

# A Commentary on Plato's *Republic*

by Kenneth Quandt

## PREFACE

WELCOME to OnPlatosRepublic.com, an interactive website that presents a translation and commentary on the *Republic* of Plato, for the use of scholars and students hoping to understand this very beautiful work better and better, word by word.

In the far left column you see a scrollable Outline of the *Republic* including my Appendices, which enables you to jump to a section of the dialogue. Next is a scrollable column of blue Stephanus page numbers that enable you to jump to a page of the text. The main column in the middle, which you are now reading, presents a brief Preface, my Translation and Summary of the *Republic*, and a few exegetical Appendices. The column to the right presents my many exegetical footnotes.

Clicking on a footnote number in the Translation instantaneously scrolls the right column to display the selected footnote. Conversely, clicking on a footnote number in the footnote column scrolls the center column to the passage in the translation on which the footnote comments. Clicking on references within a given note to another note likewise scrolls to the other note.

You may use the Find function in your browser to search the entire document for any word, in English and Greek (for the latter you of course need to have a Greek font installed in your computer: I have used GreekKeys Unicode [US], available from the American Philological Association). The Find function does recognize partial words and is not case-sensitive nor sensitive to diacritical marks.

The entire document is rather large and takes a few seconds to open. The last thing to load is the date stamp shown in numerical format at the left end of the Footer. I do continue to import changes into the text based on better understanding and the suggestions of my readers. *In order to ensure that you are seeing the latest version you must empty your browser's cache periodically.* To the right of the date stamp you will see my name, which is a link for sending me comments and suggestions by e-mail. I attribute corrections to their authors and reply privately to suggestions with which I disagree.

Among the Platonic dialogues the *Republic* is unique for its length, for its personnel, for the breadth and number of topics it reaches out to and passes through, and for the “radius” of the dramatic curve with which it succeeds to bring all this together.

The *Laws* is longer but Socrates is absent, so that it can only be discursive: there is no interlocutor who does what Socrates always does and will never not do, for which he was loved and hated, ever true to his double commitment of achieving for himself and his interlocutor a rational embrace of virtue, and refusing to allow anything in the conversation to deflect, defer, or demean the pursuit of that goal, in any way at any moment. The *Republic* is the most sustained exhibit of this commitment and conduct of his in Plato's corpus or anywhere else, and the richest display of the techniques and tactics he employed to those ends, itself being four and five times longer than other great displays such as the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Theaetetus*.

As to the personnel, Socrates's principal interlocutors turn out to be Glaucon and Adeimantus, but only after he has gone through distinct and complete conversations with three others, the old man Cephalus at whose home the entire conversation takes place, Cephalus's son Polemarchus who inherits the argument his father leaves him, and Thrasymachus, a teacher of oratory who is visiting from out of town. These latter three are "public" figures – persons we have heard of from outside the dialogue – but the former two, who are the persons Socrates ends up talking with far longer than with the other three, and indeed than with anybody else in the entire Platonic corpus, are persons about whom we know next to nothing. It is not unique for Plato to combine known and unknown interlocutors in one dialogue; nor is it in itself surprising that Socrates would take the time to talk with unknown persons nor likely that a conversation he would have with such persons would be any the less significant or substantial, since it is his relentless management of the "what" and the "how," rather than the "with whom" he is talking, that makes the conversations so great -- as we learn for instance from his conversations with the unknown Euthyphro and the barely known Meno.<sup>1</sup> What is unique about the personnel of this dialogue is that the lesser known interlocutors, who end up playing the principal roles, are persons that are very well known after all, known best, indeed, to one person, the author of the dialogue, for they are Plato's elder brothers. In telling us about his brothers, this author, who has otherwise done so much to remain "anonymous," has in the case of this one dialogue laid the suggestion that he is somehow telling us something about himself!

As to the *breadth and number of topics* the dialogue visits or treats in greater or lesser detail and trenchancy, I have to say what might at first seem farfetched: it reminds me more than anything else of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. Not only do both books deal with subjects of the highest generality – Plato's *Republic* raises "the question of how to live one's whole life,"<sup>2</sup> and Hegel's book is about *everything or the all* – but also both authors have a genius for analogy that enables them to reach for a topic that might seem remote, to exploit it as a vehicle for what they want to say, and then to drop it just as fast as they raised it.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, at the same time that the conversations between Socrates and Glaucon and between Socrates and Adeimantus visit every subject under the sun (including the sun itself!), the *entire conversation as a whole* accumulates from all these sources a multidimensional and unified solution to the original question – does being just make a man happy? – and a triumphant agreement about the solution, between Socrates and Glaucon at least, its success being set into dramatic relief by the dark foil of a failure between Socrates and Adeimantus. Not only is the main question answered, but even why it was asked and how it was asked comes to be understood, and a provision is made to compensate the world of truth and beauty for the erroneous prejudices against justice that had underlain the formulation of the original question (Moses, too, was commanded to take his sandals off the moment he decided to stop and look harder at the burning bush). The beauty and power of the

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<sup>1</sup>Indeed to the contrary it seems persons who think they have a reputation to protect, such as Protagoras or Theodorus or Gorgias, are all the harder to engage in a conversation worth having.

<sup>2</sup>344E1-3.

<sup>3</sup>The perils of aging, subjective and objective (both what the old man thinks and how he talks about it); What is a friend, really? Why wait around and figure out how to be just when people admire the man who takes what he wants, even if it is from themselves that you take it? The masterful expert is the servant of the person that needs him. People concocted the idea of justice merely to have great enough numbers to overwhelm the strong man they wish they were. If you had a ring that made you invisible what would you do? What if rhetoric and poetry were so powerful they could even persuade the gods to look the other way? What would we say virtue was if it weren't something we had to live up to ourselves, but we could make up a board game that shows it, with tokens and rules? Can a person be both as strong and fierce as a wolf but as loyal as Fido? What are the proper ways to talk about the gods, since they are really divine, after all? that is, what makes a god a god? And that's just the first fifth of the *Republic*!

result that Socrates and Glaucon reach spills over into a coda that demonstrates that their conclusion is so important that it not only trumps the literary means by which Plato or anyone else might reveal such a thing to us, but that it also consigns the problem of death, the ultimate reward of the just and unjust life with which the entire conversation began, to the shadows.

One should next be wondering why or how these four unique characteristics all appear in this one work. Why is it here that Socrates's ministrations are needed for so long? Why or how can so many topics be brought in to help accumulate a conclusion? How can the disparate plurality of these topics be redeemed in a unifying conception? Why is the dialogical work of this most important, this longest and most complex but most unified conversation in Plato's entire corpus of conversations, given over to the author's brothers?

To answer these questions I direct the reader to a fifth unique characteristic of this dialogue, which I left out above: the lengthy speeches of Plato's brothers at the beginning of Book Two (357A-367E), in which they confess – Glaucon more candidly and even ashamed, and Adeimantus from behind a proud mask of resentment – that they desire to love justice more than they love it in fact, and that they fear the consequences of failing to. In many of Plato's so-called aporetic dialogues Socrates spends the whole day working to establish just as much as these brothers already know: that one should recognize he is ignorant and worry about how this will affect his life.<sup>4</sup> These two speeches at the beginning of Book Two pick up where the aporetic dialogues leave off.<sup>5</sup> There is no other place in the dialogues where Socrates's interlocutor is given so much space to describe a problem and ask for Socrates's help, and no other place where the request is so frank, or is depicted with such dramatic power and psychological authenticity. Add to this that *both* the brothers speak: when Glaucon is finished Socrates is ready to try to reply but Adeimantus interrupts to tell him he will not let him off so easily (362DE), and adds his own challenge to Socrates -- a criticism of wisdom literature, to which the ensuing conversation itself will have been one of the greatest contributions.

These two speeches are unique in the corpus for the fullness in which they present a theory to be tested at the same time that they present a psychological profile of the speaker, which shows that the theory is not their only problem. The "affect" of the two speeches, if I may use this term in a general way, is far more important and far more recognizable, compelling, and true than the theories and criticisms the young men present. In truth the invisibility Gyges gets from his magic ring is useless, but we do not notice this if we are affected by Glaucon's rhetoric. Adeimantus on the other hand, in complaining about the inadequacies of wisdom literature, is at the same time criticizing his parents for failing to tell him something he thinks he does know after all, but will not own up to knowing. It is exactly because the affect and indirection of their speeches shows the problems are operating deep within the young men that Socrates immediately deflects the conversation away from the questions as the young men framed them and proposes instead to project the question of justice onto the canvas of an imaginary city, in which the problems and anxieties within the individual man are externalized and depersonalized and the question of justice becomes amenable to objective theoretical scrutiny.

In a nutshell, what gives the *Republic* its heft and its length is the large discrepancy between the brothers' theories that justice might not pay and that education has failed, and the affect with which they present them, a disconnect that both justifies and requires the length of the discussion, under Socrates's tutelage, that follows. The plurality of topics raised, though as in Hegel reached with easy segues and surprising unobtrusiveness, will in the aftermath be seen to have provided balm for the very anxieties expressed in those affects, and to have calmed the souls of the young men so that they

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<sup>4</sup>The "care of the soul" he promises the Athenian jurors he will never let them ignore as long as he can breathe (*Apol.* 29D2-E3; 30A7-B4 36C5-D1, 38A1-8, 39D7-8, 41E3-7).

<sup>5</sup>Indeed Book One is quite a lot like an aporetic dialogue, or three of them – though its particular function, I believe, is largely to serve as foil the hugely successful and extensive conversation of Books 2 thru 10, by illustrating three very different ways conversations can fail.

can see further than they had, though in the end Adeimantus refuses to see and Glaucon runs out of steam. The general insight gained, about the objective structure of reality and truth in the Sun image and about the subjective structure of the soul that enables man to resonate with it, will marshal all these divagations into a single unifying and climactic image of the inner man within the outer man at the end of Book Nine, a climax that both motivates and gives cover for a coda that looks back on the literary vehicle by which it was reached so as to surpass it, as well as forward to the afterlife, a worry that know pales in comparison.

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These are some of the more important conclusions of my rather long-evolving study of the work, which included reading it over and over through my life as many have, but then culminated in more concentrated work over the last six years that gradually became all-consuming, as it finally dawned on me that I had no choice but to write a commentary, given my lifelong devotion to Plato, my knowledge of Greek, but also the more lately developed belief that this text is far more important to us than all the other works written by this already very important author. The exciting cause, however, in both logical and emotional senses of the term, was a challenge to test my confidence in the overall truth and validity of Plato's project, in light of meeting René Girard several years ago and being served up his theory of desire, a theory that appeared to call everything into question and opened a new hermeneutic horizon for me. In the course of our meetings on Friday afternoons, René confessed a prejudice against Plato, which he led me to believe he regretted with his usual consummate grace, so that I set about trying to disabuse him of it. Immediately I discovered that Glaucon's fastidiousness about the simple polis in Book Two (372), which fatefully would require the entire re-construction of the city, evinced Plato's awareness of René's own theory of desire.<sup>6</sup> René accepted my analysis and encouraged me to continue my study. A few months later, continuing like a Tiro to apply his uncanny insight about mimetic desire and its peculiar hermeneutic as ever I could, I discovered and brought to him the insight that the true significance of the story of Gyges in Herodotus was that Candaules made Gyges hide behind the door of his bedroom so that he himself could look across and see the desire in Gyges' eyes when his wife disrobed, and then send him away. René remarked that an abuse so exquisitely designed is just the sort of thing that leads to murder, a comment that sent me back to the version of the story we find in the *Republic*. The connection between Herodotus's and Glaucon's Gyges is famously riddled since Glaucon tells a different story, but with Girard's hermeneutic I seemed to discover a "mimetic" interpretation of Glaucon's speech, too: that the emotional outburst in which he suddenly imagines a sequence of tortures to subject the just man to is an expression of envy – a completely new interpretation as far as I know, that however came to be corroborated in spades by the dramatic sequelae of the argument and the ultimate closure of the discussion in Books Nine and Ten. It was envy also in Girard's sense, I seemed to see, that motivated Adeimantus's interruptions in Book Four and Six, and envy that spurred the contagion by which Polemarchus's objection in Book Five became unanimous, a unanimity of mob thinking that itself adumbrates the state of mind Socrates's jurors will choose to adopt at his trial in 399. An invisible and inward virtue of the sort Socrates and Glaucon had envisioned just before Polemarchus's interruption leaves a man severely alone with himself, after all, and deprives him of anything to imitate.

During the time of these meetings with Girard, I set up and carried out a "slow read" of the *Republic* in English one evening a week, with several adult students, which took a year. Soon after I conducted a one-week intensive read-through in English, meeting six hours a day at the University of Kent at Canterbury, hosted by Professor Stefan Rossbach. After these exercises I devoted a good deal

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<sup>6</sup> My study of this passage is included in *Aglaïa – Autour de Platon: Mélanges offerts à Monique Dixsaut* (Vrin 2010).

of time to a concerted and meticulous reading of the Greek text with my student, Jason Karabatsos, that consisted of one or two three-hour meetings per week covering about one page per session, which occupied us for more than four years. Like Hans Sachs I came away from those sessions with a new song -- this commentary -- and Mr Karabatsos, like Sixtus Beckmesser, came away with a new pair of shoes -- his solid knowledge of Greek.

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It will already be evident to those at all familiar with the secondary literature that the interpretation I am presenting does not fall within the usual range. Scholars still argue pro and con about the unity of the whole book; they conclude it was written at different times and with different purposes; they have strong but discrepant opinions as to whether the book is about the soul or politics; and they criticize the arguments and their methods as if they belong to a Plato they imagine behind the text they are sitting in front of. Above all it is an object of wonder to me that the most influential anglophone treatment of the book in recent decades can have found it wanting in almost every way. At the same time the literature barely recognizes the significance of the dramatic curve of the dialogue – the way Glaucon not only reverses his original outlook but apologizes for it in Book Ten, and the way Adeimantus's personal pride and skepticism bar him, in Book Six, from ascending to the Good, while for Glaucon it is only his stamina that falls short. Nobody to my knowledge has written on the huge discrepancy between theory and affect in the brothers' two speeches, just as nobody seems to reach the conclusion that Thrasymachus has no theory at all but only affect, trying to bowl over his audience with rhetoric and envy.

My interpretation, different as it may be, has come about as the cumulative result of a close reading of the Greek text whose twists and turns I delineate herewith in five thousand footnotes – though my “results” are of course affected by my own prejudices and marred I am sure by my own blind-spots. Relying as I feel I have done on the text, and having found the text amenable to something that still feels to me like a natural interpretation of a great work of literature written by a great prose artist, I have forgone to mention or engage the opinions of other persons who have written on the *Republic*, except for those who have written not essays but commentaries on all or part of the Greek text; and I have mentioned such commentators only to thank them for their guidance in individual passages or to defend my interpretation against theirs when we are significantly at odds. In fact I welcome, and will attribute, any corrections a generous reader might send me in the future.

In lieu of discussions about a development or shift within “Plato's thought” lurking behind what Socrates says to Adeimantus and Glaucon, the reader will find me concentrating instead on shifts in the styles Plato has given to Socrates and his interlocutors for enunciating what they have to say and managing the common endeavor of conversing with each other, including for instance the very special “ecphrastic” style Socrates uses during the decline of the city.<sup>7</sup> Rather than comparing the propositional content of what is said in the *Republic* against a background of theses propounded elsewhere in the corpus I have tracked Plato's use of background lists, the traditional or received or conventional sets of categories Socrates shares with his interlocutors, which provide a conceptual platform, a linguistic context, and a structure of anticipation for a conversation on any topic that might arise out of the dramatic occasion of the dialogue – such as for instance the division of goods into psychic, bodily and external; or the categories of value as being the good, the beautiful and the just. In lieu of applying the formulas of propositional logic and inference to the sentences we encounter I have described the actual transitions from thought to thought which do not need to be logically valid in order to be fully understandable and vivid, the movement of thought as embodied not so much in the

<sup>7</sup>I find no mention of this style in the extensive studies of H. Thesleff, and have written Appendix 7 to describe it.

words as propositional termini as in the configuration and sequence of such words and the connectives and particles that link them and couch them and set the pace at which thought moves through them. It is not so important to me to wonder whether Plato remembers what he said in an early dialogue as to notice that Glaucon remembers what he himself said two hundred pages earlier, and thereby to recognize a development within the drama of the dialogue that he himself has recognized, rather than speculate about an external development in Plato's thought.<sup>8</sup> In lieu of seeking to improve what Plato has said, my reader will find me saving and restoring a good number of manuscript readings that most or all editors have improved out of the text.<sup>9</sup> In general I have paid attention to the persons Plato has put before us rather than engaging in the shadow play of determining what another person, Plato, might or must have been thinking behind the scenes so as to have them say what they say. The result is that we are vouchsafed a story with great power and truth, rather than being left to ignore or to try to believe the implication of the usual hermeneutic, that the *Republic* is a dramatically unverisimilar patchwork consisting of dubious and self-contradictory arguments of an ilk our author shows far too much control and intelligence to have been satisfied putting his name to.<sup>10</sup>

My sense is that I am presenting a reading fresh and new that can stand on its own: in fact, Plato's book is a very great ride. I hope that my many notes will help Plato's reader stay on the horse, register every bump, and savor every leap; and I hope also they will help him experience the conversation as the tennis match it is and watch the ball go back and forth, rather than find himself outside the give-and-take of the conversation and left with the impression so many have formed that he is hearing a series of blasts by Socrates that are unthinkingly cheered, one after the other, by his interlocutor. At the same time I recognize that my interpretation is nothing more than one alongside many, like another book set on the shelf in alphabetical order between the others squinting out to its potential reader through its narrow spine. My efforts will be rewarded if only I can imagine my readers finding some unexpected light in it, as I have sometimes found light in books I came across in a library or bookstore but never heard of, books that for all I knew had been sitting there unopened for years or decades. As to the general reader's inability to know whether my interpretation of the Greek is correct, I suggest to him that in the end it is the most edifying and trenchant and challenging interpretation – whether of Plato or any other author -- that will be of most use to him regardless of whether the interpretation is true, and I encourage him to measure my results on that ground alone. In saying this I am only agreeing with Plato, who himself takes great pains to make a similar point near the end of the *Republic*, when he tries to disabuse his readers of their reverence and reliance on Homer, and encourages them instead to make the best judgments they can about how to live their lives, following with courage and moderation the quiet light of their own reason.

The time and effort I have put into this study would not have been available to me except for the loyal and graceful and canny support of my wife, to whom I dedicate the work,

Laura Myers  
conjunx dilectissima sine qua non

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<sup>8</sup> As a corollary I have resisted to explain an earlier passage in the conversation by one that occurs later unless all that is at stake is an obscure locution that becomes clearer upon repetition. The interlocutors cannot be helped understanding what they say by telling them what they will say.

<sup>9</sup>E.g., at 370A6, 378B6, 439B4, 451A7, 460E6, 504E5, 515B4-5, 562B4, 580D4, 608A6.

<sup>10</sup>It is significant to me that I can claim I have made an advance on the very great work and interpretation of Paul Shorey; and I am glad to claim, after close study and for what my opinion is worth, that Burnet is still the greatest editor of Plato.

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## INTRODUCTION

SOCRATES was walking back up to Athens, accompanied by his young friend Glaucon. Someone has sent his slave to run up from behind and detain him until his master catches up, to invite him to stay down in the Piraeus and come to his home. The master is Polemarchus, accompanied by Adeimantus who is Glaucon's brother. The audience for whom this story was written will immediately be struck by the fact that the two tag-alongs, the one accompanying Socrates and the one accompanying the man who has accosted him, are the brothers of the story's author.

Within the house's main room the four of them find Polemarchus's elderly father, Cephalus. He has just come in from conducting a private sacrifice in his courtyard. A few others have already gathered there, including Thrasymachus the teacher of rhetoric visiting Piraeus from Calcedon, who might have come to teach his sons. The old man claims he wants to talk with Socrates, but perhaps only so that he can complain that he does not come down to visit often enough, now that he can no longer make his way up to Athens so easily. Socrates turns gracefully away from recrimination about future and past conversations in order to make something of the present one. As an older man, might Cephalus be able to tell the younger men present what lies before them? Cephalus replies, and again his statements describe himself by contrasting himself from others. Yes, he is old – but not as old as those cronies of his make old age out to be by their complaints; yes, he is rich – but riches alone do not make the man any more than Athens made Pericles; yes, he inherited money – but less than his father did whereas he increased the sum he inherited by a moderate amount rather than squandering most of his inheritance as his own father had. Out of all these clever comparisons Socrates's attention is drawn to what seems to be Cephalus's moderate attitude about money (in fact, Cephalus was the largest industrialist we know of in the Fifth Century, with a huge weapons factory that employed hundreds). Although most rich persons talk only of money, perhaps Cephalus has some other values he would like pass along? Money, says Cephalus, does have its value, alright, for it enables a man to ensure that he has righted things with men and gods before he dies, so that he can go on to face his death with equanimity. And the moment arrives that always does in a conversation with Socrates: the abruptly pertinent but unexpected question the speaker thought he would not be asked nor would need to be able to answer: "What does it really mean to 'right' things?" Surely not, for instance, to return a weapon you had borrowed to its 'rightful' owner, if he had since gone mad?"

With this, the easy breeze of words emanating from this seasoned windbag suddenly abates – one has the sense he had recited all these clever witticisms before – in the face of Socrates's disarming question, and just as suddenly our loquacious host decides to leave. He bequeathes to his son, Polemarchus, the debt to explain his position, who will after all, he jokes, be inheriting everything else he has to leave. For his own part he will return to his sacrifices – to set things right with the gods, we suddenly realize in a flash.

His son has no immediate desire to know what righting things might mean but does accept the debt his father has saddled him with – as heirs do, as often as not to their detriment. In place of his father's authority he adduces the maxim of the old wisdom poet Simonides in corroboration of his father, who said somewhere that righting things is doing what one owes or ought. Socrates's

questions now begin, and require him to modify his thesis over and over again, each modification bringing on its own unforeseen consequences, until in the end his original position turns into its own opposite. The conversation is tedious and unimportant all along, largely because Polemarchus has no personal stake in it. They are arguing about a mere abstraction, and we are served an exercise in dialectical exchange, which in itself is not entirely worthless. In the end Polemarchus is utterly confused, but the one outcome that is significant is that he has accrued a sense that of joint endeavor with Socrates. Someday they will search for a better answer that avoids the implications of his original position. In short Polemarchus has found something better than the fealty toward his father that had led him to defend his father's position for better or worse.

Suddenly another person butts in, with a loud and angry taunt: "How long will you two be carrying on this stupid game, Socrates?" It is Thrasymachus, the rhetorician from abroad, chafing to display of his artistry to the group. Though he addresses both of them he blames only Socrates, adding the taunt that Socrates's usual ploy is to make a show of asking questions in order to avoid having to give answers of his own. The accusation is meant not to force Socrates to give an answer so much as to capture the attention of the others. The truth is that Thrasymachus wishes to deliver a message of his own to that audience, an "answer," indeed, that is not truly a thesis to be upheld but an assertion that will scandalize them and place him in the center of all attention. The overall message he wants to convey is that it is foolish to worry about appearing a just and upright man, when a person can become the master of all those around him merely by the force of oratory. He interrupted with the demand that Socrates give an answer, but since he must be the center of attention it soon enough it devolves upon him to give an answer of his own, the "excellent answer" as he calls it, the answer that "Justice is the advantage of the stronger."

All he means by this is that for a person to "act justly" – i.e., to limit his own concupiscence – does nothing but provide the strong man with an opportunity to increase the sway of his own. But Socrates as usual takes his interlocutor at his word and quickly shows it is nonsense. What if the strong man in error orders the weak to do something contrary to his own interests? Thrasymachus immediately raises the stakes, at the risk of losing the argument, to thrill the audience even more, by saying the strong man he is talking about *cannot err!* Socrates subsequently reduces his position to contradiction in a way that reveals to Plato's reader the depth of Thrasymachus's own blindness, forcing Thrasymachus finally to move on to his original plan, the plan he came in with – to deliver a set speech of his designed to will bowl the audience over and end all discussion: "Leave off your pussy-footing over these small matters of law" he asserts – "these procedural niceties and fair play. The real game is to shoot for the moon, and when the people around you see you doing this they will admire you so greatly that they will even enslave themselves to you just for the sake of giving themselves an opportunity to witness the spectacle of a tyrant who never has to look back!" It is by far the longest speech of the night so far.

Completely of a piece with his own rhetoric Thrasymachus now stands up to leave, as if he has no more time for the group, but Socrates calls him back. Beyond the issue of defining justice, what he has just now said could have a lifelong effect on a person if he heeds it, and so it must not go unanswered. He submits Thrasymachus's "thesis" to a series of attacks but it is not truly a "thesis" that is being advanced as if on its merits, and the arrows he sets against it hit the mark but do not quench the effect it has had now that the bell has been rung. Thrasymachus recedes into silence, gloating. We have now undergone a third lesson on the minimal conditions necessary for rational discussion, to set alongside the conversations Socrates had had with Polemarchus and with Cephalus.

As we soon learn <BK.2>, Thrasymachus has gotten under Glaucon's skin – once again, he ruefully adds. He now engages Socrates in a conversation with an offer he cannot refuse, for his refutation of Thrasymachus was only a seeming refutation not a refutation in truth (Socrates's favorite distinction): to prove what justice isn't is not to prove what it is, so now asks he man he came in with

to immunize him for once and for all against such speeches, speeches he hears all too often but somehow can't get out of his head, the argument that justice is nothing but an agreement among the weak and the fearful not to molest one another, though by their nature they would surely do exactly this; the ineluctable sense that if one had a magic ring that made him invisible he would feel no bar against doing all sorts of bad things; and the corrosive sense that if one really wished to believe it is good to be just and bad to be unjust, he will have to prefer the pitiable existence of a martyr – just imagine him, impaled on display – over that of a secretly unjust man universally acclaimed to be great.

Of course, there are blind-spots in Glaucon's confession, as there are in all confessions. A person voluntarily confesses only when he believes it might lead to a remedy. The argumentative exercises of dodge and parry we underwent during the conversations with Cephalus and Thrasymachus might have prepared us to notice such blind spots as these. How for instance can justice have no "natural" reality of its own, whereas *injustice* was always there by nature? Apparently "injustice" means violent behavior, not the absence or contradictory of justice. As to the idea that if one had a ring that made him invisible he would not be able to resist committing all sorts of unjust acts, the acts Glaucon imagines in his parable could not have been committed by an invisible man. What he in fact imagines, though it remains subconscious, is that the ring would make him invisible to himself – that is, that he could escape his own conscience. Third, what is it that drives Glaucon to submit the perfectly just man to a series of tortures culminating in impalement, and to put his disfigured body on display before the world? He claims that it will enable the just man to infer that he should have chosen injustice, but it is only the viewer of the impaled corpse that could infer this: the just man has by now been reduced to a blinded corpse that will neither see nor learn anything.

Socrates is moved by Glaucon's speech and is ready to reply but Adeimantus interrupts, insisting brusquely that he has something even more important to say than Glaucon. Though the interruption as such is unwelcome Socrates rolls with the punch, and even goes to the trouble of providing Adeimantus a justification: "Let brother help brother." What follows is a speech just as long as Glaucon's in which he criticizes the way parents rely on wisdom-poetry in the upbringing of their children. The poetry encourages just behavior merely by promising monetary rewards and an afterlife of pleasure, as if there were no subtler goods to desire. Worse, the poetic tradition condescends to acknowledge that to be good is difficult, while at the same time it praises astute behavior that avoids the cost of practicing virtue in this life. And there is more. Certain particularly clever poets suggest the gods can be bribed to reverse the punishments meted out in the afterlife, and even to do so after the sinner has passed away. What can we expect an astute and subtle young man who has heard all this to think as he embarks on the path to eminent success? We need you therefore, Socrates, to prove to us that virtue is its own reward, you who have spent so much of your life on this question, or else we will blame you *along with* the wisdom poets for failing to teach us to avoid allowing vice into our lives!

The tone of Adeimantus's speech hardly comports with his request. Though he claims so sorely to desire a better poetry and upbringing, his speech is driven by a recrimination against his parents that in the end he threatens to extend even to Socrates in case he fails to respond adequately ("for you have spent your whole life on these things" – he will say it again in Book Six) regardless whether he is willing to respond, let alone able to, or might not think the questions deserve a response as Adeimantus has framed them. To the extent that Adeimantus is by now old enough to take responsibility for himself, he can no longer hold Socrates or anyone else responsible to answer for him. When in the last part of his speech he depicts the young man's good mind debating with his bad mind and losing, he shows us, unbeknownst to himself, that he has lost the debate in his own mind, so that it is no longer clear whether he wants help to do the right or wants instead an excuse for having failed to do so. We may contrast his importunate manner of requiring Socrates to answer against the more manly gesture of Glaucon, who knows how to engage his friend Socrates and make him "an offer he can't refuse." Suddenly the comparison reminds us that Glaucon came in with Socrates but Adeimantus, his brother, came in with Polemarchus.

The brothers' challenges are very different, though they could both be overcome with one response – a proof that a just life is in itself choiceworthy. And yet we already know that more than proof will be needed to satisfy the brothers, Glaucon has shown himself to be seduced by his imagination and Adeimantus has shown an obduracy or recalcitrance that stems from disappointment over the model his father had provided him. Such emotions will thwart them from acquiescing to mere "proof." The force of Thrasymachus's seductive speech had itself somehow survived the rational "refutation" Socrates had amply provided against it. So Socrates must do more. He must bring it about that the brothers come to *admire* and to *love* justice, and to desire to be just.

He begins his response to them by doing two things. First, he expresses faith in the brothers – their lineage as sons of Ariston suggests they are of a higher nature than these very cynical speeches would indicate; and second he promises to do all he can on behalf of justice, which has come under attack, and then proposes an indirect method for defending her. Let us populate a City in our imaginations and see where justice resides there, on a larger canvas where it would be easier to see, and only then, using this as a guide, turn back to look for such justice within ourselves. Of course this proposal is fraught with methodological fallacies, but the brothers voice no qualms, and all that matters is whether in the end it will work. We might liken the exercise it to a game with toy soldiers, a therapeutic technique indeed not unknown in the psychiatrist's counselling room. The distancing it provides might give the brothers enough psychic breathing room that each on his own terms might describe at ease what people seen at a theoretical distance ought to do, before they are compelled by the argument to embrace doing such things in their own lives!

Still in conversation with the second brother to speak, Socrates and Adeimantus now populate a City with the figures of artisans that would be required for fulfilling the basic human needs – a cobbler, a weaver, a house builder and a farmer, and a small set of other functionaries for which their trades eventuate a need, such as a smith to make a plow. Once this is complete Socrates asks him, "Where is justice in this picture?" and Adeimantus is not sure but wonders if it might be in the use or need these specialists have for each other. Socrates ignores his answer and decides to fill out the picture of the simple and honest home life of these working persons, even though it has nothing to do with their interrelations at all, a picture replete with the calm tranquillity of their evening meal of mash and vegetables served on broad leaves and eaten on the ground, as they sip a little wine and pray to the gods and sustain their family. The passage is strikingly eloquent – I hear in it the model for the later literary form of the idyll – and perhaps it is its surprising juxtaposition of eloquence and simplicity of what it depicts that arouses Glaucon to interrupt: Socrates has praised their lives as festive tranquillity, but the fare he feeds them lacks any dash. Socrates again takes his interlocutor at his word and adds a host of condiments, like olives and chickpeas, as if it were really the fare that Glaucon had found objectionable, and Glaucon now objects to his *multiplication* of delicacies, as if Socrates were throwing fodder into a sty!

What bothers him, as we will see by reading the passage itself, is the vision of men "merely" living their lives and then dying, but he will not admit this. If the one diet is not enough and the other is too much, "What, dear Glaucon, would be just right?" Bashful, he requests "merely the conventional things – tables and chairs if they are not to live in permanent discomfort, and the rather better fare than we have become accustomed to, as well, including – yes – dessert!" Socrates again "goes with the pitch" and adds not just chairs but all sorts of luxuries, over and over again, Glaucon accepting without demur or hesitation. But for the city to provide these will require an expansion and an amassing of wealth that will lead to war – both to defend our own riches but also to provide for our increased "needs" – and so an army is needed, and now Glaucon begins to rue the unforeseen consequences of his desire for the expanding provision of "basic comforts." Bashfully he hopes the citizens themselves can do the fighting, and in response Socrates scolds him for recognizing according to their original policy that shoemaking should be specialized, but now imagining that fighting should not, as if the arms alone could make a man into a soldier.

The thought experiment of the City has now yielded its first dividend: it has smoked out Glaucon's concupiscence, but also, because he realizes his hope for an automatic army was foolish, he now accepts responsibility to solve the problem his own proposal brought upon them: What will keep the guards from turning into wolves that consume the flock? It is the Thrasymachean problem of course, viewed from the other side. Is it against nature, after all, to imagine a person fierce enough to fight for the city but loyal enough not to molest it? No, for within the natural world we witness the dog, which by its nature combines these very elements! Our guards will blend those same elements of fierceness toward the foreign and loyalty toward the familiar.

In addition to nature there is its old standby, nurture; and the fundamental nurturing of the young itself traditionally falls into the studies of gymnastics and music. Our conversants are managing their research with the aid of conventional divisions or lists that lie in the background of all conversation. As to the children's study of Music itself (they being yet too young to do gymnastics) music itself breaks down into by convention into the stories of the poems and their "music proper." On the subtopic of "stories" Socrates coyly asks Glaucon how much time they should devote to it, and this elicits an interruption from Adeimantus who insists they spend all the time they may need to. He is a stakeholder in the question, after all, for he had complained that the poetry on which he was brought up lacked what might have convinced him to choose a just life over an unjust one. A second great dividend has been yielded by the thought-experiment of the City, for now Adeimantus has decided that even if he cannot reform *his parents*, at least he will try, in theory, to reform the education!

The evaluation of stories that Socrates and Adeimantus now formulate is structured by another background list – gods-heroes-men – a triad that constitutes a comprehensive division of who or what the stories might be about. Distinguishing the stories from what they are about makes it possible to measure stories for their truth – not their factual truth for they are of course fictional, but truth in a more catholic sense. For instance, as for the gods, if we view them as they are in themselves rather than as they have been described in stories, they must be good; and from this we can infer and insist that they are unchanging (changing could only make them worse) and that they have no need to change or to lie or dissimulate. Surely then they would not, for instance, accept bribes. <BK.3> As for heroes, these must also behave well or else they would not be the offspring of gods, but the important fact about heroes is that we can emulate them, since they provide standards for behavior that men can strive to achieve but may understandably fall short of, so that men can emulate the heroes without entering into rivalry with each other. For these reasons they are particularly serviceable models.

But as for stories about men, we would beg the original question of our whole Experiment to ask what sorts of human actions are proper, since after all it is the nature of just behavior we are trying to discover, and so we have gone as far as we can on the subject matter of stories. And yet there is another aspect of poetic learning besides story (i.e. logos), namely the aspect of memorization and recitation (i.e. lexis). Adeimantus does not recognize this distinction, and in fact it is not borrowed from the common background like the other divisions we have seen so far, but it does make sense on its own. Socrates has invented it on the spot for the sake of the conversation, in order to provide them the opportunity to investigate how the recitation of poetry might affect an impressionable young man, such a young man indeed as Adeimantus had in his speech *depicted* arguing with himself. If such a young man must recite the words of unjust, intemperate, or cowardly men (as we had heard Adeimantus's young man trying to do!) he will need to take in these characteristics within his soul. And so, indirectly, that third element of the background list of story-subjects, the behavior of men, comes back into play after all. The two of them conclude that they must control the scope of imitation in the recitation of poetry, lest the young man becomes so convincing an actor as that he convinces himself! The background division of gods, heroes, and men provided the treatment of stories with a beginning, middle, and end, but the net effect is that the very sorts of poems Adeimantus complained about will not be taught to the impressionable youth whom he had envisioned being corrupted, in his speech.

The larger division of which this division was a part, the division between the story aspect and the musical aspect of music, effortless bequeathes Socrates his next topic, but it is the identity of his next interlocutor that is more important news. Just as Adeimantus had intervened to ensure that the treatment of story would be adequate, Glaucon now steps in to insist that the treatment of music-proper receive the attention that he, in turn, wants it to. As it turns out, the “characterology” that had emerged in the treatment of stories supplies all the criteria they need for choosing which musical modes and rhythms will be appropriate, for these of course have ethical meanings of their own that correspond to the ethics of the behavior depicted in the stories. Naturally then the modes and rhythms we will be admitting will be those that are heroic and even-tempered, rather than confused and emotional. We might have noticed a general absence of reason in their youthful education so far (though one does feel a suggestion that reason might be the counterpoint to the emotional loss of control that has been avoided throughout), just now reason does make a more explicit appearance in the argument, and it does so in a very new and unexpected way. If the orderliness of the personality can be seen to “translate” into an orderliness of rhythm and tonal scale, there would seem to be an all-embracing orderliness *per se*, independent of but overarching all its various embodiments. The orderliness embodied in all these media (like all other such “-ness”’s, if I may speak so) is a thing to be recognized in and of itself by reason. We flirt for a moment with the Theory of Forms, and contemplate for a moment an airy vision of our impressionable youths browsing in the ambience of a beauty affecting all the senses and mediated by reason.

Music-proper now complete, the larger division in the background – the division between music in general and gymnastics – now provides Glaucon and Socrates their next transition, and once again a conventional topic: the proper care of the body. We might stop just long enough to reflect that the discourse has been structured at one moment by the subdivision of its own contents but then at another by the interruptions of Socrates’s two interlocutors, and to all appearances freely and naturally so. The second aspect of nurture, gymnastics, now dovetails neatly with the identity of his interlocutor since it was Glaucon after all who asked for “garnish” and then became enervated with all the delicacies Socrates offered, though immediately thereupon he had quietly acquiesced in the heaping-on of luxuries which in turn caused all the problems it has now devolved upon them to solve. Another dividend has been yielded in the very implementation of the Experiment. Socrates, talking with this same Glaucon, finds himself now in a position to satirize the excessive diets of a luxurious regime and the nursing of disease it leads to; and once he has completed that step he can discover, through recognizing that litigiousness is a sign of corruption and through an interesting distinction between the work of judge and of the doctor, according to which they should *not* both be experienced in the problems it is their job to solve, that in all cases it is soul after all that is in charge of body. Though the doctor may learn something about treating disease by himself becoming sick, the judge would do better to avoid any damage the soul with which he must do his judging! The immediate corollary is that the very background notion they had been depending upon, that music is for the soul and gymnastics is for the body, was never quite right, since the purpose of both disciplines is in truth to establish the proper balance and tension within the soul. We may stop just long enough to observe once again that just as a traditional list can give the argument its structure, the argument it leads to can achieve on its own the authority to turn back upon and emend it, just had Socrates had discovered and deployed an unforeseen division between logos and lexis, above.

The education complete, we may now optimize our choice of guards by testing which of our young graduates are particularly strong of soul and immune to the sort of enervation that Glaucon himself had suddenly displayed at the sight of the simple life, back in Book Two – with tests of daring and fortitude. Socrates now finishes the story with the myth of metals by which the gradations of natural ability they have discovered among their students can be buried from their own consciousness by convincing them that their education was a dream and that it is on the basis of their inborn “metals” that we have assigned them higher and lower roles in our City. He then caps this

preposterous conceit by envisioning the group of them all going forth and finding a proper site for their City, and ushers the guards to their separate camp and their simple beds. In the description of these, the very language that had enervated Glaucon in Book Two returns, and he does fret a little, but Socrates takes a deep breath and brings him over by warning him how easily a person's passions can be aroused by luxury (as indeed Glaucon's had been back in Book Two). Glaucon then roundly acquiesces in the severely moderate regime of the guards. The feverish city has been purged, and the healthy city has been founded!

But there is another brother to convince <BK.4> who now gives voice to his own kind of enervation, admonishing Socrates that he would be liable to ridicule for conceiving of guards that would allow themselves to be so deprived of riches. He avoids confessing these are his own feelings and even feigns they are not, though it becomes plain that they are, from the increasingly concupiscent tone with which he lists the items he blames Socrates for keeping from them. Socrates immediately agrees – as usual! – but reminds him that it is not for the guards that they are making the City (though the young men's identification with the guards in the fictional experiment *is* after all the mechanism by which they are learning and accepting self-improvement, as we have just seen in the case of Glaucon). Wealth does indeed divide a city, and we need unity to make our experiment complete. The quality of the education is the lynchpin of the entire enterprise, as Adeimantus himself had insisted in his big speech and had agreed during the discussion about poetry – but now we see Adeimantus agreeing a little too adamantly. He has little tolerance for persons that become enervated easily and shows a puritanical streak of his own, which Socrates notices and tries to humor into toleration, with little success. It is as much Adeimantus's mood that is being dealt with as it is the finishing touches of the City.

But now it is complete – the final details for instance concerning family organization can be left to others – and it is time for the young men to find justice in it. Socrates acts as if he will leave this part up to Glaucon and Adeimantus, but Glaucon calls him back and thereby becomes the interlocutor once again. “But Socrates, you *promised* to do all you could!” – and so he continues. The movement forward is provided by another background list, the four cardinal virtues: wisdom, bravery, temperance, and justice. Socrates proposes a strangely front-loaded method. If we can find where the city's wisdom is, and where its bravery and where its moderation, and then pick those parts out, the just part we are seeking will be the remainder. The logic of this method is just as questionable as was that of the method of the large letters, but beggars can't be choosers, and the brothers again express no qualms. First of all, we can surely say that wisdom resides in the rulers who have the education to provide good counsel, and bravery in the guards at large. But moderation is different for it permeates the entire City (vitiating the method of course, since if modesty is everywhere it can't be pulled out – but nobody notices). And now where is justice? After some beating around the bush it occurs to them that it consists of the parts of the city keeping to their own roles just as they had required the craftsmen to do so early on in the construction of the simple City!

Socrates is not worried about the validity of this argument but only its potential, once it is hypothesized, to explain the soul, which had been the goal of the construction all along, once the young men could be calmed down and attuned enough to appreciate it. To this he will now turn, but immediately there is a problem. If justice in the City is a matter of its several “parts” or groups agreeing to recognize each other's integrity, the soul must itself have parts in order that the justice within it could be that sort of agreement within! This peculiar focus on “parts of soul” requires Socrates (more accurately, it provides him an occasion) to investigate with Glaucon whether the soul does have parts, but of course it will be with, or within, or through all or part of their souls that they will conduct this investigation! Socrates immediately wakens the reason in Glaucon (and in us), both with an extremely abstract argument from the Law of Non-contradiction, and with a prophylactic exercise against captious sophistry, so that he can go on to present a purely rational articulation of the structure of desire. Once these two aspects of soul have been divided from each other it becomes

easy to distinguish a willful and spirited third aspect, distinct from each, and so now we have three parts, which we must next try to square up with the three parts of the City that we constructed. Once the rulers are likened to the rational part and the soldiers to the willful one, we have only to realize that the rest of the soul, that lives from day to day with its desires, corresponds to the workers that provide the goods and services.

This hurdle passed, the great question is now prepared: What would justice be, in the soul? If as in the City it is the parts minding their own proper business, then justice would consist of the rational part of the soul, which by nature rules as we have just undergone seeing in the previous argument, managing the rest of soul with the aid of the spirited soldierly part. Reason and spirit will be harmonized by the musical and gymnastic education – a still finer application for that traditional scheme of education than we had seen before though we had learned at least that it is all for the soul – and together these two parts will hold the passions at bay and even enslave if necessary lest freed these should foolishly overturn the entire order of the soul.

The conclusion has not been shown to be necessary. The argument and its methodology are a house of cards held in place partly by luck. But it is a stunningly convincing conclusion because of the way our souls (the soul of Glaucon and ours as well) have been prepared for it by the highly rational exercise in dividing the soul, the moral of which is tantamount to the same thing: that reason is truly the criterion of the soul. Justice, we can aver from the now vivid and vigorous center of ourselves, is an entirely personal and inward matter, the triumph of reason over the blind parts of the self. In case some part of us feels a little vertigo and cavils over our conclusion, some vulgar proofs can be added in corroboration (and they are), but the glorious truth is that we have found the order within ourselves, unaffected by the behavior of others. As for our treatment of those others, Glaucon now makes the clinching argument, using indeed the very argument-form Socrates had used to shame him for his bashful hope that untrained citizens could step in as soldiers, the argument from contraries. How could we, who worry that life would be unlivable if our bodies were vitiated, allow our treatment of others to ruin “the part of ourselves that is harmed by vice and benefitted by virtue?”

A height has been reached but <BK.5> the rest of the group, suddenly spurred on by Polemarchus and seconded by Adeimantus, will bring the two of them back down, on the pretext that Socrates had not adequately explained the community of wives and children, a point that he had passed by in *praeteritio*, an hour earlier, to which nobody there objected. We must remember that living the life of the soul, like conversing with Socrates, though always attractive and edifying, can and will be tolerated only in limited doses. Indeed, it is to the credit of the Athenians that they tolerated the admonitions of Socrates for seventy years! Always and continually men prefer to return to the “normal” world for relief. But now this “normal” world into which we would escape from the pressure of inward awareness reveals itself, in a height of paradox, to be exactly the *public* world, the only world into which we can escape from *ourselves*! It is an unexpected corollary of the insight about the soul we just reached with Glaucon and Socrates, that politics and its range of virtues and vices, which provide a more comfortable range of human hope and despair since the heights are not so high nor likewise the lows so low, has now come into view as the realm not of reality and sunlight but of oblivion an escape into a conspiracy of blindness.

There is no surprise then that the motion put forth by Polemarchus and Adeimantus, that they go back to the details about the imaginary City, becomes unanimous in the blink of an eye. The event that has the greatest dramatic importance is that even Glaucon joins in, so that Socrates must return to the City-construct even though it is patent to anybody who has understood the previous discussion that the City is now a “ladder thrown away.” The detour that the group suddenly requires him to make is not fatally erroneous – it is not a return into the cave or a turning back into Sheol. In fact, the theoretical medium of the ideal City is plastic and forgiving, especially in Socrates’s hands. As usual he feigns to agree with the objection, and now takes up the task of justifying the ideal picture against the

scandals that the conventional outlook has complacently put in his path, the threat to which was the main reason for Polemarchus's interruption, aided by the seductive distraction of a prurient curiosity about sexual matters. Glaucon, by luck (that is, by Plato's design), will be his interlocutor, and the movement and course of the coming phase of the discussion between them will be to stem the tide of the mob's stupid laughter, and re-establish the commitment to reason that had been reached before, within Glaucon at least, allowing it to take them wherever it might lead.

Glaucon enjoys the idealistic play at policy-making and moves right through the paradoxes at Socrates's side (and so will we, if Plato is to succeed); but the enjoyment of this dreamy stroll, as well as an occasional flash of theoretical vertigo, remind him of the pragmatic problem, the problem of realizability. Socrates goes on undaunted and requires Glaucon finally to put his foot down: "If I let you go on you will never get to the question whether all this is feasible!" But even as he says this he himself indulges in more ideal imaginings, at first in *praeteritio* (and even then too long for that), and resolutely stops *himself* so as to require Socrates finally to face the question. For once Socrates fights back: "The pressure is not really upon *me*: let me remind you this whole construction was designed to discover the nature of justice so that whatever result we might reach about the City, that result would redound as an incumbency upon *you* as an individual to act upon! As such we do not need to know if our City is realizable but whether our construction is correct enough to have yielded a vision of justice. Besides, words will always be truer than deeds, regardless of what people say!"

This is the final dividend of the thought-experiment into which the brothers acquiesced back in Book Two. If Socrates would provide them a safe medium in which to project an inquiry concerning their personal problems, the results of that inquiry must be allowed to redound back onto them as participants in the experiment. The chickens have come home to roost. Wonderfully, and once again, Glaucon does rise to the occasion and takes the next step upward, as he had at the end of Book Three, a step up and back to a radical reliance on reason and the world it knows, in the face of such cavils as Polemarchus and any crowd will fabricate on the barest of pretexts.

But Socrates does not leave it there. Once Glaucon has taken this step he serves him up an even greater paradox than the ones Polemarchus and Adeimantus had served upon him, a paradox that has nothing to do with those scandals of theirs but rather turns them on their heads. Either the Polemarchus's of this world, if they yearn for politics, must become philosophers, or philosophers – persons, that is, who have made the choice Glaucon has just made – must become the Polemarchus's of this world. Glaucon's choice to drop his dodge of pragmatism has now saddled him with an incumbency to bear witness to his own rationality in the face of the world, a world that will ridicule him at first, but kill him if necessary – a thing that Glaucon knows, just as he knows it places him into the same small boat as Socrates, and decides to take it on nevertheless: "They will come at you with brickbats but I will fight at your side!"

Plato has the others remain silent at the moment this great paradox is introduced, just as he allows Glaucon and Socrates to ignore them. For they have work to do, namely to decide what this philosopher is – how he is different from the persons around him and how this difference requires that he be their leader. The wisdom-lover they have in mind is not to be confused with those types that gad about chasing down spectacles but, if spectacle it must be, those who pursue the spectacle of truth. Their desire for the *real* truth enables them to recognize it resides not in the many versions that fleetingly embody it, but in the common original these versions fleetingly embody, while the other persons around them are satisfied to repeat their passing brushes with real truth as long as these take place in different venues, and not only cannot follow the discussion about an original beyond them but also resist any mention of such a thing. They are not ignorant, for they keep coming back; and yet they lack real knowledge since they refuse the communion with the invisible truth beyond. We must identify this middling state of consciousness as *opinion* and call them not lovers of wisdom, philosophers, but philodoxers, lovers of doxa or opinion – a new term that our identification of the philosophical

orientation as a love that is higher has enabled us to coin. A person with such a large view, [BK.6](#) assuming he is not deficient in practical knowledge, would surely have the insight and the greatness of soul and clarity about what is truly valuable that he could rule over others, to the point that even Momus, the god of mumbling censure, could find no fault in him!

Glaucon and Socrates have reached another theoretical climax, as they had at the end of Book Four and at the end of Book Three – and again they are brought down by an interruption, once again by Adeimantus. To say the philosopher is beyond Momus only tempted Momus, after all, and Adeimantus, who had worried in his long speech how one might make his way to the heights of eminence, now plays Momus himself, employing his usual indirection by imagining “somebody” disagreeing, not only with what Socrates has said but also with what he has been doing. “Your way of conversing could lead a person absolutely anywhere; but if you just will stop talking and open your eyes and look around you, you will see that philosophers are weirdoes if not utter scoundrels, and that even the best of men who become philosophical become useless in politics.”

Of course Socrates agrees with his interlocutor, this time in order to buy an opportunity to introduce an image. The philosopher is like a ship's captain as he is seen by the sailors in the boat. Although seafaring is one of the most dangerous of cooperative human endeavors, the sailors are foolish enough to think there is no science of navigation but only aspire to seize the helm and “take charge” though they are unqualified to do so. In their ignorance, all they see at the helm is a man deaf to their scuttlebutt, looking off to the stars and to all appearances blind to the immediate world around him,. This unattractive image of the imprudent mob separates the disdainful Adeimantus from the imaginary objector he was just now hiding behind and requires him to engage once more in the kind of conversation with Socrates that his own imaginary interlocutor had just mischaracterized as misleading. At the same time, the style of Socrates's subsequent questions becomes more elevated, in a way that might just flatter that penchant for elevated talk that Adeimantus had shown in Book Four. Yes, the philosopher is useless but this is because the mob has no use for him; yes, the would-be philosophical types are crude logic-choppers but this is because they are tinkering interlopers seeking to appropriate her high reputations to themselves, not truly philosophical but only trying to appear so; and yes, many of the better types who have philosophical ability become corrupted, but it is not by the sophistical teachers their parents both hire and blame, but by the seduction of the mob whose moods and desires even these sophists play servant to. It is the seduction of celebrity that is the true problem, a seduction that compels even the parents of the young and gifted to turn them away from contemplation and curry favor among the mob and the world of action and power! Short of divine intervention, only the hobbled and lame can hope to persist in a life of philosophy!

In the midst of all this pother of high indignation we should not fail to notice that the true motive of a parent's mendacious acquiescence in the use of wisdom poetry has in passing been finally been revealed, and it is the same motive as his own motive for corruption. It is a motive he shares with his parents in their use of wisdom poetry in his upbringing. In truth he has no brief with the blamelessly virtuous philosopher that Glaucon and Socrates had described but has only envy that such a person has succeeded to evade the seduction of attempting to “climbing the heights to eminence,” and in the subsequent conversation it is envy that Socrates identifies as the reason people are skeptical about the possibility of philosophical rule, a kind of envy that Adeimantus must himself now overcome.

The introduction of the philosophical orientation required in the ruler was brought on by Socrates's challenge to Glaucon in Book Five that he drop all reliance on a world of deeds and join Socrates in the truer world of thinking. It was then carried through in the discussion with Adeimantus, where his own sense of shame for choosing the world of deeds over words was exposed as the reason for his objection to the philosophers as well as his complaint against his father and the wisdom poetry. Tactfully, Socrates now turns the glaring light away from Adeimantus and focusses it back onto

the “neutral” theoretical medium of the ideal City. Now that they have come to inherit from the ensuing argument *philosophical* rulers for the ideal City that he and Adeimantus had rounded out back in Book Four, they must find the education that will make their rulers so. We had so far managed to choose the proper natures and give them the proper nurture in music and gymnastics, but beyond nature and nurture there is science, another of the great background lists in the Greek thought-vocabulary. This most powerful and important study, which philosophy will enable them to pursue and which will ensure they have values true and secure enough that they can rule the city correctly, is of course the study of The Good, but what is the good?

Adeimantus acts as if he has no inkling what this Good might be and admonishes Socrates that the group will not let him leave without solving the problem. Socrates’s reply is uncharacteristically abrasive: we saw him adopt such a tone once before, with Glaucon, in the last Book. Surely Adeimantus knows the problem well and needs not rely so heavily upon Socrates. The good cannot be pleasure since some pleasures are bad, and it cannot be knowledge since the value of knowledge would have to be in its knowledge of the good. All other putative goods are good only if and when they share in its goodness. Moreover though men might be satisfied to be apparently just, or satisfied to possess apparent beauty, they are not satisfied to have what is only apparently good but demand no less than the real and true good. After all this problematizing of his, Adeimantus once again presses him for his own personal answer and now Socrates loses his patience. “What am I to do with this fellow?” he asks nobody in particular. Adeimantus ups the ante still further and insists Socrates *divulge* the answer – since after all he has spent his whole life studying this question (echoing his taunt from Book Two). It does not occur to Adeimantus that the very fact that Socrates has done just this might have something to do with his reluctance to hand him some answer as if it were a matter of information. Socrates could call him back to listen to himself, as Jesus had in his answer to Pilate, “You said it;” but instead he turns on him and demurs to lead him any further: “Why do you press me for some paltry and ignorant answer when you could get a finer answer from somebody else?”

Glaucon does not wait for some retort from Adeimantus but intervenes. He feels Socrates is threatening to quit the conversation! “Proceed as ever you wish, Socrates, and we will follow.” The standoff with Adeimantus has brought Glaucon back on board, and we shall not be hearing from Adeimantus again for quite a while. Socrates now offers to speak about the Good, if he may risk doing so with an image, for now he has an interlocutor who is enthusiastic enough to risk making a mistake rather than being too skeptical for his own good. Before beginning he states his hope not only that he can articulate it but also that Glaucon and the others can take it in and not be misled, for it is an image only. It is like the prayer we hear at the beginning of a sermon, or the prayer we ourselves are told to make when we take up the Bible!

This ultimate object of knowledge, the Good, he now suggests, stands to all other knowledge as the Sun stands to the world around us, as both the sustainer of that world, the reason that it is as it is, and as the cause of our being able to see it. To take the point further and to the very edge of language, with Glaucon (and ourselves) just keeping up, we may say this: Just as the world around us consists of real objects and also their shadows or mere images, so in the realm of knowledge and truth there are the true objects we must come to grasp as ever we can, and also another sort of mental entities that are somehow mere images of them. We must not tarry with these latter, lodged though they are in our minds, or seek to make a system of them, but break through them, back and up to the originals that inspired them, of which they are mere images, just as the philosopher in Book Five desired to pass beyond the series of spectacles to a vision of the truths they all transiently embodied, one after the other.

The world we actually live in <BK.7> can be seen as a whole to exhibit this structure, with the political or socially constructed world within which Polemarchus at that moment at least had wanted to confine us being like a cave darkly lit, in which men live and stare and utter names, unable to turn

around and see where things have come from but consigned instead to trying to make a system of these derivative and secondary images showing as shadows on a wall. If you could force one of these prisoners to turn around and lead him back and up and out, how will he react? He will resist at first, but slowly as he is brought out of the cave his eyes will adjust to the light of day and he will behold for once the original world of which those mere derivatives had barely resembled at all, so far cut off from their source that the only kind of sense the prisoners can try to make of them had to consist of predicting the patterns of their relationships with each other rather than their derivation from the original identities they dimly reflect. Next, have this man return to the cave. How laughable he will be, at first, as his eyes again must now adjust to the dark and he can not yet even make out the shadows that all the others count as the real. When once they do adjust, how paltry and pitiable he will see their world to be! He will try out of fellow feeling to tell them about the other world above, of which their cherished world is in truth but a shadow. He knows they will not understand at first – neither did he, as his eyes were adjusting to the light – and so he will persevere any way he can to bring them along. But as he persists their ridicule will escalate until it crosses the line and become violent. In the end they will contrive to kill him, according to the benighted procedures of their den.

This message had already been broached, in the ascent of Book Four to the vision of inward virtue. The message had indeed met with resistance, first from Polemarchus and then the rest of the company. As for this higher truth, Glaucon already saw a version of it in the distinction Socrates drew, later in Book Five, between philosophy and the “philodoxy” that cannot and will not see beyond the familiar version to the original whose cognition is sustained by thought alone. What has now been brought into focus by Socrates’s argument about the Good and the Sun is that that world of originals is the cause of the world of appearances around us, that as its cause it guarantees that this other world we live in makes whatever sense it does, and that by some upward, backward path of thought we may be able to ascend to it, while to refuse to turn around and do this is to adopt the pattern to which men and society are at present and perennially enslaved, a pattern of life where men would prefer to vie with each other in ignorance and for stakes whose value is in the end illusory, and where nevertheless if these facts should be brought to “public” attention the mass will sooner kill the messenger than seek to escape the prison of illusions they enable each other to share.

The alternative is the upward path, which Socrates and Glaucon already began to take, after Adeimantus fell out of the conversation, and now continue to take together, by a process they have already called discussion, dialogue, dialectic. In truth even that beginning – the image of the Sun as the Good – was a resumption of their conversation at the end of Book Five, which itself was a resumption of the conversation with which they ended Book Four. All these conversations have moved upward because every time their inquiry encountered the dictates of mind, they followed the dictate rather than shirking it or backing off.

It is time now to try that path still further and show what reason can do by doing it. Once again a background list structures the argument, the quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and harmonics, which became canonical in future centuries but was probably rather new in Plato’s time. In the present inquiry however these separate studies will be made to stand in as media for the mental activity of dialectic, which, we have heard, starts not with assumptions and subject matters but with thoughts, and moves through thoughts to thoughts. Through discussion Socrates and Glaucon find a new use for these subjects, that they can be practiced for purposes beyond their ken. Arithmetic, for instance, is the study of numbers and their relations, but what is a number after all? Merely to get things going Socrates recommends the study of arithmetic for the guards since it will be useful in war, but when they move on to geometry and Glaucon offers the same argument Socrates disallows it, for they learned in the case of arithmetic that the true value of it was in the logic of distinguishing one number from the other rather than in some application. And no sooner does Glaucon recognize the sequence of studies Socrates is recommending as being the quadrivium, than Socrates requires him to revise that course of studies by inserting stereometry in between the second and the third studies

since it makes no sense to study the heavenly bodies in motion before you have mastered the study of three-dimensional body *per se* – this even though the very field of solid geometry does not as yet exist! We meet again but now with more explicit awareness the loose and tentative role played by background lists in Books Two and Three: the argument they enable may well sublate them! As for the next study, the celestial study of astronomy, what makes it divine is not the “elevation” of the objects studied but a “higher” understanding of them that would recognize the supra-material patterns which they only embody.

As they move on to acoustics, the last of the hypothesized four, Glaucon has become exhausted and wishes to be spared the effort of going through another sublation, and being jerked vertiginously upward and backward all over again. Now he wants Socrates simply to tell him the nature of the science of discussion itself to which this review had been presented as a preliminary; but dialectic is the very thing they have been employing. It is tantamount to a request that they stop engaging in dialectic in order to describe it, a virtual contradiction in terms! His request is like the impatient demand Adeimantus had made an hour earlier, but it is out of fatigue rather than importunity and impatience that he makes it.

Socrates now redirects the glare of the discussion away from Glaucon, his partner in the high flight of dialectic, the same way he had redirected it away from Adeimantus near the end of Book Six, by reverting once again to the neutral theme of the ideal City, and suggests they complete their discussion of the rulers' higher education. There is now little reason nor even a motive to complete the picture of the City – just as Polemarchus in Book One had little reason or motive to define justice – but with the guidance of Socrates the discussion can still proceed with grace. The main provision to which they now agree is that they postpone the dialectical occupation Glaucon has just found so difficult to a person's full maturity rather than expose the science or method to abuse among the young, as it currently is abused, not in this case for the sake of its reputation (that topic was covered with Adeimantus in Book Six) but for the sake of the young man himself, who is so vulnerable to “misology” during his younger years, if once in captious argument he finds himself orphaned by the reason he had only learned to imitate and is moved to turn against reason itself.

Indeed we have engaged the higher education of the quadrivium only to leave each branch of that new curriculum behind, just as our original argument had left behind its initial original goal of modeling a City when we found justice to reside not within it but beyond it, within the individual. That discovery had met with resistance (at the beginning of Book Five) because in order to gain virtue we had now to abandon the old sense of our identity which in the Cave image have now seen being held and maintained in existence only by the conspiracy of those who resist being selves, vying instead to rival the identity of others by besting them in a game of shadow-boxing (as Cephalus had in his ripe old age become so adept at doing!), and ready to work in harmony only to annihilate a man who tries to lead them out. Given all we have left behind we have also been left with something, namely the guardians speculation upon whose education provided us a model and a medium for discovering the inner landscape of the soul, and what the soul will do with its de-politicized life. Their participation in the state has become irrelevant even to themselves. It is their participation in truth and reality that is their true purpose and fulfillment in life, and that they should succeed to get onto this path in their maturity is what the policy of postponing the dialectical work is meant to ensure. As to the Experiment, we now witness a “withering away” of the theoretical importance of the City betokened in the policy of allowing those few who have proven able to pursue dialectic viably, to serve in its governance only from time to time, for they have discovered things much finer with which to occupy themselves.

Yet, as we next learn <BK.8>, we have not quite exhausted the uses of the Experiment, and soon enough we will be reminded why. The Just City can now for the second time be declared complete, with its corollary about the just soul having been drawn, and we can return to the

continuation of the Experiment that Socrates had proposed at the end of Book Four when Polemarchus interrupted, which perhaps we had forgotten altogether, since the proposal disappeared from view right after it was made. The converse search for the nature of *injustice* in men might likewise be pursued through contemplating the Ideal one topple and cascade downward through a series of inferior constitutional forms. It is not, like before, a search for justice or a project in imaginary policy-making. Rather the narrative will take on the form of an historical fiction, and so to begin this tale Socrates naturally will invoke the Muses – for who else could tell us “How first the glorious aristocracy began to wobble”?

For the occasion the prose rises to an elevated style. It is the Muses who are speaking, and what they say must be true, since they are Muses after all. This high style continues until the narration of the vicious constitutions is complete. The style is “ecphrastic,” emphasizing description instead of action, and is characterized by the agglutination of circumstantial participles; by diction that is allusive, imagistic and astigmatic (as we shall see); and is driven by an new and improvised methodology not unlike that of the original search for justice in the State. We are meant to watch a cascading process by which one constitution loses its staying power and begins to change until it reaches a stopping point where it assumes a new stable state, and then to look back to find these two things in the individual man, how his personality gives way to change and what he turns into. There is no proof that change is or must be stepwise rather than continuous, for state or for man. It is the Muses who are speaking, telling a story of their own, and we are meant to listen rather than ask questions. There can be no stronger indication from an author who wishes to remain anonymous that something new is “going on,” and by now we should be wary enough to watch for what it might be.

The decline of constitutions begins with an indecipherable but authoritative numerical derivation of the so-called nuptial number, consigning to irretrievable obscurity the mechanism by which the Ideal will inevitably fail, one day. Once the decline can begin, the presentation takes on a specific order and form: first the decline of the constitution and then the corresponding decline in the individual soul. In the event, as we shall see, the institutional “history” is foil for the crucial and new theme, the decline of the *personality*. A series of constitutions typified by distinct governmental “arrangements” guides the narration of a series of corresponding family generations each typified by a distinct personal lifestyle. The pattern of the personal states are foreshadowed by the patterns of the succeeding constitutions, but the “internal” mechanism that drives the decline in the case of the men is driven by the dynamics of the relation between father and son. As in real life, the son reacts against failures he perceives in his father and shifts course to compensate for them, but ever-more remote for the true order as the sons come to be, they adopt a course even worse than the fathers’. It is exactly the problem Adeimantus in Book Two had begged Socrates to extricate him from. Appropriately enough, as soon as Socrates starts to narrate to Glaucon the first step in the decline of the *personality*, Adeimantus interrupts with typical rudeness (a disparaging remark about his brother and as usual he is the pot calling the kettle black). Thus he becomes interlocutor once again, and justly it is he who will play witness to the slaughter.

The lesson of the decline, in a nutshell, is that the son is still too young to step up and own his father’s way of life but not old enough to find remedies for what seem to him to be its limitations. In truth we needn’t tarry upon the series of political transformations that severally introduce, foreshadow, and break gently, to Adeimantus and to us, the incremental mutilation of the *personality*. I will present it unvarnished. In the first case, after we hear how the aristocratic regime slips down from loving virtue to loving the reputation of virtue and becomes a timocracy, we are brought to focus on the men: the “aristocratic” father, who is a *philosopher* living in a mediocre state, who no longer has anything to do with politics but has achieved the life of sustainable dialectical study (none other than the dialectician we had trained in Books Seven) and how his son will devolve into a mere “timocrat”. Adeimantus, who has taken over as interlocutor after interrupting a moment ago, eagerly interrupts again: “How? How?” The catalyst, according to Socrates, is this son hearing his mother criticize her a-

political husband, his father, for being *unmanly*. It is hard to imagine an experience of higher psychological potency for an adolescent. Abetted by other counsels he decides to *eclipse* his father by becoming a respectable pillar of the community. But now his treasured self-esteem can become subject to the vagaries of chance and politics. He grows up, and one day he is ruined by shipwreck, meteorological or political, and his son, in turn, who so far had emulated him, is crushed by his father's failure and devotes himself, resolute and resentful, to amassing enough wealth to become immune from such ruin, adopting for himself the showy style of a Persian monarch, out of cynicism and self-recrimination for abandoning his father's higher outlook. As he matures, in turn, this materialist shuns graceful society as too costly and denies own son a finer upbringing as needlessly expensive; but now having nothing better to want, costly desires begin to simmer secretly within him. The son senses the imperfection of his father's affections – both of his love and his prudishness – and now is prey to certain paramours of desire, which he can succeed at least to moderate, by adopting a regime that gives all aspects of life an equal hearing in a "democratical" way. But then in his own son the lower desires only grow stronger <BK.9> and indeed they contrive with a more devilish plan for him. His naïve commitment to the studiously openminded approach that of his father had vouchsafed him enables them one day to capture him with a fearsome erotic addiction that utterly supplants his personality and set up their own regime within his soul. He has become the instrument of the profligate desires that tyrannize him, and now he even lays hands on his own father so that he can pay the piper!

The sequence, presented as I have without the intervening political transformations, which function both as relief from the appalling stages of the self's decline and as prelude or foreshadowing of the next step is continually nothing less than mortifying. I daresay all sons and all fathers will find something ruefully familiar at each and every stage. The overarching theme is that fathers are imperfect but that their sons are even more so and it would do well for sons somehow to find ways to adopt what their fathers teach them without resentment for its imperfections and find a way to make more of it rather than less – the very goal that Cephalus had announced for himself (as a financial plan, at least) back in Book One. In addition to the primary lesson that only the true and orderly hierarchy of the soul can in the long run maintain the human personality intact and immunize it from deformation, we have now been regaled with a cautionary warning as to what lies in the future for a person like Adeimantus who still blames his father for his imperfections and hangs around with the likes of Polemarchus, rather than with the likes of Socrates as his brother Glaucon does.

Quietly, at the cold and destitute culmination of this decline, Glaucon resumes the role of interlocutor. For the first time the switch occurs without immanent dramatic motivation or justification, but perhaps we will have recognized that Adeimantus has now learned as much as he can, or will, or deserves to learn, at this stage. Glaucon and Socrates, on the other hand, now have the rest of their work to do, to *compare*, that is, the just man's life with that of the unjust man and make a *judgment* as to which is happier, as Glaucon had required Socrates to do back in Book Two, seconded there by Adeimantus. But now the criteria of "judgment" itself must be stipulated. In the course of two or three pages the vocabulary of κρίσις is used twice as many times as it is in the rest of the Platonic corpus! Glaucon's story of Gyges in Book Two, and his slaughter of the just man there, were there formulated as visual images so as to make the judgment easy, but Socrates now advises him that it is only by viewing what is going on *inside* the man – a viewing which after all has been the greatest burden of the intervening discussion first to introduce and then to articulate and fill out in the most vivid detail possible – that the *true* judgment can be made. Three arguments ensue that prove in three ways that the tyrannized soul is least happy and the philosophical the happiest, and the proofs, as we might expect, engage more and more intensely the one part of ourselves that alone commands the true criterion of making a true judgment, the λογιστικόν. Finally, and again, as in Book Four, even the realm of pleasure or desire is made to yield to the analysis of reason, which within the argument is shown alone to be capable to declare that pleasure after all is in large part illusory. By a powerful and

climactic image of the life submerged in the delusion of animal pleasure we are suddenly brought back to that pigsty of the luxurious city Glaucon had unwittingly brought upon himself, though now it is a phantasmagoria in which beasts, not humans are sitting at the tables he had asked for, eating as if at a trough and raping each other and butting each other, armed with the metal weapons they acquired when an army became necessary. The corollary of their inability to gauge the true value of things is that men vie with and envy each other over distinctions that make not real but merely seeming difference, as we saw them do in the Cave. Reason, conversely, has now won such a total victory that even the degree to which the good man is happier than the tyrannical one can be expressed by a number. By a partly specious proportionalization of appearance and reality concatenated with the number of phases in the decline, the philosophic soul is argued to be 3<sup>6</sup>, or 729, times happier than the tyrannized one. The lofty calculation is then empirically corroborated by a most telling existential observation, that two persons feel the difference in their happiness not only during the day but during the night also, not just every day of the year but every day and night ( $729 \approx 365 \times 2$ ). The tyrant's life is a waking nightmare!

With this arithmetical conceit, ringing the conceit of the nuptial number with which the Muses' narrative of the Decline began, the determination of the question is complete. Socrates now invites Glaucon to look back at "that fellow" who had suggested at the beginning that injustice is better than justice if only you can get away with it. They have come so far he can refer to him in the third person though it is Glaucon himself he is talking about! Let us give him an image to contemplate, and see what he would say, an image of the tripartite soul encased in a covering that outwardly looks like a man. The three parts are envisioned in the image as a many-headed hydra representing the desires, a lion representing the spirited part – but for the rational part he imagines another *man*, a little man within, an invisible man covered along with the other parts by the outer bodily form of a man. It is an image by which the reason is identified with the conscience: the conscience is "who we are" whether anybody sees us or not. The image inverts, therefore, Glaucon's original image of Gyges and his invisibility! And now Glaucon takes to scolding the man that thought injustice could be good, on the grounds that he is betraying that inner man and saying in effect that it is better for him to be enslaved by the hydra than to be its master and find a way to calm it down. The image is corroborated by conventional attitudes about virtue, as was the radically "internal" definition of justice at the end of Book Four. We can even say, if we were to put the ultimate point onto it, as we did at that point also, that it would be better to be enslaved to the principle of reason, or to a rational man for that matter, than to become the rabid tyrant that Thrasymachus had sought to dangle before our eyes! Rather he will prefer the true "politics" of the soul that takes place within, and subordinate all other pursuits to maintenance of that order, just as the man in the simple city allowed his family neither to become too large nor too small. Glaucon grants this sort of man will have rejected the political life (the life Polemarchus sought to defend with his bullying objection at Book Five), but now Socrates will not even allow him to call that the political life: the true politics is the politics within the soul!

For a second or third or fourth or fifth time Glaucon and Socrates have reached a high vantage point, as Socrates had called it at the end of Book Four, and their excess of insight now enables them <BK.10> to elaborate and rectify their outlook on two other matters they had discussed in the earlier conversation: the dangers of poetry, which now can receive a fuller treatment since they have refined their understanding of the parts and internal dynamics of the soul, and a straightforward treatment of the question of rewards and penalties for unjust and just living, which for the sake of Glaucon's theoretical experiment had been hypothetically inverted.

The tradition has been scandalized by "Plato's" criticism of poetry, but it is not Plato's. It is Socrates-and-Glaucon's, and what justifies it is the conclusion to which they have just agreed, for the second time in fact, that the health of the soul is the one condition upon which all other happiness in life depends. Once this is seen, the very picture of listening to a poet talking about the lives of others pales before the prospect of finding and living the order of the soul within one's own. The warning

against poetry culminates in a sickening passage in which Socrates illustrates, with a virtual quotation, that reminds me of Adeimantus's young man arguing against himself in Book Two, of an argument the λογιστικόν might bring itself to make, under the seductive power of the poet's work, in order to persuade its own inferior, the proud and willful part of the soul, to allow it to enjoy watching the poetic depiction of viciousness, on the grounds that the vice is the character's not mine and I do myself no harm to enjoy watching it. It is not the truth or falsity of the argument but the part of us that finds itself making it that matters.

As to the second topic, Glaucon now agrees to pay back the loan that Socrates had made to him when he "lent" him the perverse conceptions that justice might be punished and injustice rewarded. Now in turn Glaucon will give Socrates an opportunity to place our conduct during this life into the largest perspective of truth and reality, the perspective of the sempiternal existence of souls returning to this life to live a life they choose in Hades, a choice they make according to the condition of their souls. Socrates interrupts the astounding report of Er to admonish Glaucon one last time that the only worthwhile study in life is the study that keeps the soul in order, an admonition from which all readers of Plato or any other author and even those who read nothing, can truly stand to profit.

This summary of the plot is completely new, though it is plainly a weave of the oldest of human themes with almost nothing novel in it. It is a story that stands on its own as great, and justifies the reputation the work has accrued to itself. I have tried not to allow the prevailing opinions and confusions about the plot affect or warp my recounting, and have resisted to justify the steps of the account with footnotes citing the passages and interpretations of individual words upon which alone it depends as a whole. That, after all, is the work of the commentary appended hereunder.

Still I should indicate at least the scale of my departure from both the traditional and the scholarly interpretations one will encounter elsewhere. I have found the critique of poetry in Book Ten entirely justified if only one grant the premise that the order of his soul is the only value truly necessary and truly feasible for man to protect' I have found the constitutions in Books Eight and Nine to be mere foil for the painful narration of how the personal soul declines, but Aristotle already had taken them as a serious enough version of Plato's actual beliefs about political history to criticize them for failing in accuracy. I have taken the run-through of the new quadrivium of studies in Book Seven to be an exercise by which Socrates teaches Glaucon to see what dialectic is, the continual sublation of all assumptions, as he had just presented it to him in theory at the end of Book Six, but many think it presents Plato's curriculum at "The Academy," and even that the guardians are figured as future students to be taught by him there. As to the utopian scheme of Book Five with its community of women and radical eugenics, the entire tradition has taken it to show just how far gone an idealist Plato could be, but I have found that it is Socrates's *ad hoc* attempt to recall Glaucon to the level of self-awareness – idealistic if you will since the self is invisible – that he had reached at the end of Book Four just before Polemarchus and Adeimantus tried to bring the discussion back down to practical politics. I have taken the long treatment of poetry in Books Three and Two to be Socrates's technique of showing Adeimantus he is able to take responsibility for what poetry should be like, if it is to be for the sake of bringing up children, rather than merely criticizing his parents; but almost all others have heard Plato giving free hand to an obsessive and quirky puritan attitude of his own about poetry in general. Most extreme of all perhaps, I have seen Glaucon's objection to the simple life of the "trace of a City" in Book Two as the expression of a deep moral error on his part (an error for which he will in fact apologize in Book Three, as we shall see) rather than to be a completely justified plea for the rudiments of sophisticated living that any decent person would make, as every scholar known to me has taken it to be. The whole thing really got started by my sense that the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of Book Two are sincere confessions of troubled young men with very specific personal traits that are flawed but representative. As to the much-discussed methodology of

Socrates's proposals to build a City in Thought, and of his approach to the soul having parts, and on the relation of the parts to the parts of the state, I skirt the issue entirely. It is the result that matters, in each case, and Socrates's problem is to keep the headstrong and confused brothers in the game, not to pass muster with eavesdropping logicians of future centuries who have no stake in the argument – continually to divert the discussion into a safe harbor within they might feel comfortable to present their best ideas before having to live up to them. It is only in Book Five that Socrates finally requires them to take responsibility for themselves, to allow their construction to reflect back upon themselves and dictate their behavior, and even then it is only one of them, Glaucon, that he asks. When later he tries it with Adeimantus he fails – or rather, Adeimantus does.

For Plato's dialogical endeavor to succeed, his Reader must come to feel enough of a stake in what is being discussed and the way it is being discussed, and must identify with the interlocutors and their mission intimately enough and with enough urgency, that he feels no urgency to grasp for a private and critical though entirely imaginary relationship with the anonymous and invisible author of the conversation. When the primary fictional scenario fails – and it is an index of Plato's high and severe calling that it fails far more often than it does in our reading of Shakespeare, the Reader finds himself wondering what Plato is doing, and he will find in the world of Plato scholarship a haven of fellow wonderers among whom he can now choose his favorite. What keeps their discussion alive is that their different theories cannot all be true, so that they can distinguish themselves from each other, while at the same time there so little evidence for or against any of them that they will never be refutable. In such a context, a Karl Popper might say that it counts for something that a complete account can be given without any reference to their work – my work here being the witness.

It is a pity that the precipitate of this secondary conversation finds its way into the expert Introductions that are placed before the Translations, diverting the non-professional Reader from his own fresh access to Plato's text, spoiling him for instance with notion that he can get behind the scenes and be inoculated against being led down the garden path by Socrates, as Adeimantus says in Book Six, while in truth such guidance places the Reader unbeknownst into something like a cave, puzzling over shadows of what he should instead be enabled, let alone allowed, by the ensuing Translation to see straight on.

## REPUBLIC BOOK ONE

(327) Socrates speaks directly to us,<sup>11</sup> telling us that yesterday he went down<sup>12</sup> to Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston<sup>13</sup> to pay homage to the goddess,<sup>14</sup> but at the same time<sup>15</sup> planning to take in the spectacle<sup>16</sup> of the festival since it was being done for the first time. The contribution of the Athenians was beautiful, but the Thracian contribution was no less appropriate.<sup>17</sup> Having done their homage and their viewing<sup>18</sup> they made off for the city,<sup>19</sup> when they were seen from behind by Polemarchus the son of Cephalus who told his slave to run up to them and tell<sup>20</sup> them to wait for him. The slave ran up and grabbed Socrates by the coat to tell them that Polemarchus told them to wait for him. Socrates turned around to see where his master<sup>21</sup> was, and some clever repartee ensues:

“Look!”<sup>22</sup> says the slave, “Here he comes. Just<sup>23</sup> stay put.”

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<sup>11</sup> Since Socrates is always addressing us even when reporting what he said to his interlocutors “yesterday,” I have adopted the orthographic protocol of omitting quote marks around his remarks to his interlocutors, as well as around what he says to us only.

<sup>12</sup>κατέβην (327A1): Though the downward direction will later be used as a metaphor for descent into an inferior place (the Cave of Book Seven) one overreads to find it so here. To characterize the entire “evening” as a descent is wrong: the dialogue is a triumph. It is true that the Piraeus area is a less pleasant place than Athens for all the reasons that port towns can be, but what is downward about going there is that going to the seashore is always down just as going from shore to land is upward, as witness the title of Xenophon’s *Anabasis*. The visible horizon is always higher than the ground we stand on.

<sup>13</sup>Ariston (A1) is also the father of Adeimantus (C2 and 388A) – and also of Plato. His family, as well as that of Plato’s mother Perictione, trace their roots far back into Athenian history.

<sup>14</sup>τῇ θεῷ (A2): He does not tell us which. At the end of Book One (354A11) we learn it is Bendis, about whom little is known except that perhaps she is a Thracian goddess and that the Thracians in Piraeus were encouraged by the Athenians and joined by the Piraeans to celebrate their goddess there. Socrates’s lack of specificity implies that Bendis is “the Goddess of Piraeus.”

<sup>15</sup> τε ... καί (A2) invites us to compare the two participles it links (προσευξάμενος and βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι), as if they were a pair.

<sup>16</sup> θεάσασθαι (A3).

<sup>17</sup>The different motives, to pay homage and to enjoy the spectacle, correspond to the different grounds for praise: beauty and propriety. By answering his μέν not with δέ but with μέντοι and a litotes Socrates both avoids the invidium of pitting the Thracians against the Athenians and also suggests that the beauty of the Athenian contribution was fitting and the propriety of the Thracian contribution was beautiful.

<sup>18</sup>προσευξάμενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες (B1): Instead of saying, “When it was finished we left”, he repeats the two motives, and in the original order. The absence of chiasm—the “apodotic” chiasm of before and after if I may so style it (cf. nn. 161, 982, 1278, 2556, 2685, 2698, 4136, and 417A6-7, 464B6)—is more noteworthy than its presence would have been.

<sup>19</sup>τὸ ἄστυ (B1), strictly the fortified part of Athens, Athens-proper as opposed to its suburbs, reminding us that Piraeus is a mere appendage of a city.

<sup>20</sup>κελεύειν used twice (B3,4): Polemarchus will have his slave talk to Socrates and Glaucon in the same manner he talks to his slave.

<sup>21</sup>αὐτός (B6) includes the sense *ipse* (your master), but also has the force of challenging the slave to point out the person told him to tell them, i.e., “Where’s the teller himself if it’s not you?” or, “And where is he?”

<sup>22</sup>The slave’s οὗτος (B6) is cheeky.

<sup>23</sup>The slave’s ἀλλά (B7) is impertinent and suggests if anything that he is treated harshly by

"Stay put<sup>24</sup> we shall," says Glaucon, and soon enough Polemarchus arrives with Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon,<sup>25</sup> and some others, coming from the parade, and he says, "I would reckon you're setting off for the city,<sup>26</sup> as if you were leaving the Piraeus?"

And<sup>27</sup> you'd reckon right, Socrates replies.

"You do see how many of us there are?"

How couldn't I?

"So if you do,<sup>28</sup> you've got to prove stronger than these,<sup>29</sup> or else stay where you are."

So there isn't a third alternative: that we might persuade you that we ought to be going?

"Could you really persuade people who won't listen?"

"No way," says Glaucon.

"So take it that we won't be listening and act accordingly."<sup>30</sup>

(328) "What?<sup>31</sup> You don't know there's going to be a horseback torch race for the goddess?" Adeimantus asks, interrupting Polemarchus's tough treatment and turning to persuasion instead, not Socrates persuading them that he ought to leave but they, first Adeimantus and then Polemarchus, persuading him that he might want to stay. The torch race will be a novelty<sup>32</sup> and besides<sup>33</sup> Polemarchus chimes in, a vigil worth taking in,<sup>34</sup> and a dinner before it, where there will be a lot of young people and dialogue.

"So stay and don't do otherwise," Polemarchus concludes.<sup>35</sup>

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Polemarchus.

<sup>24</sup>By repeating ἀλλά (B7) Glaucon acquiesces to the slave's command with a hint of mockery.

<sup>25</sup>And therefore the son of Ariston and the brother of Plato. From *Apol.*34A2 we learn he is enough older than Plato to act as his guardian.

<sup>26</sup>ἄστυ (C5), again, renewing the distinction between the real city and the suburb.

<sup>27</sup>γάρ (C6).

<sup>28</sup>τοίνυν (C9) as if to draw a conclusion Socrates could have drawn for himself. Polemarchus wishes to telescope his demand to Socrates.

<sup>29</sup>τούτων (C9): not "us" as above (C7). The threatener exempts himself in order to diminish his responsibility for the threat.

<sup>30</sup>Again with τοίνυν (C14) Polemarchus wishes to introduce his choice as a given fact. His addition of the redundant οὐτώ is like saying "That's that."

<sup>31</sup>ἀρα γε ... οὐδ' ἵστε (328A1): By his choice of particles Adeimantus effects a transition from the threat of force to an attempt to persuade, the alternative Socrates himself had suggested above. His γε feigns a touch of surprise and his δέ a touch of criticism, so as to suggest that the reason to stay is both unsurprising and unquestionably agreeable. Thus his strategy of persuasion, like Polemarchus's threat of force, is to pre-empt disagreement. For pre-emptively critical οὐδέ cf. Cephalus's opening remark to Socrates (328C6, *infra*).

<sup>32</sup>καινόν (A3). Cf. Gildersleeve *ad Justin Martyr Apologia* I.15 (New York, 1877): "νέος of the organic, καινός of the inorganic; νέος of that which grows, καινός of that which is made." Cf. *Phdr.*267B1.

<sup>33</sup>καὶ πρός γε (A6): Polemarchus chimes in with an eager adverbial use of the preposition, as in English we say, "Plus, there'll be a vigil!" For γε adding an unexpected item cf. n.70 *ad* 329D2.

<sup>34</sup>ἄξιον (A7) raises again the moral and esthetic pairings with which Socrates began, πρέπειν / καλόν and προσευξάμενος / θεάσασθαι. Polemarchus is after all trying to persuade Socrates by saying the spectacle is "worthy," but can only say it will be entertaining. In fact as a παννυχίς it will be very costly of time.

<sup>35</sup>ἀλλὰ μένετε (A9), another ἀλλά echoing his slave's ἀλλά (327B7), but now warmly cajoling.

"Stay it seems we must," says Glaucon.<sup>36</sup>

But if that's what seems best, that's what we ought to do, Socrates tells us he said, ending the repartee by acquiescing in the persuasion.

The banter is urbane on the surface but even so it begs the question, Why play at threats? The request for Socrates's presence is always attended by such anxiety and nervousness, whether his old friend Crito is wakening him at the beginning of the *Crito* or his young friend Hippocrates at the beginning of the *Protagoras*. Agathon likewise frets while he waits for Socrates to arrive at his *Symposium* but tries to hide it. In the most general terms the reason is that Socrates is going to be serious and they want to be also, but they are uncertain they can be and are afraid what it might do to them. A person is eager that his better self be acknowledged and engaged, but would rather have it taken for granted than have to reveal it for what it is. Younger people have an easier time being candid and forthright,<sup>37</sup> a large theme in the proem to the *Theaetetus*, where we see that an older person like Theodorus has more face to lose than a younger one, even though at the same time he, like Cephalus whom we are about to meet, can afford to postpone things the least!

### I.A: Arrival and Conversation with Cephalus

They proceed to Polemarchus's home, where they find his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and Thrasyllus the Chalcedonian,<sup>38</sup> Charmantides of Paiania, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonous.

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Reinforcement with μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε sounds dictatorial but Greek usage is exactly the opposite, as when we say, "Don't even think of saying No" or when we say "I insist." It is a formula for *closing* an attempt at persuasion rather than strengthening it.

<sup>36</sup>μενετέον (B2): the verbal adjective depersonalizes the compulsion, maximally.

<sup>37</sup> Losing spirit, becoming despondent and shrinking from the task are common experiences during Socratic investigation, as are their opposites, eagerness, willingness, and sanguinity: *Charm.*156D; *Rep.*450D5-451B1; etc.

<sup>38</sup>The list of names (B4-8) has the form Α τε καὶ Β καὶ δη καὶ Κ καὶ Δ καὶ Ε, with Κ representing Thrasyllus. Commentators, knowing what is coming, read an emotional tone into καὶ δη καὶ that it does not in itself have:

καὶ δη καί introduces the last item of the list at *Phdrs.*274C8-D2 and *Leg.*643B7-C2ff, as if to effect closure. At *Rep.*563E10-4A1 καὶ δη καί [καὶ δη om.AM] introduces the final item, which is also the target of the list. To such use of καὶ δη καί we may compare the addition of δή (but no second κούι) again to effect closure, as at *Crat.*411A7-8; *Leg.*631C1-5 and C5-D1, 661A5-B4, 810E7-8; *Lys.*215D4-7; *Meno* 87E6-7; *Phlb.*50B1-4, 59C2-3; *Rep.*526D2-5, 544C2-7 (with ironic γενναία), 549C8-E1. καὶ δη καί introduces the last item before the generalization at *Leg.*758E4-6 (where this last item is then taken up in the sequel) and at *Rep.*367C7-D2 (which rehearses 357C2-3) and 419A5-10. However, it introduces the second of many items in *Soph.*265C1-3, where the said item is a generalization of the first item (φυτά for ζῷα: cf. Cornford *ad loc.*, pace Campbell). At *Leg.*747A2-5 it effects a transition to the third of four categories of items (arithmetic, geometry, acoustics, kinetics), and at *Leg.*760A7-B1 it introduces what is simply the fifth of six items, and at 917A4-5 the fourth of five. For other instances of categorical transition done with δή cf. *Leg.*679D4-E3; *Parm.*155D6-8 (cf. 142A3-4); *Rep.*373A2-4, 493D2; *Tht.*149D1-3, 156B2-6. Compare use of ἥδη at *Soph.*260C8. At *Tim.*82A8-B2 (καὶ κοῦφα δή) δή signals an abandonment of a balanced μέν / δέ and an extension of the δέ clause instead. At *Leg.*962D10-E9 it is added to an item in order to stop the flow and place an ironical spotlight on the item; and at 967D6-8A1 to cast the light of praise.

The force of καὶ δη καί in the present passage is simply to effect a transition from the first category of persons present at the house, who live there, to the second category, people from the

Cephalus too was home but by himself, “within.”<sup>39</sup> Socrates was struck how very old he seemed, but after all he had not in fact laid eyes on him for some time.<sup>40</sup> There he was, sitting on a padded couch, just finished conducting a sacrifice and still wearing his chaplet. The couch was flanked by chairs set in semicircles, and so the company sat down with him.<sup>41</sup>

As soon as Cephalus sees Socrates he both greets him with a hug and scolds him. “Can’t you ever make it down here, sometimes?<sup>42</sup> You really ought to.” Again Socrates starts in the red. “If it were still convenient<sup>43</sup> for me to come to you I would, but old age has its ravages and so you should make your way down<sup>44</sup> to the Piraeus instead.” Although his bodily desires wane, his desire for talk only waxes. “Besides, I have<sup>45</sup> these young men around here.<sup>46</sup> So, in all,<sup>47</sup> don’t be such a stranger. Visit us as you would visit your friends and even your very family.”<sup>48</sup>

Socrates politely objects<sup>49</sup> that he does take delight from conversation with the very old as well. He would like to hear his elders report<sup>50</sup> back what he himself may face in his own old age, and know

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outside and needing therefore further introduction by defining genitives designating their city (the first two) or their father (the last of the three).

<sup>39</sup>We soon learn (C2) he was conducting a private sacrifice, alone, in the inner courtyard.

<sup>40</sup>ἐωράκη (C1). The pluperfect along with καί describes how Socrates resolves his own surprise: The image that had settled in his memory was in fact (καί) an old image that envisioned a younger Cephalus.

<sup>41</sup>παρ’ αὐτόν (C3). We already know that Cephalus is isolated from the company around him, both by his absence from their gathering and by their perfect willingness to join him. I want to ask him, “What about your kith and kin?” He will tellingly raise the issue himself, when he speaks about οἰκεῖοι in two very different ways, positively at 328D6 and negatively at 329B1.

<sup>42</sup>οὐδέ (C6) with all mss. (Burnet accepts Nitzsch’s οὐ δέ) implies some other unstated criticism that this fault will only corroborate and exacerbate. οὐδέ was used in this pre-emptive way by Adeimantus above (328A1). Cephalus’s behavior—immediately to hug Socrates and then to scold him—continues the implicitly hostile treatment of Socrates.

<sup>43</sup>ῥαδίως (C8) rather undercuts Cephalus’s plea. He speaks as if the two of them have so much to talk about that of course they will get together, and that they haven’t gotten together only because of Socrates’s imperfect recognition of how Cephalus’s age isolates him.

<sup>44</sup>καταβαίνων (C6): again the downward is still physical (cf. n. ad 325A1); but as Cephalus’s own designation of the destination it reveals his sensitivity to the fact that Piraeus is hardly a “destination.”

<sup>45</sup>τοῖσδε (D5) the “first person” demonstrative pronoun. Cf. Stock *ad Crito* 44E.

<sup>46</sup>ἀλλὰ τοῖσδε ... σύνισθι (D5): again (cf. A9) an attempt to persuade Socrates by sandwiching in at the last moment the lure of youth. That Cephalus refers to his sons and their friends as youngsters (whether νεανίαις [AM] or νεανίσκοις [FD]) though they are upwards of forty is an index of his eager rhetoric.

<sup>47</sup>μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει (D4-5): again the “Don’t do otherwise but do this” formula, with its contrapositive redundancy, to cap a wave of persuasion by revealing, or politely feigning to reveal, how desolé the requester will be if the requested fails to requite him. More eager rhetoric.

<sup>48</sup>ώς παρὰ φίλους τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους (D6). Cephalus yearns for company, even the intimacy of family relations, and yet he spends a lot of time sacrificing alone. Why is he so preoccupied with it?

<sup>49</sup>καὶ μήν ... γε (D7).

<sup>50</sup>πυνθάνεσθαι (E2) means both ask (for a report) and learn (from a report), having to do with the kind of knowledge one may have from hearsay rather than direct experience (cf. 344C2 [and contrast Gorg.470D9-E6], 358D3, 476E5, 491C6, 530E1; Prot.318A4). The verb therefore figures large in the “reported” dialogues (such as *Symposium* and *Phaedo*; cf. also *Phdrs.*227B8) where a person who could not be present for the event feels both eager to have a report and skeptical as to whether the report will be adequate. In using this word Socrates as the younger man puts himself at the disposal of the older (as he does to the Guest at Soph.216D3). He corroborates this below with ἡδέως πυθοίμην

whether the way of life becomes steep and harsh or easy and broad.<sup>51</sup> Cephalus obliges him with an elaborate response that occupies thirty lines and begins with a preamble.

(329) His own outlook on the matter is as follows.<sup>52</sup> “Just as birds of a feather flock together, I often gather with my contemporaries. The most of us—they, really—turn it into a griping session,<sup>53</sup> with yearning reminiscences<sup>54</sup> of the youthful pleasures of sex and drink and feasting.<sup>55</sup> They chafe at having been deprived of ‘Oh! such very great goods! Before they had a good life; now they have no life at all.’<sup>56</sup> Some of them are even<sup>57</sup> so pained<sup>58</sup> when their kinsmen<sup>59</sup> ridicule them for being such old farts that they’ll launch into a litany of the many evils that old age brought on. If you ask me, I think they’re not blaming what’s really to blame. If old age were the cause I myself would have undergone the same troubles, just by dint of my old age, and so would everybody who has reached this age. The truth is and ὅτι σοι φαίνεται and ἔξαγγέλεις (E5,7). Cephalus then acknowledges the broad berth that Socrates has given him, and indicates that he will be filling it, for he opens with ἐγώ σοι and repeats οἶόν γέ μοι φαίνεται (329A1-2).

<sup>51</sup>The question (E3-4) is ready to the lips of Greeks today. A few years ago I was introduced as a “φιλόσοφος” to Antonis, an elder of the Cretan village Afrata. He greeted me thus: κιά που ἥμου είσαι | κιά που είμαι θά σοι (“Where you are, I one day was. Where I am, you one day will be.”) More recently I had a message from him inviting me to return to Crete and drink some wine with him sometime before he dies.

<sup>52</sup>Cephalus’s ἐγώ σοι (329A1) suggests that it will be a sustained speech, as when in English we start by saying, “Let me tell you about ...” Socrates warns Cebes that he is embarking on a continuous and extended discourse in a similar way, at *Phdo*.96A1: ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι (cf. also 96A6: ἀκουε τοίνυν ώς ἐροῦντος); cf. also *Gorg*.522E5-6.

<sup>53</sup>όλοφύρονται συνίοντες (A4): His shift from first plural to third plural, despite ἡμῶν, draws attention to the fact that he wants to distance himself from “them.” It is already obvious that he brings them in merely as foil.

<sup>54</sup>ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀναμησκόμενοι (A5) is an hendiadys, or, given the two verbal complements before and after the participles, a “binary construction” (for which cf. Riddell *Digest* §§204-230, and cf. 378B2-4, 386A2-4, 431A7, 433E12-4A1, 451C5-6, 462B5-6, 493C4-6, 515C4-5, 615B2-5). Some are distributive (n.773) and others are non-distributive (n.2288). The present tense of the participles indicates Cephalus finds their behavior tedious.

<sup>55</sup>περί τε τἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ πότους τε καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἄλλ’ ἄττα ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται (A5-7), a list interesting both for its form and its content.

The content and criterion of the list, bodily pleasure, is usually done with three items, food (F), drink (D), and sex (S), usually in that order. So 389E1-2 (D,S;F), 439D6-7 (S,FD), 580E3-4 (D,FS); *H.Maj*.298E1-2 (FD;S) ; *Leg*.782E1-3A4 (FD;S), 783C9-D1 (FD;S), 831D8-E2 (FD,S); *Phdo* 64D3-7 (FD;S), 81B5-6 (seeing, touching; D,E; S); *Phdrs*.239A2-B5 (F; D; aposeiopsis for S); *Prot*.353C6 (FD,S). Drink and food can be done with the pair drink and feast (εὐωχία), as 420E3-4, 488C6; cf. *Ep.VII* 326D2-3 (FD,S), and here. Conversely, feasting can cover both drinking and eating, as 411C4. Just so, at 436A11-B1 we have two kinds of pleasure, that of τροφή and that of γέννησις. It appears that Cephalus’s list is the only instance in the corpus besides 439D6-7 where sex is mentioned first.

As to its form, the anaphora of περί and the reiteration of preparatory τε after πότους mark sex as a category apart from drink and revelry (i.e., indicate that the items in the list have the relation A; B<sub>1</sub>,B<sub>2</sub>). But since καὶ ἄλλ’ ἄττα would then strictly be generalizing only the latter, we might take the anaphora of περί as having been discontinued to avoid slavish parallelism, and supply it mentally before εὐωχίας as well as before ἄλλ’ ἄττα (cf. *Rep*.580E3-4). Anaphora regularly marks a subdivision but not always, as a single example will suffice to reveal: *Rep*.389E1-2, τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἔδωδὰς ἥδονῶν, where epanalepsis of περί militates against the implicit categorical distinction in order to effect closure.

Cephalus’s list closes with ἄλλ’ ἄττα ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται, dismissing a tedious listing of logically coordinate items. The dismissal and closure is more often done by articulating the universal

otherwise. Besides my own case, I've found others who don't act like them: Sophocles the poet no less.<sup>60</sup> I was standing beside when somebody confronted him with the question, 'Hey, Sophocles, how's your sex life? Can you still make it<sup>61</sup> with a woman?' And he replied, 'Mind your tongue! You can be sure that I've escaped enslavement to *that* mad and violent master.'<sup>62</sup> I thought then that the great man had a point and I think so no less now.<sup>63</sup> It's utterly true that age brings on great tranquillity and a freedom<sup>64</sup> from these<sup>65</sup> kinds of things for sure. Whenever the desires cease to have a grip on us and slacken it's utterly true that the thing Sophocles refers to happens: one can have<sup>66</sup> respite and release from masters many and mad.<sup>67</sup> What determines whether this will happen and determines moreover how to respond to the ridicule of one's kinsmen, is not the age of a man but his character. If a man is balanced and easygoing his old age is only moderately bothersome. If not, both his old age and his

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(here it would have been ἡδονή [or ἡδοναῖ]). ἔχεσθαι can denote the relation of the case (as subject) to the case (as verbal complement in the genitive), as here and at *Gorg.*494E1ff; *Leg.*811E1; *Rep.*389E7; but also the relation of the case (as subject) to the universal (as verbal complement), as at *Leg.*775D6-7, 859E3-4; *Polit.*289A; *Tht.*145A8. For the former relation various metaphors are used: ἀδελφά (Leg.811E4, 820C1, 956E6; *Phlb.*21B1; *Rep.*436B1, 558C3; *Soph.*266B2-3); ἐπόμενα (*Leg.*815C2-3; *Phdr.*239A2; *Polit.*271B4 (cf. *ap.crit.*); *Rep.*406D5, 544C; *Tht.*185D3 (literally denoting an actual sequence); *Tim.*24C3, 42B1; cf. συνεπόμενα, *Phlb.*56C5); the pregnantly logical συγγενῆ (*Leg.*820B9, 897A4; *Phlb.*11B8 (cf. σύμφωνα, B6); *Polit.*258D5, 260E2); συνέριθα (*Leg.*889D4); τὰ ἐφεξῆς (*Tim.*30C2). For a review of the terminology cf. *Ast ad Leg.*775D6-7 (VII.20, p.384), *Stallb.ad Polit.*289A.

<sup>56</sup>With τινῶν (A7)—“so they say”—Cephalus moves from the imitative and onomatopoetic ὄλοφύρονται, to a description of their thoughts, to a virtual quotation of their words.

<sup>57</sup>ἔνιοι (B1) singles out a subgroup of the πλεῖστοι (A4) who will serve as the special target for Cephalus's criticism. Describing the others has provided him a preamble to presenting his own view.

<sup>58</sup>ὁδύρονται (B1), onomatopoetic like ὄλοφύρονται. Cephalus is mocking his peers for the way they act when their juniors mock them. ὑμνεῖν invokes the image of a nagging wife (cf. her litany at *Rep.*548C8-E1, and cf. *Euthyd.*297D4 [referring to 297B9-D2]; *Leg.*653D5ff; *Prot.*317A6; *Rep.*463D7 [approbatory]; *Tht.*174E5 and 176A1), and is cognate with ὕθλος (on which cf. 336D4, *infra*).

<sup>59</sup>οἰκείων (B1), the term he had used, with φίλοι, when inviting Socrates to come visit (328D6).

<sup>60</sup>With καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτε (B7) we have the first of several run-on constructions by Cephalus (cf. C4-5, D5-6). At first the καὶ with ἄλλοις links these “others” back to Cephalus himself, who by virtue of the irreal construction above has indirectly denied that he is a οὗτως ἔχων. Then, immediately after καὶ ἄλλοις comes καὶ δὴ καὶ followed by a singular noun, indeed the proper name of a single person, so that καὶ and ἄλλοις suddenly seem proleptic: “I've run into people who aren't that way, both others and in particular Sophocles.” Yet just as soon as *this* construction comes into view, we encounter the enclitic adverb ποτὲ leaning back on Σοφοκλεῖ and therefore linking this dative to a future verbal construction, namely παρεγενόμην which comes two words later. Cephalus is eager to get to his special instance of a προπτηλακισμός τοῦ γήρως answered by Sophocles's response, and to set it into sharp relief with the behavior of the age-peers he has just described.

<sup>61</sup>συγγίγνεσθαι (C2), pres., of sustained activity.

<sup>62</sup>αὐτό (C3). Greek, eschewing metaphor and embracing simile, here requires a periphrasis unneeded in English which conversely finds metaphor congenial. Thus αὐτό (which I've translated with the demonstrative adjective “that”) plays a strictly expletive role as antecedent to the ὥσπερ clause by which the simile is expressed. ἀποδράς (read by Burnet for ἀποφυγών though found in no ms.) is an improvement made needless by ὥσπερ, which at the same time corroborates the repetition of ἀποφυγών as the hinge of the comparison. The simile itself, ὥσπερ λύττοντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγών, uses τινὰ as a sort of an indefinite article establishing λύττοντα as an attributive participle modifying δεσπότην in tandem with ἄγριον.

<sup>63</sup>εὖ ... καὶ τότε ... καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἥττον (C4-5): Another run-on statement, where the first καὶ should be, and is, correlated with the second, but then their parallelism is broken by added words that

youth treat him harshly.”<sup>68</sup>

As opposed to Cephalus’s friends who lose their composure when confronted by their mudslinging kinsmen, a person with the character of Sophocles keeps his wits about him and slings the mud back, saying, “You’re the one who’s still the slave to pleasure, young man.” The victory consists in the fact that he maintains his composure in his reply.<sup>69</sup> Cephalus infers from Sophocles’s example that one’s character is responsible for how things go, both with respect to the ravages of aging and the way one handles his troublesome juniors for that matter.<sup>70</sup> The character in question he describes with the approbatory but rather vague terms κόσμιος and εὔκολος. Of these the latter seems to have been a byword for describing Sophocles,<sup>71</sup> but the salient fact about the two terms is that they describe a manner and disposition exactly opposite to the behavior he has just been criticizing in his contemporaries.<sup>72</sup> Cephalus’s message is that they should act like Sophocles rather than acting as they do. He wants us to infer that although one’s character will not retard the advance of old age it makes

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vitiate the parallelism after all, just as the dative Σοφοκλεῖ, above, had at first appeared to correlate with καὶ ἄλλοις but then, followed by τότε, became the beginning of a new construction requiring the dative for a new reason (παρεγενόμην).

<sup>64</sup>πολλὴ εἰρήνη ... καὶ ἐλευθερία (C6-7) is meant to be a formulation of the opposite of Sophocles’s λύττοντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην, with εἰρήνη corresponding to the adj. and ἐλευθερία corresponding to the noun. πολλή is added, as often, to magnify, or complement, quality with quantity. In formulating the opposite of what we are released from—namely, what we are released *into*—Cephalus perhaps unwittingly suggests the notion of a release from toils (ἀπαλλαγὴ πόνων), a euphemism for dying: cf. ἀπαλλαχθῆναι below, D1.

<sup>65</sup>τῶν γε τοιούτων (C6), another infelicity of expression which at first seems to point back but then when we encounter the asyndeton at C7 (ἐπειδάν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ..., where M and correctors of F and D as well as Stobaeus have γάρ, a *lectio facilior*), its reference is turned forward toward δεσποτῶν πολλῶν καὶ μαινομένων (D1).

<sup>66</sup>Potential ἔστι (D1), incorrectly unaccented in Burnet’s text.

<sup>67</sup>δεσποτῶν πολλῶν καὶ μαινομένων (D1) is Cephalus’s redo of Sophocles’s more interestingly binary construction, λύττοντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην, somewhat flattened by his intervening formulation of the opposite, πολλὴ εἰρήνη καὶ ἐλευθερία.

<sup>68</sup>τοιούτῳ (D6) effects another mild change of construction in midstream: “If a person is not balanced, both age and youth treat this sort harshly.” Contrast the alternative expressions, “Both age and youth treat harshly the sort that isn’t balanced,” and “If a person is not balanced, both age and youth treat *him* harshly.” Cephalus speaks in his apodosis as if he had done the protasis with a relative clause.

<sup>69</sup>εὐφήμει (C2).

<sup>70</sup>καὶ τούτων πέρι καὶ τῶν γε πρός τοὺς οἰκείους (D2) where γε means “to boot.” For καί γε adding an item unexpected or different from the previous, extending the conception beyond its usual limit and to a new level, cf. *Charm.* 168E9-9A1 (καὶ ἔτι γε); *Crito* 47B9-10; *Gorg.* 450D6-7; *H.Maj.* 295D3, 300E8-301A6; *H.Min.* 368C4; *Leg.* 679A4-6 (καὶ μήν γε), 728D8-E1, 746D7-E2 (καὶ πρός γε); *Phdo* 82B7; *Rep.* 328A6 (καὶ πρός γε), 425B1-4, 438C3 (καὶ ἔτι γε), 499B2, 598E1-2, 608B5-7; *Tht.* 156B5, 175E7; and G. Billings, *Art of Transition*, 69. It appears to be a stylistic affectation of Protagoras’s, e.g. *Prot.* 334AC, 351A, et *passim*. The anastrophe τούτων πέρι helps to hide an almost unmeaning doubling of the prepositions (i.e., περὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους). Cephalus needs the πρός (plus accusative) in order to insinuate that the problem with the οἰκεῖοι is how to meet their attack with a counterattack.

<sup>71</sup>E.g., *Ar.Ran.* 82.

<sup>72</sup>With κόσμιος (D4), a synonym for σώφρων (399E11 and 403A7 and nn. *ad locc.*; *Charm.* 159B2-3; *Leg.* 802E8-10, 831E6-7), contrast their demonstrative griping (όλοφύρονται) and wailing (όδύρεσθαι); and with εὔκολος contrast their nervous anxiety (ἀγανακτεῖν) and ceaseless complaining (ὑμνεῖν).

old age less unpalatable, but his most important point is to turn the tables on his kinsmen, and this is what he means by saying that character helps against mudslinging. In short, the “character” in question is an imperturbable smoothness which might, and probably will, be mistaken for moral competence.

Socrates is amused by Cephalus's speech and decides to egg him on (329D7-E5). Most people would not accept his claim of moral superiority but would attribute the ease he shows at being old to his wealth. The rich, after all, have “many consolations.”

“Right you are,” Cephalus retorts, “—that they won’t accept it, that is.<sup>73</sup> What’s more there’s some truth in what they say, but not as much as they imagine. Just<sup>74</sup> think of that great reply Themistocles made to the Seriphian<sup>75</sup> who said he was famous only because he was an Athenian: ‘As a Seriphian I’d be unknown; as an Athenian you’d be.’ (330) Just so,<sup>76</sup> the same argument can well be used in response to<sup>77</sup> those who have no wealth and bear their old age ill, that a good<sup>78</sup> man who is poor (like them) might not indeed have an easy time when he gets old; but if a man is a bad man he will never achieve equanimity, whether he is rich or poor.”<sup>79</sup>

The nature of Cephalus’s argument here is the same as the previous in all relevant details. In structure, a derisive or challenging remark is met not by refuting the charge, but by a counterchallenge that appears to turn the tables on the accuser, using his own terms in a retort against him. Sophocles had responded to a derisive remark about his physical prowess by impugning the moral health of his accuser without warrant. He did not seek to refute the charge. Themistocles had responded to an attempt to deflate his reputation for virtue by asserting without evidence that his opponent had no virtue to inflate, again leaving the charge unanswered. Finally, Cephalus responds to the allegation that it is wealth not virtue that makes him happy, by the flat assertion that regardless which thing makes him happy his envious opponent possesses neither. In each case the underlying charge is left intact and the counter charge is made without warrant. Truth is the one thing that doesn’t matter on either side. Had it been Aeschylus that made the remark to Sophocles, had Pericles said this to Themistocles, had Socrates said this to Cephalus (which in fact he did, though indirectly), the technique could not have been deployed. It relies on being accosted by a presumptive inferior, and in each deployment of the tactic the presumptive superior simply retains his presumptive superiority and the presumptive inferior fails to get a foothold.

This is the world of mudslinging, of the pot that calls the kettle black and the presumptive superior who has putatively forgotten more than the presumptive inferior will ever learn. It is the world of getting the last word. Ultimately, it is the world of self-satisfaction perpetuated, and this is what is appropriate about putting this way of speaking into the mouth of the old man, who will be given the last word by his juniors, and will be taken away once he has uttered it anyway.

<sup>73</sup>At first Cephalus seems to grant their claim, but then brings us up short and tells us he grants only Socrates’s claim that they won’t grant his claim (*οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται*).

<sup>74</sup>ἀλλά (E7) baldly changing the subject.

<sup>75</sup>τῷ (E8): the definite article indicates the story is proverbial.

<sup>76</sup>καὶ δή (330A3) moving to the target case.

<sup>77</sup>The dative *τοῖς μὴ πλουσίοις* (A3) corresponds with the dative in which the Seriphian stood as indirect object of *ἀπεκρίνατο*. Cephalus assumes that the person who would say he’s happy because rich says so because he’s a poor man who is bearing old age with difficulty; but Socrates has suggested that it is the many who say this, not the poor. Cephalus’s inference is based on the assumption that the criticism is driven by envy.

<sup>78</sup>ἐπιεικής (A6).

<sup>79</sup>εὔκολος ἔαντῷ (A6), here the opposite of χαλεπώς φέρων (A5).

Rhetorically, such arguments as these are designed for the onlookers. A presumptive superior has been impugned in their eyes, and it is in their eyes that his superiority must be restored. He restores it by making his opponent look worse than he himself has been made to look. Sophocles makes his opponent look worse by calling into question his morals rather than his bodily strength; Themistocles may have less virtue than he is presumed to have, but his opponent has none. When we pass to Cephalus, however, we might recognize he is no Themistocles! There is no presumptive superiority in him except for his wealth and his superior age. He is neither statesman nor poet. He is not even an Athenian. That he should arrogate to himself even the style of the Sophoclean and Themistoclean defense is something of a reach. The only superiority he can defend himself for enjoying is his wealth. Wealth is after all a good, a member of the third of three traditional categories of good: the goods of the soul (e.g., wisdom), the goods of the body (e.g., strength) and the external goods (e.g., wealth).<sup>80</sup> We've had all three in this passage, with Sophocles trumping a criticism of his own bodily state with a criticism of his opponent's moral state, and Themistocles trumping the claim that his external fame overdraws his internal virtue by asserting that his opponent has neither fame nor any basis of for it. Now we have Cephalus, who fends off the claim that wealth is the only basis for his happiness by stipulating wealth can contribute to happiness, but insisting that wealth can't make a bad person happy. He acquits himself in argument by returning attack with counterattack.

So much is tangled together in Cephalus's skillful presentation!

Although Socrates allows Cephalus to dispose of the objector in this clever way without a comeback of his own, he does stay on the topic of his wealth and asks whether he inherited most of it or made most of it. Cephalus affects surprise<sup>81</sup> at the very concept of being thought a noteworthy businessman and responds by placing himself in the middle as it were<sup>82</sup> between Cephalus, his grandfather and namesake, and his father, Lysanias. The former inherited about what Cephalus now has and multiplied it many times; the latter turned all that into something less than Cephalus's present fortune.<sup>83</sup> Cephalus would be satisfied<sup>84</sup> to play a role somewhere in between these: to leave to his sons about as much as he inherited – no less than he got, and perhaps a little more.

Socrates explains why he asked his question. Although rich, Cephalus seems not so concerned

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<sup>80</sup>The tripartition is both a philosophical and a rhetorical topic. Within the Platonic corpus, explicitly or implicitly, cf. *Alc.* I 130E8-1C4, 133DE; *Cleit.* 407B1-408A9; *Eryx.* 393C4-D6; *Euthyd.* 279A4-C4; *Gorg.* 467E, 477A8-C5, 503E-504B, 511D1-2, 514A5-515A1ff; *Lach.* 195E10-196A1; *Leg.* 631B6-D1, 660E2-5, 661A5-B4, 697B2-6, 717C2-3, 724A7-B3, 743E3-4A3, 726, 743E, 870B1-6; *Lys.* 207C1-D2; *Meno* 70A6-B1, 71B6-7, 78C6, 87E-88B; *Phdo* 68C1-3; *Phdrs.* 239A2-240A8; *Phlb.* 26B5-7 (with B1-2), 48C7-E10; *Rep.* 362B2-C6, 366C, 432A4-6, 591C1-D10, 618C8-D5; *Symp.* 205D1-8; *Tht.* 144E5-145B6ff. Outside Plato, cf. *Arist. EE* init., *EN* 1098B12-15, *MM* 1184B1-6, *Pol.* 1323A21-7; *Bacchl.* 10.35-49; *Cic. de fin.* 3.13.43, *TD* 5.27.76 & 5.30.85, *de off.* 3.6.28; *D.L.* 3.80-1; *Hdt.* 1.29ff; *Lys.* 1 *sub fin.*; *Plut. de educ. lib.* 5Cff; *Soph. fr.* 329; *Stob. Ecl.* 2.7 (136W); *Theogn.* 255-6; *Xen. Oec.* 1.1.13, *Mem.* 1.5.3-4; In the rhetorical treatises, cf. *Arist. Rhet.* 1360B25-8, *ad Alex.* 1422A4-10 (cf. 1440B15-20); *Cic. ad Herr.* 3.10, *Part. Or.* 22.74-5, *Top.* 23.89, and cf. *Walz Rhet. Gr.* 4.738.14-739.1, and *Cope ad Arist. Rhet.* 2.21.5 (2.207-8). Cf. also *Thompson ad Meno* 87E, *Shorey WPS* 629 (*ad Leg.* 679B).

<sup>81</sup>ποῖος ἐπεκτησάμην; (B1): for ποῖος expressing or feigning indignant surprise cf. *Euthyd.* 291A1, 304E7; *Gorg.* 490D10, E4; *Lach.* 194D10; *Tht.* 180B8, and n. 1457.

<sup>82</sup>τις (B1) mitigating the spatial metaphor of μέσος. Once again Cephalus makes a clever comparison structured by reversing points of view.

<sup>83</sup>νῦν οὔσης (B6), echoing (ἡ) νῦν οὔσια (B4), Cephalus's word for wealth.

<sup>84</sup>ἀγαπᾶν (B6), expressing moderation and therefore giving moral content to the μέσος metaphor. Presumably Cephalus views his grandfather as too concerned, and his father as too insouciant, about money. Socrates next moves to matter of his namesake's over-concern.

about money, like those rich persons<sup>85</sup> who didn't earn their money themselves. Those who did always enjoy it twice as much as the others do. First,<sup>86</sup> they're serious<sup>87</sup> about money the way a poet cares about his poems<sup>88</sup> or a father cares about his sons, seeing it as product of their own efforts—in addition to the enjoyment that everybody takes from using<sup>89</sup> it to buy things. It's bothersome even to bump into<sup>90</sup> these sorts since all they want to talk about is money.

Cephalus agrees and Socrates re-agrees,<sup>91</sup> so that the conversation comes to a rest for a moment. But money comes up again: Socrates asks him to tell him a little more<sup>92</sup> on this topic. "When all is said and done<sup>93</sup> what would you say is the greatest good of having a lot of money?"

This question unleashes as long an answer as his first question did.<sup>94</sup> Again Cephalus begins by contrasting his own outlook with that of others, but this time the tone is rueful rather than proud. "Let me tell you, Socrates, when a man gets nearer to thinking<sup>95</sup> he's going to die he's visited by a fear and concern about things that never bothered him before. At first<sup>96</sup> there were those well known

<sup>85</sup>It is noteworthy that Cephalus is never said to be rich (even 330D2-3 *infra* falls short of this) though this is all that one notices about him, so that this is his οὐσία. The sacrifices he is performing both before (328C2) and after (331D6-9) this brief conversation are an extravagance that speaks louder than words.

<sup>86</sup>Proleptic τε (C4) leaning back on the dative ταύτῃ, which recalls the dative διπλῇ and thereby indicates that τε will be meaning "both" in a both/and construction. The dative ἦπερ below (C6) completes the construction.

<sup>87</sup>σπουδάζουσιν (C5) goes beyond ἀσπάζειν and ἀγαπᾶν and suggests that a man like Cephalus's grandfather, who loves to make money, may neglect his sons. A spendthrift like Cephalus's father might likewise be faulted for neglecting his sons since he's wasting the substance they would inherit. Socrates has perhaps revealed the reason why Cephalus wants to be in the middle between these two extremes. The conjecture by Groen van Prinsterer reported by Adam *ad loc.* (*Platon.Prosopog.*, 111) and the emendation by Hemsterhuis cited in the *ap.crit.* by Burnet (i.e. Λυσίας for Λυσανίας at 330B5) is unnecessary ingenuity. From what Cephalus here tells us it is unlikely he would name *any* of his three sons after his father!

<sup>88</sup>ποιήματα (C3): English has forgotten that the poet is etymologically a "maker," and so the connection between making poems, making children and making money is less obvious; but to a Greek it is right beneath the surface. Thus the joke at *Charm.*162D2-3, in the context of Charmides's defense of Critias's definition of σωφροσύνη as τὰ ἔαυτοῦ πράττειν.

<sup>89</sup>κατὰ τὴν χρείαν (C6) introduces the issue of money's usefulness which is Socrates's next topic.

<sup>90</sup>συγγενέσθαι (C7), aorist rather than present. Contrast 329C2 above.

<sup>91</sup>πάνυ μὲν οὖν (D1).

<sup>92</sup>τοσόνδε (D1) the "first person" demonstrative adjective of quantity (contrast "second person" τοσούτον). Socrates is apologizing for asking one *more* question about money as if the question were bothering *only himself*.

<sup>93</sup>ἀπολελαυκέναι (D2) perfect.

<sup>94</sup>Thirty lines (330D4-331B7): cf. 329A1-D6.

<sup>95</sup>ἐγγύς (D5) must go with οἴεσθαι rather than τελευτήσειν, despite the proximity to the afterworld that makes it more visible (below, E3). What the expression loses in logic it gains back in psychological verisimilitude, much like our expression, "death staring him in the face."

<sup>96</sup>οἴ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῆθοι (D7), with proleptic τε, as above (C4) purchasing in advance a berth for a second step (here begun with καὶ αὐτός, E2). Though τε ... καί usually links intimately related things, it may link unlikes also, including pure opposites which are after all two sides of one coin (*H.Min.*366A5, 369B3-4; *Leg.*885B1; *Tht.*199B8); complements (*Prot.*313D); alternatives (*Leg.*732C4); subject and object (*Phdo* 66A6); process and result (*Gorg.*478C2, *Rep.*341D8); ground and inference (*Phdrs.*254A2; *Rep.*334D3, 335B4); action and purpose (*Rep.*573B3); example and universal (*Phdo* 74D4-5; *Rep.*339E2, 362E5f, 374D1-2, 381A4); abstract and concrete (*Phdo* 87C2); metaphor and its meaning

stories about what awaits us in Hades, how we pay the penalty there for our injustices here. The stories had always seemed so ridiculous, but now they torture<sup>97</sup> his soul: Are they true after all? The result is that a person, whether from the weakness of old age or because now that he's nearer death he has caught a glimpse of what's to come—be that as it may—<sup>98</sup> the person finds himself<sup>99</sup> beset with uncertainty and fear,<sup>100</sup> and from that moment on he is always going over his accounts and figuring out whether he has indeed done anybody an injustice. A man who thereupon discovers lurking in himself many such acts that he has done<sup>101</sup> bolts up from his sleep, as children do, sweating in fear, and passes his conscious<sup>102</sup> life with hope forlorn as his constant companion.<sup>103</sup> But a man who has (331) a clear conscience has the company of a hope that is pleasant and good, a “nurse for the aged,” as<sup>104</sup> Pindar says when speaking of a man who has lived his life justly and piously:<sup>105</sup>

(Rep.472A5, 555D7-8, 564D10, 609A3-4); meaning and metaphor (Rep.509D2) act and evaluation of act (Gorg.460D2: an hendiadys, really); statement and explanation (Leg.867E6, 868D5; Rep.380C7 [cf. n. *ad loc.*]); and even strongly contrasting items where we might expect μέν / δέ (Euthyphr.6D5 [satirizing perhaps a blind spot of Euthyphro's]; Leg.687C10-11, 881A5-7; Rep.527A6).

<sup>97</sup>στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχήν (E1-2). Placement of αὐτοῦ emphasizes τὴν ψυχήν as specifying the inward location of the tortured feeling. Two hundred Stephanus pages from now we will again be reading about a painful twisting of the soul, but there it will be τρέπειν rather than στρέφειν (*περιτροπή*, Book Seven).

<sup>98</sup>δ’ οὖν (E4) emphasizing the result by declaring moot any further controversy about the cause.

<sup>99</sup>καὶ αὐτός (E2), in contrast with οἵ τε λεγόμενοι μῆθοι, the widely public stories. αὐτός stresses the solitary aspect of the experience. For the first time Cephalus talks about himself without a comparison to others, for a moment at least (cf. 331B6-7 and n. 114, *infra*).

<sup>100</sup>ὑποψίας ... καὶ δείματος (E4) redoes δέος και φροντίς above (D6) in reverse order.

<sup>101</sup>ἐαυτοῦ (E6), subjective genitive with ἀδικήματα. Its early placement again stresses the inward and meditative aspect of the experience that Cephalus is stressing.

<sup>102</sup>Proleptic καί (E6) before ἐκ τῶν ὑπνων corresponds to καί before ζῆ, suggesting that ζῆ is a metonymy for daytime life as opposed to nighttime, when we sleep.

<sup>103</sup>μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος (331A1), poetic: cf. συναορεῖ, 331A7. Cephalus is, and has been, working his language into the idiom of the Pindaric passage he is about to quote: στρέφουσι 330E1 / πολύστροφον, 331A8; ἐλπίδος, 331A1 / ἐλπίς, A8; ἡδεῖα, 331A2 / γλυκεῖα, A6; ἀεὶ πάρεστι, 331A2 / συναορεῖ, A7; μεστὸς γίγνεται, like being flooded at sea, 330E4 / κυβερνῷ, 331A9. The double agenda, to make his own argument and to create a segue to the quote from Pindar, results in the run-on locution, ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος, where he needs ἀγαθὴ to make the contrast with κακῆς above but also wants γηροτρόφος to anticipate the quotation below. Commentators not realizing Cephalus is painting himself into a corner, disagree whether to take ἀγαθὴ with γηροτρόφος or with ἐλπίς.

<sup>104</sup>Pindar, frg.214 Bergk, Loeb edd. (both Sandys's and Race's) = 233Boeck = 256Turyn. ἐλπίς is perhaps hypostatized in Pindar's hymnal manner (Synesius, *de insomniis* 17: ὕμνησε τὴν Ἐλπίδα ὁ Πίνδαρος). καί with a relative (ώς) introducing an illustration, is otiose.

<sup>105</sup>δικαίως καὶ ὄσιως (A4), terms of moral approbation much more distinct in meaning than the terms he has used up until now, since they represent cardinal virtues.

The cardinal virtues are traditionally four: δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ανδρεία, σοφία (e.g. Pindar N.3.76; Xen. Mem.3.9.1-5, 4.6.1-12; and, in non-speculative passages in Plato, Crat.411-414, *passim*; Euthyd.279B4; Gorg.507AC; Leg.630A8-B2, 631C5-D1, 957E2-3, 964B5-6, 965D1-2; Phdo 69C1-2; Rep.427E10-11, 443E5-4A2, 500D7-8). Sometimes other virtues, particularly ὄσιότης, appear instead of in addition to these four (Gorg.505B2-3, 507AC; Leg.837C6-7; Meno 74A4-6, 88A6ff; Phdo 114E5-5A1; Prot.330B4-6, 349B1-2, cf.359B2-4; Rep.395C4-5), but the quaternion is authoritative enough to support Socrates's argument for the eliminative argument of Bk 4 below (427E6-432B5ff).

It is of course the burden of much Socratic investigation whether the several traditional virtues constitute a spectrum, a range, a plurality or a unity (cf. e.g. Prot.329B5-E2); but natural usage appears to allow one of them, δικαιοσύνη, to refer to virtue as a whole (Euthyphr.11E4-12D4; Gorg.477C2

“Sweet to him she invigorates his heart, the elder’s nurse and companion, Hope, whom mortals rely on most to steer them through the twists and turns of second thoughts.”

Cephalus finds these words very powerful indeed; and we can see he understands them since they repeat what he said before he quoted them, and what he said there was so clearly sincere and heartfelt. Accordingly,<sup>106</sup> he would say that money has its greatest worth in connection with this Hope, not for any and every man but for the good one.<sup>107</sup> To avoid having defrauded<sup>108</sup> a person, even under duress,<sup>109</sup> and to avoid<sup>110</sup> going off to Hades in fear because you still<sup>111</sup> owe a sacrifice to a god or

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(vs.B7-8); Leg.630C6, 957E2-3 (where it is treated as the virtual genus of the other three!); Meno 78D5; Phdrs.276C3, 277D10-E, 278A3-4; Polit.295E4-5; Prot.327B2; and cf. Theogn.147). Sometimes σοφία can be used in this way (e.g., Gorg.467E4; Leg.688B; Rep.585B13-C1), and sometimes the whole group of virtues might be referred to by the pair of these, as Lys.207CD, Soph.247B1-2. By far the commonest way to refer to the whole by a pair is, however, by the pair δικαιοσύνη and ὄσιότης: Gorg.479B8-C1,481A5, 507B2-4, 523A7-B1 (and B2); Meno 78D4; Phdo 75C9-D2; Phlb.39E10-11; Rep.458D8-E2, 461A4, 463D5, 479A5-8, 496D9-E1, 610B6 (cf.615B7), and cf.391A1-2; Tht.172A1-2 (cf.172B2-3). Cf. also the speech of Protagoras, Prot.322C7 (δίκη καὶ αἰδώς), Hes.WD 192, Tyrt.12.39f (=Theogn.937)], and Theogn. 291-2. This seems to be the function and meaning of Cephalus’s pair in the present text. It means what we mean when we say somebody is “decent and god-fearing,” but if we translate this way Socrates will not so easily be able to pick out δικαιοσύνη at 331C2.

<sup>106</sup> δή (A10) moving to the target idea.

<sup>107</sup> τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ (B1) Burnet needlessly reads καὶ κόσμιοι in addition, on very weak authority (one of three mss. of Stobaeus).

<sup>108</sup> ἔξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι (B2) denotes fraud, since deception and lying barely qualify as ἀδικήματα unless one profits from them. In law the elements of fraud are three: (1) intentional (2) deception for (3) gain.

<sup>109</sup> The position of ὥκοντα (B2) indicates that the first μηδέ is not corresponsive with the second but emphatic. The point of this detail is not that one might have done the misdeed unwittingly—for such an error conscience is blind and wealth therefore useless—but that one can always afford to “err on the side of caution.” Looking back over one’s life one might recall an incident where he was “forced” to tell a “white lie” that, because white, was not justiciable. Now he can clear his conscience by making reparation for it. For ὥκων meaning against the will rather than unwittingly, cf. Arist.NE 1110B18,ff.

<sup>110</sup> The construction (B1-4) is somewhat telescoped. According to the syntactical order, the coordinate conjunction μηδ’ αὖ links the infinitive ἀπίέναι with the infinitives ἔξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, but in terms of sense the latter infinitives, describing unjust acts, are continued by the participle ὀφείλοντα as if in analepsis (though in all strictness it is not unjust to owe, but to leave never having paid). The αὖ is therefore mildly illative.

<sup>111</sup> ἔπειτα (B3) can be used (as also εἶτα) to link a circumstantial participle to an ordinary verb (here, ἀπίέναι), to stress that regardless of the nature of the participial circumstance the action of the participle precedes that of the ordinary verb (‘having done this he then [ἔπειτα] does that.’ cf. Phdo 70E7, 82C8). The reason for making the temporal sequence explicit is often that the occurrence of the first event should have or might have obviated the occurrence of the second, in which case the circumstantial participle is concessive and ἔπειτα means “still” instead of “then,” as at Apol.20C7; Charm.163A7; Gorg.456D7, 457B1 (remembered by Socrates at 460D3), 461E3, 519E5, 527D6; Lach.192B7; Phdo 90D1 (cf. Burnet *ad loc.*); Prot.341E4, 343D1, 358C1; Rep.336E8, 337E5 [and n.302 *ad loc.*], 434B1). My explanation is based on Stallbaum’s remarks *ad Phdo.70E*.

some money to a man,<sup>112</sup> in this connection money can be a very important player.<sup>113</sup> It has many other good uses, but this one is the most useful of all, at least for a man who has his wits about him.”<sup>114</sup>

Socrates is pleased overall<sup>115</sup> with Cephalus’s account but wants to ask him a question about one thing,<sup>116</sup> his reference to justice:<sup>117</sup> Can we say so flatly that it justice is truthfulness and returning whatever one might have gotten from another, or are these two acts taken in themselves<sup>118</sup> sometimes just but sometimes unjust?<sup>119</sup> Here’s what I<sup>120</sup> mean. Anybody would agree that if one took custody of a weapon from a friend,<sup>121</sup> the friend being of sound mind, but then the friend asserted his claim<sup>122</sup> to get it back in a crazed mood,<sup>123</sup> one really oughtn’t give the thing back under these circumstances, and whoever did would not be a just man, nor<sup>124</sup> would he be just for telling the whole truth<sup>125</sup> to his friend in such a mood.

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<sup>112</sup>Θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα (B2-3): Dividing the debt into debts to gods and debts to men (sacrifices and money) continues the dyadic representation of virtuous living that Cephalus had begun with δικαίως καὶ ὄσίως above, 331A4.

<sup>113</sup>συμβάλλεται (B5) has mercantile overtones (cf. συμβόλαια, 333A12, *infra*).

<sup>114</sup>From χρησιμώτατον (B7) it is clear that Cephalus is talking about buying one’s way out of injustices in this world in order to avoid the more heinous penalties fabled to take place in the other. The range of injustices that can be so recompensed, namely, fraud and forfeiture, is however severely narrow. Cephalus is groping to extend the importance of what he has—wealth—to buy off the one thing he cannot manage to accept—his own demise. Beneath the surface old age has deprived him of his composure after all. He closes by contrasting himself with a rich man without his wits about him, who would presumably keep the money he owes or stole.

<sup>115</sup>πάγκαλως … λέγεις (C1).

<sup>116</sup>τοῦτο δ’ αὐτό (C1) undercuts his general praise of the speech in a way we recognize as Socratic. He introduces his objection gently, by isolating (αὐτό, 331C1) a part of what Cephalus has said; but just as in the case of the σμικρόν τι of the *Protagoras* (329B6), to answer the question he asks will require, motivate, structure and constitute the entirety of the ensuing conversation.

<sup>117</sup>τὴν δικαιοσύνην (C2): Without apology Socrates chooses only δικαίως from Cephalus’s (perhaps loosely intended) doublet, δίκαιως καὶ ὄσίως (A4: cf. n. *ad loc.*), and then isolates it so as to make it a topic for discussion (using τοῦτο δ’ αὐτό: cf. *Gorg.*453B2 for the expression and the idea, and cf. n.273 *ad* 336C6-D2, *infra*). Cephalus is more interested in piety, however, and perhaps more interested in acting piously than talking about it, and so he takes the first opportunity to depart πρὸς τὰ ιερά (331D9).

<sup>118</sup>αὐτὰ ταῦτα (C4), without further qualification, in and by themselves.

<sup>119</sup>δικαίως / ἀδίκως (C4): The alternatives as usual in moral contexts ignore the *tertium*. Cf. n. 164, *infra*.

<sup>120</sup>τοιόνδε (C5), “first person” demonstrative adjective of quality: cf. τοσόνδε, 330D1.

<sup>121</sup>φίλου ἀνδρός (C6), here a natural and unexceptional specification, will soon (332A9) have a dispositive role.

<sup>122</sup>ἀπαιτοῦ (C6).

<sup>123</sup>μανείς (C6) suggests only a passing emotional state, not the permanent insanity one often finds in translations. μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι (E9 and 332A4-5) is even more circumstantial since it dispenses with etiology. What is at stake in the distinction is Socrates’s stress on the essentially transient or “situational” aspect of human affairs.

<sup>124</sup>οὐδ’ αὖ (C8): being a friend he would neither give it back nor tell him the truth about where it is, unlike the proverbial whistle-blower whose moral scrupulosity requires him to ruin his associates. οὐδ’ αὖ echoes μηδ’ αὖ at B2: Socrates’s responses characteristically reveal him to be a good listener. Cf. 340C9 and n.

<sup>125</sup>πάντα ἐθέλων τάληθῇ λέγειν (C8-9) redoies μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἔξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι (B1-2).

Since Cephalus agrees, Socrates can conclude that telling the truth and giving things back can't be the criterion<sup>126</sup> of justice. "No but it IS," Polemarchus interrupts, "if one is to believe Simonides." Of course one should believe him, since Simonides is one of the wise poets, and so Polemarchus's interruption draws our attention away from Cephalus, while Cephalus for his part exploits the opportunity to leave! He announces his departure by bequeathing<sup>127</sup> the argument to Socrates and Polemarchus.<sup>128</sup> The time has come<sup>129</sup> for him to attend to his sacred dealings.<sup>130</sup>

"But isn't it to me you bequeath it, being as I am the heir of all else<sup>131</sup> that is yours?" Polemarchus interjects wittily.

"Quite!" says Cephalus, laughing, but still he does not tarry.<sup>132</sup>

### I.B: The Close and Extended Epagogé with Polemarchus

Despite the departure of the host the conversation does not end, but continues with a replacement player.<sup>133</sup> Socrates turns to the inheritor of the logos and asks him just what he thought was right about what Simonides said about justice.

"It was that giving to each person what is owed him is just."<sup>134</sup>

Well, says Socrates, it's hard to distrust a saying of Simonides, wise and inspired man that he is, and yet it's even harder<sup>135</sup> for me to make out what he means by this, though perhaps you can. Surely he does not mean this thing we just said, that when somebody has placed something into your custody, you should somehow or other<sup>136</sup> honor his (332) claim to give it back to him if<sup>137</sup> he makes his claim in a crazed state of mind. Yet I presume you'd agree the thing is owed<sup>138</sup> to him, the thing he placed into your custody.

"So much is true."

<sup>126</sup>Socrates's term is ὄπος (D2). The metaphor is that of a boundary line, by lying within which something would be just.

<sup>127</sup>παραδιδόναι (D6), one converse of παραλαμβάνειν (330A8, B4). The other is καταλείπειν (330B6), which conceives of the subject having died.

<sup>128</sup>ὑμῖν (D6) may address the whole group and not just the two to whom he is talking.

<sup>129</sup>ἢδη (D7).

<sup>130</sup>τῶν ιερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι (D7). It would seem unlikely that, but would be quite significant if, Cephalus intends now to perform another sacrifice having completed one just moments before (328C2). Nobody asks.

<sup>131</sup>γε (D8) jokingly asserts or acknowledges his rights to this dubious inheritance.

<sup>132</sup>ἄμα (D9).

<sup>133</sup>κληρονόμος (D8): the conceit of inheritance nicely fits the usual protocol of Socratic discourse whereby the role of answerer can be passed on to another. Cf. *Charm.* 162E; *Phlb.* 12A; *Prot.* 331A. Cf. also the notion of paying interest on an account deferred: 504B, *infra*.

<sup>134</sup>τὸ τὰ ὄφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιον (E3-4). No extant line of Simonides says this, in these or so many words. Adam's inferences (*ad loc.*) from the absence of such are therefore baseless.

<sup>135</sup>μέντοι (E6) heaped on μέντοι (E5).

<sup>136</sup>ὅτῳδὲν (E9) is a strong asseveration.

<sup>137</sup>μή (E9) makes the circumstantial participle conditional, so that together with ὅτῳδὲν we have the protasis of a present general condition (ἀποδιδόναι representing a present indicative in the apodosis).

<sup>138</sup>καίτοι γε ὄφειλόμενόν που (332A1): The intimate relationship between "ought" and "own" is a blind spot that goes back to the I.E. root \*εικ, whence *Eigentum*, for which compare the Latinate calque, "property."

And yet one was not at all supposed to return it, at the moment when its owner asked for it back in a frenzy?<sup>139</sup>

“That’s true, one was not.”

So it’s something else that Simonides appears to have meant by saying that it is just to give back ‘what’s owed.’<sup>140</sup>

“Quite else indeed, since what he thinks friends ‘owe’ to friends is to do them a good turn, surely not<sup>141</sup> a bad one!”

Socrates next specifies what<sup>142</sup> Polemarchus has now asserted to be Simonides’s meaning. It is not “what is owing” that one gives back if one gives back gold<sup>143</sup> to the person who has placed it in his custody, under the special<sup>144</sup> circumstances that the giving back or receiving is harmful and that the giver and the receiver are friends. This raises whether we must “give back” to enemies something that is “owing” to them. Socrates retains the terminology even though on the face of it it doesn’t apply, and Polemarchus responds to the strain by repeating the language of owing<sup>145</sup> only in order to change it to the language of appropriateness ( $\tau\ddot{o}$  προσῆκον). What is owed after all to an enemy from an enemy is, presumably, what is also appropriate: something bad.

As poets often do, the wise Simonides has told us a *riddle* about justice, Socrates feigns suddenly

<sup>139</sup>δέ γε (A4) introducing a minor premise. The bare optative may be understood either as representing subjunctive with ἄν in a present general condition (note generalizing ὀπωστιοῦν, echoing ὀτῷοῦν, 331E9) in virtual past tense *oratio obliqua* (referring to the time “we asserted” this denial [i.e., 331C5-8: cf. 331E8]), or more easily as the protasis of a past general condition ( $\hat{\eta}\nu$  to be understood with ἀποδοτέον), Socrates treating the present general version of the assertion just above (331E9f) as equivalent to the future less vivid version he had used in 331C5-9, and then casting it into the past because when he asserted it.

Placing the propositional contents of a premise into the past in order to indicate that it was agreed to earlier (Smyth’s “philosophical imperfect,” §1903) is the usual dialogic shorthand when the “questioner” is re-adducing what the “answerer” has already agreed to (cf. n. 586 *ad* 350C7). The tense, that is, reminds the “answerer” that he must agree or grant the point, or else change his position. Adam’s “*oratio obliqua* of self-quotation” (*ad loc.*) is a misleading portrayal of the idiom, and Goodwin’s converting the sentence into a future less vivid condition (GMT §555) misses it entirely.

<sup>140</sup>τὰ ὄφειλόμενα (A8): The proleptic placement suggests that the controversial aspect of Simonides’s assertion might lie in these words; and Polemarchus picks up the suggestion by telling us what Simonides thinks ὄφείλειν ought to mean in this connection (A9-10).

<sup>141</sup>μηδέν (A10) is emphatic: “οὐ denies the fact, μή the conception” (Gildersleeve).

<sup>142</sup>μωνθάνω (A11), idiomatic: “I get it.” The speaker announces he has perceived why or with what warrant his interlocutor has said what he has just said, and then (with ὅτι) states what this is (cf. 372E2 and n. 1035).

<sup>143</sup>χρυσίον (A12): the weapon has been replaced by an item one more usually places into another’s custody.

<sup>144</sup>εάνπερ (A12).

<sup>145</sup>ὅ γε ὄφείλεται αὐτοῖς (B6): With limitative γε he acknowledges that the term ὄφειλόμενον needs to be newly delimited, and then, with δέ and repeated γε, he gives the new delimitation. Against the δέ γε of all the mss., Adam and Shorey read δέ (a *scribitur* in Ven. 184 preferred by Bekker, though Burnet and Chambry do not even place it into their *app.critt.*) arguing that the collocation δέ γε is inappropriate here, but the second γε, like the third one Polemarchus adds two words later, merely continues the force of the first one.

to realize.<sup>146</sup> What he was meaning<sup>147</sup> now appears to be that rendering the *appropriate* thing to each person<sup>148</sup> is just, though he used the word “owing” for this.

“What do you think?” Polemarchus churlishly rejoins.<sup>149</sup>

With the introduction of Simonides several things have happened: Cephalus gets an opportunity to hand over the role of answerer and return to his dealings with the gods;<sup>150</sup> the authority of an elder interlocutor which had made Socrates’s acquiescence in a “πυνθάνεσθαι” (informational) conversation appropriate is now passed on to the authority of the wisdom poet Simonides but since Simonides is not present his position must be represented by Polemarchus, with whom Socrates can talk as an equal. As such it is really Polemarchus who becomes the answerer, so that saying what Simonides the wise meant becomes tantamount to saying why he himself was moved to quote him in the first place. Polemarchus prefers to continue this fiction even when what he had represented as Simonides’s position needs to be saved with “clarifications” (332B4). Socrates takes his statement on face value and accuses Simonides of riddling, so that Polemarchus is forced into the position of saying to Socrates, essentially, “Why isn’t it clear to you that he is speaking unclearly?” (332C4). In response to this playful challenge Socrates goes onto the attack, retaining the conceit that it is Simonides who must answer for the implications of the position Polemarchus has lately adopted.

Here begins an exercise of persistent questioning that will continue until 335D13, with a breathing pause at 334A11-B7. The questions and their answers stand in sharp contrast with the conversation we have just witnessed between Socrates and Cephalus, which also consisted of questions by Socrates and answers by his interlocutor. There, the answers were long and complicated and went far beyond the questions, which Cephalus had treated as taking-off points. After all, Socrates had invited Cephalus to “report” to him.<sup>151</sup> That kind of conversation reveals much about the answerer but helps the two of them learn little together. Here by contrast the questions are pointed and the answers are brief and pertinent. The give and the take fit each other tightly, and the logical movement of the thought is gradual and explicit, down to the smallest details in the Greek expression. I wish to bring out the details of this movement and show the contours of the thought by a careful consideration of its expression, since I feel that in this case the method is at least as important as its results.

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<sup>146</sup>The suddenness is in ὄρα (B9); the feigning is in αἰνίττεσθαι, which like μωνθάνειν above provides Socrates a means to show the answerer what he is freighted with defending (“answering for”). After all, Polemarchus has advocated the position of Simonides on the poet’s *authority* (cf. πείθεσθαι, 331D5). He is arguing Simonides’s position and Socrates has made Polemarchus responsible for the position himself only to the extent that Polemarchus is telling what about Simonides’s statement he approves of. When Polemarchus under the force of the ἔλεγχος has to modify Simonides’s position, in all likelihood he is improvising a solution without owning up that the solution is his own. If so, attempts to find lines in Simonides that represent this second position (e.g. Adam [who had helped Polemarchus by treating even his first citation of Simonides’s position as being this second one despite the words in Plato’s text {n.ad 331E31}] citing Xen.Hiero 2.2) are unneeded.

<sup>147</sup>διενοεῖτο (C1).

<sup>148</sup>τὸ προσῆκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι (C2): Socrates carefully repeats Polemarchus’s quotation of Simonides verbatim (331E3-4), changing only this one word, as if it were mere semantics (ώνόμασεν, C3).

<sup>149</sup>ἀλλὰ τί οἴει (C4). The emendations don’t help. Polemarchus seems to mean, “Obviously—what else do you think?” boasting that he himself understood all along when certainly he did not. Socrates in his usual manner ignores the bait and takes his interlocutor seriously (here, literally), and tells him what he thinks by starting an imaginary elenchus of Simonides.

<sup>150</sup>Solitary as before, and self-fulfilling as we now know.

<sup>151</sup>ἔξαγγέλλεις, 328E7; πυθοίμην, 328E4; πυνθάνεσθαι, 328E2.

The question with which Socrates initiates this new question-and-answer procedure—the question he would put to Simonides through Polemarchus—is striking: “By virtue of rendering what due and proper thing to whom is a certain craft called medicine?”<sup>152</sup> It is a double question and the interrogative pronouns are located in severely subordinate syntactical positions. The formulation of a question—especially in the uninflected languages—usually starts with the interrogative pronoun or adjective, and what is being asked is asked prominently, i.e., early and within the main construction. Here we have a double interrogative pronoun (doubling indicated by their proximity to each other) that is not the subject but the complement of a verb and the verb is not the main verb but a participle. The participle moreover is sandwiched between article and noun in the attributive position. Indeed the interrogative particles hold the most subordinate rank available in the sentence. It is noteworthy that Polemarchus nevertheless has no difficulty understanding Socrates’s question.<sup>153</sup>

The interrogative pronouns are placed in subordinate positions in order to give something else the ordinary or controlling role, something we might call at a first pass the “form” of the question. The form introduced by Socrates is like a matrix or a chart with three columns: the art, the thing it provides, and the thing to which it provides that thing, according to the proprieties<sup>154</sup> of the art. Socrates does not talk about such a chart, nor does he articulate its headings and distinguish columns from rows as it were, but he asks a question whose syntax requires his interlocutor’s mind to create a chart within itself. The question can be answered without Socrates articulating the headings in general terms, exactly because it is a specific question, a question about a specific thing. The case, that is, instantiates the general idea. This use of a case as a springboard to a general idea has given to the exercise of persistent questioning that Socrates has here initiated the name, “induction” (*ἐπαγωγή*). Polemarchus answers, “The one that renders drugs and a diet to bodies.”

In his second question, once Polemarchus has answered the first, Socrates uses exactly the same syntactical structure and word order. “By virtue of rendering what due and proper thing to what is a certain craft called cooking?” Having then given two questions whose parallelism obviates any need for articulating such headings, and Polemarchus having answered the second (“The one that gives flavoring to food”),<sup>155</sup> Socrates can ask a third question, which is the target question,<sup>156</sup> the filling-in of the

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<sup>152</sup> ἡ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὄφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται; (C6-7). The καὶ in ὄφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον is exegetical: “what’s ‘owed,’ i.e., what’s appropriate, which is what he meant.” Socrates re-uses this formula below (C11). The question introduces a matrix to be filled in with examples.

<sup>153</sup> δῆλον ὅτι (C9). More often Socrates’s interlocutor does not understand how to fill in the matrix: e.g. 382A7-9, 602C1-5. Cf. also 353C5-6, 510C2, 597D13, 601E5, 618C8-D5.

<sup>154</sup> I.e., the προσῆκον.

<sup>155</sup> ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα (D1). The exact meaning of ὄψον will become important below (372C2).

<sup>156</sup> οὖν δή (D2): That he has moved on to the target is not only revealed by the content of the question but is also announced by formal “discourse markers,” here the connective particle οὖν and the δή that indicates a before-and-after point in the discourse (for which compare ἢδη). For δή used in this way with connective particle δέ, cf. *Alc.* I 111E11; *Charm.* 169E4; *Leg.* 963B4; *Phdo* 65A9; *Prot.* 311D1, 312A1, 312E2; *Rep.* 333A10, 342A1, 349C4, 439A1, 470E4, 523E3; *Soph.* 221D1; *Thg.* 123C6, 123D15, 126C3; *Tht.* 185C4 (returning to true subject after an irreal warmup), 189A6. With connective ἀλλὰ, *Rep.* 335C14; with connective τε, *Rep.* 439D2-3; without connective, *Charm.* 166B5; *Symp.* 199E6.

For δή announcing the conclusion of an argument *ex contrariis*, *Rep.* 374C2; of a sorites, *Rep.* 351E6; of an analogy (which is tantamount to induction from one case), *Leg.* 808D3, 962A9, cf. 899B3; *Polit.* 294E4, 296C4, 296C8. The strength of this particle to indicate the move to the target is shown in *Rep.* 427D1, where it resumes a topic that has not been mentioned for pages. Contrast δὲ δή introducing surprised question, *Gorg.* 452B4, 452C3 (and Denniston *ad loc.*, 59); and marking a transition not to the target but (like δή infixes in lists [*supra*, n.38]) to a new class of examples: *Crito*

question-form that is relevant to the topic of conversation, namely the proprieties of an “art” of justice. That is, he does not have to generalize with a statement like, “Apparently each art (Item A) renders an appropriate something (Item B) to something (Item C).” The result of the first two questions is that Polemarchus has no trouble knowing where to look for the answer to the target question,<sup>157</sup> even though he may not have such an easy time finding the thing.

With the target question we have completed something since we have reached a result, namely an answer to the question that underlay the sequence and that was the purpose of the whole sequence to answer. We may again use our word “induction” (*ἐπαγωγή*) for this process.

A second induction now begins, again without warning. The only indication it has begun is that Socrates has asked a question. This time the question places the thing asked in a position that is prominent syntactically as well as in the word order (“Who is most able to help sick friends and harm enemies with respect to their disease and health?”). The new “form” adopts elements from the *definiens* of justice, namely, helping friends and harming enemies (*τὸ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἔχθρους κακῶς* [332D7]) and adds new variables: the state that the friend or enemy is in (here *κάμνοντας*) and the state or goal that the help or harm will bring about (done with *πρός* – *πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγιείαν*). We may imagine that Socrates has omitted, and that we are to supply, *ὑγιαίνοντας* with *ἔχθρούς*, as the state opposite to the state of the opposite parties, the friends. It is noteworthy that he forgoes the vividness he could have gotten by making explicit that the doctor will make sick friends healthy and healthy enemies sick.

Re-use of the example<sup>158</sup> of the doctor makes it especially easy for Polemarchus to answer the question, and he reveals this ease by answering with just the one word, “doctor.” This first question answered, Socrates can ask the second, which we may already anticipate will match the first in its form or matrix. The very fact of our anticipation however allows Socrates some freedom<sup>159</sup> to compress the second question: *τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον* (332E1). The only elements in the question are the interrogative pronoun itself and the “variables:” *πλέοντας* replaces *κάμνοντας* and (*πρὸς*) *τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον* replaces (*πρὸς*) *νόσον καὶ ὑγιείαν*. Moreover just as the previous question was abbreviated by leaving out *ὑγιαίνοντας*, here the pair of outcomes (disease and health) are abbreviated by the term *κίνδυνον*, representing both ruin and safety on the seas by means of itself designating the whole range of vicissitude.

#### 49C2.

<sup>157</sup> N.b., εἰ ... δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν ... τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις (D4-5).

<sup>158</sup> Re-use of an exemplary case as a stepping stone to a new or higher level is a common pedagogical technique in real life and in the Socratic epagoge. *Crat.*387-8 (*τέμνειν*); *Leg.*631C1-D1 (dovetailing by means of *πλοῦτος*), 694E6-7 (*ποίμνια / πρόβατα*), 906C4-6 (adapting material from the list of ὄρχοντες at 905E); *Minos* 313B-314,ff (re-use of Phoenix); *Phdrs.*268A8-269D8 (re-use of Pericles); *Tht.*184D7ff and 185A4ff (eyes and ears); *Symp.*199D (re-use of *πατήρ*).

<sup>159</sup> Note also that though he repeats the doctor he does not repeat the cook (*μάγειρος*, C11-12). The teacher must always move on to new illustrative examples lest a single example begin to accrue the dignity of the precept. By far the most natural pattern in the use of exemplary material as the argument proceeds forward is therefore “overlapping substitution:” 352D8-353E11 (eyes/ears are repeated but the knife is dropped), 419A5-6 (redone at 420E1-421A2), 444C5-E6ff, 479A1-8 (cf.475E9-6A5); *Charm.*165E-166B (AB in question and AC in answer), 170AC (*sim.*); *Gorg.*450D6-7 redone at 451B1ff (where *πεττευτική* is dropped); *Leg.*643B7-C2, 709A3-7 and B2-3, 961D1-962A9; *Phdo* 70E4-71A10 (redone with overlap substitution at 71B2); *Prot.*311B5-C7 (cf.E2-3), 319BD; *Symp.*200BD; *Tht.*147B (and Campbell, with more examples, *ad loc.*, defended the manuscripts against a streamlining emendation: “It is in Plato’s manner to surprise us with a fresh example at each step of the argument instead of dwelling upon one already adduced”). *Leg.*889B6-8 and 892B3-4 is noteworthy since the latter passage purports to refer back to the former but alters the contents with overlapping substitution.

Again Polemarchus is able to answer with a single word, “pilot,” so that Socrates can ask his third question, which opens with an interrogative, but a neuter interrogative pronoun rather than a masculine nominative: τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; What about the just man? (E3). What had been the “unknown” – namely the identity of the person who moves friends and enemies from one state to the other -- is now the “given,” and the unknown is, What is the result that the person with this identity brings about? The move to the target includes a sort of commutation consisting of holding a different variable fixed and deriving the other from it. In asking the question for the result that corresponds to the just man Socrates has occasion to articulate the heading of the variable, namely, ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον, and to spell out the fixed contents of the form that he had left out in the two example-questions, namely, φίλους ὥφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν. The two parts of the heading ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον correspond respectively with κάμνοντας (and understood ὑγιαίνοντας) / πλέοντας, on the one hand, and πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγιείαν / πρὸς τὸν θαλάττης κίνδυνον, on the other.

Polemarchus has no difficulty understanding the question but answers it with a hint of diffidence.<sup>160</sup> His answer reverses the order of the question by telling what activity the just man is most capable of bringing about against the enemy (i.e., προσπολεμεῖν) before telling what activity he is most capable of bringing about for the benefit of the friend (i.e., συμμάχειν).<sup>161</sup>

Socrates marks a transition with εἰν, and asks a follow-up version of the two example questions, with a third induction. If the friend and enemy aren’t sick (κάμνουσι from κάμνοντας above) is the doctor of no use? If the friend and enemy aren’t sailing have we no use for the pilot? And so<sup>162</sup> if people aren’t at war<sup>163</sup> does the just man become useless?<sup>164</sup>

Polemarchus cannot still<sup>165</sup> say Yes. Since the function of the just man had been articulated in the

<sup>160</sup> ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ συμμάχειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ (E5).

<sup>161</sup> Reading προσπολεμεῖν (E5) with mss. ADM rather than the προπολεμεῖν of F (which would be an exegetical synonym for συμμάχειν and like κάμνοντας above [D10] would specify only the treatment of friends). Chiastic order between question and answer (AB,BA) is just as natural as, but more common than, repetition of the order of the question in the answer (AB,AB). It is a case of the chiasm of before and after (cf. n. 18). Adam’s note reveals a presumption that epagogic word order must observe the niceties of symmetry, which we are taking pains herewith to disprove.

<sup>162</sup> ἄρα (E11) marking the target by making it a question, the two examples being presented as statements. The καὶ (*ibid.*) is correlative.

<sup>163</sup> The single expression πολεμοῦσι (E11) covers both συμμάχειν and προσπολεμεῖν, just as κίνδυνος above had covered both salvation and wreckage.

<sup>164</sup> ἀχρηστος (E11) had been used in the two example-statements (explicit in E7; understood in E9), but when it is used with ὁ δίκαιος it suddenly sounds different and has a new connotation of failing to be a χρήσιμος ἀνήρ. χρήσιμος, like δίκαιος, and like Cephalus’s terms κόσμιος (329D4) and ἐπιεικῆς (330A5, 331B1), are terms widely used in causal speech. Although their users might not be able to define justice or usefulness, the terms fall easily from their lips as terms of approbation (just as the of them is merely an insult). In the vocabulary of moral valuation the *tertium* is often ignored in this way (viz. when one says a man is not moral he most often means by a litotes to say that he is immoral).

<sup>165</sup> τοῦτο (E12) referring to the proximate question, in contrast to the ones that came before. It is narrow but true to say that the questioner’s job in a dialectical conversation is to secure yes-answers (so Arist. *Topics*: cf. B. Einarson *AJP* 57[1936]33-54 and 151-72), since yes answers (and, of course, no-answers to questions that expect no) allow him to continue accumulating the propositions that will constitute a συμπέρασμα. At the same time, the answerer expects to say yes—that is, he expects to be asked questions whose answer is obvious, and indeed must give the obvious answer (*H. Maj.* 304A3, cf. *Erastae* 138DE)—and then he suddenly discovers he has granted enough to be refuted; he must answer yes if the proposition is a correct one. Dialectical questioning fails when the answerer says no,

contrast between his treatment of friends and enemies he will naturally be thought of as participating in the tension between friends and enemies as a helper to the former and an enemy of the latter. Hence, Polemarchus overdraw the activity of the just man as being helpful in war; but this leaves the just man “useless” in peace, which is doubly repugnant. Not only do vital questions of justice and injustice arise in peacetime; it is also repugnant to think of the just man as being “worthless” rather than “worthy” at *any* time.<sup>166</sup>

Socrates next infers<sup>167</sup> from Polemarchus’s response that he is willing to grant him the opposite, that the just (333) man is a useful and worthwhile person in peacetime. But<sup>168</sup> there are other peacetime activities, such as farming; and this activity, like medicine and like piloting a ship, has its own outcome, its own goal that it brings about, in this case the acquisition of food.<sup>169</sup> Shoemaking too is useful in peacetime, for the goal of acquiring shoes. What then about justice, our target<sup>170</sup> case? To acquire what, or to fulfill what need (*χρεία*, from *άχρηστος*, E7), is justice useful during peacetime?

Polemarchus thinks of business deals where parties with adverse interests come to an agreement (*πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια*, A12).<sup>171</sup> Socrates responds with a new kind of question, presuming to suggest<sup>172</sup> a clarification about what Polemarchus has said: the just man will be useful (in dealing with friends and enemies) not in the role of the person one makes a deal with but as a person helping one to make the deal with someone else.<sup>173</sup> Polemarchus accepts the corrective clarification as fully justified,<sup>174</sup> enabling Socrates to begin a new sequence of questions.

The new question-form is recognizably a modification of the one we had above,<sup>175</sup> but Socrates’s choice of playing draughts as his initial example of the general principle is striking both in its content and in its diction: *ἄρ’ οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν*. To ask about

and it turns to eristic when the answerer tries to say no.

<sup>166</sup>Cf. 333E1ff. Many of Socrates’s elenchi end, as this one does, in a *reductio ad absurdum*. The result is absurd not because it contradicts another of the answerer’s premises (in this case he will have a choice which one to rescind or modify) but because it contradicts a proposition absurd to deny. Since it is never necessary to assert a proposition that “goes without saying” such propositions remain implicit until as here an argument leads to their contradictory.

<sup>167</sup>αρα (E13).

<sup>168</sup>The force of *καὶ γάρ* (333A2), as at 340A9 and *Euthyph.* 14A1, is to concede the truth of the answer only to deny its value as an answer: “To say justice is useful in peace tells me little, since farming is also useful—useful in its case at least (*γε*) for the acquisition of food.”

<sup>169</sup>*πρὸς γε καρποῦ κτῆσιν* (A4) Socrates gently indicates the connection by using *πρὸς* plus accusative again, emphasized by *γε*.

<sup>170</sup>Note δὲ δή (A10).

<sup>171</sup>In using *πρὸς* in his answer (A12) he follows suit with the form of the question.

<sup>172</sup>δέ (A13): a connective instead of an interrogative particle at the beginning of his “question” presumes his interlocutor knows he will be asking a question, as often (335B6, 376E11, 377A1). Compare ὅν “carried forward” (cf. 382D11 and n. 1280) Contrast *ἄρ’ οὖν* which he next uses.

<sup>173</sup>This is corroborated in the sequel, which focusses on the role of the *κοινωνός*. The point of the substitution is that contractual relationships require fairness but partnerships presume it. D.J.Allen’s notion of a “partnership between buyer and seller” makes nonsense of all three of these terms.

<sup>174</sup>δῆτα (A14) acknowledges that he is giving the response Socrates is expecting, and thus indicates he believes that Socrates’s presumption to be clarifying his meaning is correct.

<sup>175</sup>Compare 333B1-2 (*ἄρ’ οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν*) with 332D10-11 (*τίς δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὗ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγιείαν*). We have *χρήσιμος* instead of *δυνατός*, and *εἰς* instead of *πρὸς*; and instead of the “helping friends and harming enemies” formula we have simply “partnership” (*κοινωνός*).

turning to a “good and just” friend<sup>176</sup> for help playing draughts would in itself be almost a ridiculous question except that within the question Socrates suggests the answer is No, since the draughts-master would obviously<sup>177</sup> be the proper κοινωνός. Just as obviously the expected answer is, for the first time in this dialectical exercise, “No,” though in a sense No here means Yes. The exemplary content, draughts, is inappropriate and unexpected, exactly in order to make the answer immediately clear.<sup>178</sup> What is moreover striking in the diction of the question is the periphrastic formulation of playing draughts, namely, πεττῶν θέσις (“draught placement”). We speak of playing chess rather than of placing the chessmen. So that in addition to our having to make an adjustment to answer No instead of Yes, we have to field a curiously playful expression of the “goal” to be achieved with the help of the κοινωνός. Since the answer to the entire question is nevertheless obvious, we can make an answer, and we do: Polemarchus says, unhesitatingly, ὁ πεττευτικός (B3).

In the next example-question<sup>179</sup> we again have a combination of repetition and variation: “Is the just man a more useful and better helper for the placement of bricks and stones (!) than the house builder?”<sup>180</sup> The repetition of “placement” (θέσις) suggests a stability in the question-form and also its use with placing *bricks* is less strange than its use with draughts, but as soon as we feel re-assured that the question-form has calmed down we realize that θέσις, the term that has conferred stability onto the question-form, has been used equivocally. In the first question we had to countenance a strangeness of expression (πεττῶν θέσις) and here we are served up a little joke because of the equivocation.<sup>181</sup> In both cases it is semantic freedom that is at work, a freedom made possible by the presence of ideas shared between the interlocutors, behind and despite the words they are using for them.

The next question, as we might expect from its being third, is the target question: ἀλλ’ εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδόμικοῦ τε καὶ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων. Again because the question before it expected a negative, it is introduced by ἀλλά. That it is the target question is confirmed by δὴ. But instead of repeating the notion of help “toward” (εἰς) the θέσις of something, he begins the statement with the question εἰς τίνα κοινωνίαν. If the just man is not the helpmate for draughts, then for what joint effort is he the

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<sup>176</sup>That the κοινωνός is a friend is implicit. Note that in addition to being χρήσιμος the κοινωνός is stipulated to be ἀγαθός (B1, the adjective being attributive). Addition of this term is meant to memorialize Polemarchus’s *moral* aversion to the inference that the δίκαιος might be ἄχρηστος. Socrates echoes the stipulation in the subsequent example-questions (ἀμείνων [B5,B7]), but then drops it.

<sup>177</sup>What makes it obvious is the etymological connection between πεττεία and πεττευτικός. As there is a rhetorical, there is also a dialectical *figura etymologica*. This is the first one we have encountered in the dialogue so far. Often a superficial use of etymology leads to error: Rep.348C5 (treating κακοθεία as the opposite of εὐηθεία); 439E5 (θυμοειδές / ἐπιθυμία). Cf. n. ad 375A2-3.

<sup>178</sup>Playing draughts is not a throwaway item, however. It is one of Socrates’s favorite examples for mental activity, respectable therefore in some respects although not in others. It was invented by Theuth alongside mathematics and writing (*Phdr.274CD*); it enjoys pride of place therefore alongside geometry and the rest (*Gorg.450D6-7* [cf. Dodds *ad loc.*]; *Leg.820C7, 820D1-2; Polit.299E1*). It can stand for a kind of knowledge that does not improve the soul (*Charm.174B*), and a kind of knowledge that jokingly vies with virtue for being hard to teach (*Alc.I, 110E*). At 374C5-7 below it is compared with the art of war in an *a fortiori* argument.

<sup>179</sup>ἀλλά (B4) introduces the question because like the last one it is designed to incite resistance and get a “No” answer.

<sup>180</sup>τοῦ οἰκοδόμικοῦ (B5): In place of a choice between two we have a comparison between two, with comparative adjectives replacing adjectives in the positive grade, and a genitive of comparison replacing an ἢ (B2) that had meant “or else.”

<sup>181</sup>In English we do refer to a mason as a bricklayer but never to a chessplayer as a pawnplacer.

helpmate? And as the question unfurls it reveals, as if hidden in its folds, another case that comes into play at the last minute: the cithera player and his θέσις (understood with εἰς κρουμάτων) of musical notes.<sup>182</sup>

The principle that governs this flow of variations, repetitions and surprises is *pedagogical pacing*. All teachers go slowly to make sure the student catches on, but once he has caught on the teacher shifts into a higher gear and goes somewhere more quickly. Inserting a last illustrative example even after the target case has been articulated can be the teacher's way of showing the student that the teacher knows that the student already understands and that he knows it too, or a way of calling back into question the student's belief that he has come to a resting point. Done too early this move will leave the student in the dust; well timed it will bring him right alongside but still alert.<sup>183</sup>

Polemarchus is indeed keeping up, as the brevity of his answer reveals: εἰς ἀργυρίου. With εἰς, the accusative we have to supply is not the κοινωνίαν that went with εἰς at the beginning of the question, but θέσιν, which we just supplied with the more proximate εἰς κρουμάτων. Among experts who are good helpmates in the “placement” of the various objects with which they severally deal, the just man will be the best helpmate here, in the “placement of silver.” In the previous questions θέσις had indeed been used obtrusively and even equivocally, and so it is used this time. Polemarchus is not talking about which square to place the silver on, nor where to place each piece of silver so as to make a house, nor even the placement of a silver *re* between a silver *do* and a silver *mi*. He is talking about depositing the silver—i.e., placing it *simpliciter*.<sup>184</sup>

A result has been reached and an epagoge completed, but Socrates immediately starts another one based on this result, and immediately reveals<sup>185</sup> that he means to challenge the conclusion: “Except

<sup>182</sup>τε (B8) is noteworthy, as an unobtrusive (because enclitic) wedge making a place for an otherwise unexpected καί which in turn (because proclitic) creates a berth for the new item, cithera-playing. For this τε cf. Leg.633C1.

<sup>183</sup>For other instances of clinching the point with an accelerated last minute addition of exemplary material after the conclusion is reached, cf. Charm.168E9f; Crito 47B9-10 (eating and drinking added [with γε]); Lach.193AC (a single non-military example); Leg.658A7 (ἰππικόν added to imitate the indiscriminateness of the contest maker), 716D2-3 (but note mss.); Lysis 220A1-6; Phdo 64D (clothes), 96D8-E1; Polit.284E4-5, 293B5-6 (εἴτε καὶ αὐξάνοντες); Prot.332B6-C8 (where adding τῇ φωνῇ clinches the point by disambiguating the last example), 356C5-8 (adding acoustics); Rep.340D2-7 (γραμματιστής), 475E1 (τεχνυδρίων added after harder parallels are excluded).

Sometimes the last minute addition actually begins a transition to something new, as when at Gorg.475A1-2 the addition of the new item μαθήματα to the list from 474D3-4 moves the interlocutor to volunteer a generalization; or as when the addition of γυμναστής at Leg.720E2-3 begins to free us from the paradigm of the doctor so that we can move on to that of the lawgiver; or as when the elaboration of the conclusion elicits a transitional objection from Glaucon, at Rep.475B11-C8. Compare also the addition of sleeping and waking to the other pairs of opposites at Phdo 71C1-2 and, at Charm.161D-162A, the re-instantiation of the principle reached with new examples that usher in the next step of the argument.

Related is the better known and much more commonly employed technique, dubbed “cumulative illustration” by Campbell (Rep.2.259), the technique of moving through exemplary material at an accelerated rate before drawing the conclusion (e.g., Rep.438B4-C4, 507C1-5), including generalization or lavishing particularization of the last item (e.g., Phdo 70E6-71A10; Phileb.21D9-10). For a fuller treatment of this range of phenomena cf. n.202).

<sup>184</sup>We are right back at the dilemma of placing one's possessions in the hands of another (παρακαταθέσθαι, 331E9 and 332A12), except that there it was gold (332A12) and here it is silver. Does Polemarchus not yet realize this?

<sup>185</sup>πλήν γ' ἵσως (B11).

perhaps not for *using* silver,<sup>186</sup> when one needs help<sup>187</sup> to buy or to sell<sup>188</sup> a horse. Then it's the horse expert (sc. who would be a better κοινωνός)."<sup>189</sup>

Polemarchus's answer is lukewarm: "So it seems." Perhaps he is tiring of the attempt to make sense of Simonides's position. When Socrates continues with "And again<sup>190</sup> whenever you need a boat, is it the shipbuilder or the pilot?"<sup>191</sup> he answers similarly: "Looks like it." Unconcerned, Socrates moves on to the target question,<sup>192</sup> "When one needs help to use silver or gold to do *what*, is the just man more useful than the others?" In his formulation of the target question Socrates is careful to replace the comparative "better" with the comparative "more useful," not only to highlight the connection between the usefulness of the κοινωνός and that of the money, but also because this is the original and exactly pertinent version of the question-form.<sup>193</sup> The last minute addition of gold<sup>194</sup> to Polemarchus's silver might just be a suggestion to him that, yes, he must concede that we are back where we began. In any event Polemarchus does concede just this, by answering, "Whenever one needs help depositing it and keeping it safe," using in his answer the very term with which the whole dilemma began ([παρα]καταθέσθαι).<sup>195</sup>

The logos, we may now begin to feel, will proceed deliberately to its completion. The time in which we take a stab at saying something in conversation is a different kind of time from the time in which the logos comes to be understood fully or "critically"—as I hope my extensive exegesis of the present page shows.

<sup>186</sup>I.e., when it is to be spent rather than placed. Clearly Polemarchus did not mean by θέσις ἀργυμάτου a decision whose hands to place it in!

<sup>187</sup>κοινῇ (B12), an adverb, reproduces κοινωνός.

<sup>188</sup>That the κοινωνός is a consultant, rather than a client or a venture partner with whom one might consummate a συμβόλαιον, becomes crystal clear at this point, and with it the need to clarify συμβόλαια with κοινωνήματα at A13.

<sup>189</sup>πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι (B11): Socrates's objection-question-form places χρῆσθαι, as a new general heading, into the position of the εἰς τί (for which he has reverted to πρὸς τί) and then instantiates it (buying or selling a *horse*), and suggests which κοινωνός would be better than the just man in that instance (ὁ ιππικός). Notably, the instantiation is done with a present general conditional protasis, itself introduced in a mild anacoluthon which I have reproduced in my paraphrase (ώσπερ [vel.sim.] is wanting).

<sup>190</sup>καὶ μὴν... γε (C3), following πλὴν γε in the previous question, shows that this question threatens further (καί) damage to Polemarchus's position.

<sup>191</sup>ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης (C3): the acceleration gotten by suggesting two terms when only one is needed is ominous.

<sup>192</sup>Announced by οὖν (C5).

<sup>193</sup>In its first articulation the criterion was τὸ χρήσιμον (332E13), arising as an objection to ἄχρηστος (332E11), which Polemarchus found morally derogatory. Socrates humored this objection by adding ἀγαθός to χρήσιμος at B1 (cf. n. *ad loc.*). In his next question he retained both adjectives in a comparative formulation (B4-5), and in the next he reduced them to the single comparative ἀμείνων (B7). In the last phase of the argument (B11-here) his question-form did not need to make the adjective explicit and he used none (C1: ὁ ιππικός [sc. ἀμείνων κοινωνός ἐστι]); ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης [sc. ἀμείνονες κοινωνοί εἰσιν]). Here, as is appropriate in the definitive and concluding question (which we should call the συμπέρασμα), he reverts to the original formulation, speaks amply, and leaves out the "scire licet."

<sup>194</sup>ἢ χρησίω (C5): an instance of the technique noted above (n. 183), where the last minute addition facilitates a transition, this time a reversion to the original formulation of 332A11-B3.

<sup>195</sup>παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι (C7): cf. 331E9 and 332A12. The double infinitive describes the activities of the two κοινωνοί, one man putting it into the custody of the other and the other keeping it safe for him.

Inexorably Socrates does continue the questions. To deposit the thing and keep it safe means it's unneeded. Thus, it is only when<sup>196</sup> silver is *unneeded* (i.e., useless!) that justice becomes *useful*. Polemarchus accepts the former more readily than the latter<sup>197</sup> since the latter comes nearer the absurdity he has been trying to avoid, that justice is useless. Socrates continues with a question that presents itself as parallel.<sup>198</sup> When it's necessary to guard a scythe, then justice is useful, whether one is guarding it for oneself or for another;<sup>199</sup> but when it's necessary to use it, then gardening is the art that is useful. Polemarchus agrees with less enthusiasm<sup>200</sup> and Socrates asks whether he will agree<sup>201</sup> that when similarly one needs to guard the shield and the lyre<sup>202</sup> rather than put them to use,<sup>203</sup> then use there will be for justice, but when he needs to use them it will be the hoplite's art and the musician's art that will be useful. Polemarchus agrees,<sup>204</sup> and Socrates is able to generalize with a paradox: Justice is useless when something is useful and useful when something is useless.

As such justice would seem not to be a very serious thing,<sup>205</sup> but Socrates proposes a new tack of questions.<sup>206</sup> The man most able to attack in battle, whether it in a boxing match or whatever,<sup>207</sup> is

<sup>196</sup>ἄρα with ὅταν (C11).

<sup>197</sup>πάνυ γέ (C10) vs. κινδυνεύει (D2).

<sup>198</sup>καὶ ὅταν (D3).

<sup>199</sup>καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἴδιᾳ (D4). The action is useful to the depositor, but the usefulness is inherent within the act of guarding, whoever does it.

<sup>200</sup>φαίνεται (D5).

<sup>201</sup>φήσεις (D6), assert or declare to be true a proposition voiced by another, as at 377E8, whence οὐ φημι means "deny."

<sup>202</sup>Note the pacing of the examples, first one (C11f), and then another with expanded articulation of the question (expanded both by καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἴδιᾳ and by the ὅταν δέ clause, D3-4), then the expanded articulation applied to two examples simultaneously (D6-8), then the generalization (D10-11). Moreover, the new examples, shield and lyre, range back and re-use previous exemplary material (cithara, B8; war, 332E5), widening thereby the application of the current result.

For this and other pacing strategies cf. (with notes) 334C12, 353C5-6, 397E6-7, 437B1-4, 438B4-C4, 442E4-3A10, 455E6-6A12 (where note the freedom in the development of cases), 507C1-5; *Charm.*168BD, 173DE; *Crat.*390B1-C5; *Euthyd.*298D; *Gorg.*495E6-6B5; *Ion* 540B6-D2; *Leg.*643B8-C1, 709B2-3; *Phdo* 70E6-71A10, 75C9-D2ff, 90A4-9, 105D13ff; *Soph.*258B10-C3 (where the mss. readings exhibit pacing and emendation is unnecessary); *Tht.*188D7-9A14; *Tim.*82A8-B2.

<sup>203</sup>φυλάττειν (D6, repeated from D3), is here elaborated by καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι adduced from C8 as the original warrant for φυλάττειν at D3, with χρῆσθαι placed at the end of the protasis so as to maximize the connection with the usefulness of justice, here the first word of the apodosis (D7). The noose tightens.

<sup>204</sup>ἀνάγκη (D9): The necessity he refers to pertains only to the "analytic" truths that a musician uses the lyre and a soldier the shield. ἀνάγκῃ and ἀναγκαῖον are often used of logical truths and truths by definition (353E4, 443C3, 458D2; *Charm.*168C3; *Phdo* 87E1; *Prot.*332B1). By a conversational convention he agrees to the whole by agreeing to the last (as 374D7, 433C3, 462D4, 463B13, 477E2, 495C7, 529D4-6, and 611A10 [τοῦτο denying the whole by denying the last]; *Gorg.*453D10-11; *Prot.*333E5-4A2, 354B), to which compare the convention of answering a series of questions in reverse order (as *Charm.*169D5-8, D9; *Euthyph.*2B3, 10B3; *Leg.*890E6ff [and England *ad loc.*]; *Phlb.*54A6; *Rep.*462D6-7). Cf. Riddell, *Digest* §§305-6.

<sup>205</sup>οὐκ ... πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον (E1): From above (332E11-12), that justice should be useless is an absurdity. That same conclusion is here mitigated by understatement.

<sup>206</sup>τόδε τι (E3): It is noteworthy that he does not pause to secure the answerer's agreement to the conclusion but moves on, owning up to the fact that it is with an idea of his own (first person demonstrative). Soon enough we will see where he is going, and what is going on.

<sup>207</sup>ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ὄλλῃ (E3-4) chooses either the wrong genus (*μάχῃ* should have been ἀγῶνι) or the wrong species (*πυκτικῇ* should have been ὄπλητικῇ) but then quickly makes

also most able to (334) defend; and a man able to defend against and elude<sup>208</sup> disease is most able to bring it on. When it comes to an army the man that is good at guarding it is the same as the one that is good at stealing the enemy's plans and other maneuvers.<sup>209</sup> Thus in general whatever someone is good at guarding he is good at stealing, and our just man, who is by definition a guard of silver, has turned out<sup>210</sup> to be a silver thief!<sup>211</sup> The apparent absurdity of the conclusion is then continued in the inference Socrates draws from it,<sup>212</sup> that Polemarchus learned this position not from Simonides like the last one but from Homer himself, who praised Odysseus's maternal grandfather, Autolycus, for excelling all men 'in stealth and trust.'<sup>213</sup> "To sum it all up you and Homer and Simonides all see justice as a kind of stealthiness, as long as it works for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies. Is this not what you were arguing?" Socrates asks him.

the error moot by generalizing with εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ. Campbell's comment that πυκτική is "added to vary the notion of μάχη from ὀπλητική," notices the awkwardness, but his solution doesn't help since by playing the role of the genus, μάχη retains more of ὀπλητική than it leaves behind.

<sup>208</sup>I place a comma after λαθεῖν and read ἐμποιῆσαι (E7), with all mss. To take νόσον as the object of λαθεῖν (Jowett *ad loc.* calls it a personification) is easier than breaking the parallelism of οὐτος with οὗτος above and ὅσπερ below, and avoids the awkward suggestion that λαθεῖν rather than ἐμποιῆσαι is being contrasted with φυλάξασθαι. Cf. κλέψαι below taking πράξεις. The parallelism is improved by reading καί before ἐμποιῆσαι, read by Stallbaum with the note "in multis codicis abest." It is conversely reported by Adam as the reading of the corrector of Venetus 185 (Burnet's D) and of the Monacensis 237. Slings attributes it only to the former. All notice of the reading has since been dropped in Burnet and in Chambry.

<sup>209</sup>τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ([sc. ἀγαθὸς] κλέψαι) καὶ βουλεύματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις (334A2-3), another awkward list due to καί proleptic with βουλεύματα in interrupted attributive position after τά, but followed by correlative καί and a new article that renews the attributive position. κλέψαι is as awkward taking τὰς πράξεις (esp. after taking τὰ βουλεύματα) as λαθεῖν was taking νόσον above. To point out with Campbell (*ad loc.*) that κλέψαι can mean steal as well as overtake recognizes the problem but burdens us with a far-fetched zeugma.

<sup>210</sup>ἀναπέφανται (A10). Both the prefix and the tense express surprise at the conclusion.

While φαίνεσθαι with infinitive in *oratio obliqua* designates uncertainty, or the sense that more thinking is needed, with the participle (the construction with verbs of perception) it can designate an assertion as "perceived" (to be true) at some moment during or at some place in the dialectical process and rethinking is no longer necessary. This dialectical use of the verb is one of many evidences that the conversation is viewed as an event or an experience. To think of the contents of an ongoing conversation in this way and to "follow the logos whithersoever it may lead" resembles and anticipates Hegel's concept of phenomenology. Cf. n.1427.

