narrated as occupying a περιφορά in Socrates's Second speech, plays in enabling a man to find the terms of the divisions and collections. Cf. the unmistakably suggestive passage above, 266B3-C1, and nn.972, 1171.

1558 It is the term κάλλιστα (274A4) that refers back to the notion of the "truly artful" presented above (τεχνικός, 273E3): cf. n.1173.

The suppleness consists, in the first sentence, of the unexpected reversion to the apodosis effected by the impromptu connective, τε (D5). Second, there is the subtle interplay between the dative case and the participial mood in the duplex participial construction, to wit,

> ἑαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενος, εἰς τὸ "λήθης γῆρας"
> εἀν "ἵκηται" καί παντὶ τῷ ταὐτὸν ἴχνος μετιόντι

where, I should want to point out, the participle introduces the purpose of writing (swiftly denoted by εἰς) as a bar against forgetting (something of a quotation is included as the object of the preposition) both for themselves (ἑαυτῷ with proleptic τε) and anybody who can sniff out the train of their thought. The teacher's reader is included only on the proviso (μετίοντι is *virtually* as conditional as θησαυριζόμενος though it is in attributive position) that he can follow the scent of the writing and does not think it to be the very thought but only the trail left behind by the thought. Third there is the reversion to the apodosis with an afterthought that also feels impromptu because it is attached to the foregoing by τε.[1559]

The second sentence starts with, rather than postpones, the protasis, so as to indicate (with δέ) that a comparable but adversative or alternative statement is coming. All this is immediately corroborated by ἄλλοι παιδιαῖς ἄλλαις, where the ἄλλος forms indicate the alternative, while παιδιαῖς, repeated from above (D2) and made plural to agree with them, indicates comparison. The sentence does not move directly to its apodosis, but is interrupted, instead, by a circumstantial participial construction that is, in form at least, strikingly similar the participial construction that interrupted the first sentence, to-wit,

> συμποσίοις τε ἄρδοντες αὐτοὺς ἑτέροις τε ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά

Again we have a single participle governing a doubled complement in the dative (the doubling announced with proleptic τε) with the first limb of the duplex complement containing a reflexive (αὐτούς ~ ἑαυτῷ). But the syntactical resemblances or parallelisms are wholly specious! The contrasts rely instead upon the semantics or, more accurately, the ideas behind the semantics. σπερεῖ τε και γράψει corresponds to ἄρδοντες (the teacher tends to his "written plants" but the others water *themselves*!), and the goal of the teacher's play is remembrance but that of the others is oblivion. Once these (playful) points of comparison are made, the sentence is given an apodosis that is entirely otiose ("our man instead will play in the way I just described"), merely to bring the paragraph to an end.

Phaedrus again agrees enthusiastically and right on point by singling out the discrepant purposes of play, for oblivion *versus* for remembering (παγκάλην παιδιάν, 276E1).

(5) Recollection of Their Results (277B5-C6)

In the wake of Phaedrus's enthusiastic agreement Socrates can now suggest they make the decision they have conducted their entire conversation to become able to make, namely, whether the opprobrium heaped upon Lysias as λογογράφος was justified and what makes λόγοι artful and what not. The artful element, they have now made sufficiently clear (δεδηλῶσθαι μετρίως, 277B3). But first, as once before,[1560] Phaedrus wants to *be reminded*[1561] of their results and wants to have them

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1559 For this "τε of the light touch" cf. 230B2-C5 and nn.93, 95, 97.

1560 At 271C5: cf. n.1095.

1561 πάλιν δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με πῶς (277B4): Note that this request is made in the wake of their having agreed that written

articulated one more time. He entirely knows the ideas but craves to undergo their presentation in one continuous and articulated movement. Is it a movement of thought or of words he has in mind? or both? – and Socrates has one more chance to outdo himself!

From his admonitory πρὶν ἄν we immediately see that Socrates will again define or represent artfulness ('a composition is artful if it …') by listing the necessary prerequisites to artfulness ('a composition will not be artful unless …'), a formulation we have witnessed several times in this section,[1562] including in passage #2 above (271C10-272B2), and in passage #3 where it provided the pattern repeated in the κλῖμαξ within Socrates's reply to Tisias (273D2-274A5). Such a formulation must by its nature front-load all the criteria it wishes to mention in a series of syntactically coordinated subordinate constructions and then close by ascending to the ordinate rank with the assertion in the indicative that *art* will not have been achieved unless and until the listed criteria have been met. The challenge that the form imposes upon the speaker is therefore to retain the syntactically subordinate rank throughout his articulation of a multiplicity of criteria, keeping intact their logical interrelations of prior and posterior.

In the present formulation, beginning as it does with πρὶν ἄν, the primary or default subordinate form will be the subjunctive, but available as ever is the circumstantial participial construction. Four subordinate clauses ensue, in εἰδῇ, γένηται, ἐπιστηθῇ, and τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῇ. It is striking that these coordinate subjunctive clauses are all linked by τε (starting with proleptic τε at B5). The third clause begins with an epanaleptic circumstantial participle (ὁρισάμενος τε … picking up ὁρίζεσθαι) that pairs its clause (τέμνειν ἐπιστηθῇ) with the second (ὁρίζεσθαι δυνατὸς γένηται), since these two clauses constitute an exegesis of the first clause (τό τε ἀληθὲς ἑκάστων εἴδῃ) in that they explain knowledge (εἰδέναι) as the dialectical ability both to define the subject matter as a whole and to subdivide it into its parts. Immediately following is περί with postpositive τε but for the first time the syntax of τε changes: it will not ultimately be adding a new subjunctive clause to the series but will only append the circumstantial phrase in διιδών to the immediately previous subjunctive clause, in order to stipulate that the composer must also have an analogously two-part dialectical[1563] knowledge of the soul. We are anticipating a coordinate subjunctive and do not discover this new and delimited function of τε until we reach οὕτω, which in retrospect throws the intervening phrase τὸ προσαρμόττον ... ἀνευρίσκων into the role of its antecedent. The only warning or clue that we have moved into a different phase in the listing of prerequisites is the shift in the tense of the participles from the aorist (ὁρισάμενος and διιδών, describing the preliminary knowledge) to the present (ἀνευρίσκων, describing the work with which the specific composition now can begin). That carrying out the discovery (ἀνευρίσκειν) is tantamount to the act of composition itself (described with τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῇ τὸν λόγον, also present in contrast with the previous aorist subjunctives) is indicated by semi-redundant οὕτω.[1564] The execution of the actual composition being described with a pair of verbs instead of just one introduces or motivates the elaboration that follows (C2-3), done in another[1565] retrospective participial construction, continuing the regime of the present tense (διδούς, C3), and fashioned with a μέν / δέ construction that generalizes with a polar doublet.[1566]

works might serve as ὑπομνήματα (276D3). On Phaedrus's request for restatement cf. n.1095

1562 Such admonitory rhetoric may be a convention by which dialectical manuals advertised their own importance. Cf. 273E3-4 and n.1166 *ad loc.*, 272A6-B2, 271B7-C1, 270D9-E1, 269D4-6 and perhaps 266A4-5.

1563 διιδών alludes to the ability to divide; the periphrasis of ψυχή with ψυχῆς φύσις alludes to the ability to grasp the whole (for which cf. n.1059).

1564 On the ordering force of this οὕτω cf. 260D7 and n. *ad loc.*

1565 Like περί τε ... διιδὼν κατὰ ταῦτα, B8.

1566 The generalization of the process by representing souls with the polar spectrum ποικίλη / ἁπλῆ, like the alternation between datives and accusatives, is simply a technique for swiftly representing the dyadic adjustment back and forth of logos to soul by referring to its coordinates, and need not square with other remarks in other contexts, above (cf.

All this set out, we reach οὐ (C3), which by not being μή announces the beginning of the ordinate construction or apodosis. The subsequent πρότερον then brings forward the temporal condition introduced by πρίν and we are in familiar territory (we have seen οὐ πρότερον before, at 272A8; cf. οὔ ποτ' ἔσται, 273E3): 'Not before all that is done will it be possible, artfully, to the extent that nature will allow, to manage the realm of arguments...' . The front-loading of the qualifiers (δυνατόν, τέχνῃ, καθ'ὅσον πέφυκε) adds asseverative assurance before the assertion itself is even made, and then the language used to denote the act of composition – μεταχειρισθῆναι τὸ λόγων γένος – is a complete surprise both because of its vague verb, which has not been used before, and because of its seemingly gratuitous periphrasis of λόγοι with τὸ λόγων γένος. Immediately, however, we discover the purpose of the vagueness: it motivates at the same time that it introduces a berth for specification, for Socrates wants to assert that this method is needed just as much for teaching, which he had been talking about just above (276E5-277A4), as it is for persuading an audience, which is the general topic of the conversation. The generalization closes the whole performance with a further asseveration of the truth of the principles involved, done with intensive perfect (ὡς ὁ ἔμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος).