For instances of the term, cf. *Alc.* I 112D8-9; *Charm.* I 54D4-5, 172A8; *Crat.* 387D1-2; *Crito* 48D3; *Gorg.* 460E1-2, 481B5, 495B4-5, 508E7, 517A4; *Euthyd.* 282A2, 289A3, 297A6; *Euthyph.* 9C8; *H. Maj.* 291C8, 294E7-9 (with elaboration of the metaphor), 300D6 and 7, 302D6; *H. Min.* 369B3, 371E7 (with ἄρτι); *Ion* 541E8; *Lach.* 193D2 (with ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν); *Leg.* 646D8, 896C6; *Lys.* 220A4, 220E3, 220E4; *Phdo* 94C9 (with νῦν); *Phdrs.* 245C2, 261D7-8; *Prot.* 333B5-6, 355B6, 357A6, 360C3; *Rep.* 335E5, 336A9-10, 350C10, 441A5-6, 445B3-4, 587A13, 612D8; *Soph.* 232B3-4, 233C11, 258A7-8, 260B7-8, 264C1; *Tht.* 179B8-9, 181B2, 181E6, 190E3, 5. It can be so used absolutely (without *oratio obliqua*): *Charm.* I 66D9 (prob. = "as it appears to you at the moment" cf. *Rep.* 337C5), 175B1; *Crito* 46D6; *Euthyd.* 289D10; *Gorg.* 527E2; *Rep.* 434E3-5A3 (elaborating the metaphor), 484A2, 487B7, 491C8, 602D6; *Soph.* 231B6-7 (παραφανέντι; cf. φάντασμα, *infra* 232A2-3), 256D4, 264C11; *Tht.* 157D4, 183A4, 199C8 (παραφαίνεσθαι). It can be used in a personal construction (e.g., "We will become obvious being wrong"): *Euthyd.* 282A2; 294E7-9; *Leg.* 898D6-7; *Lys.* 220B1; *Prot.* 313C2; *Tht.* 165C8, 181B2. Construction with the participle of εἶναι is often not made explicit: *Crito* 48C1; *Gorg.* 457D4 (with νῦν), 478E1, 479D2, 508E7 (where the metaphor is spatial rather than temporal); *Euthyd.* 292B7; *H. Maj.* 293B5, 297C6 (mildly contrasted with δοκεῖν), 297D3 (with ἄρτι), 303E12 (with νυνδή); *H. Min.* 375D5;

Polemarchus cries uncle in response to all this playful banter.“I no longer know what I was trying to say! But this last part of it that you just said<sup>214</sup> I do still believe, that justice helps friends and harms enemies.” For what it is worth, he has dropped his dependency on Simonides and now will present and defend what is his own belief.

Socrates asks, Would you argue<sup>215</sup> that friends are those a given person feels to be worthy or those that really are worthy despite what the person feels, and enemies likewise? Instead of making an argument Polemarchus makes an observation: “It would seem that a person likes people that he believes<sup>216</sup> to be worthwhile and despises those he believes to be wicked.”<sup>217</sup> Recognizing the empiricism Socrates asks whether men in fact err in their judgment of peoples’ worth, in which case they might often feel somebody is worthwhile who isn’t and vice-versa. Polemarchus agreeing then makes it possible for Socrates to infer that for people so disposed, good men would be counted enemies and bad ones friends: would it be just for these people then to help the wicked<sup>218</sup> ones and

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Leg.896B1, 899B6; Lys.218B5; Phdo 76A1; Phlb.11D11, E1, 21A1, 31A5, 66A9, 66E8, 67A3; Polit.268B8, 305C10; Prot.351E5, 355B6; Rep.383A1, 351A4, 440E2, 464B5, 478D11-12, 584A2 and 3 (cf. φάντασματα, *infra* A7-10), 602D6, 611B7; Soph.224D2, 233C8; Thet.151E2, 157D3 (cf. φάντασμα, 155A2). At Rep.454D it takes partipile in the μέν and infinitive in the δέ clause, the latter perhaps by an attraction from the ensuing articular infinitives.

For dialectical φάντασθαι with prefix ἀνα- acknowledging the change of perspective caused by the discovery, cf. Charm.175D5 (after B1); Gorg.514A4, H.Min.369B3, Ion 541E8; Leg.896B1; Lys.220E4; Polit.305C10; Rep.350C10, 484A2, 487B7; Soph.224D2, 233C11, 260B7-8; Thet.157D3, 164C3. For use of the perfect πεφάσθαι cf. Rep.410A6, 464B5, 478D11-12; Soph.231B9-C2, 264C1; for ἀναπεφάσθαι cf. Charm.160D3, 172A8; H.Min.369B3, Phdr.245E2, 261D7-8; Rep.350C10; Soph.233C11. With prefix προ- cf. 545B1, Charm.173A3.

There is a “dialectical” γίγνεσθαι as well, depicting a position as arising (as a truth) in the dialectical process (Gorg.459A7, 478D7, 494D7, 512D5; Lys.219B7; etc.). The two idioms are combined at Thet.186E12: καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ὄν.

<sup>211</sup>καὶ κινδυνεύεις ... μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό (A10-11): As the sloppy language indicates the argument is merely a jocular appendix to the main reductio by which Socrates stealthily races to the conclusion that the just man is a thief. The three cases simply exemplify the general principle of the μία δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων, and it is on the force of this general principle—though, as often, it is not enunciated as such -- that the just man, *qua* guard, becomes thief.

<sup>212</sup>He simply steps forward with καί (A10), just as he had moved abruptly into the argument he has just finished with τόδε δέ (333E3).

<sup>213</sup>Αὐτόλυκος (B1), “Very-wolf,” quoting H.Od.19.395-6.

<sup>214</sup>τοῦτο (B8), second person demonstrative, quoting Socrates’s μέντοι clause (B5) which for the first time used this language of ὡφελία and βλάβη.

<sup>215</sup>With λέγεις (C1) Socrates continues ἔλεγες (B5) and ἔλεγον (B6), emphasizing that the position Polemarchus is taking is his own.

<sup>216</sup>δοκεῖν in Socrates’s question (C1,C2), easily pairs up with the contrasting εἰναι (ὄντας, C2) because weak; ἥγεῖσθαι (in Polemarchus’s answer, C4) is a stronger term. “Feel” in English gets the relevant weakness of δοκεῖν. On the different modality of these terms cf. L.Bodin, *Lire le Protagoras* (Paris 1975).

<sup>217</sup>That is, it is not that I like him (φιλῶ) because he is a friend (φίλος) but that he is a friend (φίλος) because I like him (φιλῶ), for his worth.

<sup>218</sup>Substitution of πονηρούς (C12) for κακού (C10) is also a reversion to the πονηρούς of C5 for which κακού had been a substitute. Varying the terms used for the same idea is part of dialectical pacing.

harm the good? From their point of view, yes;<sup>219</sup> but in truth, the good ones by virtue of being good<sup>220</sup> are also just and as such<sup>221</sup> not the kind of people who do injustice. Polemarchus agrees to this as being independently true,<sup>222</sup> so that Socrates can draw the conclusion that according to the position Polemarchus has taken,<sup>223</sup> to treat people badly who do no<sup>224</sup> injustice, is just.<sup>225</sup>

Polemarchus vehemently<sup>226</sup> denies this on the grounds that it is a “wicked” conclusion,<sup>227</sup> but instead of stopping to remark on his joke Socrates exploits his vehemence to secure his hasty<sup>228</sup> agreement to the converse proposition, that it is the unjust<sup>229</sup> whom it is just to harm and the just it is just to help. To this Polemarchus agrees, again on the basis of his reaction to the idea than on the merits of the argument *per se*,<sup>230</sup> which allows Socrates hastily<sup>231</sup> to draw an alternate inference that for all those people we mentioned above that misestimate people, it will turn out to be just for them to harm their friends, who in themselves<sup>232</sup> are wicked, and to help their enemies on the belief they are good—the very opposite of the position Simonides inspired us to adopt at the beginning.<sup>233</sup>

<sup>219</sup>Polemarchus’s φαίνεται (D2) denotes the restricted sense of mere appearance, to be distinguished from “dialectical” φαίνεται.

<sup>220</sup>οὐ γέ ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοι (D3), γε causal. Goodness in the relation of man to man has been identified with justice, for purposes of the present conversation, ever since Cephalus’s casual assertion at 331A4. Socrates relied on it at 331C1ff.

<sup>221</sup>δίκαιοι τε καὶ οἵοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν (D3): τε καί is illative, linking ground and inference (cf. n. ad 330D7). The inference is almost tautological but lays the suggestion that the question is about to be begged. μή rather than οὐ for the essential nature rather than the fact.

<sup>222</sup>ἀληθῆ (D4) the truth of the proposition is independent of the context, in the manner of the minor premise.

<sup>223</sup>κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον (D5), reminding him again.

<sup>224</sup>μηδὲν (D5) brought forward from μή (D3). The concept of the enemy is exactly that he has done or will do me some harm; and it has only been on this basis that one felt justified to treat him ill. οἱ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντες are people from whom one can expect no harm, and are therefore non-enemies.

<sup>225</sup>At the same time that he reduces Polemarchus’s position to paradox (note the emphasis he achieves by juxtaposition ἀδικοῦντας δίκαιον, D5), Socrates skirts a *petitio principii*, since regardless what the good of justice and the evil of injustice are, it cannot be right to return evil to someone who does you no evil.

<sup>226</sup>μηδαμῶς (D7), as if he felt the sting of the μή's Socrates had been using.

<sup>227</sup>πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος (D7-8): he means of course that it would be πονηρόν rather than δίκαιον to mistreat persons who aren’t unjust, and by a loose inference πονηρόν rather than δίκαιον to assert the opposite. Just as at 332E12 he refused the implication that the δίκαιος should be ἄχρηστος as being distasteful (cf. n. 193, 176), he here allows his moral sensibilities to settle his mind absent the logic, the way most people do. Another person might say, “That conclusion is false; one of the premises or inferences must have been wrong.”

<sup>228</sup>ἄρα (D9) so invites him.

<sup>229</sup>τοὺς ἀδίκους (D9) stand in as the opposite of τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας just above (D5).

<sup>230</sup>οὐτος ἔκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται (D11): Again he chooses what suits him better.

<sup>231</sup>With another ἄρα (D12).

<sup>232</sup>Reading αὐτοί (E2) with D (and the corrector of F *apud* Slings), the friends here spoken of being the ones they are mistaken about, far preferable to the αὐτοῖς of AFM read by edd., though it is, indeed, construable (cf. Adams, Jowett/Campbell *ad loc.*, though one would prefer paroxytone accentuation of εἰσὶν under their interpretation), but misleading (cf. Stallb. *ad loc.*). Chambray does not report this variant.

<sup>233</sup>τούναντιον (E3): in sum, the position implies either that one may treat the good badly (inherently absurd), or that one may harm one’s friends (the very opposite of Simonides’s assertion).

Polemarchus fully agrees that this follows and so he suggests that they alter their position,<sup>234</sup> and in particular the position that seeming worthwhile or wicked was sufficient to qualify a person to be posited<sup>235</sup> a friend or an enemy—a position that he had chosen exactly because he thought it was not a position but an observation. This time, in order to avoid contradiction, he crafts his position more conscientiously: A person IS a friend if he both seems and is worthwhile; (335) he IS an enemy if he both seems not to be and is not worthwhile. Somebody who seems worthwhile but isn't is only a seeming friend and somebody who seems not worthwhile but is, is a seeming enemy.<sup>236</sup> A friend comes to be a person that I *ought* to like whether I do or not, and ceases to be a person I *do* like unless I know he is worthwhile, which is unlikely. Socrates recognizes that the purpose of this emendation is to ensure that the good man will be a friend and the wicked man an enemy (forefending against the eventuality of 334D12-E3), and Polemarchus agrees. The suggestion therefore entails that the original thesis must be supplemented.<sup>237</sup> Justice is not just doing good<sup>238</sup> to my friend and evil to my enemy, but doing good to my friend because<sup>239</sup> he is a good person, and harming<sup>240</sup> my enemy because he is bad.

Socrates then asks,<sup>241</sup> “So there is a time then when it is the mark of a just person to harm anybody, after all?”<sup>242</sup> The question imputes the completely new idea that perhaps the just man never harms anyone, and Polemarchus responds with a little impatience<sup>243</sup> that “Yes of course there is: he must harm those who are wicked and therefore<sup>244</sup> enemies.” Having secured his asseveration Socrates begins to ask him about harm. When it's horses that undergo harm, do they become better or worse? And better or worse in terms of the virtue of dogs or of horses?<sup>245</sup> Likewise when dogs undergo harm they become worse in terms of the virtue of dogs rather than that of horses—so much is true by

<sup>234</sup>μεταθώμεθα (E5), perhaps a term from the placing of draughts on the board (cf.333B1-2), and so mildly suggesting that Socrates is his κοινωνός in the “setting down” of his position (θέσις) about justice. In this phase of the argument they are conducting a σκέψις ἐν κοινῷ, with one playing answerer and the other questioner: hence the first plural. In acknowledging the consequence (συμβαίνει) and in proposing to revise the premises (μεταθώμεθα, E5), Polemarchus accepts the need for logic after all. He may change either the Simonidean definition of justice, or his empirical “definition” of friends.

<sup>235</sup>φίλον εἶναι (sc. θέμενοι, E8). Originally he thought their settled attitude (ἡγεῖσθαι, C4) was sufficient to make them friends; now he sees that asserting that this made them friends was a matter of taking a position (θέσις) in his own mind. It will not be their attitude but his own that he will now change, by substituting a different position (μετατιθέσθαι).

<sup>236</sup>334E10-335A2. His first definition was empirical but insufficiently thought through; this one is only a congeries of words. To say “I only seem to like my seeming friend” borders on nonsense. Polemarchus is moving into the area between opining and thinking.

<sup>237</sup>προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλέγομεν (335A6-7): the construction is awkward (“to posit a supplement to what the just is, [more] than our original position”) but that does not quite warrant Faesi's deletion of ἢ.

<sup>238</sup>εὖ ποιεῖν (A7) replacing ὠφελεῖν; κακῶς (sc. ποιεῖν, A8) replacing βλάπτειν.

<sup>239</sup>ἀγαθὸν ὄντα (A9): the burden of Socrates's restatement of the position is borne by the circumstantial participles ὄντα (also with κακόν, A10), which are causal. As above he is scrupulous to note what the unamended position is (cf. 334E7 with the λέγοντες phrase at 335A7-8) before confirming the emendation (cf.334E9 with νῦν δὲ κτλ, 335A8-10).

<sup>240</sup>Shifting back to βλάπτειν (B2), from κακῶς ποιεῖν.

<sup>241</sup>βλαπτόμενοι δέ (B6). The question lacks an interrogative particle (cf.333A13): again he relies on his interlocutor to know he is being questioned and that he is to play answerer.

<sup>242</sup>ὄντινον (B3).

<sup>243</sup>γε (B4) twice, sputtering.

<sup>244</sup>τε καί (B4) linking ground and inference.

<sup>245</sup>The false alternative makes the true more attractive (B8).

definition.<sup>246</sup> And so when it comes to men we must agree that if harmed they become worse in the human virtue. But the virtue that pertains to man is not the ability to run or hunt, but is being just, so that any man that is harmed becomes more unjust. "So it seems," Polemarchus allows.

Next, musicians are unable to make people unmusical with their art; nor can horsemen by means of theirs make people unhorsemanlike; and yet<sup>247</sup> are we to believe that the just can use justice to make men unjust—or for that matter that virtue as a whole<sup>248</sup> can be used by the good to make men bad? No more than we are to believe that the work of heat is to make things cold rather than that that is the work of its opposite, nor of the dry to make things wet rather than of its opposite,<sup>249</sup> nor finally<sup>250</sup> that the work of the good man is to do harm rather than being that of his opposite. So that if the just man is good<sup>251</sup> it is not his work to harm anyone, neither his friend<sup>252</sup> nor anyone else, but rather this is the work of his opposite, the unjust man.

Socrates completes the argument by going back to the beginning. If someone tells us that rendering to each his due is just,<sup>253</sup> but means<sup>254</sup> by this that to enemies what is due is harm from a just man and help is due to friends,<sup>255</sup> we now know this man was<sup>256</sup> not wise for saying this, since in fact it is not true.<sup>257</sup> We have now seen that it is never just to harm anybody. And you and I, Polemarchus, will join hands as partners in battle<sup>258</sup> in case someone alleges that Simonides or Bias or

<sup>246</sup> ἀνάγκη (B12): cf. 333D9 with n.

<sup>247</sup> δή (C14) of the target case.

<sup>248</sup> συλλήβδην ἀρετὴ (D1): the *human* virtues collected together. He had used ἀρετὴ above for the "virtue" of the horse and dog in his analogy, and so there needed a more specific term for the (inherently moral) ἀρετὴ that is human. The term most commonly used for this notion is "justice" (cf. n. ad 331A4, and Phdr.276C3, 277D10-E, 278A3-4; Polit.295E4-5; Prot.327B2). Now that he is done with the analogy he re-appropriates the term ἀρετὴ to its normal moral meaning.

<sup>249</sup> The concept of opposites is often instantiated with physical properties as they arise in the world of change, in the Ionian manner (cf. 380E3-4 and n., Leg.889B6-8, 892B2-3, 897A6-B1; Lys.215E5-8; Phlb.14D1-3; Phdr.270A5 [where read ἀνοίας with BT], Symp.186D7-E1; Tim.82A8-B2). In such a context Tim.50A2-3 can call one pole an opposite.

<sup>250</sup> δή (D7), of the target case.

<sup>251</sup> δέ γε (D9), of the minor premise.

<sup>252</sup> οὕτε φίλον (D11-12): to this much Polemarchus had agreed from the beginning.

<sup>253</sup> τὰ ὄφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι φησίν τις δίκαιοιν (E1-2), the original language, with ὄφειλόμενον (cf. 331E3-4). Simonides for all his authority is now no better than a τις.

<sup>254</sup> νοεῖ (E2) redoes διενοεῖτο, used during the attempt to discover Simonides's wise undermeaning (332C1), the prefix dropped as is usual in all IE languages (cf. n. 1532; Adam ad Prot.311A); but now it is just τις that is the subject: it is not the person but the argument that will be the authority for our belief.

<sup>255</sup> This is what defending Simonides's position drove Polemarchus to assert at 333B7-9.

<sup>256</sup> Socrates moves from the present φησὶν (E1) back to the imperfect ἤν (E4) on the force of the intervening recapitulation of what happened.

<sup>257</sup> σοφός (E4): it is the uncritical use of this term in unknowing praise that Socrates presses to criticize: we must expect the wise at the very least to know the truth, and we need to know something in order to have an inkling whether they do.

<sup>258</sup> μαχοῦμεθα ἄρο (E7): the battle is of course argumentation, with its "rough and tumble" that might bruise opinion, as Polemarchus has lately seen. The language recalls and redeems the idea that the just man will help *in battle* (332E5) as μεταθώμεθα above (n.234) had recalled the language of his helping in draughts. Often the argument itself repays the strain on the intentionalist consciousness one spends to follow it carefully, by luminously coming round full circle; conversely the dramatic context can be made to provide a concrete instance before theory treats it abstractly ("drama precedes dogma"). In the pendant to his reductio (333E3-334A10,ff) Socrates had used κλεπτοσύνη to reach

Pittacus, or any of the wise and inspired<sup>259</sup> greats, ever said so. Polemarchus notices and returns Socrates's offer of partnership,<sup>260</sup> so that Socrates has now enough fellow feeling to confide his own opinion: he would (336) expect such a saying from the mouth<sup>261</sup> of Periander or Perdiccus or Xerxes, or Ismenius the Theban, or some other rich man who fancies he has a lot of power.<sup>262</sup>

### I.C:Thrasymachus Intervenes

Polemarchus having given his complete<sup>263</sup> agreement, Socrates marks a pause in the conversation, and asks what else someone might say justice is.<sup>264</sup> The emphasis is on what else, not who else, but it is finally at this point that a certain somebody else gets to put his word in. Thrasymachus has been trying the conclusion that the just man is a thief (cf. n.211); and earlier, Cephalus's clever repartee provided an embodiment of the belief and the attitude that the way to treat enemies is tit for tat.

Self-reference and self-instantiation of this sort is one of Plato's favorite literary devices and deserves a monograph. It has an obvious use in transition, as here and as at the end of several dialogues (*Ion* closes [541D] with Socrates commenting that his criticism of Ion's answers as ὄντω κάτω στρεφόμενα prove that he is a good general after all. *Lysis* closes [223B] with 'We friends don't know what friendship is!' *Phaedo* closes with Socrates undergoing περὶ οὐδὲ λόγος [cf.73B6-7]. *Protagoras* closes [361A] with the logos laughing at Socrates and Protagoras for having exchanged positions).

He uses it with a philosophical purpose to remind us that method is to be kept in balance with message, that the philosophizing is taking place in a world that preceded it and will survive it unchanged, or in the largest terms that the search for truth and reality paradoxically takes place within, and is an event within, reality. We may say that the device serves Plato in his writing, as irony served Socrates in live conversation. Instances are to be found everywhere in the corpus (indeed, it is in its nature to pop up anywhere):

*Charm.* the interlocutors variously exhibit σωφροσύνη or fail to: 155E3 (Socrates's μόγις: cf.156D1ff,155A5), 158C5-D6 (n.b.D7), 159B1-2, 162D2-3 (paradox of sobriety as ἔαυτοῦ πράττειν, vis à vis Critias's impatience with Charmides), 164C9-D3 (Critias's definition as γνῶσις ἔαυτοῦ founders when he doesn't know what he is talking about), and 166D1-2 (Socrates's reply to Critias's personal attack [166C7ff] on the grounds that he is investigating the matter to improve his self-knowledge).

*Crat.*384C3ff (Hermogenes's name fails to work κατὰ τὴν φύσιν), 388A2-7 (etymological induction).

*Crito* 48A7-10 (Crito's improper εἰσήγησις in the dialogue belies his criticism of the improper εἴσοδος at the trial: 44E3-4), 50B8 (The Laws have the same blind spot as *Crito*: cf. δικαὶ δικασθεῖσαι [50B8] with δίκαια ὄντα [49E and 50A3]).

*Euthyd.*286B7 (Ctesippus forced to disagree in silence), 286E9 (the brothers show ἀμαθία though they say it doesn't exist), 287E2 (they err but deny error's existence). In general, the sophistic trickery is words in action.

*Gorg.*456A-458B (Gorgias says the φιλονικία of students should not be blamed on their teachers and Socrates shrinks from pointing out that Gorgias has contradicted himself), 467A8-10 (How can you say rhetors are powerful if you can't prevail upon me to believe it?), 475D4-6 (Socrates reassures Polus he will not be hurt by his answer about pain), 494D2-6 (Socrates shames Callicles into being unashamed about his position), 501C7-8 (Socrates elsewhere won't accept an answer like 'I'll say yes to please you,' but here, where the topic is flattery, he does), 505C3-4 (neither man nor λόγος will persist), 517C4-7 (the argument is moving in a spiral)

*H.Maj.* (on beauty) The ubiquity of the expression καλῶς λέγεις, vel sim.

*H.Min.* The entire dialogue instantiates its doctrine: Socrates is ἀμαθίς and therefore gets the wrong answer ὄκων (broached at 373B4-9). The characters themselves are more aware of self-instantiation in this dialogue than in others whose authorship is more certainly Platonic, as at 368D6-8

to get control of the conversation several times<sup>265</sup> but those sitting beside him had continually restrained him because they wanted hear the discussion through.<sup>266</sup> We are given to infer that the very form of the conversation was invalid to him, or was not as important as what he had to say, or both; but these attitudes do not explain his urgency. We are given a direct sense of it in his outburst.<sup>267</sup>

He crouched like an beast and sprang out at us; Polemarchus and I shook<sup>268</sup> to the bones with fear. He blurted out, to nobody in particular,<sup>269</sup> “How can two people be so full of it, and full of it for so long?<sup>270</sup> What’s with this naive game of pussyfoot you are playing with each other? If you really want to know what justice is, don’t just ask questions and then fix it so that you can make yourself look good by refuting the answers, knowing all along it’s easier to play questioner than answerer. Instead, step up

(cf.369A4-8), 369E5, 370E10-11, 373B4-9(cf.372D4-7), etc.

*Lach.* 193D11ff (the *λόγος* / *ἔργον* contrast in Doric speech [188DE], but are we brave enough to engage in discussion? We must obey what we are saying!), 196A4ff (acknowledging aporia bravely [*γενναίως*]), 197A4 (being daring enough to make assertions cf.B4,C5 and 193B1)

*Leg.* 626B5 (*γεγυμνάσθαι* on gymnastics), 629A1-2 (Cretan’s love of war militates against Socrates), 662B2 (the disagreement about music is an instance of *ἀπάδειν ὅπ’ ἀλλήλων*), 722Cff (sudden discovery that what they’ve been doing all along is a *προοίμιον* to the laws), 891E7 (*ψυχήν* which will be the earlier thing placed later), 897D5 (*προσλαμβάνειν* in relation between interlocutors, but cf. 897B1), and 965B4.

*Phdo* 72E3-3A3 (Cebes reminded of *ἀνάμνησις*), 73A5 (Simmias’s request to be reminded of *ἀνάμνησις* – *παθεῖν περὶ οὐ ὁ λόγος*, B6-7), 77A1-2 (*όμοίως* presaging the affinity argument), 77C7 (συντιθέναι presages fragility of compound), 96A6-100B9 (Socrates’s “autobiography” discovers a new method in the very questions motivating the search), 96B9 (*ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον*, studying *μεταβολή*: cf. *φερόμενος*, 98B7), 97D7 (*κατὰ νοῦν*), 103A5f (the opposite said about the opposites).

*Phdrs.* Socrates’s guess that the logos is under Phaedrus’s cloak. Lysias’s speech is designed to convince by the very action of speaking. Socrates’s shame drives him to speak. 243E7-8 (Where’s that *παῖς*? Right here!).

*Phlb.* 58A (The knowledge we are looking for is the science we are looking with).

*Polit.* 260B7-8 (search for the *πολιτικός* will require only *όμονοεῖν* [cf. Campbell *ad loc.*]). In other passages one begins to see the aridity of self-referential intellectualism: 277D9ff (*παράδειγμα παραδείγματος*) 283B6ff (treating the proper length of treatment), 286DE (conversation about conversation).

*Prot.* 312A2 (Hippocrates blushes), 333A6-8 (οὐ *πάνυ μουσικῶς* referring to Protagoras’s theory of education), 333C1 (*αἰσχύνομαι* instantiates Protagoras’s theory of knowledge: cf. *νοῦθετεῖ* 341A8-B1), 341A7-B2 (Socrates commenting on Protagoras’s use of *δεινόν* at 339A1), 361CD (Socrates resembling the savior Prometheus from Protagoras’s Myth).

*Rep.*336C1-2 (Thrasymachus unbeknownst to himself sounds like Cephalus at 329A4-B3), 340A4-B8 (Thrasymachus legislates [*τιθέσθαι*] a position against his own advantage), 344D3-4 (the “stronger” compel Thrasymachus to stay), 350D2-3 (Thrasymachus blushes), 402A7ff (presentation of the Theory of Ideas right after a reference to the arrival of rationality in the young), 433A, 439E-40A (proving the difference between thumoeidetic and epithumetic by invoking the feeling), 487BC (Adeimantus’s charge against Socrates becomes a charge against the bad *φύλαξ*), 504BC (Adeimantus must emulate the *φύλακες* by taking the longer road—which is the exercise of the Line Passage and Advanced Education), 506A6 (cf. n.3036), 533A (what the power of dialectic really is can appear only to those who have gone through the preliminaries we have just gone through).

*Soph.* Generally: the evasiveness of the subject matter (the sophist) is replicated by the sophist popping up here and there, e.g. 223C, where he eludes them before they reach him.

*Symp.* Generally: Alcibiades’s speech attributes to Socrates the attributes the symposiasts had attributed to eros, proving thereby Socrates’s thesis that eros is both *ἐνδεής* and the cause of good. (cf. Bury [ed.] Ix-Ixiv).

to the plate and say what you think it is.<sup>271</sup> And spare me<sup>272</sup> from the answer that it is ‘the binding,’ or that it is ‘the helpful,’ or that it is ‘the profitable,’ or that it is ‘the lucrative,’ or that it is ‘the advantageous.’<sup>273</sup> Instead be clear and careful in your formulation. You won’t be able to pass off smoke like that on me.”<sup>274</sup>

Socrates reverts to narration: I was bowled over by what he said and I watched him in fear. In fact I think if I hadn’t been looking at him first<sup>275</sup> I would have been struck mute.<sup>276</sup> As it happened I already had my eyes on him when he was beginning to get stirred up<sup>277</sup> by our conversation, and so I was able to answer him, though my voice trembled some: Don’t be too harsh on us. If this fellow<sup>278</sup> and I have erred in the way we have been talking please know it was unintentional. Surely, if it were gold we were searching for we wouldn’t “pussyfoot” with each other and thwart ourselves from finding it—at least

*Tht.* Much play on perception and appearance, the theme being knowledge (151E2 [φαίνεται νυνί], 152C7, 154C10-D2, 155A2 [φάσματα], 155D10, 155E3, 156C6, 157C2-3, 157D10, 157E4, 158C8, 185E6-6A1, 186E11-12, 187A9-B1); Theodorus’s changing perception of Theaetetus (144D-5C5, 148B3-4, 148C9ff, 155D1, 185E3-4 (Theaetetus is καλός because he λέγει καλῶς); 160E5 (midwifery has brought to birth [έγεννήσαμεν] the theory that brings sensibles to birth [γεννᾶν αἰσθητά, 159C14]); 183A4-5 (πάντα ρέει: even the answers are in flux: cf. A8-B5)).

<sup>259</sup>σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν (E9) recalling σοφὸς καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ (331E6), with μακάριος used climactically as often (*Euthyd.*273E6, *Soph.*233A4, *Pind.Pyth.*10.1-2 and Bundy *ad loc.*[SP 2.38], *Rep.*419A9 trumping the εὐδαίμων at A2; 561D7; and cf. the specifically Thrasymachean use, 344B7 [and n.]), and therefore effecting closure. Simonides has been topped by two of the Seven Sages.

<sup>260</sup>Ἐγὼ γοῦν (E10) evinces his inward, very personal sense of commitment to the cause.

<sup>261</sup>ρῆμα (336A1): cf. *Prot.*342E7, where it is used with φθέγγεσθαι, which makes it an utterance; and its use with ἐκβέβληκας, 473E6 *infra*.

<sup>262</sup>Περιάνδρου ... ἡ Περδίκκου ἡ Ξέρξου ἡ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἡ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἷομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός (A5-6) linked by ἡ and generalized with ἡ τινος ἄλλου, Socrates copies the form of the list of wise people above (335E8-9: *n.b.* ἡ and ἡ τιν' ἄλλον). The first, the tyrant Periander, himself came to be a member of the canonical Seven Sages (Demetr. *apud Stob.*3.1.172 [= Diels-Kranz 1.65.15-66.3]), but the personnel of the list was not stable: cf. D.L.1.40ff (= DK 1.61). Muson rather than Periander appears in the (early) list given by Protagoras at *Prot.*343A. The choice of Periander here may have the role of a transitional case between those of 335E8-9 and these.

Every decade has its men who think they are important because of their wealth, and other men who secretly think so for them so they can envy them and petulantly complain about them: there is no need to name names. So far the only rich person we know who μέγα οἴεται δύνασθαι (cf.336A6) is the meager Cephalus, who has made the claim that money plays a large role in moral redemption and yet made a very weak case for it, preferring to leave the conversation and continue redeeming himself in the eyes of the gods. The surprise that the drama holds for us at this moment is that we are about to meet the Master of Envy himself.

<sup>263</sup>ἀληθέστατα (A8).

<sup>264</sup>ἐφάνη (A9) with participle is dialectical (cf.334A10 and n.). When Cephalus left, the λόγος survived a change in answerer; now it has survived failure; all that has survived is the question.

<sup>265</sup>ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι (B2) of interrupting the speaker with a question: 495D3, 505A1, *Gorg.*506A2, *Soph.*239D1. The force of ἀντι- is that of taking up the opposite end of the rope and pulling back. It is not always belligerent, as it (and most everything else about Thrasymachus) is, here. At *H.Maj.*287A Socrates confides to Hippias that he is only good at ἀντιλήψεις, so would he please hold forth for him. πολλάκις indicates there were several moments in the conversation at which he wished to intervene. Despite the questionable logic of the argument, those who eavesdropped on it (παρακαθημένων, B3) found it interesting because of the sense it made at every step, as we have taken pains to notice by watching it close up.

<sup>266</sup>Continual use of the prefix δια-, with διακοῦσαι (B3) as well as with διαλεγομένων (B1) and διεκωλύετο (B3) before it and with διεπανσάμεθα (B4) and διαρπασόμενος (B6) after it, evinces the

not willingly. Since it's justice we've set out to find, a thing more honorable<sup>279</sup> than a lot of gold, how can you think we would be going about it<sup>280</sup> by giving in to each other in this empty-headed way that you describe<sup>281</sup> rather than using all zeal to make it appear?<sup>282</sup> Our problem is, we aren't able, and so we would much more properly receive mercy from a clever person like you than scorn.

Socrates's response is almost exactly the same length as Thrasymachus's assault, and surely as dense and well (337) contrived.<sup>283</sup> It elicits a guffaw and a sardonic<sup>284</sup> smile from Thrasymachus: "There you have it, that famous irony of Socrates!"<sup>285</sup> He had warned the group before they sat down that Socrates would try this ploy: unwilling to answer, he would act dumb and do anything to avoid it if anybody asked him a question.<sup>286</sup>

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audience's sense that the conversation between Socrates and Polemarchus has a life of its own worth allowing to play through to the end: tension is mounting because of Thrasymachus's utter disregard for this value.

<sup>267</sup> οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἔγεν (B4-5).

<sup>268</sup> διεπτούθημεν (B7), another δια-. The first plural gently reminds us, at this transitional moment, that the event is being reported to us by Socrates.

<sup>269</sup> εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος (B8). The first inconcinnity in his behavior is duly noted: though his remark portrays itself as an address to Socrates and Polemarchus (ὑμᾶς) he noisily delivers himself of it into the midst of the entire group.

<sup>270</sup> τίς ὑμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει (B8-C1): The prolepsis of πάλαι expresses, or feigns, that he is sick and tired of their conversation, that he has been wanting to interrupt for some time, and that that time is now over. πάλαι refers not to a remote past but to a time that present events now threaten to supersede. Cf. 392B9 and n. l 388.

<sup>271</sup> ἀπόκριναι (C5) For all the sputtering, what Thrasymachus actually says is that if you want to ask about something you should give your answer about it.

<sup>272</sup> μοι (C6): with the loose ethical dative he somehow appropriates Socrates's attempt to learn as an event to be tailored to his own enjoyment.

<sup>273</sup> ὅτι τὸ δέον ... μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ συμφέρον (C6-D2): The relentless anaphora of μηδ' ὅτι τὸ expresses (or feigns) enervation in advance, but it is unclear what argument foul he means these examples to instantiate. The combination of unclarity and vehemence is a rhetorical device for challenging assent, affecting the audience (and even the exegete!) upon whom in the meanwhile it devolves to construe the general complaint. Shall I make his case for him by guessing that he is objecting to the manner in which Socrates characteristically isolates and deals piecemeal with ideas (cf. ἀπολαμβάνειν, H.Maj.301B4, cf. H.Min.369B9), which in common speech and thinking tend to slide through (cf. εὐχερές, Tht.184C), as for instance the way he isolated δικαιοσύνη as a subject (331C1-2, n.b. αὐτό) and ἀποδιδόναι ὃν τίς τι παρὰ του λάβῃ as a predicate (C3), out of the flow of ideas that constituted Cephalus's speech (δίκαιος, 331A4; ὄφείλοντα ... χρήματα, B2-3), what Shorey calls "collecting a definition," citing Gorg.453A as a parallel (WPS 558, ad 331C)?

The speaker may hardly remember what words he used, and so may perceive Socrates's "selection" of the item as taking Cephalus too literally (cf. Gorg.489B8; HMaj.284E1-2; Ion 540B6ff [where Socrates treats the elements of Ion's generalizing polar doublet as though he meant them singly]), or as nitpicking (HMaj.301B2-4, Rep.340E3), or as making large things out of small (Gorg.486C8, 497B6-7; HMaj.304AB; Prot.328E3-4 [where he anticipates this objection]; Rep.487B), or as illiberal and uncultured (Gorg.461C4, 485C7, 508E-9A).

In the course of barring Socrates from giving an abstract answer, Thrasymachus in fact cannot resist revealing by degrees what will be the essence of his own answer. His list moves from a likely but generic answer (τὸ δέον), through an answer like the one Polemarchus and Socrates have been considering (τὸ ὠφέλιμον), to a debasement of this answer (τὸ λυσιτελοῦν), to an absolutely impossible debasement even of this (τὸ κερδαλέον, never approbatory, absent even from the list in

Socrates offers a riposte: You knew because you are wise.<sup>287</sup> You knew very well that if you asked somebody how much twelve was, but forbade<sup>288</sup> him and said, “Don’t say that it’s twice six and don’t say that it’s thrice four and don’t say that it’s six two’s and don’t say that it’s four three’s, since I won’t accept such nonsense from you”<sup>289</sup>—I’m sure it was clear to you (when you asked it) that nobody answers<sup>290</sup> a person asking for information in this way. Instead, if he had said to you “Am I not to answer these even if they are in fact true? Are you commanding me to lie?” then what would you have said to him?

“This of course being the same as that,” Thrasymachus scoffs.<sup>291</sup>

It might just be, but even if it isn’t, if it *appears* to be to the man that has been asked, isn’t this the

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ps.Plat.Cleit. that imitates this one [409C]), and finally to what will be *his* own answer (τὸ συμφέρον, cf.338C2)!

In the course of the conversation an actual reason behind Thrasymachus’s objection (as opposed to the guess his method has forced us to contrive for him in the interim) will become clear: cf. n. 557 ad 348E5-49A2, *infra*.

<sup>274</sup>ἐγώ (D3) emphatic because expressed. The context requires ὕθλους to mean the opposite of the σαφές and the ἀκριβές—hence “smoke.” Its sense, like that of φλυαρία (B8), is largely onomatopoetic (cf.337B3-4). ἀποδέχομαι is not here absolute: its object, ὕθλους τοιούτους, is “incorporated” into the ἐάν clause (cf. Smyth §2536-8). Indeed Thrasymachus’s rhetoric is a little like Cephalus’s (cf. ὁλοφύρονται, ὁδύρονται, ὕμνειν [cognate with ὕθλος]: 329A4-B2); or more exactly Cephalus’s is a little like his.

<sup>275</sup>ἐωράκη (D6), the pluperfect, used in contrafactual conditions “when stress is laid on ... the continuance of the act” (Smyth §2306a).

<sup>276</sup>προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος (D8): from Thrasymachus’s words the essential point that Socrates gathers is that he is being attacked. He alludes to the superstition about encountering—or more exactly being encountered by—a wolf. Pliny NH 8.34 explains (cf. Verg.Ecl.9.53, Theocr.14.22): The moment one discovers he is in danger (the wolf has spotted him) he discovers also, by inference, that he has been in danger (the wolf has been watching); and then realizes his opponent has not yet attacked. The reflex to defend oneself is therefore short-circuited by an inner reflection that the proper strategy is to ascertain why the attack has been delayed. A particularly trenchant account of the feeling is René Girard’s “mimetic rivalry.” It is to avoid the escalation of violent feelings (like those of Thrasymachus) that, according to Girard, Jesus looks down and doodles in the sand when confronted by the crowd that wants him to sanction stoning the prostitute, rather than raising his eyes to their spokesman (R. Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning* [New York 2004] 54-61). The dialogical encounter is subject to the same derailments as any other human encounter, including the invidious dynamics of the evil eye (cf. Phdo 95A4-6B8), and to the extent that Plato is presenting it “live” it devolves on the reader to recognize when such things are happening.

<sup>277</sup>ξαγριαίνεσθαι (D8), the opposite of κηλεῖν, used in the context of hunting prey at Lysis 206B2, the other Platonic occurrence. Socrates is referring to the behavior he described above (B2) as ὥρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι.

<sup>278</sup>Οδε (E3): By his first-person demonstrative Socrates commemorates and preserves the sense that he and Polemarchus have been working together and indeed have become “allies in battle.” It is this that so bothers Thrasymachus. He blames Socrates rather than both of them for their success because he envies Socrates, as Socrates has indicated to us with his reference to the invidious evil eye.

<sup>279</sup>τιμιώτερον (E8) suggests that Socrates is vying for honor in his conversation after all, the honor of learning, and neutralizes thereby Thrasymachus’s accusatory φιλοτιμοῦ (C3).

<sup>280</sup>ἔπειτα (E8) cf. 331B3 and n.

<sup>281</sup>οὔτως ἀνόητος ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις (E8), a tamer version of Thrasymachus’s εὐηθίζεσθε ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς (C1-2). εὐηθής is a favorite term in the cynic’s vocabulary (e.g., 343C6); Socrates replaces it with the vocabulary of philosophy (νοῦς and ζήτησις). οὔτως is a “second

answer he gives<sup>292</sup> -- how it appears to him<sup>293</sup> -- whether we forbid him to or not?

“So you’ll be doing this, giving as your answer one of the things that I have forbidden?”<sup>294</sup>

I wouldn’t be surprised, if my thinking should lead me to do so.

“But what if I exhibit<sup>295</sup> as an alternative<sup>296</sup> an answer about justice better than all these? What penalty should you undergo?”<sup>297</sup>

I should undergo what is befitting. What befits a person who is ignorant is to learn from a man who knows. Just so, that’s the “penalty” I propose.<sup>298</sup>

person” demonstrative.

<sup>282</sup>φανῆναι (E9) dialectical.

<sup>283</sup>The construction of E4-9—μὴ οἴου (negative command) ~ irreal present condition (μέν) ~ simple present condition (δέ) ~ οἴου σύ (positive command)—swiftly commands our attention despite the inflammatory remarks of Thrasymachus.

<sup>284</sup>ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον (337A3): The noise he makes from his throat draws our attention to his face on which we see fixed a sardonic grin: the subplot of first looks continues.

<sup>285</sup>αὕτη ’κείνη (A4): the second person demonstrative as predicate of third person demonstrative subject (“there you have it”), since Thrasymachus is again addressing his remarks about Socrates to the others present, but he uses the third person demonstrative as subject (“the good old irony”) as if he had already warned his audience about it before, as he goes on to assert (A5-7). Will we ever catch up with him?

<sup>286</sup>ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δέ ... ποιήσοις ... ἀποκρινοῖ (A6-7): with rare future optatives (governed by the imperfect, προύλεγον, A5) Thrasymachus stresses his foreknowledge.

<sup>287</sup>σοφὸς γὰρ εἰ (A8). The term is often less than approbatory in Socrates’s mouth. In the *Apology* it serves as a grounds for prosecuting him (23A3) and also a grounds for criticizing those who condemned him (38C3-4)! The generally approbatory εὖ λέγειν might also mean less to Socrates than it does to others (cf. n.316).

<sup>288</sup>ἢδησθα, προείποις (A8,9): Socrates mildly taunts Thrasymachus by borrowing the verbs from his unsolicited self description (ἢδη, προύλεγον [A5]): that προείποις is used in a different sense (prohibit rather than predict) improves the taunt.

<sup>289</sup>μὴ ὅτι ... δὶς ἔξ μηδ’ ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ’ ὅτι ἔξακις δύο μηδ’ ὅτι τετράκις τρία (B1-3): Socrates closely imitates Thrasymachus’s prohibition (336C6-D4), including the tedious anaphora of μὴ ὅτι and the gratuitous plethora of examples; but with ἀποδέχομαι (B3) he forgoes the arrogant ἐγώ and in redoing ὕθλους with τοιαῦτα φλυαρῆς forgoes Thrasymachus’s swift “incorporation” of the object into the ἔόν clause (D4, cf. n.274).

<sup>290</sup>Reading ἀποκρίνοιτο (B4) of AFDM, against the perispomenon scribitur of the Monacensis, read by edd. The future is not needed. The leading construction is oratio obliqua in secondary sequence with ὅτι. Owing partly to the morphology of the verb, the logical significance of the optative ἔροιο in the ensuing protasis is therefore maximally plastic. It can represent an imperfect indicative (an original aorist would have been kept), a present or aorist subjunctive with ᾧ, or an original optative in either tense, and so it can constitute the beginning of a contrafactual, present general, future more vivid, or future less vivid condition. In the event, however, the protasis is so long that Socrates restarts the sentence (δῆλον οἶμαί σοι ἦν ὅτι) rather than moving on to an apodosis, and then generalizes, with οὐδείς and with the re-characterization of the questioner—no longer Thrasymachus (this would require dropping τῷ, which three of four mss. have [Chambry saw it in the fourth in superscript])—as a person seeking information (for πυνθάνεσθαι [B5] cf. 328E2 and n.). The present indicative may therefore stand as part of the generalization.

<sup>291</sup>ώς δή (C2) ironic. Most of the time one will understand Thrasymachus by assuming he means the opposite of what he says. But this raises the question, Why does he speak?

Thrasymachus won't quite let go of it. "Isn't that sweet?"<sup>299</sup> In addition to learning, you must pay a fine in silver."

Once I get some, you mean.

"Count it that you have it now," Glaucon interposes, his first remark since the opening page of the dialogue, and then tells Thrasymachus if money is needed the entire group is ready to ante up for Socrates.<sup>300</sup>

"Of course—so that Socrates can pull off<sup>301</sup> his usual stunt. When it's his own turn he doesn't answer, but once the next person does he joins the conversation as cross-examiner."

The complaining won't cease so Socrates addresses it directly. It is inconceivable that a person would answer if—let alone the fact that he is ignorant and makes no claim to knowing, but assume he

<sup>292</sup>Reading ἀποκρίνεσθαι (C5) with AFM, rather than the future with D and edd. Cf. B4 and n.

<sup>293</sup>τὸ φανόμενον ἔαυτῷ (C5): dialectical φαίνεσθαι.

<sup>294</sup>Scrupulously Thrasymachus avoids the give and take of conversation (C7-8).

<sup>295</sup>δείξω (D1) promises something more than a mere statement, and suggests a display (ἐπίδειξις).

<sup>296</sup>ἔτεραν ... παρὰ πάσας ταῦτας (D1-2). ἔτεραν instead of ἄλλην indicates this new answer is of an alternative type. Cf. n.2092 and also n.1197.

<sup>297</sup>παθεῖν (D2). That Socrates should be required to pay a penalty for failing to answer reveals, even if only in play, that Thrasymachus feels that the evasiveness he has been accusing Socrates of is essentially unjust behavior. According to Attic legal procedure (and as occurred in Socrates's actual trial), once the jury finds the defendant guilty the defendant proposes a penalty alternate to that preferred by the prosecution, to be suffered or paid (παθεῖν ή ἀποτίσαι is the formula).

Thrasymachus's remark therefore presumes that in breaking down and giving an answer himself, Socrates will have succeeded in his evasion and be guilty enough in succeeding that he must propose a penalty. At the same time of course, eager to give his answer, he fails to see his own role as accomplice in the unjust act. That he should forgive injustice when it helps himself and enforce it when it harms others might come as no surprise.

<sup>298</sup>μαθεῖν (D4): In the penalty phase of his trial (*Apol.*36Bff) Socrates likewise proposed to suffer (παθεῖν) a reward as his penalty, making there the same play on the etymology of the verb ἀξιοῦν (cf. esp. 36D1-3). In his own mouth, many years before his execution, the play is γέλοιον; for Plato to put it there many years after is σπουδαῖον. To a great extent Socrates's condemnation can be attributed to people undergoing the irksome "irony" of which Thrasymachus accuses him here. Plato achieves dramatic irony also, having Socrates unwittingly allude to the apothegm πάθει μάθος.

<sup>299</sup>ἡδὺς γὰρ εἰ (D6), echoing 337A8, another insincerity of Thrasymachus distasteful to translate. He failed to secure a physical penalty (παθεῖν) and so now proposes to settle for the alternative, a financial one (ἀπότεισον, D6). In this there is dramatic irony, for in being on the verge to perform his song-and-dance as a teacher it will convene with his habit of being paid for doing so. He is a sophist.

<sup>300</sup>Glaucon's intervention (D9-10) continues the allusion to Socrates's trial, during which our author among others (38B6-8) intervened to stake him thirty minas. But Glaucon's reason is that he wants the conversation to continue, whether to hear Thrasymachus's answer or Socrates's response to it or both. That it is Glaucon who here intervenes, rather than Polemarchus, the host and Socrates's new ally, is noteworthy. The interest of the onlookers is something Plato's new genre of dialogue has some difficulty depicting unless the interlocutors provide him an opportunity, as this byplay between Thrasymachus and Socrates does.

<sup>301</sup>διαπράξηται (E1): The prefix and the voice imply success by hook and crook. Thrasymachus tells us something about the relation between Socrates and Glaucon by interpreting Glaucon's interruption as indicating less interest in Thrasymachus's answer than in Socrates's response to it.

fancies that he knows—if<sup>302</sup> all the things he would feel comfortable about<sup>303</sup> saying had been barred, and barred by a man of no mean stature.<sup>304</sup> Given all this it would be more appropriate for you, Thrasymachus, to do the speaking. You in fact claim to know, and to be (338) able to articulate your knowledge in speech.<sup>305</sup> So don't do anything else;<sup>306</sup> rather, do please me by playing answerer at the same time that you avoid begrudging to teach Glaucon here<sup>307</sup> as well as the others.

This does the trick, as we immediately intuit when Socrates reverts to his narrative persona, the one that speaks directly to us. All the others, he tells us, urged Thrasymachus to “Do nothing else,” and it was plain to see that he was very desirous of telling, in order to come off well, since he was sure he had a killer answer.<sup>308</sup> Nevertheless he made a show of wanting to vie<sup>309</sup> over whether he or I should

<sup>302</sup> εἰ (E5) in all strictness goes with τι καὶ οἴεται so that ἀπειρημένον εἶη, the true optative protasis that goes with the foregoing apodosis, lacks an εἰ. In the event, however, the hypothetical thing he fancies he knows (the τι that is the subject of οἴεται) is “also functioning” as the subject of ἀπειρημένον εἶη (more exactly, it is “incorporated” into the εἰ οἴεται clause: cf. οὐθλούς at 336D4).

The sentence got off on the wrong foot when Socrates found himself unable to pass up an opportunity to interpose an avowal of ignorance, according to his habit. He adopted the strategy of employing the idiom of the participle with ἔπειτα (on which cf. 331B3 and n. 111) to interpose this avowal which was going to end up being inconsequential to the entire sentence anyway since what is actually inconceivable is that a person would answer at all when he has been barred from doing so.

<sup>303</sup> ήγεῖται (E7), of the sort of belief that a person acts upon without a second thought. Compare the crucial role this kind of attitude played in Polemarchus’s argument at 334C4, in Thrasymachus’s eagerness to answer just below (338A6), and in Cleitophon’s attempt to inoculate the ruler against error at 340B7.

<sup>304</sup> ὑπ’ ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου (E7): ἀνδρός for ἀνθρώπου or τινος makes the litotes all the stronger. Thrasymachus certainly wants to come off as an ἀνήρ.

<sup>305</sup> εἰπεῖν (338A1), drawn out of λέγειν before and avoiding the term ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Socrates is referring to Thrasymachus’s claim to have an alternative type of answer and his mincing offer to “exhibit” it (δείξω ἐτέρων, 337D1), and yet he persists in asserting the presumption that this λόγος is the result of knowledge (εἰδέναι), exactly because this is what will give him the warrant to interrogate the “exhibitor” (and make him “answer” after all).

<sup>306</sup> μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει (A1-2): now it is Socrates’s turn to use this formula in suasive peroration (cf. 328B1 and n.), and fill it out with amplitudinous reference to Glaucon and the others (τε ... καὶ and hyperbaton of τοὺς ἄλλον), so as to impose an ineluctable incumbency on Thrasymachus to comply.

<sup>307</sup> With τόνδε (A3), “first person,” Socrates acknowledges his special closeness to Glaucon that Thrasymachus had assumed above; but with διδάξαι he attributes to Glaucon a different motive from the one Thrasymachus deduced from it.

<sup>308</sup> ήγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην (A6-7). The adjective reveals that it is the other meaning of ἀπόκρισις that Thrasymachus has in mind, the answer-performance or ἐπίδειξις of the sort that was part of Gorgias’s advertised repertoire (cf. ἐπαγγέλλει, Gorg.447D7, 448A2, 449B2; and compare δείξω, 337D1, with ἐπεδείξατο, Gorg.447A6).

We get a full picture of this skill at the beginning of both the *Gorgias* and the *Protagoras*. Callicles recommends people ask Gorgias a question (*Gorg.*447C5-8, saying οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν), and Gorgias takes up the position to answer by saying οὐδείς μέ πω ἡρώτηκε καὶ νὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν (448A2-3: cf. *Meno* 70B6-7). From these remarks we may infer that answering is nothing but impromptu oratory. We here learn also that the measure of a professional answer is its degree of beauty (*Gorg.*448A9-B1, cf. ρήτορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, 448D9-10 [and *Meno* 70B6-7], as embodied in the answer Polus finally gets to give at 448C4-9 [compare *Meno*’s answer, also inspired by Gorgias, at *Meno* 71E1-72A6, and *Protagoras*’s self-advertising early answer at *Prot.*316C5-317C5]), rather than its adequacy (e.g., ἰκανῶς, *Gorg.*448B1) to the question. Measured for its adequacy to the question, the rhetorical pretensions of the performance-answer render it liable to the

play answerer. In the end he gave in but not without having the last word:<sup>310</sup> “There you have it, the wisdom<sup>311</sup> of Socrates! When it’s his turn he’s unwilling to engage in teaching,<sup>312</sup> and instead he roams about<sup>313</sup> learning from others and not even giving them thanks<sup>314</sup> in return.”

It is seldom that Socrates allows a flat lie to go unanswered. That he learns from people is very true; but that he does not “repay them with thanks”<sup>315</sup> is a lie. He pays what he can, and what he can pay is praise. This he pays unstintingly, however, when in his judgment a man speaks well, as Thrasymachus will see once he gives his answer, for surely he’ll speak well.<sup>316</sup>

So much leaves Thrasymachus little to do but give his answer. “The just is nothing else than<sup>317</sup> the

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charge of μακρολογία by Socrates (*Gorg.*449B4-8, C5; *Prot.*334A2-C6), while for the fully accomplished rhetorician brevity in answer is another ability he is ready to display (*Prot.*334E4-5A1). There is therefore a distinction and a tension between the plain (cf. φαῦλον at *Hdt.*147C3-6) shortness of pertinence and the brevity of wit, which is sometimes misunderstood by scholars, as for instance in the treatment of *Gorg.*449B7. The audience response to a professional answer is applause (e.g. *Euthyd.*276B7, *Prot.*334C7); when the applause subsides the sophist calls on the next questioner; after a while he retires.

This performance situation, with himself doing the talking (*εἰπεῖν*, 338A6), is what Thrasymachus desires so much to move on to that he is willing to let Socrates off the hook. Like Polus in the *Gorgias*, who has to tolerate a certain amount of question and answer in the usual sense of the term (448B7-C3) before he gets the opportunity to unfurl his rhetoric (448C4-9), Thrasymachus tolerates a certain amount of Socratic elenchus (338C4-343A10) before he presents his own “answer” in full dress (343B1-344C8).

<sup>309</sup>προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν (A7) the imperfect and its present infinitive point to an effort being made that Socrates does not deign to include in his narrative for us: he emphasizes his decision not to include it by placing the important fact, that Thrasymachus would in fact be holding forth, in the (essentially concessive) μέν clause (A5-7: cf. 342D2-3, 350C12,ff). φιλονικεῖν indicates it was more of what we have already seen: rivalry for its own sake; having the cake and eating it, too; and getting the last word.

<sup>310</sup>κάπειτα (B1).

<sup>311</sup>αὐτὴ δή ... ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία (B1), Thrasymachus finally gives in to winning the opportunity to speak by reverting to the formula he used at 337A4, now to accuse Socrates not of irony but, with irony, of the wisdom that Socrates had with irony accused him of (337A8). With αὐτή (second person) he again seeks to capture the sympathy of his audience (cf. n. ad 337A8), since now he is about to address them.

<sup>312</sup>διδάσκειν (B2), pres.inf. Thrasymachus calls it teaching rather than answering, which he had accused him above of avoiding (337A5-7), since he, following Socrates’s flattering suggestion from above (διδάξαι, A3), is now, in his way, announcing that he is about to hold forth.

<sup>313</sup>περιύόντα (B2), another allusion to Plato’s *Apology* in the form of the complaint that he is a busybody. Cf. ἐπ’ ἄλλον ἥα, 21D8; πλάνην, 22A6; ἥα A8, C9; περιών, 23B5; and περιεργάζεται, 19B4; and the implication these uses have for περιέρχομαι at 30A7: “my meddlesomeness consists of nothing but trying to elevate your thought.” Cf. also 31C5, συμβουλεύω περιών καὶ πολυπραγμονῶν (reading T rather than BW). The charge is a mob-tactic, by which one member of the mob can acknowledge to the others that “he did to me what he did to you” without admitting it himself or forcing them to, either.

<sup>314</sup>χάριν ἀποδιδόναι (B3), a euphemism for paying a wage. Thrasymachus is used to being paid, though of course he does not expect to be in this casual gathering.

<sup>315</sup>The strained expression χάριν ἐκτίνειν (B5) calls Thrasymachus on his euphemism. He had first identified his fee for teaching with a juridical penalty due (a τίσις, 337D1-10); now he identifies being paid with being thanked. Socrates will not allow his own *inability* to pay to be mischaracterized as

advantage of the stronger.<sup>318</sup> Where's the praise, then? See? I told you<sup>319</sup> you would be unwilling."

It's too soon to say, until I learn what you are saying. What does the formula mean? Certainly I'd be wrong to put the interpretation onto it that<sup>320</sup> justice would be for us,<sup>321</sup> the weaker, to eat the food that the helps a wrestler who is stronger than us to be strong.

"You are stupid<sup>322</sup> to think this Socrates, and are just contriving to construe my statement in a way you might most easily damage it."<sup>323</sup>

No, that's not at all my intention—rather it is to get you to say more clearly<sup>324</sup> what you mean. Socrates's intentional misinterpretation forces Thrasymachus to explain and give a more discursive answer—though of course his one word answer is not vague or essentialist, as he found Socrates's to be, but sensationalist, as we shall see.

"I guess you are not aware, then,<sup>325</sup> that cities adopt different political forms—some have tyranny imposed on them, some democracy and some aristocracy. In each case it is the ruling element or class<sup>326</sup> that runs the place. But<sup>327</sup> although they differ from one another these ruling elements all set down laws with a view to their own advantage, since a democracy makes democratic laws, a tyranny tyrannical, and an aristocracy aristocratic.<sup>328</sup> In setting down such laws they have in essence declared

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ingratitude.

<sup>316</sup>εὖ λέγειν (B8) and εὖ ἐρεῖν (B9) draw attention to the ambiguity of the expression. Of course for Socrates it means to give a good argument; but the test of a good argument will be how it survives under dialectical scrutiny, i.e., how it survives as an answer (whence ἐπειδὸν ἀποκρίνη, B8-9).

<sup>317</sup>οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἦ (C2): the *definiens* should always tell us nothing else than the *definiendum*, neither more nor less than what it is, so that the protestation "is nothing else than" or "is nothing more than" is strictly gratuitous. Then as now, however, such phrases are used, as when one asserts that emotions are "nothing but" neurological discharges. The stipulation adds a tone of tendentiousness that betrays that the statement is not meant to be the "definition" that it purports to be after all. Thrasymachus likewise expects his audience to be *moved* by what is tendentious in his formulation.

<sup>318</sup>τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον (C2). He had forbidden Socrates to give an answer like τὸ δέον or τὸ ὠφέλιμον for being too vague (the opposite of σαφῶς καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγειν: 336C6-D4). His own answer makes the scandalous point – there is no justice, only power -- by mocking the Socratic form: "The advantageous as you might say – to the strongman, that is!"

<sup>319</sup>οὐκ ἐθελήσεις (C2) picks up the charge of μὴ ἐθέλειν at B2 above, carelessly.

<sup>320</sup>τοιόνδε (C7), first person demonstrative adjective of quality.

<sup>321</sup>ἡμῶν (C7): it is striking that Socrates should suggest he and Thrasymachus are the weaker rather than hope to be the just man!

<sup>322</sup>βδελυρός (D3), another sonic slur from Thrasymachus's harp. Of course whatever sort of incompetence he means to accuse Socrates of is removed by his ensuing charge of clever ill-will.

<sup>323</sup>κακουργεῖν (D4) of the questioner seeking to vitiate an argument by intentionally misconstruing it as at Gorg.483A2.

<sup>324</sup>σαφέστερον (D5): Socrates immediately imposes on Thrasymachus the first standard for proper answering that Thrasymachus had threatened to impose on him (σαφῶς, 336D2). The second, ἀκριβῶς (336D3) will make its appearance at 340E2.

<sup>325</sup>εἶτα (D7) feigns impatience. He will indeed tell us something σαφές, but not without deriding Socrates.

<sup>326</sup>τὸ ὄρχον (D10) is as abstract as can be, while κρατεῖ is as concrete as can be (cf. 339A2).

<sup>327</sup>δέ γε (E1) introducing the minor premise.

<sup>328</sup>His meaning has to be that the various laws are designed to preserve the respective form of government, including both the power elite and the order it protects. His formulation with ὄρχή leaves this distinction undrawn, and his *figura etymologica* stresses a self-referential relativism in the several sets of laws instead, to the point of suggesting arbitrariness.

to the people they rule that the just is what is advantageous to their own regime; and they punish those who step out of line as being lawbreakers and<sup>329</sup> unjust. This is what I am pointing to, a common (339) element which can be found in any city you wish to name, namely the ongoing advantage of the established regime. Here you have what actually holds the power, so that any astute<sup>330</sup> person will see the writing on the wall wherever he is, that justice is whatever the stronger command in their own interest.”

Now Socrates knows what he means; whether it is true he does not yet know. The position is that the just is “the advantageous”—one of the very answers he was barred from giving—though he must acknowledge there is something more, the supplement “of the stronger.”

“A small supplement perhaps?”<sup>331</sup>

Socrates sees the double meaning and he answers it. It is not the size of the addend but whether it is true. That justice is in some sense advantageous Socrates for his part<sup>332</sup> already agrees. It is Thrasymachus’s addition that he is not sure about and wants to investigate.<sup>333</sup>

“Investigate away!”

So I will: Tell me, would you also<sup>334</sup> agree that obeying the rulers is just?

“Yes.”

Is the ruling group in all of its many types infallible, or are they able to make mistakes as well?

“It is entirely possible that they should make some mistakes,” Thrasymachus says, his vehemence giving Socrates cover to insert a reason this is true: In their attempt to set down laws, some they set down properly and some they don’t, where properly means they succeed in formulating<sup>335</sup> laws that give them an advantage, and improperly if the formulation results in their disadvantage. And then, once they formulate their laws,<sup>336</sup> the ruled are to follow them in their actions, their compliance constituting

<sup>329</sup> ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα (E5). The τε καὶ is illative. Thrasymachus’s point is that the ruling elite makes the argument (ὡς expressing *their grounds*) that breaking the law is *eo ipso* an unjust act. He avoids asserting that the required behavior is required because the rulers deem it just, in order to assert instead that it is just because it is required. His argument is different from that of the Laws in the *Crito*, who simply identify τὸ δίκαιον with a δίκη δικασθεῖσα, just as our law counts a man innocent until proven guilty but guilty upon conviction regardless of the truth. For Thrasymachus there is no legitimacy in the ruling element, but only power (*κράτος*), a power that makes resistance futile. This much is contained in his original formula, κρείττονος συμφέρον, to which his use of *κρατεῖ* here is meant to advert etymologically.

<sup>330</sup> τῷ ὄρθῳ λογιζομένῳ (339A3). In place of λόγος the realist uses λογισμός, and gets the answer that is right (ὄρθῳς) because it is right everywhere (πανταχοῦ). Thrasymachus suggests by the generalization over space that he has isolated the essence of things, but his position is true everywhere only because it is tautological, and cannot be false anywhere.

<sup>331</sup> σμικρά γε ἴσως (B1), “ironic.” This “small” supplement about the largeness of their power ends up being the only basis for the conclusion that their συμφέρον is justice, and so the addition contains the entirety of the meaning. Again Thrasymachus is saying the opposite of what he means.

<sup>332</sup> συμφέρον γέ τι (B3), somehow advantageous: Thrasymachus’s προσθήκη specifies the τι.

<sup>333</sup> ἐγώ / σύ / ἐγώ (B4-5): Socrates’s repeated use of personal pronouns, always emphatic in the nominative, is striking. The ensuing elenchus will be serious and trenchant.

<sup>334</sup> καὶ ... μέντοι (B7-8): “also,” i.e. in addition to asserting that the just is the κρείττονος συμφέρον: μέντοι responds to ὅτι μέν (B2) after the interruptive back and forth (B3-7).

<sup>335</sup> τιθέσθαι (C7) middle, as used by Thrasymachus above (338E1, E3), to emphasize their conscious intention.

<sup>336</sup> ἀ δ’ ἂν θῶνται (C10): Socrates uses what we have come to call a “general” condition (ἄν plus subjunctive in the protasis), but despite our nomenclature the force of the subjunctive is anticipatory.

just behavior.

“Yes, of course.”

Well then it's not only just according to your argument for them to act in the rulers' advantage, but also the opposite, to their disadvantage.

“Now<sup>337</sup> what are you are trying to say?”

Just what you<sup>338</sup> are saying, it seems to me. But let's try to analyze it. We have on the table<sup>339</sup> the agreement that the ruling group, in commanding<sup>340</sup> the ruled to act in a certain way, err from time to time in the formulation of what is best<sup>341</sup> for themselves; but that once they make their command, being the rulers,<sup>342</sup> justice consists in the ruled acting accordingly. Isn't this what we have on the table?

“I do think so,” Thrasymachus says, almost without affect.

Well then think<sup>343</sup> this, too, that you have granted that their doing what is disadvantageous to the rulers or your ‘strongers’<sup>344</sup> is also just, whenever the one group, the rulers, unintentionally command them to do things bad for themselves, while for the other group you assert<sup>345</sup> it is just to do what the former commanded. Does the situation not then necessarily come about, my most wise Thrasymachus, that it is just for them to do the opposite of what you have said to be just? For at that moment what is being commanded is that the weaker ones act to the *disadvantage* of the strong.

Unlike the argument about the wrestler's diet this argument has a beginning, middle and end, and Thrasymachus has been participating in it step by step. The very moment the refutation is complete, Polemarchus cuts off our access to (340) Thrasymachus's response by stepping in to agree with Socrates, just as he had blocked Cephalus from responding to Socrates just when Socrates had made

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Thrasymachus agrees to the proposition without noticing the trap he is stepping into, not because he unguardedly allows Socrates to generalize, but because he *anticipates* the direct and unthinking compliance of the ruled as something that appeals to him.

<sup>337</sup>τί λέγεις σύ (D4), the unnecessary nominative pronoun again emphatic, and derogatory, expressing impatience. The expression according to Aristophanes is a commonplace in eristic argument (*Nub.* I 174, the scholium to which says one uses it to knock his opponent dumb [καταπλήξαι]).

<sup>338</sup>Ἄσὺ λέγεις (D5): Socrates returns the nominative *pari passu*.

<sup>339</sup>ώμολόγηται (D6) perfect, of an agreement already reached (to be preferred 339E2, *infra*).

<sup>340</sup>προστάττοντας (D7), the simple act of commanding, replaces τιθέσθαι νόμους, lawmaking, with which Thrasymachus identified it, above (338E3-6).

<sup>341</sup>The superlative (βελτίστου, D7) makes error more likely, and therefore makes the proposition that they sometimes err harder to rescind.

<sup>342</sup>προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες (B8): the subject of προστάττειν is restated to firm up the grounds for the assertion that they must obey.

<sup>343</sup>οἴου τοίνυν (E1): again Socrates re-uses Thrasymachus's words (cf. σύ, D5) but τοίνυν adds an edge: Thrasymachus *must* agree.

<sup>344</sup>ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσί (E2), τε καί linking illustration with idea: Socrates reverts to the original definition (τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, 338C2), for which the ruling group (τὸ ἄρχον, 338D10) was merely an illustration as Thrasymachus himself said at 339A2 (cf. n. *ad loc.*).

<sup>345</sup>φῆς (E4), subjunctive, with Burnet (Chambray prints it baritone and therefore as an indicative, with a correspondingly strained translation). The construction in μέν / δέ pre-empts any interpretation by which the two clauses should not be parallel, and therefore requires the subjunctive regardless of the slight inconcinnity in the character of the two conditionalities. Adam is concerned about ὅταν being appropriate with only the first, but the indifference of the matter is revealed by the facts that ἔάν would have been appropriate with both and that we commonly say “When x is 2, 2x is 4,” without thereby committing ourselves to having asserted that x has ever been 2.

trouble for Cephalus's argument about paying back.<sup>346</sup> In the former case, as soon as Polemarchus had risen in support of Cephalus's position Cephalus took the opportunity to leave. The dramatic parallel leads us to reflect, and thereby to realize without anybody saying it, that there is no way Thrasymachus will make an exit before he proves to be stronger than everybody. To the extent that we are aware of this, we recognize that the conversation that now intervenes takes place in the ominous shadow of Thrasymachus's mounting anger in response to it being shown what he himself believes in all its self-contradictions.

Cleitophon chimes in to counter Polemarchus's support of Socrates. He is speaking on behalf of Thrasymachus as we can tell not by his defense of the position but by his attempt to imitate Thrasymachus's derisive and contrarian manner, saying, "As long as you are his witness," (340A3) by which he identifies himself, by implication, as a witness on behalf of Thrasymachus and invites Polemarchus into a sub-squabble. Then Polemarchus takes up the derogatory language and uses it against Cleitophon, as Socrates had just done with Thrasymachus:<sup>347</sup> "Who needs a witness when your man himself confesses that the ruling group on the one hand sometimes commands things bad for themselves, but that for the ruled on the other hand it is just to carry out such commands?"

The two are imitating the interlocutors they admire, in order to advance the logos.<sup>348</sup> We get the sense that we can ignore Thrasymachus for a moment and enjoy a little by-play, but we still know he is not going to disappear.

"What you need to know,"<sup>349</sup> Polemarchus," says Cleitophon, "is that justice according to Thrasymachus's formulation<sup>350</sup> consisted in responding to the rulers' bidding with obedience."<sup>351</sup>

"That justice was the advantage of the stronger was also<sup>352</sup> part of his formulation. The problem is, having saddled himself with both these formulations<sup>353</sup> he went on to agree that sometimes the rulers bid<sup>354</sup> the weaker persons whom they rule<sup>355</sup> to do things disadvantageous to themselves.<sup>356</sup> The

<sup>346</sup>At 331D4-5, where just as here (340A2) he uses γε to justify his intervention.

<sup>347</sup> μάρτυρος (A4). Cf. σμικρά / μεγάλη (339B1-2); λέγεις (339D4-5). Polemarchus's use of καί here, instead of an adversative, shows he believes he has the upper hand.

<sup>348</sup>Similar sub-squabbles take place in the *Protagoras* (335C8-336D5: Callias for Protagoras, Alcibiades for Socrates) and in the *Gorgias* (448A6-C9: Chaerephon for Socrates, Polus for Gorgias).

<sup>349</sup>Cleitophon's γάρ (A7) derisively mimics the γάρ of Polemarchus, at the expense of being so elliptical that, like many of Thrasymachus's retorts, it approaches meaninglessness.

<sup>350</sup> εἴθετο (A8): is lightly ironic (the verb has hitherto been used, saliently, of the ruling lawmakers: cf. 338E1, E3, 339C7; and nn.335 and 340): it broaches the idea that Thrasymachus's own attempt to rule the conversation with his thesis of the advantage of the stronger might have been formulated in a way disadvantageous to himself.

<sup>351</sup> κελευόμενα (A7): He speaks as if substituting κελεύειν for προστάττειν makes the contents of the commands moot. For him, as for Thrasymachus at 339C10-12, the focus is on the relation command-obedience (cf. n. 336, *supra*; and note the use of the term at 327B5, where Polemarchus's slave speaks as though the mere act of κελεύειν requires obedience, which for him of course it does).

<sup>352</sup> καὶ γάρ (A9). The γάρ, besides its mocking echo of Cleitophon's γάρ, accepts the truth of the answer in order to deny its relevance, as at 333A2. The brunt of Polemarchus's rhetoric is in the mocking repetition of Cleitophon's words δίκαιον εἶναι εἴθετο (B1: cf.A8).

<sup>353</sup> θέμενος (B1): cf. n. ad A8.

<sup>354</sup> κελεύειν (B2): He accepts and uses Cleitophon's new term since it has been neutralized.

<sup>355</sup> ἡττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους (340B3) Polemarchus shows how acutely he has picked up the identification Socrates had made (339E2) between the "rulers" of the illustration and the "stronger" of the original definition, by now adverting to the fact that, conversely, the *ruled* are functioning as an illustration of the *weaker*.

<sup>356</sup> Polemarchus's exactness in rehearsing the expression of the argument is Socratic (cf.331C8 and

result of all these concessions would be that justice, as obedience to the stronger, is no more to the advantage than to the disadvantage of the stronger.”<sup>357</sup>

“But by ‘the advantage of the stronger’ he meant what the stronger man was quite assured<sup>358</sup> was in his interest. His point was<sup>359</sup> that it was incumbent upon the weaker to carry this out, and that to do so was justice.”

“But this was not the way the conversation actually went,” Polemarchus objects, with complete justification.<sup>360</sup>

Both interlocutors imitate and both fall short of their models, with Cleitophon hewing so closely to Thrasymachus’s meaning that he forgets to win the spat by packaging it derisively, and Polemarchus doing such a good job of remembering how the argument went that he ends up having no idea where it should go next. Socrates therefore intervenes with the simple proposal to Polemarchus that the disagreement about what he meant (*ἔλεγεν*) and what was said (*ἔλέγετο*) comes to nothing since we can simply ask Thrasymachus what he now says and move on from there.<sup>361</sup> With this he turns to Thrasymachus and the digression ends: How about it? Did you mean justice is what seemed to the stronger to be advantageous, whether in truth it was advantageous or not?

“How could I think that! Do you really think I would call a man making an error stronger than the others at the moment he is making the error?”<sup>362</sup>

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n.). Thrasymachus posited that justice is the advantage of the stronger at 338E1-9A4, and that justice is obeying their commands at 339B7-8. It was after these posits that he agreed, in turn (note Polemarchus’s *αὐ*), that the rulers sometimes make disadvantageous commands (339C1-9).

<sup>357</sup> οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (B4) the expression alludes formally to a type of refutation (e.g. Democritus DK68B156) that was to become one of the skeptical tropes. Cf. 487C3 with n. 2717, 538D9, 609B3-4.

<sup>358</sup> ὁ ἡγοῦτο (B7). For the verb denoting settled opinion, cf. 334C1,2 and n. By using optative for indicative in secondary sequence Cleitophon prefers to allude to the time of Thrasymachus’s talk, as opposed to the present moment when things in fact appear to have changed.

<sup>359</sup> ποιητέον εἶναι (B7-8), shifting away from the *ἔλεγεν* construction to an infinitival construction without a leading verb, the indicative portraying the meaning Thrasymachus intended by his words (*ἔλεγεν*) and the infinitive the “propositional content” of the formulation (*ποιητέον*).

<sup>360</sup> ἔλέγετο (B9), appropriating Cleitophon’s term to his own purposes (*ἔλέγετο*, now denoting “what was said”).

<sup>361</sup> ἀποδέχεσθαι (C2) means, for the questioner, to accept an answer as meeting enough of the rudimentary criteria of competence to make it worthy of dialectical scrutiny (as here); and for the answerer, to accept a proposition as worthy of defense. Cf. the extensive discussion of the matter in Phaedo 91E, ff. When Thrasymachus barred Socrates’s one-word answers (οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, 336D3), he was claiming such answers were categorically inadequate for consideration; but for Socrates the only criterion for such adequacy is that the answerer really believes it, and this only because it will motivate the answerer to defend it, and therefore help Socrates test its veracity through question and answer (337C3-6: cf. Gorg.495A5-C2; Meno 83D; Prot.331CD, 333C5-9; Soph.246D [and Campbell *ad loc.*]; Tht.154C-155A).

<sup>362</sup> αλλά (C6): Thrasymachus feigns to try to conceive how he could think this. His reason for finding his rulers infallible is not to retreat to an idealist defense against Socrates’s refutation but to continue the conversation unscathed by shifting the ground of the conversation toward his main idea, his “killer answer,” that the strong are the only people that matter anyway, since the others are foolish enough to give them power in their belief that there is something called justice according to which they feel they must do so, or would be benefitted by doing so. His admiration for the strong is not rational, and so it does not need us to rationalize it.

The moment a strong man makes a law, obeying that law becomes justice. Now it comes into view that the strong man who makes that law becomes a strong man only after he makes a law, since it

I did in fact think this is what you meant when you were granting that the rulers were not infallible but do in fact make some mistakes.<sup>363</sup>

"Well, Socrates, that's because you play the sycophant in conversations.<sup>364</sup> Just ask yourself:<sup>365</sup> Do you call<sup>366</sup> a person who is making an error in treating the sick a doctor in respect to the very error he is making? Or an accountant a person who makes an error in calculation just at the moment he makes the error, and in respect to<sup>367</sup> the error he has made? I feel we<sup>368</sup> do talk this way when we say, 'The doctor erred' and 'The accountant erred' and 'The grammarian.'<sup>369</sup> But I feel<sup>370</sup> that in reality<sup>371</sup> each of these individual types,<sup>372</sup> to the extent that they really are<sup>373</sup> what we designate<sup>374</sup> them to be, never errs. And so in terms of accurate thinking—something you of course will never tire to require

is the law that will make him stronger—if, that is, the others obey—and that in doing so these others become the weaker. Not only does the strong man not err: he is strong only because and only when he does not err.

<sup>363</sup>ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι ἀλλά τι καὶ ἔξαμαρτάνειν (C9): Socrates, as often, restates the language of the previous passage in its idiomatic particularity, as if to recall the very moment it was said to his interlocutor's mind (e.g., the phrase τι καί at 340C9 repeated from 339C2: cf. 392B1-4, 394B9-C1, 427D4-7, 490D3, 503A6-7, 504B5, 607B2, 612B1 and n.5088, 613C8; Phdrs.272D2 [cf.260A1-3]; Prot.311D4 [cf.310E1-2], 313B7 and C1 [cf.310E4], 313C1 [cf.311E4], etc.). On the other hand his repetition is not slavish: he omits the adjectival supplement οἷοι(C2), and he shifts from ἀμαρτάνειν to ἔξαμαρτάνειν, as a nod to what Thrasymachus has just now said, ἔξαμαρτάνοντα ὅταν ἔξαμαρτάνη (C6-7).

<sup>364</sup>συκοφάντης γὰρ εἰ (D1). Thrasymachus's responses have ranged from mild impatience to snide misdirection to bald derision (336B8-Cff, 337A4, 337C2[ώς δή], 337C7-8[ἄλλο τι οὖν], 337D6, 337E1[γε], 338B1-2, 338D2-3, 338D7[εἰτα], 339B1[γε], 339D4, 340C6[γε]). He has by now called Socrates three names (with peremptory γάρ : ἡδὺς γὰρ εἰ [337D6]; βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἰ [338D3]; συκοφάντης γὰρ εἰ [340D1]). When he is not derisive he is boastful (337D1-2 vaunts that he has a killer answer and 338C1 commands Socrates to hear that answer). Yet he is able to introduce the steps in his argument without the edge, and does respond to Socrates's elenchus politely—at least, until Socrates concludes he has contradicted himself (τί λέγεις σύ, 339D4).

The sycophant acts honest and simple for devious and dishonest reasons. In argument this might consist of making an innocent-looking allegation that Thrasymachus's argument should be held to a standard which Socrates knows all the while it does not need to meet (cf. the use of the term in Arist. Top. I 57A32; I 39B26, 33). Thus for Thrasymachus Socrates's sycophancy is just an aspect of his irony, his strategy of playing dumb and asking questions, and thereby defeating persons by holding them to a higher standard than he himself could sustain as answerer.

<sup>365</sup>ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα (D2), as when a speaker starts with "first of all" to indicate he could have started elsewhere at the same time that he promises he'll get there in good time. Cf. Gorg.472D1 (and Dodds *ad loc.*); Lach.195B3; Phdrs.235E; Prot.359E3 (and Stallb., "ne longe hinc abeam"); Tht.166B; Adam on Crito 44D; Riddell, *Digest* §143.

<sup>366</sup>καλεῖς (D2), as opposed to λέγεις (340C8 and before) broaches a distinction between the word and the meaning.

<sup>367</sup>κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀμαρτίαν. (D4-5): The argument depends on the meaning of κατά, "in respect to," and therefore "by looking at." When we call him a doctor even though he errs, we are looking at something other than the error; conversely when we focus on the error (cf. κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, D3) we would not call him a doctor.

<sup>368</sup>λέγομεν (D5): to prove his charge of sycophancy – i.e., that Socrates is holding him to too high a standard – Thrasymachus needs to have Socrates make the same minor error he does; but to save his position he needs to have everybody speak this way, and so he shifts from the second singular (καλεῖς, D2) to the first plural. He softens or hides the transition by avoiding to use any verb at all in the intervening and transitional case of the accountant (D3-5).

of us—none of the various worthies we rely on<sup>375</sup> errs. It is when his knowledge leaves him in the lurch that an erring expert errs, at which moment he is not really an expert. And so the worthy, whether acting in the role of expert or of ruler, never<sup>376</sup> errs while he really is<sup>377</sup> ruler;<sup>378</sup> although anybody might say, ‘The doctor erred’ or ‘The ruler erred.’ It is in this latter way that you may take the meaning of my answer to you just a moment ago, whereas it is the perfectly accurate<sup>379</sup> former answer that is truly the case, that the man who rules, to the extent that he really is (341) ruling,<sup>380</sup> doesn’t err;<sup>381</sup> and that unerring, he formulates as law what is best<sup>382</sup> for himself; and that this law the ruled must carry out. And so, as I defined justice at the outset, so do I define it now: doing what is advantageous to the strong man.”<sup>383</sup>

Thrasymachus has captured the floor and held it for two minutes. Socrates’s reply sounds

<sup>369</sup>ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἔξημαρτεν καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἔξημαρτεν καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής (D5-6). The γραμματιστής is new. Last minute additions are a typical way of confirming a point (cf. 333B8-9 and n.). What is casual in their being added without warning is here underscored by his dropping of the verb in this third case.

<sup>370</sup>οἶμαι twice (D5, D7), feigning humility. He is beginning a vaunt.

<sup>371</sup>τὸ δέ (D7), “but in truth” (as often), here meaning not just in fact but in essence or in reality.

<sup>372</sup>ἔκαστος (D7), as the superlative of ἐκάτερος, insists on superlative specificity; as such it is one of the expressions Plato uses for the ideas (cf. n.4631).

<sup>373</sup>κατά (D7) now used with quantitative ὅσον (ἔστι paroxytone).

<sup>374</sup>προσαγορεύομεν (E1), more technical than καλεῖν (D2) or λέγειν τῷ ρήματι (D5).

<sup>375</sup>δημιουργός (E4): Thrasymachus suddenly introduces the term to serve as a generalization from his three examples of the doctor, the accountant and the grammarian: the question is whether he means it also to cover the ἄρχων for the sake of whom these three examples have been adduced.

The semantic field of the word is complex. The δημιουργός is sometimes a mere craftsman (Leg.850B1, C3; Prot.312B1-4; Rep.396A8) but sometimes on a par with the finer competencies (parallel with ἐπιστήμαι at Charm.173C2, Leg.902E5, Tht.146C8-D1) Sometimes the range of use appears to be exhausted by manufacturing trades (e.g. Apol.22D [and Riddell *ad loc.*]; Charm.173C2; Euthyd.280C8; Rep.415C2, 466A8-B2, 468A6-7 [where the γεωργός is not a δημιουργός]; ἄλλων is ambiguous at 371C2], 552A9-10, 598B9; Soph.219AC [esp.C4]), including the production of graphic art works (Rep.401A1-4 [but contrast 597D11]); but sometimes it extends beyond them, perhaps by metaphor although without apology, to approach any competency whatever (Crat.429A4-B9; Gorg.452A2-3, 503E; Rep.421C1-2, 466E5-6, 552D4-6). Rep.433D2-4 needs to be treated separately. In all cases competency is present.

The etymology of the word, its use in distinction from ιδιώτης (*Ion* 531C5-6, *Prot.*312B1-4, and cf. *Thg.*124B5-7), the parallel use of the term δημοσεύειν in a context like *Gorg.*455B3 (cf. Thompson and Dodds *ad loc.*), and its ready availability for the approbatory uses of Timaeus and of Eryximachus in *Symposium* (186D4-5 [and Dover *ad loc.*], 187D3-5, 188D1), all suggest that the value of the competency lies in the public’s reliance upon it. This perhaps explains Glaucon’s denial that a painter of a bed is as much a δημιουργός as a bedmaker (597D11-E2).

<sup>376</sup>δημιουργός ἢ σοφός ἢ ἄρχων (E4-5): The list is rhetorically bold at the same time it is strikingly ambiguous. It may consist of three nouns, “a specialist, or a wise person, or a ruler,” but the logic of such a triad is obscure, the fact that he expatiates only on the third item needs to be explained, and the subsequent elaboration with ἰατρός and ἄρχων appears to leave out the middle item, the σοφός.

σοφός in particular is new in the present context. Logically it stems from ἐπιστήμη (E3); as such it should modify δημιουργός. In this case ἄρχων, presumably parallel to it because also introduced by ἢ, should also modify δημιουργός. Thus the list means, “no specialist, whether working for the people as expert or as ruler ...” and the point of the list is to cast back through the σοφοί of the present paragraph (the γραμματιστής, the λογιστής and the ἰατρός), so as to return us to the explicandum they were introduced to explain, namely, the ruler. Such a list-configuration, in which a general term is followed by a pair of specifiers, is well established (Euthyd.271B4-5; Leg.766E1-2, 776D8-E1, 933A2-3;

Thrasymachean for the way it responds to a long and substantial argument by raising *ad hominem* matters: “So you think I am playing the sycophant, do you?”

“Certainly.”

You think I was asking<sup>384</sup> the questions I was asking as a plot to attack you in conversation?

“I don’t think, I know: and you’ll have no advantage from it. You could neither ambush me nor overcome me with main force in an open attack.”<sup>385</sup>

I wouldn’t even try, my dazzling friend! But to keep this kind of thing<sup>386</sup> from arising between us again, make a clear distinction whether you mean by the ruler and stronger the one of common parlance or the one of the accurate conception as you have just now articulated it, whose advantage, given the fact that they are the stronger, it shall be just for weaker to carry out.

“The one who, by the very most accurate<sup>387</sup> conception, really is<sup>388</sup> ruler. Now attack at will and play the sycophant<sup>389</sup>—I give you full license. Of course you’ll have no success.”

You think me so mad as to try bearding the lion and to play the sycophant against Thrasymachus?

“The fact is you made an attempt just now,<sup>390</sup> feckless as you are.”

*Phlb.* 17E4-5; *Rep.* 411D3-4, 431B9-C1, 528A4-5; *Soph.* 260C8-9); and linking nouns with modifiers as though syntactically coordinate is commonplace (*Charm.* 161E12-13; *Leg.* 665C2-3; *Prot.* 319D2-4; *Tht.* 175B3-4 [and Campbell *ad loc.*]).

<sup>377</sup> ἔτι (E5) again existential (cf. D7), though diacritics cannot indicate so in the subjunctive.

<sup>378</sup> ἀρχων (E6): or, “really is ruling.” The word may be a noun or a periphrastic participle, but it comes to the same. It is an index of his subliminal desires that Thrasymachus exploits the opportunity to expatriate on the last item in his list only (he says “when he rules” when he could or should have said “when he heals or rules”), just as, conversely, he had taken given shorter shrift to the last item in his last one, in which he is uninterested (*γραμμιστής*, 340D6). To generalize for all the items in terms that generalize the last only, cf. *Alc.* I 107B9 [A7-8]; *Leg.* 631C4-5 [applying also to B7-C1], 906E10-12, 948E5-9A5; *Phdrs.* 247D5-E2; *Polit.* 288D7-E4 [esp. E2-4], 290B1-4, 307A8-B1 [where the solution to the coming paradox is broached with a generalization of the last item only]; *Rep.* 526D2-5, 529E1-3.

<sup>379</sup> ἀκριβέστατον (E8): The superlative is gratuitous and enthusiastic.

<sup>380</sup> ἔστιν (341A1) enclitic; or ἔστι, “really is ruler,” as at 340D7.

<sup>381</sup> μή (A1), because the denial is based on the definition or nature of the ruler.

<sup>382</sup> βέλτιστον (A2), the superlative, taking head-on the challenge Socrates had made with his superlative at 339D7. There is a note of triumph in the presentation of his conclusion.

<sup>383</sup> He claims he has not shifted positions, but by adding ποιητέον (A2) he shifts the accent from the justness of the command to the justness of obeying it, from the paradoxical statement that whatever the strong want is *eo ipso* just, to the almost tautological view that obeying the law they impose by virtue of their position as rulers, is just. The former is controversial; the latter almost goes without saying, since in common parlance laws prescribe what behavior is “just.”

<sup>384</sup> ἐρέσθαι (A8), present infinitive representing the imperfect.

<sup>385</sup> He has not only seen through Socrates’s sycophantic ruse (*λάθοις*, B1) of holding him to a higher standard than Socrates himself could maintain, but has succeeded to meet that higher standard himself (so that Socrates’s ruse had no force [*βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύνατο*, B2-3]).

<sup>386</sup> With τοιοῦτον (B4) Socrates avoids dignifying the squabbling with a name, which besides would in all likelihood only extend the controversy.

<sup>387</sup> ἀκριβεστάτῳ (B8), Thrasymachus’s enthusiasm reappearing (cf. 340E8).

<sup>388</sup> ὄντα (B8) again “existential” (cf. A1, 340E5, 340D7).

<sup>389</sup> κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει (B9) invites Socrates to concatenate the two kinds of attack Thrasymachus has accused him of trying so far (κακουργήσαις, 338D4; συκοφαντής, 340D1).

<sup>390</sup> γοῦν (C3) of “part proof:” whether he would be mooted by the fact that he already did.

That's enough of that, Socrates remarks. Thrasymachus has clearly chosen the strict interpretation, and has vowed unstintingly to defend his position. To achieve this level of resolution is the only value this kind of banter can have for Socrates. Now his testing elenchus can begin: Is your physician in the strict sense a businessman or is he a caregiver to the sick? Mind you,<sup>391</sup> talk about the man who really is a doctor in truth.<sup>392</sup>

"Caregiver to the sick."

What about a pilot?<sup>393</sup> Is the pilot in the proper sense<sup>394</sup> the ruler of the sailors or a sailor himself?

"Ruler of sailors."<sup>395</sup>

I suppose we shouldn't be troubled by the thought that he does sail in the ship nor think that therefore<sup>396</sup> he is to be called a sailor, since it is not looking to<sup>397</sup> his sailing that we call him pilot but looking to his skill and rule<sup>398</sup> over the sailors.

"True."

Now doesn't each of these<sup>399</sup> practitioners have an interest or an advantage?

"Quite."

And is it not this, namely the interest of each, that skill by its very nature is meant to seek out and provide?<sup>400</sup>

<sup>391</sup>καί (C6).

<sup>392</sup>τῷ ὄντι (C6). The distinction between the loose and strict senses having been secured, Socrates can now refer to the strict sense with a variety of terms. Here he repeats Thrasymachus's formulation with existential ὄντα (from B8) by varying τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ (C4) with τῷ ὄντι.

<sup>393</sup>κυβερνητής (C9): Socrates expands on Thrasymachus's example, ιατρός (E6), with κυβερνητής so as to instantiate not only expertise (like Thrasymachus's supplementary cases: λογιστής, γραμματιστής [340D3-7]) but the sorts of expertise that we rely upon in life and death situations. Cf. 389C2-6, 551C3; Leg.709B2-3, 961E-962A; Polit.299BC; Prot.344D2-5.

<sup>394</sup>ὁρθῶς (C9) replaces τῷ ὄντι in attributive position (cf. C6).

<sup>395</sup>ναυτῶν ἄρχων (C11): Though he was triumphant in the by-play Thrasymachus's answers now become defensively spare (cf. C8).

<sup>396</sup>οὐδέ (D1) illative, as καί would be if the two clauses were positive (cf. 342A5 and n.).

<sup>397</sup>κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν / κατὰ τὴν τέχνην (D2-3): Socrates closely imitates Thrasymachus's expressions at 340D3 and D4-5.

<sup>398</sup>τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἄρχήν (D3): With his exegesis (καί) Socrates adopts and emphasizes the association between expertise and rule that Thrasymachus had relied on above and expressed with δημιουργός at 340E4-5.

<sup>399</sup>ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ (D5): ἐκάστῳ may be neuter or masculine, but given Thrasymachus's insistence on the distinct nature of the various τέχναι it, with τούτῳ, likely refers to the two sample practitioners, doctor and pilot, rather than to the pilot and the sailor (who moreover should have been in the plural). D.J.Allan's flat assertion that ἐκάστῳ is masculine, on the grounds that there has as yet been no mention of objects or persons whose benefit the arts secure, merely begs the question. There is no warrant in the text by which we can intervene and remove the ambiguity: it is intended by Socrates.

<sup>400</sup>If this ἐκάστῳ (D8) has the same reference as the previous one (D5), an inference we have at this point no warrant either to assert or deny, Socrates has now suggested that skills have come into existence to benefit their practitioners. This is Thrasymachus's position exactly. The art of rule is for him identical with the ruler obtaining and maintaining power by the promulgation of laws the obedience to which redounds to his benefit, even though secured merely on the argument that, being laws, it is just to obey them.

“This.”<sup>401</sup>

So let me ask you, when it comes to the various skills do they have any interest or advantage other than to be as complete and perfect as possible?

“How do you mean this question?”

I mean it this way:<sup>402</sup> if you were to ask me whether the body is able to maintain itself as a body on its own, or whether it needs something else besides itself, I would say, “You bet it needs something else: that’s why we have a science of medicine, because the body is burdensome<sup>403</sup> and cannot sustain itself. To provide for this and secure its interest is what medicine has been set up to do.” Would my answer seem to you correct if I answered this way?

“Correct.”

(342) But then, to move on to the question I am asking you,<sup>404</sup> is the skill of medicine considered in itself burdensome, in turn? Is there any skill for that matter that needs some ability or virtue besides itself the way the eyes need the ability to see and the ears need the ability to hear, and therefore, because they have needs, there is in their case a need for a distinct skill that will seek out and then provide what will avail them to achieve these abilities?<sup>405</sup> I ask you, is there likewise in the skill itself some insufficiency, so that<sup>406</sup> for each of the special skills there will be a need for another skill that will seek out its advantage, and for this seeking skill another skill in turn, and so on into infinity? Or else<sup>407</sup> is it that each plays this role for itself, and tends to its own advantage? Or is it not rather that skill needs neither herself nor another skill to look out for her<sup>408</sup> interest to compensate for a burdensome deficiency within herself, since there is neither deficiency nor error of any kind within any skill, nor does it befit skill<sup>409</sup> to search out the advantage for any other<sup>410</sup> than for the one we have noted above, whose<sup>411</sup> skill it is, while in herself she is immune from harm and free of alloy, correct and

<sup>401</sup> ἐπὶ τούτῳ (D9): Thrasymachus’s reply is still spare and without affect, despite the fact that Socrates has finally and for the first time articulated exactly the controversial thesis Thrasymachus wants to thrill everyone with.

<sup>402</sup> With ὡσπερ (E2), adverb, Socrates answers in kind Thrasymachus’s peculiar question, πῶς.

<sup>403</sup> πονηρός (E5): the diction is strained. But if we ask why a villain is called πονηρός it is because he is troublesome and burdensome to us or, as we sometimes say, a “pain.”

<sup>404</sup> τί δὲ δή (342A1) with δή indicating a move to the target.

<sup>405</sup> εἰς αὐτὰ ταῦτα (A4), ‘to move them in the direction of the ability (ἀρετήν) they each need.’ εἰς is used with ἀρετή exactly this way at 335B8, B10, and C2.

<sup>406</sup> καί (alterum, c. δεῖ, A5) illative, as at Gorg.478D6-7; H.Min.366A2-4; Lach.197A8; Meno 76D4; Phdo 85E5-6A1, 86A2-3; Phdrs.229B8; Polit.274A2; Rep.382B2-3, 434C1-2, 465C7, 476A10, 488E4-9A1. Close and sometimes hardly worth distinguishing is καί designating the temporal consequence of items as Charm.156D1-3; Gorg.467D3-4; Leg.738D6-E1; Phdo 81B8; Phdrs.251A7-B1; Symp.206D3-5, D5-7.

<sup>407</sup> ή̄ (primum, B1) meaning “or else” (cf. 401B [bis], 504D, 598E4; and Phdrs.237C1; Tim.52C5), the first alternative having been refuted, and therefore eliminated, by the fact that it leads to infinite regress. Distinguish this use from ή̄ for the “or else” of the unattractive alternative (e.g., 490A2, 574A3, 598E4; and Crat.426B2; Gorg.494A1; Phdrs.245D8).

<sup>408</sup> ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς πονηρίαν (B2): The language begins to raise τέχνη to a higher level and even to personify her.

<sup>409</sup> οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἀμαρτία οὐδεμίᾳ οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνη (B3): the language turns away from logical demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) toward praise (ἐπίδειξις), a praise of τέχνη that takes its cue from the enthusiasm that Thrasymachus had momentarily shown (ἀκριβέστατον, 340E8).

<sup>410</sup> ἄλλω (B4): as with the dative ἐκάστῳ above (341D8) the reference and the gender are unascertainable.

<sup>411</sup> οὐ̄ (B5) continues the semantic obscurity of ἄλλω and adds syntactic obscurity: is the genitive objective or subjective? Does the τέχνη benefit the technician whose τέχνη it is (subjective) or the

upright as she is and will be as long as she has her own accuracy as the complete whole that she truly is.<sup>412</sup> Is this the way it is or is it otherwise?

His long question, during which he suggests and even advocates an answer, nearly matches the presentation of Thrasymachus's thesis in length but easily surpasses it in ardency. Socrates, too, it seems, admires what we have come to call the empire of skill, its autarky, its purity, its wholeness and perfection. Thrasymachus cannot but agree: "It is evident that this is the way it is."

The other shoe is about to drop. Socrates makes the direct inference<sup>413</sup> that medicine does not seek the advantage of medicine but of the body; Thrasymachus says "ναι," the shortest yes-answer available in Greek. Nor does horsemanship that of horsemanship but of horses; nor does any skill whatsoever that of itself—after all it needs nothing besides itself—but of that whose skill it is."<sup>414</sup> Thrasymachus, as if he were not sure whether he was coming or going, re-uses his last answer with the words reversed: "It seems that is how it is." With ἀλλὰ μήν ... γε, Socrates now asks the question that supplies the minor premise that lets the other shoe drop: "But to be sure it is a *ruling*<sup>415</sup> role that the skills enjoy, and a role of power over that whose skills they are."<sup>416</sup>

Socrates at this point does not convey Thrasymachus's very words to us but reverts to narration and tells us that Thrasymachus with great reluctance said yes; but then he quotes himself as drawing the fatal conclusion: "Therefore<sup>417</sup> it is not true that knowledge,<sup>418</sup> any knowledge in the world, makes the interest of the stronger its concern, to find and bring it about under its direction,<sup>419</sup> but that of the weaker that is ruled by it."

Socrates again reverts to narration: although Thrasymachus finally agreed to this as well it was not

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thing on which it operates (objective)? The former possibility was mildly suggested by Socrates at 341D5-8, perhaps a little perversely. That the latter might be the answer is however suggested by ἐκείνῳ, which as the demonstrative of the more remote reference would point back to the items τέχνη was said to seek the advantage of (341E6-7) before the talk about τέχνη needing another τέχνη (342A1-B2).

<sup>412</sup>ἀβλαβῆς καὶ ἀκέραιός ἐστιν ὄρθη οὐσα ἔωσπερ ἀν ἦ ἐκάστη ἀκριβῆς ὅλη ἥπερ ἐστίν (B5-6): the heaping sequence of approbatory abstractions sounds Parmenidean! Among these terms Socrates has incorporated ἀκριβῆς (B6), which he borrowed from Thrasymachus, as he goes on to remind him (B7).

<sup>413</sup>ἄρα (C1) without apology and without supplementary connective.

<sup>414</sup>ἐκείνῳ οὐ (C5): The ambiguity of syntax and semantics is continued (cf. B5) and becomes all the more pregnant (unfortunately difficult to render in English: my "that" for ἐκείνῳ can be a person): the ambiguous phrase is starting to echo.

<sup>415</sup>ἄρχουσι (C8), emphasized by γε.

<sup>416</sup>ἐκείνου οὐπέρ εἰσιν τέχναι (C9): This phrase since it was first used at 342B5 was amenable to a misinterpretation advantageous to Thrasymachus, but now its true reference is ineluctably clear: the genitive is objective and not subjective and the antecedent of ἐκείνου is the object the art operates on. The skills belong to nobody; the world belongs to the skills.

<sup>417</sup>ἄρα (C11), again (cf. C1), direct and bare, this time supplemented with γε after ἐπιστήμη: "knowledge, given what she is." He reverts from narration back to quoting himself abruptly, without ἢν δ' ἐγώ or ἔφην, as if we knew he would.

<sup>418</sup>ἐπιστήμη (C11) is really what they have been talking about all along (cf. 340E3), though Thrasymachus's introduction of δῆμιονγός (340E3), which helped him bridge the analogy between the σοφός and the ἄρχων (nn.375 and 376, *supra*), deflected attention toward the bridging term, τέχνη.

<sup>419</sup>ἐπιτάττει (C12) replaces ἐκπορίζειν (341E6, 342A4), its ἐπι- picking up the goal of τέχνη as done with ἐπί plus acc. at 342B2; but the root of the new verb recalls the language of the previous context, in particular the picture of the ruler giving commands to the ruled (προστάττειν: 339D6, E3, 4, E7, and 340A5, replaced with κελεύειν by Cleitophon at 340A7).

without trying to make a battle out of it;<sup>420</sup> but once he agreed, Socrates could continue. It's no different with the doctor: no doctor, to the extent he is a doctor, seeks and directs the achieving of the doctor's interest but that of the man who is sick. After all we have agreed that the "accurate" doctor<sup>421</sup> is the ruler of bodies, not a businessman,<sup>422</sup> just as the "accurate" pilot was a ruler of sailors rather than a sailor himself. So therefore it is not the case that<sup>423</sup> a pilot and ruler of this kind at least<sup>424</sup> seeks and gives commands<sup>425</sup> to achieve the pilot's interest, but that of the sailor whom he rules. So, isn't it the case, Thrasymachus, that nobody who holds a position of rule, to the extent that he really is a ruler, either looks out for his own interest or<sup>426</sup> makes orders toward that end, but rather that of the ruled and<sup>427</sup> whatever person relies on him for his expertise.<sup>428</sup> Yes, it is by looking off<sup>429</sup> toward that goal and toward what is advantageous to and appropriate for that person that he

<sup>420</sup> ἐπεχείρει ... μάχεσθαι (D2-3): Compare his enervated behavior at 338A8-B3 (and n.). Again Socrates places the important fact, that he did agree, into the (concessive) μέν clause (cf. n.309). From this we get the impression he has taken an effort to spare us burdensome detail. Cf. 350C12, ff.

<sup>421</sup> ὁ ἀκριβῆς ἰατρός (D6): another variation in the expression of Thrasymachus's pronouncement (cf. 341C6, C8 and nn.), this time incorporating the emblem of Thrasymachus's proud enthusiasm (ἀκριβέστατον, 340E8, cf. 341B8).

<sup>422</sup> ὠμολόγηται (D6), the perfect pointing back to an agreement previously secured (341C4-8). With this step he closes the door on the second meaning of ἔκεινῳ οὐ τέχνῃ ἐστίν at 342B5, which was there still ambiguous enough that he could still secure Thrasymachus's agreement there.

<sup>423</sup> οὐκ ἄρα (E2) abrupt and bare for the third time (cf. 342C1 I and C1).

<sup>424</sup> γε (E2).

<sup>425</sup> σκέψεται τε καὶ προστάξει (E3): Now that he has the instance of the pilot back in the picture he has a more natural example of an art that rules (since it rules the sailors), so that he can replace ἔπιτάττειν with exactly the original term, προστάττειν. The distinct uses he had in mind for the two examples he had given at the beginning, the medico who is not a businessman and a pilot who is not a sailor, have now been revealed and brought to fruition. We had been told that the essence of the example of pilot and sailor consisted in the fact that the pilot was also sailing in the ship (πλεῖν, 341D2); but the real purpose was to set up the image of an expert ruling others, which also was broached there (with the rather strained expression, ναυτῶν ἄρχων, 341C9). Now he cashes this image in, but only after a strain in expression that calls it back to mind, the expression σωμάτων ἄρχων (342D6). Socrates's refutation is a consummate display of virtuosity.

<sup>426</sup> οὐδέ (E6) was proleptic, announcing a large period, and is picked up here (οὐδ' ἔπιτάττει, E8). The pair of negatives is then shuttled by ἀλλά (E8) into a series of positive statements linked by καί in "triumphant exuberance" (cf. England *ad Leg.734D*), building to a climax and then brought to a rest by the generalizing anaphoric doublet, λέγει ἡ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἡ ποιεῖ (E10), capped with ἄπαντα (E11).

<sup>427</sup> καί (E8) epexegetical, but ushering in a series of καί's in triumphant exuberance (342E9-11), of which the characteristic is that they come one after the other with different forces and different effects: 360B7-C3, 402C2-5, 475C6-7; Alc.I 105B4-7, 122C4-8; Crito 47B1-2, 51A7-C1 (the Laws speaking); Gorg.507E-508A; 511E1-3, 525A, C, D4; 527BE; Leg.734D, 892B3-4 (unswaying march to the goal), 942B4-5; Phdrs.239E5-6; Prot.325A6, 360B4-5; Symp.180B6-8, 185B5-6, 188D4-9 (all perorations: conversely, note conspicuous absence of καί in Agathon's peroration: 194C1-E5). Compare καί in unremitting satire at 396B5-7, 425B1-4, 573D2-4; and Charm.161E11-13.

<sup>428</sup> καὶ φὸν αὐτὸς δημιουργῆ (E8-9): Socrates remembers to clean up a detail: Thrasymachus had brought in the δημιουργός so as to confuse his strong man with the strength conferred on a practitioner of an art (340E4 and n.). To make his point in English I have taken some liberty with the wording: τὸ τῷ ἄρχομένῳ καὶ φὸν αὐτὸς δημιουργῆ (342E8-9).

<sup>429</sup> βλέπων (E9): Now it is Socrates's language (rather than Thrasymachus's: cf. 340D7 and n.) that approaches the terminology of the ideas!

says what he says and does what he does,<sup>430</sup> in each case and in every case.<sup>431</sup>

(343) It was now clear to them all, Socrates tells us, that they had come to a point where the account of justice had been totally reversed. Thrasymachus now stops playing the role of answerer, and asks a question instead, “Where’s your nanny, Socrates?”

Huh? Oughtn’t you come up with a better answer rather than reverting to questions like that?

“Because<sup>432</sup> there you are with snot all over your nose and Nursie’s neglected to take care of her ward<sup>433</sup> and wipe you off. You can’t even tell her<sup>434</sup> which are the sheep and which is the shepherd!”

Because what? Socrates replies. As before, Thrasymachus has stopped the conversation and arrested Socrates’s attention with name-calling, more derogatory and more inscrutable this time, so that this time can buy a moment finally to launch into his speech, a full statement of the πογκάλη ἀπόκρισις, which he has been chafing to give all along. It is a highly rhetorical speech (343B1–4C8), delivered *ex tempore* and without any warning as to its length. Finally we get an opportunity to see the professional orator at work.

“Because<sup>435</sup> you think shepherds and cowherds look out for the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten them and take care of them, with some other goal in their sights than the good of their masters and their own good, and likewise<sup>436</sup> rulers in the city—the rulers for real<sup>437</sup> that is—you sit there with the notion<sup>438</sup> that they have something else in mind for their subjects than what a person would be ready to do to his sheep, and that they are on a vigil night and day<sup>439</sup> for some other purpose

<sup>430</sup>καὶ λέγει ἂ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἂ ποιεῖ (E10): Closure is often achieved by a complementary or polar doublet: 361B4-5, 412B3-4, 476B4-5 [χρόας καὶ σχήματα a doublet for the visible world] 580A3-5, 608E6-9A4; Crit. I 15A4-5; H.Maj.304B2-3; Leg.694E6-7 [πολλῶν πολλάς], 744B7-C2 [reading πενίαν with A and O<sup>2</sup> vs. πενίας with O], 764C8-D3, 779D2-5, 836A6-B1; Phlb. I 1B7-8; Polit.267E7-8, 299D3-E2; Prot.315C2-5, 325A6; Tht.186D10-E1; and cf. Thg. I 24B5-7.

<sup>431</sup>ἄπαντα (E11) achieves a climax that was postponed by Socrates’s choice to use simple relative clauses (ἀ λέγει and ἂ ποιεῖ, E10) rather than the generalizing formulation that he had just used (ὦ ἄν ... δημιουργῆ, E8-9).

<sup>432</sup>ὅτι (343A7): Thrasymachus’s riddle about the nurse was meant to elicit the question, “What do you mean?” just as a “knock-knock” joke relies on eliciting “Who’s there?” Socrates did say τί δέ, but he went on to scold Thrasymachus for asking an inappropriate question. In order to tell his joke Thrasymachus has to ignore the remark and act as if Socrates did not say it. Thus Thrasymachus has to bring himself to answering a question Socrates did not ask.

<sup>433</sup>περιορᾶ (A7) and δεόμενον (A8) reveal that Thrasymachus is parodying Socrates’s praise of knowledge as the savior of the weak. He chooses to confuse Socrates’s ardent admiration for knowledge with a sentimental or softhearted concern for people who need its benefits. As though supposing that Socrates “identifies” with them, he now treats Socrates as a helpless baby. We shall soon see that his impatience is not due to the fact that his position has just been refuted, but that what is dazzling and compelling about his outlook has not yet burst forth upon the scene so as to make all this pussy-footing conversation unnecessary.

<sup>434</sup>αὐτῇ (A8): The dative is ethical and loose, parallel to his use of μοι at 336C6.

<sup>435</sup>This third ὅτι (A10) ends the back and forth and becomes the opening word of his performance.

<sup>436</sup>καὶ δὴ καί (B4) is the shoehorn Thrasymachus uses to make a transition to his main thesis from the example of the shepherd. Cephalus used it in a similar way (329B7, and n.).

<sup>437</sup>οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν (B5). The expression echoes and imitates his own stipulation of a “strict sense” but the meaning as we shall see is now almost the opposite (“realistic” rather than “idealistic”: cf. τῷ ὄντι, C4).

<sup>438</sup>ἡγῆ (B5), of settled belief (cf. 334C2 and n.216, 494A1).

<sup>439</sup>διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας (B7): The doublet vies with the doublet λέγειν / ποιεῖν in Socrates’s

than to benefit themselves. Yes, you are so far from what justice and injustice are and what they mean<sup>440</sup> that you are blind to the fact that “justice” so called is really<sup>441</sup> nothing but the other guy’s good, the advantage of the strong man who rules, while for oneself there is only harm<sup>442</sup> in obeying and serving him; and that injustice<sup>443</sup> to the contrary -- the injustice of the strong man -- lords over those of goodly temper who are the just,<sup>444</sup> while his subjects for their part work for the benefit of him since he is the stronger, and work only for the happiness of him<sup>445</sup> in their role as his servants, and never at all for their own. Take the trouble to investigate, Socrates, my fine<sup>446</sup> fool, how the just man everywhere<sup>447</sup> has less than the unjust—you really ought to. First of all in private business, whenever the one type embarks on a joint venture<sup>448</sup> with the other, you will never find the just man coming away with more than the unjust when they split their profits, but always less. In dealings with the city, when it’s time to pay into the public coffers the just man pays in more, out of the same income, and the other man less, but when it’s time to draw down<sup>449</sup> something for oneself, the one gets nothing while the other makes a big haul.<sup>450</sup> Just look at<sup>451</sup> what’s in store for each of them when it comes to political appointments. For the just man, no fines for misconduct I’ll grant you, but his personal affairs

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peroration (342E10).

<sup>440</sup>τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης (C1-2): neuter adjective and abstract noun denoting practice and precept.

<sup>441</sup>τῷ ὄντι (C4) continuing the realist tenor of ως ἀληθῶς.

<sup>442</sup>Polemarchus’s terminology of ὠφελία (C1) and βλάβη (C5) has now returned.

<sup>443</sup>ἀδικία (C5), surprisingly, is the subject of ἄρχει (C6), in a virtual personification. It is a passion of Thrasymachus to see the concept personified in the person of the strong man—unless we prefer to say he sees injustice “embodied” in the strong man—so that ἀδικία for him is a metonymy for ὁ κρείτων.

<sup>444</sup>τῶν ως ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων (C6-7) an instance of “reverse καί” (or τε καί as often as not), as at 359A3, 376C2, 378A3, 392D8, 409A2-3, 411A7-8, 411D3-4, 411D7, 431B7, 474D5, 503C4, 524B4, 564C10, 574B2, 579D10, 590B3-4; cf. *Apol.* 19D2 [τε καί]; *Gorg.* 461C6, 474A1; *Phdō* 80C7-8, 100B8; *Phdr.* 254C8; *Symp.* 191A1, 209C3; *Tht.* 162B4-5; *Tim.* 73E2.

<sup>445</sup>ἐκεῖνος (C8) repeated (cf. C7), shows his enthusiastic approval.

<sup>446</sup>εὐηθέστατε (D2) echoing his εὐηθικῶν above. Thrasymachus carelessly identifies the “weak” with those who disagree with his strong-man attitude.

<sup>447</sup>πανταχοῦ (D3): Again we see Thrasymachus’s penchant for identifying the truth with the omnipresent (ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν [338E6-9A1], whence πανταχοῦ (A3); cf. n. *ad loc.*), in order to avoid revealing that his argument is tautological: the unjust man *has* more simply because he *takes* more. In this case he goes further. What he presents as a *proof* by exhaustion (note the structure πανταχοῦ, 343D3, followed by πρώτον μὲν ἐν X [A3], ἔπειτα ἐν Y [A6]) becomes for him a vehicle to *praise* injustice in all its venues one by one and thereby gradually to overcome his auditor’s resistance to his λόγος πονηρός. Again, απόδειξις becomes ἐπίδειξις (cf. 343B2 and n.).

<sup>448</sup>συμβολαίοις / κοινωνήσῃ (D4): The terminology of business and partnership now reappears.

<sup>449</sup>λήψεις (D8), “gettings” is obviously meant to stand in parallel with paying assessments (the parallelism prepared by responsive τε at D7). He plays down the technical term εἰσφοραί by burying it in the verb εἰσφέρειν, and then coins the term λήψεις, and in so doing gives legitimate-sounding voice to the sentiment “I give them all this money, but what do I get back for it?” Translators miss the rhetoric and supply a decent sounding term. “Distributions” [Shorey] and “retributions” [Leroux] are officialese; “anything to be received” [Jowett] and “quand il s’agit de recevoir” [Chambry] are milquetoast passives; “when the city is giving out refunds” [Grube] combines both these vices; Allan (*Plato.Republic I* [London 1940] *ad loc.*) invents certain “exceptional distributions of land or money” for it to refer to. The idea that there is something to get is its own warrant!

<sup>450</sup>πολλὰ κερδαίνει (E1): the term, with its connotation of excessive profit, reappears from Thrasymachus’s list of interdictions (κερδαλέον, 336D2).

<sup>451</sup>καὶ γάρ (E1) introducing proof by focussing on specifics.

suffer from neglect while from the public weal he profits not at all since he behaves justly, not to mention how he angers his relatives and his cronies when they come to him for favors and he turns them away because of his scruples. In store for the unjust man is just the opposite—I mean (344) the sort of man I was just talking about,<sup>452</sup> the one who has the power to pull off something big. Use this one as your model if you want to assess just how much more advantageous it is for one's private fortune to act unjustly than justly. In fact the easiest way to get the picture is to reach<sup>453</sup> the man who has gone so far in injustice as to live its perfect version, which<sup>454</sup> raises the man who acts unjustly to the highest heights and consigns the man acted upon and unwilling to act that way himself to the depths of destitution. Who is she you ask? Tyranny! She who will not stay at the gains to be got here and there by stealth and force, from the sacred or from the profane, now from the public and now the private, but takes from all these everywhere and all the time—things that is with which if you would deal in a small way, and once get caught, would bring fines and penalties upon you and heavy opprobrium. Just think after all how the petty criminals get named after<sup>455</sup> their crimes: temple robber or kidnapper or burglar or swindler or thief! Such distasteful terms! But now look to the man who does not stop at seizing his fellow citizens' possessions but kidnaps them bodily and makes them his slaves: his name will be none of these; all will call him happy — nay, blessed<sup>456</sup>—a man who made it big, not only the very citizens whose lives he took over but also anybody who only hears the story of a man that achieved this total injustice in each and every department of life. People who scorn injustice do so because they are afraid of suffering it, not doing it.

“There you have it, Socrates: Injustice. A thing more strong, a thing more free, a thing more dominant than justice,<sup>457</sup> once it comes into its prime.<sup>458</sup> As I said at the beginning,<sup>459</sup> and it is true in very fact, being just only helps the strong man while being unjust brings profit and advantage<sup>460</sup> to

<sup>452</sup> ὅνπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον (344A1), though there has been no depiction of the unjust man as such. Thrasymachus can now reveal that all along he has been talking about one and the same man, first as the κρείττων then as an ἄρχων and a δημιουργός and finally, just above, as the ἄρχων ὡς ἀληθῶς (B5), namely the fully unjust man. To reveal this is his rhetorical climax. The old dispute over whether to read ὅνπερ or to substitute the ὅπερ of the recentiores (Ast apud Adam ad loc.) is another attempt (cf. λήψεις, D8 and n.) to save Thrasymachus from himself—from saying what he really means—by blunting his expression.

<sup>453</sup> His expression is ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς (A4), again (with its propositional phrase) entertaining the personification or embodiment of injustice in the unjust man; but ἔλθῃς almost suggests that his student or auditor is meant to entertain the notion and imagine himself going to these ends himself.

<sup>454</sup> With ἡ (A4) Thrasymachus verges on epideictic personification, as Socrates had at 342B3ff.

<sup>455</sup> τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων (B4) a genitive of condemnation with pregnant τοιούτων (“condemned for committing the crimes by themselves being called by their several names”).

<sup>456</sup> μακάριοι (B7) goes beyond εὐδαιμονες, toward a divine happiness (cf. n.259). Socrates will remember this hyperbolic and impious claim throughout the entire dialogue, starting at 346A3 (n. 259) and ending at 591D8 (n.4597).

<sup>457</sup> καὶ ἴσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον (C5): Thrasymachus like Socrates perorates with καὶ in confident fullness (342E9-11 and n.), but adds homoioteleuton into the bargain. The triad rhymes and reaches a climax in the surprising candor and intensity of its last term, but constellates no meaning or gestalt along the way.

<sup>458</sup> ικανῶς γιγνομένη (C6). ικανός is always ready to be used in this superlative sense. The term is a favorite among men who are satisfied about being tough, like Callicles (cf. his ἐλευθερον καὶ μέγα καὶ ικανόν, Gorg.485E1 [cf. 484A2], 491B3, 492A1, noticed and corrected by Socrates at 489A6, 493C7, 495A8). Contrast its use in meiosis, as at Gorg.480A4 where it means *basta*.

<sup>459</sup> ὅπερ ἔξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον (C6-7), referring to 341A3. Thrasymachus's speeches progress not in argumentation or logic, but in candor and intensity.

<sup>460</sup> λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ συμφέρον (C8): With the addition of λυσιτελοῦν Thrasymachus adduces

oneself."

### I.C.1: Excursus on Thrasymachus's Speech

We may start with the paraphrasable content of this speech. The ruler's concern for the ruled is the same as that of the shepherd for his sheep. It is to use them up for his own profit. Justice (insofar as it consists of obeying the ruler's laws which after all are only orders he has concocted for them to act in ways to benefit himself), boils down to being a choice of the ruled to allow him to do this. He always comes out ahead, because the "just" men, in being duped, allow themselves to fall behind him. How far he can get ahead you can see in the case of the completely unjust man, the tyrant, who has gotten so far as to reduce the men who obey him to slavery, and is thanked and admired for it to boot, not only by those in his thrall but by all that hear of him. People disapprove of injustice because they fear suffering it, not because they are averse to<sup>461</sup> committing it.

Beyond what he has said, what he has tried to do? He projects onto Socrates's pursuit of truth the construction that it is nothing but a ruse to get the upper hand in conversation,<sup>462</sup> because he knows nothing but to try to get the upper hand himself.<sup>463</sup> Continually he has failed. From the intervening refutation we learn that what will assure his hegemony is clearly not his mastery of the useful arts of a demiurge, arts which Socrates admires for their resemblance to the most useful art of all (knowledge). That he has been refuted by the deployment of such an art only forces him finally to place his cards on the table and make his big move, which is this speech. Though Socrates may be slavishly enamored of art and of its hegemony, autarky,<sup>464</sup> and purity, Thrasymachus makes the case for an hegemony, purity, and autarky<sup>465</sup> of the self just as it is, elevated and inflated by the self-subjugation of others to the transfiguration of itself into the tyrant, if only it will dare.<sup>466</sup> Why it should dare is that otherwise it will be acted upon. Injustice is a game that must therefore be played for keeps, and Thrasymachus will be talking (and talking only) about "playing for keeps" as long as he can breathe. His speech has been an attempt to arouse the two deep seated passions of fear and self-love in his audience and forge an alliance between them that will lead the audience to take the first step in the direction of the unjust life, namely, to agree with Thrasymachus, lest they consign themselves to identify and be identified with the losers.

We know the name of these passions when they are allied (it is envy); and we know the effect of a demagogue inciting them in a mob (it is violence). Prudence then dictates, third, that we stop for a for his own purposes the fourth (even in its participial form) of five *definientia* that he forbade Socrates to adduce in his definition of justice, predicated it, now, of injustice (compare ὡφέλιμον, brought back at 343C1; κερδαλέον, brought back at 343E1; and of course συμφέρον, *passim*). The τε κού is gratuitous decoration.

<sup>461</sup> φοβούμενοι (C3): in order to achieve epigrammatic swiftness Thrasymachus has to stretch the meaning of φοβεῖσθαι to include shrinking from doing evil (this is why φοβούμενοι is in hyperbaton). Compare the distinction between δέος and αἰδώς in *Euthyph.* I 2AB. Again the translator must make his own decision how willing he is to try to talk like Thrasymachus (cf. on ἡδύς, 337D6 and n.).

<sup>462</sup> Now we can understand why he could easily identify Socrates's irony (337A) with a desire to learn without paying (338B) and with playing the sycophant (340D1 and n.). Thrasymachus envies Socrates for his ability to persuade his interlocutors to abandon their willful sense of superiority and follow him (and the logos) instead, which for instance took place in his conversation with Polemarchus.

<sup>463</sup> Thus the only way for him to ὑπολαμβάνειν the λόγον is ὀντιλαμβάνεσθαι (336B2 and n.).

<sup>464</sup> τελέαν (341D11), ἔξαρκεῖ (E2, E5), and 342B3-6, esp. ὥλη (B6).

<sup>465</sup> τελεωτάτην (A4), ὥλη (C2).

<sup>466</sup> Now we learn how it is that Thrasymachus can think asking a question is the same as deciding an answer to it, as he had at 336C2-7. Cf. n. *ad loc.*

moment and analyze the rhetoric by which Thrasymachus's speech seeks to arouse such passions. His warrant for making his opening assertions, that the ruler leads the ruled to slaughter (343B1-C1) and that justice is for suckers (C1-D1), is not that they are true but that Socrates is too naive to know that they are. So under the guise of condescending to teach him (D1-2), he launches into his "proof by exhaustion" that the unjust man beats the just, everywhere. Through invidious comparison and vivid depiction he shows how the unjust man wins out, first in private life (D3-6), and then in public (D6ff). His treatment of public life begins by dividing it into what we do for the common weal (i.e., pay assessments: D6-8) and what we can get back (the rather more vague but exciting notion of λήψεις<sup>467</sup>), and then moves on laterally to the opportunities provided by political office. The lateral movement<sup>468</sup> disregards the logic of the division but affords him an opportunity<sup>469</sup> to describe in vivid detail the figure cut by the just man, focussing invidiously on how he disappoints his own cronies. When he moves on, as if *pari passu*, to the unjust man and how he handles public office (ἀρχή) he has finally reached the heart of his speech. He has spent twelve lines (D3-E6) getting to his *laudandus* and now will tarry with him for twenty four; (E6-344C8). When he is done with this part, his speech will be over. The structure therefore reveals that the speech, though it begins as a remedial lesson for the benighted Socrates, is in truth and was always meant to be a praise of the unjust man.

He ushers in this final section and warms up to his ultimate topic with a sort of priamel. He will focus our attention thereby not on any unjust man but the "really unjust one" he has been talking about all along, the one he now can call μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν, and so unveil the frank and unvarnished terms by which power describes itself. He admonishes us that if we really want<sup>470</sup> to discern (κρίνειν<sup>471</sup>) the measure of injustice's superiority we have to look at this man. But then he stops to replace this man with an even better subject of scrutiny<sup>472</sup> (i.e., of praise) the superlatively

<sup>467</sup>343D8: cf. n.ad loc.

<sup>468</sup>Laterally: i.e., from one species to another of the same rank, although with καὶ γάρ he portrays the transition as a focussing, as if public office were a species of λῆψις, which of course for the just man it is not (cf. the false promise of a focus in καὶ δὴ καί, at 343B4). Allan (*ad loc.*) takes the bait and invents the notion that ἀρχαί are to be included under λῆψεις, which, like his attempt to domesticate that term itself, is an unconscious attempt to save Thrasymachus's argument from its own concupiscence.

<sup>469</sup>Illogic and inconsequence are symptomatic of excited discourse, and are therefore also found in the imitation of it and in the satire of it. When illogic is present in a text for these reasons, to emend it away is a misuse of learning. For instances of illogical order in the listing of items due to the speaker's excitement or confusion, or the imitation of these in another person, cf. *Alc.I* 122B8-C2; *Leg.661A5-B4* (desire), 687A6-B2 (desire), 734D7 (triumph), 896E8-7B4 (triumph); *Rep.373A1-8, B5-C1, C2-4* (concupiscence), 561C7-D2ff (democratic man), 573A5-6 and D2-4 (concupiscence, *bis*), 586A8-B3 (concupiscence: cf. n.4464 *ad loc.*); *Symp.183A4-7* (desire). For a sophist's use of flooded kaleidoscope to bowl over his auditors, cf. *Gorg.473B12-D2* and *Symp.197D3-E5*, to which the gratuitous use of ποικιλία gravitates: *Prot.316D6-E4, 334A3-C6*. In the depiction of things by their nature disorderly, the illogic or inconsequence might be classed as objective rather than subjective: *Gorg.490C8-D1, 491A1-2* (both derogatory); *Leg.669C4-D2* (imitation), 669E6-7, 842A5-B2, 842D3-5 (and Engl. *ad loc.*), 842D7-8, 890C4-5; *Phdo.111A5-6; Rep.425C10-D6* (miscellaneous legislation), 516C10-D1 (cave images), 596E1-3 (imitation).

<sup>470</sup>For εἰ βούλει (344A2) in priamel cf. P.O.I.3-4 and E.L.Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* 59n.55.

<sup>471</sup>κρίνειν (E2) is common in the epideictic context of the priamel (the usual function of which is to select an item), but will reappear in the apodictic context of Glaucon's challenge to Socrates, in Book Two (360E1ff) and will return to play a very important role when Glaucon reassumes the role of interlocutor, Book Nine (576Bff: cf.n.4256).

<sup>472</sup>He excuses what will be a detailed and lurid account on epistemological grounds with the teacher's formula πάντων δὲ ρᾶστα μαθήσῃ (344A3-4), which also has the function, by means of its superlative, of moving from foil to cap.

unjust man upon whom Injustice herself<sup>473</sup> has conferred the greatest happiness while those who spurn her she condemns to perdition.<sup>474</sup> Who is this Injustice? She is Tyranny!<sup>475</sup> She who ... – and the sequel has the form of a hymn.

Fourth and finally we must pause to deny the prevalent view that Thrasymachus has a theory in the first place.<sup>476</sup> He does not believe that might makes right. If anything he believes that “right” makes might, since some people’s belief in right, in the sense of their believing it is right that they obey laws *per se*, enables the promulgators of laws to lead them into doing whatever will help themselves and thereby into aggrandizing their own power. He is not a legal positivist: surely he does not himself believe that the legal enactment of laws creates a duty upon the ruled that they obey them. His allusion to governments is merely illustrative and not substantive; the only “government” he cares about is the one in which all institutions have become subordinate to his one unjust man, the tyrant. His entire pitch (*παράγγελμα*) is a strategy for acquiring power and yet does not have a definition of power beyond a vague image of the “freedom of the tyrant”<sup>477</sup> which consists for him of nothing but the willingness of his subjects to obey him. Power, like *pleonexy*,<sup>478</sup> is a merely comparative attribute. Without his cowering subjects and his reputation among persons who have not met him, his power is nothing, for there is nothing it enables him to do that they will not let him.<sup>479</sup> The evidence of its nothingness has been revealed in the movement of the argument to this point, by which Thrasymachus was nearly forced into naked candor when his usual methods of seduction and cajolery failed to stand up in straightforward conversation.

Socrates has assumed the responsibility for keeping the conversation straightforward, both by refusing to take the bait of Thrasymachus’s continual insults and by protecting the process of search from the rights and wrongs of captious squabbling, like the squabbling of Polemarchus who is clearly right and Cleitophon who is clearly wrong. The representation of Thrasymachus’s attitude by Glaucon

<sup>473</sup>ἢ (relative, 344A4). His passionate tendency to personify Injustice leads him to the language and formulas of the kletic hymn.

<sup>474</sup>Thrasymachus would have us believe that ἀδικία, like Pindar’s Zeus, τά τε κοὶ τὰ νέμει (*Isth.* 5[4]52); cf. H.Od.6.188-9).

<sup>475</sup>Within the ambience of the kletic hymn we move from one to the other avatar of the goddess.

<sup>476</sup>The selection of fragments and testimonia in Diels-Kranz (2.319-326) is quite enough to reveal that outside Plato Thrasymachus was thought of as a rhetorician only; the long fragment we have from a speech of his in Dionysius Helicarnassus (*Dem.3=DK, B1*) evinces no theory (and the “assertion” reported by Hermias in *Phdrs.* [239 Couvrier, = DK85B8] contradicts, if anything, a theory that justice is bad) but only a hard and emotionally powerful use of balanced antithesis. As to the Platonic “evidence,” besides the vivid depiction in *Rep. I* we have a description of his *oratorical* “powers” in *Phdrs.267C7-D2* where his claim of a redoubtable ability to arouse an audience with slander and then to charm their anger away is all that is said. In that context he is singled out from other teachers, and even satirized, for the violent forcefulness of his art (*κεκρατηκέναι τέχνῃ*, C8: cf. σθένος [C9] and κράτιστος [D2]). Here, his violent effect on Glaucon and Adeimantus is the problem.

<sup>477</sup>ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον (344C5).

<sup>478</sup>πλεονεξία: “Having or getting more”—more, that is, than another. Likewise, his hero is not strong, only stronger (*κρείττων*); and the pinnacle of tyranny is only that everybody thinks he is. For Thrasymachus being first is all but he needs a second in order to achieve this. This is the “difference between the shepherd and the sheep” of which Socrates is so blissfully ignorant. Cf. πρότερος 336D5, προύλεγον, 337A5; βελτίω, 337D2; πλέον, 341A9; and within his big speech, his use of comparative (εὐλαττον, 343D3; μᾶλλον, 344A2; capping comparatives at 344C5) and μέν / δέ constructions (343C3-D1, D7-E7, and 344C7-8).

<sup>479</sup>This impotence of power had already been broached in the case of the list of anti-sages to whom Socrates attributes the “doctrine” that justice is helping your friends and harming your enemies, above (μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός, 336A6-7).

and Adeimantus that we will find at the beginning of Book Two will indeed elevate this attitude to a “position” or a “belief” articulate enough to be tested,<sup>480</sup> but they were able to do so not because there lurked a theoretical content in Thrasymachus’s argument but because as Hegel has taught us the very articulation of their own deeply held belief that justice is real and good brings into being the conceivability of the opposite position, that justice is nothing or, if something, something bad.

### I.C.2: Socrates’s Reply to Thrasymachus

Such a speech, so long and so emotional, would give its audience pause. Indeed in the aftermath we realize that we are part of its audience. The moment we do, Socrates confirms it for us by reverting to the narrative mode and addressing us directly (344D1ff). “Having drenched our ears<sup>481</sup> with this speech,” he tells us, “Thrasymachus got up to leave like a bathman who has poured a tubful of rinse-water over his bathers.”<sup>482</sup> There was no way the company would allow him to leave. They made him stick around<sup>483</sup> and explain his position.<sup>484</sup> In particular I myself<sup>485</sup> pushed him hard, saying: You redoubtable fellow do you really think you can drop a bomb like that on us and just get up and leave, before you have finished telling us how it’s so or for that matter hearing how after all it isn’t?<sup>486</sup> Unless you think trying to get clear on this topic isn’t worth the trouble or has nothing to do with the choices that each of us must make about how to manage our conduct so as to enjoy the best life possible.”<sup>487</sup>

<sup>480</sup>Shorey: “...in the case of many doctrines combated by Plato there is no evidence that they were ever formulated with the proper logical qualifications except by himself.” (WPS 8, quoted by Shorey in connection with Thrasymachus’s putative “doctrine” in his Loeb edition [I.xi.]).

<sup>481</sup>Like a tub of water his logos was ὀθροός καὶ πολύς (344D2-3), a doublet of quality and quantity. The feeling of density is an index of how many places the listener might have wanted to ask a question and couldn’t.

<sup>482</sup>His technique of bathing people is less gentle than that of the τίτθη. To administer the cold shower of realism is as much ministering as he will do for these trucklers: they’ll have to wipe themselves dry. From his own perspective his Great Answer is the end of the discussion since among other things he has now revealed that discussion is for losers. All along he has intended only to hold forth, never to converse.

<sup>483</sup>ὑπομεῖναι (D4): The prefix denotes that he is to put himself at their disposal.

<sup>484</sup>διδόναι λόγον τῶν εἰρημένων (D5) suggests that somehow his εἰρημένα were not already λεγόμενα. To make sense of the phrase we must recognize the difference between holding forth and conversing.

<sup>485</sup>When Socrates reverts to narrative he reverts to the first person, we move into the position of the second person, and the others present revert to that of the third. The force of καὶ δὴ καί (D5) is to assert that Socrates’s response was consonant with and even representative of the reaction of the whole company. By infixing αὐτός within καὶ δὴ καί he balances his role as narrator against his role as participant. Parallels of such infixing are naturally few.

<sup>486</sup>Of course his primary duty is to explain himself (cf. λόγον παρασχεῖν above), a job that Socrates now slightly overstates with διδάξαι (D7) so as to introduce the alternative, μαθεῖν. Hereby Socrates articulates the difference between τὰ εἰρημένα and their λόγος. The speech is a performance referred to in the perfect (εἰρημένα) because the performance is over. Its meaning (λόγος) is the enduring and separate precipitate or “aftermath” of the performance. Evaluation cannot begin until the performance is over. Just as Thrasymachus’s authority (διδάξαι) is called into question by μαθεῖν, οὗτος is called into question by ἄλλος. The binary cancellations leave standing only the notion of sufficiency (ἴκανῶς), the criterion of all dialectical conversation (cf. nn.495, 534, 695, 1507, 2019, 2085, 2614, 3298, 4829; and 435D7, 523B1, 603D5). Thrasymachus thinks he is finished but Socrates in effect asserts he has not begun.

<sup>487</sup>ὅλου βίου διαγωγὴ ἡ ἀν διαγόμενος ... (E1-3), a “lilies of the field” construction meant to

"As though I fancy this thing I have told you is not as I say it is!"<sup>488</sup>

It seems you do, or else it seems we mean nothing to you<sup>489</sup> so that you won't pay attention to whether our lives will turn out better or worse if we remain ignorant of what you claim to know. But come and take the effort<sup>490</sup> to make it clear to (345) us. It won't go badly at all for you, my friend, considering how many of us there are,<sup>491</sup> if you do us this favor. Just between you and me I am not persuaded by what you said: I am not persuaded that injustice is more lucrative<sup>492</sup> than justice, and I wouldn't believe it even if one turned her loose and didn't try to block her every attempt to have her way. Let her be unjust, my friend; give her the power to injure others, whether by stealth or by open aggression. Still,<sup>493</sup> she does not persuade me that she is more lucrative than justice. Now it may just be that I am not alone in coming away with this feeling,<sup>494</sup> so take the trouble to persuade us to our satisfaction<sup>495</sup> that we are wrong to think it important to pursue justice rather than injustice in the choices we make about our lives.

"And<sup>496</sup> how am I to persuade you, if the speech I've delivered has left you cold? Shall I grind it up into a pabulum and spoon it into your brains?"

That's not the kind of help I want from *you*, by Zeus! You could start by sticking with your amplify the topic, in contrast to thinking it σμικρόν. διαγόμενος represents an optative protasis. The condition (completed with ἀν ... ζώη) is ideal in order to stress that how one lives one's life is a matter for deliberation (whence βουλευόμεθα, 345B3 below). The shift from βίος to ζώη suggests a distinction between what we sow and what we reap.

<sup>488</sup>τοιτὶ ὄλλως ἔχειν (E4) refers to Socrates's words εἴτε οὔτως εἴτε ὄλλως ἔχει (D7-E1). τοιτὶ ("this thing you just heard [sc. in my speech]"), with its deictic iota suggests a gesture with the hand. What he said cannot "be otherwise" since for Thrasymachus it is not a theory but a fact.

<sup>489</sup> ἔοικας ἢν δ' ἐγὼ ἥτοι (E5): Socrates is suggesting (with ἔοικας) that Thrasymachus's speech is not sincere but just a display meant to thrill and scandalize his audience. For otherwise (ἥτοι) he would be concerned that our taking him seriously would have a serious effect on the way we live our lives (E1-3, E5-7). Socrates brings to the surface that in lieu of a *captatio benevolentiae* for himself, what Thrasymachus's rhetoric is meant to do is stir up envious resentment against others.

<sup>490</sup>προθυμεῖσθαι again (E7: cf. n.37). Cf.*Euthyphr.* 11B4, E3.

<sup>491</sup>τοσούσδε (345A1) first person demonstrative, suggesting now that the whole company is on Socrates's side (cf. 338A3, 336E3); but since it is quantitative (vs. τούσδε) it is reminiscent of Polemarchus's remark to Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue (όρâς οὖν ἡμᾶς ὅσοι ἐσμέν; 327C7) about overcoming him with superior numbers. The τοι and the litotes οὔτοι κακῶς add to the mock-minatory tone. Now it is the strong man's advocate that is being overpowered!

<sup>492</sup>κερδαλεώτερον (A3), rather than the less crass λυσιτελές used at 344E2 and C8 (cf.336D2 and n.), to indicate he has understood that Thrasymachus is arguing "as a realist:" still, he does not agree.

<sup>493</sup>ἔστω / δυνάσθω (A5):The third person imperatives hypothesize the scenario that Thrasymachus has just constructed, and the personification of injustice acknowledges the power with which he asserted the position (cf.344A4ff and nn. *ad loc.*). Socrates takes pains to indicate that he has indeed undergone the performance, but that he was affected otherwise by it than Thrasymachus had hoped (πέπονθεν, B1).

<sup>494</sup>ἔτερός τις in place of ὄλλοι τινες, as well as ἵσως and the vague πέπονθεν, create an extended litotes. For πεπονθέναι describing the "effect" of a speech on a person, cf. *Apol.*17A1, *Phdrs.*234D1-2, *Symp.*215D3-E1.

<sup>495</sup>ἰκανῶς (B2) the criterion of dialectical argumentation repeated from 344D7 above, which implies also that πεῖσον here means what "teach or learn whether it is thus or otherwise" meant there, just as βουλευόμεθα here (B2) repeats what was done with an ideal (deliberative) condition there (344E2-3).

<sup>496</sup>καί (B4) impatient as at 340A4.

position, or giving a warning when you alter it so as not to send us off onto the wrong path. In fact, you've just done this, if I may revert to your previous argument for a moment.<sup>497</sup> You started by defining the doctor strictly, but then when you moved on to the shepherd you thought you didn't need to keep to the strict method but had him fattening his sheep as if it were his job not to tend to their interest but to act like a banqueter tending to a feast, or else alternatively as a wholesaler aiming at selling them, as if his job were to make money rather than be a shepherd. The shepherd's art is preoccupied with nothing but the job its nature has assigned it,<sup>498</sup> to promote and provide for this as best it can, while its own concerns have already been taken care of, consisting as they do of nothing but being what it is to be the art that it is. Given all that, I thought we had no choice but to agree that any kind of being-in-charge, to the extent that it truly was a being-in-charge, by its nature and to that extent<sup>499</sup> looked out for the interest of nothing but that thing,<sup>500</sup> the thing placed under its charge and its care, whether the charge be political or professional. Look at it for yourself: Do you fancy that the rulers you see in cities<sup>501</sup>—the real rulers I mean—do you fancy they serve willingly?

"By Zeus I not only fancy it but know it for a fact!"<sup>502</sup>

And yet wouldn't you agree that people accept other kinds of charge only for pay, as if they saw no good coming to themselves from being in charge, but only for those they took charge of? Will you at least give me this much,<sup>503</sup> that (346) we always distinguish one art from another on the basis that what it is able to do is distinct from what the other is able to do? Please don't answer contrary to your belief,<sup>504</sup> my blessed man<sup>505</sup>—that would keep us from moving forward in our discussion.

"No, that is why: by the ability being different."

And likewise a benefit is provided by each, a benefit unique to the art itself and not a benefit the others also provide, the way that medicine provides health and piloting provides safety at sea, and so forth with the others?

"Quite."

And does the art of wage-earning likewise provide the benefit of a wage, this being the ability that wage-earning has. Or would Thrasymachus<sup>506</sup> call both medicine and piloting one and the same art?

<sup>497</sup>Ἐτι γὰρ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψώμεθα (B9-C1) apologizes (*γάρ*) for bringing up the previous argument (*τὰ ἔμπροσθεν*) in order, by investigating it further (*ἐτι*), to illustrate the present issue.

<sup>498</sup>Ἐφ' ὁ τέτακται (D2), perfect.

<sup>499</sup>μηδενί (D7): μή of what is true (or false) by nature or definition.

<sup>500</sup>ἐκείνῳ (D7) echoing ἐκείνῳ at 342E9 (cf.n.416), as this entire passage echoes that passage, at the end of which Thrasymachus saw no alternative but to deliver his long speech. As often ἐκεῖνος is used to designate an object *notionally* remote, here remote from the interests of the practitioner.

<sup>501</sup>ταῖς πόλεσιν (E2): the plural again indicates he is making an empirical observation: cf. 338D7.

<sup>502</sup>οὐκ (sc. οἶμαι, from οἴει, E3) ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα (E4), averring straightforwardly the same fact he had averred indirectly, at 344E4, with his ironic remark, ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι τούτῃ ἀλλως ἔχειν (cf. n.).

<sup>503</sup>ἐπεί (346A1), as often, provides the questioner a way to continue speaking so as to block the answerer from answering until the questioner can give the reason he asked the question, which reason comes in the form of a preliminary question he wants the answerer to answer first. With τοσόνδε he concedes that his former question may have asked for too much of a concession.

<sup>504</sup>παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι (A3): the expression also suggests courting paradox (*τὸ παράδοξον*) for its own sake, which has been Thrasymachus's constant practice in conversation. The give and take of conversation is, after all, a medium ill-suited to the display of his true message in all its glory.

<sup>505</sup>Ὥ μακάριε (A3), the highest characterization a man could have, now lavished on Thrasymachus, along with other honorifics, as if to keep him calm in the aftermath of his outburst (345B2, 345A5, 344E7, 344D6).

<sup>506</sup>σύ (B2) as always is emphatic: Socrates provides him as wide a berth as he needs not to answer

Nay, to the contrary, once you decide as you did before that it's best to define things accurately and strictly, then if a man working as pilot happens to become healthy by dint of some benefit he derives from sailing in the ocean, you would not begin calling piloting medicine, would you?

"By no means."

Nor for that matter would you call moneymaking medicine<sup>507</sup> in the event that a person making a wage happens to heal somebody.

"By no means."

But would you call medicine wage-earning,<sup>508</sup> if somebody in the course of healing should happen to make a wage?

He denied it.<sup>509</sup>

But when it comes to the benefit conferred by each art didn't we agree that it was unique to each art?

"Let that answer stand."

Therefore in the case of any benefit all artisans enjoy in common, it must by virtue of their practicing, in common, something in addition to their several arts, and it must be from that additional practice that they derive the enjoyment of this common benefit.

"So it seems."

And in particular we are averring that the event of the artisans being made better off by the wages they earn,<sup>510</sup> is an event that derives from their practicing, in addition, the wage-earning art.

To this he agreed, reluctantly.

Therefore it is not from their own several arts that this benefit comes to them, namely getting<sup>511</sup> paid. Instead, if we are to pursue the question strictly, medicine produces health and wage-earning produces the wage, and building produces a house whereas wage earning following upon building produces the wage, and all the other arts likewise tend each to its own task and each benefit whatever they are placed in charge of. Conversely in case a wage does not accrue to it following upon its own deployment, is there any sense in which an artisan derives benefit from his art?

παρὰ δόξαν.

<sup>507</sup>τήν (B8) makes μισθωτικὴν the subject (with ιατρικὴν the predicate) of καλεῖς, both understood from the previous question. μισθωτική therefore plays a role parallel to that of κυβερνητική in the previous example, as οὐδέ confirms.

<sup>508</sup>μισθαργητικήν (B10), substituting unobtrusively for μισθωτική, in order to provide a berth for the phrase μισθὸν ἀρνυμένος below (C9).

<sup>509</sup>οὐκ ἔφη (C1): the kappa makes οὐκ adhaerent. Socrates is not quoting Thrasymachus's answer as being "οὐ," but asserting as our narrator that he denied the question without telling us what words he used to do so. Socrates's ease in wavering between narration and quotation has subtle effects worth keeping track of.

<sup>510</sup>τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένος ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δημιουργούς (C9-10) scrupulously replaces the nouns ὠφελία and μισθαρητική with verbs (nominal infinitive and participle): the event that they are better off by earning money cannot be disputed, but once it is stipulated the analysis of how it happens can only be that the ὠφελία comes from a particular art (per 346A6-8), and the action of making money (μισθοὺς ἀρνυσθαι), which since beneficial must be by art, is by the τέχνη μισθαρητική (B10: an etymological argument), or μισθωτική for which it was substituted, from B8 and B1.

<sup>511</sup>ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις (D2) a new formulation of "being paid" that employs Thrasymachus's crass term for the "haul" that the unjust man seeks from government service (343D8).

"It seems there is not."

Would you likewise<sup>512</sup> say that he confers no benefit in the case when he carries out his task without being paid?

"No, I think he does confer benefit."

So, Thrasymachus, now it is clear that no art and no charge or rule works at providing a benefit to itself, but as we were saying before<sup>513</sup> it works at achieving what is beneficial to the ruled and issues its commands toward that end, ever keeping its eye on the advantage of that other party, since it is weaker, and not on the advantage of the stronger. And that's why I said just now,<sup>514</sup> my friend Thrasymachus, that it's out of the question<sup>515</sup> that a person would be willing to rule if he had the choice, or to become involved in straightening out the messes that other people get themselves (347) into,<sup>516</sup> but instead that he demands a wage, since if you are dealing with a person who is going to be effecting his art with skill, he never effects what is best for himself nor issues his commands toward this end if he is commanding what his art requires, but instead toward what is best for the person in his charge. That's why there needs to be a wage in store for a person if you expect him to be willing to rule, whether the wage be silver, or honor—or a penalty if he won't.

Socrates thus ends this sustained wave of argument (345E2-347A5) with a *quod erat demonstrandum*, the solution to the question that began it—the paradox of being unwilling to rule (345E2-3). Moreover, just as that paradox was introduced at the very end of his sustained statement to Thrasymachus about how to behave in conversation (345B7-E2), he here introduces a new paradox at the very close of that solution (the "penalty," A5-6) which will lead to a third wave of argument. Such suggestive last minute questions enable him to keep control of the conversation.

We are surprised and perhaps relieved that Glaucon now intervenes to react to the paradox. He can understand the two kinds of "wage," but he can't see how a penalty can play the part of a wage. Socrates replies that Glaucon must be ignorant of the "wage of the noblest,"<sup>517</sup> that causes the most decent persons to rule when they do willingly rule. After all, zeal for high honors or for money lead to a bad reputation, and deserve to, so it's easy to see<sup>518</sup> that good men will not be willing to rule for pay or for honor. If they draw pay in the open they'll be called hirelings; and they'll be called thieves if they extract financial gains in secret.<sup>519</sup> Honor won't persuade them to rule, since they aren't interested in being famous. In their case some further compulsion must be brought into play if we are to expect them to rule willingly, or a penalty. Why else have we come to think that it is shameful to seek office and then hang around as an incumbent<sup>520</sup> beyond the time the office requires?<sup>521</sup> As for a penalty, the

<sup>512</sup> οὐδ' (E1) continues the οὐ in οὐ φαίνεται: "Would you say it also (δέ) seems to be the case that he does not (οὐ) confer (in addition to not receiving) any benefit, in case he works for free?"

<sup>513</sup> πάλαι (E5) means not long ago but in a previous phase or section of the argument (cf. n. 1388 ad 392B9), in this case the argument before Thrasymachus's big speech (341B4-2E11).

<sup>514</sup> ἄρτι (E8): the converse of πάλαι (E5), during this section or phase of the argument (namely, 345E2-3). Cf. 395A5-6 and n.

<sup>515</sup> μηδένα (E8) instead of οὐδένα, for emphasis.

<sup>516</sup> τὰ ἀλλότρια κακά (E9) echoing and quietly mocking Thrasymachus's ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν (343C3).

<sup>517</sup> τὸν τῶν βελτίστων μισθόν (347A10), as if this were a proverb like "noblesse oblige."

<sup>518</sup> τοίνυν (B4): Glaucon's agreement (ἔγωγε) gives Socrates the warrant to draw his inference, which he naturally expresses with an "apodotic" chiasm (οὔτε χρημάτων ... οὔτε τιμῆς, B5-6).

<sup>519</sup> λαμβάνοντες ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς (B8): the verb is derogatory, again echoing Thrasymachus's laudatory language use of λήψεις (343D8); for ἐκ cf. 343E4).

<sup>520</sup> περιμένειν (C3) present.

<sup>521</sup> In contrast to what Plato is here able to have Socrates say, I cannot resist mentioning the fashion, thriving even in local jurisdictions of my beloved country, according to which the electorate

greatest they face is being ruled by a worse man<sup>522</sup> in case they won't accept office themselves. It's out of a fear of this that good men rule, on the occasions they do, and even here they seek office not as one seeks something good with the prospect of benefitting from it but as one facing a necessity since he has no one else to rely on that is better or equal to himself. Think of it:<sup>523</sup> if a city of good men ever came to be, the greatest prize would be not ruling, just as ruling is in the existing ones! And there you'd have your proof that in reality the basic nature of the true ruler<sup>524</sup> is to seek not his own advantage but the advantage of the ruled. Thus, anybody who knows the difference<sup>525</sup> would prefer to be in the position of receiving help from others rather than giving it and having to face all the difficulties attendant upon doing so.<sup>526</sup> So, as for this assertion that justice is the advantage of the stronger there is no way for me to agree with Thrasymachus. We can put it aside and deal with it later;<sup>527</sup> much more important to me is this declaration he has now made, that the life of the unjust man is stronger<sup>528</sup> than that of the just man. How about you, Glaucon? How do you choose between

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seeks to hobble the politicians they nevertheless continually re-elect by imposing "term limits" upon them. The actual effect is that these persons go on to run for offices they have not yet held in other departments of government, and are usually elected by dint of something the press calls "name recognition," and defeat candidates who have sought to move up from staff positions within that department, inevitably more competent and inevitably less known to the nevertheless all-powerful and all-incompetent electorate. It is because the refreshing cold shower Plato can so easily toss off with a comment like this that we call him a classic. Moreover he will treat a version of this very problem in Book Six.

<sup>522</sup>πονηρότερος (C4) a person deficient in comparison to themselves. The adjective is used as at 341E5.

<sup>523</sup>ἐπεί (D2) expressing, as often, a new idea on the ordinary rather than the subordinate level (cf. 346A1 and n.). To hear an allusion by "Plato" to the "ideal" state that Socrates and Glaucon and Adeimantus will construct in the coming books is an overstatement deaf to the drama that is being played out here and now, in which Plato is not even a speaking character. It is true that those guardians would prefer not to rule (520Dff), but the basis for persuading them is still that otherwise they would be ruled by their inferiors (520B6-7). The "ideal" city they construct is not a city consisting of ideal men.

<sup>524</sup>With τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινός (D4-5) Socrates appropriates and concatenates two of the expressions for the Thrasymachean strictness (cf. n. ad 341C6), and then caps them with πέφυκε (*ibid.*).

<sup>525</sup>πᾶς ὁ γιγνώσκων (D6): For the absolute use cf. 476D5.

<sup>526</sup>ἀφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν (D7-8), a telescoped construction where the expected parallel, ὀφελεῖν, is demoted to a participle so as leave open a syntactic berth for what the parallel entails, πράγματα ἔχειν.

<sup>527</sup>εἰς αὐθίς σκεψόμεθα (E2). To search among the *Dialogues* for a passage to which a further treatment of this question is postponed, takes too seriously what is only a formula of dismissal placed in a concessive μέν clause, and ignores Socrates's point, which is that this captious "definition" is hardly as serious a matter as the showy declaration (φάσκων [E4], like pouring water over the audience) that one ought to dedicate one's life to injustice. For dismissal with reference to another *time* cf. 506E1 (and n.3055); for dismissal by reference to other *persons* cf. 400C7 (nn.1545, 1835, 492A6-7 (and n.2803), 583B5-6 (and n.4385); for dismissal by reference to other *arguments* cf. 611B9-10 (and n.5051).

<sup>528</sup>κρείττω (E4): In his peroration he had said ισχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης (344C5-6). That Socrates should summarize these adjectives with κρείττων is substantively correct but uncharacteristically imprecise. Still, by repeating κρείττων he introduces a point of comparison between the two concepts that brings them close enough together that the great difference in their importance becomes salient. "Yes, Thrasymachus loves to extol the strong; but when he says injustice is stronger than justice, I have to draw the line." Cf. οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην, 354B8.

them? Which is more truly said to be the stronger?

“That the life of the just man is more profitable<sup>529</sup> seems true to me.”

(348) Didn’t<sup>530</sup> you hear how many wonderful things Thrasymachus had to say about the life of the unjust man a few moments ago?

“Sure I heard it. I just don’t believe it.”

Do you think it would be a good idea for us to try to persuade him, if we can find some way, that his argument is false?

“How could I not think it a good idea?”

Come then,<sup>531</sup> if our argument should consist of setting off point against point, we listing the wonderful things that a just man has in store, and then he listing more against those, and we another list against that, we’d have to count up all the pros and cons on both sides and weigh how much each of us had put in his own pan. And at that point we’d need some kind of judges who could decide<sup>532</sup> which was greater. But if instead we proceed as we did before, securing agreement from each other by question and answer at each step,<sup>533</sup> then we would be our own advocates and judges<sup>534</sup> all at the same time.

Glaucon chooses the latter method and Socrates turns to Thrasymachus with a question. Come, Thrasymachus, and answer a fresh line of questions.<sup>535</sup> Would you say that the perfect injustice you have spoken of is more profitable than justice even if the justice is perfect?<sup>536</sup>

“Quite so, and for the reasons I articulated above.”<sup>537</sup>

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<sup>529</sup> τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἔγωγε λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶναι (E7): Glaucon ignores Socrates's squinting use of κρείττω and reverts to the original language of Thrasymachus's thesis (λυσιτελέστερόν τε καὶ συμφέρον, 344C7-8) preferring indeed the finer expression (λυσιτελέστερον) to the crass language Socrates had used to restate it (κερδαλεώτερον, 345A3 and A7).

<sup>530</sup> ήκουσας (348A1): the asyndeton is abrupt, and Glaucon answers by repeating the word.

<sup>531</sup> With τοίνυν (A7) Socrates expresses a little impatience with Glaucon's echoing answers. “If you agree with me, what shall we do?” There is a choice to be made what method to use, as the initial ἄν, taking up the already indefinite protasis (n.b. πῃ, A4) of the previous question, and then being followed by μέν, shows.

<sup>532</sup> δικαστῶν τινων τῶν διακρινόντων (B2). Not uncommonly the indefinite adjective plus attributive participle together do the work of an indefinite relative clause.

<sup>533</sup> ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἄλλήλους σκοπῶμεν (B3): For the term and the idea cf. διομολογεῖσθαι at 350D4 and Phdr.237C3. This method, which assumes nothing but checks itself at each step, is tantamount to the method Socrates expressed above with διδάξαι ίκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει (344D7-E1), where the answerer who upholds and teaches a thesis might end up learning from the questioner's questions that what he is upholding is wrong.

<sup>534</sup> δικαστὰι καὶ ρήτορες (B4): Aristotle borrows the metaphor at *de Caelo* 279B11-12, where ίκανῶς echoes the notion of dialectical adequacy implicit here.

<sup>535</sup> ιθι δή (B8), formulaic in dialectical discussion, for the questioner taking the answerer in hand. ἐξ ἀρχῆς is likewise a formula designating that the slate is wiped clean of ὄμολογήματα.

<sup>536</sup> τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν (B9): Thrasymachus's argument that injustice is better than justice began as a straight comparison (343C1ff) but this gave way to a praise of injustice, not injustice per se but injustice on a large scale, and in particular “perfected” injustice (343E7-344A4: τελεωτάτην, A4). He has left the possibility therefore that small injustice is not better than small justice; but Socrates leaves this weakness behind and posits a perfect justice which for Thrasymachus would be unmeaning or ridiculous. His question requires Thrasymachus to assert that injustice is, in principle or in the abstract, better than justice. Having thus begun he can continue the argument on the abstract or formal level.

<sup>537</sup> καὶ δι' ἂ, εἴρηκα (C1): With this second answer he has unguardedly and unnecessarily placed

Come, then,<sup>538</sup> how would you answer something like this: of the pair<sup>539</sup> you would call one virtue and the other vice, wouldn't you?

"Of course."<sup>540</sup>

Justice on the one hand being<sup>541</sup> virtue, and injustice on the other being vice?

"You're naive<sup>542</sup> enough to think I'd think that, when I've also argued that injustice on the one hand<sup>543</sup> profits, and justice on the other does not?"

But then what would you say?

"The opposite of what you just said."

Are you calling justice vice?

"I'm calling it a goodliness oh so very fine!"<sup>544</sup>

And therefore<sup>545</sup> you'd call injustice badliness?"<sup>546</sup>

"Just good planning."<sup>547</sup>

And for you are they intelligent and worthy,<sup>548</sup> the unjust?

back onto the table all that he said (note the perfect εἴρηκα) during his long speech.

<sup>538</sup>φέρε δή (C2) a formula like ἵθι δή.

<sup>539</sup>αὐτοῖν (C3): With the dual Socrates secures for the argument the formal parity of ἀδικία and δικαιοσύνη as abstractions that he had gotten to with his previous question, although in all likelihood, for Thrasymachus, only ἀδικία has a real perfection or highest form.

<sup>540</sup>πῶς γὰρ οὖ; (C4): The categorical response indicates he is viewing the opposites on a formal level.

<sup>541</sup>οὐκοῦν (C5) as if this were a continuation of his previous statement; μέν / δέ continuing the pairing of concepts.

<sup>542</sup>ἢδιστε (C7): With this and with γε Thrasymachus reverts to sarcasm (a step up from ἡδύς γὰρ εἰ, 337D6). He has no choice since his position can only be expressed derogatively. For him it is good to be bad and bad to be good.

<sup>543</sup>ἀδικίαν μέν / δικαιοσύνην δέ (C7-8). The answer indicates he has accepted the method of inferring *ex contrariis*.

<sup>544</sup>γενναίαν εὐήθειαν, C12. Both terms are sarcastic so the phrase is obtrusively inscrutable. γενναῖος is often ironic (414B9, 454A1, 535B2, 544C6, 558C2) though just as easily approbative (363A8, 372B4, 375A1-2, 496B2 [where its connection with γνήσιον is shown], 527B9); εὐήθεια he has used above of the δίκαιος (343C6), and of Socrates who prefers justice (343D2), with the same sarcasm by which he has here called him ἢδιστε.

<sup>545</sup>ἄρα (D1) stressing even more strongly the underlying logic of an inference *ex contrariis*.

<sup>546</sup>κακοήθεια (D1): Socrates continues the method *ex contrariis* by correlating a predicate "etymologically" opposite to εὐήθεια with the subject correlatively opposite subject, ἀδικία. For etymological fallacy in dialectical exchange, cf. 333B2 and n.

<sup>547</sup>εὐβουλίαν (D2), "being good at planning," as opposed to εὐήθεια, good at being too dumb to plan. Thrasymachus is continuing to answer within the confines of inference *ex contrariis*. The ingenuity of his answer reveals at the same time what is inexact in this method. Just as the knight in chess may move over and up or up and over, the argument *ex contrariis* may move from positing the positive (εὐήθεια) either to negating the positive (κακοήθεια) or to positing the negative (εὐβουλία).

<sup>548</sup>φρόνιμοι ... καὶ ἀγαθοί (D3-4): καί might imply that an inference is being drawn, without saying so, that it is their astuteness (φρόνιμοι, implied by εὐβουλία in contrast with εὐήθεια) that makes them able or "worthy" (ἀγαθοί). But at the same time ἀγαθός can be the adjective for ἀρετή (e.g. 381C2 [cf. B10 and C8], 588A9-10, 601D4, 618C7; *Apol.*30B4; *Phdrs.*253D2; *Symp.*196B5 [referring to ἄριστον at 195A7]) in which case it would better be translated "good;" and φρόνιμος can be the

"Those, at least, who are able to carry out injustice in its finished form, able to reduce whole cities and tribes of men to subjection under themselves. Poor you,<sup>549</sup> you think I'm talking about purse-stealing, which does turn a profit as long as one isn't caught<sup>550</sup> but a profit hardly worth mentioning compared to what I am really talking about."

No, I do know what you have in mind. What I<sup>551</sup> wonder at is how you have injustice playing the role of virtue and wisdom<sup>552</sup> and justice the role of their opposites.<sup>553</sup>

"Yes but that's exactly where I put them!"

This takes us<sup>554</sup> to a level<sup>555</sup> where progress<sup>556</sup> will be more difficult, and where one no longer has the usual things one can say. If you held the thesis<sup>557</sup> that injustice is profitable but then were willing to agree that it is an evil or an ugly thing<sup>558</sup> as some others would,<sup>559</sup> we would be able to make an

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adjective of virtue's component σοφία (e.g., 381A3), in which case it means "wise" more than "astute." Being essentially conservative, the conventional moral vocabulary will always waffle in order to maintain a connection between the good and the praiseworthy (witness the stock phrase καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός in which they are combined), though Socrates had just above found it easy to assert that οἱ ἀγαθοί are not φιλότιμοι (347B9).

<sup>549</sup>σὺ δέ (D6), the pronoun emphatic.

<sup>550</sup>λανθάνῃ (D8): For his attitude about being caught cf. 344B1-5. What makes perfect injustice perfect is that it does not need to hide: indeed it draws praise rather than blame (344B5-C2).

<sup>551</sup>τοῦτο (E1): Second person demonstrative for the interlocutor's idea (τοῦτο) and first person for Socrates's own (τόδε).

<sup>552</sup>ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας (E2), substantives corresponding chiastically to the adjectives φρόνιμοι ... καὶ ἀγαθοί (D3-4 above) as we saw at the time (n.ad loc.).

<sup>553</sup>ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις (E3): the construction is telescoped from ἐν τῶν ἐναντίων μέρει. For ἐν μέρει cf. 347A9.

<sup>554</sup>ὦ ἔταῖρε (E5) Whether sincere or merely rhetorical, the vocative conveys the sense Socrates sees the two of them as partners (cf. n.3285). One of the functions of the vocative is for the speaker to characterize how he feels the argument is going: 351D8, 450D2, 453C6, 477D7, 504C9, 506D6, 522B3, 526A1, 527B9, 574B7 (cf. L.Campbell, *Tht.App. F*, 283-4).

<sup>555</sup>ἢδη (C5) marking a new phase or new regime and a point of no return, whether in the state of the argument or in the state of affairs (cf. 348B2, 407A8, 411B2, 510D1, 540A6, 565C1, 569A8, 569B7, 574D2, 605A8, 605B2, 609B6, 612B7).

<sup>556</sup>στερεώτερον (E5) perhaps belongs to the field of metaphors as ἀπορία and εὐπορία.

<sup>557</sup>ἔτιθεσο (E7): In the language of dialectical debate the θέσις is the leading answer that is to be tested, and ὁμολογήματα are subordinate statements granted or conceded by the answerer, that might imply his thesis becomes tenable. For instance in order to persist in holding the thesis that justice is helping friends and harming enemies Polemarchus had to accept it was useless in peacetime; but if so then justice would not be the serious thing (*σπουδαῖον*) we think it to be. The answerer agrees to the subordinate statements since they are generally assumed to be true (here, νομιζόμενα; in the technical vocabulary of Aristotle, ἔνδοξα).

Socrates's meaning is that Thrasymachus has taken a position where the usual ἔνδοξα cannot be brought into play by the questioner. From the very beginning Thrasymachus has held the "thesis" that injustice is the advantage that justice gives to the unscrupulous, and that good is good only for the bad. The motive of his original attempt to keep Socrates from using the νομιζόμενα ἀγαθά in his discussion of justice (336C6ff), and the meaning of his assertion that such talk is claptrap, has finally become clear. Such revelations are characteristic of real conversations.

<sup>558</sup>κακίαν μέντοι ἡ αἰσχρόν (E7) representing the negation of the conventional expression for value, ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν.

<sup>559</sup>ώσπερ ἄλλοι τινές (E8) is not meant to send us away from the text to find names to name, but to locate the position somewhere in between the idiosyncratic (*παράδοξον*) and what is commonly

argument based on conventionally held beliefs. Instead it's now clear that you will assert that it is a thing beautiful<sup>560</sup> and strong, and will endow it with all the other traits we (349) have traditionally<sup>561</sup> associated with justice, given the fact that you have the cheek to place it into the category of virtue and wisdom.<sup>562</sup>

"Clairvoyant you are!" he said.

Still one must not shrink from the challenge, but press forward in the inquiry for the sake of the argument, as long as I can assume that you are really saying what you think. Between you and me, Thrasymachus, I do believe you aren't joking but you're really saying what you judge to be the truth of the matter.<sup>563</sup>

"What difference does it make to you whether it's my opinion or not? Isn't your business just to test the argument?"

No difference.<sup>564</sup> Just try to answer me this question, in addition to all these things you have already said:<sup>565</sup> When it comes to two just men does one want to have more than the other?

"No way! Such behavior would be impossible for them: they're too civil—and<sup>566</sup> dumb."

Does he want to have more than what a just way of life will reward him?

"Not this, either."

But comparing himself to an unjust man, would he feel he deserves more and consider it just to have more than him? Or not?

"Consider as he may and feel as he may, he'd lack the ability."

That's not the question but whether, even though he would not believe he deserves more than the just man and not think it a good idea that he get more than him, whether he would believe and think the opposite about the unjust man.

"Yes he would."

But now consider the unjust man. Does he think he deserves more than the just man and should get more than the just way of life affords?

held, in public at least (*ένδοξον*).

<sup>560</sup>καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν (E10): καλόν, a general term of approbation (cf. E7 and n.), supplemented by *ἰσχυρόν*, which is more closely tailored to Thrasymachus's own outlook.

<sup>561</sup>προσετίθεμεν (349A1), imperfect of customary action, standing in contrast with the prospect of Thrasymachus acting otherwise in the future (προσθήσεις).

<sup>562</sup>ἐν ἀρετῇ ... καὶ σοφίᾳ (A1-2): cf. 348E2 and 348D3-4.

<sup>563</sup>τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (A7). Several times he has portrayed his speech as a cold shower of truth, e.g., 343B5 (ώς ἀληθῶς), 343C1 (πόρρω εἰ), 343C3 (ἀγνοεῖς), 343C4 (τῷ ὄντι). Here the gratuitous pleonasm *τῆς ἀληθείας* expresses a sort of incredulity or abhorrence (cf. ἀποκνητέον, A4), as when one is moved to speak of the *real* world in conversation with an idealist, as if there were an unreal one.

<sup>564</sup>οὐδέν (B1) is not only dismissive rather than literal (Shorey *ad loc.*): the positive reason for its use is to defuse a fight, a method of presentation that Thrasymachus always prefers. Cf. 472B7 and n. *ad loc.*

<sup>565</sup>τόδε and τοῦτο (B1), again (cf. 348E1-2 and n.): With τόδε Socrates warns Thrasymachus that he will need to distinguish between what he wants to say (over and over) and the new line of questions Socrates now has in mind, which Thrasymachus does not yet know about.

<sup>566</sup>ἀστεῖος ὥσπερ νῦν καὶ εὐήθης (B4-5): ὥσπερ νῦν refers to 348C12, γενναίον εὐήθειαν: Thrasymachus enjoys recalling his clever improvisation, and then varying it with bathetic καὶ εὐήθης.

"That goes without saying since he's out to have more than anybody<sup>567</sup> else."

So you're saying<sup>568</sup> he'll have more than the unjust man, too,<sup>569</sup> and the unjust life, and will vie to take<sup>570</sup> for himself the most of all men.

"Now you've got it."

Well let's formulate the result this way, then. The just man tries to outstrip not his like but his unlike, whereas the unjust tries to outstrip both indifferently.<sup>571</sup>

"A formulation<sup>572</sup> most excellent!"

But as we agreed<sup>573</sup> the unjust man is astute and therefore competent,<sup>574</sup> whereas the just man is neither?

"This, too, you put well."

And you'd say that the unjust man resembles the astute and competent man, while the just man does not?

"How could you expect it to be otherwise than that a person who *is* of such and such a sort would also *resemble* such and such a sort, whereas the one who *isn't* doesn't?"

Nicely put.<sup>575</sup> We can conclude that each of the pair is like the persons they resemble.

"As I said, how could it be otherwise?"

Socrates's next steps can be presented consecutively: Alright then, Thrasymachus. Consider a person who's musical in comparison with<sup>576</sup> another who is unmusical. The musical person is astute and the unmusical one not, and by virtue of being astute, competent, or by virtue of not being, incompetent. So also with the doctor. When a musician tunes his lyre he is not trying to outdo a musician in the tightening and loosening of the strings, though he would gladly outdo (350) a non-musician. And a doctor in his prescriptions will not exceed the prescriptions of a doctor or the prescriptions of medical practice, though he would gladly see himself doing better than the suggestions of a man ignorant<sup>577</sup> of medicine. Indeed, survey<sup>578</sup> the whole field of knowledge and the lack of it and ask yourself whether there is any kind of knower who would arrogate to himself to do more than

<sup>567</sup>ὅς γε πάντων (C6): γε indicates he infers the part from the whole, that he sees the inference as *a fortiori*.

<sup>568</sup>οὐκοῦν (C7), purporting to continue the thought of the interlocutor.

<sup>569</sup>γε (C7), emphasizing the inference Socrates needs, for which Thrasymachus had just suggested an *a fortiori* warrant that he had not explicitly asserted.

<sup>570</sup>ώς ἀπάντων πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ (C8-9): With Thrasymachus's concupiscent term (*λάβῃ*, cf. *λήψεις*, 343D8 and 346D2, 347B8), augmented by the superlative *πλεῖστον* (while the argument only needs *πλέον*, C4) and the intensive *ἀπάντων* (while the argument needs only *πάντων*, C6) Socrates caters to Thrasymachus's preference to overstate, rather than merely state, his position.

<sup>571</sup>μέν / δέ (C11-12) for the just man but τε / καί for the unjust (C12-D1). The former draws a distinction whereas the latter masses all others together.

<sup>572</sup>εἰρηκας (D2) the perfect for the complete articulation of a result.

<sup>573</sup>δέ γε (D3) recalling a previous agreement here translated with the Thrasymachean slant (348D3-4 and n.), and adducing it into the position of the minor premise.

<sup>574</sup>φρόνιμος τε καὶ ὁγαθός (D3), repeated from 348D3-4 (here translated with the Thrasymachean slant: cf. n.).

<sup>575</sup>καλῶς (D10) ominously echoes Thrasymachus's adverbs *εὖ* (D5) and *ἄριστα* (D2).

<sup>576</sup>ἔτερον (D13) is essentially comparative.

<sup>577</sup>μὴ ιστρικοῦ δέ (350A3), μή designating a man *essentially* unqualified.

<sup>578</sup>ὤρα (A6), present imperative, of scanning across the entire field.

another knower would, whether in acting on his knowledge or discoursing on it, rather than just the same amount as his fellow would say or do about the same topic.

Thrasymachus with some hesitation agrees with the conclusion on the force of its logic,<sup>579</sup> and Socrates can turn to the counterpart of the knower, namely, the uninformed man. Will he not seek to overreach or do more than both the knower and his uniformed fellow? Thrasymachus agrees, with a faintly echoing reluctance,<sup>580</sup> but this is all Socrates needs in order to move on to the minor premise he had adduced above: the knowing man is astute and wise<sup>581</sup> and therefore he is competent and worthy.<sup>582</sup> So the good and wise man will not be willing to overreach his like but rather his unlike and opposite, while the bad and ignorant man will overreach both indifferently.<sup>583</sup> But our unjust man overreached like and unlike alike<sup>584</sup> whereas the just will never overreach his like but only his unlike,<sup>585</sup> so that the just man resembles the wise and good whereas the unjust resembles the bad and ignorant. But we agreed in principle a moment ago<sup>586</sup> that whichever sort the one resembles that sort he also is, so that we can now see that in truth<sup>587</sup> the just man is good and wise and the unjust is ignorant and bad.<sup>588</sup>

Thrasymachus's position has come out backwards. Socrates breaks immediately into the narrative mode to speak directly to us just as he did the last time this happened,<sup>589</sup> but this time he lets us see something very new: Thrasymachus did indeed concede<sup>590</sup> all this, though not so easily as I have now presented it.<sup>591</sup> Reluctant, he had to be dragged along to each step, and the labor made him sweat profusely (it was summer after all); and it was then that I witnessed something I'd never seen before:

<sup>579</sup> ἀλλ᾽ ίσως ... ἀνάγκη τοῦτο γε (A10). He attempts to depreciate the inference (ἀλλ᾽ ίσως) by asserting it is only logically true (ἀνάγκη), but grants it all the same.

<sup>580</sup> ίσως (B2) echoes ίσως at A10.

<sup>581</sup> σοφός (B3) straddles the Thrasymachean and the Socratic meanings (cf. 348D3-4 and n.), and Thrasymachus laconically agrees (φημί, B4).

<sup>582</sup> ἀγαθός (B5) likewise straddling; Thrasymachus laconically echoes his φημί (B6).

<sup>583</sup> μέν / δέ (B7-8) of the discriminating man and τε / καί of the indiscriminate, as above (349C11-13 and n.).

<sup>584</sup> τε / καί (B14).

<sup>585</sup> μέν / δέ (C1-2).

<sup>586</sup> ὡμολογοῦμεν (C7), imperfect of citation (cf. n. 139, 352C4, 374A5 and B6, 392B9, 429E8, 472D9, 485A4, 511A3, 543C9 [with n. 3577], 572C1 with n. 4146], 572C1, 580D10, 590D3, 605C7 [restored by Ast], 607B2, 612C8, 613C8; and cf. 559E4, 562B7, and 588E3 and n. 4521).

<sup>587</sup> ἀναπέφανται (C10) dialectical, in the perfect, taking the participial (sensory) construction. The prefix and the perfect tense marks the complete reversal of the previous position.

<sup>588</sup> ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός / ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός (C10-11): chiasm for closure: cf. 370E2-3, 428D6-7, 463C5-7, 491D1-2, 510A5-6, 619E4-5; Leg. 626C11-12, 665C2-3, 779D2-5; Phlb. 11B8, 25A6-B1; Polit. 299B3-4; Prot. 343A1-5; Tht. 175A3-4; Tim. 38E10-40A2. It blends with the chiasm of opposites used in a list of opposites, as at Gorg. 474D1-2; Phlb. 32C1-2; Rep. 410D1-2.

<sup>589</sup> 342D2.

<sup>590</sup> ὡμολόγησε μέν (C12): μέν is concessive and suggests a division within him between what he grants, as dialectical partner, and what he really believes, or wants to believe, or wants to say he believes, or wants to get others to believe. We will learn which, below (cf. n. 596).

<sup>591</sup> All along we have presumed that Socrates is presenting the events of the previous afternoon and evening as they "actually" occurred. Above, as here, he allows himself to describe Thrasymachus's behavior without quoting him (338A5-8, 342D2-3), and indicates the version he is giving us is streamlined. His continual placement of the important result into the μέν clause (cf. nn. 420, 309) and the behavior he describes without quotation into the δέ clause continually indicates he is editing things only to spare us tedium. The purpose of such narrative interruptions surely is not to undermine our confidence in the version he has given us; it is a narrator's way of announcing a transition.

Thrasymachus blushing!<sup>592</sup> Once we had gotten as far as to agree<sup>593</sup> that justice is virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I continued the investigation: So let's treat this much<sup>594</sup> as agreed. We also had asserted that injustice was strong, didn't we? Or have you forgotten,<sup>595</sup> Thrasymachus?

"I remember what I said. Moreover the argument you are now making<sup>596</sup> suits me not at all. I have an argument in response, but if I should present it you would surely accuse me of speechifying. Choose then whether you think it best to allow me to say as much as<sup>597</sup> I would, or, if you think it best to question me, then question away and I for my part will respond to you as one does to old women when they spin their tales, with 'Is that so?' and 'Yes Mum' and 'No Mum.'"<sup>598</sup>

As long as you respond in no way contrary to your own judgment and belief.<sup>599</sup>

"I'll do it, so as to suit you, since you aren't allowing me to speak.<sup>600</sup> But please, is there something more you wish of me?"

Nothing else, by Zeus. If you will do this then do it, and I for my part will do the asking.

"Ask away."

(351) Ask I will, along the same line of inquiry as before, about what sort of thing justice really is in

<sup>592</sup>More important than the logical impurities of Socrates's argument is the effect it has on Thrasymachus. The power of his argument lies in the fact that his comparison of the master of injustice with an ignorant clown is deeply correct, and that he has been able to invoke the comparison objectively and without belligerence. Critics who infer from the course of the argument that their own command of logic is better than Thrasymachus's or Socrates's can supply Thrasymachus ammunition for fighting back, but he will still be Thrasymachus. To win the argument is not what he needs as his blushing indicates.

<sup>593</sup>The δια- in διωμολογησάμεθα (D4) stresses that the conclusion was reached through a series of steps, and its middle voice that the steps were taken as a joint effort and together (cf. n. 533).

<sup>594</sup>τοῦτο μέν (D6): referring to the conclusion reached together at C7-8.

<sup>595</sup>ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι (D7) is sincere and not a taunt. Thrasymachus's basis for inferring that the unjust man is strong—namely, that he is competent and astute at getting his own way—has now been removed. If his mind were totally occupied by the thoughts that the dialectical process is moving through and were confined to its horizon, an assumption Socrates would easily make, Thrasymachus might at this moment find himself quite unable to remember what he had meant, as Polemarchus had at a similar moment (cf. 334B7, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί’ ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι ἔλεγον).

<sup>596</sup>μέμνημαι (D9): By throwing Socrates's word back at him, and then asserting that Socrates's questions are actually an argument of his (ἢ νῦν λέγεις, D9), he abruptly dissociates himself from Socrates's project of a σκέψις ἐν κοινῷ. In truth he was never the partner Socrates was taking him to be (and still took him to be even now in the narrative interlude, 350C12-D8, esp. ἡμῖν and φαμεν [350D6] and διωμολογησάμεθα [D4], and just before this ἡμῖν [C10] and ώμολογοῦμεν [C8], and his own answer at 350C9). With ἔμοιγε οὐδ'... ἀρέσκει (*non placit mihi*) he blandly reserves the right to maintain his own view regardless of what he has himself said and regardless of logic, and by repeating λέγειν in καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν he treats his own manner of defense, the long speech, as equal in standing with the Socratic method of question and answer but only raises the spectre of logos set alongside logos, which as Socrates said will only postpone a decision (348A7-B4), as Thrasymachus realizes δημητηρεῖν, EI).

<sup>597</sup>With ὄσα (EI) he threatens quantity, admitting his desire to hold the floor and harangue his audience: cf. ὄσα at 348A1 and A8, and ὁθρόον καὶ πολύν (344D2-3).

<sup>598</sup> Even if Socrates succeeds at requiring him to converse, Thrasymachus at least gets to call him an old lady.

<sup>599</sup>παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν (E5): Socrates reiterates his one criterion (γε): cf. 346A3, 349A6-8.

<sup>600</sup>λέγειν (E6): arguing, as opposed to answering (D10, etc.). But as things unravel there is dramatic irony in hearing Thrasymachus agree to say what he believes since Socrates will not let him talk.

comparison with injustice. It had been stated that injustice was a more powerful and stronger<sup>601</sup> thing than justice; but now,<sup>602</sup> if in fact justice is virtue and competence, we shall easily realize that it is also a thing stronger than injustice, especially if injustice is ignorance—a fact no one can fail to know<sup>603</sup> any longer. But this simple and straight path<sup>604</sup> is not what I have in mind, Thrasymachus. Instead follow me on a different path: Would you say that it is unjust<sup>605</sup> for a city to attempt to reduce other cities to slavery, by means of injustice, and so to enslave them, and hold many cities in her thrall?

“How could I not say this? No less that this will the best city do exactly<sup>606</sup> by virtue of being most completely unjust.”<sup>607</sup>

I get it:<sup>608</sup> That was indeed the purport of your speech, but here is what I have in mind to ask:<sup>609</sup> Will this waxing city achieve this kind of power without justice or does she need justice to pull it off?

“If things were as you have been arguing, and justice were astuteness, then she’d need justice to pull it off; but if as I was arguing she’d need injustice.”

I admire your going beyond “No Mum” and “Yes Mum” and giving a real answer in finished form.<sup>610</sup>

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<sup>601</sup> δυνατώτερον καὶ ισχυρότερον (351A2): Socrates picks up where he wanted to pick up a moment ago (καὶ ισχυρόν, 350D7), adding δυνατώτερον. Thrasymachus made the assertion in his long speech (cf. 344A1-C2 [n.b. μεγάλα δυνάμενον, A1] and summed up at C5-6: ισχυρότερον ... ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης.

<sup>602</sup> νῦν δέ γε (A3) contrasts the current finding with what our position was before (cf. φαμεν, 350D6), as if Thrasymachus had been playing the “answerer” even during his speech. Socrates uses the optative εἴη, observing the secondary sequence of ἐλέχθη, to stress that positions change in the course of the conversation. Something else has since “happened” (ἀναπέφανται, 350C10), a reversal of the grounds on which we based that opinion. That reversal portends that it will come into view (φανήσεται, A4, dialectical) that justice is stronger than injustice.

<sup>603</sup> οὐδεὶς ἀν τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοήσειεν (A6), for we have learned from the argument that injustice is lack of learning (ἀμαθία, A5)—i.e., the opposite of ἀρετὴ καὶ σοφία. Perhaps ἔτι refers back to Thrasymachus’s assertion at 343C3.

<sup>604</sup> ἀπλῶς (A6): the “simple” movement he forgoes is to take one step further in the same direction. Without even referring back to the subject term, justice, he can say that as justice’s knowledge led *qua* knowledge to its competence, its competence would lead *qua* competence to its effectuality (i.e. δυνατώτερον). His less simple path of argument will take him back to the subjects of justice and injustice, so as to derive a new line of implication from their inner nature.

<sup>605</sup> ἐπιχειρεῖν (B1) is dependent upon εἶναι. The καί before ἄλλας, like the καί that commonly follows ὅμοιος, is nearly otiose: “... unjust to move beyond its border to other cities and attempt to enslave them.” Thrasymachus had depicted the ἄδικος, a single man, mounting such an assault on the civilized world (344B5-C2). Socrates now asks him whether his vision would also fit a city.

<sup>606</sup> τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος (B5): with the superlative he refers to the τελεώτατα ἄδικία described in his long speech (344A1,ff).

<sup>607</sup> ή ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος (B4-5) with his interlaced word order he tries to invoke, compendiously, the dramatic climax of his speech—whose illogic and lack of verisimilitude will finally become the subject of Socrates’s scrutiny.

<sup>608</sup> μανθάνω (B6): cf. 372E2 and n.

<sup>609</sup> οὗτος and τόδε (B6), again (cf. 349B1-2, 348E1-2): “There you go again, wanting to repeat your speech.” Thrasymachus’s speech did not assert that injustice was *inherently* powerful but praised injustice by depicting an unscrupulous man suddenly coming to power. Socrates now focusses on the process by which this seductively attractive result might, or might not, come about.

<sup>610</sup> πάνυ καλῶς (C5): What is fine about Thrasymachus’s answer is that it reveals that his concern about justice and injustice at this point rests entirely on the question of astuteness (n.b., σοφία, C2),

"It's because I'm trying to please you."

And how good that is of you.<sup>611</sup> But please me by answering the following: Would you say that a city or an army or pirates or thieves<sup>612</sup> or any other tribe that bands together to mount such an unjust attack will have the power to pull anything off if they are treating themselves injuriously?

"By no means."

But if they are not doing injury to each other won't they be the more able to pull it off?

"Quite."

This is because factions come from injustice, as do feelings of hatred and battles among themselves, whereas justice brings about likemindedness and friendship. Wouldn't you say so?

"Anything to avoid a falling out with you!"<sup>613</sup>

Again, how good of you, my excellent<sup>614</sup> fellow! But take the next step with me. If in fact this is the effect of injustice, to instill hatred into everything it invades, wouldn't it make men hate each other regardless whether they are free or slave<sup>615</sup> if once it finds its way among them, and make them break up into factions so as to make them unable to pull off any joint endeavor?

"Quite."

But what if it springs up in a *pair* of men? Will they not begin to differ<sup>616</sup> with each other and then hate and become inimical to each other at the same time that they are inimical to the just against

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whether this is the disinterested knowledge of Socrates's just expert or the unscrupulous cunning of his unjust tyrant-to-be.

<sup>611</sup>σύ (C7) answering emphatic σοί, C6.

<sup>612</sup>ἡ πόλιν ἡ στρατόπεδον ἡ ληστὰς ἡ κλέπτας ἡ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος (C8-9): The list consists of two pairs (πόλις, στρατόπεδον; λησταί, κλέπται) followed by the generalizing term ἔθνος. The πόλις is the case Socrates has raised; the army is presumably the agency by which this πόλις would impress its will. These two singulars are then followed by a pair of plurals that shift from the city and its mechanism to pluralities of persons that serve as parallels to the city, groups that are likewise out to do some large act of injustice. In contrast to the city and its army that might adopt an unjust policy, these persons, pirates and thieves, are by definition unjust (according to the legal and conventional view), though for Thrasymachus their names designate only the narrow specialism of their injustice (344B1-5; cf. 348D5-9). Socrates's shift from singular to plural is made less noticeable by his use of the otherwise gratuitous specificity of the pair ληστοί and κλέπται as if to balance πόλις and στρατόπεδον. The shift to the plural enables him next to depict internal dissension among them.

<sup>613</sup>ἴνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι (D7) Thrasymachus mocks Socrates's question in the wording of his answer, as Socrates's χαρίσαι had mocked his χαρίζονται (C7). Placement of σοι again adds emphasis.

<sup>614</sup>ὦ ἄριστε (D8), a case of the vocative indicating the speaker's feelings about the argument (cf. 348E5 and n.554).

<sup>615</sup>With ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις (D10) Socrates has left behind the singular (πόλις), as well as the pluralities of the types of men that are unjust by definition. The phrase functions not only as a polar doublet so as to generalize the ἔργον of ἀδικία but also happens to present the very two sets of men into which Thrasymachus characteristically analyzes any human endeavor (cf. esp. ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον [344C5] and the present example of the best city enslaving [351B7] all the others). This forebodes that his unjust men will not somehow be exempt from the facts of reality after all. Plato does employ this doublet elsewhere, as a way of to speak of men in general, but always in conjunction with other doublets. Cf. Gorg.514D, 515A7; Leg.665C2-3, 838D7-8; Meno 71E-2A; Rep.431C1-3 (οἰκέται for δοῦλοι), 433D2-4.

<sup>616</sup>διοίσονται (E3), the same verb for disagreement or fighting that Thrasymachus used in his mocking answer above (διαφέρωμαι, D7).

whom they are planning their assault?<sup>617</sup>

“So they shall.”

So finally<sup>618</sup> what if injustice invades a *single man*? Will it suddenly lose its inherent power and effect, or will it still possess it no less than ever?

“Let it possess it no less than ever.”

Since<sup>619</sup> as we see<sup>620</sup> it has this kind of power I mentioned, that whatever it invades, whether city or family or army (352) or whatever,<sup>621</sup> its first effect is to make that thing unable to work with itself because dissension and difference arise within it, and then renders it inimical as much to itself as to any other opponent<sup>622</sup> including the just. So that if it invades an individual man it will likewise have this

<sup>617</sup> ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις (E4). The persons against whom the unjust are conceived to be plotting are here referred to as δίκαιοι, not because Socrates believes that the victim of injustice is *eo ipso* just, but according to Thrasymachus’s conception that the scruples of the just man are what enable the unjust to succeed (i.e., that justice is nothing but the συμφέρον κρείττονος).

<sup>618</sup> δή (E6), moving to the target. A similar argument (from all to many to two to one) is made by the Athenian at the opening of the *Laws* (626B-D). Cleinias there remarks that as the focus narrows to the individual man the essential point becomes progressively clearer (τὸν λόγον ἐπ’ ὀρχὴν ἀνάγειν, 623D3).

<sup>619</sup> οὐκοῦν (E9), spelling out the reason for the interlocutor’s agreement (cf. 349C7).

<sup>620</sup> φαίνεται (E9), dialectical, bringing forward what was agreed to at C7-D3.

<sup>621</sup> εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὅτῳδιν (E10-352A1): In redoing the list from C8-9 Socrates switches out the items that were both plural and essentially criminal (cf. n. *ad loc.*) in order to emphasize how an inherently neutral (i.e. non-criminal) group (denotable therefore by a singular noun) is affected by the invasion of injustice.

<sup>622</sup> ἔαντῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ (352A3). The list corresponds to ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις above (351E4) and καὶ ἔαντῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις below (A8). What the middle term τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντί adds is the principle (παντί) according to which enmity to an unjust man is shared both by himself as unjust and by another man who is just: both become his opponent (ἐναντίῳ). Adam’s note on παντί: “i.e., whether just or unjust,” treats παντί as the noun and ἐναντίῳ as the adjective (i.e., πᾶσι ἐναντίοις οὖσι); Jowett’s translation: “becomes its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just,” is unclear without the exegesis of his note, “with all that opposes, and therefore (inclusively) with the just,” but the meaning thus clarified—that the unjust individual becomes inimical to all that opposes him—is mere tautology. Lee in the Penguin, “with itself and with its opponents and with whatever is just” seems to take παντί with both τῷ ἐναντίῳ and τῷ δικαίῳ by pluralizing the one and adding “whatever is” to the other; Grube “to itself and to what is in every way its opposite, the just,” and Shorey in the Loeb: “an enemy to itself and to its opposite in every case, to the just,” require καί to be appositive; Leroux in the Flammarion, “ennemie d’elle-même et de tout un chacun qui est son opposé et qui est just,” and Chambry in the Budé, “ennemi de lui-même et de tous ceux qui lui sont contraires et qui sont justes,” import the inference that the victim of injustice is *eo ipso* just; Robert Baccou in the Garnier, “ennemi de lui-même, de son contraire et du just,” leaves out παντί; and Allan Bloom’s “enemy to itself and to everything opposite and to the just” illustrates because of its ambiguity a limitation inherent in his decision to produce a “literal translation” of the sort that Aquinas had of the text of Aristotle from William of Moerbeke (cf. his “Preface,” *init.*). Tucker comes close with his note *ad loc.*: “to itself (i.e., inwardly), and to everything that opposes it and (consequently or necessarily) to the just.” Cornford’s translation, “at enmity with itself as well as with any opponent and with the just” (cf. Davies-Vaughn and Lindsay), and Schleiermacher’s “mit sich selbst verfeindet und mit allem entgegengesetzten und dem gerechten,” are clear, and I think correct, about τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντί, but fail to articulate how the just man fits in. Waterfield (1993) replaces the Greek with a sentence of his own that means something the Greek does not say. By my

same effect that it is its nature to have, first to make him unable to act due to internal strife and a lack of consensus in himself, and then inimical both to himself and to just persons.<sup>623</sup> But let's note<sup>624</sup> that the gods are to be included<sup>625</sup> among the just. This would imply that our unjust man will be the enemy of the gods as well, while the just man would be loved by the gods.

"Feast in our argument at will,"<sup>626</sup> Socrates. I won't oppose you or else I'll incur the enmity of these auditors I see about us."<sup>627</sup>

Present me my dessert<sup>628</sup> then, by continuing to play answerer as you have just now. We've finished everything else:<sup>629</sup> We've seen the just are wiser and more competent and more able to act whereas the unjust are unable even<sup>630</sup> to deal with themselves. In fact our rash assertion<sup>631</sup> that unjust persons ever yet have acted in concert to pull something off was not entirely correct, for if they were unjust pure and simple<sup>632</sup> they would not be keeping<sup>633</sup> their hands off each other. The very concept

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lights only Rufener's "es sich selbst und jedem Gegner un damit auch dem Gerechten zum Feinde wird" (Zurich 1973) is correct.

<sup>623</sup>τοῖς δικαίοις (A8): reverting to the plural (as at 351E2) after the singular he employed with ποντί to state the principle (A3), so as to prepare for the next step by bringing back the whole class of persons to whom the unjust is inimical.

<sup>624</sup>δέ γε (A10) fits this unexpected assertion into the argument by immediately identifying it as a minor premise.

<sup>625</sup>καὶ οἱ θεοί (A10).

<sup>626</sup>εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου ... θαρρῶν (B3): his remark is directed at Socrates's apparently gratuitous addition of the gods to the argument, as if he were heaping food onto his plate.

<sup>627</sup>οὐ γάρ ἔγωγέ σοι ἐναντιώσομαι ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπεχθάνωμαι (B3-4). τοῖσδε means "our auditors:" it is a first person *plural* demonstrative, as it were (cf. τοιούσδε, "our kind," 597A8). Once again the reason he gives for agreeing undermines and mocks the logical procedure of argumentation by imitating the subject matter (ἐναντιώσομαι / ἀπεχθάνωμαι: cf. διαφέρωμαι, 351D7), which comports not at all with the feasting metaphor he throws at Socrates. Thrasymachus now toys with blaming the company for his giving in to him.

<sup>628</sup>τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἐστιάσεως ἀποπλήρωσον (B5-6): Socrates plays along with Thrasymachus's metaphor of the feast (εὐωχοῦ) but not his corrosive mockery of the content and method of the argument (ἀπεχθάνωμαι).

<sup>629</sup>ὅτι μὲν γάρ (B6): γάρ announces he will explain how this next step will complete the feast (τὰ λοιπά ... ἀποπλήρωσον), with μέν suggesting that the explanation will consist of a summary of what they have already done (as if they have "finished" these plates), to be followed by a δέ clause expressing what still needs to be done (eaten). The μέν clause is then interrupted with a self-correction (C1-8) lengthy enough to require a resumption (with μὲν οὖν, C8-D2), giving way finally to the δέ clause at D2.

<sup>630</sup>οὐδέ (B8), the δέ with μετ' ἀλλήλων.

<sup>631</sup>οὓς φαμεν ἐρρωμένως (C1), referring to 351C8-10. οὓς brings back the plural he there introduced (cf. n. *ad loc.*) but subsequently suppressed (cf. 351E10 and n.). He now retracts the hypothetical notion of unjust people banding together to do injustice on the grounds their injustice would pre-empt them even from banding together.

<sup>632</sup>The more neutral κομιδῆ ἄδικος (C3-4) relies on, but also replaces, Thrasymachus's extreme expression τελεώτατα ἄδικος (351B5), an essentially epideictic expression he drew from his speech (344A4).

<sup>633</sup>ἀπείχοντο (C3): a noteworthy use of the *present* contrafactual construction to deny the truth of a presumption. In English we would say, "They would never have kept their hands off each other in the first place."

implies<sup>634</sup> there was some justice in them after all that enabled them not to be messing with<sup>635</sup> each other at the same time they were mounting their attack<sup>636</sup> on the others, through which they accomplished whatever they accomplished. It's clear they set forth on their path of unjust conquest unjustly yes, but only by being semi-evil,<sup>637</sup> since people vicious through and through and perfectly unjust<sup>638</sup> are likewise perfectly unable to act. So much then, if you allow this revision, have I learned to be the case, contrary to the way you had set it out at first; but whether in addition they live a better life, the just than the unjust, and are more happy, this point we must now approach as we had originally set out to do.<sup>639</sup> To all appearances they do, as things now stand in the argument, but we must make a more complete examination of it. After all our subject is not just any old thing, but the question how one must live one's life.<sup>640</sup>

"Examine away."

Examine I shall. Let's start here. Does a horse have a function? I mean something that it alone can do or does best? For instance there is nothing with which you can see other than with the eyes, or hear with other than with the ears,<sup>641</sup> so that seeing and hearing would properly be called the function

<sup>634</sup> ἐνήν (C4), imperfect, directs our attention back to the moment before we envisioned the unjust group mounting an assault on the just (351B1-3). One may compare the so-called philosophical imperfect.

<sup>635</sup> μήτοι and γε (C5) add a tone of self-ridicule for their failure to see this point earlier.

<sup>636</sup> ἐφ' οὓς ἡσαν (C5), shorthand for the imperial aspirations of the unjust, repeated from 351C9.

<sup>637</sup> ἡμιμόχθηροι (C7), a term vastly disappointing for Thrasymachus since for him being all-bad is best, but being half bad is not half good (cf. 344A7-8, B2-5). The term itself, like almost all compounds in ἡμι-, is derogatory.

<sup>638</sup> παμπόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἀδικοι (C7-8): Socrates reverts to Thrasymachus's formulation (the adverb τελέως, though still not the superlative adverb: cf. 351B5), now that the notion has been vitiated, so as to use that formulation against itself (τελέως ... ἀδύνατοι).

<sup>639</sup> ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προυθέμεθα σκέψασθαι (D3-4): Finally we revert to the original challenge Socrates brought against Thrasymachus's long speech (345A2-B3). The question was postponed first by the digression into the rule either to use terms in the same meaning or to announce a change of use (345B3-347A6), which re-established along the way that true rulers never seek their own good, and it was then further postponed by Glaucon's request for clarification of the principle *noblesse oblige* (347A7-D8), at the end of which Socrates and Glaucon agreed that the best method of testing Thrasymachus's thesis was to revert to the method of question and answer they had been using before his long speech (348A4-B7). At that point Socrates began an entirely new line of questions (εἰξ ἀρχῆς, 348B8-9) designed to dismantle the image of the unjust man Thrasymachus had built up in his long speech, rather than attack the main point which it could reach only in its peroration, that the unjust life is better than the just life, which had been his original goal to impugn. The intervening argument has erased the picture Thrasymachus drew of an unjust man who with astuteness and competence developed his power to perfection; finally the original question, which had played the culminating role in his speech, and which regardless of his rhetorical strategy was always the most important question since it is the main question we face in life, can now be reached: whether the unjust life is in fact preferable to the just.

<sup>640</sup> οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος (D5-6): this phrase appropriately recalls 344E1-3, where the great question was first broached. The end of this conversation is approaching.

<sup>641</sup> τί δέ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ωσίν; (E7): ears being the complement of eyes, the question borrows its content from the previous question, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ὃν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὄφθαλμοις; (E5), as also it borrows its grammatical formulation in the potential optative. Hence ὃν does not need to be repeated (exactly parallel to 382D11, which echoes D6-7: cf. n. 1280). We can compare the omission of the interrogative particle when the questioner can rely on the interlocutor to know a question is coming (cf. 333A13 and n.).

of the eyes and the ears. Or again you (353) could use a dagger to cut back your vines or a knife or a lot of other tools, but there's nothing that does so fine<sup>642</sup> a job of it as the scythe that was made for this purpose. That's what I mean by asking whether things have their own special function which they alone do or they do best.<sup>643</sup> Now given the function of a thing there is a virtue corresponding to it. To use the same examples, the eyes have a function but also a virtue that enables them to do it, as do the ears. Now can the eyes perform their function if instead of having the corresponding virtue they have the vice instead?

"How could they—for I assume you mean they would have blindness instead of vision."

Whatever the virtue may be—I'm not asking you to identify it as yet.<sup>644</sup> Just answer whether having the virtue they would do their job well in the course of their exertions,<sup>645</sup> and having the vice instead they would do it poorly.

"So far what you say is true."

And so with the ears, deprived of their virtue they would execute their job poorly, and so on with the other cases. But now take the point I am trying to reach.<sup>646</sup> The soul has a function that you can achieve by no other thing than soul, and I'd describe the function this way: looking after things and governing and deliberating and all this sort of thing.<sup>647</sup> Is there anything else we could properly accord these functions to than to the soul? Can we say they are hers alone to perform?

"Nothing else's."

But then again<sup>648</sup> what about living? Isn't this a function of soul?

"Most of all, I'd say."

But we are also saying that soul has its own proper virtue?

<sup>642</sup>καλῶς (353A4): Finally τὸ καλόν enters the argument! Having the right tool enables the craftsman to perform his job *admirably*.

<sup>643</sup>κάλλιστα (A11), replacing ἄριστα in the original formulation (352E3).

<sup>644</sup>οὐ γάρ που τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ (C5-6): The pacing of Socrates's questions in this passage is noteworthy in several respects. Above, the list of tools inappropriate for cutting vines (353A1-2) might have brought to mind the δρέπανον by its very absence (cf. 333D3-4); here Socrates by avoiding to name the ἀρετή of the eyes has brought that specific ἀρετή to Thrasymachus's lips, but Socrates refuses to approve or disapprove this impletion of the question's form or matrix, in order to insist that the matrix be recognized *per se*. We must wait to see why, in his presentation of the target case of this whole argument—soul.

<sup>645</sup>τὰ ἔργα ζόμενα (C7) internal or adverbial accusative, while ἔργον is an external or objective accusative.

<sup>646</sup>μετὰ τοῦτα τόδε (D3): by the "persons" of his demonstratives the speaker distinguishes for his interlocutor between what the interlocutor already has taken in (τοῦτα) and a new point the speaker is about to make (τόδε). Above, the distinction has provided a way to impede Thrasymachus from repeating himself (351B6, 349B1, 348E1), but it can also serve to prepare the interlocutor for something quite new, as it does here.

<sup>647</sup>τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βούλευεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα (D4-5). I do not know what background list, if any, this triad is relying upon, nor the logical configuration of the three terms.

<sup>648</sup>With αὖ (D9) Socrates intimates that the function of living (τὸ ζῆν) falls under a second heading rather than being another member in the previous category, which contained actions of a moral nature. Even so, given the biological context created by the examples of the eyes and ears, when he now brings up ζῆν as a function of soul we might assume a biological meaning and therefore not notice that he has arrived at the target question of this section, ὅστις τρόπος ζῆν, brought forward from before (352D6 and n.).

“So we are.”

And so could soul execute its function well if she were deprived of her peculiar virtue, or is this impossible?

“Impossible”

Logic then requires<sup>649</sup> that with a bad soul one rules badly and takes care poorly, but with a good soul one does well in all these respects.<sup>650</sup>

“So it does.”

Did we not reach the agreement<sup>651</sup> that justice is what constitutes competence and virtue of soul, whereas injustice makes it weak and vicious?

“So we did.”

The just soul will therefore do a good job of living and the just man will live well,<sup>652</sup> whereas the unjust man will live poorly.

“So much appears to be true according to your argument.”

(354) Yet<sup>653</sup> he who lives well is blessed and happy,<sup>654</sup> while he who lives not well is the opposite.

“Must be.”

Thus the just man is happy and the unjust miserable.<sup>655</sup>

“Let it be so.”

Yet<sup>656</sup> being miserable does not profit a man, while being happy does, so that injustice is never,<sup>657</sup>

<sup>649</sup> ἀνάγκη ὄρα (E4) of logical necessity, as usual.

<sup>650</sup> εὖ πράττειν (E5): Context and parallelism (of κακῶς and εὖ) require us to construe πάντα ταῦτα (353E5) as an external or objective accusative, making εὖ πράττειν mean what εὖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι (et sim.) has been meaning (E1-2, C9-10, C6-7, B14-C1, A10-11); but εὖ πράττειν cannot fail also to carry the connotation of “faring well,” in accordance with which πάντα ταῦτα would be construed as an accusative of respect.

<sup>651</sup> ἀρετήν γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην (E7), alluding exactly and only to διωμοιλοησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, 350D4, itself a restatement of the argument (349B2-50C11) that the just man in resembling the knowledgeable man (σοφός) shares also in his competence (ἀρετή) while the unjust resembles the ignorant and thus inherits his incompetence. The intervening second argument (351B1-352A8) had added effectuality or power to the side of justice and futility to the side of injustice, a conclusion Socrates already thought was implicit in the argument about σοφία and ἀρετή (351A3-6) but thought it worthwhile to prove by a more complex route (*ibid.*, A6-7). The present, third argument uses the conclusion of the first to prove that the virtue the just man has, since it belongs specifically to his soul, enables his soul to do its job well, and thus enables it to give him a good life.

<sup>652</sup> εὖ βιώσεται (E10) continues the same ambiguity we saw in εὖ πράττειν, namely, doing a good job of living and having a good life.

<sup>653</sup> ἀλλὰ μήν γε (354A1) of the minor premise.

<sup>654</sup> Socrates redeems these terms from their abuse by Thrasymachus (cf. 344B7).

<sup>655</sup> ὄθλιος (A4) is as much a descriptive term (“miserable”) as it is a term of derogation (“loser”). It was in its latter sense that it was given a role to play in Thrasymachus’s great speech (in the superlative, of course: 344A6), and Socrates intends to correct this here. Thrasymachus’s notion of happiness is likewise more a matter of others thinking the tyrant happy than of his actually being so.

<sup>656</sup> ἀλλὰ μήν γε again (A6).

<sup>657</sup> οὐδέποτε ὄρα (A8): The conclusion is a conclusion in principle regardless of circumstances.

my blessed<sup>658</sup> Thrasymachus, the more profitable<sup>659</sup> life than the life of justice.

“Let so much constitute your feast on the day of Bendis.”<sup>660</sup>

Don’t fail to take credit for being my host, Thrasymachus, since now you have become tame and have stopped your chafing. Still, the feast was unsatisfying—by my own fault, not by yours. Like a glutton I grasped at whatever dish was brought around before giving the dish that came before the time it deserved. We had set out to discover what justice is, but before discovering the answer I let it go and jumped at the question whether it is a vice and ignorance or a kind of knowledge or virtue.<sup>661</sup> Then another argument came upon us, that injustice is a thing more profitable than justice, and I was not able to resist going at that instead of the former. The result is, I haven’t really learned anything from the conversation. As long as I don’t know what justice is I don’t know the first thing<sup>662</sup> about whether it should be classed as a virtue or not, and whether the man who has it is not a happy man or a happy one.

## END OF BOOK ONE

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Thrasymachus’s speech on the other hand presented only a fabulous story of “successful” circumstances that was meant to be overwhelming in its appeal. Socrates had already declared himself immune of this attempt at persuasion (345A4-7).

<sup>658</sup> ὁ μακόριε (A8), held out until the end. Socrates borrowed it from Thrasymachus’s speech (344B7) and has already used it twice of Thrasymachus himself (346A3, 345B2).

<sup>659</sup> λυσιτελέστερον (A8) another reappropriation from Thrasymachus’s speech (344C8). κερδαλέον on the other hand, did not deserve to be redeemed.

<sup>660</sup> ταῦτα δή σοι ὁ Σώκρατες είστιάσθω (A10): Thrasymachus has the last word by reminding Socrates he has now had his dessert (cf. τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἐστιάσεως, 352B5).

<sup>661</sup> εἴτε κακία ἔστιν καὶ ἀμαθία, εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή (B6), a “chiasm of before and after” (cf. n.18) that summarizes the last few moments of the argumentative feast: The notion that justice was a kind of viciousness (κακία) led to its being seen as ignorance (ἀμαθία) and incompetence rather than astuteness (σοφία) which turned out to be the province of virtue (ἀρετή).

<sup>662</sup> σχολῆ (C1) idiomatically designates an *argumentum a fortiori*: cf. n.1432.

## BOOK TWO

### 2.A:The Brothers' Requests

(357) Socrates as we might expect reverts to the narrative mode. He thought he was done with having to<sup>663</sup> converse,<sup>664</sup> but what came before turned out to be only a prelude.<sup>665</sup> It was Glaucon who pressed him to continue, the Glaucon he had been on his way home with, his friend and “student,” whom he warmly characterizes as being even less daunted, or more daunting, than Thrasymachus,<sup>666</sup> and who in fact takes issue with him for giving in<sup>667</sup> too easily.“Will you be satisfied only to seem to have persuaded him, and not to have persuaded him *in reality?*” Glaucon asks, reminding his teacher of the sort of distinction of his that later helped get him poisoned.<sup>668</sup> Of course Socrates would choose to persuade him in reality, assuming he had the ability.“But then,” Glaucon rejoins in mild reprimand,<sup>669</sup> “you are not doing what you would.”<sup>670</sup> Again the student turns back upon his teacher the sort of paradoxical challenge by means of which Socrates would draw a person into dialogue. This time he follows it up with the same sort of explanatory apology that Socrates always next gives, namely, an explanation by a series of questions.<sup>671</sup>

Glaucon’s questions introduce a distinction among good things based on our different reasons for valuing them.<sup>672</sup> First are the things we want to have not because we are aiming at what might result

<sup>663</sup> ἀπηλλάχθαι (357A1) denotes a release or respite that has been earned, and therefore alludes to the circumstances of Socrates’s presence, that he was compelled to join the group. Now, he thinks, they would let him go. His allusion connects the beginning of this Book to the beginning of the last, and the programmatic character of his remark approaches transparency.

<sup>664</sup> λόγου (A1):The λόγος from which he hoped for release (note lack of article) may be argumentation per se or conversing: with Socrates the distinction does not amount to a difference for very long.

<sup>665</sup> προοίμιον (A2):The first impression we get from the term is quantitative (“Long and toilsome as that conversation might have been, much more was yet to come”), but προοίμιον has this meaning only because of its true meaning, which is qualitative. Socrates swiftly intimates, under the guise of his characteristic irony, that the conversation invoked problems that only a fuller discourse could handle properly, and that the ensuing conversation did in fact achieve this. His comment therefore promises us that the conversation will become more substantial than it has been. By looking only backward Socrates indicates what we need to know about what is coming.What will make it more substantial? What will constitute the real beginning and turn the conversation so far into an only apparent beginning?

<sup>666</sup>The ἀεί τε δὴ ἀνδρειότατος ... καὶ δὴ καί construction (A2-4), akin to ἄλλως τε (...) καί, boils down to the praising Glaucon’s vigor for rising even in *this* very formidable occasion. For the sense of ἀνδρειότατος cf. 459C6.

<sup>667</sup> ἀπόρρησιν (A4):The sense is given in a methodological passage from the *Phaedo* (85C1-D4).

<sup>668</sup> βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ή ὡς ὀληθῶς πεῖσαι (A5-B1) cannot help but remind us of Socrates’s constant refrain in the *Apology*,“He seemed to be wise but in reality he was not” (*Apol.*21C-23B). Socrates here reports an imitation of himself by Glaucon, without letting on to it. Apollodorus likewise imitates Socratic talk at *Symp.*C6-D3, and Aristodemus his barefootedness, as there reported by Apollodorus (173B2). Chaerephon in *Gorg.*448A6-C9 sounds just like Socrates, as Alcibiades does at in a similar “sub-squabble” (n.348) at *Prot.*336B7-D5. Cf. also n.2266.

<sup>669</sup> τοίνυν (B4), as always, presses the interlocutor to own up to the implications of what he has just agreed to.

<sup>670</sup> οὐ ... ποιεῖς ὦ βούλει (B4).The paradox again imitates Socrates –e.g., *Gorg.*467B2 οὐ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀ βούλονται, q.v. and cf. 577E.

<sup>671</sup> λέγε γάρ μοι (B4).

<sup>672</sup> Goods viewed per se and objectively are typically distinguished as external, bodily and psychic

from having them but welcoming them in themselves and because of themselves,<sup>673</sup> such as joy and the pleasures, as long as<sup>674</sup> they are harmless in the sense that nothing results from them other than enjoying having them.<sup>675</sup> Second there are the goods that we like<sup>676</sup> both in and because of themselves<sup>677</sup> and because of their results,<sup>678</sup> such as being aware, and seeing, and being healthy. Things like these, presumably, we welcome for both reasons.<sup>679</sup> And there is a third type of good,<sup>680</sup> among which we would class exercising and undergoing medical treatment when sick, and giving medical treatment for that matter, and all other activities by which one makes money.<sup>681</sup> Things like these are toilsome but beneficial. Although in and for themselves we would not accept having them<sup>682</sup> we do accept them for the sake of the wages they produce or for the other things that result from them.<sup>683</sup>

Glaucon presents his division step by step, question by question, with a balance between variation (cf. n.80 supra). The criterion of the present division is our (subjective) reasons for valuing things, an idea later to be thematized with *τιμᾶν* and its cognates (359B1, 359C6). Glaucon employs the distinction in order to draw Socrates into holding forth; whether it is a cherished belief of the dialogue's author is extra argumentum and does not matter to the drama.

<sup>673</sup>αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα (B6): as we might welcome having an orange (αὐτό) for its flavor (αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα).

<sup>674</sup>Όσαι (B7) introduces a proviso (ἀβλαβεῖς [sc. εἰσιν]). καί is epexegetical introducing the negative μηδέν which will explain what is being denied by ἀβλαβεῖς. μηδέν is used instead of οὐδέν by a common kind of logical attraction according to which the explanation of a proviso might best itself be expressed as a proviso. But the construction squints: after a few words we have ταύτας, which indicates that the proviso is being explained by being commented upon rather than restated. The variants in F (καὶ μηδὲν] εἰ καὶ μηδὲν F : ταύτας] αὐτάς F) give the logically imperfect sense “as many as are harmless if in fact nothing else issues from them other than enjoyment,” and they do so with Greek syntactically faultless but less idiomatic. It is natural after all that an epexegetical remark should take on a *constructio ad sensum*.

<sup>675</sup>ἔχοντα (B8) probably echoing ἔχειν (B5) but perhaps meaning “unvaryingly” in contrast with ἄλλο γίγνεται immediately before.

<sup>676</sup>ἀγαπῶμεν (C1) varies ἀσπαζόμενοι (B6).

<sup>677</sup>αὐτοῦ χάριν (C1) varies αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα (B6).

<sup>678</sup>τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνόμενων (sc. χάριν), C1-2, varies τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι (B5-6).

<sup>679</sup>διὰ (C3) inexactly varies the constructions in χάριν and ἔνεκα above; and ἀγαπῶμεν reverts to ἀσπαζόμεθα (C3).

<sup>680</sup>εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ (C5), a categorical term fully motivated and justified by the accumulation of instances.

<sup>681</sup>In this last case the examples (C5-7) are given before rather than after the general criterion is articulated (C7-D2). Such chiastic order is of course natural for closure (cf. 350C10-11 and n.588; and 547D4-8C2), but we may note in addition that hereby the listener is mildly “induced” (i.e., led) to formulate the criterion, himself. The list of examples is notable for its content and its form: τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ιατρεύεσθαι καὶ ιατρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός (357C5-7). The first two terms are formally parallel (articular infinitives) and in content are motivated by ὑγιαίνειν above. The third term is a surprise, drawn in content from the second as if it were the active instead of the passive but saliently different from it in form, being an abstract verbal noun instead of an articular infinitive. Immediately it is succeeded by a categorical statement of what it is meant to represent that is effected by the fourth term, χρηματισμός. ὁ ἄλλος by a common idiom means “the rest of” (in lieu of a plural) and indicates that χρηματισμός is a generalized element of higher logical rank than the other items. ιατρευσίς therefore has what we may call an “ancipital” role in the list. What is noteworthy is how much care is given to ensure through the careful choice of examples that the movement from one idea to the next be made as smooth and continuous as possible. The thought of the Socratic epagoge, as well as Glaucon's imitation of it, is εἰρουμένη rather than κατεστραμμένη and “often proceeds by minute steps through linked synonyms” (Shorey *ad Rep.*338E [Loeb 1.48.note

and attention to detail like we saw in Socrates's questions to Polemarchus. Indeed his imitation of Socrates is quite polished, and Socrates now accommodates him by playing the role of the typical Socratic interlocutor: 'Yes, I grant that third type too—but what's all this leading to?'<sup>684</sup> Of course it is leading to the question, 'Into which category would Socrates (358) place justice?' For his own part<sup>685</sup> he would place it into the finest<sup>686</sup> category, with the things that a person would want both because of what they are in themselves and because of their future results, assuming the person is really thinking about living a happy life.<sup>687</sup>

Socrates has taken the bait and now Glaucon can reveal his purpose. "You might think<sup>688</sup> it belongs in that category, but most people don't! Instead they put it into the toilsome category that a person pays regard to<sup>689</sup> for the sake of the payoff and the honorific emoluments that reputation brings,<sup>690</sup>

a]).

Given the καί before ιάτρευσις, the τε after it is strictly redundant. Its special force is to announce there will be a connection between its own item (ιάτρευσις) and the ensuing item that is more intimate than its item's connection with the previous items. Compare 407B8-C1, 410D1-2, 412B3-4, 431B9-C1, 519B1-2, 568E2-3 (οἵ going with all three), 611B2-3; Crat.407E5-A2; Leg.733E1-2, 738D6-E1, 834A4-5 (cf. England *ad loc.*), 899B3-4, 950E5-6; Meno 75C8-9; Phdo 85E3-4; Symp.206D3-5, 213D3-4; Thet.146C8-D1, 156B2-6, 157B9-C2, 167C1-2, 176C3-4. Distinguish the force of γε, δέ, and δῆ in similar position, all of which distance their item from the previous rather than bringing it closer to the subsequent (Thet.149D1-3 has both τε and δή). Distinguish also non-redundant τε placed in lieu of καί, helping to effect closure, where it may or may not also indicate an intimate link (Α καὶ Β καὶ ... καὶ Χ, Υ τε καὶ Ζ—and—Α καὶ Β καὶ ... καὶ Χ, Υ, τε καὶ Ζ) as Alc.I 122B8-C2; Leg. 665C2-3, 735B1-2, 828B4, 842E1-3, 886A2-4, 896B10-C1, C9-D1, D5-7, 899B3-4; Phdo 59C1-2; Polit.288B2-4; Rep.547B3-4; Tim.24A7-8, 42E8-9, 43B2-4, 46D2-3, 87D1-2, 92C7-8. In the present case the especially intimate relation between the item (ιάτρευσις) and its subsequent (χρηματισμός) is that of particular and universal (for which cf. the similar list at Thet.157B9-C2).

<sup>682</sup>δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν (C8), repeated from the first division (B5).

<sup>683</sup>Note the chiasm (D1-2): μισθῶν ... χάριν (varying ἐνεκα immediately above) picks up ιάτρευσις and τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν (a repetition of the formula at C1-2) picks up the salubriousness of exercise and medical treatment.

<sup>684</sup>γὰρ οὖν (D3) grants the obvious and ἀλλὰ τί δή voices, or feigns, a little impatience.

<sup>685</sup>The μέν solitarium (358A1) indicates some diffidence but more resolve.

<sup>686</sup>ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ (A1). Notably not τὸ ἄριστον, which would constitute a claim about the essence of goodness. To call something καλόν is often to express admiration, and τί τὸ καλόν; can mean "What shall we praise?" That we love (ἀγαπητέον, A2) justice for both reasons therefore makes it καλλίστον in Socrates's eyes exactly because in this case it affords us more grounds for praise. There is no deeper idea at stake; the tripartition has served its immediate purpose in that Glaucon has succeeded to warm Socrates to the task of praising justice in itself. To wonder about the doxography of this tripartition is to ignore its application in the drama, by which it is immediately exhausted.

<sup>687</sup>μακαρίω ἔσεσθαι (A3): Socrates is remembering the climax of his argument against Thrasymachus, that justice is the virtue of the soul that enables it to do its job well, and therefore enables its possessor to have a happy life (352D8-354A9).

<sup>688</sup>τοίνυν (A4): Glaucon marks the victory of his epagogic strategy. Glaucon's signal "bravery" (ἀνδρειότατος, A3) is shown by his elevating the conversation to the Socrates's own standard.

<sup>689</sup>ἐπιτηδευτέον (A6): a new term denoting a "practicing observance" that (appropriate to the attitude being described) lacks the zeal of the terms used so far: ἀγαπᾶν, ἀσπάζεσθαι, and ἐφίεσθαι.

<sup>690</sup>μισθῶν θ' ἐνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν (A5). εὐδοκιμήσεις are the attitudes that grant such rewards as power and money (τε ... καί linking effect and cause), and δόξα is the agent that brings them about. With near pleonasm Glaucon prepares us to learn that it is not goodness that brings about the rewards but a *reputation* for goodness (cf.363A1-5, below, esp. ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης, and

while they would avoid it for what it is in itself and what it does, thinking it in truth a bothersome and unpleasant thing.”<sup>691</sup> Socrates recognizes this is the opinion of most people as well as being the burden of what Thrasymachus has said in the previous discussion, but confesses that he is somehow slow to learn what is so plain to everyone else. His irony indicates that he is ready to defend his ignorance.

When else has Socrates answered questions rather than asking them?<sup>692</sup> Glaucon has brought him to this point, and indeed he has earned a free pass to ask him all the questions he wants: “Listen then to me and see if you might<sup>693</sup> agree.” Though he will deliver a series of assertions, they will be subordinate to the enclosing construction, “Is it true, after all, that...” Clearly he expects a negative answer.

Thrasymachus became calm but not because his position had been adequately refuted. It was as if he had been stunned.<sup>694</sup> The questions about justice and injustice still remain,<sup>695</sup> and Glaucon desires<sup>696</sup> to hear<sup>697</sup> answers to them, to wit: What is each and what power<sup>698</sup> does each possess in itself and on its own terms by virtue of being present in the soul?<sup>699</sup> Leave aside the payoff and the aftereffects!<sup>700</sup>

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554C12). Indeed in the next line justice is considered harsh not only αὐτό but also δι’ αὐτό. His two-item list replaces μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται of 357D1-2; and his pleonasm specifies the process of γένεσις.

<sup>691</sup> ως ὃν χαλεπόν (A6) playing the opposite of ήδύ. The term has a special career in the maxim χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά, where it is essentially approbatory (this theme will come up below, 364A1-4); elsewhere, and here, it is just negative. With ως Glaucon emphasizes this is the opinion of οἱ πολλοί.

<sup>692</sup>Cf. 337A5-7.

<sup>693</sup> εάν ... δοκῇ (B1): The construction is, “Listen on the chance that you will agree” (Smyth §§2672 and 2354; cf. 427D3-4, 432C2, 455B1-2, 474C5-6; cf. Lach. I 79E6), just as we say “Listen if you please,” or as an advocate says “If it please the court.” In effect Glaucon is asking leave to lay the entire thing out in a long speech, by suggesting such a speech will carry Socrates along (cf. a similar use at Phdo 64C where Socrates suggests a line of argument). The pronouns are emphatic as usual. Glaucon is making a “personal” request that Socrates hear an argument that he himself despises but cannot escape. He hopes of course that Socrates will remain “unteachable” but cannot in himself see how.

<sup>694</sup>Socrates’s “stunning” effect on his interlocutor (ώσπερ ὄφις κηληθῆναι, B3) does not consist of reducing his argument to self-contradiction, but his self. Thrasymachus stays stunned; his blush indicates that he realizes in full company that he has been shown not to be what he has been showing himself off to be; but he has no further stake in the conversation other than to win it. His involuntary behavior reveals that he was making his argument not because he thought it was true but because making it made him a somebody. Glaucon on the other hand desires the truth because he thinks the answer crucial to his own happiness.

<sup>695</sup> οὕπω κατὰ νοῦν (B3) is his expression for the inadequacy of the account, an inadequacy that he feels in his mind and that leads him to ask questions. Conversely if his mind were satisfied and had no further questions he would find the account “adequate” (ἰκανῶς).

<sup>696</sup>, επιθυμῶ (B4) reveals he has been feeling an intellectual hunger.

<sup>697</sup> ἀκοῦσαι (B4): Notably he says he wants to hear an account rather than that he wants to learn. Cf. πυθέσθαι below (D3).

<sup>698</sup> δύναμιν (B5) is meant to exclude such γιγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ as might accrue not because of the inherent power of the thing itself (αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτό) but because of people’s opinion about the thing (διὰ δόξων).

<sup>699</sup> καθ’ αὐτό (B5) means to focus on the immediate operation of the thing, used properly, in its essential relations, as for instance the sharpness of a knife’s blade that enables the knife to cut, disregarding what kind of handle the knife has, what the knife might be used to cut, whose knife it is, and where the knife came from.

<sup>700</sup> ἔᾶσαι χαίρειν (B6-7) expresses impatience with the importance characteristically according to such things.

Here is how I shall proceed if you please: I will present the Thrasymachean position anew, in three steps. First, I'll tell what they say<sup>701</sup> justice is in the sense of where it came from; second, how anybody that practices and observes justice does so not because he wants to, thinking it a good,<sup>702</sup> but because he thinks it necessary to do so; and third, that to act this way is plausible<sup>703</sup> since the life of the unjust man is better after all<sup>704</sup> than that of the just man, as they argue. Myself, I think they're wrong, and yet I am quite at a loss: my very ears are jammed<sup>705</sup> with the argument made by Thrasymachus and by a thousand others, but a speech in defense of justice, that she is better than injustice, I have never yet heard the way I want to: I want to hear it praised in itself and for itself, and it's just from you I think I might hear this message.<sup>706</sup> So<sup>707</sup> now I'll make a concerted effort to praise the unjust life in order to indicate the sort of speech I want to hear from you, censuring injustice and praising justice instead<sup>708</sup>—if, that is, you're willing.<sup>709</sup>

Socrates's answer is just right, the answer everybody wants to hear when asking for something. "I wouldn't have it any other way! What would anybody with a mind<sup>710</sup> more readily welcome and enjoy

<sup>701</sup> τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον (C1): This Thrasymachean position is actually held by οἱ πολλοί (A4); Thrasymachus's relation to it is like the actor's relation to his role: like the actor his personal beliefs are of no importance.

<sup>702</sup> ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν (C3-4): Glaucon has already abandoned his own tripartition. What was an ἐπίπονον ἀγαθόν of the third type there is here a necessity, and what was the first type of good there is here good *simpliciter*. In his division the second category had merely been a means to introducing the third, as the transitional example ὑγιαίνειν (357C3), leading to γυμνάζεσθαι, ιατρεύεσθαι, and thence to ιάτρευσις, revealed.

<sup>703</sup> εἰκότως (C4) already suggests that their reasons are shortsightedly justified.

<sup>704</sup> ὄρα (C5) is redundant after γάρ, itself is a compound of γε and ὄρα (just as μή was redundant after μῶν, itself originally a compound of μή and οὖν, at 351E6-7: cf. Smyth §2651c); but it is not entirely otiose. It marks the *unexpectedness* of their grounds. The question remains whether it expresses Glaucon's surprise or that of οἱ πολλοί, and the answer is, both.

<sup>705</sup> διατεθρυλημένος (C7): Glaucon is *unable* to be clear. He is enervated, driven to distraction, broken into little parts, in his ears, from hearing it, hearing it from Thrasymachus and countless others. Thrasymachus's position is not unique after all.

<sup>706</sup> With ἐπεί γε (C6) Glaucon indicates not the reason for the foregoing but his reason for saying it (cf. Smyth §2380), and with ἀπορῶ (C7) moves completely into confession. The movement of the thought is emotional and unpremeditated: these are indices of Glaucon's sincerity and desire. ἀπορῶ gets no grammatical complement, but a cause instead (διατεθρυλημένος), which itself is given a cause (ἀκούων). With ὑπέρ instead of περὶ Glaucon shows which side he is on at the same time that he abandons the effort to do the praising himself (he has passed over saying ἀπορῶ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου λέγειν), although he does know what needs to be done, and says what that is, and then expresses his sense that Socrates is just the person to deliver this message: πυθέσθαι replaces ἀκούειν as if he feels he can no longer trust his ears.

<sup>707</sup> διό (D3) like οὐτωσί (B7) and ἐπεί ... γε (C6) continues his confession under the guise of explanation. It is paradoxical and ironic that what Glaucon wants is a defense of justice but what he insists on doing is to castigate it. Somehow he feels he must do the only thing he can do – to re-enact the bad argument in all its parts.

<sup>708</sup> κατατείνας (D3) echoes ἀντικατατείναντες (at 348A7): In his eagerness to confess his feelings to Socrates Glaucon has forgotten the point Socrates there made, that listing all the pros and cons is worthless unless and until a judge arrives to weigh them (348B2). It is as though he conceives that rehearsing the argument will prompt and stimulate Socrates to make the opposite argument.

<sup>709</sup> ὄρα εἴ σοι βουλμένῳ (D6) the third time the student addresses a plea to his teacher, this time slightly more direct (εἰ instead of ἐάν), but still he does not directly ask Socrates to make a speech.

<sup>710</sup> νοῦν ἔχων (D8), echoing Glaucon's κατὰ νοῦν (B3).

than this topic, whether he's to do the speaking or the listening?"<sup>711</sup> Glaucon is relieved,<sup>712</sup> and straight-away he begins.

## 2.A.Ia: Glaucon's Speech on Justice

"First, their account of the nature and origin of justice.

"In nature,<sup>713</sup> they say, doing injustice is good whereas getting it done to you is bad, but the goodness of doing it falls short of the badness of getting it done to you. What happens therefore is that once people have done injuries to and received injuries from each other and have had their taste of both, those of them who cannot pull off avoiding the (359) one and getting the other judge it<sup>714</sup> to their advantage to agree among themselves to do neither. And that, these people say,<sup>715</sup> is how men began formulating laws and<sup>716</sup> compacts among themselves, and calling the behavior that these laws enjoin "lawful" or<sup>717</sup> "just." This is the origin and this alone<sup>718</sup> is the essence of justice, a thing that lies

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<sup>711</sup>χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων (D8). Compare the conversation between Echecrates and Phaedo at the beginning of the *Phaedo*, and in particular how Echecrates after testing Phaedo's memory for details gingerly requests him to give him an eyewitness account of Socrates's last conversation (58D2-3), the formula by which Phaedo agrees to do so (τὸ μεμνῆσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἥδιστον [D5-6]), and how Echecrates is then relieved by the answer (D7-9). The reversibility of roles is topical in the Greek concept of χάρις, but also is integral to the reciprocal process of dialectical conversation (cf. *Prot.*310A1-7). Thus pairing the verbs commonly denotes dialectical scrutiny by question and answer (432E5-6, 489E3, 605C10 [ἀκούων σκόπει], 608D6-12 and n.4980, *Prot.*347D6-7).

<sup>712</sup>κάλλιστα λέγεις (E1), answering Socrates's superlative (πάντων μάλιστα), followed directly by καί.

<sup>713</sup>πεφυκέναι (E3) the first word of the account, immediately invokes the infamous distinction between φύσις and νόμος, although Glaucon means only to assert that his claim is self-evident—what we would mean by saying "naturally."

<sup>714</sup>δοκεῖ (359A1): Glaucon shifts out of the infinitival indirect discourse as if this were his position.

<sup>715</sup>ἄρξασθαι (A3): Now Glaucon shifts back to the infinitive of indirect discourse.

<sup>716</sup>νόμους τιθέσθαι (A3): Adopting laws is presented as a logical extension of the concept of reaching agreements (συνθέσθαι ἄλλήλοις, A1-2). To list the extension of the idea before the basic idea places it into a kind of reverse exegesis of its own extension, often in the manner of a correction ("laws, which are, after all, compacts"). It is a species of "reverse καί" (343C6 and n.): cf. καὶ δόξα, *Crito* 47B1-2; ἐργασίᾳ (new) τε καὶ χρήσει (old), *Euthyd.*281A2; καὶ φύσεις, *Leg.*798A7-8; κηρυκιῇ (without καί, placed last although the "basic" item), *Polit.*260D11-E2; καὶ ἀληθεῖς, *Thet.*167C1-2. We may class here the καί that explains effect by adding cause, e.g., *Rep.*392D8 (γελοῖος διδάσκαλος καὶ ἀσαφῆς); *Gorg.*474A1 (γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν). Cf. also 381A4 and 381A7-9 with nn.

<sup>717</sup>νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον (A4): The argument is etymological. The ἐπίταγμα is called νόμιμον because νόμος ἐπιτάττει. From here, we are to believe, it is a short step to δίκαιον, as if this were a synonym of νόμιμον. That the step is short is the burden of τε καί to gloss over.

<sup>718</sup>γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης (A5): We had been told we would hear what justice is and how it came to be (358C2, E2), but in the event we hear only how it came to be. What it is, is now being portrayed as just the outcome of the becoming (compare Thrasymachus's expression οὐκ ὅλο τι ἡ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον [338C2] which likewise denies that justice has any inner meaning). Moreover, the definition (or evolution) of justice requires the essence (or existence) of injustice, and

between the best, which is doing injustice without paying the penalty, and the worst, which is suffering injustice without being able to exact recompense. Being a thing in between the best and worst, we embrace<sup>719</sup> it not as good but as a thing to which we accord value because of our less than superhuman strength to commit injustice.<sup>720</sup> After all the man who is able to pull the thing off—the real man—would never make a pact with anybody to desist from both: that, they say, would be madness!

“So much for the nature of justice, what it is or how it came to be, according to this argument. Next, the assertion that the people who practice and observe it do so out of inability of do injustice and therefore<sup>721</sup> unwillingly. The best way to see that this is true would be to perform an experiment in thought. Let’s give each of them, the just man and the unjust, the prerogative and opportunity to do whatever they wish, and follow them on their way to see where their desires lead them. We would<sup>722</sup> catch the just man *in flagrante* arriving at the same place<sup>723</sup> as the unjust, led there by pleonexy, the desire for more, the thing that all of nature pursues as good, although she is forced off her course by law<sup>724</sup> toward an honorification of equality and fairness.<sup>725</sup>

Here’s the way I might best formulate the opportunity. Give them both the power that once upon a time came to Gyges. He was serving as a shepherd for the King of Lydia when one day a great storm arose and the earth opened up where he was tending his flock. He looked down into it bewildered and then he went down inside. There he saw a bronze horse, among other things according to the story. It was hollow and had little doors that he looked through and saw what seemed to be a corpse,

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so the account is baseless or circular.

<sup>719</sup> ἀγαπᾶσθαι ως ἀγαθόν (A8-B1) reverts to the language of the tripartition (357C1, 358A2) but does here carry the connotation of acquiescence.

<sup>720</sup> ἀρρωστία (B1) means not weakness but a deficiency in the kind of overmastering power that would enable us, as described above, to ἐκφεύγειν the one and αἱρεῖν the other (358E6-9A1). The phrase ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμούμενον is therefore an oxymoron.

<sup>721</sup> οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι (B6-7) restates 358C3 (οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν) in such a way as to sandwich in what the first point yielded (ἀδυναμίᾳ [359B6, cf. ἀρρωστίᾳ, B1]).

<sup>722</sup> λάβοιμεν ἄν (C4): contrary to good empirical procedure the result of the experiment is revealed before the experiment is allowed to take place. It is after all within the διάνοια of Glaucon’s rhetor’s audience that the experiment is in fact taking place.

<sup>723</sup> εἰς ταῦτὸν ιόντα (C4) arriving at the same destination even though coming from different places.

<sup>724</sup> νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ (C5-6): the word order again stresses the complacent and superficial contrast of φύσις and νόμος (cf. πεφυκέναι, 358E3, and n.). The jarring juxtaposition of νόμος and βίᾳ is mitigated only slightly by the intervening δέ; the lack of καὶ makes βίᾳ a virtual synonym for νόμος in contrast with φύσις. Compare Aristotle’s division of motion into κίνησις βίᾳ and κίνησις κατὰ φύσιν (e.g. Phys.4.8.215A1-2). For the awkward juxtaposition cf. ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ, at 552E2 (and n.). It is thus that though (natural) ἐπιθυμίᾳ can be said to ὄγειν (ἄξει, C3), νόμος is said to παράγειν (παράγεται, C6).

<sup>725</sup> ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἵσον τιμήν (C6). τὸ ἵσον is here treated, with some cynicism, as mere political sloganry (cf. 561B2, 558C5-6). To use τιμή relies in part upon the previous use of τιμούμενον at 359B1. In the natural case one honors what he thinks good, but we need to explain a psychology that grants honor to something that a person does not think good. From such behavior come such expressions as “empty pomp” and the “show of honor.”

larger than human size, that was wearing<sup>726</sup> nothing but a ring that he took off its finger and left.<sup>727</sup> At the next regular meeting of the shepherds where they assemble to amass their monthly report to the king on the state of his flocks, he arrived wearing the ring. As he sat among the shepherds he fiddled with the ring on his finger and when he turned the collet inward he (360) became invisible to them – since they talked about him as if he had left.<sup>728</sup> Quite surprised he rotated the collet back outward with his finger, and became visible again. He stored this little event away in his mind and later tested to see if it was for real. He would become invisible if he turned the collet inward and visible if he turned it back out.<sup>729</sup> He recognized what this meant,<sup>730</sup> and soon managed to get himself selected to be one of those who bore the report back to the king.<sup>731</sup> Having gained access to the palace he seduced the king's wife and with her help ambushed the king and killed him and became king himself.<sup>732</sup>

"Imagine there were two such rings and imagine the just man had one and the unjust man the other. It would seem<sup>733</sup> that nobody is made of such adamantine stuff that he would abide in justice

<sup>726</sup>Reading ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν (D8) with ms.A (*legit Burnet*), as the *lectio difficilior*, rather than ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν with the majority (mss. FDM). ἄλλο is proleptic with μέν in the manner of a second ἄλλως τε καί construction (after D5-6) as further narrative focussing, and waits for a construction it will share with the contrasting item in the δέ clause. As it turns out, that item, χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, comes after δέ instead of before it since the storyteller wishes to depict Gyges's attention moving toward the hand. Thus περί is made to initiate the construction of the δέ clause and the anticipated parallelism dissolves.

<sup>727</sup>περιελόμενον ἐκβήναι (E1): imitating the swift λέξις εἰρουμένη of an Ionian logographer like Herodotus, including abrupt and unwarmed shifts of subject (mitigated by tense changes in the participles), which I imitate in my paraphrase (note also prepositional καὶ τὸν rather than τὸν δέ [360A2], in change of subject). In this the rhetor adopts a style familiar in storytelling—indeed a similar story is told by Herodotus (1.64ff). Reversion to this archaic “objective” style happens to leaves out (or conveniently hides) the inner psychic dimensions and processes of consciousness and conscience.

<sup>728</sup>ώς περὶ οἰχομένου (360A2). They said to each other “Say, where’s Gyges? He was just here a moment ago.” Notably Gyges discovers his “private interest” in the midst of his one public and corporate engagement, the monthly meeting. The rest of his life he spends alone with his sheep out in the fields. During the last few weeks he had perhaps already fiddled with his ring, but the sheep did not notice he became invisible and so neither did he.

<sup>729</sup>πειρᾶσθαι, συμβαίνειν, γίγνεσθαι (A5-7): The present infinitives represent imperfect indicatives in the *oratio recta* (whence dependent optative ἔχοι, A5).

<sup>730</sup>αἰσθόμενον (A7) is absolute: “he recognized the significance of what was going on,” an understatement conveniently neutral like Thucydides’s use of ἀναίσθητος.

<sup>731</sup>γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα (A8): cf. ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα (359E2-3). διαπράξασθαι (A7) suggests he kept his motives hidden (cf. 576A2 and n. *ad loc.*)

<sup>732</sup>Our storyteller has taken us to Persia where, also, Solon once met Croesus. Croesus could not understand how somebody who was unknown could be the happiest man in Solon’s judgment and finally had to learn that Solon would call no man happy until he was dead. Our rhetor has similarly left out the final fate of the Lydian shepherd. Or on second thought, despite himself he has not. The shepherd who became king will perhaps be buried out in some field, something more than a mere man but naked in a hollow bronze horse with little doors, with nothing on but that ring.

<sup>733</sup>ώς δόξειν (B4), “as it would seem,” the rather weak peg on which the entire argument is made to hang. But in all strictness the thought experiment is not an argument. It is a devil’s diversion whereby each member of the audience is for a moment given his chance to turn the collet inward himself, and to decide to do evil in hiding by condoning his own weakness through a condemnation of all mankind. Truly it is this moment that Glaucon meant to describe when he said of himself, ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλήμενος τὰ ὡτα ἀκούων (358C7). During the moment that he finds himself falling silent (ἀπορῶ) his chance to jump up and object passes by, and a moment later, *eo qui tacit, placuit*.

and keep himself from laying hands on what belongs to others, once he was granted the opportunity in the market to take without fear whatever he wants; to enter anybody's house and sleep with his wife, whichever wife he wants; to kill or to free from prison whomever he wants; and in general to pursue a range of action like to a god among men. In behaving so his behavior would differ not at all from that of the other man. The two of them would pursue the very same thing.

"One could infer that this experiment in thought gives powerful proof for the notion that nobody acts justly because he wants to but only because he has to and thinks it is no good for him in private,<sup>734</sup> since any time a person thinks he will be able to act unjustly that is how he will act. As for profit in his private life any man believes he'll profit more from injustice than from justice, and he believes right—so says the person arguing for this position.<sup>735</sup> After all if a man comes upon an opportunity like this and once proves reluctant to do wrong and unwilling to lay his hands on what belongs to others, he comes off being the most hapless<sup>736</sup> of men in the eyes of those who understand what is going on and a perfect fool, though to each others' faces they will praise him in order to deceive each other out of their fear of being treated unjustly themselves.

"So much for the second point; now comes the problem of weighing the men's lives objectively,<sup>737</sup> which had been the plausible basis for believing that nobody is voluntarily just.<sup>738</sup> We must lay out the two lives beside each other in full detail—otherwise the choice will not be possible.<sup>739</sup> And let us

<sup>734</sup> Harming others in hiding he is unconcerned about doing harm to himself that only he could see, and conversely he sees no benefit to his hidden self (*ἀγαθὸν ἴδια*, C6-7) from doing good. The same is true of the storyteller, who tells the story of the Lydian instead of the story of Solon.

<sup>735</sup> ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων (D2): We begin to realize that Glaucon adds this both as a disclaimer (to distance himself from the argument) and as a confession (blaming the speaker for the effect the speech is having on him—in his *διάνοια*—as though to say to Socrates: "See what I mean?").

<sup>736</sup> ἀθλιώτατος (D4), in the Thrasymachean sense of the "loser" (cf. 354A4 and n.).

<sup>737</sup> αὐτήν (E1) vauntingly indicates that the universal prejudice against justice evinced by the experiment in thought will now be placed on an objective foundation. But in all strictness it was not all men who gave in to the opportunity but only the men imagined in the *διάνοια* of the person who engaged in the experiment. It was only he who knew no man made of such stern stuff as to resist the opportunity, or could not conceive of one, or would not, or chose not to. Nothing at all was proven except that he would find himself ready to hide in the shared conspiracy of lowered expectations. The rhetoric of the thought-experiment includes providing for the anonymity of the person engaged in the experiment; but it is obvious that that person is the man in the rhetorician's audience. Thus the vaunt to put the thought experiment onto an objective basis is an invitation to that same member of the audience to conspire to close the door on justice forever. The powers and principalities are allowed to take over, and this is the heart of Glaucon's concern. One may compare how the *κρίσις* between Barabbas and Jesus, by which his fate was finally sealed, was dignified by Roman procedure.

<sup>738</sup> τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτήν (E1): This formulation replaces the original description of the third point in his program, ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι (358C4), i.e., that men choose injustice when they can since the unjust life is better than the just life. Glaucon now interposes an event: a judging (or trial) of the lives (*κρίσις*), to see whether (or show that) the preference for an unjust life is εἰκότως, "reasonable" (or justified).

<sup>739</sup> οὖν διαστησώμεθα ... οἵοι τ' ἐσόμεθα (E1-3): The more "impartial" optatives that are customary in methodological announcements (e.g., 359B7-8) are now replaced with the more sanguinary subjunctive and future indicative, then hortatory subjunctives (E4, E6), and then imperatives (E7, 361A3, etc.). But let us stop to notice, amidst all of this being pushed around, that we are not being given to judge the lives by a criterion (*κρῖναι*, E3), but to compare them side by side (this is the purport of the need for a *διάστασις*); and that what is being placed side by side as if symmetrically is a life that has something (*δικαιοσύνη*) and a life that is deprived of that same something (*ἀδικία*); and

extract nothing from the injustice of the unjust man nor from the justice of the just man, but posit them as perfect and complete exponents of their respective practices.<sup>740</sup> Let the unjust man act like a redoubtable<sup>741</sup> expert—like the top pilot or doctor who can (361) distinguish which jobs he can pull off and which he can't, who takes on the one but declines to take on the other, as well as having the ability to recoup just in case<sup>742</sup> he makes a slip along the way. Make your unjust man act like that, selecting his acts of injustice astutely so as to avoid being caught, if he is to be forcefully<sup>743</sup> unjust. The view must be adopted that the ones who get caught are insignificant persons.<sup>744</sup> After all, the most extreme<sup>745</sup> version of injustice is to seem just while not being so. So the perfectly unjust man must be endowed with the very perfection<sup>746</sup> of injustice, and he must not be deprived but allowed, in his performance of the greatest acts of injustice, to manage at the same time to achieve an equally great reputation for justice. Grant him also that if he does make a slip<sup>747</sup> he is able to recoup the situation, able as he is<sup>748</sup> to speak when persuasion is needed in case one of his crimes is disclosed, as well as to

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that the something (*τὸ δίκαιον*) has been defined as being only as a *ficta res* contrived as a mechanism for avoiding that privation. So we are being asked to compare a non-entity with an anti-entity.

<sup>740</sup> ἐπιτήδευμα (E6), mendacious in its neutrality, had entered the speech only to replace the language of ἀγαπᾶν and ἀσπάζεσθαι in order to account for “unwilling observance” (358A6 and then C3: cf. nn.). Now it becomes the measure of both men, both the just (who despite the attempt to define him out of existence still loves justice because he thinks it good: ἀγαπᾶν ὡς ἀγαθόν) and the unjust. The notion that both the positive and the privative, both ὁ δίκαιος and ὁ ἄδικος, can have a perfected or complete form likewise rests only on the dubious presumption of a symmetry between the two types. Socrates had already shown (in fact it was presented as a mere *obiter dictum* at 352C) that ὀδικία can become τελέα only through an admixture of δικαιοσύνη, in which case the best injustice would only be half bad.

A prudent reader knew that once this common terminology had been convened the horse was already out of the barn.

<sup>741</sup> δεινοὶ δημιουργοί (E7): The adjective already suggests expertise is to be pressed into the service of something nefarious.

<sup>742</sup> ὥρα (361A1) with the second limb, of a backup alternative in case the first fails, imitated below (B1; cf. also 587A3), a usage not isolated by Denniston (but note his mention of an hypothesis or idea “not before recognized,” 37-8).

<sup>743</sup> σφόδρα ἄδικος (A3): σφόδρα deftly avoids value-language—the presence of which would of course vitiate the fairness of the procedure.

<sup>744</sup> ἡγητέον (A4): Glaucon now slips from setting up the διάστασις (hypothesizing a description of the unjust man) into telling the judge what to think about his counterpart: in other words, to admire the unjust man's ability to evade being caught; and he vitiates thereby the fairness of the procedure he just sought to protect. His term φαῦλον replaces Thrasymachus's ἄθλιος.

<sup>745</sup> ἐσχάτη ... ἄδικία (A4-5): like σφόδρα, ἐσχάτη avoids positive or negative connotation.

<sup>746</sup> τῷ τελέως ἄδικῷ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἄδικίαν (A6-7): τελέως moves to the outer edge of the language still neutral, a limit already tempted by σφόδρα and ἐσχάτη; but in adopting Thrasymachus's superlative τελεωτάτην (cf. 351C5, which we saw Socrates eschew (352C7-8), Glaucon allows himself to wander across the line once again (cf. ἡγητέον above).

<sup>747</sup> καὶ ἐὰν ὥρα σφάλληται (B1): with the repetition of ὥρα (from A1) we realize Glaucon is making a transition to the unjust man's ability like a δεινὸς δημιουργός to recuperate, and therefore that the intervening lines (A4-B1) have constituted an improvement upon the λανθανέτω of A3. In the perfect case the unjust man must not only be hidden doing injustice but must be seen as just in the very act of so doing.

<sup>748</sup> λέγειν τε ἵκανῷ (B2-3): τε introducing an explanation in apposition, called “explanatory τε” by England (*ad Leg.809B4*, comparing 654B3). Cf. *Leg.809C7-8, 848A4-6; Prot.315E4; Rep.381A6* (and n.), 495A7-8, 552B9, 555A2; *Soph.219D5-6; Symp.186A3-7*; and Denniston 502.

use forceful methods<sup>749</sup> wherever that is indicated, relying on his bravery and his puissance, and by calling upon his supply of friends and money.<sup>750</sup>

“Having posited this one to be of this sort let us set up in words alongside him a statue<sup>751</sup> of his counterpart, the just man, a man simple and good<sup>752</sup> who wants, as Aeschylus put it, “not to seem but to be” good.<sup>753</sup> Now strip him of the seeming, for if we let him appear to be just, honors and rewards will accrue to him by virtue of people thinking him just<sup>754</sup> and it will become unclear whether it is for the sake of justice or for the prospect of the rewards and honors that he was<sup>755</sup> that way.<sup>756</sup> We must strip him naked, rather, of everything but his justice,<sup>757</sup> and portray him in circumstances wholly the opposite of the first one’s. Just so, although he has done not a whit of wrong, give him the biggest

<sup>749</sup>λέγειν τε ... καὶ βιάσασθαι (B2-3): implicit is the universal doublet, λόγος / ἔργον.

<sup>750</sup>διά τε ἀνδρείων καὶ ρώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φύλων καὶ οὐσίας (B4-5): the elaborate exegesis of ἐπανορθοῦσθαι (B2), starting with the balanced antithesis with paired protases and culminating in this list, constitutes a climax. The list includes goods of all three traditional categories, in the form διὰ Α καὶ Β καὶ διὰ Κ<sub>1</sub> καὶ Κ<sub>2</sub> (psychic: ἀνδρεία; bodily: ρώμη; external: φύλοι καὶ οὐσία). The form, in which the final category is instantiated by two terms (the governing term [here διά] either repeated before the final category, as here, or not), is common (342E10-11, 400B2-3, 426E1-2, and nn.). Alluding to the categories undermines the thesis, however, since the ἀνδρεία in question is not virtuous, the semantics of ρώμη suggests a power without internal strength (ἰσχύς: cf.410B7 and n.1703), and the selection of friends and money lacks the item or items, family and background (συγγένεια, commonly included among external goods, e.g., 491C1-4, 494C5-7; Alc.I 107B6-7; Charm.157B7-8; Lys.207C3; Meno 71B6-7; Prot.319C3-4; and cf. ὄπόθεν, 362B3).

<sup>751</sup>ιστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ (B6): the metaphor is from statuary (cf.D5).

<sup>752</sup>ἄνδρα ἀπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον (B6-7): the adjectives are similar to those with which Thrasymachus paid lip service to virtue in Book One (γενναία εὐήθεια, 348C12) but they lack his snideness and the ἀνδρα is sympathetic (cf.372C., 376D10 and n., 408A8 [vs. ἀνθρώπῳ, 407D7], 412D9, 419A3, 425D7, 426D7, 465B6, 556D2, 565E6): Glaucon is somewhere in between.

<sup>753</sup>The quotation (Septem, 592-4, the rest of it quoted below, 362A8-9) says, of Amphiarous,

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει,  
βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος  
ἔξ ἦς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.

The language is from a different time when men watched and waited for the harmony of φύσις and νόμος. Only real goodness would think to plow the deeper furrows and derive from them the truer and more solid plans that burgeon thenceforth into the light. The distinction between seeming and being cannot fail, again, to evoke the trial of Socrates; so that the subsequent ἀφαίρεσις of τὸ δοκεῖν evokes the forensic effort of Socrates’s accusers.

<sup>754</sup>ἀφαιρετέον (B8) proposes an absurdity, as if his appearing were “separable” from his being so: the appearance is after all in the eyes of those who watch; but in the experiment these are also the persons who know he is just. The use of the verb undermines Glaucon’s method, since he gave us to believe there would be no ἀφαιρέσεις (36E4-5). Moreover, the ἄδικος had conversely received the supplements of bravery, power, money and friends-from-who-knows-where.

<sup>755</sup>εἴη (C3) optative in the secondary sequence of the man’s underlying (and therefore past) intention; but if by hypothesis he was a just man it could only be after he received the accolades that he might come to have an ulterior motive. Glaucon departs from his own method again – but why?

<sup>756</sup>ἄδηλον (C2): to whom will it be unclear? We have just now posited him to be good. All that will be unclear is our own motive when we view the statue of the just man, in case at that moment of choice that we have served up to ourselves we should choose him over the unjust man. The lesson of the thought experiment about Gyges was to enable us to think this way; and now Glaucon has us apply it. It is envy that holds the good to an unreasonably high standard.

reputation for injustice so that the justness might be put to ordeal and test<sup>758</sup> as to its strength to resist moderation<sup>759</sup> by a bad reputation and what it can do.<sup>760</sup> Instead let him stay the course, his character unchanging to end, and live his entire life unjust by reputation and seeming but just in reality and truth. Let the two of them reach their respective extremes,<sup>761</sup> the one of justice and the other of injustice, so that they might be judged side by side as to which is the more happy.”<sup>762</sup>

Socrates intervenes (361D4-6) to express consternation at the tenacious vigor<sup>763</sup> with which Glaucon polishes off the statues of the two, standing complete before us for us to choose between. He acknowledges that he is trying as hard as he can<sup>764</sup> and continues: “What sort of lives await the two of them is not hard to infer,<sup>765</sup> and so I will. At the very likely risk that the account will seem somewhat crass<sup>766</sup> I want to remind you, Socrates, that it is not I who say all this but those who praise

<sup>757</sup>γυμνωτέος (C3), another term that undermines itself, reminiscent of but an inversion of what Socrates envisions at the end of the *Gorgias* (523A5-E6), where the proper κρίσις in the Final Judgment is assured by judging the souls naked, stripped of their bodies and vestiges of their external goods (cf. its use at 601B2), a provision that would be gratuitous if the soul were good, as this one is hypothesized to be, and necessary only if the soul be provided with external goods, as the hypothetical *unjust man* has been. At the same time the image is consonant with the notion of torture.

<sup>758</sup>βεβασανισμένος (C5) specifies the κρίσις this candidate will be facing, unaccountably quite different from that of the ἄδικος. Only slaves could be tortured (*Andoc.Myst.43*): implicitly Glaucon’s just man has been degraded to being a slave.

<sup>759</sup>τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι (C6), this metaphor of watering or moistening is elsewhere used of moderating the excesses of willful hardness and uncultured intransigence (e.g., *Leg.880E3*; cf. 853D3 [τήκεσθαι], D4 [ἄτηκτοι]); *Aesch.Prom. 2008*; *Eur.Hipp. 303*), just as much as the hardness of adamant serves as a metaphor for a brave resolution to be good (360B5, 618E4; *Gorg.509A1*). Glaucon inverts the usage: “adamancy” is for him too much to expect from a man (360B5), while the adamancy of the just man is an obduracy that must be tortured by the “mitigating” effect of ill repute and all it can do to a man.

<sup>760</sup>ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς γιγνομένων (C6-7): ὑπό (alter, unsurprisingly misquoted by Eusebius and Theodoret as ἀπό) adds personification to κακοδοξίας. What a bad reputation can do to a man will presently be seen.

<sup>761</sup>εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον (D8: sc. δικαιοσύνης or ἀδικίας): again medaciously neutral: cf. ἔσχάτη, A4. Glaucon may speak of them as if they were symmetrically extreme (cf. ἐπιτήδευμα, 360E6 and n., and παρ’ αὐτὸν ιστῶμεν, B6) but the only thing extreme about the just man is that he does not change.

<sup>762</sup>ἴνα ... κρίνωνται (D2-3): The passive deflects our awareness away from the fact that it is we that are meant to judge and that we that are being prepared by all this to do so properly (κρίναι ὥρθως, 360E3, active). If the question truly were Which is happier? then we would simply ask them. If we notice what is happening inside us during the preparation, we will see that Glaucon has turned the question into, Which will you envy less even though you should envy him more, and Which will you envy more though you should envy him less?

<sup>763</sup>ἐρρωμένως (D4), not ἀκριβῶς vel sim., of an enthusiasm bordering on the obsessive, eliciting the distinctly Socratic ejaculation βαβαί (βαβαῖ), which in all Platonic instances express Socrates’s consternation about the task that has suddenly come into view as lying before him (459B; *H.Maj.294E7*; *H.Min.364C8*; *Lys.218B7*; *Phdo 84D9*; *Phlb.23B5*; *Phdr.236E4* [so it used by the Stranger at *Soph.249D9*]). The *Alc.I*, upon the authenticity of which we cannot rely, gives two instances to Socrates uncharacteristic both for their proximity (118B4, 119C2) and for expressing consternation on someone else’s behalf.

<sup>764</sup>ώς μάλιστ’ ἔφη δύναμαι (D7) recalls κατατείνας ἔρω (358D3) and with it Glaucon’s effort to claim that he is divided, one part believing all this and another not wanting to.

<sup>765</sup>οὐδὲν ἔτι ... χαλεπόν (D7-8): The judgment is meant to have been made easy by creating images of them in the most extreme versions (D2-3).

<sup>766</sup>ἀγροικοτέρως (E1): both formations of the comparative adverb are found (ἀγροικότερον, *Phdrs.*

injustice over justice. Here is what they will say, that the just man cutting such a figure as (362) this will be whipped and will be scourged; he'll be tied up and have his eyes burned out of their sockets and for a *coup de grace*<sup>767</sup> he will be impaled,<sup>768</sup> and he will be smartened up so as to aim at appearing rather than being just.<sup>769</sup> In very truth, they will say, that line from Aeschylus is more<sup>770</sup> appropriate for the unjust man, who in pursuing a kind of action that latches onto the truth and reality of things rather than giving his life over to appearances, does prefer the reality to the appearance—of injustice that is,

“Plowing a deeper furrow with his wits  
Whence his goodly plots burgeon forth to fruition—”

first, his plot that ruling the city will go to the man who is believed to be just, as well as marriage into any family he wishes,<sup>771</sup> and to enter contracts and enter partnerships with whomever he wants, and on all these fronts to be benefitted by exploiting his ability to commit injustice without hesitation. In

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260D3). With the comparative and καὶ δὴ καί (E1), Glaucon affects scrupulousness at separating himself from what he is articulating so forcefully, and does right before he reaches its (or his) climax. Despite his disclaimer it is he who is speaking: these feelings are within him, as they are in Polus at *Gorg.*473C (and within Apollo for that matter, at *A.Eum.*186-90); and like Thrasymachus – but for different reasons – he wants to arouse these feelings in Socrates.

<sup>767</sup>τελευτῶν (362A1) cf. τὸ ἔσχατον, *Gorg.*473C4, of another *coup de grâce*.

<sup>768</sup>μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται τῷφθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθῶν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται (E4-362A2): It is not merely a “traditional list of tortures” (Emlyn-Jones *ad loc.*). Whereas future middles used with passive sense, perhaps as holdovers from “the earlier language,” tend to show durative aspect, the regular passive form derived from the aorist passive shows a punctual aspect (Gildersleeve SCG §168). After a session of whipping (μαστιγώσεται) and a session of torture (στρεβλώσεται) he gets bound up (future perfect middle-passive, the aspect given by the perfect reduplication), and, held in place thereby, has his eyes burned out and then for finishers gets impaled and put on display (ἐκκαυθέσεται, ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται, future passives both punctual). Compare the sequence of abuses envisioned by Polus at *Gorg.*473C1-5: durative tortures (στρεβλῶται, ἐκτέμνηται) followed by the punctual burning out of eyes (ἐκκάηται, second aorist passive) and a *coup de grâce* (ἀνασταυρωθῆ ἢ καταπιτωθῆ). In comparison with the well settled list of judicial punishments (e.g., 492D7, 553B; *Apol.*37BC; *Crito* 46C5-6; *Gorg.*466B11-C1, 468B-9C, 480C8-D2, 508D1-3; *Leg.*847A6-B1, 855C2-6, 890C4-5, 949C6-7; *Polit.*309A2-3) Glaucon’s striking specificity, persistence and pacing reveal an affect that cannot be ignored. That ἀνασχινδυλεύειν denotes impalement on a sharp stick, not crucifixion or hanging or nailing up, is proven by the sources gathered by Susemihl *ad loc.* (*Platons Werke* 25 [Leipzig 1881] bd.I, 336), i.e. the scholiast, Tim. Lex. Plat. (followed by the Souda and Hesychius), and *Etym.Mag.*100,50. Impalement, recondite and oriental (though mentioned at *A.Eum.* 189-90 and *Eur.Rh.*517), is administered after all the other disfiguring tortures, not only to ensure death but also and more importantly to put the victim on display as if it were a proof of his own viciousness or of the fearsome power of the parties that had their way with him, or both.

<sup>769</sup>But he will be dead. Glaucon—or the persons whose λόγος this is—will have “taught him to death.” this final statement is therefore a virtual taunt delivered to the dying man on the stick. Clearly, it is out of our sight that he must be put, or better, if he is in our sight, let us see him squirming to death on a pole. Compare the similar blind-spot in Polus’s orgy of tortures in the *Gorgias*: his victim will be forced to watch (ἐπιδεῖν) his family tortured after he has had his eyes put out (*Gorg.*473C4).

<sup>770</sup>ἄρα (A4) recalls the argument at B7-8 and corrects it.

<sup>771</sup>γαμεῖν ὄπόθεν ὃν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ὃν βούληται (B3) designate marrying one’s son into a family (i.e., taking a daughter “out of” it) and marrying one’s daughter into a family, respectively. The asyndeton and the homoioteleuton achieved by repetition of βούληται makes this set of benefits sound parallel to the tortures of the good man.

any contest you can be sure he will come out on top, in private cases and in public ones,<sup>772</sup> and will get the better of his enemies, from which will come wealth and the ability to grant favors to his friends and to do harm to his enemies, as well as sacrifices and votive offerings to the gods, ample and showy, that he will subvene for sacrifices and donate to temples.<sup>773</sup> In the end he will be tending to the gods better than the just man does, as well as to the fellow men that he chooses to, so that to be god-beloved would more plausibly be his lot than the just man's. And so, as they claim, Socrates, in the view of the gods and in the view of men life is better<sup>774</sup> turned out for the unjust man than the just."

## 2.A.Ib:Adeimantus's Speech on Justice

Socrates reverts to narrative. When Glaucon was done he was ready to make a reply,<sup>775</sup> but no: his brother Adeimantus intervened, "I don't presume you somehow think the case for their position has been completed: what needs most to be said has still been left out."

'Let brother help brother,' as they say.<sup>776</sup> Still, what your brother has said has already pinned me to the mat and rendered me useless for rescuing justice.

"Baloney.<sup>777</sup> Add the following to what you have to wrestle with. We have to include also<sup>778</sup> the arguments that oppose these that Glaucon has made, which praise justice and censure injustice, in order to make it clearer just what Glaucon wants from you. Fathers, you surely know, encourage their sons, and all caretakers encourage their respective wards, (363) that they ought to be just, and do so not by praising justice considered in and of itself but rather the honorific rewards<sup>779</sup> that come from justice.<sup>780</sup> Their purpose is that their sons accrue such awards by virtue of a reputation for justice—

<sup>772</sup>καὶ ιδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ (B6) implies the ἀγῶνες are forensic. For the division of cases cf. 365D4-5, 549D2-3.

<sup>773</sup>θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἵκανως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι (C2-3), the sacrifices measured by size (ἵκανως) and the objects by their decorative magnificence (μεγαλοπρεπῶς), an instance of the kind of distributive binary structure in which the modifiers (and also, here, the governing verbs) go with the respective items *only*, rather than all going with all (that is, [S<sub>1</sub>+S<sub>2</sub>][P<sub>1</sub>+P<sub>2</sub>][V<sub>1</sub>+V<sub>2</sub>] = S<sub>1</sub>P<sub>1</sub>V<sub>1</sub> + S<sub>2</sub>P<sub>2</sub>V<sub>2</sub>). Cf. Rep. 332D5-6, 370E2-3 (chiastic), 430A6-B2, 433E12-4AA1, 462B5-6, 476B4-5, 491D1-2 (chiastic), 515C4-5; also Crito 48D1-2, Leg. 945C4-5. Contrast the non-distributive (n.2288).

<sup>774</sup>ἀμεινον (C3), as an adverb with παρασκεύασθαι, rather than ἀμείνονα (adjective) with βίον, indicates, without Glaucon noticing, how "external" the account of happiness is.

<sup>775</sup>αὐ (D1) indicates Socrates's sense that it was now his turn, but μέν already suggests that his sense was wrong, as he learned in the event and reports to us today, a day later. Glaucon's brother (δέ) chimed in, and what he says (οὐ τί που οἴει ... ἵκανως, D2-3) reveals that he saw that Socrates was ready to speak.

<sup>776</sup>ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη (cf. Paroem.Gr. I.219, 2.16 for the interpretation: ὅτι προτιμητέον τοὺς οἰκείους). Socrates's reason for citing the proverb is not to approve that brother should help brother but to accept the natural impulse as a sufficient excuse for Adeimantus to interrupt: besides his remarks will enhance the investigation. Polemarchus likewise interrupted on behalf of his father to save the argument, whereas Thrasymachus interrupted, without warrant, to destroy the logos.

<sup>777</sup>οὐδὲν λέγεις (E1): He continues (cf. D2-3) to rely on Socrates to recognize that he is joking.

<sup>778</sup>καί (E2): To add these opposing arguments will make Glaucon's meaning more clear (σαφέστερον, E4); but on the face of it making his meaning more clear can hardly constitute "what most needs to be said" (ὅ μάλιστα ἔδει ρηθῆναι, D5). Adeimantus has something else up his sleeve.

<sup>779</sup>εὔδοκιμήσεις (363A2), bringing forward Glaucon's term (358A5).

<sup>780</sup>οὐκ αὐτό ... ἀλλά (A1-2): Such a generalization cannot but include a confession about Adeimantus's own upbringing. We had been prepared to consider his family by the emphatic reference to the fact the he and Glaucon are brothers.

offices and marriage and the rest that Glaucon just went through, which come to the just man by virtue of his good reputation. Indeed they widen the ambit<sup>781</sup> of the case for reputation by including honorific awards bestowed on men by the gods, a bounty of goods that the gods bestow on the pious,<sup>782</sup> as our worthy poets Hesiod and Homer, the one how the gods make a just man's "oak tree full of acorns at the top and bees in the middle, and make their sheep heavy laden with wool" and lots of other such goods,<sup>783</sup> and Homer likewise:<sup>784</sup>

"Yea, as of a king that is blameless who in reverence  
Keeps to the rule of good justice, the black earth bears him  
Barley and wheat, his trees become heavy with fruit,  
His sheep bear lambs and the sea provides him with fish."

Musaeus and his son have added a novel line of goods coming from the gods to men. They lead<sup>785</sup> the virtuous down to Hades, provide them couches and outfit a whole party for the pious, with crowns all around and drinking 'til the end of time. Leave it to them to think it obvious<sup>786</sup> that the best payoff for being just is eternal inebriation! Other poets press this theme of rewards from the gods still further, how there will be children and children's children to survive the man who is pious and keeps his oaths. These are the sorts of terms in which they make their praise of justice. When it comes to the impious and the unjust they stick them into that mud in Hades or they make them carry water in a sieve there, and while they are still living<sup>787</sup> they lead their characters into lives of ill repute. They include in their tales of the unjust those very same punishments that Glaucon went through in connection with the truly just but seeming unjust, having nothing else to add.<sup>788</sup> So much for the praise

<sup>781</sup>A satirical tone is introduced by the excess of ἐπὶ πλέον (A5), the arbitrariness of ἔμβάλλοντες (A6), the implicit conception of the gods participating in the world of reputation (εὐδοκιμήσεις, A6), the quaint cornucopiae (ἄφθονα) from Homer and Hesiod, and the characterization of Hesiod as γενναῖος (A8), that Adeimantus with some irony imputes to the κηδόμενοι: the word is no longer innocent (361B7, 348C12, and nn.).

<sup>782</sup>τοῖς ὄσιοις (A7) designates the proper relation of man to god, as δικαίω (A3) designates that of man to man. Cf. 331A3 and n.

<sup>783</sup>Hes. WD 232-4.

<sup>784</sup>Od. I.9.109, 111-13, omitting line 110. Odysseus compares the fame of Penelope to that of a pious king (whence the opening genitive).

<sup>785</sup>νεανικώτερα τόγαθά ... διδόασιν (C3-4). The comparative warns us that while the rewards just narrated were ridiculous for their quaintness, those to come are truly beyond the pale; and his colloquial formulation according to which the authors themselves give benefits to their characters rather than write stories in which they receive them (διδόασιν, C4) all with all that follows (ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ, κατακλίναντες, etc.), satirizes a failure in the poet's verisimilitude by feigning the credulity his account requires if it is to be taken seriously.

<sup>786</sup>ἡγησάμενοι (D1) of unconscious and uncritical certainty (334C2 and n.). Adeimantus criticizes both their belief there could be nothing finer and the fact that they believe it unconsciously, without himself saying what he believes or why he believes it.

<sup>787</sup>The order in which the rewards are treated (C4-E4) is artfully chiastic: rewards in life to the just (A7-C2) and then in death (C3-D5); then punishments for the unjust in death (D5-7) and then in life (D7-E2).

<sup>788</sup>ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν (sc. λέγειν) (E3): This pendant remark, abruptly brief after his elaborate and irrisory smorgasbord of rewards, resembles the critical remark he dropped at D1-2 (ἡγησάμενοι ...) in the way it damns the poets but withholds any attempt to say what is missing in their account. This time he begs the question more acutely. To say οὐκ ἔχουσιν rather than οὐ λέγουσιν is sharper than the indirect criticism of ἡγησάμενοι above: he claims not only that they did not but could not say anything more. Moreover, ἄλλα is ambiguous: is it a supplement or an alternative hat he misses? Even

and blame of the one and the other."

Clearly Adeimantus finds praise of justice and the dispraise of injustice that fathers offer their sons to be insipid and inadequate, showing indeed no more inspiration than those who argue the opposite; but he has more to burden (364) Socrates with, "another type of arguments"<sup>789</sup> one finds in plain speech and from the poets, too.<sup>790</sup> Everyone<sup>791</sup> avers as if with one voice<sup>792</sup> that self-control and justice<sup>793</sup> are without question<sup>794</sup> fine (though mind you harsh and toilsome),<sup>795</sup> whereas<sup>796</sup> their opposites are pleasant and ready to hand, with opinion only and convention calling them vile.<sup>797</sup> More profitable, too, is unjust behavior than just, in most cases, as they go on to say.<sup>798</sup> Knaves that become rich and acquire power<sup>799</sup> they count happy and are willing to honor them without scruple, both

the question whether there are any such rewards is begged! Shorey (*ad loc.*) takes Adeimantus's bait and supplies an answer—a good answer, indeed ("communion with the good")—and others may vie to supply others; but in finding such an answer have we supplied what Adeimantus himself wants?

His final remark by its structure (E3-4) perhaps suggests that he is dissatisfied that their praise of justice has nothing more to draw on than the topics of its dispraise, and that the anti-entity is the source for describing the entity, but why doesn't he say so? Does he prefer an untested boast of superiority over taking the risk of suggesting an answer we might all profit from?

<sup>789</sup>The pairing of ἔπαινος and ψόγος (E3-4) had suggested that the range of λόγοι had been exhausted; this announcement of an ἄλλο αὐτοῦ εἶδος (E5) catches our attention. Have we reached ὁ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι (362D5)?

<sup>790</sup>ἴδια τε λεγόμενον καὶ ίππο ποιητῶν (363E6-4A1): the λόγοι of the κηδόμενοι had included edifying citations from the poets (γενναῖος, A8); but the passive (λεγόμενοι) allows Adeimantus to make a transition away from the κηδόμενοι to other, unspecified advocates, leaving only the distinction between plain speech and poetry (ἴδια ... ποιητῶν). He uses this passive again, below (λέγονται 364B3), to effect a transition from the unnamed πάντες (364A1) to the strange ἀγύρται καὶ μάντεις.

<sup>791</sup>γάρ (364A1) is programmatic, as often. Here it warns us that Adeimantus will now be imitating the exponent of this other kind of talk.

<sup>792</sup>ἔξ ἐνὸς στόματος ὕμνουσιν (A1): With the metaphor Adeimantus complains of the same saturation his brother did at 358C7 (ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὡτα ἀκούων), though he puts the accent on their unanimity and only implies he believes they are wrong, rather than on his own being overwhelmed by them.

<sup>793</sup>δικαιοσύνη (A2) is expanded by σωφροσύνη, which is however placed first; the two are attached by τε καί. The expansion sets up a contrast, unfavorable to justice, between the self-denial that just behavior entails and granting free rein to desire, which in truth the speaker is advocating.

<sup>794</sup>καλόν before μέν (A2) already suggests the wise old saw, χαλεπὸν τὸ καλὸν (cf. schol. *ad Crat.384B*), but since μέν is always concessive, we already sense that things are going in the wrong direction. According to the proverb it is the *difficulty* that is to be conceded, not the admirability (that is, we need χαλεπὸν μέν not καλὸν μέν)! For the problem of positioning μέν cf. Socrates's amusing analysis at *Prot.343C7-D1ff.* ὕμνουσιν, which already suggested a criticism of the speakers' complacency, and even indicated that the universal avowal verges on ὕθλος, the cognate noun (cf. n.58, *supra*). Nobody will disagree, but will anybody do anything about it?

<sup>795</sup>μέντοι (A3), in place of δέ, effectively cancels what has been conceded in the μέν clause; and ἐπίπονον adds condoning and negative tincture to χαλεπόν. It is clear where this argument is going.

<sup>796</sup>ἀκολασία δέ (A3): the μέντοι did not answer the μέν after all!

<sup>797</sup>δόξῃ δὲ καὶ νόμων αἰσχρόν (A4): That the vices are αἰσχρόν only δόξῃ καὶ νόμων, suggests that their opposite virtues were καλόν only by convention as well, but it is part of the strategy of this new kind of talking to leave such matters implicit, a strategy not unlike Adeimantus's above. We see again how easily in usage τὸ καλόν can mean merely "the praiseworthy." (cf. καλλίστῳ, 358A1 and n.).

<sup>798</sup>ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος (A5): after the argument that beauty is in the eyes of the beholder comes the sober statistical observation.

among themselves and in public venues,<sup>800</sup> while the others<sup>801</sup> they dishonor and ignore, finding a way to view them as<sup>802</sup> basically weak and poor though of course they would grant that they are better people than their counterparts. The most amazing part of these arguments<sup>803</sup> is what is said<sup>804</sup> about the gods and virtue,<sup>805</sup> that the very gods<sup>806</sup> in many cases<sup>807</sup> have sent misfortunes and a bad life down upon the good and the opposite to their opposites.<sup>808</sup> There<sup>809</sup> are mendicant priests and seers that gain the ear of the rich and persuade them that they can channel powers from the gods, and can use sacrifices and incantations, in case there's been some kind of misdeed,<sup>810</sup> whether his own or his children's, so as to make it good with a ceremony of pleasing feasts;<sup>811</sup> not to mention that in case he wants to bring a little<sup>812</sup> trouble down on his enemy's head (just or unjust, no questions asked), for a small fee he could do some real harm by means of the special<sup>813</sup> inducing incantations and constraining spells they have for persuading the gods to serve their wishes.<sup>814</sup>

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<sup>799</sup>πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας (A6): πλουσίους is a first predicate and is then generalized by the participial phrase which suddenly requires ἔχοντας to have been placed after it. Call it zeugma or syllepsis.

<sup>800</sup>In contrast to the persons described by Glaucon at 360C8-D7.

<sup>801</sup>τοὺς δέ (A8) succeeds to omit referring to the subject as τοὺς ἀγαθούς or τοὺς δικαίους: baldly to assert that the good are bad is beyond the pale and in the end lip service is conceded to them (όμολογοῦντες, B1) and they are called ἀμείνους.

<sup>802</sup>οἱ ἀν πῃ ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ὥσιν (A8-B1): postponement of the protasis and its insidious πῃ indicate that ἀσθενεῖς and πένητες are the excuses (i.e., reasons discovered after the fact) that they give themselves. The logic fails, but only at the end of the sentence; and he moves on.

<sup>803</sup>τούτων δὲ πάντων (B2). By referring to the arguments he is *about* to introduce (the θαυμασιώτατοι) as already included in τούτων πάντων is another of Adeimantus's ways to presume we know what he is thinking: we are supposed by now to have "gotten the drift" as to the εἰδος of these λόγοι (363E5-6), both their tone and manner.

<sup>804</sup>λέγονται (B3): the shift to the passive prepares for his change of subject from "all the poets" (πάντες, A1), who make the arguments about human affairs, to the strange specialists (ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις, B5) he will next introduce as authorities for the surprising statements about the gods. The transition from men as subject matter to gods repeats the transition above (ἐπὶ πλέον ... 363B5ff).

<sup>805</sup>περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς (B2-3): the position of τε indicates that the topic is the *relation* of the gods and virtue.

<sup>806</sup>ἄρα and καί (B3) conspire to express, or feign, shock.

<sup>807</sup>πολλοῖς (B3): Again a statistical statement postures, or is allowed to qualify, as a universal or essential truth.

<sup>808</sup>τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν (sc. ἐνειμαν), B4-5: compare the aposiopesis in Pindar, Ζεὺς τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει, *Isth.*5(4)52, and Nausicaa's remark to Odysseus (6.188-9), which avoid the explicit statement that gods are the cause of bad things.

<sup>809</sup>δέ (B5), colorless, as at A5. The rhetoric is cumulative rather than consecutive.

<sup>810</sup>εἴτε τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν (B7-C1): Adeimantus now imitates the "sales language" of the priests: τι and του minimize their prospective client's sin by avoiding to say whose it is, and γέγονεν finesses out of saying who did it. It is as if one is filling out a form.

<sup>811</sup>ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐօρτῶν (C2) echoes θυσίας τε καὶ ἐπωδαῖς with something a little more concrete and a little less liturgical, but at the same time it is a hendiadys: placating the gods is being slanted toward pleasing them and sugaring them up. At the same time that Adeimantus aspires to voice the truth he displays an estimable facility for imitating the liars.

<sup>812</sup>ἔαν τέ τινα ἐχθρόν (C2): the indefinite adjective is again euphemistic.

<sup>813</sup>τισιν (C4) again euphemistic and suggestive: what else is involved than the notion of pushing the gods around?

<sup>814</sup>τοὺς θεοὺς, ὡς φασιν, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπερετεῖν (C4-5): The syntax is roundabout but the solicitation is direct. In the end, as they boast (with σφισι), the gods turn out to be servants of men

"They are able to cite the poets as witnesses<sup>815</sup> for all these points, some citing them on the topic of baseness, in order to facilitate<sup>816</sup> being bad:

"Evil a man can find in plenty, easy for the taking.  
The path to it is smooth and near, while on virtue's path  
The gods have placed sweat at the very start,"<sup>817</sup>

a path good and long and rough and steep, if you will.<sup>818</sup> Others<sup>819</sup> call on them as witnesses that gods can be diverted<sup>820</sup> from their ways by men, they cite Homer himself, how he said,

"... to prayers even the gods hearken,  
And by sacrifices and soothing vows  
With incense and libation they are turned by human  
Prayers, when one has gone beyond the bounds and sinned."<sup>821</sup>

And<sup>822</sup> they can produce book after book by Musaeus and Orpheus, children of the Moon and the Muses as they claim. They use them as manuals for their rituals and they get not just individuals but whole cities to believe that there are ways to release them and cleanse them of their wrongdoings through sacrifices and pleasing games for (365) clients that are still alive, and that there are ways that work even for the defunct also (which they call functions<sup>823</sup>) that absolve those in the world beyond from the evils<sup>824</sup> they face there, whereas if they don't perform the sacrifices those worrisome evils

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(ὑπερετεῖν, C5)!

<sup>815</sup>μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται (C5-6): these μάντεις or ἀγύρται are a strange bunch indeed, quoting poets for corroboration as if they were delivering a brief in court! It is the third time the poets have been adduced for corroboration in Adeimantus's speech, first by the caregivers (363A7-8), then by Adeimantus himself (363E6-4A1), and now by Adeimantus's μάντεις.

<sup>816</sup>εὐπετείας διδόντες (C6). They cite the poets saying that evil is easily availed not in order to prove it so but to make it so. The citation therefore provides an index of the way in which the poets are taken to be teachers.

<sup>817</sup>Hes.WD 287-9. In the gnomic rhetoric evil is conceded (μέν) for the sake of highlighting (δέ) the good, quite the reverse of καλὸν μέν ... χαλεπὸν μέντοι, above (A2-3). Hesiod is being misused.

<sup>818</sup>τινα (D3) natural in apologizing for the metaphor but carries also a hint of incredulity.

<sup>819</sup>οἱ δέ (D3): Adeimantus speaks as if he were drawing a distinction among the μάντεις, but in substance it is the variety of poets (Hesiod and Homer again, and again as witnesses: cf. 363A8) and the range of their arguments that he means to catalogue, as the sequel shows (παρέχονται, E3, making no distinction between or among the παρέχοντες).

<sup>820</sup>παραγωγή (D4) revealing what ἐπαγωγαῖς (C3) had succeeded to remain vague about: cf. παράγεται, 359C6.

<sup>821</sup>Iliad 9.497ff, adapted. Phoenix speaks to Achilles, persuading him to let go his rancor: 'Even the gods show clemency to a man contrite.' Again the poet is misused, for Phoenix makes the gods the measure of men not their servants, as in Hesiod good was the measure of toil rather than ease the measure of good.

<sup>822</sup>δέ (E3): again the cumulative rhetoric. The move from Homer and Hesiod to the more radical claims of Musaeus and Orpheus repeats the escalation in his narration about the caregivers (363C3ff: n.b. νεανικώτερα), and makes more explicit the extravagant claim of the divine authority of those poets.

<sup>823</sup>τελευτήσασιν ὃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν (365A1-2), an etymological connection between τελευτήκασι and τελετάς. I borrow the rendering into English from Shorey.

<sup>824</sup>κακῶν (A2): The term now used not of the client's evil deeds that deserve punishment, but of

still lie in wait.<sup>825</sup>

“Given this sample, friend Socrates, of things that are said about virtue and vice and the kind of respect men have for them and the gods have, too, consider what sense the soul<sup>826</sup> of a young man who has strong natural gifts and is able to connect the dots<sup>827</sup> might make of it all as he ponders what one<sup>828</sup> should be like and how one should make his way through life. He would argue, in all probability,<sup>829</sup> quoting that line from Pindar: ‘Shall it be by justice that I ascend the heights or by the devious ways of deception,’ and to live out my life protected from all comers?<sup>830</sup> From everything I have heard, to be truly just, unless in addition I seem to be,<sup>831</sup> is nothing to the good but only toil and likely onus; to be unjust but careful to achieve a reputation as just, their story gives me a life like a

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the punishments they will face unless they hire the μάντεις to ward them off.

<sup>825</sup>δεινὰ περιμένει (A3). Cf. 330D-331B. Adeimantus’s depiction includes even the scare tactic with which his μάντεις might seek to close the deal. Though his description explicitly distances himself from these assertions (λέγουσι at 364A6, πείθειν at 364B6, C4, E5 and ὡς φασι at 364E4) he does a little too good a job of presenting their brief. One may wonder, moreover, whether a visitor such as the one he has described, has visited the door of Cephalus once or twice (ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ιόντες, 364B5-6) or has Cephalus found his frequent private sacrifices sufficient? His fear would presumably decide this for him.

<sup>826</sup>νέων ψυχάς (A6): Although the fate of the soul is meant to be the true subject of both the speeches (358B6) the soul has not been mentioned per se within either speech, not even in connection with the psychagogery of Musaeus at 363C and 364E. In turning to it in now, with solicitude, Adeimantus shows a hint of vulnerability; and with the vocative φίλε appeals to Socrates for help.

<sup>827</sup>ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι (A8). If with J.-C. the image is borrowed from bees (comparing *Ion* 534B), the metaphor (ἐπιπτόμενοι) is not. The gnomic and encomiastic topic of the bee as exploited for instance in Pindar has the bee moving from flower to flower to extract the honey, as the poet might pass over the details so as to focus on the gist of the matter. The term for harvesting the gist is δρέπεσθαι, but the term used, ἐπιπτόμενοι, connotes mere impetuosity. Likewise, συλλογίσασθαι —“adding it all up”—is likewise a disappointing *pis aller* for συλλέγειν. Cf. 401C2 where Socrates uses δρέπεσθαι instead, pointing back to this passage.

<sup>828</sup>ποιός τις (A8): he shifts from the plural of the group to the singular of the case—oneself—that each must think about in prospect.

<sup>829</sup>ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων (B2) recalls Glaucon’s εἰκότως at 358C4. In both cases to say that a person “in all likelihood” will adopt an attitude is really no more than an attempt to exonerate him, but now Adeimantus goes further, imagining an inner self canny enough to “get the drift” and endowing it with the *sophistication* of an argument from likelihood. In truth of course he is arguing against himself; and he already knows he will win, and that in winning he loses.

<sup>830</sup>πότερον δίκᾳ ... (B3-4): The passage from Pindar is quoted at greater length by Max. Tyre (12.1 = fr.254 Turyn, 213 Schneider): πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὑψιον | ἡ σκολιαῖς ἀπαταῖς ἀναβαίνει | ἐπιχθόνιον γένος ἀνδρῶν, | δίχα μοι νόος ἀτρέκειαν εἰπεῖν; and by Cicero in a letter to Atticus dubitating how he should treat a certain person; but later, Dion. Helic. can quote only the last line to express uncertainty on a technical question (*comp. verb. 21*). Adeimantus’s truncated version seems to presume the theme of deep dubiety expressed in the fourth line of the fragment. The language of the portion quoted by Plato closely resembles *Isth. 5(4)* 49-50: τετείχισται δὲ πάλαι | πύργος ὑψηλαῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀναβαίνειν, which suggests that the wall (there taking [with Dissen] ἀρεταῖς as dative of agent with τετείχισται and ἀναβαίνειν as epexegetical of ὑψηλαῖς) is a metaphor for social eminence. As such Adeimantus’s exegesis, ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ shades the meaning away from eminence in virtue toward the unapproachable security of a battlement.

<sup>831</sup>Reading ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ (B5) with F (against ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ with ADM).

god's.<sup>832</sup> So then, as the wise assure me that appearance and show can defeat even truth<sup>833</sup> and that these hold the key to happiness, onto this path must I turn with all my strength.<sup>834</sup> Let me build a proud front and wrap myself around with a show of justice before me, but keep in tow behind me that crafty crooked fox of Archilochus the wise. Someone<sup>835</sup> might object, 'It's hard to fool all the people all the time.' Yes, I'd say, ease never earned the greater goods.<sup>836</sup> We<sup>837</sup> must buck up if we are to achieve happiness, and cling to reason.<sup>838</sup> Reason bids us<sup>839</sup> to mount an assault against being caught by building up cabals and associations;<sup>840</sup> next<sup>841</sup> there are the teachers of persuasion we can hire to provide us with skills oratorical and forensic. From these sources we'll be equipped to persuade our way through some troubles and force our way through others,<sup>842</sup> and come off far ahead in the end<sup>843</sup> and scot-free.

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<sup>832</sup> θεσπέσιος (B7), gratuitously approbatory: cf. the use at *Euthyd.*289E. It recalls ισόθεον in Glaucon's speech (360C3) and reveals the young man's "buy in." Thrasymachus has promised superhappiness with μακάριος, definitively more than mere humans have. The desire is essentially "pleonexic."

<sup>833</sup> τὸ δοκεῖν ... (C1-2): a quote from Simonides according to the attribution of schol. in E.Or.235 (=fr.93Page [PMG 598]): τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιάται.

<sup>834</sup> οὐκοῦν (C1) always has some interrogative force in Plato (Denniston, 436; cf. des Places, *Quelques particules de liaison* [Paris 1929], 158 and 188). The parts of the self in conversation with each other challenge assent by putting a question: cf. D7 below.

<sup>835</sup> φησί τις (C6): The objector within has been put outside with the third person, so that the two persons within become a "we" (φήσομεν, D1) that it is addressing.

<sup>836</sup> Warming to his task Adeimantus joins the chorus of 364A1-4, and perverts the gnomic wisdom: τὰ καλά become τὰ μεγάλα and χαλεπόν is redone with a litotes, οὐκ εὐπετής, the expression striking a clumsy and false note since εὐπετής had there been used to seduce. Now the taunting counsel is bravery, with γάρ (C7) answering γάρ (C6) tit for tat, and the verbal adjectives ensuing in boastful resolution.

<sup>837</sup> φήσομεν (D1): Just as the opponent is cast out into the third person, the part of the self that had opposed the scandalous position now comes on board to hear the exhortations of the other part of the self. It has become idle to ask which one is Adeimantus, but all-important to recognize that he does not notice the shifting reference of his pronouns.

<sup>838</sup> τὰ ἵχνη τῶν λόγων (D2) adduces to the devil's argument even the open faith in reason, a favorite metaphor of Socrates as when he follows the λόγος through a dark thicket or rides it like a raft through waves of paradox in hopes of reaching the harbor of truth. Cf. 394D, etc.). That radical reliance on reason is here perverted into grasping at the merest threads of rationalization.

<sup>839</sup> γάρ (D2) immediately supplies reasons supplied by our young man's cunning fox.

<sup>840</sup> συνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἔταιρίας (D3): Aristotle quotes a typical club-member's oath at *Pol.*5.9: καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω ὅτι ὃν ἔχω κακόν (1310A9-10).

<sup>841</sup> εἰσίν τε (D4). Our young man remembers the argument of 361B2 and, with slovenly but serviceable τε, cobbles it together for himself, in reverse order. This is συλλογίζεσθαι instead of συλλέγειν (cf.365A8 and n.).

<sup>842</sup> τὰ μὲν πείσομεν τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα (D5): Adeimantus expatiates upon the first statement of this pair of solutions (persuasion and force, 361B) by first mentioning the resources available (συνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἔταιρίας // πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι, D3-4) and then their employment (τὰ μὲν πείσομεν τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα) ordered in apodotic chiasm.

<sup>843</sup> ὡς (D6) rather than ὥστε, with infinitive for natural result, rare in Plato (e.g. *Symp.*213B2) but commoner in Xenophon (several passages in Smyth §2263-8), as if to say the young man, following Pindar, keeps his eyes on the goal (ἀεὶ τέλος ὄρāν). πλεονεκτοῦντες however lays bare the true motive.

'But<sup>844</sup> the gods you can't persuade nor can you force them.' But can't I say in response<sup>845</sup> that first of all, if they don't exist or don't care<sup>846</sup> about human affairs, why should we for our part care<sup>847</sup> about eluding them? Alternatively, if they do exist and do care about us, let me remind you<sup>848</sup> that our only evidence<sup>849</sup> that they do is from the arguments we are reviewing<sup>850</sup> and from our poets who sing the genealogies,<sup>851</sup> but these very sources tell us also that by means of sacrifices, and by those 'soothing vows' of Homer,<sup>852</sup> and by setting up monuments<sup>853</sup> to them, they are amenable to being reoriented<sup>854</sup> in their outlook and persuaded to think otherwise.<sup>855</sup> You must believe those sources in both or believe them in neither.<sup>856</sup> Take it<sup>857</sup> that we are to believe: then we must commit injustice and make a sacrifice paid for out of the proceeds. After all, if we are to be just we will escape only the penalties the gods would impose on us, at the expense (366) of forgoing the proceeds of injustice; but if we are unjust we'll not only secure the lucre but also, by making our prayers as persons who have

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<sup>844</sup>ἄλλὰ δὴ θεούς (D6): Adeimantus now dispenses with saying who is speaking, but in his favored manner requires us to buy in and infer who it is (cf. 363D1-2, E3 and nn.). Presumably it is the τις again (since again the respondent is "we," D8), who now makes the transition, a transition we have already seen twice, from the human to the divine level (cf. 364B2ff; 363A5ff).

<sup>845</sup>οὐκοῦν (D7), again (cf. C1).

<sup>846</sup>μέλει (D8) of the gods' concern for men, stands for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, and that is the meaning we give it; but in the next line we see that this reduced term was adduced merely to a foundation for a tit for tat argument (see next note).

<sup>847</sup>μελητέον (E1) answering μέλει (D8-E1): note correlative καί presuming that men were on a par with gods the way Euthyphro does when he says (6A5) περὶ τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ: cf. also 378B2-4 and n.

<sup>848</sup>τοι (E2) Adeimantus adeptly imitates the oleaginous familiarity of the coaxing cynic. Cf. ὁ φίλε below (366A6).

<sup>849</sup>οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν (E2). Though the first sense of ἴσμεν is to "know," its inherent optical sense is brought to the fore by its collocation with ἀκηκόαμεν, so that a statement is being made about the evidence of the eyes and the ears. Adeimantus is applying the statistical empiricism he learned from others 364A5 and B3; and the argument includes a new kind of tendentious sophistication that we can only attribute to himself. But also it is drawn out of the characterization of the poets as "witnesses" to certain assertions, as 364D5.

<sup>850</sup>Reading λόγων (E3) on the superior ms. authority of ADM (instead of νόμων with F and edd.): the phrase redoes ίδίᾳ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν (363E6-4A1 and cf. n. *ad loc.*), repeating τε ... καί.

<sup>851</sup>τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν (E3): i.e., Homer and Hesiod: cf. Hdt.2.53. The characterization explicitly depicts them as authorities about the gods, though they have, twice above, only been presumed to be (364C5-E2; 363A7-8).

<sup>852</sup>εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῆσιν (E4), quoted (perhaps θυσίαις is, too, θυσίαισι replaced with θυσίαις τε, which preserves the dactyl as well as the caesura) from the passage quoted above from *Iliad* 9.

<sup>853</sup>καὶ ἀναθήμασιν (E5): In one and the same breath he quotes the *Iliad* and he throws in the pairing of θυσίαι and ἀναθήματα from Glaucon's speech, 362C2-3.

<sup>854</sup>παράγεσθαι (E5): cf. 364D4 and παρατρωπῶσ' in the quote from Homer below it (E1).

<sup>855</sup>ἀναπειθόμενοι (E5), as a nominative participle in hyperbaton, recalls λισσόμενοι in the Homer quote, though it is unrelated in sense and different in voice. In everyday speech ἀναπείθειν means to bribe (Ar. *Pax* 622; Eq. 473; V. 101), an undermeaning by which our young man now segues into a mercantile analysis.

<sup>856</sup>οἶς ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον (E5-6): with each question our young man unrelentingly pushes himself (or enables himself) to disown another resource for his own redemption. To decide which it is requires us to know where Adeimantus himself stands, and everything in this long speech indicates that like the young man, he can argue the bad position better than he wants to.

<sup>857</sup>δ' οὖν (E6) dismisses the alternative as if it were not an alternative after all.

‘o'erstepped the bounds and sinned,’<sup>858</sup> and softening their resolve, we will get off without having to pay a sou.<sup>859</sup> ‘But you've forgotten<sup>860</sup> how we pay the penalty in Hades for the evils we do here above, whether ourselves or our<sup>861</sup> children's children.’ ‘But my friend,’ he shall reply<sup>862</sup> from his enlightened economical point of view,<sup>863</sup> ‘for that in turn I can adduce<sup>864</sup> the power and efficacy of the telestic rituals and the releasing gods that the greatest cities extol as do those children of the gods that have become their poets and prophets,<sup>865</sup> who<sup>866</sup> have laid this information for us.’

“What argument could still be made, then,<sup>867</sup> for choosing justice over a life of great injustice,<sup>868</sup> the which<sup>869</sup> if only we garner it while maintaining a false gracefulness we shall be pulling off something quite intelligent,<sup>870</sup> both in respect to gods and to men, in this life and in the life beyond, in accordance

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<sup>858</sup>λισσόμενοι ([366A3](#)) continues the reference to the quotation from Homer, with the two subsequent participles quoting his subsequent protasis, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἀμάρτη, but now the sins and the prayers for forgiveness are slapped together, syntactically coordinate, as if they were all one act culminating in the result, πείθοντες ([A4](#)). These “improvements” on Homer are the work of Adeimantus himself.

<sup>859</sup>ἀζήμιοι ([A1](#)): The moral cost-benefit analysis into debit (ζημία) and credit (κέρδος [[A2](#)]) is another innovation of our young man, and again with every advance in his argument he leaves behind a greater mess while his outlook becomes simpler by becoming more empty. By now the only good he can look forward to is κέρδος and the only evil the thinks he has to avoid is ζημία, which by now for him means only monetary debit: τίσις he has left out.

<sup>860</sup>Again the objector uses ἀλλὰ γάρ ([A4](#), cf. [365C6](#)), “elliptical” in Denniston’s classification: “But (sc. I can’t agree with what you say) since ...” At each step the imaginary objector remembers what part of the truth the advocate is forgetting, but since his own grasp of the truth is only conventional the advocate continually gainsays him.

<sup>861</sup>παῖδες παίδων ([A6](#)): The article is often dropped in family relations: cf. [363D3](#), and [571C9](#) and n.

<sup>862</sup>φήσει ([A6](#)): The play with the pronouns continues: the reluctant part of the self has become the “we” ([A5](#)), and now the devil’s advocate has shifted into the third person ([φήσει, A6](#)), addressing “us” with the singular vocative ὦ φίλε (for which contrast ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, [365A4](#): cf. n.), to assure us that he does after all have our best interests in mind. He has won.

<sup>863</sup>λογιζόμενος ([A6](#)) might be taken to resume συλλογίζεσθαι ([365A8](#)) in peroration (dropping the prefix being characteristic in repetition), but it is the characteristic of this speech that words tend to slide into crasser meanings. The young man’s λογισμός has usurped his λόγος, his justification for so characterizing the argument being the cost-benefit analysis the young man has just offered. Cf. the immediately suspicious use at *Lach.*193A4.

<sup>864</sup>With his ἀλλά ([A6](#)) the young man answers the objector’s ἀλλά ([A4](#)), and with αὖ treats this last step as even more ready-made than the previous, though it is the most perfidious step he has taken.

<sup>865</sup>The phrasing ([366A7-B2](#)) repeats the assertions about the μάντεις ([364E3-5](#)) in more confident terms. There the μάντεις sought to persuade the cities πείθοντες, [E5](#)), and now the cities testify to it ([λέγουσι, B1](#)); there the poets were said to be the offspring of the gods ἐκγόνων, [E4](#)) but only here is the insinuation that they qualify thereby to be their spokesmen is explicitly asserted ([οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γιγνόμενοι, B1-2](#)).

<sup>866</sup>οἴ ... μηνύοντιν ([B2](#)): restating the content of the ordinary clause in a clause that is subordinate to a subordinate clause is a distinct type of illogical idiom especially useful in closure. Still, the restatement is not innocent: μηνύοντιν is “more than λέγουσι” as Tucker says (*ad loc.*). It was last used of laying an information against an ὄδικος whereby he no longer λανθάνει ὄδικῶν ([362B3](#)): our young man has capped his speech by asserting that the gods’ injustice has not escaped our notice, a claim novel in its content and even more enormous than the remark of Adeimantus’s μάντεις that they can persuade the gods to serve them ([364A4-5](#)).

with the argument that is being made by everybody who's anybody?<sup>871</sup> Given all that has been said, what device is left, Socrates,<sup>872</sup> for a person to be willing to honor<sup>873</sup> justice, assuming he has any power<sup>874</sup> at all, whether of soul or of wealth or body or family,<sup>875</sup> rather than laughing in ridicule<sup>876</sup> when he hears it praised? In fact if someone is able to declare these things false and conversely has gotten solid knowledge that justice is the best thing, he presumably has<sup>877</sup> great sympathy for those who are unjust and feels little anger toward them, knowing instead that unless a person is held back from injustice by some instinctual aversion to it supplied him by a god, or else by having learned what he knows,<sup>878</sup> that otherwise nobody acts justly because he wants to but rather that he condemns injustice out of cowardice or old age or some other weakness that makes him unable to do the deed

<sup>867</sup>κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον (B3), aporizing over the grounds for a contrary view in peroration: cf. 501D (and Shorey *ad loc.*, 2.74 note a), 589B8, 591A5.

<sup>868</sup>μεγίστης (B3): still, and again, injustice per se is unattractive and needs μεγίστη to distract us from the fact.

<sup>869</sup>ἢν ἐὰν μὲν ... (B4): this double subordination, followed by the balanced pairs καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις, ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες and πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων, achieves a stately elevation of style—a momentary one.

<sup>870</sup>The syntax (B3-7) is telescoped: the initial potential optative (αἱροίμεθ' ἄν) turns out to be the apodosis (note repeated ἄν, B3 and 4) of a mixed condition whose protasis is presented in a relative clause in the future indicative, itself containing a protasis in the form of a proviso (ἔάν ... κτησώμεθα, B4-5). How can there be a reason not to be unjust when practicing such injustice constitutes the intelligent life?

<sup>871</sup>ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λόγος (B5-6), a pairing that would be oxymoronic anywhere else in Plato. Our young man has remembered ἄκρος in the meaning it was given 360E7, though in a very different connection. The combination of the many and the best redoes ιδίᾳ λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν (363D6-4A1), and also recalls Aristotle's definition of ἔνδοξα as τὰ δοκούντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἔνδοξοις (*Top.*100B21-3). Insofar as Adeimantus has improved their arguments in this last section he has himself become the man to refute.

<sup>872</sup>ὦ Σώκρατες (C1): The vocative along with δή (B7), recalls the plaintive tone Adeimantus momentarily adopted above (ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, 354A4). His shift is sudden but distinct: the optative construction with ἄν is replaced by τίς μηχανή; the mood changes from that of a peroration in which the orator's case has been made beyond conceivable cavil to that of an interlocutor desperate to find a way to avoid that conclusion. Soon he imagines himself forgiven by a wiser man (C3-D1: *n.b.* συγγνώμην), but then again, only a moment later, he blames Socrates and people like him (i.e. exactly the wise persons he imagines) for failing to have removed his own perplexity before it had a chance to settle into him (366D7-367A4)!

<sup>873</sup>τιμᾶν (C3): Honoring justice was the response that Glaucon's inductive division of "goods" had evoked in Socrates (cf. ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, 358A1, with *n.*). The burden of the brothers' speeches has been praise and censure, and the results that praise and censure achieve are honor and dishonor.

<sup>874</sup>δύναμις (C2, cf. also D2-3 below) brings forward Glaucon's notion of ἀδυναμία (359B6, cf. ἀρρωστία, B1): Adeimantus begins to bring the points his brother made alongside his own.

<sup>875</sup>ψυχῆς ἢ χρώματος ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους (C2-3), again the traditional three categories of good, but in looser array and slanted to correspond with the uses to which one's storehouse of ὑπάρχοντα had been applied above, the use of the soul being wisdom (365C5, and cf. λογιζόμενος, 366A6) and bravery (implied at C7-D2); the use of money to hire persuaders (D4-5); of family, the συνωμοσίαι τε καὶ ἑταίριαι (D3); and of body, the readiness to use force (βιασόμεθα, D5).

<sup>876</sup>γελάν ἐπαινούμενης ἀκούοντα (C3): Adeimantus commemorates Glaucon's ἀθλιώτατος (360D4).

<sup>877</sup>ἔχει (C4): With his simple condition in indicatives (C4-D3) Adeimantus expresses neither a

himself. The proof is simple: as soon as one of these types acquires some ability he abuses<sup>879</sup> it to whatever extent he can. This entire situation is due to that basic fact that incited my brother here and me to put this argument before you and make the following charge: ‘My wonderful man, of all of you who claim to be advocates of the just life,<sup>880</sup> going back to the time of the heroes and reaching down to the men of our time, to judge from all the thoughts and sayings of yours that have reached us not a one of you has ever yet condemned injustice nor praised justice except to praise and blame the reputation and honor and the wealth they confer.<sup>881</sup> As for what each of them is in itself and in contrast with the other is able, given its own nature<sup>882</sup> to do, by virtue of being present in the soul of the person who possesses it, regardless whether gods or men notice, nobody yet in verse or in plain speech<sup>883</sup> has adequately mounted an account proving that the one is the greatest of the evils by which a soul can be afflicted, whereas justice<sup>884</sup> is the greatest of goods. After all if this case were being made all (367) along from the start by all of you and you were persuading us of it from youth on,<sup>885</sup> we would not be guarding against each other doing injustice, but each of us would already be the best guard against himself accepting the greatest of evils into his very home<sup>886</sup> by living unjustly.’

“This much and more a Thrasymachus could say or another man like him,<sup>887</sup> Socrates, on the

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hope nor a generalization, but is speaking about Socrates, who, he presumes, will forgive his canny presentation of the bad view and his inadequacy to gainsay it, and will declare these arguments to be false.

<sup>878</sup>Θείᾳ φύσει ... ἡ ἐπιστήμην λαβών (C7): The distinction invokes the triad φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη (on which cf. Shorey TAPA 40(1909)185-201, *Meno* init., *Phdr*s.269D4-6, Rep.374B10-D6, 606A7-8; nn.927, 1456, 1743, 1932, 3576). To say therefore, as here, that only divine favor or knowledge can avert a person from injustice implies that inculcation is impotent, and that nothing less than knowledge will suffice to overcome the present state of faulty inculcation by praise and blame.

<sup>879</sup>ἀδικεῖ (D4): repetition of πρῶτος indicates the meaning is that as soon as he acquires the δύναμις he uses it abusively. Understand τοῦ ἀδικεῖν with εἰς δύναμιν. Adeimantus repeats Glaucon’s assertion from 360C7-8.

<sup>880</sup>Ὄσοι ἐπαινέται (E1): Again, it was the purpose of Glaucon’s epagogic division of goods to lead Socrates to say that the kind of good we love not only for its effects but also in and of itself is the κάλλιστον, and thereby to put him on record as a praiser of justice, so as now to make it incumbent upon him to answer the present challenge. The sudden shift in the vocative from singular to plural mixes prayer with deprecation just as in the Muses’ address to Hesiod Th.26-28: n.b. με, 24).

<sup>881</sup>δόξας τε καὶ τιμᾶς καὶ δωρεάς (E4): The plurals are derogatory. For ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γιγνομένας cf. Glaucon’s τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν (358B5).

<sup>882</sup>For δυνάμει and ἐνόν (E5-6) cf. Glaucon at 358B5 and cf. n.698.

<sup>883</sup>οὗτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὗτ' ἐν ιδίοις λόγοις (E7-8): he repeats his distinction, again, from 365E2-3 and 363E6-4A1 (itself referring back: cf. n. *ad loc.*), but this time the order is reversed: it is a λόγος after all that Adeimantus and Glaucon want from Socrates.

<sup>884</sup>τὸ μέν (E8): The “privative” idea, injustice, which had up to now been an element prerequisite even to defining justice, is finally passed over unnamed. The order ψέγειν / ἐπαινεῖν just above (366C3-4, going back to 358D5 [contrast 362E3]) ushered in this reversal.

<sup>885</sup>ἐκ νέων (367A1): Again Adeimantus emphasizes the importance of inculcation (cf. n. *ad* 366C7).

<sup>886</sup>With σύνοικος (A4) Adeimantus climactically expresses the treasured notion of justice working invisibly within the self (ἐνόν, E6) by the image of one’s homelife, the polar opposite of the public prominence Thrasymachus promises for the perfectly unjust man.

<sup>887</sup>With ταῦτα ... ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω (A5) Adeimantus finally steps fully out of the persona of the objector and dismisses the need to load Socrates down with more material to oppose.

merits of justice and injustice,<sup>888</sup> perverting their true characters into their opposites,<sup>889</sup> a thing most slovenly as it seems to me. For my own part, I have impersonated their position (I have no need<sup>890</sup> to hide it from you) and have gone full out<sup>891</sup> in doing it because I desire to hear<sup>892</sup> the opposite position from you. So don't just make out for us how justice is more effective<sup>893</sup> than injustice but tell us what direct effect they have by their very nature<sup>894</sup> on the man that has them inside him, on the basis of which the one is therefore good and the other bad. Leave altogether out of account the reputations for being just or unjust and their effects, as Glaucon insisted. If you don't leave out the reputations that are deserved and true or if you add the reputations that are false and undeserved we will assert that you are not praising being just but only seeming just, and not censuring being unjust but only seeming to be unjust, and that in doing so you are encouraging<sup>895</sup> us to find a way to be unjust without getting caught, and that you agree with Thrasymachus<sup>896</sup> that justice is merely somebody else's good and the advantage of the stronger, and that injustice is beneficial to oneself and unprofitable and disadvantageous only to the weaker. Since after all you granted that justice falls into the category of the greatest goods,<sup>897</sup> the ones worth acquiring for the effects they bring about but even more<sup>898</sup> for what they bring about in and of themselves<sup>899</sup> such as seeing, hearing, being aware and being healthy, too,<sup>900</sup> and any other goods that generate good effects<sup>901</sup> by their inner nature rather than by the

<sup>888</sup> ὑπέρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας (A6-7): With ὑπέρ Adeimantus continues to insist on both the inadequacy of the defense of justice and the monstrosity of any defense of injustice, as the immediate sequel indicates.

<sup>889</sup> αὐτοῖν (A7), dual, suggests or indicates a reciprocal relationship.

<sup>890</sup> οὐδέν (A8) adverbial. For οὐδὲν δέομαι cf. 579A2-3.

<sup>891</sup> κατατείνας (B2) echoing Glaucon's use of it at 358D3: Adeimantus begins a recapitulation of Glaucon's opening argument, using so much of the same language that it seems the two of them are "speaking with one voice."

<sup>892</sup> ἀκοῦσαι (B1) recalls Glaucon's πυνθάνεσθαι (358D3): Adeimantus joins Glaucon in wanting Socrates to hold forth rather than engage them in a dialogue.

<sup>893</sup> κρείττον (B3), the Thrasymachean criterion by which injustice has been winning out over justice: cf. E2 below and τῶν μεγίστων (C5).

<sup>894</sup> αὐτὴ δι' αὐτήν (B4): Its essential nature (αὐτή) enables it to have an effect (δι' αὐτήν). Hence also αὐτό ... τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει, 366E5, cf. 358B5.

<sup>895</sup> παρακελεύεσθαι (C1): Glaucon was vague about what would remain ἄδηλον if the just were allowed to seem just (361C2-3 and n.); but here, Adeimantus threatens Socrates that if he allows them a good reputation he will be guilty of not preventing Adeimantus from having thoughts he believes Socrates would disagree with—the same way the patient blames his psychiatrist. Indeed his choice of words reveals that at this moment he is remembering his disappointment with his father's, or his caretakers', παρακελεύσθαι (362E4-363A1).

<sup>896</sup> ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ (C2): Adeimantus attempts to shame Socrates with a slur that he has proven to owe to himself! ὁμολογεῖν here has the connotation of *acquiescing*.

<sup>897</sup> Adeimantus uses μέγιστος (C5), in line with the refutation of the Thrasymachean claims, rather than the καλλιστος that Socrates actually used to express his admiration for it (358A1). With ὁμολογήσας he reminds Socrates that the expression constituted a dialectical admission (cf. e.g., 339D6, 348E7 and n., 350D9 and n.) that now can be held against him.

<sup>898</sup> The construction prepared by τε (C6) is superseded by πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον (C7) because the effects are as nothing in comparison with the true nature of justice. For such strengthening of emphasis by shifting to δέ in the second limb cf. 394C4-5, *Polit.* 270D3.

<sup>899</sup> αὐτὰ αὐτῶν (C7) sc. ἔνεκα: in contrast with τῶν ὀποβαινόντων ... ἔνεκα.

<sup>900</sup> ὅρᾶν ἀκούειν φρονεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δή (C7-D1). Cf. Glaucon's interestingly different list, τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὅρᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν (357C2-3). The asyndetic list adds ἀκούειν as a twin with ὅρᾶν. On the force of δή attached to the last item cf. nn. ad 328B4-5 and 332D2.

<sup>901</sup> γόνιμα (D2) replaces γίγνεσθαι as it has continually appeared in the distinction δι' αὐτό vs.

power of reputation,<sup>902</sup> so now<sup>903</sup> you must praise this aspect of justice, namely, how<sup>904</sup> justice in and through its own nature profits a man, and how injustice does him harm. As for the payoffs<sup>905</sup> and the opinions, leave them for others to praise.<sup>906</sup> I would allow<sup>907</sup> others to praise justice and censure injustice in these terms, namely, praise and censure of their reputations and rewards, but I would not stand for it from you—unless of course you should tell me I must<sup>908</sup>—you who all your life have done nothing but try to understand exactly this.<sup>909</sup> Therefore do not show only that justice is more powerful than injustice, but also what each one does to the man that has them in him, the direct effect they have by their own natures whether the man deceives or doesn't deceive the men around him and the gods, and how the effect of the one is good and the other bad.<sup>910</sup>

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διὰ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα (*vel sim.*), starting at 357B8, fully stated at 357C1-2, and then continued at 357D1 (cf. n.), 358A2, and 358B6. Adam's notion that γόνιμα means γνήσια attributes to γόνιμα what τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει here adds to it. Cf. the use in *Tht.151E*: γόνιμον ἡ ἀνεμιαῖον (of an egg), and see next note.

<sup>902</sup>For δόξῃ (D2) contrasted with φύσει cf. Glaucon's διὰ δόξων at 358A5, used to contrast Socrates's δι' αὐτό at 358A1. There as here the distinction is between what justice creates by virtue of what it is (φύσει: cf. αὐτὴ δι' ἔαυτήν, above) and what it creates by dint of people's belief that it is there (δόξῃ) regardless of whether it is present or not.

<sup>903</sup>οὖν (D2) renewing the exhortative force of οὖν at 367C5.

<sup>904</sup>ὅ (D3) can be viewed as an adverbial accusative or accusative of respect. Clearly the nature of justice (αὐτή) must be known in order to see what profitable effects (ὄνινησιν) can properly be attributed to it (δι' αὐτήν). The praise will then consist of describing this ὅ (cf. αὐτό) once it has been identified. Adeimantus and Glaucon have articulated exactly the point that Socrates made more loosely at the end of Book One: that he had praised justice without knowing what it is.

<sup>905</sup>With μισθοί (D4, cf. D7) he reverts (contrast 366E4-5, 367B5) to the language of Glaucon's tripartition which he has just reintroduced (C5-D2), where μισθοί had served as the definitive term for the external effect that elicits praise (357D1, 358A5, B6).

<sup>906</sup>πάρες ἄλλοις (D4) combines Glaucon's ἐάν χαίρειν (358B6-7) and his μάλιστα δ' οἶμαι ὃν σοῦ πυθέσθαι (358D3). It is not that the payoff for being just is not a good, nor that the reputation for being just is not a good, but that these goods are not directly attributable to justice in its essence and operation (αὐτὴ δι' αὐτήν), and therefore do not constitute bases for praise of justice *per se*. The plurals (μισθοίς, δόξας) are again derogatory.

<sup>907</sup>For reasons revealed in the text at 613E4, I read the more belligerent ἀνασχοίμην (D5), reported by Chambry as the reading of ms. Vindob.54 (his W) and the corrector of Marc.4, I (his T), rather than the ἀποδεχοίμην of F (read by modern editors) or the αποσχοίμην of AT. As to its meaning cf. n.5127 *ad* 613E4. To get the flavor of the word one should remember that the Lacedaimonians' ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις for starting the war was that patience became ἀνασχετόν to them given because of the growth of Athens: *Thuc. I.118.2*, cf. I.23.6). Adding the belligerent edge is as characteristic of Adeimantus as his sudden retraction (*εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύοις*): cf. next note.

<sup>908</sup>εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύοις (D8): Adeimantus barely remembers to defer to his teacher (as Glaucon did, twice: ἐάν σοι ταῦτα δοκεῖ, 358B1 [cf. n.]; and εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ, 358D6). His underlying argument is that it is *incumbent* on Socrates to share his life's work with a doubter, merely because having been drawn into saying justice is good inherently as well as for its effects, he must now fend off the charge of contradicting himself. Beneath this we see again how quickly the doubter's self-recrimination manages to hide itself in a recrimination of the man who lacks the weakness he himself regrets in his experience of doubt. It was exactly this reaction that stimulated Glaucon's imagination to run to slaughtering the good man; and also this reaction that cast the black stones at Socrates's trial.

<sup>909</sup>ἀνασχοίμην (D5: cf. n.907): Adeimantus's willingness to accept the usual kinds of praise about justice from others is of a piece with his notion above (366C3-6) that a true knower, who could refute such attitudes, would forgive people for holding them. He conceives that Socrates's forgiveness of

## 2.A.2: Excursus on the Speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus

Thrasymachus had enacted an outlook, if you will, until the Socratic elenchus had deprived his role-playing of all credibility. Now Glaucon and Adeimantus attempt to spell out the “mindset” his behavior seems to have embodied, or aroused in them. Their speeches have both personal psychological significance and public political significance.

On the personal level, Glaucon is not satisfied with Thrasymachus’s acquiescence, because he still feels the power of the ideas to which Thrasymachus had been giving voice. He knows their power because he is somehow unable to resist them. His strength and directness at confronting the truth of this power rather than repeating it and passing it on to his neighbor with forceful blustering, as Thrasymachus did, constitutes the bravery for which Socrates praises him. He also believes that the “Socratic treatment” will heal him, and he invokes the Socratic treatment through his imitation of Socratic exhortation. In truth it is not an exhortation but a plea that he addresses to his teacher, a plea to give him the reply he feels, or fears, he cannot himself make.

His presentation of the position of which he wishes to be disabused is therefore tantamount to a confession. The sinner while he sins is under the power of the sin, and his behavior, like the behavior of Thrasymachus in Book One, is the spokesman for the sin. When he confesses his sin he becomes the spokesman for himself. His confession describes the sin. By revealing the sin for what it is he begins to deprive it of its power by disengaging it from the medium through which it operates, namely, his self. Both the brothers confess, or at least reveal, parts of the sinning outlook. How far the confession has taken them is shown by the facts that at the end of Glaucon’s speech he imagines taunting and murdering the good man, and that at the end of his speech Adeimantus *performs* the vicious attitude with special sophistication in his proposopopeia of the young man defeating himself in argument.

The words Plato places into Adeimantus’s mouth brilliantly characterize the confusion between the confessional and the self-aware elements operating in his mind. Without saying he will, Adeimantus presents his material in three parts equal in length and similar in theme (from men’s arguments about men to the poets’ arguments about gods), the first part a report of the inadequate arguments inculcated in him by those who are supposed to take care of him (362E1-3E4); the second a clever inversion of these arguments that he attributes to strange and nameless persons (363E5-5A3); and the third a conversation within himself in which the clever arguments he imitated win out over the inadequate ones he had been inculcated with (365A4-6B2).

Not all sinners are ready to confess, and not all interlocutors acknowledge being reduced to aporia. Thrasymachus could truculently fall silent instead. It remained for Glaucon and Adeimantus to confess their aporia, and whereas Glaucon gives vent to his feelings, Adeimantus with a complex ambivalence calls upon Socrates for help at the same time that he threatens to hold him responsible for his own confusion. It is this deepening of the issue that Socrates had referred to at the opening of the Book Two when he said that the previous discussion was mere prelude.

The public and political significance of the speeches centers on the point made by Adeimantus that the climate of opinion he and his brother have described affects not only them but also all young men, including young men who do not or will not have Socrates to turn to.<sup>911</sup> Unformed young men always have and always will live among less than perfect older men who take it upon themselves, whether as fathers or uncles, out of love and duty and vanity and regret, to guide them into what they see adulthood to be according to their own best lights. Here as elsewhere men’s frailties play a more prominent role than their virtues. The younger see more wrong in their elders than they can see right,

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those who have not recognized the problem is interdependent with his duty to help those who have.

<sup>910</sup>The formulation (E1-5) echoes with striking redundancy what he has said just a page above (367B3-5).

<sup>911</sup>This is Plato’s audience.

and imagine out of inexperience that improvements would not only be readily possible but also have needlessly been forgone. The elders who had once been young had also felt this way, but have since discovered their fathers' limitations lurking in themselves, and often have reverted, perhaps a little too easily, to their fathers' ways. They even find themselves willing to lower their sights on behalf of their sons. The discipline required in the young man to accommodate himself to his father's order (as indeed to any order) hardly suits the moods and energetic rhythms of youth, and his untested desire to improve upon his father's order might strike an unholy alliance with a less healthy desire to avoid anything that suits himself ill.<sup>912</sup> As he begins to mature and begins to realize how very much he owes to the very order he is bent on ameliorating, he may well become impatient with himself and find it more convenient to emulate certain of his father's peers to whom he owes nothing, though this is only because they have given him nothing, and this in turn only because they do not love him.<sup>913</sup> Exactly these dynamics and stages in the transmission of order from the old to the young and from father to son<sup>914</sup> is what Adeimantus's speech describes.<sup>915</sup> Public moral culture affects the young, and its agents are parents, cities,<sup>916</sup> poets,<sup>917</sup> and even the mass of men when they speak in one voice.<sup>918</sup> The brothers' speeches therefore reveal a political problem that is perennial.

Once we recognize the political mechanism of transmission from old to young, we can read the mechanism back into Glaucon's "Thrasymachean" speech to see how it can work in an individual soul. The world around Gyges to which he can become invisible is the public world in which he is already a partner. He did not discover the power of the ring until the regular monthly meeting of the shepherds, which we may now take to be the analogue to the Athenian citizen's occasional public duty of serving in the assembly. What made Gyges visible in the first place is his being seen by them; by himself he is neither visible nor invisible. This paradox broaches the sense in which man is by nature a man among men, a political animal.

The thought experiment, therefore, as well as the "theory" of law that precedes it, are only excuses that the inner self makes to itself to escape or to repudiate the reality of the community that the outer self finds itself in.<sup>919</sup> Therefore, when Thrasymachus makes this speech in public he is making a public display of repudiating the public world. He is telling the inner conscience of his auditors that society does not exist. He is telling them their true beliefs are invisible. He is fomenting their vanity. To hear this they will of course be required to pay him, and pay him in the coin of the realm. The more of

<sup>912</sup>Cf. 537E9-538C3.

<sup>913</sup> Thus Socrates likes to notice that people pay sophists to teach them things they could learn from their familiars better and for free (this is the implication of 600D1-2 ; cf. also *Apol.*19E5-6).

<sup>914</sup> Adeimantus's πατέρες τε ήέσιν καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι (362E6-363A1) broaches the analysis of political or social substance into elder leaders and younger followers, but at the same time it constitutes something of a confession that the teaching he received from his own father was deficient, implying the same thing for Glaucon as well as for our author.

<sup>915</sup>Indeed exactly these dynamics of transmission will provide Socrates the mechanism by which the polis is shown to decline in the Eighth and Ninth Books, a showing for which Adeimantus will intervene to play the role of Socrates's interlocutor (at 548D). We may compare also the psychological analysis of 537E9-9A7.

<sup>916</sup>E.g., 364E and 366B.

<sup>917</sup>The poets are called as witnesses by the young men's guardians throughout Adeimantus's speech. Cf. also the imaginary Young Man's οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἵσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν, 365E.2 Their role in setting the climate of opinion is the warrant for Plato's critique of poetry.

<sup>918</sup>Glaucon, 358C; Adeimantus 364A; Young Man, 366B.

<sup>919</sup>The sophists' "contract theory," as well as their "distinction of φύσις and νόμος," are therefore impoverishments of philosophy and hardly its substance. As we see from Glaucon's speech these are rhetorical *topoi* for reducing the human dilemma to manageability rather than means to penetrate to the problems that lie at its core.

them he can convince the more of them he has ripped off, until perhaps he addicts them all to his seductive doctrine and slavishly they assemble at his feet and call him great and happy.<sup>920</sup>

There is finally the matter of the philosophical acuity of the speeches. Glaucon's indignation and conspiracy with the Thrasymachean position has somehow led him to draw, and Adeimantus to continue, a distinction among goods, drawn on behalf of justice, that in itself is profound and unusual. In the end their speeches have articulated the substance underlying Socrates's inchoate remark at the end of Book One that he has failed to ask what justice is but only asked what sort of thing it is. Their desire to defend justice expresses itself in a critique of doxa. Their ability to imitate both Socrates and the young man connecting the dots shows how things could go either way for them.

## 2.B: Socrates's Reply to Glaucon and Adeimantus

The implicit comparison between the brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus and the imaginary youth they wish not to be, and the fact that they are seeking to avoid what they are saying the youth can only be expected to do given his surroundings, suggests that they have received slightly superior guidance from their elders, and particularly their father, Ariston. On the other hand the fact that the two brothers have resorted to one and the same teacher<sup>921</sup> suggests a shared lack of guidance from their father,<sup>922</sup> and a shared sense of how to supplement it that in all likelihood they owe to the shared influence of that same father. We are entitled to speculate on the matter because the author of the dialogue is the ever-absent third brother, who moreover has decided to spend his life commemorating the sorts of results he and his brothers might have received from this father's helper.

It is with their father that Socrates begins his reply to the brothers' request (367E6ff). As he listened, his admiration for them leaped to a new high<sup>923</sup> and he was moved to sing praises to that famous father of theirs<sup>924</sup> in the (368) same terms Glaucon's friend the elegist had done in the opening of his paean to the valiance the two brothers had shown in a battle at Megara:

“Children of Ariston, the godly progeny of a famous man ...”

—godly indeed if they had not been taken in<sup>925</sup> by the argument that injustice is better than justice given how eloquently they spoke on behalf of it. I do judge you haven't been taken in, and my evidence is my general<sup>926</sup> knowledge of what sort you are.<sup>927</sup> Judging just by the arguments you made I'd be

<sup>920</sup> 344BC.

<sup>921</sup> Glaucon arrived with Socrates at Cephalus's but Adeimantus was already there.

<sup>922</sup> Again, Adeimantus would not make his complaint about the standard fatherly advice on morals (362D4ff) if he had received better; but it must also be acknowledged that it is for some reason in general difficult for sons to learn from their fathers, else Pericles's sons would have learned.

<sup>923</sup> Both the proleptic ἀεὶ μέν (E6) and the climactic complement by ἀτάροιν καὶ τότε (E7) create great emphasis. For δέ replaced by the stronger adversative ἀτάρ cf. H.Maj.282C, Prot.335D, Tht.172C.

<sup>924</sup> ἔκεινου (368A1), “the great one.” Cf. Phlb.36D for the idiom.

<sup>925</sup> The perfect οὐ πέπεισθε (A6) leaves room for their inability to persuade themselves of the opposite.

<sup>926</sup> τοῦ ἄλλου (B1), like ἀεὶ μέν above, is proleptic. As the ἀεί above stands for all time except the present moment (τότε), τοῦ ἄλλου τρόπου stands for a general range of their demeanor that includes everything but the current, namely the τρόπος of their argumentation, the character of the thinking that they have succeeded to imitate, the arguments considered in themselves (αὐτούς) independent of who voiced them.

<sup>927</sup> He has now praised their lineage or inborn nature (φύσις, 367E6: cf. γένος, 368A4) and their

unsure. My certainty only makes things more difficult. I have no idea how I can come to justice's aid, since I thought that what I had said to Thrasymachus was enough to prove that justice was better than injustice, but you did not accept that account. On the other hand there's no way I won't help her either. I shudder<sup>928</sup> to think how impious it would be to sit idly by while justice is being impugned and to beg off defending<sup>929</sup> her as long as one<sup>930</sup> can draw breath and make his voice heard.<sup>931</sup> The best thing to do then is to come to her aid any way I can, regardless.

Glaucon and the others urged me to help any way I could and not to let the argument go its own way,<sup>932</sup> but to track down through careful examination both what the two things are and what the truth is about their respective benefits. I improvised a beginning:

What we are trying to ascertain<sup>933</sup> is not easy<sup>934</sup> but calls for a person with sharp vision. Since we are hardly clever<sup>935</sup> it seems to me (as I put it to them)<sup>936</sup> that we ought to proceed as if somebody had assigned the task of reading small letters from a great distance to people who were not particularly sharp sighted, and then somebody remembered<sup>937</sup> that the same letters had been written

habits and upbringing (*τρόπος* ~ μελέτη). Except for anything they have gotten by a lucky gift from the gods (τὸ θεῖον, 368A5), what is left to consider is their knowledge (ἐπιστήμη: on the list of the three or four sources of virtue cf. 366C7-D1 and n.). It is becoming clear that it is for this that Ariston and his sons turn to Socrates.

<sup>928</sup>δέδοικα (B7). Prudence dictates that one fear being impious as much as he reveres the gods (cf. e.g., *Euthyph.*12B9, ἵνα αἰδώς ἔνθα καὶ δέος). Socrates's uncertainty is adamant openness; his ignorance is aware of itself; and his irony is just as biting as his friendliness is sincere.

<sup>929</sup>ἀπαγορεύειν (C1) suggests a public demurral.

<sup>930</sup>The subject accusatives ἐμπνέοντα and δυνάμενον (B8, C1) depersonalize Socrates's apprehension and therefore generalize it. Cf. ἀγνοοῦντα, *Phdr.*230AI

<sup>931</sup>With φθέγγεσθαι (C2) Socrates expresses his dilemma in a way that echoes the way Glaucon expressed his own (διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὡτα, 358C7). Things have gotten so bad that speech has devolved into sound, and his mouth cannot remain empty of defensive words just as Glaucon's ears were full of offensive ones.

<sup>932</sup>ἀνεῖναι (C5) suggests that the λόγος, i.e., the treatment of the topic, is a prey that has been trapped and now needs to be examined rather than released.

<sup>933</sup>τὸ ζητήμα (C7) the object of the search in contrast to the method (ζήτησις, D2).

<sup>934</sup>φαῦλον (C8) can mean "easy," as at 374E10, 527D7; cf. also ironic uses at 423C5 and 435C4. Socrates leaves it unclear whether he means the subject is hard to grasp or the trying is arduous. The serious investigator experiences both problems.

<sup>935</sup>δεινοί (D1) now specifies what οὐ φαῦλον ἀλλ' ὁξὺ βλέποντος (C8) alluded to vaguely, and makes sharp vision exceptional rather than something to be ashamed of for lacking. It would be too much therefore to read into the passage an allusion to the sharper vision of elders in moral matters (*Leg.*715D7-E2), though to the extent that such sharp vision is proverbial it is impossible to ignore it as an undermeaning of Socrates unnoticed by his young interlocutors (contrast *Soph.*232E6-8). Immediately, sharp vision as a metaphor for redoubtable competence (δεινότης) will be elaborated into the figure of the ease and difficulty of seeing larger and smaller letters (D2-7).

<sup>936</sup>δοκῶ μοι ἦν δ' ἐγώ (D1-2): With the juxtaposition Socrates takes the trouble to remind us that though he appears to be speaking to them he is reporting to us what he said to them. The reminder comes in tandem with a proposal (*τοιαύτην*) that launches what will be a large part of the conversation.

<sup>937</sup>ἐννόησεν (D4). Plato does not use the νοῦς words lightly. While it would be an overstatement to say the anamnesis theory underlies this remark (that noetic insight is stimulated by recollection), we should likewise avoid understating the paradoxes that attach to any account of the natural event of memory stimulated by similars that denies a suprasensorial role to mind in recognizing their similarity.

larger somewhere else on a larger surface.<sup>938</sup> What a lucky turn of events this would be! You'd be able to discharge the assignment by first reading the larger letters and only then<sup>939</sup> reading the smaller letters to check whether they were in fact the same.<sup>940</sup>

Adeimantus now steps in to accept the proposal but wants to know what larger thing Socrates has in mind, so Socrates continues. There is a justice that characterizes an individual man, and a justice that characterizes a whole polis. A polis is larger than a man. Assuming the analogy holds,<sup>941</sup> the justice that characterizes a city would be greater in quantity, given the larger canvas of the polis, and as such would be easier to apprehend.<sup>942</sup> So if you are willing, Socrates says, let us first ask the question what sort of thing justice is as it appears in cities,<sup>943</sup> and only then make a (369) close inspection<sup>944</sup> to find it in the individual man, seeing if we can see in the smaller object of scrutiny the likeness of what we saw in the larger.

This exegesis of his plan completely satisfies Adeimantus,<sup>945</sup> which enables Socrates to add a refinement. If we were to imagine in our mind's eye<sup>946</sup> a city developing from scratch, we might just witness its justice and injustice<sup>947</sup> developing right along within it; then once having seen that occur<sup>948</sup> we would have reason to hope we could more directly<sup>949</sup> apprehend our primary *investigandum*, the

<sup>938</sup>ἐν μείζονι (D5) is purely epexegetical of μείζονα (a larger tablet can accommodate larger handwriting), but prepares also for the application to the smaller medium (man) and the larger (polis).

<sup>939</sup>οὗτως (D6), semi-redundant, as often, to emphasize the syntactically subordinate first step. Cf. 327C14, 369A1, 382D3, 511B8, 557D9, 576E2, 589B5, 591E3, 596B7; *Prot.*314C6.

<sup>940</sup>Ἐστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι (D5): A larger version of the same letters is presumably somewhere to be found. The point is that the larger letters are legible and can be used to lead the eyes to recognize the smaller ones by a kind of directed close scrutiny (*ἐπισκοπέīn*, D7), which is exactly what Socrates will go on to do in the discussion of the soul in Book Four. To find the larger version is a lucky turn of events: an ἔρματον, i.e., an object that a needy person chances upon that meets his need even though it was not intended or designed for this use (cf. schol. *ad loc.*, *Charm.*157C7). Socrates's proposal is opportunistic and improvisatory, unlike the many sophisticated methodologies foisted on the passage by the commentators and then criticized for their imperfect implementation. To project what one knows onto what one does not know enables the inquirer to form an opinion only by disabling him from ever knowing whether it is true. This is the reason old-school Greek teachers disallow their students to use ponies.

<sup>941</sup>τοίνυν (E7) holds Adeimantus responsible for agreeing at E4 and 6.

<sup>942</sup>καταμαθεῖν (E8) replaces the ἀναγνῶναι of the analogy.

<sup>943</sup>ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι (E8) suggests an empirical and even comparative approach, but this is soon refined into something else.

<sup>944</sup>ἐπισκοπέīn (369A1, A3), repeated from D7, again means to look for something we already know from the first medium in the second medium. οὗτως (A1) again semi-redundant.

<sup>945</sup>With ἄλλά (A4) he dismisses any hint of his former uncertainty.

<sup>946</sup>Θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ (A5) as well as the perceptual participles γενομένην (A5, 6) refine or revise the empirical proposal suggested above and propose a kind of watching not unlike going to the theatre, inherently pleasant.

<sup>947</sup>τὴν δικαιοσύνην ... καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν (A6-7): Justice and its opposite are not two topics but one (cf. 371E13-14 and n. *ad loc.*). The hendiadys is usual in the statement of moral and aesthetic topics (compare καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν) since the purpose of the study is always to avoid the one and achieve the other.

<sup>948</sup>γενομένου αὐτοῦ (A9) the neuter replacing the feminines and the aorist the present participles from A5-7 envision a point at which we have witnessed the basic and prerequisite step being complete —i.e., that we have seen the evolution *en gros*.

<sup>949</sup>εὐπετέστερον (A9) means what ράων meant at 368E8 and the opposite of χαλεπόν (at 364A4): methods are adopted, after all, to make things more possible and easier.

justice that occurs in the individual man.

Adeimantus agrees it would be much easier, enabling Socrates to call the question. Shall we do it then? Actually<sup>950</sup> to carry out what we have described might turn out to be a rather large undertaking, so think it over. Adeimantus replies, “The thinking’s been thought,”<sup>951</sup> Socrates. Get on with it!”<sup>952</sup>

With this the mental “construction” of the city begins, which will occupy us for about as long as we have been occupied so far.<sup>953</sup> By this point in the discussion the ice has been broken in the social sense. The parties have confessed (or at least revealed) their inner feelings, and the pressure of deciding how to begin is off. Moreover, an agenda has been set out, to which the parties have subscribed with substantial unanimity<sup>954</sup> and with eagerness, and a burden has been placed on Socrates to perform (in this sense the pressure is on). With a few swift strokes he has shifted the mood. First, he has agreed to lead, not because he agrees he is able to as Glaucon and Adeimantus believe he surely is,<sup>955</sup> but because for him, as for anyone else in his position,<sup>956</sup> it would be impious to demur.<sup>957</sup> Second, rather than step forth to deliver a set oration according to the manner and the specifications of the brothers, he has suggested a rather rickety and ungainly path of inquiry tailored to require no special competence<sup>958</sup> in the group, within which he includes himself. The combined effect of these measures is to magnify the importance of truth and to minimize the importance of the persons searching for it, and *a fortiori* to minimize the differences among them. The pressure is “off” because we are as dust, but it is “on” since we are dust *sub specie aeternitatis*. Having thus cleared the air<sup>959</sup> Socrates can begin.

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<sup>950</sup> αὐτό (B3) refers to the doing (ἔργον) rather than the mere proposing (λόγος).

<sup>951</sup> ἔσκεπται (B4): the perfect is idiomatic for dismissing a proffer to deliberate: cf. 400C4, Crito 46A4-5 (βεβουλεῦσθαι), Charm. 176C5-6, Euthyd. 278C7-D1, Symp. 192B. Abruptness is characteristic of Adeimantus, as we have seen (362E1), and shall see (413C5, 424D7ff).

<sup>952</sup> On the dismissive force of μὴ ὄλλως ποίει cf. 328B1 and n.

<sup>953</sup> In Stephanus pages we have done 45. The construction per se will be completed in 2 but then extended another 32 to the end of Book Three, then to be followed, after an interruption by Adeimantus (approx. 8 pages), by the projected ἐπίσκεψις of the individual soul, to find the smaller version of this same justice within it (starting at 427D).

<sup>954</sup> Socrates had said “Glaucon and the others” (οἱ ἄλλοι, 368C4), but not “all” the others. Thrasymachus, if we give him a thought at all, is silent; but his silence has little significance for the group now that Glaucon and Adeimantus have brought his seductive “thesis” out into the open—or, more exactly, turned it into a thesis simpliciter so as to make it decidable.

<sup>955</sup> Consider Glaucon’s pseudo-Socratic exhortations (357A4-B4), his virtual begging (358B1 and D5 and nn.), and his use of ἀκούσαι (358B4, D1, D2, D5) and πυνθάνεσθαι (358D3); and consider Adeimantus’s “Baloney” (362E1 and n.), his imposition of stringent requirements upon Socrates’s answer (367B2-E5) and his assertion that Socrates can even be blamed for having left them in the lurch up until now (366D7-7A4).

<sup>956</sup> Hence the depersonalized construction of the accusative participles at 368BC2 (cf. n.).

<sup>957</sup> Hence he proposes only χρήναι ἐπιχειρήσαι περαίνειν at 369B2.

<sup>958</sup> ήμεῖς οὐ δεινοί (D1). Socrates always encourages the people he is with to admit that their desire for a good speech is an index of their intellectual weakness. Cf. Thet. 154D8.

<sup>959</sup> Plato appears to be dead serious about depicting his characters’ moods concretely. Their willingness and resolve to converse, their openness to truth and controversion, and the momentum of the conversation, are not treated in the superficial and arbitrary decorative way they tend to be in dialographers subsequent to Plato, but with dramatic and characterological consistency and verisimilitude.

## 2.B.I: Construction of the City in Thought

The<sup>960</sup> city comes into existence, I would guess, because of the fact<sup>961</sup> that we are not self-sufficient as individuals but need many things.<sup>962</sup> This is the initial impetus for settling<sup>963</sup> a city. One person will call upon another out of his need for something and the other on another for something else, since they need many others,<sup>964</sup> and thus they will gather a plurality of partners and helpers<sup>965</sup> into one habitation, for which community we use<sup>966</sup> the name polis. The one agrees to exchange what he has with another or to share it,<sup>967</sup> thinking it to his advantage to do so.

Recognizing it is our need that brings it into existence let us make up what it looks like. Now the first and greatest need is the need for nutrition, which is a prerequisite to the bare fact of staying alive.<sup>968</sup> Second is the need for shelter and third the need for clothing. Our city will suffice to meet these needs with one man a farmer, a builder another, and one a weaver I'd say,<sup>969</sup> unless of course<sup>970</sup> we add a cobbler or some other provider of bodily needs. Already then we have the absolute minimum of a city, consisting of four or five men. Next, let's ask: Must<sup>971</sup> each of them place his own products on deposit for the whole group—the one farmer for instance producing food for four and

<sup>960</sup>γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις (369B5): Socrates does not use the article. Something comes into existence that ends up being called a polis. We might say “Cities, so called, first come into existence because...”.

<sup>961</sup>τυγχάνει (B6): supplementary ὥν is understood and needs not be written in, with the editors: to place it into either phrase only causes an imbalance between them. Socrates prefers τυγχάνει to ἔστι here because he is wants to make a factual observation about the human condition without entertaining the question of why it is this way. The account he gives is anything but historical (*pace* Adam), since there is no time in history when men began forming cities. The principle of the development is explicitly said to be need (*χρεία*). It is a casual account based on common sense and it is conceived not as an end in itself, but only a pleasant and theoretical means to witnessing the appearance of justice and injustice.

<sup>962</sup>πολλῶν (B6) may be neuter (referring to αὐτάρκης) or masculine (referring to ἔκαστος). That it is neuter becomes clear below when it is repeated at C2 and becomes the cause of the masculine πολλούς, but the vagueness in the interim is inconsequential.

<sup>963</sup>οἰκίζειν (B7) already presumes that the household, the smallest unit of human organization, is the model for the larger.

<sup>964</sup>The otherwise symmetrical ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ’ ἄλλου (sc. χρεία) construction (C1), by subsequently repeating the accusative (τὸν δέ) but not the nominative (C1-2), emphasizes that one man needs *more than one other*.

<sup>965</sup>κοινωνούς τε καὶ βοηθούς (C3). The τε καί combines the commutative and symmetrical notion of communism with the assymmetrical and non-commutative notion of a helper, without resolving the paradoxical notion that combining them broaches. The paradox becomes more explicit with μεταδιδόναι and μετατιθέναι just below.

<sup>966</sup>ἐθέμεθα (C4), inceptive aorist: “and that’s when we began calling them cities.”

<sup>967</sup>μεταδίδωσι ἄλλος ἄλλῳ (C6), like βοηθούς above, designates a non-commutative and assymmetrical act, now including the notions that one person possesses an item and transfers it to another; whereas the alternative μεταλαμβάνει, like κοινωνούς above, designates a commutative and symmetric relation between the persons. The division of labor will resolve the paradox.

<sup>968</sup>τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ ζῆν (D2): τε καί matches the basics with their prerequisite.

<sup>969</sup>τις (D8) as well as the alternation of subject and predicate in the face of μέν and δέ which tend to eschew such looseness evince the casual tone and manner of the “construction.”

<sup>970</sup>προσθήσομεν (D8): A verb is needed to govern the first three jobs (D6-8), but before it is enunciated Socrates interrupts himself to add an optional fourth, in connection with which he enunciates the needed verb: the syntax imitates the casual and improvised character of the thought.

<sup>971</sup>δεῖ (E2), continuing to look for the *needful* arrangement.

spending four times the time and labor on the provision of food so as to share it with the others—or should he ignore them<sup>972</sup> and produce only (370) one fourth the amount so as to provide for himself only, spending one fourth his time on it and spending the other three fourths occupied with providing himself shelter and a cloak and shoes, so as thereby to avoid<sup>973</sup> the complications of communal dealings with others and be rather an island unto himself,<sup>974</sup> minding his own business?

“And yet,<sup>975</sup> Socrates, one would have to say the way we had it is easy<sup>976</sup> in comparison with *his* way of looking at things.”

His intervention gives Socrates time to notice something else,<sup>977</sup> that different people by their very natures are suited to different kinds of action,<sup>978</sup> so that the several different tasks are less likely to be done admirably<sup>979</sup> if done by one man than if they had been assigned to several men according to their several natures. Moreover, the “right time” for things does not wait for the man: once it passes it is gone forever. The task<sup>980</sup> tends not to wait for the leisure of the person tasked with it; instead the person tasked must conform himself to the task and not see his product as a mere by-product<sup>981</sup> of his activity. From these arguments,<sup>982</sup> production of the distinct items will be more copious, and of higher

<sup>972</sup> ἀμελήσαντα (E6) immediately depicts the alternative with a disapprobation that is strengthened by its lack of an object: see below.

<sup>973</sup> καὶ μή (370A3) continues the construction with δεῖ and expresses a note of aversion.

<sup>974</sup> αὐτὸν δι’ αὐτὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν (A4): the phrase echoes ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ’ ἄλλου (369C1-2), and stands in contrast with its complications; at the same time that it serves as an exegesis of πράγματα ἔχειν. It attempts to magnify and advocate for the carelessly self-serving alternative (ἀμελήσαντα, E6) by recasting selfishness as being unmeddlesome: “If I neglect you, you won’t have to admonish me to mind my own business.”

<sup>975</sup> With ὡλλ’ ἵσως (A5) Adeimantus acknowledges the insouciant attitude that Socrates has impersonated in presenting the second alternative; but with οὔτω directly dismisses the position as remote from reality and from what he and Socrates have agreed on, that in fact man is not αὐτάρκης (B5-6). We do not need a grammatical parallel (for the second person demonstrative used of the former and the third person demonstrative for the latter), but rather need to have understood Adeimantus’s rhetoric, as well as the rhetoric of the mild prosopopoeia in Socrates’s presentation of the second alternative, to which it is a response.

<sup>976</sup> Reading ράδιον (A6) with all mss. and against modern editors who opportunistically read ρᾶον from a scribitur in the Monacensis (ρᾶον is likewise read against the ράδιον of all mss. at *Meno* 94E6 with equal alacrity, absent any historical support). For omission of μᾶλλον cf. H.II.1.117, Hdt.3.40.2, Soph.Aj.966, and the exx. cited by Riddell §170.

<sup>977</sup> ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σου (A7-8). Perhaps one of them should do all the talking for both!

<sup>978</sup> πράξει (B2) replaces ἔργον from 369E2: Socrates is slanting his argument to meet the challenge raised by the naysayer’s τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.

<sup>979</sup> κάλλιον (B4), an adverb, with exactly the same sense as at 353A4, namely the British “properly.” Again it is πράττειν that Socrates is focussing on, even to the point of omitting an object for the verb!

<sup>980</sup> τὸ πραττόμενον and τοῦ πράττοντος (B10) continue to slant the diction in order to sustain a criticism of τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.

<sup>981</sup> With ἐν παρέργου μέρει (C1), derogatory, Socrates puns on ἔργον (an approbatory term, 370B2, B8; cf.B5).

<sup>982</sup> ἐκ δὴ τούτων (C3) summarizes the results, and looking backward Socrates sees the points in reverse order (the chiasm of before and after: cf. n. 18). πλείω (C3) draws an inference that is the converse of καιρὸς διόλλυται (B7-C1); under the term κάλλιον (C3) the principles of natural ability and specialization (A7-B6) are brought together (pace J.-C.); and ρᾶον (C4) voices agreement with Adeimantus’s argument (ράδιον, A6).

quality, and easier to manage – if one person does one thing in accordance with his natural gifts and kisses off<sup>983</sup> the rest.

Given this new principle we will need more than the four, since the farmer will not be making his plow if the plow is to be a proper<sup>984</sup> plow, nor the mattock nor the other tools used in farming. Likewise the builder, and he needs lot of tools, and so with the other two also, the weaver and the cobbler. Woodworkers and braziers and other such craftsmen will come on as partners and our little city<sup>985</sup> will become a rather crowded<sup>986</sup> place.

“Quite so,” replies Adeimantus.

And it still won’t be so very large<sup>987</sup> if we add cowherds and shepherds and the other herdsmen to provide the farmers with draught animals and the builders also for hauling their materials around, as well as to provide the weavers and the cobblers with leather and hides.<sup>988</sup>

“But it won’t be particularly small, either, if it is to have all that.”

And yet no matter where we situate our city we will almost certainly need to import some things, so that they will need others to convey to their city items it needs from another city; and the man who conveys<sup>989</sup> these goods to us will come back empty handed unless we provide goods for him

<sup>983</sup>σχολήν (C4): A punning second use of σχολή that turns the tables on the meaning it had just above (B11), just as the πραττόμενον turned the tables on the πράττων there. The dismissive expression (this σχολήν answers ἀμελήσαντα, 369E6) along with ending the sentence with πράττει matches and trumps the dismissive but self-deluded attitude voiced at 370A3-4. τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν ends up meaning doing what one’s work needs one to do!

<sup>984</sup>καλόν (C9): continues κάλλιον above. The division of labor among those whose jobs we have already distinguished has the unforeseen consequence of requiring an increase in the number of jobs. In a genetic account effects are multiplied and “one thing leads to another.”

<sup>985</sup>With πολίχνιον (D6), a diminutive of a diminutive, he sidles up to calling it a πόλις.

<sup>986</sup>συγνόν (D6), in juxtaposition of the diminutive πολίχνιον, courts paradox and draws more attention to itself than it seems to have received. Hesychius glosses it thus: συγνά – πυκνά, συνεχῆ, πολλά. Its etymology is probably συνεχῆς (by metathesis and syncope: cf. Passow, s.v.). It is found in Herodotus and Thucydides but absent in the orators before Demosthenes, and it is absent in Aeschylus and Sophocles but present in Aristophanes. Only a trace of it is to be seen in Aristotle. Xenophon’s eight or so uses reveal a penchant to describe a multitude of men undergoing something painful or unseemly. In Plato it tends to connote the toilsome or the tedious (Gorg.465E3; Leg.968B9; Rep.511C3, 539B1, 544C4; Tht.185E5). Its denotation with πολίχνιον is therefore compactness with a derogatory connotation of crowding (cf. the Davies-Vaughan tr. where these new persons “create a population”). Cf. its use below, 371B16.

<sup>987</sup>οὐκ ἄν πω πάνυ γε μέγα τι (D9): On the heels of acknowledging an increasing denseness Socrates and Adeimantus haltingly reveal some reluctance that the city become large. The πολίχνιον, after they have added the herdsman, “would not yet quite, in conception at least, be large per se” (the four particles and the optative construction all conspire to soften the broaching of μέγα). “Yes,” Adeimantus says, “but it won’t be exactly (γε) small, either (δέ), once it has all this,” sharing Socrates’s distaste, as his derogatory use of the neuter plural πάντα ταῦτα (E4) reveals.

<sup>988</sup>τε (D10, E1) linking the two users of animals for draught, and δέ (E2) introducing the other two artisans who use them for another purpose, raw materials. The paragraph closes with a chiasm that also underlines the economical dovetailing in the complementary uses of live animals for work and for supplies when dead. Sometimes you can kill two birds with one stone: the principle “one man one work” does not extend to animals. The double pairing makes it easier to fail to notice the third use we make of these animals.

<sup>989</sup>διάκονος (E12), though by now a term for an unskilled operative, might be connected etymologically with κόνις as if he were a man who stirs up dust on the road.

to take with him to trade for what he would bring (371) back, items the other city needs; so that the city will need products enough not only for its own needs but also products that will suit those others, both what they need and the right amounts. Hence we will need more farmers and producers of other products within our city,<sup>990</sup> as well as more of those other functionaries in addition<sup>991</sup> to convey goods back and forth—traders that is. And in case the trading requires sea travel we'll need a whole lot<sup>992</sup> of other experts having to do with boats and sailing.

As to how they will manage the exchange of goods within the city<sup>993</sup>—the problem we mentioned above<sup>994</sup> as the reason we formed a community that ended up constituting a city—this they will achieve by selling and buying, so we'll need a marketplace as well as a currency. Unless all the people who need food show up at the same moment at which the farmer, for instance, is free to bring his goods to the market, the farmer will have to sit there and allow his duties on the farm to languish.

Adeimantus volunteers a solution with an uncharacteristically long speech.<sup>995</sup> No problem! There are certain people who see the need for shopkeepers and take the initiative to fill it. In the better organized cities it is the people who are physically weak and otherwise unskilled.<sup>996</sup> Their job is just to sit there in the marketplace and exchange silver for goods with those who need to divest themselves of something and exchange goods for silver with those who need to buy something.

Socrates rejoins, “So this is the need that brings retailers, so called, into being in the city,” and thus he resumes the lead in the conversation. We distinguish between the buyers and sellers who do the job of<sup>997</sup> staying put in the market place and the itinerant retailers who go from city to city, whom we call traders.<sup>998</sup> And there are still other workers who have little of mental virtue for us to enjoy as

<sup>990</sup>The ethical dative ήμῖν (371A8) is one of many indications we shall meet of a tendency in their experiment to identify the model citizens' interests with the interest of themselves who are constructing the model – if you will, an ethical dative of “theoretical interest.” Cf. 376C7, 423A6, 427C6, 545D5, 607A6.

<sup>991</sup>καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαικόνων (A10) and the subsequent subdivision (A10-11) suggest again the automatic multiplication of effects as does Adeimantus's automatic way of agreeing by repeating the key word in Socrates questions (370E8, E11, 371A6, A9, B3).

<sup>992</sup>συγχών καὶ ἄλλων προσδεήσεται (A16-B1). Cf. συγχόν 370D6 and n.

<sup>993</sup>ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει (B4) echoes its use at 370E5: we are looking for an *institutional* solution, or perhaps just a *place* in the city that will facilitate exchange.

<sup>994</sup>At 369C6-7. Note that the unresolved tension there between sharing (μεταλαμβάνειν) and exchanging (μεταδιδόναι) has since been resolved by the division of labor (μεταδώσουσιν ὃν ἀν ἐκάστῳ ἐργάζονται, B4-5).

<sup>995</sup>His speech occupies seven lines (C5-D3). He is eager to cast these persons as opportunistic lie-about who merely need to be located in the right place to make their living. His eagerness to criticize his inferiors is as characteristic of Adeimantus as his desire to be superior. Cf. 504C5 and n. *ad loc.*

<sup>996</sup>Despite τὰ μέν and τοῖς δέ (D1,D2), the expression neither requires that there are two occupations of persons nor that there is only one; but the mention of physical weakness raises the question of strength and paves the way for a group valuable only for this (E1-5).

<sup>997</sup>διαικονοῦντας (D6). The continued use of this word and its cognates (370E12, 371A10 and C6), promulgates a distinction between labor and real work (done with δημιουργοί [A7, C2] or ἐπιστήμονες [B1]) and prepares us for the category of physical laborers he is about to introduce. The approbative use of δημιουργός is reminiscent of Socrates's conversation with Thrasymachus.

<sup>998</sup>καλοῦμεν (D5): Adeimantus's intervention (C5-8) adduced existing institutions as solutions for needs that arise in the city they are developing in thought, with no scruple or concern that an ideal is being contaminated by “reality.” Socrates continues in the same vein by noting that the distinctions among types that arise in thought already exist in conventional language. Cf. ἐθέμεθα 369C4 and n.

their partners, but who make a worthy<sup>999</sup> contribution by their bodily strength. It's because they sell their needful strength for "hire," as they call it in their case,<sup>1000</sup> that they have come to be called "hirelings," I guess.<sup>1001</sup> To make it complete then our City even has hirelings.<sup>1002</sup>

## 2.B.2: Search for Justice in the Thought-City

The City has grown to completion so now we can ask ourselves, Where is its justice and injustice? With which constituent we encountered in our investigation did it arrive?<sup>1003</sup> Adeimantus for his part<sup>1004</sup> is not sure, unless it (372) consists in the need the constituent members as such<sup>1005</sup> have for one another.<sup>1006</sup> Socrates hears more despair in his answer than conviction and encourages him. "You might be right but let's press our inquiry further. We have equipped them; now let us follow their daily regimen."<sup>1007</sup>

They'll pass their days making their food and wine and their cloaks and shoes,<sup>1008</sup> and in the

<sup>999</sup> ικανήν (E3) is not neutral but approbative, as often (cf. 372B1, 362C2; Lys. 204A6; and n. 1923). The κοινωνία in question is the partnership of the polis, based on perceived needs (369C3, E5). "Elitism" so-called has nothing to do with the present observation.

<sup>1000</sup> Sic ταύτην (E4).

<sup>1001</sup> ως ἐγώματι (E5): The thought experiment can even reveal the source or basis for existing conventions! μισθωτοί carries a negative connotation (as in 346B6-8) that is only amplified by the special history the concept brings with it from Socrates's argument with Thrasymachus (345E5-346A1, etc.).

<sup>1002</sup> πλήρωμα (E7) is the predicate. μισθωτοί are a step below the unskilled and weak shopkeepers and are admissible into the κοινωνία on the minimal ground of their purely physical strength. Their admission therefore marks the last step, the πλήρωμα, and the completion of the σκέψις.

<sup>1003</sup> ἔγγενομένη (E13) singular, treats ἡ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὀδικία as an hendiadys (as does γίγνεται at 376D2). Cf. 369A6-7 and n. With καὶ τίνι ὄμα Socrates focusses his question, "Where (ποῦ) is the justice?" by reminding Adeimantus of their notion (369A5-7) that they might see it evolve in tandem with the city itself.

<sup>1004</sup> μέν (372A1), is *solitarium*, hoping Socrates will provide the confirming limb.

<sup>1005</sup> αὐτῶν τούτων (A2), the persons *per se* in contrast with their distinct jobs (τίνι ὄμα).

<sup>1006</sup> The temptation to take Adeimantus's χρεία in the new meaning "use" rather than "need," as J.-C. do, is strong. It could have meant "use" in its first appearance, in the dative at 369C2, where it is explained (but not replaced) by δεόμενοι. Immediately below it was isolated as the formative principle of the City (C9-10), and then subdivided into the χρεῖαι for food, for shelter and for clothing. It appears again at 371A1 as a virtual synonym to the ὃν ὅν δέωνται of A5. Through these passages "need" has become its meaning. The emphasis in the present passage is on ἀλλήλοις, by which Adeimantus means to transfer all those needs for things to the need deriving from our interdependency, which had been brought out by ἀλλήλοις at 371B4, a passage that itself looks back to 369C6-7 (J.-C.'s reference to Arist. Rhet. I.15.22 therefore merely begs the question). This need of the members or partners for each other is strictly a new need, or at least a new expression for the need for things.

<sup>1007</sup> The distinction between παρασκευή and δίαιτα (A5-6) corresponds to the distinction in Glaucon's speech between the attributes of the just and unjust men and the respective lives that await them (361D7-E1). Socrates's description of their daily regimen is lavish with particulars and made vivid by the use of the future indicative.

<sup>1008</sup> σιτόν τε ποιοῦντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ίμάτια καὶ ύποδήματα (A6-7): Formally, the list consists of four items linked with τε... καί ... καί... καί — the most flexible or least determinate scheme for connecting four items. In content it covers the first and third (and maybe fourth) χρεῖαι, food and clothing (and maybe shoes): cf. 369D1-9. Food, the first χρεία, is here done with a pair, so that clothing

building of their houses we'll find them working shirtless and unshod on the whole during the heat of summer, but well suited<sup>1009</sup> with clothes and shoes during the cold of winter.<sup>1010</sup> Their nourishment they will take by making meal of their barley and flour of their wheat, and by baking the one and kneading the other they will produce glorious<sup>1011</sup> puddings and loaves<sup>1012</sup> and lay them out on a mat of reeds or washed leaves, and get down and stretch themselves out<sup>1013</sup> for their meal on ground covered with<sup>1014</sup> a spread of bryony and myrtle. Such is the feast they will enjoy<sup>1015</sup> with their children at their side, sipping a little wine, rustically wreathed and singing their hymns of thanks to the gods. Sweetly they will lie together and make children but only within their means, to avoid penury and war."<sup>1016</sup>

The description of the daily life is idyllic in both the literal and what will become the literary sense. Their regimen is inherently rustic and simple, but Socrates goes out of his way to give it an idyllic description, too.<sup>1017</sup> His vignette does not describe their dealings with other men, even though it and shoes, the third (and fourth) *χρεία*, become a second pair (they had been paired briefly at 370E2-3). The second *χρεία*, shelter, is absent, but will appear presently and will also be done with a kind of pairing.

<sup>1009</sup>ικανῶς (B1) again expressing temperate approbation.

<sup>1010</sup>The ordering of the *χρείαι*, with second (καὶ οἰκοδομησάμενοι οἰκίας, A7-8) coming third and being articulated anew in terms of the third (i.e., they build the houses naked or clothed), is another example of the flexibility and improvisatory character of the thought.

<sup>1011</sup>μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους (B3-4). The adjective bespeaks the kind of approval and even admiration we feel when we contemplate rustic simplicity. Socrates uses it without irony nor a Thrasymachean sneer: cf. 348C12 and n.

<sup>1012</sup>The order (B2-4) is a double chiasm. The wheat (*πυρῶν*) is made into flour (ἄλευρα) and baked (*πέψαντες*) into loaves (ἄρτους); the barley (*κριθῶν*) is made into meal (ἄλφιτα) and kneaded (*μάξαντες*) into pudding (*μάζας*). Barley meal (A1), wheaten flour (B1); baking (B2), kneading (A2); pudding (A3), loaves (B3).

<sup>1013</sup>The language (*passim*) describes the simple life by borrowing language from the more advanced, as if to compare them or to make them seem comparable. *παρατιθέναι* would be used of serving a plate to a person "at table," as we put it; but *παραβάλλειν* describes the action of the present scene more accurately, even though it is the sort of language used of feeding animals, a connotation that Socrates seeks to soften by using the middle voice. *καταλινέντες* invokes *κλίνομαι* ("recline") but adds *κατά* in order to get them all the way down to the ground.

<sup>1014</sup>I take στιβάδων (B5) to refer to areas of ground flattened by tamping down (στείβω).

<sup>1015</sup>εὐωχήσονται (B6): The description is presented as an answer to the question *πῶς διαιτήσονται* and begins with ὅλλο τι ἡ (A6, on which expression see the fine note by Riddell, *Digest* §22), which formally limits the syntax of the ensuing description to constructions subordinate to the leading question, *τίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται*. εὐωχήσονται in the midst of the description therefore makes an anacoluthon.

<sup>1016</sup>εὐλαβούμενοι (C1) attributes a policy to them although nothing we founders have said has put it there. Their behavior must therefore be self-explanatory. That a family can be too large to afford (*πενία*) is obvious, but also suggests that an enlarged family requires enlarged wealth, which can either require war (*πόλεμον*) or, more likely, bring it on (373DE4-E7, cf. esp. *ικανὴ τρέφειν*). We should expect from the entire tenor of the passage that it be a matter of balancing alternatives (ἢ, C1).

<sup>1017</sup>The passage (A6-C1) attracted the attention of the great Denniston who sees in its long string of participles dependent upon a single indicative an example of a loose-textured periodic style he associates with Plato in contrast with the multi-tiered weave of the Demosthenic period (*Greek Prose Style* [Oxford 1952] 69). But the passage does not characterize Plato's style (he has many styles) so much as it characterizes his ability to adapt his style of expression to his content. The string of participles depicts the citizen's day in a few bold strokes, as a pastiche of moments instead of a tedious sequence of tasks from dawn 'til dusk, and their subordinate syntactical status as participles preserves Socrates an opportunity to achieve an emotional climax by his reversion to an ordinary indicative

is in these relations that Adeimantus had suspected justice and injustice were to be found. In fact Socrates mentions only that first round of citizens whose job was to fulfill the primary needs, not the διάκονοι nor the μισθωτοί. He places them at their basic tasks of farming and making clothes and shoes, providing thereby for the first and third basic needs, and then he makes his way to their fulfilling the second by imagining how they are clothed when they build their houses.<sup>1018</sup> The protection they need from clothes and shoes while working all day in the winter, and the exhausting heat of the summer that makes clothes and shoes more trouble than they are worth, then gives him a segue to following them as they return home for dinner and the evening's rest at the end of the day. They have "run into" nobody. At home the preparation and presentation of their food is described with striking detail by a continuation of the series of doublets: barley and wheat, meal and flour, baking and kneading, puddings and loaves, serving the food on reed mats or on washed leaves, the spreads strewn with bryony and myrtle, themselves and their children, they are crowned and signing, they avoid poverty and war.<sup>1019</sup> The presence of so many pairs is remarkably unobtrusive but their cumulative effect is strong. The pairs describe a life of variety without excess, choice without the embarrassment of riches, and regularity without tedium. If the people's<sup>1020</sup> whole life lacks bulk it is not because any of its parts is jejune.