This little performance brings together into one continuous statement all that they had reached through dialogue: the importance of dialectical (two-part) knowledge of the subject matter (265D3-266C1), the dialectical knowledge of the audience's soul that truly penetrates to φύσις (269E4-270D7), and the derivative ability to fit the λόγος to the soul (270D3-7). Whereas combining the last two of these three items together was the task of Socrates's consecutive description of rhetoric as ψυχαγωγία (which we analyzed in reading #2), the present performance reaches back to the prior argument about dialectical knowledge of the subject matter, with the previously used logical language of ἕκαστον and αὐτό[1567] but adding also the new idea of the ἄτμητον εἶδος which was only implied before, and combines it with the first of those two items, knowledge of soul, only then to combine them. The knowledges of subject matter and of audience are here swiftly made to be parallel with each other by the syntax of the *retrospective* participial construction (διιδών), on the basis of the fact that they share the same duplex dialectical structure (division and aggregation). The distinguishing between the two knowledges as preliminary to composition and the determining of composition itself to be the application of these two knowledges, is then managed by a *proleptic* participial construction (ἀνευρίσκων), including a shift of tense-aspect from complexive aorist to conative present, a different method of ordering the prior and the posterior from the methods used in speech #2. The very recent analogy between (or extension of) λόγον λέγειν καὶ γράφειν from the oratorical scenario to the dialogue between teacher and student, is gracefully included at the end by means of new terminology, without undermining or distracting our attention from the consistency of the whole edifice.

The presentation of the ideas is new, in syntax, diction, and organization, while the ideas have all been previously reached through dialogue, even though they might have undergone clarification in the intervening conversation. This "consecutive presentation" or "speech" of the ideas therefore embodies the distinction that Socrates is pressed to emphasize between written and live λόγος, which has by now come very close to a distinction between writing and thinking. The thought is the same, though the words and manner may vary from presentation to presentation. Phaedrus's response (277B7) likewise reveals both his awareness of and enthusiasm for the compendious complexity (παντάπασι) of Socrates's description of what they have thought through together, as well as his recognition of its improvisatory newness, i.e., that it is a *version* (οὕτως πως, as he says).[1568]

n.1243).

1567 Cf.265C8-266B1 and nn.956 and 960.

1568 We may with profit compare the highly eloquent bringing-forward of all that Socrates and Glaucon have agreed to, at *Rep*.586A1-B4, on which cf. my nn.

(6) The Climactic Inference (277D6-278B4)

Phaedrus having accepted the foregoing presentation of the results they had reached about what constitutes an *artful* logos, Socrates now moves on to the prior question, the opprobrium against writing speeches down – against being a λογογράφος – which was the constant refrain in the lambasting Lysias had recently received from some politician, which Phaedrus at the beginning of this entire section had claimed would make him reluctant to attempt to compose a speech to match Socrates's Second Speech (257C4-7).

The answer to this question, Socrates now asserts, we also reached in our dialogue.[1569] Anybody that thinks a document he has written possesses solidity and clarity deserves to be criticized for the belief, whether somebody brings the criticism or not, since he does not evade the reproach he deserves for having no live arguments in his mind about important topics, something he should have even in his sleep, merely because he is praised by the mob for delivering a prepared speech (277D6-E3). The formulation requires Phaedrus (and us) to supply a gaping lacuna in the argument, that this man relies on the accolades he can produce to distract him from his own awareness and sense of shame that he lacks a living argument of his own on important issues. The accolades, for all that they seem to be, do not in truth exempt him from the reproach (οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, E1), even if nobody voices it. In both cases he owes what peace of mind he has to the opinions of others. In order to forget his own inadequacy he needs them both to praise his speech as if it proved he truly owned good ideas, and not to accuse him of relying on a written text to prove he owns them. It is not his reliance *eo ipso* on the written word that is reproachful, but his reliance on it to compensate for the more primary fault of having no living thoughts of his own that he can stand by.

The notion that speechwriting was reproachful first came up when Phaedrus asserted that such a reproach was included in the politician's wider-ranging slander that Lysias was a pedestrian composer, a slander that might deter Lysias from trying to compose a counter-speech to Socrates's Great Myth. Socrates immediately doubted such a censure would deter Lysias, not only because he is a "real pro" and not so easily spooked, but also (though this is unstated) because as a metic he was ineligible to deliver a speech in Athens, anyway. Socrates there proved only that the censure was insincere and left us to guess the politician's real motive, and now we are reminded of the guess we ourselves reached.[1570] The real challenge a man faces is to stand up and speak his mind on important issues out of his own personal substance, and so the professional politician envies the speechwriter for not having to do this. But if the politician's censure was not Lysias's problem, as Socrates claims, whose problem is it? As we suggested above, it was Phaedrus's. It has been Phaedrus all along that wishes he could stand up and speak out of himself but fears he cannot, from the very moment Socrates asked him to recite the Lysian speech without a crib through to this second half of the dialogue where he began by timidly justifying his own hopes for rhetoric as the power of persuasion without knowledge, as if it were the doctrine of others (259E7-260A4).[1571] The core issue in his wavering between rhetoric and philosophy has now come into focus as a wavering between relying on his own mind and thought and avoiding this or defending himself against the jeopardy of having to do so, by (at best) possessing prepared remarks or (as a *pis aller*) by deploying rhetorical techniques that will affect his audience regardless of the substance and truth of what he says, by dint of their

1569 δεδήλωκεν τὰ λεχθέντα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν (277D3-4) is an overstatement: the answer has not been made clear though the dialogical agreements out of which to compose such an answer have been.

1570 Cf. "Transition from Performance to Conversation," *supra*.

1571 Cf. also n.866.

likelihood. We may conclude, therefore, that there is nobody else that deserves the reproach Socrates has now formulated than Phaedrus himself.

The μέν buried unobtrusively in the midst of this formulation[1572] announces that a δέ-clause will follow, without stealing the thunder of the statement's roundly condemnatory conclusion, and it is to this δέ-clause that Socrates now turns, and to a description of the praiseworthy man that Phaedrus *could* be (277E5-278B4). We may view this presentation as Socrates's perfectly focussed attempt to exhort Phaedrus to choose the life he prayed for him to adopt at the end of the Great Myth, in the face of which Phaedrus had there immediately waffled.

"But a man," Socrates begins, "who presumes that in an argument he has written up a great deal of frivolousness is unavoidable no matter what the topic, and that no argument ever written, whether in meter or prose, is worth taking seriously, not even a spoken one if it was delivered in a scenario that allows for no questions and answers but for persuasion only as for instance in the performance of a rhapsode, but recognizes that in fact they serve at best as reminders of what their readers already know; and sees, on the other hand, in things that are being *said* for the sake of teaching and learning – a process in which the things are "written," if at all, in the soul, important things about beauty and justice and the good – sees only in these a possibility for being clear and complete and serious, and thinks only those arguments should properly be called his own legitimate sons that he found within himself, and besides these such arguments as have been spawned as the offspring of this one or as its brothers, in other souls of other men according to their deserts, but simply kisses off the whole world of writing: this might just be the sort of man you and I would pray that each other should become!"

The paragraph is another extended *comparatio per contrarium*, relying upon the μέν paragraph (D6-E3) to provide reference points for a comparative re-do as well as for moorings to which to tether elaborations, corrections, and modifications. Thus it also has two parts, the first (ἐν μέν, E5) having to do with γεγραμμένοι λόγοι (corresponding to σύγγραμμα above) and the second (ἐν δέ, 278A2) having to do with what had been absent for the other man because of his ignorance (ἀγνοεῖν), namely, λεγόμενα – arguments *simpliciter* (278A2). The first category is now expanded to include spoken arguments (λεχθῆναι expanding γραφῆναι, E8) as long as they disallow the questions and answers of teaching and are delivered only with persuasion in mind, and with this remark the commanding and underlying criterion is revealed. The notion that teaching and persuasion exclude or oppose each other now becomes explicit, though we saw it only as a distinction, above, and only in passing.[1573] A contradiction or opposition between the two was broached in the μέν paragraph where ἀγνοεῖν, the inverse of teaching and learning, had been coordinated with pleasing the crowd (D10, E2-3), but now the opposition becomes completely explicit and supersedes what was merely a distinction, before. Teaching and learning means talking, dialogue; the other λόγοι are mere performance, whether written or not. In prizing only the former as capable of true clarity and perfection and only the conversation they produce as worthwhile and worthy of his name as author, kissing the rest good-bye, our second man removes the safety net and resolves to fly high on live thinking alone. His course in life is the very identical of μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποιεῖσθαι (257B6), and this time Phaedrus embraces Socrates's prayer that *each other* should become such men as this, without reservation, so that the dialogue can come to a close.

1572 οὕτω μέν, D9.
1573 Cf. 277C5-6.

Appendix: The Critique of Writing in the *Phaedrus*

The scholarly controversy as to whether Plato's writings are vulnerable to the critique of writing Socrates presents in the Phaedrus[1574] presuppose as obvious that the dialogue presents a doctrine about writing that can be applied beyond its immediate context, and that Plato's writings are *eo ipso* vulnerable to the criticism. My new commentary adds background material relevant to these presuppositions that might be of interest to the partisans of this controversy. and so I assemble this material as an appendix.

THE CRITIQUE ITSELF

The distinction between writing and live speech and conversation arises early in the *Phaedrus* but neither the distinction nor the relative merits of the two is thematized until much later, when Phaedrus begins the dialogical section by evading the prayer Socrates had made at the end of his great speech and suddenly alleges that Lysias is reluctant to write anything because some nameless politician has criticized him for being a mere speechwriter. Even there, however, Socrates denies that writing is *eo ipso* reproachable, even to the politician, though surely writing and speaking badly would be. Thus he steers the conversation to the question what makes writing or speaking good or bad. Once they have decided this question, however, Socrates does revert to the prior question about whether writing itself is reprehensible, and argues, in terms that arose in the course of the conversation on good or bad composition in general, that a person's choice to consign his thoughts to writing instead of speaking them live will disserve the audience by (1) encouraging them to rely upon writing rather than their memory, and (2) leaving them with the belief they can retrieve the ideas by reading when they will not be able to unless they understood them in the first place (274C5-275B2); and that (3) the experience of reading will stimulate in the reader a natural desire to converse with the author live, whether for clarification or elaboration, that will of course be disappointed, unless the author can write his ideas directly into the soul of his audience, as it were (275D4-276A9); and that (4) a serious author would never consign his important ideas to a medium that can carry them only transiently but like a serious farmer planting precious seeds will choose his soil and the time of his planting rather than force his seeds in pots (276B1-C5), so that (5) whatever writing he would do would not be for the sake of producing an immortal reputation for himself (cf.258C) but for the sake of play and as mere reminder (276C7-D8). Phaedrus approves these arguments against relying on writing, and does so with increasing enthusiasm.[1575] Finally Socrates uses them as a basis for contrasting the man who does choose to write despite the shortcomings with the man who prefers live conversation, in a climactic passage that culminates with Phaedrus now accepting the prayer he had evaded to recognize at the beginning of the dialogical section (277D6-278B6).

This final comparison articulates the conclusion which the entire criticism of writing was designed to reach, namely, the reason that Phaedrus should abandon the Lysianic pursuit of speechwriting with which he had busied himself all morning and should devote himself instead to the Socratic sort of conversation in which he has since been engaged. A person who writes deserves reproach if he thinks that the mere writing up of something gives it the solidity or substantiality that only live argument can achieve, since the reproach a man deserves for neglecting the important topics

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1574 It has proven a testing ground for philological argumentation (Heitsch, etc.) as well as a medium for a philosophical gigantomachia (as for instance between Derrida [*Dissemination*] and Rosen [*Hermeneutics as Politics*]) The question is further complicated by the assertion in the probably inauthentic *Seventh Letter* that Plato would never commit his best ideas to writing.

1575 Cf. 275C3-4, 275D3, E6, 276E1-3, 277A5.

of beauty, goodness, and justice will never be compensated by the praise his writings may garner from the masses. Conversely, the man who views whatever he puts down in writing as mere play and thinks that its best and solidest worth is to remind a person of the justice, goodness and beauty he already understands within his soul, who rests his legacy on his best live arguments and the effect those arguments will have in other souls that will make their own arguments in turn, and kisses off leaving behind written tomes with his name on the cover – such a man, Phaedrus, I suspect that you and I would pray and hope each other would prefer to be!

The limitations of writing become grounds for reproach only in this last comparison, which envision a man who prefers to write for the praise of a mass audience over participating in substantial discussion, one-on-one. There is of course no *essential* contradiction between these, for a given person could do both; and writing is not in itself reproachable if the writer recognizes the limitations of the medium and maintains his respect and reverence for the prior duty of serious study. On the next and final page of the conversation Socrates moves on to suggest that while the person of lesser devotion may as well be named after the kind of writing he leaves behind, whether playwright or law-maker or speechwriter, the person who recognizes the weakness of all writings, his own included, and would prefer to expound their substance live, should get a different name – and since he loves wisdom more than the fame that might redound to him as a writer that name should be philosopher, lover of wisdom.

The critique of writing is invented by Socrates in order to drive a wedge between Phaedrus and his foolish enthusiasm for the sort of Lysianic trickery by which a young beauty might be persuaded to gratify a man who claims not to love him. Indeed this was Socrates's motive for turning the conversation away from politician's critique of Lysias with which it began, and toward the discussion of good and bad composition instead, so that he could contrast honest thinking and talking with the toxic grab-bag of the "rhetoricians," and arouse thereby the more philosophical elements he knows to be present in Phaedrus's nature so that in the end he could in good conscience choose philosophy for his own edification over the self-forgetting manipulation of a crowd.

It is already questionable whether Socrates has any continuing brief against writing, beyond the special argument it enables him to bring for the purpose of converting Phaedrus to his best interest; and now to ask whether "Plato" in addition to the Socrates of the *Phaedrus* holds a similar brief against writing (as if Shakespeare too, wishes that his too too solid flesh might melt) becomes something more of a reach, but for all the reach we have to hazard, the question becomes attractive for another reason: Plato, as opposed to Socrates did decide to write.[1576]

PLATO'S WRITINGS AS VULNERABLE TO THIS CRITICISM

The criticism is ultimately aimed at the Lysianic profession, namely at writing speeches to be delivered by another person in order to persuade a crowd, for this is what logographia is,[1577] but within its four corners the critique faults a different kind of writing – didactic writing to be read by individuals, rather than persuasive speeches – for it is their didactic shortcomings and their effects on the cognitive powers of their readers as students that are criticized, in contrast with the didactic and pedagogical virtues of live conversation. Socrates's strategy in adopting an investigation of rhetoric or good composition was to reveal shortcomings in the teaching of Lysianic rhetoric that an ideal method of composition could be shown to overcome, which ideal method would actually end up being philosophical conversation. In order to facilitate the comparison and the overcoming, the kind of writing under analysis shifted from speechwriting to the didactic; and now we are faced with the

1576 Socrates's versification of Aesop in prison was the exception that proves the rule.

1577 The scenario of writer and the politician that is his client is eloquently revealed in the pamphlet of Alcidamas; a good treatment in English is K.J.Dover's *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley, 1968).

unforeseen outcome that the very author of the story who conceived of this interesting dialogical strategy or plot from the inside out, can come under the criticism from the outside in by the very creature he created!

We must "come in closer" with this argument as Socrates says.[1578] If written didactic works are, indeed, to to be criticized, shall Plato's own *Phaedrus* come in for the criticism, too? Does the *Phaedrus* attempt to teach, and if so, how? On the surface (once again) it is a drama consisting of conversation, and the action takes place within the shared horizon of its characters, Socrates and Phaedrus. We see Phaedrus learning a lesson, and so we learn something, too. The lesson includes the insight that the didactic powers of writing are inferior to those of spoken conversation, from which Socrates infers a further criticism, that the choice to write for fame is inferior to the choice to converse about important subjects for the sake of learning. As to this second criticism we cannot apply the reproach to Plato himself, since he may in addition to writing his dialogues have spent his best time in live conversation. But whether his works are vulnerable to the first, the criticism of writing *per se*, depends on the questions whether his writings do indeed (1) seduce us into a detrimental reliance on our memories, or (2) give us the sense that we know something because we can look it up, or (3) stimulate us with a desire to engage the text in a conversation but then leave us high and dry, or (4) plant seeds of ideas into our minds as if they were flowerpots in which a conclusion or lesson is reached too quickly and without proper preparation rather than (5) engaging us in a play of suggestion to help us recall what we already know of the good and the just and the beautiful.

On the basis of the foregoing commentary I would say that none of these criticisms seems to apply – not to the *Phaedrus*, at least! Take for instance the fifth and remember the anamnetic effect of the Socrates's playful myth.[1579] As to the fourth, we may very well have felt forced to reach conclusions if Socrates and Phaedrus had agreed too easily on their conclusions, but we have seen that these agreements were reached gradually, from Phaedrus's point of view at least (though I cannot say whether another reader was left dissatisfied, as for instance Adeimantus was in the *Republic* when he interrupts at the beginning of Book Four right after his brother had agreed at the end of Book Three). As to the third we continally felt engaged by the conversation we were vouchsafed to overhear, and our engagement was continually deepened by the subsequent goings-on.[1580] As to the second, we again become so engaged in the process of the argument between Socrates and Phaedrus that there was nothing by way of information to look up. Instead we come away realizing that if anything we should read the dialogue again so as better to grasp the dialogical curve that led to the conclusion. On the first criticism, about memory, we again have the ambiguous role of memory to deal with. Every reader of Plato has experienced the feeling that the problems that come up are problems he has already thought of, problems already relevant to his own life; but nobody I think comes away with the sense that he can place the book on the shelf as a kind of encyclopedia of answers to those questions, but rather comes away with the sense that if he should take the trouble of navigating his way through the conversation all over again he would only come up with a richer interpretation.