Glaucon interrupts:<sup>1021</sup> "You<sup>1022</sup> depict the men<sup>1023</sup> 'feasting' but there's nothing on their bread!"<sup>1024</sup> (εὐωχήσονται) at the moment dinner is served. This indicative serves as an editorial comment on the description that has been accumulated by the participles and in effect answers the original question, "τίνα τρόπον διατήσονται" with "εὐωχήσονται."

Many of the essential elements of bucolic or pastoral genre are prefigured by the tone, the style and the content of Socrates's description, including the quiet joy of country simplicity, the singing, and even the festooned crowns. The poetic genre, even in its account of its own origin, will conceive of itself as providing respite from the hustle bustle of the city (cf. the third origin for the genre given in *schol.Theocrit. [Ambrosianus 222]*). But in truth it is, and always was, man getting away from his own institutions and "communing with nature" that is the crucial ingredient underlying such a conception. The bucolic and the pastoral perennially serve as both our warning and our consolation that the world is not of our own making and that mere country life among the plants and the seasons might just suffice for happiness. The genre does not puristically ban all the rivalry and mimetic competition of the city (as today's environmentalistic "greens" envision), but sublimates this inevitable and ubiquitous human tendency by including poetical contests that are as elaborate as they are unlikely, and also rustic but decorated prizes for the victor, like a wooden bowl with a mythological scene carved in it (*Theocr.Id. I.25ff.*).

<sup>1018</sup>We have seen an example of this kind of "internal" metabasis to the next item in Glaucon's use of Ιάτρευσις at 357C6 (cf. n.).

<sup>1019</sup>The linking of the pairs is nicely varied. First there are two sets of μέν / δέ at B2-3 (the expression has a logically overbuilt expansiveness). The third pair, μάζας and ἄρτους, are then joined by καί but also by their shared adjective. Then we have a ή and then τε καί twice, then καί, and finally ή. On the double chiasm in the presentation of the foods, cf. n. ad B2-4.

<sup>1020</sup>The participles have enabled Socrates to avoid naming the subjects, who are after all citizens of this city even if they don't seem so. Glaucon will refer to them as ὄνδρες just below.

<sup>1021</sup>ὑπολαβών (C2): We should imagine that Socrates has been turned toward Adeimantus for the last few minutes. The image elicits a reaction from outside.

<sup>1022</sup>ώς ἔοικας ποιεῖς (C2-3): Glaucon uses the second singular. Although Socrates and Adeimantus have developed the city jointly, the description (the "poetry" of which Glaucon acknowledges with the term ποιεῖς) is purely the work of Socrates; and so he rightly holds him personally responsible for it. The participle is similarly used in the *oratio obliqua* of imaginative depiction, with γέγραψε, at Phdr.227C5.

<sup>1023</sup>τοὺς ὄνδρας (C3), more than αὐτούς: Glaucon adds a sympathetic dig (cf.361D6 and n.752).

<sup>1024</sup>ἐστι ωμένους (C3): Socrates had warmly styled their διατάν as εὐωχοῦσθαι (B6, and n.) and

Socrates accepts the criticism as a correctible oversight, or feigns to: “You’re right, I forgot. They will have something for their bread, too—salt, obviously, and olives and cheese, and leeks and cabbages too, the sorts of things people boil in the country<sup>1025</sup> they will boil.<sup>1026</sup> Also we will be serving<sup>1027</sup> them side dishes of figs and chickpeas and beans, and they’ll be roasting<sup>1028</sup> myrtle berries and acorns by the fire and washing it all down with a little wine. So will they live the days of their lives, in peace and good health with any luck, and die at a ripe old age passing on a similar life to their sons.”

Glaucon steps up his tone from satiric to sarcastic: “If it were for pigs you were outfitting a city, Socrates, what else than this would you put in the trough<sup>1029</sup> for them?” This rips it. Socrates cannot continue in the same vein but says, “Just what would you have, Glaucon?”<sup>1030</sup>

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Glaucon satirizes his praise by repeating the term but noting that there is no ὄψον on the bread. The ὄψον he has in mind may be a garnish or condiment, or it may be meat (for their diet and the economy of their animals as described so far is vegetarian). Socrates takes his meaning in a narrow and literal sense in order to provoke Glaucon to express his objection more directly. It is not quite accurate to call this “intentional misinterpretation” with Shorey, who cites Gorg.451E, 453B, 489D, 490C and 491A and Leg.714C. Glaucon is pushing us into the area that Adeimantus moved us into, by degrees, in his long speech, when he criticized the poets without articulating his complaint or suggesting a solution (first at 363DI-2, then at E3: cf. nn.).

<sup>1025</sup>οῖα δὴ ἐν ἀγροῖς (C6): Socrates lets fall the word: he is modelling his picture of their life on country life as opposed to city life.

<sup>1026</sup>The expression (C5-D1) is scrambled as Socrates tries hastily to make good his omission. To say they shall have these items omits to say who will provide them. The list of accusatives that is tacked on to ὄψον by τε (C5) is governed by ἔξουσιν, but somewhere in the middle of the list of items he forgets that this is the leading construction (the editors’ comma after τυρόν doesn’t help him), and when he seeks to close the list by generalizing (with the οἶα δή clause which provides him the criterion of the generalization [ἐψήματα]) he adds ἔψονται, which has the unintended consequence of depicting them boiling cheese. His γε after λάχανα tries to dispel any charge of skimping. For tacking on an appositive with τε cf. 361B2-3 and n.

<sup>1027</sup>καί (primum, C7) indicates he is still scrambling, που is apologetic, and παραθήσομεν (C7) attempts to make amends for the roughness of παραβάλλειν above. Its change of person from third to first reveals that Socrates is in effect negotiating with Glaucon.

<sup>1028</sup>σποδιοῦσιν (C8): By returning to the third person, by his picturesque reference to the men roasting nuts by the fire, and with his gentle participle ὑποπίνοντες, Socrates allows himself to drop the urgent tone and revert to the style of his description above, a leisurely series of participial phrases completed by a finite verb. The calm simplicity of the passage is reminiscent of Solon’s description of the life of Tellus in his first response to Croesus’s question who is the happiest man (Hdt. I.30.4), and is designed to elicit a similar reaction from Glaucon.

<sup>1029</sup>The tension between Socrates’s and Glaucon’s dispositions mounts, and continues to express itself in their choice of verbs. Here (D4-5) Glaucon replaces Socrates’s παρασκευάζειν (A6) with the less inter-personal κατασκευάζειν (D4), and refuses to accept Socrates’s smoothing over of παραβάλλειν (B4) with παρατιθέναι (C7) by now using χορτάζειν (D5) which inevitably pertains to animals since a χόρτος is a pen (cf. σῖτον / χόρτον Hdt.9.41.2). His point is not that these primitive men are slovenly but that it is inhumane to feed them garbage; but to make his point he needs to bring in pigs whose boundless appetites require them to be penned. The notion of a “City of Pigs” is one of those watchwords of Plato scholarship that has no basis in the text but is held in play only by the fact that commentators unselfconsciously and uncritically share Glaucon’s aversion.

<sup>1030</sup>ἀλλὰ πῶς χρή; (D6), with ἀλλά expressing his recognition that the conversation can’t continue on just these grounds. The exchange of vocatives also elevates the tension. Socrates keeps the question vague by leaving out complementary infinitive. We could supply a variety of fillings from με ποιεῖν to κατασκευάζεσθαι αὐτούς. His purpose is to give Glaucon as little as possible to play off

Glaucon's answer is abrupt at the same time that it is evasive: "Just the customary."<sup>1031</sup> Then he tacks on<sup>1032</sup> a list: "To 'get down' as you put it on couches if they are to have any rest at all,<sup>1033</sup> and to dine off tables, and just<sup>1034</sup> the garnishes that current people have, as well as the side dishes."

### 2.B.3: The Amendment of the Thought-City

"Aha! Now I get it," Socrates says.<sup>1035</sup> It's not a city whose evolution we are trying to construct, but a finicky<sup>1036</sup> city." Maybe that's better. Looking for a city of this kind<sup>1037</sup> might enable us to witness how justice and injustice are sown into a city.<sup>1038</sup> The city we've already constructed seems the true

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of (the sort of playing off that takes place in stichomythy) and to invite but also force him to present an answer that takes responsibility for itself and stands on its own.

<sup>1031</sup> ἄπερ νομίζεται (D7), answering with an abrupt asyndeton but still expressing somebody else's belief (νομίζω evasively passive).

<sup>1032</sup> With τε (D7), as Socrates had just above (ἄλας τε ..., C5).

<sup>1033</sup> τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι (D8), epic diction in churlish overstatement.

<sup>1034</sup> ἄπερ (E1): His list closes with another ἄπερ clause pointing back to his opening phrase (ἄπερ νομίζεται) as though saying something twice made it true. The clause introduces two final items: ὅψα, which points back to his original complaint (ἄνευ ὅψου, C2); and τραγήματα, which points back to the side dishes that Socrates had since added to appease him (C7).

<sup>1035</sup> With μανθάνω (E2) Socrates indicates that he apprehends the unstated meaning of his interlocutor's remark. From the very structure of Glaucon's reply—the way it starts with indignant protest and then appends a list that can't quite stop adding things—Socrates recognizes what his underlying objection really amounts to (or, forces it out into the open). For the idiom cf. Ar. Av. 1451-63, 1529; Lys. 1008; Batr. 65, 195, and 1444-5: οὐ μανθάνω | ἀμαθέστερόν πως ειπὲ καὶ σαφέστερον. As for instances in Plato cf. Euthyph. 3B5 (Euthyphro easily understands the charges though Socrates found them ἄτοπα), 9B6 (Socrates infers that Euthyphro thinks him δυσμαθέστερον than the jurors: for the pun cf. Ar. Batr. 1445.), 13D7 (Socrates makes the inference from θεραπεία via δοῦλος to the cognate θεράπων); Gorg. 447D3-6 (of the unstated universal evoked by a single example), 474C9 (Socrates inferring the underlying denial about the good and the beautiful); Phdo. 117C1 (recognizing the remark meant "No"); Phlb. 16A6 (recognizing Socrates's allusion to the young was aimed at himself and his peers: n.b., γάρ); Phdrs. 257E7 (Phaedrus rightly suspects Socrates is telling a riddle); Rep. 332A11, 351B6 (recognizing Thrasymachus wants to take every opportunity to restate his thrilling position: cf. n.), 511B1 (recognizing Socrates is alluding to the "geometers"), 568E4 (announcing he "gets" Adeimantus's joke: cf. n. ad loc.).

<sup>1036</sup> τρυφῶσαν πόλιν (E3). τρυφᾶν means to be in the habit of taking one's own pleasure and comfort too seriously. Hence its association with the infantile [Lach. 179D; E. Ion 1376]), and thence of worrying too much about trifles affecting oneself (fastidiousness [Leg. 695D] and effeminacy [Rep. 590B, Ar. Nub. 48, Vesp. 1455; Dem. 19. 197]) and conversely too little about important matters (Leg. 901A), overvaluing what gives oneself physical comfort (E.I.A. 1050) and preening (Ar. V. 688; Isoc. 2.32), a willingness to affect a fickle disposition in the presence of those who wish to please you as a beloved might play the mincing coy in the face of his lover (Euthyphr. 11E; E. Supp. 214, whence its association with flattery Dem. 8.34), and finally losing perspective and becoming insolent (Gorg. 492C) and then violent (Gorg. 525A, Meno 76B; Ar. Lys. 405). We have the sense that these traits are bound together by an underlying neurological imbalance, but in truth it is more likely the nearly universal problem of wanting to have one's cake and eat it, too.

Socrates, or Plato, often uses the term to describe the behavior of participants in the dialogues, as at Alc. I 114A, Euthyph. 11E, Meno 76B, Phdrs. 228C2, and Prot. 327E. Adeimantus's behavior at 363D1-2 and E3 is a precursor. Glaucon's intervention has exhibited exactly such behavior here, with his move from satire to sarcasm to sputtering indignation as if on behalf of custom. Jowett-Cambell and Shorey

city to me, the healthy city if I may use the metaphor.<sup>1039</sup> But if you all<sup>1040</sup> want to, we will start again and investigate the fevered type<sup>1041</sup> of city. It seems the present provisions will (373) not satisfy some of you, particularly the daily regimen. Couches will be needed in addition, and tables, and the other furniture, and those condiments you asked for,<sup>1042</sup> and body oils and perfumes and courtesans and all the most exotic types<sup>1043</sup> of these things, and we can no longer posit that the items we just listed constitute the basic necessities, namely houses and cloaks and shoes, but we'll have to initiate the manufacture of portraits and decorations and we'll have to acquire gold and ivory and all that.<sup>1044</sup>

Glaucon quietly agrees, and Socrates continues with the new task. We will have to make the city still larger; the healthy one is no longer adequate.<sup>1045</sup> Now we'll need to fill it to the brim both in bulk and numbers with things that before were less than necessary. For instance, all the different kinds of hunters and the imitators, too, a good number of those who deal in the visual arts<sup>1046</sup> and a good number of those who deal in the province of the muses<sup>1047</sup>—poets and their underlings: rhapsodes,

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are wrong I think to view Glaucon's reaction as merely a bit of humor used by Plato to effect a transition, and Jowett-Campbell's remark that Glaucon's intervention is necessary or else the conversation will not reach the complexity of a three-part state (*ad* 372E) begs the question. Socrates is just as serious in saying the simple state is the true one (E6) as he will be serious saying maintenance in the prytany is his due reward (*Apol.*36B5-37A1).

<sup>1037</sup>καὶ τοιαύτην (E4): καί repeats the καί before τρυφῶσαν.

<sup>1038</sup>‘ὅπῃ ποτε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται (E5-6) is much more specific than the previous formulation (εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ὃν γιγνομένην καὶ κακίαν, 369A5-7). There, justice and injustice were conceived of as arising spontaneously; here Socrates imagines them being engendered in the city, but leaves the agent or agency unidentified.

<sup>1039</sup>‘ώσπερ ὑγιής τις (E7): τις apologizing for the metaphor.

<sup>1040</sup>βούλεσθε (E7) is second plural. Socrates seeks not ignore the whole company, by inferring that the others agree with Glaucon, as he immediately explains (note γάρ and the plural τισιν, 373A1).

<sup>1041</sup>With καί (E8) repeating the καί 's in E4 and E3, Socrates stresses that he views this finicky or sick city as a case or a type of the original city. With φλεγμαίνειν he diagnoses as a sickness what he had previously referred to with τρυφᾶν. Though φλέγμα is indeed one of the four humors, Socrates does not mean by the verb to present so fine a diagnosis but only to identify the rash temper of youth, the youth Glaucon, just as the Athenian Stranger does at *Leg.*691E.

<sup>1042</sup>δή (373A3) moves on to subset of items by acknowledging they have been asked for.

<sup>1043</sup>‘ἐκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά (A4) a mild anacoluthon in exuberance. παντοδαπά perhaps suggests a range beyond the familiar: cf. LSJ s.v. ἀλλοδαπός and 381E4 with n.

<sup>1044</sup>The list, κλίνοι τε προσέσονται καὶ τράπεζαι καὶ τάλλα σκεύη καὶ ὄψα δὴ καὶ μύρα καὶ θυμιάματα καὶ ἔταῖραι καὶ πέμπατα καὶ ἔκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά (A2-4), is epithumetic (cf. n.469 [excited]), both in form and in content. The editors' attempts to rationalize it with punctuation only spoil the intended effect; even punctuation cannot mitigate the asyndeton (cf. prev. n.). Along with its confused logic, note that from θετέον to κινητέον to κτητέον the identity of Socrates and his interlocutors moves from theorizers positing, to agents initiating, to actual members of the city possessing. In the sequel therefore Socrates will continue to speak of the inhabitants in the first plural (373C2, 4, 5, D1, etc.).

<sup>1045</sup>‘ἐκείνη (B2) treats the healthy city as gone forever; and gone with it is the adequacy of the adequate: if ίκανός is approbatory (cf.371C3, 344C6) then οὐκέτι ίκανή is derogatory.

<sup>1046</sup>σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα (B6), like the “line and color” spoken of by art historians, is a common way to designate the entire visual realm. Cf. 476B5, 601A2, 616E8-7A4; *Crat.*423D4-5, 431C6; *Gorg.*465B4-5, 474D3ff; *Leg.*668E2-3; *Meno* 75A1-2; *Phdo.*100D1-2; *Phdrs.*247C6-7; *Phlb.*12E, 51B3-5; *Soph.*251A9; *Thet.*163B10.

<sup>1047</sup>οἱ περὶ μουσικήν (B6): music, poetry, dance.

actors, chorus leaders, jobbers, craftsmen for the manufacture of all sorts of gear,<sup>1048</sup> down to cosmetics for the women.<sup>1049</sup> And besides<sup>1050</sup> we'll need more of those unskilled types, wouldn't you say, like tutors, wet nurses, feeders, hairdressers, barbers, and also condiment makers and butchers and you know what else? Swineherds! We didn't have this<sup>1051</sup> in our first city since we had no need for them, but in this one we'll have a new need<sup>1052</sup> for this, too, and we'll need every other kind of fatted animals that people will be eating.<sup>1053</sup>

Glaucon takes all this in stride<sup>1054</sup> and Socrates continues. “Won’t we have a greater need for doctors than before if we live by this regimen instead of that?<sup>1055</sup> And the region we inhabit: it was adequate to support the people before but now it will go from being adequate to being small.<sup>1056</sup> We’ll need to annex some land from our neighbors if we’re to have enough for farming and grazing; but so will they, in turn, if they for their part<sup>1057</sup> give themselves over to the unbounded acquisition of wealth and overstep<sup>1058</sup> the limits of necessity. This can lead only to war. Before we decide whether war does or doesn’t achieve anything worthwhile let’s note that we have now found where it comes from after

<sup>1048</sup> σκευῶν τε παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί (B8). The *τε* as it has in the previous sections of the list indicates that we are moving on to a new group. Each of the previous groups had been first designated and then elaborated (*θηρευταί* with *πάντες*, *μιμηταί* with *μέν* and *δέ* clauses, and *ποιηταί* with their *ὑπηρέταί*) but in this next case we are given the elaboration before the group is named. As in the case of the previous group (*ποιηταί*) the elaboration (*τούτων ὑπηρέταί*) is elaborated (by the appositive list in asyndeton *ράψῳδοί ... ἐργολάβοι*), so here the elaboration (*σκευῶν παντοδαπῶν*) is elaborated by the *τῶν τε ἄλλων καί ...* phrase.

<sup>1049</sup> τὸν γυναικεῖον κόσμον (C1): Here is the first mention of women as citizens (*έταῖραί*, A3, are not), though they are obliquely present in the reference to “mating” in the simple daily regimen (συνόντες ἀλλήλοις, 372B8, where by the common rule the masculine is used for the complex).

<sup>1050</sup> αὖ (C3) suggests we are moving from one major category to another, as it had at the beginning of the paragraph (B2). Here the shift is from *δημιουργοί*—skilled workers—to *διάκονοι* who are ancillary operatives.

<sup>1051</sup> τοῦτο (C4), neuter singular, rather than *οὗτοι*, is contemptuous.

<sup>1052</sup> προσδεήσει (C6). For *πρός* cf. A2 and C4. Socrates is careful to distinguish between needs, which drove the design of the original city (369C9-10 and n. 971), and the secondary “needs” (*προς-*) required to appease Glaucon’s objection.

<sup>1053</sup> ἔδεται (C7): The future indicative (instead of subjunctive plus *ὅν*) makes their excessiveness inevitable instead of merely something to watch out for.

<sup>1054</sup> πῶς γάρ οὖ; (C8).

<sup>1055</sup> καὶ ιατρῶν (D1): Doctors were not part of the original city. Socrates is careful to distinguish between needing more doctors than before (in the way we needed additional *διάκονοι*, C1-2), and needing doctors more than we needed them before. The mention of doctors was prepared for by the medical metaphor *φλεγμαίνουσα*, 372E8.

<sup>1056</sup> σμικρὰ δὴ ἔξ ὀνάγκης (D5): *δὴ* is both rueful and satirical: without itself changing the city will become small. He speaks from the point of view of the concupiscent population undergoing unforeseen and unintended effects.

<sup>1057</sup> Although *καί* (D8) correlates *ἐκείνοις* with *ἡμῖν* above the present sentence is not an instance of the kind of “binary” construction wherein a pair of predicates is meant to go with both subjects (cf. 329A5 and n., 329D1, 362C2-3, etc.). With its two protases the “we” describes the others’ behavior in terms different from their own (cf. *ὑπέρ* below, 374A1-2 and n. 1062). While “we” are envisioned to be cutting off part of its land so as to have as much as it used to (as if so much were natural: note indicative *μέλλομεν* expressing entitlement), “they” are envisioned cravenly overstepping bounds (note anticipatory subjunctive with derogatory description continued with participle). It is the blindspot by which the symmetrical behavior of the two parties is asymmetric in the eyes of each, that makes war seem to be something other than mutual destruction.

<sup>1058</sup> ὑπερβαίνειν (D10), echoing 364E2 and 366A3.

all,<sup>1059</sup> namely from the thing that more than anything else brings the evils that come to cities, afflicting both private and public (374) life, whenever it rears its ugly head.<sup>1060</sup> A still larger city will be needed, larger not by a small amount but by a whole army, which will venture forth on behalf of all we have and are, and what we have lately added,<sup>1061</sup> and defending against invaders for the sake of the possessions we have now added at home.<sup>1062</sup>

As Socrates becomes more and more animated Glaucon has more and more complacently accepted the additions to the city that Socrates blames him for causing. Finally he hazards a mild<sup>1063</sup> objection: “What? Won’t the citizens be adequate to this task just as they are?”<sup>1064</sup>

Socrates responds to Glaucon’s shift by adding a recriminatory edge:<sup>1065</sup> “No way, if you along with the rest of us were right in the agreement we reached in the course of molding our city. We did agree after all,<sup>1066</sup> if you remember, that it is impossible for one man to perform many arts well.

“True, we did.”

So, do you think the contests of war do not require the competence<sup>1067</sup> of an art?

“Quite so.”

Does the art of competent shoemaking deserve more concern than the art of competent war?

“No way!”

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<sup>1059</sup> αὖ (E6), suggesting they have entered a new world, the world in which war is inevitable. It was justice whose γένεσις we were meant to find (369A5-7; cf. ἐγγενούμενη, 371E13): instead we have found the origin of war! The implicit comparison is enough to suggest that it is the *injustice* we were looking for—namely πλεονεξία with all its blindspots—that is the origin of war, but Socrates does not draw this conclusion explicitly: this is what the brothers need to realize.

<sup>1060</sup> I.e., ὑπερβαίνειν τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρον, from D10: overstepping the bounds of necessity, i.e., πλεονεξία. But Socrates’s failure to be, or decision not to be, explicit (aposiopesis) is odd. What has been discovered is not that poverty causes war but that the desire to “have more” causes the “poverty” that causes war. The moderation of the original citizens (372B8-C1 and n.) had seemed an expendable option.

<sup>1061</sup> τῆς οὐσίας ἀπάστης (374A1): desire expanding is the rule of this whole passage, just as need was the rule that formed the original city. The wanton concupiscence expressed by ἀπάστης was first associated with the *neighbors’* boundless desire (D10).

<sup>1062</sup> ἔξελθών / ἐπιοῦσιν (A1-2): the participles suggest a distinction between aggression (ἔξελθών) and defense (against the ἐπιοῦσιν), that is shoved under the rug by the use of ὑπέρ (properly defensive) as providing the motivation for both. Again Socrates describes the irresponsible and limited point of view according to which an essentially symmetrical relation is seen by the party of the first part as being asymmetric. The chiastic positioning of the participles however suggests that in the end the one army is indistinguishable from the other. War begins when αἰτίαι become προφάσεις (so Thuc. I.26. as interpreted by L.Pearson, “*Aitia and Prophasis*,” TAPA 83(1952)205-223).

<sup>1063</sup> τί δέ; (A3) stops Socrates by requesting an explanation, but does not in itself object.

<sup>1064</sup> αὐτοί (A3).

<sup>1065</sup> οὐκ, εἰ σύ γε ... καὶ ἡμεῖς (A4): οὐκ is abrupt, and γε after σύ is reproachful.

<sup>1066</sup> ὡμολογοῦμεν δέ που (A5): δέ rather than γάρ, reminding Glaucon in case he needs it, rather than presupposing that he remembers.

<sup>1067</sup> τεχνική (B2): In the ensuing argument Socrates uses adjectives in -ικός for the notional competence that can be had in addition to the primary competence that constitutes the person’s identity (for which he uses nouns like γεωργός [B6] and participles like γεωργῶν [C4]), in accordance with the division of labor. I here reserve the word “competent” for translating these.

So how<sup>1068</sup> on the one hand could we<sup>1069</sup> forbid the shoemaker from trying to be a farmer at the same time and from being a weaver or a builder but allow him only to be a shoemaker, with the purpose of ensuring that the work of the art competent at shoes<sup>1070</sup> comes out well, and similarly with the others, in general assign one job to one distinct man, the job that his inborn nature best suited him for<sup>1071</sup> and in connection with which we meant him to dismiss the other pursuits and every day of his life work just at it<sup>1072</sup> and avoid missing the needs of the moment, and therefore to achieve a fine product and outcome,<sup>1073</sup> whereas when it comes to matters of war is there any question whether it is of the utmost importance that such be achieved well? Or is war such an easy matter that a person who farms will be competent at military things also<sup>1074</sup> as will a person who makes shoes, and anybody else who works at any other art, although at the same time the world has never known<sup>1075</sup> a person competent at checkers or competent at dice,<sup>1076</sup> who hasn't been at it since he was a child but treats it only as a hobby. No, the moment he grabs<sup>1077</sup> a shield or some other weapon or tool of the military art,<sup>1078</sup> right then and there he'll be a "sufficient" combatant to use your term,<sup>1079</sup> whether for a battle requiring the competence of the hoplite or any other kind, while at the same time there is no other tool that can turn a man into an able craftsman or an athlete by being picked up,<sup>1080</sup> nor is even useful to him if<sup>1081</sup> he hasn't acquired the science of the particular field and hasn't devoted the requisite time

<sup>1068</sup>Αλλ' ἄρα (B6) literally, "But (no): the true inference is..." , ironic. With these words Socrates introduces an unremitting series of front-loaded *argumenta a fortiori*. See next notes.

<sup>1069</sup>διεκωλύομεν (B6) an imperfect of citation (cf. ὠμολογοῦμεν, A5, and n. ad 350C7).

<sup>1070</sup>σκυτικῆς (B8) continues the adjectival designation of competence alongside the nominal expressions (σκυτότομος, etc.) that designate the primary identity of the man.

<sup>1071</sup>The pluperfect ἐπεφύκει (B10) is merely the original notion (the naturally perfect πέφυκε) placed into the imperfect of citation used throughout for back-reference (ὁμολογοῦμεν, A5; διεκωλύομεν, B6; ἀπεδίδομεν, B9; ἔμελλε, B10; etc.).

<sup>1072</sup>αὐτό (C1) means to Socrates what αὐτοί meant to Glaucon at A3.

<sup>1073</sup>The language (B8-C2) repeats in some detail, and thereby brings forward, their grounds for adopting the division of labor (370A7-C5).

<sup>1074</sup>Socrates now uses participles (γεωργῶν, σκυτοτομῶν [reading FDM over A], ἐργαζόμενος, C4-5) as above he had used nouns, for the man as opposed to his putative supplementary competence done still with adjective in -ικός (πολεμικός). The participles make us imagine a man farming with his helmet on or cobbling in his greaves.

<sup>1075</sup>οὐδ' ἀν εἰς (C6), a tmesis of οὐδείς for emphasis.

<sup>1076</sup>πεττευτικὸς δὲ ἡ κυβερνητικός (C5-6) The games referred to by these two competences in -ικός exemplify a need for skill even to achieve a needless purpose, in contrast to a skill that is needed exactly and only because the purpose is necessary (paradigmatically, war). Adjectives in -ικός are again used for the competence, but the point is that nobody warrants the adjective being used of him unless he has practiced the game from youth, i.e., unless he is such and such (a dice-player or a checkers-player), i.e., unless he deserves to be described with the noun or the participle.

<sup>1077</sup>λαβών (D1), the aorist stressing the instantaneous effect.

<sup>1078</sup>ἡ τι ἄλλο τῶν πολεμικῶν ὅπλων τε καὶ ὄργάνων (D1-2), with τε καί moving from example to general principle (cf. 330D7 and n.) so as to prepare for the use of ὄργάνων in D4. Note the -ικός adjective, denoting competence, is now being transferred to the weapon!

<sup>1079</sup>ἰκανὸς ἀγωνιστής (D3): ικανός comes from A3, and ἀγωνιστής is now a *nominal* designation for the πολεμικός. The semantics are made to suggest that competence will suddenly seep into his underlying identity by dint of his grabbing the "competent tool."

<sup>1080</sup>ληφθέν (D4): The notion that the tool's merely being picked up makes the man competent is almost unsayable (of fifteen translations consulted only three [Griffith, Baccou, Bloom] preserve the passive, and of these only one [Griffith] recognizes that the participle is causal, not merely conditional); still the notion is quite familiar, in the child's notion of a magic wand.

<sup>1081</sup>μήτε (D5 and 6), after the negatives in οὐ (D3-4), makes its circumstantial participle

to practicing it.

Socrates disengages himself of three consecutive *a fortiori* arguments<sup>1082</sup> to the effect that specialization is at least as important in war as in the crafts, that practice is required to achieve competence in this art at least as much as in the game of dice, and that the tools of this art are just as useless to a man who lacks knowledge how to use them as anywhere else. The biting tone of these essentially sarcastic arguments adds to the vehemence with which he had above characterized the uncontrollable growth of the city. Both had been brought on by Glaucon's concupiscence.

Glaucon indicates that he agrees with the whole mass of the argument by stating his agreement with the last part.<sup>1083</sup> His agreement is more than mere acquiescence. With his brevity he shows a measure of contrition, recognizing that his guess they would be sufficient required something like magic to come true: "Such tools would be worth quite a lot!" They have achieved a truce, and Socrates shifts from criticism and satire to constructive proposal.<sup>1084</sup>

To the extent it is true that the job of the guards<sup>1085</sup> is the greatest job, to that extent it needs the fullest release from all from the other jobs and instead<sup>1086</sup> the greatest amount of art and practice of conditional. Note that success in the occupations requires φύσις (B10), μελέτη (D6) and ἐπιστήμη (D5). Cf. 366C7 and n.

<sup>1082</sup>The "argument from contraries" or "argumentum *a fortiori*," (here, 374B6-D6), being an argument from likelihood, is a common enthymeme in oratory (cf.e.g. Cic. *Top.*55). Within the Platonic corpus compare 336E4-9, 422C5-9, 445A5-B4, 589E, 600D; *Alc.*I 108E5-9A3, 110E; *Apol.*28E (and Adam *ad loc.*), 34C, 37CD; *Crito* 46D, 50E7-1A2ff; *Gorg.*512A; *H.Maj.*286E8-7A1; *Leg.*647C, 890E4-6, 902E4ff, 931C; *Meno* 91D5-2A2 (and Thompson *ad loc.*); *Prot.*313A2-C3, 325BC; *Phdo* 65B4-6, 68A3-B2, 80C2-E2; *Phlb.*30AB, 41E9-2A4; *Tht.*161C; and cf. *Erastae* 133A7-B2. Hippias is made to show an addiction to it in the *H.Min.* (363C7-D4 [imitated by Socrates at 364A1-6], 362C7-D4, 365C7, 375D4-5 [imitated by Socrates at 376C3-6]).

In its commonest form the argument asserts that S is not P on the grounds that S' is not P although it has more reason to be (the more being based on a comparison of S and S'). The former is impugned on the grounds that is less likely to be true than latter which we already agree to be false. The proposal that a small man can lift a certain rock becomes unlikely given the fact that a large man was unable to. The truth of the one is cast into doubt by the falsity of the other.

The expression of this kind of argument will naturally employ hypotaxis, but since it consists essentially of the comparison of two propositions the Greeks have found a way to present it paratactically with μέν and δέ (cf. G. Gebauer, *de hypotacticis et paratacticis argumenti ex contrariis formis* (Zwickau, 1870). The given is posited in the μέν clause and then the δέ clause presents the *refutandum*. Literally, "The large man could not lift the rock, but the small man can;" but since μέν is concessive the true sense is, "Whereas the large man as we know could not lift the rock, the small man can." Add the particle ὅπα or δή to the δέ clause and we get, "Whereas the large man as we know was unable to lift the rock, I just realized (ὅπα) that the small man can;" or "Whereas the large man as we know was unable to lift the rock, the small man will of course (δή) be able to." The "affect" added by the particle becomes the focus of the entire statement since it begs us to ask, "You 'just realized it' how?" or "How can you be sure he, 'will of course'?" The ὅπα that most commonly appears in the δέ clause can be prepared by another ὅπα in the μέν clause (*Crito* 50D, *Prot.*325BC, *Rep.*600D). For the future cf. C4 and D5; 422C9, 445B1, 600D3.

<sup>1083</sup>πολλοῦ γὰρ ὅν ... ἄξια (D7): Glaucon agrees to the whole argument by agreeing to the last part: cf. 333D9 and n.

<sup>1084</sup>ὅν εἴη (E1): Socrates's shift to the optative (E1) restores the mood of joint investigation.

<sup>1085</sup>τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργων (D8), a periphrasis for what he had been calling πολεμική (B4) or τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον (C2) that allows him to introduce the new term, φυλάξ, which quietly reverses or at least attenuates the aggressive role Socrates had envisioned for Glaucon's army.

<sup>1086</sup>αὐ (E1) contrasting superlative release from other duties with superlative immersion in this

its own,<sup>1087</sup> as well as an inborn nature that is able to develop such an ability.<sup>1088</sup> In that case our<sup>1089</sup> job would be to select the natures whose qualities<sup>1090</sup> are suited to guarding the city, if we are able.

“Ours indeed,” Glaucon replies. They have gotten themselves back onto the same page, and Socrates adds his (375) characteristic reminder that the task might be beyond them, but still they must not shrink from it.<sup>1091</sup>

### 2.B.3a: The Search for the Guard in the Amended Thought-City

The trouble introduced by Glaucon’s impatience with the plain city will be resolved by the search for guards, in two senses. The very reversion to joint search immediately relieves the tension between Socrates and Glaucon and turns their conversation back into a joint search, and if the object of the search is found then the order of the “feverish” city will come into focus and the search for justice and injustice within it can take place. At a similar juncture Socrates had offered the novel suggestion of looking for justice on a larger canvas. This time he begins with a riddle: “Do you think there’s much difference in nature between the noble hound and the son of a noble?”<sup>1092</sup> Glaucon has no idea what he means,<sup>1093</sup> so Socrates has bought himself an opportunity to explain.

duty.

<sup>1087</sup> μεγίστης (E2) goes with both τέχνης and ἐπιμελείας, which are closely linked by τε καί. The pair repeat ἐπιστήμη and μελέτη from D5-6 above, and prepare for the third member of the triad (φύσις) which is postponed for emphasis. The periphrastic construction with δεόμενος (in place of δέοιτο) is meant to continue the correlative construction by ending, with an adjective, what was started with one (ὅσῳ μέγιστον … τοσούτῳ δεόμενον).

<sup>1088</sup> Note the etymological figure φύσεως ἐπιτηδείας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα (E4). The figure is halfway between a proof and a pun, and is repeated at 394E3-4 and 433A5-6. The basic term ἐπιτηδής refers to a decided orientation. Its cognates range in denotation from worthy serviceability to cunning, from practice to polish, and from improvised advantage to duty and policy. “Pursuit” often translates it. The term ἐπιτήδευμα tends to appear in lists of καλά, where it is often placed alongside νόμοι, as Gorg.474D3ff (and 475A), H.Maj.298AB, Symp.210C3-49 (and 211C). Cf. H.Maj.294C9, 295D5; Leg.793D1.

<sup>1089</sup> ήμέτερον ἔργον (E6) echoes τὸ τῶν φυλακῶν ἔργον, D8: Socrates likens themselves and their duty to the citizens of the polis and theirs.

<sup>1090</sup> τίνες τε καὶ ποῖαι (E7).

<sup>1091</sup> ήμέτερον μέντοι (E9): Earnest diffidence (expressed here by μέντοι) is the exact opposite of the insouciant complacency of τρυφᾶν (cf. n. ad 372E3).

<sup>1092</sup> οἵτινες τοῦ τι διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακήν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦνς; (375A2-3) is Socrates’s question. The rare word σκύλαξ and the chiastic alliterations, especially with the alliterative words εἰς φυλακήν sandwiched between them, make the question sound like a children’s riddle. A further application of the metaphor of the dog will of course be discovered, below. Plutarch, who continually emulates Plato in his own ways, repeats just this word in his treatise on the education of the very young (*de lib. educ.* 3AB).

For παρήγησις adding congeniality or initial plausibility to the argument, cf. 395E8-9, 406B8-9, 409B2/B5, 430A5-6, 433E12-4A1, 437E5-6, 496E6, 557C5-6, 609B5-6; Leg.733B6-7, 956E1, 968D2-3; Phlb.12C8-D4; Symp.188B5-6; Tht.171E5-6. Related but different, and also exemplified here (γενναίου / εὐγενοῦνς), is argumentation from etymology (e.g. 333B2 [and n.], 348C5ff, 374E4 [and n.], 400D11-E3, 439E5, 608E6-9A1) and its punning (Leg.658B7-C1, 803A) and fallacious (Crat.416D1-5) uses. Consult the wonderful entry in the general index printed at the end of Jowett’s translation (v.5, ed.2), s.v. “Etymology.”

<sup>1093</sup> τὸ ποῖον λέγεις; (A4). Socrates commonly buys time to expiate by asking a paradoxical question: cf. 382A1-10 and n.1259; for the pedagogical pun compare 467D12-13.

Both the well bred youth and the worthy dog need to have sharp senses, and as they sight their prey to be quick at pursuing it, and then once they have caught it to be strong at battling it into submission.<sup>1094</sup> The battling moreover will require bravery, and to be brave belongs to a nature that is spirited, whether we are speaking of a horse or a dog or any other animal whatsoever. The will is an unconquerable and invincible thing, and when it is present in a soul the soul is fearless and imperturbable.<sup>1095</sup> These then are the basic requirements in body (senses, quickness and strength) and soul (willfulness) that are needed in our guards.

Given such natures they are likely to be violent to each other and to the citizens, besides.<sup>1096</sup> We need them instead to be gentle and tame<sup>1097</sup> to their fellows<sup>1098</sup> and to treat their enemies harshly. Otherwise they won't be around long enough to worry about others defeating them but will have done the deed to themselves. We need to find the character<sup>1099</sup> that combines the gentle and the high spirited, whereas the gentle nature would seem to be the very opposite of the high spirited nature. On the other hand our guards cannot be deprived of either and still be good guards. It looks like we're asking for the impossible, and that good guards will never exist.

Socrates reverts to narrative for the first time in quite a while, to tell us that he sat there puzzled, going over what had been said up to this point, and then remarked, "But of course we're puzzled, my friend! After all, we were left in the lurch by our original image." Glaucon of course does not know what he is talking about. "We failed to keep in mind that there do exist natures that we thought impossible, that do combine these opposite attributes."

"And where are they to be found,"<sup>1100</sup> pray tell?"

"Well you could see it in various<sup>1101</sup> animals, but not the least in the very one we brought up in our analogy about the guard. You must know this about the better dogs,<sup>1102</sup> that they have just this

<sup>1094</sup> ὄχύν τε ... καὶ ἐλαφρόν ... καὶ ισχυρὸν αὖ (A5-7): the attributes are listed genetically, i.e., in the order they will come into play: First he is sharp enough to see his prey, then he is quick enough to catch up with it and then strong enough to reduce it to possession. αὖ helps show that the list is moving stepwise. For such "genetic" listing cf. 382B2-3, 387B4, 395E1-2, 443E6-7, 551A8-10, 608A5; Charm. I 56D1-3; Crito 51C8-D1; Gorg. 487E3-4; Leg. 678A8-9, 696A2, 738D6-E1, 897A6-B1, 969B8-C2; Phdo. 98B8-C1; Phdrs. 251A7-B1, 255E3 [also describing a "hunt" like the present passage]; Phlb. 51C3-6 [n.b. γιγνόμενα]; Polit. 274A2, A7; Prot. 316D2-3, 325C7-D1, 333E3; Symp. 206D3-5 and 5-7; Tim. 82B5-7.

<sup>1095</sup> ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον (B1), invincible: A minor distinction is drawn between invincibility and imperturbability (ἄφοβος τε ... καὶ ἀήτητος, B2) in order to have an occasion to draw the major distinction between soul and body (B4-8).

<sup>1096</sup> πολίταις (B10): For the first time the members of the city are called citizens, and treated as a group separate from the guards (ἄλλοις is adverbial: cf. n. 1460): cf. C1-4 *infra*.

<sup>1097</sup> ἄγριοι (B9), πράους (C1): the language is more suited to the animals of the analogy than to the guards.

<sup>1098</sup> οἰκείους (C1) is meant to include each other and their fellow citizens. It means familiars rather than family, and suggests the dog's ability to recognize his master. We expect it therefore to be contrasted with ἀλλοτρίους, but the political context requires πολέμους. A compromise is reached with the adjective πολεμίους (C2).

<sup>1099</sup> ἡθος (C7), a new term to distinguish the quality sought per se from the animal that might instantiate it.

<sup>1100</sup> With ποῦ δή: (D9), after his πῶς λέγεις; (D6), Glaucon plays along, feigning open-eyed credulity as he waits to learn what in the world Socrates has in mind.

<sup>1101</sup> ἄλλοις (D10) proleptic.

<sup>1102</sup> τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν (E1-2), a genitive of the topic (whence the article), in a proleptic "lilies of the field" construction. The adjective is meant to bring us back into the ambience of the original comparison (cf. A2-3).

character in their nature.<sup>1103</sup> Toward the people they are used to and familiar with<sup>1104</sup> they are just as gentle as you could wish, but toward those they do not know quite the opposite.”

The instance refutes the impossibility and shows that their conception of the guard is not contrary to nature<sup>1105</sup> after all. But now Socrates begs Glaucon to grant him a little more.<sup>1106</sup> In addition to being high spirited the person we will have as our guard needs to have a philosophical nature as well.<sup>1107</sup> Glaucon hardly understands what this can mean so Socrates (376) illustrates his meaning with an elaboration of the analogy with the dog: Believe it or not this too is found in the dog, beast that he is. At the sight of an unknown man he becomes irritated even though he has not been abused by him, but when he sees somebody he knows he feels joy even before he has been given a treat.<sup>1108</sup> Glaucon had never focussed<sup>1109</sup> on these facts but now that he thinks of it he agrees, and Socrates adds a refinement. The feeling or emotion with which their nature equips them has a subtle aspect that particularly deserves to be called “philosophical” in a literal sense.<sup>1110</sup> They feel a distinction between friend and foe at first sight, solely because they recognize the one and don’t recognize the other. To find oneself distinguishing what is one’s own from what is alien on the basis that one understands the former and fails to understand the latter is the very essence of being a lover of what one knows, a lover of learning, and yet<sup>1111</sup> this is identical to being a lover of wisdom or a “philosopher.” Let’s take heart<sup>1112</sup> then and posit that in the human animal also, if he is to be gentle to

<sup>1103</sup> τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἥθος (E2) attributes the needed description (ἥθος, C7) to the appropriate subject or substrate (φύσις, 374E4 and 7).

<sup>1104</sup> τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους (E3) spells out the meaning of οἰκείους, C1.

<sup>1105</sup> παρὰ φύσιν (E6) straddles between natural and logical possibility: the problem had been that the two natural dispositions (C7-8) were logically opposite (ἐναντία, C7) so that their compresence in a single character (ἥθος, C7) was a logical impossibility (ἀδυνάτοις ἔσικεν, C11) that as such was impossible to occur (ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι, D1) in nature. οὐ παρὰ φύσιν means naturally possible because not logically impossible.

<sup>1106</sup> ξτι τοῦδε (E9): Socrates uses the first person pronoun to warn that the idea is novel (E9).

<sup>1107</sup> προσγενέσθαι (E10), in contrast with ἐσόμενος, might suggest that the philosophical aspect is meant to evolve (γίγνεσθαι) in addition (πρός) to the underlying spirited aspect, but τὴν φύσιν rules this inference out. It is, moreover, the aorist of γίγνεσθαι that we have, which is commonly used to supplement the forms of εἶναι when the aorist aspect is desired, as here: it just means “to be in addition.”

<sup>1108</sup> οὐδὲ ἐν (376A5): The shift from οὐ to μή (μηδέν, A6) is the shift from “Without the stipulation that...” to “Even if it is not the case that....” Heraclitus’s κύνες γὰρ καταβαύζουσιν ὃν ἂν μή γινώσκωσι (DK B 97) exploits the dog’s certainty in a different way. Their behavior indirectly suggests they know what they know and take that experience to be the rule rather than the exception.

<sup>1109</sup> οὐ πάνυ (A9) according to Riddell (§139) “universally means ‘scarcely,’” but Riddell doesn’t tell us what “scarcely” means. The problem is that the expression succinctly negates entirety, which leaves everything less than all, which is too much to mean anything. It is by nature a litotes. Glaucon means by it that he has no basis for responding.

<sup>1110</sup> ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον (B1), ὡς ἀληθῶς suggesting the adjective is being used in an uncommon way that is nevertheless warranted—as in English we say “literally.” The dog is not a philosopher, but loves wiseness in some way that Glaucon cannot at first comprehend (whence πῇ δή; B2).

<sup>1111</sup> γε (B8), with AF and Stobaeus, rather than τε with D. In tandem with adversative ἀλλά (with or without μέντοι), it marks the minor premise. So also ἀλλὰ μήν γε, 342C8, and most commonly δέ γε, 332A4 and n., 338E1, 349D3, 352A10.

<sup>1112</sup> Θαρροῦντες (B11) dispelling the crippling aporia of 375D3-4, and hazarding an hypothesis: the term suggests the role of θυμός in philosophical investigation. Cf. n.37.

his own kind and to those known to him<sup>1113</sup> he must have a nature that is philosophical or<sup>1114</sup> love what he knows.

Our conclusion is that if the man is to be a competent and worthy guard for the city he will be philosophical and spirited, and quick and strong.<sup>1115</sup> Glaucon agrees and Socrates can move on.<sup>1116</sup> Let this then be the nature he starts out with.<sup>1117</sup> How is he to be raised and educated for us?<sup>1118</sup> Do you think our investigating the matter on its own merits<sup>1119</sup> will help us reach the narrow goal of our entire inquiry—discovering justice and injustice and how they<sup>1120</sup> arise in the city—for the pursuit of which goal we should neither pass over anything needful nor include an unnecessary mass of detail.<sup>1121</sup>

Glaucon's brother<sup>1122</sup> now answered.“I for my part surely expect that this investigation will advance us toward that goal.” Narrowly his response means he would prefer to err on the side of prolixity, but the broader import of his remark is that he wants to join in. Socrates responds,“By Zeus, then, we mustn't let the question go,<sup>1123</sup> even if it might prove<sup>1124</sup> to be quite a lengthy one to answer.”

“You can be sure we mustn't.”<sup>1125</sup>

<sup>1113</sup>οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους (C1) brings together the entire range of the synonyms we have seen in 376B6, 376A6-7, 373E3, and 375C1-2.

<sup>1114</sup>φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ (C2), an instance of “reverse” καὶ, shoehorning in the target term (φιλόσοφον) before the term that serves as its warrant (φιλομαθῆ): (cf.409A3 and n.). In the next sentence the warranting term is dropped and the target stands alone (φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ ..., D4). “Philosophy” will soon be more than being glad to see the known.

<sup>1115</sup>καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρός (C4) re-include the requisite somatic elements from 375B4-5, and rounding out in three matching pairs of adjective (φιλόσοφος καὶ θυμοειδῆς before and καλὸς κάγαθός after), mark the completion of a section of argumentation. Glaucon's reply παντάπασι (C6) expresses his recognition that this is so, and his μὲν οὖν that it is time to move to the next point.

<sup>1116</sup>μὲν δή (C7): Socrates echoes Glaucon's μὲν οὖν, with δή adding “as you agree.”

<sup>1117</sup>ὑπάρχοι (C7), as at 343E2, is not otiose. One's nature affords him what he has in store. The optative is ideal and can be translated with an imperative since they are making ideas. Θρέψονται δὲ δή then moves from φύσις to μελέτη, with ἐπιστήμη standing somewhere off in the future.

<sup>1118</sup>ἡμῖν (C7), ethical dative of theoretical interest as above at 371A8 (cf. n.).

<sup>1119</sup>αὐτό (C9) countenances that the subject has its own shape, independent of the role it may play in our overall investigation. The term therefore motivates οὐπερ—our particular goal—and raises the issue of a tension between relevancy and length (ἰκανόν / συχνόν).

<sup>1120</sup>γίγνεται (D2) singular with the hendiadys. Cf. 371E12-13 and n.

<sup>1121</sup>ἔδωμεν ικανόν ... συχνὸν διεξίωμεν (D2-3): The chiasm helps draw the contrast. The purpose clause in ἵνα expatiates on the prepositional phrase πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν in just the same way that the indirect question τίνα τρόπον ..., expatiates on the nouns δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ἀδικίαν.

<sup>1122</sup>καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαυκῶνος ἀδελφός (D4): By his periphrastic reference to Adeimantus, Socrates, in the role of narrator, effects the transition from one interlocutor to the other (calling him by name immediately below confirms and completes the transition). Adeimantus will not leave the question about poetry to Glaucon, and he reveals a personal willingness (ἔγωγε προσδοκῶ, D4-5) to run the risk of prolixity on the topic of παιδεία—hardly a surprise, given his sensitivity to the fearsome effect poetry might have on the young, according to his speech at the beginning of the Book. Once again brother helps brother (n.776).

<sup>1123</sup>ἀφετέον (D6), like (ἀνεῖναι, 368C5) above, refusing to miss an opportunity to complete the hunt.

<sup>1124</sup>μὰ Δία (D6): Socrates scrupulously notices and approves Adeimantus's special interest by fervently allowing that the treatment even be very long, if the occasion should demand. τυγχάνει, “in fact,” issues a warning like the warning he placed at the beginning of the “construction,” with the term ἔργον (369B2-3 and n.).

<sup>1125</sup>οὐ γὰρ οὖν (D8): There is an insistent edge in the answer. Rather than thanking Socrates,

Instead let's go at it in the leisurely manner of the storyteller and tell the story of our men's education.<sup>1126</sup>

"So much would only be suitable."

### 2.B.3b.I: The Nurturing of the Natural-born Guards: MUSIC (Poetry)

What would their education be like? Socrates begins. In truth it would be<sup>1127</sup> hard for us to improve on the time honored division between *gymnastic* for the body and music for the soul. Of these two the education in music will of course<sup>1128</sup> begin earlier.

"Of course."

Under the heading of music fall discourses, and under the heading of discourse there are two types, true and false.<sup>1129</sup>

"Yes."

(377) And we are to raise them on both kinds, but on the false kind first ...

"I don't understand how you mean that."<sup>1130</sup>

You mean you don't understand that at the beginning we tell our little children myths?<sup>1131</sup> This kind of story is false as a whole, though there are elements in it that are true. In educating our little children we start by telling them tales earlier than we assign them *gymnastic* exercises,<sup>1132</sup> and this is Adeimantus takes the trouble to remark that his personal request was justified. Compare ἀλλὰ χρή (E1). Requesting and complaining, like describing and criticizing, are close to each other in Adeimantus, as we saw at the end of his speech and will see again and again, below.

<sup>1126</sup>τοὺς ἄνδρας (D10), as Glaucon had once referred to them (372C3), not πολίτας and not φύλακας. The term invites us to "identify" with them rather than seeing them merely as creatures of an institution. Cf. 361B6 and n.752.

<sup>1127</sup>ἢ (E2) is elliptical: not "or," but "Wouldn't you say?" to suggest an answer to the question.

<sup>1128</sup>ἢ οὐ (E9): Socrates asks if this isn't so and Adeimantus's answer shows he finds this policy natural. The purpose is not to insist on priority of music: as we shall see (377A9-10), his remark merely reveals how early the education begins, when the child is still too young to be instructed in *gymnastics*.

<sup>1129</sup>μουσικῆς / λόγων (E9, 11) The thought easily moves downward from logical wholes to logical parts: from all παιδεία, to μουσική (sc. παιδεία), to λόγοι, to false λόγοι. The genitives μουσικῆς and λόγων, placed in the initial position, are genitives of the genus, a type of partitive genitive. The meaning of λόγοι is not as yet clear: that it should be included under μουσική is patent; whether it refers to the logical studies of the trivium, or to stories, or to historical accounts, is undecided.

<sup>1130</sup>δέ (E1 I, 377A1): The last two "questions" by Socrates have no interrogative particle (cf. 333A13 and n.), but Adeimantus treats them as questions, inferring the statements are a continuation of the construction governed by τιθείς which was a question (E9). Since the brunt of his criticism of poetry at the beginning of the Book was that it gave young men false ideas, Socrates's remark seems to get off on the wrong foot.

<sup>1131</sup>μύθους (A4): "Fairy tales" would be convey the sense of μύθους more directly in English: that such tales should be instances of the λόγοι mentioned above clarifies both what λόγος meant there and what a pedagogically useful ψευδῆς λόγος could be (note the verb is λέγειν μύθους). Socrates spoke too broadly when he said λόγοι, and too abstractly when he used the logically exhaustive division of λόγοι into true and false, as though to send Adeimantus off the trail. The effect of the minor detour is to emphasize that it is not the truth of a story that makes it good nor the falseness that makes it bad, but its effect and suitability for the young, which is the point Socrates now develops.

<sup>1132</sup>πρότερον δὲ μύθοις (A6), specifying the sense in which musical education begins earlier than

what I meant when I just said that music comes earlier.<sup>1133</sup>

“And you are right.”

What we do at the very beginning has the strongest influence in any undertaking, especially as concerns anything<sup>1134</sup> that is young and therefore tender. It is then that it is most malleable, and then that whatever stamp one wishes to impose on it can sink in,<sup>1135</sup> no matter what was there before.<sup>1136</sup> Therefore we will not casually allow our children to hear any story made-up<sup>1137</sup> by anybody,<sup>1138</sup> and take beliefs<sup>1139</sup> into their souls mostly<sup>1140</sup> opposite to the beliefs we will be wanting them to have once they reach maturity.

“No way should we allow this.”

From the start we'll have to monitor<sup>1141</sup> the storytellers<sup>1142</sup> and enlist any fine story they compose but exclude any that is not. Then we will persuade the nurses and the mothers<sup>1143</sup> to tell

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gymnastic. Now Adeimantus learns that the distinction between false and true stories was harmless. If the children are old enough for bedtime stories but too young to run around in an orderly way we must imagine them to be two or three, not college students.

<sup>1133</sup>τοῦτο δὴ ἔλεγον (A9): the restatement adds emphasis. We start guiding them as early as we can, even before their cognition distinguishes true from false or could profit from such a distinction.

<sup>1134</sup>ἀρχὴ πάντος ἔργου μέγιστον (A12): The focus on their youth has prepared this statement; ὅτιοῦν is neuter and emphatically general, so it refers not only to children but to animals and even plants, anything that “grows up.”

<sup>1135</sup>The order (B1-3) is chiastic, with generalizing phrase (ὅτιοῦν) providing the subject of the first verb (πλάττεται, passive), and the second verb (ἐνδύεται, middle) followed by generalizing clause defining its subject in turn: any thing young enough is served up to receive the influence of whatever we wish. For the middle ἐνδύεται, describing the way the trait is able to make its way into the malleable child, cf. 401D6, below and Leg.642B. Also Menex.235C. The two verbs (pace Adam *ad loc.*) do not have the same subject, and (pace Richards) there is no need to alter the text.

<sup>1136</sup>Ἐκάστω (B3), referring to underlying distinctiveness of the entity being stamped, and thereby continuing the generalization of πάντος (A12) and ὅτιοῦν (B1).

<sup>1137</sup>πλασθέντας (B6) reminds us that the stories will be “made up,” but the term adds a connotation of lying fabrication. Even adults, after all, would prefer to hear one story instead of another and would like things to come out this way instead of that way. Telemachus has to remind Penelope that it is the singer's inspiration that determines what he will sing (*Od.I.345-59*). πλασθέντας echoes πλάττεται at B2 and thereby calls attention to the twofold problem that stories are more congenial than truth and that the very young, being terribly malleable, will take them too seriously.

<sup>1138</sup>The double use of ἐπιτυχεῖν (B5-6) is not an otiose *figura etymologica*, but stresses that we must be mindful not only of the story but of who chooses it, who tells it, and – as we shall see in a moment -- who composes it. ῥᾳδίως οὖτος points back to how easily the σημαίνων deeply imprints whatever τύπος he wishes on a young animal (ἢν τις βούληται, B2).

<sup>1139</sup>δόξας (B8) includes the notion that the beliefs are adopted unconsciously, that the children's souls are stamped with them. They are not ideas the children have formed, but beliefs that form the children's thinking.

<sup>1140</sup>ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (B7) presumes that most stories are bad, so that things cannot be left to chance and that supervision is really needed.

<sup>1141</sup>ἐπιστατέον (B11), the first time this verb is used. The interlocutors had set out to compose a city in thought but now their thinking includes “thinking ahead.” Socrates had warned us that once art was “set into motion” it would soon get a mind of its own (cf. κινητέον, 373A6).

<sup>1142</sup>μυθοποιοῖς (B11): the poets, who of course tell their own stories.

<sup>1143</sup>τὰς τρόφους τε καὶ μητέρας (C2-3) has the children younger than seven.

their children those we have enlisted and thereby to mould their souls with stories even more profoundly than they mould their bodies with their hands.<sup>1144</sup> Most of the stories the caregivers tell these days will have to be thrown out.<sup>1145</sup>

“Just what sorts do you mean?”<sup>1146</sup>

In greater tales we will find also which of the smaller tales need to be expelled. It is the traits of the story that matter, since stories with similar traits, whether large or small, will have similar effects.<sup>1147</sup>

“I agree with that but really want to know what ‘greater’ tales you mean!”

What Hesiod and Homer<sup>1148</sup> used to tell us and the other poets as well, for it is these who have composed false stories for mankind and compose them still.<sup>1149</sup>

<sup>1144</sup>τὰ σώματα τοῖς χερσίν (C4), a further indication of the timeliness of music over gymnastics during the age in question. The soul is even more impressionable than the soft bones of a baby. The allusion to baby massage is part of what one would say to the caregivers by way of persuading them (πείσομεν, C2), by expressing what might be unfamiliar in terms they already know.

<sup>1145</sup>ἐκβλητέον (C5), stronger than ἀποκριτέον since they had already been “included” before the present criticism (κρίνεσθαι) was introduced and are already ensconced. For τοὺς πολλούς cf. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ above. Poets have always scandalized audiences and always will, and the idea of suppressing poetry is nothing new. It is the present purpose that is new: The experiment in thought has introduced a scrutiny of values and goals so radical that the usual preoccupations of conventional society are not allowed to govern by default. Poets will now be evaluated as to their suitability for a higher purpose than before, and their effect on persons younger than we used to worry about. They must meet the radical needs of the state-in-thought, and none of them will be “grandfathered in.” So also Book Ten.

Modern sensibilities have chafed at the exclusions, but the emphasis here is on who will be included on a team (this is the primary use of ἐγκρίνειν and ἀποκρίνειν), rather than who will be expelled. Nor is much provision made for the “innocent bystanders” who haven’t the inborn nature to become guards. Socrates and his interlocutors usually focus their comments on the sub-population of noble youth (as e.g., 378C1-2, 386A2-4 and C1 [note limiting τοῖς], 387B4-5 [on παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν cf. n.752], 387C2-5; 388A1-3, D2-7; 389D9-E2 [on the meaning of ὡς πλήθει cf. n.1354]; 391D5-6 [where the article and the ethical dative ἡμῖν ensure it is “the youth we are concerned about”]), but easily allow their bans to expand to the rest of the young indifferently (378B2 and D1, 381E2-5, 386A, 390A3 and B4), and to the whole city (378B1, 378D6, 380B8, 394D6). Thus at the end of Book Two we will deny a chorus and bar public performance to the poet who strikes the wrong notes, in order to ensure that our budding guards will turn out reverent and godly (383C5).

<sup>1146</sup>ποίους δή (C6) expresses surprise, bewilderment, indignation and joy at the free play of the ideas. We should recall that only a few moments ago he was begging Socrates to correct the poets (366D7-367A4).

<sup>1147</sup>ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι μύθοις ὄψόμεθα (C7): On the face of it Socrates is suggesting the same method as before, that seeing (n.b. ὄψόμεθα) the truth *in macro* will enable us to see it *in micro*, and this much Adeimantus grasps (ἔγωγε, 377D2); but with some impatience (the δέ in οὐδέ, D2) he impresses on Socrates that the distinction does not help him answer his previous question (τίνας, D2: cf. ποίους, C6). τύπος (C8) verges in meaning away from the imprint left (B2) to the related notion of the character or cipher that is on the stamp itself (D8). τούτον δύνασθαι is epexegesis of τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον.

<sup>1148</sup>Ἐλεγέτην (D4): with the dual that makes them partners compare Adeimantus’s hendiads that made them one: ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ὅμηρος, 363A8. As being the most important poets Socrates has exploited the ambiguity of μείζων and ἐλάττων.

<sup>1149</sup>Ἐλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσι (D6): With the tenses Socrates echoes Adeimantus’s stress on society’s ongoing exposure to a set body of assertions made by just these poets (cf. 366E1-3, ἀπὸ τῶν ... ἡρώων

“Which ones? and for what fault you find in them?”<sup>1150</sup>

The fault that must be condemned first and foremost, especially if one lies poorly.<sup>1151</sup>

“What is this fault you mention?”<sup>1152</sup>

Socrates explains by comparing the poet to a painter: he creates a likeness in words of the gods or the heroes and what they are like, and he might botch the likeness the way an artist does when his drawing resembles not at all<sup>1153</sup> the original he wanted to draw.

“Obviously it is correct to find fault in this,<sup>1154</sup> but how are we saying the stories have this fault and which stories are we saying have it?”<sup>1155</sup>

First of all, there is the biggest lie about the most important subjects<sup>1156</sup> and the story that told it<sup>1157</sup> told it poorly: that Ouranos committed the act<sup>1158</sup> alleged in Hesiod and that Kronos his son took revenge on him in turn; [378](#) and worse,<sup>1159</sup> the things Kronos is said to have done to his son and suffered from him,<sup>1160</sup> even if they were true, would hardly be things to be recited carelessly<sup>1161</sup> to the

... μέχρι τῶν νῦν). It appears Socrates will be engaging Adeimantus's challenge head on.

<sup>1150</sup>ποίους δὴ καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις (D7): ποίους δή is repeated from above (C6) and τί μεμφόμενος repeats the idea of a τύπος Socrates wishes to restrain; and again Socrates deals with the methodological question before getting down to cases and telling just which ones. This is Adeimantus's personal issue.

<sup>1151</sup>μὴ καλῶς ψεύδηται (D9), the adverb again suggesting competence. Lying poorly is not the great fault (as ἄλλως τε καί indicates) but something that exacerbates it. Again Socrates explains the *obscurum* with an *obscurius*, though the intrusive ψευδεῖς (D6) already suggests that the great fault will be lying itself.

<sup>1152</sup>τί τοῦτο (D10), asyndeton. With his ὅπερ (D8), like his οὓς (D4), Socrates is able to sandwich in methodological preliminaries before revealing which stories he has in mind, which is what Adeimantus has eagerly wanted to know all along. His asyndeton reveals impatience; τοῦτο points to ὅπερ.

<sup>1153</sup>μηδέν (E2) emphatic rather than merely conditional.

<sup>1154</sup>This is the force of καὶ γάρ ... γε (E4). He speaks as if the criterion Socrates suggests is so obvious and his acceptance of it so easily granted, that his request for instances is even more warranted (so again, at [378A7](#), agreeing as if the assertion were obvious).

<sup>1155</sup>πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα (E5): Adeimantus with the first plural finally joins Socrates rather than challenging him to list off examples. His double question restates his double question at D7, πῶς corresponding to τί μεμφόμενος and ποῖα to ποίους.

<sup>1156</sup>πρῶτον τὸ μέγιστον (E6): Socrates's insistence on proper order stands in strong contrast with the way that Adeimantus in his speech presented the human situation first and then extended it to the gods, which in effect made man the measure of gods ([363A5ff](#) and [364B2ff](#)). Adam's insistence that μέγιστον is masculine because it will be at [378B5](#) requires too much “live” sense in what is merely a standard formula.

<sup>1157</sup>οἱ εἰπών (sc. μῦθος ἐκβλητέος), E7, the first story to be thrown out (governing τό ... ψευδός in hyperbaton), because it told (εἰπών) a lie and moreover did so badly; Hesiod (i.e. his poem) alleges (φησί) it to be true.

<sup>1158</sup>ἡργάσατο and δρᾶσαι (E8) together form an aposiopesis.

<sup>1159</sup>δὲ δῆ (378A1) asserts that the μέν clause was indeed concessive. The language avoids the name of Zeus.

<sup>1160</sup>ἔργα (A1) continues ἡργάσατο in nominal form (continuing the aposiopesis), so the undergoing it led to is done with the noun that expresses undergoing, namely, πάθη. ὑπὸ τοῦ νέος is in syllepsis with both ἔργα and πάθη though its preposition associates it only with the latter.

<sup>1161</sup>ῥᾶδίως οὗτος λέγεσθαι (A2-3). ῥᾶδίως οὗτος repeated from above ([377B5](#)); the passive λέγεσθαι shifts the responsibility for exposure from the poets to the parents, or from the poets to

mindless young.<sup>1162</sup> The general<sup>1163</sup> policy would that they be suppressed altogether; but even if there were<sup>1164</sup> some need to tell them, that as few of our citizens as possible hear them, and hear them in secret and only after they've sacrificed not just a pig but something large and hard to come by, so that the experience of hearing them might happen<sup>1165</sup> only to the fewest few.

"I certainly agree these stories grate."<sup>1166</sup>

And they are not to be told, either,<sup>1167</sup> in the city we are building.<sup>1168</sup> Nor will we let our young man hear the idea<sup>1169</sup> that if he<sup>1170</sup> were to commit the most extreme acts of injustice he would be doing nothing out of the ordinary, nor if he punished his father<sup>1171</sup> for unjust acts in a most exacting way, but to the contrary that he would just be doing what the greatest and foremost gods do.<sup>1172</sup>

"He certainly should not by Zeus!" Adeimantus replies, "Even to me they seem unsuitable!"<sup>1173</sup>

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ourselves who are becoming their monitors. That the most harmful stories are about horrid dealings between fathers and sons is notable, in light of Adeimantus's complaint that his elders have failed him (362E4ff, 366D7ff n.b. ὑμῶν).

<sup>1162</sup> ὄφρονάς τε καὶ νέους (A3): reverse καί (cf. 343C6 and n.): they are ὄφρονες because νέοι.

<sup>1163</sup> μάλιστα μέν (A3).

<sup>1164</sup> With ἦν (A4) he continues the irreal construction from A2.

<sup>1165</sup> συνέβη (A6) stressing again the effect of hearing the story. Cf. 377B1-3, B7 (καὶ λαμβάνειν ...), 377C3-4, and C8-D1. The construction with ὅπως is an object clause thrown into the aorist indicative by the leading irreal construction. Cf. Goodwin *GMT* §§333, ff.

<sup>1166</sup> καὶ γάρ ... γε again (A7): χαλεποί, given the moral context, veers toward the merely esthetical. Compare the remark, καλὸν μὲν σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι in Adeimantus's speech (364A2-4), which rather grates. The proper sentiment is, χαλεπὸν μέν, καλὸν δέ: cf. n. *ad loc.*). With καὶ γάρ ... γε Adeimantus accedes to Socrates's point without resistance at the same time that he waters it down. cf. 377E4-5.

<sup>1167</sup> γε (B1) answers Adeimantus's limitative γε at A7, insisting that his concession, though weak, was strong enough to require he will now agree they must not be told.

<sup>1168</sup> ἡμέτεραι (B1). Their overall common purpose had fallen out of view, in the midst of the give and take on Adeimantus's favorite and most sensitive subject.

<sup>1169</sup> οὐδὲν ἀν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῦ (B3): By shifting to the ideal construction Socrates shifts from the plot of the story to the moral that underlies it, called ὑπόνοια below (378D6).

<sup>1170</sup> The antecedent of ἀδικῶν (B2) is the young man who *hears* the story: that he implicitly identifies with the character in the story is taken for granted. It is with Ouranos he would be identifying in this clause (cf. 377E7-8).

<sup>1171</sup> κολάζων (B3): Now he identifies with Kronos (E8-378A1), with αὖ repeated from there.

<sup>1172</sup> The order of the sentence (B2-4) is an instance of interlaced or distributive binary construction (cf. 329A5 and n.). The second participle appears to represent a second protasis going with the apodosis οὐδὲν ἀν θαυμαστόν ..., but then that appearance is dispelled by ἀλλὰ and the second protasis is given an apodosis of its own (δρῷη ἀν ...). In the end both protases go with both apodes. Such an easy comparison of oneself with the gods bespeaks a fundamentally impious arrogance such as we see in Euthyphro (τὰ ἐνάντια λέγοντι περί τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἔμοῦ, 6A5); and recalls Adeimantus's trap argument at 365D7-E6.

<sup>1173</sup> αὐτῷ μοι (B6): The addition of αὐτῷ might make μοι too emphatic to go only with δοκεῖ (as it does for instance with φαίνεται at 390C4; cf. also 398B9). Perhaps Adeimantus is recanting his lukewarm reaction above (A7), but perhaps we must take ἀντῷ also, or even primarily, with ἐπιτήδεια (for the dative cf. νέοις ἐπιτήδεια ἀκούειν, 390A4), and take it that he is comparing himself with the νέω ἀκούοντι at B2. Adeimantus is old enough to know better, but feels a trace of what he felt while he was delivering his speech a half hour ago, a feeling he began to confess in his last reply (378A7). We are reminded by this dramatic detail that the purpose of the construction is to reach a response that is adequate to the challenge Adeimantus and Glaucon have placed before Socrates and their candor.

Nor, to be sure,<sup>1174</sup> shall we tell them in general that the gods fight wars and foment plots and pitch battles<sup>1175</sup> against each other. Besides being false like the rest<sup>1176</sup> we surely<sup>1177</sup> need those who are to be guarding the city to hold the belief that it is most shameful to fall easily into discord with each other. We hardly need to depict such tales in our embroidery<sup>1178</sup> for them to see, about a Battle of the Giants and other such dissension among the gods and heroes<sup>1179</sup> and their very relatives and families. If we are to persuade them that citizen never yet fought against citizen and that to do so would be impious, it is this sort of thing, instead, that the children must hear from their grandfathers and grandmothers; and as they grow older they must compel the poets to write stories nearer to such themes as these. As for the bindings of Hera by her son and the hurlings of Hephaestos by his father when he was about to defend his mother, and all the theomachies<sup>1180</sup> we find in Homer, these we will not carry over<sup>1181</sup> into our city, neither their themes<sup>1182</sup> nor the stories themselves. A young person

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The better attested personal construction δοκῶ (with mss. ADM) instead of δοκεῖ (ms. F, Eusebius, Theodoret, Ficinus [*apud J.-C.*], and modern editors) should be restored to the text.

<sup>1174</sup>οὐδέ γε (B8), like his γε above, picks up right where he left off (as Adeimantus's agreement, B6-7, permits him to do), and now he moves forward to a generalization.

<sup>1175</sup>πολεμοῦσί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται (B8-C1) presents the general situation, being at war, and then specifies it with two actions, plotting and battling (A/a<sub>1</sub>/a<sub>2</sub>). Cf. *Euthyphr.* 6B6-9.

<sup>1176</sup>οὐδέ (C1) sympathetic with οὐδέ at B8.

<sup>1177</sup>γε (C2) bringing forward the point of the γε at B8.

<sup>1178</sup>For καὶ ποικιλτέον (C4) and the tenor of the whole passage cf. *Euthyphr.* 6B7-C4, which explicitly mentions the Panathenaic robe.

<sup>1179</sup>ἥρωων (C5), the only mention of heroes in this passage. Adeimantus had included them among the edifiers (366E2). They will receive much closer consideration at the beginning of Book Three, where we will see they have a special role in the education.

<sup>1180</sup>δεσμούς ... ρίψεις (D3-4): The plurals are derogatory as the similar ones are at 387B-C1, 391B5-6, 495A7-8, 573A5-6, D2-4 (cf. *Alc.* I 122BC; *Euthyphr.* 6B8; *Gorg.* 490C8-9, 491A1-2; *Leg.* 643E1; *Lys.* 205C4-5; *Phdo* 98C1-2, D7-E1, 101C7ff; *Phdrs.* 231B4 vs. A4; *Soph.* 251A9-10; *Symp.* 211E1-4 [esp. σαρκῶν], 218A7-B2 [n.b., Socrates is in the singular!]; *Tht.* 166C6-7 [cf. 161C5], 176C6). As a good story bears being told δἰς καὶ τρίς; telling a bad one once is already too many times. With θεομαχία a generalization embracing all the cases is achieved by a climactic neologism. New criticism after all needs new language (though cf. Xenophanes DK 21 B11, 12, and 26).

<sup>1181</sup>παραδέχεσθαι (D5), the opposite of ἐκβάλλειν (377C5 and n.).

<sup>1182</sup>Ἐν ὑπονοίαις (D6). Commentators cite for the meaning Plut. de *aud. poet.* 19EF, where Plutarch complains about needlessly far-fetched interpretations critics foist upon (παραβιαζόμενοι) Homer to twist his meaning (διαστρέφοντες) away from an immoral theme. These he characterizes as αἱ πάλαι μὲν ὑπόνοιαι, ἀλληγορίαι δὲ νῦν λεγόμενοι. It is a fallacy to infer that something that has been renamed had originally only the sense of the new name: all of ἀλληγορία in Plutarch's time might have been called ὑπόνοια “in aforesight” but this does not imply all ὑπόνοια was what is now ἀλληγορία. Plutarch goes on to say these far-fetched interpretations are needless since Homer has exonerated himself, at least for those who pay attention (προσέχοντας, 19F: cf. προσέχοντος 19E, *supra*) to the mute (σιωπώμενον) details of the story, and he gives two examples (19F-20B). The ὑπόνοιαι that a younger auditor might miss are not the far-fetched allegorical interpretations invented by poetasters with time on their hands, but rather the subtle meanings that Homer leaves implicit, that is, Plutarch's σιωπώμενα. This is the meaning in works contemporary to ours, e.g., EN 1128A23-4, where Aristotle distinguishes between the older comedy that gets its laughs from explicit name-calling (αἱσχρολογία) and the newer that relies on innuendo (ὑπόνοια); and Xen. *Symp.* 3.6, where the rhapsodes are said to be the stupidest people in the world since although they can cite their Homer from heart they do not know the meaning (ὑπόνοιαι, certainly not allegorical interpretations; cf. also ὑπόλογον, *Lach.* 189B7.). LSJ's fulsome gloss, “the deeper meaning that underlies everything,” receives no warrant from the passages he cites and gives ὑπο- a spatial meaning although in all other uses of the noun it has its

doesn't distinguish fiction from facts, and everything that he takes into his stable of beliefs as a young person has a way of becoming indelible and unalterable later on.<sup>1183</sup> Given all this, in fact, we should probably do everything we can to see to it that the first things they do hear are the best things to hear for becoming virtuous.<sup>1184</sup>

"That makes good sense," Adeimantus rejoins, "but what do we say if someone challenges us to say which things have this effect and which are the stories that tell them, which ones could we point to?"

Socrates steps back to remind us he is telling us the story of yesterday's conversation:<sup>1185</sup> "And I said in reply, (379) 'Adeimantus, you and I aren't poets. In our present occupation<sup>1186</sup> we are founders of a city, and as founders we only need to know the general traits<sup>1187</sup> that are to govern the poets' stories, and if they make stories that go against these guidelines not to abide it. We have no duty to compose stories ourselves.'"<sup>1188</sup>

"Well then what are the guidelines or traits for stories about the gods<sup>1189</sup> that we shall point to?"

I'd say they are about as follows.<sup>1190</sup> The god<sup>1191</sup> must always be depicted as he truly is, whether in

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attenuative force.

<sup>1183</sup>λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις (E1) imitates the language, and thereby brings forward the idea, of 377B7-9, with elaboration.

<sup>1184</sup>πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὀκούειν (E3): Again what is to be heard is being measured by its effect (A6 and n. 1165).

<sup>1185</sup>καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον (E7): With the more explicit and full-winded "stage direction" (not just the formulaic quasi-phonemes ἦν δ' ἐγώ or ἦ δ' ὅς), characteristically introduced by interruptive καί, Socrates marks for his auditors (i.e., us) a moment of transition or heightened dramatic importance: cf. 416B8, 419A1, 427B2, 475D1, 487B1, 487D6, 506C6. It is after all the Adeimantus that found the received stories inadequate who is asking this question: the deeper strategy of inveigling him into the role of city founder comes close to the surface!

<sup>1186</sup>οὐκ ἔσμεν ποιηταὶ ... ἀλλ' οἰκισταὶ πόλεως (378E7-9A1): Of course neither is true—they are guests at Cephalus's and the host has departed. The storytelling they have embarked upon must continually reconcile the authentic freedom of leisure with the demands of relevance to the goal (i.e., allowing the ἰκανόν but avoiding the συχνόν: cf. 376C8-D10). The notion that they must play their role in an appropriate manner reveals a parallel between the proprieties of poetry and the proprieties of their own investigation. ἐν τῷ παρόντι serves not only to dismiss composing the needed stories by postponement but also to remind us that the censorship of children's stories is just one step in the overall project of finding justice and injustice in the individual soul. The reader outside the conversation to whom Socrates has just nodded in the words before, is thus admonished to recognize the account is fictional play.

<sup>1187</sup>τύπους (379A2), repeated from 377C8.

<sup>1188</sup>Answering the μέν (A2) with οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς ... γε (A3-4) instead of mere δέ stresses that artistic talent will not be allowed to lord it over the critical.

<sup>1189</sup>τύποι περὶ θεολογίας (A5-6): another θεο- compound is coined (cf. θεομαχίας, 378D5). The neologism and the word order suggest that Plato somehow meant the phrase to be quotable.

<sup>1190</sup>τοιοίδε (A7): with the "first person" demonstrative he acknowledges that he is responsible to provide guidelines, and with πον that they are not to be written in stone.

<sup>1191</sup>οἱ θεός (B1), not οἱ θεοί, here and throughout this passage. The article here has its categorical meaning so that ὁ γε θεός, with the reinforcement of γε, means god as god. Cf. τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ θεῖον, 382E6. It may well be noted that Plato's expression often accommodates and sometimes invites a monotheistic interpretation (Apol.42A; Crito 54E), but what we should take away from such usage is not a Platonic opinion to be recorded in the history of theological opinions, but how easily Plato allows his dialogue form to point beyond current language.

epic or lyric or tragedy. Being god he is good, and so he must be spoken of as such. Now among good things you will find nothing that is harmful, and if not harmful it wreaks no harm and therefore does nothing bad. If it does nothing at all bad then it could not be the cause of anything bad either. And conversely since a good thing is helpful it will be the cause of faring well.<sup>1192</sup> Thus the good is not the cause of everything. Only the good outcomes<sup>1193</sup> can be attributed to it, whereas it cannot be blamed<sup>1194</sup> for the bad. Therefore god, being good, would not be the cause of everything as everybody says, but is the cause of rather little that affects men<sup>1195</sup> and is blameless for most. After all, good things are far fewer than the bad for us, and of the good only god is the cause whereas for the bad we must seek out other causes and not god.

Hence we may not condone this<sup>1196</sup> error about the gods, whether from Homer or from any other poet, nor such foolish remarks as

“Two are the pots that stand full of fates at the doorstep of Zeus,  
The one full of good ones and the other of horrid ...”

and that a man for whom Zeus mixes an allotment from both pots

“Such a man meets evil at one moment and good at another;”

whereas the man for whom he prepares a dose of the one pot<sup>1197</sup> unmixed,

“Him does an evil hunger drive through his life on the bright earth.”

Nor that, as if he were our steward, Zeus

“... dispenses both good and evil.”

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<sup>1192</sup>εὐπραγίας (B13), could be “transitive” (cf. 353E5 and n., where εὖ πράττειν is transitive), but αἴτιον tells otherwise. In contrast to the gradual and explicit steps on the bad (B3-10), the converse argument on the good is streamlined. There the adjective (βλαβερόν, B3) led to the cognate verb (βλάπτειν, B5) verb which in turn introduced its synonymous verb-plus-adjective (ποιεῖν κακόν, B7), which then finally restated nominally in terms of cause (αἴτιον [εἶναι] κακοῦ), B9); here the four parallel steps (ώφελιμον / ώφελεῖν / ἀγαθὰ ποιεῖν / αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ) are telescoped into the single expression, αἴτιον εὐπραγίας. The replacement of ἀγαθοῦ with εὐπραγίας suggests the steps leading up to it: εὐπραγία comes from εὖ πράττειν (intransitive) derived, we are to infer, from ἀγαθὰ ποιεῖν from ώφελεῖν from ώφελιμον. It is a striking instance of dialectical pacing.

<sup>1193</sup>εὖ ἔχόντων (B15-16) characterizes the good things in question adverbially (εὖ), i.e., as results of a process or action.

<sup>1194</sup>ἀναίτιον (B16). The quasi personal construction with the adjective achieves a verbal allusion to Homer *Od.* I.32-3: “Ω πόποι οῖον δή νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιώνται. Ι ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κακὸν εἶμεναι ... .

<sup>1195</sup>With this assertion he borrows something back from the ensuing lines of *Od.* I.33-34 (αὐτοὶ Ι σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίησιν), thus drawing, from the poet's quotation of the gods, grounds that he will later use for criticizing the poet's representation of them.

<sup>1196</sup>ταύτην (D1) suggests there will be others (cf. οὗτος, 380C6).

<sup>1197</sup>τὰ ἔτερα (D7): ἔτερα (here alluding the bad κῆρες), is often derogatory, in mild aposiopesis: cf. 390C7, 407D7-8, 426D8-E1, 488B2-3, 532C2, 550A1-2, 586C7, 601A6-7, 605A10; *Euthyd.*298E1; *Gorg.*481E4, 482A2, 514D8-9; *Phd.*58D8; *Prot.*326A4; *Symp.*201E4; *Tht.*167B2. Cf. the more general remark of Gildersleeve, §593. Contrast the approbative use in litotes at *Phdrs.*233D4, and cf. Thrasymachus's use at 337D1 and also its use connection with infinite regress, 342A7.

As for breaking one's oath or violating a treaty as Pandarus endeavored to do,<sup>1198</sup> if someone says it was through the agency of Athena or Zeus that it happened we shall not approve it any sooner than approving the story of a strife (380) and division among the gods instigated by Themis and Zeus.<sup>1199</sup> Nor shall we let our young hear the story Aeschylus tells, that

“God plants the cause among mortals  
Whenever he wishes to bring their house to utter ruin.”

If somebody composes poems in which we find verses that depict the sufferings of Niobe or of the Pelopids or the Trojans or other such disasters we must either forbid them treating these events as being the work of the gods, or if such events are to be the gods' doing we must have them invent an account that closes on<sup>1200</sup> our current theme instead, and tell the story that what the gods were wreaking<sup>1201</sup> was just and good, and that the men benefitted from their punishment. The story that people who pay the penalty are pitiful losers<sup>1202</sup> and that it was god after all who actually perpetrated the evil deed—these we will not allow the poet to tell. If on the other hand they tell that bad men deserved correction because they were losers, and that in paying the penalty they were benefitted by the gods, that we would allow. As for the idea that god is to blame for an evil that befalls a man even though he is good, this idea we must fight against at every turn, against a person telling it in his own city if his city is to be law loving<sup>1203</sup> and against anybody hearing such a story whether he be young or old, whether the story is told in rhyme or prose, since telling such a story is an impious act, and a story that is disadvantageous to us, as well as being at odds with itself.<sup>1204</sup>

“I vote with you in support of this law,” Adeimantus answers, from the point of view of the citizen Socrates had just referred to:<sup>1205</sup> “It is quite satisfactory to me.”

The playful alliteration in his assent gives Socrates his cue formally to adopt this first custom and trait<sup>1206</sup> about the gods—that they are responsible not for all that happens but only for the good—and move on to presenting the second trait he<sup>1207</sup> has in mind: Shall we imagine that god is a sort of sorcerer and characteristically contrives to make appearances in different forms at different times, sometimes himself actually undergoing change so as to<sup>1208</sup> switch out one shape or form for another,

<sup>1198</sup>Hom.II.4.85-140, when Pandarus wounded Menelaus during the truce, spurred on by Athena in the guise of Laodicus, later referred to as the daughter of Zeus (128).

<sup>1199</sup>Hom.II.20.1-74, when Themis gathered the gods to Zeus.

<sup>1200</sup>σχεδόν (380A8): cf. ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν, 378D2-3.

<sup>1201</sup>ἡργάζετο (B1), usually of a bad or evil act (like δρᾶν). Compare B3 and the association of the two terms at 377E8-8A1), here being corrected against expectations.

<sup>1202</sup>ἄθλιοι (B2) with its derogatory connotation, echoed from 360D4. This cynical term is laced with disparagement the same way the term “pity” is often laced with contempt (cf.354A4 and n.). Socrates is representing the use that someone might make of Homer, such as the uses reviewed in Adeimantus's speech, which is the immediate target and center of the whole discourse though not its circumference.

<sup>1203</sup>εὐνομήσεσθαι (B8), referring to mental habits one can hardly expect the citizens to have formed if from youth they had heard that obeying the law is for “losers.”

<sup>1204</sup>οὔτε σύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς (C3).

<sup>1205</sup>σύμψηφός σοί εἰμι (C4) humorously echoes Socrates's σύμφορα and σύμφωνα but also alludes to the notion of a well ordered state at B8.

<sup>1206</sup>νόμων τε καὶ τύπων (C7), with τε καὶ designating the special connection between the settled belief and the trait that leads to it, just now confirmed by Adeimantus.

<sup>1207</sup>ὅδε (D1), first person demonstrative, again.

<sup>1208</sup>καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος (D3), “i.e., switching his (visible) shape” specifies γιγνόμενον

while other times deceiving us by creating the appearance that he has done something like this? Or shall we imagine him to be both<sup>1209</sup> straightforward<sup>1210</sup> and the least likely of all things to (381) depart from his own true form?

Adeimantus finds himself unable to answer and so Socrates asks a question that might help him do so.<sup>1211</sup>

If something<sup>1212</sup> should depart from its own true form, mustn't it<sup>1213</sup> make the transition from the one to the other form either under its own power or else under the power of something else? As for being changed by something else, things that are in optimal condition are least subject to being changed or moved,<sup>1214</sup> as we see from the cases of the body being affected by food and drink and

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αὐτόν ("in himself undergoing change"), just as καὶ ποιοῦντα below specifies ἀπατῶντα below: the epexegetical καί of mss. ADM should be kept (pace Burnet).

<sup>1209</sup>τε (D5) added to καί to indicate this statement of the alternative (ἢ, D5) will cover both the τότε μέν and the τότε δέ clause, with two reasons and not just one.

<sup>1210</sup>ἀπλοῦν (D5) here in the basic sense given by its Latin cognate, "simple" (i.e., *einfach*, the singular of *dreifach*, double or duplex). It has a range of connotations similar to those of εὐήθης, though much more often approbatory. As εὐήθης refers to a goodness that might be the effect of simplicity (whence Thrasymachus's cynical uses it of 343C6-7 and 348C12), ἀπλοῦς expresses a simplicity, or lack of duplicity, that might be the cause of good. Here in a "corrective" chiasm, it means guileless and corrects ἀπατῶντα, as ἡκιστα ἐκβαίνειν corrects γιγνόμενον.

<sup>1211</sup>τί δὲ τόδε (D8): "But what about this (thing of mine)?" – typical at such a juncture. The ensuing argument, that god never changes whether actually or apparently (380D8-2E11), is an extended *eliminatio*. If the god actually changes the change is caused either by himself or something else (380D8-E1). That it can be caused by something else is refuted first (380E3-381B7); that he would change himself is refuted second (381B8-C6). Rather than move on to god's *apparent* changing—i.e. changing from our point of view—Socrates pauses to expel a selection of stories that depict gods as changing (381D1-E7). Only then does he move to the possibility that gods deceive men into thinking they change when they don't (381E8-10). He refutes this possibility by distinguishing between two kinds of deception (382A4-C1) and then eliminating both, the one kind because it is abhorrent to both gods and men (C3-5) and the other kind because while it has several uses for men none of them is needed by gods (C6-E4). It is only then that he presents the second τύπος in formal dress (383A2-5), as he had the first τύπος at 380C6-9, and closes the discussion with the extended example of a story about god deceiving man, which this second (cf. δεύτερος, 383A2) guideline would now disallow.

The interruption of his argument with condemnations halfway through led the scholiast to find two traits in this passage (*ad* 380D and 382A: ἀμετάβλητος and ἀληθής) and confused J.-C. (*ad* 380D). For self-transformation and producing the illusion of difference as the two types of deception cf. Soph.236C. The brunt of this second trait is that the gods must be depicted as trustworthy. Thus the climactic example of a passage to be censured in accordance with this trait is Thetis's complaint at being lied to by Apollo *in propria persona*, whom she trusted since he is a god (cf. 383B5-6: θεῖον ἀψευδῆς στόμα ἥλπιζον). She has no doubt that the god did not change (note her striking anaphora of αὐτός).

<sup>1212</sup>τι (D8) is the subject of ἔξισταιτο (not god, as neuter αὐτό [E1] shows). The enclitic shows a distinct tendency to come early in its clause rather than wait for the word it agrees with (cf. 411A9-10 and n.1209, 382A1, 389B7, 430E7, 555A1, 564E2).

<sup>1213</sup>ἀνάγκη (D8) of the logical necessity of logically exhaustive possibilities (cf. 333D9 and n. 204).

<sup>1214</sup>ἀλλοιοῦται τε καὶ κινεῖται (E3-4): exegesis of the precedent term, ἀλλοιοῦται, with κινεῖται suggests a passing reference to Ionian φυσιολογία, to which Socrates easily turns, and rather often, for gross corroboration of moral or psychological ideas. Cf. 388E5-7, 485B2-3, 498A6-B1, 548C5, 563E9-564A4; Lys.215E1-216A2. Here it ushers in the examples from the world of animals (σῶμα) and plants (φυτόν).

exercise, or any plant being affected by hot spells or winds or the other things they undergo: the healthiest and strongest individuals are the least altered. And in the case of the soul the bravest and most mindful<sup>1215</sup> one is least subject to outside forces making it anxious and confused<sup>1216</sup> and so<sup>1217</sup> to alter it. Even<sup>1218</sup> in the case of all manufactured equipment and buildings and woven garments,<sup>1219</sup> those that were well<sup>1220</sup> made in the first place and in this way are in a good condition<sup>1221</sup> are least subject to being altered by the passage of time and the other wear and tear they undergo.<sup>1222</sup> Thus in general anything<sup>1223</sup> that is in a fine state,<sup>1224</sup> whether in its nature or due to the craft that made it or both,<sup>1225</sup> admits the least degree of change by forces from the outside. God, however,<sup>1226</sup> and everything about god, is already in optimal condition;<sup>1227</sup> and so in this first<sup>1228</sup> way god could not take on<sup>1229</sup> many

<sup>1215</sup> ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην (381A3), two of the four standard virtues, to match the pair of bodily virtues adduced above (380E6), τὸ ἀνδρεῖον selected for its kinship to bodily strength, and τὸ φρόνιμον somewhere between σοφίᾳ and σωφροσύνῃ.

<sup>1216</sup> ταράξειν (A4) embodying in one word both types of effect (fear and confusion) that the soul's bravery and intelligence suit it to resist. These two aspects of the soul happen also to be the prerequisites of the natural born guard, from above.

<sup>1217</sup> ταράξειν τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσειν (A4): contrast ἀλλοιοῦται τε καὶ κινεῖται above, where the exegetic verb followed the precedent term and helped introduce the exemplary material (380E4 and n.). Here, by a reverse logic, the exemplary realm (the soul) has already been introduced and the term particularly suited to it (ταράξειν) comes first, followed (with the same connective, τε καὶ) by the precedent or generic term, which in effect asserts that the particular verb (ταράττειν) is indeed an instance of, and therefore boils down to nothing more than, the precedent or general idea (ἀλλοιοῦσθαι). For τε καὶ linking the example to the principle cf. A8-9 (with n.), 339E2, 374D1-2.

<sup>1218</sup> καὶ μήν που καὶ τὰ γε σύνθετα (A6): the asseveration (μήν) is shown by που to be merely opportunistic.

<sup>1219</sup> τὰ (γε) σύνθετα πάντα σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα (A6-7). The predicate position of πάντα makes τὰ σύνθετα a noun. Therefore the list σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα is an exegetical appositive to τὰ σύνθετα πάντα. For τε linking an apposition cf. 361B2-3 and n.

σκεῦος is one of those nouns that can be used for the species or for the genus. As a genus among other genera it stands for the artificial realm in contrast to the natural (e.g., Gorg.506D5-6 [σκεῦος, σῶμα, ψυχή, ζῷον]; H.Maj.295CE [σῶμα, ζῷα, σῶμα, σκεύη, etc.]; Rep.401A3-4 [σκεύη, ἡ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις, τὰ ἄλλα φυτά, on which cf. n. 1561], 510A5-6 [ζῷα, φυτευτὸν γένος, σκευαστὸν γένος], 596C5-9 [σκεύη, φυόμενα, ζῷα, etc.], and cf. Soph.219A11-12). It can also be used for a species or subset of artificial items, usually with modifier as at Leg.679A (ἀμπεχόνη, στρωμνή, οἰκήσεις, σκεύη ἔμπυρά τε καὶ ἄπυρα) but also alone as at Charm.173B7-C1 (σκεύη, ἀμπεχόνη, ὑπόδησις). Its “ancipital” character as genus (looking back to the natural genera σῶμα, φυτόν, ψυχή) and species (looking forward to οἰκοδήματα and ἀμφιέσματα) accounts for its being placed first in the present list. The subsequent verbal nouns οἰκόδημα and ἀμφιέσμα are metonymies for the more usual οἰκία and ιμάτιον (as, e.g., at 372A7) stressing the fact that these items are the result of manufacture (σύνθεσις).

<sup>1220</sup> εὖ εἰργασμένα (A7-8): the natural way to say this would be καλῶς εἰργασένα (in the sense of καλός noted at 353A4); εὖ is used to slant the expression toward εὖ ἔχοντα (see next note).

<sup>1221</sup> εὖ ἔχοντα (A8): cf. 380E3 (with εὖ rather than ἄριστα copying the εὖ with εἰργασμένα), but that notion primarily applied to living entities that achieve one or another stable state such as health or weakness or strength or disease (i.e., ἔξεις from ἔχω): this category does not properly apply to artifacts, which are put into their condition by being manufactured, and thereafter merely last, shorter or longer. The καὶ therefore links the case to the precedent term, as above (A4).

<sup>1222</sup> ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων (A8-9) calls for exactly the same analysis as εὖ ἐργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα (A8). Time is the new item, specific to artifacts since they do not have ἔξεις

forms.<sup>1230</sup>

But<sup>1231</sup> could he alter<sup>1232</sup> himself and change thereby? Does he change himself to a better and finer<sup>1233</sup> condition or to a condition worse and uglier than his present one? Given the fact that he lacks nothing in virtue and beauty<sup>1234</sup> he could not make himself better, so it must be<sup>1235</sup> to the worse.<sup>1236</sup> And yet, given this,<sup>1237</sup> what god or man would willingly make himself worse in any way whatsoever?<sup>1238</sup> Therefore in the case of god as well,<sup>1239</sup> he cannot willingly alter himself. Instead, since each god is optimally beautiful and good<sup>1240</sup> each in his way,<sup>1241</sup> he remains always and honestly<sup>1242</sup> in his own proper form.

Let none of our poets therefore tell us that

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but simply wear out, which is then linked to the precedent term it needs to instantiate (*τὰ ἄλλα παθήματα*, redone from 380E6). Here the connective is *τε καί*, connecting example to principle as it did at A4.

<sup>1223</sup>πᾶν δή (B1) draws a generalized conclusion from the instances σῶμα, φυτόν, ψυχή, σύνθετον (380E4-381A7) which then as a principle would be applied to the gods.

An argument of this form cannot be valid or “logically true.” A strictly exhaustive list of specifics would have to include the demonstrandum itself and therefore could only beg the question; conversely a logically exhaustive division according to types would prove too much on the one hand since the demonstrandum would perforce belong to only one of the types and too little on the other since the truth of the principle in the one instance draws its support from its resemblance to the others.

Still this kind of argument can be stronger or weaker, and more or less persuasive. If the collection of instances or types is comprehensive and yet each type instantiates the principle differently but indifferently well, then the principle appears to be detachable from its cases and true for its own reasons. The present collection lays out essentially three categories that collapse into two: body (human or otherwise natural [cf. use of φυτοῦ at 491D1-2]), soul, and artifact (whether a tool or a house or a garment). Behind these three loom two larger categories, things that grow (as well as ψυχή, the principle of life within, reading now αὐτήν with D rather than the οὐ τήν of AFM, at 381A3) and things that are made, a version of the distinction between the real and the artificial. The selection is therefore both comprehensive and refined. As to the principle that what is in good condition is less liable to change under external assault, the attributes of health and strength which all natural bodies share enable them to resist the assaults to which they are severally liable, of food and drink or of wind and heat. The soul in turn if it is strong in its way retains its mindfulness and resolve. Even artifacts, whether the equipment we make for ourselves or our houses and our clothes, if made well (this now corresponding to being “grown” well) are more durable and less liable to break apart into their original components.

The argument points to relations within the several categories of individuals that it adduces. Objectively speaking, as the examples continually re-instantiate the principle, the principle verges onto taking on a life of its own. Even though articulating the principle may still borrow from or bear traces of the examples that have revealed it, it finally rises out of the process as truer and realer than each and all the examples exactly because it remains the same while they come to be seen as embodying it only in their several ways. Stated subjectively the mind is led by the sequence of examples to notice, isolate, remember and then apply a common element it had not seen as such before. This leading on of the mind, identical in all essential aspects to the kind of argument Socrates has used with Polemarchus in Book One, gives this kind of argument the name ἐπαγωγή, or induction.

<sup>1224</sup>καλῶς εἶχον (B1): εὖ and ἄριστα are replaced by καλῶς under the influence of the last example, the artifact.

<sup>1225</sup>ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ (B1): φύσις in its sense of the natural condition (i.e., ἔξις; cf. 514A1-2, 518B2, 573C8, 576A6 and B7, 591B4); but pairing it with τέχνῃ brings it into its more usual meaning (the world of nature). The slip in meaning is tolerated in order to reach and exploit the standard exhaustive doublet and make the conclusion an exhaustive generalization. ἢ ἀμφοτέροις is then added for logical

“... gods change their looks to that of strangers’ garb,  
And take on all sorts of forms when they visit the cities of men.”

Let nobody tell those lies against Proteus and Thetis, and whether in tragedy or in other poems let nobody bring on Hera completely changed into a priestess gathering alms

“For the life-giving sons of Inachus, the Argive stream,”  
nor let us allow anybody to tell all the other lies of this sort.<sup>1243</sup>

exhaustiveness, regardless whether there may be no instances of it.

<sup>1226</sup>ἀλλὰ μήν ... γε (B4), reading γε with D Euseb (τε AFM), which helps mark the minor premise while καί infers (whereas τε is unneeded).

<sup>1227</sup>ἄριστα ἔχει (B4), retrieving the original terminology from 380E3.

<sup>1228</sup>μέν (B6) gently reminds us that there are two kinds of γοητεία to be refuted (380D3-6).

<sup>1229</sup>ἰσχοι (B6): In the midst of retrieving original terms Socrates allows himself also to use a new term (rather than retrieving γιγνόμενον and ἀλλάττοντα from 380D3), which relies on and brings forward the role played by the cognate expression ἔχειν πως in the proof.

<sup>1230</sup>πολλὰς μορφάς (B6) also retrieves the original terminology (380D4), and gives the sense of a QED.

<sup>1231</sup>ἀλλ’ ὁρα (B8) introducing the remaining alternative. Adeimantus recognizes and acknowledges the logic of the *eliminatio*, by answering, “Clearly he would alter himself, if it is actually true (*εἴπερ*, B9) that he changes.”

<sup>1232</sup>μεταβάλλοι καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ (B8): μεταβάλλειν is new. The alternative concept, that he is both subject and object of the change, is most simply expressed by a *transitive verb*, which is then made to boil down to a type of ἀλλοίωσις (καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ).

<sup>1233</sup>βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον (B10) the comparative degree of the commonplace hendiadys expressing value, ἀγαθὸς καὶ καλός, just as τὸ χείρον καὶ τὸ αἰσχιόν represents their opposites.

<sup>1234</sup>κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς (C2), the nouns that go with those adjectives, in reverse order.

<sup>1235</sup>ἀνάγκη (C1): Adeimantus again acknowledges the logical necessity of the *eliminatio*.

<sup>1236</sup>χείρον (C1) does the work of the hendiadys: the beautiful is certainly good because it is good for it to be beautiful, and therefore when the doublet is to be represented by one of the members, the member that does the work is τὸ ἀγαθόν.

<sup>1237</sup>οὗτος ἔχοντος (C3) genitive absolute, unexpressed neuter τούτου standing for the principle enunciated in B10-C2, that change would have to be for the worse. That principle is deduced from the perfection of god, but once grasped—that (for whatever reason) change would be for the worse—men can come back into the argument: for what god or man would choose change for the worse?

<sup>1238</sup>χείρω ποιεῖν ὄπηοῦν (C4): χείρω worse in general (cf. C1 and n.); then ὄπηοῦν, generalizing, includes both τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ κακόν.

<sup>1239</sup>θεῷ (C7), with ADM, instead of the *facilior* θεόν (with F). καί emphasizes that logic binds god.

<sup>1240</sup>κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος (C8), the superlative degree.

<sup>1241</sup>εἰς τὸ δυνατόν (C8) seems to me a concession to the separate virtues of the gods in the pantheon.

<sup>1242</sup>ἀεὶ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ (C9): ἀπλῶς suggests straightforwardness and honesty (so it was used, saliently, at 380D5: cf. n.) and therefore threatens to confuse the distinction that the two-part argument is based on (actual change, whether caused by external forces or the god himself, and deception that such change has occurred: 380D3-6). But the basic distinction there was between the actual and the apparent, and the apparent was characterized by the motive of deception. There remains the question that if the god actually changed what would be his motive for doing so. The refutation that he does not actually consists, in part, in showing that in pure logic he could have no

Furthermore we mustn't let mothers, distracted<sup>1244</sup> by such lies as these, try to scare their children with badly made stories about gods that lurk around at night, withal, making themselves resemble all sorts of strangers.<sup>1245</sup> This blasphemes the gods at the same time that it makes our children fearful.

By talking about mothers rather than poets Socrates has gone a little past his immediate target. Going too far is often the signal that it is time to get back to the main point, and this he next does by asking about the second limb of the second trait. Granting that the gods do not change themselves, might they make us *think* that they do by taking on a kaleidoscope of appearances so as to deceive and bewitch us?<sup>1246</sup> Adeimantus only sees that this possibility has not been eliminated<sup>1247</sup> and Socrates starts an argument to do so, with a question Adeimantus cannot answer:

(382) Would god be willing to deceive either in word or deed,<sup>1248</sup> by holding in front of him a false picture to us?

"I do not know."

You mean you don't know<sup>1249</sup> that when it comes to true falsehood,<sup>1250</sup> if you will allow me to use such an expression, this is a thing abhorred<sup>1251</sup> by gods and men alike.

The oxymoronic phrase of course leaves Adeimantus in the dark: "How do you mean?" and Socrates has another opportunity to expiate:<sup>1252</sup> I mean it thus, that by the most important of one's rational motive to change. This argument ignores our fear of some underlying character (as opposed to his thinking) lurking in this powerful divine force, so that the assertion, here, that he is straightforward is consoling and in itself harmless. The issue of his intentions will in any case be dealt with next.

<sup>1243</sup>In the first case (D2-4) the Homeric words themselves, παντοῖοι τελέθοντες (*Od.17.495-6*), are relevant to the formulation of the τύπος; but in the second the relevant word, ἡλλοιωμένην (D7), comes in Socrates's narrative. We are free to imagine this term did appear in the immediate context of the quoted fragment (which is reported by schol. in *Ar.Batr.1344* as being from *Aesch.Xant.*[= fr.170 N], whence μηδ' ἐν τραγῳδίαις [D5-6]).

<sup>1244</sup>ἀναπειθόμενοι (E2), of being persuaded against one's better judgment, as at 365E5.

<sup>1245</sup>περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ινδαλλόμενοι (E3-4): the language is in fact an interpretation and elaboration of the quote from the *Odyssey* above (cf. Adeimantus's similar move at 366A3-4 and n.), here helping to bring out what is troublesome about it (περιέρχονται νύκτωρ ~ ἐπιστρωφώσι // πολλοῖς ... καὶ παντοδαποῖς ~ ἀλλοδαποῖσι παντοῖοι [the repeated -δαπ- or -απ- element suited to the foreignness of their garb: cf. the etymology given in LSJ s.v. ἀλλοδαπός]). The inference that the gods changing shape would alarm the children reveals the point of ἀπλῶς at C9.

<sup>1246</sup>The contrast is between their actually changing and merely deceiving us, but as above the expression sets the gods (sc. as they are: αὐτὸὶ μὲν οἱ Θεοὶ, 381E8, cf. τότε μὲν αὐτόν, 380D3) against us (sc. as viewing them: ἡμῖν δέ, 381E9, cf. τότε δὲ ἡμᾶς, 380D4). The same polarity will be stressed below, 383A3-5.

<sup>1247</sup>ἴσως (E11) indicates not that he is unsure but that he recognizes this is the next unanswered question in the structure of the *eliminatio*.

<sup>1248</sup>ἢ λόγω ἢ ἔργω (382A1-2): generalizing with the usual couplet, but since the primary semantic field of ψεύδεσθαι is in language he needs to add a picture what a lie in action would be—whence φάντασμα προτείνων Cf. 382E9-10 and n. 1288.

<sup>1249</sup>οὐκ οἰσθα (A4) answering Adeimantus's οὐκ οἶδα: Socrates buys himself an opportunity to expiate on his question—by introducing a new meaning of ψεῦδος and ψεύδεσθαι.

<sup>1250</sup>ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος (A4): Compare his riddle about the γενναῖος σκύλαξ, 375A2-3 and n.

<sup>1251</sup>μισοῦσι (A5), functioning as the opposite of ἐθέλειν (A1, A8).

<sup>1252</sup>And again with οὔτως (A7) he opens by answering the interlocutor's expression (πῶς λέγεις, A6).

own things to deceive, and about the most important things, is something nobody<sup>1253</sup> would knowingly<sup>1254</sup> choose. It is fearsome above all to have *that* stored up *there*.<sup>1255</sup>

Adeimantus is still more confused,<sup>1256</sup> and so are we. How does deceiving become storing something somewhere? What is this “most important”<sup>1257</sup> by which or for which we deceive,<sup>1258</sup> and what are the “most importants” that somehow correspond by their paramount importance to it, about which we might deceive? For the moment it is impossible to know what these two “importants” can mean let alone “storing up” and “that” and “there.”

Now Socrates clarifies, after a fashion. You don’t understand because you think I am saying something deep.<sup>1259</sup> All I have in mind is that with the soul to lie about what is real and true,<sup>1260</sup> and thereby to become deceived<sup>1261</sup> so as to be in a state of virtual ignorance, and to have, and be left possessing,<sup>1262</sup> nothing but falsehood there, is the last thing anybody would abide, and that they abhor

<sup>1253</sup> οὐδείς (A8), neither god nor man (cf. A5), the opposite of τις at 381C4.

<sup>1254</sup> ἐκών ἔθέλει (A8), not redundant, but exact. ἐκών as often describes not the will but the knowledge or awareness with which the will makes its choice, as in the maxim οὐδεὶς ἐκών ἀμαρτάνει. Contrast the use at 331B2 (and n.).

<sup>1255</sup> ἔκει αὐτό (A9): both terms are vague and yet both are emphatic, ἔκει as third person demonstrative adding importance as ἔκεινος = *ille*, and αὐτό not τοῦτο, suggesting prior familiarity or notoriety.

<sup>1256</sup> οὐδὲ νῦν πω μανθάνω (A10): the explanation has introduced new (νῦν) confusion.

<sup>1257</sup> τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἔαντόν (A7): the adjective is new in the context. It connotes mastery subjectively, and importance or influence objectively.

<sup>1258</sup> τῷ κυριωτάτῳ (A7): The force or meaning of the dative is at present *unclear*.

<sup>1259</sup> οἵτι γάρ τι με ... σεμνὸν λέγειν (B1): enclitic τι tending to appear early in the clause rather than after the word it goes with (σεμνόν: cf. 380D8 and n. 1212). It is not deep but it is a riddle. It is totally in keeping with the Socratic method as we know it and with the Platonic method of composition that imitates and emulates it, that Socrates’s interlocutor as well as Plato’s reader should be required to do some thinking along the way and reach the idea on his own. By stirring up a question in his interlocutor’s mind Socrates’s intentional obscurity at least creates a berth in his mind (and ours) for an answer. For instances, compare 375A2-3, 392C9-D8, 413A2-B4 (compare τραγικῶς there with σεμνόν here), 421C8ff, 557D1-2, 602C1-6, 608C9, 612C5. Conversely the commentator who lies in ambush, waiting for a compelling proof, often ends up finding fault with the text for failing to do his work for him, or faults the argument for ignoring questions that occur only within his own mind.

<sup>1260</sup> τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα (B2): By the syntactical parallelism (κυριωτάτῳ / περὶ τὰ ὄντα) we immediately perceive that Socrates is answering his riddle by filling in its blanks.

<sup>1261</sup> ψεύδεσθαι τε καὶ ἐψεύσθαι (B2): ψεύδεσθαι is repeated from A7: what was unclear there was not, as with κυριωτάτῳ and κυριωτάτῳ, the semantics or reference of the verb, but how deceiving (ψεύδεσθαι) could be tantamount to storing up something κεκτῆσθαι (A9). Epexegetical καὶ with ἐψεύσθαι, as though it were an etymological clarification, begins the explanation, the ensuing terms depicting a metamorphosis that ends with the target term κεκτῆσθαι.

<sup>1262</sup> ψεύδεσθαι τε καὶ ἐψεύσθαι καὶ ἀμαθή εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος (B2-3): The list is “metabolic,” providing the steps that lead from the term ψεύδεσθαι to the term κεκτῆσθαι from the previous remark (I borrow the term from Phdr. 262A2-3). The person deceives with or by his soul (ψεύδεσθαι), then himself becomes deceived (ἐψεύσθαι) as if telling the lie forced him to unlearn what he knew (ἀμαθή εἶναι), because there (ἐνταῦθα) where he knew truth he now holds (ἔχειν) the lie, so that it has become a fixture there. The metabasis in this case is a temporal process.

Usually the metabolic list is used to bring the interlocutor along in prospect rather than to backfill: cf. 348D2-3, 357C5-7, 395D1-3, 412C12-13, 488D1-2 (cf. 488E1-9A1), 492C7-8; cf. Crat. 393A6-

such a thing<sup>1263</sup> happening in that part of themselves given its nature.<sup>1264</sup> Moreover,<sup>1265</sup> this phrase “true falsehood” is just the right term for the ignorance lodged in the soul of the person stuck in deception, seeing that the falsity that occurs in statements<sup>1266</sup> is an attempt to imitate something that is happening in the soul, which attempt only later congeals into a fixed image,<sup>1267</sup> and as such, though false, is not a falsehood through and through.<sup>1268</sup>

Now as we said, the real and true<sup>1269</sup> falsity is something abhorred not only by gods but by men, too. What about the kind of falseness that occurs in speech and thought? When and for whom<sup>1270</sup> is it useful enough not to be abhorred? Presumably in both our dealings against enemies during war and in connection with<sup>1271</sup> our so-called<sup>1272</sup> friends, as when<sup>1273</sup> they are raving or otherwise beside themselves and attempt some horrid act: falsehood may then prove useful in the way a drug may for

B1 (a specious use of metabasis that is characteristic of the etymologies of Cratylus, as again 429D8-E7), 411C4-5, 423B4; *Crito* 48B8, 54C5; *Gorg.* 505A6-10; *Ion* 533B6; *Leg.* 634A3-4, 664A6-7, 678A3, 686E4-5, 828B3, 909B5; *Parm.* 142A3-4 (cf. 155D6-8); *Phlb.* 17E4-5, 36C10-11, 50B1-4; *Prot.* 319D2-4, 337C8, 352B4; *Tht.* 157B4 (where τοῦ is metabatic [with Campbell *ad loc.*] and not to be emended), 206D3-4; *Tim.* 49B8 (λίθους) and C1-2 (ἀέρα), 76D8-9 (and Cornford *ad loc.*). Less obviously metabatic are *Lach.* 192A4-6; *Leg.* 704D6-7, 783A6-7; *Lys.* 215D4-7; *Phdo* 80C4-5; *Symp.* 192A4-5.

<sup>1263</sup>Emphatic αὐτό (B4) repeated along with μάλιστα from A9, is now seen to mean κεκτήσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα, i.e., περὶ τὰ ὄντα; leaving the spatial or local expression ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ to refer to ἐκεῖ, there, which is now seen to mean the κυριώτατον, i.e., the soul. The soul began as the instrument by which the lie was told (bare dative κυριωτάτῳ, cf. τῇ ψυχῇ, B2), but ended up as the medium in which the lie was lodged (ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, B4-5).

<sup>1264</sup>τῷ τοιούτῳ (B5): referring to the soul in terms of its crucial influence (as τῷ κυριωτάτῳ) in the judgment and awareness of truth.

<sup>1265</sup>ἀλλὰ μήν ... γε (B7), introducing the “simultaneously true” minor premise, in this case the articulation of a distinction between the kinds of falsehood that inhere in statements and in souls, indirectly alluded to by the expression ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος above, an oxymoron at the same time emphatic and vague. All that we have to go in is the obverse of A7-9: is there a ψεῦδος that lodges in a less primary or influential instrument or medium? or a ψεῦδος about less primary and influential things (depending on the sense of κύριος)?

<sup>1266</sup>τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις (B9): With τό Socrates suggests we already have met this kind of ψεῦδος. He is referring back to A1-2 with its indication (again indirect, as much is in this page!) that the primary application of ψεῦδος and ψεύδεσθαι was in λόγος and speaking (so that ἔργῳ there needed to be illustrated with a metaphor: cf. n. 1248).

<sup>1267</sup>μίμημά τι τοῦ ... παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονός εἴδωλον (B10): μίμημα stands to the world of the verb and the adverb as εἴδωλον stands to the world of the adjective and noun. The former, with its indefinite τι and its objective genitive παθήματος, another verbal noun, expresses a groping or evolving process that later comes to a stop (γεγονός): when the waters clear and the dust settles the fixed outlines of an εἴδωλον come into view, which then can be compared with the original and found to be false, to be a ψεῦδος. For this use of εἴδωλον of a “reification” in contrast with the verbal blur that leads to it, compare 599A6-7 and B4-5 with nn.

<sup>1268</sup>ἄκρατον (C1) of wine undiluted with water: the εἴδωλον bears some admixture of truth, some mark of the event that led to it, which itself was real ἔργῳ. The ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, conversely, is a ψεῦδος ἄκρατον because it occludes the soul from performing its sovereign function of reaching the sovereign truth.

<sup>1269</sup>τὸ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος (C3), standing in contrast with τὸ ἐν λόγοις ψεῦδος as ἔργον in contrast with λόγος, and replacing the more provocative juxtaposition, ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, with which he bought time to draw the distinction (382A4: for the synonymity cf. 343C4, 347D4-5). Now that the distinction has been achieved, such a compendious expression as this may safely be adopted.

<sup>1270</sup>πότε καὶ τῷ (C6): The reference of τῷ is unclear: it may be a dative of means (like πάντῃ, E6) or a dative of interest. At this point we do not know what it means.

the sake of averting them. Also in connection with the storytelling we have been talking about: Since we<sup>1274</sup> don't have historical knowledge of the aforesometimes, by conforming our fiction to the truth as best as we can, so<sup>1275</sup> we can derive some use from what is actually false.

"Very much so," says Adeimantus, his strong agreement enabling Socrates to ask the next question: Of these ways that the false may be useful,<sup>1276</sup> which is useful for the god?<sup>1277</sup> Are we to say he needs it to substitute for an account of the past that he lacks out of ignorance?<sup>1278</sup>

"That would be ridiculous!"

So there is no false poet in god.<sup>1279</sup> But could it be out of fearing those whom he hates that he would lie?<sup>1280</sup>

<sup>1271</sup>πρός τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλούμενων φίλων (C7-8): The shift to the genitive is unexpected. The τε, rather than as usual setting up a connection for a second prepositional object (second to πολεμίους) to be governed by πρός after being introduced by its own καί in effect places a comma after πολεμίους, placing πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους on its own, with proleptic καί introducing not only the complementary noun φίλων but, with its new case, a new syntactical phrase in which the role of the genitive is not yet clear.

<sup>1272</sup>τῶν καλούμενων φίλων (C7). The proviso recalls the confusion in Book One whether people are our friends because we help them or we help them because they are our friends, a point that will suddenly become relevant below (E3). The shift from accusative to genitive extenuates the construction, which is then slightly shifted (Heindorf's οἵ ἄν for ὅταν smoothes out the mild anacoluthon, unnecessarily).

<sup>1273</sup>ὅταν (C8): The question is πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον (C6). πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους combined the two (our enemies [ἔχθροί] during war); the mention of friends, the complement to ἔχθροί who are πολέμιοι, gives a second answer for τῷ and thus begs for a corresponding second answer for πότε, a time or circumstance in which falsehood would be useful for friends. ὅταν is therefore natural and expected (pace Hermann who emends to οἵ ἄν in order to give the genitive a governing syntax as soon as possible); the dangling genitive is then tucked in to the sentence as an objective genitive governed by ἀποτροπῆς (C9). τότε is semi-redundant, like οὕτω below.

<sup>1274</sup>ἀφομοιοῦντες (D2) being nominative may only go with the subject of λέγομεν, and so also with εἰδέναι. We the founders are being conflated with the poets for whose poetry we are in the process of formulating guidelines.

<sup>1275</sup>οὕτω (D3) semi-redundant, elevating the syntactically subordinate participial expression to the ordinate rank. Cf. 368D6 and n.

<sup>1276</sup>καὶ μάλα ... οὔτως ἔχει (D4): Of course the "validity" of the argument relies on the list of usefulnesses being exhaustive. Whatever comprehensiveness might have been suggested by the reference to friends and enemies is undermined, however, by the opportunistic reference to storytelling. So, in lieu of a logically comprehensive list of usefulnesses we are given the dramatically strong response of Adeimantus.

<sup>1277</sup>τῷ θεῷ (D5). The article with θεός in the singular verges toward the meaning "that which is god" i.e., the divine: cf. its first uses in the present context, at 379A7 and B1 and note ad B7. The reasoning is clearer if it is based on god as god rather than calling for an exhaustive survey of the entire pantheon, which would be just as ridiculous as imagining that god is ignorant of days gone by. Indeed the shift from the indiscriminate plural used of men above, to this essentialist singular bespeaks a categorical shift from the human to the divine.

<sup>1278</sup>διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι (D6) begins to go through the possible grounds of usefulness in reverse order according the usual chiasm of before and after (cf. n. 18).

<sup>1279</sup>ποιητῆς μὲν ἄρα ψευδῆς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι (D9): ἐν θεῷ (in divinity) virtually replaces ἐν θεοῖς (among the gods), continuing thereby the essentialist, or "theological" tenor of the argument.

<sup>1280</sup>δεδιώς τοὺς ἔχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο (D11), the reading of mss. ADM and the edd. The phrasing copies that of the previous option, ἀφομοιών ἀν ψεύδοιτο (D6-7), with the exception of omitting ἀν

“Far from it.”

But because of their familiars’ foolishness or raving?<sup>1281</sup>

“But<sup>1282</sup> nobody in the group of fools and madmen is a friend to god.”

Therefore there is no purpose for which god would lie, and we can conclude that in every way<sup>1283</sup> the spiritual and divine realm<sup>1284</sup> is utterly free<sup>1285</sup> of falsehood.

From this it is easy to conclude<sup>1286</sup> that god is essentially<sup>1287</sup> uniform and true both in action and in speech, and neither changes in himself nor deceives others, not by producing appearances nor in what he says,<sup>1288</sup> nor in the messages he sends us<sup>1289</sup> whether we are waking or sleeping.<sup>1290</sup>

(383) Adeimantus asserts he has come to see what Socrates says is true, during the very time of Socrates’s argument,<sup>1291</sup> and as before<sup>1292</sup> his agreement enables Socrates to announce their adoption of a second τύπος as to how the poets must speak of the gods and depict them in their poems: The

(read by F and Eusebius before ψεύδοιτο). The omission of discourse markers in parallel questions is an index of the casual spontaneity of dialectic (cf. 333A13, 352E7, 398A6, 415D9-E3, 443A6). ἔχθρούς substitutes for πολεμίους (C8) since the gods do not engage in war; but it matters little since they don’t have rivalrous and hateful relations, either.

<sup>1281</sup>οἰκείων (E2) replacing τῶν καλούμενων φίλων (C8), and the construction in διά being imitated (in reverse chiastic order). But the notion of friendship it is not forgotten: θεοφιλής (E3): the gods are not stuck with mad relatives and fickle friends as we are.

<sup>1282</sup>ἀλλ’ οὐδείς (E3): The sequence of answers shows the options are not just false but ridiculous and absurd. The ἀλλά with which Socrates introduces the alternatives (D11, E2) mildly protests, “But perhaps... .” With this third answer, Adeimantus closes the door on the “but perhapses” by himself saying, “But no.”

<sup>1283</sup>πάντῃ (E6) formulaic in summary of an *eliminatio*.

<sup>1284</sup>τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ θεῖον (E6): the neuter adjectives more explicitly formulate the essentialism of the argument; the addition of δαιμόνιον, shoehorned in before the precedent term θεῖον, broadens the conclusion to include everything beyond the human realm (cf. 427B6-7 and n. ad 391D1-2), as if to remark that we have been looking through the wrong end of the telescope throughout this phase of the argument, trying to conceive of gods on analogy with humans.

<sup>1285</sup>ἀψευδές (E6) a new term used in powerful litotes: in the course of learning the gods don’t lie we have been reminded that men live in an unreliable world and always may.

<sup>1286</sup>κομιδῆ ἄρα (E8).

<sup>1287</sup>ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθές (E8): The neuter adjectival mode of expression is continued by ἀπλοῦν (recalling the first limb, that god does not change: 380D8-381C10 [cf. ἀπλῶς, 381C9, ἀπλοῦν 380D5]) and ἀληθές (recalling the present limb, 381E8-382E7, about falsity and deception).

<sup>1288</sup>οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους (E9-10) redoes 382A1-2 (ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων) in normal chiastic order, and corroborates the interpretation that (*pace Adam*) is only meant there as an explanation of ἔργῳ.

<sup>1289</sup>οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς (E10): This new item is a natural extension of what has already been dealt with, perhaps anticipated by δαιμόνιον (E6) as occupying the μεταξύ through which the message is sent. We shall see its application immediately below (*πομπήν*, A8).

<sup>1290</sup>The ending portion of the list (E9-11) is our first instance of “serial subdifferentiation,” each new section of the list differentiating the last item in the previous section. Cf. 395A4-10 and n.

<sup>1291</sup>φαίνεται (383A1) is therefore “dialectical.”

<sup>1292</sup>The conclusion is here agreed to (383E8-383A1) and then adopted as a τύπος (A2-6), just as agreement was presented at 380B6-C5 and then formalized into a τύπος at C6-10. J.-C. are wrong to read 383E8-11 as the articulation of the τύπος and as the antecedent of τούτον (383A2). The τύπος is stated in the ὡς clause (383A3ff), which otherwise becomes either a redundant restatement of the τύπος or a circular explanation of it.

gods do not mislead us in word or deed, as if they were sorcerers, by changing themselves at their end or by creating false ideas in us at our end.<sup>1293</sup> Despite the fact that we praise and approve much in Homer we will not be praising the story of the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon,<sup>1294</sup> nor the passage from Aeschylus where Thetis asserts that when Apollo was singing at her wedding he

“... foretold the happy fortunes of my children,  
Their lives full long unknowing sickness:  
Throughout the paean he talked good omens  
Of my divine protected luck, and gave me heart.  
And I was sure that Phoebus’ divine mouth  
Was free of lie, teeming with art of prophecy.  
But he, himself who sang, himself who shared the feast,  
Himself who made these words, himself in deed  
Is murderer of my son.”<sup>1295</sup>

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<sup>1293</sup> ποιεῖν and λέγειν do not govern ώς (pace Adam and J.-C.). As in the presentation of the first τύπος (380C6-9) their syntax is enclosed within the prepositional relative clause that defines the purpose of the τύποι in general, which is then followed by the recitation of the τύπος itself, in an infinitival noun clause (παράγειν), that is the antecedent of τούτον (383A2, cf. οὗτος 380C6). If ώς is intolerable as introducing an infinitive noun clause it must be dropped. Emending παράγειν into παράγοντας (Richards) makes ώς possible at the expense of making its clause redundant or circular; and it creates a balanced pair of participles for the two μήτε’s at the expense of restricting sorcery to alteration where before it had been applied to both alteration and deception (cf. 380D1-6, 381E8-10).

In the previous two formulations of this τύπος, the word order pointed a contrast between the gods and us (μήτε αὐτούς ..., μήτε ἡμᾶς: cf. 381E8-9 with n., and 380D3-6), whereas the statement drew a contrast between the gods changing and the gods deceiving. This same astigmatism of contrasts is present a third time here, with αὐτοὺς γόντας ὄντας and ἡμᾶς intervening between the μήτε’s and the datives they govern (τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἐαυτούς and ψεύδεσι), the former intervening accusative being the subject and the latter being the object of the infinitive παράγειν. The word order seems gratuitously lapidary and something we would expect in the ὕγκος style of the *Laws*.

<sup>1294</sup> *Iliad* 2.1-83. Zeus remains in heaven and sends Dream (a δαιμόνιον τι, we may say) to Agamemnon, as a messenger who looks to Agamemnon like Nestor and who tells him he is a messenger from Zeus. It is a deception πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Zeus instructs Dream to tell Agamemnon that now is the moment he can sack Troy since it is no longer defended by the gods, which is a lie. He hopes Agamemnon will rely on this lie, attack rashly, and then suffer great losses. Zeus lies that victory is in store in order to create the opposite outcome. Agamemnon does rely on the message—partly because Dream looks like wise old Nestor but also because Dream says it is from Zeus—and calls a counsel of the princes and advocates an attack. Nestor (the “real” Nestor) counsels the princes to believe the dream: from any other than the best of the Achaeans it might be a lie. Nestor places Agamemnon in the same position of reliability as Agamemnon had placed Zeus: the reliance proves to be transitive and the princes summon all the troops. Agamemnon tests their will by telling them a lie (110ff), that he has decided that Zeus’s long-standing promise they would some day sack Troy has now after nine futile years proved to be a bitter deception, and that it is time for them to quit and go home. Agamemnon lies about his dream from Zeus in order to create the opposite outcome: the troops rebel against retreat and the battle is joined. It is here we get the Catalogue of Ships.

<sup>1295</sup> Again the god did not change but lied, and again it is reliance (ἢλπιζον, B6) on the lie and its exact inversion of the truth that makes it so bitter. Had Apollo ceased to be Apollo Thetis could at least point to a time when Apollo was good to her; if someone or something else had forced him to change she could blame the someone else instead of him. But he did not change (as her anaphora of αὐτός stresses), and she had relied on him and the truth of what he said in the interim. Aeschylus’s almost otiose εἰπών (B3), repeated at B8, sets up a damning contrast between words and deeds

When somebody speaks this way about the gods we'll treat him harshly and won't provide him a chorus,<sup>1296</sup> nor will we let the teachers use his verses in the education of the young, if we want our guards to come out god-fearing and god-like<sup>1297</sup> as much as a man is able to be.

Adeimantus accepts these<sup>1298</sup> traits and would adopt them as the laws of his city.<sup>1299</sup>

## END OF BOOK TWO

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(κτανών).

<sup>1296</sup> χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν (C2): As his argument gains ground Socrates feels inspired to expand the reach and sway of the policy, arrogating a greater role to himself than the hypothesis of the argument justifies.

<sup>1297</sup> That piety confers godliness is an adumbration of the notion of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ developed below (500C5-D2, 501B7, 613A7-B3).

<sup>1298</sup> τούτους (C6) indicates Adeimantus has grouped the second trait (divine deception) with the first (divine blamelessness), and this in itself suggests the end of a section, a section about gods. It is in the character of transitions to begin before we know it and to end when they become obvious.

<sup>1299</sup> ὡς νόμοις ἀν χρώμην (C7): Adeimantus accepts the argument in the dialectical sense (συγχωρῷ, C6), not only as a τύπος to be used for the φύλακες but as a guide he would be willing to adopt as law and custom (cf. 380C4 and n. 1205), an acceptance that likewise goes beyond the hypothesis of the argument.

## BOOK THREE

(386) Socrates continues, confirming the suspicion we gathered from Adeimantus's last remark, that he was about to move on to a new topic: As for the gods, these are the sorts of things, as it appears from our conversation, that are to be heard and not heard, straight from childhood by persons who are to turn out<sup>1300</sup> honoring gods and ancestors as well as<sup>1301</sup> not dishonoring their friendship with each other. But what if they are to be brave?<sup>1302</sup> Won't these things too need to be said, namely, what sort of things will make them fear death as little as possible? or do you think somebody can become brave as long as he holds such dread within himself?

"By God I surely do not," Adeimantus says.

So do you think a person who believes there is a Hades and that what goes on there is fearsome<sup>1303</sup> will be free from a fear of death, and in the thick of battle will choose death rather than defeat and enslavement?<sup>1304</sup>

"No way."

Then we must oversee those who set about writing these stories too,<sup>1305</sup> and prevail upon them not to take the standard line that what goes on in Hades is all bad, but rather to praise it, since in speaking this way they would be<sup>1306</sup> saying things neither true nor useful for preparing persons to be eager warriors. Thus we shall erase all such expressions starting with the following passage which I take<sup>1307</sup> from epic:

"I'd rather be a serf in the employ of another  
Who rents his field, a man whose life barely yields a living,

<sup>1300</sup> τιμήσουσι (A3) future because the education of the young guards is meant to instill in them opinions that will not be the opposite of what we will need them to be when they grow up (377B7-9).

<sup>1301</sup> τήν τε ἀλλήλων φιλίαν μὴ περὶ σμικροῦ ποιησαμένοις (A3-4) The τε may be viewed primarily as adding the φιλία to the other two or primarily as adding the negative clause to the positive one, but it is best to view it as doing both. The sentence has the binary construction Plato favors (cf. 329A5 and n.). Either way there are three items we want them to honor, gods parents and friendship among themselves: these constitute three aspects of piety (as defining the relation to gods, parents, and city). Socrates is making more explicit what he broached with the term θεοσεβεῖς at 383C4. We had heard that young men might easily apply the relations among the gods as a justification for their action toward their own parents (378B1-5); but it is only to the latter that the present words apply.

<sup>1302</sup> ἀνδρεῖοι (A6), as the primary predication of the δέ clause, virtually presumes the μέν clause covered a single virtue co-specific with bravery—i.e., piety, as we had guessed. The transition has ended when it became obvious (cf. n. 1298 ad 383C6).

<sup>1303</sup> τὰν Ἀιδου ἡγούμενον εἶναι τε καὶ δεινὰ εἶναι (B4): τε καὶ linking prerequisite and inference, with εἶναι shifting from existential to copulative sense.

<sup>1304</sup> ἥττης τε καὶ δουλείας (B6): loss of the battle and enslavement as its result.

<sup>1305</sup> περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων ... λέγειν (B8) a *constructio praegnans* for μύθους λέγειν περὶ τούτων.

<sup>1306</sup> ὡς ... ἀν λέγοντας (B10-C1), reading the ἀν of F (om.ADM) with Burnet. I take the construction to be an abbreviation of ὡς οὔτε ἀληθῆ ἀν λέγοιεν, ταῦτα λέγοντες, οὔτε ὠφέλιμα, the tautology of λέγειν being abbreviated into ἀν only for ἀν λέγοιεν and the participial protasis λέγοντες attracted back into the accusative case of its antecedent, the accusative subject of λοιδορεῖν, if they do in fact speak this way.

<sup>1307</sup> N.b. τοῦδε (C3), first person demonstrative.

Than to rule over all these evanescent shades.”<sup>1308</sup>

or the fear that

“The homes of the dead should be laid open to men and to gods,  
Horrible and dank, that even the gods abhor ...”<sup>1309</sup>

or

“Woe! Now I see that there is still life to be lived in Hades’s house,  
And the likeness of us, too, but nothing by way of wits!”<sup>1310</sup>

or

“He alone has wits among the fluttering phantoms.”<sup>1311</sup>

and

“Forth from his limbs flew his soul and made its way to Hades  
Wailing over its fate and the vigor and youth it left behind.”<sup>1312</sup>

(387) or

“But his soul went below ground and was off and gone  
Like gibbering smoke.”<sup>1313</sup>

or

“As bats in some haunted grotto flit about and gibber  
When one of them falls loose from the cluster  
By which they hold themselves fast to the rock,  
So did these souls gibber and fly.”<sup>1314</sup>

As for these passages and all the others like them, we will request Homer and the rest of the poets not to gripe and chafe when we cross them out.<sup>1315</sup> It’s not because they lack poetry or fail to

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<sup>1308</sup>Achilles speaking to Odysseus in Hades (*Od.*11.489-91). Achilles would sacrifice τιμή (and, we are to take it, accept ἡττη τε καὶ δουλεία [B6]). Other than honor, Achilles, according to the heroic world view, knows no greater good, except perhaps life, and never will. But now he chooses the merest of lives above ground over the endless “diminution of life” (καταφθιμένοισιν) in Hades. How can we expect our young to begin any better off than he? In the end the best of them will of course learn what Achilles doesn’t know, and the heroic world does not know, that being brave is a good in itself.

<sup>1309</sup>*Iliad* 20.64, the thought of Hades fearing that Poseidon’s angry earthquake might expose his house to the world above.

<sup>1310</sup>*Il.*23.103, spoken by Achilles after embracing the air where he dreamed the dead Patroclus was standing.

<sup>1311</sup>*Od.*10.495, said by Circe of Teiresias when she tells Odysseus he must go down and take counsel with him.

<sup>1312</sup>λιποῦσ’ ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην (D10), a formula used of the death of Patroclus (*Il.*16.856) and of Hector (*Il.*22.382).

<sup>1313</sup>*Il.*23.100, describing the disappearance of Patroclus from Achilles’s embrace, immediately before the passage quoted above.

<sup>1314</sup>*Od.*24.6-10, of the suitors’ shades.

<sup>1315</sup>διαγράφειν (387B2). Clearly Socrates is thinking of a text written on something, as he did above with ἔξαλείψομεν (386C3).

please the mass of mankind,<sup>1316</sup> but that exactly to the extent they are and they do, they mustn't be heard by the children and men<sup>1317</sup> whom we need to be free in the sense of having learned to fear slavery more than death.

Socrates's selection of passages moves, without intervening commentary, from statements of what Hades is like made by people who are already there, to observations of the dehumanizing enervation even manly men suffer (more exactly, their souls) as they depart to the place that has such a reputation. The enervation is described onomatopoetically in all three of the last examples,<sup>1318</sup> which provides the motivation now to move on to the diction used in scary stories. We'll throw out that entire vocabulary<sup>1319</sup> that expresses fear and foments it too<sup>1320</sup>—the “Cocytuses” and the “Styxes”<sup>1321</sup> and the “lurkers below” and the “withered ones”—all these expressions cause nothing but<sup>1322</sup> shivers. There may be a use for them somewhere else,<sup>1323</sup> but let's devote our fears to the good of our guards lest the shivering make them overheated and softer in temper than we need them to be.<sup>1324</sup> It is the opposite sort of stories we need to tell them and must cause to be produced.<sup>1325</sup>

Likewise we will strip away the groans and the wails,<sup>1326</sup> of men who are notable. Why? Because a decent<sup>1327</sup> man will not be shaken at the death of another like himself, while as for himself we will count him especially self-sufficient and therefore far more able to live a good life on his own than others can, so that he will be least affected by the bereavement of a son or a brother or of his

<sup>1316</sup> τοῖς πολλοῖς (B3): as opposed to our wards. Cf. C3-5.

<sup>1317</sup> παισὶ καὶ ἄνδρασιν (B4) is metabatic and genetic, meaning “the children we will need to end up as men who are free” (cf. 413E6). The tense of the ensuing participle πεφοβημένους likewise describes the process in terms of its result.

<sup>1318</sup> By γούωσα in the first (386D10) and then by the participles of τρίζω used in the last two A3, A8.

<sup>1319</sup> ὀνόματα (B8).

<sup>1320</sup> δεινά τε καὶ φοβερά (B8-9) distinguishes the effect of the fearsome terms (δεινά) from the feelings that motivate their use (φοβερά): Socrates's point is that the two feed on each other.

<sup>1321</sup> Κωκυτούς τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας (B9-C1) The plurals as well as the autonomasia are satirical and derogatory. (cf. 378D3-4 and n. 1180).

<sup>1322</sup> ὡς οἴεται (C2), of all mss. makes no sense; I read ὡς οἶόν τε written into the Monacensis (as reported by Burnet).

<sup>1323</sup> μή ... γένωνται ἡμῖν (C5): Again he is careful to indicate that his argument is not against the power of stories and language *per se*, but its misuse in the presence of the young who are being groomed to become guards (cf. ποιητικά, 386B3).

<sup>1324</sup> θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι (C4-5): as opposed to the cool and steady temper of an ἄνδρειος. I take the two comparatives to be opposite tendencies (as θυμός is depicted at 590A9-B4). To interpret them progressively, as a fever that follows a thrill (e.g., Phdrs. 251A) leading to a softening of metal by heating (Rep. 411B) not only mixes metaphors (as Shorey notes in the course of accepting the interpretation, *ad loc.* [I.206 note c]) but leaves us with nonsense.

<sup>1325</sup> τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον ... ποιητέον (C9): At first the emphasis was on excision, but with the elaboration of instances and the natural variation of expression a fuller and fuller picture comes into view. We will not only bar some things but also request others; control will be placed on the authors (ποιητέον) as well as on the readers or reciters (λεκτέον) and the performers and actors, too (χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, 383C1-2), since all kinds of poetry will be supervised (380C1-2, 381D5-6), and even depictions in the plastic arts (ποικιλέον, 378C4).

<sup>1326</sup> τοὺς ὁδυρμούς ... καὶ τοὺς οἴκτους (D1), both onomatopoetic. ὁδυρμός recalls Cephalus's criticism of his contemporaries for their intemperate emotionality (329A4-B3: esp. ὁδύρονται, B2). Socrates elaborates on the emission of inappropriate phonemes (as Adeimantus sees, D3).

<sup>1327</sup> ἐπιεικής (D5), again the language of Cephalus: 330A5, 331B1; cf. n. 164.

possessions or other such things.<sup>1328</sup> He will<sup>1329</sup> groan and wail the least and maintain instead the greatest calm when such an event overtakes him, and so we are justified in excising<sup>1330</sup> (388) the laments of notable men, reserving them instead for women (though even here not serious women<sup>1331</sup>) and for any man who is base,<sup>1332</sup> so that our young men whom we claim after all<sup>1333</sup> to be grooming to rule the land will take umbrage at acting the way such men do.

So we have a new set of requests for Homer and the rest of the poets: not to depict Achilles, who is after all the son of a goddess,<sup>1334</sup>

“Flopping about now on his sides and now his back  
And finally prone,”

and then getting himself upright and

“Plowing the waves of the barren sea, aimless,”

nor grasping “handfuls of powdery dust and pouring them over his head”<sup>1335</sup> nor crying out in general and wailing, the way and the amount Homer has him do. Likewise let’s not have Priam,<sup>1336</sup> who is also close to the gods in lineage, calling out prayers as he rolls around in a bed of dung,

<sup>1328</sup> ὑέος ή ἀδελφοῦ ή χρημάτων ή ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων (E3-4): The list is *paced* (cf. nn.202, 644), moving from two examples of one species of assets (son, brother) to a single general term for a second species of assets (*χρήματα*), to a closing term, all-inclusive because totally vague (*ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων*). Classing family members alongside one’s possessions (which offends the modern sensibility more than the Greek: cf. Gorg.511E1-3 [where γυναικας perhaps means female slaves: cf. Dodds *ad loc.*]; Leg.830D1; Lys.219D5-7; and cf. also Phdrs.239E2-40A8; Symp.178C6-D1; Thet.174D3-5A5) is here meant to emphasize the man’s autarky.

<sup>1329</sup> The infinitives *όδύρεσθαι* and *φέρειν* (E6) are parallel with *στερηθῆναι* from which they are direct inferences, as indicated by the repetition of *ήκιστα ἄρα* with its inferential *καί* (E6). There is no need to emend them into indicatives with Stallb. nor to supply a lost indicative with H.Richards (*apud* Adam). J.-C.’s attempt to explain them away as dependent upon *λέγομεν* above (387D11) is vitiated by the fact that *λέγομεν* already took *ώς* rather than the infinitive in indirect discourse in D11-E1, but did not do so again in E3-4, to which the present clause is clearly parallel.

<sup>1330</sup> ξειροῦμεν (E9) repeats the word used at the beginning of this argument (cf. 387D1) effecting closure, or a sort of *quod erat demonstrandum*.

<sup>1331</sup> καὶ οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις (387E10-388A1), preparing the ground for including women among the guards. The stipulative use of the demonstrative (*καὶ ταύταις*), usually done with the neuter accusative (Riddell §§17-18; cf. Smyth §947), is here given a personal construction. The *δέ* in οὐδέ here has the same role as the *περ* in *καίπερ* in stipulative constructions, cf. Smyth §2083b.

<sup>1332</sup> καὶ ὅσοι κακοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν (A1): The policy expands beyond giving examples only of the good, to finding a place for the derogatory depiction of the others.

<sup>1333</sup> δή (A2) as well as *τούτοις* (second person) indicates virtual indirect discourse after δυσχεραίνωσιν: we hope they will chafe at us, saying, “How can you, who are supposed to be grooming us, show us such men as you have?”

<sup>1334</sup> Θεᾶς παῖδα (A6) is the basis for his being an *όνομαστός* (387E9): so also with Priam (ἐγγὺς θεῶν γεγονότα: [only] seven removes from Zeus [Apollodorus 3.12]).

<sup>1335</sup> II.18.23-4, upon hearing of Patroclus’s death.

<sup>1336</sup> Πιρίαμον (B4): Socrates deals as evenhandedly as Homer with the Trojan leaders and the Greek ones, and for the same reasons: for both are *ἔλλογιμος* (for this his criterion is their divine lineage). With these two cases we pass from unseemly body language (*κυλινδόμενον*) to unseemly phonemes (*ώμοι*, etc.).

“Invoking the names of each man, one by one.”

All the more sternly will we demand they not depict the very gods bellyaching and making remarks like

“Woe is me and broken who bore the best to my sorrow!”

—if truly they are gods, at least—nor dare to depict the greatest of the gods in a way so unlike the way he must be as to make him say,

“Ach! Beloved is the man I behold dragged about the town,  
How wails my heart to see it!”

or

“Oh me! Oh my! My Sarpedon, the man I love the most,  
Has met his fate at the hand of Patroclus the son of Menoitius!”

Just imagine after all if the young we are raising heard such remarks as these and did *not* laugh them to scorn as things unworthy for the gods to say!<sup>1337</sup> You’d be wasting your time thinking he would deem such behavior beneath himself, a mere man, if once the occasion arose for him to do so. To the contrary he would stick at nothing but let loose a chorus<sup>1338</sup> of lamentation at the least discomfort to himself, and every manner of wailing. And yet this is just the way they must not act, as our argument has indicated to us, and we must stick with that argument until a better looking one<sup>1339</sup> comes along. Conversely we will not have them laugh at the least provocation, either. A person who gives in easily to laughter is asking for a sudden switch.<sup>1340</sup> No, we don’t want to see men being overcome<sup>1341</sup> with laughter, much (389) less the very gods, and so we won’t accept Homer’s line,

“Unquenchable was the laughter among the blessed gods

<sup>1337</sup> καταγελῶν (D3): As his confidence increases and he can ask how can we not laugh at the ridiculous, Socrates’s tone approaches the satirical indignation of Juvenal (e.g., *Sat.* I.30). Quickly he will cap this tendency (E5ff).

<sup>1338</sup> ἄδοι (D7), recalls Cephalus’s ύμνειν (329B2). In πολλοῖς ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ... παθήμασιν θρήνους (D6-7), the adjectives by a favorite construction are separated from their nouns in order to be placed side by side to strengthen their contrast, their nouns being re-added afterward in chiastic order. (παθήμασιν θρήνους, D7), with ὁδυρμούς added to tie the statement back to the logos above (387DI-388A3).

<sup>1339</sup> καλλίονι (E3): not a stronger argument (like the so-called κρείττων λόγος), but a more attractive argument. Socrates again reveals his awareness that his argument to censor Homer is controversial.

<sup>1340</sup> ζητεῖ (E6) perhaps means “calls for,” with μεταβολή a euphemism for a good swat. At the same time, the term μεταβολή, the parallelisms of quality (*τοιοῦτον*) and quantity (*ἰσχυρῷ* and *ἰσχυράν*), and the correlative *καί* in cause and effect suggests Ionian φυσιολογία, in which context ζητεῖ is a synonymous with φιλεῖ. Cf. 563E9-564A1, where ἀνταποδιδόναι corroborates the suggestion, and where both the moral and the physiological conceits are present. As often a vague or inexact statement will be cleared up in the sequel.

<sup>1341</sup> κρατούμενος (E9), in contrast with καρτερῶν (388D6), now expresses the “equal and opposite reaction” of ἀνταπόδωσις.

As they beheld Hephaestus bustling<sup>1342</sup> down the hall."

This we will not accept if we keep to *your* argument, Socrates says, suddenly pointing to Adeimantus.

"Go ahead and make mine it if you will, and let's say we won't accept it," Adeimantus replies, and with this dramatic wrinkle<sup>1343</sup> the treatment of bravery<sup>1344</sup> comes to a close.

And yet on truth<sup>1345</sup> we must spend no less effort, if we were right to say a moment ago that whereas the gods in fact have no use for falsehood men find it useful the way drugs can be useful. After all we allow only doctors to prescribe drugs, not just anybody. So likewise it will be the rulers of the city if anyone that we will rightly allow<sup>1346</sup> to lie for the good of the city, whether their purpose involves enemies or citizens, but everybody else will be barred from it. In fact we will count a citizen who lies to our rulers to have committed an error tantamount to and worse than<sup>1347</sup> that of a sick person not telling the truth<sup>1348</sup> to his doctor or a person in training to his trainer on matters having to do with what's happening in their bodies, or to the pilot concerning his ship and his sailors not to answer the truth about how one's own work<sup>1349</sup> is going or that of one's fellow sailors.<sup>1350</sup>

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<sup>1342</sup> ποιπνύοντα (389A6) = II.1.599-600: Lame (ἀμφιγυήεις, 607), he is easily winded. The laughter is the contagious reaction (ἄσθεστος, 599) of the gods responding as a mob (κρατουμένονς) to deride Hephaestus's ungainliness as he tries to defuse the conflict between Zeus and his mother Hera by moving hastily among the gods to fill their cups with wine: Zeus whose anger was great enough to cast him down from to earth from heaven one day (589-594).

<sup>1343</sup> τὸν σὸν λόγον / εἰ σὺ βούλει ἐμὸν τιθέναι (A7-8). The byplay does remind us that the whole argument is for the sake of Adeimantus and his and his brother's challenge to Socrates, but does so harmlessly: it serves primarily as a technique of transition to the next topic. Cf. n. 1353.

<sup>1344</sup> οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὖν ἀποδεκτέον (A8-B1). Bravery has not been defined but instantiated in several of its aspects. It is slow to fear, strong in the face of adversity, and proud of its bearing. A technical definition is neither needed nor proffered at this point.

<sup>1345</sup> ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειάν γε (B2). ἀλλὰ μὴν breaks to a new or independent idea (as when it introduces a minor premise), and γε points to the word it follows as warranting the break. Thus ἀλήθεια seems to mean "truth," though it will mean "truthfulness." I render the force of the γε with this translation of the substantive and with the ensuing litotes. Truthfulness is not one of the canonical virtues and cannot be assimilated to bravery which has come before nor to temperance which comes next (389D7ff); Socrates is not bound to a canonical treatment. In the ensuing passage on temperance Socrates will exploit his emphasis on truthfulness to expand the sway and elevate the tone of his criticism still further, on which trend cf. n. 1145 *supra* and nn. 1352, 1364, 1368, 1370, 1377, and 1382, *infra*.

<sup>1346</sup> τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δή (B7): The initial placement of the dative followed by δή encourages us to construe it with δοτέον, but as it turns out προσήκει provides the construction. This sort of syntactical segue is not uncommon in Greek.

<sup>1347</sup> ταῦτὸν καὶ μεῖζον ἀμάρτημα (C2): καί is, idiomatically, "corrective" (cf. n. 2260); but logically, ταῦτόν suggests there is an analogy: this once grasped, μεῖζον makes the evaluative comment that the analogue is graver than the original.

<sup>1348</sup> μὴ τἀληθῆ λέγειν (C4), like μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντι (C5) – as opposed to ψευδῆ λέγειν or μὴ ἀληθῆ λέγειν or τὰ μὴ ὄντα λέγειν – suggest they have been asked and fail to answer the truth. The ruler has the duty to ask and the ruled the duty to tell.

<sup>1349</sup> ὥπως ... τις ... πράξεως ἔχει (C5-6). For the genitive cf. n. 2680.

<sup>1350</sup> With the analogies to doctor, trainer, and pilot (C2-6) Socrates imports prejudices about the nature and functions of the ruler familiar from his discussion with Thrasymachus (341C5,C9; 341E4ff; 342D4,D9). The first two analogies depict the individual's private gain from being ruled well, while the last begins to place him in a "social" group that shares a common fate (*νοῦν* and *πόλις*).

Therefore, whenever the ruler catches somebody lying,

“who numbers among the city's helpers,  
A seer, a healer of ills, or a man who carves timber,”<sup>1351</sup>

he will chastise<sup>1352</sup> him for bringing a disruptive and baleful element into the city just as if he were bringing it on board a ship.

“Baleful it would be, if the false information becomes the basis for action,” says Adeimantus,<sup>1353</sup> again marking a transition to a new topic.

What then of temperance? Shall we not need to provide this for our young men? By my lights its chief elements on the whole<sup>1354</sup> are that while they of course defer to the real rulers they themselves play the role of rulers over their own pleasures of drink and sex as well as of eating.<sup>1355</sup> And so by my lights we will deem well said the sentiment Diomedes says for Homer:

“Friend,<sup>1356</sup> pipe down and listen to what I have to say.”

and what comes next,<sup>1357</sup>

“the Achaeans moved forward with steady resolve  
And silent,<sup>1358</sup> fearing their commanders in silence”

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<sup>1351</sup> *Od.* 17.383-4: Eumaeus lists off the types of men worthy to be invited for dinner; in contrast to the beggar one is unlikely to invite. Interestingly the list has one more entry, which Socrates leaves out: ἦ καὶ Θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὃ κεν τέρπησιν ἀείδων. (385)

<sup>1352</sup> κολάσει (D4): The ruler will inflict a punishment, not just the sorts of athetizations inflicted on the poets' work by Socrates and Adeimantus. Again the sweep of their authority broadens.

<sup>1353</sup> ἐάνπερ ... ἐπί γε λόγῳ ἔργα τέληται (D6). It is the doctor's, trainer's, captain's, and ruler's reliance on the lie and not the lie itself that causes problems. Adeimantus again answers with an elaboration, which (like the byplay with personal pronouns at 389A7-B1) creates closure of the topic of truthfulness (cf. n. 1343).

<sup>1354</sup> ὡς πλήθει (D9), taken by Shorey (Loeb *ad loc.*) to designate a demotic version of σωφροσύνη to be distinguished from a finer version belonging to philosophical types, spoken of elsewhere in the *Republic* or in the other *Dialogues*. But it is Socrates, not Plato, who is speaking, and his purpose is not to maintain consistency in a corpus of *Dialogues* but to rough out a definition of the virtue (as with ἀνδρεία: cf. n. 1344) so that they might apply it, ἐν τύπῳ, in the censorship of poetry: it means therefore “on the whole” and, parallel with μέγιστα, refers to σωφροσύνη in its principle outlines. For the construction (ώς + dative) cf. S.OC 20 (and Jebb *ad loc.*).

<sup>1355</sup> τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἥδονῶν (E1-2): for the content and for the epanalepsis of περί cf. 329A5-6 and n.55.

<sup>1356</sup> *Iliad* 4.412. Eustathius (490.37, *apud LSJ*) declared this instance of the term τέττα untranslatable. Agamemnon has just rebuked Diomedes for acting less bravely than his father and Diomedes has taken the rebuke in silence, but young Sthenelus pipes up and calls Agamemnon a liar: their fathers were no more honorable than he and Diomedes. Diomedes then turns upon Sthenelus and advises him with this line and its sequel not to talk back to his commander.

<sup>1357</sup> II.4.43 I-2. Socrates calls these lines τὰ τούτων ἔχόμενα (E7) with reference to 4.412. Emendation is not necessary: he calls them this not because they are immediately contiguous but because they describe the immediate outcome of Diomedes's statement: the army has fallen into line. The external comparison of Plato's text with Homer is less important than grasping the development of Socrates's argument.

<sup>1358</sup> σιγῇ again (E9). Quietness (ἡσυχία) is likewise the watchword of σωφροσύνη in the initial

and any other passage like these.

"Well indeed."

And yet what about this:

"Groggy with wine, with eyes like a dog and the heart of a deer"<sup>1359</sup>

(390) and what follows—would you say they are well written, as well as any other lines where somebody records wise-cracks made by individual citizens against their rulers, whether in prose or verse?

"Not well."

Yes, such will surely not help toward inculcating temperance in the young. If besides being inappropriate<sup>1360</sup> they are pleasing to hear for some reason this is no surprise. Or how do you see this?

"I see it as you do."

What about depicting the wisest of mankind<sup>1361</sup> saying that in his judgment the finest and most beautiful thing of all is when

"at the ready stand tables  
full of bread and meat, and the steward ladles wine from the mixing bowl  
and pours it into the beakers."

Do you think hearing this helps the young man's self-control? Or hearing

"To die of hunger is the most piteous and the worst of fates."

or hearing that one night while all the gods and mankind slept Zeus was wakeful, and how all his plans slipped out of his mind because of his sexual desire, how he was so distracted by it that when he laid eyes on Hera he would not even wait to take her home but just had to have her right there, on the ground even,<sup>1362</sup> and how he said he was subdued by desire as he had never been, not even as when

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definition that Charmides diffidently offers to his elder, Socrates (*Charm.* 159B2-6).

<sup>1359</sup> Achilles to Agamemnon at the beginning of the *Iliad* (1.225).

<sup>1360</sup> Adverbial ἄλλος (390A5) asserting the irrelevance of the pleasure. The fact that the line is pleasurable for its intemperance does not countervail the claim for expunging it: indeed the pleasure is no accident! The remark is appended to make a segue from the acquiescent aspect of σωφροσύνη (the μέν clause above, ἀρχόντων μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, 389D9-E1) to the continent aspect (the δέ clause, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἀρχοντας ..., E1-2), and in accepting it Adeimantus is already halfway to agreeing to curtail the subsequent stories about failing to master desire.

<sup>1361</sup> ἄνδρα τὸν σοφώτατον (A8): To mention the reputation without the name of the person who bears it (Odysseus, whose words these are: *Od.* 9.8-10) is damning by fulsome praise. Insouciance toward Odysseus is by Plato's lights all he deserves, and it is beside the point that Socrates's "treatment of the quotation is hardly fair to Homer" (Shorey in the Loeb, *ad loc.*). What is at stake here is the upbringing of young men and how they would take the line and use the line, not the reputation of the famous poet.

<sup>1362</sup> χαμαί (C3) specifies the unplanned implication of αὐτοῦ and therefore makes βουλόμενον oxymoronic.

they made their first rendezvous, “deceiving our very parents;” or hearing about the binding of Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus in punishment for passions of the same ilk.<sup>1363</sup>

On the other hand stories and plays about the fortitude of worthy men should be both seen<sup>1364</sup> and heard, as when he<sup>1365</sup>

“Beat his breast and vouchsafed a word to his heart:  
‘Bear up my Heart, betimes you have borne worse than this...’”

We must not allow the men<sup>1366</sup> to be the sort that take bribes<sup>1367</sup> out of a love of material goods, nor should we hear the poet sing that

“Gifts persuade the gods, gifts the reverend kings;”

and let's not be praising the advice that Achilles's tutor Phoenix gave him when he counseled him to fight for the Achaeans only if they gave him gifts, but if they didn't to persist in his rage. We should not even expect, nor acquiesce in the statement if someone proposes it,<sup>1368</sup> that Achilles himself was so fond of possessions as to accept gifts from Agamemnon nor later on to return the corpse only after receiving an honorific gift but was unwilling otherwise.

(391) Adeimantus notes that to praise such behavior would be unjust, and Socrates tops him by venturing to say<sup>1369</sup> that Homer's derogatory depiction of Achilles is an impiety to boot, as the very being persuaded by such a depiction if it he had heard it from others would be,<sup>1370</sup> as likewise it would

<sup>1363</sup>δι' (C7), the *lectio difficilior* (mss.ADM as opposed to the δή of ms.F). Socrates's reason to expunge the deed of Hephaestus is the passionate behavior, similar to Zeus's, that provoked it. ἔτερα (C7) is derogatory in mild aposiopesis (cf. 379D7 and n. 1197).

<sup>1364</sup>Θεατέον (D2): Again his policy expands (n. 1345), now beyond stories to theatrical productions. Note the apodotic chiasm (λέγονται / πράττονται // θεατέον / ἀκουστέον, D2-3).

<sup>1365</sup>Od.20.17-18. Odysseus lies awake planning the fate of the suitors (κακὰ φρονέων ἐνὶ θυμῷ | κεῖτ' ἐγρηγορών, 20.5-6) while the world sleeps except for the maids returning from servicing them. Contrast the wakeful Zeus who forgets his vigilant planning just above (μόνος ἐγρηγορώς ἂν ἔβουλεύσατο ... ἐπιλανθανόμενος (390B7-C1). Odysseus is angered by the easy incontinence into which his house has fallen but must contain his anger and wait for the right moment to strike.

<sup>1366</sup>τούς (D7) continues the stipulation introduced by ἐλλογίμων above (D2).

<sup>1367</sup>δωροδόκους γε (D7), another topic from the brothers' speeches: 364C5ff, 365D7-6B2 (cf. esp. the euphemistic ἀναπειθόμενοι, 365E5 and n.855).

<sup>1368</sup>οὐδ' ὄμολογήσομεν (E7-8): He expands the reach and sway of the policy from barring the assertion to barring belief in what it expresses.

<sup>1369</sup>Reading δι' (391A3) with FD rather than δή, the *facilior*, with AM. Socrates's periphrasis with διά as well as his expression of ὄκνος (ὄκνω δέ γε ... δι' Ὁμηρον λέγειν) constitute his careful attempt to distinguish between the formulation and enforcement of the policy on the one hand, and whatever reverence and love he feels for Homer on the other (cf. φιλία τις καὶ αἰδώς, 595B9). To chastise the poet here would take him off track just as writing proper poems would have done above (378E7,ff), but his mention of the tension in passing reveals he is conscious that the argument has led him into a radical zone. The tension will return in a larger way later, in Book Ten (595B9-C3).

<sup>1370</sup>οὐδ' ὄσιον (A3): More extension. Not only should the lines that get important matters wrong be athetized (διαγράφειν) and Homer himself be barred from writing them: he should also be chastised for having written them since they are untrue, even if he only heard them from someone else, since he promulgated them. With ὄσιον Socrates emphasizes what had been particularly inappropriate in Homer's line about bribing kings with gifts, namely, calling them αἰδοίοντες in this connection (390E3).

be to believe that Achilles had said to Apollo,

“You harmed me, Far-darter, you most destructive of all the gods.  
How I would exact my revenge on you if I had the power!”<sup>1371</sup>

and that he stubbornly opposed the river even though it was a god<sup>1372</sup> and was ready to do battle with it. Or take<sup>1373</sup> the story about that other river, Spercheius, and the hair that he had pledged to it, and the claim that he said,

“To Patroclus the hero I would give this hair to be his company”

—to his corpse that is—and that he carried out this deed:<sup>1374</sup> none of this should we believe. Also the draggings of Hector’s corpse around Patroclus’s tomb and the slaughterings<sup>1375</sup> of live prisoners over his pyre: all these things we will deny as being false nor allow our men to be persuaded that Achilles, son of a goddess and of Peleus, that man so sound of mind and grandson of Zeus, who was then brought up in the hands of Chiron who was so wise, became nevertheless so fully discombobulated as to exhibit two afflictions simultaneously, and contradictory ones to boot: a slavish greed on the one hand and overweening arrogance toward both gods and men on the other.

Nor while we’re at it shall we believe this, or let them say it, that Theseus the son of Poseidon and Perithous the son of Zeus went on a shocking spree of pillaging, nor that any other son of a god and a hero<sup>1376</sup> would bring himself to commit acts so freakish and irreverent as they are now being falsely accused of committing.<sup>1377</sup> Instead let’s impose the requirement on the poets either to speak of the deeds as not theirs, considering what these deeds are in themselves,<sup>1378</sup> or that these men are not the sons of gods, but not let them have it both ways, and not allow them to try to persuade our

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<sup>1371</sup> *Iliad* 22.15.

<sup>1372</sup> θεὸν ὄντα (B1), i.e., Scamander: *Iliad* 21.130-2.

<sup>1373</sup> καὶ αὖ τὰς τοῦ ἐτέρου ποταμοῦ (B2): Never before or since was the Spercheius the “alternate” river to the Scamander! Socrates is heaping the criticism on, exploiting the tail end of one idea as his segue to the next, rather than laying out an orderly division at the start.

<sup>1374</sup> *Iliad* 23.151. Again Shorey (Loeb *ad loc.*) needs not apologize for Platonic exaggeration. The story can easily be seen in its context to involve no impiety, but for a young Adeimantus to misunderstand it in order to justify an act of impiety is even easier.

<sup>1375</sup> Referring to *Iliad* 24.14ff and 23.175-6 respectively. Note again the derogatory plurals (ἔλξεις / σφαγάς, B5-6).

<sup>1376</sup> μηδέ τιν’ ἄλλον θεοῦ παῖδά τε καὶ ἥρω (D1-2): τε καί linking ground and inference. Plato’s usage of ἥρως conforms with the Hesiodic notion that the heroes are the fourth generation after the gods and spirits (δαίμονες), and mankind the fifth (WD 109-10). Compare the lists θεοί τε καὶ δαίμονες καὶ ἥρωες, Rep.427B6-7 (cf.392A4-6) and Leg.717B2-4, 738D2, 799A6-7, 801E1-10. At Leg.799A6-7, 818C1-2 the heroes are called παῖδες θεῶν; and cf. Crat.397D9-E2, δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας καὶ ἀνθρώπους.

<sup>1377</sup> καταψεύδεσθαι (D3) verges on the charge of slander (κατ’ Ἀχίλλεως above [A4] started the ball rolling). Socrates’s tone and posture now expand (cf. n. 1345) to include a sort of indignation on behalf of the good that verges on an a desire to drag somebody into court.

<sup>1378</sup> αὐτά (D4) isolates the notion, as often in Plato. Here it separates the verb from its subject, the deed from the doer.

youths that the gods bring evil into being<sup>1379</sup> and that the heroes are no more noble than men.<sup>1380</sup> We have said all along such statements are not pious and we proved they are not true when we showed that for evil to arise from the gods is impossible. But above and beyond this such statements are harmful to their auditors. Anybody will tend to forgive himself even though he is vicious, under the force of being persuaded that, “By gosh this sort of behavior is there to be found and always has been, even among

the offspring of the gods,  
Close kin to Zeus, for whom on the heights of Ida  
Stands a flaming altar of their great Ancestor—  
Nor is the blood of the daimons far from them.”<sup>1381</sup>

(392) That is why such stories must cease,<sup>1382</sup> since they will engender in our youth nothing but ease<sup>1383</sup> in acting badly.

Is there any other kind of story we need to deal with in determining what may be told and what not? We have dealt with how to talk about the gods<sup>1384</sup> as well as about the daemons and heroes and the spirits in Hades. The supplement to all this would be stories about men, but we are not yet equipped to dispose of this issue. In all likelihood we will conclude<sup>1385</sup> that the poets and storytellers say the worst things imaginable about men—that unjust men often come out happy<sup>1386</sup> and the just

<sup>1379</sup> κακὰ γεννῶσιν (D6). Busy hands have emended the metaphor away (replacing giving birth to κακά with giving birth to κακούς), but the straddling metaphor is exactly what Socrates needs to connect the present thesis, that gods’ offspring can hardly be evil (κακοί), with the general thesis from Book Two that the gods are not responsible for evil in the world (κακά). See next note.

<sup>1380</sup> ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν (D7): With the back-reference to the gods causing only good we sense the section is coming to an end, so that the ensuing general statement that heroes are nobler than men takes on the status of summarizing its theme. Already we sense that we will be moving on from gods and heroes (377E1-2) to men, as will be confirmed explicitly just below.

<sup>1381</sup> The passage (E7-9) is attributed to Aeschylus’s *Niobe* and refers to the Tantalids.

<sup>1382</sup> With παυστέον (E12) the policy exceeds the bounds of the hypothesis of educating imaginary guards and arrogates an historic status and role to itself, as a policy for the future that will correct the present (νῦν, D3) as well as the past (πράττουσίν τε καὶ ἔπραττον, E5-6), recalling in this the historical perspective and challenge of Adeimantus’s criticism (366D7-367A4).

<sup>1383</sup> εὐχέρειαν (392A1) means not dexterity as if its etymon were χείρ, but a lack of internal impediment or hesitation, whether to do good or evil (cf. Shorey, CP 12[1917]308-310). Compare its use (with δυσχερής) to describe natural inclinations at 475B11-C8. It is a direct reference and response to the εὐπέτεια for misbehavior afforded by poets (364C6: cf. n.816) and the δυσχέρεια for injustice that one needs to have, innately, in order to resist the culture around him, mentioned by Adeimantus at 366C7.

<sup>1384</sup> περὶ θεῶν ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι (A4-5), a phrase for which above he coined the abbreviation θεολογία at 379A5.

<sup>1385</sup> ἄρα (A13).

<sup>1386</sup> Reading ἄδικοι μὲν εὐδαίμονες πολλοί (B1-2) with Burnet and ms.F rather than ὄδικοι μὲν εὐδαίμονες δὲ πολλοί with Adam and mss.ADM. The scandalous doctrine being opposed is that unjust behavior is what confers happiness while just behavior only diminishes the goodness of one’s life (makes one ἀθλιος), and the μέν / δέ construction contrasts the fate of the unjust with that of the just. To include ADM’s δέ after εὐδαίμονες creates a contrast between being unjust and being happy (many are unjust but nevertheless happy), which only begs the question and moreover undermines the principal contrast between the unjust and the just.

ones are losers, that justice is “somebody’s else’s interest”<sup>1387</sup> and nothing but a penalty for oneself—and we will be banning such stories as these and requiring them to tell the opposite sort of tale in verse and prose. And yet if you agree that this is what we would say, then I will accuse you of having reached already the answer to the question we set about researching before we began our construction,<sup>1388</sup> namely, what justice is in itself and what inner value<sup>1389</sup> it has for a man apart from reputation and show. Accordingly, our treatment of the stories to be told is finished.

Socrates now continues with an obscure statement: We must next turn to the manner of the telling,<sup>1390</sup> so that what is to be told and how to tell it shall both<sup>1391</sup> have been thoroughly covered. Adeimantus picks up on the etymological figure (using “tell” twice) and replies, “Fine, but you’ll have to ‘tell’ me what you mean.”

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<sup>1387</sup>The language (B1-4) repeats the belief that the entire enterprise is meant to overthrow, including the ironic and fraudulent language by which Thrasymachus first recommends it (343C), and the proviso added by Glaucon and restated in the speech of Adeimantus (367C2-5), that one escape detection ( $\epsilon\acute{e}\alpha\eta\lambda\alpha\nu\theta\acute{e}\alpha\nu\epsilon\iota$ , B3): e.g.,  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{o}\tau\acute{e}\iota\eta\alpha$   $\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{e}\eta\eta$  (“good, but not for you”),  $\alpha\theta\lambda\iota\eta\iota$  (“losers,” 360D4),  $\lambda\nu\sigma\iota\tau\acute{e}\lambda\eta\iota\eta$  (“profit” 344C7-8, cf. nn. 273, 492, 529, 659),  $\o\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\alpha$   $\zeta\eta\mu\iota\alpha$  (self-penalty).

<sup>1388</sup> $\hat{\alpha}$   $\pi\acute{a}\lambda\iota\eta$   $\hat{\epsilon}\zeta\eta\tau\acute{e}\eta\mu\eta\eta$  (B9), reading the imperfect, with Stallbaum [*pace Burnet*] and all mss. It means “what we were seeking to discover in the previous stage of our conversation.” To presume (presumption is the denotation of the perfect,  $\omega\mu\o\lambda\eta\gamma\eta\kappa\eta\eta\eta\eta$ ) that we know how men should act would beg the question that set us on this path of the construction we are still in the midst of. Stallbaum suggested  $\zeta\eta\tau\acute{e}\eta\mu\eta$  as his guess about what Ficinus had before him so as to translate with *quae iam diu quaerimus*. This suggestion became “ $\zeta\eta\tau\acute{e}\eta\mu\eta$  Stallb. cum Ficino” in Adam’s apparatus, “ $\zeta\eta\tau\acute{e}\eta\mu\eta$  ci. Stallbaum” in Burnet’s, and “ $\zeta\eta\tau\acute{e}\eta\mu\eta$  Stallb.” in Chambry’s, even though Stallbaum himself read  $\hat{\epsilon}\zeta\eta\tau\acute{e}\eta\mu\eta$ ! The present is used at 420C1.

$\pi\acute{a}\lambda\iota\eta$  points to a previous phase of action or experience, or section or phase or context within the discourse (Adam is right to see that this is what  $\pi\acute{a}\lambda\iota\eta$  means but wrong to think it hasn’t happened), and only means “long ago” or “long since” if the current section or phase has been going on for a long time (whence  $\pi\o\lambda\lambda\acute{e}$   $\epsilon\eta\eta$  needs to be added to  $\pi\acute{a}\lambda\iota\eta$  at Apol. 18B2, since by itself the opposite of  $\pi\acute{a}\lambda\iota\eta$  is only  $\ddot{\alpha}\rho\tau\acute{e}$  [18D8-E1], referring to the time before the trial as opposed to the time of the trial itself (compare  $\pi\acute{a}\lambda\iota\eta$  at Gorg. 458B6: “before you arrived”). At 414E7  $\pi\acute{a}\lambda\iota\eta$  refers to a time one minute (twelve lines) ago, the moment before Glaucon had heard the big lie as opposed to the present moment, to stress that hearing it has changed his mind. At Phlb. 18D7 it refers to 18A1-5 where Philebus and Protarchus wanted a hasty answer about the relevance of Socrates’s methodical description of moving from the one to the many. Rather than answer Socrates had interposed a second methodical description, of moving from the many to the one (18A6-D2), and they “still” want to know. It appears in the eleventh line of the *Laches* (179A1) to announce, with  $\pi\rho\o\iota\mu\iota\alpha\zeta\eta\mu\eta\eta$ , that the immediately previous ten were an introductory section. Compare its uses at 336B8-C1, 346E5, 414E7, 420C1, 506B5, 551E6, 574D5, 588C2, and 590A5; *Euthyd.* 293B2; and Arist. *An.Po.* 100A14 with Ross *ad loc.* As to the similar semantics of its adjective,  $\pi\alpha\lambda\alpha\iota\eta\o\eta\eta$ , cf. 607B5 and n. 4930, and 611D2; for the semantics of its noun,  $\pi\alpha\lambda\alpha\iota\eta\o\eta\eta\zeta$ , cf. 609E2 and n. 5001.

By reminding Adeimantus that the present treatment of poetry is but a sub-part of the larger investigation into the nature of justice that he himself asked for, Socrates effects a transition to the next phase of that treatment at the same time that he keeps the whole section, as well as the entire construction of a state, in perspective.

<sup>1389</sup> $\phi\acute{u}\sigma\iota\eta$   $\lambda\nu\sigma\iota\tau\acute{e}\lambda\eta\o\eta\eta$  (C3) lacks the pointed precision with which Socrates characteristically quotes previous passages (namely Glaucon’s words at 358B5-6 and Adeimantus’s words at 367B3-5), although he does echo the *obiter dicta* of Adeimantus, his current interlocutor, with  $\phi\acute{u}\sigma\iota\eta$  (in opposition to  $\delta\acute{e}\xi\eta$ : cf. Adeimantus at 367D2) and  $\lambda\nu\sigma\iota\tau\acute{e}\lambda\eta\o\eta\eta$  (which comes close to Adeimantus’s  $\dot{\alpha}\nu\iota\eta\eta\eta\iota\eta$  at 367D3).

<sup>1390</sup> $\tau\acute{o}$   $\delta\acute{e}$   $\lambda\acute{e}\xi\eta\omega\zeta$  (C6): supply  $\pi\epsilon\pi\acute{e}$  in anastrophe. By the parallelism and etymological connection with  $\tau\acute{a}$   $\mu\eta\eta$   $\lambda\o\eta\eta\eta$  Socrates bluffs that his new idea already makes sense, just as he began the last

Socrates immediately finds a way to make his meaning plain. Everything told by storytellers and poets is in fact a narration of events, whether past, present or future. To this Adeimantus agrees since it is exhaustive,<sup>1392</sup> and Socrates can continue: The telling uses either pure narration or narration by imitation<sup>1393</sup> or both. Even though this second question is also formally exhaustive Adeimantus cannot agree to it without clarification as to its content.

Now that he has bought room to say what he wants to, Socrates dismisses the fitful by-play by commenting on it: As a teacher I'm a comic figure and unclear to boot—so I'll tell you what I mean as a person less than clever at speaking would, by giving an example<sup>1394</sup> rather than trying to articulate it in general. You know<sup>1395</sup> the beginning of the *Iliad*, where the poet has Chryses beg Agamemnon to release his daughter, how Agamemnon treats him harshly, and how he goes away empty handed and prays to Apollo to avenge him against the Achaeans. In the midst of this section (393) the poet himself says

“and he prayed that all the Achaeans  
And especially Agamemnon, the lead shepherd of the people ...”

and says it without trying to divert our attention away from himself as though someone other than he were saying it. But in what follows he speaks as if he himself were Chryses and tries with all his skill to make us think that it is not Homer who is speaking but the priest,<sup>1396</sup> with his old man's way of talking. All the rest of his narrative is composed this same way, about what happened in Ilium and what happened in Ithaca and the entirety of the *Odyssey*.<sup>1397</sup>

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section with the bluff that of course the false stories should be taught first (377A1-2). Plato often depicts him bluffing this way, asking questions intentionally obscure as to content that portray themselves by their form as being crystal clear, in order to elicit a question from the interlocutor that will allow him to expiate. Cf. 382B1 and n. 1259.

<sup>1391</sup>ἄ τε λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον (C7-8): τε ... καί is used to emphasize the idea that the study has two parts, continuing the bluff so as to raise even further Adeimantus's desire to find out what this second part might be.

<sup>1392</sup>τί γὰρ ἄλλο (D4).

<sup>1393</sup>μίμησις (D5) is inherently abstract, and as such tends to be vague, so that Adeimantus does not understand. γιγνομένη (sc. διηγήσει, D5-6) nails down the point that had only been implied by appending ἀπλῆ το διηγήσει, namely that μίμησις, whatever it is, is a kind of narration.

<sup>1394</sup>οὐ κατὰ ὅλον ἄλλὰ ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι (D9-E1). His attempt at making things clear with a general statement has failed for its vagueness (ἀσάφεια: D8,9) so now he will make his meaning clear (δηλοῦν) with an example, which he calls a “part” to promise its relevance to the general point. On ἀπολαμβάνειν cf. n. 273 ad 336C6-D2.

<sup>1395</sup>ἐπίστασαι (E2) suggests having mastered the text, perhaps having it by memory.

<sup>1396</sup>μὴ “Ομηρον δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα (393B1-2): We tend to overlook the fact that impersonating another requires us to “depersonate” ourselves, but Socrates points to it. This is the first consequence of his premise that mimicry is a kind of διήγησις rather than something alongside it. Let us note in general that the subject tends to forget he is another person, and also that we tend to forget that a picture is an oiled canvas.

<sup>1397</sup>περί τε τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλη Ὀδυσσείᾳ παθημάτων (B3-5): The list dares to move toward a generalizing universal (ὅλη Ὀδυσσείᾳ) after two coordinate specifics (τὰ ἐν Ἰλίῳ and τὰ ἐν Ἰθάκῃ), the first itself being a generalization of the example of Chryses's prayer. Note that the generalization is achieved by generalizing (more exactly, perhaps, by “universally quantifying”) only the second. The fact that the entirety of the *Iliad* took place in Troy whereas the entirety of the *Odyssey* did not take place in Ithaca spoils the logic only for the scholar (cf. Herwerden *apud* Adam and Adam's gratuitously ingenious response to him, *ad loc.*): Ἰθάκη is an “ancipital” item whose logic looks

Given this example, won't you agree narration is taking place both when one tells speeches and when one tells what comes between speeches, but when one tells the speeches as if he were another person,<sup>1398</sup> at that point<sup>1399</sup> we will remark that the teller is likening his own manner of speaking<sup>1400</sup> as much as he can to the individual whom he has just announced as about to speak.

With this Adeimantus has no problem.<sup>1401</sup> "Well," Socrates goes on, "to liken oneself to another whether in voice or posture<sup>1402</sup> is to imitate the person he likens himself to, no?" And Adeimantus agrees with a little impatience: "So what?"<sup>1403</sup> It's in this kind of thing, we can now say,<sup>1404</sup> that Homer and the other poets<sup>1405</sup> compose their narration "through mimicry."<sup>1406</sup> And Adeimantus agrees roundly and without reservation.

both ways, exactly as *iátrευσις* did at 357C6 (cf. n.681).

For generalizing the whole by generalizing only the last (co-specific) item, as here, cf. Leg.716E2-4, 735B1-3, 792B6; Polit.307A8-B1; and n.183. Distinguish this from the essentially otiose use of a generalizing term with an item that is already generic in order to indicate that a generalization is being drawn, as Leg.716D7: εύχαῖς καὶ ἀναθήμασιν καὶ συμπάσῃ θεραπείᾳ θεῶν (cf. 777E2-4, 792B6, 881E2-3; Polit.280C1-2, 288D7-8). Finally, a generalization can be achieved by concatenating the former with the latter, as for instance Charm.173B7-8: τὰ σκεύη καὶ τὴν ἀμπεχόνην καὶ ὑπόδεσιν πᾶσαν καὶ τὰ χρήματα πάντα (cf. Polit.289B4-5 [a degree of first-stage generalization gotten from pluralizing the species], 307A8-B1; Rep.387E3-4, 608E6-9A4). Leg.694E6-7, ποίμνια καὶ πρόβατα καὶ ἀγέλας ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ πολλῶν πολλάς, is something quite different. Generalization is achieved through the introduction of a neutral grouping term (*ἀγέλας*) which is then impled with a list of genitives of substance that is itself generalized: cf. Leg.777E2-4 (where the participle is the grouping term); Polit.288B2-4; Rep.580A3-5 (*πανδοκεῖ*). The move at Thg.124B5-7 should also be mentioned in this connection, where the genus is "generalized" by the addition of its complementary coordinate (*ἰδιωτῶν*) which is then itself generalized by subdivision into complementary subspecies: ... αὐτῶν τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἀπάντων καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν.

<sup>1398</sup>Ὦς τις ἄλλος ὅν (C1): We would say "when he tells speeches as if he were the person giving the speech."

<sup>1399</sup>τότε (C2), giving the point for which the μέν clause (B7-8) provided the foil or background.

<sup>1400</sup>λέξιν (C2), the *definiendum* that this digression was designed to explain, now reappears.

<sup>1401</sup>τί γάρ (C4) asks for more: "Yes we will—so what?"

<sup>1402</sup>ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα (C5-6) widens the scope of the imitation beyond voice to appearance and emphasizes the performative aspect of practicing poetry, which as we will soon see is the essence of Socrates's present concern. The widening is done by the logical step of adding sight to sound, but at the same time we must recognize that the term *σχῆμα* narrows the mere sight or appearance of a person to those aspects of his appearance that show his character (hence "posture"), in the same way that the voice (*φωνή*) of a person is here to be understood in a sense narrower than the mere sound of the person's voice. Imitation of mere sound will come later (396B5-6, 387A4-7).

<sup>1403</sup>τί μήν; (C7). Socrates is a very poor teacher (cf.392D8): first he goes too fast, then he goes too slow.

<sup>1404</sup>δή (C8), responds to Adeimantus's impatience.