On the surface, then, neither Plato nor his writing appears to be vulnerable to the criticisms – at least in the case of the *Phaedrus* as we have interpreted it above – but rather than wade farther into the controversy I will take the opportunity to go back and garner the results we have reached in that reading and leave it to others to weigh their relevance to the dispute. If Plato is teaching something in

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1578 ὁμόσε ἰέναι, *Euthyd*.294D, *Rep*.610C6 – the expression is also used by Euthyphro (*Euthyph*.3C5).

1579 Cf. προσεπαίσαμεν (265C1, with my commentary *ad loc*.) and παιδιᾷ πέπαισθαι (265C8-9)

1580 Many readers in fact think Plato is trying to communicate with them indirectly, from beneath the surface or behind the screen of the conversation. To whatever extent this is true his dialogical writings are not subject to this third criticism.

the *Phaedrus* as the criticism must presuppose, the only thing he may be said to be teaching is what he makes Socrates teach Phaedrus. So the question, How does this writing do its teaching? becomes How does Socrates teach Phaedrus? Immediately we need to modify that question, however, since Socrates's purpose was not only to teach but to persuade Phaedrus.[1581] That is, if there is an objective teaching it will be packaged in such a way as to appeal to this character as he finds himself situated. The commentary has shed new light on how Socrates did this, results that we can present under three heads: (1) How the topical Question for the dialogical section was reached (for we have reached an entirely new interpretation of how this occurs, 257B7-259E2); (2) the Semantics of the crucial term τέχνη (this term and particularly its use in the bare dative, plays a pivotal role that has not been noticed before), and (3) the unusual variety in his use of Imaginary Interlocutors (again insufficiently noticed). Having presented these points we can conclude this Appendix by asking how they affect the question whether Plato's writings are vulnerable to the critique of writing Socrates presents within this dialogue.

1. SETTING THE QUESTION

The choice of a topical Question arises out of the exigencies of the action during the first pages of the "dialogical" section of the *Phaedrus* (257-8).[1582] Socrates, in the presence of Phaedrus, had closed his great speech by praying to Eros that Lysias become more philosophical so that his acolyte, Phaedrus, will stop wavering (257B1-6). Of course Phaedrus will waver as long as he has not decided for himself what he really cares about; and as for what a man might really care about, the speech Socrates had just delivered shows us perhaps as clearly and forcefully as anything anybody has ever said, before or since, that the decision to "follow one's *daemon*" is an easy choice for the best part of oneself to make, revealing that it is not a matter of will-power or egoism or self-abnegation.

Still, Socrates prefers extreme indirection in encouraging Phaedrus to make his decision, and Phaedrus's response exploits the indirection so as to avoid doing so, which reveals that he wishes still to waver (257B7-C7). He admits an interest in changing if it would indeed be beneficial[1583] only to dismiss the issue and take up the matter of *Lysias's* reaction to the speech is if that were more important than his own. In particular (he goes on to say) Lysias may no longer be willing to mount a counter-speech to compete with it (though Phaedrus assured Socrates, an hour ago, that he could convince him to) since Lysias had come under criticism for being a hack (though this according to Phaedrus happened some days before), the critic constantly calling him a "*speechwriter*." Even the criticism is only tangentially relevant to Lysias's putative reluctance to write or compose a speech on divine love, for according to Phaedrus a *politician* was lambasting Lysias for being "*pedestrian*" and made his point by taunting him for being a "*speechwriter*." All that really can be gleaned from his reply is his sense that Socrates's speech was so great it would put anything into the shade. But then why continue to waver?

We are at this moment eager to hear Socrates's response, thinking he will get Phaedrus to answer the questions that have arisen in our own minds, but in fact his response does not help to clear up those questions at all: "My dear Phaedrus don't tell me you really think your man Lysias would be spooked by such name-calling. Besides, are you so naïve as to think the politician actually *believes* that speechwriting is a bad thing to do?" Socrates begins to suggest that they should drop the idea

1581 πείθετε, 261A4. We shall see that this term undergoes a change of meaning within the argument (cf. n.).

1582 The detailed basis and proof for all the assertions I here make are presented above in my footnotes to the translation.

1583 In a concessive μέν-clause.

that Lysias would be hesitant because of the criticism and threatens thereby to undo the evasion Phaedrus has interposed and push back to the fact of his evasiveness and his wavering; but in the next moment, even he chooses to pursue the less relevant matter of the politician who brought the criticism, in order to question his sincerity in acting as though speechwriting were a bad thing, moving both himself and Phaedrus even further from the question, and even past Lysias, so as to cancel forever the question of his evasiveness. Phaedrus can reply, "You have to admit the politicians are always calling people sophists that are seen trying to make a name for themselves by leaving behind written works" – to which Socrates responds with a proverb: "Again you show your naivete, Phaedrus, as if you would also believe that the notorious "Easy Bend" in the Nile is actually easy when in fact it is treacherous. Just look at the politician: he is always trying to curry favor with his sponsors by mentioning their names in his writing, whatever the occasion, only in order to commemorate his own name therein."

Phaedrus, and we, have no idea what Socrates is talking about; in fact we have our hands full trying to keep up with the conversation these two are having. Just as a moment ago we were looking at Phaedrus over the shoulder of Socrates, thinking he would ask Phaedrus to clear up his remark about Lysias, we are now looking over Phaedrus's shoulder at Socrates, waiting for him to clarify what he is saying about the politicians: "What do you mean by that – I don't get it," says he. Who after all are these "sponsors?" and what is the spectrum of "occasions" to which Socrates alludes? And what in the world are the "writings"? After all this politician had given us to believe that writers are mere scribblers rather than doers.

Socrates delivers a retort that does not clear things up: "You 'don't get it' that at the beginning of a politician's written brief the name of his sponsor is written in?" This restatement in tighter language suggests that he is telling a riddle, and Phaedrus replies by giving up trying to solve it: "How do you mean?"

Only now does Socrates reveal what he has been "saying." The mover and shaker wants the assembly or the counsel (the legal venues constitute the "occasions") to pass a law that will have his name written into it (like the "Taft-Hartley" Act), and in fact the way laws were worded was to begin with the formula, "Resolved by the deme..." or "Resolved by the council." In this sense the persons who acquiesce in the politician's motion (the members of the deme or of the counsel are his "sponsors") are "written in" at the very beginning. In a warped but literal sense it is true that the man making the motion is hoping to achieve enduring fame with a written screed, though the politician will proudly distinguish himself from a mere speechwriter by claiming that it was his live eloquence rather than the bought and paid for writing he held in his hand that won the day.

We could barely keep up with this riddling byplay of Socrates.[1584] Why has he done all this? For the moment we do not need to ask since Phaedrus, at least, has now come to understand what Socrates has been hinting at and now acknowledges that the politician does not in fact believe that writing is *eo ipso* shameful. With whom do we at this moment identify? *Both*, for they have come to an agreement!

But hear what Socrates now asks: "So if all would agree that writing *in itself* is not shameful what would be shameful is be to speak or write not well but in an ugly and bad way." As if in the wake of the Phaedrus's change of attitude – writing *per se* is not wrong – he discovers or invents a berth for asserting the analytical truth that "what *would* be wrong would be writing wrongly," whatever "wrongly" would mean.[1585] By interposing his riddle Socrates has moved Phaedrus to accept this new

1584 Indeed in my own study of the dialogue it was only by reflecting on the little known pamphlet of Alcidamas "On Those Who Write Speeches," and the background issues of speechwriters and the clients that pay them to give them words that only they will be delivering, that I could reach this interpretation.

1585 Note that this last step in Socrates's transition relies upon an equivocation between αἰσχρόν as morally shameful and

Question, and now, I say, this neutral and blameless topic of good and bad writing and speaking can will provide him a medium to explore not only the proprieties of writing (and speaking, for that matter), a topic inherently interesting to both of them, but also bring to the surface, within that exploration, Phaedrus's inability to resolve whether he should write (or speak) philosophically.

We have now reached what I have called the "Question" – the topic that sets the program – and now I advance the claim that the tension between this Question and the underlying and motivating Problem that led through Socratic sleight of hand to its articulation – namely, Phaedrus's irresolute wavering – will drive the conversation. The Question is relevant because of the Problem, but the Problem is intractable except within the mediation provided by the Question. That is, in Socrates's exposure and exploration of the Question he will bring Phaedrus into a position where his continuing fascination with the writing technology of Lysias, which obstructed him from accepting the prayer, will become visible as something outside himself he can look off to and contemplate and try to understand, just as in the *Republic* the sunny project of building a city in words provided Socrates a "third-person" medium in which and through which to solicit Glaucon's and Adeimantus's best ideas about orderly life, which only later would bring to the surface the feelings and doubts about themselves that they had confessed, with such telling and credible eloquence, in their two speeches at the beginning of Book Two.

This first page of the dialogical section has given us the impression that Socrates is in charge, but soon this sense will fall away: we will see it has only been for the sake of establishing the Question, What is good writing (and speaking)? that he has played his game with the arresting riddle. Soon enough it will be Phaedrus's own beliefs about the art of speaking or writing that will govern the path of the conversation and the give-and-take of the challenges Socrates brings against those beliefs. To the extent that through his own remarks and answers we come to understand Phaedrus's point of view and the beliefs and attitudes he has brought with him to the conversation, we will also understand the force and pertinence of Socrates's questions about those beliefs. Even if Socrates tries to convert Phaedrus to a new sense of what speaking or writing can be that happens to conform with a doctrine of Plato's about speaking and writing, neither Socrates's work (as the edifying teacher) nor Plato's work (as the author of the verisimilar story in which we now find ourselves immersed) will have completed their work until Phaedrus can be shown to use the new insight to deal with the problem that motivated their decision to investigate of the proprieties of writing in the first place.

Of this ultimate purpose Plato reminds us, once Socrates and Phaedrus really get on track with the Question,[1586] in a way that slightly strains verisimilitude. They have agreed that the gravamen of the issue is whether Madame Techne is correct in saying that she (the "Art" of rhetoric) is truly artful (260D3-9) – i.e., the assertion that her contribution to speaking is what makes speaking well done – since there are arguments poised against her that claim she is not an art but a slapdash bag of tricks that hardly deserves the name (260E2-7). At this point Socrates positions himself as the spokesman of these challenging arguments, assuming the role of the questioner, and moves Phaedrus into the role of answerer – so that the conversation can have enough structure to get somewhere, as I have noted above. He pulls this off by personifying those challenging arguments so that he can say to them, "Come, you redoubtable beasts, and persuade Phaedrus that unless he becomes adequately philosophical he will never become an adequate speaker! And let Phaedrus do the answering"

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as aesthetically ugly (the opposite of καλόν, the fine or the artful).

1586 At 261A7ff. They began also a page earlier (259E1-2) but the conversation immediately derailed when Phaedrus imposed the notion that the only kind of speaking or writing he would talk about was public speaking. In the intervening page Socrates brings Madame Techne personified onto the stage, asserting that it is artfulness (τέχνῃ, dative) that she brings to speech and writing, and also brings onto the stage some other personified arguments that want to refute her claim.

(261A3-6). Phaedrus replies, not strictly to Socrates but to the personified arguments for which Socrates will now be the spokesman: "Ask away!" (261A7: note the second plural). Phaedrus had up until now consented only to the plan of investigating the Question, What makes writing fine? but Socrates here alludes to the Motivation that occasioned the Question, by specifying the goal of their inquiry as being his attempt to convert Phaedrus to philosophy. What strains verisimilitude is that Phaedrus accepts this formulation without objection or demur.

Phaedrus's investigation of the Question is immediately and then continually affected by his underlying alliance and devotion to the technology of rhetorical art, whether taught by Lysias or whomever. In the first and soon abortive go-around (259E1-260D2) Socrates suggests they start their investigation with the obvious and basic idea[1587] that for a speech or argument to be good the speaker must be knowledgeable about the topic, and Phaedrus immediately derails the conversation by claiming he has "never heard" this (259E7-60A4), but only that the orator must know the opinions of his audience in order to convince them. His narrowing of the question to "oratory" was in fact barred by the formal framing of the Question,[1588] he ignores the axiomatic character of the question Socrates has asked him, and he feels no incumbency even to tell Socrates from whom he has heard this claim. We can guess he is adducing the opinion of the very "technicians" of rhetoric whose "technical expertise," qualifies them, he thinks, to answer the Question, What makes speaking and writing good? and if so, then on both counts he is begging the question. In short, his Motivation in the background is infecting what he says in answer to the Question.

It is noteworthy that Socrates now "goes with the pitch" as it were. Rather than complaining that Phaedrus has avoided answering the Question but has merely repeated some opinion of his, he accepts the hearsay argument in the most positive light possible – as words of the wise that must not be ignored (260A5-7) although Phaedrus has ignored his own question – in order to flesh out Phaedrus's unexamined and tacit belief (260D3-8) by imagining Madame Techne making the very claim Phaedrus has assumed – that *artful* persuasion, which we are to take as the equivalent of the "fine speaking" of the Question – comes only from herself. Phaedrus of course agrees with what she says (260E1) and so would Socrates (he has no stake in disagreeing with Phaedrus), unless, as he puts it (260E2-7), certain arguments he seems to hear approaching (!) are correct, which seek to impugn her qualifications to make such a claim since in fact it is not artfully that she helps a man be persuasive but only by some opportunistic and slapdash knack.[1589] Phaedrus is just as eager to hear these arguments as he was to isolate and pursue the Question about the proprieties of speech (261A1-2),[1590] and so Socrates now addresses them to come forth and convince Phaedrus, a moment I described above.

Once Phaedrus is on board as the answerer and Socrates has assumed the role of questioner, he turns to the new version of the Question, the investigation of rhetoric as the art that as such would confer the fineness they are looking for onto a speech, and again proffers an axiomatic beginning point, the notion that as an art (a soul-leading or persuasive art as Phaedrus has just insisted), rhetoric must be able to compose speeches for any venue, public or private, and on any topic large or small, devoted as it is only to the inherent *correctness* of the speech (261A7-B2).[1591] Recalling

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1587 This is what ὑπάρχειν δεῖ means at 259E4.

1588 Socrates had generalized the scope of the question at 258D7-11 to include any kind of writing, past and future, and Phaedrus had there accepted the generalization (E1ff).

1589 Madame Techne's claim, that it is artfully (τεχνῇ) that she persuades since after all she is art (τεχνή), is essentially circular. The "arguments" Socrates hears approaching frame their attack against her as a challenge of competence lodged *in limine* (this is the sense of διαμαρτυρομένων, 260E4).

1590 τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων: cf. ἐρωτᾷς εἰ δεόμεθα, 258E1.

1591 Socrates is merely listing the categorical attributes of any τεχνή – from wood-carving to medicine.

how Phaedrus had responded to his first proffer, he indulgently asks for his agreement by asking him whether he agrees or perhaps "has heard" otherwise (B2). Affected again by his underlying Motivation rather than facing the Question on the merits, Phaedrus again allows "what he has heard" to govern his answer and supersede what Socrates has just proffered as being axiomatic, and once again he restricts the field of good speaking to oratory, this time not just forensic but maybe deliberative, too (B3-5).[1592]

Socrates responds to this non-responsive answer with another riddle. Perhaps Phaedrus has heard the rhetorical treatises that the eloquent heroes Nestor and Odysseus composed during leisure moments in Troy, but not that of Palamedes? I cannot solve this riddle for sure, but neither can Phaedrus: he wonders whether Socrates might be referring to Gorgias when he says Nestor and to Thrasymachus or Theodorus when he refers to Odysseus. Socrates's riddle avoids confrontation just as his proverb about listening to the wise had, above. If nothing else Socrates has led Phaedrus to reveal the sources he has so far cited anonymously. But in addition the riddle introduces the figure of Palamedes, and this will provide Socrates the wedge by which to force Phaedrus to open up the range of skillful speaking beyond public venues. Just as speakers in a forensic context "argue both sides" so does the famous Eleatic Palamedes, namely, Zeno whose artful way of speaking argues both sides in his own person, with his paradoxes (261C4-E3).

But just before Phaedrus can agree with the conclusion that the ability to argue opposites – i.e., to make one thing look like its opposite – works not only within the courtroom but outside, too, Socrates throws in an afterthought: the ability includes being able to catch another man up as he tries to do this same thing (E3-4). The afterthought is not an entirely new idea since surely in the forensic context the litigants are known both to have and to display this subaltern competence, but it is new enough that Phaedrus next asks for clarification (E5). Socrates appends a liberally articulated explanation (261E6-262B8), how the stealth of arguing that one thing actually its opposite, without oneself becoming confused, requires the arguer to take very small steps in his gradual movement from one end of the spectrum to the other. He must have a fine command of distinctions, finer indeed than his audience. To the extent that having such fine knowledge of what is what appears to consist in knowledge of the truth of things, the notion a truly artful speaker does not need to know the truth, as Phaedrus had argued at the beginning (259E7-260A3) and Madame Techne had subsequently claimed was not her responsibility to provide (260D4-7), seems to be wrong after all (262C1-3).