<sup>1405</sup>καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί (C8-9): Socrates characteristically generalizes beyond his example whenever the pace of the epagoge affords him an opportunity to do so. Cf. the widening with *σχῆμα* just above.

<sup>1406</sup>διὰ μιμήσεως (C9): His explanation has consisted in moving from a plain description of what the poet does (*ποιῆσαι* ὥςπερ ἄλλος ὅν, C1: cf. B1-2) to a more compact statement of it (*όμοιοῦν* ἔαντὸν ἄλλῳ, C2) to a most compact statement (*μιμεῖσθαι* ἄλλον, C5-6), and then ends by replacing this last verb with its cognate abstract noun in -σις, which was the original *obscurum* (*διὰ μιμήσεως*, C9, cf.392D5 and n.1393). The explanation among other things fixes impersonation within narration as

The basic point about mimicry having been made Socrates can now elaborate it so as to reveal its importance to the problem of education.<sup>1407</sup> If the poet never hid<sup>1408</sup> his true identity he'd come off with a work whose telling<sup>1409</sup> was entirely without mimicry. So that you don't start saying<sup>1410</sup> you don't know what I mean again, let me show you how this could be done. If Homer, after starting out by telling us that Chryses arrived with a ransom for this daughter as a suppliant to the Achaeans and especially to their kings,<sup>1411</sup> had not next spoken as if he had become Chryses but had continued as Homer, then the sequel<sup>1412</sup> would not have been mimicry but straight narration. It would have gone about as follows—though my illustration will not use meter: I'm not skilled enough at composition for that.

"The priest arrived<sup>1413</sup> and prayed, first on behalf of the Greeks that the gods should grant them to sack Troy and be saved, and second that his daughter be released to him in return for the ransom he brought and also out of a respect for the god of whom he was the priest. He said this and although the others were stirred by reverence to concede his

a mere narrative technique and hence requires us now to translate μίμησις with "mimicry."

<sup>1407</sup> Aristotle in his *Poetics* does closely follow Plato's treatment of poetry in this passage but the anatomy of poetry here is not an end in itself, as in Aristotle, but merely a vehicle for Socrates's investigation of paideia (whether that of the guards or that of Adeimantus), and will be dropped as soon as it ceases to serve those ends. The absence of λέξις from an account of poetry in the very different context of *Gorg.*502C therefore has no inherent significance.

Adeimantus does not understand the distinction between λόγος and λέξις because it is new. Aristotle (*Poetics* 1450B14-16) already takes it for granted. That Aristotle should borrow from Plato without acknowledgment and in ways that reveal he either did not recognize the purpose or did not care about the purpose of the remarks he borrows is more the rule than the exception. One of the unfortunate effects of the comparison Aristotle thereby suggests, between his own works and purposes and those of Plato, is that what is merely a dialectical event or passage in Plato can be made to seem an entry in a systematic history of some idea or field – in the present case the history of literary criticism in antiquity. Thus the pedagogical apparatus Socrates here uses on Adeimantus can be transmogrified into so many Platonic beliefs, prejudices, and even fears about literature. J.W.H. Adkins (*Literary Criticism in Antiquity* [Cambridge 1934] I.33-4, 41-4, 47-9) for instance invents Platonic reasons for the present censorship of poetry over and above those that the present context already supplies, while G.M.A. Grube (*The Greek and Roman Critics* [Cambridge 1968] 50-52), invents a psychological predisposition of Plato's that, he claims, requires him to have Socrates do this.

<sup>1408</sup>, ἀποκρύπτοι (C11) suggests device and deception, whereas the ensuing periphrastic construction affords him an opportunity to use the dative αὐτῷ (D1) as though the poet were better off without the business of lying. Again, where we take the εἰκών as the truth (i.e., meaning) of poetry Socrates measures poetry against truth (i.e., reality).

<sup>1409</sup> ποίησις τε καὶ διήγησις (D1). διήγησις stands to ποίησις as λέξις to λόγος (392C6-D3). The proliferation of verbal nouns in -σις is perhaps an affectation.

<sup>1410</sup> οὐα ... μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι οὐκ αὖ μανθάνεις (D2) where αὖ adds "don't start with that (again)."

<sup>1411</sup> μάλιστα δέ (D5): The detail with μάλιστα is repeated to bring us to the point in the quotation above (A5) at which Chryses had begun to speak *in propria persona* (as we would have it), or (as Socrates would have it) Homer began to speak *in aliena persona*.

<sup>1412</sup> The subject of ἦν (D7) is τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, drawn from μετὰ τοῦτο at D5.

<sup>1413</sup> ἐλθὼν ὁ ἵερεύς (D8-E1): Asyndeton is felt even though mitigated by forward pointing ὥδε (D7), and shows that the ensuing passage is to be taken as a set piece. For the text, *Iliad* 1.12-42, for which Socrates composes his "metaphrasis," as Roger Ascham calls it in his *Schoolmaster* (1570) [<http://www.classiclanguagearts.net/resources/the-schoolmaster.htm>, accessed 12/4/11], and a comparative analysis of Plato's version of it, see Appendix I.

request, Agamemnon acted savagely and warned him to leave and never to return, lest the scepter that he had and the god's chaplet he wore would not suffice him; his daughter would not be released, he said, before she had grown old in his entourage at Argos; and he bid him leave and without making a fuss so that he might (394) make it home safe. When the old man heard this he was stunned and left quietly, but once he got clear of the army he made a great prayer to Apollo, invoking the god's eponymns and reminding him of his own previous good deeds and asking for a favor back,<sup>1414</sup> if ever once he had brought the god joy whether in the building of temples for him or in the rituals of sacrifice: in return for such<sup>1415</sup> he begged the god to make the Achaeans pay for what gave him tears, by means of the great one's shafts."

That's what I mean, my friend, by straight narrative free of mimicry!

This is quite a performance, and Adeimantus gets the point,<sup>1416</sup> so that Socrates can continue. Get this then:<sup>1417</sup> you have the exact opposite of this if you strip away the portions between the speeches and are left with nothing but the exchanges.<sup>1418</sup> Adeimantus recognizes Socrates is talking about the type of thing you get in tragedies, so that Socrates can announce they have now completely disposed of Adeimantus's uncertainty what he meant above when he had said there were three kinds of poetry or storytelling,<sup>1419</sup> a kind that is done entirely with mimicry, like tragedy and comedy which he has just adduced;<sup>1420</sup> a kind that consists entirely of reports from the poet himself,<sup>1421</sup> especially to be found in dithyrambs; and the kind we have just mentioned that uses both, which is to be found in the epic but also<sup>1422</sup> in many other genres. With this it has become clear what Socrates had meant by his distinction

<sup>1414</sup> ἀνακαλῶν καὶ ὑπομιμήσκων καὶ ἀπαιτῶν (394A3-4) digest the content of the prayer into its three rhetorical moments. First the I calls to the Thou (ἀνακαλῶν: cf. κλῦθί μεν, ἀργυρότοξ', *Iliad* I.37); then the I invokes the aspects of the Thou that it needs, as well as putting the Thou in mind of previous services rendered by the I (ὑπομιμήσκων: cf. II.I.37-41, ὅς ... αἰγῶν), which in turn creates an auspicious moment at which the I presses his claim to the Thou (ἀπαιτῶν: II.I.41-2, τόδε μοι ...). The list depicts the termini of the prayer with its first and last items, and everything in between with its second (ὑπομιμήσκων).

<sup>1415</sup> ὁν δή (A6). The relative, as noted by Smyth, can be equivalent to a demonstrative plus connective particle (§§2488, 2491); but this is a survival in Attic of the epic use of relative for demonstrative, which Socrates here finds it natural to imitate.

<sup>1416</sup> μάνθανω (B2).

<sup>1417</sup> μάνθανε τοίνυν (B3).

<sup>1418</sup> ἀμοιβαῖα (B5) is pregnant. Exchanges are what you are left with if you take all the rest away.

<sup>1419</sup> ποιήσεως τε καὶ μυθολογίας (B9-C1): cf. μυθολόγων ἡ ποιητῶν (392D2), another instance of Socratic accuracy in reminiscent quotation (cf. 340C9 and n.363), with apodotic chiasm to boot. Δηλοῦν (B8) likewise echoes δηλώσαι (392E1).

<sup>1420</sup> The widening of Adeimantus's τραγῳδίας with κωμῳδία is again characteristic of Socrates's technique. Herwerden's conjectured τε before καὶ κωμῳδίας at B6 is unneeded.

<sup>1421</sup> αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ (C2-3) again insisting on the fact that the poet or reciter comes with a voice of his own as opposed to the voices of other persons he might make himself into.

<sup>1422</sup> τε (C4-5) followed by δέ rather than καί. The mention that there are others is not just ampliative generalization (this would have been done with bare τε .. καί). δέ is also mildly adversative, dispelling any hint of limitation imported by the use of epic as an example (cf. *Apol.* I.9D8 [and Stallb. *ad loc.*]; Leg.818C4-D1, 919D5-7 [and Engl. *ad loc.*]; *Polit.*270D1-3 [ἄλλως τε ... δέ for ἄλλως τε ... καί!]; Rep.367C6-7, 370D10-E3, 395C4-5, 499B2; *Symp.*186D4-5; and cf. Denniston 513-4). The shift from τε to δέ within an enumeration to add a contrary or complementary item (*Phdo.*65C5-7; *Polit.*305B8-C1;

between what is said and how it is said, and now we may move on to asking whether<sup>1423</sup> we need to regulate the poet's use of mimicry and how.<sup>1424</sup>

Adeimantus now guesses that Socrates is harboring an unstated intention to exclude drama altogether from their city.<sup>1425</sup> At the same time that he acknowledges that they might well be on the verge of an outcome no less radical,<sup>1426</sup> Socrates disowns any responsibility or unstated intentions of his own by restating the basic principle that has been governing their conversation ever since the construction of the city began (367E-9C), that they must follow the λόγος wherever it may lead just as a sailor resets his sails to follow the changes of the wind.<sup>1427</sup> As long as the movement of the logos follows the wind there is no justification for asking the captain where he is steering it nor even to ask him or anybody else where it is going. Following the wind seems to be the eminent way under the force of an intuition that reason is somehow suited to find truth.

*Rep.382E8-II*) is a subtype of this use.

Distinguish this adversative δέ from illative δέ (341D1, 475C4).

<sup>1423</sup>πότερον ἔάσομεν (D2).

<sup>1424</sup>ὅποια ἐκάτερα (D4).

<sup>1425</sup>His καί in εἴτε καὶ οὐ (D6) suggests he is ready to hear as much.

<sup>1426</sup>ἰσως δὲ καὶ πλείω (D7): Socrates allows that their result may be even more radical than the wholesale abolition of drama not (as J.-C. and even Shorey say) to foreshadow the treatment of poetry in Book Ten, as if Socrates were speaking on behalf of the author who is putting these words into his mouth to a reader that is not really listening to his characters, but to set into still higher relief (with Adam) that *following the logos is to be the guide*, not some personal agenda nor the avoidance of controversy.

<sup>1427</sup>ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρει (D8-9): I take the metaphor to be nautical. One resets his sails and helm in response to the varying strength and direction of the wind so as to keep the boat under weigh. The willful alternative that Socrates deflects consists not so much of determining the direction of the search but relying solely on one's own strength to keep it going or (to continue the nautical metaphor) dropping the sails and relying on rowing instead, which is the meaning of the hard-going δεύτερος πλοῦς of the *Phaedo*. While, as Shorey objects (Loeb *ad loc.*), it is naive to think that Plato does not know where the argument is leading, it is likewise simplistic to believe with Shorey that all that is meant is to resolve that any conclusion will be accepted once it comes into view. The argument is forming all along and there is no separation between it and the interlocutors. The conclusion reached will make sense in itself before it is seen to contradict what had been said at the outset (in case it does) or to be otherwise surprising or paradoxical.

The usual interpretation, that they are to follow the logos willy-nilly, is a notion far too flaccid for the engaged questioning they are immersed in. Adjusting the sails to varying circumstances is akin to the other great metaphors with which Socrates describes rational search (ζήτησις), namely, (1) the hunt for game (*Rep.432B7ff* [and Shorey Loeb *ad loc.*, 1.365]; *Euthyd.290BC*; *Lach.194B5ff*; *Leg.654E* [and *Stallb.ad loc.*]; *Lys.218C*; *Parm.128C*; *Phdo 66C*; *Polit.263B1-2, 264A5, 290D5-6*; *Soph.235B*; *Thompson ad Meno 96E* and cf. *Gorg.483A7*); and (2) the pursuit of the beloved (*Euthyph.11E2, 14C3-4*; *H.Maj.295A8-B1*; *Meno 70B, 76B4-C2*; *Phdo 66E*; *Phdrs.266B*; *Rep.489D* (and Shorey Loeb 1.26 note b), 347C, 495-6, 490B, 521B; *Thet.148Eff*.

Besides these great metaphors there are individual passages worth quoting for their eloquence in putting the paradox of knowing questioning, such as *Rep.450D8* (ζητοῦντες ἀμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι); *Gorg.455A8* (ἴδωμέν τι ποτε καὶ λέγομεν: cf. *Crat.428D*). The argument is felt to suggest the way (λόγος ὑφηγεῖται: *Lys.217A2*). At *Rep.453D5-II* they hope their logos will stay afloat until a dolphin might save them! The Athenian Stranger can be sure his interlocutors will agree with him if only he takes the argument a little further (ἐὰν βούλεσθε πειράσομαι ιών κατὰ τὸν ἔξῆς λόγον ἀνευρίσκειν τε καὶ ὑμῖν δηλοῦν ...*Leg.688D*). The path of the logos is a metaphor threaded all the way through the Laws; elsewhere cf. *Crit.106A1-3*; *Rep.420B3, 432C7ff*; *Tim.44D1-2, 55C1-3, 55D5-6*.

Adeimantus's agreeing with this principle enables Socrates to take the next step.<sup>1428</sup> Shall our guards be good at mimicry or not? Or is this just another case of our old principle that a person might be able to practice one skill<sup>1429</sup> well, but that if he tries for many he runs the risk of failing to achieve<sup>1430</sup> standing in any of them? The principle applies just as well to mimicry, that one and the same man would never be able to mimic many things as well as he could mimic just one.<sup>1431</sup>

(395) Therefore it goes without saying that<sup>1432</sup> if it is something worthwhile<sup>1433</sup> that he is practicing he will not have time to create a lot of mimicries and become an accomplished mimic, given how patent<sup>1434</sup> it is that one and the same person can't even compose the two sorts of mimicry that to all appearances are not that different from one another—comedy and tragedy.<sup>1435</sup> You were just calling

<sup>1428</sup>τόδε τοίνυν ... ἄθρει (Ε1). With τοίνυν and the imperative ἄθρει Socrates acknowledges that he is in charge after all, and with the first person demonstrative τόδε that it is he that sees the next step first.

<sup>1429</sup>The etymological figure ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι (Ε3-4), as also 374E4 and 433A5-6, is not otiose: see below.

<sup>1430</sup>ώστ' εἶναί που ἐλλόγιμος (Ε5-6) is an epexegesis of πάντων not the object of ἀποτυγχάνοι. For ώστε with infinitive used in epexegesis cf. Prot.314B5-6 and Smyth §2271. There is no need to emend πάντων to πάντως with Ast.

<sup>1431</sup>πολλὰ (sc. μιμήματα) μιμεῖσθαι (Ε8-9), parallel with ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύοι above, as is confirmed at 395A3-6, below.

<sup>1432</sup>σχολῆ (395A1). The expression belongs to conversational Greek only, and therefore to the Greek of Socrates. Outside Plato it appears in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, where thrice Socrates's interlocutors use it to grant Socrates a question whose answer is obvious (3.14.3, 4.2.24, 4.4.25). Among the orators it occurs only in Andocides (I.90,102; 2.19), although Aristotle incorporates the expression into his example of the oratorical *argumentum a fortiori* (the “argument of more or less”) in Rhet.1397B13.

Plato uses σχολῆ for one thing only: to draw an inference *a fortiori* (354C1, 388D3, 610E7 ; cf. Lach.190A; Leg.668C; Phdō 65B, 106D; Prot.330D8; Soph.233B, 241E, 261B; cf. LSJ s.v.), and in every case but one (Soph.261B) the *fortius* is what something is in itself (τί αὐτό) as compared to what else it might be by virtue of being what it is (οὗτός τι), that favorite of Socratic and Platonic distinctions. Aristotle imitates and perhaps echoes Plato in this usage (e.g. Met.999A10, 1001A23, recounting Platonic arguments; and EE 1218A1 rejecting what he thinks is one). Though Aristotle always adds γε (as Bonitz notes, *Index* s.v.) as do Xenophon and Andocides, Plato's usage is more flexible and spontaneous (besides using it with γε, he uses it with ποτε at Soph.233B and 241E; with που at Soph.261B; with μέντοι, Prot.330D; and alone at Rep.354C). When he uses γε it is to highlight the hinge of the *argumentum*.

The present argument is likewise an argument *a fortiori* whose “stronger” is ἐπιτήδευμα (ἐπιτηδεύσει γε) while the “weaker” is μίμημα, the parallelism between these having been set up in the previous sentence (cf. previous note). If mere mimesis requires specialization, clearly any serious competence would. Adams sees this (*ad* 394E8), but J.-C. in their gratuitous and far reaching attempt to explain “Plato’s enmity to the drama” miss the logic of the passage under their eyes (2.123-4).

<sup>1433</sup>γε (Α1) implies a valorization of ἐπιτηδεύσει over μιμήσεται, which is then confirmed by the periphrastic expression of its internal object, τι τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδευμάτων (Α1-2).

<sup>1434</sup>ἐπεί που (Α3), adducing an empirical fact. Just as “the uncertainty of που, whether real or assumed, is ill-adapted to the precision of history or to the assertiveness of oratory” (Denniston GP 491), it is perfectly suited in dialogical contexts to the introduction of empirical (as opposed to logically inferred) assertions, as here.

<sup>1435</sup>κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν (Α4-5): Upon those who see a contradiction to complain about (as J.-C. do) or to resolve (as Adam) between this passage and Symp.223D (where Socrates asks whether

these products of mimicry weren't you?<sup>1436</sup> And likewise that the same person can't be a good rhapsode and a good actor at the same time, nor even can one and the same actor play comic and tragic roles.<sup>1437</sup> All of these are mere mimicry, and yet it seems to me that the natural ability we have as men is of so narrow a compass<sup>1438</sup> that we can't even master more than one of these sub-types of mimicry, let alone<sup>1439</sup> mastering the originals<sup>1440</sup> that these mimicries are modeled after.

Thus if we are to preserve our initial argument, that our guards will need to surrender pursuing all the other practices<sup>1441</sup> and become polished practitioners of freedom<sup>1442</sup> for the city and work at nothing that does not contribute to this end, then they mustn't be doing anything else let alone imitating it. If they must imitate something let it be what is befitting to these<sup>1443</sup> right from their very

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the same man can or should be able to write comedy and tragedy, too), it is incumbent to tell us what person believed both at the same time and in the same respect so as to be suffering from contradiction. Socrates asks that question there because the only interlocutors still awake for him to engage are Agathon the tragedian and Aristophanes the comedian, just as here his arguments are tailored to the earnest request of Adeimantus and his brother.

<sup>1436</sup> ἄρτι τούτω ἐκάλεις (A5-6), refers back to ὅλη at 394C1, itself an interpretation of Adeimantus's 394B6-7.

<sup>1437</sup> κωμῳδία / τραγῳδία // ραψῳδί / ύποκριταί // ύποκριταὶ κωμῳδοῖς τε καὶ τραγῳδοῖς (A4-10). The sequence presents pairs with smaller and smaller differences and greater and greater overlap, namely, composing in two genres, performing in two genres, performing two sub-types of one genre of performance. The fact that each subsequent pair with its smaller differences cannot be performed by the same person constitutes an indirect argument *a fortiori* that the previous ones, with their larger differences, cannot either. The implicit warrant for believing that the pairs are increasingly close together is the epanaleptic structure: each new pair is a subdivision of the second item in the previous one.

The list is therefore a dihairesis or division, each new species becoming the genus for a subsequent division. Though lists often do imply or contain arguments, producing a virtual argument *a fortiori* is not the most common use of sustained serial subdifferentiation. Usually the logical relations among the items assembled by this means are less important and it is a matter of finding more by looking at what you have more closely (*inventio*). The purposes of such an increasingly specific list can for instance be illustrating an idea by elaborating it with finer and finer distinctions so as to establish it in one field before it is applied to another (Alc.I 111Bff; Crat.397C-400C; Rep.438B4-C4) or expressing certainty with perspicuous fullness (north, east, south, and west) or an exhaustion of the possibilities (jot and tittle), the subdivisions verging onto lavishing particularization (Crit.117A7-B4; Gorg.483D3-4, 517D2-5,6-E2; Meno 71E1-72A1; Prot.334A3-C6 [exhibiting the boundlessness of his relativism], 354A4-6). Subdivision of the last item only can achieve closure (cf. 361B4-5, 443E3-4, 547B3-4 and n.430 ad 342E10; and Gorg.502D6-7; Leg.743D2-4, 747A2-5; Phdrs.241C1-5; Polit.293B5-6, 299E1-2; Soph.262D2-3). In a strained use it can make a transition to a desired item by exploiting the fact that that item can be made to appear among the subcategories of the present topic, as music is reached from the quick tempo of bravery in Polit.306C10-D3 (cf. also Leg.823B2-C1).

As one can see from a passage like Soph.221B2ff or 231B3ff, which resume dihaereses, the ordering of items by means of serial subdifferentiation naturally results in a list that has the form of what was called a *κλῖμαξ* in antiquity, i.e., where the list moves to the next item through an epanalepsis of the previous one—not “from Tinker to Evers to Chance,” but “from Tinker to Evers and Evers to Chance.” Demetrius notes the figure at de Eloc.270 citing Dem.18.179 and then accounts for the term as describing a sequence that ascends. I sense rather that the metaphor of the ladder or *κλῖμαξ* derives from the way that the epanalepsis resembles the foot replacing the hand on the rungs (cf. Longinus 23.1, who classes it under *πολύπτωτα* confirming that for him the definitive feature is re-use of the same term with shift in syntax [i.e. epanalepsis], and cf. the Latin term *gradatio* [step pushing off from step] as Cic.de Or.3.54.207 and Quint.9.3.24 [who cites among other examples Hom.II.2.101-

youth on: men brave and temperate, pious, and liberal and the rest of such behavior.<sup>1444</sup> Anything lowly and mean let them avoid doing, nor become clever at mimicking that and anything else to be ashamed of, since copying it might make them so themselves.<sup>1445</sup> Haven't you noticed how the mimicry, if they start it young and continue it long, gains a foothold in their character and in their developed selves, in the way they carry themselves and speak, and in their very attitudes?<sup>1446</sup> No, we will not allow those we claim to be caring for,<sup>1447</sup> the ones we say must become good men, to play the role of females though they are male, neither a young one nor an older, nor a woman griping at her husband or squabbling at the top of her lungs against the gods, strutting how well off she is or engulfed in her crises, her grief, and her lamentations.<sup>1448</sup> Nor female slaves shall they play nor male ones either,

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8, in which there is epanalepsis but no climax]). For κλῖμαξ in Plato cf. Gorg.473B12-D2, Phlb.54C1-4, Rep.424D7-E2; the thought of Leg.669C4-D2; and exclude Prot.352B4 which lacks epanalepsis and is merely a climactic sequence (*pace* Deuskle-Cron *ad loc.*).

<sup>1438</sup>κατακεκερματίσθαι ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις (B4): To be human is to have limits and to lack limits is divine. The topic characteristically arises in Plato's discussions of creativity, as here and at 596CD. Cf. also 612A and n.5082, Soph.233A3-4. The keynote of Plato's condemnation of poetry is not philosophical arrogance but an awareness of human limitations in both artist and audience, who very often conspire to help each other forget such things.

<sup>1439</sup>Asserting that the list consists of mimicries (ἀφομοιώματα vs. αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα, B5-6) is pointless unless to set up the *argumentum a fortiori* produced by the stronger interpretation I have given to ἡ. With this step Socrates finally broaches the inherent superiority of the original to the copy.

<sup>1440</sup>αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα (B5), approbative, articulating the *fortius* of the *argumentum a fortiori*.

<sup>1441</sup>δημιουργιῶν (B9), approbative as in Book One (cf. n.375), just as ἐπιτήδευμα is approbative above.

<sup>1442</sup>ἐλευθερία (C5). This characterization of their mission is new and climactic. Apart from an *obiter dictum* at 387B5, the term had until now belonged to the strong-man outlook of Thrasymachus (344C5-6; cf. Gorg.485E1, Leg.962E4, 5-6), an outlook to which Socrates will return much later (when he isolates ἐλευθερία as the characteristic of the democratic stage of the polis's decline, around 563D, which becomes unavailable to the tyrant: 576A4-6). In common usage the ἐλευθερος is the free man vs. the slave, one of the four primary divisions among humans alongside young and old, male and female, ruler and ruled (351D10, 433D2-4; cf. also Gorg.515A7 [cf.514D]; Leg.665C2-3, 777B5-6, 838D7-8; Meno 71E-72A). Its climactic and approbative use here resembles Phaedo's use of it in his climactic eulogy of Socrates at the end of the *Phaedo* (114E-115A).

In a sudden access of inspiration Socrates reaches for the term and arrogates it to his own current purpose. Adam finds the expression "artificial and somewhat strained;" I would suggest that the reader give it the best meaning he can until Plato and Socrates make it good, taking it for now to denote the full flowering of human potential.

<sup>1443</sup>τούτοις (C4): sc. τοῖς δημιουργοῖς ἐλευθερίας; but also pointing forward to the adjectives ἀνδρείους, etc., which attract it back into its accusative case. The character type determines the behavior appropriate to it. τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα then reverts to the construction of τὰ προσήκοντα in order to set up the contrast next achieved, with τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα, which equals τὰ μὴ τουτοῖς προσήκοντα.

<sup>1444</sup>ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὄσίους, ἐλευθέρους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα (C4-5): Compare for the content as well as the resolute tone the famous retort at Leg.817B: ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταί.

<sup>1445</sup>Ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν (C7-D1): By their act of imitating (producing a likeness) they would reap what it is to be (rather than imitate being) that way. For a similar argument using this verb cf. 606B5-8.

So much in life hinges on the distinction between reality and illusion, and yet Plato has been singled out for insisting on it -- as if it were an illusion of his. Everyone remembers the Cave but few of

behaving<sup>1449</sup> as slaves do. Nor play<sup>1450</sup> base men I dare say, nor feckless ones, acting opposite to the way we have just described, abusing and parodying and berating<sup>1451</sup> one another whether under the influence or (396) not, and doing all the other wrongs that this sort of people do in word and deed both to themselves and to others. And I'd guess we won't be having them habituate themselves at taking off madmen in action or speech,<sup>1452</sup> either. To be able to discern a madman is important, or an evil man or woman too, but one mustn't do what they do nor imitate them.<sup>1453</sup> And what about hammering bronze and other jobs, and rowing triremes or calling out the pulls, and all the rest of these sorts of acts—shall they imitate these?

Adeimantus replies: "Nonsense! these activities don't even require the application of intelligence!" But Socrates continues, giving himself over to the whole experience: How about neighing horses and lowing bulls, the rushing of rivers, the crashing of the sea, and the rumbling thunder—shall we have them imitate these perhaps?<sup>1454</sup> And Adeimantus objects: "We've already barred them from doing what a madman does as well taking off the type."

those who do would actually say they have been outside it. Socrates's present justification for insisting on the distinction derives ultimately from Adeimantus's complaint that fathers teach the mere show of virtue, starting with δοκοῦντι (363A2) and culminating in the young man's corrupt and irreversible rationalization (365B-366A), to which Socrates presently alludes with the verb κήδεσθαι (D5: cf. 363A1).

<sup>1446</sup>κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν (D3), is climactic in its syntax (epanalepsis of κατά), its content (moving from outside to inside through the sound of the voice), and its rhythm (esp. the addition of τήν), and rightly elicits an enthusiastic καὶ μάλα from Adeimantus. The tension between the structure (A<sub>1</sub>, A<sub>2</sub>, B), as suggested by the two κατά's and their placement, and the path of the thought (from the extreme of body through the mediation of voice to the extreme of soul) is powerful. Stallbaum's conjecture (σχῆμα for σῶμα, with the precedent collocation of σχῆμα and φωνή at 393C5-6) reduces the tension at the cost of the sense. For φωνή used to effect a metabasis from body to soul cf. *Lach.*192A4-6 and *Crat.*423D4-5; for διάνοια standing in for ψυχή in contrast to σῶμα, cf. *Leg.*916A7, 925E3-4; *Phdrs.*239A-240A.

<sup>1447</sup>κήδεσθαι (D5), the fathering term used by Adeimantus at 363A1, again focussing the scope of their special measures on the guards-to-be (cf. 394E2). Socrates is responding to Adeimantus's request by putting him into the position of the κηδόμενος!

<sup>1448</sup>ἐν συμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθεσιν καὶ θρήνοις ἔχομένην (E1-2): The sequence is illogical but genetic and phenomenologically accurate. Imagine the director coaxing his actress: "She finds herself in trouble (συμφορά): imagine how she feels (πένθος) and what then she would say (θρήνος)." The plurals are derogatory. With the previous participial phrase this one forms a chiasm (οἰομένην ... ἔχομένην) and together they close the sequence of participial phrases. This is only the beginning.

<sup>1449</sup>πράττοντας (E5): We do not know whether to take it with the proximate masculine δούλους (having a construction parallel with the feminine singular participles of the previous list), or with the remote masculine αὐτούς (the guards we are educating)—nor will they know, if they play the roles for long! The syntactic ambiguity is continued in the sequel.

<sup>1450</sup>Note anaphora of οὐδέ γε (E5, E7).

<sup>1451</sup>κακουργοῦντάς τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντάς ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας (E8-9) the rhyme is intended and its effect is satirical. The first and last participles cover deed and word and the middle one alludes to the business of comedy that consists of these.

<sup>1452</sup>The repetition of ἐν λόγοις / ἐν ἔργοις (396A1-2, A3-4) directs our attention to the fact that the former is the actual behavior of these low types whereas the latter is the actors' imitation of it in gesture and recitation.

<sup>1453</sup>Closure is achieved by reversion through the material (μαίνεσθαι [A3]; κακοί [395E7]; γυναῖκες [395D6]; πράττειν / μιμεῖσθαι [395C6 and C3]), which broaches a transition to a new category of considerations (A8ff).

<sup>1454</sup>αὖ and ἦ (B7) ironically feign openmindedness.

With these easy questions and extenuated satire Socrates has gotten the buy-in he needs from Adeimantus to attribute the whole position to him, so that he can ask him the next question, which happens to be indecipherable: “If I understand you right let me ask you whether there exists a proper style for a gentleman<sup>1455</sup> to use when he has to tell something, and conversely another style opposite to this that a person would rely upon and use who was born and bred<sup>1456</sup> in a manner opposite to his?”

Adeimantus of course does not know what Socrates is talking about<sup>1457</sup> so Socrates has to explain. “Well, I’d say that the moderate<sup>1458</sup> man, when he comes to a place in the story that tells what a good man said or did, will be willing to report that man’s words by impersonating him and would not be ashamed of this kind of mimicry especially when he’s to imitate him doing things sound and mindful, though when he’s been struck by a disease or by passions or even inebriation or some bad turn of events<sup>1459</sup> besides,<sup>1460</sup> he’ll pass over it with less detail and a lighter touch.<sup>1461</sup> On the other hand when

<sup>1455</sup>καλὸς κἀγαθός (B11): The crasis adopts a tone conventional and uncritical or unexamined. On the pair of adjectives cf. n. 1556.

<sup>1456</sup>φύς τε καὶ τραφείς alluding to φύσις and μελέτη and reminding us by its omission of the third ingredient, ἐπιστήμη (on the triad cf. 366C7 and n. 878).

<sup>1457</sup>ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα (C4): “What in the world is this (thing of yours)?” For incredulous ποῖα presenting a challenge in the form of a question cf. 330B1, 375A4, 526A2, 588C1, n. 81 and compare the οἶον that Stallbaum styles “miratum” (*Alc.* I 113E; *Charm.* I 166C). Incredulity can also be feigned to express indignation or contempt, announcing the rejection of a point, as 400A7, *Charm.* I 74B4 (on which cf. Riddell, *Digest* §319); *Euthyd.* 304E7; *Gorg.* 490D10, E4; *H. Maj.* 285D2 (and Stallb. *ad loc.*); *Ion* 536E6 (cf. E2-5); *Laches* 194D10 (contrast E3 and cf. Stallb.); *Phlb.* 73C8.

<sup>1458</sup>μέτριος (C5) picks up the conventionalist tone of the crasis above.

<sup>1459</sup>ἢ ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ ὑπὸ ἔρωτων ἐσφαλμένον ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἢ τινος ἄλλης συμφορᾶς (D2-3): The list of less attractive events (D2-3) moves from more objective to more subjective sources of trouble (i.e. from disease to lust and even [καί] drink), but the moral is that since he is a good man even the bad moments in his life will be decent enough to imitate without shame. Thus even his response to events utterly beyond his control (συμφορά) will be decent: cf. 387E7.

<sup>1460</sup>ἄλλης (D3) combines two distinct idioms, ἄλλος as mass singular and ἄλλος adverbial.

(1) Singular (ἄλλος as a mass term: “the rest of” vs. “the other”): *Rep.* 357C6-7: ιάτρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός—cf. *Leg.* 763B3-4; *Prot.* 334B; *Rep.* 368B1, 402E6, 414C1-2, 416C6, 457A7-8, 458D1-2, 461E7, 465B9, 467B4, 521A8, 537D5-6, 543C2-3, 554C1-2, 608B7-8, 609D5, 612B8-C1; *Tht.* 185D1.

(2) Adverbial: The primary use of ἄλλος is to make a transition from species to genus (horses and other animals) but it can also make a transition from a species to an adjacent species, where we have to translate it adverbially, with “also” or “besides.” The logic of this adjacency admits everything from the opposite (τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων: *Gorg.* 473C7-D1—cf. *Polit.* 298D5-6, *Rep.* 390A5) and the complement (*Polit.* 269A1-2: ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων [n.b., the sun was not a star in antiquity]—cf. *Leg.* 898D3, 916D2-3 [and England vs. Stallb. *ad loc.*], 941B4-5; *Phdr.* 232E [and Ast *ad loc.*, pp. 241-2]; *Prot.* 316D2-3; *Rep.* 368B1 [“pleonastic” ἄλλος, *Campb. ad loc.*, 2.219 §43 {d}], 396E6, 401A4 [cf. 380E4-5, 564A1], 404A12-B1, 414C1-2 [cf. D3-4, D7-E1, 417B5-6], 457A7-8, 458D1-2, 618A7ff; *Tht.* 170B3; *Tim.* 40D6, 76D8-9, and the related meaning, “second” in the ordinal sense [as *alter* in Latin] at *Tim.* 39A10ff), to the neighboring species (*Leg.* 868A7-B1: ἀγοράν τε καὶ ἀθλα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ιερά—cf. *Apol.* 36B; *Crit.* I 17B4; *Leg.* 699C7-8, 789D6; *Polit.* 305B8-C1; *Rep.* 416A4-5; *Symp.* 191A8-B1).

The word’s meaning is purely logical. The flexibility and range of its uses serves as a reminder that the Greek language like others is as unsystematic as thought itself. We can only guess its logic in a passage like *Phdo* 118A16-17. Its meaning can be seen to approach that of αὐτός at *Leg.* 935B6 (cf. *Leg.* 868B1).

<sup>1461</sup>ἐλάττω καὶ ἥττον (D1-2), neuter plural adjective plus adverb, like πάντα μᾶλλον below (397A2) and πολὺ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον at 417B3-4. For ἐλάττω measuring plurality rather than degree

the story reaches a section<sup>1462</sup> that deals with a man<sup>1463</sup> who is unworthy of him I'd say he will not be willing to liken himself to someone he recognizes as his<sup>1464</sup> inferior with any commitment, unless perhaps briefly<sup>1465</sup> and for some ulterior purpose, but will feel ashamed to do so both because he has no practice at emulating<sup>1466</sup> men like these and because he will feel annoyance at forcing himself into the mould<sup>1467</sup> of baser<sup>1468</sup> types. Maybe he could play the part for fun<sup>1469</sup> but if he thinks about it at all the game would soon be spoiled<sup>1470</sup> for him. Instead he'll<sup>1471</sup> revert to the other kind of narration we described above in reference to Homer; he'll have the style that partakes of both at his disposal, both mimicry and narrative of the general<sup>1472</sup> sort, and the mimicry can play only a small part in the long narrative. Or am I just talking on?

Adeimantus reassures Socrates he's not just talking on—in fact it's inevitable that the good man acquit himself of speaking in just this way. Securing such complete agreement allows Socrates then to move to the alternative way (397) of talking that he had asked about in the question Adeimantus had not understood before. The man who is not of this nature and nurture,<sup>1473</sup> to the degree that he is a cf. *Crito* 53A2, *Gorg.* 512B6.

<sup>1462</sup>γίγνηται (D3) sc. ἡ διήγησις with κατά in the sense it has at *Apol.* 17B6: κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ρήτωρ.

<sup>1463</sup>τινα (D3) goes with ὀνάξιον so both must be masculine singular.

<sup>1464</sup>τῷ χείρονι (D4): i.e., αὐτῷ χείρονι ὄντι. The article makes χείρονι a predicate, the predication taking place in this decent man's mind: "to a man he would see as inferior." By now it becomes clear that Socrates's use of the comfortable terminology of the καλὸς κάγαθός (B11) and the μέτριος (C5) are an index of what progress he thinks he has made in establishing a vision of the growing leader. The test of whether he has succeeded is whether Adeimantus is still with him.

<sup>1465</sup>εὶ μὴ ἄρα κατὰ βραχύ (D5). With ἄρα Socrates momentarily acknowledges that the principle at stake will have its exceptions in the real world, and with βραχύ he introduces still another degree in the range of degrees already broached by ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἥττον (D1-2). The exception, and its inclusion, are comparable to the prudential allowance that the leader may tell a lie, which he makes at 389B. The young guard is being accorded discretionary privileges *pari passu* with his growth, and conversely prudential discretion is taken for granted.

<sup>1466</sup>In fact, the only μιμεῖσθαι (D6) he will be allowed to practice is emulation (395C4-5). For this lack of familiarity with the territory compare the converse situation, when the base man finds himself in the company of the good (409CD).

<sup>1467</sup>ἐκμάττειν (D7), from modelling wax or plaster.

<sup>1468</sup>τῶν κακιόνων (E1): Again the comparative, again representing the point of view that has lodged in his soul.

<sup>1469</sup>Filling in the complement to σπουδῇ (D4): again the idealistic puritan remembers what his critics would dub "reality."

<sup>1470</sup>ἀτιμάζων τῇ διανοίᾳ (E1).

<sup>1471</sup>χρήσεται (E4): The future tense is continued. Originally it was a creature of Socrates's expression of conviction (and therefore subordinate to οἴμαι) but now Socrates sees the future with enough conviction that he drops οἴμαι and uses the indicative without scare quotes. Still and again he exceeds the hypothesis of the construction. He'll check himself at the end of the paragraph (ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω; E7-8).

<sup>1472</sup>μιμήσεώς τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης διηγήσεως (E6-7), with ἄλλης adverbial, of the complement to μίμησις. Adam's emendation (ἀπλῆς for ἄλλης), for all of its conveniently similar number of vertical strokes in majuscule) falls into the category of emendations that force the text to say what it has already, by its own devices, forced its reader to realize it has to mean. As usual something is lost by making the author say what he should have said. The decent man can take advantage of the fact that there are two options and minimize the role of the one, reverting by default (ἄλλης) to the other. This is what Socrates then says in the sequel.

<sup>1473</sup>μὴ τοιοῦτος (397A1): μή rather than οὐ as negating the hypothesis rather than the fact.

man of lesser stature, will go the opposite direction and choose to narrate everything without discrimination,<sup>1474</sup> and think nothing beneath himself, so that he'll make a concerted run at imitating anything that's there for the entertainment of as large an audience as he can, including the extremes we happened<sup>1475</sup> to mention above, the rumbling thunder and sound the wind makes and the hail and axles make and the block and tackle,<sup>1476</sup> and trumpets, flutes, and piccolos—the voices of all the instruments<sup>1477</sup>—and won't stop until he's done also the cries of dogs and sheep and birds.<sup>1478</sup> This fellow's style will be the converse of the other's: the whole thing will be done with mimicry, in gesture as well as voice,<sup>1479</sup> with straight narration kept to a minimum.

These were the two types of style Socrates had mentioned above. What he next makes of the distinction is that the one involves “variations”<sup>1480</sup> that are small, so that if someone were to supply it with a harmony and rhythm that suited it, the delivery would tend not to vary the key if a man speaks in the upright manner<sup>1481</sup> but keep to a single key,<sup>1482</sup> since the variations are small, not to mention

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τοιοῦτος refers back to φύς τε καὶ τραφεῖς, 396C3.

<sup>1474</sup>πάντα τε μᾶλλον (A2): The two terms, describing his eagerness, correspond in content and even order to the pair of terms with which Socrates described the good man's reluctance (ἐλάττω καὶ ἥττον, 396D1-2). There, when the διήγησις (used of the whole story, as at 396C6) reaches a baser type as its topic (it was not the man but the διήγησις that was the subject of γίγνεται, as κατά indicated), the good man became reluctant; here, the baser man goes right along without scruple, if anything more eager. διηγήσεται like διήγησις at 392D3 (and as understood with the feminine participle γιγνομένη at 392D5-6) in the parallel passage above, refers to the telling not the narrative λέξις in particular. By its back-reference to ἐλάττω καὶ ἥττον, πάντα μᾶλλον places the accent on the second man's lack of narrative scruple in general. If the back reference is missed, Madvig's addition of μιμήσεται ἥ before διηγήσεται will seem necessary.

<sup>1475</sup>δή (A4) adds an acknowledgment that the opportunity to re-use this exemplary material was unforeseen, and once again Socrates does not resist the opportunity to indulge in satirical mockery.

<sup>1476</sup>τροχιλιῶν (A5), an example repeated by Plutarch, *de aud.poet.* 18B.

<sup>1477</sup>όργάνων (A6): In antiquity, ὄργανον, like “instrument” today, can denote without modifier a musical instrument. What underlies this usage becomes clear from a passage like *Symp.* 215BC, where Alcibiades says that Socrates can move a person the way Marsyas can except that Marsyas needs a flute in his mouth (δι' ὄργάνων ... τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δυνάμει) whereas Socrates can do it ἀνευ ὄργάνων ψίλοις λόγοις. That all the instruments listed here are wind is not accidental. Persons can make music without instruments by singing in their own voice. ὄργανον is therefore a metabatic term here, effecting the transition from the imitation of sounds to the impersonation of animals. For other metabatic terms cf. μεγαλοπρεπές at *Leg.* 837C6-7, ἐμφάνεσι at *Leg.* 855B7-8, σκληρότερα at *Polit.* 307B9-10, αἰσθησις at *Tht.* 164A6-7, and κωφόν at *Tim.* 88B4. μεγάλως is sophistically metabatic at *Euthyd.* 284E1-5.

<sup>1478</sup>The funniest list so far, competing with the satirical irrationality of 373A2-4 and B5-C4 but with a stronger underlying point, that the mimic of everything makes himself into everything else's instrument and finally replaces his own voice with an animal's.

<sup>1479</sup>φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν (B1-2) Fleshying out ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις (396A1-2 and 3-4), as they are disfigured in the medium of imitation. Cf. φθέγξασθαι / ποιήσει (604A6-7 and n.4835).

<sup>1480</sup>σμικρὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς ἔχει (B6): The reference of μεταβολή and even its sense are at first obscure. Socrates is beginning to make a transition within μουσική (376E) from story to music proper, and he needs an abstract and general term to make the bridge. μεταβολή was indeed the term for modulation in music (cf. LSJ s.v.). For the idea behind σμικραὶ μεταβολαί cf. 604E1-4 (where ἔχει is again used, E1).

<sup>1481</sup>Taking λέγειν (B8) as the subject of γίγνεται.

<sup>1482</sup>ἀρμονία (B7) is close to what we now call mode, but “key” is less technical, and can serve in the translation to get the meaning, for a while.

keeping to a rhythm that likewise follows suit.<sup>1483</sup> The alternate type will need an opposite sort of accompaniment, with all keys and all rhythms, if it is going to be delivered in a manner that follows suit, since the type will have all manner of variations. Now all poets and whoever tells a story will either fix on one these two types of delivery or else they'll fix on some mixture of the two. Should we admit them all into our city, or should we admit only one of the two or only the mixture?

Adeimantus would vote for admitting only the narrator who imitates the decent man without admixture, so that Socrates can afford to voice the protest that the narrator who comes up with a nice mixture is pleasant, after all, and the narrator that imitates the exact opposite type of the one he chose is most pleasant, not only to the children and to their tutors<sup>1484</sup> but also to the greatest proportion of the crowd. Adeimantus grants the objection, unmoved.<sup>1485</sup> Socrates proffers him the excuse in case they need it that such a man won't fit in to our city, and Adeimantus grants it.<sup>1486</sup> Among us, Socrates continues, on Adeimantus's behalf, men aren't duplex nor multiplex, since each of our men practices one thing. Only in a city like ours will we find the cobbler a cobbler and not a captain in addition, and the farmer a farmer and not a juror in addition, and the soldier a soldier and not a businessman in (398) addition, and so forth. If a man should show up on the scene clever<sup>1487</sup> enough to fashion himself into many occupations and able to mimic many things and should bring along his poems to display them to us, we would pay him our respects as an inspired and wondrous man and entertaining,<sup>1488</sup> but we'd tell him we don't have this kind of man in our city and it's against our ways

<sup>1483</sup> πρέπουσαν ἀρμονίαν καὶ ρύθμὸν τῇ λέξει (B7): Already the principles that the melody follows the lyrics and the rhythm follows the melody are broached. καὶ ἐν μίᾳ ἀρμονίᾳ (B8) is epexegetical on αὐτήν, and gets its explanation in the parenthesis; but rhythm, too, had just been mentioned alongside ἀρμονία and so needs not to be forgotten at least in passing.

καὶ δὴ καί here has the force of recalling an item that is inherently interesting or demands inclusion in its own right whether it advances the immediate theme or not. Likewise δή can be used to mark the transition to a new class of item in a list (n. 38 ad 328B4-8). The new class may well be the target of the list (cf. Leg.758E4-6; Phdrs.274C8-D2; Rep. 563E10-4A1) or the argument (Rep.330A3, 331A10, 332D2, etc.) in which case καὶ δή is transitional (Denniston 256), but may just as well not be, as here and at Charm.169B6, Meno 96D2, Leg.747A2-5, 760A7-B1, Rep.371A10 (along with several other δή's, passim, as the occupations multiply), 419A5-10, Soph.265C1-3.

<sup>1484</sup> παιδαγωγοῖς (D7) is a surprising addition unless the first plurals above (D1, D2) have lingered in our minds. If it is we that are deciding what the paideia of these young guards will be, we are their παιδαγωγοί. Socrates is admonishing Adeimantus that they are taking an unorthodox position, and immediately portrays him standing alone (οὐ σὺ αἱρῆ, D7-8) against the whole mob.

<sup>1485</sup> ήδιστος γάρ (D9), "assentient" γάρ (Denniston) granting the objection unperturbed.

<sup>1486</sup> οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἀρμόττει, another assentient γάρ, unperturbed.

<sup>1487</sup> ὑπὸ σοφίας (398A1) along with emphatically placed ἄνδρα already suggests the much-touted arrival of the sophist as it is depicted at the beginning of Prot. (309C1-310A1, 310B6-D4) as well as Gorg. and Euthyd. The slight illogic or confusion of αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξασθαι satirizes the grandness of his arrival as well as the fatuous avidity of the Athenians to see him perform, something Plato always satirizes. Cf. Euthyd.271A1-5; and in Gorgias, οὐδὲν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν (447C5), followed by Socrates's surprise question ὕστις ἔστιν (D1); and in Prot., Hippocrates's οὐδὲ ἐώρακα Προταγόραν οὐδὲ ἀκήκοα οὐδέν (310E4) followed by Socrates's prudential distinction between the man and what he says. The praise Socrates suggests that we give to this interloper is not "Platonic irony" but the quickest way to persuade him to leave.

<sup>1488</sup> ιερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ήδύν (A4-5), exhibiting the swift powers of the triadic form.

Socrates moves from the objective assessment (ιερόν) to the subjective cause of the assessment (ήδύν), through the middle term θαυμαστόν. For such an elegant triad cf. 461B6, 522C1-2, 582A5, 601D4-5 (a double triad); and Crito 47B1-2; Gorg.485E1, 494E5; Leg.634A3-4, 704D6-7, 757B4-5, 809D3, 897C6; Phdo. 66C6; Phdrs.229B7-8; Polit.301D2-3; Prot.338A8; Symp.208E4; Tim.82B6-7. Contrast Thrasymachus's rather flaccid attempt at elevation in his peroration, 344C5 (and n.457).

that one should be let in among us,<sup>1489</sup> and we'd<sup>1490</sup> send him off to the next city after bedecking him with myrrh and a crown of wool, whereas for ourselves we would provide a place for the more austere and less entertaining poet or storyteller<sup>1491</sup> who looks instead to utility,<sup>1492</sup> one who would mimic the narrative of a decent man and tell stories that fall within the guidelines we set out from the start when we began working on educating our soldiers.<sup>1493</sup>

### 2.B.3b.I.a: Excursus on the Treatment of Poetry

With this reference back to the beginning of the treatment of myths and storytelling Socrates suggests the treatment is complete. The treatment started with the content of the stories (*λόγος*) and ended with the manner of telling them (*λέξις*), but this does not represent a theory of literature. Neither Socrates in the present context nor Plato from outside the dialogue has much use for an analysis of poetry into its “essential parts” such as Aristotle will provide in the *Poetics*. The distinction, as distinctions often do in Plato, provides him and his Socrates with the vehicle by which he can arrive at a new vista. There is not only the distinction between *λόγος* and *λέξις*, but also within the treatment of *λόγος* the distinction between tales of gods and tales of heroes. Of course the gods come first, but Socrates deepens their priority by articulating the theme of a divine truth that is primitive and underived. The method of the passage (379A-383C) is severely logical and abstract, as it must be in establishing such a theme. Such a supra-empirical method assumes that the world man lives in is not of his own making and the result reached by this method is that the world he lives in is governed by good.<sup>1494</sup> The next phase of the treatment announces itself as promoting virtue in the young (386A), but happens also to treat heroes, who come next after the gods and whom men should emulate. It is a division among the virtues more than anything else that provides the material and range of this account,<sup>1495</sup> but as the judgments to include and exclude stories proceed the tone becomes more certain and shows greater indignation at the misrepresentation of those we

Characteristically the connectives are striding καί only (A καί B καί C) or for that matter asyndeton (e.g., *Symp.*211E1 and *Rep.*399C2-3 and n.1522), rather than the usual A τε καί B καί C; and characteristically the rhythm is managed with considerable effect.

<sup>1489</sup>The contrast between οὐκ ἔστιν and οὔτε θέμις ἐγγενέσθαι (A5-6) depends on the distinction between οὐσία and γένεσις, the strongest of distinctions in Plato, and hardly needs the improvements of the negative adverbs suggested by Adam (οὔτ' for οὐκ in A5) and Bekker (οὐδέ for οὔτε in A6). Our city by its nature (οὐσία) has no place for this type and moreover would be harmed by its introduction (γένεσις) from the outside.

<sup>1490</sup>Reading τε εἰς (A6) of ms A rather than τε ἀν εἰς of mss FDM, with edd. It is an index of the intimacy of connection done by τε that ἀν does not need to be repeated, just as it tends to be reiterated in clauses connected by the stronger and more insistent δέ (A5,A8).

<sup>1491</sup>ποιητῇ ... καὶ μυθολόγῳ (A8-B1) repeats οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἵ τι λέγοντες (397C8).

<sup>1492</sup>The contrast here drawn between ὡφελία (the *utile*) and τὸ ἡδύ (the *dulce*) begins, to all appearances, a tradition that extends down to Horace's contrast between them at *Ars Poetica* 333-346, and beyond. Cf. 607E1-2.

<sup>1493</sup>κατ' ἀρχάς (B3), referring back to the τύποι περὶ θεολογίας (379A1-6).

<sup>1494</sup>Such fundamental points and logic are exactly what is ignored in Glaucon's account of the “nature and origin” of justice (358C2, E3ff), and are what, by being ignored, made the beginning of the account incoherent (what it is is whence it came; injustice has a nature but justice does not: cf. n. 718; and nn.722, 733, 737, 739, 740, 756, 762, *supra*).

<sup>1495</sup>Piety corresponds to the proper way of speaking about the gods (τύποι περὶ τῆς θεολογίας, Book Two); then in Book Three, in connection with the depiction of heroes, whom we would properly emulate, comes bravery (386A6, cf. n.762), truthfulness (~ wisdom? 389B2), and temperance (389D7, and n.1354); as to justice (which would guide the proper depiction of mere men) this begs the question (392A10-C4).

increasingly expect to be better than ourselves, and the account arrogates to itself more and more authority to promote worthwhile stories.<sup>1496</sup> When the division of virtues that lies behind the review of hero stories is exhausted, Socrates exploits the other list that lies behind and governs the treatment so far, the list that begins with gods and then heroes—the list, that is, that would next include men.<sup>1497</sup>

To ask which stories depict men acting in ways that our young should imitate seems at first to beg the question of the entire construction (392A10-C4) and so it appears that the evaluation of stories is complete. But then under the guise of treating *λέξις* rather than *λόγος*,<sup>1498</sup> a topic that is putatively related though Adeimantus does not understand why,<sup>1499</sup> the question of which men our young men shall imitate is made to return after all. By the vehicle of analyzing poetic delivery Socrates achieves a transition from the subject of emulation to the adjacent subject of imitation, in order to give place for the young man to imagine himself acting like the people he must not act like as well as those he should act like. The previous lessons on emulation have now instilled in him enough sense of self that he is able to make his choice with conviction. That is, though he does not ask it in so many words, Socrates's question to Adeimantus about the two men who choose one kind of narration or the other (396B10-C3) is a question that asks him which man he would prefer to imitate, himself. Though the question portrays itself as a question about others, it is directed to Adeimantus, and Adeimantus realizes in the end that it is up to him and adopts the metaphor of casting his vote (397D4-5).<sup>1500</sup>

The overall purpose of the treatment is to awaken and enliven a conviction in Adeimantus to own the good and refuse the bad. The theoretical distance he is afforded, from which he is determining what will affect another than himself, marginally distances him from his own predilections. The material is then ordered so as to transport him toward this greater goal: one background list is dropped and the other adopted in order to lead to it, and an unprecedented distinction in literary analysis between content and delivery is invented merely to advance it to the final step where Adeimantus is asked to imagine *himself* acting one way and then the other. Meanwhile, his acceptance of the argument is solicited all along, his agreements are acknowledged at each step, and the points reached are accepted by him as his own.<sup>1501</sup> Socrates persuades Adeimantus in the incremental way that poetry persuades, but this “poem” comes in the form of a live conversation.

The argument Plato here places in the mouth of Socrates would naturally scandalize any reader who believes it represents Plato's own attitude toward literature. The belief, however, is without justification. The content and the purpose of the argument are Socrates's not Plato's. It is part of his answer to Adeimantus's and his brother's request to help them resist the fashionable immoralism they confessed at the beginning of Book Two they could not refute, including the abuse of literary authority

<sup>1496</sup> Cf. nn. 1296, 1299, 1332, 1337, 1368, 1370.

<sup>1497</sup> 392A3-6.

<sup>1498</sup> Note the construction with *μέν* and *δέ* and the etymological figure *λόγων / λέξεως* (392C6): Cf. n. 1390.

<sup>1499</sup> For etymological transition cf. nn. 177, 546, and 1261. Plato's manner of inventing distinctions in order to create a context of thought onto which more important questions about a better life can be projected and thereby dealt with at a more comfortable distance, stands in the strongest contrast to Aristotle's discourse, which invents distinctions for their own sake and thereby paves the way to philosophy as a *divertissement* for people who enjoy thinking more than they need to. Aristotle places the difference between his own and Plato's manners of philosophy into its very best light at the beginning of the *de Partibus Animalium* I.2.

<sup>1500</sup> ἐὰν ή ἐμή ... νικᾶ (397D4).

<sup>1501</sup> The repetition of his personal asseveration *καὶ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ* at the very end of the section (B9) recalls and stands in contrast with the moment near its beginning when Adeimantus averred the corrosive effect that the patricidal stories of Zeus and Cronos had even upon himself (378B6-7).

on which this immorality fashionably rests, which was the principal theme of his current interlocutor. Socrates's argument pertains not to literature but to the teaching of it,<sup>1502</sup> and focusses not on the merits of style or fiction but the influence they wield, for better and worse, on persons young enough still to be indelibly affected by them and still too young to know why. Likewise, an amount of attention that seems inordinate in a less oral "reading" age such as our own, is given to the internal and habituative effects of memorizing by heart not only what is said but who says it and how it is said. A fuller critique of literature *per se* will be added in Book Ten, which will be seen to depend for its meaning upon the development of the argument in the intervening Books.<sup>1503</sup>

### Resumption of the Text (398C1): Music: Song

Although the background list governing this section in the dialogue craves next that the "musical" part of music be treated, namely melody and rhythm, a major subject has been completed and completed with success. The fact is marked not by an interruption of the sequence—we *will* indeed move on to music—but by Glaucon interrupting and taking over for Adeimantus. Socrates suggests that nobody would fail to see what needs next to be said on these topics,<sup>1504</sup> and Glaucon, who had been silent for some time, chimes in with a laugh, "I guess I'm a nobody"<sup>1505</sup> since I can't say just what we'd say—though I could make a guess." Socrates welcomes his intervention warmly<sup>1506</sup> and suggests he would agree that we'd say<sup>1507</sup> the following, that song is composed of three elements: words, melody and rhythm. With the element of words, at least,<sup>1508</sup> we have sufficiently dealt just now: whether the lyrics be sung or spoken they must conform to the guidelines and the manner<sup>1509</sup> we have already set

<sup>1502</sup>As his several caveats about the special constraints of the present context continually remind us (he defers to the traditional structure of education, 376E2-3;377B1-2, B7-9; 378A2-3, B2-5, C1-3, C6-D3, D7-E1, E7-379A1; 380B7-C1; 381E1-6; 383C1-5; 386A1-4; 387B1-6, E7-388A3; 390A4; 391D7-E1; 394E1-2; 395B3-D3). Criticism of literature *per se* will come in Book Ten, where its effect on the mature soul, there thought of as tripartite, can be evaluated.

<sup>1503</sup>It is perhaps Plato's very strength and authority as a literary artist that worries and has worried his less philosophically inclined readers when suddenly he has his "spokesman," Socrates, focus his attention and his very penetrating light into their favorite haunts. From antiquity this authority was revered as now it is feared, even though from the beginning he had contrived a way to write that would require and allow his readers to interpret for themselves what is being said (*the logos*) before they could "attribute" it to him or anybody else. Sir Philip Sidney famously preferred, in connection with Plato's criticism of poetry, "justly to construe Plato's authority rather than unjustly resist it" (*Defence of Poesy*, ch.13), and quoted Scaliger's criticism of the barbaric use of Plato's "authority" to ban all poetry from the city (*Poetics*, 5.A.1). Plato however did all he could to evade being an "authority" by remaining anonymous, just as his teacher, Socrates, avoided "authority" by waiting for the question to be placed by others.

<sup>1504</sup>He shows a certain insouciance about music right away with the pun συμφωνήσειν (C5).

<sup>1505</sup>κινδυνεύω ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἰναί (C8): cf. H.Maj.293A9. Adeimantus had intervened to ensure that poetry, with which he was particularly concerned, should receive a full treatment (at 376D4-5: cf. n.1122); Glaucon's interruption suggests that he, in contrast, is particularly fond of music, whatever this implies.

<sup>1506</sup>πάντως δήπον (C11).

<sup>1507</sup>With ικανῶς ἔχεις (C11) Socrates, with characteristic sensitivity, picks up Glaucon's expression (οὐκουν ικανῶς ἔχω, C8-9).

<sup>1508</sup>Socrates's γε (D4) picks up Glaucon's (D3).

<sup>1509</sup>ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δεῖν τύποις λέγεσθαι οἵς ἄρτι προείπομεν καὶ ώσαύτως (D5-6), echoing both B7-8, ὃ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ώς (in using the adverb to refer to the λέξις rather than λόγος), and B1-4 τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν μίμοιτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγοι ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τύποις, ... (in abbreviating the whole treatment of μῆθος as boiling down to λέξις and the τύποι of the λόγοι).

out. As for melody and rhythm, it is their nature<sup>1510</sup> to follow the words. Now among the λόγοι we have seen no reason to include wailing and complaint. Which are the melodies,<sup>1511</sup> then, of threnody?<sup>1512</sup> After all, you are the musician.<sup>1513</sup>

Glaucon is indeed ready with an answer: “The mixo-lydian and mini-lydian and such modes as these.”

Whatever their names they must be removed, Socrates continues, since they are useless even for women who are meant to be decent,<sup>1514</sup> not to mention men. And likewise drinking binges are surely most inappropriate to guards and languorously and lying about:<sup>1515</sup> what are the languid and symposiastic modes?<sup>1516</sup>

“The Ionian and the certain Lydian ones that are dubbed relaxed.”

(399) Do we have any use for these in connection with men who are to go to war?

“No way. And by the way the only modes you<sup>1517</sup> seem to have left are the Dorian and the

<sup>1510</sup> τήν γε ἀρμονίαν (D10) is causal. The omission of a separate article for ρύθμος despite change of gender is a way to avoid weakening its force.

<sup>1511</sup> ἀρμονίαι (E1). It is now (cf. 397B7 and n. 1482) that we need to improve upon translating ἀρμονία with “melody” and to begin substituting the notions of key, or mode, or scale. The traditions of classical Indian raga are perhaps the most fully articulate model still available to us for what Socrates has in mind. In the raga tradition there are several scales and within each scale there are many ragas each intimately connected with a season and/or time of day and/or meteorological condition and/or a mood (from heroic to dolorous), a theme, a god. Proper execution of the given raga by the performer establishes the raga’s characteristic feeling or mood—its *ras* or juice or sap—and maintains and explores it through the piece.

<sup>1512</sup> Θρήνων καὶ ὁδυρμῶν ἐν λόγοις (D11) almost begs the question since θρῆνοι are already songs. For this reason indeed Socrates has ready to hand the term θρηνώδεις ἀρμονίαι (E1) for the musical modes that would conform to the content of the λόγοι. Cf. the next example, and n. 1516.

<sup>1513</sup> σὺ γὰρ μουσικός (E1): Despite the impression of relative incompetence we were supposed to take from Glaucon’s opening remark (έκτὸς τῶν πάντων, C8), Socrates now lets fall that he is some kind of musical expert after all. Only a desire to know can produce this combination. His uncertainty what to say about music is an index of his interest and attraction to the subject. Analogously, a combination of interest and uncertainty that Adeimantus had exhibited in his very speech motivated him to intervene (at 376D) to ensure that “enough” time would be given to the question of poetry, where “enough” ended up meaning as much time as he wanted.

<sup>1514</sup> γυναιξίν (E4): For the second time Socrates casually assumes some of the guards will be female (cf. 387E9–388A3, to which he here refers).

<sup>1515</sup> And therefore so are stories (λόγοι) about such behavior, to which the corresponding ἀρμονίαι must now be determined.

<sup>1516</sup> μέθη ... καὶ μαλακία καὶ ἀργία (E6-7): In the case above, θρῆνοι καὶ ὁδυρμοί corresponded to θρηνώδεις ἀρμονίαι. In the present case, μέθη ... καὶ μαλακία καὶ ἀργία correspond to μαλακαί τε καὶ συμποτικαὶ ἀρμονίαι, where the chiasm registers the accumulating success at finding ἀρμονίαι to correspond with the action or behavior depicted in the λόγος. The two cases exhibit dialogical *pacing* (cf. n. 202 *ad* 333C11). In the first and easier, we have language ready-made for expressing the correspondence between the content (θρῆνος) and the musical mode (θρηνώδης). The second case expands upon the first with a double instance, and resembles the first case in the first of its instances by the use of an etymological figure despite the fact that no musical genre is referred to (μαλακία / μαλακαί) and in its second instance by the use of an established musical genre without relying on etymology (μέθη / συμποτική). The verbal variation begins to broach the question whether every activity has a music essentially appropriate to it despite the limits of language.

<sup>1517</sup> With σοι (399A3) Glaucon continues to accept the role Socrates has assigned him, to play his

Phrygian," Glaucon replies.

Socrates accepts and dismisses Glaucon's expertise at the same stroke: I don't know the modes by name. Just try to leave<sup>1518</sup> me one that works for military action by a person who is truly brave or for any other activity one is forced to engage in, a mode that can imitate the utterances and the cadences in which such a person would speak when he fails at his mission or meets injury or death or when some other calamity befalls him,<sup>1519</sup> but he keeps at his station through it all and bears up valiantly against failing<sup>1520</sup> luck. And leave me another for peacetime activity, for a man not forced to act but acting freely, whether trying to persuade somebody of something or making requests, whether it be a god he approach with prayer or a fellow man with instruction or admonition, or conversely engaged in receiving a request from another, or instruction, or being put upon to change his mind, how he stays cool and pays attention<sup>1521</sup> and subsequently acts in accordance with his own best understanding, not overbold but sound of mind and moderate in all his engagements, acquiescing in the way things turn out no matter how they do. These two modes, for the forced and the free, depicting men in the vicissitudes of failure and success, men moderate and men brave<sup>1522</sup>—the modes that best match the utterances made by such as these, leave only these for me!<sup>1523</sup>

"These are the only ones left to you anyway," Glaucon replies, perhaps enjoying his role as keeper of the modes a little too much to be affected by the elevation of Socrates's sudden eloquence.

Socrates continues: Then we certainly won't need the polychordic or panharmonic element in consultant in technical musical matters.

<sup>1518</sup>κατάλειπε (A5), again gamely repeating Glaucon's word (λείπεσθαι, A3). The present is conative and alongside his demurral of expertise it adds pathos.

<sup>1519</sup>ἀποτυχόντος (A8) is analyzed into two cases governed by exegetical participles, the first (ιόντος) subdivided into two that are related by degree (εἰς τραύματα / εἰς θανάτους) and the second (πεσόντος) closing the pair with a generalization (εἴς τινα ἄλλην συμφοράν) that repeats the governing idea of vicissitude, from ἀποτυχόντος.

<sup>1520</sup>τὴν τύχην (B3), with quasi-demonstrative article, points back to the idea with which the colon began (ἀποτυχόντος).

<sup>1521</sup>Reading ἔαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα (B6) with all mss. The shift in the man's role from the person entreating to the person entreated entails abandoning the genitive participial construction and replacing it with the objective accusative. The vagueness of ἐπέχοντα, like that of ἀποτυχόντος in the first limb, opens a space in which the ensuing specifications can gather. καὶ ἐκ τούτων, κτλ (B7) corresponds to ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις, κτλ, above (B1-2), introducing *pari passu* the description of how the person bears the circumstances he meets. παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως there describe bravery whereas κατὰ νοῦν καὶ μὴ ὑπερηφάνως describe sobriety or temperance here; these two virtues then appear side by side in the summary (C3).

<sup>1522</sup>βίατον, ἔκούσιον, δυστυχόντων, εὐτυχόντων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων (C2-3): Socrates has sketched the activities of wartime and peacetime with a few well-chosen strokes, and now summarizes with an elegant triad of complementary pairs set out in asyndeton. Of these pairs the first and last correspond to war and peace, in characteristic chiasm, and the second pair (δυστυχόντων, εὐτυχόντων) emphasizes the theme of human vicissitude that permeates the whole paragraph. The syntax of the neuter singulars βίατον, ἔκούσιον needs no editorial refinement: all that is needed for the sense is to distinguish this pair from the other two which deal with the vicissitudes and the types of persons worth imitating. Lists in asyndeton are not uncommon, especially when the items are coordinated (Denniston is willing to class this as formal asyndeton rather than stylistic: Ixiii and Intro.II[2][iii]), but to achieve elevation by asyndeton, in Plato at least, is rare (cf. Symp.211B1 and E1).

<sup>1523</sup>The sudden elevation in Socrates's expression (A5-C4) resembles in degree as well as manner that of his description of the idyllic life in the simple city (372A6-C1), including elaboration by balanced pairs and extenuation of the construction with participles and divisions instead of subordination. In both cases he retains a humbler tone by avoiding periodicity.

our songs and melodies.<sup>1524</sup> Likewise we won't be needing to develop craftsmen to manufacture of polychordic or panharmonic triangulars<sup>1525</sup> and plectrums. And will you admit flute-makers and flautists into the city? Or isn't flute music the most polychordic of all?<sup>1526</sup> Isn't the panharmonic aspect of music what is in fact the special job of the flute to mimic?<sup>1527</sup> So all you are left with by way of instruments the city will need is the lyre and the cithara, and perhaps a makeshift pipe for the shepherds to use out in the country?<sup>1528</sup> So much would not be too bare and radical a choice—to choose Apollo, that is, and his instruments over Marsyas and his. In fact, by dog,<sup>1529</sup> unbeknownst to ourselves we're fully engaged in purifying<sup>1530</sup> our city, the city that just a short while ago was enervated with luxury!

"Rack it up to our temperate ways," Glaucon now agrees, with a little dig.<sup>1531</sup>

"So let's complete the purification.<sup>1532</sup> What follows the modes and keys for us is the rhythms, and preventing the pursuit of a needless variety and of all manner of dance steps to go along with them,<sup>1533</sup> but choosing which are the rhythms of life moderate or life brave.<sup>1534</sup> These once found we'll require

<sup>1524</sup> φῶδατῖς τε καὶ μέλεσιν (C8) referring to the words and the melodies, respectively, again.

<sup>1525</sup> τριγώνων (C10): A recondite stringed instrument referred to also at Arist. Pol. 1341A41; surely not our modern "triangle." For both condemned instruments cf. Susemihl-Hicks, *Politics of Aristotle* 1.632-6.

<sup>1526</sup> πολυχορδότατον (D4): Embouchure and "squeezing" the stops can achieve slight variations in tone on the flute as if it had thousands of fixed strings.

<sup>1527</sup> Reading μίμημα (D5) with the majority of mss. By the second singular παραδέξῃ (cf. also σοι at D7) Socrates again defers to the expertise of Glaucon and then guides it with the ensuing observation about the modes appropriate to the flute. Glaucon accepts the observation as plainly true (δῆλος δή, D6).

<sup>1528</sup> σύριγξ (D8): Socrates introduces the shepherd's pipe without worrying about the kind of music it makes because its use is not so much for making music for the polis but for an individual killing time (*τις*, D8, is dismissive) out in the country, where a Gyges could be, in the company of his sheep, without even being noticed. He mentions it at all because he has been formulating a policy to provide for ὄργάνων δημιουργοί (C10-D1), and so it is a bit of a joke. Glaucon as musical connoisseur accordingly chafes a bit at the reasoning (*γοῦν*, D10).

<sup>1529</sup> νὴ τὸν κύνα (E5), an oath associated with Socrates but not peculiar to him (cf. Ar. V. 83), described by the Scholiast as Rhadamanthean. Cf. Greene's note to the scholion ad *Apol.* 22A in his edition (*Scholia Platonica*, 5) for other ancient testimony. It was traditionally thought to be an expedient for avoiding the free use of divine names, like "Godfrey Daniel" in English and other such ingenuities in all languages.

<sup>1530</sup> λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες (E5). The perfect represents their total engagement rather than asserting they have completed the job of purification (cf. E8), which is presented in a conative aspect by the present participle (διακαθαίροντες) re-enforced by the prefix δια-. What has brought this coloration of their work to mind for Socrates is the remark he himself has just made about Apollo and the impious Marsyas. He had set the tone with his Rhadamanthean oath, and the whole trend is noticed by Glaucon in his response. Such back-reference always suggests the end of the section is near.

<sup>1531</sup> σωφρονοῦντές γε ἡμεῖς (E7): It was after all this same Glaucon that caused the city to become spoiled and enervated (372E2-3).

<sup>1532</sup> καθαίρωμεν (E8) simply repeats διακαθαίροντες (E5). Dropping a prefix in restatement is as characteristic as repeating it: Cf. λείπειν (C5) after κατάλειπε (C4); also 335E2, 365A6, 370E11, 410E1, 413D5, 436B5, 444D3, 472A2 (and n.2522), 474C3, 484D5, 528C8, 564B2, 610C3, 612E1, 619C2; Charm. 153D1; Gorg. 453C5-6, 497B7-C1; Lys. 209C1, 223B1; Meno 97C7-8; Phdo. 59B7-8, 104D1-2; Phdrs. 248A2-5; Polit. 286A3-4; Tht. 178A2-4. Cf. C. Watkins HSCP 71(1966) 115-9.

<sup>1533</sup> αὐτούς (E10), along with the δέ of μηδέ, treats choreography as an accompaniment following the rhythms considered in themselves, as rhythm itself was understood to follow melody.

<sup>1534</sup> κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου (E11), the two essential behavioral characteristics pursued and

the steps to follow the story of the (400) respective sort of life rather than making up a story of a life that follows the dance and the melody. Once again, as with the modes, I turn to you to specify which rhythms these are.

Glaucon finds himself a little over his head: "By Zeus, I've got nothing to say on that topic.<sup>1535</sup> I can tell you about the three distinct types of rhythm that weave together to form the various dance steps, just like the four tonic intervals out of which all the modes are composed—so much I've witnessed in performance.<sup>1536</sup> But as to how one and the next of them have a quality that imitates one or another kind of living and behavior I can't even begin to say."<sup>1537</sup>

Well we can just as well<sup>1538</sup> consult Damon on this, both about which steps comport with a slavish manner and which with rashness or madness and with other viciousness,<sup>1539</sup> as well as about

defined above (A5-C4), associated there with peacetime duties and wartime, and corresponding to the traditional virtue of σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία. The genitive is the genitive of characteristic. The construction is repeated at 400A7 and survives even the addition of πρέπουσαι (B2-3) which would otherwise have called for the dative.

<sup>1535</sup> ἀλλὰ μὰ Δι' (400A4), an oath not Rhadamanthean (contrast νὴ τὸν κύνα, 399E5 and n.1529).

<sup>1536</sup> τεθεαμένος (A6) here suggests spectacle (θέαμα: cf.390D2) not study. The perfect is empirical as at 577A6-7, 584D9, 601B4, 608D3; cf. Leg.711A; Phdrs.249E5; Polit.264C4. Glaucon admits he has seen more art than he has understood: so much is implied below at 402D4. The distinction becomes thematic at 475D in conversation with this same Glaucon.

<sup>1537</sup> ποῖα δὲ όποιου βίου (A7), instead of τίνα and τίνος, and in contrast to ὅττι above (A5) stresses that the basis for associating the rhythms with the moods will be “qualitative” (as opposed to the more mechanical dissection of the whole into its parts and the quantitative mapping of one onto one evoked by τρία and τέτταρα above [A4-6]), but also express Glaucon’s skepticism whether there is any way in the world to do so after all (on ποῖον incredulous cf.396C4 and n.1457).

<sup>1538</sup> ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν (B1) dismisses the question, and the ensuing καί as well as the first plural βουλευσόμεθα, by referring the question to Damon, exonerate both Socrates and Glaucon from pursuing imponderables once the principle has been set down (cf. οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταί, 378E7). The καί with Damon is not derogatory but approaches δή in meaning (sic Denniston 317, 320). Accordingly, the next statement (οἶμαι δέ, B4) provides a justification for bringing him in.

καί commonly introduces a reference to a source or an authority outside the text, as it also may introduce a corroborative etymology (cf. Leg.706D; Phdo.65B3 [Burnet’s worries *ad loc.* are unfounded]; Phdrs.240C1-2; Rep.404B10 [and Shorey *ad loc.*, Loeb 1.267 note f]; Tim.72A6; and Arist.de Caelo 279B30; EE 1218A36, 1332A8; EN 1096A3; Met.989A10, 1076A39-B1, B39-1077A1; Top.65B16; for etymologies, e.g., Arist. HA 492A22; EN 1103A17, 1112A16-17).

<sup>1539</sup> ἀνελευθερίας καὶ ὕβρεως ἡ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας (B2-3): The form of the list appears to be: αἱ καί αἱ ἡ αἱ καὶ ἄλλο Α (assuming κακία is the genus and designating it with a capital, of which ἀνελευθερία, ὕβρις, and μανία are meant to be species). The sequence of connectives (καί, ἡ, καὶ) appears slovenly. As to its content, if the opposite of κακία is ἀρετή then for guidance in understanding the three listed species we can consider the species that are their opposites, the set of cardinal virtues. But these are usually four (σοφία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, δικαιοσύνη and ἀνδρεία) and sometimes five (ὄσιοτής added in), whereas the species of vice listed are only three, and two of them (ὕβρις and μανία) would seem to be opposites of the single virtue σωφροσύνη, while the third simply has to be the opposite of ἐλευθερία used in the personal sense, rather than one of the standard four virtues. Some help is gotten from the list of virtues at 395C4-5, which exceptionally does include ἐλευθερία in a list of virtues (cf. also 401B4-5); and some consideration should be given to the fact that in the recent context the virtuous behavior under consideration for emulation has been epitomized by virtues of ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη.

The real subject here is the inculcation of virtue and the role played by mimicry and imitation in the inculcation. Along the way we have discovered that mimicry does some inculcating of its own.

which rhythms are to be retained for their opposites. For myself I think I have heard him use the terms “enhoplios composite” and “dactyl” and “heroic” too,<sup>1540</sup> and classifying them so that the up is equal to the down by means of their becoming short and long,<sup>1541</sup> though I couldn’t say how, and again as I seem to remember he was calling one of them iambic and the other trochaic and would attach lengthenings and shortenings. And in some of these types as I remember<sup>1542</sup> he would approve and disapprove the dance movements associated with them no less than the rhythms themselves, and sometimes the combination somehow. I can’t really say—but as I was saying we can just as well let this go<sup>1543</sup> until we find Damon, since it would be quite a chore for us to set out all these distinctions.

Glaucon certainly thinks such a task beyond himself at least, and Socrates introduces an alternative of his own:<sup>1544</sup> Let me suggest instead<sup>1545</sup> a distinction that we are capable of making, that well managed dance postures as opposed to the ones that aren’t, correspond to well managed

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Illustrations of virtue must therefore be drawn from the more palpable and grossly visible aspects of behavior (cf.397B6-C6 and nn). For this, ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη are especially appropriate (cf.399E11 and n.1534). Acts of ἐλευθερία might deserve exceptional inclusion for the same reason. The list of virtues reached below (402C2-4) continues in the same vein by adding μεγαλοπρέπεια, which is again absent in the list of cardinal virtues but again is easy to see in the figure cut by a man and his posture.

Returning then to the question of the list’s form, since ὕβρις and μωνία serve as alternative opposites of the single virtue σωφροσύνη, the form is:  $a_1 \text{ καὶ } a_2 \text{ ἢ } a_2 \text{ καὶ } \text{ἄλλο } A$ , and the sequence of connectives (καί, ἢ, καί) is appropriate after all. Indeed though there are many Platonic lists in καί, καί, ἢ καί there seems to be one in which καί and ἢ simply alternate (*Charm.*161D6-7, *Leg.*801C8-D1, *Tht.*175E4-5 only momentarily appear to be examples). The constellation  $a_1, a_2, a_2$  is a favorite of Plato’s whether followed by a generalization as here or not: 411D3-4, 431B9-C3, 439D6-7 (incl.generalization), 476B4-5, 528A4-5, 598D4-5; *Euthyd.*271B4-5; *Gorg.*457D6, 483B6-8, 508C6-7; *H.Maj.*304B2-3; *Leg.*744B6, 766E1-2, 776D8-E1, 782A6-7, 803E1-2, 947E5, 950E5-6; *Meno* 75C8-9; *Phdo* 85E3-4; *Phlb.*17E4-5; *Polit.*262D3-4; *Prot.*325A6, 325E1; *Symp.*219D4-5.

<sup>1540</sup>ἐνόπλιον τέ τινα ... καὶ δάκτυλον καὶ ἡρῷόν γε (B4-6): From their names at least (as γε suggests with the most obvious case) these rhythms might be acceptable.

<sup>1541</sup>The sudden flurry of technicalities (B6-C1) might as well be taken to refer to the resolution of a *longum* into two *brevia* in the arsis of the dactylic foot, whose arsis is equal in length to its ictus; but it is hard not to agree with Shorey that ἄνω καὶ κάτω is satiric (Loeb 1.253, note f, comparing *Phlb.*43A and B).

<sup>1542</sup>οἵμαι (C1) continues the οἵμαι of B8 which itself continues the οἵμαι with which the sentence began (B4). Socrates is careful to dispel the impression that the opinions belong to him, or that in repeating them he agrees with them.

<sup>1543</sup>ἀναβεβλήσθω (C4). The perfect is dismissive: cf.369B4 and n.951.

<sup>1544</sup>τόδε (C7).

<sup>1545</sup>ἄλλὰ (C7) finally answers the μέν of 400B1, which had been reiterated at C4, to close the digression on Damon and his kind of expertise with a dismissal. The real purpose for introducing the details is not to then derogate the expertise, but to stress the importance of what he dismisses it for (cf. n.527), namely, the *meaning* of music, which will soon occasion an enunciation of the Theory of Ideas.

rhythms and rhythms that aren't,<sup>1546</sup> while meanwhile<sup>1547</sup> well managed rhythm goes with fine expression ( $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma$ ) and the lack of it with the opposite,<sup>1548</sup> as likewise does well managed harmony, if indeed rhythm and harmony go with the story as we have said above rather than the converse.<sup>1549</sup>

As for the type of  $\lambdaόγος$  and  $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma$ , they follow the character of the soul<sup>1550</sup> being portrayed, whereas all these other things follow the  $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma$ .<sup>1551</sup> Therefore story well done<sup>1552</sup> and harmony well done and dance postures well done and rhythm well done follow  $\varepsilonύ\eta\thetaει\alpha$ , "character well done" if you will: real "goodness of character," not the meaning this term is given when it is used superciliously to describe mindlessness<sup>1553</sup> but rather a carefulness of mind<sup>1554</sup> that is literally<sup>1555</sup> well and beautifully turned out with respect to its character.<sup>1556</sup>

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<sup>1546</sup>The argument (C7-9) presumes that the postures of choreography must follow or reflect the rhythm in the way that both rhythm and melody had been said to follow the story (398D8-9). Melody had then been treated first (398E1-399E7), and rhythm "followed" melody (as the next topic at least:  $\varepsilon\pi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  is used, not  $\dot{\alpha}\kappa\omega\lambda\omega\theta\epsilon\iota\bar{v}$  [399E8-9]; but cf. 400D2 and 7 below:  $\varepsilon\pi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota \dot{\eta}\mu\bar{v}$  at 399E8 is probably a pun). Rhythm was then made to conform not to melody but subject matter ( $\beta\iota\varsigma$ ; 399E10-11). And now within rhythm ( $\tau\bar{o} \pi\epsilon\bar{r}\dot{\iota} \dot{\rho}\theta\mu\omega\bar{v}$ , D9) we have discovered with Damon's help distinguishable components of rhythmic pattern and steps of the foot ( $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\omega\dot{\gamma}\alpha\varsigma \tau\bar{o} \pi\theta\delta\bar{o}$  vs.  $\dot{\rho}\theta\mu\omega\bar{v}$ , 400C1-2), each characterizable on its own and together. In then dismissing Damon we dismiss this anfractuosity by presuming that dance is composed to follow rhythm and focus instead on whether the quality of rhythmic composition also determines the "quality" of the choreography. The range of this quality is done by the prefixes  $\varepsilon\bar{u}\text{-}$  and  $\dot{\alpha}\text{-}$ . The adverb  $\varepsilon\bar{u}$  directs the imagination toward an action that is well executed; the privative alpha suggests that the alternative is a privation or non-execution of that action, rather than the action being executed poorly. Hence Shorey translates "apt" and "unapt." Socrates is not concerned about aesthetic rankings finer than these, though it would appear that Damon was (400C1-3).

<sup>1547</sup> $\dot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\dot{\alpha} \mu\bar{v} \dots \gamma\bar{e}$  (D1), of the minor premise.

<sup>1548</sup> $\varepsilon\bar{u}\rho\theta\mu\omega\bar{v}$  (D1):  $\varepsilon\bar{u}\rho\theta\mu\omega\bar{v}$  conforms to  $\kappa\alpha\lambda\dot{\iota}$   $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma$  and  $\dot{\alpha}\rho\theta\mu\omega\bar{v}$  follows its "opposite" ( $\dot{\varepsilon}\nu\alpha\nu\tau\dot{\iota}\dot{\alpha}$ , D2), which would be  $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma \alpha\dot{\iota}\sigma\chi\rho\dot{\alpha}$  or  $\kappa\alpha\kappa\dot{\iota}$ . This mild oscillation between contrary ( $\kappa\alpha\lambda\dot{\iota}$  and  $\alpha\dot{\iota}\sigma\chi\rho\dot{\alpha}$ ) and contradictory ( $\varepsilon\bar{u}\text{-}$  and  $\dot{\alpha}\text{-}$ ) again draws attention to the tension between speaking of art good and bad and art well done and not well done, two ways of speaking that an aficionado would keep separate but Socrates for his own purposes here identifies.

<sup>1549</sup> $\varepsilon\bar{u}\pi\bar{e}\bar{r}$  (D3): Conformity of the harmony and rhythm with the  $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma$  follows *a fortiori* from the fact that  $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma$  follows  $\lambdaόγος$ . The point of rounding up all these parts and moving upward through them is to get back to what the next question asks, what do  $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma$  and  $\lambdaόγος$  follow?

<sup>1550</sup> $\tau\bar{o} \tau\bar{h}\dot{\iota} \psi\bar{u}\chi\bar{h}\dot{\iota} \dot{\eta}\theta\bar{v}\iota$  (D7): The mention of  $\psi\bar{u}\chi\bar{h}\dot{\iota}$  is striking. Among other things it introduces a predicate for the term  $\dot{\eta}\theta\bar{v}\iota$ , which will play a climactic role in the next sentence. Hitherto the  $\beta\iota\varsigma$  (399E10) or the human type (399A5-C1, 399A1, etc.), rather than the soul, had been the entity imitated by art.

<sup>1551</sup> $\lambdaέ\xi\bar{e}\iota$  (D9): It comes to the same whether  $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma$  here represents both  $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma$  and  $\lambdaόγος$  (which have been placed together just above [D6] and will again be just below [400D11:  $\varepsilon\bar{u}\lambda\bar{o}\gamma\bar{v}\alpha$ ]), or represents itself only so as to make the stricter point (which was forgone just above, D3-4) that the other things follow the  $\lambdaόγος$  only because they follow the  $\lambdaέ\xi\varsigma$  which had previously been shown to follow the  $\lambdaόγος$ .

<sup>1552</sup> $\varepsilon\bar{u}\lambda\bar{o}\gamma\bar{v}\alpha$  (D11), a coinage produced by the logical mood and style of the passage, which has forgotten the meaning that the word already has, everywhere else it is used (i.e. praise).

<sup>1553</sup> $\dot{\alpha}\nu\omega\iota\alpha\bar{v}$  (E1) denotes a condition far more dire than the kind of simpleminded innocence envisioned by the supercilious use of  $\varepsilon\bar{u}\eta\theta\bar{v}\iota$  and glossed over by it. Socrates nevertheless uses the strong term because of its privative alpha (so as to continue the system of contradictories [rather than contraries] that he had articulated with  $\varepsilon\bar{u}\text{-}$  and  $\dot{\alpha}\text{-}$  words by means of which he had set up the climactic string of  $\varepsilon\bar{u}\text{-}$  words), as because he wants to bring  $\nu\bar{u}\bar{v}\bar{s}$  into the discussion, as we shall

Glaucon is right with him<sup>1557</sup> and Socrates continues in this triumphant vein. It is these qualities of aptness and propriety in their embodiments that our young must pursue everywhere, if they are to be willing to perform their proper task.<sup>1558</sup> Glaucon has less trouble than we might in understanding what Socrates is saying, and he immediately (401) agrees.<sup>1559</sup> The embodiments are ubiquitous. Painting is full of such elements as are all the other related arts. Full also<sup>1560</sup> are weaving and embroidery and housebuilding and all the manufacture of useful things,<sup>1561</sup> and also the physical attributes found naturally in bodies and in plants besides.<sup>1562</sup> After all good form and the lack of it are present in all these, and while the formless and the graceless and the inharmonious are things<sup>1563</sup> akin to a bad story and a bad character,<sup>1564</sup> their opposites are akin to the opposite character, the temperate and good, of which they in turn are imitations.

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immediately see.

<sup>1554</sup>διάνοιαν (E3), where δια- emphatically denies the alpha privative of ἀνοία. It is one of the characteristic techniques of Plato (and his Socrates) to speak directly to the reader's (and the interlocutor's) mind, by exploiting meanings latent in terms but brought to the surface by the process of the logos (the λόγος of language), against their standing and conventional meanings (the δόξα of language). Cf. εὐλογία above.

<sup>1555</sup>ώς ἀληθῶς (E2), etymologizing εὐήθεια with εὖ and ἡθος.

<sup>1556</sup>τὴν ... εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἡθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν (E2-3). εὖ having served its purpose may be replaced with καλῶς; but at the same time it is to be remembered that these are the adverbial expressions of ἀγαθός and καλός, the pair by which human goodness is traditionally expressed (perhaps as the combination of the moral and the aesthetic: cf. 466A9, 509A4-5 [and n.3100], 561C1, 581E7, 599C7 and n.4711, 601D4 and n.4764; Prot.319E4). Against the mendacious bendings of language that have found their way into everyday speech, Socrates bends language back, to an edifying usage of his own, and with this passage εὐήθεια is finally redeemed from the cynical abuse of Thrasymachus (343C6, 348C12), which had ruefully been continued in the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus (e.g., 361B7), though its rehabilitation had begun in the argument about the honesty of the gods at 380D5 (cf. n.). This merely playful "etymological argument" involves the same term in connection with which the fallacious limitations of etymological argument had been exposed when Socrates used it in an *argumentum ex contrariis* in Book One (εὐήθεια / κακοήθεια, 348C5, and n. ad 348D1).

The present tour de force of language began when Socrates dismissed the complications of Damon's theory and asked Glaucon a simpler question (400C7,ff). At this point the language began to feel skewed (εύ- vs. ἀ-) and now the end justifies, or at least explains, those means. This proleptic skewing of language is a salient feature in the philosophical rhetoric of Socrates and Plato, useful in any transition (e.g., Charm.173C3-7 [addition of μαντική]; Crat.410C4 [addition of ἔτος], 423D4-5 [addition of χρώμα]; Gorg.467D1 [πλεῖν], 478E4 [ἀδικίαν, *pace delentes!*], 502C5-D9 [δῆμος], 504E7-8 [κάμνοντι leading to μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ], 521E8-22A2 [setting up 522B2-9]; Lach.191C8-192A6 [τάχος transitioning from body to mind]; Leg.694E6-7 [setting up shepherds], 797E-8B [body preparing for soul], 865B6 [ψιλῷ]; Phdo 89D6-8 [ὑγιής], 104E1-5 [strained repetition of ἀ- prefix, as here]; Phlb.29A10-11 [πνεῦμα slanting ἀήρ toward meteorology], 39E10-11 [εὔσεβής]; 55B3-4 [slanting σοφία into νοῦς against ἡδονή], 67B1-2 [slanting animals into beasts to parody Eudoxus]; Polit.306C10-D3 and 307A8-B1 [use of φορά]; Rep.408E2 [σώματι σῶμα], 428D11ff [qualitative effect of few], 468B11 [φιληθῆναι], 442B2-3 [n.2184], 492A7 [n.2803], 499A4 [n.2912], 508B3 [n.3079], 547B3-4 [χρυσίου τε καὶ ἀργύρου], 585A3 [n.4426], 590E3 [n.4576], 601E1 [n.4770]; Symp.211E2-3 [reducing the list to its theoretically relevant minimum]; Tht.158D1 [χρόνος], 175E3-5; Tim.28B7-8 [sensation done with ὄρατὸς ... ὀπτός τε setting up the theory of four elements], 50B2 [τρίγωνον] and 53B5 [ἀριθμοῖς] prepare for analysis of the elements into polygons). Slanting is particularly serviceable in transitions from the lower to the higher, of which the ultimate case is the *analogia entis*. Accordingly it plays a prominent role in the Line Passage (507C6ff, 509E1-10A3). We will see a paradigmatic instance of it below (402B5-7 and n.1585).

Glaucon assents to all this, recognizing the scrupulous thoroughness of Socrates's expression,<sup>1565</sup> and Socrates goes on. If the good qualities can appear in any product it's not just poets we must force to instill the likeness of good character<sup>1566</sup> into their works and banish them for failing to, but the other craftsmen, too. This element of bad character, licentiousness, slavishness and gracelessness<sup>1567</sup> we must manage and check at every turn lest they allow it into their portraiture,<sup>1568</sup> their architecture,<sup>1569</sup> or into any other manufactured thing. If a man cannot keep them out we won't let him practice his trade among us. We will not allow our young guards to find themselves in a pasture of bad images, day in day out to browse<sup>1570</sup> on them and bit by bit to ingest them from every quarter so as to assemble into one place and set up within their souls<sup>1571</sup> a huge and evil thing without even noticing it. Instead,

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Such refinements in the use of language characteristically elicit such pleased and pleasing remarks as "Plato blends image and thing to which the image refers" (G.Billings, *Art of Transition in Plato* [Menasha 1920 = New York 1979], 80n.34, with references); and "By subtle introduction of these words the doctrine is pushed to the farthest limit" (Campbell ad *Tht.* 157D8-9); and Socratic epagoge "often proceeds by minute steps through linked synonyms" (Shorey ad *Rep.* 338E [Loeb 1.48.note a]).

<sup>1557</sup> παντάπασι μὲν οὖν (E4), characteristically used to express agreement to a complex assertion.

<sup>1558</sup> μέλλουσι (E5), μέλλειν used with present rather than future infinitive. Smyth (§1959a) accounts for the appearance of a future infinitive with μέλλω by saying in these cases μέλλω means "think (presumably accounting for the future infinitive as being a creature of indirect discourse, as elsewhere); when the present infinitive is used μέλλω is just itself, i.e., a verb of will.

<sup>1559</sup> διωκτέα μὲν οὖν (E7). The point seems new but is implied in what came before. We had adopted a division of labor in the City in Words, and now we are being reminded that our young are likewise being groomed to perform a special job in that city, to guard it against the evils of its own desire for more. Their nature was what made it even conceivable that they should be able to perform this task, namely their dog-like inborn combination of brave resistance to the enemy and reliable loyalty to the friend. Their nurture must enable them to bring this endowment into action, the action being to "guard," though this job has not been defined. In the event, the influences we have been seeking to guard them against appear to become the influences they will guard the city against. μελέτη goes with ἥθος.

<sup>1560</sup> πλήρης δέ (401A2): The anaphora belongs to Socrates. His tone is rising.

<sup>1561</sup> σκευῶν ἔργασία (A3) is contrasted (αὐτόν) with the δημιουργία of the visual arts (τοιαύτη). ὑφαντικὴ καὶ ποικιλία (A2) are metabatic, effecting the transition from merely decorative items to useful items (σκευή) that are decorated.

<sup>1562</sup> The list (A1-4) is reminiscent of 380E4-381A9. Musical art has led him to graphic art, and from this he has backed upward into a list of "everything." φύσις makes σωμάτων mean animal bodies (vs. the σύνθετα already listed), to which φυτά are the usual complement (ἄλλος complementary: cf. n. 1460 ad 396D3, §2).

<sup>1563</sup> καὶ ἡ μέν (A5-6): The article gives a place for postpositive μέν and is not repeated with the subsequent subjects (ἀρρυθμία, ὀνταρμοστία); the predicate is then done with a neuter plural (ἀδελφά, 401A7). For a similar dropping of the article cf. B4-5 (where the initial article creates predicate position for the demonstrative and then can be dropped [as at *Prot.* 357A-B1], analogous to the way it creates attributive position for a common modifier at 501B2, and *Leg.* 727C4-5, 885D5-7). Lacking such an excuse are *Alc.* I.117A8-10; *Crito* 47C9-10; *Euthyd.* 298D4; *Gorg.* 450D6-7, 508E1-4; *Leg.* 634A3-4 (metabatic), 645D7, E1-2, 733D8, E1-2, 863E6-8, 896D5-7 (and *Stallb. ad loc.*); *Meno* 79A4-6; *Phlb.* 21A14-B1; *Polit.* 258E8-9 (a true plurality), 274A2, 284E4-5, 295E4-5; *Prot.* 312B1-2, 329C4-5; *Rep.* 353D4-5, 537A9-10; *Symp.* 202E8; 207D8-E1. The dropping of the article does not imply that the items on the list are any more intimately related than the very fact of listing them together already makes them out to be. For article repeated then not repeated, *Euthyphr.* 7D1-2; *Gorg.* 459D1-2; *Leg.* 741A7-8, 765E5-6A1; *Phdo* 75C9-D2 (and *Stallb. ad loc.*); *Phlb.* 11B4-8 (bis); *Rep.* 582C5-6; *Symp.* 207E2-3; *Tht.* 202A2-5 (and Campbell *ad loc.*). Similarly the preposition might not be repeated:

we must search and find that other<sup>1572</sup> kind of men who have the noble natural talent<sup>1573</sup> to track the essence of beauty and grace,<sup>1574</sup> and with the help of such as these produce a healthy ambience within which our young man<sup>1575</sup> might dwell and draw benefit from all that is around him, from whatever quarter something might impinge upon his senses for him to see and to hear,<sup>1576</sup> an ambience that bathes him with healthy influences imported from noble climes beyond, so that what he fails to notice, and fails from a boy, is how it gently readies him to experience kinship and friendliness and harmony with stories and with thoughts that also are fine.<sup>1577</sup>

Glaucon praises this latter way of nourishment as by far the finest, so that Socrates can now capture the meaning in a doctrine. We have to conclude that music is the most influential aspect of the young man's nurture, and so for the following reasons. The thing most able to seep most deeply into *Crit.* 114E10; *Leg.* 718A6-8, 777E2-4, 828B3, 830C9-D1, 957E2-3; *Prot.* 353C6; *Symp.* 192A4-5, 211D3-5; *Tht.* 152D7, 172B2-3; *Tim.* 55D7-8, 84D1-2, or a common modifier like *πᾶν*: *Tht.* 171E5-6. For resumption of the article at the end or use at the end only cf. *Alc.* I.105B6 (but cf. B5); *Leg.* 669B2-3, 723D2-3, 728D8-E1, 837C6-7; *Phlb.* 45E5-6; *Polit.* 297C1; *Rep.* 545A2-4, 613C5; *Symp.* 179B5; and Vahlen ad *Arist. Po.* 1449A1. Though the thought can made clearer by the use of distribution of articles (e.g., *Phlb.* 24AE7-5A1 and 25A6-B1), Riddell (*Digest* §237) sees in most cases no rhyme or reason beyond the aesthetics of variation and rhythm.

<sup>1564</sup>κακολογία (A6): By being placed between the aesthetic failures it causes and the failure of character (κακοήθεια) that causes it, the term is forced according to the argument to mean the “bad story” (λόγος and its implied λέξις) despite the fact that everywhere else it means calumny (cf. the converse coinage of εὐλογία at 400D11 and n. 1552). The language is becoming streamlined, ideas are coming to govern words, and still the logic is being run by the prefixes.

<sup>1565</sup>παντέλως μὲν οὖν (A9).

<sup>1566</sup>τὴν τὸν ἀγαθὸν εἰκόνα ἥθους (B2): The hyperbaton of ἥθους raises the stateliness of the expression another notch. εἰκόνη, a harbinger of the “theory of ideas,” begins to suggest that the prefixes can be detached from their nouns, a linguistic phenomenon roughly analogous to the discovery that ideas are “separable” from the world in which they appear.

<sup>1567</sup>τὸ κακόηθες τοῦτο ἀκόλαστον καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ ἄσχημον (B4-5): The choice of items recalls 400B2-3 (cf. n. 1539), with ἄσχημον added to emphasize the aesthetic aspect (cf. C5 below).

<sup>1568</sup>ἐν εἰκόσι ζῷων (B5-6): portraiture, by the same idiom as ζωγραφία.

<sup>1569</sup>οἰκοδομήμασι (B6), still and again the paradigm of δημιουργία needed in the city: cf. A2-3 above.

<sup>1570</sup>δρέπομενοι (C2) recalls Adeimantus's ἐπιπτόμενοι at 365A8 and that entire passage along with it (cf. n. 827). The discourse has now discovered the roots of the kind of environment Plato's brother Adeimantus complained about being brought up in.

<sup>1571</sup>Ἐν τι συνίσταντες ... ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (C2-3) is perhaps imitated by Aristotle at the end of the *Posterior Analytics* (100A10-B5), a passage that likewise countenances the paradox of reaching the “universal” from the “particulars.”

<sup>1572</sup>ἐκείνους (C4) of the remote and august. This is the liftoff we have been anticipating.

<sup>1573</sup>εὐφυῶς (C4), recalling Adeimantus's εὐφυεῖς at 365A7: Socrates is reassembling the crucial ingredients in the right order.

<sup>1574</sup>ἰχνεύειν τὴν τὸν καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν (C5) encapsulates the theory of ideas in language that is untechnical but whose sense is crystal clear.

<sup>1575</sup>οἱ νέοι (C6): I adopt the singular in translation from here forward, for euphony and clarity.

<sup>1576a</sup>ἢ πρός (C7-8): again the anaphora is Socrates's.

<sup>1577</sup>εἰς ὄμοιότητά τε καὶ συμφωνίαν (D1-2): The list introduces elements or ideas for which we have only partly been prepared (while συμφωνία is a metaphor looming throughout the passage, ὄμοιότης and φιλία are prepared only by the familiarity inherent in οἰκοῦντες, C6). The ὄμοιότης calls for, and the other two nouns easily tolerate, the dative τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ. Acclimation to beautiful sights and sounds prepares the youth for the beautiful story (λόγος) to which these correspond

his soul is rhythm and harmony, where it achieves a powerful purchase and imports its gracefulness, so as thereby to make the soul a graceful soul, if the nurture is managed properly, and the opposite if not. Moreover when it comes to the things we are leaving behind for being poorly made or poorly spawned,<sup>1578</sup> the person with the finest eye will be the one who was raised properly in that finer pasture and with a proper sense of disdain, besides<sup>1579</sup> praising whatever is beautiful and greeting it with joy and taking possession of it for his soul so as to feed on such things and thereby himself become a man fine and (402) good, he will meet the ugly with proper calumny and hate it even as a young man, before he's been able to make reason his own,<sup>1580</sup> though once reason arrives he will welcome it as something familiar, as long as his upbringing is on this wise.<sup>1581</sup> Aren't these the reasons music is so powerful?

Let us then consider an analogy.<sup>1582</sup> We've always thought we have learned to read once the individual letters<sup>1583</sup> no longer elude us even though they are small and even though they appear hither and yon<sup>1584</sup> in all sorts of words, and once we treat them equally whether they are written large or small (as if things written small didn't matter!) but instead eagerly approach all instances of writing as needing our careful discrimination of them on the grounds that if we can't do this we still haven't because it articulates them, once reason (*λόγος*) should arrive. *λόγος* is a special kind of entity for Plato, as spirit is for Christians, acting as both cause and substance.

<sup>1578</sup>μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων (E2-3): The inclusion of the natural with the artificial is continued from the exuberant generalization at 401A1-4.

<sup>1579</sup>μέν (E4), concessive. Cf. also Riddell, *Digest* §300(a).

<sup>1580</sup>The moments here described in the development of the person (402A2-3) recall the statement at the beginning of the treatment of *παιδεία* that we must take care that the young guard be reared in such a way that the opinions he has reached at the end of childhood not be totally at odds with what we will need him to believe as an adult (377B7-9, and compare *λαμβάνειν δόξας* there [and at 378D8] with *λόγον λαβεῖν* here).

<sup>1581</sup>ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζειν δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα (A3-4): The new ideas just broached by *όμοιότης* and *καλὸς λόγος* (401D1-3) are now being filled in. The recognition (*γνωρίζειν*) of like by like, as well as the instinctual or pre-logical reactions *δυσχειραίνειν* and *ἀσπάζεσθαι*, recall the natural orientation of the *σκύλαξ* as described at 376A5-7. From that context we can in turn bring back *φίλος* and *ἐχθρός* (376B3) to shed light on the appearance of *μισεῖν* at A2 and of *φίλια* in the list at 401D2. What then remains to explain in that list is *συμφωνία*, but of course it is music that has provided the occasion for the entire discussion! As to *λόγος* it now means not story as we thought but the ability to reason. Commentators since van Heusde (*Specimen*, 123-4) recognize the beauties of these sentences and note Plato's broad use of the notions of harmony elsewhere in the corpus, but fail to mark the association of these decorations and this enthusiasm with his Theory of Ideas.

<sup>1582</sup>Ἄσπερ ὄρα (A7) introduces a not uncommon instance of "front-loading," where the illustration is elaborated rather far before its application is revealed. Cf. *Apol.*40D2-D7. The imperfect tense places the illustration into a recognizable because habitual past, out of which something new and unexpected will be made to emerge. The emergence of the theory of ideas at this moment in the discussion imitates its arrival in the young man (*ἐλθόντος τοῦ λόγου*, above), so it is an example of self-instantiation (cf. n.258 *ad* 335E7).

<sup>1583</sup>στοιχεῖα (A8), is a convenient term for Socrates's purpose, having its special meaning relating to written letters at the same time it has a general meaning which the analogy has been introduced to reach. We may say roughly that it is both a species and a genus.

<sup>1584</sup>περιφερόμενα (A9) introduces the notion of confusion in the widespread distribution of the letters, by which the true ability to recognize them in their individuality will not be affected. The framing of the analogy warms to the theory of ideas by emphasizing the characteristics of phenomenal experience (e.g., sameness in difference and the plurality of the unique) that the theory is meant to explain. Compare the term's use in a similar context at *Tim.*49E5 and in a not unrelated metaphor at *Rep.*596E1.

learned to read. As to the likenesses of letters,<sup>1585</sup> moreover, if they should appear in water or in mirrors<sup>1586</sup> we will not be able to distinguish them from one another until we have become able to distinguish the letters themselves of which these are likenesses. Distinguishing the likenesses depends on the same art and practice as distinguishing the letters themselves.<sup>1587</sup> Just so, with the help of the gods,<sup>1588</sup> we can hardly become competent at music, ourselves or those guards we must educate in music, before the characters of temperance and bravery and liberality and greatness and what is akin to these as well as their opposites<sup>1589</sup> become distinguishable to us, as they are found here and there and borne about in many things, and until we are able to perceive them as being present wherever they are, both the characters themselves and the images of them, and think nothing less of their instances because they are small instead of large,<sup>1590</sup> but know instead that distinguishing all these cases belongs to one and the same art and practice.

Glaucon accepts the analogy and finds that what it implies for music is logically necessarily, so Socrates can continue: Wherever instances of fine and beautiful characters occur in a person's soul or in his looks<sup>1591</sup> having the same essence as those originals and being harmonious with them by virtue of sharing their distinguishing mark, there you will have a thing most beautiful to behold, if you have the eyes to see it. Since what is most beautiful also<sup>1592</sup> incites the greatest love and desire, a man competent in music will love and desire the persons who are most that way, while if a person lacks

<sup>1585</sup>καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων (B5): Adding this exotic category of items, the “likenesses of letters,” extends the front-loading with a proleptic skew (cf. n. 1556). Who has ever even thought of “likenesses of letters”? Socrates is requiring us to hold to the idea and persist; we are sailing very close to the wind and might be overpowered. The movement of the thought is from the known, upward to the unknown. Will Socrates lose Glaucon? Will Plato lose us?

<sup>1586</sup>ἢ ἐν ὕδασιν ἢ κατόπτροις ἐμφαίνοντο (B5-6). Further obscurity: these not the sort of places that letters or their likenesses, or anything else, is characteristically seen!

<sup>1587</sup>πρὸν ὃν αὐτὰ γνῶμεν (B6-7): The letters visible on the reflecting surface will suffer geometrical distortion in case the visible surface is not parallel to the plane on which the originals were written; and the letters, now “written on” or “written in” water or glass will subsist in a medium the inherent qualities of which might distort them, as for instance in the case of water or a mirror making them wavy or smudged. The point is that knowledge of the turbulence in the water or the flaws in the mirror will not enable us to recognize the letters “written” there unless we already know them as they are in themselves (αὐτά, B7) independent of all media and angles of view. For the idea cf. Tim.49D4-E7.

The argument by implication calls into question the credentials of a discipline that would call itself “sociology of knowledge” on the one hand; as well as of any of the “comparative” -ologies, in which the waves or idiosyncrasies of the medium, as it were, purport to be the object of study while the thing conditioned by the medium is taken for granted as known. Socrates (and Plato) will revert to this problem in the Line Passage at the end of Book Six (510C6-D3).

<sup>1588</sup>πρὸς θεῶν (B9) The oath in the genitive calls for divine aid (cf. n. 4211): the point Socrates is making is as important as it is difficult to understand.

<sup>1589</sup>τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὐλ ἐναντία (C2-4): The list elaborates on the two virtues he has been thinking of in an access of enthusiasm, so as to include two unexpected and large-sounding items (ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας) and to complete the picture by mentioning their kindred values and opposing disvalues. Bare καὶ as connective is characteristic in such triumphant lists (cf. n.427 ad 342E9-11).

<sup>1590</sup>μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις (C6-7): A small bit of bright-white is whiter than a large swath of off-white, when measured against whiteness itself.

<sup>1591</sup>τε (D1), in its sense and in its position after ἐν, indicates that εἴδει (D2) is metonymy for σώματι, as the (visible) complement of the soul. καὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι would have been clearer but crass.

<sup>1592</sup>καὶ μήν ... γε (D6) introducing minor premise.

this harmony of bodily and moral beauty, he will not desire him.<sup>1593</sup>

“No he would not,” Glaucon answers, “if the person has a deficiency in his soul. A deficiency in body, however, he will tolerate enough to greet him with an embrace and a kiss.”<sup>1594</sup> Socrates catches on.<sup>1595</sup> Glaucon is alluding to boyfriends of his past or present and reveals a certain fastidiousness about physical contact. Socrates grants him the point so as to move on to a new question.<sup>1596</sup>

Can sound mindedness have anything in common with extreme pleasure?

“How could it, given the fact that<sup>1597</sup> extreme pleasure drives a man out of his mind no less than pain does?”

Can virtue in general have?

(403) “No way.”

But what about with rashness and licentiousness?

“With these extreme pleasure has more in common than with anything.”

Can you name a pleasure more strong or more intense than sex?

“No, nor more maddening.”<sup>1598</sup>

But is the correct kind of desire and love, the love incited by the well-mannered<sup>1599</sup> and fine person, a love that desires harmoniously and musically?

“Quite so.”

Therefore no ingredient of madness should be added<sup>1600</sup> to the correct kind of desire, nor anything akin to licentiousness.<sup>1601</sup>

“It must not.”

Nor therefore should this kind of pleasure be added. The lover and his beloved should not partake of it if they are to love correctly and be loved correctly.

<sup>1593</sup> ἀσύμφωνος (D9): the inverse of ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα (402D2-3). Socrates completes his point by asserting the contrapositive. Focussing on the subject's own connection or harmony with beauty as well as that of the object—on the beauty that is in the eye of the beholder—helps to remind us of Glaucon's desire to talk about music out of a professed ignorance (398C7ff). He has a deep connection (συμφωνία, 401D2) with music that his technical learning could not articulate to his satisfaction; and so in the end Socrates is right to have implied that even he could have filled things out in the account of music “consonantly” (συμφωνήσειν, 398C6).

<sup>1594</sup> ἀσπάζεσθαι (E1) is required by the context, to include the physical contact of an embrace, or else there would be no sense in ὑπομεῖναι.

<sup>1595</sup> With μανθάνω (E2), he indicates the statement means more to him than what it says on the surface (372E2 and n.1035).

<sup>1596</sup> τόδε μοι (E3): The first person demonstrative warns that the idea resides in Socrates's mind only and is in this sense new. The allusion to Glaucon and his coterie brings the discourse back from the impersonal heights it had reached, and next we have Socratic question and answer.

<sup>1597</sup> γε (E5) can be causal with the relative just as it can be with the article.

<sup>1598</sup> οὐδέ γε μανικωτέραν (403A6), continuing the opening reference to σωφροσύνη and the connection he has drawn with being driven out of one's mind.

<sup>1599</sup> κοσμίου τε καὶ καλού (A7): Given its position κόσμιος bears the same relation to καλός as σωφρόνως bears to μουσικῶς in the sequel.

<sup>1600</sup> προσοιστέον (A10): προσφέρειν as in the administration of a drug (n.2194).

<sup>1601</sup> Socrates's μανικόν (A10), repeats Glaucon's μανικώτερον (A6) and ἔκφρονα (402E5), whereas ἀκολασίας (*ibid.*) repeats his own ἀκολασία from A2.

"Truly by Zeus it must not be added, Socrates."

Socrates has been careful to secure Glaucon's agreement at every step, so that he can now hold him responsible for the result, which he presents as a personal challenge to Glaucon: "Will you then set down as a law for the city we are founding that the lover may kiss and be with and touch<sup>1602</sup> his beloved as a person would his son,<sup>1603</sup> for the sake of beauty and its pursuit and if he has his permission, but for the rest must treat him as a person with whom he has serious business and avoid even the appearance of spending more time with him than such as those would with each other, else he will bear<sup>1604</sup> the calumny of being unmusical and lacking culture?"

Glaucon agrees to do so, and this personal coda to the treatment of music comes to a close. Socrates, for one, feels they have finished where they should have, since musical matters ought to culminate in the erotics of beauty;<sup>1605</sup> and Glaucon agrees for his part, so they can turn then to the other branch of nurture and education,<sup>1606</sup> gymnastics.

### 2.B.3b.2: The Nurturing of the Natural-born Guards: Part Two: GYMNASTIC

Here too we must care for them closely, from their childhood up. I have a sense what needs to be done; investigate it for yourself along with me. It seems to me<sup>1607</sup> that a worthy body cannot by means of its bodily virtue<sup>1608</sup> make a soul good, whereas conversely a good soul by means of its psychic virtue is able provide a man the best body he can have. If then we have adequately conditioned our young men's minds we could hand over to them the task of formulating a detailed plan for running the body.<sup>1609</sup> All we need to do is give guidance in the outlines. We can avoid tedious length.<sup>1610</sup>

First of all inebriation<sup>1611</sup> will be something they must avoid. We have no room for a guard so

<sup>1602</sup> φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ἀπτεσθαι (B5). Unlike Phdr.255E3 (όραν, ἀπτεσθαι, φιλεῖν [= kiss], συγκατακεῖσθαι) and the more discreet 240D2-3 (όρωντι, ἀκούοντι, ἀπτομένῳ, καὶ πάσαν αἴσθησιν αἰσθανομένῳ) which it recalls, the order and selection, and therefore also the semantics of the items in this list are unclear to me!

<sup>1603</sup> ὥσπερ οὐέος (B5): For the comparison compare E.Ion, 1365: ἵσον γάρ σ' ὡς τεκοῦσ' ἀσπάζομαι; for the behavior compare Socrates's treatment of Alcibiades as described by the latter at Symp.219C6-D2.

<sup>1604</sup> ὑφέξοντα (C2) echoes Glaucon's ὑπομείνειν (402D11).

<sup>1605</sup> οἱ γοῦν δεῖ τελευτῶν τετελεύτηκεν C5-6): The need to respond to Glaucon's fastidiousness (402D10-E1) led to the controlled dialectical section about the propriety of erotic relations between "lover and beloved" in their pursuit of culture (E3-403B3); but the true flower of all music always was the erotic participation in beauty, and so to reach this topic was opportune.

<sup>1606</sup> θρεπτέοι (C9): "nurture;" compare "education" (παιδεία, 376E2-7).

<sup>1607</sup> φαίνεται (D2) repeated from above (C4).

<sup>1608</sup> τῇ αὐτοῦ ὀρετῇ (D2-3): The stipulation makes clear the fine observation that although a healthy body might provide the necessary foundation for psychic improvement, it cannot use its health or strength or beauty actually to improve the soul, whereas conversely the soul can use its temperance and its intelligence to improve the body.

<sup>1609</sup> ἀλλὰ τούναντίον (D3): That mind can dictate to body lays the foundation for the ensuing treatment in outline, which will avoid length with humor and satire, which distinctly appeals to the intelligence. Much of what follows serves as a sort of scherzo, after the sober and morally serious treatment of music.

<sup>1610</sup> ἵνα μὴ μακρολογῶμεν (E1): Worry about prolixity naturally arises before beginning something new (cf.376C9-D10, 398C4-6), as does the expedient of using outlines (τύποι: cf. 378E7-379AA4). This time nobody objects.

<sup>1611</sup> μέθης (E4): The point was already made in passing, at 398E6.

drunk<sup>1612</sup> he doesn't know where in the world he is.“It would be laughable that the guard himself should need a guard,” Glaucon replies.

As for food,<sup>1613</sup> our men are like athletes taking part in the greatest of contests.Would it then be (404) appropriate that they achieve the condition of the professional athletes we see around us?<sup>1614</sup> Probably not, since the athlete is somnolent and has a fragile hold on health. Haven't you noticed that they sleep their life away, and that when they depart even a mite from their set regimen they get sick in a very big way? We'll need a more subtle<sup>1615</sup> kind of training for our athletes of war, whose very job requires them to be vigilant like dogs and to have particularly sharp vision and hearing as well as being ready to adjust to conditions various and varying when they are on expeditions.We can't have their health teeter-tottering with the different kinds of water they'll be drinking and everything else they ingest, or with the heat of summer and the cold of winter. Perhaps the better model for our gymnastic would be something akin to the simple style of music we described a few minutes ago, a gymnastic simple and reasonable, modeled in fact after the activity of war. One can take some tips from Homer.<sup>1616</sup> You know from the poems that under bivouac he has his heroes feasting not on fish (despite the fact that they are near the Hellespont) nor boiled meat stews but on meat roasted only, which is the most convenient for soldiers since a fire can be started anywhere and there's no need to pack and haul cooking pots.You know that Homer never mentions garnishes and sweets—so much you could learn from other men in training, that a person whose body is going to be in good shape has to keep away from these altogether.A Syracusan table and the Sicilian style of assorted garnish you will not be recommending, if you agree with all this; and the Corinthian maid you will talk down as something not so friendly after all, for men who are thinking of<sup>1617</sup> being fit in body;<sup>1618</sup> as well as those Attic sweetmeats that are thought to be so pleasant.<sup>1619</sup> That whole way of eating and living<sup>1620</sup> would rightly be compared with musical compositions based on the panharmonic and polyrhythmic elements.<sup>1621</sup> In the sphere of music that kind of variety spawned licentiousness while here in the sphere of the bodily regimen it spawns disease; and simple music engendered temperance in their

<sup>1612</sup>μεθυσθέντι (E5) properly goes with εἰδέναι but according to the general rule the subject accusative is attracted into the case of the antecedent in the main construction, which is both παντί and φύλακι. The sentence does not mean we have no need for a drunken guard to be ignorant but no need for a guard to be so drunk as to be ignorant.

<sup>1613</sup>σίτων πέρι (E8): Food is the second bodily need after drink (445A6-8; Crito 47B9-10; Leg.789D5-6), to which together, if sex is added we have the entire complement of bodily pleasures (cf.329A6 and n.55).

<sup>1614</sup>τῶνδε (404A1) is almost deictic and makes ἀσκητῶν adjectival.The ἀθλητής contends for an ἀθλον; the ἀσκητής (perhaps the rhyme is felt) is a contender who spends the rest of his time preparing for his performance. The ἔξις is the condition he achieves by his training.

<sup>1615</sup>κομψωτέρας δή τινος (A9), an oxymoron.

<sup>1616</sup>καὶ παρ' Ὅμηρου (B10): Despite his radical critique of Homer in the treatment of λόγος and λέξις Socrates easily reverts to the convention of citing Homer for corroboration, without the irony or condescension that has been read into καί and γε (B10-11). καί has the same force it has with Damon at 400B1 (cf. n.1538); and if γε diminishes the importance of anything it is the subject rather than the witness: Socrates is simply less concerned with the body than the soul.

<sup>1617</sup> μέλλουσιν εὖ σώματος ἔξειν (D6): cf. 400E5 and n.1558.

<sup>1618</sup>These cities (D1-6) are all emblematic of luxury and lavishness. The metonymies afford him a way to arrive at Κορινθίων κόρην (D5), a discrete way to speak of courtesans, with which the third element of bodily enjoyment is brought in after all (cf. n. 1613 *ad* 403E8).

<sup>1619</sup>πεμμάτων (D8) along with the κορή and the other luxuries, recalls the ἐταῖραι and the πέμματα listed after the μύρα and θυμιάματα, to please Glaucon, at 373A3-4. We have returned to the place where luxuries had occurred to the mind, but this time we are immune!

<sup>1620</sup>διαιτῶν (D11) continues the allusion back, now to διαιτήσονται, 372A5.

<sup>1621</sup>παναρμονίω (D12): Cf. 373A6ff.

souls, (405) while gymnastic simplicity engenders health. As licentiousness and diseases fill<sup>1622</sup> the city, courtrooms and doctors' offices start opening up everywhere;<sup>1623</sup> and the arts of wrangling in court and doctoring come to be taken seriously once the freer sort of citizens<sup>1624</sup> get on the bandwagon and pursue them with vigor.

Truly, there is no more telling sign that a city's culture is on the decline than a rising demand for doctors and sharp<sup>1625</sup> lawyers, not only among the common craftsmen but even among persons who wish to be viewed as properly educated.<sup>1626</sup> Don't you think it ugly to have to conform to some sort of justice cooked up by others who sit over you as your masters and judges and require you to make it yours and fit your life to it as if<sup>1627</sup> you had no inner sense of justice yourself? The only thing more shameful than this is a person who spends his whole life in the courtroom, today a plaintiff and tomorrow a defendant,<sup>1628</sup> and worse, thinks nothing of it out of his utter gracelessness, telling himself<sup>1629</sup> how astute he is in the area of injustice,<sup>1630</sup> how adequate to make every twist and ready to avail himself of every escape, a constant display of legal acrobatics, ever having himself exempted from paying the penalty, regardless how small.<sup>1631</sup> No idea has he how much finer and better it would be to get himself a life and a livelihood that has no need for a nodding juror!

And what shall we say about the demand for doctors to do more than treat wounds and cases of seasonal disease, but in addition to administer to the ravages of inactivity or the regimen we have mentioned? These fluids and the vapors they are full of, as full as swamps, with similar secretions and flatulence,<sup>1632</sup> each and all of them to be given their proper denominations from our clever troupe of Asclepiads! How disgusting!

<sup>1622</sup>πληθουσῶν (405A1): Cf. ἐμπληστέα, 373B3.

<sup>1623</sup>δικαστήριά τε καὶ ιατρεῖα πολλά (A2): The flourishing of disease and the demand for doctors returns from 373D1-2, but legal contentiousness is new, added here to provide the psychic correlate to somatic excess (the reverse of the transition from τρυφᾶν to φλεγμαίνειν at 372E2-8!), and will now provide Socrates an opportunity to reframe the hero of Adeimantus's speech (365D2-6).

<sup>1624</sup>ἐλεύθεροι πολλοί (A3): The population envisioned is not the one we have constructed and the one for which we are preparing guards but the real or typical population of any city, with its typical class structure and self-understanding. Socrates contemplates how a given education will affect the guards by comparing how education affects people in everyday life.

<sup>1625</sup>ἄκρων (A8) echoes Glaucon's use at 360E7.

<sup>1626</sup>τοὺς ἐν ἐλευθερίῳ σχήματι προσποιούμενος τεθράφθαι (A9-B1), a phrase dense with eloquence. σχήματι suggests they have a picture what an educated person looks like, although in truth education is from the inside out and will show itself, unless it is absent in which case one needs to make a show of it (προσποιούμενος). The perfect τεθράφθαι adds their sense that they are done with the process of education and wear it like a cloak.

<sup>1627</sup>Reading ως (B3) with ms.F over the καὶ of mss.ADM. One's supposed lack of inner resources explains why one's judge is also his δεσπότης.

<sup>1628</sup>Compare Euthyphro's presumption that Socrates would be a defendant rather than a plaintiff (2B1-2), and his utter intransigence to the ugliness of prosecuting the person he is prosecuting – his father (4A5-B3).

<sup>1629</sup>ώς (B9) virtual indirect discourse, taking place within his benighted mind.

<sup>1630</sup>περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (C1): The preference for injustice—the focus on the privation—hearkens back to the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus. Here is what the astuteness praised by Adeimantus (365D2-6) actually looks like.

<sup>1631</sup>ἰκανὸς πάσας μὲν στροφάς ... πάσας δὲ διεξόδους (C1-2): For the twists and turns cf. Glaucon's ικανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι (361A2, B1-3), the use of ικανός in bravado going back to Thrasyllus (344C6 and n.458). For avoiding to pay the penalty (μὴ παρασχεῖν δίκην) cf. 365D6.

<sup>1632</sup>Chiasm of cause (ρένυμάτων τε καὶ πνεύματων, D1-2) and effect (φύσας τε καὶ κατάρρους, D2-3): cf. 431E10-2A1, 576C1-2, 618B3-4.

Glaucon too has noticed these novel and strange names, and Socrates goes on to make the point that things were different in Asclepius's time. His actual sons<sup>1633</sup> served at Troy, and when they saw a servant maid giving the (406) wounded Eurypylus a preparation of Pamnean wine with lots of barley and cheese mixed in with it, a thing that today would surely be deemed phlegmatic, they made nary a fuss nor a comment to Patroclus who was in charge of the case.

"But really the drink was quite out of place<sup>1634</sup> for a person in his condition," Glaucon rejoins.

Not really, if you realize that the entire institution of medical training we now have was unknown before the guild of Asclepiads. Then one day Herodicus showed up. He was a gymnastic trainer that became sickly and contrived to combine gymnastics with iatrics. He tried it out on himself first; only later did it catch on with everybody around him. The result was, he made his death last a long time.<sup>1635</sup> He became the constant companion of his disease, a mortal sickness he could not heal. He spent his whole life treating it and was too busy to do anything else. He'd have a flare-up whenever he departed from his usual regimen but got progressively harder and harder to kill<sup>1636</sup> and even made it to old age.<sup>1637</sup>

"So fine a medal he bore off with his mettle!"<sup>1638</sup>

Just what you would expect from a person who was unaware that it was not out of ignorance or inexperience that Asclepius held back from this kind of iatrics and from teaching it to his heirs.<sup>1639</sup> He saw that the situation of all well governed men was to have a single duty assigned to them in their city that they have to work at all the time, and none of them had time to spend their life laboring with illness<sup>1640</sup> and treatments, a thing that laughably enough<sup>1641</sup> we recognize to be valid for our craftsmen, while we fail to see its application to the rich and well-off.

Glaucon of course does not understand so Socrates explains. A builder who is ill will expect to get a drug from his doctor<sup>1642</sup> that will make him vomit the sickness up or pass it downwards or have it burned off or cut out of him and be done with it. Let the doctor assign<sup>1643</sup> him a lengthy regimen

<sup>1633</sup>αὐτοῦ ὁ νέῖς (E1): Socrates means to insist upon the literal meaning of Ἀσκληπιάδεις that has been forgotten in the intervening centuries.

<sup>1634</sup>ἄτοπον (406A4) the term he just used for the newfangled terminology of the Asclepiads (D5). Only fashion can find things unfashionable: Adeimantus soon learns he is insufficiently aware of his own.

<sup>1635</sup>μακρόν ... τὸν θάνατον αὐτῷ ποιήσας (B4): the catachresis is satirical.

<sup>1636</sup>δυσθανατῶν ὑπὸ σοφίας (B8), oxymoronic.

<sup>1637</sup>That his cobbled wisdom (μείξας, A8) found a market is the salient point, as we can infer from Prot.316D10 (οὐδενὸς ἡττων σοφιστής).

<sup>1638</sup>γῆρας / γέρας (B8-9): Glaucon joins in the satiric spirit with a soundplay.

<sup>1639</sup>ἐκγόνοις (C3) gracefully combines both his sons and the guild that made a patronym of him.

<sup>1640</sup>οὐδὲνὶ σχολὴ διὰ βίου κάμνειν ἰατρευομένῳ (C5), another oxymoronic phrase.

<sup>1641</sup>γελοίως (C6). In contrast to the perspicuous Asclepius (εἰδώς, C3), who sees that the principle is universal, we can only perceive its application to the working class, and so we cut a sorry figure relying on him for clarification, while he proves an elegant spokesman, in his way. Meanwhile we don't know what to say about the rich since we don't know what the rich and well-off are supposed to be doing. Again, it is everyday life that we are imagining.

<sup>1642</sup>παρὰ τοῦ ἰατροῦ (D1): As opposed to "going to the doctor" this person gets something from him. The expression throughout the paragraph closely imitates the direct and simple thought, manner and tone of the τέκτων.

<sup>1643</sup>προστάττει (D4), the verb used above for the assignment of tasks to individuals in the well-governed environment (C4). Herodicus's illness diverted away him from gymnastics and into a new career, in which as it turned out he was his only client.

with compresses to be applied to the head<sup>1644</sup> and all that stuff and he'll soon be hearing from his patient<sup>1645</sup> that he hasn't time to be sick, and that living that way he would produce nothing, and that paying attention to the disease would make him neglect his work. Soon enough he'll bid adieu to that kind of doctor and step right back into his usual regimen,<sup>1646</sup> and then he'll either get better and go on with his life or else if his body can't carry on he'll be done with the bothers of being alive.<sup>1647</sup>

"Yes, for a man of his station<sup>1648</sup> this would be the right attitude toward doctors," Glaucon allows, and Socrates (407) makes sure the reason he agrees is that what made the man's life useless was his inability to work. On the other hand we don't speak of the rich man as having any work cut out for himself, work that would make his life unsustainable<sup>1649</sup> if he neglected it—at least Glaucon hasn't heard tell of such. But then, Socrates wonders, perhaps Glaucon has not heard the teaching of Phocylides, that 'once a man has secured his livelihood, he must practice virtue.'<sup>1650</sup>

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<sup>1644</sup>πιὼν ἐξεμέσαι τὸ νόσημα ἡ κάτω καθαρθεὶς, ἡ καύσει ἡ τομῇ χρησάμενος ἀπηλλάχθαι (D2-3): After this list of four dispositive treatments (two pairs), the single example of a lengthy and bothersome one (D3-D5) is enough to call for an impatient and insouciant dismissal. For other cases where a single example is for various reasons relied upon as sufficient, cf. 362E5-3A1, 412C7-10, 456D8-10, 467A2-5, 510A1-3, 551C3-11, 608A5, 618C8-D5; and Crat.423A4-5, 439D3-4; Gorg.447D3-6 (not enough for Polus: cf. Dodds *ad loc.*), 478A2-4, 478B7-C6; Leg.631C3-4, 697B8ff, 734E6-7, 816D, 832E5, 949A1, 957B5-7, 967A2-3; Lys.219D5 (an example esp. apposite for the interlocutor: cf. 207Dff); Phdo.103E26-7; Phdrs.239D5 and 240A2 (adding swiftness), 261A8-9, 278C1-4; Phlb.29B, 53AC, and the back-and-forth of 54AC; Polit.258D4-5, D8-9, 288D8-9, 299D3-E2; Prot.342C6-7.

<sup>1645</sup>ταχὺ εἶπεν (D5), the aorist adding "gnomically" that the action is characteristic (cf. n. *ad* D1). Cf. the aorists in Book Eight describing the behavior that characterizes the types of men: 550B4-5 and n.3704.

<sup>1646</sup>εἰς τὴν εἰωθυῖαν δίαιταν ἐμβάσι (E1) compares with Herodicus's εἴ τι τῆς εἰωθυίας διαίτης ἐκβαίή (B7-8), just as the factitious ὑγιῆς γενόμενος here compares with the factitious νοσώδης γενόμενος there (A8).

<sup>1647</sup>At first he seeks relief from the disease (ἀπηλλάχθαι, D3); failing that he gets relief from living (ἀπαλλάγη, E3).

<sup>1648</sup>μέν γε (E4): μέν is *solitarium*, as often with γε it restricts the remark to the one type.

<sup>1649</sup>ἀβίωτον (407A5), the same language Socrates uses of the unexamined life in the *Apology* (38A5-6). There it is translated "not worth living;" here, despite the language of the craftsman himself that it glosses (οὐ λυσιτελεῖ οὔτω ζῆν, D6), we will find it translated "unsustainable," and translated so for Glaucon's sake. The meaning is the same in both passages, and the craftsman is our instructor. Although we might believe that a person of his station cannot afford to miss work, this worry is absent from his complaints. He goes back to work even if it kills him, with no talk of going broke, because his life is meaningless without work. In his brief and gruff remarks he exhibits the virtues of wisdom (*προσέχειν νοῦν*) and courage (accepting death), and probably justice since he means to execute his duties (*τὰ ἔαυτοῦ*), and temperance since he will listen to the doctor but not too long. We are hearing from the man who sleeps on the ground! The rich man, we laughably think, has no such need for meaningful work.

<sup>1650</sup>ὅταν τῷ ἥδη βίος ἦ, ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν (A8). Socrates's version, which doesn't quite scan, is quite different from the complete hexameter attributed to him by Alex Aphrod. (*in Arist top* 3.2, 118A=258,W.): δίζησθαι βιοτήν, ἀρετὴν δ' ὅταν ἦ βίος ἥδη (Anth.Lyr.Gr. [Diehl] 1.59, fr.10 =PLG, fr.8 Bergk), "Find your livelihood, and virtue once you have secured it." Socrates quotes the two clauses in reverse order and with an ironic simplicity that resembles his initial response to Glaucon's request for ὄψον (372C4-D3), he infers that Phocylides advised men to take up the real work of practicing virtue (ἀσκεῖν) just as soon (ἥδη) as they could afford to, rather than postpone it until they were rich enough (ἥδη) to quit working. The joke (γελοιώς, C6) is that Phocylides and everybody who thinks his way fails to see the implication that the formula presumes that life is worth living (βιωτός~βιοτή) without the practice of virtue.

"I'd say he should before he's secured it, too," Glaucon retorts.<sup>1651</sup>

Let's not fight with Phocylides on that point but teach ourselves a lesson. Which shall we choose? Shall we say that the rich man must concern himself with this<sup>1652</sup> and that his life would be unsustainable if he did not? Or shall we say that, while a life nursing disease<sup>1653</sup> pre-empts a builder or other craftsman from paying attention to his true occupation, it doesn't pre-empt a person from fulfilling the maxim of Phocylides?<sup>1654</sup>

Glaucon is almost beside himself: "It most certainly does pre-empt him, more indeed than anything else does, this supragymnastical and kooky meticulousness about the body!<sup>1655</sup> What stomach could it have<sup>1656</sup> for managing the household or for armies not to mention the executive meetings one has to sit through in the city?" And Socrates goes him one better:<sup>1657</sup> But most of all for studies, any kind you could name, and for thinking and inward meditation<sup>1658</sup> this attitude makes for hard going. It's always

<sup>1651</sup> δέ γε (A9) signals that his remark is a retort.

<sup>1652</sup> τοῦτο (A11): By replacing ἀρετή with the vague neuter demonstrative Socrates prevents the obvious fact, that all men should practice virtue all the time, from distracting his interlocutor away from the narrower question whether the rich man's purpose in life is self-improvement in the same sense that making houses is the purpose in life for the builder.

<sup>1653</sup> νοσοτροφία (B1), coined here, an oxymoron.

<sup>1654</sup> οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει (B3): This alternative cannot be true unless pursuing virtue requires less exercise of νοῦς than the crafts, a pretty pass indeed!

<sup>1655</sup> Note Glaucon's sputtering repetition of γε (B4, B5) and of the article (ή, B5 bis), his asyntactical adverb περαιτέρω (B5), and his self-interruption with the demonstrative αὕτη (B5)—all as if he were at a loss what to call it.

<sup>1656</sup> δύσκολος (B7), sc. ή ἐπιμέλεια. With the personification Glaucon makes another joke of his own.

<sup>1657</sup> τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον (B8) capping Glaucon's σχεδόν γέ τι πάντων (B4). Socrates's close continuation is hardly sufficient grounds to believe Plato had to indicate change of speaker with ἦν δ' ἐγώ vel sim. (*Slings, lacunam statuens*). Socrates indicates and justifies his intervention both to Glaucon and to us by the parallelisms in the formulation of his reply. Both are excited.

<sup>1658</sup> πρὸς μαθήσεις ἀστινασοῦν καὶ ἐννοήσεις τε καὶ μελέτας πρὸς ἔαυτόν (B8-C1: reading τε with ADM, which is omitted by F). The most common position and use of τε in lists is after and enclitic to first item, where it announces the fact that a list is coming by indicating that the first item must not be considered alone (καὶ does not announce but already begins the movement forward). In the present case τε is internal to the list—i.e. enclitic to an item itself already added. Again it keeps its item from being thought of as standing alone, usually to indicate that the ensuing item or items will be an elaboration of its item rather than items additional to and coordinate with what had come before. Thus we find it forming a single item in the form of a polar doublet at 412B3-4, 431B9-C1, 503C2-4; and *Meno* 75C8-9; and in the form of another kind of hendiadys at 519B1-2 and *Crat.* 407E6-8A1, Leg. 950E5-6, *Symp.* 206D3-5, 211D3-4. Note also that it can give a counterweight for subsequent elaboration, as *Crat.* 408A1 (ἐν λόγοις) and here (πρὸς ἔαυτόν).

Distinguish from this the internal τε that substitutes for καὶ, as at *Tim.* 28B7-8 ὥρατός ... ἀπτός τε καὶ σῶμα ἔχον and 31B4 (σωματοειδές ... ὥρατὸν ἀπτόν τε), cf. *Critias* 107C3-4, 112C6-7; Leg. 733B6-7 [note rhyming], 809B4, 828B4 [another rhyme]; *Tim.* 43B2-4, 92C7-8: here τε achieves a more intimate connection than καὶ by a kind of elegance Demetrius called τὸ γλαφυρόν (de Eloc. I 38). Alternatively, varying καὶ with τε can be a means for indicating a transition within the list, to a new category of items (often but not always with αὖ: *Crit.* 107C3-4, 114E10-5A1; Leg. 679B8-C1 [and Stallb. *ad loc.*], 872A7-B1, 899B3-4), to an exegetical pair (Leg. 809B4 [cf. England *ad loc.*]), or to the penultimate item or closing generalization (Leg. 735B1-2, 738C6-7, 896C9-D1, D5-7; Rep. 370D9-10, 547B3-4).

Finally there is the question of the relation in this particular list between μαθήσεις and the pair —i.e. what is the force of the καὶ before ἐννοήσεις? The modification of the pair by πρὸς ἔαυτόν

sensing a hint of a headache or dizziness coming on and blaming it on philosophy, so that anytime and anywhere a person practices this kind of virtue<sup>1659</sup> something shows up to block his way. It makes a person think he is sick all the time and puts him in the body's throes unceasing. Asclepius knew it well. It was for people who were essentially sound and following healthy regimens but who caught some distinct disease, that he founded the ministrations of medicine. He found ways to cast out disease with drugs or cutting<sup>1660</sup> but in order not to disturb the political order he assigned his patients to continue with their usual round of activities. For bodies<sup>1661</sup> that were utterly riddled with disease through and through he did not try to prescribe regimens to drain off one humor or infuse another by which he would only make the folks<sup>1662</sup> life a long evil<sup>1663</sup> and enable them to procreate offspring of a similar ilk.<sup>1664</sup> Instead he deemed that a person who was no longer able to live according to the established pace and order should not be treated at all since there was nothing to gain by it either for himself or for the city.<sup>1665</sup>

"You make this Asclepius out to be *politically adept*," Glaucon rejoins.

Clearly his sons were, too, exactly because he was. Haven't you realized how nobly they behaved in wartime at Troy and that (408) the way they practiced medicine was the way I am describing? Do you remember how they treated Menelaus when he was wounded by Pandarus:

"They sucked out the blood and sprinkled on some drugs"<sup>1666</sup>

—but as to what he was to drink or eat after the treatment they had as little to say as they did for Eurypylus, since they know that drugs were enough to heal a man<sup>1667</sup> if his regime before he was wounded was salubrious and moderate—even if he might quaff a mull on a given occasion—whereas a life<sup>1668</sup> sickly by nature and licentious by habit they counted worthless both to those who live it and to everybody else, and they held that their craft was not designed to serve such as these nor should they

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suggests that the pair is a specification of μαθήσεις meant to emphasize the subjective state of mind involved (for a similar exegetical pair with internal τε cf. the elegant *Thet.* 176C3-4, δεινότης ἄνδρος καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία, and cf. *Rep.* 431B9, 519B1-2).

<sup>1659</sup> ταυτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀσκεῖται (C3): sarcasm. It means countenancing these valetudinarian concerns rather than pursuing virtue undistracted.

<sup>1660</sup> φαρμάκοις τε καὶ τομαῖς (D2-3): An abbreviation of the procedures imagined by the working man, 406D2-3)

<sup>1661</sup> τὰ δ' (D4): Bodies, not people: we had expected οἱ δέ after τοὺς μέν (C7). Socrates treats these as something less than men.

<sup>1662</sup> ἀνθρώπῳ (D7), pathetic and impersonal. Contrast ἄνδρας (408A8 and n.1667).

<sup>1663</sup> μακρὸν καὶ κακὸν ... βίον ποιεῖν (D6-7), an oxymoron, given the presumption that long life is *eo ipso* good. Rousseau borrows much of the tone of this passage in the middle of the first book of *Emile*, as when he speaks of "des médecins qui leur donnent chaque jour le seul plaisir dont ils soient susceptibles, celui de n'être pas morts" (59, ed. Flammarion).

<sup>1664</sup> ἔτερα τοιαῦτα (D7-8) the ἔτερον of mild aposiopesis (cf. n.1197).

<sup>1665</sup> His language is more refined, but in substance the position Asclepius takes in this paragraph is the same as that taken by the more blunt craftsman above (406A1-E3).

<sup>1666</sup> Hom. II.4.218, modified.

<sup>1667</sup> ἄνδρας (408A8) rather than the impersonal ἀνθρώπους used above, expressing fellow feeling or "identification." Cf. 361B6 and n.752.

<sup>1668</sup> νοσώδη δὲ φύσει τε καὶ ἀκόλαστον ... (B2-5). For this pair of accusative singular masculine or feminine adjectives, which appear to agree with a subject accusative with ζῆν (B3), the mss. give no noun. The easiest omission (the one that requires least energy to supply) is an internal accusative with ζῆν; we need a feminine or masculine; I supply therefore βίον—but the omission is unusual and peculiar.

in fact receive treatment, not even if they were richer than Midas.

"You make Asclepius's children out to be quite clever," Glaucon rejoins.

As one should. Others don't believe this is the story about them. The tragedians and Pindar<sup>1669</sup> make the father out to be a son of Apollo, but say he was bribed to treat a rich man who was quite near death, and that this is why he was struck by lightning.<sup>1670</sup> We cannot, according to our own principles, believe both these claims. If he was the son of a god then we'll conclude he was not a money grubber; and if he was a money grubber he was not the son of a god.<sup>1671</sup>

Glaucon agrees with all that, partly in order to raise a worry that has now come into his mind.<sup>1672</sup> Will Socrates take this radical attitude so far as to deny that the city needs to obtain good doctors? Off-hand it seems to himself that the best qualified would be those who had treated the greatest number of people whether healthy or sick, just as the most qualified jurors are those who have been around the block<sup>1673</sup> with the entire range of human types.<sup>1674</sup>

Socrates replies, carefully, "I am arguing that we must have very good ones indeed—but perhaps you don't know which people I'd think are good."

"I'll know if you'll tell me."<sup>1675</sup>

And I will do so, but mind you<sup>1676</sup> your question applies the same formula to things that are dissimilar. As for our doctors,<sup>1677</sup> they'll turn out most clever if right from their childhood, in addition to their formal studies, they get to know<sup>1678</sup> as many bodies as possible and the worst possible, and if they themselves catch all the diseases and have an inborn tendency not to be healthy. After all, it's not with a body they'll be treating a body; if it were, there would be no room for their bodies to be bad or become so either. Rather it is with the soul they'll treat (409) the body, a soul that has no room to be,

<sup>1669</sup> Aesch. Ag. 1022; E. Alc. 3-4; Pind. Pyth. 3.55-8.

<sup>1670</sup> According to the story the man was dead and Zeus punished Asclepius for bringing him back to life and thus using his god-given gifts in a way that would abolish fear of the gods among men. With θανάσιμον ἥδη ὄντα (B9) Socrates attempts a compromise between the real story and the question at issue in the present context, treating a mortal disease for the sake of lengthening a life that will be useless as long as it lasts. Socrates's insouciant disregard for the distinction between the two cases—it's a matter of life and death after all!—makes his remark all the more comic.

<sup>1671</sup> εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ἦν, οὐκ ἦν, φήσομεν, αἰσχροκερδῆς· εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδῆς οὐκ ἦν θεοῦ (C3-4): The formulation recalls both in form and content the *reductio* in Adeimantus's speech where the imaginary young man asserts there is no need to fear the punishment of the gods. Either there aren't any gods or if there are the same people who say so say also they can be bribed (365D7-E6, esp. οἵς ἡ ἀμφότερα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον). προειρημένα (C2) points to 391BD where the principle was first applied.

<sup>1672</sup> γε (C5), limits the range of ταῦτα and the adjacent τοῦδε reveals his self-consciousness.

<sup>1673</sup> ὠμιληκότες (D3), bespeaks the kind of familiarity people get by working and partying with each other. The perfect suggests that after a while we "get each other's number."

<sup>1674</sup> φύσεσιν (D2), with derogatory παντοδαπαῖς, is a sort of euphemism for the menagerie of human types ranging from virtuous to vicious (on analogy with the healthy and the sickly in connection with medicine, D1).

<sup>1675</sup> ἀν εἴπης (D6): Glaucon's sudden self-distancing reminds us that all along there are two minds at work in the conversation: Plato tends to remind his reader of this, in preparation for an unforeseen development. For the gesture cf. 573D1.

<sup>1676</sup> σὺ μέντοι (D7), is strong and direct.

<sup>1677</sup> ιατροὶ μέν (D10) suggests already that the complexity Socrates has accused Glaucon of overlooking consists of a distinction he should have drawn between doctor and juror, which Socrates will now do.

<sup>1678</sup> ὠμιλήσειαν (D12): Socrates transfers Glaucon's ὠμιληκότες (D3) from juror (D2) to doctor (D12), to set the comparison of the two professions into stronger relief.

or come to be, in a bad state if they are to give good treatment. The juror on the other hand uses soul to rule soul, and soul has no room to take on the effect of constant exposure to and familiarity with<sup>1679</sup> bad<sup>1680</sup> souls or to pursue a full career of unjust acts as if she would come out the other side with a sharp sense for diagnosing the injustices of others like diagnosing the diseases of the body. Instead she must evolve<sup>1681</sup> during youth unexposed to corrupt characters and unsullied by them, if she wants to make her judgment<sup>1682</sup> about right and wrong in a healthy<sup>1683</sup> way by means of herself being fine and good. This is why decent people appear to be rather simple<sup>1684</sup> while they are still young and liable to be taken in by unjust people, lacking as they do any homoeopathic identification<sup>1685</sup> with base men that they could use as a standard to measure them with.

Glaucon quite agrees that the young have this weakness, and Socrates makes the supplemental point that the best jurors are in addition older men, who have gotten to know about injustice only lately<sup>1686</sup> and have done so not by a clear and unmediated perception of it residing in their own souls but by a studied attempt to make the thing out as an alien thing found in alien souls, so that over time they come to see it for the evil thing that it is.<sup>1687</sup> They get there by knowledge and not by personal experience.

"No one could say this is not the noblest sort of all to be a judge."<sup>1688</sup>

Yes, and a "good" judge, too, to answer the question you asked.<sup>1689</sup> In short, what makes him good

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<sup>1679</sup>τεθράφθαί τε καὶ ώμιληκέναι (409A2-3), an hendiadys combining a new term with the old one, by which Socrates now reveals the deleterious effect (in *τροφή*) of the ὄμιλία unguardedly proposed by Glaucon. That the exegetical elaboration should come first is not unexampled, and shows that καί is not always logically "proclitic," in the sense of introducing epexegetis. Cf. n. 444 on "reverse καί."

<sup>1680</sup>πονηραῖς ψυχοῖς (A2) parallel with πονηροτάτοις σώμασι (408D12), above.

<sup>1681</sup>γεγονέναι (A6), corresponding to γένοιτο (408D10).

<sup>1682</sup>κρίνειν (A7) recalls the theme of κρίσις in Glaucon's speech (360E1, cf. 358C4). Since that speech we have learned that making the right judgment about justice depends on character, not the unexamined consideration of "self-interest" that remains invisible to itself without even needing the ring of Gyges, avoiding its own conscience by restricting its consideration to an evaluation of externals.

<sup>1683</sup>ὔγιως (A8). By borrowing what he can from medicine to shed light on justice, he sets into greater relief their differences and what they do not share, which is the primary burden of the passage to illuminate.

<sup>1684</sup>εὐήθεις (A8), drawing a contrast with κακῶν ἥθων (A6). After arrogating εὐήθεια into his own arsenal by forcing it to bear its "literal" meaning (400E2-3 and n. 1555), Socrates now goes the rest of the way to show how the term took on the connotation that makes it serviceable for the cynic, by glossing it with εὐεξαπάτητοι.

<sup>1685</sup>παραδείγματα ὄμοιοπαθή (B1-2), the latter term may be a coinage but might be another term borrowed from current medical fashion. Cf. 464D4.

<sup>1686</sup>Ὄψιμαθή (B5): literally "learning late;" but all the ὄψι- words are derogatory, so it tends to mean "late, if at all," as at Soph. 251B. The man's vice is therefore a virtue and we have another oxymoron. The term stands in rhyming contrast with ὄμοιοπαθής above and adds a play on πάθος μάθος. Theophrastus makes a character of the Ὄψιμαθής (Char.8).

<sup>1687</sup>διαισθάνεσθαι (B8) contrasted by its prefix and tense with ἡσθημένον (B6). διά adds the sense of making out one particular tree among others in a forest, and the present tense suggests an investigative process leading to that result. οἶον πέφυκε κακόν suggests that the result is both certain and surprising because it was always there before his eyes.

<sup>1688</sup>Glaucon's γοῦν (C2) asserts his admiration for the man described, quite apart from the question of his aptitude as judge.

<sup>1689</sup>Ἄγαθούς (C6). But it was a good doctor that he had asked about, and had unguardedly thrown

is having a good soul. His counterpart is a crafty and untrusting man with a large personal record of unjust acts, who would stop at nothing<sup>1690</sup> and thinks himself clever.<sup>1691</sup> When he associates with men like himself he does seem crafty in his circumspection and the dogged hold he has on the models of evil he holds within;<sup>1692</sup> but when he finds himself among men who are good, assuming they are of the requisite age,<sup>1693</sup> he seems stupid, suspicious at the wrong moments and unable to recognize a healthy character since he has no model of such a thing at his command.<sup>1694</sup> We certainly must not look for a man who is good and smart the way this one is to be our juror, but the former type. Whereas baseness of character could never recognize both virtue and itself, the virtue that comes to belong to an inner nature properly educated will get command at one and the same time of itself as well as of baseness.<sup>1695</sup> And so it is this man that turns out to be<sup>1696</sup> the wise one and not the bad man.

As for medicine, will you legislate it to follow suit<sup>1697</sup> with our juridical art, and fashion the two of them so that (410) they support the citizens that are sound in body and in soul, but as to those that are not fit in body they shall allow them to die and those that have grown incurably evil in their souls their practitioners<sup>1698</sup> shall take it upon themselves to put them to death?

in the need for a good juror just by way of illustration, which indicates how much he took the matter for granted.

<sup>1690</sup>πανοῦργος (C5) with some sensitivity to its etymology making it mean that he has not only done many bad things in the past (πολλά ... ἡδικηώς) but would also do others in the future—indeed, anything.

<sup>1691</sup>τε (C5), “internal,” (n. 1658 ad 407B8-C1), draws the last two attributes together and therefore separates them from the first (ἡδικηώς), of which they are the result, according to the conception of A2-5.

<sup>1692</sup>πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ παραδείγματα ἀποσκοπῶν (C7): This πονηρός is looking off to something that is inside himself. The ἀπό of ἀποσκοπῶν usually denotes the remoteness of the object contemplated, as at 460A5 where ἀπό is used of the temporal remoteness of a foreseeable result that is to be avoided. But remoteness can also, as here, serve as a metaphor for the invariance of the paradigm (C7; cf. B1) over against the moving circumstances that the contemplator is trying with its help to manage or understand. The fact that the model is within instead of outside the πονηρός therefore makes no difference.

The language and the conception are pregnant with Plato’s theory of ideas and as such beg the question once again that was begged by Thrasymachus and then by the brothers, whether injustice has a nature after all or is merely the privation that its name bespeaks. Within the context of the theory, ἀποβλέπειν rather than ἀποσκοπεῖν is the usual term (e.g., 472C7, 501B1, 530A4, 532A4, 540A7; Phil.61E1). A distinction in flavor between the terms can be sensed at 432E1-2.

<sup>1693</sup>πρεσβυτέροις ἥδη (C8), referring back to the gullibility of younger good men (409A7-C1).

<sup>1694</sup> The second construction with φάίνεται and circumstantial participles (C8-D1) redoes the first (C6-7), with ἀβέλτερος echoing δεινός, ἀπιστῶν παρὰ καιρόν echoing ἔξευλαβούμενος, and ἀγνοῶν ... ὅτε οὐκ ἔχων echoing ἀποσκοπῶν. The pairing helps to define the terms. The focus is on the difference in the appearance the πονηρός makes in different groups. There is no allusion to Socrates’s condemnation, though the event at Apol.24E3-25A11 fills the bill, when Meletus’s unguarded eagerness to flatter the jurors in his answers to Socrates’s dialectic leads him into an absurdity he does not foresee.

<sup>1695</sup> With this (D7-E1) we have reached, as a conclusion, a marvelous inversion of what had been hypothesized as ἔνδοξον by Socrates in Book One (349B-50C)—that only the ignorant would try to be more than smart as well as more than ignorant.

<sup>1696</sup>γίγνεται (E2) “dialectical”: the transformation was brought about by the argument.

<sup>1697</sup>οἶαν εἴπομεν (E4): This pointing back to ὀδελφή τις (404B4) suggests that the digression on doctors and lawyers is coming to a close.

<sup>1698</sup> αὐτοί (410A4): the arts (f.pl. αἱ, 409E5) have in the interim, by a mild anacoluthon, been

"It has become plain," Glaucon courageously agrees,<sup>1699</sup> "that no less than this is the best treatment both for themselves and for the city."

With this agreement from Glaucon, Socrates can move back to the point where this entire digression on doctors and lawyers began:<sup>1700</sup> Our young clearly will take care to avoid needing the courts if they do practice the kind of simple music we have said instills temperance; and a man schooled in such music as this will follow a similar inspiration in his choice of gymnastics, so that when it comes time to choose he will select a regime that will keep him out of a doctor's office except when it becomes absolutely necessary. He will perform his gymnastic exercises<sup>1701</sup> for the sake of the spirited aspect of his nature and in order to invigorate it rather than for the sake of physical strength, and will not be manipulating<sup>1702</sup> his diet and exercise as the athletes do to achieve peak energy.<sup>1703</sup> Can we also say, Glaucon, that what the people who first established the curriculum of music and gymnastics had in mind was not, as some people believe,<sup>1704</sup> that the one would minister to the body and the other to the soul?

The question takes Glaucon by surprise,<sup>1705</sup> and Socrates continues: It may just be that it was soul they held in the forefront of their minds in their design of both. Just focus<sup>1706</sup> for a moment on the replaced by their practitioners, the doctors and judges (m.pl.).

<sup>1699</sup>πέφανται (410A6): "dialectical" φαίνεται in the perfect (n.210 ad 334A10), of what has become manifest in the argument.

<sup>1700</sup>405A1ff.

<sup>1701</sup>Reading αὐτά γε μήν (B5) with Burnet and Galen (γε om. omnes), γε focussing on the internal substance of gymnastics after it has been likened externally to music.

<sup>1702</sup>Reading μεταχειρεῖται (B8) with all mss. That Galen's μεταχειρίζονται might be "more idiomatic" (Shorey) hardly enhances its credentials as a witness, especially after his completely unidiomatic reading, κάκειν' ἐπεγείρων, in the line before.

<sup>1703</sup>οὐχ ὕσπερ (B7): ὕσπερ can introduce a "clause of comparison" (Smyth §§2461ff). When as here the clause is negated, we get what we might call a negative clause of comparison, a paradox since the more the clause argues that the comparanda are not comparable the less comparative it will be. The paradox is resolved by combining syntactical parallelism with semantic differentiation. What is being said is that our musical guard will pursue gymnastics in a way that is different from (οὐχ ὕσπερ) that of the athlete-in-training (alluding to 403E8-4A7), in the same way that πονήσει (main verb) is different from μεταχειρεῖται, τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τοὺς πόνους (internal accusative) is different from σιτία καὶ πόνους, and the ισχύς in which the musical man is not interested is different from ρώμη in which the athlete is interested.

The straightforward work of πονεῖν with its internal accusative and its cut-and-dried outlook (βλέπων), is contrasted with being immersed in the constant management and adjustment (μετχειρεῖται) of diet and exercise portrayed as external to the management process itself. For elaborate diet as opposed to just eating cf. εὐωχῆται εὖ μάλα, 411C4-5. ρώμη is the athlete's more recondite word for what the musical man would call ισχύς—the standard term for "strength" as a somatic good alongside health, beauty and stature (432A4-6, 491C1-4, 618A7-B2; cf. Crito 47A13-B3; Gorg.451E3-5, 452B6, 477B1-C2, 495E6-6C5, 499D6-7; Leg.631C1-5, 696B2-4, 715B8-C2, 728D8-E1; Meno 87E6-7; Phlb.26B5-6). The only two cases where ρώμη stands in for ισχύς as a bodily good are metonymies seeking special effects: Leg.789D6-7, ὑγίειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ρώμην, where as here medical satire is in the air; and Rep.361B4-5 (cf. n.750 ad loc.).

<sup>1704</sup>τινες οἴονται (C1): The commentators predictably try to name names, needlessly, since Socrates himself has been acting as if he believed this. Now that that hypothesis has yielded what it can (in particular the asymmetry of body and soul in the argument about the doctor and the juror that comes up almost by accident) he can move to a new division of things and advance a new idea.

<sup>1705</sup>ἄλλὰ τί μήν; (C4).

<sup>1706</sup>αὐτήν (C8). αὐτός instructs us to isolate and focus on the denotation (and therefore plays a

sort of mental disposition you find in people who have a continuous association<sup>1707</sup> with gymnastics but never even a taste of music, and consider in turn those who have developed the opposite disposition.<sup>1708</sup> I am referring to the dispositions of savage hardness on the one hand and soft tameness on the other.<sup>1709</sup>

Glaucon can finish the idea: "Yes, I see that people who practice gymnastics undiluted<sup>1710</sup> come out more violent than they should be, and those that do music only become softer than is becoming<sup>1711</sup> for them."

Yet, Socrates continues, this same violent element is something the young man's innate spiritedness can provide, which if nourished properly could become brave, whereas if overfed it would in all likelihood become boorish and harsh. As for the aspect of calmness, surely his innate love of wisdom would be the basis<sup>1712</sup> for that; but if the innate potential is given too free a rein<sup>1713</sup> it would

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role in the expression of the "theory of forms"): 331C1, 372A2, 373B2, 391D4, 412B9, 437D3, 439A5, 507B5, 507D12, 510D6, 511B4, 517E1-2, 532A3, 539C8, 545D1 and D2, 556C11, 559B1, 571A1, 581E8, 585C2, 585D5, 586C8, 600E1-2, 601A1, 603B10, 604C1, 611C1; and nn.3074, 3831.

<sup>1707</sup> ὄμιλήσωσιν (C9), the term used above by Glaucon (408D3).

<sup>1708</sup> διατίθενται ... ἀψωνται (C8-10): In the first limb the disposition (*διατίθενται*) is presented in an apodosis and the habits that bring it are presented in a protasis. In the converse or contrapositive second limb (ἢ αὖ ὅσοι ἀν τούναντίον διατεθῶσιν, C10) the corresponding disposition, although strictly an effect, is moved into the protasis and the apodosis is dropped. Such telescoping or truncation is roughly analogous to the phenomenon of catalexis in monostichic meters by which just enough closure is secured for each line that its monostichic individuality is preserved.

Because the mind usually anticipates a contrast at the same time it is being made explicit, a continuation of the expression immediately verges on prolixity. This is why isocolia comes off as an affectation rather than the norm. One may therefore truncate the second or the final limb in a variety of ways that range from brachylogy to dismissive generalization (e.g., πλούτου χρῆσιν καὶ πενίαν, Leg.744C2, and cf. *Apol.*19D2 [sc. ἀλλήλοις with φράζειν]; Leg.625C3-5, 735B1-2, 819E13-820A1 and 820A7-8; *Phdr.*252C3-3C2; *Phdo.*62A5 [ἔστιν ὅτε dropped with οἵς δέ], 98A [ἢ πάσχει for ἡ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ]; *Polit.*306C10-D3 [its rhythm]; *Rep.*439D6-7 [with an ulterior motive to introduce the genus: cf. n.2151 *ad loc.*]; *Soph.*258B10-C3 [the editors' supplements are unneeded]; *Tim.*82A8-B2 [abbreviation, then dismissal]). Alternatively, one may expand it, whether with periphrasis (e.g. ἢ ... πόλεμος ... ἢ πενίας χαλεπῆς ἀπορία, Leg.709A3-5, and cf. Leg.794C7-D2 (όπλων χρεία); *Polit.*267E7-8 (τὸ τῶν ἱατρῶν γένος), 290B1; *Rep.*361B4-5), serial subdifferentiation (cf. n.1437 *ad* 395A4-10 and *Gorg.*468E4-5; Leg.747A2-5; *Polit.*299E1-2; *Prot.*354A4-7), ampliative generalization (e.g., ... καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημιουργοί, *Rep.*552D4-5, and cf. *Phdo.*75B10-11; *Rep.*580A3-5; and cf. n.2030), or other types of elaboration (Leg.831D8-E2; *Polit.*239B2-3; *Rep.*491D [addition of article]; Leg.715C1-2, *Tht.*174D4-5 [insertion of τι]). The range of these phenomena is nicely surveyed by Riddell (*Digest* §§231-261 [abbreviation] and §§262-269 [pleonasm]).

<sup>1709</sup> ἀγριότητός τε καὶ σκληρότητος, καὶ αὖ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερότητος (D1-2). Note chiastic arrangement (helped by αὖ: cf. nn.1985, 5010) of the more psychic (ἀγριότης / ἡμερότης) and more physical (σκληρότης / μαλακία) attributes. With his interrupted and inchoate statement Socrates nevertheless establishes the playful comparison of psychic and physical that governs the sequel.

<sup>1710</sup> ἀκράτω (D3): The allusion to undiluted wine suggests intemperance.

<sup>1711</sup> τοῦ δέοντος (D4): This genitive of comparison in the first limb is varied with an ἢ construction in the second, but instead of the positive καλόν (corresponding to τὸ δέον) we have the gratuitously comparative κάλλιον. Mismatch of degrees in comparison is not uncommon.

<sup>1712</sup> ἔχοι (E1): i.e., παρέχοι (from D7), the prefix dropped in repetition (n.1532).

<sup>1713</sup> ἀνεθέντος (E2), means "given free rein," the antithesis of ἐπιτείνειν (cf. ἐπιταθέν above [D8]), as confirmed by its repetition below (412A1). Contrast ἀνεθέντος αὐτοῦ μαλακώτερον εἴη (E2), with ὄρθως μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρεῖον ἀν εἴη, κτλ., above. The striking intervention of the genitive absolute,

become a softer thing than it should, while if it is nourished nicely it could become calm and decorous.<sup>1714</sup> Moreover, as we have seen<sup>1715</sup> we needed our guards to have both these aspects inborn. Therefore we must find a way to bring them into harmony with one another. A man so harmonized will have (411) a soul that has become both temperate and brave, while the unharmonized will have a soul fearful and coarse.<sup>1716</sup>

Now when somebody surrenders his soul<sup>1717</sup> to music and lets it waft its strains over him and flow down into his soul through his ears as if they were its funnels and bathe his soul with the harmonies we have identified as the sweet and soft and threnodic ones,<sup>1718</sup> and if he spends his life exuding dolorous hums or beaming with joys<sup>1719</sup> inspired by the music, what happens at first is that he softens whatever<sup>1720</sup> element of spirit he had<sup>1721</sup> in him as one does to temper iron, and makes it a serviceable thing that had been unserviceable because too inflexible;<sup>1722</sup> but if he perseveres in his surrender and doesn't give it a rest<sup>1723</sup> but becomes enchanted, the next thing is that he has gone and enforced by αὐτοῦ and then followed by reversion to the nominative, can only be meant to emphasize the dissociability of inborn potential and nurtured outcome, which it is the burden of this passage to illustrate. Given the ὅν with which the whole sentence is introduced (E1), its absence at E2 becomes acceptable (cf. Smyth §1767) and its omission in AM (against the ὅν of FD) becomes the *lectio difficilior*.

<sup>1714</sup>ἢμερόν τε καὶ κόσμιον (E3): in contrast to the excesses and defects of unmixed gymnastics (D3-6), hitting the mark can be expressed without comparatives. κόσμιον suggests the virtue of σωφροσύνη, which pairs up with the ἀνδρεία (D7) that can be developed from the thumoeidetic aspect of the guard's inborn nature.

<sup>1715</sup>δέ γε (E5) introducing as minor premise a principle that had been established before (376C4-5!).

<sup>1716</sup>ἡρμόσθαι (E8) / ἡρμοσμένου (E10): The very formulation predetermines that music as harmonizer will play the hegemonic role in the reconciliation of the psychic element (hitherto the special province of music) with the bodily (hitherto the province of gymnastic).

<sup>1717</sup>παρέχῃ (411A5) sc. ψυχήν which appears in the genitive at A6. For the hyperbaton cf. τὸν θυμόν at 411B8.

<sup>1718</sup>Θρηνώδεις (A8) has been established (398D11-E1), but to call this harmony sweet and soft is new. For the “reverse” καί, where the exegesis or expansion of the original concept is placed first, cf. n.444 ad 343C6.

<sup>1719</sup>μινυρίζων (A8): The scholiast gives us a choice between θρηνῶν and ἡρέμα ϕόδων (Greene 217), which have nothing to do with one another. The point of μινυρίζων is that it combines a mood with a sound whereas γανώ combines a mood with a look. Socrates is wading among the “psychosomatic” effects of music.

<sup>1720</sup>εἴ τι θυμοειδές (A9-10). The enclitic τι properly modifies θυμοειδές but is attracted back to the proclitic εἰ. Cf. the parallel passage, 411D1. For reversion to a proclitic cf. 460C2; to the first word, 357B9, 460C3, etc. On the displacement cf. Smyth §3028(B), 380D8 with n. 1212, 430E7, and 431A7.

<sup>1721</sup>εἶχεν (A10): Note shift to imperfect indicative within the subjunctive protasis that began at A5 (also ἔλέγομεν, A7). This imperfect will be followed by an aorist indicative (ἔμαλαξεν, A10), as if we had a simple past condition describing what comes (or came) first (τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, A9), in order to set into relief what happens if the surrender to music goes too far (B1,ff. n.b. ἥδη marking a point of no return), at which point the construction reverts to the present general condition with which the paragraph began (apodosis in τίκει καὶ λείβει, B2). The same construction within a construction is used in the parallel paragraph below (B6-C2), beginning with a present general protasis (ἔάν ... λάβῃ ...) followed first by aorist indicatives for the medial results (διεπράξατο ... ἀπηργάσατο) with the final result given with a proper apodosis in the present (i.e. the perfect γεγένηται).

<sup>1722</sup>ἀχρήστους καὶ σκληροῦ (B1) reverses the order of cause and effect (or, postpones the explanation) under the force of the proleptic χρήσιμον. The idea was already planted by the metaphor of iron.

<sup>1723</sup>ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνιῆ (B1-2). For ἐπέχειν J.-C. cite Tht. 165D8-E1: ἥλεγχεν ὃν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ

melted it and turned it to liquid, to the point that he has let his spirit flow out of him and has cut loose the sinews of his soul, and has made himself a “soft soldier.”<sup>1724</sup> If his inborn gift of spirit is deficient<sup>1725</sup> he reaches this result quite quickly. On the other hand if he has a high-spirited soul<sup>1726</sup> from birth, by weakening it he makes it reactive, prone now to burst into a rage over small things and quenched then into quiescence. The outcome is that instead of being high-spirited he ends up choleric and quick to anger, full of crankiness.

The converse is the man that practices gymnastics a good deal and lavishes time on feasting<sup>1727</sup> but never hears a note of music. When at first he gets his body into shape he becomes fully attentive and vigorous<sup>1728</sup> and becomes braver than himself.<sup>1729</sup> But what if he practices nothing else and refuses all company with the Muse? Even if he has a strain of the love of learning in his soul, the fact that it never has a taste of study or the investigative hunt<sup>1730</sup> and never takes a round<sup>1731</sup> with reasoning and the rest of music, it becomes weak and mute and blind,<sup>1732</sup> since it is never aroused and never fed with study, and the perceptions he has are never brought to book and purged.<sup>1733</sup> In the end<sup>1734</sup> he becomes a misologist<sup>1735</sup> and a man of no music,<sup>1736</sup> who has given up persuasion and talking things over and makes his way with force and fierceness as a beast does, and lives a life ignorant and awkward, halting and graceless.

ἀνίεις. Perhaps this uncommon meaning is idiomatic when the verb is connected with ἀνιέναι.

<sup>1724</sup>μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν (B4): The phrase is proverbial (cf. *Symp.* 174B) and comes from Homer (*Il.* 17.588) where it is used of Menelaus.

<sup>1725</sup>ἀθυμον (B6), sc. τὸ θυμοειδές from A10. The privative ἀ- can represent the contrary or just the contradictory, as here.

<sup>1726</sup>θυμοειδῆ (B7), sc. τὸ θυμόν, constructed ἀπὸ κοινοῦ with ἀσθενῆ ποιήσας (B7-8), or in hyperbaton after it. Cf. *Smyth* §3028(e).

<sup>1727</sup>γυμναστική πολλὰ πονή καὶ εὐωχῆται εὖ μάλα (C4): Cf. σιτία καὶ πόνους (410B8) in contrast with πόνους only (B5).

<sup>1728</sup>φρονήματος καὶ θυμοῦ (C6) as well as ἀνδρειότερος (C6) represent psychic effects caused by the physical regime.

<sup>1729</sup>ἀνδρειότερος γίγνεται (C7): The expression reminds us that it is not the virtues that are inborn but certain raw materials out of which they evolve.

<sup>1730</sup>μαθήματος / ζητήματος (D2): The verbal nouns stress active engagement.

<sup>1731</sup>μετίσχον (D3), begs to be compared with εὐ ὕσχων (C6), as the metaphor γενόμενον (D2) begs comparison with εὐωχῆται (C4), in the manner of negative comparison (cf. 410B7-8 and n. 1703).

<sup>1732</sup>ἀσθενές τε καὶ κωφὸν καὶ τυφλόν (D3-4): The list presents a paradoxical item (ἀσθενές: the athlete would think himself strong) and then explains it with a polar doublet (cf. *Gorg.* 479B8-C1). In the case of soul, weakness is cognitive deficiency. For the constellation A/B<sub>1</sub>/B<sub>2</sub> cf. 329A5-7, nn.2422, 3374. Placing the paradox first instead of second makes the καί after it a “reverse” καί (n.444 ad 343C6).

<sup>1733</sup>ἄτε οὐκ ἐγειρόμενον οὐδὲ τρεφόμενον οὐδὲ διακαθαιρούμενον τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτοῦ (D5), reading the genitive plural with AFM (διακαθαιρόμενον, D). Both οὐδέ's are illative: unaroused (cf. 410B6), his mentality receives no sustenance, and therefore his perceptions remain unvetted: he believes whatever he sees and hears because his mind is deaf and blind. αὐτοῦ corroborates the switch to the genitive absolute (τῶν is not possessive but creates predicative position for the participle) and closes the sentence by returning to the mention of the man (αὐτοῦ, D1) within whom this metaphorical event is taking place.

<sup>1734</sup>As above, a three part argument: the raw material (φύσις), the process it is put through (τροφή), and the outcome that results.

<sup>1735</sup>μισόλογος (D7), a coinage of Plato's that is not improved with translation. In *Lach.* 188C it appears in a tellingly similar context. In 537E-9A and *Phdo.* 89Dff it is explained from scratch with great psychological acuity.

<sup>1736</sup>Another reverse καί (D7): ἄμουσος is anticlimactic after μισόλογος.

Glaucon agrees with all aspects of this account, and Socrates can express the position they have reached. It would seem that I could say some god bequeathed to mankind this pair of arts in service to just this pair of elements<sup>1737</sup> in them, music and gymnastics in service to the willful and the philosophic, and not to soul and body,<sup>1738</sup> at least not primarily, so that these two elements might be (412) harmonized to one another by tightening and loosening the strings until true tonality is reached. Therefore the man who does the finest job of mixing gymnastic with music and applies their influences to the soul in the most tempered way would most correctly be called the most musical and most harmonized in the fullest sense of the term,<sup>1739</sup> much more than the man who can tune<sup>1740</sup> strings to each other.

In our city likewise there will be a need for a man of this type constantly to serve as supervisor if our government and society<sup>1741</sup> is to be preserved, Socrates suggests, and Glaucon fervently agrees. But we have a sense that something has changed. Socrates alludes to the old idea—that the young men we are training are being trained to be phulax or guard—with the notion of “preserving” the city: we had been supervising<sup>1742</sup> how to make the guard suitable for just this purpose. What is new is the way his goodness, by which he will supervise the city, suddenly replaces the concern we had to create circumstances that would make him good. That is, we discover the role we had arrogated to ourselves is in reality his role, and with this we realize that in a sense we had, all along, become him, but now in the same sense he has become us! The surprise ends up being the way that Socrates announces that the basic education has been completed, but the very fact that it is complete means we find ourselves near the next step, installing him as guard over the polis. Transitional moments sneak up on us just like this in real life, too!

Socrates next announces what we have just realized. We have arrived at the essential outlines<sup>1743</sup> for the education and nurture that we needed to provide. There is no need to treat separately the dances these types will be dancing, nor their chases and hunts and contests in gymnastics and

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<sup>1737</sup>δύ' ὄντε (E4): The dual stresses the two aspects (*θυμοειδές / φιλόσοφον*) as distinct elements in the human make-up, and therefore brings us back to 376C4ff, where the *τροφή* of these ingredients was taken up (cf. φύσιν, 376C5, and *ὑπάρχοι*, C7). The surprise is that in the interim our interlocutors have indeed found reason to revise the time-honored educational theory there mentioned, according to which gymnastics was for the body and music for the soul (376E2-4).

<sup>1738</sup>μουσικήν τε καὶ γυμναστικήν ἐπὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον οὐκ ἐπὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα (E5-7). Double chiasm (A, ~B / B, ~A / A, ~B) is too common to warrant a comment *per se* (cf. *Crito* 47C9-10; *Gorg.* 459D1-2, 474D1-2; *Ion* 540B3-5; *Leg.* 714E4-5 [including syntax]; *Phdrs.* 277D10-E1); but in this case there is a logical reason for chiasm, that music is not for soul but for perfecting the essentially bodily element, and gymnastic not for the body but for perfecting the essentially psychic element. The traditional view is corrected by a chiasm. Contrast the double chiasm at 372B2-4 which is purely decorative (cf. n.1012).

<sup>1739</sup>κάλλιστα / μετριώτατα / ὁρθότατα / μουσικώτατον καὶ εὐαρμοστότατον (412A4-6): Superlative piled on superlative.

<sup>1740</sup>συνιστάντα (A7), perhaps a technical term in music (cf. *Phdo.* 92C2, *Phlb.* 17D2, 26A4; *Symp.* 187C6), chosen to contrast the specialist with the harmonizer in the broad sense (*τέλεως*).

<sup>1741</sup>πολιτεία (A10) used here for the first time in the conversation.

<sup>1742</sup>ἐπιστάτου (A10), now used of the young guard. The supervising had been “our” job since 377B11 (*ἐπιστατέον*), and was continued thenceforward by other verbal adjectives in -τέον.

<sup>1743</sup>οἱ μὲν οὖν τύποι τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι ἀν εἰεν (B2-3): Closure of the topic of education is done by looking back, and naturally the steps are seen in reverse order: τύποι as the method of *παιδεία* (379A1-4) which played the role of nurture or *τροφή* (*θρέψονται ... καὶ παιδευθήσονται*, 376C7-8), once the requisite inborn nature had been established (*οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἀν οὕτως ὑπάρχοι*, 376C7). To the extent that the language preserves the reference to the model of φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη (cf. 366C7 and n.878), the third question begins to loom: τίς ἡ ἐπιστήμη;

horsemanship.<sup>1744</sup> Obviously these activities will be modeled after the ones we have dealt with, and to discover them has been made easy, given what we have done so far. But what must we do next? Presumably it is to decide which among<sup>1745</sup> this group of guards will be the rulers and which the ruled.

### 2.B.3c: Graduation from Guard to Ruler

Criteria have indeed emerged in the course of the discourse that can provide answers to this question, and Socrates adduces them without mentioning where he got them. Of course<sup>1746</sup> the older among them should be the rulers and the younger the ruled, but the best of them, too.<sup>1747</sup> Glaucon agrees, but Socrates now chooses not to rely on the goodness of the man that they had discovered in the case of the juror, but the goodness of the phulax or guard as such. He proceeds by a quick induction.

When it comes to farmers, are the best farmers the most farmerly ones?

“Yes.”

But now it is a matter of guards. Would the best of these be the most guardly<sup>1748</sup> of a city?

“Yes.”

To be guardly the basic attributes one would need are being sound-minded and able, and also being solicitously concerned<sup>1749</sup> about the city. Solicitous concern one feels most of all for that which one in fact loves, but what he would most love would be that whose interests he thought were the same as his own, such that when that thing was well off it would turn out that he was, too, and when not, not. Therefore from out of the whole group of guards we need to select such individuals<sup>1750</sup> as will

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<sup>1744</sup>χορείας γὰρ τί ἄν τις διεξίοι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ θήρας τε καὶ κυνηγέσια καὶ γυμνικοὺς ἀγώνας καὶ ἵππικούς; (B3-4): The list diminishes the items being dismissed by pairing them with other items very close to each other, as if there were a distinction without a difference; and the plurals are derogatory.

<sup>1745</sup>αὐτῶν (B9), narrowing the focus, as at 410C8: cf. n. 1706.

<sup>1746</sup>ὅτι μέν (C2) answered not by δέ (C3) but by καὶ ὅτι γε (C5). As we look among the group for those most fit to rule, their relative ages presents itself as an obvious criterion. But on further reflection it is their “phylacticity” or “guardliness” that is the core credential, and the elders were preferable only because age is likely to confer it. As often, concessive μέν introduces the transitional idea. J.-C. fail to understand the μέν and turn the passage into an awkward revision by Plato (v.2 [Essays], 8-9).

<sup>1747</sup>For ἀριστούς (C5), as the superlative of ἀγαθός, cf. 408C6-9B3; for πρεσβυτέρους (C2), vs. νεωτέρου, cf. 409B4-C1.

<sup>1748</sup>γεωργικώτατοι (C7): There is no call for the translator to mitigate the strangeness of the diction with a periphrasis. The word φυλακικός never appears in Classical Greek before or later. Its use in Plut. Mor. 1136F is a virtual quotation from the *Republic* and Mor. 620C is a direct one. Socrates has coined the word to suit the simple logic of his argument perfectly. Given the fact there are many qualifications of a farmer or a guard the best farmer or guard would be the person that satisfies the largest number of them to the largest degree.

<sup>1749</sup>φρονίμους τε ... καὶ δυνατοὺς καὶ ἔτι κηδεμόνας τῆς πόλεως (C12-13): The argument from the superlative provides an umbrella for the introduction of the various attributes without constellation. Intelligence and effectiveness have perhaps been provided by the education of the φιλόσοφον and the θυμοειδές; solicitous care is introduced as a new item (ἔτι κηδεμόνας, C13), though loving loyalty was surely present in the original concept of the dog in which the other two elements had been found side by side. The parallelism with the Hebrew *schma* is notable.

<sup>1750</sup>ἄνδρας (D9) emulative and sympathetic: cf. 361B6 and n. 752.

seem to us upon examination most of all and throughout their lives to be occupied with ascertaining what will benefit their city and then doing that with all their energy, and conversely what does not benefit her to be utterly<sup>1751</sup> unwilling to do.

"You describe in his very essence the men with the proper orientation," Glaucon replies.

It seems to me the way we must conduct the examination will be to watch them throughout the stages of their lives, and see if they act in a guardly manner toward this belief, and neither by bewitchment nor by force lapse into expelling their decision and resolution<sup>1752</sup> to do whatever is best for the city.

"What is this 'expelling' you refer to?"

Say I will. A resolution can be lost from one's outlook either willingly or unwillingly. It is willingly when a false decision departs from a person whose outlook has changed under the force of learning, but the departure of a true (413) opinion is always unwilling.

"I understand the case of the willing expulsion, but I still need to learn what you mean by the unwilling one."

I had to say to him, Socrates tells us,<sup>1753</sup> "Don't you believe, as I do, that men are deprived of good things against their will, and of bad things willingly? Or do you doubt perhaps that being deluded from the truth<sup>1754</sup> is a bad and being in possession of it is good? Do you not agree that believing what is a fact is possessing the truth?"<sup>1755</sup>

"You've made it clear enough<sup>1756</sup> that what you say is correct. I consent that it is unwillingly that men become deprived of a true judgment."