Phaedrus grants the point with an idiom, κινδυνεύει (C4), an idiom we don't quite have in English. The word – literally, "it runs the risk (sc. of being so)" – confesses to a direct perception that what has been just been said is true, but confesses also to a growing sense in the immediate aftermath of that perception that this new insight might not sit so well with other things one had complacently been believing – something like the English "That may well be," as opposed to "Maybe," or even "I never thought of that!"

With this wedge Socrates for the first time has begun to separate Phaedrus's reasoning mind from the prejudice he brought with him and had unthinkingly continued to rely upon. Forensic oratory, if not demagogic, requires a careful analysis of concepts if it is to proceed in a reliable (i.e. artful) way, so that the mere conning of public opinion, which from the outset he had heard was all that was necessary, might not be enough after all. That it took Socrates two waves of questions to get this far (259E1-260E7 and 261A7-262B4) shows how slow the progress might be and now he relieves the strain[1593] and shifts gears (262C5-7): "Why don't we look at the speeches we delivered in the first part

1592 His delimitation of speaking to forensic at 259E8-260A4 was merely an accident of the *figura etymologica* he there used (δίκαια / δικάζειν) in order to change the subject (cf. my n. *ad loc.*).

1593 Note that the two waves of questions are brought together in the conclusion reached in the second, by its reference to knowing truth as well as opinion (262C1-2: cf. 259E7-60A4), which prepares his transition away from them.

of our conversation and see whether they provide examples of the aspects of an art of speaking that we are now isolating?"

2. SEMANTICS OF τέχνη

That Socrates could drive a wedge between Phaedrus's original attitude and the attitude toward oratorical skill he has now with some trepidation embraced, owes something to the semantic range and connotations of the term, τέχνη. The term is brought in when Madame Techne herself makes the following claim at 260D7-9:

> … my high claim is that without me (sc. τέχνη), even knowing the truth will give a man no advantage at persuading *artfully* (τέχνῃ).

This anarthrous use of τέχνη without modifier as an adverbial dative (here meaning little more than "slickly") is very rare in Greek[1594] and therefore Madame Techne's tone is emphatic. But perhaps the lady doth protest too much. Indeed Socrates (and Phaedrus in response to him) will use this expression fifteen more times in the rest of the dialogue, while the total occurrences in all of classical literature outside the dialogue amount to less than ten. The term τέχνη has a laudatory connotation, just as "being an *artist*" may in our own times. About its real denotation Phaedrus is at first less aware and attuned, for he does not recognize that the attributes Socrates suggests for the rhetorical art a few lines below (261A8-B2) belong by definition to any art *qua* art. Socrates's immediate reply to Madame Techne throws down the gauntlet: 'I would agree that she is indispensable for persuading "artfully," if indeed it is "artfully" that she enables a person to speak' (260E2-3).

Phaedrus's failure to see that Socrates's suggestions are axiomatically true (e.g. that rhetoric *as an art* would help persuade in any context, not just public venues), requires Socrates to prove them to him in terms he already knows. He compares the Τέχναι (here the term has its third, idiomatic meaning, denoting treatises on speeches,[1595] treatises with which Phaedrus is fully conversant) of Nestor and Odysseus to compare them with a putative Τέχνη written by a certain Palamedes – that is, the Eleatic Palamedes we know as Zeno, whose Paradoxes, written for a private audience, consisted of the same sort of ἀντιλογία or arguing for both sides that forensic orators specialize in. The comparison leads also to the recognition that Zeno as well as the lawyers could hardly make one thing look like its opposite if they did not have a very fine knowledge of the similarities and differences of things, finer than their audience at least, so that an exponent of the Madame Techne's art of speech which includes no such knowledge, would seem to possess an "art" that is "artless" (ἄτεχνον, 262C3).

In the ensuing phases of the discussion, the ambiguities and valences of this term will mediate further arguments against Phaedrus's unexamined predilection for Lysias and his ilk. For instance when Socrates with a mild taunt introduces his much beloved methods of synthesis and division as methods a man would enjoy to deploy *skillfully* (τέχνῃ, 265D1), and then describes them perspicuously and proves their efficacy by showing that for instance they resolve the apparent contradiction between the speeches as to whether eros is a good thing or a bad thing (265D3-266B1), he finishes the description by telling Phaedrus that he himself calls the men who can apply this method "dialectical" but wonders whether the "art of speeches" that Phaedrus and Lysias teach might consist of exactly this, Phaedrus replies that the rhetoricians he knows are surely not "masters" of this sort of thing (ἐπιστήμονες, 266C6), but to the contrary that for all the understanding of the "dialectical element" of

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1594 Cf. n..

1595 τέχναι λόγων, or in Latin *artes dicendi*.

argumentation he and Socrates have so far reached in their dialogue, the "rhetorical element" *per se* has utterly evaded them. Phaedrus is pointing at the powerful delivery of the rhetor[1596] and sees this power as provided by something other than the dialectical competencies of a speech. Socrates notices that whatever the residuum it must be important if dialectic does not provide it: "But what a fine element this rhetorical element of theirs must nevertheless be, if, assuming it is something distinct from this dialectical element, it is something that still can be deployed *skillfully* (τέχνῃ, 266D2): let's try to identify this wonderful element that would be the distinct and exclusive province of the rhetorical *art*."[1597]

Phaedrus's reply is that there are many such elements readily found in an "Art of Speeches" (D5-6), but he is not too happy to say so. Again he has made Τέχνη as a title stand in for the substance of epistemonic and sovereign "art," and while the ensuing (satirical) assemblage of special "elements" of an oration is characterized at the beginning as the "subtleties of the art" (τὰ κόμψα τῆς τέχνης), once these elements are compared to the special devices of tragic poetry or medicine that in themselves are nothing until they are incorporated into the unified art of the true doctor and true poet (268A8-269A4), they are demoted, by the imaginary interlocutor Pericles, to the status of τεχνήματα (269A7) a *derogatory* cognate that fills out the semantic field of τέχνη[1598] and a characterization that evacuates any remaining vestige of approbation from the τέχνη alluded to in the name Τέχνη Λόγων that is the rhetorician's book title.

From this point forward Phaedrus has no illusion about the "technicity" of the rhetorical "techne," but the alternative abilities and knowledges that Socrates has described in the interim (particularly, the objective science of dialectic [265D3-266C1] and the subjective science of psychology [270B1-272B2]) have come into view as possessing the admirable virtues denoted by the term τέχνη, virtues that have in the very description become interesting to Phaedrus where before, under the vain tutelage vain Madame Techne, his access to them had been occluded by book titles and his credence in her self-serving and self-satisfied vaunt (the merely adverbial τέχνῃ). As to those virtues, Socrates having now made his point is free from having to use the pivotal and controversial term and may now describe them freely, in other terms implied by the denotation of τέχνη in the true sense, such as accuracy (ἀκριβεία: 270E3, 271A5) and seriousness (σπουδῇ, 271A5).

Through the mediation of the semantic field of the term Phaedrus has in essence been converted from being a lover of rhetoric misnamed as τέχνη, to a lover of a τέχνη for which he as yet has no name, nor even a means to acquire it (272B6-7).[1599]

1596 τὸ ῥητορικόν (266B8) in this dialectical context stands for a *Sinn*, but the last time it was used in the dialogue its reference (*Bedeutung*) was the element of delivery (235A1).

1597 τῆς ῥητορικῆς (266D4): Note that Socrates reverts to the feminine (sc. τέχνης) after Phaedrus's more abstract and dialectical use of the neuter (τό ... ῥητορικόν, 266C8).

1598 The word is spoken by Socrates but already in a protasis to a condition for which Pericles will supply the apodosis. For the neuter verbal noun as derogatory cf. σπουδάσματα (apparently coined by Plato at 249D1) and δοξάσματα (274C3).

1599 Parallel to the "dialectical evolution" of the term techne we have an evolution in the sense of πειθώ and its cognates, again beginning with the usage Phaedrus "has heard" (260A3) from the likes of Madame Techne (πείθειν τέχνῃ, 260D9), where persuasion consisted of causing a person to believe something regardless of its truth (illusionism, essentially: 261C10-262C4), through a use by the indisputable oratorical master Pericles that dissociates it from the school techniques by associating persuasive power with organization of the speech into a whole (269C2-3) rather than the mere deployment of techniques (technEmata (269B7), to an extremely pointed sense at the very edge of its semantic field that is generated by an analogy between a higher Periclean "rhetorical art" and medical art (270B1-9), according to which just as drugs and nutrition are prescribed by the medical art for the sake of instilling health and strength, lessons and lawful activities (logous kai epitheuseis nomimous) are prescribed by this rhetorical art to instill conviction and virtue (peithO … kai aretEn): 270B4-9. πειθώ is now acquiescence in salubrious truth rather than a subjective state of mind effectuated by the illusionisms of rhetoric, disconnected from truth. The analogy, which is the sole justification for the

3. IMAGINARY INTERLOCUTORS

Socrates (and Plato) very often introduce an imaginary interlocutor into the *Dialogues*,[1600] but never with such frequency and variety as in the dialogical section of the *Phaedrus*. First we have the mover-and-shaker politician (257C4-E6), who though he does not speak in his own voice becomes enough of a presence in hearsay that Socrates and Phaedrus are able to argue over the meaning of what he has said. Then come the cicadas overhead, who speak in their buzzing way and more importantly will watch all the goings-on between these two mortals – indeed they complicate even *our own* status as the audience of the conversation (258E6-259B2). A page later comes the unnamed person that Phaedrus has "heard" whom Socrates generously presumes to be a wise man so that his thesis cannot be ignored (259E7-260A7); and thereupon the voice of the hypothetical orator who follows his advice and proves a donkey is as good as a horse in battle (260B1-D1), giving way hard upon to the voice of Madame Techne who comes onto the stage to make her boastful but patently circular claim, which must be quoted *ipsissimis verbis* to be believed – that persuasion, the needed and desired effect of public speaking, can be managed artfully (τέχνῃ) only by τέχνη, which is herself (260D4-9). Immediately Socrates hears another voice, that of certain other arguments approaching[1601] to challenge her competence (260E4-7), arguments whose position he will represent while Phaedrus will more or less will take the side of Madame Techne or, to put it more accurately, will answer their challenge (261A1-6).

It is notable in such a sequence of personifications that when we are introduced by name to the promulgators of rhetorical skill at 266D7-267E9, we are not given their own voices, but instead are given their several techniques, each vying to be *named* after the part of an oration he wrote about. It is their names rather than their voices that we hear! But immediately and as a corrective to them we hear the voices of other technicians – Eryximachus, Akoumenos, Sophocles and Euripides (268A9-D5), who are quoted in excerpt, and an unnamed "musical" man who is quoted *in extenso* (268E2-6), followed by the most eloquent man and one of the greatest celebrities in Athenian history, Pericles (you could do better only with Solon, I would guess), who is not only quoted by Socrates but is made (by Socrates) to turn upon him and Phaedrus and upbraid them (269B4-C5)!

Once the example of Pericles has been exploited (269E1-270A8) Socrates takes the opportunity to instruct Phaedrus that they are on their own. The advice of Hippocrates, whom Phaedrus adduces, must be checked according to their own lights (270C3-10). What they learn from Periclean approach is that the power of persuasion relies upon a knowledge of soul's nature and types, for it is the soul that is persuaded or not. In the sequel they quote nobody but *themselves*, until they are briefly interrupted by the type of the speechwriter they are leaving behind who wonders if their psychology is truly so important (ὁ συγγραφεύς, 272B2-4), after dismissing whom they then face the argument of Tisias head on, the "wise" person adduced anonymously by Phaedrus at the beginning who is now brought on as a devil's advocate with his cynical nostrum about carrying the day by simply arguing likelihoods (272C7-273A1). Amusingly Phaedrus at first acts as if or even thinks he does not

new meaning, comes as a complete surprise.

1600 *Apol.*28B, 37E; *Crito* 50C4-54D1; *Charm.*165CE; *Gorg.*450E, 451B; *H.Maj.*287B; *Ion* 538D-539C; *Leg.*628E (and Stallb. *ad loc.*), 648A, 803B, 809B (and Stallb.) 815C; *Lys.*216; *Meno* 72B (and Thompson *ad loc.*); *Prot.*330C-331A, 352E; *Rep.*332C, 337AB, 341E, 453A, 476E. Sometimes a known personage is brought on the stage and we imagine what he would say (Tyrtaeus, *Leg.*628E; the gods, *Leg.*662C); νοῦς and ἡδονή come on to speak their pieces in *Phlb.*63B-64A.

1601 "Personification" of the logos, so-called, is tantamount to the depersonification of an interlocutor, and therefore provides a kind of mediation analogous to that of the imaginary interlocutor. Having to confront an argument depersonified, Socrates and his partner are entirely pre-empted from taking refuge in an *ad hominem* response and must deal with the arguments on their merits. Cf. *Gorg.*475D; *Leg.*870B; *Phdo.*76E, 88E, 89B-C; *Phlb.*53E; *Polit.*277C, 284B; *Rep.*503AB, 538D; *Tht.*200C, 203D.

remember (273A2-6) that it was himself that brought this position into the discussion. Socrates's depiction of Tisias's position in Tisias's own language is virtually another imaginary interlocutor, and the portrayal is concrete enough to elicit from Socrates a hugely eloquent and indignant upbraiding, addressed to him in person (273D2-274A5). Only a moment later, and still on a roll, Socrates remembers a discussion between Theuth and Ammon (274C5-275B2), but now that he and Phaedrus have agreed on the principles, it is the ideas that matter rather than who voices them (275B7-C2) and they stop quoting anybody.

The indirection, triangulation, burden-shifting, and objectification afforded by the appearance of these imaginary interlocutors,[1602] which in the case of the dialogical section of the dialogue constitute an overwhelming majority of the total discussion, together provide a huge berth of mediation within which Phaedrus's outlook can comfortably evolve from a toxic fascination with the rhetorical technology he associates with Lysias to the enjoyment and prospect of open and free philosophical thought and conversation with the likes of Socrates. For example, because Phaedrus presents the Lysian-Tisian penchant for argumentation from likelihood as something he "has heard" rather than standing up for it as his own belief, Socrates is able to scrutinize it aggressively without risking a confrontation; and Socrates's immediately subsequent impersonation of such an orator arguing from false beliefs for the use of donkeys in war provides an example that provokes him to laugh, and even to interrupt laughing,[1603] at the prospect. Then, the impersonation of Madame Techne brings to the table an exaggerated but credible overstatement of the power of her art, an overdrawn position the refutation of which will be so easy that it will evoke in reaction an alternative science of argument coming into view as a corrective. Socrates's announcement at this moment that he hears "challenging arguments" approach that wish to oppose Madame Techne enables him moreover to suggest a kind of playful trial or contest in which he will argue their position and Phaedrus will answer, an arrangement that again avoids confrontation but will also require Phaedrus to come up with answers of his own even if they are to be taken, at first, to represent the position of Madame Techne. It is with this shifting of his status into playing the *role* of the answerer, that the second approach to the Topic or Question now can begin (261A7ff)[1604] and this time Phaedrus is enough engaged in the give-and-take, even if only in play, that as we saw he can be brought along to agree that forensics resembles the antilogy of Zenonian paradox, and then can follow the extension of this argument into the discovery that a forensic orator does need knowledge of the truth after all in order to hoodwink his audience rather than himself (261E3-262C4).

It is, moreover, an index of the dramatic curve of the whole passage that several pages later, after the two of them have discovered a real art of argumentation, and Socrates alludes to that position Phaedrus had heard and now will countenance it as a counter-claim from a devil's advocate, that Phaedrus is barely willing to own up to having introduced that position himself at the beginning of the conversation; and by this time Socrates is able to call him on his evasiveness in no uncertain terms, admonishing him to look at that dog-eared copy of Tisias he has if he wants consult the position in detail (272A10-273B1). But forgoing to confront Phaedrus, Socrates now instead addresses Tisias personally, the author of the dog-eared book, while Phaedrus who dog-eared it watches. Socrates can

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1602 Tangential to the technique of the imaginary interlocutor but analogous in a nutshell, and deserving only a reference in passing, is the introduction of Nestor and Odysseus as treatise writers (261C1-3) as a vehicle to introduce an Eleatic Palamedes for the sake of drawing an analogy between forensic antilogy and philosophical *paradoxa* (261C4-E3). Compare also the use of Lysias's speech which functions as a virtual interlocutor since it comes to serve as an object that Socrates and Phaedrus can criticize together.

1603 At 260B5.

1604 The first one having failed since Socrates's basic suggestion of what good argument should be nature be contravenes what Phaedrus had "heard."

now tell Tisias that *Phaedrus and he* have achieved in their dialogue a position that goes far beyond his petty techniques of argumentation from likelihood (273D2-274A5), and he does so with a high eloquence that elicits nothing less than wholehearted agreement from Phaedrus (παγκάλως, 274A6), who is now his full partner in the investigation.