<sup>1751</sup>πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ποιεῖν (E1-2) represents a present indicative apodosis to the present general protasis ὁ μὲν ἂν ... ἡγήσωνται .... It is answered, after the second present general protasis, ὁ δ' ἂν μή, with μηδενὶ τρόπῳ πρᾶξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν, where ἐθέλειν corresponds semantically to προθυμία (as μηδενὶ to πάσῃ and πρᾶξαι to ποιεῖν) but syntactically to ποιεῖν (as the main verb of the apodosis). The addition of ἂν at πρᾶξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν (E2), however, alters the condition from present general to "future less vivid" (or "ideal"). We will watch to see that every time an action promotes the city's interest he carries it out with all eagerness; but that when it does not, he not only does not but would not do it.

<sup>1752</sup>δόξα (E8) drawn from δόγμα (E6), itself referring to the attitude described in so many words at E1-3, which is itself based on underlying beliefs described at D4-7 (n.b. ἥγοιτο, D4; and οἴοιτο, D6).

<sup>1753</sup>His addition of ἐγώ (413A4) reminds us more forcefully than the first and third persons ἔφην and ἔφη do, that Socrates is telling us about the discussion the day after it occurred.

<sup>1754</sup>τῆς ἀληθείας (A6): The genitive is ablative and brings ἐψεῦσθαι as near as possible to a privation of good (ἀγαθῶν ... στέρεσθαι, A4-5); at the same time the expression prepares for drawing a verbal contrast between ἐψεῦσθαι and ἀληθεύειν.

<sup>1755</sup> The set of questions, which each expect yes-answers, present in reverse order the propositions of two syllogisms, to-wit:

Believing the true is having truth,  
Having truth is a good:  
Therefore believing the true is a good.  
Nobody is willingly deprived of a good  
Therefore nobody is willingly deprived of believing the true.

Thus the sequence of questions, although uninterrupted by the yes-answers they plainly expect, constitutes a virtual induction. In response to Glaucon's request for μάθησις Socrates plays the animated teacher.

<sup>1756</sup>ἀλλά (A9) "assentient" (Denniston).

And do they undergo the deprivation either by being robbed or by being bewitched or by being forced into it?<sup>1757</sup>

“Here, too,<sup>1758</sup> I need some guidance.”

Maybe you find my expression too highfalutin.<sup>1759</sup> By “robbed” I refer to people whose minds have been swayed by persuasion and to those who have forgotten. From some it is time and from others it is argument that strips away their belief without their noticing. Is that the guidance you needed?

“Quite.”

And by those forced I mean anybody that suffering or pain causes to change their opinion.

“This I did understand; you are correct.”

But<sup>1760</sup> the bewitched, you could say without guidance, are those who are led to change their opinion either spelled by pleasure or shuddering in fear.

“Yes, since anything that bewilders can be said to bewitch.”<sup>1761</sup>

So now you can understand what I was saying a moment ago, that we must search out which are the best guards of the decision<sup>1762</sup> they hold in themselves always to do whatever they judge to be the noblest thing for the city. Indeed we must observe straight from their childhoods how they respond to tasks we put before them that are just the sort that make a person forget or become confused in this kind of resolve, and then select the one who holds to it in his mind and proves hard to delude, and reject the one who doesn’t. Besides tasks there will be labors we set before them<sup>1763</sup> and pains to undergo and contests their response to which we will observe with the same questions in mind. And we must also conduct a test for the third kind, of bewitchment. Just as when one leads a colt into a clattering racket or an echoing din to test whether he is skittish, so must we convey them while they are still young into frightful situations, and then in turn expose them to pleasures, subjecting them to an assay more stern than subjecting gold to fire, to see which of them is impervious to bewitchment and maintains his poise<sup>1764</sup> in all situations, a good guard over himself and over the culture he has learned,<sup>1765</sup> approaching all these situations with the rhythm and harmony<sup>1766</sup> that is appropriate, so as

<sup>1757</sup> κλαπέντες ἢ γοητευθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες (B1): The new list seems to add a third item (κλαπέντες) to the previous two (γοητευθέντες and βιασθέντες: cf. μήτε γοητευόμενοι μήτε βιαζόμενοι, E7).

<sup>1758</sup> οὐδέ (B3) referring to his request at 413A2-3.

<sup>1759</sup> τραγικῶς (B4), referring to the metaphorical use of κλέπτειν and perhaps to the inherent vagueness of γοητεύειν. Cf. his remark οἴει γάρ τί με σεμνὸν λέγετιν (382B1): it is another instance of Socrates buying time by being obscure (cf. n. 1259).

<sup>1760</sup> Reading the lively μήν (C1) with AD, rather than deliberative μέν with F. It corresponds in liveliness to the τοίνυν used in the explanation of the second category (B9). The particles express Socrates’s continuing didactic enthusiasm in response to Glaucon’s request for guidance.

<sup>1761</sup> πάντα (C4): Glaucon is agreeing to both alternatives (pleasure and fear) by responding to Socrates’s catachresis of γοητευθέντας upon which they are both made to depend (C1).

<sup>1762</sup> φύλακες τοῦ παρ’ αὐτοῖς δόγματος (C5-6): the objective genitive makes the noun φύλακες function as a verb. The more natural expression would be ‘best able to guard (or protect) the opinion’, but Socrates is pushing toward the definition of an office with a title.

<sup>1763</sup> θετέον (D5) repeating προτιθέμενος (C8), with characteristic omission of the prefix (cf. 399E8 and n.).

<sup>1764</sup> εὐσχήμων (E2) hearkens back to the climax of the musical education (400C7ff).

<sup>1765</sup> καὶ μουσικῆς (E3), again expanding on the test of his care and ability to preserve it, and referring back to the musical education. The ἀπὸ κοινοῦ construction, or hyperbaton, of μουσικῆς, adds weightiness.

<sup>1766</sup> εὐάρμοστον (E4) recalls the culminating step in the education, the harmonizing of the

to prove to be the sort of man that is of greatest value to the city. The one who has been assayed in (414) childhood and youth and then in maturity<sup>1767</sup> and emerges unscathed<sup>1768</sup> must be installed in the office of ruler and guard<sup>1769</sup> of the city, must be given honors during this life and for his memory be allotted<sup>1770</sup> the largest of graves and memorials, while the one who is not of this kind must be dropped. This is how I see the selection and constitution<sup>1771</sup> of the rulers and guards of the city, in broad outline and without going into detail.

Along with the selection comes a nomenclature. The ones we have selected will most rightly be called “guards,” fully prepared<sup>1772</sup> to watch both our enemies outside the city and our friends within, guarding against the one group conceiving a plan and the other actually becoming able to harm the city. As for the younger ones we had been calling guards before, the ones who have not achieved this title in its new meaning, we will now call “helpers”<sup>1773</sup> and aids for the policies of the ruling guards.

### 2.B.3d: The Establishment of the City

Is there some way we could bring off one of those lies we were saying, a while ago, are needed on occasion,<sup>1774</sup> this time a real whopper<sup>1775</sup> of a lie to persuade them of, though only one -- to persuade the rulers themselves if possible but at least everybody else in the city—a lie not at all<sup>1776</sup> original with us but borrowed from the Phoenicians?<sup>1777</sup> Indeed in the past it has shown up in many places as the poets say and people believe them, but in our part of the world it has not and I don’t know if it could. I do know that selling it would be a hard sell.

“You seem to be ashamed to say what it is!”

Yes, and you’ll see I have good reason once I say it.

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influences of gymnastic with music in the soul (412A4-7).

<sup>1767</sup>Ἐν τε παισὶ καὶ νεανίσκοις καὶ ἐν ἀνδράσι (E6): The education and supervision continues into maturity (cf. 387B4 and n. 1317). Indeed we may conclude that the testing and probation just described continues past the education *per se*.

<sup>1768</sup>ἀκήρωτον (414A1): cf. 417A1.

<sup>1769</sup>ἀρχοντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ φύλακα (A1-2), cf. τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων (A6), an hendiadys about to become an identity after B4-6.

<sup>1770</sup>λαγχάνοντα (A4): The participle replaces the verbal adjective in praise.

<sup>1771</sup>ἐκλογή ... καὶ κατάστασις (A5-6) combines the final or culminating step with the entire process that led to it, starting with their selection because of their dual native gift and then proceeding through their education. The further back these remarks hearken the stronger the closure and, derivatively, the more major the transition.

<sup>1772</sup>Both παντέλεις and the superlative ὄρθότατον (B1-2) refer back to the argument from the superlative (412C5-13).

<sup>1773</sup>ἐπικούρους τε καὶ βοηθοὺς τοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων δόγμασιν (B5-6). They help not the rulers but their δόγματα, but the rulers will of course preserve their own states of mind: δόγματα has now come to mean the enactment of these beliefs or the city’s they will be help enforce.

<sup>1774</sup>389B4, B7-9.

<sup>1775</sup>γενναῖον (B9): I owe the translation, “whopper,” to Eric Voegelin, *Plato and Aristotle* (= *Order and History III* [Baton Rouge, 1957]) 105 n.17. Cf. γενναῖα, 454A1 and 348C12 with n.544. It is used of a lie at H.Mn. 366E3.

<sup>1776</sup>μηδέν (C4), rather than οὐδέν, does not import the tone of an imperative (Stallb., J.-C.. et al. *ad loc.*) but denies the fact from higher ground by denying the very idea. Like ἐν (C1) it is apologetic. There will be only one lie and nobody can say we made it up, either.

<sup>1777</sup>Φοικονικόν τι (C4): i.e., the Cadmus legend of the sown men who sprang from the dragon’s teeth.

"Go ahead; don't be afraid."

So I will—but still I don't know how I'll summon the cheek to say it or just how to put it into words.<sup>1778</sup> I'll try first to persuade the rulers themselves and their soldiers,<sup>1779</sup> and then the rest of the city, to the effect that what we have put them through by way of raising them and educating them did not really happen after all. What seemed to be happening to them and going on around them was all a dream. What was really happening was they were underground. They were being shaped down there into what they now are, both themselves and their armor and weapons<sup>1780</sup> and the rest of their equipment. Once they were fully formed and turned out, their Mother Earth yielded them forth from herself. And on behalf of this land they find themselves living in it is they that must now take counsel, and defend it<sup>1781</sup> as if it were the mother that nursed them in case someone attacks her, and must take care of their fellow citizens as if they were their Brothers of the Earth.<sup>1782</sup>

"You were right<sup>1783</sup> to be ashamed about telling a lie<sup>1784</sup> a minute ago.<sup>1785</sup>"

(415) Yes, with quite good reason.<sup>1786</sup> Still, hear the rest of it. 'You are brothers, all of you in the city,' we'll say to them in the fable,<sup>1787</sup> 'but the god who fashioned and formed you, for those of you who are adequate to being rulers, mixed some gold into their<sup>1788</sup> makeup, which accounts for their being the most valuable and honored members of the city.'<sup>1789</sup> Into those who could be their assistants he mixed

<sup>1778</sup>ποίοις λόγοις χρώμενος ἐρῶ (D1-2): The lie is not just a false proposition but a performance, placed by ἐρῶ into a future separate from the present presentation of content and purpose (ἐπιχειρήσω, D2). The distinction enables him to move Glaucon into the position of helper (*n.b.* ήμεῖς, D4) in the endeavor to persuade the rulers ("them," αὐτούς), and suddenly he has replaced the original goal of persuading "especially the rulers but failing that at least the rest of the city," with a two-step strategy of persuading the rulers first and then the others second. In a moment (415C3-6) the rulers will in turn be moved into the position of helpers in achieving the second step, persuading the rest of the city.

<sup>1779</sup>τοὺς στρατιώτους (D3), already an alternate designation for the ἐπικούρους τε καὶ βοηθούς of B5.

<sup>1780</sup>πλαττόμενοι (D8): The theme of metallurgy is here introduced, which is of course the only industry underground.

<sup>1781</sup>βουλεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἀμύνειν (E4): The pair (note τε καί) represents the gamut of civic duty with peacetime and wartime activities.

<sup>1782</sup>γηγενῶν (E6): The lie has so far provided a sanction for duty to the city (as to one's mother) and duty to one's fellow citizens (as to one's brothers) that is deftly attached, by the term χώρα, to the political geography one finds oneself in.

<sup>1783</sup>οὐκ ἔτος (E7): The expression is common in Aristophanes (*Ach.*411; *Av.*413; *Thesm.*921; *Eccl.*245; *Plut.*404, 1066), from the epic term ἐτώσιος, "vain, fruitless." What makes it comic is that it is faint praise implying a criticism more damning still. 'You were not wrong to be ashamed to do it' implies 'You should be all the more ashamed now that you have gone on and done it.' Used again at 568A8.

<sup>1784</sup>τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν: τό with λέγειν. Glaucon acknowledges how far out on a limb Socrates has taken himself, and himself along with him, by this speech.

<sup>1785</sup>πάλαι (E7), of an event just a moment earlier, stressing how quickly he has come to be of a different mind (cf. n. 1388). It is his surprise at what he has just heard that makes Socrates's expression of ὄκνος seem more remote than ὅπτι would designate.

<sup>1786</sup>πάνυ εἰκότως (415A1): A degree more emphatic than μάλιστας (C9).

<sup>1787</sup>ἔστε μὲν γὰρ πάντες (A2) He has found the language he worried he would never find just a moment ago (ποίοις λόγοις, D1). As he proceeds his confidence increases.

<sup>1788</sup>αὐτοῖς (A5): He is addressing all the rulers in the second person (ἔστε ...). A remark to them about a subsection of themselves (the rulers-proper) must go into the third.

<sup>1789</sup>τιμιώτατοι (A5), refers back to 414A2 (τιμᾶς δοτέον) but incorporates also the meaning of

silver, and mixed iron and bronze in the farmers and the rest of the craftsmen.<sup>1790</sup> Now since you are separate species you most of the time will breed true, but there could be cases of silver offspring from gold parents and gold from silver, and similarly among the others.' So, first and foremost to the rulers among them the god gives an admonition.<sup>1791</sup> Above all else they must become good guards of their offspring, and expend the maximum effort watching out for any admixture of the metals in their souls. In case one of their own<sup>1792</sup> offspring shows a trace of bronze or iron they shall have no pity at all for it but assign it to its proper station and send it off whether to the craftsmen or the farmers; and if conversely within these latter groups an offspring is born with a tincture of gold or silver, our rulers shall elevate him to the group of guards or to that of their helpers, explaining their conduct on the grounds there is an oracle<sup>1793</sup> that the day a guard of bronze or a guard of iron guards the city, that day the city will perish. Can you see a way we can to get them to believe this fable?

"None at all for this first set of them, but to persuade their sons and the subsequent generations and then the rest of mankind, well ...".

And it's all the better for fostering their care for each other and for the city, if I get your drift. We can leave the whole thing to rumor and fad<sup>1794</sup> and ourselves take on to the next step, to send forth our earthborn sons in full armor under the leadership of their rulers. Let us imagine them searching out the best place in the city to locate their own encampment,<sup>1795</sup> a place from which they could best

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"value" that is pertinent to gold, as again with *τιμήν* at C2.

<sup>1790</sup> Four metals are mentioned (A4-6) though only three are needed, perhaps in imitation of the four metals of Hesiod (WD109-201: they are listed in the same order, though Hesiod inserts the generation of heroes between the bronze and the iron and assigns them no metal).

<sup>1791</sup> *παραγγέλλει* (B3-4), a shift from the second plural of direct address by "us" telling them the story (A3), to the third person of narration, the persons addressed being placed in the dative (*τοῖς ἄρχουσι*, B3), and god completing that first step of persuasion for us (D2-3). See note below on Glaucon believing. The *παράγγελμα* is expressed in the "vivid" condition with apodosis in future indicative as has the tone of the 'shall' used in statutes.

<sup>1792</sup> *σφέτερος* (B7): The indirect reflexive stresses the necessity that they remain disinterested and choose to act on principle (n.b., *προσήκουσαν*, C1).

<sup>1793</sup> *ώς χρησμοῦ ὄντος* (C5): This is the guards' reason and justification in speaking to the people. At first we had to convince them, but now they have become our partners in persuasion.

<sup>1794</sup> *όπη* ... ή φύμη ἀγάγοι (D6). Glaucon's unstated conception that the guards have come on board with us as persuaders and no longer require us to persuade them but will take up the matter of persuading their sons (D1-2), continues the trend of rising confidence we have seen in Socrates's presentation. Socrates can then adduce the rulers' inner solicitousness for the city's needs (*κήδεσθαι*, D4: cf. *κηδεμόνας τῆς πόλεως*, 412C14) as a support for Glaucon's hopes they will succeed at it. Now that all of them—Socrates, Glaucon, and the guards—have navigated around the reef, he (and they) can let φύμη do the rest.

<sup>1795</sup> *ὅπλίσαντες* (D7) and *στρατοπεδεύσασθαι* (D9) continue the image or characterization of the guards and their helpers as constituting an army, which was how the search for the φύλαξ began (373E9-4A3,ff) and whither it reverted at 414B2-4 with noticeable emphasis and corroboration at 414D3 (*στρατιώτας*). Intervening (376E-412A) was the education that prepared their dispositions to reach a balance between the two necessary but apparently incompatible traits of culture and highspiritedness which would enable them to behave with peaceable loyalty to the citizens and rise in quick opposition to the enemy (410E5-6: cf. 375B9-6C5). The outcome of the education was that having found this deeply rooted and fine-tuned balance in themselves these men become the men most able to *preserve* the city (412A9-B1). It is in the last step of their preparation, where their relative ability to preserve the necessary solicitude about the city becomes an issue and is resolved (412B8-414A7), that a military kind of training and temper comes back to the surface. Still, it must be said that pressing them into a military life is an image that barely suits them, despite the fact that it has

control a faction of the citizenry unwilling to obey the laws and from which they could best defend the whole city against invaders from the outside,<sup>1796</sup> if an enemy should raid them like a wolf who comes among sheep. Now once they have laid out their encampment and have made the appropriate sacrifices to the gods, let them go to bed<sup>1797</sup>—right?<sup>1798</sup>

“Just so,” says Glaucon.

And they have beds adequate to protect them in the winter as well as<sup>1799</sup> summertime?

“Of course—I presume you are referring to their shelters.”<sup>1800</sup>

If this term can be used of what soldiers have<sup>1801</sup> and not businessmen, Socrates rejoins.

(416) “And just what does this add to that?”<sup>1802</sup>

Let me try to tell you. The most shocking and shameful thing a shepherd could do would be to raise his sheepdogs—his assistants, that is—in such a way that because of a licentiousness in them or a famine or some other characteristic in their makeup the dogs on their own initiative<sup>1803</sup> try to harm the sheep and come to act like wolves instead of dogs.

“Shocking, of course.”

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been set up in what came before. We can therefore expect some backfilling on this point.

<sup>1796</sup>τούς τε ἔνδον μάλιστ’ ἀν κατέχοιεν ... τούς τε ἔξωθεν ἀπαμύνοιεν (D9-E3) The doublet is repeated from 414B3-4. Note how easily ὅν may be dropped in the parallel apodosis (E2) despite the intervening protasis (cf. 382D11 and n. 1280).

<sup>1797</sup>εὐνὰς ποιησάσθων (E4) may mean “go to bed” (as at Xen. Kyn.5.9: sic Fr. Portus *apud* Sturz, Lex. Xenoph. s.v. εὐνή) rather than build their beds, despite the isolation of the noun in the next paragraph. For such use of the plural (where we use the singular) cf. Prot.321A6; Thuc.3.112, 4.32.

<sup>1798</sup>ἢ πῶς (E4): The mention of the beds recalls the fatefully provocative description Socrates had made of the citizens’ idyllic home-life in the πολίχνιον (372A5-C1, and D7-8). His pause after εὐνὰς ποιησάσθων, to make sure Glaucon is still with him, is therefore pregnant and dramatic.

<sup>1799</sup>χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ἰκανὰς (E6): distributive use of τε καὶ: the two genitives of time each modify the phrase, στέγειν ἰκανάς, distributed between them.

<sup>1800</sup>His term οἰκήσεις (E8) despite being a maximally abstract term (“shelter”), brings back the image and the setting of the idyllic description, as does Socrates’s initial description of the εὐναῖ in terms of winter and summer with winter requiring more protection (E6-7, cf. 372A8-B1). That Glaucon uses an abstract and functional term shows he is thinking of what is needed rather than creature comforts.

<sup>1801</sup>γε (E9) limits or qualifies Socrates’s assent to Glaucon’s presumption. Shorey cites 430C3, and there cites Leg.710A5. If Denniston had cited these passages he would have done so on p.136 under his §11(vi) but cf. also his comments on “double duty,” pp.132 and 135. Socrates and Glaucon are sailing very close to the wind at this moment.

<sup>1802</sup>Glaucon’s αὖ (416A1) expresses his awareness of the fact that Socrates’s answer to his question has forced him to ask another one, and by expressing his awareness in this way he shows some enervation (cf. n.2489). Compare less enervated καὶ τοῦτο at 392D7 and οὐδὲ νῦν at 413B3, and contrast 377D2-3 where Adeimantus apologizes for having to ask a second consecutive question with ἀλλά (rather than αὖ). Conversely at 393D2 where Socrates acknowledges his responsibility for being obscure his αὖ is apologetic.

Glaucon’s τοῦτο and ἐκείνου may refer to the businessman and the soldier, but they may also refer to Socrates’s limitation of his assertion (E9) as opposed to his original assertion (E8), i.e., “And just how is this qualification of yours meant to alter that presumption of mine?”

<sup>1803</sup>αὐτούς (A5) focusses on the dogs by isolating them from their upbringing, which by then will have become their second nature. For this isolating use of αὐτός cf. n.1706.

Must we not then do whatever we can to guard against our assistants<sup>1804</sup> doing this sort of thing to the citizens, given the fact that they are stronger,<sup>1805</sup> and against their becoming like fierce despots instead of gentle allies?

“Yes, we must guard.”<sup>1806</sup>

And would they not be equipped with the greatest measure of a safeguard conceivable if they have been<sup>1807</sup> educated completely and well?

“Yes, and you can be damn sure that they have been, in fact!”

Socrates again reminds us that he is talking to Glaucon at that moment, and tells us he said,<sup>1808</sup> “We have no warrant to make so strong a claim, my dear Glaucon. What we can be sure of, as we said a minute ago, is that they need to get a proper education—whatever a proper education is—if they are to have the greatest support<sup>1809</sup> for becoming tame and peaceful both among themselves and toward the people that are being guarded by them.<sup>1810</sup>

“And right we were to say so.”

You will agree then that in addition to<sup>1811</sup> this education, any thoughtful person would say that their shelters and all other possessions or property to be provided them must meet the criteria that they not impede their progress toward becoming the best guards they can, and not arouse<sup>1812</sup> them to mistreat the other citizens.

“And true will it be for him to say so.”

<sup>1804</sup> ήμῖν (B1) is the usual dative with the verbal adjective, and the assistants are “ours” both in the sense parallel to that dative (i.e., that it is we who are forming the city), and in the sense that they are assisting us (since the metaphor of the shepherd pertains to the regime we will be imposing on the “assistants”). Indirectly it is becoming clear that “we” are playing the role of the “rulers” (or vice-versa) that we just distinguished from the “rulers’ assistants” whose job it is to “guard the beliefs of (i.e. policies decided upon by) the rulers.” (Cf. 414B5 and n. 1773).

<sup>1805</sup> ἐπειδὴ αὐτοὺς κρείττους εἰσίν (B2): That the remarks above (A2-7) allude to Thrasymachus’s remarks about the fattening of the sheep (343B) now becomes undeniable.

<sup>1806</sup> φυλακτέον (B4): Glaucon’s answers (besides this, A8, B7, C4) are short and without affect.

<sup>1807</sup> πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν (B6): The shift to the indicative places the onus on “ourselves” as the educators.

<sup>1808</sup> καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον (B8), emphatic: cf. n. 1185.

<sup>1809</sup> τὸ μέγιστον (C2): Here and at B5 (τὴν μεγίστην), a noun is left out. The effect is auxesis.

<sup>1810</sup> This interlude (416B5-C4), begun by Glaucon’s protestation ἀλλὴ μὴν εἰσίν γε (B7), prepares for the severe prophylactic measures to be imposed upon the guards just below. Socrates drew the protestation out of Glaucon by his shift to the indicative (B5-6), and now he exploits the opportunity to make a fine and crucial point. We cannot take for granted that our best efforts will be guaranteed success: for this we need to be *right*. It is not (with Shorey) a “refusal to dogmatize” nor (with J.-C.) a “touch of unlooked for modesty” that elicits this remark from Socrates (though both are right to see a disowning of pride). Socrates recognizes that without their being right the whole thing will collapse. The fact that the crucial ingredient at this stage is their believing a nearly incredible story (about the underground pre-life) is an index of how much more work is to be done in the conversation, and even suggests where the work is needed. Still, Adam goes too far to read into Socrates’s diffidence an indication from the author that he is holding out a need to be filled by the higher education of the subsequent books.

<sup>1811</sup> πρὸς τοίνυν τῇ παιδείᾳ ταύτῃ (C5): That education was *superlatively* important (μέγιστον cf. C2, B5) indirectly implied there are other important μέγαλα that can also help.

<sup>1812</sup> ἐπαίρειν (D1) commonly in Plato of stimulation to covet wealth or reputation (434B1, 608B6; Leg.716A5; cf. Thuc.7.13.2).

Having extracted (or secured) Glaucon's agreement to these criteria Socrates can now present untrammeled a vivid and forthright description of the life and regimen of the rulers and their assistants (416D3-7B4). Apart from the "big lie" he has just taken us through it is the longest continuous statement he will have made all evening,<sup>1813</sup> and with it Book Three will come to an end. Everything conspires to make us aware that we have returned full circle to that fateful moment when Socrates last described the people for our viewing,<sup>1814</sup> and once we sense the return we recognize in a flash that it is again Glaucon who is witnessing Socrates's description, and we are full of apprehension what his reaction will be, since last time his reaction set us off on a long detour, requiring in fact everything that has intervened.

"Observe then my picture<sup>1815</sup> of what home life they must have in order to turn out this way. First as for possessions no private wealth will any of them have unless it is absolutely necessary. Second, as for their home and stores no part or corner of them will be off limits: anyone who wishes may enter at will. They will be outfitted as much as is necessary for men who are athletes of war, sober and brave,<sup>1816</sup> maintaining their stations as guards<sup>1817</sup> and receiving from the other citizens a wage for doing so in an amount that will leave them no excess at year's end nor a shortfall. Imagine them<sup>1818</sup> making their way to the mess: they will live life in common with each other as men do that are ensconced in an army. As for gold and silver we will tell them they have a divine kind of it stored away forever in their souls, which they got from the gods. Of the human kind they have no further need, nor would piety allow them to them to mix the divine with the mortal and pollute it, since the currency of the many becomes associated with (417) many impious acts, but the one that they<sup>1819</sup> possess is

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<sup>1813</sup> His remarks on the γενναῖον ψεῦδος were longer (414D-5D) but there was a breathing interruption in the middle (414E8).

<sup>1814</sup> I.e., 372A5ff, τίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται ... .

<sup>1815</sup> τοιόνδε (D3) first person demonstrative adjective of quality.

<sup>1816</sup> σώφρονές τε καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι (D8-E1): The dispositional virtues that were the burden of the paideia to instill: cf. 412C12 and n. 1749, 399A5-C4.

<sup>1817</sup> ταξαμένους (E1), middle. The idea is that they are preoccupied with holding their post and can ignore where their remuneration will come from.

<sup>1818</sup> φοιτῶντας (E3) sets the men into motion and begins something of an ecphrasis. Within the previous description (372AC) this occurred with παραβαλλόμενοι and κατακλινέντες, 372B4-5.

<sup>1819</sup> ἐκείνοις (417A1), like ἐκείνου (E7) indicates that our remarks to them (εἰπεῖν αὐτοῖς, E5) will be couched in paraenetic terms.

unscathed.<sup>1820</sup> Rather, they alone in the city will be barred by Themis from dealing with and even<sup>1821</sup> from touching gold and silver, from entering under a roof where they are present,<sup>1822</sup> from wearing it,<sup>1823</sup> and from drinking out of a silver or golden vessel. We will tell them that if they follow these rules they may themselves be preserved and may preserve the city, but as soon as they acquire land of their own and homes and coin they will be householders and farmers<sup>1824</sup> rather than guards and moreover will become harsh despots rather than allies of the other citizens.<sup>1825</sup> Hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against will be the rule and content of their lives, a life lived in greater fear, and fearing indeed those within the city rather than those without, themselves ever skirting the edge of the abyss and ruin, bringing their city right along with them.

It is for all these reasons, we shall say, I said, that the guards' provision must be thus, with respect

<sup>1820</sup> ἀκήρατον (A1). LSJ gives both κεράννυμι and κήρ as etymons of ἀκήρατος and claims (s.v. ἀκέραιος) that ἀκέραιος is the prose term for the poetic ἀκήρατος (despite ἀκήρατος in Hdt.2.86.5, 4,152.3, 7.10.a1; Xen.Hiero 3.4; as well as in Plato; and despite ἀκέραιος in E.Hel.48, Or.922) and classes its uses under two heads (pure, unmixed, etc. vs. unharmed, unravaged, etc.) that might derive from these same two etymons. Passow cites κεράννυμι only as the etymon of both terms. The Souda s.v. ἀκέραιος has ἄφθαρτος. Timaeus Sophistes glosses ἀκήρατοι with καθαροί and ἀκέραιοι with οἱ ἔξω κήρας (sic: for the latter cf. Tim.Locr.95B: ἀκήρατον τῶν ἐκτὸς κήρων, and 105C). Latin *sincerus* is a calque.

Plato's uses of ἀκήρατος include only one instance where the meaning plainly depends on κεράννυμι (*Tim.41D6*). Its use at *Leg.735C2* may refer to what we might call the mixed breed as opposed to the pure (cf. γενναῖα καὶ ἀγεννῆ, 735B5), but ἀκηράτων may be a new, ethical idea to go with ἥθων as opposed to ὑγιῶν with σωμάτων. In the present passage he places the idea of admixture adjacent to his use of the term (συμμειγνύντας μιαίνειν, 416E7-8), but a truism enunciated in *Leg.937D6-8* (πολλῶν δὲ ὄντων καὶ καλῶν ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ τοῖς πλείστοις αὐτῶν οἵον κῆρες ἐπιπεφύκασιν, αἱ καταμιαίνουσίν τε καὶ καραρρυμαίνουσιν αὐτά) reveals that this connection with admixture derives not from the κεράννυμι etymon but is an extension of the religious notion of miasma that itself derives from the influence of the Κῆρες in human affairs (for the sentiment cf. "Democrats" in DK 68B191 and 68B285 and cf. 68C7). A notion of religious purity likewise underlies *Leg.840D5-6* (ἥιθεοὶ καὶ ἀκήρατοι γάμων τε ἀγνοί, where with England, γάμων ἀγνοί explains ἀκήρατοι). The text is uncertain at *Phdrs.247D1*, but mixture is not at issue though something like transcendent purity is.

*Polit.303E* cites ἀκήρατον χρυσόν as a locution (λεγόμενον) for the gold that emerges from the process of smelting (cf. *Hdt.7.10.a1*). That use is clearly close to the use at 414A1, a passage so recent it must in turn govern the meaning of the present use. There it was decided that it is the guard who emerges from the torture tests (βασανίζειν) ἀκήρατος will be installed as ἄρχων. He has been tested as gold by fire (413E1-2). He is not purified but discovered to be pure. This theme of unsullied innocence itself goes back to Glaucon's offhand remark about good jurors (παντοδαποῖς φύσεσιν ὡμιληκότες, 408D2-3) and Socrates's correction of it (ἄπειρον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκέραιον δεῖ κακῶν ἥθων νέαν οὖσαν γεγονέναι, 409A5-6), where we encounter ἀκέραιος, the doublet of ἀκήρατος. There the associated term ἄπειρον confirms the meaning of untested and virginal purity. The present use of the term brings forward this notion of innocent purity from 413E-4A and rediscovered in the ascetic life of the guards another metaphorical application of the λεγόμενον ἀκήρατον χρυσόν cited in *Polit.303E4*.

In his treatment of the ill effects of philotimia on civic life (κῆρας ἔχει ἐν πολιτείᾳ, *Praec.ger.rei. 819E*) Plutarch quotes the present passage and glosses ἀκήρατον with ὄχραντον ὑπὸ φθόνου καὶ μῶμον τιμῆν (820A).

<sup>1821</sup> καὶ ἄπτεσθαι (A2-3) marks a climax in the remarks about gold that began at E4.

<sup>1822</sup> ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄροφον iέναι (A3-4): The rule resembles rules about pollution (μίασμα), and so continues the theme of the κῆρες from above. Prudence and prophylaxis are the rule here, not enlightenment and philosophy. J.-C. suddenly see humorous extremism in the provision, but Socrates is dead serious.

to their shelters<sup>1826</sup> and the rest, and this is the law that we will lay down for them.

"Quite so."

Glaucon has agreed.

### 2.B.4: Excursus on Why Glaucon Agrees: a Summary of Sect. 2.B

Book Three may be said to end with Glaucon's acquiescence, but Book Four begins with Adeimantus resisting this very conclusion and so perhaps it would be better to say that Book Three ends before Adeimantus disagrees. In the pause between we would do well to summarize how we got as far as we did.

The first time Glaucon saw the citizens at home with each other (372AB) he blurted out that their diet was too austere. Socrates's ready addition of condiments only worsened his mood, a mood that Socrates quickly diagnosed as a feeling of enervated dissatisfaction that reaches for more and only creates havoc in doing so. Perhaps the search for justice in the large canvas of the state would be helped rather than harmed by adding this appetitive aspect to its regimen,<sup>1827</sup> but the addition soon leads to a state that finds itself at war, whether to annex the wealth it needs to meet its rising expectations or to defend itself from the rising expectations of others.<sup>1828</sup> The army will consist of experts like all the other jobs the citizens do, but how can the person with the natural gifts requisite to do this work be kept from becoming an enemy within the city? It seems contrary to nature for violence and loyalty to be present at one and the same time. And yet there it is, in the dog. Perhaps the combination can be found among men after all: an instinctual loyalty to friends alongside an instinctual hostility toward the unknown. If there are humans with such an inborn nature we will educate them to bring their potentials to full strength following the original wisdom of those who first divided paideia into music and gymnastic. We'll refine the curriculum of poetry to instill deep into them the values we'll need them to have when they come of age and become our guards, and the curriculum of music to foster the requisite temperaments of courage and moderation. Their physical regimen will be simple such as suits the bodily needs and fits into the life of soldiers, avoiding thereby the diseases of luxury and the need for functionaries who cater to them. We will reintroduce a long-forgotten refinement: Music and gymnastics were set up not for soul and body respectively but both for the development of soul, to balance sensitivity with vigilance and resoluteness with flexibility. Among those we have educated we will select those who are particularly impervious to the forces that would seduce a person from retaining his grip on what he knows to be good and true, and make them our guards, with the others acting as their helpers. Before we set them loose into their brave new world we need to make them forget we educated them. We'll tell them it was all a dream, and the best of them will

<sup>1823</sup> περιάψασθαι (A4) perhaps recalls the fateful moment Gyges stole the ring (περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον ὅντα περιελόμενον, 359D8-E1).

<sup>1824</sup> γῆν τε ιδίαν καὶ οἰκίας / οἰκόνομοι τε καὶ γεωργοί (A6-7): The chiasm of before and after (cf. n. 18) There is a lurking pun in οἰκόνομοι since next to γεωργοί it should have been οἰκόδομοι.; but the focus on the rest of the citizens has shifted from the differences between them and the several tasks they do, and their difference as a group from the guards: they have all become χρηματισταί.

<sup>1825</sup> δεσπόται δ' ἔχθροὶ ἀντὶ συμμάχων (B1), recalling ἀντὶ συμμάχων εὐμενῶν δεσπόταις ἀγρίοις, 416B3.

<sup>1826</sup> οἰκήσεως τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (B7-8). οἴκησις, placed prominently by the anastrophe, reminds us that the question that initiated the description of their regimen was their εὔναί (415E4), or their οἰκήσεις (415E8), the vision of which in the πολίχνιον had triggered the reaction in Glaucon that made the entire education necessary!

<sup>1827</sup> ισως οὖν κακῶς ἔχει (372E4-6).

<sup>1828</sup> 373E2.

get the point and go along with us. These we will persuade to live under the most austere and simplest of regimes and to mess together, in a location suited to protecting the city against invaders from without as well as to keeping a eye on the behavior of those within. We will forbid them becoming involved in the sorts of activities that get people started wanting more. They will not be allowed even to touch gold and silver but be reminded they have something within them that is better far and mustn't be polluted by the envy of the world. If we are lucky they will remain exempt and unsullied, or else they will lose their integrity and they as well as the state will teeter at the abyss.

This new life certainly lacks garnish (*ἄνευ ὄψου* was Glaucon's complaint before). Where before the inhabitants could alternate from one dish to the other and while away the evening singing to the gods and producing children, not too few and not too many, these will own nothing and store nothing away, have no private space, have no tools but what they need for their job, receive a set stipend from which they can save nothing, and eat together. These provisions in fact spell out in the starker terms a pattern of life the very hint of which was enough to elicit from Glaucon his sputtering objection in Book Two, yet this time he accepts them. What has happened?

Apparently our summary has left out what has happened. Let's try again.

#### 2.B.4a: Revised Summary of Section 2.B

The luxuries were projected into the theoretical city in response to Glaucon's anxious reaction against a life-too-simple, which he had difficulty articulating. The remarks he did make were taken literally by Socrates. When as a result an army became needful he was ashamed and expressed the hope it could be supplied from the normal rank and file. Socrates scolded him for his carelessness and required him to stick by their agreement to assign one task to each citizen. But a professional standing army leads to the problem who will guard the guards, so that the very existence of the conceptual state is brought into conceptual jeopardy. Glaucon had by then taken enough responsibility for the outcome that he was relieved when Socrates chanced on the idea of the *σκύλαξ*, which provided a ray of hope that such a thing is not unnatural, and therefore impossible, after all.

Socrates next suggests that the concern for inborn nature leads to a concern for proper nurture, and Glaucon's brother Adeimantus jumps into the conversation, quite willing to expend whatever amount of effort is needed on the subject of education (376C7-E1). Socrates then offers another perfectly natural suggestion, that instead of reinventing the wheel they adopt a scheme of education based on the age-old division into music and gymnastics. When the review of the music curriculum becomes a radical review of the poetic tradition, Adeimantus finds himself engaged in the very critique he had begged Socrates to carry out in his large speech. As it has turned out, by helping to formulate the criteria for what poetry the young guards should be subjected to and what not, he is participating in the critique rather than being lectured to by Socrates. After all, Adeimantus cannot be re-educated: at his age he can improve his education only by improving education itself. Somehow his search for a personal solution has become bound up in a solution fit for those younger than he is.<sup>1829</sup> Somehow his recognition of the inadequacy of the society around him has been converted into a sense of responsibility to "do something about it."

The review of poetry re-establishes the authority of truth over opinion as Adeimantus had craved,<sup>1830</sup> under the excuse that whatever else humans might get from poetry they will not be allowed to have it at the expense of the gods. Next, on the pretense that he is moving through the ranks, Socrates will treat stories about the heroes. These are the personages that men must emulate. The criterion by which to measure poetry about them is that they be depicted as worthy of

<sup>1829</sup> His remark at 378B6-7 (*οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιτίθεια*) poignantly reveals his awareness of the ambiguity of his own position.

<sup>1830</sup> 366E3-9, 367B4-5 vs.5-6, D3-4.

emulation.

After heroes come men, the treatment of whom in poetry now is made to submit to a different criterion. Socrates invents a distinction from scratch between *logos* and *lexis*, or plot and delivery, in order to move to the next phase of the education of Adeimantus. The fact that the study of poetry includes recitation implies that the student will be required to impersonate the humans depicted, and do so with whatever resources he has as a human himself. If he is asked to do this young, he will have to stretch his youthful sources in their direction. If they are low types he will stretch himself in the wrong direction, to his own detriment. The topic of emulating heroes and imitating one's inferiors goes to the heart of Adeimantus's experience and predicament. The false attitude he finds accepted among his peers and justified from traditional poetry has made its way into his own soul to the extent that although he believes it is wrong he does not know how to resist it.<sup>1831</sup> By putting him in the position of censor Socrates has given him an opportunity to find a way to resist it, with his help and guidance.

The initial expression of his attitude about the opportunity he is given is his statement about Socrates, whom he idolizes for the way, on this occasion and we can imagine many times before, he has brought him to the edge of his best intuition. That is, he guesses that Socrates is about to banish all imitative poetry (394D5-6). Socrates's response to this act of transference or projection or imitation, is to turn the focus of the conversation away from themselves and back onto the men they are imagining into existence for the sake of their city, the guards who like all the other citizens must be one thing only and do one thing only. How then can they imitate many (394E)? By focussing on the student-guards he invites Adeimantus to imagine himself a student and recast what his teacher would or should make him recite. By the end of this treatment of *lexis* or delivery Socrates has Adeimantus fully on board.

This completes the treatment of the stories, the *logoi* that constitute part of music, as opposed to gymnastic. We must recognize, or else misinterpret the whole treatment, that the great stress placed on the stories is due to an agenda that underlies the discussion of education. What is happening before our eyes is not the promulgation of a theory of education by the great thinker Plato in which an idiosyncratically great amount of stress is placed on plot, but a remediation of Adeimantus's education conducted by Socrates on Adeimantus in that special manner of his that forces Adeimantus to participate rather than merely receive an edifying story. We have to believe that Adeimantus asked Socrates for help at the beginning of Book Two not only because Socrates had given him answers before but because Socrates had recognized his desire before, and had midwifed it before toward progress in understanding. We have to believe that that is all that Adeimantus expects here, and moreover that that is all that is happening here.<sup>1832</sup>

The transitions within this putative "treatment of education" are driven by the opportunities Socrates sees for educating his interlocutors, but since his method is indirect he hides this in ready-made categories like the division between gods, heroes and men or between music and gymnastic. After story and its delivery comes musical accompaniment, and while we may be tempted to mine this section for information on the musical ideas of the time, about which we know precious little, Socrates is almost completely unconcerned with the matter, as his punning remark that music must "harmonize" with storytelling reveals at the outset.<sup>1833</sup> What will turn out to be important about the transition to music is that Glaucon interrupts and takes over for Adeimantus, since he has a personal

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<sup>1831</sup> His account includes the confession that the promising young man conceives of his own choice in life as devolving into choosing what sort of man he will imitate and how he will himself appear (365B5-6, C1-2; 366B3-C2).

<sup>1832</sup> Rousseau's remark (*Emile* I.40 [ed. Flammarion]) that the *Republic* "n'est pas une ouvrage de politique comme le pensent ceux qui ne jugent des livres que par leurs titres mais le plus beau traité d'éducation qu'on est jamais fait," is truer than Rousseau realizes.

<sup>1833</sup> συμφωνήσειν (398C5).

interest in the topic. He knows something about it and cares enough that he knows that he does not know enough (398C7-10). His attitude enables Socrates to call upon him as the expert for identifying the modal forms, but clearly it is more substantial matters that Socrates has in mind than these technicalities, as we see when he says, "Leave me at least the modes that go with heroic martial and temperate political behavior," and then goes on (399AB) to describe the balanced temperament he wishes to see achieved by the musical education of the young guards, with an eloquence and leisureliness that comes close to his description of the city's inhabitants at the idyllic stage (372AB). Glaucon then has the role of giving his *nihil obstat* as to which modes will suit these behaviors and does not need to comment directly upon them.

When Socrates closes his review of the modes with some remarks on the musical instruments that will be needed he suddenly realizes what they have been doing is tantamount to a purgation of the city that he had accused of being spoiled. Glaucon shows that he knows it was his own intemperance that spoiled it, with his reply that nothing less than purgation should be expected since they themselves have been acting temperately.<sup>1834</sup>

They are not quite finished purging the music, however. There is still the matter of rhythm. Of course rhythms will be selected to follow the harmonies just as the harmonies were selected to fit the morals of the stories. Glaucon has the expertise to distinguish the rhythms from one another but confesses he has no knowledge at all about which rhythms go with which life (400A4-7); but Socrates has already enunciated the principle and he defers the details to Damon so that he can move on.<sup>1835</sup> The moral states of temperance and bravery must be fostered and their opposites must be suppressed: this much Glaucon can certainly distinguish, Socrates insists. Moreover, he can distinguish these qualities in rhythm and harmony as well as in story. He can see them everywhere, in architecture and weaving and even in the world of plants. While music among all the elements in the environment wields an especially strong influence on the soul, it is rather the overarching and pervasive characters of beauty in all things that we must promote in the climate of our young men. The knowledge that truly makes a man a great musician is the knowledge of these characters in all their embodiments.

Glaucon unhesitatingly agrees with Socrates at each step, even though what is now being said implies that the very kind of musical knowledge he has just boasted of having is of little intrinsic worth. Glaucon has been borne along by the sweep of the argument and the importance of the matters it treats and leaves the details behind.<sup>1836</sup> He is moved by inspiration.

Socrates has now used the treatment of music as an occasion to move to a much higher and more final level of study than any traditional curriculum has, would, or even could envision. At the very end of the study comes the recognition that beauty is the province within which eros comes to life, and Socrates adds a coda, both humorous and realistic, on the petty derailment to which the erotics between teacher and student are prone (402D10-3C3). It is of course the harmonious beauty of the soul in the student that attracts the teacher, he remarks, and Glaucon by way of agreeing notes that yes the psychic beauties enable one to look past physical defects. Glaucon shows a trace of fastidiousness here and Socrates comes down upon it like a load of bricks. There is no place for the bodily eros in the psychic and musical eros shared by souls for each other, he argues (402E-3B). You may sit with your boy and hug him but no more than a father would his son. Once Glaucon accepts this corrective Socrates is ready to move on from music to gymnastics.

Given what has just been said we should expect the treatment of gymnastics to receive even

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<sup>1834</sup> σωφρονοῦντές γε ἡμεῖς (399E7).

<sup>1835</sup> There is no need to worry over the terminology nor about Damon himself but only the rhetoric of the dismissal (cf. n.527) and the focus and stress it places upon the sequel.

<sup>1836</sup> Indeed it is nothing less than the Theory of Ideas that animates this passage which Shorey in his reassuring tone calls Wordsworthian and Ruskinian (Loeb 1.253 note g, and 1.254 note b), since he sees that the Theory is for Plato more a vision than a set of falsifiable propositions.

shorter shrift; but something else happens that sets the tone. The principle is enunciated that body hasn't the ability to heal the soul but the soul does the body. Therefore if our guards are intelligent they can prepare the gymnastic rules themselves, with a little guidance from us in the form of a few bold strokes (403D).

The insouciance of this remark is comic, and so is the first guideline. The guards will not be allowed to become drunk: indeed the very figure of the drunken guard is risible. What then follows is not a program of exercise but guidelines for the dietary regimen, and the moral is: Don't get lost in subtleties. Our guards will eat what the Greeks ate on bivouac in Troy. Under the guise of a treatment of gymnastics Socrates is making a frontal assault on Glaucon's ὄψη. All that needs to be said is that the diet should resemble in its simplicity the musical harmonies we have retained, and that fancy dishes only lead to excess, license, and disease. The sequence of excesses Socrates here lists off is just a restatement of what he loaded the polis down with back in Book Two, but in the present context he has gotten the upper hand and has placed the whole issue of the diet into the category of the ridiculous. The ensuing treatment satirizes the valetudinarians and reduces their lifestyle to an oxymoronic self contradiction that only the rich can afford.

Besides the rehash there is something new, an extension of the symptoms of excess to include an increased demand for juries (405A6-B1), which moves us *distinctly beyond* the scope of gymnastics and medicine. The extension is justified by an analogy. That someone should look for justice in the decisions of others because he has no sense of it in himself, is shameful;<sup>1837</sup> but how much more shameful that he should specialize in manipulating a false sense of it in the minds of jurors for his own personal gain? Likewise it's shameful to rely on doctors not for the dressing of wounds and the treatment of seasonal diseases, but for managing an intemperate regimen that makes one exude the odors of a swamp.

The want of inner sense or conscience that is expressed in an undue reliance on the courts and then transmogrified into a high art by the professional haggler, is made the pattern and basis for criticizing a person's lack of good sense about his own bodily regime and the transmogrification of this bad sense is made into a science of maintaining the body in sickness. The comparison is designed to ridicule a person for having to rely on the flattery of a doctor who dignifies his flatulence with the name of a medical condition;<sup>1838</sup> but it has exposed two very telling errors in Glaucon's speech from Book Two, which assumes one has no inner sense of justice, or presumes one can ignore what inner sense he has, and therefore falls back on defining it in terms of injustice,<sup>1839</sup> as well as his portrayal of the haggler as astute rather than destitute of conscience and unable even to help himself.<sup>1840</sup> The incontinent eater who only brings trouble onto himself also serves as a counterweight to Glaucon's image of Gyges, by making Gyges's self-ignorance inwardly visible, within Glaucon's conscience, as a counterweight to the invisibility of his sins to others.

Once begun, Socrates's method of satire and ridicule-by-comparison continues *ad libitum*, to the point that the working man who is too busy to be sick comes off more noble than the rich man who has nothing better to do with his time than be sick, now that he has made his pile. Glaucon interrupts the satire to ask whether in all seriousness he would go so far as to deny the city needs doctors who are good,<sup>1841</sup> given the fact that the doctors Socrates seems to prefer would dismiss most of their patients and let them die. In passing he suggests that the best doctors might be those that had the

<sup>1837</sup> ἀπορίᾳ οἰκείων, 405B3-4.

<sup>1838</sup> 405D3-6.

<sup>1839</sup> Cf. 359A5 and 360E1-3 and nn.718, 739.

<sup>1840</sup> 359A4-B4, 362B5-C1.

<sup>1841</sup> His first mention of doctors was that with luxury we would have a greater need for them (not that we would need more of them: 373D1-2); he has reverted to complaining about the greater need and now Glaucon asks the fundamental question, whether there is a need for *any* that are good.

widest possible familiarity with disease, the same way the best men to have on the jury are those who have spent a lot of time among all kinds of people from slumming with the low-lifers to hobnobbing with the rich. Socrates replies that he does of course want good doctors, but he attacks Glaucon's extension, in passing, of the "experiential" epistemology to jurors, and with this he reverts to mining the analogy between the juror and the doctor.

What he goes on to say has more to do with jurors than doctors: its relevance to the ostensible topic of gymnastics is minimal, but at the same time it continues the direct education of Glaucon in a manner closely tailored to the ways he is making himself available and amenable to education, namely through his candid remarks and his participation in the dialogue.

Since, as Socrates had said at the beginning, the ruling principle governing the "gymnastics" curriculum is that the mind or soul has the power to improve the body, our physicians may profit as such from empirical familiarity with being sick and being exposed to sickness. The juror's job, which is knowing the just from the unjust, likewise requires mental acuity rather than physical, but empirical familiarity with injustice through indiscriminate exposure might weaken or contaminate this acuity. What it takes to be the "good" juror that Glaucon alluded to in passing, is therefore that the juror have a good soul and be a good man, in the sense at least of being untainted. The conclusion that a juror cannot afford to be "sick" with a case of injustice is irrelevant to gymnastic but goes to the heart of Glaucon's most compelling argument at the beginning of Book Two, the story about Gyges, which he presented as a case that anyone will judge the same way, along with his subsequent description of the just and unjust men as if they were statues, the very sight of whom, he claimed, made the judgment between them easy. In both cases, as we saw, his presentation is vitiated by his own blind spots.<sup>1842</sup>

With comparisons from the more palpable world of the body and sickness and diet, Socrates is able to illustrate the less palpable facts of conscience, which are as such more "ignorable" in just the way we are to envy Gyges for being able to ignore his own sins merely because they are invisible to others. Glaucon himself is left with the sole alternative of ignoring Socrates's argument, but even that alternative is now ruled out since it has been revealed that doing so threatens to disable the part of himself that enables him to participate in the conversation, which, as itself a search for justice, is akin to the work of a juror.

Humor is just the right elixir to get him onto the other side since it operates on the will. On the other hand it can only take him as far as will can take him: to resolution. Understanding will require more work. The prospect of purity and freedom from admixture is just such an appeal to the will, and it is with an appeal on this level to which Glaucon accedes, so as to end Book Three.

## END OF BOOK THREE

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<sup>1842</sup> μάλιστ' ἀν αἰσθανοίμεθα (359B6), οἵοί τ' ἐσόμεθα κρίναται ὁρθῶς, 360E2-3. Socrates has now broached the issue of the juror's credentials for Glaucon. He will require him to specify what they are, when Glaucon re-enters the discussion in Book Nine (576D6-577B8 and nn. *ad loc.*).

## BOOK FOUR

### 2.B.5: Objection of Adeimantus

No sooner has Glaucon accepted the conclusion than Adeimantus interrupts to object:

(419) “What will you say in defense of yourself if someone accuses you of making scant provision for the happiness of these men of yours,<sup>1843</sup> especially when they themselves could have had it otherwise? The city virtually belongs<sup>1844</sup> to them and yet they enjoy none of its benefits,<sup>1845</sup> while<sup>1846</sup> others<sup>1847</sup> are

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<sup>1843</sup>τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας (419A3). ἄνδρας again suggests fellow feeling, as it did in the mouth of Glaucon at 372C2-3: cf.361B6 and n.752. Adeimantus's use of the second person (ἀπολογήσῃ A2) points blame at Socrates even more resolutely than Glaucon's personal constructions ποιεῖς and κατασκεύαζες / ἔχόρταζες did when he interrupted in Book Two (372C2-3: cf. n. 1022), but in just a moment he pulls his punch by imagining the charge is being brought by some “third person” (τις, A2).

<sup>1844</sup>ὧν (A3): The bare predicate genitive (rather than dative) endows the guards with a sort of possession of or sovereignty over the city that is global at the same time that it is indeterminate (cf. gen. at Lach.207D7). The pairing of ὧν and οἱ (A4: I am tempted to read the relative rather than the article) with μέν and δέ points up the inconsistency between this privilege and their actual role that ridicules them personally (δι’ ἐαυτούς: “They have no one to thank but themselves”). Adam’s comparison with X.Mem.2.1.17 is more misleading than helpful. For the shame attending their forgoing the opportunity to take more, compare Glaucon's remark at 360D4-5. Callicles's remark at Gorg.492C3 (καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἐαυτῶν πόλει) expresses the same indignation and does so by identical means.

<sup>1845</sup>These ἀγαθά (A5-10) are not “goods” in the sense of economic goods, but merely “good things,” and we need to wait for specification (again, Callicles uses the same rhetoric at Gorg.492B6). It turns out that they are not the needful things that the city had been brought about to supply. Even though he begins the list with fields and houses in order to allude to the primary δημιουργοί, the farmers and house-builders (echoing 417A6), it is not food and shelter but land ownership and lavish homes that here count as ἀγαθά, as the rest of his list corroborates. He follows by filling the house with furnishings suitably grand, and then adding a private altar and inviting foreigners to stay, as if one's personal home were the center of the divine and human universe, a polis unto itself—all this in sharp contrast to the εὐναί of the guards where no corner is sequestered from public scrutiny as a private storeroom (416D6-7).

<sup>1846</sup>With οἶον (A5), its antecedent ἀγαθόν, Adeimantus sets out to exemplify the goods of the city of which they possess not a one (μηδέν emphatic), but then immediately, and only half-consciously, shifts the construction because what bothers him is not the things they forgo so much as the sight of others getting them.

<sup>1847</sup>ἄλλοι (A5): Adeimantus drops the article to depict the embarrassment the guard feels when he compares himself to the people around him, forgetting for a moment that his condition and theirs are the result of the new and unprecedented τάξις imposed on them all (for the contrast cf. ἡ ὄλλη πόλις, etc.[414C2,D3-4, E5; 416E1]; and μόνοις αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, 417A2). Socrates will represent the situation more accurately by restoring the article at 420A3, below.

acquiring the fields and building the great big homes,<sup>1848</sup> amassing<sup>1849</sup> possessions to fill such homes, making private sacrifices<sup>1850</sup> to the gods and entertaining foreign guests,<sup>1851</sup> and of course as you just mentioned acquiring gold and silver and all the things one customarily expects<sup>1852</sup> to find in the lives of those who have really arrived.<sup>1853</sup> One could very well say<sup>1854</sup> that the name you gave (420) them is all they really are: ‘assistants’ like hired help, who to all appearances are just sitting there on their watches.”<sup>1855</sup>

The outburst rivals Glaucon’s from Book Two in vehemence but it has its own specific flavor. Just as Glaucon had there “identified” with the citizens in their simple home closely enough to find it calm, Adeimantus here imagines himself being a guard or assistant to the guards vividly enough to feel envy for others than the guard, who aren’t limited by his simple and calm regime, and to fear ridicule by others for forgoing to take advantage of his own opportunities. He articulates his envy in the list, which is a list of external goods that is unique among such lists for the way it stresses private wealth over public accolades.<sup>1856</sup> The usual list of external goods includes family, money, and honors,<sup>1857</sup> but

<sup>1848</sup> ἀγρούς τε κεκτημένοι καὶ οἰκίας οἰκοδομούενοι (A5-6): The two-item list evokes the occupations of farming, housebuilding, (and therefore weaving) that initially appeared as providing the basic needs for life (369D1-5) but later reappeared in various dialectical contexts (specialization [374B, 397E], competence [381A], the manufacture of better and worse looking things [401A]). Here, Adeimantus bends the occupations of farming and housebuilding so as to portray their practitioners as amassing capital from them (in contrast with the guardians who serve year in and year out but have not even a sou to show for it: 416E1-2). While one can imagine a capitalistic farmer getting possession of larger and larger fields, Adeimantus’s concept becomes inarticulate in the case of the housebuilder who must be imagined building larger and larger houses *for himself*.

<sup>1849</sup> The list of possessions (A5-10) is done with a sequence of six participial phrases. The first and last are governed by perfects (*κεκτημένοι*), and this one, the third, is governed by the present (*κτώμενοι*). Those before and after it are also present (*οἰκοδομούμενοι, θύοντες, ξενοδοκούντες*). The effect of the presents is to portray the process of accumulation and expenditure.

<sup>1850</sup> Θυσίας θεοῖς ιδίας (A7): Private sacrifices are an occupation of the rich, who can afford them. They might think they need them, too, as Cephalus does (331B2-3, cf. nn.825 and 48 *ad* 365A3 and 328D6), and as this same Adeimantus repeatedly says the unjust do (362C2-3, 364B5-C5, 364E5-5A3, 364E5-5A3, 365E4-6A4).

<sup>1851</sup> ξενοδοκεῖν (A7) is an *hapax* in Plato.

<sup>1852</sup> With ὅσα νομίζεται (A9) Adeimantus seeks to disown responsibility for his complaint with exactly the same formula Glaucon used at 372D7 (ἄπερ νομίζεται)!

<sup>1853</sup> Climactic μακάριοι (A9) replaces the εὐδαίμονας of A2 (cf. 335E9 and n.259) as he becomes more excited by his own list.

<sup>1854</sup> φαίνη ὄν (A10): A tone of satirical speculation replaces the threatening tone of the subjunctive condition in which the opening accusation was couched (A1-2).

<sup>1855</sup> φρουροῦντες (420A1) along with καθῆσθαι ridicules the prophylactic work of the guards by reducing it to a somatic posture, stationary and staring (φρουρᾶ, *Phd*.62B). Moreover, φαίνονται presupposes someone else in turn observing *them*, someone in fact indistinguishable from Adeimantus (though he speaks impersonally of a τις [A2], that is also the subject of φαίνη ὄν [A10]), who was himself distracted by the mental image of the “others” reaping the “good things of the city.”

Adeimantus portrays the power of others’ envy to create desire in the person being envied so accurately that we can be sure these forces are acting or have acted within himself. There is no hint of parody or irony in his remarks. As at the beginning of Book Two, he finds himself “in between.”

<sup>1856</sup> With ἀπολογήσῃ (419A2) he implies Socrates will be blamed for something; Callicles actually articulates the moral reproof (Gorg.492B4-5, αἴσχιον ... οἵς ἔξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ...).

<sup>1857</sup> Goods are divided differently in different dialectical contexts. When the external goods (τὰ ἔξω, the goods besides those of body and/or soul) are represented by a single item, the item is wealth (πλούτος: 495A7-8, *Euthyd*.279A7ff, 280D2; Gorg.467E4; Leg.631B6-D1, 660E2-5, 661A5-B4; χρήματα:

Adeimantus's goes on to include the ability to honor the gods privately and to receive foreigners into one's home. Of all things it recalls Cephalus in his home, his continual use of the private altar he has built, and his request that Socrates come down to visit him from Athens more often. The peculiar isolation of those who "have arrived" is something to be envied from the outside only. Adeimantus's list therefore expresses envy with an accuracy that evinces some familiarity.

Socrates's response is not short. Don't forget to add<sup>1858</sup> they'll be working for their dinner<sup>1859</sup> and won't be receiving a wage in addition to their victuals as the others<sup>1860</sup> will, so that even if they wanted to take a sojourn out of town<sup>1861</sup> on private business they would not have the wherewithal to do so, nor to pay money for girls<sup>1862</sup> or waste it on anything else they might get a hankering for, the way people who are thought to be happy can.<sup>1863</sup> There's this and a whole lot more you have left out of the charges against me.<sup>1864</sup> Don't hesitate to include these also in the list.

"Consider them included," Adeimantus replies, his vehemence unabated.<sup>1865</sup>

So you are asking what we<sup>1866</sup> shall say in our defense? I think we'll find our defense by sticking with the same path of inquiry<sup>1867</sup> we already set out on. We'll say that while we would not be surprised

443E3-4, Leg.870A; Phlb.48E1-9A2). When represented by a set of items the characteristic ones are πλοῦτος and γένος (491C1-4, Charm.157B7-8; Phdrs.239-40A8), πλοῦτος and ἀρχή (445A6-8, Prot.354B3-5), or πλοῦτος, γένος, and ἀρχή (494C5-7, 618C8-D5; Alc.I 104A4-C1; Tht.175D3-5A5). In outlying dialectical contexts we find clothing (Phdo.64D), οἰκία and πλοῖον (Gorg.504A7-10), δόξαι, τιμαί, δωρείαι (Rep.366E4-5), and horse, dog, gold, honor, friends (Lys.211D8-E1).

<sup>1858</sup>With καὶ ταῦτα (A2) Socrates directly echoes Adeimantus's at A3, which he himself notes with γε. He takes Adeimantus's point even further, just as he had acquiesced to Glaucon's request for ὄψον by adding acorns and nuts (372C4-D3). And just as Glaucon's impatience there brought on the need to sicken and then heal the state in order to reach the goal of looking for justice within it, Adeimantus's impatience here not only threatens the progress that has been made toward that same goal but also postpones our taking the final step until 427D.

<sup>1859</sup>With ἐπισίτιοι (A2) he echoes the derogatory tone of Adeimantus's ἀτεχνῶς ... ὥσπερ ἐπίκουροι μισθωτοί, but corrects him. They work for food, not money!

<sup>1860</sup>οἱ ἄλλοι (A3): His re-use of Adeimantus's ἄλλοι receives the article and begins to restore the structure by which the two groups are defined. Adam seeks to justify his previous interpretation of ἄλλοι (419A5) by giving this one a different reference, choosing without any basis οἱ ἐπίκουροι, who however received the same treatment as the φύλακες in this regard, as 416E4-5 and 417A3 confirm (χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον).

<sup>1861</sup>ἀποδημῆσαι (A4) is the luxury that is the converse to ξενοδοκεῖν (419A7), and an equal badge of autonomy from the petty concerns that preoccupy one's neighbors.

<sup>1862</sup>ἐταίροις (A4), another reminiscence of Socrates's reply to Glaucon at 373A3 (cf. also κόρη, 404D5 and n.1618).

<sup>1863</sup>ἄναλίσκειν (A5), which is placed in the position of the criterion of the list, is actually a criticism of all the elements leading up to it. It is virtually a "specious genus" (on which cf. n. 2688). For formulae of the criterion cf. 431C1-3 and n.2030.

<sup>1864</sup>τῆς κατηγορίας ἀπολείπεις (A7): Socrates makes Adeimantus responsible for bringing the complaint, despite his attempt to dodge it by using τις (419A2 and n.1843).

<sup>1865</sup>ἄλλά (A8).

<sup>1866</sup>ἀπολογησόμεθα (B1): The plural is ambiguous. Socrates begins to suggest that the complaint Adeimantus brings is a complaint he must also help answer.

<sup>1867</sup>οἶμος (B3), an *háppax* in the Platonic corpus outside quotations from poetry, sounds like οἶμαι, which is used below (B4, B8, C2) to trace the steps the thought has taken back to the beginning question, What is justice in itself and its effects? (Book One having been a προοίμιον, 357A2), as well as to depict an erroneous way of thinking going forward (D2).

if these men did indeed come out quite happy as a group,<sup>1868</sup> it's quite irrelevant since our goal in founding the city never was that any single group within it might be particularly<sup>1869</sup> well-off and happy but rather that the city as a whole might be happy as much as possible,<sup>1870</sup> so that in a city so disposed we might most likely find justice, as likewise in a city organized worst we might find injustice, and that once we caught sight of justice<sup>1871</sup> we would be able to decide the previous<sup>1872</sup> question. Our present notion is that we are fashioning and modelling a well-off and happy city, not by selecting a few of the citizens and setting them up to have this quality, but as a whole.

If we were painting a statue and someone came up to us and criticized us for failing to decorate the most beautiful part of the body with the most beautiful colors, since we were using black paint for the eyes instead of the oyster's purple dye,<sup>1873</sup> it would be perfectly reasonable for us to say in our defense, "My strange fellow, don't adopt the attitude that we must paint the eyes so prettily that they don't even look like eyes, nor any of the other parts. Focus instead on how well we accord to each part its proper place so as to create a beautiful whole." Just so in the present application don't<sup>1874</sup> try

<sup>1868</sup> εὐδαιμονέστατοι (B5): The plural makes them a group; the superlative (I take καί with εὐδαιμονέστατοι not with οὗτοι) only suggests comparison. Socrates begins by "denying the predicate."

<sup>1869</sup> διαφερόντως (B7) continues the suggestion of envy by its etymology: a happiness that sets apart one apart from the others.

<sup>1870</sup> ὅτι μάλιστα (sc. ἔσται εὐδαιμων) ὥλη ἡ πόλις (B7-8). The city was brought into existence as a κοινωνία in which the needs of the individuals would be best served by cooperation rather than their staying apart and "minding their own business" (369C1-70C6). It is that maximization (ὅτι μάλιστα, B7-8) of quality and supply and ease (370C3-4, for which the term here is εὐδαιμων, implied but not explicitly predicated of the city until 420C2) which is brought about by cooperation (κοινωνία is here done with ὥλη), that Socrates is referring back to. Indirectly he has defined εὐδαιμονία not as having money beyond need, as Adeimantus has just suggested, but as enjoying an efficient fulfillment of needs. So much becomes more explicit below, at 421C3-4.

<sup>1871</sup> κατιδόντες (C1) repeats καταμαθεῖν (368E8) and ὕδοιμεν (369A6).

<sup>1872</sup> πάλαι (C1), referring to a previous phase in the argument, the phase before they began the construction of the city, when Adeimantus asked the question, What is justice as it exists in the soul and what is its effect within those who have it? With the back-reference Socrates admonishes Adeimantus that his interruption at envy's behest has threatened his chances of getting an answer to his own original question.

<sup>1873</sup> ὄστρείφ (C8): Plutarch's remark at QC 5.5.618A suggests that it is the cost of the paint rather than its special color that is the issue.

<sup>1874</sup> μὴ ἀνάγκαζε ἡμᾶς (D5): The second singular imperative is addressed to Adeimantus (*pace* Burnet and Chambry who postpone closing the quotation to 421A4), whom Socrates's argument here pushes into the position invented by the imaginary interlocutor who objected to the painter (even though as above Adeimantus is also included in the first plural ἡμᾶς, and below [B1] the person Socrates has corrected is referred to as ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο λέγων).

Socrates (along with Plato's other conversationalists) commonly finesse the tension between the individuality or independence of the two conversants (expressed by first and second person singulars) and the partnership of their project (expressed by the first plural which denotes their joint effort), by introducing *imaginary interlocutors* and *imaginary objections* (332Cff, 337AB, 341E; *Apol.*28B, 37E; *Charm.*165C10-E2; *Gorg.*450-I; *Ion* 538D7-9E1ff; *Leg.*648Aff, 662C7ff, 807B7-8; *Lys.*216A5ff; *Phdrs.*261A3ff; *Phlb.*63B-4A (prosopopoeia); *Prot.*330C-31Aff, 352Eff; *Stallb.ad Leg.*628B, *Thompson ad Meno* 72B). Sometimes the purpose is to ensure that a position is adequately articulated (*Rep.*453A7-9, 476Eff), especially in such cases as the present where the partnership of joint search is threatened (cf. *Crito* 50A6ff [after the challenge of 49C11-E2]; *HMaj.*287Bff; *Leg.*628E-9B8ff). The case of 588B1-8 is illustrative in its extremeness (cf. n.4510), since there the hypothetical interlocutor is plainly Glaucon himself though neither he nor Socrates admit it. The present case is of the same nature and the

to make us adorn<sup>1875</sup> our guards with a sort of “happiness” that will turn them into something other than the guards we need them to be.<sup>1876</sup> We need no lectures<sup>1877</sup> on how to swathe our farmers in fancy cloaks and bedeck<sup>1878</sup> them with gold, and then to suggest to them that they till the land only if they feel like it, or how to have our potters recline in a pretty array beside the fire to drink and to feast, keeping their wheel within easy reach in case they have a hankering to throw a pot or two, and so on likewise how to make the others into people that have really made it big<sup>1879</sup> so that in the end the whole city might enjoy happiness. Advice like that we hardly need! If we follow it our farmer will soon be no farmer, and our potter no potter, nor would the others (421) maintain the postures<sup>1880</sup> that came into view as our city developed. Indeed, for the majority<sup>1881</sup> of those roles the stakes of maintaining them are rather low. If the leather-stitchers<sup>1882</sup> become incompetent or lose their art and pretend to be good when they are not, the city suffers no fearsome consequence; but guards of laws and of the city who aren’t but seem to be can bring the whole city down in a fell swoop, while at the same time they alone hold the keys to her good order and true happiness. So, if we are trying to turn out guards deserving the name by virtue of being the least prone to do harm to the city, whereas a person<sup>1883</sup> who speaks the way that man spoke a moment ago intends to turn farmers into happy

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circumspection is used for the same reasons.

<sup>1875</sup> προσάπτειν (D6), commonly used of pinning on an award or decoration in the aftermath of great deeds, in contrast to the distribution used in setting things up (τὰ προσήκοντα ἀποδιδόναι [D4]).

<sup>1876</sup> ἔκείνους (D6), approbative: “the guards as we made them.” Giving them a dose of happiness could only (πᾶν μᾶλλον) disable them from performing their task, as pretty paint on the statue’s eyes would ruin the contribution we need the eyes make to the whole statue.

<sup>1877</sup> ἐπιστάμεθα (E1) often used in dismissive *praeteritio*, meaning “we already know” (e.g., Phdrs.230E, Alc. I 106C, H.Maj.285C, Meno 85C).

<sup>1878</sup> περιτιθέναι (E2) suggests a ring (as at 360B4) or a crown (as at 406D4).

<sup>1879</sup> μακαρίους (E6): Socrates picks up Adeimantus’s climactic use of μακάριος (cf. 419A9 and n. 1853). With these humorous sketches Socrates parodies Adeimantus’s envious portrayal of the δημιούργοι by presenting the real outcome if Adeimantus’s irresponsible conception of the specialists’ roles (n. 1848 *ad* 419A5-6) actually came about.

The overlapping substitution of exemplary material (there, farmers and builders; here farmers and potters) is characteristic (cf. n. 159 and n. 1848, *supra*). For Adeimantus the earth-tiller was turned into a landowner followed by a house-builder who becomes a lord of the estates; here he is depicted out at work impeded by the nonsensical accoutrements of wealth, followed by a potter leisurely at table with his tools within reach, in order to show that work does not mix with leisure nor leisure with work. Disagreement may be expressed on the level of principle and ideas, or in terms of the very different qualities that different principles impose on the exemplary material. Though as here the latter can bring the abstract point home, it may also devolve into exemplomachy.

<sup>1880</sup> σχῆμα (421A2): The term, according to Mr Karabatsos, strikes a corrective contrast to its complement, χρῶμα in the choice of paints, as line to color, essence to accident, and substance to affect. Cf. n. 1046.

<sup>1881</sup> ὄλλων (A2) with μέν proleptic, as often.

<sup>1882</sup> νευροπόρφοι (A3), a derogatory specification for σκυτοτόμοι, itself no less specific but not derogatory merely because it (i.e., “leather-cutting”) is in Greek the common and received synecdoche for the shoemaker (n. 4760). For derogatory specificity cf. Thrasymachus at 348D7 and 450B3, Charm. 163B6-8 (ταριχοπαλοῦντι), Euthyd. 294B6-7 (vs. B3-4); Gorg. 491A1-2 (κναφεύς replacing ὑφάντης); Leg. 842D3-5, D7-8 (μελιττούργοι); Phdrs. 240A7 (γλυκύ); Symp. 211E1-4, 221E4-5 (βυρσοδέψας); Thet. 147A. Rep. 455C6-7 uses derogatory specificity for dismissal.

<sup>1883</sup> οὐ δ’ ἔκεινο λέγων (B1), the “third person” pronoun distancing Adeimantus from the position he has just taken: cf. οὐ δ’ ἔκεινα λέγων at 588B10-11, distancing Glaucon from the position he had taken in Book Two.

revellers somehow, as if at a carnival and not in a city,<sup>1884</sup> then he must be speaking about something other than a city.<sup>1885</sup> What we have to ask is whether it is with this goal<sup>1886</sup> in mind that we should institute our guards, that the greatest happiness might accrue to them, or whether as to such happiness as this<sup>1887</sup> we must watch<sup>1888</sup> how that develops in the city as a whole<sup>1889</sup> while as to the “helpers” as you style them<sup>1890</sup>—our guards that is—we must compel and persuade them to pursue the goal we mentioned before,<sup>1891</sup> that they become the best exponents possible of their own special job just like the others. Given the flourishing that would follow for the city as a whole and the goodness of its organization<sup>1892</sup> we may leave it up to nature to endow each group with whatever happiness is in store for them to share.<sup>1893</sup>

To this Adeimantus now calmly agrees and we take a deep breath.<sup>1894</sup> The exchange between

<sup>1884</sup> ἐν πανηγύρει (B2): The image is reminiscent of Adeimantus’s description of the rewards for virtue in Hades (363C4-D2).

<sup>1885</sup> ἄλλο ὃν τι ἡ πόλιν λέγοι (B3): The sentence does not need emendation. It is the contrast between the two behaviors depicted in the protasis (ours and his) that warrants the apodosis being inferred.

<sup>1886</sup> τοῦτο (B4), implicitly second person.

<sup>1887</sup> τοῦτο (B6), again.

<sup>1888</sup> θεατέον (B6): “watch and learn” (as 369A5) almost “wait and see.”

<sup>1889</sup> βλέποντας (B6), repeated from above and going with θεατέον, becomes redundant in the concessive μέν clause, so as to prepare for the contrast to the active ἀναγκαστέον and πειστέον of the δέ clause.

<sup>1890</sup> τούτους (B7), referring to 419A10, and followed by corrective epexegesis καὶ τούς φύλακας.

<sup>1891</sup> ἔκεινο (C1), referring to the more remote antecedent, but also approbatory, referring to the whole course of the argument that Adeimantus and the interloper Socrates replaced him with would have us abandon.

<sup>1892</sup> αὐξανομένης καὶ καλῶς οἰκιζομένης (C4): With this hendiadys the expedient of associating the city’s good order with its happiness which he introduced without apology above (420B7-8 and n. 1870) becomes explicit.

<sup>1893</sup> μεταλαμβάνειν (C5): participatory happiness as natural result, in contrast with a happiness arbitrarily added on as an adornment (προσάπτειν, 420D6). Compare how in the analogy rendering to each part its due makes the whole come out beautiful (τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις ἀποδιδόντες τὸ ὅλον καλὸν ποιοῦμεν, 420D4-5).

<sup>1894</sup> ἄλλα ... καλῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν (C7): With ἄλλα Adeimantus acknowledges how far he has been brought to agree. At 50 lines (420B2-421C6) Socrates’s “apology” is by far the longest continuous statement made in the conversation so far. Its length is due to its rhetorical complexity. Adeimantus’s objection faulted the policy Socrates and Glaucon had formulated as providing too little εὐδαιμονία for the leading class, the guards—but his examples revealed that εὐδαιμονία was for him only a euphemism for wealth (for which cf. e.g., Charm. 157E7-8A1)—and revealed also that his main worry was the prospect of being ridiculed by others. Socrates’s lengthy response separates any policy concerning happiness from the policy concerning the guards, first by redefining happiness as a natural result instead of a reward, and second by returning to the basic ground that the guards as citizens have their own job to do and a life that will yield its own peculiar happiness alongside the happinesses yielded by the different lives of the other classes. At the beginning happiness is slanted toward a happiness of the city that substitutes for what we had previously conceived to be its being well ordered. By the end happiness does come to belong to the individual citizens (420B6-8), but only as a result of the orderliness of their city. In the middle (420C4-421A2) is placed a parody of Adeimantus’s concept of the δημιουργοί as profiteering from their work, in the images of a crowned farmer and a potter’s wheel at banquet—a ridicule akin to the ridicule Adeimantus had imagined the guard might be subjected to—which was softened by introducing the analogy of statue painting and an imaginary interlocutor. By the end the tables are turned and the guards can be depicted as δημιουργοί

them so far constitutes something of a proem to Book Four—but Socrates is immediately ready to ask him to grant the brother argument.<sup>1895</sup> Of course Adeimantus has no idea what Socrates means,<sup>1896</sup> so Socrates asks him to look over to the rest of the city's workers<sup>1897</sup> and consider whether these same things will corrupt them, too, so that they would likewise become evil. “What same things?” Adeimantus asks, though he is the one that brought the offending thing up. “Wealth and poverty” is the way Socrates puts it, the “it” that underlay Adeimantus’s attack a moment ago.<sup>1898</sup>

“And just how could this happen?” Adeimantus asks with some incredulity.

Here’s how: Once he is rich do you think a potter will still be willing to ply his trade? Won’t he become more lazy and careless than he was before? As such he’ll change into a worse potter. And yet at the same time<sup>1899</sup> imagine him being so poor he does not have the tools for his work, or whatever else his trade needs him to have: then too the products he makes will diminish in quality and so will his ability to teach<sup>1900</sup> his trade to his sons or whomever else he would pass it on to. Thus wealth and poverty both have the effect of making the products of the trades worse as well as the tradesmen themselves, and we have come upon a second set of things the guards must keep from (422) insinuating their way into the city, wealth and poverty. The one makes for finickiness and laziness and an enervated desire for novelty<sup>1901</sup> while the other makes for boorishness and incompetence as well as novelty.

Adeimantus accepts the argument so as to move on to a further point of his own.<sup>1902</sup> “If the city has not amassed wealth, how will it be able to go to war, especially against a city that is large and wealthy?”<sup>1903</sup>

Socrates’s answer to this pressing question is paradoxical and unclear: It would be quite hard against one but against two it would be quite easy. Just think about it step by step. If our city is compelled to fight, the fight will pit our athletes of war against rich men. Compare it to a boxer who

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themselves (C1-2), and we are left to hold our breath and see whether Adeimantus agrees.

<sup>1895</sup>τὸ τούτου ἀδελφόν (C8): With this curious expression he begins a series of cryptic and playfully worded questions and remarks: 421D1-2, 422A8-B1, and especially 422E3-5 with the paragraph that follows (422E7-3B2). For the technique cf. n. 1259.

<sup>1896</sup>τί μάλιστα (C10) is bemused.

<sup>1897</sup>τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς (C10): The δημιουργοί, as opposed to the φύλακες or ἄρχοντες and their ἐπίκουροι, with ἄλλους picking up the ἄλλων of A2. As the articulation of the city advances into sub-groups the vocabulary needs to be adjusted.

<sup>1898</sup>αὖ (D1): The point of the long speech was that a distracting concern for wealth might corrupt the guards (διαφθείρει, D1: cf. A4); the complementary point (αὖ) is: what would be its effect on the others?

<sup>1899</sup>καὶ μὴν καί (D13) is not essentially adversative; here it is cumulative.

<sup>1900</sup>παρέχεσθαι (D13): The middle voice does not (following Riddell, *Digest* §87) denote that the father does not teach his son: it adds a connotation that he is makinshifting. Cf. Campbell in J.-C. and his apposite citation, Ar.Nub.783.

<sup>1901</sup>νεωτερισμός (422A2): The strong aversion will not seem a psychological idiosyncrasy of Plato’s if one consider the reasons given at 563E3-564A1.

<sup>1902</sup>τόδε μέντοι (A4), first person demonstrative.

<sup>1903</sup>πολεμεῖν (A5). Adeimantus has forgotten they discovered that the origin of war is concupiscence (not poverty, but a desire for wealth: 373D7-E7), but at the same time he is aware of it since he imagines a large and wealthy city, which is not poor but rich, desiring nevertheless to conquer a poor one. His question reveals the same blind spot that affected the conversation before, where the description of our own expansion was described in a tone wholly different from that used to describe the expansion of our invading neighbors (373D7-10, 374A1-2, and nn. 1057 and 1062).

has become fully competent fighting against a pair of men who aren't boxers, but are rich and fat.<sup>1904</sup> Don't you think the fight would be easy even though they are two, since he could dodge the first<sup>1905</sup> one that comes at him and with the same move turn to the other and punch him, and then back to the other, over and over again in the heat and exertion of the ring. He'd be able to worst several men, I think, an athlete so well prepared. And yet the wealthy have more boxing in their upbringing than fighting war, so the argument is even stronger when we consider our athletes of war. They could beat double and triple their numbers.

Second, consider what would happen if our city sent ambassadors to one of them but not the other and laid it out plain and simple: "We don't use gold and silver, and we are not about to take it up either. You for your part do use them. So, make war with us as your allies and take what's theirs." Do you think on hearing this they would opt to make war against tough and lean dogs rather than join the dogs in a fight against sheep fat and soft?<sup>1906</sup>

Adeimantus agrees for his own part<sup>1907</sup> that they would not, but still expresses the worry<sup>1908</sup> that if one city should indeed accumulate the wealth of the others<sup>1909</sup> by confiscating it, the city would by virtue of its sheer size constitute a standing threat against the city that according to our supposition had accumulated nothing.

I envy you your naiveté, Socrates now interposes, if you think you can call anything else a city than the kind of organization we have set up.

Adeimantus needs to have that explained, so Socrates can continue. We have to use a larger and vaguer term<sup>1910</sup> for the others. Each one of them is a great many cities and does not make a city itself, as we say in the game.<sup>1911</sup> There's a pair of them at least, no matter where you look, each at war with

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<sup>1904</sup> πλουσίοιν δὲ καὶ πιόνοιν (B8): At this point, wealth, which Adeimantus had euphemized with εὐδαιμονία, comes in for an edifying shellacking.

<sup>1905</sup> τὸν πρότερον (B10): The argument begs the question by presuming the two will not attack simultaneously, just as does the argument of Diomedes, according to which two scouts are better than one because one will see before the other (II.10.224), an argument Socrates happily quotes to encourage joint scrutiny, as at *Symp.* 174D and *Prot.* 348C (cf. *Rep.* 432C2, 595C10-596A1 and n.4628, and cf. n.3519)—though the opposite reason is given in *Phdo.* 89C5-10.

<sup>1906</sup> στερεοῖς τε καὶ ισχνοῖς alongside πίοσί τε καὶ ἀπαλοῖς (D5-7), a chiasm; ἔχετε τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων, a brachiology. These dogs talk swift and tough.

<sup>1907</sup> οὐ μοι δοκεῖ (D8). μοι sets up a contrast, more emphatically than οὐ δοκεῖ and less emphatically than οὐ δοκεῖ ἐμοί would have, between what Adeimantus would like to think and what prudence requires him nevertheless to countenance. We may compare his move at A4.

<sup>1908</sup> ὅρα μὴ κίνδυνον φέρη (E1), a more anxious expression than the σκόπει plus future vivid condition with which he first introduced this concern (A4-7).

<sup>1909</sup> τῶν ἄλλων (E1), as plural, refers to other monied-cities that a single monied-city may go on to conquer and swallow up, not just the one city of fattened sheep, while τῇ μὴ πλουτούσῃ refers to a city like our own, presuming (μή at E2 is conditional) it remains unmonied.

<sup>1910</sup> μειζόνως ... προσγορεύειν (E7): the periphrasis with adverb strains to create an ambiguity. They are larger than a polis but also they are painted with a broader brush. The paragraph brings to a climax Socrates's play on the tension between quantity and quality, size and substance, and finally appearance and reality (εὐδοκιμεῖν vs. ὡς ἀληθῶς, 423A7), which is in a sense the problem that underlies all of what Adeimantus has been worrying about since the beginning of this Book.

<sup>1911</sup> ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων (E8-9): This allusion to the game called "city" or "cities" (cf. scholiast *ad loc.*) remains obscure. If we knew what every Greek casually knew about it we might understand what is hopelessly obscure in the sequel, just as a Greek would be stumped forever if we made an allusion to Contract Bridge and started talking about north and south slamming east and west.

the other, a city of the poor and a city of the rich. (423) And within each of these cities in turn there is a great number of cities. If you try to treat them all as one you're lost, but if you recognize they are many cities and distinct, and allocate the one group's wealth and power and even their sovereignty over themselves<sup>1912</sup> to the other group, you will always have most of them as your allies and only a few as enemies. Likewise, as long as your city<sup>1913</sup> keeps temperately<sup>1914</sup> to the order we have lately designed for it, it will be the largest of cities, not largest in repute and show but largest in truth, even if its army numbers only one thousand men. A city made so large by its unity<sup>1915</sup> you will not find among the Greeks or the barbarians, though you will find a large number that seem, but only seem, to be many times larger<sup>1916</sup> than this one.

Adeimantus accepts this climactically radical argument with both emphasis and surprise,<sup>1917</sup> and Socrates continues in an enthusiastic vein to apply the principle. This then would be just the right

<sup>1912</sup>χρήματά τε καὶ δυνάμεις ἢ καὶ αὐτούς (423A4): The list starts as a list of external goods, since (strictly, at least) only these can be transferred. χρήματα begins the list, as usual; δύναμις then stands for what is more often done with ἀρχαί or τιμαί or οἰκία and γονεῖς, and slants these in the direction of Adeimantus's underlying conception of prerogative as a good; but the final item, ἢ καὶ αὐτούς, "even themselves if this were possible," bluntly strains toward something else (and it is something ominous, whether Thrasymachus's καὶ αὐτούς [344B6] or the trouble with oligarchy, τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι [552A7, 556A5]). αὐτούς may be part of the vocabulary of the board game (just as we would call them "men"), which would mitigate the bluntness of the expression, but the inescapable meaning that Adeimantus and we along with him must grasp is that the guardians will be deprived not only of any personal wealth but even their personal "autonomy," something tantamount to slavery. Contrary to Adeimantus's objection, the guards, who are the few, will indeed appear to have subordinated themselves in every way to "the rest of the polis" (n. 1847) not only in wealth but in every aspect of their personal lives.

<sup>1913</sup>σοι (A6), the ethical dative of the theorist creating the imaginary city (usually ἡμῖν: cf. 371A8 and n.990).

<sup>1914</sup>σωφρόνως (A6), here prefiguring what it will mean below, the harmonious acquiescence of the city's two groups to rule and be ruled (431D9-E6, 442C10-D1). Cf. the prominence of ὄρχειν in the formulation in Book Two (389D9-E2).

<sup>1915</sup>οὗτῳ μεγάλῃ (A8) repeats the ambiguity of μειζόνως above, but to different effect: "having the largeness that is conferred by unity." Socrates does not attempt to reduce what is paradoxical in his formulation of the controversial point, but flatly asserts that one is more than many.

<sup>1916</sup>πολλαπλασίας (B1): The very term makes the large larger by the crippling power of its greater plurality.

<sup>1917</sup>ἢ ἄλλως οἴει (B2), Socrates asks; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, Adeimantus replies (B3). Adeimantus had acquiesced in Socrates's theory that wealth is neither good for the guards nor the rest of the citizens, in the same breath that he introduced new worries about war (τόδε μέντοι σκόπει, 422A4ff), as if he agreed in principle but objected only on prudential grounds. The series of jocular and paradoxical arguments with which Socrates then replied (422A8-D7) elicited his agreement but also and again, his prudential reservation (οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ἄλλ' ἔαν ..., D8, and cf. n. 1907). But now after this capping argument in which Socrates strains the distinction between the quantitative and the qualitative meaning of "one," both sincere and a huge bluff, Adeimantus agrees without reservation. The arguments Socrates has here used resemble his remarks to Glaucon during the gymnastics section (in particular his digression into medicine and litigation) in their combination of sincerity and bluff irresponsibility. There as here they are essentially protreptic, designed to edify, persuade and even cajole Adeimantus to throw over his doubts rather than seeking to command his assent through exhaustive reasoning. Adeimantus's emphatic answer announces he has accepted them on their terms.

criterion<sup>1918</sup> for our rulers to use for determining how large the city should be<sup>1919</sup> and how much territory it needs so it can forgo acquiring any more. I would say<sup>1920</sup> the city may grow only as long as she still is willing to be a unity; beyond this she may not grow.

"Yes: what you say is nicely put."

So let us add another<sup>1921</sup> order to our guards' list of orders, that they guard by all means possible against all semblance of the city being small or large for that matter,<sup>1922</sup> but keep her just the right size and truly unified.<sup>1923</sup>

"Yes:<sup>1924</sup> it's a trifle<sup>1925</sup> of an order we put upon them."

Yes:<sup>1926</sup> but more trifling still I'll add something we mentioned before, that if one of their own should be born a trifling<sup>1927</sup> fellow he'll have to be sent off to the others,<sup>1928</sup> just as if a significant fellow is born among the others he must be sent to the guards. The purpose of this policy was to make it clear that the other citizens also must tend to their own proper jobs in accordance with their own natural gifts, steady in the purpose that by practicing his single job each man should become a single man instead of many, and thus the city in its entirety should grow into a single whole and not many.

"A mere detail,<sup>1929</sup> indeed."

But my dear Adeimantus these things we are enjoining them to do are not many and large, as opinion might have it, but truly trifling<sup>1930</sup> every one, if only they keep their eye on "the one big

<sup>1918</sup> ὄρος (B4): The term courts ambiguity. The city's boundary (ὄρος) will be determined by the population and the population by a qualitative criterion (ὄρος). The term echoes τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρον, 373D10.

<sup>1919</sup> μέγεθος (B5), in the new qualitative sense, whatever size (in population) it happens to have taken on when it has achieved the maximal temperate organization. This population in turn will determine the required amount of land.

<sup>1920</sup> οἵμαι μέν (B9): The μέν is *solitarium*, indicating uncertainty.

<sup>1921</sup> τοῦτο αὖ ἄλλο (C2), i.e., in addition to 421E3ff. As in the discussion of poetry with its τύποι, the theoretical conversation precipitates formalizable and countable results (380C6-7).

<sup>1922</sup> μήτε σμικρά (C3): Corresponding to the apparent largeness of the rich city was the apparent smallness of the one that had no wealth (422D8-E2), apparent size being only relative, while true size is absolute, and quantity becomes quality (μία, ἴκανή).

<sup>1923</sup> ἄλλά τις ἴκανή καὶ μία (C4): He repeats from 423A6-7 (ἀληθῶς μεγίστη) the peculiar correlation of quantity with appearance over against quality (i.e. unity) with truth or reality.

<sup>1924</sup> καὶ φαῦλός γε (C5): Adeimantus again answers with καί ... γε (cf. C1).

<sup>1925</sup> φαῦλον ἵσως (C5). The underlying lesson to which Adeimantus has now acquiesced is that what seems large is not *eo ipso* large in truth. He indicates his awareness of this very serious underlying theme by playfully adducing the converse: he calls something small that does not seem small if you know what's truly large. The byplay continues up to 423D8-E1.

<sup>1926</sup> καὶ τούτου γε ἔτι φαῦλότερον (C6), Socrates continuing the byplay a καί ... γε of his own.

<sup>1927</sup> φαῦλος ἔκγονος (C8) a third time.

<sup>1928</sup> οἱ ἄλλοι (C8) by now is almost a technical term for the general public (cf. 421A2 and D1).

<sup>1929</sup> σμικρότερον (D7) varies φαῦλότερον (C6).

<sup>1930</sup> φαῦλα (E1): Socrates returns to the term one more time, now to make his most telling point.

thing"—indeed I'd rather just say the one sufficient thing:<sup>1931</sup> education and upbringing.<sup>1932</sup> If they are well educated and grow up to be temperate men they will easily be able to discern what is needed in all these areas as well as others we can pass over here,<sup>1933</sup> such as the acquisition of wives and marrying them and reproduction.<sup>1934</sup> All we need is the general maxim that as much as (424) possible "friends have what they have in common."<sup>1935</sup>

Adeimantus agrees with the principle and lofty spirit of this remark,<sup>1936</sup> and Socrates can continue, *upward*. Once it is well begun a city and society<sup>1937</sup> progresses as a spiral<sup>1938</sup> growing outward. If the worthy nurture and education are preserved they continue to instill good natures in the young, and such worthy types in turn, relying on such an education to spawn still better offspring than their forbears, better even in their inborn nature, as it is with the rest of the animal kingdom.

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<sup>1931</sup> ικανόν (E2): Again quantity (*μέγα*) is not allowed to stand unqualified, but is replaced by the meet and proper (*ικανός*). For the catch-phrase ἐν μέγα φυλάττειν, cf. *Polit.* 297A7, and Shorey's brilliant suggestion (Loeb *ad loc.*) that it is excerpted from the proverb about the fox and the hedgehog (*πολλ’ οὖδ’ ἀλώπηξ ἀλλ’ ἔχινος ἐν μέγα*, cf. Zenobius 5.68). On *ικανός* in this approbatory sense cf. 371E3 and n.999, and contrast its use in brash understatement (344C6-7, 361A2, 361B2 and n.458). Another of the value terms has been redeemed from prior abuse!

<sup>1932</sup> τὴν παιδείαν (E4): The emphasis on education now reappears from 416B5-C3, from which Adeimantus's interruption had forced a digression. The addition of *τροφή* only specifies that the *παιδεία* is identical to the maturation process once they have been selected for their *φύσις* (cf. *παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς* [412B2] and *θέψονται καὶ παιδευθήσονται* at the beginning of the education [376C7]). The enduring physiological effect of the education moreover becomes thematic in the next paragraph. One needs not go so far as to argue that by slanting *παιδεία* toward *τροφή* and *μελέτη*, Plato means here to make place for the third (*φύσις*, *μελέτη*, *ἐπιστήμη*), taken up some fifty pages from now (cf. n.1743 ad 412B2-3).

<sup>1933</sup> παραλείπομεν (E6), the present commonly used in *praeteritio* as in any programmatic remark.

<sup>1934</sup> τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτῆσιν καὶ γάμων καὶ παιδοποιίας (E6-7). I take *παιδοποιίας* to be accusative plural, and therefore take the list to be genetic, depicting the results coming from "women" who enter "marriages." The list begins as if it were a series of *κτήσεις* because possession and the management or reform of possession is the current theme. Although marriage, expressed by the second genitive dependent on *κτῆσιν* can be viewed as an "asset" (e.g., 363A3), its closer association is with the plurals *γυναικῶν* before and *παιδοποιίας* after. For the metabatic logic we may compare the restatement of this list at 502D4-6 (τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτήσεως δυσχέρειαν καὶ παιδογονίαν). The reading Burnet reports from Vat. 1029 (*γάμον*), later supported by the Vindobonensis 54 (*apud Chambry*) ill suits the plurals *γυναικῶν* and *παιδοποιίας*; Richards's accusative plural *γάμους* breaks with the theme of acquisition too abruptly while Hartmann's excision of the offending words lacks warrant. For genetic lists cf. 387B4, 395A1-2, 608A5. Socrates glides through the list quickly, in exactly the same manner he glides through *θήρας τε καὶ κυνηγέσια καὶ γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ ἵππικούς*, at 412B3-4 (cf. n.1744). The list, in concert with the proverb, constitutes a dismissal of further particulars for the sake of closure and transition. What is being finished is the interruption of Adeimantus, and so we are back to the vision reached at the end of Book Three.

<sup>1935</sup> κοινὰ τὰ φίλων (424A1-2) asserts that the intimacy and importance of friendship leaves little room for a person to own things external to the relationship, a notion wholly at odds with the vision of private wealth that Adeimantus found so friendly at the beginning of the Book, where the happy man sequestered himself along with his belongings apart from the rest of the world and entertained foreigners and even the gods within his own house, but quite of a piece with the purified outlook of the guardians as described at the end of Book Three, which elicited that response.

Is the proverb (*παροιμία*, A1) meant as a truism? An exhortation? A utopian ideal? The scholiast (*apud* Greene, 222) says it was first used to describe the Pythagorean community in Sicily where Pythagoras requested his followers to live together without private possessions (*ἀδιανέμητα κεκτήσθαι χρήματα*), for which he quotes as evidence the statement of Timaeus (*FHG* 1.211.77) that

To put it in simplest terms,<sup>1939</sup> those who are to take care of the city must keep a firm grasp on this and not allow it to perish out of neglect. They must guard first and foremost against any innovation in the gymnastic and musical education that runs counter to the order we have established. They must be wary when somebody lets fall the word that

...the song to which men most hearken  
Is the one that haunts most lately the lips of the rhapsode,<sup>1940</sup>

in case he is taken to refer not just to new songs but to new genres of song, and receives praise for such an attitude. In truth one must neither praise such a thing nor try it out, either. One must recognize that change and novelty in the genres puts everything at risk,<sup>1941</sup> and that wherever the modes of music change greatly, the modes of political culture<sup>1942</sup> undergo a fundamental change along

Pythagoras required those who wanted to study with him first to give up their private possessions. Pythagoras is also credited with related formulas of friendship such as φιλία ισότης and ἄλλος ἐγὼ ὁ φίλος, so that it is not clear to which proverb Cicero is referring at *de leg.* I.12.34.

The proverb is included in the collections of the Paroemiographers (e.g. Zenobius 4.79). Apart from the askesis of a religious community, we have allusions to it at Eurip. *Or.*735 (Pylades taking the good with the bad in solidarity with his friend Orestes), and *Androm.*376-7 (Menelaus perverting the meaning from equal non-ownership into equal prerogative); and we have a rediscovery of its inner truth at Arist. *EN* 1159B31. Cf. also Ter. *Ad.*803-4 (*nam vetus verbum hoc quidem est, communia esse amicorum inter se omnia*—perhaps a borrowing from Menander); also Cic. *de off.* I.16.51; Dio Chrysost.3.135.

Within the Platonic corpus, at *Lys.*207C10 Socrates uses it playfully to assert that though friends might be rivals in age, nobility, and beauty (bodily goods) they could not be rivals in wealth (external goods) since they are friends; and all this leaves the question which of the two is more wise or just (psychic goods), which was of course Socrates's desired topic all along. At the end of *Phdrs.*(279C) Phaedrus does not need to make his own prayer to Pan since his friend Socrates's prayer will do the job for both of them. But there is more: since the prayer was a prayer to bear possessions gracefully, Hermias (*ad loc.*) is moved to infer that the proverb can apply to prayers as well as to external goods since we hope that our friends will have the same things we hope to have for ourselves.

To adduce the proverb presumes that a great high-mindedness, indeed, has been reached by the guards.

<sup>1936</sup> ὥρθότατα γὰρ γένοιτ' ὅν (A3), the superlative (like παντάπασιν), acknowledging complexity and expressing complete agreement (cf. 376C6, 400E4, 442D4, 444A3, 453E3, 495B7, 507B11, 511D6).

<sup>1937</sup> πολιτεία (A4) now used a second time (cf. 412A10).

<sup>1938</sup> κύκλος αὐξανομένη (A5): What is “circular” or “cyclic” is that A leads to B and then B leads back to A, but by a different path and without a stop to turn around (that would be oscillation). The process continues by repeating and repeats by continuing. Combine this with the “increase” that accrues and you have a spiral. Better children become better parents and better parents in turn make better better children.

<sup>1939</sup> διὰ βραχέων εἰπεῖν (B3): i.e., in the form of a πρόσταγμα.

<sup>1940</sup> ... ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπιφρονέουσ' ὄνθρωποι | ἡτις ἀειδόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται, a version of Hom. *Od.*I.351. In response to Penelope asking the rhapsode Phemius not to sing the “Return of the Achaeans,” Telemachus suggests she not begrudge the rhapsode pleasing his audience with whatever song his mind spurs him on to sing. That newness is good, is an old saying (e.g., Pindar *OI.*9.48-9). ἀμφιπέληται suggests the rhapsode's choice is divinely inspired. The text of Homer has ἀκουόντεσσι for ἀειδόντεσσι and ἐπικλείουσ' for ἐπιφρονέουσ'.

<sup>1941</sup> ἐν ὅλῳ κινδυνεύοντα (C4): cf. 618B6-7 and n.5213.

<sup>1942</sup> πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγίστων (C5). He makes a pun on the musical and political senses of νόμος that we almost get with the English term, “mode.”

with them, as Damon says, and I agree with him.

Adeimantus completely agrees with Damon, too.<sup>1943</sup>

Socrates continues with stern resolution: Here then must we build a guardhouse for our guards to inhabit.

Adeimantus is equally stern: "It's certainly true that relaxation of this type of law can easily insinuate itself unnoticed."<sup>1944</sup>

What makes it easy, Socrates adds with fellow feeling, is that the innovation is viewed as if it were merely a playful diversion that has no lasting effect on things.

"Ah yes, no effect at all.<sup>1945</sup> Bit by bit it gets established, and then quietly and calmly it invades the mores and the ways people do things. Having gotten this far it begins to show up in the dealings men have with one another, and from the dealings<sup>1946</sup> it makes its way into the laws and forms of government, uncontrollably wanton,<sup>1947</sup> if I may put it this way, Socrates, until in the end it has subverted every aspect of life both private and public."<sup>1948</sup>

Is that how it is? Socrates asks.<sup>1949</sup>

"Seems so to me."

So when it comes to our children, as we said at the beginning, we'll have to make sure they start off with a more orderly sort of play,<sup>1950</sup> on the grounds that once the play becomes disorderly the

<sup>1943</sup>καὶ ἐμὲ τοίνυν θές τῶν πεπεισμένων (C7) almost means, "You're not the only one who agrees with Damon!"

<sup>1944</sup>Reading αὐτή (D3), with mss.FD and Stobaeus rather than αὐτή with mss.AM. The demonstrative is meant to specify the species—the παρανομία against the νόμοι of music—just as the indefinite pronoun τις can (Gorg.447D1 and Dodds *ad loc.*): Madvig's conjecture ταύτη is therefore not needed. For the metaphor of formative influence, cf. παραδύντα (421E8) and ἐνδύεται (377B2); for the peculiar power of music to penetrate, cf. 401D5ff and καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὄτων (411A6). With γοῦν Adeimantus agrees that *something* must certainly be done, given the peculiar power of musical innovation.

<sup>1945</sup>οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται (D7): Again Adeimantus agrees with Socrates through ironic understatement: compare the byplay on φαῦλος above (413C5,C6, etc.). οὐ γὰρ (ἐργάζεται) would have meant, "You're right, it doesn't;" οὐδέ adds an edge that could almost be misinterpreted.

<sup>1946</sup>Ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν συμβολαίων (D10): Tethering together the items in the list with epanalepsis makes the list a κλῖμαξ (cf. n. ad 395A4-10) that has a rising and cumulative effect. Without it, the list would devolve into a splash, which is quite a different thing.

<sup>1947</sup>ἀσελγείᾳ (E1), being an *hapax* (cf. ἀσελγαίνειν, Symp.190C and Leg.879D) in hyperbaton, is climactic.

<sup>1948</sup>Adeimantus's list (D7-E2) begins with understatement and terminates in a global generalization. Its purpose is not to list what is to be included but to assert that there is nothing to be left out. The logical sequence is necessarily from small to large or particular to universal, and so the list may be called "anagogic" (for which compare, on larger and smaller scales, 401A1-4, 437B7-8, 510A1-3, 519B1-2; Charm.173B7f; Crito 47B1-2, 47C1-3; Crat.411C4-5, 423E2-5; Gorg.479A2-3, 500C5-7, 524E3-4; Leg.645D7-E2, 696B2-4, 716B4-5, 792B6, 818C4-D1, 859B7-8; Lys.215D4-7; Phdo.70D7-9, 105A6-B3; Phlb.21D9-10, 50B1-4, 54C1-4; Phdrs.278C; Polit.301A8-B1; Symp.186A3-7, 211A6-B1, 211C1-D1; Thet.157B9-C2). ἄλλος in its various uses (including οὐ μόνον ... ἀλλὰ καί ...) naturally plays a role in moving things upward in such lists.

<sup>1949</sup>εἰεν ... οὗτοι τοῦτ' ἔχει; (E3): Socrates acknowledges Adeimantus's ironic indignation by giving him (with εἰεν) a little extra room.

<sup>1950</sup>ἐννομωτέρου εὐθὺς παιδιᾶς μεθεκτέον (E6): The reference must be to Socrates's remark at 377A12-B9 (compare σπουδαίους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας αὐξάνεσθαι with 377B7-9), though παιδεία is

children do, too, and then it (425) becomes<sup>1951</sup> impossible for them to grow up to be orderly and serious adults?

“How could it be otherwise?”

So if the early play of the children is properly handled and they admit orderliness into themselves through their musical education it will accompany them and foster their growth in a way that is quite the converse, to the point of restoring aspects of civil order that had gone to seed before?

“Quite true.”

And this is way these people are in fact able to rediscover what might seem minor aspects of law and orderliness that their predecessors had lost touch with.

“What sorts of things do you mean?”

I mean things like young people observing silence in the presence of their elders when appropriate, and observing the proprieties of sitting down or standing up and of serving their parents, as well as minding their grooming and the manner of their clothing and shoes and the whole demeanor of their bodies, and all the other things like this.<sup>1952</sup> To legislate these behaviors as such<sup>1953</sup> seems silly to me. This isn’t the way such things work,<sup>1954</sup> nor would the rules be any more likely to stick simply because they had been formulated in the written law.<sup>1955</sup> Whatever the initial thrust of the education<sup>1956</sup> the rest follows suit with it, just as like always looks for aid from what is like itself.<sup>1957</sup> The process culminates in a finished product spanking new, fully good or fully the opposite. For my part at least I would not legislate such details any further.

Adeimantus thinks he is probably right, so Socrates can go on to expand his point into the area of more the subject there than *παιδιά*. In the immediate context the more general notion of *παιδεία* has been replaced by *παιδιά*, a specific aspect of it, because of the dangerous supposition that innovation is merely a form of harmless play (D5-6). The etymological connection between *παιδεία* and *παιδιά* is an undercurrent of the whole passage, as is the semantic ambiguity of *vόμος* in its musical and political meanings.

<sup>1951</sup> ὡς plus participle (E6-425A1) used to express the correct supposition and outlook in contrast with the incorrect one, expressed by the same construction above (D5-6). The shift within the ὡς construction from genitive absolute to accusative absolute is striking, and may serve as an index of how strong the rule is that the accusative is used for impersonal verbal constructions (Smyth §2076).

<sup>1952</sup> For the selection of items embodying *σωφροσύνη* (B1-4) we may compare Hdt.2.80, X.Mem.2.3.16, and Charmides’s compact definition of *σωφροσύνη* at Charm.159B2-6.

<sup>1953</sup> αὐτά (B7) envisions isolating each of the behaviors for separate legislation. The form and content of the foregoing sample of behaviors (B1-4) already suggests how tedious and complicated such legislation would be. A comparison of the list with the desiderata of the ridiculously conservative Just Logos in Aristophanes’s *Clouds* (961-1023) likewise shows how old-fashioned this list might sound. Socrates’s demurral to legislate such “right conduct” would probably offend his more reactionary readers, just as much as his insistence on its importance would offend his more liberal ones.

<sup>1954</sup> Taking γίγνεται (B7) to mean what it meant in 414C5 and 6, where γεγονός is the opposite of καινόν.

<sup>1955</sup> λόγῳ τε καὶ γράμμασιν (B8): γράμμασιν corrects λόγῳ. Socrates seems to be familiar with the way legislators sometimes think they have accomplished something once they get the wording just right.

<sup>1956</sup> ὄρμήσῃ (C1) goes back to 424A4.

<sup>1957</sup> Reading ὄν (C2), with AD and with F as emended, which makes τὸ ὄμοιον ὄν the predicate of *παρακαλεῖ*. It sounds like a proverb but the versions of the proverb ὄμοιος ὄμοιώ recorded by the paroemiographers lack *παρακαλεῖν* (cf. PG 1.350 [=GC1.15 and notes], and PG 2.559 [=Ap.12.68 and notes]).

business regulation:<sup>1958</sup> Should we be legislating on the deals that traders make in the agora, and that craftsmen make in their contracts for that matter?<sup>1959</sup> Or on slanders and assaults, on the filing of suits and the filling of jury panels,<sup>1960</sup> on the question which payments are to be exacted or which are to be deposited,<sup>1961</sup> whether into the budget of the market or that of the harbor,<sup>1962</sup> and legislate across the board, regarding departments mercantile, municipal, maritime and all the rest? Have we the stomach to do any of this?

“Really there is no excuse for instructing men<sup>1963</sup> of the better sort. Most of what we’d want to require by law they will easily discover<sup>1964</sup> on their own.”

Yes, as long as, god willing, those basic modes and laws<sup>1965</sup> remain alive and well for them.

“And if they don’t the citizens will waste<sup>1966</sup> their lives legislating and rectifying<sup>1967</sup> things, forever thinking they are on the verge of achieving the ideal.”

You are describing the lifestyle and the outlook of people who labor with an illness but refuse to abandon their (426) deleterious regimen out of intemperance. It’s rich<sup>1968</sup> the way they pass their time, always under a doctor’s care but making no progress—unless the elaboration and amplification of the diseases that ails them is progress—forever hopeful someone will prescribe them a drug that will make them healthy. Don’t you think it rich that the one man they have resolved to hate is the man who confronts them with the truth, telling them that until a person cuts down on the drinking and the overeating, on too much sex and too little exercise, no drugs or cauteries or surgeries, nor incantations nor wrappings nor all the rest will do him a bit of good.

“I’d hardly call a man ‘rich’ when he can’t accept good advice,”<sup>1969</sup> Adeimantus replies.<sup>1970</sup>

<sup>1958</sup>τάδε τὰ ἀγοραῖα (C10): In his account of the effects of innovation Adeimantus had similarly moved from ἥθη and ἐπιτήδεια to συμβόλαια (424D8-10).

<sup>1959</sup>χειροτεχνικῶν περὶ συμβολαίων (D1): the prolepsis begins a disorderly presentation which suggests that the field of business is more complex than the naive and eager legislator realizes.

<sup>1960</sup>δικῶν λήξεως καὶ δικαστῶν καταστάσεως (D2-3). The etymological parallelism and the homoioteleuton (reading λήξεως with M as the *lectio difficilior*) suggest a parallelism in meaning that is not there, and thus satirize the inanity of bureaucratese. Socrates here moves from the realm of private συμβόλαια to the public realm of νόμος and πολιτεία as Adeimantus had (cf. 424D10-E1).

<sup>1961</sup>τελῶν τινες ἡ πράξεως ἡ θέσεις (D3), τινες being as awkwardly proleptic as χειροτεχνικῶν was above.

<sup>1962</sup>κατ’ ἀγορὰς ἡ λιμένας (D4): The plurals are generic (cf. πολιτείας, 424E1).

<sup>1963</sup>ἀνδράσι (D7) again used for the types we “identify” with (361B6 and n.752).

<sup>1964</sup>εὐρήσουσιν (E2), re-applying the point made by ἔξευρίσκουσιν at 425A9.

<sup>1965</sup>τῶν νόμων (E4): Again the play on the musical and legal meanings of νόμος (cf. 424C5).

<sup>1966</sup>πολλά (E5): an instructive instance of πολλά implying futility (a usage is not noted in LSJ s.v.) as in the famous maxim of Solon, γηράσκω δ’ αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος, and the proverb οὐ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ πολύ. Compare the derogatory use of πολλά (473D4, 479D3, 489D10, 576C3-4 and n.425I, 604A6-7), and the idiomatic use of οἱ πολλοί.

<sup>1967</sup>ἐπανορθούμενοι (E6): The idea is repeated from A5 (ἐπανορθοῦσα) but the voice has changed to the middle of the busybody.

<sup>1968</sup>χαριέντως διατελοῦσιν (426A1): English lacks a single etymon that joins the ludicrous (χαριέντως here) and the graceful (χαρίεν and χάριν, 426B3-4). “Charming” (D.-V., Shorey) gets the etymon but misses the joke; “rich” produces something of a joke at the expense of introducing a new etymon. The expression is used similarly at 602A11.

<sup>1969</sup>τὸ τῷ εὖ λέγοντι χαλεπαίνειν οὐκ ἔχει χάριν (B3-4): The meter suggests that Adeimantus is quoting a line of wisdom from tragedy.

<sup>1970</sup>οὐ πάνυ χαρίεν (B3): Socrates’s lighthearted attitude (τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίεν, A6) elicits a puritanical response from Adeimantus. As before (424E3) Socrates makes room for it, but this time he

I can see you don't count yourself among the admirers of this sort of men.

"You can be quite sure of that."

And if a city as a whole acts this way you won't admire it, either. After all isn't it the same sort of thing when a city forbids her citizens from trying to alter the basic regime<sup>1971</sup> on pain of death, whereas anyone who enables themselves<sup>1972</sup> to continue in their ways, who caters to their pleasures and foresees their every whim and also can fulfill them, this man will turn out to be good and wise in all the things that matter and will be honored by them.

"Yes it's the same kind of thing; and yes, I don't admire them, either, not one bit."

But focus instead<sup>1973</sup> on the people who are willing to abet such cities and encourage them. Don't you admire their cheek and their ingenuity?

"I do except for those among them that are deceived by these cities into thinking approval of the majority makes them true civic leaders."<sup>1974</sup>

Listen to you! Have you no fellow feeling for men<sup>1975</sup> like this? If a man had no ability to measure things, if he were faced with<sup>1976</sup> a large number of others similarly unable but telling him nevertheless that he is five feet seven, can you imagine he could somehow resist adopting this belief himself?

"From that point of view,<sup>1977</sup> no."

So don't be so harsh with such people. In their way they live a most charming<sup>1978</sup> life, constantly legislating on the sort of things we just mentioned and straightening them out,<sup>1979</sup> imagining themselves ever on the verge of putting an end to misdeeds in business while they are blissfully unaware that what they are really trying to do is cut off the Hydra's head.

(427) "And that's just what they are doing."

Accordingly my own sense of it was that this kind of lawmaking and this kind of political activity<sup>1980</sup> never was the business of a true lawgiver, whether he is working in a well-governed city or a badly governed one. In the latter the effort will not help and will make no difference; in the former everything a lawmaker would introduce could be invented by anybody at all, or else would arise on its

teases it out (οὐκ ἐπαινέτης [B5-9], οὐκ ἄγασαι [D2] and οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις [D7]) in order to give it a proper response (E4ff).

<sup>1971</sup>κατάστασιν (C1): This time English has a pun (regime, regimen) lacking in the Greek (κατάστασις compared with διαιτης, 425E10).

<sup>1972</sup>σφᾶς (C3) reflexive (along with σφετέρας and σφῶν below, and the passive [in sense] τιμήσεται) is a joke. The city is telling its citizens what it wants them to think it thinks, and it is impressed by its own argument. In the end the elevation of the flatterer to high repute is depicted as a discovery or sudden realization (ἄρα, C5) rather than the self-fulfilling prophecy that it is.

<sup>1973</sup>αὖ (D1), suggesting re-evaluation from a different vantage point.

<sup>1974</sup>ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν (D5-6): Adeimantus strikes the first note of supercilious impatience with the majority.

<sup>1975</sup>ἀνδράσι (D7), again evoking fellow-feeling (n. 1963). Socrates perhaps reminds the stern Adeimantus of the lenient position he took (at 366C3-D3) toward those who could know no better.

<sup>1976</sup>ἔτέρων τοιούτων (D8-E1) masses them with a broad brush into a single category over against him. For derogatory ἔτέρων cf. 379D7 and n. 1197.

<sup>1977</sup>αὖ (E3), with all mss., responding relentlessly to αὖ at D1.

<sup>1978</sup>χαριέστατοι (E4): Socrates continues with the χάρις terminology.

<sup>1979</sup>ἐπανορθοῦντες (E6) again begs the question how the principle of improvement is found once it has been lost: cf. 425E6 and A6.

<sup>1980</sup>νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας (427A2-3): For the collocation cf. 424E1.

own out of habits and usages already in place.<sup>1981</sup>

“What then would be left do by way of legislation?”

I said to him, Socrates tells us, taking a step back:<sup>1982</sup> Our own job is done. It devolves on Apollo in Delphi to legislate what are the largest and finest and indeed most fundamental matters,<sup>1983</sup> the building of temples and the conduct of sacrifices, and of all the other ministrations<sup>1984</sup> to gods and daemons and heroes; and<sup>1985</sup> for the departed in turn, their burial and all the rest that will ensure they remain well disposed toward us. On these matters we have no sure knowledge, nor will we rely on anybody else if we keep our wits about us,<sup>1986</sup> and will not hire a special exegete other than the one our ancestors used. It is this god that is the ancestral exegete for all mankind, on such matters as these, delivering instructions from his seat at the omphalos in Delphi.

## 2.B.6: Search for Justice in the Purified Thought City

Accordingly your<sup>1987</sup> founding of the City can be declared complete, my son of Ariston. What is next is for you is to look within it, with the aid of some helping light—call on your brother for help and on Polemarchus and these others—with the hope<sup>1988</sup> we<sup>1989</sup> might catch sight where justice is to be found within it and where injustice, and how they differ from one another, and which of the two a man needs to acquire if he is planning on being happy in life, without considering whether or not he is

<sup>1981</sup> The prudential skepticism about perfectibility alongside a reliance on the effortless custody of habit puts Socrates in the same camp as Edmund Burke, a place Plato and his Socrates hardly belong as the political “idealists” they are made out to be. Cf. also 383C4-5, 493D5, 500D1, and 501C1.

<sup>1982</sup> καὶ ἐγὼ εἰπον (B2): Emphatic, effecting transition (cf. n. I 185).

<sup>1983</sup> Hartman’s γε (B3) for the τε of all mss. is an unneeded improvement, as are his αἱ at B6 and his τὴν at B9.

<sup>1984</sup> Θεραπεῖαι (B7): Not an uncommon metaphor for men’s treatment of god (443A9; Leg.716D7, 930E5), by dint of narrowing of its meaning from ἐπιμέλεια to ὑπηρεσία (*Euthyph.*13AD). It reappears with the gods here so as to stress by contrast the fatuity of catering to the ignorance of the polis (of which it was used above, 426C3 and D1), as well as to underline the deferential attitude Socrates suggests toward the gods in contrast to the ἀνδρεία and εὐχέρεια with which that catering was delivered to the citizenry (D2-3).

<sup>1985</sup> Reading τε (B7) from Ven. I 184 (om. AFDM). It conspires with αὖ to indicate that a second plurality is being added to the first, a very common use of αὖ that resembles our use of the semicolon as a stronger comma (cf. 373C3, 374E1, 410D1-2 [separating chiastic pairs], 437B7-8, 545C2-4 [separating an item done with a pair from subsequent items done with one word only, again like our semicolon], 585B13-C1, and cf. n. 5010). The list (B6-8) is another congeries of items adduced only to be dismissed, for the sake of closure: cf. 423E6-424A2 and n. 1934, 412B3-4 and n. 1744.

<sup>1986</sup> ἔττινον νοῦν ἔχωμεν (C1): He dismisses the ἀγύρται καὶ μάντεις that had scandalized Adeimantus by soliciting the rich to pay them to “fix” things with the gods (364B5-C5, 365E1-366A4).

<sup>1987</sup> σοι (C6): Whether it is a dative of agent with φέτισμένη or an ethical dative of theoretical involvement (cf. σοι at 423A6 and n. 1913) does not affect the meaning; but the fact that it is singular is striking: why say Adeimantus owns the result and not “we”? This should not go unnoticed: cf. 389A7-B1 and n. 1343.

<sup>1988</sup> The ἔστι construction (D3) echoes the modality of Glaucon’s initial request that Socrates help, in Book Two (358B1 and n. 693).

<sup>1989</sup> ιδωμεν (D3): Socrates has postponed the first plural to this position (compare σοι C6), after suggesting Adeimantus get some help from his brother and Polemarchus and the others (D2-3). He imagines that he is receding from the center of the conversation, as he had at the beginning of Book Two (λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι, 357A1).

found out by any of the gods or by his fellow men.<sup>1990</sup>

“Baloney,” Glaucon interjects.<sup>1991</sup> “You already promised you would conduct the search, saying it would be impious for you not to try to come to the aid of justice any way you could.”<sup>1992</sup>

You remind me truly, and so I must; but you all must collaborate.

“It goes without saying that we will.”

Alright then, I’ll confess I have a hunch<sup>1993</sup> how we might find what we are looking for. If our city has been organized properly then it is completely good. As such it is wise and brave and temperate and just—all four.<sup>1994</sup> (428) Whichever of these we find in it, the one that is still unfound is<sup>1995</sup> the remainder. That is, say we were looking for one of any four things in something. If we found it then we would be done; but if we had recognized the other three things first then, too, we would already have found what we were looking for since it would be whatever was left over. This is the method we must use in the case of our four things.

Right away we can see wisdom in it, and wisdom in a peculiar way. The city we have described does in fact seem wise to me, since it is well-counselled. Yet this very thing—good counsel—is obviously a kind of knowledge, since it is with knowledge not ignorance that people give good counsel. On the other hand there are knowledges of all sorts present in the city, but the city is not counted wise or well-counselled because of the knowledge of her carpenters.

“No,” Glaucon agrees, “such would be called a city good at carpentry.”

And so it is not because of the city’s knowledge about wooden implements, and her deliberation about how they best should be manufactured, that the city is to be called a wise city, nor because of her knowledge about bronze nor any other of these kinds of knowledge. Nor because of her knowledge of farming: that makes her a city good at farming.<sup>1996</sup> Is there then some certain knowledge

<sup>1990</sup> His statement of the primary question (D4-7) is very close to the challenge Adeimantus had put to him at 366E6-7, 367B2-6, and 367E1-5, with the exception of ποῦ (D4), which refers to the method they had agreed upon to answer that challenge, namely to build a city and look for justice “in” it (ἐν μείζονι, 368E7; cf. ποῦ, 371E12). On such accuracy of restatement cf. n.363.

<sup>1991</sup> οὐδὲν λέγεις (D8): Last time, this conversational gesture was given to Glaucon’s brother (362E1), when he interrupted Socrates’s answer to Glaucon’s speech at the beginning of Book Two with a supplementary speech of his own. What moves Glaucon to interrupt is the pairing of the second person singular and the first plural, which leads him to infer that Socrates thinks he is done!

<sup>1992</sup> ὑπέσχου ζητήσειν ως οὐχ ὄσιόν σοι ὅν ... (D8-E2), quoting Socrates back to himself from 368B7-C2. Glaucon’s interruption saves the logos.

<sup>1993</sup> ἐλπίζω (E6). ἐλπίς, as a δόξα τῶν μελλόντων (Leg.644C10 and Stallb. *ad loc.*) and as a πάθημα τῆς ψυχῆς (Tim.69D1-6 and cf. Leg.864B3-7), is as much a cognitive weakness as a strength (cf. 383B6 and n.1295). In the present case Socrates’s hunch will at least serve as a vehicle to reaching the solution. The artifice of looking at larger letters that he proposed at a similar moment before (368C7-D7) was no more methodologically sound or sophisticated than the current proposal.

<sup>1994</sup> δῆλον ὅτι σοφή τ’ ἔστι καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαία (E10-11): Such a strong reliance on the traditional quadripartition of good (on which cf. 331A4 and n. 105) is unwarranted (at least he says δῆλον rather than ἀνάγκη), but in the end it will lead to a tremendous heuristic success.

<sup>1995</sup> ἐν (E13) Though he hypothesizes that the one has been found “in” the thing (427E13, cf. 428A3), Socrates says not that the others will be *in* the remaining area but that the others will be the remainder (427E14, cf. 428A6). He courts an ambiguity that is (1) fatal to the logic of the method (since it is only by assuming that the different aspects of the polis occupy different areas that he can expect to find the unfound in the remainder), but (2) crucial to the solution (since it turns out to be the nature of justice that it is everywhere in the city).

<sup>1996</sup> The running through of cases (428B10-C10) is orderly but not slavishly so, according to the

in the city we just constructed, available to some of her citizens<sup>1997</sup> by which she counsels not about some one thing within herself but about herself as a whole, about how she should deal with herself and how with the other cities around her.

"There certainly is," Glaucon collaborates to say.

Which is it and in whom<sup>1998</sup> does it reside?

"It is this guarding knowledge you have articulated, and it resides in these rulers we have just now called perfect guards."

"And because of the presence of this knowledge what can you call the city?"

"Well-counselled and therefore truly wise."<sup>1999</sup>

Now which of the two groups is going to be larger in our city, the bronze-smiths or these true guards?

"The bronze-smiths, by a large measure."

And likewise of all the other groups that been named after their knowledge, the group of guards will be the smallest of all.

"By a large measure."

Therefore it will be by dint of her smallest constituent group<sup>2000</sup> and the knowledge that resides in them—in the leading<sup>2001</sup> or ruling group—that the entire city whose evolution we have witnessed comes to be called wise; and (429) at the same time it is in the nature of things that only the fewest are suited to take part in this knowledge, which alone among all the kinds of knowledge deserves to be called wisdom. Somehow then, I know not how, we have discovered one of the four at least,<sup>2002</sup> as well as where it resides in our city.

Glaucon gives him full credit: "Seems to me we have found it in a manner altogether satisfactory."

Socrates forges on. The attribute of bravery and where it resides so as to confer its name onto the whole city is easy to see. To declare whether the city is fearful or brave anybody would look to that part of her that fights or stands ready to fight on her behalf. The bravery or fearfulness of others than these within her population would not lead to her being called the one or the other.<sup>2003</sup> So a city is brave by dint of one part of herself and of her having in this part an ability that through all

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usual dialectical manner. Cf. nn. 158 and 159.

<sup>1997</sup> ἐν τῇ ἄρτι ὑφ' ἡμῶν οἰκισθείσῃ πόλει παρά τισι τῶν πολιτῶν (C11-12) The knowledge is "in" the city (in the sense required by the argument, 427E13) by virtue of being at the disposal of (παρά) some of her citizens.

<sup>1998</sup> ἐν τισι (D5) now replaces παρά τισι: the knowledge is in the city by being in some portion of her citizens.

<sup>1999</sup> With τῷ ὄντι (D7) Glaucon echoes the phrasing Socrates used at the beginning of the argument (B3), and by reversing the order (εὑβούλος / σοφή) he acknowledges its completion with a chiasm. To call a city σοφή strains diction but to call it εὑβούλος does not. τῷ ὄντι is added to σοφή because the phrase is accurate despite its awkwardness.

<sup>2000</sup> ἔθνει (E7): cf. 420B7 for the term.

<sup>2001</sup> προιστάναι (E8) is a new term.

<sup>2002</sup> μέν (429A5).

<sup>2003</sup> οὐδ' ἀν εἰς (B4): The tmesis is not emphatic, but yields to the tendency of ἄν to come second.

eventualities will preserve a sense<sup>2004</sup> that the things and the sorts of things<sup>2005</sup> that are worrisome and dangerous are just the ones the lawgiver has conveyed them to be in the education.<sup>2006</sup> Such an ability is just what bravery is.

Glaucon does not quite get it and wants Socrates to say it again.

“I am saying that bravery is a kind of preservation.”<sup>2007</sup>

“What kind of preservation?”

A preservation of the sense or belief, acquired through her education under our law, as to what things and what sorts of things are dangerous. By its preservation ‘throughout all eventualities’ I meant a man’s keeping it safe and unaltered<sup>2008</sup> in times of pain or pleasure and desire or aversion and not losing his grip on it. I can give you an image of what I mean if you’d like.

“I’d like.”

You have seen what dyers do when they want the dye in their wool to be colorfast. First they select and gather from all the many sorts of wool available to them the kind that is naturally white. Then they prepare it—and spare no pains in the preparation, mind you—by treating the wool so that it will take in the colorant as deeply as possible. Only then do they dye it, and the wool that is dyed by this method comes out colorfast, so that laundering is unable to remove the color no matter how much soap is used. If the wool is of another color or is not prepared in this way, it behaves quite differently from this, as you have seen.

“Yes I have: the color washes out ridiculously easily.”<sup>2009</sup>

Alright then take it that this is the kind of thing we were trying to accomplish<sup>2010</sup> when we selected and (430) gathered our soldiers<sup>2011</sup> and then set about educating them in music and gymnastic.<sup>2012</sup> We were contriving nothing else than that they would be persuaded of the laws and let the laws sink in like dye, so that they would develop<sup>2013</sup> a fast hold on the sense of what is to be feared and of other things because they possess the nature and the nurture they need, and so that the dye of their character should not be stripped away<sup>2014</sup> by these catalysts that are so terribly good at washing

<sup>2004</sup> τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν (B8-C1): The “sense” in question will need, and will be given, further support later (E7-430B5). δόξα (C1) cannot be purely approbative in Plato. It is exactly the “knowledge of sorts” (*τοιαῦτα*) for which it *cannot* be relied upon, and it is characteristic of it that it knows what it knows only by hearsay (*παρήγγελεν*, C2).

<sup>2005</sup> ταῦτα .. καὶ τοιαῦτα (C1), answered by ἡ τε καὶ οὖτα. The doublet adds, to the specific items (*ταῦτα*) the law enjoins it to guard against, a general sense of what sort of things (*τοιαῦτα*) these are. Cf. ταῦτά τε λεκτέον καὶ οὖτα, 386A6-7.

<sup>2006</sup> αὐτά (C1): Its antecedent is *τῶν δεινῶν*. The expression is proleptic and front-loaded, causing Glaucon to ask for a restatement (cf. n. 1259).

<sup>2007</sup> In his restatement (C5-8) Socrates recasts what he had said above into the logical order of dihaeresis or definition: σωτηρία (C5-6), τῆς δόξης (C7-8), διὰ πάντος (C8-D1).

<sup>2008</sup> Reading αὐτήν (C9), with all mss. and Stob.

<sup>2009</sup> καὶ ἔκπλυτα καὶ γελοῖα (E6): Socrates only needs the positive but Glaucon supplies the contrapositive as corroboration. It is characteristic of Socrates’s dialectic as of all conversation to stress opposition and “exclude the middle” in this way.

<sup>2010</sup> ἐργάζεσθαι (E7), present representing the imperfect.

<sup>2011</sup> Referring to the selection κατὰ φύσιν, 374E6-6C6 (n.b., ἐκλέξασθαι, 374E7). Calling them στρατιώται takes us back to the discovery of a need for an army (373E2-4E3).

<sup>2012</sup> ὅτε ἔξελεγόμεθα (E8): referring to 376E2-412B7 with the usual imperfect of citation.

<sup>2013</sup> γίγνοιτο (430A3), present.

<sup>2014</sup> ἔκπλύναι (A5) an aorist optative (not infinitive, as the accent indicates) parallel to γίγνοιτο. The present represents the process and the aorist the event.

things out:<sup>2015</sup> pleasure, more terrible than the lye of Chalastra or the strongest soap, and pain and fear, and desire, which is stronger than any catalyst. This sort of power, this ability to preserve under all circumstances the correct and lawful sense about what is to be feared and what is not, is what I assert bravery to be, and set it down as agreed unless you have some objection.

"Objections have I none. It seems you are taking a stand against the kind of right opinion about the same dangers that can settle in a person without grace of education and relies instead on a fierce and slavish disposition, as lacking lawfulness and not worthy of the name of bravery."<sup>2016</sup>

Exactly right.

"I do accept bravery to be what you say it is."

Yes, accept it as the political kind of bravery and you will be accepting it rightly. We can put a finer point on it at another time if you want: what we have set out to find in the present inquiry is justice. For that purpose<sup>2017</sup> our treatment of bravery has gone far enough. There are two more qualities that remain for us to catch sight of within our city, temperance and the goal of it all, justice. How do you think we might be able to find justice so as to avoid the bother<sup>2018</sup> of dealing with temperance?

"Well for my own part I neither know how nor would I wish it would come into sight before temperance does,<sup>2019</sup> if that would entail that we'd be omitting to take a close look at temperance. So if you want to do me a favor investigate this before you investigate that."

Surely I do want to, unless it would be quite wrong!<sup>2020</sup>

"Investigate, then."

Investigate I will. From my own vantage point<sup>2021</sup> temperance appears to have a stronger resemblance to harmoniousness and being in tune than the previous ones did. It is a sort of orderly beauty, a sort<sup>2022</sup> of "mastery" over pleasures and desires, as people put it who speak, in the same vein, of one's being "stronger than oneself,"<sup>2023</sup> whatever that means. Other things along the same lines are

<sup>2015</sup> ἐκπλύνοι / ἐκκλύζειν (A5-6): An almost-rhyme (cf. 375A2-3 and n. 1092). The aorist ἐκπλύνοι stands in contrast to the present γίγνοιτο, while the present ἐκκλύζειν denotes tendency or capacity. The construction (A6-B2) is binary of the distributive kind (n. 773), and the first limbs are specific while the second generalize: a ~ b :: A ~ B. The metaphorical ρύμματα are presented as ήδονή and then as λύπη τε καὶ φόβος καὶ ἐπιθυμία; the actual ρύμματα (the term is generic) are presented as the Chalestrian and the κονία and then πᾶν ἄλλο ρύμμα.

<sup>2016</sup> δοκεῖς γάρ (B6): Glaucon infers Socrates's attitude from his remarks at 429C1-2, spelled out at 429C7-8 and continued just above (B3).

<sup>2017</sup> ἐκείνου (C6) refers to justice as opposed to bravery (τοῦτο, C5, also neuter).

<sup>2018</sup> πραγματεύεσθαι (D4) shows some impatience, even intemperance. Moreover, πολυπραγμονεῦν will be integral to the definition of justice (433A8). So we have "self-instantiation" (335E7 and n. 258).

<sup>2019</sup> With πρότερον (D7) he refers back to the alternative envisioned at 428A3-4, ὅπότε πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο ἔγνωμεν, ίκανῶς ἀν εἶχεν ἡμῖν.

<sup>2020</sup> εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ (E1): Though idiomatic ("urbana locutio quae pro fortiore ponitur affirmatione," Ast Lex.s.v. ἀδικέω: cf. 608D7; Charm. 156A6; Menex. 236B7; and cf. δικαιώω at 353D6), the expression continues the self-instantiation (cf. 612D2, E1). We can and should expect to see why.

<sup>2021</sup> ὡς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν (E4): Socrates confesses it is his own idea (for other formulas for introducing his own guess cf. 368C7, 427E6, 428A11).

<sup>2022</sup> ήδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια (E6-7): i.e., ἐγκράτειά τις (ήδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, making ἐγκράτεια parallel with κόσμος τις. The tendency for the enclitic to be placed early is strong enough to spoil the syntactical parallelism. Cf. 380D8 and n. 1212.

<sup>2023</sup> ἐγκράτεια ὡς φασι, κρείττω δή (E7), placing comma after ὡς φασι rather than before, and reading (epexegetical) λέγοντες (E8) with mss. FM and Shorey and Chambry rather than Richards's

said about it that give us a trace at least<sup>2024</sup> of what it is. But there's something laughable about saying a person is stronger than himself. A person stronger than himself would also be weaker than himself and likewise a person weaker than himself would also be stronger, since all these expressions are referring to the same (431) person. I think what they are trying to say is that in the single man,<sup>2025</sup> talking about his soul, there is a nobler something and an inferior something, and that when the part that is nobler by nature holds the ignoble in check, it is this that the expression "stronger than himself" refers to—the expression is used after all by way of praise. But when under the influence of a bad upbringing or association of some kind<sup>2026</sup> the nobler part is overpowered by the massive force of the inferior, since it is itself the smallest part, their theory provides them a formula for censure by calling the man in this state "weaker than himself" and unbridled.

Apply this to our youthful city. Definitely you will find the one condition there since you could rightly say she would be "stronger than herself" given the fact that the superior part of her rules over the inferior part, and that therefore she deserves to be called temperate or "master of herself."<sup>2027</sup> Furthermore, the fact is<sup>2028</sup> that all the desires and pleasures and pains,<sup>2029</sup> multitudinous and variegated as they are, are easy to find in children and in women and in house-servants, not to mention the majority of those reputed to be above such slavish behavior but who are in fact quite

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ἀποφαίνοντες with Burnet (cf. Slings). Socrates then interrupts himself even further, to allude to other such expressions, and leads himself into anacoluthon.

<sup>2024</sup> ἵχνη (E9), with Shorey, suggests the hunt.

<sup>2025</sup> αὐτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ (431A4).

<sup>2026</sup> ὑπὸ τροφῆς κακῆς ἡ τινος ὄμιλίας (A7): Placing τινος after ἡ creates a non-distributive binary construction (n.2288): τινος and κακῆς both go with both τροφῆς and ὄμιλίας.

<sup>2027</sup> Reverse καί (B7): cf. 343C6 and n.444: Just above it was ἥττω ἔαυτοῦ καὶ ἀκόλαστον (B1-2), but this time the warrant for the attribute is placed second instead of first.

<sup>2028</sup> καὶ μὴν καί ... γε (B9), introducing a minor premise. The empirical fact that the wide spectrum of pleasures is visible in the large majority of persons and the controlled ones in only a few, will be seen to correspond to the larger inferior part of our city and smaller superior part.

<sup>2029</sup> ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας (B9-C1), a triad of the form A/B/~B (cf. nn.2463 and 2422), with τε corroborating the closer relation between the last two items. Contrast the use of τε at 528A4-5 (n.3374).

trivial persons,<sup>2030</sup> whereas in few persons will you meet the plain and moderate<sup>2031</sup> emotions which are guided by measured thought aided by intelligence and a right sense of things,<sup>2032</sup> namely in the people best born and best raised.<sup>2033</sup> This same distribution is there for you to see in our city, too. There, too, the desires of the many and trivial people are kept under control by the desires and mindfulness<sup>2034</sup> that reside in the smaller and more decent group. If ever a city deserves to be designated a master over pleasures and desires and master over herself, this one does. As such she also deserves to be called temperate according to this whole argument.

Moreover if there is any city where the rulers and the ruled have the same opinion as to who should be ruling, it will be so in this one, too.<sup>2035</sup> If we ask which party exhibits the temperance in holding this opinion, we would answer that both do, so that our intuition a moment ago was right:

<sup>2030</sup> ἐν παισὶ μάλιστα ... καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις (C1-3). The list starts with the obvious case and moves toward less obvious ones until it reaches objects that should not be on the list except for the fact that they are not what they are cracked up to be (λεγομένων). The criterion of the list is revealed, as usual, in the closing item, and by the very common device of a quantitative adjective (πάντες or πολλοί) with a specifying adjective (πάντα τὰ X), or relative clause (πάντα ὅσα X) or a defining partitive genitive (πολλοί τῶν X). What is noteworthy here is that the criterion, slavishness, is given *per contrarium*. It is the contrary of autonomy (ἐλευθερία), the failure of displaying which requires the inclusion after all of those who have it only by reputation.

For a sample of lists in which as here the generic (or aggregative or climactic) criterion is introduced through a periphrasis including quantitative noun plus a defining adjective or noun cf. 437B7-8 (ὅλως), 444B7-8, 493D4 (ἄλλην), 500D7-8, 536D5-6, 549C4-5 (satirical genus), 585B13-C1; Gorg.469E4-6, 477C3-4 (συλλήβδην), 508D7-E4 (συλλήβδην); Leg.678C9-D1, 694E6-7(πολλά), 716D6-7, 743D2-4 (πολύν), 777E2-4, 810E7-8, 817C4-5 (aggregate, not genus), 818C4-5 (aggregate), 832C5-7 (climactic), 859B7-8 (συμπάντων), 881E2-3 (aggregate), 948A2, 957E2-3 (συλλήβδην), 967C4-5 (πολλά); Phdo.70D7-9 (συλλήβδην); Phlb.14D1-3 (μυρία), 39E10-11 (πάντως), E13 (παντάπασι), 67B1-2; Polit.258D8-9, 272A3-4 (πολλῆς), 288D8, 289B4-5 (and Stallb.ad loc.), 294E5-6; Prot.324E3-5A2 (συλλήβδην); Symp.207D8-E3 (aggregate); Thg.124B5-7 (single ἀπάντων having generalizing force with δημιουργῶν and exhaustive force with ἴδιωτῶν); Tht.155E5-6, Tim.82A8-B2; plus relative clause cf. Leg.897A1-4, 949A2-5; Polit.280C1-2, 284E6-7, 288D7-8; plus partitive genitive, as here, cf. Rep.552D3-6.

πάντα (vel sim.) with a co-ordinate terminal item has the force of exhausting the supply of the last item and so effects closure, as at 553B3-5, 596C7-8, 606D1-2; Gorg.484D2-7 (συλλήβδην); H.Maj.292D1-3; Leg.779D2-5, 792B6, 830C9-D1 (ὅλος), 899B3-4 (πασῶν); Lys.215D4-7; Phlb.21D9-10; Polit.283C11-D1 (cf.C3), 290B1-3 (πάνδεινοι),293A3-4, 299D3-E4 (seven times!); Soph.222C5-7. πάντα (vel sim., esp. μυρία) with a transparent generalizing term like τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὰ ἄλλα, τὰ συγγενῆ, etc., effects an essentially dismissive closure, as at 353A1-2 (πολλά); Leg.630E7 (μυρία), 885D5-7 (μυριάκις μυρίοι); Meno 81C6-7 (cf. Stallb.ad loc.); Phdo.70E1-4 (μυρία), 98D7-E1 (μυρία); Phdrs.246D8-E1; Phlb.11B7-8, 19D4-5, 26B5-7, 40E2-3.

Elaborations of the norm include Leg.897A1-4 (πάσαις ὅσαι τούτων συγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις) and Leg.889D3-4; Polit.285D4-5, 260D11-E2, which all have πάντα with both transparent term and generic term. Notable also is the use of exhaustive πάντα with the penultimate term and generalizing πάντα with the last one as at Charm.173B7-8, Phlb.54C1-4; Polit.307A8-B1). Rep.510A5-6 does the converse.

As to the content of the list, the way the people are split up (reading H.Wolf's brilliant conjecture παισί against all mss. and Stob.: cf.494B5), compare Gorg.511E1-3 (οἱ χρήματα cf. Dodds ad loc.); Leg.665D2-3, 817C4-5, 838D7-8; Meno 71E1-2A1; and the redo of this list at Rep.433D2-4.

<sup>2031</sup> ἀπλάς τε καὶ μετρίας (C5) is in weak chiasm with πολλάς καὶ παντοδαπάς (B9).

<sup>2032</sup> μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ ὁρθῆς δόξης (C5-6). These guideposts one follows along the way (n.b. μετά: cf. 537D6-7), though important, serve as foil for λογισμός, which here represents σωφροσύνη, the new

temperance is by nature like being in tune.<sup>2036</sup> After all it was by dint of residing in part of the city that bravery and wisdom rendered the whole city wise and (432) brave,<sup>2037</sup> but this virtue does not operate this way. It spans<sup>2038</sup> the city as a whole through each individual person and brings them all in concert as if they were singing the same song, the weakest, the strongest, and those in the middle,<sup>2039</sup> reconciling all the ingredients, whether the wisdom of the one group or the strength contributed by the other, or the superiority in numbers or wealth or any other aspect of that sort that is contributed by the others.<sup>2040</sup> This kind of likemindedness we are quite justified in identifying with temperance, namely, an harmonious resolution between the naturally superior and the naturally inferior elements as to which of the two should in fact<sup>2041</sup> be in charge, whether in the city or in the individual man.

So now we have made out three in our city as best we can.<sup>2042</sup> As for the remaining one by which a city can share still more in virtue, what shall our account be? I refer of course to justice.

“Of course.”

What we need to do is gather close together and encircle our city as if we were hunters, and pay close attention that justice does not slip past us, nowhere to be seen and therefore no-how

item after σοφία (~ νοῦς) and ἀνδρεία (~ ὄρθη δόξα), nicely rendered “consideration” by Shorey.

<sup>2033</sup> ὀλίγοις τε ... καὶ τοῖς βέλτιστα ... (C6-7), repeats the pairing (τε καί) of quality and quality from πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις (C3), again in chiasm.

<sup>2034</sup> ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως (D1): The ἐπιθυμία is close to θυμός in the soldiers, while φρόνησις is in our rulers.

<sup>2035</sup> ἄρα (D4): The inference is not fully prepared but receives support from three considerations. (1) The myth of the metals includes, in its being accepted, both that the rulers will acquiesce in ruling and that the workers will acquiesce in pursuing their trade. (2) The notion of ἐγκράτεια lately adduced (A6) according to which the lower part is contained, not tyrannized, by the higher, implies that the man who is stronger than himself is at peace within. (3) The statement is only comparative: in other states it is not the better that rule and therefore it is less reasonable that the inferior should acquiesce; with ours, withal, there is reason to acquiesce.

<sup>2036</sup> ὠμοίωται (E8), the perfect used of what is fundamentally true (cf. 597D8 and n. 4660).

<sup>2037</sup> ἀνδρεία / σοφία ... σοφήν / ἀνδρείαν (431E10-432A1): Chiasm of cause and effect (cf. n. 1632).

<sup>2038</sup> τέτατοι (A3) suggesting a tension linking parts that might glide apart. The middle voice of the verb expresses a paradox: the subject stretches and is stretched, hence “spanning” like the German *Spannung*.

<sup>2039</sup> διὰ πασῶν ... τοὺς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ... καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους (A3-4), the list (with the musical sense of διὰ πασῶν) imitating the major triad (do=1, so=5, mi=3).

<sup>2040</sup> εἰ μὲν βούλει φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει ἰσχύνι, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν ἢ ἄλλῳ ὄτωοῦν τῶν τοιούτων (A4-6) The division by μέν, δέ, δέ emphasizes the categorical tripartition of goods into psychic (φρονήσει), bodily (ἰσχύνι) and external (πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν). By a characteristic form the first two types are represented by single examples while the last is more elaborately instantiated and then the elaboration is closed with dismissive ἢ ἄλλῳ ὄτωοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. For πλήθος as an external good playing the role elsewhere played by “friends” or “family,” cf. 434B1.

<sup>2041</sup> δεῖ (A8) of moral action in contrast with the inferiority and superiority that is fixed by nature.

<sup>2042</sup> τὰ μὲν τρία (B2): In each case a conventional notion of the virtue has guided our searching for a version of itself in the city, and in each case the city has revealed something related to the conventional notion but also radically different. That is, the new ideas stand in dialectical tension with the old. σοφία, in order to be an attribute of the city as a whole, has to be redefined as wisdom about the ends of all the specialist means; bravery has to be distinguished from the soldier’s animal toughness or insensitivity to fear, which is only a small part of it (pleasure being the greater threat, as the Athenian explains to the old Cretan and Lacedaimonian at the beginning of the *Laws*); and temperance is found not to be the triumphant eradication of lesser by greater urges but a balance between them.

understood. She must be here somewhere. Look closely and try to catch sight of her, in case<sup>2043</sup> you see her before I do, so that you can point her out to me.

"I wish I could; but I'll be more help if I follow right behind you, ready to look in the direction you indicate."

Follow then, and pray<sup>2044</sup> for help along with me.

"So I will. Lead the way."

Oof! The going is tough here and the path dark with shadows. That is,<sup>2045</sup> the problem is obscure and hard to think through. Still, we must press on.

"Yes, keep going."

"I saw something," Socrates tells us, and then he turns back to Glaucon to say, "Look! Look! maybe we have found a clue and she won't be eluding us after all!"

"Great news!"

What utter boobs we've been!

"Huh?"

It seems she has been bandied<sup>2046</sup> about by us from the very beginning and we didn't see her because we are so ridiculous, as when you find yourself searching for something you already have in your hand. We weren't seeing her right in front of us because we were looking off somewhere. That's why we missed it.

"What are you saying?"

This: I think although we have said it and heard it<sup>2047</sup> before, we are failing to recognize that in a way we have been discussing justice ourselves.

"Somebody wants to know what you are talking about, and he's finding your prelude a bit tedious."

(433) Alright then, listen and see if it makes any sense if I say<sup>2048</sup> that the behavior we set down at the beginning as being necessary, when we were founding our city, this behavior is what justice is, or at least a certain type of it is. At the start we said—and we reiterated it several times as you will remember—that each individual must practice just one of the city's tasks, the task to which his nature best suits him.

"So we did."

And at the same time the idea that minding one's own business in the sense of not being a busybody should be justice, is a commonplace we have heard many times before not to mention how

<sup>2043</sup> ἐάν πως (C2), the wishful construction with ἐάν we saw at 358B1 and 427D3-4 (cf. n.693).

<sup>2044</sup> εὐξάμενος (C5), the hopeful attitude following up the ἐάν πως construction. Even if Glaucon cannot do it he can ask the gods for help at the outset, as we all must.

<sup>2045</sup> γοῦν (C8), interpreting his own metaphor.

<sup>2046</sup> κυλινδεῖσθαι (D8), of words and therefore ideas, as at Phdrs.275E1;Ar.V.492, explained below with καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκούοντες (E5).

<sup>2047</sup> λέγοντες αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκούοντες (E5-6), characterizing the process of dialogue, the one speaking and the other listening: cf. n.711. αὐτό means the thing itself (though we did not recognize it as such: so also D8 and E7).

<sup>2048</sup> ἄκουε εἴ τι ἄρα λέγω (433A1) in accordance with the expression λέγοντες αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκούοντες above, Socrates announces the beginning of a dialectical search. On such preparatory byplay cf. n.3296.

often we've said it, ourselves.<sup>2049</sup>

"So we have."

Well there you have it. It might be coming into focus that this is what justice is, this minding your business. Do you know how I get there?

"No. Do tell."

The complement of the three things that we have found in the city, of temperance and bravery and mindfulness, is this I think, a thing whose function or role it is to enable the other three to take root in the city and if once they take root to preserve them, as long as it is present.<sup>2050</sup> But we also said that justice would be the one left over after the three had been picked out.<sup>2051</sup>

"Yes and that was necessarily true."<sup>2052</sup>

But if we had to decide which of the three engendered virtues does the most to make the city virtuous, the decision would not be easy. Shall it be the likemindedness<sup>2053</sup> shared by the rulers and the

<sup>2049</sup>τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν (A8-9): The sense that justice is not being meddlesome is the initial doxic definition that guides the search (cf. n. 2042 *ad* 432B2), a method that is, strictly, circular. The two perfects (ἀκτικόαμεν καὶ αὐτὸὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, B1), suggest that all that talk is "on record" and took place before the today's dialogue, and also, in restating the pair ἀκούειν / λέγειν, credential these ideas as having been established in conversation. The explanation and association of the idea of minding one's business with a denial of the converse, of being a busy-body (πολυπραγμονεῖν), recalls the moment at the beginning of the city's construction where a different concept of τὰ ἔαυτοῦ πράττειν was aired (369E2-370A4, *n.b.* ἀμελήσαντα, 369E6) although a similar expression was used in connection with it: καὶ μὴ ἀλλήλοις κοινωνοῦντα πράγματα ἔχειν ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δι' αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, 370A3-4).

Somehow πράγματα ἔχειν is unattractive while πολυπραγμονεῖν is desirable. The paradox is analogous to the paradox Adeimantus brought up at the beginning of Book Four, that the rulers deserved more. The underlying issue of autonomy and its paltry substitute and *pis aller*, power over others, returns.

<sup>2050</sup>ἔγγενέσθαι (B9), something of a correction or refinement of the ἐνεῖναι (*being present*) of the original conception (427E13; 428A11; 429A8; 431B5, C9, E2; 432A1,B2). The presence of the other three items that we discovered in the city, is now seen as a result of their being engendered by the prior presence of the fourth.

<sup>2051</sup>καίτοι ἔφαμεν (C1): Corresponding to the development of ἐνεῖναι into ἔγγενέσθαι, there is a change or development in the meaning of ὑπολείπειν, from the complement of the other virtues into their ὑπόλοιπον (B7), the thing they lack—their *sine qua non*. καίτοι ἔφαμεν brings back the complementary sense (ὑπολειφθέν, C1), and by dint of identifying the ὑπόλοιπον with the ὑπολειφθέν, justice appears to be the virtue whose essence it is to make all the others possible. The logical form is: A is C and B is C therefore A is B, invalid as a syllogism. Rather than draw the invalid inference Socrates goes on to the next argument (C4-E2).

<sup>2052</sup>ἀνάγκη (C3), of logical truth as usual, referring to the quadripartition of virtue posited above. Glaucon says yes to the whole by saying yes to the last, as often (cf. n. 204 *ad* 333D9).

<sup>2053</sup>The engendered virtues are rehearsed (C6-D1) in the order opposite to their discovery according to the chiasm of before and after (cf. 327B1 and n. 18). ὄμοδοξία (C6) is decorative *variatio* for ὄμονοια, the essence of σωφροσύνη (432A7). The restatement of bravery (as σωτηρία) is linked to it by a chiasmus (τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ ἀρχομένων and περὶ δεινῶν τε καὶ μὴ ... ἐννόμου being the middle terms, the second functioning as an extensive prolepsis); and chiasm is employed again to introduce wisdom (ἐν τοῖς στρατώταις and ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι being the middle terms) with the restatement of wisdom being done with a bold hendiadys (φρόνησίς τε καὶ φυλακή). After this regal vanguard arrives the fourth, the virtue underlying them all, prepared for by a proleptic demonstrative followed by an introduction restating the leading construction (μάλιστα ἀγαθήν ... ποιεῖ ~ μάλιστα

ruled alike? Shall it be the sense of what is to be feared and what is not, and its preservation by a lawful attitude we have engendered in the soldiers? Shall it be the mindfulness and vigilance that inheres in the rulers? Or is it rather this that makes the city virtuous by its presence, its presence in the child and in the woman, the slave and the freeman and the worker and the ruler and the ruled:<sup>2054</sup> that each was keeping to his own business as the single person he is and was not trying to do many things at once and invade the province of others?

“To decide between them would be difficult, indeed!”

So, we may conceive this ability of each person to mind their own business as on a par with the others for the contribution it makes to the city’s virtue—on a par with her wisdom, temperance and bravery; but at the same time justice as the fourth in the list of the four virtues<sup>2055</sup> also has equal footing with these other three. Moreover, try the following argument for this point. Would you assign the job of rendering decisions at the bar of justice<sup>2056</sup> to our rulers?

“Of course.”

And will the leading goal and purpose in all their decisions be that the individual parties neither possess what does not belong to them nor be deprived of what does?

“No other than this.”

Since this is the just outcome?

“Yes.”

And so by this<sup>2057</sup> argument, too, it would be consistent<sup>2058</sup> to argue that the possession of one’s

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ἀγαθὴν ἀπεργάζεσθαι) and then a broad and open-textured list that assembles willy-nilly all the ingredient members of the citizenry that had been brought up in connection with the other virtues. The high rhetoric celebrates the progress they have made in their understanding, but in particular praises justice as the *sine qua non*.

<sup>2054</sup>καὶ ἐν παιδὶ καὶ ἐν γυναικὶ καὶ δούλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ καὶ δημιουρῷ καὶ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ (D2-3), a list of “everybody.” Repetition of καὶ is triumphant but tedious repetition of ἐν is avoided. The use of the singular (we may style them “representative”) is striking and rare. Geddes noted how Plato can shift to the singular “as the reasoning becomes more vivid” (*ad Phdo.62D3-5*) but the singular here is thematic rather than logical or rhetorical, stressing the presence of justice in the individual (*n.b.* εἰς, D4) rather than the type.

As to its contents, the first four elements, including their configuration into pairs, recall the list of persons prone to intemperate behavior (431C1-3), and its last two recall the pair of parties whose agreement as to who should rule was the embodiment of temperance in the city (431E5). Wisdom and bravery each belonged to a special group. The point of the present sentence is to show that the fourth, justice, belongs to each person in the city as maintaining his own identity. Of this behavior the δημιουρός had up until now been our paradigm, and this is why he has a place in the list. Richards’s addition of γεωργῷ καὶ before δημιουρῷ makes a pair to go with the other pairs but thereby dilutes the meaning.

<sup>2055</sup>τὸ γε τούτοις ἐνάμιλλον (D11), with γε drawing a second application out of ἐνάμιλλον (cf. D7): As in the ὑπόλοιπον / ὑπολειφθέν argument above (B7-C2), A (ἐαντοῦ πράττειν) is C (ἐνάμιλλον) and B (δικαιοσύνη) is C (ἐνάμιλλον), suggesting that A is B; and again Socrates omits to draw the invalid conclusion, but instead moves on to give a third argument or approach (E3ff, καὶ τῆδε).

<sup>2056</sup>τὰς δίκας δικάζειν (E4). The *figura etymologica* stresses δίκη.

<sup>2057</sup>ταύτῃ ὅρᾳ πῃ (E12): The “second person” demonstrative replaces the first person (τῇδε, E3), once Glaucon has accepted the idea from Socrates.

<sup>2058</sup>ὅμολογοῖτο (434A1) a claim for a consistency that is less than apodictic.

own (434) things and the pursuit of one's own job is what justice is.<sup>2059</sup> See if you think as I do. Think of a carpenter trying to do what a cobbler does or a cobbler trying to do what a carpenter does and of them exchanging their tools or arrogating each other's privileges<sup>2060</sup> to themselves. Or think of one practicing both by taking on all of the other's things: do you think this would greatly harm the city?"

"Not much."

But say he is a craftsman by nature or some other kind of money-maker,<sup>2061</sup> and that in the midst of his life, enticed<sup>2062</sup> by money or influence or the prospect of power or something else of this sort,<sup>2063</sup> he tries to make his way into the ranks of the soldier class,<sup>2064</sup> or say he is already a member of that class but wishes to make his way into the subclass of those who make and preserve the law even though he is unworthy of the station. Say these two go as far as to take on the other men's tools and arrogate their privileges to themselves or that they try as one man to take on all the jobs at once. I'd bet you would agree with me that this kind of shifting and meddling would spell the destruction of the city.

"I would completely agree."

So the three types of meddling and shifting into one another inflict the very greatest harm on our city and would quite correctly be called the most intense<sup>2065</sup> kind of evil-doing.

"Obviously."

And yet the greatest sort of evil-doing would rightly be called injustice, so meddlesomeness is injustice. Let's go back and argue the other side of it. For the business class, the helper class, and the guardian class all to be "homebodies"<sup>2066</sup> if you will, each doing what is his own job in the city, this would as the opposite of that, and would be justice, and would render the city just.

"To me this seems to be exactly the way it is."

<sup>2059</sup>The two hendiadyses οἰκείου τε καὶ ἔαντοῦ and the rhyming ἔξις τε καὶ πρᾶξις (E12-434A1) constitute a distributive binary construction (the first going with the first and the second the second: cf. n.773) that feigns to ignore and tries to obfuscate an equivocation on τὰ ἔαντοῦ (one's possessions and one's assigned task), an equivocation that in all strictness renders the argument invalid.

<sup>2060</sup>τιμάς (A5), perhaps including a reference to their "pay-scale."

<sup>2061</sup>χρηματιστής (A9), a new way of characterizing the "rest of the city," suggesting their interests rather than their contributions, and setting up ἐπαιρόμενος and the list at B1-2.

<sup>2062</sup>ἐπαιρόμενος (B1) a term we met at the end of Bk.3 (416D1) describing the ominous arousal to reach beyond one's station, from which we sought to exempt the guards. Cf. also its ominous role at 608B6.

<sup>2063</sup>ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ πλήθει ἢ ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ (B1-2):The list of material or external goods is brought forward from 432A5-6 (cf. n.2040).

<sup>2064</sup>ὅλεθρον (B7):The greater harm to the state brought about by the craftsmen becoming guards rather than merely switching crafts (434A3-B2), already noted in Socrates's response to Adeimantus's objection that the guards should receive something special for their trouble (421A3-B3), is now brought forward and expanded (B3-B6) to provide an argument for justice.

<sup>2065</sup>πολυπραγμοσύνη (B7) in any field is deleterious to the field but such shifting among the roles that constitute the city is particularly damaging to the city (ὅλεθρον, B7). In the city therefore (ἄρα, B9) it is particularly true to say that πολυπραγμοσύνη (which tentatively and doxically = ἀδικία as the opposite of ἔαντοῦ πράττειν) is κακουργία (κακουργία = κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι) but κακουργία is also a synonym for ἀδικία (C4-5). That is, A (πολυπραγμοσύνη) is B (κακουργία), and B (κακουργία) is C (ἀδικία) so that A is C, laying the grounds for the (again invalid) inference that ~A is ~C.

<sup>2066</sup>οἰκειοπραγία (C8) a coinage by, and *hapax* in, Plato, made up out of οἰκεῖος as used at 433E12, and invented for the immediate dialectical context to fill in as the contrary of "busy-bodiness" (πολυπραγμονεῖν and πολυπραγμοσύνη), i.e., the ~A of the note above.

### 2.B.7: Application of the Civic Justice to the Individual

Let's not write it in stone as of yet, but if this characteristic should also be agreed to be justice when it enters<sup>2067</sup> the individual man then at least we will have reached a consensus:<sup>2068</sup> what else would be left for us to say? Otherwise<sup>2069</sup> we will try another investigation. But as it is let us complete the line of investigation we conceived of originally, that if we first try to contemplate justice off<sup>2070</sup> in some larger thing that has it, then it might be easier to get a sense of what it is like in a single man.<sup>2071</sup> We decided this larger thing would be a city and so we founded the best city we could on the conviction that justice would certainly be present if it was a virtuous one. So let us now transfer<sup>2072</sup> what came into view<sup>2073</sup> off in the city onto the individual man. If the analogy receives our approval, we shall have finished a very fine study. Otherwise, if justice should look different in the individual, we will have to go back and review our construction of the city and find where we went wrong. In fact we

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<sup>2067</sup>εἰς ἓνα ἔκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο (D3): The conception of the εἶδος moving into each and any individual man is striking, and it is quite unrelated to the notion of a *man* going into an εἶδος that we saw just above (εἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ εἶδος ἐπιχείρη ιέναι, B2). οὐ proposes that we will “move,” in thought, the political image of justice into the individual man.

<sup>2068</sup>καὶ ἐκεῖ δικαιοσύνην εῖναι (D4): The circularity of the method proposed finally becomes explicit. Even in the original formulation (368D1-369A3) we had to know what were looking for in order to tell whether the letters spelled it, regardless how large they were; but now for the first time Socrates asserts that the application to the small case will need to pass muster there as well. It never was justice in itself, after all, that we had sought, but justice in man.

<sup>2069</sup>τότε (D5): Just as νῦν can refer to the present as the “real” that disproves the unreal conditional (νῦν δέ = “but the fact is”), so τότε here refers to a remote time as the time in which an entailment of unreal condition might be realized (“in that case”).

<sup>2070</sup>ἐκεῖ (D7). There is no need to supply ἦ, with Burnet. The reference of ἐκεῖ needs not be the same as it was just above (D4): the two places are interchangeably “there” and “here” to each other.

<sup>2071</sup>ῥῆσον ὅν ... κατιδεῖν (D8): The optical conceit, that virtue will be easier to see in a large thing (368C7-D7), always presumed that we would be near enough this large thing that it would not be too small to see, yet this larger object of contemplation is here said to be ἐκεῖ, “there.” Socrates now says that the investigation has produced what it could, for better or worse. As witnesses to the process (in fact it did not happen but was conceived only for our contemplation) we ourselves can say that what has determined its course more than anything else is the interventions of Glaucon and Adeimantus, and moreover that they have intervened to point out a mote (κάρφος) they saw in that polis over there because of the log (δοκός) in their own eyes.

Jesus’s parable (Matt.7.3, Luke 6.41) is miraculously succinct. He calls the mote in my eye a “log” because it is close to my eye—indeed “in” it, no more nor less than my brother’s mote is “in” his. His parable leaves it to me to realize that I can see that tiny mote far off in my brother’s eye, if it is truly there in the first place, only because I know the mote in mine so well. He leaves it to me to confess that his mote was always too small for me really to see, let alone how much my own ability to see it should be entirely disabled by the mote in my eye that is so large. That is, he leaves me to confess what is almost unbearable to confess, that I project the mote I never saw, to be there in my brother’s eye rather than my own. *Mutatis mutandis*, Socrates’s over-there polis has been a neutral medium in which the theorization of virtue could be carried out safely, one step removed from my anxieties, that fragile comic mechanism in me that somehow reconciles my pride with my self-doubt. Have I been prepared to receive the result, now that we are on the verge of bringing the point home to the individual soul, i.e. me? Are Adeimantus and Glaucon ready for it?

<sup>2072</sup>ἐπαναφέρωμεν (E3), replacing the impersonal concept of ιέναι (ιόν, D3). ὁμολογήται (E4), repeated from there, may be spelled out by supplying ταῦτὸν εῖναι or δικαιοσύνην εῖναι.

<sup>2073</sup>ἐμφαίνηται (E8): dialectical φαίνεσθαι again.

might cast some light on the (435) problem by rubbing both the two lines of inquiry together the way we make fire by rubbing two sticks together: maybe this would give us a flash of insight as to what justice is. And then, once the answer has become clear, we can seek to confirm it among ourselves.<sup>2074</sup>

“You are proceeding in a methodical<sup>2075</sup> manner: please do what you have proposed.”

Now if someone refers to a thing that is the same as another as being in a given case larger or smaller than the other,<sup>2076</sup> is it in that case unlike the other in the way that it was the same as it, or alike in that way?

“Alike.”

Thus if you compare a just man to a just city he will not differ from it at all in respect to the characteristic of justice they both share, but will be alike?

“Alike.”

Now the city appeared to become just when each of the three natural classes<sup>2077</sup> in it were doing their own jobs and minding their own business, and temperate and brave and wise by dint of other kinds of feelings or dispositions in these same three classes. Just so, in the case of the individual shall we expect that if he has these same three natural types or aspects<sup>2078</sup> present in his soul,<sup>2079</sup> by dint of their having the same feelings and dispositions<sup>2080</sup> as the city’s constituents, he correctly deserves the same designations as appeared in the city?

“Logic requires it.”

Once again<sup>2081</sup> we find ourselves in a pretty pass,<sup>2082</sup> Glaucon, if we now have to decide whether

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<sup>2074</sup>The method (E3-435A3) is revisable and the revision is slapdash. Curiously, the technique of adjusting both embodiments of justice to save the analogy—to apply personal aspects of the virtues to the city and vice-versa—is just what he has already been doing throughout the search for the virtues in the city that he has just completed. Socrates comes very close to admitting the method does not matter after all. Moreover, it is not yet clear what he means by confirming a result among ourselves once it has become obvious (A2-3).

<sup>2075</sup>καθ’ ὄδον τε λέγεις (A4) thanks Socrates for making their place in the program clear step-by-step; he is not asserting that the program is methodologically sound.

<sup>2076</sup>μεῖζόν τε καὶ ἔλαττον (A5-6): Smallness and largeness were the crucial differences between city and man in the original guess that justice was the same in each (368E).

<sup>2077</sup>φύσεων (B5) stretches the more abstract term, εἶδος (B2) toward the realm of the natural and alive, which will then be further stretched (or specified) below (B7: cf. n. 2080).

<sup>2078</sup>εἶδη (C1) proffered as analogous to γένη as used at B5.

<sup>2079</sup>Ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ (C1). ψυχή is new: this is the first time that the justice that is being sought in the individual is asserted, more particularly, to be in his soul. The point is not controversial—virtue was always going to be an attribute of soul just as strength belongs to body (e.g., 353D11, accepted without argument)—but since the justice we have found in the city, like σωφροσύνη, has a sort of second-order character, present not in a part the way a sock is somewhere in the drawer but in the relation among the parts, any just thing will need to be a plurality so that there can analogously be a relation among parts, and therefore the soul will need to be so. This prerequisite to the heuristic analogy, that πόλις (which is obviously a plurality of πολῖται) and soul (whose inner plurality is far from obvious) must both be pluralities, had not of course been foreseen.

<sup>2080</sup>πάθη τε καὶ ἔξεις (B7) now stretches φύσεων (B5) into the personality and experience of the natural and alive man.

<sup>2081</sup>αὖ (C4) points back to βλακικόν γε ἡμῶν τὸ πάθος (432D5).

<sup>2082</sup>εἰς φαῦλόν γε ... σκέμμα (C4). The neuter σκέμμα (in place of σκέψις) is derogatory (cf. Crito 48C4). Although φαῦλον can be used of a topic the speaker finds undignified to consider (e.g., Parm. 130C6-7), Glaucon’s reply indicates that the sense here is the opposite of χαλεπόν (as at 368C8)

the soul has or does not have three corresponding parts.

“Don’t despair, Socrates. As they say, ‘Fine things are difficult.’”<sup>2083</sup>

That has become quite obvious! I just want to voice the opinion that by the methods we are now using<sup>2084</sup> it is unlikely we will achieve a really fine treatment of this question. It’s another path that leads to that answer, both slower and longer. Still, to continue by this method will at least be on a par with the sorts of answers and questions we have reached up to this point.

“So much would be welcome. Indeed I for one would be quite satisfied for our present purposes.”<sup>2085</sup>

I too will be quite as satisfied for my own purposes.

“Well then don’t lose your head of steam: get on with it!”

## LEMMA: The Internal Plurality of the Soul

Don’t we pretty much have to stipulate that the same characteristics or character-types<sup>2086</sup> inhere

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and is being used ironically (as at 423C5 and C6). In following the general plan or μέθοδος of using the justice in the large entity as a guide to finding it in the small entity we happened to discover along the way that the large entity has three parts. This fact along with the fact that justice itself was found to be a relation among these parts, entails that continuing with the method will require us, as an unforeseen preliminary (ἐμπεπτώκαμεν), to find an analogous partition in the soul (the small entity) and then search for justice in the relation of these parts. Cf. ἀπαμβλύνεται, 442D7 and n. *ad loc.* In the event, this side-study will prove to be central!

<sup>2083</sup> Ironic φαῦλον elicited a similar statement of overarching purpose at 423D8-E2.

<sup>2084</sup> τοιούτων μεθόδων (D1) referring to the path of inquiry he just restated so as to show which step in the inquiry comes next, a method he declared in passing to be tentative (434D2-5A3), in contrast to a path longer in number of steps (πλείων) and in the time that would elapse in taking them (μακροτέρα). Glaucon had replied with approval of Socrates’s orderliness (καθ’ ὅδον, A4). The plural μεθόδων, as well as anarthrous use of the demonstrative τοιούτων, are derogatory. To take Socrates’s reference to a longer road as an indication from Plato to his readers that goes over Glaucon’s head vitiates the dramatic project of the dialogue merely to provide the commentator an opportunity to grandstand among his peers. He will still need to account for Socrates’s φαῦλον (C4) and for his καὶ πάνυ ἔξαρκέσει (D8).

<sup>2085</sup> ικανῶς ὃν ἔχοι (D7) denotes dialectical sufficiency in the present circumstances (cf. n. 486), which includes meeting both the polite exigencies of a live conversation at Cephalus’s house as the night approaches and the existential exigencies of reaching an account sufficient to answer the pressing questions about justice and the life-aspirations of Glaucon and Adeimantus. Plato’s decision in his invention of the dialogue form to invent conversations that create their own horizons and to limit speculation to the needs arising from likely occasions, just like Socrates’s discipline of showing up daily at the agora that was its inspiration and model, evinces a fidelity to life as lived; but neither of them will drag truth into the mud. Socrates does not parade scandalously in public view like a Cynic and Plato does not write dialogues about fools who happen to be passing by. The fate of Glaucon and Adeimantus, for which Socrates has taken some responsibility in the conversation, is not the most important thing in the world, but surely it is a topic easier to deal with than the soul. Hence his rejoinder that he is even more happy than Glaucon, who after all will not let him leave until he finishes (so much he indicates with μὴ ὀποκάμης, D9).

<sup>2086</sup> With εἴδη τε καὶ ὥθη (E2) Socrates resumes slanting the aspects of the soul (εἴδη, the abstract and logical term for qualitative identity as opposed to quantitative in the argument above, 435B2) into the direction of dispositions as he had already done with φύσεων and πάθη τε καὶ ἔξεις,

in the individual as in the city? I don't know where else the city might have gotten them from.<sup>2087</sup> It would be ridiculous to think that high-spiritedness shows up in a city without coming from its individual citizens: in fact we identify this attribute with people in the region of Thrace or Scythia or almost anywhere north, just as love of learning is something people (436) most easily attribute to the environment<sup>2088</sup> here in Athens, or the way we associate the love of money with people who live in Phoenicia or Egypt.<sup>2089</sup> This is just the way things are and it is not difficult to see that it is so. What I find difficult<sup>2090</sup> is the question whether we perform these three different<sup>2091</sup> kinds of things with this selfsame aspect of ourselves, or whether there are three aspects and we use the one for the one and the other for the other. Do we learn with the one<sup>2092</sup> and become riled up with the other of the resources within us, and do our desiring with a third one, desiring the pleasures of nutrition and sex and all the things akin to them?<sup>2093</sup> Or is it with the soul as a whole that we do each of them one after another whenever we act?<sup>2094</sup> This will be difficult to decide in a way that passes muster with reason.<sup>2095</sup>

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above (435B5-7).

<sup>2087</sup> γελοῖον (E3). The assertion bluffs certainty and then attempts to corroborate it with the threat of ridicule, a corroboration comparable to the one offered in Book Eight (544D7-8 and n. 3599) despite its worthlessness as such. As in the case of his method with the large letters, Socrates suggests the hypothesis for the illumination it casts, in the Viconian manner: nothing is added by turning it into an ontological claim.

<sup>2088</sup> αἰτίαν (E6). The society owes it to the men, who in turn owe it to the environment (αἰτιάσαιτο, 436A1).

<sup>2089</sup> The list of places and dispositions (435E6-436A3) illustrates by examples a commonplace belief in the climatic localization of human temperaments or characters (cf. Leg. 747CD, Arist. Pol. 1327B24-33, and the expression πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν), but in the course of presenting three examples of such, two of which we encountered in the education (τὸ φιλομαθές or φιλόσοφον paired with τὸ θυμοειδές without any coordinate involvement of τὸ φιλοχρήματον) the list also broaches the tripartition of the soul as well as a coordinate tripartition of goods (φιλοχρήματον standing in for ἐπιθυμητικόν: cf. 553C5 and the explanations given at 442A5-7 and 580E2-81A1). Θυμοειδές already is being slanted toward the body since the other two dispositions (φιλομαθές and φιλοχρήματον) clearly correspond to the psychic and external goods.

<sup>2090</sup> χαλεπόν (A5,8) echoes Glaucon's χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά (435C8) and therefore recalls the questions about ψυχή that Socrates felt unable to treat adequately "by the present methods." Rather than giving up treating the difficult problems he continues to note where they lie. Cf. ἀξίως (B2 vs. 435D5) and ἀκριβέστερον (C8 vs. 435D1).

<sup>2091</sup> ἔκαστα (A8) makes them distinct from one another and stands in contrast with αὐτῷ.

<sup>2092</sup> ἐτέρῳ (A9), of the first aspect, as if there were only two ("this one instead of that one"), soon replaced by ἄλλῳ for the second aspect and then τρίτῳ for the third. The three aspects are being mustered before our eyes as if in response to the things that are to be done. For the close logical use of ἔτερον in distinction with mere ἄλλον cf. 337D1; Charm. 166A9; Euthyphr. 10A10ff.

<sup>2093</sup> τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν τε καὶ γέννησιν ἡδονῶν καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά (A11-B1): Elaboration or subdivision of the last item of the list is a technique of closure (cf. 432A4-6 and n. 2040, 431C1-3 and n. 2030, 342E10-11 and n. 430). This list of bodily pleasures (the typical triad, food and drink and sex [329A6 and n.55], being done with the pair, τροφή and γέννησις) is unusual in the way that it describes the objects of desire as means for ends beyond themselves (nutrition and procreation), which desire characteristically ignores.

<sup>2094</sup> ὄρμήσωμεν (B2), replacing the more external πράττομεν (A8) as the generic term he now chooses for all three types of action seated in and initiated in the soul.

<sup>2095</sup> ἀξίως λόγου (B2-3) on the surface means "worth mentioning," "worth talking about," but in the context of Socrates's expressions of doubt about the adequacy of their "method" (ἀξίως, 435D5) there is place for it also to mean "worthy measured against the demands of reason," which is certainly

Glaucon agrees this is the problem and so Socrates proposes to him<sup>2096</sup> a way to start deciding<sup>2097</sup> whether the same actions belong to each of the psychic elements respectively, or whether they alternate, one belonging to one and another to another.<sup>2098</sup> It is to establish a preliminary point, that for the same thing to do or undergo opposites in the same respect and in the same relation and at the same time, is impossible. Thus if we find this kind of thing occurring in the aspects of the soul we will know that the aspects of the soul that do or undergo them are not one and the same thing but a plurality of different things.

"Hmm!" Glaucon says.<sup>2099</sup>

Watch what I am arguing.

"Well, go ahead and make the argument."

What I meant was, can one and the same thing stand still and be in motion at the same time and in the same respect?

"No way."

But let's refine the point now so that we do not have a falling out as we advance further in the argument.<sup>2100</sup> Someone could say, of a man who is standing still but moving his arms and his head, that one and the same man was immobile and moving at the same time, but I fancy we'd say that isn't the correct way to describe the situation but rather to say that one aspect<sup>2101</sup> of him was at rest and one aspect was in motion. The man who made that argument could then add an entertaining subtlety to his case<sup>2102</sup> and bring up children's tops that as a whole<sup>2103</sup> are at rest and at motion, held as they are by a pin in one and the same place but spin around it—and likewise anything else that moves in a circle but does not change its location. We will not accept this account either, in this case on the grounds that it is not in the same respects<sup>2104</sup> within themselves that they are, at that moment, both at rest and in what it will turn out to be introducing.

<sup>2096</sup>τοίνυν (B5).

<sup>2097</sup>ὅριζεσθαι (B5) is a repetition of διορίσασθαι above, with the usual dropping of prefix (n.1532), but also begins to suggest they will demarcate (determine the ὥρος between) the areas of the three elements or aspects of soul as "parts outside of parts."

<sup>2098</sup>The logical adjectives αὐτά, ἀλλήλοις, and ἔτερα (B5-6), and the shift of construction from datives of agent with concrete verb to loose datives of possession with ἐστί, continue to give the expression logical precision at the expense of leaving it so abstract that its meaning would be uncertain unless we already know what had to be said.

<sup>2099</sup>εἶεν (C2) used differently from the ways so far.

<sup>2100</sup>μή πῃ προϊόντες ἀμφισβητήσωμεν (C8-9): In the event, it is not only to fend off future disagreement that Socrates adds the following refinements but to elevate Glaucon's thought to a higher level in advance, to a level more adequate to the very elevated topic of soul, a level Socrates had warned us we might not tolerate (435D1-3). ἀμφισβήτησις suggests captious squabbling in contrast with ὁμολογεῖν, which is to be thinking on the same plane as each other. Cf. 437A5, 442E1 with n.2195, 476D9, 501D1, 505D2 with n.3028.

<sup>2101</sup>τὸ μέν τι / τὸ δέ (D1): If we supply a noun it might be μέρος; but in the coming case of the spinning top, μέρος wouldn't work. Again the vagueness of the expression is necessary in advance and it is a matter of dialectical pacing (cf.n.202 ad 333C11).

<sup>2102</sup>With ἔτι μᾶλλον χαριεντίζοιτο and κομψευόμενος (D4-5), his motives become questionable. Socrates often prepares his interlocutor for an abstract argument by reviewing the abuses of reason and language, intentional or unintentional, that lead to its failure, lest his own talking and thinking might seem indistinguishable from them. Cf. 453A7-454A2ff; Phdo.89C11 (on μισολογία).

<sup>2103</sup>ὅλοι (D5) embodies the clever man's attempt to gainsay the τὸ μέν / τὸ δέ solution.

<sup>2104</sup>κατὰ ταύτα (D8). The principle is to deny that ταύτὸν τάναντία ποιεῖ ἢ πάσχει κατὰ ταύτὸν καὶ πρὸς ταύτὸν ἄμα (B8-8 above), which requires that the *same thing* be oppositely qualified in the

motion, but rather that they have within themselves a straight (vertical) aspect and a circular (horizontal) aspect<sup>2105</sup> and that with respect to the straight they are at rest while in the circular aspect they are moving rotationally, whereas if at some other moment the thing should begin to lean with respect to the straight<sup>2106</sup> in any direction—forward, backward, to the right, or to the left—at the same time that it is rotating, that then it is at rest in no way. None of these clever challenges will perplex us therefore, nor ever persuade us that something, if it is one and (437) the same thing, at the same time and in the same respect and the same relation could undergo or be or do opposites.<sup>2107</sup>

“They certainly won’t bother me, at least,” says Glaucon.<sup>2108</sup>

To avoid getting forced into a tedious and lengthy scrutiny of each and all of these quibbling controversies<sup>2109</sup> merely to prove them false, let us make our start<sup>2110</sup> the belief that this is true so as

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*same respect and in the same relation at the same time.* In the instance of the man it was not ταῦτόν that was suffering opposites but two different parts of him, and in the present case while it is ταῦτόν that is suffering opposites it is not so κατὰ ταῦτά. On its vertical axis (a mathematical entity without diameter) the top is stationary, though on its periphery, horizontal and perpendicular to this, the top is in motion. Once the top begins to wobble it ceases to be at rest in any respect (οὐδαμῆ, E6). Socrates (Plato) characteristically varies the expression for κατὰ ταῦτόν (the plural κατὰ ταῦτά); this dative of respect [οὐδαμῆ, with ὅδος understood]; the accusative of respect εὐθυωρίαν [E4]) so that the mind might not become diffused into the words and become unable to think about what they mean.

The stipulation πρὸς ταῦτόν (B9) is not illustrated here. A good instance would be the middle sized finger being at the same time long in comparison to (πρός) the shorter and short in comparison to the longer, a paradox Socrates will use in order to focus thought below (523C4ff).

<sup>2105</sup>τὸ εὐθύν (E3): The neuter is used, avoiding an abstraction like “aspect,” “part” or “dimension.” The reality of this dimension or aspect of the top is purely logical, as the parts or aspects may be, according to this argument.

<sup>2106</sup>τὴν εὐθυωρίαν (E4), accusative of respect.