Here we find another special use for the imaginary interlocutor in mediation, namely, to play the role of a third person set opposite Socrates and Phaedrus so as to draw them together as an allied pair. It happens three times. First, they are *both* upbraided by Pericles for being perhaps too crass in their criticism of art (269A5-C5); here they appear as a pair of triumphant soldiers on a divine mission that puts Tisias to shame; and soon, at the climactic moment when Phaedrus actually embraces the conclusion they have reached about the true art of argumentation, they are treated as a pair by the unnamed objector who truculently challenges whether things are the way they say the are simply because they say so.[1605] In all three cases it is Phaedrus that thereupon speaks for the pair of them, recognizing in the first case how very true Pericles's depiction of the teachers is, and in the last responding directly to the objector by saying to Socrates, "But it seems impossible for it to be otherwise, Socrates, though indeed it will be no small task to achieve it" (272B5-6), the very thing Socrates had said to him a page earlier.[1606]

In the case of Madame Techne and the "Oncoming Arguments" the personnel is momentarily increased to four, as we saw, with Socrates and Phaedrus each soon adopting the identity of one of the other two. Late in the dialogue when the question of writing comes back up, which is in fact the primary gravamen of Phaedrus's wavering, Socrates avoids a confrontation with him by contriving that the relative merits and deficiencies of writing be represented in a dialogue between a most exotic pair of imaginary interlocutors whom they are vouchsafed to watch, the inventor Theuth and the Pharaoh Ammon of Egypt, the Pharaoh surprisingly objecting to the clever technologist that his invention of writing will actually harm the mind rather than enable it to remember. And yet right after, the bell having been rung, Socrates stresses to Phaedrus it is the principle that matters and not who voices it.[1607] For the rest of the dialogue the two men talk to each other without mediation by external persons, whether to interfere or to support their discussion.

At the very end of the dialogue another pair of figures will arrive, and the usual sort of mediation provided by the device of the imaginary interlocutor is turned inside out. Socrates and Phaedrus having agreed and in fact adopted a hope and a prayer for each other to be philosophical men (278B3-6) now imagine what they will do next, once they part from each other. After all, Phaedrus's choice how he will live his life has actually become the main theme and purpose of their conversation, and for the nonce at least he has made his choice. Two figures are imagined, thereupon, two mediators who are absent, in whom this choice of his is now articulated and embodied. They are Lysias and Isocrates. Socrates suggests to Phaedrus that he return to Lysias and tell him what he has learned, that writing is only writing and the love of wisdom is something more. But Phaedrus does not leave it here, for he wants to know what message Socrates will take from this conversation back to his young friend, Isocrates. Isocrates is the last stand-in Plato and Socrates bring in for Phaedrus to compare himself with, and in telling Phaedrus how he will encourage the philosophical element he sees

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1605 Τί δὴ οὖν, ὦ φαῖδρέ τε καὶ Σώκρατες; δοκεῖ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀποδεκτέον λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης; (272B2-4, reading ἤ with the mss.against Burnet).

1606 At 271B7-C1. It is noteworthy that Phaedrus does not seem to notice how closely his own assertion resembles what Socrates had just said. We may compare how he demurs to know what is the essential matter of composition (264B9-C1) eliciting Socrates's simile of the organized animal (264C2-5), but then soon later reasserts that lesson virtually verbatim (268D4-5) without acknowledging that he had just heard it: but it is part of his character to repeat what he has heard!

1607 At 274C5-275C2. Phaedrus immediately accepts the correction (C3-4).

in the young Isocrates, Socrates conveys to him what he will always be ready to say to Phaedrus, if he should join him in the future.

Socrates employs imaginary interlocutors in his teaching of Phaedrus in this section of the dialogue far more extensively than anywhere else in the Platonic corpus. We do not need to go very far to see the special reason or need for this. Phaedrus has shown a certain timidity to admit his own opinion. In the presence of one person he brings in the opinion of another. He trades on stimulating one person to vie with another so that he is responsible for more speeches coming into existence than anybody besides Simmias, as Socrates says to him in the first part of the dialogue (242A7-B5). Though Socrates politely grants, in that passage, that Phaedrus also produces speeches of his own, we certainly see none; and in the aftermath of Socrates's speech, when it may by his own lights be time for him to step up and make some kind of performance in response to that of Socrates, he evades doing it without even giving an excuse.

If we may call it timidity, it is of a piece with his erratic behavior at the beginning of the dialogue, when he tries to command Socrates's attention with a speech that he trusts will pass muster with him because it was written by somebody else. We learn that he hoped to deliver it on his own steam and even begins to do so (228D1-5)[1608] when Socrates disappoints him by guessing, or noticing, that he is carrying a written version of it under his cloak (D6-E5). He had resolved to take a chance and deliver it, despite his formulaic misgivings about being able to do so (227E6-228A4), because he was also sure that Socrates would enjoy it no matter what, since Socrates has such a weakness for all speeches so that he would actually share his enthusiasm,[1609] even if his performance should be less than sterling (228B6-C1).

We have extraordinary evidence that this is what was going on inside Phaedrus, namely, Socrates's guesswork at 228AC ("If I don't know my Phaedrus I don't know myself …,"), itself a unique event in the broad spectrum of events that occur in the *Dialogues*. At the end of that passage there are in fact two Phaedruses, the one Socrates is talking about (αὐτοῦ, 228C4) and the one he is addressing (σύ, 228C3). It is not going too far to say that at this moment Phaedrus himself becomes something of an imaginary interlocutor! And conversely we may say that at the end of the dialogue there are two Phaedruses again, the one who began as a partisan of the manipulative rhetoric identified only at the end with Tisias (273A6-B1),[1610] and the one who now barely remembers him, who feigns even to have forgotten his worn-out copy of Tisias's τέχνη λόγων.

Phaedrus's need for the mediation of imaginary interlocutors is deeply entwined with the overall theme of the dialogue, the choice he must make to speak on his own feet or to hide in a garret writing speeches for others to deliver in the real world of danger and καιρός, a choice richly illustrated by and analogous to the lover's choice to confess his love to the beloved and pursue it for all it is worth as opposed to playing the predatory wallflower who prefers to operate at a distance because he only remembers the painful torments of love's somatic dimension and the dialectic of possessor and possessed – the love horizon of the first two Speeches. What brings the two themes together is that to pursue divine Eros is to adopt the faith that one is thereby refurbishing the wings of his soul so as to return to the gods, and that that pursuit, in its highest and strongest and most rewarding form in this life, consists exactly in the philosophical exchanges of teaching and learning such as we witnessed in the second part of the dialogue, we and also the cicadas above who will

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1608 Cf. my n. *ad loc.*

1609 συγκορυβαντιῶντα (B7): exactly this comes true at 234D1-6 (where *n.b.* echoic συνεβάκχευσα).

1610Now he will be heard, despite the fact that Phaedrus has rejected his thesis, because even the *devil's advocate* deserves a hearing (272C10-11), though originally he deserved a hearing on the presumption that being Phaedrus's expert he must be a *wise man* (260A5-7)!

return a favorable report to the Muses about how Socrates and Phaedrus have spent their afternoon, and particularly to Calliope, she of the fine speeches,[1611] and Ourania who guards the blissful climes of the divine processions above, to which they and we may someday return.

4. CONCLUSION

This review of Socrates's techniques for persuading Phaedrus, which as we claimed at the beginning are nothing more and nothing less than Plato's techniques for teaching his reader, shows the *Phaedrus* in which Plato depicts them to be largely immune to the derogation of live thought by its being written down that Socrates describes, in the course of persuading Phaedrus not to write, this derogation that infects the practice of the professional writer. A written logos, as a logos, can only be a version of a live logos of which the primary and paradigmatic form is thought itself, the dialogue of the soul with itself; and Plato's *Phaedrus* likewise proves to be a written version of the live teaching event that took place, though only in fiction, under a plane tree outside the southeastern gate of Athens one summer day, which its author and inventor depicts with a versimilitude and vividness achieved by no other author of dialogue before or since.

Its vividness and verisimilarity are predicated upon our finding Phaedrus's change of mind at the end credible; and the credibility of his change within the hour-long discussion that follows the speculative speeches relies largely on the mediations that Socrates provides for him, mediation between his Motives and the Question in which those motives can be explored at an arm's length, at first; the mediation of the language the two of them share and the semantic range of the words they use that harbor and enable changes of attitude sort of being self-contradictory; but perhaps most of all by the many voices and mindsets Socrates brings onto the stage, third persons that help to usher him and Phaedrus through a series of relationships to each other as they converse, which culminates in their conception of two individuals to whom they might return after they leave each other that embody the outlook of Phaedrus before they sat down under the tree and the person he could continue to be if, and to the extent that, they continue their relationship on the way back into the city.

The evidence that the logos though written is still alive, is the change readers still undergo from reading it.

End of

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1611Socrates invents a new etymology along these lines at 259D6-7 (cf my commentary *ad loc.*).