<sup>2107</sup>ώς ποτέ τι ἀν τὸ αὐτὸ ὃν ἄμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τάναντία πάθοι ἢ καὶ εἴη ἢ καὶ ποιήσειν (E9-437A2): In this less conversational and more pedantic expression of the principle all the stipulations are placed before the verb instead of being interfiliated (as they were at B8-9), and εἶναι is sandwiched in between πάσχειν and ποιεῖν. For the triad πάθοι ἢ καὶ εἴναι ἢ καὶ ποιήσειν cf. Shorey *ad loc.* (Loeb I.384 note c) and Phdo.97C8-D1. Perhaps it is added to pre-empt one more eristic attack.

<sup>2108</sup>ἐμέ (A3), like any accented pronoun, is emphatic. Socrates’s illustration has had the preparatory effect it was intended to have on the only person who matters, his interlocutor (cf. n.2100).

<sup>2109</sup>ἀμφισβητήσις (A5) again pejorative (cf. 436C9), as often (cf. n.2100).

<sup>2110</sup>ὑποθέμενοι (A6) is hardly technical and so it is explained, even defined, in the sequel. It is an intransitive middle, as at 346B3; Aeschines 1.37, 2.102; Arist. Meteor.340A23, Rhet.Alex.1432B5; Isoc.4.51; Thphr.Char. proem (which all point backward to a proposal made at the start), and at Parm.137B4, where as here it sets out a program in prospect. The middle means to make a beginning in an argument (as the hypothesis of a play is the beginning point for a filling in of the details: cf.W.Trimpi, *Muses of One Mind* (Princeton 1983), 50ff), and therefore it can take a prepositional phrase (make a beginning with the topic X: *Parm.*137B4; *Isoc.*4.51; *Arist.*Meteor.340A23) or a question (begin with the question X: *Parm.*135E9, 136A5,B1; *Arist.*deCaelo 269B20). For indirect discourse the verb uses the infinitive (*Phdo.*100B5, *Prot.*339D2, *Soph.*237A3-4) but since it can take a bare noun (as to propose a subject for discussion: *Rep.*510C; *Tim.*53D5) it can appear to take a participial construction if its object is made subject of a circumstantial participle (e.g., *Parm.*136B7, C4). Here, we have neither of these constructions (neither τοῦτον οὕτως ἔχοντα nor τοῦτον οὕτως ἔχειν), but ώς τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος. The genitive and ώς are used to distinguish (with the genitive absolute) our belief (ώς) in the proposition from the beginning we proposed to make by hypothesizing that belief. It is our ground for

to move to the next point, with the agreement that if ever the matter should appear otherwise<sup>2111</sup> then we'll have to let everything go that we were able to<sup>2112</sup> infer from it.

Glaucon agrees and Socrates moves on to apply the principle. Nodding yes and shaking the head no,<sup>2113</sup> pursuing something to acquire it and avoiding it, drawing something near and repelling it from oneself<sup>2114</sup>—these all belong in the group of opposites<sup>2115</sup> (whether they be actions or passions does not affect their being opposites). Moreover, thirst and hunger and in short all desires, as well as consenting or choosing deliberately—these all we would place in the former group. That is, in concrete cases we will say that the soul of a desiring man either “pursues” that which it desires or that it “draws to itself” the thing it chooses to have, or in turn that to whatever extent it consents that the thing should be made available to it is “giving the nod” or saying yes about that thing to itself as though someone had put a question to it, revealing thereby its desire<sup>2116</sup> to get it.<sup>2117</sup> Conversely choosing not and denying consent and feeling no desire<sup>2118</sup> we would place in the category of her “repelling” and driving something off from herself and all the other contraries of those.<sup>2119</sup>

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making a beginning, and only in this sense something we “hypothesize”—a term that in itself has no meaning except this.

<sup>2111</sup> φανῆ (A8) dialectical.

<sup>2112</sup> ἡμῖν (A8) by its position it is an ethical dative of the theoretician, rather than a dative of agency with λελυμένα.

<sup>2113</sup> In Greek, τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ὀνανεύειν (B1), nodding the head and raising it. Where we shake the head for “No,” the Greeks raised it, and still do.

<sup>2114</sup> τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ὀνανεύειν καὶ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι (B1-3). The list is paced (cf. n.202): first a pair of verbs distinguished only by their opposing prefixes (*ἐπι-* and *ἀνα-*); then a pair that is parallel in meaning with alternative opposite prefixes, one the same and one different (*ἐπι-* and *ἀπο-*), and opposing roots too; and finally a third pair with a third pair of prefixes (one the same and one different) and a pair of opposing roots that redo the second pair more transitively. The selection of verbs in the middle voice corroborates the mootness of active and passive. For the overlapping substitution illustrated in the prefixes cf. n. 159. The deployment of syntax and diction that enforce the meaning without going so far as slavish parallelism is as characteristic of Plato's conversational diction and dialogical manner as his willingness to vary them when the meaning is patently the same. As the argument proceeds the variation can, and will, become radical.

<sup>2115</sup> τῶν ἐναντίων (B3): Genitive of the genus: cf. 439A1 and 376E9 with n. 1129.

<sup>2116</sup> ἐπορεγόμενον (C5) The elaboration with a new verb (*όρέγεσθαι*) affords an extra opportunity to use the “positive” prefix (*ἐπι-*).

<sup>2117</sup> οἵτοι ἐφίεσθαι ... ἢ προσάγεσθαι ... ἢ αὖ ... ἐπινεύειν (C2-4). The three items (1,2,3) in the new list are being associated with the three pairs (A,B,C) in the previous list without repeating the order of either list: *ἐπιθυμία* (1) with *ἐφίεσθαι* (B), *βούλεσθαι* (3) with *προσάγεσθαι* (C), and *ἐθέλειν* (2) with *ἐπινεύειν* (A).

<sup>2118</sup> μηδ' (C8), means merely “and not,” parallel with καὶ μή, as at Leg.743D2-4. For the article governing all items of a list (as if their common role as opposites were more important than any distinction one might draw between them) cf. 353D4-5; and Crito 47C9-10; Gorg.450D6-7, 508E1-4; Leg.634A3-4, 645D7, E1-2, 733E1-2, 863E6-8; Phdo.75C9-D2ff; Polit.258E8-9, 274A2, 284E4-5; Prot.312B1-2, 329C4-5 (in context of whether the virtues are one or many), 357A7-B1; Symp.207D8-E1, E2-3.

<sup>2119</sup> ἀπωθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν (C9) redoing only the third item from the list above, ἀπωθεῖσθαι (B3), now in the active rather than the middle. ἀπελαύνειν is mere exegesis on ἀπωθεῖν, being itself a closer antonym to προσάγεσθαι (B2), but affording a second opportunity to use the “negative” prefix (*ἀπο-*). The other two items in the original list are then incorporated dismissively with καὶ εἰς ἄποντα τάναντία.

Given all this, let us say there is a common aspect among desires as a group, and that among them considered separately<sup>2120</sup> the ones most easy to grasp and talk about are the ones we call thirst and hunger. The one is a desire for drink and the other for food. The question is whether thirst, as such, is a desire in the soul for anything more than for what we have just said? Is thirst a thirst for a warm drink as opposed to a cold one, or for a large drink or a small one, or in general for a drink of any specific kind? Or shall we say instead that if heat is added to the thirst, it would bring on<sup>2121</sup> a desire for coolness in addition to the desire for drink, and if coldness a desire for warmth?<sup>2122</sup> And that if by the compresence of a large quantity the thirst became a large thirst, it would be for a large one, and if it became small, one for a small one?<sup>2123</sup> The fact of being thirsty<sup>2124</sup> in and of itself could never ever<sup>2125</sup> turn into a desire other than what it is its nature to be, a desire for drink *per se*, and so also the fact of being hungry a desire for food *per se*.<sup>2126</sup>

"That's how I take it," Glaucon responds. "In itself each desire is a desire only for the object its nature is for; for this kind or that is the added elements."<sup>2127</sup>

(438) So now don't go letting somebody harass you<sup>2128</sup> into thinking we are being less than perspicuous, by claiming that nobody desires drink but always a worthwhile drink, nor food but food worth eating. Everybody of course<sup>2129</sup> desires the thing that works, so that if thirst is a desire it is a

<sup>2120</sup>αὐτῶν (D3) "reframing:" cf. n.1706.

<sup>2121</sup>The preposition from προσῆ (E1) is followed up by προσπαρέχοιτο (E1). The variation of the first declension feminine noun δίψα (D3,D9) with the third declension neuter δίψος (τῷ δίψῃ, D11-12), is purely gratuitous.

<sup>2122</sup>At the same time that the exemplary material is repeated (D11-E2), the re-expression of the cases undergoes radical compression: the case is 13 words long (D11-E1) and the counter-case 6 (E2).

<sup>2123</sup>The compression (E2-4) is again radical. Moreover the work done by πρός above (E1) is now done by παρά instead (παρουσίαν / παρέξεται, a verbal noun replacing the subjunctive προσῇ and a future indicative παρέξεται replacing potential optative προσπαρέχοιτ' ἄν); and, worst of all, the two cases (πολλή / ὀλίγη) are subsumed under a vague general term πλήθος (in a vague prepositional phrase, to boot) that might have meant a large amount but ends up meaning quantity in general, and in fact a *small* quantity in the first case (making the thirst large, just as the presence of heat had made for a thirst for cold and of cold for a hot one). The assertion that a hot thirst would desire a cold drink appear to have troubled the formalistic Hermann and he emended, needlessly. The passage avoids formalism at every possible opportunity, requiring thinking instead. The pains that Adam takes to make explicit the subtle and implicit logic of this passage (*ad* 437A[2], 437E[29], 438A(3), 438B[8], 438D[20], 438E[29]), illustrate exactly the sort of adjustment and edification that Glaucon is meant to be undergoing and carrying out within himself!

<sup>2124</sup>τὸ διψῆν (E4): Now the verb varies the neuter noun δίψος.

<sup>2125</sup>οὐ μή (E4) plus subjunctive, the strongest of denials, in defense of the virtual theory of forms.

<sup>2126</sup>πῶμα rhyming with βρῶμα (E5-6), as if the rhyme confirmed the point, though all that came before presupposes that diction, grammar, syntax, and semantics are mere externals, relative to the meaning. At the very moment he insists that the objects of thirst and of hunger are one and only one, he varies the word for them (from ποτόν and ἐδωδή). Accurate thought can always exploit, but never needs to rely on, careful wording. Indeed, to the extent it does, it isn't.

<sup>2127</sup>τοῦ δὲ τοίου ἢ τοίου τὰ προσγιγνόμενα (E8): Glaucon's response (E7-8) imitates the compression.

<sup>2128</sup>τοι (438A1).

<sup>2129</sup>γὰρ ἄρα (A3) a striking collocation, as if he surprises himself by having an explanation. The point is that desire was already for something good so that the goodness of a given object of desire is not consequent upon the specific nature of the given desire but upon the fact that it was a desire in the first place. The collocation appears four other places in the corpus. Near the beginning of the Protagoras (315D1) Socrates explains what he means when, in his narration of the figures he comes

desire for a drink that will do the job, a good version of what is thirst's inherent nature to desire, as is the case with all the other desires also.

"Yes<sup>2130</sup> that fellow's argument could appear to have some substance."

But his argument is defeated by a more general and pre-emptive argument that whatever is such as to be "of" something, the qualified version of that thing is such as to be "of" a something similarly qualified, whereas if unqualified the thing is simply "of" the unqualified something.

Glaucon does not get it.<sup>2131</sup>

Well you get that the larger is such as to be larger "than"<sup>2132</sup> something, don't you? Larger than the smaller, no? But also the much larger is larger than the much smaller, and the larger at such and such time will be larger than the thing that is smaller at that same time. And so it is with the more "in relation to" the less, twice as much in relation to half as much, and heavier in relation to lighter and faster in relation to slower, as well as the hot in relation to the cold and all the things like these.

"That much I get."

What about types of knowledge? Isn't it the same here? Knowledge *per se* is knowledge of learning *per se*, or however we should style the thing that knowledge is "of." But knowledge of a certain kind of thing or quality<sup>2133</sup> is of that certain quality or certain kind of thing. For instance when the knowledge of making a house came into existence it differed from other kinds of knowledge in upon at Callias's house, he says, "And there also Tantalus did I see:" ἐπεδήμει γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος. Here γὰρ indicates that he is telling us whom he meant by Tantalus, and ἄρα expresses his surprise at seeing the man himself about whose presence in Athens he had only heard rumors (whence the imperfect). At Gorg.469D3 (γάρ BTW : γε F [Dodds]) γάρ tells what the new thing is (ἄρτι) and ἄρα expresses the speaker's still-dawning sense of his new-found power. Similarly, at Leg.698D4 Datis's claim that he had captured every Eretrian is explained (γάρ) by a still-stunning claim (ἄρα) that he had gathered them together as in a net. Finally, at Symp.205B4, Diotima tells Socrates why (γάρ) he should not be surprised, since she has a new point (ἄρα) for him to consider. This last use is closest to the present one, and conversely supplies a justification for reading it there, where the mss. are not unanimous (ἄρα T Oxy : om. BW [Burnet]).

<sup>2130</sup>Glaucon's γάρ (A6) prevents us, whether he means to do so or not, from knowing whether he himself finds the argument challenging.

<sup>2131</sup>οὐκ ἔμαθον (B2) the aorist referring to the moment Socrates said what he said (cf. ἔμαθον, E9). His very perspicuous answer in the case of ἐπιθυμία (437E7-8), reveals that all Glaucon does not understand at this moment is Socrates's generalizing language. Socrates "explains" by giving more examples.

<sup>2132</sup>τινός (B5): Greek uses the bare genitive for a spectrum of relations, as witness the objective genitive ("of"), genitive of comparison ("than") and genitive of lack ("for" as with ἐπιθυμεῖν). Socrates's expression sustains a high level of generalization by employing a series of bare genitives rather than introducing a term for such relations. An English paraphrase, compelled to supply different prepositions nevertheless, requires the same mental work to be understood as was required by Socrates's formulation. For similar uses of the genitival relation cf. Charm.168B-169A, Symp.199C-200B, and Thet.160A. The semantic equivocation of the grammatical form weakens the argument not at all.

It is noteworthy that these further examples (B4-C4)—in particular their being opposites—suggest the commutativity of the relation Socrates is describing, i.e., that qualifying the thirst qualifies the drink, but qualifying the drink also qualifies the thirst. His next example after them, ἐπιστήμη, will draw this out more clearly since it is the μάθημα that gives οἰκοδομική its name (C6-D3).

<sup>2133</sup>τίς καὶ ποιά τις (C8). καί is epexegetical (cf. bare ποιά τις below, D5). τίς means what ὅστις means at Gorg.447D1, where Socrates suggests we ask Gorgias ὅστις ἔστιν, i.e., what is his occupation (cf. Dodds *ad loc.*): it asks for a "one word answer." The knowledges have names (that is, they are τινες) which they derive, as we are about to learn, from the ποιόν of their field of knowledge.

such a way that led to it being called “housebuilding.” This name arose from nothing but the specific quality of the knowledge that set it apart from all the others. So it was the “of what type of thing” it was knowledge that made it into the type of knowledge it is in itself. And the case is similar for the other arts and sciences.

“Yes it is.”

Alright then you can say this is what I was trying to say a moment ago, now that you get my meaning, that anything that is such as to be “of” something is, if taken alone and by itself, “of” that thing taken by itself and alone, but if taken as qualified, is “of” that thing as qualified.<sup>2134</sup> And I am not trying to say<sup>2135</sup> that the qualification of the thing they are “of” maps back onto the thing, which would give the odd result that a knowledge “of” the healthy and the sick would be a knowledge in itself healthy and sick, and that of the bad and good would itself be bad and good.<sup>2136</sup> I am only saying that if the object is qualified (in this case the healthy and the sick), the knowledge of it becomes qualified also. The qualification results in the knowledge no longer being called simply “knowledge” but, by virtue of this qualification being added, “medical knowledge.”<sup>2137</sup>

“I get your meaning and agree.”

(439) So to return to the case of thirst, wouldn’t you place it into the category of things that are “for” a certain something determined by their nature?<sup>2138</sup> Thirst, that is, is—

“For drink,” Glaucon volunteers.

And if it is for a qualified kind of drink it becomes a thirst qualified in some way, whereas thirst taken by itself is neither for a lot nor for a little, nor for a good or bad drink,<sup>2139</sup> nor for a drink qualified in any way. Rather the thirst for drink as such is thirst alone and thirst as such and is so by its nature as thirst. From this it follows that the soul of a man who thirsts, insofar as he thirsts, is looking to do nothing else than to drink, and desires only this and has an impulse only for this. And so, when<sup>2140</sup> something pulls her in the opposite direction while she is thirsting, it would be a second something in

<sup>2134</sup>My paraphrase uses chiasm as the Greek does (D12-13) but in a different place.

<sup>2135</sup>οὐ τι λέγω (E1).

<sup>2136</sup>νοσώδης (E3): There is more than the absurdity of a knowledge being sick. Knowledge tends to be knowledge of opposites (e.g., what is healthy and what is not), so that if in general the qualification did map back onto the knowledge, the knowledge would oppose itself and become a self-contradiction.

<sup>2137</sup>ἰατρικήν (E8): This second example of a ποιότης conferred back on the thing (i.e., ιατρική) by its correlate (i.e. τὸ ύγιεινὸν καὶ νοσῶδες), is placed in the sense that it dispenses with the crutch of an etymological relation that made the first example easier to understand (ἐργασία οἰκίας / οἰκοδομική, D1-3).

<sup>2138</sup>τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστιν (439A2), restates what had been stated above by οὐπερ πέφυκεν (437E5, E8, and cf. A7, *infra*), with πέφυκεν standing in contrast to the qualifications that “come into existence” (ἔγενετο, 438D2, D8, E4, E6, all going back to γένηται at 437A5).

<sup>2139</sup>οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ (A5-6): This pair of candidate qualifications is repeated from 438E3. It does not contradict the stipulation that persons always desire the good (χρηστόν is used, 438A1-5): though all thirsts are thirsts for good drink it is only *qua* desire that thirst is a desire for a good drink, not *qua* thirst.

<sup>2140</sup>ἀνθέλκει (B3): The mood indicates it is less an hypothesis than an observation, and “when” might be a better translation for εἴ ποτε than “if ever.” The condition is mixed (with an optative apodosis), already intimating familiarity with times the soul somehow resists its desire to drink (C2-4, καὶ μάλα ...).

her, different from the thing that for its part<sup>2141</sup> was doing the thirsting, animalistically<sup>2142</sup> driving her toward drinking. For we deny that the same part could act<sup>2143</sup> contrary to the same part in the same respect. Likewise it would be better to say of the archer not that his arms push away and draw back the bow,<sup>2144</sup> but that the arm that is doing the pushing away is one arm and the one that is doing the pulling back is an other and different<sup>2145</sup> one.

Now there certainly are times when people thirst but refuse to drink.<sup>2146</sup> We should account for this by saying that there is within the soul of such people an element that says yea to drink and another that says nay,<sup>2147</sup> a second element that masters the bidding one.<sup>2148</sup> And isn't it the case that when a preventing element arises in the soul it arises out of calculation and reason, whereas the forces of pushing and drawing approach it through passions and diseases?<sup>2149</sup>

"So it seems."

Thus it is not without reason<sup>2150</sup> that we will expect these elements to be distinct from and other

<sup>2141</sup>αὐτοῦ and ἔτερον (B3-4): This terminology now applies the hyperlogical language established at 436A8ff (cf. nn.2091, 2092, 2098, 2101, 2107), preparing for the reintroduction (B5-6) of the principle there reached (436E9-7A2).

<sup>2142</sup>Reading θηρίου (B4) with all best mss. Castellani's collation of Ven.B and Stobaeus have θηρίον which in turn is read by most modern editors without comment (see now Slings, *Critical Notes*, 191, who chooses θηρίου, and who incidentally reports that at *Plac.Hipp.Pl.* 5.7.36-40, Galen reads the genitive not the accusative as Burnet and Chambray reported), even though in the passages they cite as parallels for the metaphor (e.g. *Rep.*589, *Polit.*309E) the θηρίον is an aspect or tendency or state of the soul, not the soul itself. That the beast should be led rather than leading (ἄγοντος) and the soul leading rather than led, of course begs the question. Cf. ὄγοντα below (D1).

<sup>2143</sup>Reading ἀμ' ἀν (B6), with Burnet. "Carrying over" of ἀν can take place by dint of close parallelism in expression (as 382D7-11 and 352E6-353A2: cf. n.1280), but such parallelism is absent here.

<sup>2144</sup>ἀπωθούνται τε καὶ προσέλκονται (B9): The middle plurals along with τε καὶ combine the two actions into one confused complex; then μέν / δε and the singular participles (ἀπωθούσα / προσαγομένη, B10-11) pull it apart and attribute its components to the arms separately.

<sup>2145</sup>ἄλλη μέν ... ἔτερα δέ (B10): again the language of ἄλλος and ἔτερος is closely tailored to the immediate logical context (cf.436A9 and n.2092), ἄλλος with μέν proleptically announcing that another is coming and ἔτερος insisting that the other is the alternative to or complement of the one.

<sup>2146</sup>οὐκ with ἐθέλειν (C2), here adhaerent. Circumstances under which a person is just plain thirsty but unwilling to drink do not so readily come to mind. The vehemence of Glaucon's reply (C4) therefore suggests that it is the desire to drink wine that they have in mind, and moreover that he knows it's true because he has felt it. The aposiopesis suggests an acute sense of shame about dipsomania (cf. a similar aposiopesis at *Phdrs.*238B2-3). Cf. also the unquestioned tee-totalism of 403E4-6.

<sup>2147</sup>τὸ κελεῦνον / τὸ κωλῦνον (C5-7): the congenial rhyme of the opposites is emphasized by anaphora of ἐνεῖναι with μέν and δέ.

<sup>2148</sup>κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύοντος (C7): The participial formulation is borrowed from the example of the archer.

<sup>2149</sup>The elaboration and specification in this description of an event within the soul (C9-D2), is striking. It is effected by a careful and contrasting choice of prepositions: ἐγίγνεται, of the κωλῦνον, is contrasted with παραγίγνεται of the ἄγοντα, and these come respectively ἐξ the λογισμός but διά the παθήματα. The elaboration of παθήματα (an aspect of soul already mentioned at 437B4) with derogatory νοσήματα is likewise striking.

<sup>2150</sup>οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως (D4): The litotes again (cf. 436B2-3 and n.2095) reminds us that reason is the element by which the several elements in the soul are being, and can be, definitively divided, including the rational element (ῷ λογιζεται, D5).

than each other, and call the one by which the soul reasons the “rational” element and the one by which she feels eros and hungers and thirsts and finds herself stunned by the other appetites<sup>2151</sup> “irrational and appetitive,”<sup>2152</sup> the companion of satiations and pleasures.

“Not without reason but with good cause would we adopt this way of looking at it.”

Accordingly, then, we have distinguished two types of thing as elements within the soul. As to the element of will and spirit -- the thing that is by which we feel anger -- is this a third or would you consider it similar in kind to one of these two?

“Perhaps it is like the second, the appetitive.”<sup>2153</sup>

I once heard a story that makes me think otherwise, about a certain Leontius the son of Aglaion, how he was walking up from the Peiraeus one day along the path outside the eastern wall, and noticed there were some corpses laid out by the executioner, and how he was feeling a desire to look at them but then also became peeved at himself (440) and tried to dissuade himself from doing so.<sup>2154</sup> For a good while the battle raged within him, as he shielded his vision; but in the end, overcome by desire, opening his eyes wide, running up to the corpses,<sup>2155</sup> “Take yourselves<sup>2156</sup> a good look, you wretches!” he said. “Drink in your fill<sup>2157</sup> of this splendid<sup>2158</sup> sight!”

“I’ve heard that story, too.”

This story shows how anger can on occasion be at war with the pleasures, as if it were one thing at war with another. And we see the same thing elsewhere too, whenever the pleasures try to force a person against his reason. We see the man berating himself and enraged by the element within that is trying to force him, as though the spirited element had allied itself with the reason in a faction against the desires. Whereas to witness it ever making common cause with the desires to work against the reason and its decision that one must not behave so, that I think you would deny you ever see taking place within yourself nor in anybody else either.

<sup>2151</sup> ἐρῆ τε καὶ πεινῆ καὶ διψῆ (D6-7). The list employs the characteristic triad of desires (cf. 329A6 and n.55) and then moves to generalization with a periphrastic expression that provides place for the term ἐπιθυμία, so as to give a basis for the term ἐπιθυμητικόν parallel to the grounding of λογιστικόν with φῶ λογίζεται, above (D5). The term needs such a justification because it is virtual coinage (though cf. ἐπιθυμητικῶς, *Phdo.* I 08A7). For a list functioning to create place for a needed new term cf. 431C1-3 and n.2030. The generalization here includes a derogatory spin (ἐπτόηται), just as νοσήματα had been added to παθήματα above.

<sup>2152</sup> ἀλόγιστον τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν (D7-8): ἀλόγιστον both introduces ἐπιθυμητικόν as the antithesis of the rational element and also echoes ἀλόγως (D4) so as to stress that the very analysis is being done not by the desiring part of the soul but the rational part.

<sup>2153</sup> ισως τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ (E5). He is influenced by the etymological root that ἐπιθυμητικόν and τὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ share, a linguistic feature hard to bring over into English.

<sup>2154</sup> The present optatives (E9-440A1) in secondary sequence represent imperfect indicatives. ὅμω with μέν and δέ explicitly states that he was doing the two things at the same time, but αὖ with the second acknowledges the one follows the other in some way.

<sup>2155</sup> κρατούμενος / διελκύσας / προσδραμών (A1-2): The three participial phrases in asyndeton describe the operation of the ἐπιθυμητικόν in a syntactically sub-rational way, at the same time that they hold in abeyance the syntactically ordinary echelon of the indicative for the irruption, eruption, and interruption of the θυμός.

<sup>2156</sup> ιδοὺ ὑμῖν (A2): The fact he uses the second person on himself reminds us we are seeing the division in the soul in action.

<sup>2157</sup> ἐμπλήσθητε (A3): Again pleasure is characterized as a πλήρωσις: cf. 439D8 and 442A7 (*bis*). Cf. much later πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ, 585A3 et seq.; 606A4-7.

<sup>2158</sup> τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος (A3): Sarcasm and derision are vehicles of the θυμός.

"By Zeus I would deny it."

What about the case when somebody thinks he is committing an unjust act? The more noble the man the less he is able to become angry, despite the pains of hunger and cold and all the rest that he might be subjected to by a man he believes is acting justly in making him feel this way<sup>2159</sup>—or, as I might put it, his spirit is not wont to be aroused against that man. Whereas what if he believes he has been treated unjustly? Doesn't the spirit within him fume and grate and take up arms for the cause he judges to be just? Holding steadfast through hunger and cold<sup>2160</sup> and all other such suffering he achieves victory, and veers from the path of noble behavior not once until either he succeeds or he succumbs or else, called off by his companion, reason, the way a dog is called off by his shepherd, he can return to calm and rest.

"The spirit is quite alike to this; but let me remind you<sup>2161</sup> that it was to dogs we had likened our helpers when we set it down they should hearken to the rulers as to shepherds of the city."

My meaning exactly! But would you add what I would, that things have turned out the very opposite of what we guessed a moment ago about the spirited element? Then we thought it might be part of the appetitive aspect, but now we are saying that is far from true and that in the factions within the soul the spirit marshals its arms on the side of the rational aspect. Now we must ask if it is other than this, in turn, or is it part of the rational, so that again the soul has not three aspects within it but two, the rational and appetitive? Or rather, just as the city had three species<sup>2162</sup> within it—the (441) moneymakers, the assistants, and the counsellors<sup>2163</sup>—so likewise in the soul this spirited element is a third aspect, by its nature an assistant to the rational element as long as its upbringing does not destroy it.

"Necessarily it is a third aspect."<sup>2164</sup>

So it would be, if it should become plain that the spirited element is a different thing from the

<sup>2159</sup>We may fill in this description (C1-5) with the case of a man rightly found guilty and imprisoned, and his feelings toward the juror that sent him there.

<sup>2160</sup>διὰ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ ρίγοῦν (C8-9). The pains of hunger and cold are the same but the circumstances are different: now he is on the battlefield.

<sup>2161</sup>καίτοι γε (D4).

<sup>2162</sup>The γένη (441A1), which according to the myth of metals breed true, may be thought of as "species."

<sup>2163</sup>χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρητικόν, βουλευτικόν (A1): This preliminary and enthymemic guess about how the soul might have three parts as the city does, corresponds exactly to Glaucon's guess about the previous question (439E5), except that this time the guess happens to be right instead of wrong. The naming of three types is a perfect instance of the substitution of synonyms to make the point easier to accept. The way was prepared when the ἐπίκουροι and φύλακες had been pushed in the direction of being στρατιώται and ἄρχοντες (414D3, 433C6-D1) and then categorized as πολεμικόν and βουλευτικόν (434B2-3). Calling the ruling species τὸ βουλευτικόν has slanted them in the direction of the λογιστικόν; calling the helpers στρατιώται and then τὸ πολεμικόν has slanted them in the direction of the θυμοειδές. The δημιουργοί had been pushed into the identity of χρηματισταί (cf. 434A9, C7-8), though in all strictness a connection between money and appetite has yet to be made.

<sup>2164</sup>ἢν γε (A5). Glaucon's "necessity" (A4) is an overstatement, as Socrates immediately notes. There is only the neat parallelism between the helping role of the third class in the city and the presently revealed helping function of the spirited element within the soul, and between the (deliberating) rulers in the city and the (deliberative) rational element in the soul that they respectively help, and even these parallelisms partly depend on the slanting terminology described in the previous note.

rational as it became plain it was a different thing from the appetitive.<sup>2165</sup>

“But for that to become plain is an easy matter,” Glaucon offers. “The fact<sup>2166</sup> is, one can see in children that when they are first born they are well equipped with spirit, whereas some of them barely ever attain a share of reason, though most get it after a while.”

Yes—a nice argument.<sup>2167</sup> One can observe the same thing in beasts.<sup>2168</sup> And then there is that line from Homer we mentioned before,

He beat himself in the chest and thus addressed his heart ...

There it is clear as day that Homer depicts the element that does the beating as distinct from the element being beaten,<sup>2169</sup> as something that reasons and takes stock of the better and worse distinct from something that is subject to irrational moods.

“So true.”

### 2.B.7: Articulation of Justice within the Soul

And so step by step we have kept our head all the way through,<sup>2170</sup> and reached an agreement founded on likelihood, that the same kinds<sup>2171</sup> are found in the city and the same in the soul of each individual, kinds equal also in number. As such it follows that the way a city was wise and by what part of itself it was wise, so also and by the same part must the individual be wise; and that the way an individual is brave and in the part of himself he is brave, in this part and in this way the city also must

<sup>2165</sup> φανῆ (A5): This “becoming plain” is φαίνεσθαι in the dialectical sense (n.210), an event of clarification encountered within the argument. Last time the event was the story of Leontius (439E6-40A7) elaborated by the hypothetical cases of the man acting unjustly and the man being treated unjustly (440CD). These cases are being viewed as virtual empirical evidence.

<sup>2166</sup> καὶ γάρ (A7), adducing a fact or single case as a reason and warrant.

<sup>2167</sup> With καλῶς γε εἶπες (B2) Socrates praises the underlying logic of Glaucon’s remarks, despite the fact that he overdraws things in order to establish the essential independence of θυμός and λόγος. Not only do children possess θυμός from the beginning, but the other may never arrive (this is the overdrawing of the case, which makes the logical point), though usually it does (conceding the empirical facts once the logical point is made).

<sup>2168</sup> ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις (B2-3): In the case of animals the rational element never arises, suggesting it can hardly be the creature of the will.

<sup>2169</sup> στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἡνίπαπε μύθῳ (B6), = Od. 20.17: Odysseus is angrily contemplating the behavior of the suitors (κακὰ φρονέων κατὰ θυμόν, v. 5). Homer very pertinently says πολλὰ δέ μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν (10), contrasting thought with anger, but Socrates quotes the later line to stress the opposition or fight – the “contradiction” – between the parts.

<sup>2170</sup> διανεύκαμεν (C4): If the verb is a form of νεύω, its use again confirms that the soul that is deciding (nodding head for yes and shaking head for no) through the very process of the argument, is the same as the soul that the argument is about (cf. ἐπινεύειν / ἀνανεύειν with which the disquisition on soul began, 437B1). The verb may be νέω: Plato does use the rare verb διανέω of making one’s way through an argument (*Parm.* 137A6, *Phdr.* 264A5), though in those cases the metaphor has a distinct application drawn out with adjacent words, whereas here it stands alone. It may refer to the shifting or bobbing possibilities (one preliminary guess [439E1] proving wrong and the next [440E10ff] proving right), through which they have plied their path.

<sup>2171</sup> γένη (C6) now logical rather than biological in meaning (contrast A1).

be brave; and so on, with the other virtues in both cases.<sup>2172</sup>

Thus in respect to justice, I think we will be agreeing that a man will be just in the same way we found a city to be.

“This too follows, with inexorable logic.”

But let's be sure<sup>2173</sup> we haven't forgotten how the city was just, how when we considered her a moment ago we saw that<sup>2174</sup> it was by virtue of the parts inside her keeping to their own tasks—all three of them—that she was just.

“I'd say we haven't forgotten this.”

So then it is incumbent upon us to recognize that when it comes to each of us<sup>2175</sup> as individuals, whenever the distinct parts within us keep to their own tasks, the individual will be a just person in the sense that he too will be doing what is his business to do.

“Incumbent it is upon us to be mindful of this.”

Now what it befits the rational element in us to do is to rule, by virtue of its being wise and prudent with regard to the needs of the soul as a whole, whereas what befits the spirited element is to be at its beck and call and fight on its behalf. As we said the combination and mixture of music and gymnastics will harmonize these two<sup>2176</sup> with (442) each other by inspiring attention in the one and

<sup>2172</sup>τὰ αὐτὰ μέν / τὰ αὐτὰ δέ (C5-6): Sameness is reciprocal or reversible. It is not that the soul is like the city nor that city is like soul, but that the virtues are the same in both (435A5-7).

<sup>2173</sup>ἀλλ' οὐ πῃ μὴν τοῦτο γε ἐπιλελήσμεθα (D8): the collocation of particles combines urgency with carefulness. The logical relation of the sentence—that it is a minor premise—is announced methodically by ἀλλὰ μήν γε; the urgency comes from this collocation being interrupted by οὐ πῃ and τοῦτο (reading all these, with Burnet). We are after all on the brink of the answer for which we have been waiting for some time.

<sup>2174</sup>ἐκείνη (D8) carefully distinguishes the conclusion, reached before and on its own grounds (432B7-433C2), from its application in the present context. There is a hint of inescapability in the verbal adjectives (μνημονευτέον) that is new. Up until now we have been hoping to reach a definition of justice at all. As we approach success it becomes incumbent upon us to remember (cf. ἐπιλελήσμεθα / ἐπιλελῆσθαι D8, 11) and be mindful (μνημονευτέον) of the conclusion we have reached, and indeed to act in accordance with it. Cf. 472C8-D1.

<sup>2175</sup>μνημονευτέον ἄρα ἡμῖν ὅτι καὶ ἡμῶν ἔκαστος (D12): For the first time, the “we” of theoretical engagement (the ethical dative ἡμῖν) stands alongside the “we” (ἡμῶν) upon whom as individual men ethical truth impinges (though παρ’ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς at 435A3 and ἡμῶν at 435E2 did broach the matter).

<sup>2176</sup>μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κράσις σύμφωνα αὐτὰ ποιήσει (E8-9): Socrates opportunistically incorporates material from the speculation on education (410B10-412A7) to strengthen the analogy from state to soul. The relation of the ἐπίκουροι (the civic θυμοειδές) to the φύλακες (the civic λογιστικόν) has so far been described only in terms of the willingness of the former to hearken loyally to the latter (ὑπηκόῳ ... καὶ συμμάχῳ, E6) and the latter's oversight and concern (προμήθεια, E5) for the former; and it is only these relations that he needs to derive from the reference to the education, namely, the attentiveness that the philosophical element derives from gymnastics (as well as the nourishment it receives from music), and the moderation the spirited element derives from its exposure to music. For the balancing and harmonizing language ἐπιτείνουσι and ἀνιεῖσα compare ἐπιτεινομένω καὶ ἀνιεμένω (412A1) and τραφέν ... ἐπιταθέν / ἀνεθέντος ... τραφέντος (410D7-E2); and for τρέφουσα cf. τρεφόμενον (411D5). For παραμυθομένη cf. πειθοῖ (411D8); for λόγοις τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθήμασιν cf. τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ (401D2). Moreover the discovery at the end of the treatment of education, that music and gymnastics serve not soul and body but the two parts of soul, fits perfectly with the sequel here (442A4-B3), in which the third element of the soul, the

nourishing it with beautiful thoughts and studies,<sup>2177</sup> at the same time that it relaxes the other with encouraging words, and tames it with harmony and rhythm.<sup>2178</sup> Nourished and educated and taught in this way truly<sup>2179</sup> to excel at their own special tasks, this twain of elements will preside<sup>2180</sup> over the appetitive aspect, which constitutes the mass portion<sup>2181</sup> of the soul in each man and the one least easily satiated by material things,<sup>2182</sup> facts the two of them will monitor most closely lest it fill itself up with the so-called pleasures of the body and expand and become strong and then might no longer keep to its own respective work but seek to enslave and rule over<sup>2183</sup> elements it is not suited by its own nature to rule, and thereby might ruin the whole fabric of life for all.<sup>2184</sup> And against external enemies, also, aren't these two ideally suited to protect the entire soul and body, the one formulating a plan and the other carrying it out on the battlefield and achieving it with its bravery.

Likewise then in the case of bravery,<sup>2185</sup> we will call the individual man brave because of this part ἐπιθυμητικόν, plays the role of the “body” (or the mass of citizens) over which the educated elements (or guards) may stand as ἐπιστάτης (412A10).

<sup>2177</sup> For this beauty compare 401D2 τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ.

<sup>2178</sup> The simultaneous participles (441E9-442A2) express feelings of success and conviction inspired by the fortuitous alignments the interlocutors are discovering within and among the fields of education and state and soul, resembling in this the mood produced at 399A5-C4 and 372AB. παραμυθομένη includes a reference to λόγος which, along with the subsequent datives ἀρμονίᾳ and ῥυθμῷ, brings out the triad of elements studied in the musical education.

<sup>2179</sup> ὡς ἀληθῶς (442A4), used of something true in a new way. The corrective effects of the duplex paideia to which he has just alluded (E3-6) enable the reason to do its work without softening and the will to do its work without turning to iron (cf. 410B10-12A7). The paideia can therefore be said to help each of them to act justly according to the definition newly reached.

<sup>2180</sup> προστήσετον (A5), a future active dual (the reading of AFD and Stobaeus) is not impossible. The redivision of the dual subject yoked together above (μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κράτις, 441E8-9) is tolerable, and a subsequent shift in subject from this affecting pair to the affected pair in τηρήσετον (A7) is a natural progression in exegesis. However, Bekker's suggestion προστατήσετον (with τούτω as subject) is not only “better than the ms.” (as Shorey puts it) but also echoes ἐπιστάτου in the precedent passage (412A10).

<sup>2181</sup> πλεῖστον (A6), denoting a great amount while still remaining singular, straddles between the concept of the individual soul and the plurality of the polis (i.e., οἱ πολλοί) to which the soul is being likened.

<sup>2182</sup> χρημάτων (A6) stands in for ἐπιθυμιῶν according to the present project of welding three triads together: the tripartition of goods (virtue, strength, possessions), the three classes of the polis (rulers, enforcers, moneymakers: 441A1), and the three parts of the soul (mind, will, appetite).

<sup>2183</sup> καταδουλώσασθαι (B1): ingressive aorist, depicting a result achieved by main force (ἰσχυρὸν γενόμενον). In contrast, the durative aspect of the present ἄρχειν (*ibid.*) denotes holding the office of rule and exercising its duties, something the ἐπιθυμητικόν is by nature unable to do. The point is expanded at 444B3-5 (cf. n.2220).

<sup>2184</sup> σύμπαντα τὸν βίον πάντων ἀνατρέψῃ (B2-3) would be hyperbolic if it applied only to the soul (there being only three parts and therefore only two others), but it also alludes to the “everybody” in the polis with its large lower class. It corresponds to πολιτείᾳ at 412A10 just as ἀνατρέψῃ represents the opposite of what σώζεσθαι meant there.

Semantic strains, slantings, straddlings and slips—in one word, metonymy—are the very substance of analogies, as for instance between state and soul (here); or between body and soul (e.g., σαθρός used of the soul, *Gorg.*479B8; πλάνη of the soul, *Phdo.*81A6 after being used objectively at 80B4-5 [cf. 79C6ff and cf. 444B7 below]); or between judge and doctor (ἀμαρτήματα in reference to body, *Gorg.*479A7-8); or between dialectician and doctor (ἀπορεῖν of the doctor, *Gorg.*522A1, πικροί of the dialectician's λόγοι, B8 [cf. A1]). Cf. n.1550.

<sup>2185</sup> καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δή ... (B11) effects a transition to bravery in the individual by resuming the

– that is, whenever the spirited part in him runs the gauntlet of pains and pleasures preserving and defending the instructions it has received from his reasonings regarding what is critical and what is not; and wise because of that very small part that we just described as ruling<sup>2186</sup> within him and passing down the instructions, that for its own part<sup>2187</sup> has within itself the knowledge of the true interest of each part and of the common fate they share;<sup>2188</sup> and temperate by the friendship and harmony they enjoy with each other when the ruling principle among them and the two of them that it rules share the opinion that it is the rational element that must rule and are free from faction with it.

“Temperance is nothing other than this whether you wish to speak of a city or an individual.”<sup>2189</sup>

So, as to our main topic, the way or the sense in which<sup>2190</sup> the individual will be just accords with our much-stated principle. I would hazard to say that the portrait of justice we now have reached retains every feature<sup>2191</sup> we saw<sup>2192</sup> it having in its civic version, so that we have no cause think there is a justice other than this.<sup>2193</sup> I could always<sup>2194</sup> add some more vulgar support for our conclusion,

expression used for the individual’s justice above (καὶ δίκαιον δή, 441D5-6). It will be continued, with variation, for individual wisdom and temperance below (C5, C10).

<sup>2186</sup> ἡρχεν (C5); παρήγγελλεν (C6): The imperfects succeed the aorist (παραγγελθέν, C2) to depict τὸ λογιστικόν as occupying the position of ruler, or being ruler according to its nature—not just issuing willful commands: cf. ἄρχειν (B1) with n.2183.

<sup>2187</sup> αὐτὸν (C6) indicating the respective work or ability in the λογιστικόν whose presence warrants the man being called wise. The ἐπιστήμη described corresponds to προμήθεια at 441E5, which itself hearkens back to the εὑβουλία of the rulers (428C11-D3).

<sup>2188</sup> ἐκάστῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν (C7), depicting a knowledge of what each part must be and do, and therefore what is good for the whole soul, just as the man whose parts each stuck to their respective jobs could therefore be called a man who himself sticks to his job (καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων, 441E2).

<sup>2189</sup> πόλεώς τε καὶ ιδιώτου (D3): The quick elaboration of the answer indicates the end of the section (cf. n.1353).

<sup>2190</sup> τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως (D4-5): The combination of the dative and the adverb refers back to the expression of the analogy between state and individual above: ως ... καὶ Ὡ (441C9-10, for σοφία), Ὡ ... καὶ ως (441D1, for ἀνδρεία), the dative referring to the place or part in which each virtue inheres. With the mention of justice (and temperance) the virtue does not exist only in one group but in the groups’ interrelation (σωφροσύνη) or their parallel unmeddlesomenesses (δικαιοσύνη). Thus the bare dative used with justice (τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ, 441D6) appears parallel to the dative used before but deftly avoids the dative of the part and incorporates the adverbial idea which alone is appropriate to justice (as it would have been with σωφροσύνη, the mention of which was however avoided by the generalization at 441D2-3), by adding τρόπος (D5-6). That dative was then continued with a dative articular infinitive (τῷ ... πράττειν, 441D9). Similarly, at 442C10 the dative τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ employed in the description of temperance is morphologically parallel but no longer the “dative of the part” we had just had in the cases of bravery (τούτῳ τῷ μέρει, 442B11) and wisdom (ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, C5); it is the purpose of αὐτῶν there (C10) to bring the parts back into the formulation.

<sup>2191</sup> ἀπαμβλύνεται (D7) refers among other things to the discovery of tripartition in soul, and the correspondence of its parts to the parts of the city and of the relations among them that constitutes justice.

<sup>2192</sup> ἐφάνη (D8) dialectical: cf. ἐμφαίνηται, 434E5.

<sup>2193</sup> ἄλλο τι δοκεῖν εἶναι (D7-8): The infinitive is epexegetical to ἀπαμβλύνεται: (“dulled into seeming something different from what it was”). The phrase refers back to the alternative envisioned with ἐὰν δέ τι ἄλλο ἐν τῷ ἐνί ἐμφαίνηται, 434E4-5.

<sup>2194</sup> γάρ (D10) explains the confident tone of his previous assertion (D7-8), in light of Glaucon limiting his agreement to himself, personally (ἔμοιγε). The extra remarks will help secure the

support we can administer in case some aspect in the soul is still at odds.<sup>2195</sup> For instance if we were asked about our city and about the individual who by his nature and education is its analogue, whether it, and he, would be likely to embezzle a deposit of silver or gold entrusted to his (443) safekeeping,<sup>2196</sup> couldn't we answer that nobody and no state is more likely to do so than those that are unlike ours? And as for pillaging temples and theft and treachery, whether in the private life of the individual among his friends or the public life of the city,<sup>2197</sup> wouldn't our just city and just individual be exempt from such behavior? Nor could they prove untrustworthy in any way whatsoever,<sup>2198</sup> whether in treaties or in personal agreements.<sup>2199</sup> Adultery withal, or disregard for their parents, or neglecting their gods<sup>2200</sup> —these you would expect from anybody else before them. And the reason in every instance is that each aspect of himself that is a part within him is doing what belongs to it to do in connection with

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conclusion from all points of view (*παντάπασι*). *βεβαιωσαίμεθα* refers back to 435A2-3: καὶ φωνερὰν γενομένην *βεβαιωσόμεθα αὐτὴν παρ'* ήμīν αὐτοῖς. There, ήμīν αὐτοῖς countenanced an adjustment within ourselves that would be necessary once the truth became clear; this adjustment is now described as φορτικὰ προσφέρειν, where the verb suggests medicament: see next n.

<sup>2195</sup> εἴ τι ήμῶν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμφισβῆτε (E1) continues the references to the identity between investigator (Socrates, Glaucon, and us) and the subject under investigation (soul): cf. 441D12 and n.2175. It does not refer to 'a trace of doubt lingering in our minds' (J.-C.), or 'un brin de perplexité' (Leroux), but a part or aspect of the soul that still *quarrels* with and *resists* the conclusion. It is to this part (αὐτῷ, E1) that the φορτικά in question will be applied. They are not tests, but arguments with a broad and vulgar appeal administered as remedies (as at 403A10, 563D6, 604D4: cf., LSJ, s.v. *προσφέρω*, I.3.b) to the φορτικώτερον τῆς ψυχῆς. For the method cf. 501D1-502C8 and 589C7-590C7, and n.2958 on γάρ at 501D1.

The part of the soul in question is the one that relies inordinately on gross external indices of behavior to corroborate what reason already knows, a reliance characteristic among persons who fear their shadow (cf. *Phdō*.101D) and are comfortable only when they are sure they are imitating themselves. Arguments κατὰ τὸ εἰκός assuage but only perpetuate this weakness, since they will never provide the dispositive proof it craves. Socrates will use the occasion to rebound and bring Glaucon to a higher plane of argument; but the others present will have a different reaction (Book Five, *init.*).

<sup>2196</sup> παρακαταθήκην χρυσίου ἢ ἀργυρίου (E6), recalls the image of the just man reached momentarily in the conversation with Polemarchus (333C7, n.b. παρακαταθέσθαι): our result saves that image.

<sup>2197</sup> ιεροσυλιῶν καὶ κλοπῶν καὶ προδοσιῶν (443A3), the first two items recall Thrasymachus's list of the common criminal acts (citing the first and last: *ιερόσυλοι* καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρύχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ *κλέπται*, 344B3-4), but προδοσιῶν and the expansion of *ιδίᾳ* ἐταίρων with δημοσίᾳ πόλεων go on to include his great act of unjust betrayal, as well (πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασιν καὶ αὐτούς, 344B5-6). Thrasymachus was after all contemplating a kind of injustice that would change the πολιτεία.

<sup>2198</sup> Reading καὶ μὴν οὐδ' *όπωστιοῦν* ἄπιστος (A6) with ADM rather than ὅπως τί γε οὖν (F) or ὁπωστισγεοῦν (Stobaeus) or the conjectures of Hartman (όπωστιοῦν ἄν) or Burnet (όπωστιοῦν γ' ἄν). There is no need to emend; ἄν is "carried forward" as often in parallel questions. (cf.382D11 and n.1280).

<sup>2199</sup> κατὰ ὄρκους ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ὁμολογίας (A6-7): If ὄρκοι refers to divinely sanctioned civic pacts, ὁμολογίαι may refer to private agreements, in which case ἄλλας is adverbial. The pairing recalls Cephalus's uses for money: ὁφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα, 331B2-3.

<sup>2200</sup> μοιχεῖαι γε μὴν καὶ γονέων ἀμέλειαι καὶ θεῶν ἀθεραπευσίαι (A9-10): To the list of injustices is added a list of impieties. For the contents cf. 386A2-3 and n.; and for the complementarity of justice and piety cf. 331A4 and n. The list's homoioteleuton in -αι and its parallel genitives show rising indignation, echoed by Glaucon's definitive answers in agreement: τίνα; οὐδέν(α) (442E7-3A2) // ἐκτός; ἐκτός. (A4-5) // ὁπωστιοῦν ἄν; πᾶς γὰρ ἄν; (A6-8) // παντί; παντί. (A10-11).

ruling and being ruled. Would you then still look for justice to be something else than<sup>2201</sup> this power that produces such men and cities as behave in this way?

Glaucon would not, so that Socrates can conclude:

Our dream then has all come true, the idea we said we had had an inkling of, how perhaps, with the guidance of some deity, at the very beginning of our construction of the state had hit upon the very principle and character of justice.<sup>2202</sup> And yet<sup>2203</sup> what we saw then was merely a likeness of justice—helpful nonetheless<sup>2204</sup>—the notion that it was proper for a shoemaker to make shoes and do nothing else, and a builder to build, and so forth. The truth of the matter was always this, as it appears, that justice does indeed resemble this,<sup>2205</sup> but it concerns not the external conduct of one's business, but the internal action of what is truly one's own<sup>2206</sup> self and truly his business, that the individual<sup>2207</sup> disallows the distinct parts of himself to practice alien jobs nor allows the separate groups or types<sup>2208</sup> within himself to interfere with each other's work, but places his inner house<sup>2209</sup> in order, to rule with one part of himself and be ruled with the other, to achieve grace and friendship within himself, to fit the three parts of himself neatly into one and harmonize them like a major triad along with all the other notes of the scale.<sup>2210</sup> All this he will bind together and integrate into his single selfhood, temperate and tempered, and when it comes to action withal,<sup>2211</sup> whether it have to do with the

<sup>2201</sup> οὐτι τι οὖν ἔτερον ζητεῖς (B4): Socrates's question will close the review of φορτικά, echoing as it does the question with which it opened (ἄλλο τι δικαιοσύνη δοκεῖν εἶναι, D7-8). But it was Glaucon's answer to his last question (καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο, B3) that gave him the warrant to ask it.

<sup>2202</sup> He refers not directly to 369E-70C, where the principle of ἔαυτοῦ πράττειν is first adopted, with proof, but to 432D-433A, where the deeper importance of the principle that had been adopted suddenly came into view. Thought is not knowledge but can be the medium in which knowledge or truth appear. As to the tenses of the infinitives, since they had had the inkling before they said they had it, we have the punctual aorist ὑποπτεῦσαι; since they were contemplating the possibility that the inkling was true at the time they voiced it, we have κινδυνεύειν, present as at 433B3.

<sup>2203</sup> τὸ δέ (C4) adverbial adversative akin to νῦν δέ.

<sup>2204</sup> δι' ὁ καὶ ὠφέλει (C4): The image or likeness (εἴδωλόν τι) can either limit and expand understanding. It may be experienced as pointing beyond itself (in the way we know that a dream [ἐνύπνιον, B7] is more deeply true than we are able to understand), or it may occlude understanding by allowing it to stop at what is only a partial adumbration (in the role of a likeness [εἴδωλον, C4] mistaken for and then even chosen over, the original); over time it can do both. The determinant lies outside it, just as measuring the man by his external behavior requires something more than rote observation. In this case we got beyond it to its own principle. Ast's emendation (ὠφέλει, imperfect), read by Chambry, is therefore attractive.

<sup>2205</sup> Reading τοιούτου μέν τι (C9) with all mss. and Chambry against Stobaeus's τοιοῦτόν τι, read by Burnet. The μέν concedes the similarity (τοιοῦτο, used as at *Tim.*50B4 et *passim*, and as ὁμοίους at 475E2, again with μέν) in order to stress the all-important difference (done with ἀλλ' οὐ).

<sup>2206</sup> ὡς ἀληθῶς (D1).

<sup>2207</sup> ἔάσαντα (D1): The accusative draws the individual man out of αὐτοῦ and makes him an actor in what we have to assume (from its case) will be an infinitival noun clause parallel to τὸ ... ἔχειν (C5-7) that will define ἡ δικαιοσύνη, either as an appositive or as a predicate with ἔστι understood. The infinitive (πράττειν, E2) comes after several subject accusative participles have made it virtually otiose. See note below.

<sup>2208</sup> γένη (D3) grafts an aspect of the civic version onto, or into, the individual.

<sup>2209</sup> τὰ οἰκεῖα (D3) made pregnant by τῷ οὗτι.

<sup>2210</sup> νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης (D6-7): The analogy from musical harmony is repeated from 432A2-4.

<sup>2211</sup> ἥδη (E2). The motive for postponing the infinitive (cf. n.2207) finally comes to light. His external behavior is once again to be seen as a mere image of his inner state.

acquisition of wealth or taking care of his body, or for that matter some civic duty or private business,<sup>2212</sup> he will adopt the view that any act is just and beautiful<sup>2213</sup> that preserves this inner state and abets it, and will count as (444) wisdom whatever knowledge determines such action, but will count as unjust whatever act tends<sup>2214</sup> to weaken it and as ignorance whatever opinion dictates a man to act that way.

"What you have said is completely true,"<sup>2215</sup> Socrates!"

Alright then, as to the just man and city and as to justice<sup>2216</sup> and what it truly is within each of them, if we say we have discovered it I fancy we will not appear to be deceived. So we can move on to injustice.<sup>2217</sup> It would need to be in turn a kind of faction among the three parts, a meddlesomeness, a sticking one's nose into the other's business and a revolt by one part against the entire soul so as to take over the seat of rule<sup>2218</sup> for which it is not suited, its actual nature making it suitable for the role of slave<sup>2219</sup> to the part that rules by its very nature.<sup>2220</sup> This is the sort of thing we can expect to say, and that the mindless confusion of these parts and their unmoored wanderings<sup>2221</sup> are injustice and licentiousness, cowardice and stupidity, indeed baseness in all its forms.<sup>2222</sup>

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<sup>2212</sup>ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἢ περὶ σώματος θεραπεύειν ἢ καὶ πολιτικόν τι ἢ περὶ τὰ ἕδια συμβόλαια (E3-4): The first two items concern the third (external) and second (somatic) categories of personal goods: the psychic good has been taken care of before action in the vulgar sense (ἐάν τι πράττῃ) begins. Following his personal interests his involvement with the people around him comes into view (ἢ καὶ πολιτικόν τι ... .). By entertaining the φορτικά Socrates has ricocheted back to the inner wellsprings of virtue of which the φορτικά are only an aftermath and outer show.

<sup>2213</sup>καλήν (E5) highlights the externality of πρᾶξιν—its outer look—and thereby slants it toward and associates it with the world of external goods just listed.

<sup>2214</sup>ἀεί (444A1) suggests continual evaluation and prudence rather than reliance on a formula.

<sup>2215</sup>παντάπασιν (A3): Glaucon celebrates the perspicuous (cf. n.3445) and elevated tone of this sentence, the longest sentence in the *Republic* so far.

<sup>2216</sup>τὸν μὲν δίκαιον ἄνδρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην (A4-5): The list enacts the separation of the form (expressed adjectivally with δίκαιον) from its two instances (man and city). The fact that it can be separated means it has been discovered in itself. Compare the semantics of εὖ in the articulation of τὸ καλόν (cf. n.1556 ad 400E2-3), another height Socrates reached with Glaucon's help, at 400C7-401D3.

<sup>2217</sup>μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο σκεπτέον οἷμαι ἀδικίαν (A10-11): The programmatic remark is meant to remind us of the set of questions Glaucon and Adeimantus had burdened Socrates to answer, to wit, Glaucon, at 358B4-6: τί τ' ἔστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; and Adeimantus, at 367B4-5 (cf. D3-4): τί ποιοῦσα ἐκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' ἔαυτήν.

<sup>2218</sup>ἀρχῇ (B3) again present (cf. 442B1).

<sup>2219</sup>δουλεύειν (B5): This time present (contrast ingressive καταδουλώσασθαι, 442B1), now denoting the role he will always play given his nature.

<sup>2220</sup>Reading τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὅντι (B5), with Vat.226 (and Chambry's W [=Vindob.54]). The reading τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὅντι of AFDM and Stobaeus, and Burnet's economical emendation τῷ δ' οὐ δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὅντι, introduce a double negative, while the point is cleanly made by τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὅντι, by presenting the one type, τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὅντι, in clear contrast with the other type, ὅντος φύσει οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν. The main point here (B4-5) as well in the precedent passage (442A7-B3), is that conquest does not make a ruling type out of a slavish type (note prominent and emphatic γένει, 442B2).

<sup>2221</sup>τὴν τούτων ταραχὴν καὶ πλάνην (B6-7) elaborates on the precedent σύμπαντα τὸν βίον πάντων ἀνατρέψει (442B2-3) with ταραχή and πλάνη, anxiety and disoriented wandering, which turn ἀνατρέπειν inward and make a segue to the metaphor of mental health.

<sup>2222</sup>ταραχή (B6) represents the soul's parts losing their proper orientations, by which the θυμός makes the soul brave and the λογιστικόν makes it wise. πλάνη (B7) represents the loss of their

As for unjust acts and doing injury,<sup>2223</sup> and conversely doing good, what all these really are is already clear in detail,<sup>2224</sup> if we can rely on having secured the truth about injustice and justice. They are no different for soul than healthy and unhealthy acts are for the body. Healthy acts after all engender health and unhealthy engender disease; so likewise just behavior engenders<sup>2225</sup> justice in the soul and unjust behavior injustice. Engendering<sup>2226</sup> health is a matter of ordering the bodily elements to control and be controlled by each other in accordance with nature, whereas engendering disease is to mix up the order of ruler and ruled<sup>2227</sup> against nature. Likewise, engendering justice is a matter of ordering the psychic elements to control and be controlled by each other in accordance with nature, whereas engendering injustice is to mix up the order of ruler and ruled against nature.<sup>2228</sup> Virtue<sup>2229</sup> would therefore be a kind of health and beauty and wellness<sup>2230</sup> of the soul, whereas vice is disease, ugliness, and weakness; and good practices<sup>2231</sup> lead to the acquisition of virtue whereas ugly ones lead to vice.

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proper relation to each other, including the harmony between them that constitutes the soul's temperance and the parts' mutual respect for each other's roles and dedication to their own, which constitute its justice. The metaphor of the πλάνη is a favorite of Plato's. It tends to come up unprepared, and often at the climax of important arguments (479D9, 505C7, 586A3, 596D1, 602C12; Prot.356D4-7ff). These facts suggest it has a phenomenological meaning to him more than a theoretical one.

<sup>2223</sup>τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν ... καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν (C1-2): Socrates now moves to the second part of Glaucon's (and Adeimantus's) question: τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν (358B5), or μὴ μόνον ... ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἄδικίας κρείττον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τί ποιοῦσα ἐκατέρα ... ή μὲν ἀγαθὸν ή δὲ κακόν (367B2-5, E2-5); but now that δικαιοσύνη has been discovered to be an inner state rather than a behavior (443C9-444A2) it is not δικαιοσύνη that affects the soul but τὸ δίκαια πράττειν, which is what the brothers meant by δικαιοσύνη there, since that is what they thought justice was at that point.

<sup>2224</sup>κατάδηλα ἥδη σαφῶς (C2-3). The two terms combine clarity with distinctness. Since τυγχάνει (C2) is repeated from A4, we are meant to compare them with ηύρηκέναι there. That what makes behavior (πρᾶξις) just is simply and only that the behavior preserves the just order of the soul is not only already clear but has just been stated, though not quite in the present terms and not for its own sake. There (443C9-444A2), behavior had been demoted to the external world (τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν, C10), in comparison with the inner state of soul. Here that new thesis is brought to bear on the conventional outlook, according to which τὸ ἄδικα πράττειν means ἄδικεῖν (C1) or ἄδικία, just as δικαιοσύνη conventionally refers to acting justly (τὸ δίκαια πράττειν).

<sup>2225</sup>ἐμποιεῖ (C10) thus answers Adeimantus's original question, τί ποιοῦσα (367E3).

<sup>2226</sup>ποιεῖν (D3) = ἐμποιεῖν by the familiar rule of dropping the prefix (cf. n. 1532).

<sup>2227</sup>κρατεῖν (D4) connotes physical power and ἄρχειν (D5) the political or moral authority. In his analogy between body and soul he uses both with both, as here.

<sup>2228</sup>κρατεῖν / ἄρχειν (D3-6) // κρατεῖν / ἄρχειν (D8-11): The analogy is scrupulously spelled out with parallelism rather than chiasm, as noticed by Glaucon in his response, κομιδῆ (D12). The parallelism is repeated below (D13-E2). The purpose is to optimize the warrant for asserting that virtue and vice really are health and sickness of the soul rather than merely being *like* the health and sickness of the body.

<sup>2229</sup>ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα (D13): The term is brought in from the corresponding generalization about vice, above (πᾶσαν κακίαν, B8).

<sup>2230</sup>ὑγίειά τέ τις ... καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς (D13-E1): Above δικαιά πρᾶξις had been elaborated with καλή by way of stressing its externality (443E5 and n.), over against the inner ἔξις of soul (443B5-6), but by force of the present analogy from bodily health, an inner "health, beauty, and well-being" (εὐεξία) come into view. The goods of beauty, health, and strength, traditionally associated with body, here ricochet into soul.

<sup>2231</sup>τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα (E4): The term echoes Glaucon's use of it during his first framing of the question, 358A6 (cf. n. 689, and cf. 360E6): Socrates now redeems it.

Now that we have come this far all that remains is the question whether it pays more<sup>2232</sup> to act justly and (445) practice fine things and be a just person, excluding any consideration of whether people notice you really are this way; or to be unjust and act unjustly on the stipulation that one is not caught and forgoes the benefit of being punished.<sup>2233</sup>

"Well it seems that question<sup>2234</sup> has by now become laughable," Glaucon now volunteers, "once you realize that when body's inner state decays, life becomes unlivable no matter how much you have of food and drinks, or riches, or rule."<sup>2235</sup> Shall we imagine<sup>2236</sup> that when the inner condition of the very thing with which a man does his living becomes disordered and feeble, life would still be worth living<sup>2237</sup> as long as the person gets to do what he wants except for that one thing that will release him from vice and injustice and enable him to acquire justice and virtue<sup>2238</sup>—given that that is the nature of

<sup>2232</sup>πότερον αὐτὸν λυσιτελεῖ (445A1), "Which" of two.

<sup>2233</sup>τοιοῦτος ὁν (A2-3). With this new explication Socrates takes on the worst case scenario that was truly the heart of Glaucon and Adeimantus's confusion, their resentment of people getting away with it who are truly bad, and the prospect of being persecuted for being good. Socrates's great "paradox," that punishment is ameliorative ( $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\beta\epsilon\lambda\tau\iota\omega\nu\gamma\epsilon\nu\tau\alpha\iota\kappa\lambda\alpha\zeta\mu\nu\epsilon\nu\sigma\varsigma$ ), goes by without notice, as it did at 380B1-2. We may think of the remark as a "preview."

<sup>2234</sup>σκέμμα (A6) as before is derogatory (cf. n.2082 ad 435C4). In response to Socrates's most challenging articulation of the problem, Glaucon now asserts that his original formulation of the problem of justice pales in the face of the climactic and radical formulation he and Socrates have reached, that virtue is only the inward state, and he asserts it with his thumos ( $\gamma\epsilon\lambda\o\iota\o\nu$ : cf. n.2158). Another great step has been taken: have we taken it along with them?

<sup>2235</sup>οὐδὲ μετὰ πάντων σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ παντὸς πλούτου καὶ πάσης ἄρχης (A7-8): To the body with which he starts ( $\tau\o\nu\mu\epsilon\nu\sigma\mu\alpha\tau\o\nu$ ) Glaucon adds the third locus of goods (the externals), before contrasting them both with the first locus (soul, here done in periphrasis with  $\tau\hbar\varsigma\delta\epsilon\alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\o\nu$  τούτου φύ\ζωμεν φύ\σεω\ς). Food and drink are never listed as bodily goods: they here provide an improvised metabasis from body to the usual externals (wealth and power). The improvised metabasis, the periphrasis, and the anaphora of  $\pi\alpha\varsigma$  are all triumphant and serve as an index of how fully Glaucon has grasped the argument.

<sup>2236</sup>ἄρα ἔσται (B1):  $\alpha\rho\alpha$  with the future indicates this is an argument *a fortiori* or *ex contrariis*, on which cf. n.1082 ad 374B6-D6.

<sup>2237</sup>ἐφάνη (B4) dialectical (n.210). The argument Glaucon volunteers in elaboration of his assent (A5-B3) is the same argument *a fortiori* that Socrates makes at the climactic moment in the *Crito*, the moment at which Crito's ability to continue with the dialectic becomes so severely strained (47C8-48A2, referred back to at 49E9-50A3, where Crito does not understand), that Socrates feeds him instead the paraenetic speech of the Laws. What makes the present passage a distinct echo of that passage and therefore an indirect reference to the fatal choice Socrates himself will have made about his own life and death, is not only the words the two arguments share (including σκέμμα: cf. 48C4) but also the way both arguments avoid mentioning the soul by name (cf. αὐτοῦ τούτου φύ\ζωμεν, 445A9 with μετ' ἐκείνου ... ὃ τὸ ὅδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, κτλ, *Crito* 47E7-8, and κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν καὶ ταῦτα οἵς ἥκιστα δεῖ, 50A1-2). That Glaucon should be quoting to Socrates his own favorite argument can be compared to the beginning of Book Two where he uses Socratic commonplaces (δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς, 357A5; οὐ ποιεῖς ὃ βούλει, B4-5) to compel Socrates to participate. There he quotes his teacher to cajole him; here he quotes him to pay him homage for having taken him somewhere.

<sup>2238</sup> $\pi\epsilon\rho$  in  $\epsilon\acute{α}\pi\epsilon\rho$  (B1) tells against J.-C.'s interpretation that  $\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\o\pi\lambda\hbar\iota\varsigma$  means "unless." Instead, it produces a stipulation to mirror the stipulation the unjust man makes, that injustice profits as long as one avoids the penalty ( $\acute{α}\pi\epsilon\rho\mu\hbar\delta\dot{\nu}\delta\iota\kappa\eta\varsigma$ , A3). Socrates had added to that stipulation the paradoxical exegesis,  $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\beta\epsilon\lambda\tau\iota\omega\nu\gamma\epsilon\nu\tau\alpha\iota\kappa\lambda\alpha\zeta\mu\nu\epsilon\nu\sigma\varsigma$  (A4), and it is this that Glaucon here elaborates. His argument *a fortiori* raises the unjust alternative to a freakish extreme. The unjust life will be livable as long as the soul keeps itself in the hell it has chosen and forgoes benefitting itself with

their cases as we have now seen?"

## 2.B.8: Corroborative Coda: Types of Injustice and Types of Constitutions

Laughable indeed,<sup>2239</sup> Socrates replies. And yet since we have come all this way we should not quit before we come to see as clearly as possible just how true<sup>2240</sup> this conclusion really is. Come along further and see now the full spectrum of vice in all<sup>2241</sup> its kinds, a thing by my lights full<sup>2242</sup> worthy to behold. In truth I seem to see, from this high vantage point our reasoning has brought us to,<sup>2243</sup> a single kind of virtue but a countless array of vices of which four deserve particular mention. As many kinds there are of constitutions so many kinds of souls there may well be, namely five. The first constitution is the one we have lately described and it goes by either of two names: if there arises in it a single man more excellent than the other rulers it is a kingdom; if there are several it is an aristocracy. But still the two are one type, since the number does not require us to change anything of substance in<sup>2244</sup> the laws as long as the ruler follows the manner of education we prescribed.

## END OF BOOK FOUR

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just behavior: this after all is the effect the two actions would have, as we now have learned.

<sup>2239</sup> γελοῖον γάρ (B5): Socrates acknowledges the triumphant sentiment that Glaucon has cloaked in irony.

<sup>2240</sup> ὅσον οἶόν τε (B6). The polar doublet of quantity and quality, in tandem with the superlative, calls for a *complete* understanding.

<sup>2241</sup> ὅσα καὶ εἴδη (C1), καί pointing interest; but the phrase continues the theme of complete understanding from B6.

<sup>2242</sup> ἡ γε δὴ καὶ ἀξια θέας (C2), καί again pointing emphasis. To behold injustice in all its kinds and details, Socrates here asserts, is a worthwhile pastime. We are left to presume it will help us achieve the firmest grasp possible that our theory of justice and virtue is true (B6-7), but he does not here say why this should be so. Commentators treat ἡ as if it were ὅσα which implies the clause limits how many types he will review, contrary to his advocating something exhaustive. The limitation is only introduced below (*τέτταρα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς*, C6-7), as if the prominence of four types of vice were a thing seen from the height, and it is immediately justified by being correlated with types of constitution, placing us on the familiar ground of studying human morality in the external medium of the city.

<sup>2243</sup> ὥσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς μοι φαίνεται (C4): The triumphant and elevated tone is reminiscent of the last paragraph of Book Three. How surprised shall we be, then, by a deflating interruption by someone who is not sharing in the logos with Socrates, like the one that Adeimantus made at the beginning of Book Four?

<sup>2244</sup> κινήσειν ὃν τῶν ἀξιῶν λόγου τῆς πόλεως (E1): τῶν ἀξιῶν a genitive of the sphere or topic: cf. n.2680.

## BOOK FIVE

Socrates continues speaking without a dramatic break, directly following up his previous remark.<sup>2245</sup> We may wonder why the break in books occurs here, but soon enough we will learn.

(449) Now this kind of city and constitution<sup>2246</sup> I would call good, and this kind correct<sup>2247</sup> as well as the man of this kind, whereas I would say the others are bad and fall short<sup>2248</sup> if we are to measure them against it, both on the civic plane, in terms of the city's organization, and on the level of the individual man and the makeup of the type<sup>2249</sup> of his soul, there being four varieties.

Glaucon asks him to describe the four types and Socrates tells us he got underway doing so and telling how, as he thought, they evolve from one another,<sup>2250</sup> when Polemarchus, who was seated behind Adeimantus, reached out and grabbed Adeimantus by the shirt at his shoulder, pulled him toward him, and leaned in so he could whisper something into his ear. All Socrates heard was, "So shall we let go<sup>2251</sup> or what shall we do?"

### DIGRESSION:Adeimantus’s “Objection” of Credibility

"Hardly!" Adeimantus answered Polemarchus, in full voice; so Socrates had to ask, Just what won't you let go?

"You!" he said.

And<sup>2252</sup> just what do you mean by that?

"You're slacking, it seems to us. A whole topic, and by no means a minor one, you are pushing under the rug to avoid it treating it in detail; and you imagine that you will get by with passing it over

<sup>2245</sup>τοίνυν (449A1).

<sup>2246</sup>πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν (A1). The latter term had been used a few times so far (412A10, 424A4, 424E1), but its use just above in the plural (445D1ff) governs the meaning here. πόλεις would be geographically separate: for comparative study we need a more abstract term.

<sup>2247</sup>ὁρθήν (A2) is new and receives emphasis from its position. We may guess at the start that it is used to distinguish the one correct constitution from the several incorrect ones.

<sup>2248</sup>ἡμαρτημένας (A3) is here the opposite of ὁρθήν.

<sup>2249</sup>ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν (A4), a pleonasm for ψυχῆς κατασκευήν, continues the idea that there are kinds or types of cities and souls from 445CD (C5 [εἶδος], C9 [τρόποι], D4 [τρόπος], D8 [εἶδος]).

<sup>2250</sup>ἔξ ἀλλήλων μεταβάλλειν (B1): That cities or governmental modes should change into "each other" (n.b., ἀλλήλων does not mean, nor does it have to mean, back and forth: cf. n. 2407) is a new topic, neither requested before nor implied by the previous program, though in the search for justice in the city a genetic approach was likewise adopted and, likewise, suddenly and without methodological justification (369A5-10).

<sup>2251</sup>ἀφήσομεν (B6): Socrates did not hear the object of the verb, and now gives it a default neuter (τί, B8). The picture of the two of them talking together privately after Glaucon and Socrates had been talking together in public and in their very view, must be handled properly in the visual dramatization of the dialogue. The very inspired conversation Socrates and Glaucon have just carried out together would inspire a good deal of envy.

<sup>2252</sup>Reading ἔτι (C1) with mss.AFD against the ὅτι of the recentiores. Socrates repeats his question since it has not been answered. For the repeated question cf. 343A10 (culminating A3-9).

with a mere mention, clumsily I would say,<sup>2253</sup> as if everyone knew that the maxim ‘Friends share the things of friends’ could apply also to their wives and children!”

Wasn’t I correct in saying so, Adeimantus?

“Sure—but this ‘correct’ of yours needs just as much explanation in this connection as it does in any other.<sup>2254</sup> Tell us the type or character of the sharing. There could be many of these after all. You won’t slip past telling us what you<sup>2255</sup> have in mind, I assure you: we have been sitting here patiently<sup>2256</sup> waiting for you to give us a description of how the breeding<sup>2257</sup> of children is to be managed, and then once they are born how they are to be raised, and your entire picture<sup>2258</sup> of this communism of wives and children you speak of. We think that whether this is dealt with correctly<sup>2259</sup> or incorrectly will play a large and telling<sup>2260</sup> role in the constitution and the city. Since you were about to move on to a new kind of constitution before you had finished with this one, we reached the decision that you (450) overheard us reach, not to let you go on until you have given as full a treatment of this part of your theory as you have of the others.”

“I join in voting the resolution also,” Glaucon chimed in.

“Give up, Socrates,” Thrasymachus added. “It’s a landslide.”<sup>2261</sup>

<sup>2253</sup> φαῦλος (C4) is the climactic remark, placed at the end of the series of accusations, and means “But we caught you!” ὥρα (C4) adds “As if you didn’t notice.”

<sup>2254</sup> τὸ ὄρθως τοῦτο (C7): Adeimantus is turning Socrates’s own term against him: ὄρθην (A2 and A3, and now C6) was to serve as the criterion for the narration he was attempting to move on to, concerning the incorrect constitutions and characters. Similarly Glaucon re-uses τρόπος (C8) from A4.

<sup>2255</sup> With σύ (D1) Adeimantus acts as if there were an onus on Socrates to come up with an answer, although the argument was reached not by him alone but by him and Glaucon together. Moreover, his remark that there are many possible answers is as much a reason not to raise the issue as it is to pass it over!

<sup>2256</sup> πάλαι (D1) means they started to wait before he moved on to these next two topics, namely, the search for vices in the city and then finding them in the soul.

<sup>2257</sup> παιδοποίας τε πέρι (D2), narrower of course than περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων (C4-5).

<sup>2258</sup> ὅλην (D3) rather than πάντα or τὰ ἄλλα requests something of an overview.

<sup>2259</sup> ὄρθως (D5,6), again.

<sup>2260</sup> μέγα ... τι ... καὶ ὅλον (D4-5). For the corrective καί cf. 461D3 (δεκάτῳ ... καὶ ἐβδόμῳ δῆ); *Apol.*23A7 (ὅλιγου τινὸς καὶ οὐδενός), *Gorg.*501D1-2 (περὶ δύο καὶ πολλάς), *Phlb.*16D6 (ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρα), *Polit.*293A3-4 (περὶ ἑνά τινα καὶ δύο καὶ παντάπασιν ὅλιγον), 297C1 (σμικρόν τι καὶ ὅλιγον καὶ τὸ ἔν), *Tht.*173E4 (σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν) and the proverb δίς καὶ τρίς εἰπεῖν. Compare also ή τι ή οὐδέν at *Apol.*17B7. In all these cases of the idiom, καί broaches the extreme possibility (Denniston’s climactic uses: 291, 293).

<sup>2261</sup> πᾶσι ταῦτα δεδογμένα (450A5): Several in his audience (note first plural, 449B6) had been waiting (πάλαι περιμένομεν, 449D1) for him to revisit the sharing of wives. If it were put to a vote it would be a landslide (Thrasymachus’s perfect δεδογμένα suggests a resolution already voted upon, and thereby a forgone conclusion: cf. δέδοκται, *Phdrs.*228E2, for the idiom). But the image of the city had been a mere vehicle for discovering justice in the soul: that task now completed, the ladder might be thrown away. However, Socrates has proposed to continue with the political investigation as a vehicle for discovering the nature of injustice and so there remains an excuse for asking him to revert to his remarks about the just city. Did his audience listen at all to the intervening recondite discussion between Socrates and Glaucon, in which the soul was divided, and then the division was applied to the individual, and how the result came out so square and clear? Had they been affected by the corroborative “administration” of φορτικά so as to see the distinction between the inner and the outer? If so, why does this “outer” concern linger? These questions become moot the moment Glaucon, the party to that crucial discussion, casts his vote with the others; and it for this reason that

The company has succeeded to interrupt the proceedings and Socrates acquiesces and at great length (450A-451B) warns them of the gravity of their interruption, which among other things suggests the digression from the program might be lengthy:

Do you know what have you done in stopping me? Can you realize how big a discussion you are stirring up about our constitution, a discussion that will take us all the way back to the beginning? For my part I was overjoyed to think I was done with the description of it,<sup>2262</sup> and satisfied if people would let it lie the way it had been laid down. But now you've done you know not what! In calling me to task you are stirring up a beehive of trouble you can't imagine, something I had hoped I could leave out<sup>2263</sup> and avoid a scandal.<sup>2264</sup>

"And you thought my friends came here to pan for gold rather than to hear arguments,"<sup>2265</sup> said Thrasymachus.

Arguments, yes, but not too long.

"Life itself is not long enough for arguments as important as these," Glaucon retorts.<sup>2266</sup> "So don't worry about us: press on and treat the questions we've put to you any way you see fit. What is the

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Thrasymachus can now say the vote is unanimous (without having to consult the others). Moreover, in casting the final vote Glaucon re-assumes the role of Socrates's interlocutor.

<sup>2262</sup>ἢν ὡς ἥδη διεληλυθώς ἔγωγε ἔχαιρον (A9): Now we have a model for the break between Books Four and Five, namely the break between One and Two, where Socrates had thought the discussion was complete but what had been said turned out to be mere preamble. There, too, the discovery came at the beginning of the new book rather than at the end of the previous. Cf. also D8 and n.

<sup>2263</sup>οὐν ὁρῶν ἐγὼ παρῆκα τότε (B1-2): It is not true that Socrates tried to suppress something: the details were irrelevant to his immediate purpose (cf. n. 1934 ad 423E6-7). By this false "confession" he only strengthens the grounds for the objection, as usual: cf. 372E2-374A2, 420A2-7, 487E6-10.

<sup>2264</sup>πολὺν ὄχλον (B2). Literally, a dense mob. Forces similar to those at work within Adeimantus at the beginning of Book Four have now been aroused in the whole company, forces for which Thrasymachus is eager to be the spokesman. Throughout the *Republic*, as the argument progresses the obstacles it meets become more difficult. Socrates expresses a worry he will be lynched, as in fact he was, in the end. His demurral is more than the characteristic "Socratic diffidence."

<sup>2265</sup>χρυσοχοήσοντας οἵει τούσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε ἀφίχθαι (B3-4): Thrasymachus's remark captures his public behavior in a nutshell. With τούσδε (first person demonstrative) he arrogates to himself the role of spokesman for all (337A3-7 and n.285), which raises the question of who saw whom first (336D8, cf. n.276). His suddenly concrete remark about smelting gold may be an allusion to a proverb, as the paroemiographers say (cf. Warren *ad loc.*, and Paroem.Gr. 2.91,727; 1.464), but the traditional explanation of the proverb illuminates no details in the text, which is crucial for corroborating that a proverb is being cited in the first place, and the passage itself lends scant support to their claim. Moreover the Platonic scholiast is silent on the point. More likely, Thrasymachus is exploiting an opportunity to throw back at Socrates the remark that Socrates had made to him, that he and Polemarchus would no sooner coddle each other's inadequacies in their search for truth than they would if they were searching for gold, a remark Socrates again recalls much later (589D6-590A2). To allude to Socrates's vaguer χρυσίον ζητεῖν (336E5) with the unnecessarily concrete χρυσοχοήσοντας fits his penchant to disarm with crassness (cf. 336B8-D4 [n.b. ἐξεπλάγην, D5] and τίτθη σοι ἔστιν; 343A3-9, ἐνθῶ 345B5, and cf. n.1882 ad 421A3 on derogatory specificity).

<sup>2266</sup>δέ γε. (B6), common in retort. Once again Glaucon serves up to Socrates the sort of thing he has heard him say (cf. n.668). Little does he know that he will indeed be required in the next half-hour to adopt just the sort of higher set of standards to which he here casually alludes (472A-474B)! μέτρον governs both the objective genitive τοιούτων λόγων and the exegetical infinitive ἀκούειν in a zeugma analogous to the "lilies of the field" construction.

nature of the communism our<sup>2267</sup> guards will practice with regard to children and spouses and to child care of the young, during the time between their birth and their education proper when the demands on the parents' time is maximal. Try and tell us how this will be managed."

To go through it is a tall task, my happy friend,<sup>2268</sup> involving much that is even harder to believe than what we have gone through already. Whether our arrangement is possible would first be doubted, and even if possible, whether it would be the best arrangement. Hence one hesitates even to bring these matters up since to company less friendly<sup>2269</sup> we'd look like we are talking about mere dreams.<sup>2270</sup>

"No need to shrink from it. Your audience is not unsympathetic, nor unduly skeptical, nor ill-disposed toward you."<sup>2271</sup>

Clearly you want to encourage me but you're doing the opposite of what you want to do.<sup>2272</sup> If I believed I was a person who knew what he<sup>2273</sup> was talking about your encouragement would be welcome. To speak with knowledge among men serious and friendly about matters most important and dear to the heart<sup>2274</sup> is a thing both comfortable and stimulating, whereas to speak without (451) certainty, searching and talking at the same time as I am, is disheartening and scary,<sup>2275</sup> not because I might be laughed at (that's a childish concern<sup>2276</sup>), but because if the truth eludes me not only will I err but I'll lead my friends astray along with me, in an area where one can least afford to be deluded. I'll

<sup>2267</sup> ήμῖν (C1): The first plural that had been used with the verbal adjectives early in the construction of the city has now become a recumbent ethical dative (cf. n.990) by which the interlocutors remind each other of the fictional modality and experimental purpose of that construction.

<sup>2268</sup> ὁ εὔδαιμον (C6) and ὁ φίλε ἐταῖρε (D2): his ὄκνος drives these repeated gestures toward a *captatio benevolentiae*, and the gestures elicit an elaborate protest in kind from Glaucon (D3-4). We may measure these against the slighter reluctance Socrates shows at 414B8-C10 and Adeimantus's less ardent response there (414C11).

<sup>2269</sup> ὁ φίλε ἐταῖρε (D2). Vocatives often reveal aspects of the speaker's mood or meaning by projecting them onto his interlocutor (cf. n.554). Socrates often uses them to reassure his interlocutor that the conversation is going well without explicitly acknowledging the hegemony the interlocutor has given him.

<sup>2270</sup> μὴ εὐχὴ δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος (D1-2). On the surface it is ridicule that he wishes to avert (cf. καταγελώμεθα ως ἄλλως εὐχαῖς ὅμοια λέγοντες, 499C4-5), but in addition the modality will be taken seriously, and even defended, below (458AB1).

<sup>2271</sup> οὔτε γὰρ ἀγνώμονες οὔτε ἄπιστοι οὔτε δύσνοι οἱ ἀκουσόμενοι (D3-4): The triad is delivered so swiftly that Glaucon must be relying on the previous remarks for its meaning to come across. ἀγνώμονες, here meaning the opposite of συγγνώμονες (cf. Andoc.2.6) has its precedent in his offering Socrates *carte blanche* to decide the path he will take (ἢ σοι δοκεῖ, B8-C1); ἄπιστοι comes of course from Socrates's references to ἀπιστία (C2,3,4); and δύσνοι (given an *inimical* tone by its prefix δυ-) replacing the mere litotes produced by the alpha privatives before) must refer to what is derogatory and *ad hominem* in the charge that Socrates's arrangement is mere wishful thinking (εὐχή) rather than valid argument (λόγος).

<sup>2272</sup> πᾶν τοίνυν ... τούναντίον ποιεῖς (D8): The observation he makes to Glaucon echoes the observation Glaucon had made to him at the beginning of Book Two (357B4).

<sup>2273</sup> ἐμαυτῷ (D9) rather than ἐμοί.

<sup>2274</sup> φρονίμοις τε καὶ φίλοις (D10) echoed by μεγίστων τε καὶ φίλων.

<sup>2275</sup> ἀσφαλὲς καὶ θαρραλέον (E1) // φοβερόν τε καὶ σφαλερόν (451A1): a chiasm of the contrapositive (n.4788).

<sup>2276</sup> παιδικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο γε (A2) cf: παιίζοντας καὶ γελῶντες, *Euthyphr.*3E1.

pay my homage to Adrastus,<sup>2277</sup> Glaucon, in connection with what I am about to say. I have a deep sense<sup>2278</sup> that manslaughter is a lesser sin than being a deceiver about beauty and goodness and justice as they are preserved in our traditions.<sup>2279</sup> It would be better to run such a risk among enemies than friends.<sup>2280</sup> Thanks a lot for encouraging me.<sup>2281</sup>

This last piece of rueful irony gets a laugh out of Glaucon: “If what you say does discomfit<sup>2282</sup> us, still we’ll acquit you of it as from a charge of murder and leave you uncontaminated and clear of any charge that you are a ‘deceiver.’<sup>2283</sup> Buck up and speak.”

## D.I: Community of Men and Women

<sup>2277</sup> προσκυνῶ δὲ Ἀδράστειαν ... χάριν οὐ μέλλω λέγειν (A4-5): A formula for diverting Nemesis, like “Knock on wood.” Unintentional wrongs, like unnoticed good deeds, do finally receive their proper deserts through the agency of the Fates who know all and forget nothing.

<sup>2278</sup> ἐλπίζω (A5): for the sense cf. 383B6 and n. 1295.

<sup>2279</sup> καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων πέρι (A7), read by all mss. (n.b. Ven. 184 writes in καί after δικαίων) and all modern editors except Ast, Stallb., and now Slings who follows Wilamowitz (who wrongly read κάγαθόν [*Platon* 2.380]). The triad καλόν, ἀγαθόν, δίκαιον is the usual terminology, usually in that order, by which to specify τὰ μέγιστα (D10; cf. 451A4): cf. 475E9-6A5, 484D2, 493B8-C1, 520C5-6; *Crito* 47C9-10; *Euthyphr.* 7D1-2; *Gorg.* 459C6-D3 (cf. 451D7), 470E9-11, 515A5-6; *Leg.* 731E6, 896D5-6, 957B7; *Parm.* 130B7-9; *Phdo.* 65D4-7; *Phdrs.* 246D8-E1, 260A1-3, 276C3, 278A3-4; *Polit.* 295E4-5ff, 309C5-6. Cf. also *Dissoi Logoi* §§1-3. Sometimes it is the pair καλόν / ἀγαθόν (*Crat.* 439C8; *Gorg.* 474D12; *Phdo.* 76D8, 77A4, 100B5-6; *Phlb.* 15A4-6; *Prot.* 315D8-E1); and sometimes the pair ἀγαθόν / δίκαιον (*Phdrs.* 272D5-6, 277D10-E1). *Phdo.* 75C10-D3 adds ὄσιον as a fourth and *Tht.* 172A1-4 places ὄσιον for ἀγαθόν, to-wit: καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὄσια καὶ μή, adding, because of the Protagorean context, οἵα ἀν ἐκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι. Closest in content to our passage is *Leg.* 801C8-D1, which refers to the realm of things too important to entrust to the poets, which things it then describes as follows: τὰ τῆς πόλεως νόμιμα καὶ δίκαια ἡ καλὰ ἡ ἀγαθά, but its variation of connectives adds a formal problem.

In almost all lists where καί is varied by ἢ or ἤ by καί, the variation indicates that two items linked by the alternate connective are almost one (whether καί varies ἢ [*Crito* 53B2-3; *Lach.* 192A4-5; *Leg.* 658D6-7; *Phdrs.* 248D3-4, 4-5; *Rep.* 553B4-5] or ἤ varies καί [*Gorg.* 520E2-4; *Phlb.* 56D11-E1; *Rep.* 400B2-3, 462E1-2; *Tht.* 175E4-5]). The only instances I know where this is not the case are *Charm.* 161D6-7, where ἤ varies καί to introduce a further elaboration (cf. D3-4); *Leg.* 889B6-8, where καί varies ἤ to introduce a closing generalization; and *Parm.* 130C6-7, where ἤ varies καί for the same purpose. Adding ἤ to one of the connective καί's (e.g. *Rep.* 423A4, 609D8-9) or καί to one of the connective ἤ's (*Leg.* 716A5-6, 738D2) is a different matter, and is usually done to effect a climax or closure. Perhaps related is A τε ... ἢ B (where τε creates an expectation for καί that is met with ἤ instead): *Ion* 535D3-5; *Meno* 95B2-3 (reading mss.BT: cf. Stallb. *ad loc.*); *Tht.* 143C2. The variation in connectives in the passage from *Leg.* 801C8-D1 is peculiar for its repetition of the variant (καί, ἤ, Ἠ). Still, we must infer that as elsewhere the variation acknowledges the intimate relation we usually see between δίκαια, καλά, and ἀγαθά. Translate, therefore: “the conventional attitude, whether touching the just the beautiful or the good.”

In both *Leg.* 801C and the present passage it is not the truth that is at stake but the preservation of conventions. At 801C it is a matter of preventing the poets from committing perhaps the greatest sin (C5): undermining the conventional wisdom on the most important topics (C3-4: cf. also *Rep.* 604B9 and context). Here, Socrates is worried that his speculative investigation about the most important topics (D10) might lead him into sin perhaps greater than manslaughter (A5-6): unintentionally deceiving his friends καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων πέρι. Cf. 479D3-4 and n. 2656, and 484D1-3. For the position and sense of νόμιμα compare τὰ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ νόμιμα, 589C7 and contrast 484D2. The unintentionality of manslaughter corresponds to the less-

If the charge of manslaughter is dropped against a man he's left untainted according to our law, and perhaps the same would apply here as well.<sup>2284</sup> We have to go back to issues we perhaps should have treated in the previous context. We could make it all good for now by imagining that since we have finished the manly drama it's now time to move on to the feminine one,<sup>2285</sup> especially given your challenge that we do so.

For men<sup>2286</sup> with the inborn nature and education we have specified there is no other proper<sup>2287</sup> way to manage having wives and children<sup>2288</sup> than to keep<sup>2289</sup> to the path we set them on at the beginning. We had conceived of ourselves setting them up as guards of a flock:<sup>2290</sup> let's give them a way to manage childbirth and nursing that follows suit with such guards as those, and see whether it seems appropriate.

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than-full understanding of values provided by νόμος. Socrates is suggesting that a deluded life might not be worth living.

<sup>2280</sup> ἐν ἐχθροῖς κρείττον (A8), added to explain how it is that stating their friendliness to him (450D3-4) discourages rather than encourages him (πᾶν τούναντίον, 450D8).

<sup>2281</sup> Reading the εὖ (B1) of the mss. (οὐκ εὖ scribitur in Monac.: οὐ coni. Hermann), ironic among friends.

<sup>2282</sup> πλημμελές (B3): The term can denote something far worse than an esthetic imperfection (“out of tune”), as Socrates’s statement at *Apol.*22D8 illustrates.

<sup>2283</sup> ἀπατεῶνα ἡμῶν (B4): Glaucon repeats Socrates’s somber term by way of a joke, but the charge of deceiving people about the most important matters is tantamount to the complaint Socrates will actually face in 399, a complaint severe enough to warrant capital punishment. With ἀφίεμέν σε (B3) Glaucon promises to let Socrates go if only he will speak, the opposite of the offer Socrates imagines his jurors making to him, to let him go if only he will shut up (*Apol.*29CD). These parallels are indices Plato supplies his reader, who knows Socrates’s fate, of the ominous significance of the fact that even his allies, Glaucon and Adeimantus, are prone to be scandalized by the present topic.

<sup>2284</sup> ως ὁ νόμος λέγει (B6-7): Socrates’s reluctance to criticize τὰ νόμιμα is offset by an opportunity he now discovers to rely on νόμος after all. After his unconventional remark that deceiving friends was worse than manslaughter, he now encourages himself by relying on the conventional attitude about the man against whom charges are dropped.

Glaucon like most of Socrates’s interlocutors does not share his scruples but is only impatient with them. His reply (λέγε τοίνυν τούτου γ' ἔνεκα) is tantamount to saying, “Whatever floats your boat.” Socrates’s willingness to continue in his dignified way is an index to Plato’s reader, if not to Glaucon, of how serious and solicitous he is of the young men’s needs.

<sup>2285</sup> ἀνδρεῖον / γυναικεῖον (C2), as opposed to ἄρρεν / θῆλυ, distinguishes people by more than gender; as does “manly/womanly” (as opposed to male/female). Thus the connotation of bravery and warfare is allowed to attach to the first, and gives a place for home-life, and in particular child-rearing, to attach to the second, in accordance with convention (τὰ νόμιμα), though in truth it is sexual mores that the others are worried about. If there is an allusion in these words to the division of Sophron’s *Mimes* into ἀνδρεῖοι μῆμοι and γυναικεῖοι μῆμοι (cf. Adam *ad loc.*), the allusion would only corroborate what is already afoot.

<sup>2286</sup> ἀνθρώποις (C4): not ἀνδράσι, which would have continued the language of ἀνδρεῖον / γυναικεῖον from above. There was nothing in the provisions so far that required the guards to be male; and the term ἀνδρεῖς has so far been used not to denote masculinity but, on occasion, to express sympathy for the persons we imagine fulfilling the roles our theory has conceived of (cf. 361B6 and n.752).

<sup>2287</sup> ὄρθή (C5, continuing the theme of τὸ ὄρθως (449C7 and n.2254)).

<sup>2288</sup> παιίδων τε καὶ γυναικῶν κτῆσίς τε καὶ χρεία (C5-6). At 423E κτῆσις had gone with γυναικῶν (and with γάμων, the consummation of the acquisition), as it will again at 502D4-6 (τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτήσεως δυσχέρειαν καὶ παιδογονίαν). κτῆσις as well as χρεία go with both γυναικῶν

Now as to guard-dogs that are female, do we suppose they should join in guarding whatever the male dogs were assigned to guard, and join them in the hunting and take part in all other activities, or do we suppose that the females are to hang around the house and are unable to join in because of their birthing and nursing of the young pups, and leave it to the male dogs to do all the work and caretaking involved with the flocks?

"They are to join in with them in everything," Glaucon replies without hesitation, "with the proviso that they are weaker while the males are stronger."

Well, if in general you cannot employ the same animal for the same task without giving it the same upbringing and education,<sup>2291</sup> then if we are going to assign the same tasks to the women and (452) the men<sup>2292</sup> their education will have to be the same. But<sup>2293</sup> the education we gave the men consisted of music and gymnastics. Therefore we have to give these same two arts to the women, including the military training,<sup>2294</sup> and they must practice<sup>2295</sup> them the same.

"Seems so, from the argument you are making."

Socrates notices Glaucon's milder assent<sup>2296</sup> and suggests that a lot of things might look laughable

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and παίδων (cf. *Polit.* 271E8 referring to a primitive state in which there were neither πολιτεῖαι nor κτήσεις γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων), and so the construction is binary non-distributive (both going with both): cf. n.54 *ad* 329A5, 431A7, 451C5-6, 493D4-6, 615B2-5. Contrast the distributive construction (n.773). For the pairing κτῆσίς τε καὶ χρεία cf. *Menex.* 238B, κτῆσίν τε καὶ χρῆσιν.

<sup>2289</sup> ιοῦσιν (C7) can and should agree with the prominent dative at the beginning of the sentence. By now it is they as well as we that are going down the path we set out upon. Socrates's defense against the paradox brought on by Adeimantus at the beginning of Book Four similarly began with the resolution to stick to the path they were on (420B3ff).

<sup>2290</sup> ἀγέλης φύλακας (C8): Cf. esp. 416A2-C3.

<sup>2291</sup> τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν (E4) is an hendiadys (cf. 376C7-8). Even if Halliwell is right to say Plato was interested in the Spartan ways ("the main implication [sc. of τροφή] is surely that girls of the Guardian class will be fed the same diet as boys ... Plato may have been influenced by Spartan ideas" [*ad loc.*]), Socrates, the speaker, is not interested in what the female guards or female dogs are to be fed.

<sup>2292</sup> The lexical shift from θῆλυς / ἄρρην to γυνή / ὀνύρ (E6-7) embodies a logical inference from the genus animal to the species man.

<sup>2293</sup> μήν ... γε (452A2) introducing minor premise, both particles conjectured by Richards (in place of μέν and τε in the mss.). The mss. reading is perfectly tolerable however: "Music and its mate gymnastics we already of course had assigned to them (the males)." On the hyperbaton of τε cf. *Leg.* 800A4, 966A7.

<sup>2294</sup> καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον (A4-5): The education did not include military training *per se*, though the gymnastic was modelled on the presumption that the guards should be ready to fight (e.g., 403E8-4C4; cf. also 422B3-D7).

<sup>2295</sup> χρηστέον (A5): sc. ταῖς γυναιξί, from above. The focus on *application* evokes images of the women in motion and gives Glaucon pause (*εἰκός*, A6).

<sup>2296</sup> λέγεις (A6) is not otiose: Socrates picks it up with λεγόμενα (C8). That his arguments should be radically discrepant from convention is not "an incidental objection" in Socrates's eyes (Halliwell *ad* 452A7), nor is their laughability "no Socratic concern" (Halliwell *ad* 451A1). The discrepancy and the risibility are exactly the topics of this Book (not just structural elements or motifs, *per* Halliwell *ad* 457B1), the burden of which is to subordinate first laughter and then opinion to logos. These hold their sway not by the support of arguments a rationalist (which Halliwell presumes Socrates to be, *ad*

in connection with the policies we are now discovering in argument, if they are become the standard practice.<sup>2297</sup> To this Glaucon strongly agrees so Socrates follows up by asking which of the spectacles he envisions<sup>2298</sup> as the most ridiculous? Or need I ask? Isn't it the spectacle of naked women working out in the wrestling room right alongside the men, not just the younger women but the older ones as well,<sup>2299</sup> like those old men you see in the gymnasium at their workouts, frisky and wrinkled, and unconcerned how horrible they look?

"Yes by Zeus that would look ridiculous, by current standards at least."

And yet now that we have embarked on talking the thing through<sup>2300</sup> we mustn't fear a whole range of wisecracks the comedians might make in prospect of this alteration of the norm becoming a reality, cracks about the gymnasiums and the musical training and of course the way they handle weapons and mount horses.<sup>2301</sup> We based our argument on principles and now we have to continue its course through the rough part of our law, and plead with them to forgo doing their job this time and to act serious instead, reminding them that it was not so long ago, after all, that the Greeks shamed and ridiculed something most foreigners still ridicule to this day, a man being seen naked. When first the Cretans took up gymnastics and then the Lacedaimonians, the clever among us could still turn it into comedy,<sup>2302</sup> but once people began to practice the kinds of things that are involved in gymnastics 449C2, 450B5, 450B7, 451D1) could easily refute, but by a personal confusion that only the great teacher that Socrates is can, and in this Book does, treat.

<sup>2297</sup> εἰ πεπράξεται ἢ λέγεται (A8), reading the scr. in the Monacensis (the future middle πράξεται fails to achieve the needed parallelism with the passive λέγεται). The conditional expresses not doubt about realizability but sensitivity to the fact that the realization would take place in a world already filled with conventions, so that any realization of the concept will butt up against accepted usage in ways unexpected and paradoxical but categorically unimportant nevertheless. The problem, though only now formulated explicitly (389D6 is not a parallel, *pace* J.-C.: cf. n. 1353 *ad loc.*), has affected the course of the conversation throughout. Socrates's quick thumbnail sketch of the theoretical results had elicited Glaucon's fateful reaction at 372C, requiring the "purification" of the feverish city; his sketch of the military εὐναί at 416D3ff with which the purification culminated had elicited Adeimantus's objection and the digression with which Book Four began. Presently it is the scandalized imagination running wild on a topic Socrates had tried to skirt rather than treat in detail (423E4-424A2)—something the conventional view would view as "sharing women"—that has interrupted Socrates's narrative (though of course he is less interested in continuing a narrative than responding to the objection!). Thus the present Book and the two that follow it are no more and no less a digression from some plan of argument, than was the lengthy education of the guards brought on by Glaucon's objection at 372.

<sup>2298</sup> With ὄρθις (A10), as well as its construction with perceptual participle (γυμναζομένας), Socrates acknowledges the transition from thought to actualization.

<sup>2299</sup> ὥδη (B1) is not temporal and proleptic (as if it meant τὰς ὥδη πρεσβυτέρας with J.-C.) but goes with καί and means "withal." Cf. long note by Cope, *Arist. Rhet. I.13*.

<sup>2300</sup> λέγειν (B6) is again not otiose, but continues the distinction between thought and action. So also at C4.

<sup>2301</sup> καὶ περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄπλων σχέσιν καὶ ἕπων ὀχήσεις (B8-C2): The list reproduces the range of the curriculum described just above (A4-5). τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον is redone with the pair, arms and horses (for the dyad cf. 552A9-10; and Leg. 880D6-7, 943A7-8, 947C6, 953B7-8), here specially formulated so as to conjure the image of the soldiers' bodily parts and poses, which are described with sexual double-entendre (ὄπλον [LSJ s.v., V], ὄχησις [cf. e.g., ὄχεύειν, 454E1]: note the jump to vivid plural).

<sup>2302</sup> κωμῳδεῖν (D1) The question whether this alludes to or (conversely) provoked Aristophanes's

it soon became obvious to them that shedding one's clothes is better than trying to stay covered up. What had seemed ridiculous in sight was simply wiped away by what was revealed to be best in thought.<sup>2303</sup> The moral is, the man is a fool who believes anything is ridiculous besides the bad, and so is the man who sets about ridiculing any spectacle as laughable other than the spectacle of a mindless and vicious person, or zealously keeps in his sights any goal<sup>2304</sup> as being fine other than the goal of being good.

To this complex redistribution of priorities Glaucon agrees in every detail,<sup>2305</sup> so that Socrates can continue:

We must first reach an agreement<sup>2306</sup> whether our project is possible and make place for a debate if others wish to argue against us, whether in jest or seriously,<sup>2307</sup> on the question whether in (453) the case of the human species the female and the male sexes are able to share each and all of their activities or can't share any, or they can share some and not others, and whether the present subject, warfare, falls into the one or the other category. If we proceed from this starting point we would most likely reach the surest conclusion.

We ourselves will have to make the argument for the others if we don't want the contrary position to be eliminated by default,<sup>2308</sup> as follows: "Socrates and Glaucon, you hardly need anyone else to argue with.<sup>2309</sup> You yourselves accepted as a principle in your civic designs that in the city you were founding each person must do only what his nature suits him for."

We did grant it.

"Well, is there any way the female is not utterly<sup>2310</sup> different in nature from the male?"

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*Ecclesiazusae* is not nearly as important as the question whether Glaucon and Adeimantus would be distracted by such a play from staying on the path of the λόγος. If the reader feels the pressing need that the brothers feel to learn that being just makes a person happy, he will be less distracted by either of the possibilities and uninterested in deciding between them.

<sup>2303</sup> τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἔξερρύη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν λόγοις μηνυθέντος ὀρίστου (D4-5): The point is baldly drawn (perhaps a mawkish parody of Thucydidean style: Denniston GPS 21 and 35-36) and will be filled out with full theorization throughout this Book, especially at the end (475D-480A).

<sup>2304</sup> σκοπόν (E2) completes the argument of the paragraph by carrying forth the nascent distinction between sight and thought, replacing the object seen (by the eyes: ὄψιν) with the object looked for (by the mind: σκοπόν).

<sup>2305</sup> παντάπασι (E3), of agreement to a complex point: cf. n. 1936.

<sup>2306</sup> ἀνομολογητέον (E4). ὁμολογία as agreement between the parties to the discussion based on their use of reason and argument with each other, continues the theme of sight vs. mind and now moves to correct the "public mind" of the sort that the comedians, imagined above, tease into consciousness and then scandalize. The very act of working the question up into an *eliminatio* begins to attenuate its susceptibility to ridicule.

<sup>2307</sup> δοτέον ἀμφισβήτησιν (E5). Besides the broad ridicule he has just criticized there is the ridicule that hides behind captious argumentation, which will be Socrates's next opponent in the defense of the philosophical profundity reached at the end of Book Four.

<sup>2308</sup> ίνα μὴ ἔρημα τὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου λόγου πολιόρκηται (453A8-9): The search for ὁμολογία does not silence opposition, as shame or ridicule would, but converts it.

<sup>2309</sup> οὐδὲν δεῖ ὑμῖν ἄλλους ἀμφισβητεῖν (B3): Socrates provided a place for the ἀντίδικος to make his case (δοτέον, 452E5); but the first thing the ἀντίδικος says is that he didn't need to (B3-4)!

<sup>2310</sup> πάμπολυ (B7), colloquial, emphatic, and conveniently vague.

They do differ of course.

"Different, then, should be the task they are commanded to do, according to their respective natures."

Of course.

"So how is it you aren't making a mistake now and contradicting yourselves when on the other hand you assert that the men and the women must do the same things, given the fact that their natures could not be more different<sup>2311</sup> than they are?"

Socrates now turns to Glaucon and asks him, Will you<sup>2312</sup> be able to defend us against this argument, my marvelous<sup>2313</sup> friend?

"Not right offhand. What I'll do instead is request<sup>2314</sup> that you spell out the argument on our behalf<sup>2315</sup> as<sup>2316</sup> you did theirs."

This is just the sort of thing I foresaw coming up, before, when I shrank in fear from touching on the topic of getting and raising wives and babies.<sup>2317</sup>

Glaucon thinks Socrates feared the difficulty of this argument and arguments like it:<sup>2318</sup> "No by God, now I see why! It really doesn't seem easy to meet."<sup>2319</sup>

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<sup>2311</sup> πλεῖστον κεχωρισμένην φύσιν ἔχοντες (C5) much more logically specific than the πάμπολυ it pretends to repeat. The expression is indeed close to one of the endoxic definitions of "the opposite" cited by Aristotle (*Met.Δ,1018A27-8; Cat.6A17-18, n.b. πλεῖστον ... διεστηκότα*).

<sup>2312</sup> ἔξεις τι (C6): By shifting from second plural to second singular Socrates stops the prosopopoeia and turns to Glaucon, speaking in his own voice.

<sup>2313</sup> ὦ θαυμάσιε (C6). With the vocative Socrates feigns to marvel at the argument. The attack has been combative and *ad hominem*, and has challenged assent (οὐδὲν δεῖ ἄλλους ... αὐτοὶ γὰρ, B3; ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως, B7; πῶς οὐχ ἀμαρτάνετε, C3; and the triumphant gesture we have to imagine accompanying deictic iota in νυνί, C3). Hence Socrates asks Glaucon if he has a defense (ἀπολογεῖσθαι), rather than an answer (ἀποκρίνεσθαι).

<sup>2314</sup> δεήσομαι τε καὶ δέομαι (C7). I cannot cite a parallel for the diplosis, unless 457B4 serves as one. Glaucon's future answers the future in Socrates's question (What will you do?) pertaining to some imaginary conversation in the future: "What I will do is defer to you" (emphatic σοῦ). The ensuing present is Glaucon's sincere and personal request, in the present of the conversation between himself and Socrates, that Socrates take on the question since he, Glaucon, cannot.

<sup>2315</sup> τὸν ὑπὲρ ήμῶν λόγον (C8) continues the idea that they have been attacked personally.

<sup>2316</sup> καί (C8) correlative.

<sup>2317</sup> τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων κτῆσιν καὶ τροφήν (D23), the complicated topic jammed into the attributive position after τοῦ, revealing a certain difficulty in naming it without buying in to the doxic scandal. Cf. the expressions at 451C5-6, 502D4-5 and 423E6-7.

<sup>2318</sup> ταῦτ' ... καὶ ὄλλα πολλά (C10): But it may just as well be Glaucon's demurral to answer the objection that Socrates refers to! The question as to whether the difficulties Socrates is facing have to do with the λόγος or with his interlocutor, becomes a constant issue during the next forty pages (e.g., n.260I, 450C3-5; n.2728 [δυσαπόδεικτον], and n.2754), as also the distinction between things for which one fears being laughed at (τὸ γελοῖον) and things one laughs at himself (also τὸ γελοῖον).

<sup>2319</sup> Even with γάρ (D4), *pace* Stallb., we can compare this proleptic blanket negative (οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία) followed by specific negation (οὐ γάρ εὐκόλω) with 605E, 484E, 536C; *Tht.142E; Xen.Symp.2.4, 4.3*; and we can compare (with J.-C.) the very close parallel, *Parm.131E6-7*, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία ... οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὔκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι. The force of γάρ is to apologize for the

It really doesn't.<sup>2320</sup> Think about it this way. Whether a person falls into a pool or the wide ocean, he's going to start swimming either way. So let's start swimming and hope to survive the wave of the argument, in hopes some dolphin might slip under us and carry us to safety or some other miraculous salvation might come upon us.<sup>2321</sup> Can you see any way out of it? We have granted that one and another nature requires one and another occupation, and that a woman's nature is other than a man's; on the other hand we are now saying these natures despite all their otherness need to practice the same occupation.<sup>2322</sup> Isn't this the charge<sup>2323</sup> we are facing?

"Quite so."

(454) Let me tell you: This antilogical<sup>2324</sup> art is a real humdinger!<sup>2325</sup>

"Why do you say this?"

Because people fall into practicing it unbeknownst to themselves, thinking they aren't contesting but conversing. It comes from being unable to analyze what is being said into its constituent meanings and investigating them closely but instead sticking with the mere names of things and attempting to prove the opposite of a statement made,<sup>2326</sup> the whole thing done in the spirit of contention rather than communication.<sup>2327</sup>

"That is indeed something that happens to a lot of people. But you're not saying it's made its way into our present conversation are you?"<sup>2328</sup>

Absolutely. We might be involved in it right now without meaning to be. We are all riled up and eager to fight about the proposition that the same nature must not be attached to the same occupations,<sup>2329</sup> as though the mere words of the proposition were all we needed to argue about, but prolepsis.

<sup>2320</sup> οὐ γάρ, εἰπον (D5): The "fallacy" of the argument has already been made quite patent by the slip from πάμπολυ to πλεῖστον κεχωρισμένην φύσιν. Raising scandalous arguments does not elicit the best of logic but anger, such as an indignation at the blending of sexual roles that would easily see fit to misuse logic. Socrates feared not πολύ but ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα (C10-D3).

<sup>2321</sup> ή ἄλλην τινα ἄπορον σωτηρίαν (D10-11). The point is, there is no contradiction in hoping for the un hoped for at the same time that we are doing all we can within our meager powers. Again the modalities of hope and reason are combined (450D1-2), in a way that is tantamount to recognizing that "The evil of the day is sufficient unto the day" while also hoping that "The rest shall be added unto you."

<sup>2322</sup> The language of διαφέρειν (B7) is now replaced with the language of ἄλλος and αὐτός (E3-4).

<sup>2323</sup> With κατηγορεῖται (E5) Socrates continues to acknowledge they have been attacked, but his summary of the challenge is now stated in purely rational terms without the personal edge.

<sup>2324</sup> ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης (454A1-2). First reason fought ridicule; now it fights "antireason." Are these opponents one or two? Surely reason can appear captious to the conventional state of mind, so that it becomes crucial that Socrates distinguish his reason from that of his captious scandalizers.

<sup>2325</sup> γενναία (A1): "Humdinger" rather than "noble," as at 414B9.

<sup>2326</sup> λεχθέντος (A7) aorist of the act of assertion, as opposed to the present λεγόμενον one line above, designating what the assertion meant and still means.

<sup>2327</sup> διαλέκτῳ (A8) a rare noun (fem.) used to make a pair with the noun ἔρις, just as the two ideas were paired as verbs above (ἐρίζειν, διαλέγεσθαι).

<sup>2328</sup> καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς (A11): Plainly Glaucon falls among the ὄκοντες of A4.

<sup>2329</sup> τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν (B4): There is no need, with Burnet, to read the μή of Ven. 184 against the

we haven't done a whit of investigation about what aspect of the natures we had in mind as making one nature different or the same as the other, nor in what relation, when we allocated one or another occupation to one or another nature, and the same occupation to the same nature.

"You're right, we didn't think about this."

Well let me remind you that we could very easily<sup>2330</sup> press the question upon ourselves<sup>2331</sup> whether the nature of the bald man is the same as the nature of the hairy man. Isn't it the opposite?<sup>2332</sup> And if we accept that it is opposite, then if bald men are doing our cobbling we mustn't allow hairy men to cobble, or if the hairy ones do then the bald ones mustn't.

"That would be ridiculous!"<sup>2333</sup>

Ridiculous for no other reason than that our allocation was not based on any and every sameness and difference in nature. We only sought to watch out for one aspect of differentiation and assimilation among natures, the one pertinent to the occupations considered in their distinct natures. We had in mind for instance that a medical woman and a medical man have the same nature with respect to their soul, while the medical man and building man have a different nature.<sup>2334</sup> Thus in the case of the type of people that are women and the type of people that are men, if the types appear to stand out from one another in respect to some craft or other occupation,<sup>2335</sup> then we would have to assign one and another occupation to the one and the other. But if their relative competency seems to distinguish them only in that one area, that the female type bears the child and the male type impregnates the female, we have not moved a bit closer to having shown that the woman is different

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older mss. and Galen. Disputation hinges on double negatives; contrast the non-antilogical restatement of their underlying position at 453E3-4, where the casual use of the ἄλλο / ἄλλην construction refers to the same and the different at one and the same time. Fighting that the same don't need the same is tantamount to fighting that the different don't need the different.

<sup>2330</sup> τοιγάρτοι (C1) intimates that we could act just as irresponsibly as the ἀντιλογικός.

<sup>2331</sup> ἀνερωτᾶν (C1). The prefix ἀνα- makes "ask" mean "question:" Unless asking for points of information is the issue (*Charm.*153D1, *Lach.*180E7, *Tht.*143D2, *Tim.*22A1), the prefix adds a confrontational edge, as when the answer is personal or when it requires or presses the respondent to decide or commit himself to something he hasn't (*Apol.*22E1, *Gorg.*455C8-D1, *H.Min.*364D1; *Leg.*793A1, 893A3; *Phlb.*63C, *Thg.*123B4). Hence it is used in dialectical conversation, where each question is a step the answerer is being asked to concede (όμολογεῖν), as at *Gorg.*497B7, *Leg.*629A2, *Meno* 84D2 (of the slave-boy), *Phlb.*20A1 and 63C3—and here, where the very framing of the question challenges assent, as it did at 453B7-8. The word presumes the person questioned owes an answer (*Ar.Lys.*484, *Pl.*499).

<sup>2332</sup>καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐναντία (C2-3): The antilogical tone returns, pushing for the entrapping answer, as at οὐ πάμπολυ διαφέρει above (453B7).

<sup>2333</sup>ἄρα κατ' ἄλλο τι ... γελοῖον (C7): Irrationality can be as laughable as the paradoxical conclusions of reason.

<sup>2334</sup> If ὄντα (D2) is to be kept, with all mss., against the excision of Burnet, it must be taken separately with each of ιατρικόν and ιατρικήν, understanding ἄνδρα as subject for the one predicate and γυναικία as subject for the other, according to the rule of the prevalence of the masculine in such cases (Smyth §1055). The two pairs of examples—female doctorly / male doctorly and male doctorly / male builderly—make the point as swiftly as it can be made.

<sup>2335</sup>τέχνην τινὰ ἡ ἄλλο ἐπιτήδευμα (D8), a chiastic hendiadys: the former term brings forward the technical qualification implicit in the examples, which were typical τέχναι; the latter returns us to the term that has been occupying us all along (last used at B9). τινα and ἄλλο then mean almost the same thing.

from the man for our current purposes, and so we would continue to believe that both the guards and their wives should be assigned the same jobs.<sup>2336</sup>

Our next move is to suggest to the man who is upholding the opposite position<sup>2337</sup> that he (455) enlighten<sup>2338</sup> us on the very point he has assumed: In relation to which craft or art or profession, among those that have a role in our civic setup, is the nature of the woman and the man different rather than the same?

“The question is only fair.”<sup>2339</sup>

Yes, and now another person might say what you just did, that to give an adequate answer offhand is not difficult, though if a person had a chance to think about it, it would be easy.<sup>2340</sup> In that case, let's ask the man who had been contradicting us to let us take the lead in the hope that<sup>2341</sup> we might show him that there is no occupation that is the peculiar work of the woman in the managing of our city. “Tell us,” we will say to him: “Weren't you thinking that the person who is naturally suited, as opposed to naturally unsuited<sup>2342</sup> to a given task, is the one that learns it easily rather than with difficulty? And who after learning even a little soon shows himself able to find the rest on his own, as opposed to a person who even after a good deal of instruction and practice is barely able to retain what he has learned? And whose physical abilities can come to the aid of his mental direction rather than thwart it? Or is it in some other way that you would distinguish the naturally suited from the naturally unsuited in a given field?”

“Nobody would have other ways to argue for,” answers Glaucon on behalf of the opponent.

<sup>2336</sup> οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (E1): It is not that the argument from φύσις has become merely empirical (Halliwell ad 454D1) but that since φύσις trumps νόμος, the burden is shifted onto νόμος to give evidence that its provisions have any basis in truth. Such evidence would perforce be empirical. For οὐδὲν μᾶλλον as the formula for such burden shifting cf. n.357.

<sup>2337</sup> κελεύομεν (E6). The interlocutor had up to now been a refuter only. By the burden shifting he has become an upholder (the technical term in dialectic is ὑπέχων), in the sense that the proposition he had foisted upon us as self-evident has become a thesis he now has to defend.

<sup>2338</sup> διδάσκειν (455A1). The term, along with κελεύομεν, evinces the different tone, polite and calm and dialectical instead of eristic, with which Socrates now advances the contrary argument. If two disagree one might teach the other what he does not know, unless they disagree for disagreement's sake. Conversely if they come to agree, one has learned. Thus the parties to a dispute can be admonished to “learn and teach” rather than haggle (Crat.427E1-4; Gorg.467B11-C2; Lach.195A4, 196C3-4; Leg.934E5; Phlb.16E; Tht.167D; cf. the fleeting allusion to it at 407A10-11, and the rhetorical use of the idea at the end of this Book, 476E4-6). In true dialectic the questioner becomes the learner and the answerer the teacher. Socrates, who desires above all to know, doesn't care which role he takes. This is too much for a Thrasymachus to believe (cf.336DE and 338B).

<sup>2339</sup> δίκαιον γοῦν (A4). For the “warranted” question cf. 599D1; Gorg.451A1-2, 454A7,B1, 461D2; Meno 85E3; Phdo.86D6.

<sup>2340</sup> οὐδὲν χαλεπόν (A7). Glaucon had said a quick answer would be hard, but had not bragged that time would make it easy (453C7). The addition suggests the antilogical interlocutor is still trying to dodge (the plea for time becomes a dodge in the *Hippias Major*: cf. 295A, 297E1-2, 304D4-5). In the sequel Socrates gooses him along.

<sup>2341</sup> ἔαν πως ... (B1-2), the same polite and gentle construction Glaucon had used to request Socrates's help at the beginning of Book Two (358B1: cf.427D3 and n.693). This is a further note in the conciliatory treatment broached above and referred back to, at 476E5-6.

<sup>2342</sup> εὐφυῆ / ἀφυῆ (B5).

So, are you aware of any human endeavor in which the race of men is not superior in all these ways to the race of women? Need we spell out a long list<sup>2343</sup> of fields like weaving and baking cakes and boiling stews,<sup>2344</sup> where the female group might seem to have the edge only to suffer the greatest ridicule<sup>2345</sup> when it is worsted?

“You are right to assert the one beats out<sup>2346</sup> the other in virtually every field of endeavor, if you view them as groups, though in any given field many a woman is better than many a man. Still, on the whole, the position you have taken is correct.”

So we can conclude there is no particular occupation among those that play a role in settling our city that belongs to women simply because they are women, or to men because they are men. The fact<sup>2347</sup> is, the personal characteristics requisite to the occupations are distributed over both the species, so that all occupations can be taken up by a woman and all by a man. Granted, in any endeavor the women are weaker<sup>2348</sup> than the men but this fact by itself does not warrant that only men should be assigned the tasks. A given woman, after all, will have a doctorly nature and another will lack it, and one (456) will be musical and another unmusical. But gymnastical, are we not to say, one will be<sup>2349</sup> and soldierly, while another is unwarlike and not philogymnastic?

“I at least will agree to this.”

<sup>2343</sup> μακρολογῶμεν (C6), in *praeteritio*. The term tends to be derogatory. A single extra word is enough to draw the charge (*Euthyphr.* 14B1,B8; *Gorg.* 449B4-9 replying to B2-3 and A7-8 above; and note the hyperbolic use of ἀπέραντον at *Tht.* 147C4). The complaint has to do with pertinence rather than mere length. Sometimes speaking at length is justified (*Gorg.* 465E1-6A2) but usually it is “speechifying” when one should be conversing, obstructing the flow of conversation with unneeded elaboration (cf. 343B-4C; and *H.Min.* 373A2-5; *Meno* 71E-2A; *Prot.* 335B8 [tendentious]; cf. *Alc.I* 106B1ff and *Soph.* 217C1-D5, where it means lecturing rather than teaching), sometimes for the benefit of the audience rather than the immediate interlocutor (*Gorg. ad init.*, 482E2-5, 494D1; *Prot.* 328E5-9B5; *Tht.* 162D3). Hence it becomes associated with the sophists (e.g., *Prot.* 334C8-D5 and *Philostr. Vit.Soph.I.494*) in contrast with the Socratic “method” of question and answer: *Gorg.* 447C1-8, *H.Min.* 364B1-C2.

<sup>2344</sup> τήν τε ὑφαντικὴν λέγοντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ποπάνων τε καὶ ἐψημάτων θεραπείαν (C6-7): What makes the list “macrological” is its gratuitous specificity.

<sup>2345</sup> καταγελαστότατον (C8): It is a reversal that ridicule is now heaped on the person who believes what is only usually true.

<sup>2346</sup> ἡττώμενον (D1), as well as the ensuing κρατεῖται (D2), by standing in contrast with βελτίους (D4), already intimate the stipulation that men as a class possess only physical superiority (cf. E1-2, *infra*).

<sup>2347</sup> διεσπαρμέναι (D8), the empirical perfect (cf. n. 1536).

<sup>2348</sup> ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός (E1-2): Physical strength as a criterion for suitability was not only listed third but also as dependent upon the other two (whence the quaint expression, τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετοίη τῇ διανοίᾳ, B9).

<sup>2349</sup> καὶ γυμναστικὴ δ’ ἄρα οὐ (456A1), reading καί with D (om. AFM Galen Eusebius : del. Burnet, edd.): the statement adds γυμναστική before δ’ ἄρα presumptively denies it, ἄρα expressing a feigned access of sudden realization as it does in *argumenta ex contrariis* (cf. 376B6-D2 and n. 1082).

What about a wisdom-loving nature and a wisdom-hating one,<sup>2350</sup> or a spirited and a listless?<sup>2351</sup>  
“These too.”

So there will also be a guardly<sup>2352</sup> woman and another that is not—the very sort of inner nature we were looking for when we selected out the guardly ones among the men.<sup>2353</sup> And so a woman has the same inner nature as a man for guarding the city, except that the woman's is weaker and the man's is stronger. And so women of this nature<sup>2354</sup> must be selected out alongside men of this nature, to live alongside them and guard alongside them,<sup>2355</sup> since in very fact they are meet to the task and naturally related to them.

“Quite so.”

As to occupations, we must assign the same ones to the same natures; and so we have come full circle, back to the original question, and we now agree and share the position<sup>2356</sup> that it is not contrary to nature to assign musical and gymnastic exercises to the women among our guards.<sup>2357</sup> Our

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<sup>2350</sup> Note (455E6-456A5) the playful substitution and elaboration of expressions for presence and absence of attributes: *ἰατρική / οὐ* (sc. *ἰατρική*); *μουσική / ἄμουσος* (privative ἀ- substituted for οὐ); *γυμναστική + πολεμική* (positives, though introduced by οὐ in a question anticipating positive response) / *ἀπόλεμος + οὐ φιλογυμναστική* (supplementary positive prefix *φιλο-* in connection with negative οὐ); *φιλόσοφος / μισόσοφος* (*μισο-* following *φιλο-* by easy logic at the expense of coining a term); and finally the reversion, in *θυμοειδῆς / ἄθυμος*, to the formula used with *μουσικός*. These embody the natural and casual manner of inductive pacing (on which cf. 333C11-12 and n.202) but also distract the interlocutor from the underlying strategy present in the choice of exemplary material at the same time that they slant the issue away from innate ability toward personal disposition or preference.

<sup>2351</sup> After *ἰατρική* (E6) the items are chosen to collect the attributes that the theoretical investigation had come to require of our leaders (the two aspects of nurture [the *παιδεία*] and the two aspects of underlying nature [cf. 376C4]), affording therefore the conclusion that women also qualify to be “phylactic” (456A7). The first example, *ἰατρική*, as well as its pairing with *μουσική* which truly belongs with gymnastics, is something of a red herring that hides this strategy. It reappears from above, where it served as the first instance of an occupation that might require a peculiar inner nature (454D5). *ἰατρική* typically represents a maximally crucial skill in which physical strength is least required, in contrast with the skill of the pilot (332D10-E3ff, 341C4-D4, 346AC, 360E6ff; cf. *Polit.*297E11-12ff), and of the general (*Charm.*173B1-3; *Leg.*709B2-3, 961E-62A; and end of *Euthyd.*279D8-80A5), which need more. Cf. also *Phlb.*56B1-2; *Prot.*344D2-5.

<sup>2352</sup> *φυλακική* (A7), recalling the coinage at 412E6 (cf. 412C10 and n. 1748).

<sup>2353</sup> The ἡ οὐ clause (A7-8) functions as a Q.E.D. The list of attributes we can expect to find among women as well as among men moves along by its own inner logic until it reaches the item (*φυλακὴ πόλεως*) that all along had been the goal.

<sup>2354</sup> ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ *φυλακικὴ γυνή* (A7): After this fundamental conclusion, the corollaries are drawn with triumphant parallelism: καὶ γυναικὸς ἄρα (A10), καὶ γυναικες ἄρα (B1).

<sup>2355</sup> συνοικεῖν τε καὶ συμφυλάττειν (B2): The expression looks back to 451D4-6 as well as to the description of the way living and guarding are combined in the description of the guards' regime on the last page of Book Three.

<sup>2356</sup> ὁμολογοῦμεν (B8), the goal of dialectical conversation.

<sup>2357</sup> τῶν φυλάκων (B9): The women have now been added in and φυλάκων might be partitive genitive rather than possessive as it was just above (454E3-4: *τούς τε φύλακας ... καὶ τὰς γυναικας αὐτῶν*).

lawmaking was far from impossible after all, nor a mere pipe dream,<sup>2358</sup> if in very fact we were laying down laws in accordance with nature.<sup>2359</sup> Rather, to the extent that the current way goes against what we have legislated, it goes against nature.

Glaucon agrees and Socrates can continue. Given<sup>2360</sup> that we had set out to investigate whether our conceptions were possible and best,<sup>2361</sup> now that we have come to agree that they are possible our next task is to reach an agreement whether they are the best. Focus on the question how a woman will become guardly. Will we have one kind of education make the men guardly and another kind make the women so, keeping in mind that the students will have the same inner nature?

“No, one kind will educate both.”

Alright then do you come with an opinion about this?

“About what?”

About a prejudice<sup>2362</sup> you might harbor within yourself that one man is superior and the other is inferior. Or do you hold to the idea that all men are equally good?

“Not at all!”<sup>2363</sup>

So in the city we were founding, which set of men do you imagine we can look to as being the better ones, the guards who were finished<sup>2364</sup> with the education we designed or the shoemakers who were trained<sup>2365</sup> in the art of making shoes?

“What a ridiculous question!”<sup>2366</sup>

<sup>2358</sup>εὐχαῖς (B12), from εὐχή (450D1), here in the derogatory plural of a ridiculing critic.

<sup>2359</sup>εἴπερ κατὰ φύσιν ἐτίθεμεν τὸν νόμον (C1): That φύσις and νόμος should be aligned gets the best of both worlds, but more, it explodes the indignant objection that Socrates's flabbergasting policy is kookie.

<sup>2360</sup>γε (C5): The “program” comes from 450C6-9 but broadly overstates that passage, which had only represented a sputtering indignant attack (“First of all it's just impossible; but besides it's a lousy idea!”) Socrates is taming down the emotional aspect of the objection, step by step.

<sup>2361</sup>δυνατά γε καὶ βέλτιστα λέγοιμεν (C4-5): The expression omits a noun. Compare the restatement at the end of this argument (457A3-4 and n.2368).

<sup>2362</sup>ὑπολαμβάνειν παρὰ σεαυτῷ (D5) is pleonastic, continuing the pleonasm of πῶς ἔχεις δόξης πέρι in the previous question. Pointedly, Socrates asks him not whether he believes it but whether he has a belief about it. δόξα tends to replace questions with *presumptive* answers, and therefore tends to have forgotten where those answers came from.

<sup>2363</sup>οὐδαμῶς (D7): He has already expressed the belief that persons are not equally competent at 455D3-5.

<sup>2364</sup>ἐξειργάσθαι (D9): The perfect emphasizes the result rather than the process, and refers to the guards as a class. They were already better men than the ones who learned trades. Contrast the aorist below (457A1) which emphasizes the increment of improvement attributable to the παιδεία.

<sup>2365</sup>τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευθέντες (D10): Notably, there was no specific provision to train them (beyond tutelage in the trade provided by their fathers: 421E1-2). The references to the rest of the city (τῶν ὄλλων πολίτων, D12; first called ἡ ὄλλη πόλις at the end of Book Three [414C2, D3, E5; cf. 465B9, 467B4]; and then οἵ τε γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ ὄλλοι δημιουργοί [415A6-7; cf. C2]) are few and unsystematic because the subject is unimportant (cf. οὐδὲν δεινόν, 421A5).

<sup>2366</sup>γελοῖον (D11). The theoretical project is by now taken seriously enough to make a comparison to common life laughable, despite the fact that for conventional purposes only common

And you need not answer it.<sup>2367</sup> These men are likewise the best of all the other citizens, just as the women that are guards will be the best of the women. There is no better boon to a city than that the women and men born in it be the best possible, and this will be the outcome under the influence (457) of the education in music and gymnastic that we designed. Therefore we legislated not only the possible but the best way a city can be.<sup>2368</sup>

The proof complete, Socrates can now place a bit of a picture before our eyes.<sup>2369</sup> Those among the guards who are women must strip down, since in truth it is virtue that shall be their dress rather than clothing, and they must share the tasks of war and the city's other guardly duties, and these must be their only jobs. From among these duties the lighter ones must be given to the women rather than the men in accordance with the fact that their species is weaker. The man that laughs at the sight of naked women, though they are exercising naked for the most important of reasons, “harvests a crop of wisdom premature”<sup>2370</sup> through his laughter, quite ignorant of what he is laughing at and what he is doing.<sup>2371</sup> After all the finest of truths is the saying that the useful is what is truly fine, and that the harmful is what is truly ugly—a saying that will never become obsolete.<sup>2372</sup>

“I agree completely.”

Accordingly let us declare that we have eluded the first wave, as it were, that came crashing down  
life is real.

<sup>2367</sup> Ον μανθάνω in response (D12) cf. 372E2 and n.1035.

<sup>2368</sup> οὐ μόνον ἄρα δυνατὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄριστον καὶ πόλει νόμιμον ἐτίθεμεν (457A3-4), imitating the omission of noun in the parallel construction at 456C4-5, the plurals changed to singular, ἐτίθεμεν replacing λέγοιμεν (itself representing an imperfect in secondary sequence), and ἄριστον replacing βέλτιστα. πόλει νόμιμον is a surprise predicate, insisting, contrary to the indignant objector, that the new provision is not only κατὰ φύσιν after all but could become νόμιμον for a city.

<sup>2369</sup> ἀποδυτέον δή (A6). Agreement having been reached, Socrates now (with δή) places a picture before his interlocutor's eyes, as he did some forty pages ago (416D3ff) only to elicit the objection of the onlooker Adeimantus; and as he had some forty pages before that (372A5ff) only to elicit the objection of the onlooker Glaucon. It has been these pictures, these ecphrastic descriptions, that have especially provoked his interlocutors' dissent or sealed their assent. The theoretical and the actual; the rational, the hoped for, and the ridiculous, are all forced to encounter each other. Which shall win out? The story of Leontius comes to mind.

<sup>2370</sup> ἀτελῆ ... σοφίας δρέπειν καρπόν (B2-3), a quotation later attributed to Pindar as his criticism of the φυσιολογοῦντες by the Vit.Pindari Ambrosiana (Schol.Pind.I.4,6 Drachmann) and by Stob.2.1.21 (2,7,18 Wachsmuth-Hense) = fr.209 Schroeder, fr.248 Turyn. The premature harvest makes small gains where a larger could have been had if one had waited. Pindar's criticism might be analogous to Heraclitus's criticism of Ionian φυσιολογία and Socrates's criticism of the περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία in Phdo.96Aff, namely, the shallow use of reason.

I disagree with those who imagine Plato is here co-opting Pindar as a representative of poetry in its “quarrel” with philosophy, into the philosophical group. There is no “quarrel” (cf. n. 4930 ad 607B5), but more to the point, the theme of Book Five is the power of ridicule and mass opinion and of the φθόνος that underlies them, which is not only one of Pindar's greatest subjects but is also in Plato's oeuvre shown to be at the center of the feeling that brought on Socrates's demise, to the shame of Athens.

<sup>2371</sup> οὐδὲν οἶδεν (B3). What makes him laughable is that he does not understand; but this implies that only the knower will laugh at him – so, again, the tables are turned.

<sup>2372</sup> καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται (B4), true now and always because not resting on fashion. Cf. δεήσομαί τε καὶ δέοματ, 453C7-8.

on our legislation concerning women, by means of argument and reason.<sup>2373</sup> We have not been utterly drowned for making the law that our guards must carry out all their duties in concert with the guardettes,<sup>2374</sup> but rather our reason has enabled us to agree that what reason dictated is a plan both possible and beneficial.

“No small wave it was that you have eluded!”

But you’ll hardly call it large once you see the next one!

“Tell and I’ll see.”

## D.2: Marriage and Eugenics

What comes after that law and the others we have set down is the following. These women are to be shared by these men, all of them sharing all.<sup>2375</sup> No woman is to live privately with any man. And their children, too, are to be shared: no parent may know which child is his own nor any child his parent.

“This is a much greater challenge to our belief than that was, both as to its feasibility and its very worth as a policy.”

I don’t think the worth of the policy would be disputed—that it would not be a tremendous good that wives<sup>2376</sup> should be held in common and children too—if only it were feasible. But I do think the question of its feasibility will incite the greatest dispute.

“Both would incite stiff controversy.”

You’re arguing that the propositions are a pair.<sup>2377</sup> I thought I would escape the one if only you thought the measure worthwhile, and all that would be left to deal with would be the other, the feasibility.

“But you didn’t get away with it. So, give an account for<sup>2378</sup> both of them.

Uphold my case I must! But humor me just this much: let me take something of a holiday, the (458) way a lazy person is wont to let his mind wander when he’s off walking along enjoying his own company.<sup>2379</sup> You know how they think about how much they will enjoy having something they desire,

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<sup>2373</sup>λέγοντες (B8) stresses that reason has not only stayed laughter and embarrassment, but also has come to a reconciliation with the captious sophistry that turned reason against itself (cf. λόγος at 453A8, C8, D10, and the methodological digression on ἀντιλογική, 454A1-D1). Hence the striking expression τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι below (C1-2).

<sup>2374</sup>καὶ τὰς φυλακίδας (C1): The coinage φυλακίς is Aristophanic. Humor, once put in its place, can be called back out to add a charm of self-satire.

<sup>2375</sup> τὰς γυναῖκας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάντων πάσας (C10): The word order weaves from women to men and with πάντων πάσας back again.

<sup>2376</sup> τὰς γυναῖκας (D7): γυνή has meant “woman” up until now; but now “wife,” its simultaneous other meaning, becomes operant.

<sup>2377</sup>λέγεις ... λόγων σύστασιν (E2).

<sup>2378</sup>διδόναι λόγον (E6), identical to playing the role of answerer in dialectical conversation, and therefore synonymous with ὑπέχειν λόγον, which is half of what Socrates has in mind when he next says ὑφεκτέον δίκην, accepting his liability for giving a rational defense for law.

<sup>2379</sup> ὅταν μόνοι πορεύωνται (458A2): The archetype behind Rousseau’s *promeneur solitaire* comes inevitably to mind in the ensuing lines (, but also the leisurely activity of spinning tales in general, and

skipping over the hard thinking as to whether it would even be possible to procure it in the first place. Instead, just assuming it is there on hand they decide how to manage all the details, enjoying to think about all they will do with it once it arrives and making their already lazy souls still lazier. I too have by now been getting a little soft and would just as soon shelve that big question, how the provision could come to be, and for now would just say it were possible—if you'll let me—and lay out a pretty picture how our rulers would manage the thing assuming the arrangement were in place, and how most excellently beneficial the practice would be, once put into practice, for our guards and for our city. This is what I'd like to investigate with you first, if you will allow it, and turn to the other question later.

Glaucon allows it, and Socrates continues the investigation. If our rulers are deserving of the name and their helpers likewise,<sup>2380</sup> I'd think that the one group will be willing to do what they are ordered to do and the others to do the ordering, by following our explicit<sup>2381</sup> laws in some areas and imitating our lawgiving in areas we left up to them.<sup>2382</sup> So in the present case you, who as lawgiver have selected who will be the male guards, will now select who will be the female ones to be their mates<sup>2383</sup> similar as far as possible in their natures. Thereupon, given their common habitation and common mess and since none of them has any private prerogative in these regards but instead all are mixed together both in their exercising and in the rest of their training, they will be driven by necessity of a natural sort, I imagine, toward intercourse.

“Necessity indeed, not the geometrical but the erotic kind,<sup>2384</sup> which proves more keen in persuading and leading the mass of mankind about.”<sup>2385</sup>

Quite so, but whether it is mating with each other or any other behavior, to act in a disorderly way is not pious in a city of happy people nor something our guards will suffer them to do.

“To suffer it would not be just.”<sup>2386</sup>

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Aristotle's distinction between ἀ ἐγένετο and οἵ ἂν γένοιτο (Po.1451B4-5). We are moving out of the light of the forum and into the shade of the trees. μολθακίζομαι (B1) brings on board all of the coarser man's derision of the more poetic types. All in all we have an embryonic definition of fiction.

<sup>2380</sup> οἱ ἄρχοντες / οἵ τε τούτοις ἐπίκουροι (B9-C1). The distinction is drawn at the end of Book Three (412B8-414A7) and pace Halliwell has nothing to do with philosophical training and little to do with age. The criterion of age (412C2-3) was merely a starting point there (based on 409A7-C1), subsumed immediately into the main criterion, which was the purity and strength of their souls (already mentioned at 409A5-6), for which several tests were then described (412D9-414A4).

<sup>2381</sup> Reading αὐτοῖς with the Parisinus 1642 *apud* Slings (cf. tr. Ficino, *partim ipsis parentes legibus*) rather than αὐτούς of the major mss., which introduces the spurious notions that the rulers “actually” believe in some laws and not others, and that they enforce the ones they do not believe in in order to imitate or emulate “us.”

<sup>2382</sup> ὅσα ἀν ἐκείνοις ἐπιτρέψωμεν (C4), referring of course to their refusal to legislate details: 423D8-424A2, 425A3-27A7; including of course the dismissal that Polemarchus resuscitated in order to interrupt the flow of the argument, which interruption caused the present digression!

<sup>2383</sup> παραδώσεις (C7), as of a father assigning his daughter to her betrothed.

<sup>2384</sup> οὐ γεωμετρικοῖς γε ... (D5): On ὀνάγκη of logical necessity cf. n.204. Glaucon strengthens Socrates's notional neuter plural (ἀναγκαῖα, D3) with a truly nominal plural (ἀνάγκαις) in order to replace abstraction with something more concrete.

<sup>2385</sup> τὸν πολὺν λεών (D7), perhaps comic diction (e.g. Ar.Ran.219, 676; cf. also Lucian Hermon.72[815 Jac.]; Harm.2[853 Jac.]), expressing a certain disdain, the opposite side of ridicule.

<sup>2386</sup> οὔτε ὄσιον ... οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον: (E1-2): again the pairing of ὄσιον and δίκαιον in compendious reference to virtue, like our “right and good.” Cf. n.105.

So it is clear the next thing we must do is to institute sacred sanctions for marriages, where we would make sacred the marriages that are the most beneficial to the city. (459) But which would these be? Answer me the following question, Glaucon. I have seen hunting dogs in your house as well as a good number of fine birds. In truth, haven't you contrived a plan with regard to their marriages or mating? Though of course all of them are fine, some of them are better than the rest, or grow up to be. You do not breed them all alike but are particularly earnest about these best ones, and of these best ones you are most earnest not about the youngest of them nor the oldest but the ones that are closest to their prime. If they breed indiscriminately you know full well that they will become worse, whether it be your stock of birds or your dogs. The same would hold for horses or any other animal. Omigosh! This all goes to show how very sharp<sup>2387</sup> we need our rulers to be assuming the same holds true for the human animal!

"You can assume the same holds true, but what are you worried about?"

It's all the drugs they'll need to use. When it comes to doctors, if their patients don't need drugs prescribed but only need to comply with doctor's orders as to the right regimen, we recognize that even an inconsequential doctor is sufficient. When they do need drugs we know we need a doctor who is more confident.<sup>2388</sup> My point is, our rulers will be needing to use a lot of lies and deception, all for their subjects' own good, things we spoke of before as being useful the way drugs can be useful.<sup>2389</sup>

"And right we were to draw the analogy."

Right as we may have been about it,<sup>2390</sup> it plays a role in the areas of marriage and having children that is far from negligible. We have already agreed that the greatest number of matings possible must take place between the best men and the best women, and that the matings between the least consequential men and women must be kept at a minimum, and that we must nurture the offspring of the one set of pairings and not those of the other, if we are to optimize<sup>2391</sup> the herd; and that all this has to take place without anyone knowing it except the rulers, if you also want the herd of guards to be as free from contention as possible.

"All that you say is right."

Then holidays will be appointed by law, in which we will bring the brides together with the

<sup>2387</sup> ἄκρων (459B11): Here the term is used in a truly approbative way for the first time, as at E1 below: hitherto it had been a term of troubled praise for a canny astuteness in the service of lesser ideals, used first by the troubled brothers (360E7, cf. 366B5-6 and 405A8). Another term has now been re-appropriated to a higher purpose.

<sup>2388</sup> ἀνδρεῖος (C6) notably functions as the opposite of φαῦλος, here (C4-6). It has exactly the same sense at it had at 357A3.

<sup>2389</sup> ἔφαμεν δέ που (D1): Referring to 389B with the imperfect of citation.

<sup>2390</sup> With τοίνυν (D4) and with the “second person” demonstrative, τοῦτο (D5), Socrates implicates his interlocutor as an abettor of his radical plan, as does his division between the herd of guards over against the rule who manage them (E2-3) with whom his interlocutor is meant to identify. Moreover he catches up Glaucon's use of ὥρθως (Glauc. καὶ ὥρθως γε | Soc. τὸ ὥρθὸν τοῦτο: D3-5) just as Adeimantus had caught him up at the beginning of the Book (Soc. οὐκοῦν ὥρθως; | Adeimant. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥρθως τοῦτο: 449C6-7), as embodying the gravamen of the matter concerning wives and children. The incumbency to answer that Adeimantus had there forced upon Socrates is now being forced by Socrates upon Glaucon as an incumbency to rise to the occasion and agree.

<sup>2391</sup> ἄκροτατον (E1): The superlative invokes the notion of gradual improvement toward a peak of perfection.

grooms, and sacrifices too; and songs (460) will be composed by our poets, fitting<sup>2392</sup> to the marriages as they take place. The majority of pairings we will leave up to the rulers with the goals of preserving their numbers against the ravages of disease and war and such, and of keeping the city from becoming large or small. We'll need a subtle system of lots so that the lesser man we mentioned above should blame his luck rather than the rulers for the way the specific yokings are assigned.<sup>2393</sup> Conversely the better youths, for their good efforts in war and elsewhere,<sup>2394</sup> must be given all manner of honors and trophies but also an especially generous access to the women and unions with them,<sup>2395</sup> so that we might take full advantage of this excuse<sup>2396</sup> to maximize the number of children such guards might rear.

“Rightly so.”<sup>2397</sup>

And when and where the children are born, the ruling constabulary will come and take them, whether it be made up of men or women or both—the ruling positions will be shared, after all, between women and men. The offspring of the good guards they will bear off to a pen and to certain feeders who live there<sup>2398</sup> apart from the rest of the city. As to those born to the inferior and any born to the others that have a defect, the rulers will hide them away in a secret hidden place as appropriate.

“So much is in accordance with our conception<sup>2399</sup> that the race of the guards is in fact to be kept pure.”

As for nurturing them, these same rulers will be in charge. They will bring the mothers to the pen as long as they are producing milk, using every device they can so that none can recognize which child is her own; and they will supply wet nurses too, if the mothers haven't enough, but even here will take

<sup>2392</sup> τοῖς γιγνομένοις γάμοις (460A1-2): The participle invokes the particulars of the marriage occasion and insists that the poem be suited to them, just as Pindar's praise blends perennial issues (his τεθμός) with the specifics supplied by his client (his χρέος).

<sup>2393</sup> αἰτιᾶσθαι (A9): Presumably the complaint of the φαῦλος is that he is assigned very seldom.

<sup>2394</sup> πον (B2) adds a note of indifference. The grounds for the awards are merely a πρόφασις for arranging more matings for them.

<sup>2395</sup> γέρα δοτέον καὶ ἀθλα ἄλλα τε καὶ ἀφθονέστερα ἡ ἔξουσία τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν συγκοινήσεως (B2-3). γέρα/ ἀθλα is an exhaustive pair (honorific privileges and memorials: cf. 503A6-7, 414A2-4, 516C8-9 (where τιμαί replaces γέρα), 465D9-E2 (where ταφή replaces ἀθλα), and 608C1-2 (where ἐπίχειρα replaces γέρα). The usual rewards are mere foil meant to serve as distractions from the underlying strategy of maximizing the matings for the better guards. Thus they are dismissed with a rather unique ἄλλως τε καί construction, ἄλλα going with both γέρα and ἀθλα since it dismisses the whole concept of traditional awards they jointly embody.

<sup>2396</sup> The language of αἰτία (A9) and πρόφασις (B4) acknowledges the process by which contention among the guards or their helpers, broached at 459E3, might arise. On the terms cf. the indispensable study by Lionel Pearson (*TAPA* 83[1952]205-223).

<sup>2397</sup> ὄρθως (B6), the fourth time Glaucon uses this term to agree, echoing the challenge Adeimantus made at the beginning of the Book (τὸ ὄρθως τοῦτο, 449C7: cf.nn.2254, 2259, 2287). Cf. also 461B3, B8, and E4 below.

<sup>2398</sup> οἰκούσας (C2) feminine because the feeders are female. τροφούς is either able to be both masculine and feminine (pace LSJ) or we have a *constructio ad sensum*, where, as Smyth says (§1013), “The real, not the grammatical, gender ... determines the agreement.”

<sup>2399</sup> Reading μέλλοι (C6) with all mss. rather than the μέλλει of the recentiores (and Vindob.54 according to Chambry) accepted by modern editors. S.R. Slings (*Critical Notes on Plato's Politeia* [= Mnemos. Suppl. 267: Leiden 2005] 87-8) compares Phdr.274A6-7, Thet.162B5-6. The optative continues the dominant theme of this Book, that the *conceptual* realm of reason is to be their guide.

care that they suckle them for only a moderate time. As to watching them overnight and the rest of the more toilsome duties, these they will assign to nurses and feeders.

“The manner of childrearing you describe is a life of relative ease for the wives among the guards!”<sup>2400</sup>

So much is only appropriate. We need to move on to what we next set before ourselves,<sup>2401</sup> that the offspring be bred when the parents are in their prime. Would you agree with me that the prime lasts about twenty years long for a woman and thirty for a man?

“Which years?”

For the woman, from the age of twenty and until she reaches forty she is prime to give birth for the city. For the man, from the time he has reached the height of his powers up to the age of fifty five he is in his prime to breed.<sup>2402</sup>

(461) “Well I would say that for both the men and the women these years are the peak years both of body and mind.”

Now if at an age older than this or younger than this a man should engage in breeding for the city, we shall declare such an error impious and unjust<sup>2403</sup> and stigmatize him as spawning a child for<sup>2404</sup> the city who if it goes unnoticed will be born without the guidance of the sacrifices and the prayers that are to be conducted over each and every marriage by priestesses and priests and by the city as a whole in order to ensure the hopes that from good parents even better children will be born and from useful ones even more useful.<sup>2405</sup> We will say instead that the child was spawned in darkness out of a dangerous kind of impulsiveness.

“Rightly we shall.”

And the same law will apply if a man while still in the breeding phase of life should have sex with one of the breeding women without the ruler’s bringing them together. We shall declare that the man has brought a bastard into being for the city, unsanctioned by betrothal and unholy.<sup>2406</sup>

“Most rightly.”

On the other hand once the women and the men move beyond their prime we will release them to be with whomever they wish excepting, for the men, their daughter and their mother and the daughters and mothers of these, and excepting likewise for the women being with son or father or their sons and fathers; but even though granting them this to enjoin them earnestly to prevent any

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<sup>2400</sup> ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν (D6-7): either “those of the guards that are female” (as at 456B9), or “the wives of the guards”—the “extension” of the two expressions is the same. The point is that the toils of motherhood will be greatly mitigated for the guards, which in Glaucon’s mind at least had been a primary obstacle to the credibility of the program: cf. 450C4: ή δὴ ἐπιπονωτάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι.

<sup>2401</sup> ὁ προνθέμεθα (D8-9): at 459B1-3.

<sup>2402</sup> τίκτειν and γεννᾶν (E5-6), are the only jobs the male and female guards do not share: cf. τίκτειν / ὄχεύειν at 454D10-E1.

<sup>2403</sup> οὔτε ὄσιον οὔτε δίκαιον (461A4): The pair needs no analysis: cf. 458D9-E2 and n. 105. The double litotes seems to be idiomatic (458D9-E2, 463D5, and perhaps 391A2-3).

<sup>2404</sup> τῇ πόλει (A7), the dative used for the eugenically controlled contribution as at 460E6, E5 and below at 461B7.

<sup>2405</sup> καί (A8) inferential. Their goodness (the nobility of their stock) entails their being beneficial to the city. Cf. 459A1.

<sup>2406</sup> ἀνέγγυον καὶ ὄνιερον (B6) echoes οὔτε ὄσιον οὔτε δίκαιον (A4).

ensuing pregnancy from coming to full term, or if they are somehow forced to bear the child, to dispose of it with the understanding that such children are not to be raised.

“The provisions are moderate enough and right as far as they go, but how will they separate out which are their fathers and which their daughters?”<sup>2407</sup>

They will have no way to separate them out. Instead, measuring from the day a man first mates, all the children who are born in the tenth or even seventh month<sup>2408</sup> later he will call sons and daughters and they will call him father; and he will call their offspring spaced by like intervals grandchildren, and those offspring conversely will call him grandfather and grandmother. And also the children that were born at the same time that those he calls father and mother bore children, these he will call his sisters and brothers, so as to prevent the eventuality of their being with each other. The law will provide for brothers to cohabit with sisters as long as the lots fall this way and also the Pythian oracle corroborates it.<sup>2409</sup>

“Perfectly proper.”

So there's your policy regarding the communism of wives and children in our city. That it is consistent with the other provisions of our constitution and that this is by far the best way it can be, we need next to confirm, with the aid of argument and reason.<sup>2410</sup>

(462) “By Zeus we do!”

Let me suggest<sup>2411</sup> that the best place for us to begin reaching an agreement on this point<sup>2412</sup> is to ask ourselves what is the greatest thing we could hope to provide for our city through all our legislation and what is the greatest evil we'd want to avoid, and then to ask whether the legislation we have just formulated fits the outline of the good outcome and contravenes the outline of the bad.

“This seems the best way.”

What greater evil could we name than the one we mentioned before,<sup>2413</sup> the city's being torn asunder and made many cities instead of one? And what greater good than the thing<sup>2414</sup> that binds it

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<sup>2407</sup> πατέρας δὲ καὶ θυγατέρας (C8-D1): Abbreviation of all four cases by mentioning (chiastically) the last and the first. The meaning of ἀλλήλων is for once not reciprocal (cf. 449B1 and 616D7). They are not to decide who are each other's daughters and fathers, but who are the women's fathers and who the men's daughters, respectively.

<sup>2408</sup> δεκατῷ μηνὶ καὶ ἐβδόμῳ δή (D3), with καί moving from the easy assertion to the extreme case, as μέγα ... καὶ ὅλον (449D4-5 and n.2260). On δή cf. Denniston 291.

<sup>2409</sup> ἡ Πινθία (E3): Once again deferring to Delphi caps off an area of legislation: cf. 427BC and 540BC.

<sup>2410</sup> βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου (E8), again emphasizing reliance on reason. Cf. λέγοντες 457B8 and n.2999.

<sup>2411</sup> ἡδε (462A2), first person.

<sup>2412</sup> ὁμολογίας (A2): The current business of overcoming paradox with a deeper reliance on reason, is again emphasized (cf. 456B8, C7, C9, 457C1-2 and n.2373). Where we speak of paradoxes being “resolved” Socrates speaks of us “agreeing” them away.

<sup>2413</sup> ἔκεινο (A9) refers back to the conversation with Adeimantus in Book Four (422E7-423B10), as the re-use of peculiar plural, πολλάς (sc. πόλεις) indicates. No particular cause of *disunity* is there named, though the problem that passage addressed was the divisive effect of the single individual's desire for wealth and power (πλεονεξία) that had been embodied in Adeimantus's remarks.

<sup>2414</sup> τοῦ (B1), the article functioning as a demonstrative even in Attic prose, not uncommon before a relative (Smyth, §1116).

together and unifies it?

“None other.”

Well, the sharing of pleasures and pains unifies the city, whenever all the citizens feel similar amounts of joy at a good thing happening or pain at the same loss.<sup>2415</sup> On the other hand isolation or privacy of feelings tends to break up the city, as when one group is devastated and the other is overjoyed by the same things happening to<sup>2416</sup> the city and its constituent parts.<sup>2417</sup> I'd say the question underlying these reactions is whether the citizens feel like applying the expressions “It's mine” and “It's not mine” to the same things at the same times, and likewise the terms “It's alien” and “It's not alien.” In whatever city the greatest number apply the expression “It's mine” and “It's not mine” to the same thing in the same way, that city has the best order. Ask yourself just which city operates most nearly the way a single man does, as when for instance one of our fingers is smacked by something.<sup>2418</sup> The entire “community”—the body aligned<sup>2419</sup> down along its every part with the soul so as to form a single system managed by the ruling principle within her—perceives the event and feels as being its own the pain of the part that is affected, and feels it at the same instant, so that as we put it, “The man hurts in his finger.” The same account applies to any other part of the man, whether it is the pain of a part that is suffering or the pleasure of a part that is feeling relief.<sup>2420</sup> In the case of a city like our own, when an individual citizen suffers any good or bad thing, the city immediately recognizes the part<sup>2421</sup> that undergoes it as something belonging to itself so as to feel pleasure as a whole or pain as a whole, as the case may be.<sup>2422</sup>

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<sup>2415</sup> γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων / χαίρωσι καὶ λυπῶνται (B5-6), binary in the distributive sense (i.e., A is a-ing and B is b-ing): cf. 362C2-3 and n.773. The participles are neuter and form an hendiadys referring to the transient and vicissitudinous character of human existence (whence the expression παθήμασι below). The importance of united feeling was first recognized during the treatment of σωφροσύνη (432A2-6) but here the words of the song that was there being sung are revealed. At the beginning of Book Four Adeimantus was seeing the very green grass on the other side of the fence. To object (with Halliwell) that they should say “ours” rather than “mine” confuses cause with result, the “ours” being nothing but a spontaneous chorus of “mine's.”

<sup>2416</sup> παθήμασι (C1) compendious for τὰ γιγνόμενά τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενα at B5-6.

<sup>2417</sup> τῆς πόλεώς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει (C1) broaches proleptically the analysis into parts and whole that will come next.

<sup>2418</sup> δάκτυλος (C11): The finger is chosen for the illustration because it is a small but distinct part of a man that by its shape almost appears to be attached to him, and therefore detachable.

<sup>2419</sup> τεταμένη (C12), another borrowing from the previous treatment of σωφροσύνη (τέταται, 432A3 and n.2038), where the same voice and tense of the verb is used to describe the binding tension that unifies the parts of the city.

<sup>2420</sup> ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ (D6): Glaucon agrees with the points in reverse order, i.e. last point first (cf. n.204).

<sup>2421</sup> τὸ πάσχον (E1-2), a neuter replacing the hypothetical πολίτης (masc.) suggesting we understand μέρος with it (from D4), and thus tightening the analogy between the state with its citizens and the individual man with his “parts.”

<sup>2422</sup> μάλιστά τε φήσει ... καὶ ἡ συνησθήσεται ἡ συλλυπήσεται (E1-2). The position of μάλιστα is striking and creates (with τε) a sort of reverse ἄλλως τε καί construction. For the constellation of materials in the form A/B<sub>1</sub>/B<sub>2</sub> cf. *Euthyd.*271B4-5; *Gorg.*457D6, 479B8-C1, 483B6-8, 508C6-7 (A~έαντόν as here); *H.Maj.*304B2-3 (A~έαντόν); *Leg.*744B6 (B<sub>1</sub>/B<sub>2</sub> exegetical), 766E1-2 ( B<sub>1</sub>/B<sub>2</sub> exegetical), 776D8-E1(A~έαντόν), 782A6-7, 803E1-2, 933A2-3, 950E5-6; *Meno* 75C8-9 (B<sub>1</sub>/B<sub>2</sub> exegetical); *Phdo.*85E3-4; *Phlb.*17E4-5, 22A3; *Polit.*262D3-4; *Prot.*325A6; *Rep.*395E1-2, 411D3-4, 431B9-C3, 476B4-5, 528A4-5,

Glaucon agrees this would obtain in a city that is well ruled at least, and so Socrates can move toward summing up the paradoxical attributes they have agreed to,<sup>2423</sup> concerning familial organization, in order to see whether the city<sup>2424</sup> as we have constructed it has these attributes or whether another city would be have them to a greater degree. Let us ask first of all, whether there exists in the other cities a pairing<sup>2425</sup> of the rulers and the mass, as there is in our city.

“Yes.”

(463) Now everyone refers to each other as citizens, but what is the further designation that the masses in other cities use in addressing their rulers?

“In most it is ‘masters’<sup>2426</sup> whereas in the democratic cities they use the generic term you just used as a name:<sup>2427</sup> ‘rulers.’”

What will it be in our city? In addition to calling their rulers citizens, what will our mass call their rulers?

“Preservers and public servants.”

And what will our rulers call the mass?

“Their paymasters and providers.”

Whereas in other cities the rulers call their masses what?

“Slaves.”

And what do the rulers call each other?

“Fellow rulers.”

Whereas ours call each other what?

“Fellow guards.”<sup>2428</sup>

Among the rulers in the other cities can you find any that address some of their “fellow rulers” as relatives but others as non-relatives?<sup>2429</sup>

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588A9-10 (B<sub>1</sub>/B<sub>2</sub> exegetical); *Soph.*219D5-6, 260C8-9; *Symp.*219D4-5 (B<sub>1</sub>/B<sub>2</sub> exegetical). The form is essentially a doublet with sub-differentiated second, to be distinguished from the device of subdividing the last element of a list to effect closure (on which cf. 342E10-11 and n.430), of which it can be seen as the limit case. For the variation of connectives cf. n.2279.

<sup>2423</sup> ὁμολογήματα (E5). Cf. n.2100.

<sup>2424</sup> αὐτή (E6): “she as she is.” As accented the adjective is very close to what would be a pronominal use in the nominative. Perhaps we should read αύτή (cf. 463D6, 431D9-E2 [with 431D4-5]).

<sup>2425</sup> ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος (463A2), τε / καί forming an hendiadys as the preceding singular verb ἔστι helps us anticipate.

<sup>2426</sup> δεσπότας (A8).

<sup>2427</sup> Reading τούνομα (A9) with the mss., which Burnet does print (*pace Slings*) despite his misgivings.

<sup>2428</sup> Filling in the matrix in a meandering way and all other casual order is characteristic of dialectical conversation (cf. n.159).

<sup>2429</sup> προειπεῖν (B1 I): It is because the “normal” meaning of family and family relations is being modified or extended by this paradoxical community of wives that a “nominalist” approach becomes necessary for purposes of conversation.

"Quite a few address each other as non-relatives."<sup>2430</sup>

And where he deems the one that is his relative to be "his own" and speaks of him this way, he deems and speaks of the non-related ones as "not his own."

"Quite."

But what about your<sup>2431</sup> "guards"? Is there a single one of them who would be able to deem one of his fellow guards a non-relative, or address him that way?

"Not a one. Everybody he runs into he will address as brother or sister, father or mother, son or daughter, or as a forebear or descendant."

Great answer! Let me ask you to take it further. Would you legislate that they must use the familial names for each other without also requiring that they behave in all the ways those names betoken, as for instance<sup>2432</sup> in the case of the father, the way our law requires his offspring to revere him and take care of him and be heedful of him else they will be taken down a notch<sup>2433</sup> in the eyes of gods and men as behaving in a way neither pious nor just if they behave otherwise? Will it be such admonitions as these or some others that you would have each and every citizen dun into their ears from a child,<sup>2434</sup> not only about the persons they are admonished to recognize as fathers but about their other relatives as well?

"These are the ones they should hear. It would be laughable if the deed did not follow the utterance of familial names."<sup>2435</sup>

We may conclude then that in comparison with all cities it will be especially in her that the citizens will sing together<sup>2436</sup> this refrain we mentioned just now, when any individual behaves well or ill, and say that "mine own" does well, or "mine own" does ill; and (464) as we said<sup>2437</sup> the associated pleasures and pains will follow upon the recognition and assertion of this belief. Likewise it will be especially true of our citizens that they will share and hold in common this thing they call "mine" and will especially share pleasure and pain. But the cause of these facts is this latest addition we have made in the organization of the city, the community of wives and children among the guards.

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<sup>2430</sup>καὶ πολλούς γε (B13), referring only to the number that address each other ὡς ἀλλότριον (B13), again answering the whole by answering only the last (cf. 462D6 and n. 204).

<sup>2431</sup>παρά σοι (C3) again the ethical dative of the theoretician (cf. 371A8 and n. 990).

<sup>2432</sup>τε (D1) can, as here, append an illustration as at 412B3, 430A6-B2, 465C1 and C2, 555A2; cf. Leg.809B4 ("explanatory," Eng. ad loc.), 931B5-C1, 956E5. It can even append an inference, as at Leg.942C1 (ἐνί τε λόγῳ).

<sup>2433</sup>μήτε ... αὐτῷ ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι (D3-4): For the idiom οὐκ ἄμεινον cf. 554D2.

<sup>2434</sup>ὑμνήσουσιν (D7): Cf. 329B2 and n. 58. The expression again shows that οὔτε ὅσια οὔτε δίκαια (D5) is an unanalytic formula (cf. 461A4).

<sup>2435</sup>γελοῖον γάρ (E1): Glaucon uses these admonitory words as if their mere utterance will cause familial deed to follow familial word! Another step has been taken in the revolutionary realignment of word and deed, paradox and convention, honor and ridicule that is being reached by agreements, one after another, in this Book, even though at the same time by any normal way of looking at things more and more preposterous institutions are being promulgated!

<sup>2436</sup>συμφωνήσουσιν (E3), drawing from the audibility of φῆμαι and ὑμνήσουσιν above, to take us back again, via the unanimity of 462C3-8, to the chorus singing in unison imagined during the original discussion of σωφροσύνη (430E3, 431E7-432A9).

<sup>2437</sup>Ἐφαμεν (464A1), points to the connection first made between ἥσθετο and συνήλησεν (462D1), and then repeated at E1-2.

“Yes, especially.”<sup>2438</sup>

And yet we agreed that this is the most important good for a city, when we likened the well ordered city to a body and the way the part stands in relation to the whole vis-à-vis pain and pleasure,<sup>2439</sup> so that it has become clear<sup>2440</sup> that the most important<sup>2441</sup> boon for our city is conferred onto it by nothing but our community of children and wives among the public servants.<sup>2442</sup> Moreover, the provision is consistent<sup>2443</sup> with our previous rule that these must not own private<sup>2444</sup> houses or land or any possession, but rather must rely on others for their maintenance and must spend all that they earn for serving as guards and squirrel none of it away<sup>2445</sup> if they are to remain real guards.<sup>2446</sup>

In sum, both what we said before and what we are arguing now makes true guards of them and keeps the city from falling asunder<sup>2447</sup> because they call the same thing “mine own,” not one man this and another that, the one man dragging off to his house whatever he can manage to reduce to his

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<sup>2438</sup>With μάλιστα (A10) Glaucon acknowledges the μάλιστα’s in Socrates’s argument (463E3; 464A4,A6), which had made it an argument of degree and acknowledges thereby that he agrees with it as such.

<sup>2439</sup> ὡμολογήσαμεν (B1): Socrates refers to 462A2-E3, with εὖ οἰκουμένην (B2) corresponding to οὖ δεῖ στοχαζόμενον τὸν νομοθέτην τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους at the beginning (462A4-5) and Glaucon’s stipulation τόν γε εὔνομον at the end (462E3).

<sup>2440</sup>πέφανται (B5): Dialectical φαίνομαι in the perfect: cf. n.210.

<sup>2441</sup>τοῦ μεγίστου ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ (B5). The superlative fulfills the desideratum that they show how the provision makes the city μακρῷ βελτίστη (461E7). Halliwell’s remark *ad loc.*, that “Plato’s proposals are meant to be nothing if not challenging,” comes very close to the right way to be hearing the conversation. For me all that needs to be changed in it is that it is *Socrates* who is doing the challenging, and *Glaucon* (and we) who are being challenged for bringing it all back up on behalf of Adeimantus and the others (and us, perhaps). This will become clear when the question of “feasibility” is finally faced (472A1-473B3).

<sup>2442</sup>ἡ κοινωνία τοῖς ἐπικούροις τῶν παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν (B6): The phrase is a reverse version of ἡ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν (A8-9), forming an apodotic chiasm before and after the conclusion (for which cf. 327B1 and n.18). The ἄρχοντες ορ φύλακες were called σωτῆράς τε καὶ ἐπικούρους (sc. τοῦ δήμου) at 463B1, and it is in this broader sense that ἐπίκουροι is used here, as opposed to its narrower sense of the φυλάκων ἐπίκουροι (first at 415C4-5 and most recently at 458C1).

<sup>2443</sup>ὅμολογοῦμεν (B8), the first of the two desiderata (ἐπομένη τε τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ καὶ μακρῷ βελτίστῃ, 461E7), which are being satisfied in reverse order.

<sup>2444</sup>ἰδίας (B9) hearkens back, through 462B8, 458C9, and 457D1, to the last page of Book Three (416D5 and 417A6); just as the brief list of possessions (οἰκία, γῆ, κτῆμά τι) echoes 417A6-7, which Adeimantus’s speech had taken up on the next page (419A5-7, the beginning of Book Four).

<sup>2445</sup>κοινὴ πάντας ἀναλίσκειν (C2) refers to ταμιεῖον μηδενί (416D6) and ὅσον μήτε περιεῖναι (E2) as well as to the summary expression κοινῇ ζῆν (E4).

<sup>2446</sup>ὄντως φύλακες (C3), in contrast to what they might otherwise become, as sketched at 417A6-B6. For the expression cf. 421A5-6, A8.

<sup>2447</sup>διασπᾶν (C7) used at 462B1.

possession and sequester from the others<sup>2448</sup> and the other off to his, it being a different house,<sup>2449</sup> his wife and his children also being different, which then fosters pleasures and pains that are private because they arise from private things. Instead, with one and the same attitude about what is near and dear, each and all of them strain<sup>2450</sup> toward unanimity of experience in feelings of pleasure and pain<sup>2451</sup> as far as that is possible. Conversely, we'll hear nothing of lawsuits and complaints against each other, since the only thing they possess separately will be their bodies and all the rest is shared. Their situation will leave them free of all contention to the extent that contention among men arises out of the possession of money or children or family.<sup>2452</sup> Nor<sup>2453</sup> for that matter will they be the sort who end up in lawsuits<sup>2454</sup> over physical assault and battery. We'll have the policy that it is admirable and just that persons of like age<sup>2455</sup> should defend themselves, which has the further effect of requiring them to keep their bodies in shape, (465) a policy that will also provide a way for a man who becomes angry to slake his passion rather than seek to perpetuate and extenuate it in a larger dispute. As to the older man, we have already accorded him the privilege of ruling all younger persons and chastising them,<sup>2456</sup> and clearly a young man will not likely try any kind of violence, let alone assault,<sup>2457</sup> against an elder, unless the rulers command it, nor I fancy treat an elder dishonorably in any other way. Against that we can rely on two guards to protect him, fear and reverence, the latter barring him from laying hands on what might be his own forebear and the former the fear that others will come to the aid of the man who suffers mistreatment, whether as his brothers or his sons or his fathers. In every way then<sup>2458</sup> the laws will provide that the men<sup>2459</sup> will live at peace with one another; and as long as these do not fight

<sup>2448</sup> εἰς τὴν ἔαυτοῦ (C8-9): Socrates is recalling the way Adeimantus's imaginary house at the beginning of Book Four developed into a private compound or even a cosmos unto itself in the course of his speech (419A5-10 and n. 1845). Again the idea is broached that greed (*πλεονεξία*) is not the desire to have more than you do but more than someone else does (cf. n. 478), which is what compelled Adeimantus's happy man to populate his house with foreigners.

<sup>2449</sup> ἐτέρων (D1, cf. D2) stresses not difference but comparison and the odium it incites.

<sup>2450</sup> τείνοντας (D4): The present expresses vividly and conatively what the perfect middle (432A3, 462C12) had expressed dynamically and systematically.

<sup>2451</sup> ὁμοπαθεῖς (D4): cf. 409B1-2, where note the iota of difference.

<sup>2452</sup> διὰ χρημάτων ἢ παιδῶν ἢ συγγενῶν κτῆσιν (E1-2): outside the context of the *κοινωνία* the list would be *παῖδες* καὶ χρήματα καὶ *γυναῖκες* (e.g., 423E6-7; cf. Gorg.511E1-3).

<sup>2453</sup> πλὴν τὸ σῶμα (D9): Contention over possessions having been obviated by the very removal of possessions, their bodies remain to fight over—a slightly ridiculous and Aristophanic conception.

<sup>2454</sup> δίκαι δικαίως (E4) almost a pun. The argument reached a climax at 464D3-5; next, as at 442E1-2ff, we have corroboration on the vulgar level (proceeding on the pedestrian level of *eliminatio* of like to like, older to younger, younger to older), but this time the transition is not announced.

<sup>2455</sup> μέν (E5) indicates a division is coming up, whose structure is then implied by ἥλιξι / ἥλικας.

<sup>2456</sup> ἄρχειν τε καὶ κολάζειν (465A5): Specifying ἄρχειν with *κολάζειν* makes a euphemism for τύπτειν (A10 below).

<sup>2457</sup> οὔτε ἄλλο βιάζεσθαι ... οὔτε τύπτειν (A9-10), a virtual ἄλλως τε καί construction, based on the distinction drawn above between *βίατα* in general and *αἰκία* in particular (464E4).

<sup>2458</sup> πανταχῇ δή (B5): An inference from the *eliminatio* (464D6-B4). Contentions rely on possessions, including (1) money and family and (2) one's own body, the latter consisting of contentions between (2A) contemporaries or (2B) older and younger or (2C) younger and older.

<sup>2459</sup> ἄνδρες is used (B6) not to exclude *γυναῖκες* who have since been included among the guards (though ignored in the present context dealing with violent behavior), but to avoid the impersonal

among themselves there is no danger that the rest of the city<sup>2460</sup> will split into factions, either against them or amongst themselves.

These major types of conflict and disorder having been argued away Socrates dismisses the rest with an elaborate *praeteritio*. Propriety makes me shrink from narrating the most minor evils from which we can expect them to be exempted, the poor man's<sup>2461</sup> need to flatter the rich, the lean times and the weary times when people must bear holding down jobs during the years their children are infants making ends meet to feed their household, sometimes taking out a loan and other times dodging the bill-collector, and handing over whatever money you can make to the wife or to the accountant, trying to set a little something aside—all this and of this sort is too obvious and ignoble to deserve mention.<sup>2462</sup>

“They are obvious even to a blind man.”

tone of ἄνθρωποι. Cf. 361B6 and n.752.

<sup>2460</sup>ἢ ἄλλη πόλις (B9) all but the rulers and their helpers (cf. 434A9 and n.2061).

<sup>2461</sup>πένητες (C2), nominative (*seclusit Ast*), in a *constructio ad sensum* requiring us to draw a verb out of κολακείας, the verbal quality of that noun already having been brought to the surface by the objective genitive, πλουσίων.

By its nature *praeteritio* broadens the description of what is to be passed over on the least pretext, by syntactical wedges of this sort. First, τε (C2) indicates that κολακείας will have something added to it, but before that happens it is elaborated by the objective genitive (πλουσίων); and while we wait for an accusative parallel to κολακείας we discover instead the nominative (we may call it a subjective nominative). Finally we get the accusative, ἀπορίας, tacked on by τε; and while we might suspect it will be modified by a genitive parallel to πλουσίων we get an elaboration of the accusative itself, ἀλγηδόνας, announced, rather than tacked on, by καί. Only then do we get the elaboration we expected, this time with a clause rather than a “verbal genitive.”

The clause buys a new syntactical frame so that the nouns no longer need to be extenuated by verbal genitives and nominatives. Immediately ὅσας confesses that a quantity of items will be passed over, and buys the opportunity to double the nouns, παιδοτροφίᾳ and χρηματισμοῖς. These verbal nouns in turn, like κολακείας above, again import through the back door a subject for the verb ἴσχουσι. Having then purchased place for the mention of home economics (τροφὴν οἰκετῶν ἀναγκαίαν) he may then divide the economic strategies with two straightforward participles (τὰ μέν, τὰ δέ) capped by a very elaborate third (note doubled circumstantial participles θέμενοι and παραδόντες).

Finally he summarizes what he will pass over with a generalizing relative clause, unstintingly adding οἵα to the expected ὅσα (C6, parallel to C2); and forgets that the original construction and peg from which the whole elaboration was hung—the accusative dependent upon λέγειν (C1) standing in apposition to τά γε μὴν σμικρότατα (B12)—and adds the assertion that what he has left out are obvious, ignoble, and not worth mentioning. The severe limitation on the guards amassing treasure (416D6) has now been countered by a list of exemptions from needing one.

<sup>2462</sup>δῆλά τε δὴ καὶ ἀγεννῆ καὶ οὐκ ἀξια λέγειν (C7): The first two items present the warrant for the third (as at *Crito* 47B1-2 and *Polit.*301D2-3), a special case of the constellation A<sub>1</sub>/A<sub>2</sub>/B (for which cf. also 556C1-2 and *Leg.*633C8-D2 [πόθους / ἥδονάς corresponding to φόβους / λύπας above, making τινας δεινάς θωπείας into B], 669E6-7, 897B7-8 [πάσης τῆς περιόδου being a generalization]). This triadic constellation is to be distinguished from the localized device of splitting the first item to start a list (e.g.602D8; *Leg.*709B2-3, 927E6-7; *Menex.*249B5-6; *Phdrs.*247C6-7; *Tim.*37E1), of which it is the limit case (compare and contrast A/B<sub>1</sub>/B<sub>2</sub>, n.2422).

Exempt they will be from all these things. Instead<sup>2463</sup> they will live a life more blessed<sup>2464</sup> than that most blessed life the Olympian victors enjoy.

“How so?”

The Olympian’s happiness<sup>2465</sup> rests on but a small part of what these men have in store. Our<sup>2466</sup> men’s victory is the finer one and the maintenance they receive from the public stores more complete.<sup>2467</sup> Their victory is the salvation and preservation of the entire state; their maintenance is not dinner only<sup>2468</sup> but everything they need in life, with which they are crowned and their children along with them, besides the honors they receive throughout their lives from their own city and the worthy burial that ripe old age will bring them upon their demise.<sup>2469</sup>

“Quite fine indeed.”

Can you recall that moment in our discussion when we were struck by the argument somebody<sup>2470</sup> made that we hadn’t made our guards happy, (466) despite the fact they had the power<sup>2471</sup> to take possession of everything that belonged to the citizens? We said I think that making an adjustment on their behalf was something we could postpone in case it came up later, and that our business at that time was to make the guards guards, and the city as a whole as happy as possible, rather than that out of regard for some one group to bend things in the direction of making it happy.

“I do recall it.”<sup>2472</sup>

<sup>2463</sup>τε (D2): The parallel construction suggests comparison by understatement.

<sup>2464</sup>μακαριστοῦ and μακαριώτερον (D3) climactically answer Adeimantus’s remark at 419A9.

<sup>2465</sup>εὐδαιμονίζονται (D5). εὐδαιμονία is the general term that the μακαρ- language always trumps: cf. nn.259,1853.

<sup>2466</sup>τῶνδε (D6): The first person demonstrative replaces the second person τούτοις which had already been contrasted with third person ἐκεῖνοι (D5), so as to add a note of triumph and pride for their construction.

<sup>2467</sup>The τε ... τε ... construction (D6-7) is strikingly repeated from just above (D2-3) and repeated again just below (D7-8) where it is then extended (καὶ γέρα ...). The three instances cumulatively elevate the tone (the nearby uses of double τε above [C1-2] and below [466C7-8] are fortuitous).

<sup>2468</sup>τροφῆ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν (D8): i.e., the σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ Socrates mentions as a fitting “penalty” in the *Apology* (37A1).

<sup>2469</sup> The comparanda, νίκη and τροφή (D7-9) are supplemented by the conventional doublet γέρα / ἀθλα (on which cf. 460B1-2 and n.2395), ornately composed into a parallelism (γέρα δέχονται / ταφῆς μετέχουσιν) and linked with a chiasm made by subordinate participles in τε καὶ (ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες).

<sup>2470</sup>Socrates says οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου (E4-5) not to commemorate that Adeimantus’s objector remained unnamed so much as to exonerate Adeimantus from any further embarrassment for having brought the objection, which clearly was his own (cf. n.1864). Socrates has a quiet ability to avoid confrontation in order to keep the logos going: cf. 420B3-421C6 (with nn.1874, 1883), 471B7, 489A8, 489B8 (with n.2761), 489C9, 504C3, and 588B1-8.

<sup>2471</sup>With οἵς ἔξον (466A1) Socrates refers to Adeimantus’s vague genitive, ὃν ἔστι (419A3: cf. n.1844) which even there he clarified as ἔξεσται αὐτοῖς (420A4); and, with τὰ τῶν πολίτων, uses the genitive as Adeimantus had there meant it. The word underlying it all is ἔξουσία.

<sup>2472</sup>μέμνημαι (A7). Glaucon answers Socrates’s μέμνησαι (E4), agreeing to the intervening question, and with this single word joins Socrates in demurring to mention Adeimantus.

Well how does it stand for us now about the life of the helpers?<sup>2473</sup> If it has become visible that their life is finer and better<sup>2474</sup> than that of the Olympian victors, I doubt that it appears to be on the level<sup>2475</sup> of the shoemaker's life or that of any other craftsman or the farmers.

"No, it doesn't."

Instead, what I said then<sup>2476</sup> ought to be said now as well, that if our guard tries to be happy in a way that requires him to give up being a guard, and if a life so temperate and secure doesn't satisfy him —a life we assert is best—and if instead a mindless and adolescent attitude about happiness afflicts him and impels him to use whatever strength he has to appropriate to himself anything and everything he sees around him in the city and bring it under his own roof,<sup>2477</sup> then he will come to learn by his own experience<sup>2478</sup> how wise Hesiod was to say that the half is more than the whole.

Glaucon's reply is striking: "If he uses me as his counsellor he certainly will remain with the life role you have described."

Socrates recognizes the asseverative tone: So you accept the community of wives for the men as we have described it, both as it touches the education<sup>2479</sup> of their children and their guardianship over

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<sup>2473</sup> ἐπίκουροι (A8). The term was derogatory in Adeimantus's peroration (419A10) but has since been redeemed by passages like 463B1.

<sup>2474</sup> πολύ τε καλλίων καὶ ἀμείνων (A9): Simply the comparative of καλός καὶ ὄγαθός.

<sup>2475</sup> For κατά (B1) cf. οὐ κατὰ τούτους, *Apol.* 17B6.

<sup>2476</sup> Ο γε καὶ ἐκεῖ ἔλεγον (B4) refers to 421A2-C6, where the welfare of the whole city is said to rest on the guards remaining guards. For the proverb cf. Hesiod WD 40-1 (quoted again at Leg.690E2-3: cf. Greg.Cyp.(cod.leid.)289 [=PG 2.83] and D.L.1.75[Pittacus]). As the sequel in Hesiod reveals (οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδελῷ μέγ' ὄνειαρ), the proverb does not advocate an astute calculation to cut one's losses, but praises the gift of simplicity (cf. also ὀλύγον ἀποτεμόμενος apud D.L., loc.cit.). It is akin to the proverb, "You can't have your cake and eat it, too" (which, incidentally, advocates eating the cake while it is still fresh). The guard's life is the best in the city (let him eat) but if he reaches for "more" he will lose even what he has (there will be nothing to eat). The meaning of Hesiod's assertion ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδελῷ μέγ' ὄνειαρ was lost on Glaucon, also, when he objected to the humble fare of the original city (372C2).

A question lurks, almost unbearable to answer: What is the value of the cake possessed if it is not eaten? The answer is that it allows you to continue believing you truly desire it, while at the same time it causes others to envy you for having it. The impossibility ("can't") only means that your desire that they desire your cake requires you to perform the logically impossible task of thinking the cake desirable at the same time that you desire not to eat it yourself. By analogy, in the case of Adeimantus's concupiscent vision at 419A it is foreigners he imagines regaling (ξενοδοκοῦντες, 419A7)—so that he can be seen to be regaling by his fellow citizens, whom at the same time he excludes.

<sup>2477</sup> οἰκειοῦσθαι (C1) tellingly identifies the psychological fantasy Adeimantus exhibited when he imagined the ruler turning his own home (οἰκία) into a private cosmos (419A5-10 and n.1845). Contrast Socrates's more concrete expression at 464C8-9, on which he here relies (including διὰ δύναμιν for ὅτι ἀν δύνηται).

<sup>2478</sup> τῷ ὄντι (C2) is seldom gratuitous or otiose in Plato.

<sup>2479</sup> παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ παιδῶν καὶ φυλακῆς τῶν ἄλλων πολίτων (C7-8). While φυλακή refers to their duties as guards, the former two terms refer to the question of childrearing as Glaucon had articulated it at 450C1-4 (τίς ἡ κοινωνία παιδῶν τε πέρι καὶ γυναικῶν ... καὶ τροφῆς νέων ἔτι ὄντων τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ γιγνομένης γενέσεώς τε καὶ παιδείας ...), with τροφή now done with παιδείᾳ. Note the chiastic order of before and after (παιδείᾳ / παιδεῖς // παιδεῖς / τροφή).

the other citizens, the way the women share in the duties not only by staying on guard with them in the city but also going out with them to war, like dogs alongside them at the hunt,<sup>2480</sup> and share everything with them in every way to the extent it is possible, and that in doing this they will be doing the best thing and a thing not contrary to the nature of the female as compared to the male nor contrary to the way nature would have them relate.

“I do accept it.”

So we are left with that other matter,<sup>2481</sup> whether after all this sort of communism is possible for the species man as it is for other animals, and if so, how.

“You took the words right out of my mouth.”<sup>2482</sup>

After all it’s surely clear<sup>2483</sup> how they will share duties in war—that they will serve alongside the men in the army and also will muster their children into battle as many as are hardy enough, giving them the benefit that the children of parents in other occupations have, namely, being able to watch<sup>2484</sup> what they will be called upon to do when they become fully grown. (467) In addition to watching they are to discharge minor tasks and serve as aids in any military matter, and to apprentice to their fathers and mothers. Perhaps you have noticed how long a potter’s child serves as an apprentice to his father before he is allowed to begin throwing pots himself. Are the potters to take more care with their children’s education than the guards with theirs, by way of their becoming familiar with how things are done through observation?

“So much would be quite ridiculous.”<sup>2485</sup>

Besides, humans like other animals fight the more fiercely when their own offspring are present.

“That’s true, but Socrates there is a distinct possibility that given the ways of war if they fall in battle their children would perish, too, leaving the rest of the city unable to recover.”

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<sup>2480</sup>συμφυλάττειν ... καὶ συνθηρεύειν ὥσπερ κύνας (C9-D1) expands upon φυλακῆς above, referring back to the beginning of the argument when their sex was shown, by analogy with dogs, not to disqualify them for the military work (451D4-E2: τὰ θηλείας τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν ... συμφυλάττειν), enabling Socrates to introduce the distinction between peacetime duties and wartime, which he will next elaborate (E1ff).

<sup>2481</sup>ἐκεῖνο (D6), referring to the question of “feasibility” that Socrates had begged to defer at 457E1-458B7. Imagining the communism in existence has meanwhile been pleasurable, as Socrates had there suggested it would be (χαίρουσιν διεξίοντες οἵα δράσουσι γενομένου, 458A6-7).

<sup>2482</sup>ἔφθης ... εἰπὼν ἡ ἔμελλον ὑπολήψεσθαι (D9): the first indication that Glaucon has become eager for Socrates to address the question of “possibility.” For the expression cf. Phd.100C1-2.

<sup>2483</sup>περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ (E1) refers immediately to εἰς πόλεμόν τε ιούσας (C9). μέν and γὰρ suggest the point is so obvious that it can be passed over and they can move on to the question just raised, but what happens is quite the opposite. J.-C. and Adam *ad loc.* are quick to praise the “dexterity” (Plato’s, that is) of the transition, on the grounds that postponing the arrival of the third wave makes it more impressive. But what we have here is a conversation between Glaucon and Socrates: what happens to Glaucon’s eagerness? What can it mean to say that it is dexterously ignored? What is closer to the truth is that Socrates would prefer, or feigns to prefer, to continue with his feast of διατάττειν (458A6).

<sup>2484</sup>ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ὄλλων δημιουργῶν (E5-6): again it is assumed in passing that the education of the craftsmen will be left up to their parents: cf. 421E1-2 with n. 1900, and n.2365.

<sup>2485</sup>καταγέλαστον (467A9): Again the γελοῖον serves as a preliminary criterion. Because of the analogy with 456D8-11 the very unconventional idea of bringing the young onto the battlefield is less laughable than the potter doting over who will be allowed to use his wheel. Rational calculation will be used to justify the unconventional measure just below.

That's true, but do you mean to take the position that danger is to be avoided first and foremost?

"Not at all."

So, if we must take a risk shouldn't it be where they will be made nobler by correction?

"Clearly."

Perhaps then you think it makes only a little difference and is not worth running the risk, whether those who are to become our military men watch or don't watch as children.

"No—it makes quite a difference in the way you have argued."

This much then is settled, to make children spectators of war, so that next we would do well to contrive that they be safe. First of all their fathers, as far as humanly possible, will not be ignorant but cognizant as to which armies pose a danger and which don't, and they will muster them against the one sort and be more cautious against the other. Second they will assign as their immediate superiors not the least noteworthy among themselves but those who by experience and age are able<sup>2486</sup> to function as leaders and teachers. Still it can be objected that the unforeseen always happens, so from the very start we ought to give them wings so that in case it becomes necessary they can wing<sup>2487</sup> their way to an escape.

This Glaucon does not understand.

I mean they must mount horses at the very youngest age so that having learned to ride they can be mustered to the spectacle on horseback, their mounts being neither headstrong nor warlike but the fastest of foot and the most compliant to the reins. By this policy they will have the finest vantage from which to view the task that will be theirs, but also the best chance of escaping safely in case the need arises, by following in the train of the elder leaders.<sup>2488</sup>

"Sounds right to me."

(468) Well then what about the matter of war itself? What is to be the bearing of your soldiers both toward themselves and toward their enemies. Do you think I have the right idea about this?

"You'll have to start over and tell me that, too."<sup>2489</sup>

As for our soldiers themselves, take the man who abandons his post or leaves his shield or does

<sup>2486:</sup> ικανούς (D7), positive grade (in contrast to the superlative φαυλοτάτους) again, itself, a virtual superlative (cf. 344C6, 372B1, 423E2 and nn.458 and 1931).

<sup>2487</sup> πτεροῦν χρὴ παιδία ὄντα εὐθὺς ἵν' ὃν τι δέη πετόμενοι ἀποφεύγωσιν (D12-13) affords him an opportunity to elaborate, in a passage that is already an elaboration. Compare his use of the indecipherable question (n.1092 ad 375A4).

<sup>2488</sup> οὕτω γὰρ κάλλιστά τε ... καὶ ἀσφαλέστατα ... (E5-7): With this summary statement and Glaucon's formally worded acceptance (ὅρθῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, E8), the digression on bringing their children to the battle is given formal closure, so that now, once again, they can move on to the anticipated (cf. ἔφθης, 466D9) question, εἰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις δυνατὸν ... καὶ ὅπῃ δυνατόν (466D6-8).

<sup>2489</sup> Reading αὖ (468A3), Burnet's brilliant emendation, sparing us from Riddell's subtle workaround for the ὄν of the mss. (*Digest* §255). With αὖ Glaucon indicates to Socrates that he is beginning to notice how many digressions he is subjecting him to (cf. ἔφθης, 466D9). Cf. αὖ at 393D2 and 416A1 (with n.1802), and *Euthyd.* 296A1, 8. Socrates now turns from the presence of the children in the battlefield to the question how the soldiers will treat each other. The former fell just within the provisions of the community of wives and children but now he has gone outside that sphere to a treatment of military behavior per se in which the presence of women and children is strictly irrelevant.

any of these kinds of things in a base way:<sup>2490</sup> mustn't he be demoted<sup>2491</sup> to the rank of craftsman or a farmer?<sup>2492</sup>

"Quite so."

And take the man who is captured alive by the enemy: mustn't we give him over to them as a gift, to make whatever use of their catch they wish?

"Obviously."

But take the man who achieves valor and makes a good showing: don't you imagine that first he ought to be crowned by his fellow soldiers and the lads and children also, each and all in their turn?

"Yes..."

And greeted by the hand?

"This too ..."

But would you go further?

"Whither?"

To kiss and be kissed by each and every one.

"Absolutely! And I'd add the law that as long as they are serving in the army nobody may deny them to kiss whomever they want, just in case one happens to be in love with one of them, whether male or female, and thereby will be made all the more earnest at performing deeds of valor."

With this extended answer Glaucon has hopped onto the bandwagon and added a law of his own, and Socrates is pleased by his answer: Wonderful! After all, we already established<sup>2493</sup> that coupling should be made easy and more frequent for the virtuous guards than for the others, and that the assignations of these should be frequent in comparison to others so as to maximize the numbers born out of their stock. And indeed from Homer we have authority for honoring the best of our youth in these ways. He says that after a good showing on the battlefield Ajax was rewarded with a huge rack of ribs, as being the genuine way to honor a man youthful and brave since in addition to being a token of honor he would become stronger by it, too. In this<sup>2494</sup> we shall follow Homer. We ourselves in our sacrifices and all such festivals will always single out the better among us, in accordance to the goodness they have demonstrated, and honor them with songs and the things we just mentioned, and in addition with "places at the banquet table and great outlays of viands and drink," so that in addition to honoring our good men and good women we will elevate their vigor.<sup>2495</sup>

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<sup>2490</sup>διὰ κάκην (A6): note accent.

<sup>2491</sup>δεῖ καθιστάναι (A7) might mean he deserves to be a craftsman or farmer and therefore would never have been appointed guard in the first place.

<sup>2492</sup>Again (A6) one of the denotations of δημιουργός is the craftsman as the complement of the farmer (cf. 466B1-2), while just a moment ago all public occupations were called δημιουργεῖν, including being a guard (466E5-6).

<sup>2493</sup>εἴρηται ἥδη (C8), referring to 460B1-5, where as here the superior ones are referred to by the positive grade of the adjective (ἀγαθῷ ὅντι, C5: cf. τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, 460B1).

<sup>2494</sup>γε (D7) is not limitative but emphatic. There is no need to think back over the whole topic of poetic censorship here, as there was not in the references to Hesiod above (466C2-3) and below (468E8-9A3).

<sup>2495</sup>ἀσκεῖν (E1) is analogous to αὐξήσει (D5), as ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας (E2) is analogous to ἡβῶντί τε καὶ ἀνδρείῳ (D3-4): the byproduct of growth in the Homeric case (αὔξειν) is no longer appropriate to our guards, since they are fully grown, but hearty eating will keep their juices

“I love it!”<sup>2496</sup>

Alright, then, take the ones who die a valiant death on campaign: won’t<sup>2497</sup> we start by saying they belong to the golden race?

“Absolutely!”

So in this we will follow Hesiod who said,<sup>2498</sup> when persons of this race come to their end,

(469) Some of them become blessed spirits roaming the earth,  
Virtuous, warders off of evil, guards for the mortal lot of men.

“Follow we will.”

And won’t we take pains to inquire of the god<sup>2499</sup> what are the proper distinctions to be given at the burial of men so divine and godly, and then carry out whatever his exegete directs? From that day forward we will treat them like local divinities, caring for them and paying homage at their monuments. And we’ll adopt this same convention to mark the death, by old age or whatever the cause, of anyone else<sup>2500</sup> who has proved eminently good in his life.

“It would only be right.”

How then about their treatment of their enemies?<sup>2501</sup>

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flowing.

<sup>2496</sup>κάλλιστα λέγεις (E3), answering and topping Socrates’s approval of Glaucon’s answer above (καλῶς, B5).

<sup>2497</sup>ἄρ’ οὐ (E5): He reverts to the use of postponed ἄρα from above (468A5,A9, and virtually at B2), which reminds us that this is the *fourth* section in his answer to the question τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον (A1), and fills out the list of possible outcomes (desertion, capture, victory and death).

<sup>2498</sup> WD 121ff.

<sup>2499</sup>διαπυθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ (469A4). The genitive is used since the god (Apollo: cf.427B2-C4) is the source of a command that will be reported by an exegete (ἐξηγήται, A6) who serves as his intermediary (cf. n.50 *ad* 328E2).

<sup>2500</sup>ὅσοι ἂν διαφερόντως ... ἀγαθοὶ κριθῶσιν (B3). This extension of the treatment beyond the burial of soldiers to the burial of all virtuous men effects closure exactly because it steps or points beyond the current subject proper, namely, τὰ περὶ πόλεμον and in particular how they will treat each others as well as their enemies (468A1-3), which had extended the treatment of war that already began at 466E1 (περί ... τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ). For closure by generalization or reaching beyond, compare the description of mothers' behavior at 381E1-6, and n.2030 *ad* 431C1-3).

<sup>2501</sup>πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους (B5): The question how they treat each other in war was only tangentially relevant to the question of community (cf. n.2489). But the question how they should treat their enemies, though introduced by a very easy step in logic from friend to enemy, has no relevance to that question whatsoever, eliciting the slight pique in Glaucon’s reply (τὸ ποῖον δῆ). The question of relevance has by now been quite forgotten. They are off on a tangent, though it must be noted that the provision about kissing that came up along the way paid the dividend of corroborating their ideas on the community of women and man (468C5-8) and dove-tailing with it neatly (468D7-10). It is important to notice that Glaucon allows Socrates to stay off on this tangent though he had initially expressed eagerness (ἔφθης εἰπών, 466D9) to move on to the question of feasibility. Glaucon’s wavering has left commentators to imagine that our author has forgotten the tensions within his own drama and has abandoned it to give us a piece of his own mind about current politics in Athens.

“But what do you mean?”

Start with the issue of reducing the defeated enemy to slavery: does it seem just for Greeks to enslave Greek cities, or should they not condone it in any other city and as much as possible make it their habit and use to spare the Greek race of this treatment, so as to devote their efforts against enslavement by the barbarians?

“The policy of Greeks sparing Greeks is crucial.”

Then they may not possess a Greek slave and should counsel other Greeks against the same?

“Quite so, since thus they would turn their attention more to the barbarians and would keep their hands off each other.”

What about the issue of stripping the dead of anything but their armor, when they have beaten them: how does this stand? Doesn’t it give an excuse to the cowardly not to close with the troops still fighting, as though they were doing something needful when they were in fact poking around the dead bodies, while at the same time this sort of plundering has proved fatal to many an army? It seems illiberal and materialistic to strip a corpse, and the sign of a womanly and petty mind to treat the body of the dead man as the inimical element after his enemy’s soul has departed and left behind only the tool with which it fought? Is their behavior any different from that of dogs that become angry at the stones with which they have been pelted but not at the man who threw them?

“Not a whit different.”

So we must drop the activity of stripping corpses and of denying them to be removed for burial.

“Quite so by Zeus.”

Nor will we be hauling their weapons off to our temples as offerings to the gods, especially not those of the Greeks, if we care at all (470) about the goodwill of our Greek neighbors. Rather we will be apprehensive that some pollution might attend bringing things to the temple that belong to our own kin, unless god directs us otherwise. And what about the matter of destroying Greek crops and burning their houses: how would you have our soldiers behave toward the people they war against?

“If you would tell I’d gladly listen.”

My opinion then is that they should do neither of these things, but only make off with the harvestable food. Do you want me to tell you why?

“Please.”

It seems to me that just as there are two words, war and faction, there are two realities different in their relation to two different things, that which is familiar and kindred, and that which is alien and foreign. Enmity toward the familiar is faction, while enmity against the alien is war.

“Nothing out of line in saying that.”

See whether this is in line, too. I assert the Greek race is familiar within itself and kindred to itself, while it is alien and ungenuine in respect to the barbarians. So when Greeks fight against barbarians or barbarians fight against Greeks we shall speak of them warring as natural war-enemies<sup>2502</sup> and call this kind of hostility war. But when this sort of thing goes on between Greeks and Greeks we’ll say that although they are friends by nature Greece is currently afflicted with a disease of factional contention, and we’ll call this hostility faction.

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Glaucon’s wavering is however of paramount importance to the meaning of this entire Book, as we shall soon see.

<sup>2502</sup>πολεμίους φύσει (470C6): “War-enemies,” i.e. enemies. The English term lacks the etymological connection to war that gives the Greek (πόλεμος / πολέμιος) much of its clarity.

"For my own part I acquiesce in that outlook."

Now in the case of what we are calling faction, wherever this arises and the city is set against itself,<sup>2503</sup> if either of the two parties destroys the crops and burns the houses, think how abominable a thing faction shows itself to be, and how both sides come across as unpatriotic—patriots would hardly dare to ravage their own nurse and mother—whereas to steal the crops is a moderate measure when one party has achieved the upper hand and the other has been quelled, just as it is moderate to conceive that the parties will be reconciled and not forever at war.

"Surely this conception is more civilized<sup>2504</sup> than the other."

But let's come to it: the city you<sup>2505</sup> are founding is a Greek one, no?

"She must be."

And as such won't the men be good men and civilized?

"Very much so."

And won't they be philhellenes? Won't they think of all Greece as friendly? Won't they all have the same temples?

"This too is very true."

(471) And as such will they not conceive of a dispute against Greeks as being a factional one and not call it a war, but carry on their dispute with the conception that they will be reconciled?

"Quite."

With good will then they will chastise them, instead of punishing them with slavery or with annihilation, chasteners being their true role rather than belligerents.<sup>2506</sup> And therefore they will not ravage Greece,<sup>2507</sup> themselves being Greeks, and will not burn houses, and will not go along with the idea<sup>2508</sup> that in any given city everybody is their enemy—men, women, and children—but that the people they are angry at are few: the individuals responsible for the disagreement in the given case. For all these reasons they will be willing neither to ravage their land, the majority of the populace being their friends, nor to destroy their homes, but will allow their dispute to go only so far as the point at which the responsible parties are brought to justice by force, on behalf of those who have suffered innocently.

"I do agree<sup>2509</sup> that this is the way we should treat opponents that are our fellow citizens,

<sup>2503</sup>διαστῆ (D4), relying on the root of στάσις for its meaning (as with πόλεμος above).

<sup>2504</sup>ἡμερωτέρων (E3), used properly of tame as opposed to wild animals, corresponding to English "civilized" in its colloquially approbative sense.

<sup>2505</sup>σύ (E3): The emphasis given by the pronoun echoes that of ἐγώ in Glaucon's response above (D2).

<sup>2506</sup>πολέμιοι (471A7): Again the adjective πολέμιοι makes an allusion to war that the English "enemy" does not and "belligerent" only awkwardly does.

<sup>2507</sup>Ελλάδα "Ελληνες rather than "Ελληνας "Ελληνες (A9) bringing forward (with κεροῦσιν: cf. κείρειν, 470D8) the personification or metaphor of the Greek lands as mother, from 470D7-8 above.

<sup>2508</sup>ὁμολογήσουσιν (A10).

<sup>2509</sup>ἐγώ μέν (B6) suggests a personal pronoun will be coming with δέ (e.g., τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις or σὺ δέ); but the δέ clause draws a contrast with πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους instead. Glaucon wavers between making the personal point he started to make, and elaborating the position Socrates had just suggested. The wavering widens below.

whereas we should treat the barbarians the way the Greeks currently treat each other."

Shall we set about laying down this law then for our guards, not to destroy the crops or burn the houses?

"Set it down, and set it down also<sup>2510</sup> that everything we have said now and before this is fine, too. Just let me say, Socrates, that I am getting the impression that if one just allows you to talk about things like this you will never get back to the topic you pushed aside<sup>2511</sup> in order to say all that you have now said, the question whether it is possible<sup>2512</sup> for a city with this kind of constitution<sup>2513</sup> to come into existence, and if so just how. Since<sup>2514</sup> it all would be hunky-dory for the city if only it came into being,—the details you have left out I myself can add, how they would fight more bravely against enemies since they would be least liable to abandon each other, knowing each other as they do and

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<sup>2510</sup>καὶ ἔχειν γε (C2) adding a second construction to θῶμεν not quite parallel to the first (accusative object, τὸν νόμον τούτον, understood). The slip in construction, as well as the shift from the present τιθῶμεν, reveals a little impatience, for which Glaucon next apologizes (hence γάρ). The paragraph break that editors place between Glaucon's two remarks downplays and therefore obscures the relation between them (leading Denniston for instance to classify this ἀλλὰ γάρ under his heading 6 rather than I.ii), only for the sake of indicating that a new section in the conversation is about to begin, while it is exactly the pairing of the remarks that brings this about. It is after all in the nature of transitional remarks to straddle two sections: cf. our remarks at the end of Book Two and beginning of Book Three (n.1298).

<sup>2511</sup>παρωσάμενος (C6), stronger and less ceremonious than "postponed" (cf. ὕσουσιν 415C2). What Socrates said at 466E1, περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ, sounded like a *praeteritio* (because of μέν and γάρ). But the μέν ended up being "solitarium" as we say, and the γάρ which sounded as if it were going to explain why the promised transition to the question of possibility was ripe ended up explaining nothing. Instead Socrates began discoursing on a series of questions touching military behavior, with increasing specificity and increasing prolixity, until he was stopped.

<sup>2512</sup>τὸ ώς δυνατή (C6-7): This question was placed second (ἀναβαλέσθαι, 458B1-7) in the combination of questions as to the goodness and possibility of the community of wives and children (the so-called σύστασις λόγων, cf. 457E2). The first proposal, that the finest women should share the jobs of the finest men, could rest upon a proof of their natural suitability to do these things and ignore conventionalist ridicule by focussing on their shared fineness (cf. the triumphant 457A6-B5). To tell men, on the other hand, and more importantly to accept for oneself, that wives are to be shared and family identity forgone is something on the order of the command Jesus gave to the rich young man to leave it all behind and follow him (*Matt.19: 16-22*). In a moment of enthusiasm, like the enthusiasm Socrates has created in Glaucon during the last few pages (466E1-471E5), such a choice might just seem possible. But sticking to it would soon become difficult, unless one had within him a very special love indeed, and this love will be the topic with which Book Five ends.

<sup>2513</sup>αὐτὴ ἡ πολιτεία (C7): His wording leaves out the specifics. The question postponed (466D6-8) was whether (εἰ) and how (ὅπῃ) the κοινωνία γυναικῶν is possible among men as it is among other animals, a question originally paired with the question whether the κοινωνία was a beneficial policy, a "good idea in the first place" as we would say (457D4-5). There, too, Socrates behaved rather strangely, suggesting that the benefit of the policy would not be controversial though its feasibility would; Glaucon replied both would be controversial; Socrates admitted he was hoping to avoid the question of benefit and cut his workload in half. There was a hint of the slave trying to shirk his tasks and Glaucon would hear none of it (οὐκ ἔλαθες ἀποδιδράσκων, 457E5). To all of this Socrates made the extraordinary request that he be allowed to desiderate at will like a man taking a walk by himself free of any worry whether his ideas could be realized but thinking them as if they already were. It is this leisurely ramble that now must come to an end; if he were talking to an old Cretan and an old Lacedaemonian rather than helping these two young men, the ramble would surely continue all the

addressing each other by those names, “brother,” and “father,” and “son.” And moreover if the women fought alongside the men, whether<sup>2515</sup> in the same formation or stationed further to the rear for the sake of striking fear into the enemy or to provide aid as necessary, I know full well<sup>2516</sup> that this would make them unbeatable in every way. On the domestic front moreover<sup>2517</sup> all the boons that were passed over,<sup>2518</sup> how many they would enjoy, I also see.<sup>2519</sup> But, assume that I agree with you on all this and the countless<sup>2520</sup> other goods they would enjoy if a city of this kind came into existence and don’t say any more about her! Let us try to persuade ourselves<sup>2521</sup> of the thing itself, that it could happen and how, and leave off the other.”

(472) Aren’t you sudden with a counterattack against my story! Have you no sympathy for a soldier?<sup>2522</sup> Perhaps you don’t know that the very moment I have barely escaped the threat of two

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way up to the top of Mount Ida and the Cave of Zeus.

<sup>2514</sup>ἐπεί ... γε (C8): cf. Smyth “where a speaker is strictly giving the reason for his statement of a fact (or for something in that statement) and *not* for the fact itself. Here there is a thought in the speaker’s mind which is suppressed” (§2380). Glaucon’s suppressed thought is that he, too, could go on at length how wonderful the city would be, but all this would add up to nothing if the city could never come into existence. For theoretical purposes he is of course wrong, and to his credit he fails to suppress the theoretical urge and does go on for a few lines. Socrates has provoked another crisis.

<sup>2515</sup>εἴτε καὶ ... γένοιτο (D4-6) Glaucon’s elaboration of the roles suited to female warriors expresses not a lingering uncertainty (Halliwell *ad* 471D3-5) but a brief divagation into the very sort of epideictic elaboration he has just accused Socrates of taking too far, in which he helps Socrates’s argument by showing how their relative weakness can be accommodated on the battlefield.

<sup>2516</sup>οἶδα (D6) in *praeteritio*: cf. ἐπιστάμεθα (420E1) and ὄρῳ below.

<sup>2517</sup>πάντῃ (D6) ends up being a generalization for the sake of closure (a feature of the epideictic style) so that he could make a transition from wartime to peacetime (καὶ οἴκοι γε) activities, where (D7) continues the confident tone it introduced with ἐπεί above, now to carry him through the next category.

<sup>2518</sup>παραλείπεται (D7): His change of the voice (cf. παραλείπεις [C9]) shifts away from blaming Socrates toward setting the record straight for its own sake. Glaucon again shows his desire to “buy in” (cf. 468B12-C4, and contrast his tone at 468A3 [n.2489]).

<sup>2519</sup>ὄρῳ (D7): the list ends with bathetic deflation. Glaucon wavers: Was his enthusiastic elaboration on Socrates’s remarks just a *praeteritio* after all?

<sup>2520</sup>καὶ ἄλλα γε μυρία (E1-2): The gratuitous addition of μυρία (more epideictic rhetoric) with its confident γε again show his desire and enthusiasm vying with his skepticism.

<sup>2521</sup>ἡμᾶς αὐτούς (E3-4) This is the first time in the conversation that either of the young men accorded to himself fully equal responsibility for the project rather than begging and cajoling Socrates to do all the work!

<sup>2522</sup>Reading στρατευομένῳ (472A2) with all mss., Ast (Leipzig 1822) and Schmelzer (Berlin 1884), against the emendation into σταγγευομένῳ found in F and accepted by all other modern editors known to me. Socrates is turning back onto Glaucon what Glaucon has just said, how our worthy soldiers are least likely to ἀπολείπειν ἀλλήλους (D1). Cf. συστρατεύοιτο (471D3), and for the dropping of the prefix cf. 399E8 and n. 1532).

It is important to recognize how quickly Socrates is able to shift gears. When Glaucon asked for a little ὕψον he piled on all sorts of luxury (372E2-3A8); when Adeimantus objected to the unhappiness of his guards he added more woes to the heap (420A2-7); although he is suddenly despondent about their investigation of the soul (435C4-6) he is soon quite satisfied with something less than perfection

great waves, you are bringing on the largest and hardest one of the three<sup>2523</sup> against me?<sup>2524</sup> When you see it—or hear it I should say<sup>2525</sup>—you'll have plenty of sympathy and see I had good reason after all to shrink from the task and to shudder at the prospect of making an argument so contrary to what people think and of trying to manage a careful investigation<sup>2526</sup> of it.

“The more you talk like this the less you will be released<sup>2527</sup> by us from telling how this kind of city can come into being. Just speak and quit delaying.”

Could I perhaps<sup>2528</sup> remind you first that it was because we were seeking to know what kind of thing justice is and injustice<sup>2529</sup> that we got to this pass?

“What of it?”<sup>2530</sup>

(D8); when Polemarchus and Adeimantus accuse him of leaving something out he confesses it was intentional (450B1-2 and n.2263). Cf., in the “future,” 487E6-10. Here, at the very moment Glaucon wavers between support and skepticism and indeed pushes Socrates to go on ( $\lambda\acute{e}g\acute{e}$ , E3) while at the same time declaring for the first time that the argument is the common work of both of them ( $\pi\varepsilon i\rho\mu e\theta\alpha \dot{\eta}\mu\acute{a}\dot{\eta}\alpha\alpha\acute{u}\tau\acute{o}\acute{u}\zeta$ , E3-4), Socrates only complains that his partnership is imperfect. The sharp reaction is part of his protreptic. The young brothers look to him for guidance, but he gives it only when they are able to recognize its merits and make it their own, a little like the way the magician finds the egg you lost right behind your ear.

<sup>2523</sup>τρικυμία (A4), proverbial like our seventh and the Romans' tenth (Ovid, *Trist. I.2.49*): cf. *Euthyd.*293A3 and *Aesch.PV* 1015. *Sept.760*; *E.Hipp.*1213.

<sup>2524</sup>ἐπάγεις (A4), a military metaphor along with καταδρομή (A1).

<sup>2525</sup>ἰδης τε καὶ ἀκούσῃς (A5), τε καί linking the metaphor and its meaning (n.96). Contrary to J.-C., what Glaucon will hear is the λόγος, not the roaring wave of indignation and laughter that it might arouse. We must realize that what will matter most will be Glaucon's own reaction.

<sup>2526</sup>διασκοπέιν (A7), notably active rather than middle. Socrates does not fear being drowned by waves but fears his interlocutor will lose his courage to continue thinking and following the logos in case the people around him influence him with mob behavior such as ridicule (as at the beginning of this Book). For him to warn Glaucon that each wave is greater than Glaucon thinks it will be (here and at 457D4-5) is for him to mark their progress through this danger and to encourage him to persevere. The third and last threat will be his last chance to require Glaucon to handle a fear of ridicule on his own. We must imagine that his long and edifying digression on military matters is somehow meant to prepare him for this.

<sup>2527</sup>ἀφεθήσῃ ὑφ' ἡμῶν (A8-B1): Socrates's strong reaction arouses Glaucon to rescind the collegial first plural he had just used (471E3) and replace it with another first plural that excludes Socrates but includes the others present, reminiscent of one that threatened him earlier that day (cf. ὄρδης ἡμᾶς ... ὅσοι ἐσμέν; 327C7), as well as at the beginning of this Book (ἀφήσομεν, 449B6). It is as if we have slipped back to the beginning and the discussion of Book Five has been a failure!

<sup>2528</sup>μέν (B3) is *solitarium*. Once again Socrates addresses a derailment in the conversation by reminding his interlocutor where they started (cf. 420B3-ff, 372E2-3).

<sup>2529</sup>δικαιοσύνην οἶόν ἔστι καὶ ἀδικίαν (B4): καὶ ἀδικίαν stresses that is not just the search for justice writ large in the city that Socrates is referring to but the original search foisted upon him by the brothers at the beginning of Book Two: cf. 358D5-6, 362E3, 367A6-7, and 367D3-4. Socrates referred back to these same passages in similar terms, before: 371E12, 420B9-C1, 427D4-7, and does so again, here. Cf. also C4-8, below.

<sup>2530</sup>τοῦτο (B6): The second person demonstrative adds an edge (“Do you have a *problem* with that?”) Cf. *Charm.*164A8; *Gorg.*448B1, 497E8. Glaucon acts as if he suspects another digression is afoot.

Nothing<sup>2531</sup>—just that once we do discover what kind of thing justice is, are we to insist that the man who is correspondingly just may not differ from it at all but must be like it in each and every respect? Or will we be satisfied if he is very very close<sup>2532</sup> to it and has a greater share of it than the others?<sup>2533</sup>

“The latter, satisfied.”

Therefore it was as for models that we were searching for what kind of thing justice is in itself<sup>2534</sup> and for the consummately just man,<sup>2535</sup> assuming there was one, just what sort of person he would be,<sup>2536</sup> and conversely for injustice and the man most unjust,<sup>2537</sup> so that by contemplating them<sup>2538</sup> and viewing whether they are the sort of people as to be happy or unhappy, we would be forced<sup>2539</sup> to acknowledge in the case of our own lives that whichever type we were most like, we would be

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<sup>2531</sup> οὐδέν (B7), an answer, with asyndeton, used in belligerent contexts to dodge confrontation, as at *Charm.* 164A9; *Gorg.* 448B2, 498A1, 515E2. Socrates uses the first plural to include both himself and the brothers, even though the conversation is on the brothers' behalf. Likewise, Jesus doodled in the dust (*κατέγραφεν*, *John* 8.6) in order to avoid eye-to-eye confrontation with the Pharisees (cf. R.Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning* (New York 2001) 54-60).

<sup>2532</sup> ὅτι ἐγγύτατα (C1): Given the context we should hardly translate “as close as we can,” the usual gloss for ὅτι-plus-superlative!

<sup>2533</sup> καὶ πλεῖστα τῶν ἄλλων (C1-2): The expression comes very close to confusing the generic man described in Book Four and the men that we are, which are the men that our conversation is after all primarily concerned with, as Socrates next asserts (C7-D2).

<sup>2534</sup> αὐτό (C4), again referring back to the *mise au point* presented by the brothers (e.g., 358B5, D2; 367B4, C7, D2).

<sup>2535</sup> ἔζητοῦμεν (C4-D1) In this review Socrates not only reminds the brothers that the impetus for the discussion was theirs: he also twice omits to mention the search for justice in the larger letters of the city, the particular means they had adopted for finding a justice that would then be tried out on the individual man (472B7-8, C4-5; contrast τὸν μὲν δίκαιον καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, in the peroration about the discovery of justice in the man at the end of Book Four: 444A4-5). He thus brings to the surface certain facts that have been overlooked since Book Five began. The city had only been a medium for theorizing justice; once justice was applied to the individual man and the inner meaning of justice was discovered, at the end of Book Four (443C9-444A2), the theoretical city became an irrelevant external, a ladder we could just as soon throw away. Somehow since the beginning of Book Five the whole conversation regressed to the perfectly irrelevant question whether that city could be brought into reality, and somehow the burden of answering this irrelevant question has devolved upon Socrates. These *glissements* have provided an occasion not for Plato idly to unload his opinions on Attic politics but, within the hypothesis of the drama, for Socrates to stretch his interlocutor's mind toward a truth that is beyond opinion, to immunize him against the fear of ridicule, and to teach him how to react when people tug at his shirt from behind (*λαβόμενος τοῦ ἴματίου*, 327B4 and 449B3).

<sup>2536</sup> ἄνδρα ... εἰ γένοιτο (C5-6), a proleptic “lilies of the field” construction. The καί in the apodosis is emphatic, not apodotic (cf. Denniston, 309).

<sup>2537</sup> τελέως δίκαιον (C5) is contrasted with ἀδικώτατον, a simple superlative. τελέως ἀδικον could easily seem a contradiction in terms.

<sup>2538</sup> ἐκείνους (C7): The “third person” demonstrative expresses their remoteness from *ourselves* as objects of contemplation and therefore recommends them as standards: cf. ἐκεῖ, 434D7 and E3 and n.2068.

<sup>2539</sup> ἀναγκαζόμεθα (C8) a notion very strong, and wholly new to the project (though cf. 441D8-

allotted a fate most like the fate of that type. This was our purpose in searching for justice and the just man, and not to prove that such could come into existence.

“All this you now say is true.”<sup>2540</sup>

Do you think that a man would be any less good a draftsman if in drawing a version of the most beautiful person he produced a completely adequate rendering but was not able to prove that the sort of person he drew could come into existence?

“I would not at all, by Zeus.”

So what about us? Don’t we claim we were fashioning<sup>2541</sup> in conversation the model of a good city?

“Quite.”

Do you think we have done any worse a job in our conversing, if we turn out to be unable to prove that it is possible to found the city that was the result of our conversing?

“By no means!”<sup>2542</sup>

Alright then, that’s the truth of the matter. If in addition I must try in earnest to prove, for your gratification,<sup>2543</sup> how and in what way the city might be as possible as possible,<sup>2544</sup> then for the purposes of this proof you must grant me these same things.

“What things?”<sup>2545</sup>

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E3 and nn.2175 and 2174), by which Socrates indicates to Glaucon that the search for justice is about his own life and fate, and that he must accept the truth about justice once it has been recognized. The student who requires too much proof requires reproof. To admit that the actual falls short of the ideal is to acknowledge you know more than you see. Hence the reference to μοῖρα below (D1).

<sup>2540</sup>τοῦτο (D3), with moderating μέν, is now conciliatory.

<sup>2541</sup>The imperfect ἐποιοῦμεν (D9) ruefully acknowledges that during the last few minutes the entire project has hung in the balance.

<sup>2542</sup> With οὐ δῆτα (E5) Glaucon admits and asserts his stake in the conversation.

<sup>2543</sup>προθυμηθῆναι δεῖ σὴν χάριν (E7): Socrates is careful to be accurate rather than vindictive. τὴν σὴν χάριν can mean either “for your sake” (σοῦ χάριν) or “per your request” (as in a phrase like εἰ ἔμοιγε βούλει χαρίζεσθαι [430D8]). With the ambiguity Socrates brings very near the surface the question whether Glaucon will be pleased to be benefitted, as well as the question whether he will be benefitted to be pleased, by continuing the conversation with Socrates.

<sup>2544</sup>πῇ μάλιστα καὶ κατὰ τί δυνατώτατ’ ἀν εἴη (E7-8): Now the converse of the caveat in n.2513 applies.

<sup>2545</sup>ποῖα (E10): Glaucon does not know what “same things” these are (τὰ αὐτά, E9) and has to ask, though J.-C. (*ad loc.*) do not: they think it is what he just agreed to about the artist: “in a different, it is true, and more universal form: that action can never come up to description.” Against their interpretation, πάλιν πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόδειξιν τὰ αὐτά (E8-9) contrasts a new investigation into how most easily to realize the ideal with another investigation, the one they had just completed (B3-D2). It was in respect to that investigation that Socrates required Glaucon to concede that the justice projected by their theorization into human form did not need to be represented perfectly in him (472C1-3), and it is this “same thing” he now wants Glaucon to grant as a precondition to his study of realizability, that the state, also, may only approximately realize the idea (473A6-7). In between asking him to be satisfied (ἀγαπήσεις, B2) he gives a warrant for being satisfied, that practice is by its very nature less able to embody truth than speech and reason are.

(473) Is it possible for something to be put into action just as it is put into words, or is it in the nature of things that action is less able to attain to truth than speech is, regardless what people might think? Which side do you take on this question?<sup>2546</sup>

“I grant it.”

So on the one hand, this thing you are trying to compel<sup>2547</sup> me to do—having to take what we have reached in our discourse and exhibit it being realized in every detail<sup>2548</sup>—drop it! Instead, if somehow we realize in ourselves an ability<sup>2549</sup> to invent how the city could come closer than close to our ideas, let<sup>2550</sup> me declare we have acquitted ourselves of the task of discovering<sup>2551</sup> the possibility you are enjoining me to discover. Or will you not be satisfied if you get this much? I for my part would be satisfied.

<sup>2546</sup> καὶ μή τῷ δοκεῖ (473A2-3): Socrates warns Glaucon that rescinding the λόγος / ἔργον distinction is controversial. Glaucon gives his agreement fully warned, but the commentators seek refuge from following him by making Socrates's remark a statement by Plato, who of course was always for them an idealist. J.-C. wax Coleridgean and quote Euler, who said about the arch: “All experience is against it but that is no reason for doubting the truth of it,” and follow up by interpreting this to mean “that the mathematical ideal of the arch is imperfectly realized in matter,” though Euler’s point is exactly the opposite (imperfect physical arches do a perfectly fine job). Adam: “Most men ... would not allow that λέξις has more truth than πρᾶξις .... Not so Plato, according to whom the world of Mind is not only more perfect but truer than the world of Matter. ... The pointed ἀλλὰ σύ invites the assent of Glaucon as a Platonist.” When did Glaucon become a “Platonist”?

These enthusiastic inaccuracies reveal why for these authors only Plato could ever be a Platonist. They are stirred to distraction by Socrates’s argument and what it evokes in them and prefer to project these feelings onto the invisible author rather than accept the responsibility and honor of feeling them and owning them within themselves, as Glaucon has just done. Only Plato, they imagine in their admiration, could have the grounds for making these extravagant statements they then make themselves—statements which are in fact their own effusions and hardly Platonic at all. What is at issue in the dialogue at this point, which happens also to be the arithmetical center of the whole work, is what is happening within the soul of Glaucon and of any reader who finds himself sitting at his side, participating in the argument as seriously as he: it is the decision to follow the implications of the argument and own them rather than blame them on somebody else, whether it be Glaucon blaming Socrates or the commentators blaming Plato. As Glaucon wavered toward holding Socrates responsible for proving the feasibility, Socrates now holds him responsible to live up to what he already knows (ἀναγκαζόμεθα, 472C8 / ἀνάγκαζε, 473A5: see next note). The commentators on this conversation between Socrates and Glaucon about justice tend to take refuge by inventing a different conversation, a secondary conversation among themselves about an imaginary Plato. Socrates will not let Glaucon get away with this sort of thing, and Plato likewise has invented a literary form designed to make it as hard as possible for his readers to do this, and as little as possible to sink their teeth into, treating them in the same spirit as Socrates treated his interlocutors.

<sup>2547</sup> μὴ ἀνάγκαζε (A5) referring to 472A8-B2. Compulsion is inappropriate, after all, in the context of the favor (*σὴν χάριν*) Socrates is offering him; and more importantly, Socrates is reminding Glaucon that μοῖρα will in any event impose upon him his true reward, quite apart from their conversation (472C8-D1).

<sup>2548</sup> If γιγνόμενα (A6) is taken as a participle in indirect discourse with the virtual verb of perception ἀποφαίνειν (which its present tense indicates it should be), then Bywater’s ὅν (A6) becomes unnecessary.

<sup>2549</sup> With οἵτινες τε γενώμεθα (A7) Socrates now transfers the objective οἷα and γιγνόμενα (A5, 6) that had described the object of search onto the subjects performing the search. Will we eavesdroppers on the conversation now join in, or will we stay out and speculate on the opinions of Plato?

“But so would I,” Glaucon says, and the discussion has been saved.

### D.3: Philosopher Kings or Kingly Philosophers

On the other hand, let's next try to find and point out just what it is about existing cities that is so poorly managed in practice<sup>2552</sup> that they do not have the order we envision in theory, or by what small adjustment a city might come to have the kind of constitution we have designed—at best a single thing or two, or if not as few as possible in number and as minor as possible in the question of their feasibility.<sup>2553</sup>

“By all means let's.”

One change I think we are already able to point out<sup>2554</sup> that could be made—not a small thing nor an easy one, but feasible.

“What?”

Well now I find myself face to face with that very thing we were speaking of before as the biggest wave. It will be said nevertheless, even if a veritable wave of ridicule and disgrace<sup>2555</sup> is likely to engulf us. Consider what I am about to say.

“Go ahead and say it.”

Unless either the philosophers become kings in the cities or the kings or dynasts or whatever their office is called become genuine and competent philosophers,<sup>2556</sup> so that the two things, political power and the love of wisdom, become combined in one, and unless all these types who in all their sundry<sup>2557</sup> ways pursue one or the other of these two paths separately are compelled to leave, there will be no surcease of ills, Glaucon, afflicting life in the cities, let alone the entire human race. Nor<sup>2558</sup> will the city we have envisioned take root or see the light of day before this condition is filled. Nothing

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<sup>2550</sup>φάναι (A8) might be a dependent infinitive parallel to ἀποφαίνειν, with the intervening ἀλλά requiring us to supply a verb opposite to ἀναγκάζειν, e.g., έάν. Or it is an imperative infinitive dictating the position to be adopted, as at 508B12 and 509B6?

<sup>2551</sup> This is the force of the perfect ἐξηρηκέναι (B1).

<sup>2552</sup>τί ποτε νῦν κακῶς ... πράττεται (B5): If the concept is good enough, then it is the deficiencies in practice that become the issue.

<sup>2553</sup>τὴν δύναμιν (B9), the remaining vestige of the worry about realizability (εἰ δυνατόν), carried forward below with δυνατοῦ δέ (C4).

<sup>2554</sup>δεῖξαι (C3), repeating ἀποδεικνύναι (B5) with the usual dropping of the prefix (n. 1532).

<sup>2555</sup>ἀδόξία (C8). As long as δόξα is in charge ἀδόξία means disgrace; once ἐπιστήμη is the measure ἀδόξία will merely be paradox (e.g., A2-3 κἄν εἰ μή τῷ δοκεῖ). About its abetting partner, ridicule (γέλως), the analogous argument has already been made in this Book (452D3-E2). The dethroning of δόξα will occupy us now, through to the Book's end.

<sup>2556</sup>λεγόμενοι (D1) is added to distinguish the title or the office from the man (the nominalism was broached at 463AC; cf. also 445D5-6), since only a man can φιλοσοφεῖν. The two answers correspond to the alternatives envisioned at B4-7, viz., (1) adjusting the management of an existing provision (kings can be improved by becoming philosophical) or (2) adding a provision to the existing store (kings are to be selected from among philosophers), presented as usual in a chiasm of before and after (cf. n. 18) or question and answer.

<sup>2557</sup>πολλαί (D4) is derogatory (cf. n. 1966). φύσις here has its naturalistic sense: “creatures,” “specimens” (cf. Phdr. 229E2).

other than this it was that I long since demurred to say, seeing as I did that the assertion would go flat against the way people see things.<sup>2559</sup> Facing the fact that any other kind of city or constitution than this could not achieve happiness, whether for the individuals or as a whole, is a bothersome thing.<sup>2560</sup>

He said (Socrates tells us<sup>2561</sup>), “Socrates! What an utterance you’ve let out!<sup>2562</sup> What an idea! Now that you’ve said it you can be sure you’ll be beset by a good many people, (474) not just us nobodies here.<sup>2563</sup> They’ll strip off their cloaks and grab whatever comes to hand for a weapon. They’ll gird up their loins and run at you full speed, bent on doing I know not what! You’ll have to defend the argument against them and acquit yourself of their charge, or else you’ll be paying the penalty with the sting of their ridicule.”<sup>2564</sup>

I have you to blame for it.

“And it was good that I made you do it. But let me tell you I won’t betray you. No, I will ward them off from you any way I can<sup>2565</sup> with my good will and encouragement, and I will play a more compliant answerer for you than someone else might.<sup>2566</sup> So rely on me for this kind of help and try to

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<sup>2558</sup>ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δὲ οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία (D6-E1): Transition from the empirical (ταῖς πόλεσι, D6) to the theoretical realm (πολιτεία) is done by a detour through the universal (ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει). For the move cf. 551C3-11; for enumerations with a similar logical structure cf. 466A8-B2, 475D1-E1, 529E1-3, 551C3-11, 610B1-3; H/Maj.298AB; Leg.849C3-4, 956E1-7; Phlb.11B7-8; Symp.207D8-E3, 211A60B1.

<sup>2559</sup>πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν ρήθησεται (E4).

<sup>2560</sup>χαλεπόν (E4), bothersome rather than difficult (cf.476D8. 480A7, and n.297I ad 502D7). Opinion (δόξαν, *ibid.*) chooses more comfortable beliefs. The entire sequence is therefore χαλεπόν, παρὰ δόξαν, γελοῖον. I keep the well attested ἀλλή with Burnet against the ἀλλῆ of the Monacensis lately adopted by Slings: only the πολιτεία they have constructed can promise happiness across the board.

<sup>2561</sup>καὶ ὅς (E6): Socrates characteristically interrupts himself with phrases like these to arrest our attention.

<sup>2562</sup>τοιοῦτον ἐκβέβληκας ρῆμά τε καὶ λόγον (E6). The expression ἐκβάλλειν ἔπος is Homeric and imitated by Aeschylus (*Eum.*830, *Ag.*1663). ρῆμα replaces ἔπος by dint of ρήθησεται above; τε καί then links the specialized term with the more natural expression.

<sup>2563</sup>πολλούς τε καὶ οὐ φαύλους νῦν οὔτως (474A1): The reference to a world beyond the discussants at Cephalus’s house (νῦν οὔτως) carries extraordinary emphasis.

<sup>2564</sup>Glaucon’s response (473E6-474A4) takes the form of a series of statements breathlessly linked together as relative clauses filled with participles, as if he were too excited to achieve a syntactically deliberate and finished expression. Opening with the vocative shows excitement; the hendiadys ρῆμά τε καὶ λόγον distinguishes the fact Socrates said it from what he said, as if Glaucon can’t decide which is the more scandalous; at the end he shifts from physical assault to the lawcourts (ἐκφεύξῃ and δώσεις δίκην) and with τῷ ὄντι tries to add an extra sting to the unbridled calumny, helping Plato’s readers to remember the mob and the baseless but emotional λοιδορία that brought him to “justice” in the *Apology*.

<sup>2565</sup>ἀμυνῶ (A7, cf. A3) picks up the topic of μὴ ἀπολείπειν ἀλλήλους from 472A2 and 471D1 (cf. n.2522) with προδώσω (A6) picking up ἐπάγεις (472A4). Glaucon has switched sides.

<sup>2566</sup>The double ἀλλά (A6,A7) shows more resoluteness than logic and the epanalepsis of δύναμαι shows humility. With ἐμμελέστερον (A8) he is *apologizing* for having confronted and “abandoned” Socrates at 471C-472B (cf. nn.2522 and 2527, and the related term πλημμελές used by Glaucon himself at 451B3). The most important reversal in his attitude comes with his opening

prove to the disbelievers<sup>2567</sup> that what you say is true.”

### D.3a: Definition of Philosopher: Nature

Try I must, since now you have proffered so strong an alliance.<sup>2568</sup> What we must do if we are somehow to elude those people you mention is to confront them with a description of who we are referring to as philosophers when we make this daring remark that philosophers must rule. Once that becomes crystal clear, one will have a means to ward them off: by indicating that certain people by their nature are suitable for taking up philosophy and leading the city whereas the others given their nature should not take it up but should follow their leaders.<sup>2569</sup>

“The time has come to describe them!”

Come along then and follow me on my path, in hopes we might do it adequately.<sup>2570</sup>

“Lead.”

Will you need to be reminded, or do you remember, that whenever we say that somebody loves something he must love all of it, if we are right to say so? That we mustn’t see him loving one aspect of it and not another, but see him yearning for the whole?

“Looks like I need reminding: I don’t get it.”

Somebody else ought to have made that remark than you,<sup>2571</sup> Glaucon. An erotic should hardly fail to remember that any boy in the flower of youth gives the youth-loving erotic<sup>2572</sup> a real bite as it were and moves him as seeming worthy of his solicitous care and affections. Aren’t you prone to act this remark, καλῶς ἐγὼ ποιῶν, by which for all his apologizing he courageously asserts he was right to get them into this fight.

<sup>2567</sup> τοῖς ἀπιστοῦσιν (B1-2): He is no longer one of them. The rather vague claim he made at 450D2-3 (and cf. ἀπιστίας just above it, C6), for the sake of encouraging Socrates to go on, has now been tested, and has become true. To the extent that he offers to help him prove his point in the present conversation, the “disbelievers” consist of the others present. Glaucon is now siding with Socrates, even against them if necessary.

<sup>2568</sup> συμμαχίαν (B3): Socrates acknowledges Glaucon’s reference to 472A1-2.

<sup>2569</sup> τοῖς μέν ... τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις (C1-3): The paradox is duplex. Not only are we asked to imagine men with their heads in the clouds running the state, but perhaps worse we have to imagine obeying them! Socrates’s observation also applies immediately to Glaucon himself, who will either lead or follow on the philosophic path. Knowing the place Glaucon has just placed him in (ἐξων τοιούτον βοηθὸν πειρῶ, B1), Socrates does not shrink from telling him to follow (ἀκολούθησον, C5, right after ἀκολουθεῖν, C3).

<sup>2570</sup> ἐάν ... ἐξηγησώμεθα (C5-6): Here for the fifth time (cf. 455B1-2, 432C2, 427D3-4, 358B8 and n.693), we encounter the polite and auspicious construction in ἐάν, a virtual prayer in the face of doubts as to their ability to find the truth (cf. εὐξάμενος μετ’ ἐμοῦ, 432C5).

<sup>2571</sup> With ἄλλῳ (D3) he makes a forgiving little joke about Glaucon’s apologetic promise to answer well (cf. ἄλλου του, A8).

<sup>2572</sup> φιλόπατιδα καὶ ἔρωτικόν (D5): Reverse καί, the newer and more specific term (φιλόπατιδα) padded with a restatement of the general term (ἔρωτικόν) that implied it (cf. n.444). That Glaucon is an ἔρωτικός is clear from the enthusiasm he recently showed at 468B12-C4. At 402D10-E1 he had evinced a certain fastidiousness about looks that he claimed he was ready to suspend if the boy’s soul was fine. It is this sentiment that Socrates thought he might remind him of, with his remark about loving the whole and looking past the part.

way toward beautiful boys?<sup>2573</sup> The one who is snub-nosed will be praised as “charming;” the hook-nose of the other will be dubbed regal; and the boy in between exhibits the happiest of happy mediums. Darker skin means they’re “manly;” lighter and they are “the children of the gods.” Do you think the term “honey-skinned” was made up by anybody other than a lover too jaded to feel a distaste for jaundice in a boy so long as he’s in the bloom? In sum there’s no excuse you won’t make, nothing you (475) would not say, to win a chance with a boy in his prime.<sup>2574</sup>

“Go ahead and use me for an example of how your erotic men act; I’ll accept it for the sake of the argument.”<sup>2575</sup>

Well don’t you see the wine-lovers doing the same thing, coming up with excuses for their affectionate attitude for it no matter which wine it is?

“Quite.”

And honor-lovers: you can see how if they are not able to be the general they take the rank of lieutenant, and that if they are not in a position to be held in esteem by the greater and more important people they will settle for the esteem of lesser and inconsequential ones, showing by their actions that it is honor in any and all its forms that they are desirous of.

“Obviously.”

So grant it or not: Whoever we say is desirous of something, shall we declare him to be desirous of the entire kind of the thing or desirous of one part but not of another?”

“Of the entire kind.”<sup>2576</sup>

Then when it comes to our wisdom-lover, our philosopher,<sup>2577</sup> we shall say he is desirous of wisdom, not of this part as opposed to that but of wisdom as a whole.

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<sup>2573</sup> πρὸς τοὺς καλούς (D7): It is characteristic of the allusive erotic vocabulary that the noun should be omitted (cf. *Phdr.227C6*).

<sup>2574</sup>The example (D7-E5) is embarrassing but it is true. Eros is not beautiful, as Diotima taught Socrates, but it is divine.

<sup>2575</sup> συγχωρῷ τοῦ λόγου χάριν (475A4): The byplay about Glaucon the compliant answerer is continued.

<sup>2576</sup> The argument (474C5-5B7) is a straightforward and neatly constructed *epagoge* such as we have not seen since the conversation with Polemarchus in Book One. The exemplary cases consist first of the most immediate or actual case, Glaucon’s love (the πρόχειρον or the ἐναργέστατον: cf. 437D3, 459A1-5; *Charm.161D3-7; Gorg.448B4-6; Ion 537A5ff; Meno 71B5-7, 75D6; Prot.312B1-2; Soph.233E-4A*) amenable to elaboration because of its familiarity, and then two generic cases threaded to the first by parallel adjectives in φιλο- (from φιλόπαις to φίλοινος and φιλότιμος: 475A5-B2). The last case is again elaborated but in a way different from the first (A9-B2), which itself brings into view that the methods of elaboration are logically complementary: the second elaboration (of φιλοτιμία), because it shows that the lover loves the object no matter what *quantity* there is of it, reveals in retrospect that the first elaboration exhausted a spectrum of *qualitative* sub-kinds (quality being set out, as usual, by pairs of opposites, from σιμός to ἐπίγρυπτος, and dark to light: 474D8-E5). Once the set of cases has reached a symmetrical completion, the general principle is enunciated for the interlocutor’s approval (475B4-6), its enunciation being a restatement of the thesis originally presented at 474C9-11, in which the term φιλεῖν (C9) is replaced by the more psychodynamic term ἐπιθυμεῖν (475B5) and the thing loved (bare τι at 474C9) is replaced with the logical and general term εἶδος (εἴδους, B5). It is noteworthy that the stated purpose of the *epagoge* is not to prove the general point but to remind Glaucon of it (ἀναμιμνήσκειν, 474D1).

<sup>2577</sup> The meaning of φίλοινος (A5) was clear, but φιλόσοφος (B8) is as ambiguous as σοφία is.

“True.”

Therefore when it comes to the person who chafes at doing his studies, especially when he's young and doesn't yet know what really matters,<sup>2578</sup> we will deny he is philomathic or<sup>2579</sup> philosophic, just as we would say that a person who chafes at eating is not hungry and doesn't desire food and thus is not a “food-lover” but a person who has a bad time with food.<sup>2580</sup> While on the other hand the person who indiscriminately tries any kind of learning and welcomes the chance to move into learning activities and just can't get enough of it,<sup>2581</sup> this one we would rightly call a wisdom-lover or philosophic—wouldn't we?

Glaucon had a reply to this, Socrates tells us.<sup>2582</sup> “But you're going to be including a lot of strange people in the group you just described. All the spectacle-lovers are going to be included since they enjoy really getting to know something,<sup>2583</sup> and then there will be the sound-lovers<sup>2584</sup> who would make the strangest of company among philosophers since they would never willingly come and listen to<sup>2585</sup> a discussion or that sort of thing, whereas they will run to catch performances by any and every

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<sup>2578</sup> ἄλλως τε καὶ νέον ὄντα (B11-C2): The stress is on one's natural erotic disposition, which “learned” behavior could mask.

<sup>2579</sup> οὐ … φιλομαθῆ οὐδὲ φιλόσοφον (C2): The proximity in meaning between μάθησις and σοφία allows the inference to be drawn with an epexegetical οὐδέ (C2). On the synonymy of the terms cf. 376B8-9.

<sup>2580</sup> οὔτε πεινῆν … οὕτ’ ἐπιθυμεῖν σιτίων (C3-4): The enumeration denies two verbs, which in turn warrants denying an adjectival attribute (φιλόσιτον) to their subject (οὐδέ [C4] is illative as at 341D1, 520A6, 546A2, 582B5, 586A5 and 6, 608B3-5). If the person were hungry we could not reliably infer an underlying fastidiousness about food, just as the prudence that accrues with maturity might mask an underlying aversion to learning. The articulation of the parallel leaves something to be desired. For κακόσιτον rather than μισόσιτον as the contradictory of φιλόσιτον the schol. glosses thus: κακόχυμον, βεβλαμμένον.

<sup>2581</sup> Socrates describes (B11-C7) the behaviors that will serve as criteria for inclusion or exclusion with attributive participles. The disqualifying behavior is done with the attributive participle δυσχεραίνοντα (B11) and then supplemented with two circumstantial participles (ὄντα, ἔχοντα [C1]) that narrow it with an ἄλλως τε καί construction (if their distaste is inborn they are especially unsuited). An illustrative parallel from the appetite for eating follows (δυσχερῆ [C3] providing the segue). The description of the opposite and winning behavior (C6-8) repeats the construction in attributive participle -- again three -- but this time all attributive (ἐθέλοντα, ιόντα, ἔχοντα [C6-7]), connected with flat καί and each given an adverb (both elements adding epideictic elevation). The parallelism suggests that the participles will describe behavior generically opposite to δυσχεραίνοντα, but the diction (esp. ἀσμένως, γεύεσθαι, and ἀπλήστως) brings forward the intervening appetitive illustration. Perhaps the three participles represent a gradation: an unimpeded willingness to taste anything, feeling pleasure at eating, and being (remaining?) insatiable. εὐχερῶς is usually and ἀπληήστος always derogatory: it is these that elicit Glaucon's response.

<sup>2582</sup> καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἔφη (D1): With the fuller stage direction (cf. n. 1185), Socrates again indicates to us the importance of what happened next.

<sup>2583</sup> καταμανθάνειν (D3): Glaucon's κατα- designates the sort of thing Aristotle has in mind when he proves that all men love to know by adducing the pleasure they take in visual perception of details and differences (*Met. init.*).

<sup>2584</sup> φιλοθεάμων and φιλήκοος (D2, D3) are both coined here, with some help from the epagogic context in which φιλο- compounds have played a salient role.

<sup>2585</sup> With ἔκοντες οὐκ ἀν ἐθέλοιεν ἐλθεῖν (D5) he picks up Socrates's εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα and

chorus at the Dionysian festivals, as if they were in the business of renting their ears out, missing not a single performance whether in a city or in the smallest village.<sup>2586</sup> Do we want to say that all these are philosophers, and include among other studious types like these even the students of the various handicrafts?"<sup>2587</sup>

Not at all. We could call them similar<sup>2588</sup> to philosophers ...

"But<sup>2589</sup> if you do who will you say are the true ones?"

The ones who love the spectacle of truth.<sup>2590</sup>

"That's good as far as it goes; but how do you mean it?"

I mean it in a way not at all easy for somebody else to understand, but you<sup>2591</sup> will probably grant me the following point.

"Which?"

Since the beautiful is opposite to the ugly they are two things.

(476) "Of course."

And if they are two each is one.

"That too."

So also in the case of the just and unjust, the good and the bad, and any distinct types,<sup>2592</sup> the argument is the same. Each in itself is one, but since they are shared by actions and by bodies and by

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ιόντα (C5,6).

<sup>2586</sup>περιθέουσι (D6-7), in contrast with οὐκ ἀν ἔλθοιεν, and (οὐ) ἀπολειπόμενοι (D7-8) pick up Socrates's ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα (C7); and πάντων χορῶν (D6) picks up παντὸς μαθήματος (C6).

<sup>2587</sup>καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτων τινῶν μαθηματικὸν καὶ τὸν τῶν τεχνυδρίων (D8-E1), what we call an ἄλλως τε καί construction. A prejudice against the value of practical arts was given a new basis at 473A1-3.

<sup>2588</sup>μέν (E2) is what Denniston calls emphatic (364-5). Socrates has been corrected and now takes a stab at salvaging what he has said. Glaucon will take it differently (E3).

<sup>2589</sup>τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς (E3). Though Denniston notes some μέν 's are *solitaria* because the speaker is interrupted (380) he doesn't note the deft conversational move Glaucon here uses, asking his next question with δέ, as if he were completing the other's idea.

<sup>2590</sup>τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας (E4): Socrates's reply matches deft with defter.

<sup>2591</sup>σὲ δὲ οἶμαι ὁμολογήσειν (E6-7), continues to play with the theme of the willing answerer (cf. 474A8 and 474D3), and nothing more. Adam (*ad loc.*): "We are to infer that the Theory of Ideas was already familiar in the school of Plato," which presumably means Glaucon studied under his little brother.

<sup>2592</sup>εἰδῶν (476A5) needs not have a special meaning private to Plato for this sentence to make sense. The three sets of opposites here chosen for illustration constitute a triad commonly used to designate things that matter or serious topics of conversation (cf. n.2279).

each other<sup>2593</sup> they make appearances everywhere<sup>2594</sup> so that they appear to be many though each is an individual.”<sup>2595</sup>

“Rightly said.”

This then is how I make the distinction. On one side there are the ones you have just called the spectacle-lovers and the craft-lovers and practical types,<sup>2596</sup> and on the other side there are the people I am talking about who are the only ones that one would rightly call wisdom-lovers or philosophers.

“Can you explain?”

The sound-lovers and spectacle-lovers appreciate pretty voices and colors and shapes<sup>2597</sup> and the things that the craftsmen make that embody<sup>2598</sup> these, but as for the character of beauty in itself, their thinking is unable to see<sup>2599</sup> and appreciate its nature.

“Yes, this is the way it is.”

But the ones who are able to make their way<sup>2600</sup> all the way to beauty in itself and see it on its own terms, wouldn’t you say these are far and few between?

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<sup>2593</sup> ἀλλήλων (A6), read by all mss. and often emended, can only mean that these attributes appear with each other—that beauty can show up in a just thing and justness show up in a beautiful thing. The other two items in the list (πράξεις, σώματα) are the quickest way of designating “everything there is” in the common sense—as if all were verbs and nouns. σώματα can be used of inanimate things (e.g. Leg.967C4-5) but, without specification, as in English, tends to be used of the animate (e.g. Rep.380E4-5). In the quick list of “everything” we usually get both the animate and the inanimate, and other terms than σῶμα are used: 601D4; Gorg.506D5-6; H.Maj.292D1-3; Leg.859D3-4. We might think it illogical that “properties” should be listed on a par with things that have them, but this very illogic of the world of appearances is a primary motive for the theory of forms in the first place. Cf. the lists at Gorg.474D3-4; H.Maj.298AB; Phdo.78D10-E1; Symp.211C1-D1.

<sup>2594</sup> πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα (A7). Compare the expression Socrates used in a similar context, again speaking with Glaucon, at 402A8-9: ἐν ἄπασιν ... περιφερόμενα.

<sup>2595</sup> ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος (A5): The individuality that is made salient by comparing an idea with its opposite (A2) becomes the basis for distinguishing the single idea from its many instances.

<sup>2596</sup> φιλοθεάμονάς τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ πρακτικούς (A10). The final term πρακτικούς articulates the direction in which Glaucon’s list was itself trending at its end (475D8-E1). It restates more explicitly the prejudice against the value of the “practical” that has its new warrant at 473A1-3. Though remote from the immediate context, that crucial passage is enough to support its present use.

<sup>2597</sup> The pair χρώμα (here χρόα) and σχῆμα (B5) represents the visual realm with a complementary doublet, as usual (cf. n.1046).

<sup>2598</sup> An overtranslation of πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα (B6) is justified for making the point of the passage clear. Just as the phenomenal world consists indifferently of things with attributes AND the attributes themselves (as stated by ἀλλήλων above) so also the spectacle-lover can be said to enjoy sights (color and line) AND the things that exhibit color and line. The world of spatio-temporal objects is here characterized as τὰ δημιουργούμενα under the influence of φιλοτέχνους καὶ πρακτικούς above (A10): such persons do contemplate (or read) blueprints, but only to turn the σχήματα and εἴδη there depicted into artifacts.

<sup>2599</sup> ιδεῖν (B7) is not otiose. It means “see” and explains the bold assertion that a philosopher is a φιλοθεάμων τῆς ἀληθείας (475E4). Metaphors of mental vision abound throughout the sequel, aiding the argument at every step: βλέπειν (477D1 [vs. 477C8]), εἰδέναι (476E6 [*bis*]; 477C4, E1; 479A1), ὄρᾶν (476B10, D1; 479E2), φαίνεσθαι (477C6; 478C14, D5, D8, D11 and 12, E3; 479A7, B2, D1 [*bis*], D7), and their cognates.

“Quite so.”

Then take this person<sup>2601</sup> who thinks about beautiful objects but has no thought of beauty in itself nor is able to follow when someone leads him right up to the cognition of it. Would you say this man is going through life in a dream, or waking? Think about it. Would you agree with me about dreaming, that whether asleep or awake the dreamer is believing that what is only similar to something else is actually the thing that it resembles?

“I would say such a person is dreaming.”

Then take the man oppositely disposed, who does believe there is a beauty that is just beauty and is able to contemplate both it and the things that share<sup>2602</sup> it,<sup>2603</sup> and doesn’t take the things that share to be it nor thinks it to be the things that share it. Do you think this man is going through life dreaming or waking?

“Waking indeed.”

And would we be right to characterize this man’s mentality<sup>2604</sup> as the cognition of a knowing person<sup>2605</sup> and that of the other as the opinion of a person who is opining?<sup>2606</sup>

“Quite so”

But what if this latter fellow takes offense at our saying that he is opining rather than knowing and contests<sup>2607</sup> the truth of what we say? Will we be able to talk this matter over with him and persuade him calmly, avoiding to allude to the fact that he is mentally imbalanced?<sup>2608</sup>

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<sup>2600</sup>ιέναι τε καὶ ὄρᾶν (B10): The metaphor is prepared for by ιόντα (475C7) and ἐλθεῖν / περιθέουσι (475D5-6).

<sup>2601</sup>οὗτος (D8) points, directly and with a little sneer, at the person described just above (C2-8). His aversion to λόγοι has already been broached (475D4-5) and is connected with his love of spectacle. We know the type: there is no need to think of Antisthenes or any other character extra *hypothesin*.

<sup>2602</sup>μετέχοντα (D2), which was made a Platonic technical term by Aristotle’s criticism, is suggested here by the metaphor of κοινωνία (A7).

<sup>2603</sup>ἐκείνου (D1) denotes the remoteness of the thing itself from its presence in things, as being an aspect of the experience of καθορᾶν.

<sup>2604</sup>τὴν διάνοιαν (D5): The sense is very general, as above (B7). Cf. 395D3 (with n. 1446), 455B9, and 595B6. Cf. also H.Mn.364A6.

<sup>2605</sup>ώς γιγνώσκοντος γνώμην (D5): The terms are borrowed from the term γνῶσις introduced just above (C3). For γιγνώσκειν absolute cf. 347D6.

<sup>2606</sup>τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ως δοξάζοντος (D6): To the extent that δόξα, in comparison with γνώμη, already contrasts a sense of certainty brought by the subject (a “judgment” being made, e.g. ἔδοξε τῷ δῆμῳ) against a mental perception that as such needs no further warrant (γιγνώσκω being able to take the participle as well as the infinitive), the expression itself grasps the distinction Socrates is making. But in the immediate context ὀνειρώττειν shortcircuits this distinction because exactly what was not directly seen is experienced as if it were, and as needing no further warrant.

An individual cannot tell if he is asleep or awake as easily as his neighbor can. The distinction between knowledge and opinion as presented here therefore brings in the Delphic admonition to see oneself from the outside, to know oneself (γνῶθι σεαυτόν).

<sup>2607</sup>ἀμφισβήτη (D9) of misguided and incompetent resistance (cf. n.2100).

<sup>2608</sup>οὐχ ὑγιαίνει (E2) perhaps continues the metaphor of δοξάζειν as a diminished mental state

“We must find a way.”

Well then let's think of what we will say to him. Why don't we play the listener<sup>2609</sup> showing the attitude that if he does have some knowledge we won't begrudge it but would welcome knowing he knows:<sup>2610</sup> “Tell us this, does the man who knows know something or nothing?” You answer for him.

“I will answer that the person knows something.”

A thing that is or isn't?<sup>2611</sup>

(477) “That is. If it somehow<sup>2612</sup> weren't, how could he know it?”

This much we can safely say,<sup>2613</sup> though we could go into further detail, that what completely is, is knowable completely; and that what in no way is, is unknowable in any way.<sup>2614</sup>

“Quite safely indeed.”

But now consider something in a state as both to be and not to be:<sup>2615</sup> wouldn't it lie somewhere in between being purely and being no-how?

“In between.”

So applying to what is, we had knowledge; and we had ignorance applying to what isn't.<sup>2616</sup> Applying to this in-between thing we should likewise look for something in between lacking knowledge and having knowledge, assuming there are indeed cases like this.

“Quite so.”

We do argue that opining is a distinct something.

“Of course.”

And that it is the same ability as knowledge or another ability?

“Another.”

Therefore opining occupies the position of applying to one thing and knowledge the position of applying to another, in accordance with the different ability that each of the two have in themselves

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(ὄντας rather than ὕπαρ: cf. *Tht.* I 90B1-C4 [n.b. οὐδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ]; also *Phlb.* 29D4-5, *Alc.* 2.138C6-8).

<sup>2609</sup> πυνθάνεσθαι (E5) of seeking information passively: cf. n.50.

<sup>2610</sup> ἀσμενοί ἀν ἵδοιμεν (E6): This is of course the attitude of the philosopher as described above.

<sup>2611</sup> ὅν η οὐκ ὅν (E10), the expression is general and vague.

<sup>2612</sup> τι (477A1) adverbial enclitic after the indefinite pronouns at E7 and E9 which were orthotone because of the contrast with οὐδέν (as again below, 478B7. cf. Smyth §187a).

<sup>2613</sup> ικανῶς... ἔχομεν (A2) suggests the dialectical criterion, agreement (cf. n.486).

<sup>2614</sup> παντελῶς ὅν : παντελῶς γνωστόν : : μὴ ὅν μηδαμῆ : πάντῃ ἄγνωστον (A3-4). The configuration is Aa : Bb :: A<sub>1</sub>a : bB<sub>1</sub>, chiasm used to combine the statements of opposite relations into a closed unit. The polysyllabic negative μηδαμῆ is sympathetic with the preceding monosyllabic μή.

<sup>2615</sup> οὔτω ἔχειν ως εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι (A6): the periphrasis of ἔχειν plus adverb deftly avoids a circular double use of εἶναι. (cf. *Euthyphr.* 5D3; *Prot.* 330E5-6 [setting up εἶναι in E6]; 331E1 [vs. E2-4], and cf. n.2644). The ground for the notion that something could *both* be and not be, resting on degrees of being, was laid by the distinction between something being and something being completely (παντελῶς) just above.

<sup>2616</sup> ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνῶσις / ἀγνῶσία δέ... ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι (A9-10): Chiasm of opposites again (A : a :: b : B). The opposition γνῶσις ~ ἀγνῶσία is not so easy to reproduce in translation.

and are.<sup>2617</sup>

“Yes.”

Now by its nature<sup>2618</sup> science applies to what is, and knows that what is, is. But it is necessary I think to draw a distinction before I go on. We say that abilities are the group of things by means of which we are in fact able to do whatever we are able to do and any thing is able to do whatever it is able to do. For instance seeing and hearing are members of the group of abilities, if you understand the idea in what I am saying.

“Oh but I do understand.”

Then let me tell you what I think about them. In an ability I do not see a color or a shape<sup>2619</sup> or any of the indicators I use to distinguish one of the things around me<sup>2620</sup> from others. In the case of an ability there is only one thing I “look”<sup>2621</sup> for: what it applies to or brings about.<sup>2622</sup> It is by this technique that I call each of the abilities what I call them, so that an ability that is assigned to the same thing or brings about the same thing I call the same ability, whereas one that is assigned to something else and brings about something else I call by a different name. How about you? What's your practice?

“The same.”

Excellent!<sup>2623</sup> Let's go back then to science. Would you say science is an ability, considered in itself? Or what group do you put it in?

“Into this group, and I'd say it is the most powerful of all of them!”<sup>2624</sup>

What about opining? Do we put it into the group of abilities or shall we move it off to some other group?

“Not at all.<sup>2625</sup> After all, the thing by which we are able to reach an opinion is nothing but opining.”

And yet a moment ago you agreed with me that (478) science and opinion were not the same thing.

“How after all could a person with any intelligence<sup>2626</sup> posit what is infallible to be the same as

<sup>2617</sup> κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν αὐτῆς (B8): The genitive can be subjective, or defining, or both. It is vague just as the formula ἐπί plus dative (A9-B1) was vague.

<sup>2618</sup> πέφυκε (B10): The perfect varies the perfect τέτακται (B7).

<sup>2619</sup> χρόα / σχῆμα (C7) again (cf. 476B5) representing the differentiating features of the visual realm (χρόα again substituting for χρῶμα: cf. n.1046).

<sup>2620</sup> παρ' ἔμαυτῷ (C9), another phenomenological way of designating the world of spatio-temporal objects (cf. περὶ ἡμᾶς, 510A5).

<sup>2621</sup> βλέπω (D1), brings forward ἀποβλέπων from C8, the prefix dropped as usual (n.1532). The verb is now used of mental vision.

<sup>2622</sup> ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω ἐφ' ὁ τε ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀπεργάζεται (D1): the single thing (ἐκεῖνο μόνον) becomes, with τε ... καί, one thing with two facets. The former facet (ἐφ' ὁ ἔστι) is already established and the latter (ὁ ἀπεργάζεται) is added as if it came to the same thing.

<sup>2623</sup> ὦ ἄριστε (D7) Again (cf. n.554) with his vocative adjective Socrates expresses not his opinion about the interlocutor but about how the conversation is going.

<sup>2624</sup> πασῶν γε δυνάμεων ἐρρωμενεστάτην (D9): As the most *able* ability ( $\gamma\varepsilon$ ) it leads the group.

<sup>2625</sup> οὐδαμῶς (E2), answering the whole by answering the last part (cf. n.204).

<sup>2626</sup> νοῦν ἔχων (E7).

what is not infallible?"

Fine, and now it is clear that we agree that science is a different thing from opinion. This implies that the two of them by their nature apply to two different things and have the ability to produce two different effects.<sup>2627</sup>

"That necessarily follows."

Science presumably applies to what is, as the ability to know the state of what is,<sup>2628</sup> opinion being the ability to opine. But does opinion opine the same thing that science knows, so that the known and the opined would become the same thing, or is that impossible?

"That cannot follow<sup>2629</sup> from the things we have agreed to. If as we said different abilities apply to different things, and if both of these, opinion and science, are abilities and if the two of them are other than each other, then it is impossible that the object of knowledge and the object of opinion should be the same thing."

But if what is is the object of knowledge, the object of opinion would be something other than what is.<sup>2630</sup> Would you then say that opinion opines what is not? Think about it. Does the person who is opining direct his opining to something,<sup>2631</sup> or is he opining but opining nothing?

"Impossible."

So instead, the opining person opines some thing.<sup>2632</sup> But if a non-being, it would most properly be referred to not as some thing but as non-thing or nothing.<sup>2633</sup>

"Quite."

We assigned not knowing or ignorance to the non-being thing and knowledge to the being thing, necessarily, so that it is not the being thing nor the non-being thing that opinion opines. Therefore opining can neither be not-knowing or ignorance, nor can it be knowing.

"Seems not."

So then is it<sup>2634</sup> outside the spectrum defined by these,<sup>2635</sup> either exceeding knowledge in its

<sup>2627</sup>δυναμένη ... πέφυκεν ([478A4](#)), brings forward the language of 477B10 (πέφυκε) and D1 (ἐφ' ὃ τε ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀπεργάζεται), δυναμένη here meaning what ἀπεργάζεται there did and would.

<sup>2628</sup>ώς ἔχει (A6) again obviates the need for a second "is" (cf. 477A6).

<sup>2629</sup>ἀδύνατον (A12), of logical impossibility just as ὀνάγκη is used of logical necessity.

<sup>2630</sup>τὸ ὄν : γνωστόν : : δοξαστόν : τὸ ὄν (B3-4), another chiasm of opposites.

<sup>2631</sup>ἐπὶ τὶ φέρει τὴν δόξαν (B7): ἐπί plus accusative with φέρειν presents itself as synonymous to ἐπί plus dative with εἰναι above (477D1-5).

<sup>2632</sup>ἀλλ' ἔν γέ τι (B10), with ἔν having exactly the meaning it has in οὐδέν. The phrase merely asserts the inverse of μηδέν δοξάζει, which has been denied.

<sup>2633</sup>οὐχ ἔν τι ἀλλὰ μηδέν (B12): The thought finds a way to express itself by etymologizing οὐδέν and μηδέν, as Democritus did when he said μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ἢ τὸ μηδέν (DK 68 B 156). Cf. also n.357.

<sup>2634</sup>Reading ḥρ' (C10) with Stallb., Adam, Shorey, and Slings, parallel with ḥρα below (C13) rather ḥρ' with Burnet and Chambry. The latter form does not sit well in first position nor combines well with οὖν.

<sup>2635</sup>ἐκτὸς τούτων (C10): With the new terms ἐκτός and the contradictories σαφηνεία and ἀσαφεία (soon improved upon by the comparative contraries σκοτωδέστερον / φανότερον [C13-14]) the loose conception of a pair of discrete entities separated by an in-between state or location is

clarity or exceeding ignorance in its obscurity?

“Neither.”

To the contrary<sup>2636</sup> in comparison with knowledge does opinion seem to you more obscure, whereas in comparison with ignorance more illuminated?

“Quite so.”

So it lies within the spectrum defined by these, and opining would lie between knowledge and ignorance. Yet earlier we said if that something came into view as both being and not being, this kind of thing would lie in between the purely existent and the completely non-existent,<sup>2637</sup> and that neither knowledge nor ignorance would apply to it but an ability that would come into view as likewise<sup>2638</sup> lying between those two.

“Yes.”

But what has now in fact come into view<sup>2639</sup> is that what lies between these two is the ability we call opining.

“Yes it has.”

So what remains for us to discover is what it is that has a share in both being and non-being and therefore cannot properly be referred to as purely being nor purely non-being, so that once it does come into view we will be able rightly to designate it as the opinable, and shall have assigned the extremes to the extreme abilities and the object in between to the in-between one.

“Quite right.”

Alright then, now that we have laid all this down and agreed to it,<sup>2640</sup> let the worthy<sup>2641</sup> fellow

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tightened into a tighter conception of a pair of termini defining a spectrum of finite length imposed upon an essentially infinite continuum extending in both directions beyond the pair, which, as outside them, completes a spatially exhaustive set. Anything that is can then be conceived of as being (1) between the two points represented by the pair, (2) being one of these two points, or (3) being located on portions of the continuum that extend beyond the pair in the one direction or the other. The spatial exhaustiveness of the continuum provides the basis for an *eliminatio*: if X is neither of the two points and is not beyond the two points then X must be between the two points. In a sense the entire argument assumes at least as much as it proves, but this is inherent in most *eliminationes*. The purpose is not proof but illumination.

<sup>2636</sup>ἀλλά (C13) used as at B12.

<sup>2637</sup>ἔφαμεν (D5): at 477A6-B1.

<sup>2638</sup>τὸ μεταξὺ αὐ φανέν (D8): the δύναμις correlated to the in-between object.

<sup>2639</sup>πέφανται (D11), the perfect representing a dialectical result (cf. n.210), after the supposititious φανέν (D8) and φανείη (D5) above.

<sup>2640</sup>τούτων δὴ ὑποκειμένων (E7): δὴ signals the reintroduction of the imaginary man as interlocutor. Reminders of what has been agreed to (as at 477A2-4, E4; 478A1,A12, C3, D5-11, E1 [λείποιτ' recalling the program set forth at 477A9-B1]; 479D7; 480A2 [μνημονεύομεν]) play a crucial role in πείθειν ἡρέμα (476E1), by making the conclusion ineluctable once it comes into view (ἀνάγκη, 479E6 and E9).

<sup>2641</sup>ὁ χρηστός (479A1): The nominative refers to the imaginary interlocutor in the third person, who was described at 476C2ff and subsequently impersonated by Glaucon for the sake of dialogue, at 476Eff. Socrates now brings him back into the conversation in order to remind Glaucon what his original position is by means of the extensive relative clause (A1-5). By calling him χρηστός, as well as

(479) converse with me and answer my questions, that man who refuses<sup>2642</sup> to consider beauty in itself or the vision<sup>2643</sup> of beauty itself which itself is there, invariant in time, invariant in its relations, and invariant in itself,<sup>2644</sup> but instead believes<sup>2645</sup> that beautiful things are many, this spectacle-lover who cannot abide<sup>2646</sup> anyone saying that the beautiful is one and the just is one and so on. Let him answer the following question: “So,<sup>2647</sup> my fine fellow, of these many beautiful things of yours could there be one that will not on occasion look ugly? Of the just things one that will not appear unjust? Of the pious one not impious?”<sup>2648</sup>

“No,” Glaucon answered.<sup>2649</sup> “To the contrary both beautiful and ugly they will necessarily seem, in themselves, and so on with the other attributes you asked about.”

And what about the many twice-as-much’s? Will they seem half-as-much any less than twice-as-much?<sup>2650</sup>

“No less.”

And the many larges and smalls and lights and heavies, I doubt they will be called by these names any more than by their opposites.

“No,” he answered. “They will forever go on having the one name and then the other.”

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now addressing him as ὁ ἄριστε (A5), Socrates marks the success of the conversation with him so far and reiterates his hope to learn something from this worthy man!

<sup>2642</sup>μηδεμίαν (A2), by its emphasis suggests not only the absence of belief but the refusal to believe.

<sup>2643</sup>ἰδέαν (A1) anticipates the use of φιλοθεάμων just below (A3). It designates a sight that the lover of sights will not be vouchsafed to see. Cf. the pregnant use of ιδεῖν (τὴν φύσιν τοῦ καλοῦ αὐτοῦ) at 476B7 right after χρόας καὶ σχήματα (B5).

<sup>2644</sup>ώσαύτως ἔχουσαν (A2-3): ἔχειν again avoiding equivocal or circular use of “is” (cf. 478A6, 477A6, and n.2615). The series of abstract qualifications (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὠσαύτως ἔχον, A2-3) resembles the one Socrates introduced in Book Four (ταύτὸν ... κατὰ ταύτὸν ... καὶ πρὸς ταύτὸν ... ἄμα, 436B8-9: cf. 436E9-7A1) when he formulated the “law of non-contradiction” so as to enable Glaucon to “perceive” that the soul’s aspects are independent of each other with that aspect of soul whose nature is likewise to be independent (cf. nn. 2098, 2100, 2102, 2104, and 2107). It appears elsewhere in Plato’s writings anytime Socrates talks about the “forms” (e.g., *Euthyphr.5D1-5; Phd.78C, Soph.248A, Tim.41D, 82B*, etc.).

<sup>2645</sup>νομίζει (A3) is repeated from 476C2-3. He brings the word back in order to say νόμιμα below (D4), by which he can refer back to 451A7. As the back-references reach further back we come closer to a major stop.

<sup>2646</sup>οὐδαμῆ ἀνεχόμενος (A4) describes a willful resistance due to more than just ignorance, preferring ignorance over bewilderment, confusion, wonder, or questioning.

<sup>2647</sup>γὰρ δή (A5) “arresting the attention” (Denniston, 243) of the man being addressed.

<sup>2648</sup>καλά, δίκαια, ὅσια (A6-8): The examples are repeated from 475E9-6A5, with a substitution of ὅσιον for ἀγαθόν, a natural doublet with δίκαιον (cf. n.105 ad 331A4). In the liberal manner of epagogic conversation overlap substitutions are more the rule than the exception (cf. n. 159).

<sup>2649</sup>Ἐφη (B1), not φήσει: Socrates reports the answer Glaucon gave on behalf of the imaginary interlocutor, complying with his request at 476E7-8, which he had just renewed with the third singular imperatives at 478E7-9A1.

<sup>2650</sup>Any doubling (of items) will look like a halving (of four times as many others); and yet these are contrary appearances.

Will one of these things ever be, any more than not be, any of the many things people say it is?

“It’s like those double-entendres people bring up at banquets,” he answered, “like that children’s riddle about the eunuch striking the bat, in which they ask with what, on what, what struck what.<sup>2651</sup> Things are ambiguous and it’s impossible to nail down with the mind whether they are both or neither.”<sup>2652</sup>

So do you have some way to deal with them? Or a finer<sup>2653</sup> place to put them than in between being and not being?<sup>2654</sup> After all they are not more obscure than the non-existent so as to appear more than non-existent, nor more obvious than the existent so as to be classed as more than existent.

“Absolutely<sup>2655</sup> true.”

We’ve found it then, it seems. Between the irreal and the purely real is where the many things the many believe in drift about—the conventional attitudes, that is, about beauty and the rest.<sup>2656</sup>

“Discovered we have.”

<sup>2651</sup> The scholiast repeats the riddle for us:

αἰνός τις ἔστιν ως ἀνήρ τε κ' οὐκ ἀνήρ  
ὅρνιθά τε κ'οὐκ ὅρνιθα ἴδων τε κ' οὐκ ἴδων  
ἐπὶ ξύλου τὲ κ' οὐ ξύλου καθημένην τε κ' οὐ καθημένην  
λίθῳ τὲ κ' οὐ λίθῳ βάλοι τὲ κ' οὐ βάλοι.

The scholiast fills in the blanks: a *eunuch* is and is not a man, the *bat* is and is not a bird, his *reed* is and is not a branch and his *pumice* is and is not a stone; but he does not explain the verbs but we can imagine he *saw* but did not *recognize*, and that he *threw* but missing failed to *peel*.

<sup>2652</sup>καὶ οὕτ’ εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι ... (C4-5): Glaucon, we must imagine, invents an answer very much in character for the lover of spectacles, which actually undermines the rationality of his position. The lover of spectacles takes the opportunity to entertain us with a witticism he picked up at one of the many parties he has gone to, while at the same time his expression *παγίως νοῆσαι* is an exaggeration that reveals a prejudice against a preoccupation with mental things.

<sup>2653</sup> καλλίω θέσιν (C7): Socrates chooses the adjective to appeal to the lover of τὰ καλά. The more natural expression would have been ὄρθωτέρων.

<sup>2654</sup> οὐσίας τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι (C7), the abstract noun used as equivalent to the infinitive εἶναι. A distinction between what something is and whether it exists is not needed to make sense of the argument, as Socrates indicates at the beginning (καὶ εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποῖμεν, 477A2).

<sup>2655</sup> ἀληθέστατα (D2): The “relativist” enthuses a superlative that his ideology really should have banned, and that, moreover, he has “absolutely” no right to use!

<sup>2656</sup> τῶν πολλῶν (D3): That the attitude of the φιλοθεάμων is commonplace was indirectly broached by the converse σπάνιοι (476B11); with τῶν πολλῶν Socrates states the fact directly, so that it becomes an axiom that can be repeated later (493E2-4A4). νόμιμα relies on the use of νομίζων at 476C2-3 and 479A3, and καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων relies on the typical list of “important” subjects done just above at 475E9-6A; but together these terms and their phrasing refer all the way back to the striking phrase καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων πέρι (451A7, cf. n.), where Socrates at the beginning of his defense against paradox had expressed reluctance to destabilize the conventional outlook. Given all this, the rather edgy and derogatory anaphora πολλῶν πολλά he uses here (D3) shows how far we have come over the last twenty five pages! For the anaphora cf. 576C3.

And we agreed in advance that once this thing-in-between came into view<sup>2657</sup> we had to call it the opinable and not the knowable, floating about<sup>2658</sup> in the in-between to be captured as it were by the in-between ability.

“We did so agree.”

Therefore about the spectators of the many beauties<sup>2659</sup> who have no vision at all of the beautiful nor any ability to follow another person trying to lead them to it, and of the many justices but never of justice itself and likewise with all the rest,<sup>2660</sup> we will say they opine everything but know not one of the things they opine.

“We are compelled<sup>2661</sup> to say so.”

But what shall we say in turn about those who contemplate the distinct individuals in themselves, invariant in time in their relations and in themselves, and fully real?<sup>2662</sup> Will we not say that they are knowing and not opining?

“We are compelled to say that, too.”

And also as to what they welcome and enjoy. For the latter persons it is the things (480) that knowing applies to, whereas for the former it is what opining applies to. Or have we forgotten that they loved and contemplated pretty sounds and pretty colors and the like, but as for beauty itself they could not even bear it somehow<sup>2663</sup> to exist on its own.

“We remember.”

So we would not be striking the wrong note to call them lovers of opinion or philodoxers rather than philosophers and lovers of wisdom. Will they be greatly offended by us if we say they are?<sup>2664</sup>

<sup>2657</sup> εἴ τι τοιοῦτον φανείη (D7), referring to 478D5-6: εἴ τι φανείη οἶον ἄμα ὅν τε καὶ μὴ ὅν.

<sup>2658</sup> πλανητόν (D9). For the idea cf. περιφερόμενον (402A9) and nn. 1584 and 2594. The metaphor will be repeated in the sequel (e.g. 484B6) with a slant toward its subjective application to the person who pays attention to things that wander, a subjective state broached at the end of Book Four (ταραχὴ καὶ πλάνη, 444B6-7); cf. also 586A3, 596E1, 602C12.

<sup>2659</sup> καλά (E1): That the particular many under scrutiny is the καλά rather than the ἀγαθά or the δίκαια (i.e., the other μέγιστα, to which, Socrates is careful to argue, the argument equally pertains) is no accident. In all it seems that the resistance of the φιλοθεάμων is not a hatred of metaphysics nor some scruples about the reasoning of an ontological proof, but a fear that his beauties will be taken away from him if he countenances beauty itself in his mind – in short, that he might be wakened from a pleasant dream (476CD).

<sup>2660</sup> The pair καλόν and δίκαιον generalized by πάντα (E1-3), expands upon καλοῦ τε πέρι which had been generalized by τῶν ἄλλων, above (D4; cf. n. 2656).

<sup>2661</sup> ἀνάγκη (E6 and 9): Glaucon recognizes the force of the argument -- i.e., the ὁμολογήματα and what their logic implies. The reminders (cf. n. 2640, *supra*) have done their job.

<sup>2662</sup> τοὺς αὐτὰ ἔκαστα θεωμένους καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ώσαύτως ὄντα (E7-8). The expression is brought forward from A1-3. Supply ἔχοντα with ώσαύτως. ὄντα (“fully real”) is new, and not merely attributive since there is no article.

<sup>2663</sup> τι (480A4) is adverbial with ως, not predicative with ὅν.

<sup>2664</sup> χαλεπαίνουσιν (A7) refers back to the imaginary interlocutor (476D8), but πλημμελήσομεν (A6) refers back to the point at the beginning of this Book, where Socrates expressed fear that defending the city in words against paradox might itself be an offense against his friends tantamount to manslaughter (Glaucon’s ἐάν τι πάθωμεν πλημμελές, 451B3).

“Not if they left it up to me,” Glaucon said. “After all, nobody is entitled<sup>2665</sup> to be offended by the truth.”

Therefore those who greet the real as it is in itself and in its own individuality must be called philosophers and not philodoxers.

“Completely right.”

## END OF BOOK FIVE

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<sup>2665</sup> With οὐ θέμις (A10) Glaucon points to a criterion of proper human behavior beyond the arena of interpersonal squabbling, as Socrates did at the beginning of this section (476D8-9 and nn.2606 and 2608). Themis is of course a much stronger force and sanction than “rights” could ever be (the latter concept barely exists in Greek) but these days it is exactly the claim of personal “rights” that rises to the lips of the man who feels resentment and takes offense. It is unlikely, in human affairs, that the others will in fact “leave it up to” Glaucon once they hear what he has to say or see it coming, no matter how gently he says it or how gradually it arrives. They will say instead, “Who are you to say?” Resentment overstates an empty hand instead of keeping quiet about it.

## BOOK SIX

Book Five began by interrupting the argument of Book Four in midstream; the break between Five and Six is less intrusive since it comes at a stopping point in the argument. With its first words Book Six looks back to the result reached in Book Five from a perspective independent enough from the argument that has just been made that it can remark as if upon reflection that the result there reached, namely, the identification of who the philosophers are, was reached with considerable difficulty.<sup>2666</sup> The personification with which Socrates here describes that process is striking: (484) “Those who are philosophers and those who are not<sup>2667</sup> has come into view only with great effort, and only after traversing a long path of argument.” His words suggest that the interlocutors (if they are still with him) have passed a hurdle.

Such a remark is not only apt but long overdue, since the entirety of Book Five was a digression brought on by a love for something less than wisdom, a love we are now able to describe as a love of opinion. Before the distinction between these loves had been made clear, Socrates had no basis for saying that questioning or worrying about the community of wives was wrongheaded; or, we may say, if he had said it, it would have fallen on deaf ears.<sup>2668</sup> Conversely, now that he has found what the philosopher is, he can go on to articulate what qualifies him to be king, namely the ability to keep the city's conventions close to truth.

Glaucon says a shorter path may not have been easier, a remark by which he thankfully acknowledges every bit of help Socrates has given him and every bit of correction we have seen him undergo and accept. It seems it would not have been easier, Socrates rejoins, “and more, I'd say that the point could have been made even clearer if this were the only question we needed to treat, and there weren't a host of other topics we have to go through, assuming we stick to our project of comparing the just life to the unjust.”<sup>2669</sup>

### D.3b: Qualifications of Philosopher to Rule

“What comes after this, then?”

What else is there than what comes next?<sup>2670</sup> If indeed the philosophers are the ones who are

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<sup>2666</sup> διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντες λόγου μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν (484A2), reading διεξελθόντες with F against the διεξελθόντος of ADM, which impossibly places the verb that governs διά plus genitive into the phrase it governs.

<sup>2667</sup> καὶ οἱ μή (A1): μή rather than οὐ to deny a characteristic rather than a fact (cf. Smyth §2734).

<sup>2668</sup> Thus though the distinction between philosophers and non-philosophers is only a few pages long (475E-480A), the crisis that required but also enabled the distinction to be drawn occupied the entirety of Book Five: whence Socrates's διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντες λόγου (A2). We shall see below several instances of Socrates making summary statements that make sense only on a deeper or more substantial level (cf. n.2694).

<sup>2669</sup> πολλὰ τὰ λοιπά (A6-7): The largeness of the task can only be taken to refer to plurality of types of vice and corresponding constitution (i.e., four each) that was brought into view at 449A.

<sup>2670</sup> τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν (B2): The formulas τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο and τὸ ἔξῆς announce that what comes after what we have just done will be the next thing, as this passage teaches us – a rule as irrefragable as Humpty Dumpty's rule that one should start at the beginning. The perfectly otiose remark merely reminds us that the structure of the conversation will continue in the next section: one person is speaker (or questioner) and the other is the listener (or answerer). But what, truly, does come next?

able to latch onto what is always the same in respect to itself and invariant, while those who are unable to do this but wander without an anchor<sup>2671</sup> among the plurality of things<sup>2672</sup> that take on all sorts of states<sup>2673</sup> are not philosophers, the next question is, Which of the two types must be the leaders of the city?

“How would a prudent discussion of that question be framed?”

By asking which of the two groups seems able to guard and preserve the laws and practices of cities, and then to argue for appointing this group as the guards. But isn’t this much already obvious? Is it the blind man or the man with good vision who ought to serve as guard, no matter what he is to guard? And yet how different from blind men are people who are really destitute of any cognition of the reality of things, who have in their souls no clear idea which they can use as a standard, who are unable to look off as painters do to their object as it is and compare from moment to moment what they are painting with what they see and look off to, in its every detail, so as to formulate laws and conventions here among men about the most important matters—the beautiful and the just and the good<sup>2674</sup>—or else to guard and preserve such laws if they are already set down?

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In hindsight we can see the sequence of prior and posterior (*Soph.*257A, *Phlb.*34C), but the view forward is empty because the future does not yet exist. The topic will become thematic in the “sequence of studies” of Book Seven. Meanwhile, the formulas of “after” and “next” are used in three kinds of circumstances:

(1) The conversation already has an underlying sequence of topics known to both speaker and audience, so that the speaker says “Next, ...” only to indicate that he has finished a topic in the sequence, which thereupon becomes the “previous” topic (*Rep.*580D2, the five regimes; *Rep.*526C9, geometry comes after arithmetic in a background list of four studies: cf. nn.3346 and 3365; *Polit.*257B9).

(2) The speaker justifies a transition to his own next topic by arguing *ad hoc* that it belongs next (*Rep.*528B1: stereometry comes next after geometry just as three dimensions comes next after two – even though stereometry does not exist! (cf. n.3376), *Leg.*796E4, ‘if that was gymnastic, music would come next;’ *Tim.*72E1: ‘what we’ve treated has to do with soul so next would be to treat the body.’)

(3) In the most important use by far, the speaker postpones to take the step he next wants to take by calling it τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο without saying what it is, so as to confirm that the interlocutor agrees with what he has just said (*Phlb.*42C5), especially when it will now serve as the basis or principle for asserting something unforeseen or controversial (*Crito* 49E3; *Euthyd.*279A1; *Gorg.*454C1, 494E1ff [έχόμενα]; *Leg.*782D7; *Phdo* 100C3; *Phlb.*29C6; *Prot.*355A5).

<sup>2671</sup> ἐφάπτεσθαι (B5): “catching hold” of stable beings stabilizes the self, whereas being among the variables sets it adrift (πλανώμενοι): cf. 479D9. and 485B2.

<sup>2672</sup> ἐν πολλοῖς (B5): more exactly, among things in their mode as “many’s,” rather than as they always are, on their own terms (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα, B4).

<sup>2673</sup> παντοίως ὕσχουσιν (B5) The apparatus of Burnet reads as follows: παντοίως F [ut vid.] : γρ. παντοίως in marg. D : πάντως A [sed in marg. τοίως A] D M). I read παντοίως, “taking on various states” as opposed to holding in the same state (ώσαύτως ἔχοντος, B4). For ὕσχειν in this sense cf. 411C6, D3. The main warrant for reading παντοίως with the modern editors over the more widely attested πάντως of ADM is the quantity/quality doublet that παντοίως completes, after πολλοῖς.

<sup>2674</sup> τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν (D1-2), referring to 479D3-4 (but echoing also the list at 451A7: cf. n.2279). The received opinions (νόμοιμα) about the most important topics, which Socrates had there been reluctant to undermine among non-philosophers who were raising philodoxic concerns, have now become the province of philosopher-kings, who now and long since have come into view, to adjust as necessary and to maintain. What has brought them into view is

“By Zeus the analogy is very clear.”

Shall it be these then that we would sooner appoint<sup>2675</sup> or else those who come fully equipped<sup>2676</sup> with a cognition of what each thing is, as long as they give up nothing to the former group in experience nor fall behind them in any part<sup>2677</sup> of virtue, besides?

“Strange it would be to select anyone other than these, provided as you say that they fall nowhere short in the other ways, since their excellence in the one matter makes the greatest individual contribution to their superiority.”<sup>2678</sup>

(485) Then let's argue how the same people could have both. As we said at the beginning of our discussion of this matter<sup>2679</sup> we must first ascertain what their inner nature is. Once we agree sufficiently about this I think we will go on to agree that this one group will be able to have both so that we won't need anybody else to be the city's leaders.

Let us set it down as agreed that persons of the philosophical nature always desire learning any lesson that sheds light<sup>2680</sup> on the kind of reality that always is, that is not consigned to wander<sup>2681</sup> according to the ravages of coming to be and passing away;<sup>2682</sup> and set down also that they are in love with all of it and would not willingly lose any part of it small or large, more or less honorable,<sup>2683</sup> just as we had said before<sup>2684</sup> about the lovers of honor and about the erotics.<sup>2685</sup>

just the empirical fact that in some men there is to be found a love of wisdom which the objects of opinion cannot satisfy. The love implies the existence of its proper object; and the existence of that proper object becomes the criterion for whatever truth the rest (the νόμιμα) can have.

Adam, *ad loc.*, by an unconscious conversion imagines the philosopher calling truth down “from Heaven to Earth by assimilating it to the earthly canons:” confusion of original and copy is a common slip under the influence of metaphysical enthusiasm.

<sup>2675</sup>στησόμεθα (D5), from καθιστάναι (B10), with the usual omission of prefix (n.1532).

<sup>2676</sup>ἐγνωκότας (D5), answering the perfect ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως (C7).

<sup>2677</sup>Ἐν ὅλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ὀρετῆς (D7): The traditional quadripartition (cf. n.105) is suggested: ὅλῳ is adverbial.

<sup>2678</sup>τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ (E9): His answer has some subtlety. To be equal in all else but superior in the one makes them choiceworthy even if there are others equal in all else but superior in some other attribute, since of all the desired attributes this philosophical attribute makes the greatest individual difference (μεγίστῳ a dative of degree of difference).

<sup>2679</sup>Ἐλέγομεν (485A4), imperfect of citation (n.586), refers to 374E7-8: ποῖαι φύσεις ἐπιτήδειαι εἰς πόλεως φυλακήν.

<sup>2680</sup>Δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας (B1-2): The genitive with δηλοῖ is a categorical partitive, like the one with κινήσειν at 445E1. Cf. 365A6, 375E1-2, 389C6, 399E11, 515D2, 544D6, 572A2, 576D7 with n.1129; Riddell, *Digest* §26; Smyth §1441.

<sup>2681</sup>Οὐσίας ... μὴ πλανομένης (B2), the wandering of the object, corresponding to the subjective wandering (πλανόμενοι) of οἱ μὴ φιλόσοφοι, at 484B6. Cf. n.2681.

<sup>2682</sup>γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς (B2-3): The formulation perhaps owes something to the “philosophers” of Ionia. It seems we are moving into a new kind of conversation: cf. n.2668.

<sup>2683</sup>ἀτιμοτέρου (B6) recalls the advice of Parmenides to the young Socrates (*Parm.* I30C5-E3). Cf. also οὗτ' ἐν σμικρῷ οὔτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἡτιμάζομεν, 402A9-B1.

<sup>2684</sup>Ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν (B7): i.e., 474C8-475A2.

<sup>2685</sup>περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν (B7-8): The reference is to 474C8-475B10. The ἐρωτικοί are lovers of boys: again the erotic vocabulary denotes something specific with a general term

“Right.”

We must next ask whether this, too, necessarily follows given their nature, a general freedom from falsehood and an unwillingness to countenance or commune with falsehood, or whether they hate falsehood and embrace truthfulness.<sup>2686</sup>

“Seems likely.”

Well it's not just likely but necessary<sup>2687</sup> that the man with an erotic bent greets with joy anything that is related to his darling<sup>2688</sup> or is akin to him. Can you point to anything as akin to wisdom as truth would be?

“But how could I?”

So then could one and the same man be by nature a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?

“No way.”

So the man who really is a lover of learning must by his nature yearn for any and all truth, even from childhood. And yet we know that a person whose desires tilt him toward some one thing tends to have desires far weaker for everything else, as though the channels had all been diverted away from them. So for a person whose desires have all been channeled into studies and everything involved with them, all his desires would have to do with the pleasures the soul enjoys by herself and on her own terms, and would desert the pleasures that come through the body, if he were not a makeshift<sup>2689</sup>

(cf. 474D7 and n.). The items are recalled in reverse order (φιλότιμοι, 475A9-BB2; ἐρώτικοι, 474D4-475A2), forming a “chiasm of before and after” (for which cf. n. 18).

<sup>2686</sup> τὴν ἀψευδίαν ... (C3-4): Truthfulness was given similar prominence in the first paideia (389B2ff), where again it was ranked alongside the canonical virtues. Cf. n. 1345.

<sup>2687</sup> πᾶσα ἀνάγκη (C6), not just εἰκός. Here and throughout the passage Socrates insists on the attributes as natural correlates of the essential character of the philosopher discovered at the end of Book Five, as his summary at 490D6-7 shows (esp. ἀληθῶς, φύσιν, and ἐξ ἀνάγκης). He expresses these essentially logical relations in a variety of ways, more and less colorful (ἀεί, Β1; ἀνάγκη ... ἐν τῇ φύσει, Β10; μηδαμῆ προσδέχεσθαι, C3; φύσει, C7; δυνατόν ... φύσιν ... οὐδαμῶς C12-D2; τῷ ὅντι ... δεῖ, D3; ἀληθῶς, E1; even προσήκει, E5, refers not to propriety but essential correlation; φύσιν, 486A2; ἐναντιώτατον, A4; ὑπάρχει, A8; οἶόν τε, A9; τοιοῦτος, Β1; φύσει ... ἀληθινῆς, Β3; ἔσθ' ὅπῃ, Β7; συγγενῆ, D7; φύσει, D1; αὐτοφυές, D11; and climactically, ἀναγκαῖα ... καὶ ἐπόμενα ἀλλήλοις, E1-2, and φύσει, 487A3) His method throughout is an instance of what he called κατ’ εἴδη διαιρεῖσθαι τὸ λεγόμενον at 454A6.

<sup>2688</sup> παιδικῶν (C8). Though generic in sense ἐρωτικός tends in to be specific in use (whence τὸν φιλόπαιδα καὶ ἐρωτικόν [474D5: cf.n. *ad loc.*], and cf. how του may be presumed to be masculine at 607E4), resembling in this the term ποίησις (Socrates draws the comparison in *Symp.*205BD). Conversely τὰ παιδικά, which is the desired object of an ἐρωτικός in the specific sense, is here made to stand for the object of ἐρωτικός in general. We can class the figure as a synecdoche (specific for universal), and compare ἀγωνία at *Leg.*764D3 (cf.D5 and Engl. on ἀθλητής *ad loc.*); βέλος at *Leg.*873E6-9; γηράσκειν at *Tht.*181D1 (if it stands for ἀπόλλυσθαι: cf. *Tim.*82B6-7); δικαιοσύνη when used as the genus of virtue as e.g. at *Leg.*957E2-3; ἐκβάλλειν at *Polit.*309A2-3; παρασκευή at *Rep.*495A7-8. The use of φιλαρία as a genus, at *Gorg.*490C8-9, *Phdo.*66C3, and *Symp.*211E1-4, as well as of παγκρατιαστική at *Euthyd.*272A5, ἀναλίσκειν at *Rep.* 420A5, φιλοπραγμοσύνη at *Rep.*549C4-5, are instances of “specious genus” used for satire, a different matter altogether. Compare also *Phdrs.*229E1. Synecdoche and metonymy appears to be a special affectation of the erotic vocabulary.

<sup>2689</sup> πεπλασμένως (D12) is the relevant opposite to ἀληθῶς in the present context, since the truth of the philosopher's orientation is being sought in his underlying nature, while πλάττειν is the specific term for producing something out of a raw material that is malleable. Conversely, in the

philosopher but a philosopher in truth.

“That is highly inevitable.”<sup>2690</sup>

Temperate, in truth, this sort of man would be, and completely uninterested in money.<sup>2691</sup> The purposes for which money and large expenditure<sup>2692</sup> are taken seriously are more fit for others than him to take seriously.

“Just so.”

(486) And here is another thing you must keep in mind if you are going to judge which is the philosophical type and which isn’t.<sup>2693</sup> Be on the watch to detect any trace of illiberality. There is no place at all for a fixation on paltry details<sup>2694</sup> in a soul that will end up dedicating itself to the pursuit of the larger wholes<sup>2695</sup> of meaning attaching to the world that men share with the gods.

“Quite true.”

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context of imitating the divine model rather than the human, the philosophic type becomes mere clay (500B1-D8, n.b. πλάττειν, D5).

<sup>2690</sup>μεγάλη ἀνάγκη (E2): Glaucon echoes Socrates’s πᾶσα ἀνάγκη (C6), by which he acknowledges that he has accepted the correction of his original answer, εἰκός (B5-8).

<sup>2691</sup>φιλοχρήματος (E3): After the things of the body (D12), brought forward by the virtue of temperance (E3), come the *things of the things of the body*, the third category of goods (χρήματα).

<sup>2692</sup>χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης (E4). For μετά in enumeration introducing a distinct idea as though it were merely, or primarily, a qualification of one of the others, cf. 431C5-6, 591B5 and B6; and Leg.630A8-B2, 661D6-E1, 693D8-E1, 906A7-8; Phlb.15A6-7. The resulting phrase is an hendiadys.

<sup>2693</sup>Again φύσις (486A2) is used in synecdoche for the man, to indicate the “essentialism” of the argument (cf. 485A10, B12). φύσις is like an immanent Platonic Idea if such there could be. Note that the attributes being assembled can be conceived of as implications of his philosophical nature and also as criteria for knowing whether he is truly philosophical.

<sup>2694</sup>σμικρολογία (A6): The λόγος-etymon momentarily has to do with calculation rather than the kind of philosophical reasoning Socrates goes on to praise. The comparison he is drawing between common human personality traits (of the sort that Theophrastus makes his subject in the *Charakteres* – e.g. σμικρολογία, μεγαλοπρέπεια [*infra* A8], and ἀλαζονεία [*infra* B7]) and the life of the philosopher, suggests that the two types of men are living in two separate worlds.

<sup>2695</sup>ὅλου καὶ παντός (A5) another emphatic doublet in quality and quantity (cf. 445B6, 469C3, 527C7; Alc. I, 109B8; Crat.434A1; Leg.734E2, 779B6, 808A6-7; Phdo.79E3-4; Tht.174A1) common as an epideictic pleonasm, though in the present context a new meaning for such terms as “whole” and “all” is coming into view, to which the romantic enthusiasms of Goethe or Longinus, here often quoted, are but pallid parallels. Hippias the Sophist is made to use just these highsounding abstractions to complain about Socrates’s dialectical “σμικρολογία:” τὰ ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς (H.Maj.301B2: compare his strange expression thereunder, μεγάλα ... καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα, B6-7, and H.Min.369B8-C2), ἀλλά ... τί οἴει ταῦτα εἶναι συνάπαντα (304A4-5), and τὸ ὅλον (288E7). Cf. his showy use of the term ὄμόφυλα, DK86B6.

So the kind of mind that has magnanimity in its nature<sup>2696</sup> of a sort that seeks to behold<sup>2697</sup> all of time and all of reality, can such a one find human life to be of much consequence?

“Impossible.”

And will such a man find death to be something alarming?<sup>2698</sup>

“Least of all men.”

So it seems the timid and illiberal type could have no share in the true love of wisdom.

“I judge he could not.”

So what shall we say? A man graceful and indifferent to wealth, neither illiberal nor boastful<sup>2699</sup> nor fearful—is there any way he could be hard to do business with or be unjust?<sup>2700</sup>

“There is not.”

But keep in mind all through<sup>2701</sup> your investigation whether a given soul is philosophic or not, to examine whether from his very youth<sup>2702</sup> his soul was just and calm rather than uncongenial and rash.

“Quite so.”

And further, I'd guess you won't leave this out ...

“What?”

Whether it finds learning easy or burdensome.<sup>2703</sup> Can you anticipate that a person could properly love something, if the doing of it gives him pain and if he achieves only a small success even with difficulty?

“That couldn't happen.”

And next imagine he can't keep hold of what he has learned, full as he is of forgetfulness. Is there

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<sup>2696</sup> ὑπάρχειν (A8), of characteristics inherent in or due to the thing's nature, used likewise of the guardians' nature at 376C7. διανοίᾳ is the antecedent “incorporated” into its relative clause, placed, as usual, at the end and without article (Smyth, §2536). It stands in metonymy for the philosopher (as φύσις has [485A10, B12, 486A2] and ψυχή will [486B10]), whence it is picked up by masc. τούτῳ in the next line.

<sup>2697</sup> θεωρίᾳ (A8) reinterprets the commonplace μεγαλοπρέπεια to specify the way it appears in the philosopher. We are, indeed, moving into a different universe of discourse (cf. n. 2682).

<sup>2698</sup> δεινόν (B1): His love of wisdom warranted that he is in touch with truth and that he will be wise, if anybody can be; next, and therefore, he is truthful, and temperate (the second of the cardinal virtue), and magnanimous. Now the third cardinal virtue, bravery, is introduced. The contrapositive is then adduced (B3-4), with a typical chiasm of before and after (first bravery then magnanimity): cf. n. 18.

<sup>2699</sup> ἀλαζών (B7): The term is new; it represents the opposite of ἀψεύδεια (cf. 490A1-3).

<sup>2700</sup> δυσσύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος (B7): Thus we reach the great fourth cardinal virtue, δικαιοσύνη, by a path very different from the one we took in Book Four. Here it appears in a commonplace meaning, as the antonym for δυσκοινώνητος and δυσσύμβολος, for which cf. the discussion between Socrates and Polemarchus back in Book One (333AB) and nn. 173 and 188.

<sup>2701</sup> καὶ τοῦτο (B10) idiomatic (as 419A3 and 420A2; Crito 50A1-2; cf. Smyth §947).

<sup>2702</sup> εὐθὺς νέου ὅντος (B10-11) like εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου (D3-4) guarantees that the attributes are there by nature. Cf. Glaucon's argument at 441A7-B1.

<sup>2703</sup> ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι ... (C3-5) bringing forward the argument of 475B11-C8.

any way he would not be empty of knowledge?

“You’ll have to tell me how.”

But if his efforts are profitless don’t you think that in the end he will be forced into the position of hating both himself and this kind of activity? So that we can conclude that having a forgetful soul disqualifies a person from being included among those we count adequate for philosophy:<sup>2704</sup> rather let us seek a soul that necessarily has<sup>2705</sup> a good memory. And also wouldn’t we assert that the unmusical and graceless element can only drag a person toward immoderation? And yet truth or honesty is akin not to the immoderate but the moderate, so that in addition to the other things we will seek a mind both moderate and graceful in its nature, in the sense that its inner nature will be supple enough to approach the vision of reality and truth.

Wouldn’t you say that each and all these attributes we have now gone through are necessary and<sup>2706</sup> work hand in hand for a soul to get an adequate and entire grasp<sup>2707</sup> on reality and truth?

(487) “Quite necessary indeed.”

And so is there a way for you to bad-mouth a pursuit<sup>2708</sup> for which a person would be unfit if he

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<sup>2704</sup> ἐγκρίνειν (D2), reminiscent of the inclusion and exclusion of poets and their poems from Book Two (377C1 and n.1145).

<sup>2705</sup> δεῖν (D2): cf. n.2687.

<sup>2706</sup> οὐκ (E1), after μή (per Smyth §2651d) negates not the “whole sentence” (i.e. it doesn’t negate διεληλύθαμεν), but the “single words” ἀναγκοῖς and ἐπόμενα: “Don’t [μή] tell me they aren’t [οὐ] necessary and aren’t [οὐ] interdependent... .”

<sup>2707</sup> With μεταλήψεσθαι (E3), the language of participation that has described (e.g. μετέχειν, 476D1-2) and will describe the “objective” relation between the manys and the ones from which they have their identity (i.e., μετεῖναι, μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν), appears already in the description of the soul’s “subjective” relations, both to these same “ones” that are the true objects of her knowledge (the opposite being στερεῖσθαι, 484C7) and to the virtues that enable her to know them (μετεῖναι, 486B4; μετέχειν, 486A4, μεταλαμβάνειν, 486E3).

<sup>2708</sup> ἐπιτήδευμα (487A2): Philosophy has become a “pursuit” and we should be careful to delimit just how and in what sense. “Philosophy” first appeared as a personal type (adjective) and as an activity (verb) in the same sentence (473C11-D3). The very use of the terms, as yet undefined, caused a stir (473E6-A4). The definition that then ensued focussed on a personal disposition or nature rather than any activity (474B6-C2), identifying that disposition as an erotic orientation toward knowledge and learning (474C8-475C8). Glaucon thought this description included too many types of people (475D1-E2), and the meaning of the personal term was then narrowed by an extraordinary distinction between fixed reality and fluid reality as the proper objects of the erotic orientation in question (475E5-480A, the end of Bk. Five), which in the course of the drawing became involved with belief in, as well as the ability to reach, that proper object (476B7-8, C2-3, 477C1ff, etc.). This ability and desire then (Bk. Six, init.) became the definitive personal characteristic of the “philosopher” (δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, 484D2-3) and his suitability to rule was to be studied by an investigation into the natural requisites (φύσις) of this ability and desire as it appears in individuals (who could therefore be called, by synecdoche, φιλόσοφοι φύσεις, 485A10). It was then seen that the standard maniples of conventional virtues were all prerequisites and helpmates to this ability and to this desire, in the course of which the very attempt to reach the proper object, with which the φιλόσοφος was by definition preoccupied, could be referred to as a πρᾶξις (486C10-11, from πράττοι, C4), an activity that a person lacking the prerequisite nature would hate rather than love to do, in contrast with a person equipped with the prerequisite nature, who would thereby be able, through this activity (πρᾶξις), to capture something of his proper object (μεταλήψεσθαι, 486E3). The activity and its

lacked any of these qualities deep in his makeup: good memory, quickness at learning, magnanimity, grace, and a friendly kinship with truth, with justice, with bravery, and with temperance?<sup>2709</sup>

“Even Momus would find it beyond cavil.”<sup>2710</sup>

Therefore once people with this inborn nature have finished their education and reached an appropriate age,<sup>2711</sup> would it not be into their hands alone that you would put the management of the city?<sup>2712</sup>

Before Glaucon can answer Socrates's question, Adeimantus interrupts.

### D.3c: Objection of Adeimantus: Philosopher is Useless or Vicious

It is Adeimantus's fourth interruption. The first one came near the beginning of Book Two, when Socrates was about to respond to his brother's speech about injustice; the second at the beginning of Book Four just after Socrates and Glaucon had reached their hugely important consensus about the guards' regime; the third at the beginning of Book Five, at the behest of Polemarchus, just after Socrates and Glaucon had reached their hugely important agreement about the inwardness of justice. This fourth interruption comes just before Glaucon can agree with Socrates on the large decision that the philosophers are after all the people most fit to rule (484B8-487A8). This time his brother's interruption pre-empts him from registering his agreement.

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purpose having been revealed, the philosopher's activity can be now referred to as an ἐπιτήδευμα, and distinguished from other activities in pursuit of other ends (as e.g., at 489C9-10).

<sup>2709</sup> φίλος τε καὶ συγγενῆς (A4-5) is a “shell entry” in the enumeration. It presents itself as the next item but in truth serves only to create, syntactically, a new *phase* in the list so as to emphasize the fact that the four μέρη ἀρετῆς desiderated at the beginning (484D7) have indeed been found in the φύσις of the philosopher, by now presenting them side by side as dependent genitives. For another such shell-entry, cf. Leg.764C8-D3 (ἐπιμελείας). Related and almost indistinguishable is the sudden move up to a genus in an enumeration of species, down from which a further series of species is then hung, as at Gorg.517D6-E2 (δημιουργόν); Leg.743D2-4 (χρηματισμόν: note that πολύν amplifies it so it can embrace several types); Polit.299E1-2 (σύμπασαν ἀριθμητικήν); Prot.354A4-6 (τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ιατρῶν θεραπείας).

<sup>2710</sup> Μῶμος (A6). Envy strictly attaches not to the occupation but the person who holds it, though of course it can twist itself any way it has to. The occupation of the philosopher as now described requires so much in an individual that people who lack it cannot even imagine how to imitate those who have it. Why else would Momus, who found fault even with the gods, fall silent? The theme returns with a vengeance, at 500D1-2 (with n.2944).

<sup>2711</sup> παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ (A7-8): The φύσις of the philosophical type will of course need παιδείᾳ and ἡλικίᾳ before he can receive the office of rule. That Socrates mentions these does not (pace J.-C.) “introduce” a treatment of the philosopher's education, which will in fact begin at page 502, but only indicates we have finished treating the φύσις. What made the treatment complete is the discovery that this φύσις is naturally virtuous, and thus satisfies the second supplementary criterion mentioned at 484D6-7.

<sup>2712</sup> μόνοις ὃν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις (A8): Socrates's question unexpectedly braves the paradox of the philosopher king, which had originally met with more than Momus's grumbling (473E6-474A4) but no less irrationality. To the extent that envy wishes to deny the truth of the fact it cannot stand to face, it has trouble articulating itself in words. What words it uses must defy speech and logic or make speech impossible and logic impotent (as we saw in the behavior of Thrasymachus), unless of course certain actions are taken that make talk unnecessary!

"I'll answer for him, Socrates. Nobody could gainsay what you have said, the way you have said it at least."<sup>2713</sup> Let me tell you the reason. The sort of argument you have now made<sup>2714</sup> always has a certain effect on people.<sup>2715</sup> They get the sense, due to their relative unfamiliarity with your method of question and answer and the way they are being led along bit by bit by each question, that once the small steps are all added together a great reversal takes place and a conclusion is reached quite opposite to what they believed in the beginning.<sup>2716</sup> Just as those who aren't clever at checkers end up being blocked from moving by those who are, so in the end people think they are blocked from making any move in this other sort of game you play, your game not of checkers but of arguments -- though all the while there is no more reason to take it your way than not.<sup>2717</sup>

"The present instance is a perfect example. Someone might very well say to you that although his

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<sup>2713</sup>πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα (B1): With μέν Adeimantus already limits the scope of his assent. Momus, it would appear, has not been silenced after all. Shorey characteristically interprets out the drama of Adeimantus's interruption of Socrates, by suavely assuring us that the interruption is "a *locus classicus* for Plato's (*sic*) anticipation of objections," as though Plato were arguing with persons who are not present, rather than Socrates with persons who are.

<sup>2714</sup>ἐκάστοτε ἂν νῦν λέγεις (B3): a generalization (ἐκάστοτε) attached to a specific (νῦν), which led Adams to imagine that Adeimantus is complaining about a specific argument on the inherent virtue of the philosopher that the historical Socrates "made all the time." But ἂν is adverbial (as ὅ in ὅ λέγεις often is). Adeimantus complains about a kind of Socratic argument that leads a person on in small sideways steps, which Shorey (ad 349D [Loeb 1.88 note a]) citing Jevons calls "substitution of similars." The so-called "affinity" argument in the *Phaedo* (78B-84B) with its table of opposites is a parallel case (cf. also Leg.889D3-4 and 6, 898A8-B8; Rep.401A1-8; Tim.28Aff, 51D3-2B7). Euthyphro's complaint that Socrates makes his own thesis move before his eyes (11AB) and Meno's confession that Socrates's arguments leave him stunned (80AB) are resorts to imagery, but Adeimantus's complaint appears to be far more logical in its formulation (the image of the board game is logical not emotional). In essence he is accusing Socrates of contriving a sorites, but soon enough we see that the original thesis, away from which the victim has putatively been led, had not after all been a thesis but a plain fact of observation: Adeimantus abandons his methodological quibble by trumping it with the more derisive charge that Socrates can't see what's happening around him.

<sup>2715</sup>οἱ ἀκούοντες (B3). Adeimantus's previous interruption was also on behalf of unnamed persons (419A2), while his second was spurred by Polemarchus, who grabbed him by the cloak from behind (449B1-B7), and whom he soon acquiesced to join, using a first plural (ἡμῖν, C2). We may well wonder, Why does Adeimantus not speak in his own person? Does he think he can? What he would say if he did? and Who actually does he think he is? We should keep in mind that what particularly peeved him about Socrates's portrait of the rulers was that they would be liable to the charge of not having more when it was in their power to take more (καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἔσαντούς, 419A3). We also may just be reminded of the asymmetry with which the dialogue began, the one brother accompanying Socrates (i.e. Glaucon: 327A1) and the other (this one) accompanying Polemarchus (327C1) who had there caused Socrates similarly to be grabbed by the cloak from behind and brought to a halt (327B4).

<sup>2716</sup>ἀναφαίνεσθαι (B7): The unnamed persons generalize their experience with the present (cf. ἀποκλείεσθαι below, C1). Adeimantus says παραγόμενοι (487B5), brought along with him, but he means ἀπαγόμενοι, led away from their original opinion, as the verb is used at Phdr.262B6. By condescending to defend the naive answerer he buys an opportunity to take pot-shots at the clever questioner, a behavior characteristic of him (cf. n.788 and D8-9 below with n. 2726).

<sup>2717</sup>οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτη ἔχειν (C3-4): I take οὐδέν μᾶλλον as a brachylogy (n.357) and ταύτη in its second person sense. For a fuller statement of the οὐδέν μᾶλλον trope cf. Lys.220A1-3 (πολλάκις λέγομεν ὅτι ... ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἔχει), and Gorg.464B1, Meno 78E6, Soph.233B4.

reason cannot produce answers to contradict the sequence of questions you have put to him, nevertheless he can plainly see in fact<sup>2718</sup> that of all the people who are attracted to philosophy<sup>2719</sup>—not those that quit after having done it in their youth for the sake of general culture but those who stay on and pursue it more deeply—the majority become weirdoes<sup>2720</sup> if not, frankly, perfect scoundrels, whereas the few that seem quite decent, suffer a reversal by this study, which you recommend nevertheless,<sup>2721</sup> and are rendered quite useless to their cities.”<sup>2722</sup>

Socrates tells us<sup>2723</sup> he heard him out, and then replied, And do you think the people who say this<sup>2724</sup> are deceived?

“How do I know? I'm eager to hear your opinion<sup>2725</sup> on the matter.”

<sup>2718</sup> ἔργῳ δὲ ὄραν (C6): Adeimantus blandly presumes with his imaginary objector that what a person “sees in fact” is *eo ipso* sufficient to gainsay what one was compelled to agree to in argument (λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν … ἐναντιούσθαι, C5), despite the fact that fifteen minutes ago his brother and Socrates had agreed that the common presumption that ἔργον trumps λόγος was something they would have to leave behind (473A1-3, where *n.b.* κἀντι εἰ μή τῷ δοκεῖ), and despite the analysis that this agreement led them to, by which sight was demoted to a rank below thought and the φιλοθεάμων as essentially a philodoxer was excluded from the company of the philosophers (475D-480A).

<sup>2719</sup> ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὄρμήσαντες (C6-7) suggests an erotic element (compare the idiom *ἱέναι ἐπί* meaning to woo) that ἀψάμενοι, “taking up,” (C7) lacks. Though truth and being have been subject matters in the conversation, philosophy as a subject matter or a branch of learning or an occupation to “take up” has not. Adeimantus has plunged us into a realm of discourse already populated by something called “philosophers,” though we do not yet know whether a person is a philosopher because he loves wisdom, or loves wisdom because he is a philosopher. Since he presents his opinion as patently true and needing no argument we must assume not only that (1) he is relying on a commonplace or doxic definition of philosophy or philosophers, probably the sort of thing that had elicited the strong reaction from Glaucon when Socrates announced the philosophers would have to become kings (it is certainly not the extraordinary definition Socrates and Glaucon just reached), but also that (2) the image of such “philosophers” as being ἀλλόκοτοι, or παμπόνηροι, or ἄχρηστοι ἐπιεικεῖς has some recognizable meaning to his audience.

<sup>2720</sup> On ἀλλόκοτος (D2) see Appendix 2. It expresses an enervated embarrassment about how to react to someone else's behavior, its own meaning being hard to pin down since embarrassment at first courts the option of expressing vague disapproval in hopes that the audience will feel the same way. When push comes to shove condemnation is not far behind (as here, ίνα μὴ παμπονήρους, D2-3), while on the other hand a person less mild will cut to the chase immediately, as Calicles does on the same subject in the *Gorgias* (484C5-6D1) and Crito's counselors, at the end of the *Euthydemus*, want him to do (304D4-6D1). Adeimantus is of a wavering disposition; Crito as we learn from his dialogue is still more so. In the *Sophist* Socrates gives an objective statement of the doxic attitude (δόξαν παράσχοιντ' ἀν ώς ἔχοντες μανικῶς, 216D1-2).

<sup>2721</sup> ὅμως τοῦτο γε ... πάσχοντας (D3-4): Their promise (δοκοῦντας) of usefulness is undermined by the effect of the study (πάσχοντας). τοῦτο points forward to the next participial phrase, which properly should have been a noun phrase in the infinitive, but by the time Adeimantus gets there he wants to describe the outcome with the perceptual participle in order to continue his contrast between the anticipation of thought and factual outcome in front of one's eyes.

<sup>2722</sup> ταῖς πόλεσι (D5): The plural advertises the claim as being supported by empirical observation.

<sup>2723</sup> καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας (D6). Socrates indicates to us that he took a deep breath: cf. n. 1185.

<sup>2724</sup> τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας (D6): Socrates generalizes Adeimantus's anonymous τις into a plural.

<sup>2725</sup> τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν (D8). In the context of the last few pages Adeimantus's casual and unthinking

You'd hear<sup>2726</sup> that by my lights they're speaking the truth.

"Then how can it be right to say that the cities will no sooner cease from their troubles until the philosophers rule in them, when we have agreed they are useless<sup>2727</sup> to them?"

### D.3c. I: Response of Socrates: Uselessness

The question you ask calls for<sup>2728</sup> an answer in the form of a fable.

"And you just hate<sup>2729</sup> to tell fables."

So in addition to forcing an answer on me hard to prove, you also make a joke at my expense.

(488) Be that as it may, hear now my fable. You can enjoy watching me struggle<sup>2730</sup> with the genre. The experience of the "people quite decent" whom you adduce, and what is in store for them in their cities, is as harsh a thing as there ever was. To do it justice and explain their plight requires that I assemble many elements into one story, the way a painter paints a goat-stag or another such mixture into a single object.<sup>2731</sup> Conceive the following sort of thing took place,<sup>2732</sup> whether on many ships or

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use of δοκοῦν (D8) reveals a measure of unreflective philodoxy, as does his characteristic mix of gratuitous deference and presumptuousness. Moreover, σοί is emphatic. Socrates finally calls him on his reluctance to own up to his own δόξα but still he does not notice.

<sup>2726</sup>ἀκούοις ἀν (D10) gently mocking Adeimantus's smooth ήδεως ἀν ἀκούοιμι.

<sup>2727</sup>ἀχρήστους (E3) With this Adeimantus makes it clear that his allegation that philosophers are scoundrels was mere foil (*n.b.*, concessive μέν, 487D1) for the charge of their being *useless*. Surely the charge that philosophy makes men scoundrels would be the stronger argument against Socrates's thesis, if Adeimantus cared to make the charge seriously; and in the event, Socrates will not ignore this charge, either (489D1ff). For as usual he takes the interlocutor's objection far more seriously than the interlocutor does, and takes it further, too.

<sup>2728</sup>δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως δι' εἰκόνος λεγομένης (E4-5): Typically the apology for making an argument (λεγομένης) in images is that it makes the point easier to grasp (Gorg.517D, Leg.644C: cf. δυσαπόδεικτον here [488A1]; and cf. Xen.Oec.17.15). But is it the nature of the question or the nature of the person asking it that calls for this kind of answer? The etymological figure, ἐρωτᾶς ἐρώτημα, suggests either interpretation, and keeps both Adeimantus and ourselves in the dark on this point. One should keep in mind that the ideal state itself is an εἰκών, and ask whether the speeches of Adeimantus and Glaucon at the beginning of Book Two were likewise raising questions that needed to be answered with an εἰκών.

<sup>2729</sup>δέ γε (E6) in retort, taking the interlocutor's word one step further (cf.407A9, 450B6, 497A3; Xen.Mem.4.4.6). "But you speak in images all the time (sc. so quit complaining)." The response reveals Adeimantus thinks Socrates finds the challenge hard to meet rather than the challenger hard to educate. This is of course his special blind spot. At the same time he barely notices Socrates has accommodated him with a different method of discussion than the close dialectic of question and answer that he, or the persons he imagines he is speaking for, had found so confining.

<sup>2730</sup> For γλίσχρως (488A2), cf.Crat.414C.

<sup>2731</sup>ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὸ συναγαγεῖν (A5): Socrates is announcing that his image is multi-faceted. It will explain not only the useless men but the people and situation they find themselves among and in. It will include many points of comparison with "real life." Already we see it might be the suitable antidote to Adeimantus's blinkered impetuosity.

<sup>2732</sup>νόησον (A7): With this term of "mental perception," Socrates replies to Adeimantus's attempt to gainsay reason with observation (ἔργῳ δὲ ὄράν, 487C6), by inviting him to "see" something in his

just on one.<sup>2733</sup> The shipmaster is a man taller and more robust than the others in the ship, a little hard of hearing and seeing likewise, and it's about the same as to his knowledge of nautical matters.<sup>2734</sup> Conceive of the crew breaking into factions among themselves about the office of pilot,<sup>2735</sup> each man thinking it is he himself who should be pilot,<sup>2736</sup> though none has learned the art nor could say who taught him nor when he learned it.<sup>2737</sup> Indeed what they claim is that it isn't the sort of thing one learns in the first place, and they're ready to hang from the yardarm anybody who says it is, while what they see fit to do on their own lights is clamber around the person of the shipmaster,<sup>2738</sup> begging him and stopping at nothing to get him to turn the tiller over to them instead. Conceive next, when one day they lose his ear to a competing group, how they turn upon those others and murder them or throw them overboard, and drug the worthy master with mandragora or wine so they can overpower him and they tie him up and find themselves in command<sup>2739</sup> of the ship, and how they use up its stores in drinking and feasting and sail a voyage I hardly need to describe.<sup>2740</sup>

Conceive how all the while they praise with the names of true sailor and captain and expert at ships<sup>2741</sup> whichever man among them stood out as a particularly astute collaborator for purposes of landing them in the office of command, whether by persuading or by forcing the shipmaster; and conceive how they castigate the man who did not bring this about as useless—even though they<sup>2742</sup>

mind's eye, with a verb that likewise takes the participial indirect discourse of perception (cf. Adeimantus's 487C6-D5: γιγνομένους [D2], πάσχοντας [D4], γιγνομένους [D5]; and Socrates's 488A7-489A2: γιγνόμενον [488A7], στασιάζοντας [B3], φάσκοντας [B7], etc.).

<sup>2733</sup> εἴτε πολλῶν πέρι εἴτε μίας (A7-8): With an almost too elegant anastrophe Socrates tucks in a jab at Adeimantus's claim of empiricism (ταῖς πόλεσι, 487D5, E2). His image, though concrete, is of course not empirical: as such, one boat will do.

<sup>2734</sup> ἔτερα τοιαῦτα (B2-3) For ἔτερος in euphemistic or dismissive understatement cf. n. 1197. The statement (B1-3) is tentatively vague, and smacks more of criticism than description. Things become clearer below (E8-489A2 and n.2749).

<sup>2735</sup> περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως (B3-4). Some kind of distinction is being set up by the use of ναύκληρος instead of κυβερνήτης, and our first clue comes here (B4), where the expected term (though in abstract form, viz., κυβέρνησις) does appear, but describes the office not the man.

<sup>2736</sup> κυβερνᾶν (B4). For the present compare the use of ἄρχειν at 444B3 and at 442B1 (after inceptive aorist καταδουλώσασθαι): cf. n.2183.

<sup>2737</sup> ἔχοντα ἀποδεῖξαι (B5): “nor could say:” Just who are we to imagine asking the sailors these questions, the very questions the Athenians finally tired of having put to them by a certain bug-eyed barefoot citizen in their midst?

<sup>2738</sup> αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ (B8): The phrase steps beyond their claims and beliefs to the factual persons, and in this context the κυβερνήτης is again called ναύκληρος.

<sup>2739</sup> ἄρχειν (C5) again present, of occupying (rather than merely assuming) the office. The infinitive among the many participles is climactic but strictly begins an anacoluthon as if the story were in the accusative infinitive continued by πλεῖν. With ἐπαινοῦντες (C7) the original construction is resumed.

<sup>2740</sup> πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους (C7): a dismissive phrase strikingly parallel to dismissive βραχύ τι καὶ γιγνώσκοντα ἔτερα τοιαῦτα above (B2-3).

<sup>2741</sup> ναυτικὸν μέν ... καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν (D1-2), a metabatic triad that now reveals the distinction that has been lurking between the man at the helm (ναύκληρον) and the true captain (κυβερνητικόν) by avoiding the former term and introducing the latter in order to cap it with ἐπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν.

<sup>2742</sup> Read ἐπαίοντες (D5) with all best mss. instead of the ἐπίοντας of the recentiores. To assume anacoluthon in extended indirect discourse is easier than to assume an error common to all mss. The

have no clue as to what qualifies a man to be captain, how he has to keep his attention on the time of year and the seasons and the sky and the stars and the winds and all else that plays a role in his art<sup>2743</sup> if he is going to govern a ship in truth.<sup>2744</sup> Instead, as for executing the task of the captain<sup>2745</sup> whether certain people want him to or not, for this task they believe<sup>2746</sup> there is no art to be mastered, nor a need for practice nor indeed a need for the very science of captaincy they arrogate to themselves.<sup>2747</sup>

Now if this sequence of events came about in ships, don't you imagine that the man who is a real and true captain would in fact<sup>2748</sup> be dubbed a stargazer ([489](#)) and a fuddy-duddy and a man utterly useless to them,<sup>2749</sup> by these men who ride<sup>2750</sup> on board the ships that had come into this condition?

"They would indeed," Adeimantus replies.

nominative construction is continued by οιόμενοι, again unanimous, at E2.

<sup>2743</sup> ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ώρῶν καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀστρῶν καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων (D6-7): Repetition of καί with each of six items (D6-7) emphasizes the scope of the captain's job as if for an inexpert audience that might have left one of them out.

<sup>2744</sup> τῷ ὄντι ἀρχικός (D8): cf. the parallel passage, ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι (444B5) from the climactic portion of the conversation with Glaucon. Here, as there, the mere holding of a position is distinguished from having the inner resources to execute what the position requires, expressed above with the tenses of the infinitive (n.2183).

<sup>2745</sup> ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει (D8), an object clause parallel to ὅπως ἄρξουσιν (D2), contrasting the goal of being at the tiller with that of knowing how to manage it, and the goal of being at the controls with the goal of being in control. Their attitude has the same blind spot as Thrasymachus's, that for all the envy it might incite, being in charge incompetently is tantamount to not being in charge at all, the paradox from which Thrasymachus so cheekily sought to escape by asserting that the ruler *qua* ruler never errs (340DI-341A4).

<sup>2746</sup> Reading οιόμενοι (E2) with all mss., rather than the accusative οιομένους of the recentiores, analogous to ἐπαινοῦντες above (C7), with its parallel object clause (D2-3).

<sup>2747</sup> μήτε τέχνην τούτου μήτε μελέτην ... ἂμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν (E1-3). ἂμα is not always temporal (under which circumstance it implies a logically "biconditional" relation). We find it placed with a connective in expressions like A ἂμα καὶ B and A τε ἂμα καὶ B, etc., where it is strictly redundant (unless of course it does denote temporal simultaneity in the terms being connected, as at Leg.665DI-2, 814C8, 900A8-B1). When redundant it can strengthen the link between A and B, just as the redundant τε in A τε καὶ B does, and thereby with καί can take on the various functions and meanings that τε καί does, such as to link opposites or complements or to insist on the equal importance of the two terms (LSJ § A.3, s.v. misses this logical use, giving examples only where it links finite verbs).

All of the Platonic examples I have come from his "onkos" style, where ἂμα tends to be otiose or even decorative: Leg.626E4 (opposites), 634C7, 679E3 (equals), 699C7-8 (decorative), 740B1 (complements), 766E1-2 (decorative) 768E2-3, 770C4, 771B1, 776B1-2, 796A8-B1, 796C2-3, 798A7-8, 808C4, 809B3, 816B4-5, 817B3 (complements), 822D7, 832D5-6, 836E5-37A1 (with the second of three items as here), 897C5 (hendiadys), 927E6-7, and Phlb.26A7-8, 34C6-7, 42A8 (opposites), 53B1. It can appear with the first item in a list of several items where it takes on a job commonly assigned to τε: Leg.829B5, 842E1-2, and cf. Leg.733E1-2 (where it goes with the first doublet of two, τε going with the other), and Leg.950E5-6, πλείστους ἂμα καὶ καλλίστους τε καὶ ἀρίστους, where it prepares for a doublet of quantity and quality but leaves place for τε to form a sub-doublet for quality. It may appear in this logical meaning after καί, as Leg.665DI-2 and Phlb.26A7-8, 34C6-7, 53B1. It can be proclitic (A ἂμα τε B, Leg.728E3), and so as a preposition with the dative can approach the meaning of καὶ (Leg.716A6); but it can also be enclitic (A, B τε ἂμα, Tim.64A5). Leg.782A6-7, βρώσεως καὶ βρωμάτων

Then I'd guess you will not be asking to see the fable being tested,<sup>2751</sup> as to whether it provides a likeness of the cities as to their attitude about the true philosophers.<sup>2752</sup> Instead, you have learned what I mean.<sup>2753</sup> So now you can go back to that man who was surprised<sup>2754</sup> that philosophers are not honored<sup>2755</sup> in the cities. Teach him this fable and try to persuade him that it would be all the more strange if they were!

"And of course I will teach him," Adeimantus now replies.<sup>2756</sup>

And teach him also that you<sup>2757</sup> speak the truth when you say that the most decent persons involved in philosophy are useless to the many; but suggest to him their uselessness is to be blamed on those who make no use of them,<sup>2758</sup> not on their own being decent.<sup>2759</sup> It is against the nature of

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τε ἄμα καὶ πωμάτων, is a pretty mystery.

When words intervene between the τε and καί (as here, μήτε ... οιόμενοι δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἄμα καί) the intimacy of the connection already suggested by τε can be restored or resumed by adding ἄμα (cf. Leg.822D7, 832D5-6, 900A8-B1). Hence in the present case there is no need to repeat the negative μήτε with this third item (τὴν κυβερνητικήν). The closest parallel I have to our passage is Leg.927E6-7, τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας ἄμα καὶ ἐπιμελείας, where as here it signals a new kind of item after a pair of closely related ones.

The τὴν with κυβερνητικήν helps it refer to κυβερνητικόν (D1), the climactic term the sailors ignorantly use in praise of the usurper's skill.

<sup>2748</sup>ώς ἀληθῶς (E3-4) is contrasted with τῷ ὄντι (E4) as λόγος with ἔργον. Socrates is playing with Adeimantus's distinction (487C5-6).

<sup>2749</sup>μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην καὶ ἄχρηστον (E8-489A1): a derogatory triad corresponding to the their triad of praise above (D1-2), climaxing in the *demonstrandum*, ἄχρηστος (from 487E3 and 487D5). The insertion of the reflexive σφισι (A1) will have laid the main predicate of the entire tale. μετεωροσκόπον reveals that the picture we were given of the ναύκληρος at the beginning (ὑπόκωφον ..., 488B1-3) described how he appeared in the eyes of the sailors. To them he is hard of hearing but the fact is he doesn't heed them, nor sees them particularly; and their opinion that his knowledge is no better than his sight means only that they have no idea what he is thinking about.

Amazingly Aristotle (*Rhet.* I 406B35, followed by the anonymous [Proleg.27 = 51.29-31 Westerink] and by Adam and Shorey [citing Polyb.6.44 against his own purpose] and most others) takes the ναύκληρος to be the Demos rather than a hegemonic leader, though clearly it is the sailors that embody the proud stupidity of the crowd, as Cope noted *ad Rhet.* I 406B35.

<sup>2750</sup>πλωτήρων (A2), a parting shot, compensating for the play on ναύκληρος and κυβερνήτης that has run through the passage. These creatures who float with the ship hardly even deserve the name of sailors (cf. 341C9-D4).

<sup>2751</sup>ἐξεταζόμενον (A4), continuing the participial construction with the verb of mental vision ίδεῖν.

<sup>2752</sup> τὴν διάθεσιν (A6), acc. of respect. It is not the question how useless philosophers can rule (487E1-3) that Socrates says he has answered, but how the attitude of "the cities" (Adeimantus's empirical observation, again! cf. 487D5 and nn.2722 and 2733) toward true philosophers arises, according to which attitude they are useless (not to mention weirdoes and scoundrels) -- a διάθεσις that belongs to Adeimantus and anybody who understood and agreed with his rap (cf. nn.2719, 2727).

<sup>2753</sup>μανθάνειν (A6): There was no proof, only learning. The ambiguity of δυσαπόδεικτον (488A1: cf. n.2728) has been cleared up and the method of likenesses was successful.

<sup>2754</sup>ἐκεῖνον τὸν θαυμάζοντα (A8): Socrates's ἐκεῖνον avoids the confrontational or vindictive

things<sup>2760</sup> for the captain to request the sailors that they be ruled by him, nor do men of skill make their way to the doors of the rich. The man that told that subtle tale<sup>2761</sup> was deceived. The true nature of the matter is that a man who is sick, whether poor or rich, must make his way to the door of the doctor; that any man that needs to be ruled makes his way to the door of the man who has the ability to rule him; that a man who rules does not beg the ruled to accede to being ruled, if he has any real benefit to offer. To the contrary, if you likened the current politicians and the way that they rule to the sailors in the story you would not err, nor if you likened the men they call useless cloud-talkers<sup>2762</sup> to the ones who truly deserve the name of captain.

“Quite right.”

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coloring Adeimantus would have felt if he had said *τοῦτον* (“that man of yours” – a little too close to “you”): instead his pronoun stresses his acquiescence in receiving Adeimantus’s speech as an objective account about a third person. The θαῦμα Socrates refers to is, then, his own interpretation of the paradoxical antithesis Adeimantus had put into the mouth of his critic, *ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκούντας / ὀχρήστους γιγνομένους* (487D3-5). Socrates will double the paradox below (489C9-D2): the noblest preoccupation is unpopular because the opinion-makers are preoccupied by the opposite sorts of things, but the greatest cause of its bad name is the very people who allege to be preoccupied with nothing but this same sort of things.

<sup>2755</sup> οὐ τιμῶνται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι (A9): Again Socrates interprets the words of Adeimantus’s critic, who said they actually come to be useless for the cities (*όχρήστους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους*) not that they merely come to be deemed so. His interpretation implies that he takes the critics words to be disingenuous, an expression of his own loss of respect rather than an assertion that they actually become useless, which implies moreover that he takes the critic’s θαῦμα to be disingenuous. too. By taking this interpretation Socrates is separating the critic, who was originally Adeimantus’s spokesman, from the Adeimantus who has now heard and learned something from the simile.

<sup>2756</sup> ἀλλὰ διδάξω (B2). Socrates had avoided confrontation by suggesting Adeimantus teach the imaginary person (δίδασκε, A9). By agreeing to do so Adeimantus admits he was wrong a little more than he tries to hide it (with ἀλλά). Where, after all, will he find this man so as to teach him, unless underneath it all it is himself he is talking about? Adeimantus tends to present his own contrary opinions as objections of possible others, but when Socrates gets him to change his mind the first thing he thinks of is those who haven’t and need to be taught. Compare his behavior subsequent to his previous intrusive interruption, in Book Four, and his subsequent behavior (424D7-E4, 426B3-E3). Cf. Appendix 8.

Shorey, again viewing the action from his superior distance, suavely converts the dramatic change within Adeimantus into a mere deployment of a Platonic habit of style, to “represent thought as adventure or action.” He goes on to cite passages in the corpus in which a thought-adventure is narrated (e.g. Socrates’s autobiographical passage in *Phaedo*) but these are merely instances of plays within plays. In the present case the converse of what Shorey says is true: the action of the dialogue, if we choose to notice it, consists of an advance in the thinking of Adeimantus. In response to that advance, Socrates separates Adeimantus from his old way of thinking by exploiting his own conceit that the thinking belonged to somebody else. A most striking deployment of this technique awaits us in Book Nine (588B1-8: cf. nn.4509 and 4510).

I sense that the dialogue form is not only a polished creature of Plato’s literary imagination, but also a loyal representation of the rude and unmediated effect the Socratic encounter had upon himself.

<sup>2757</sup> Reading λέγεις (B3) with all mss. (λέγει scr. Parisinus 1810). Only after Adeimantus has indirectly accepted responsibility for his statement does Socrates treat the ideas as his own, even offering a way to redeem what he said!

And so take it<sup>2763</sup> from these arguments and these cases that it's not at all easy for the very highest occupation to achieve high standing<sup>2764</sup> in the eyes of persons preoccupied with the opposite sort of thing. But by far the largest and strongest slander against philosophy arises because of the behavior of people who claim to be occupied with nothing else than philosophy, the ones that your accuser of philosophy spoke of a moment ago when he dubbed the majority who approach philosophy "perfect scoundrels"<sup>2765</sup> in distinction from the very decent persons whom he called useless—and I agreed that you<sup>2766</sup> were speaking the truth. Yes?

"Yes."

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<sup>2758</sup> τῆς ἀχρηστίας τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους (B4-5). The criticism is hoist on its own petard. To the extent that it is a criticism of the philosophers it is false, and to the extent it is true it is not a criticism of the philosophers but of the citizens who fail to see their value. The term αἰτιᾶσθαι (B5) nicely straddles between the realms of praise and blame (αἰτία) on the one hand, and logic and reasoning ("etiology") on the other. With the eyes, which Adeimantus has privileged over reasoning, one cannot after all see causes. Cf. below where Socrates invites Adeimantus to reason about the cause of the knavery he sees (αἰτία, D11).

<sup>2759</sup> ἐπιεικεῖς (B5) in truth is attributive not predicative. My over-translation is meant to reveal the Thrasymachean tendency in Adeimantus's thought, and anyone else's who allows his surroundings to define him—but Socrates does not confront Adeimantus with this point, here.

<sup>2760</sup> οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν (B6), for which J.-C. compare Hdt.2.45, to which Shorey adds 473A1 and Dem.2.26, as well as pointing out that the idiom ἔχειν λόγον (e.g., 378E4, 491D7) is parallel.

<sup>2761</sup> ὁ τούτου κομψευσάμενος (B8): Socrates's immediate allusion is to the ἀγύρται καὶ μάντεις that Adeimantus mentioned in his speech in Book Two (364B5-6). Trying to determine just which individuals might have put the image into Adeimantus's mind distracts the commentators from the main point, that Socrates only means to exonerate Adeimantus from responsibility and thereby, once again, to avoid confrontation. For the topic compare the schol. with Arist. Rhet.1391A8, D.L. 2.69, and Xen.Apol.17.

<sup>2762</sup> μετεωρολέσχας (C6), a coinage that telescopes the hendiadys μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην (488E8-489A1) into a single word. Though the reference to the τὰ μετέωρα is particularly appropriate in the context of the pilot, the slander and ridicule against Socrates (*Apol.*19C2-5) also comes to mind (cf. also n.2737).

<sup>2763</sup> τοίνυν (C9): For the third straight time (B3,A8). Socrates aims these comments at Adeimantus and no one else, but continues to avoid confrontation by the conceit that Adeimantus was speaking for someone else.

<sup>2764</sup> εὔδοκιμεῖν (C9), a variant for τιμᾶσθαι (A4-B1). It recalls the brothers' use of the term in connection with ἐπιτηδεύειν (358A5-6, and n.689), as well as Socrates's criticism of the term in the context of his response to Adeimantus's objection at the beginning of Book Four (423A7). Another chip from Adeimantus's speech is being taken off the table.

<sup>2765</sup> οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἰόντων ἐπ' αὐτήν (D3-4): Socrates frontloads his program by now broaching the stipulation that the παμπόνηροι Adeimantus pointed to are *imitation* philosophers, persons "making an approach on her," not real ones (ἀληθινούς, A5). In all strictness Adeimantus had claimed one can see young men who study philosophy too long becoming (γιγνομένους) weirdoes if not utter knaves. Socrates is about to separate the force that inevitably causes most young men to become knaves (τῆς τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας ὄναγκην, D10), denying that that force is philosophy, from a class of putatively philosophical knaves, denying they are philosophers. His program will become explicit below (490E2-491A5).

### D.3c.2: Response of Socrates: Viciousness

So we may say we have fully accounted for the cause of the uselessness of the decent types. Can we move on to say what forces<sup>2767</sup> the majority of them<sup>2768</sup> to be scoundrels, and see if we can prove that philosophy is not to blame for this either?

“Yes, let’s try.”

Shall our listening and speaking to each other<sup>2769</sup> begin by recalling the moment when we were working out<sup>2770</sup> what sort of nature a man needed to have to become a person fine and good?<sup>2771</sup> His (490) primary guide was truth,<sup>2772</sup> as you remember, which he had to be pursuing with all of himself and in every way available to him, lest he come out a braggart and have no share<sup>2773</sup> at all in true philosophy.

“This is how the thing was argued.”

“And doesn’t this argument run quite contrary to current attitudes about him?”<sup>2774</sup>

“Quite.”

<sup>2766</sup>σε (D5): Socrates no longer avoids attributing the assertion to Adeimantus (cf. n.2757). It is of course true that Adeimantus asserted the majority of persons who have been engaged in philosophy are weirdoes or scoundrels, but the statement was mere foil for the assertion that the most decent of them were useless: it was only these he continued to speak about when he put the question about the philosopher-kings at 487E1-3. This is why Socrates summarizes the statement and asks for his distinct approval of the summary.

<sup>2767</sup>ἀνάγκην (D10), markedly stronger than αἰτίαν (D7), with which the parallels of syntax and word order force us to compare it.

<sup>2768</sup>τῶν πολλῶν (D10), refers to οἱ πλεῖστοι (D3-4 and 487D1-2) but varies the expression in order to bring in the derogatory tone of “οἱ πολλοί,” itself borrowed from B3.

<sup>2769</sup>ἀκούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν (E3): With this pair of verbs Socrates characterizes the dialogical and dialectical joint search (cf. n.711). He makes the allusion in order to acknowledge that Adeimantus has now come on board as a true partner after his poorly argued and emotional objection to dialogue (487B2-C4), his evasive use of an imaginary objector, and the subsequent byplay attaching to his request to “hear” Socrates’s response (487D8-10). The rhetoric and tone of the conversation now takes an unprecedented turn. Cf. Appendix 3 §2.

<sup>2770</sup>διῆμεν (E4) re-introduces the dialectical treatment step-by-step (διά) that Adeimantus had objected to at 487B4-7 (esp. ἔκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι).

<sup>2771</sup>καλόν τε κἀγαθόν (E4), reverting not only to the topic of the philosophic nature, but also the manner of viewing it in the light of conventional notions of virtue (cf. nn. 2694, 2697, and 2700).

<sup>2772</sup>πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια (490A1), referring not only to the aversion toward mendacity (485C3-4) but to the desire for the truer truth from which that characteristic was derived (485A10-B8), in contrast to which the opposite characteristic is here shunned (ἀλαζονεία, more Theophrastean material: Char.23 [cf. n.2694]).

<sup>2773</sup>μετεῖναι (A3): again the language of participation is used “subjectively” (cf. n.2707).

<sup>2774</sup>τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις (A5-6) the present instead of the usual perfect, straining to draw a contrast with Adeimantus’s already strained periphrastic expression ἦν γὰρ οὕτω λεγόμενον (A4). The contrast is further supported by re-use of οὕτω and the contrast of the past (ἦν) with the present (νῦν).

"Will we have sufficient warrant to account for this discrepancy<sup>2775</sup> by saying that it is by his inborn<sup>2776</sup> propensity to measure himself against what is real, given the fact that he is a true lover of learning, and that he would not stop and abide in the world of things men opine about, this world where everything is a many, but would move past them; and that his erotic drive would neither blunt nor slacken before he latches onto the true nature of each thing in its self-same oneness, with the part of the philosopher's soul that is suited to do so<sup>2777</sup>—the suitable part being the part akin to it<sup>2778</sup>—yea, until he finds himself truly in the company of the real and then communes with it, giving birth thereby both to a knowing mind and to a truth known,<sup>2779</sup> and so achieves cognition and life in truth and receives his sustenance therefrom, and finds surcease from the travail of his soul like never before.

"The explanation is as warranted as could be."

So will this man show any hint of accepting falsehood or quite to the contrary will he hate it?

"Hate it he will."

Yes: as long as truth is doing the leading, I doubt we would ever find ourselves saying that a chorus<sup>2780</sup> of evils follows in her train.

"How could it?"

Rather, that a disposition healthy and just follows her, which temperance also follows.<sup>2781</sup>

"Correctly we would say that."

<sup>2775</sup>οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα (A8) is the reading of all the mss. The optatives in the ὅτι construction that depend on this verb (εἴη [A9] through λήγοι, [B7]) do not require the verb to be emended into a secondary sequence indicative (ἀπολογησάμεθα ci. Ast : ἀπολογισάμεθα ci. Madvig, which both commit Socrates to asserting that something happened that didn't) but are due to the compendious expression of the question (ἄρ' οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα, A8). Socrates is not asking whether they will make this ἀπολογία moderately but whether, after they make it, it shall have been warranted -- though in truth the question itself is merely a rhetorical artifice for making the ἀπολογία. A fuller expression of the underlying question would be, εἰ ἀπολογησαίμεθα ὅτι A,B,C,D, οὐκ ἂν μετρίως ἀπολογησαίμεθα; The verbs dependent upon ὅτι are optative not by the sequence of moods but to correspond to the optative of such a suppressed protasis.

<sup>2776</sup>πεφυκώς / ὄντως (A9). The language of "natural implication" returns (cf. n.2687) but here and in the sequel gives way to a rhetorical elevation above logic.

<sup>2777</sup>προσήκει (B4), of what a thing's inner nature suits it to do, as at 485E5 and, first, at Book Four, 442B2 (cf. synonymous πρέπειν at 444B4). The expression γένει used there corresponds to συγγενεῖ here. Cf. n.2687.

<sup>2778</sup>προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ (B4): Here is the point of the subjective participation he has stressed up to now.

<sup>2779</sup>μιγείς (B5): Intercourse of the man with what is real makes the former knowing and the latter true. Note that both these attributes are here rendered with nouns (νοῦς, ἀλήθεια).

<sup>2780</sup>χορόν (C3). With the metaphor Socrates tries to acknowledge how the array of qualities ancillary to the philosopher's pursuit, which he listed off like Santa's reindeer to Glaucon (487A4-5, and n.2710), might in fact have incited Adeimantus's envy and caused him to interrupt. In effect he gently broaches that list with a litotes, saying that the listed items were "not bad things."

<sup>2781</sup>With these questions (B9-C7) Socrates subjects Adeimantus to just the stepwise sort of induction he had lately condemned. Note also that the steps are completely different: ὑγιές (C5) played strictly no role in the conversation with Glaucon (485A4-E3); and δίκαιον (*ibid.*) was there deduced, *inter alia*, from σωφροσύνη (486B7), whereas here the converse occurs.

And so there is no need to try and recall<sup>2782</sup> and then to marshal all over again the entire chorus of virtues that accompany the philosophical nature. You remember the corollaries of bravery, magnanimity, ease of learning, memory.<sup>2783</sup> And after you interrupted me to say that any man will be forced to agree with what we were arguing but that if he closed his ears to argument for a moment and opened his eyes to look at the people the argument was about, he would see some of them were useless but the majority of them were scoundrels in every way a man can be a scoundrel,<sup>2784</sup> we decided to look into the cause for this slander so that now our question became, “Why in the world are most of them bad?”<sup>2785</sup> pursuant to which we have now recalled the description of the nature found in those truly deserving the name of philosopher, and have set out the marks that necessarily distinguish it.

“That is what has happened.”

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<sup>2782</sup> Reading ἀναλαμβάνοντα (C9), a scribitur in Ven. 184 (against the ἀναγκάζοντα of all mss.) to which Socrates himself refers back, with ἀνειλήφαμεν at D6 below, and which alone justifies his use of μέμνησαι two words later.

The theme of compulsion is eminent in the context, but the syntax of ἀναγκάζοντα is awkward. An “absolute” or intransitive use (LSJ §6, s.v.) is dubious. The only explicitly stated object it can take is χορόν, in which case both τάττειν and ἀναγκάζοντα govern it and the meaning is that the marshalling of them is done with forcible argument (per LSJ §4): cf. the expression ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὥρισάμεθα at the end of the paragraph. Perhaps the object is Socrates or Adeimantus represented by understood με or σε and the meaning is, ‘There is no need for you to marshal them all forcing me to carry it out, or for me to marshal them all forcing you to agree’ (per LSJ §1, s.v.): cf. the sense Socrates gives the word two lines below (C11) in the course of summarizing Adeimantus’s interruption (at 487B1-C3). Adeimantus had virtually accused Socrates of forcibly tyrannizing his interlocutor (his word was ἀποκλείονται, 487B8), but rather than showing that the compulsion was unfair (i.e. that the arguments were not as necessary as Socrates and Glaucon had agreed they were, at 486E1), Adeimantus, by an act of sophistry we have each of us perhaps committed ourselves, makes a show, under color of defending those unskilled in argument, of trumping mere talk with fact (λόγος with ἔργον, 487C5-6, Glaucon and Socrates’s agreement to suspend that distinction at 473A1-3 notwithstanding). Having for some pages now (cf. nn.2732, 2751, 2752) played the with notion that sense data is ἐναργές, which Adeimantus there relied upon and employed, the play including serving him up an “image” by which he could “see” that he would rather be a captain accused of poor “eyesight” rather than a sailor who deserves to be “disregarded” (nicely supplemented with the purely philosophical outburst and ἀπολογία just above, 490A8-B7), Socrates finally and gently welcomes Adeimantus to drop the crutch—a crutch we all recognize—and come over to the side of λόγος.

<sup>2783</sup> ἀνδρεία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη (C10-11): The asyndesis imitates the metaphors of χορός and τάττειν. For the metaphorical use of χορός of amassing a list or lists, where invidiousness, derogation, and *praeteritio* also may loom, cf. 560E, 580B; *Euthyd.*279A4-C4; *Polit.*291AC; *Tht.*173B4, and cf. *Phdrs.*246E4-7A4: Φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἴσταται). By combining *praeteritio* with an abbreviated version of the list (cf.487A4-5) Socrates again softens the blow at the same time that he insists on his point (nn.2754-2757).

<sup>2784</sup>κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν (D3) represents Adeimantus’s παμπονήρους (487D2: cf.489D3), an expression he showed some reluctance to use, whether real or feigned. As usual Socrates represents what his interlocutor said in the finest detail (cf. n.363), but at the same time he has reversed the order, placing the scoundrels second because the current topic is to account for the charge of πονηρία.

<sup>2785</sup>τί ποθ’ οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί; D5): The expression perhaps inadvertently echoes the wise saying of Bias of Pittacus (οἱ πλεῖστοι κακοί, DK 1.65.2).

This then is the nature whose debilitation we must come to see,<sup>2786</sup> the causes of its debilitation and how it is destroyed in the majority of men (though a small part of mankind escape vice somehow and end up being called not base but useless). After that we must in turn (491) behold the natures that imitate<sup>2787</sup> this one and try to settle into her task and occupation, and watch how, given the natures of soul they actually have, they have landed in an occupation unworthy<sup>2788</sup> and quite beyond themselves, and how because so often they act awkwardly<sup>2789</sup> they have brought upon philosophy the reputation you describe, among all men everywhere.

“What are the types of corruption you speak of?”

As far as I am able I will try to go through them for you.<sup>2790</sup> At the outset I think everyone will agree with us that an inborn nature of this sort, possessing all the attributes we have just now constellated<sup>2791</sup> if the man is to be perfectly philosophic, appears seldom among mankind and only in a few; and yet the forces that can corrupt these few are many and powerful.

“Yes—what are they?”

You might be most surprised to hear that each and every aspect of the soul’s nature that we praised can destroy the soul that possesses it and estrange her from philosophy: bravery, temperance and all the rest we listed off.

“Strange indeed to hear.”

But that’s not all. The things people commonly count as goods can also work corruption and

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<sup>2786</sup> Θεάσασθαι (E2), not λέγειν or διελθεῖν, but a new verb of mental vision.

<sup>2787</sup> τὰς μιμούμενας ταύτην (491A1): The concept and the language of men imitating (but not emulating) their natural superiors is unprecedented, though φάσκοντες (489D2) prepared for it and the image of the sailors arrogating the role of the pilot to themselves has provided an image. In now saying that their φύσεις are different Socrates reveals that he has two sets of scoundrels in mind, some who, despite being suited for the pursuit of philosophy as he and Glaucon before and as he and Adeimantus just now have defined it, will become πονηροί; and others whose nature is so ill-suited to pursue it that their very claim to be philosophers confers upon philosophy the bad name she now has acquired, in some quarters.

It is these latter, the φάσκοντες or μιμούμενοι, that common parlance would think of as knavish φιλόσοφοι (according to Adeimantus, representing their view in his interruption) just as it was against these in the prospect of whom becoming kings Glaucon had represented the violent indignation of οἱ πολλοί at 473E6-474A4. Neither Socrates nor Plato takes the trouble to identify them beyond the satirical image of the tinker below and the *obiter dictum* at 490A5-6 that they are reputed to lack humility and have little regard for truth. The worry about who the masses have in mind is mere gossip in comparison with the question whether Adeimantus (and Glaucon for that matter) will continue to acquiesce in the dictates of the *logos* rather than cave in to the outlook of the mass, since the entire drama of the dialogue hinges on it.

<sup>2788</sup> ἀνάξιον (A2) is intentionally oxymoronic. Cf. πολλῶν κακῶν ἄξιοι, 495C5-6.

<sup>2789</sup> πλημμελοῦσαι (A4), a term that understates truly offensive behavior (as at 451B3 and 480A6), offensive enough to overshadow other virtues (*Apol.* 22D8).

<sup>2790</sup> With ἐγώ σοι (A7) Socrates adopts something of the pose of the lecturer (cf. 329A1 and n.52, and πυθοίμην, below [C6]), announcing what will be a sustained elevation of tone unprecedented in the conversation so far. For a full review of the new style cf. Appendix 3.

<sup>2791</sup> προσετάξαμεν (A9), like τάπτειν χορόν (490C8-9), refers to the interdependency (ἐπόμενα ἀλλήλοις, 486E2), community (μετεῖναι, 486B4) and homogeneity (οἰκειότερον, 485C10; συγγενῆ, 486D7) of the attributes derived above (485A10-487A5).

estrangement: beauty and wealth and strength of body and a family influential in the city, all that sort of thing—you know what I mean in outline.

“I know the contents of the list. What I’m keen to hear is a more complete statement of what you are saying about them.”<sup>2792</sup>

Grasp the problem in general: what I am saying will become obvious and you’ll no longer find my prelude<sup>2793</sup> strange.

“How do you suggest I do this?”<sup>2794</sup>

Take any seed and shoot,<sup>2795</sup> whether plant or animal: we know that if it does not get the particular nourishment suited to it, or dwell in the right climate or region, the more robust the individual is the more dire is the shortfall. After all, evil is more opposed to the good than it is to the not-good. So there is reason to believe that the best nature, when placed in an environment for which it is relatively unsuited, will come out worse than an insignificant one.

“Reason there is.”

So, Adeimantus, shall we infer in the case of souls, too, that if the ones that are best by nature get a bad education, they will tend to turn out exceptionally evil? Or do you imagine that great acts of injustice and the stronger and purer<sup>2796</sup> strains of evil are the effect of bad education in a paltry person rather than that of a braver stripling,<sup>2797</sup> and that weaker natures will never have much of an effect, whether for good or for ill?

“No, I agree.”

(492) Alright then, as to the type of man we posited as philosophical, if he does get the education that befits him he will necessarily grow up to reach the very pinnacle of virtue;<sup>2798</sup> but if he’s of good breeding and stock<sup>2799</sup> and fails to receive the proper nourishment then he goes the opposite way, unless some god intervenes on his behalf.<sup>2800</sup> But perhaps like most people<sup>2801</sup> you believe that the

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<sup>2792</sup> On πυθοίμην (C6) cf. 328E2, where as here it is used by the person about to receive a lecture (cf. nn.50 and 892). Adeimantus's distinct eagerness to receive Socrates's account recalls that exactly this opinion played a key role in his speech in Book Two – that on the basis of bad models the talented young man can only be expected to choose the wrong path (364A4,ff).

<sup>2793</sup> τὰ προειρημένα (C8): Socrates is acknowledging that what he has said is more a matter of advertisement or preparation than a final statement. Cf. 510C1.

<sup>2794</sup> κελεύεις (C10), reacts to Socrates's imperative, λαβοῦ (C7), itself reacting to Adeimantus's πυθοίμην (C6). Adeimantus is cool and formal in comparison with the erotic Glaucon, his coolness, even in the face of a treatment of the problem that lies particularly close to his heart, being of a piece with his tendency to present his own opinion as if it belonged to somebody else.

<sup>2795</sup> σπέρματός ... ἥ φυτοῦ (D1) isolates the earliest phases of life before external τροφή comes into play: cf. σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα infra, 492A3-4.

<sup>2796</sup> ὀκρατον (E4), from its use in connection with wine denotes both purity and strength and thereby makes Socrates's argument for him.

<sup>2797</sup> νεανικῆς (E4), the word-choice referring back to the similar argument made at 425B10-C5 (n.b. νεανικόν, C5). For the negative connotation of νεανικός cf. 606C7 and νεανιεύματα, 390A2.

<sup>2798</sup> εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν (492A2) mildly taunts πᾶσαν κακίαν (490D3).

<sup>2799</sup> σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα (A3-4) repeats the doublet σπέρματος πέρι ἥ φυτοῦ (D1). Socrates is elaborating the concept Adeimantus used in his characterization of the vulnerable young at 365A6-7 (εὐφυεῖς τε καὶ ικανοί).

young we see spoiled are somehow<sup>2802</sup> spoiled by certain sophists, to any degree worth mentioning, those ones their fathers hire,<sup>2803</sup> rather than believing that it is the very people who make this argument who are the most redoubtable sophists<sup>2804</sup> and do the most effective job of educating,<sup>2805</sup> so as to make a person into whatever they wish him to be, not just young but old, and men and women, too.<sup>2806</sup>

“Just when<sup>2807</sup> do they do this?”

Whenever they're gathered in a huge throng<sup>2808</sup> -- in the assembly, the courtroom, the theatre, the battlefield, or any other gathering<sup>2809</sup> en masse<sup>2810</sup> -- and with a great hullabaloo they heap disparagement on what is being said or being done, or praise it for that matter just as long as they do

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<sup>2800</sup> Θεῶν (A5): Socrates seems to remember Adeimantus's remark at 366C6-7.

<sup>2801</sup> ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί (A6): Again Shorey (*ad loc.*, 2.34, note c) hears Plato anticipating critics rather than Socrates speaking to Adeimantus about the prejudice against philosophy he voiced out of envy over its high standards, another of the prejudices that would be aroused against Socrates during his trial. In all likelihood it is “sophists” that Adeimantus has in mind when Socrates speaks of “philosophers”—people that is who seem apart from the mass because of their inordinate interest in special talk. For Socrates to say that these are kowtowing to the mass, and that the mass rather than they are the sophists, is a stunning surprise and a maximal paradox that he will explain over the next page and a half, particularly at 493A6ff.

<sup>2802</sup> τινας (A6 and A7), though governed by the noun, modifies the whole idea. Cf. λύττοντά τινα (329C3-4), τινων (430E7), ὡς τι ὄν (480A4); and cf. expressions like μέγα τι καὶ καλόν (n.2260). The vagueness has more the force of dismissal than uncertainty, as at *Apol.*18B6. Cf. n.527.

<sup>2803</sup> ἴδιωτικούς (A7) The term awkwardly suggests training in private (cf.493A6), its occurrence being a proleptic skew (n.1556) that anticipates the paradoxical σοφισταὶ δημόσιοι Socrates is about to invent.

<sup>2804</sup> μεγίστους (A8), not greatest in the sense of best or finest but of having an effect most worthy of mention (ἄξιον λόγου).

<sup>2805</sup> παιδεύειν τελεώτατα (B1) is a bit ominous. τελεώτατα suggests more that their “education” is irreversible than that it is polished. Cf. E4.

<sup>2806</sup> To the young, the list (B2-3) adds the only expected and relevant entry – its opposite -- so as to generalize; and then this movement toward generalization becomes fully obvious by a second polar doublet that is entirely irrelevant to the question at issue, which was the corruption of the young.

<sup>2807</sup> πότε δῆ; (B4). One expects the question, “Who in the world do you mean?” If we find Adeimantus's question – “Just when?” -- surprisingly narrow, we could compare the challenge Socrates imagines in his image of the sailors (488B4-6: when did the sailors do their learning?). But more likely Adeimantus is recognizing the stress Socrates has given to the early effect of the sophists (note emphatic placement of νέους at 492A7), and asks how Socrates can now displace the effect of these novel sophists away from an effect on the young man and toward “young and old, and men and women,” which implies that their effect takes place at another time than youth. In any event his temporal question makes a nice segue to the answer Socrates will be giving.

<sup>2808</sup> πολλοί (B5) without substantivizing article as at 484B5, in hendiadys with ἀθρόοι: the crowd is large and unified. Cf. *Gorg.*490B2, *Xen.Anab.*7.3.9. and the use of ἀθρόον at *Tht.*182A9. The two adjectives are predicates for the subject understood and brought forward from Socrates's previous sentence.

<sup>2809</sup> σύλλογον (B7): The list of σύλλογοι usually comprises political ones (*Gorg.*452E1-4; *Phdr.*261A8-9, *Tht.*173D1-2) but Socrates, picking up the question πότε, is stressing the effect when people gather rather than where – i.e. regardless of their reason for gathering and their credentials for

it with excessive hooting and applause and stamping of feet, and cause the rocks and walls that surround them to echo their sentiments and double the decibels of their elation and their disapproval. In an environment like this what mood do you think a young man's heart takes on, as the saying goes?<sup>2811</sup> What manner of education received in private, do you think, can<sup>2812</sup> hold its own against a public scene like that? What education, do you think, will not be submerged in the deluge<sup>2813</sup> of such angry clamor or gleeful exaltation, and not be borne off in whatever direction its current flows, so that he will aver<sup>2814</sup> the same things are beautiful or ugly as they, and follow them in any and every<sup>2815</sup> one of their pursuits, and become like them?<sup>2816</sup>

"Much compels one to say so, Socrates."

Yet something less than the ultimate compulsion.

"What compulsion is that?"

The compulsion in deeds with which these sophist-tutors<sup>2817</sup> add to their compulsion in words when words fail to persuade. Perhaps you are unaware that if a man does not go along with them they being included in the group -- and so the list is extended to include the strikingly diverse items of the theatre audience and the army. The expansion of the list is of a piece with the expansion at 492B2-3.

<sup>2810</sup>κοινόν (B7) means what δημόσιοι means at Phdrs.261A8-9.

<sup>2811</sup>τίνα οἵει καρδίαν ἵσχειν (C3), another echo (cf. A5) from Adeimantus's speech (365A6-7: τί οιόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν;). The "idiom" (καρδίαν ἵσχειν) consists in replacing the more usual adverbial complement of ἔχειν (e.g., πῶς) with an adjectival one (i.e., the interrogative adjective τίνα), which is given its syntactical purchase by the introduction of a noun, in this case καρδίαν (cf. E. IA 1173) but other nouns elsewhere, e.g. διάνοιαν (Symp.219D3), γνώμην (Isoc.6.77, 14.15, 14.48, etc.), θυμόν (Theognis 748), and ψυχήν (Lys.32.12; Dem.28.21, 50.62), all to be taken as adverbial accusatives rather than direct objects of the verb: "How will he be in his heart?"

<sup>2812</sup>ἢν with ἀνθέξειν (C4) was deleted by Cobet and bracketed by Burnet and Chambry. Smyth (§1793) perspicaciously says, "In Attic, ἢν with a future is found in a few passages which have often been emended." Riddell, on the ἢν at Apol.29C (also deleted by Cobet), is blunter: "The future with ἢν is abundantly established," and cites in his Digest (§58) Rep.615D, Symp.222A (emended out by Bekker), Euthyd.287D (emended out by Heindorf and Schanz), Phdrs.227B (where Burnet takes refuge in the Parisinus 1811 against B and T), and even two passages in indirect discourse: Leg.719E (Burnet accepting Bekker's emendation against all mss. and Stob.) and Isaeus 1.32 (deleted by Cobet). Cf. also Goodwin, GMT 197, and compare ἢν plus future infinitive (and GMT 208). We might note the variant at Phd.61C4-5: ἢν σοι ... πείσεται (ms.T : σοι B, *idque legunt edd.*).

<sup>2813</sup>κατακλυσθεῖσαν ... φερομένην (C5): inundated and borne off whithersoever (by the noise). For κατακλυσθεῖσαν cf. 473C7-8. Contrast Adeimantus's metaphor, ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι φέρωσιν (487B8-C1, being walled in and left no direction to move, by *reasoning*).

<sup>2814</sup> φήσειν (C7): The νέος now resumes the role of subject, ousting παιδεία which has been serving as a sort of synecdoche for him (cf. the uses of φύσις and διάνοια above, 485A10, B12, 486A2). For the syntactical shift midstream compare 486A8-10, where the antecedent to the masculine τούτῳ is the feminine synecdoche, διάνοια. Note the continuation of the infinitival construction in indirect discourse: Socrates is challenging Adeimantus with echoes from his speech.

<sup>2815</sup>ἄπερ ἢν (C8): περ adding precision and ἢν adding universality.

<sup>2816</sup> φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσειν ἄπερ ἢν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσεσθαι τοιοῦτον (C7-8): The list is metabatic (cf. n.1262): the external individual act (φήσειν) congeals into a pattern of behavior and an orientation toward the world (ἐπιτηδεύσειν), and finally he loses his original identity and allows theirs to be stamped onto himself (ἔσεσθαι τοιοῦτον) – meant to illustrate the profound pedagogical effect of their "instruction."

remedy the matter with disenfranchisements, fines, and deaths?<sup>2818</sup>

“I am quite aware.”

Can you point to some other sophist than the mass, who by teaches some special lessons in private<sup>2819</sup> will tug hard enough in the opposite direction to overcome them?

“My guess is there is no such person.”

And you’re right. Even trying to oppose them is foolish. A man’s character cannot, nor ever has—and never will, I’d guess—come out with some alien attitude toward virtue, contrary to the one that the “education” of this crowd produces<sup>2820</sup>—the human part of his character, at least: the divine spark in a man I won’t “put it past” as the proverb goes.<sup>2821</sup> Indeed one can be sure that if a man does survive (493) and turns out as<sup>2822</sup> he should in such a political environment,<sup>2823</sup> we’d have to say it was the work of the gods.

“I’m of the same opinion.”

But I’ve another thing we should opine.<sup>2824</sup>

“Which?”

Every one of those private hirelings that these people call sophists and think of as rivals,<sup>2825</sup>

<sup>2817</sup> οὗτοι οἱ παιδευταί τε καὶ σοφισταί (D5-6): He has called them the real sophists not because they have σοφία but because they “teach” the young man more thoroughly than any infamous sophist could. Where I put “teach” into scare-quotes, Plato appears to have coined a word (παιδευτής, used for the first time here and below at 493C8, but then later at *Polit.*308E and *Leg.* 811E, 812E, etc.).

<sup>2818</sup> ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις (D7). The plurals are sensationalistic and minatory, as at 387B9-C1; *Crito* 46C5-6; *Leg.*885C2-6, 890C4-5, 949C6-7. The shift from active to passive nicely downplays how their attempt to “persuade” was only a veiled command to obey.

<sup>2819</sup> ἄλλον σοφιστήν and ποίους ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους together bring forward the putative σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς τινας of A7: Socrates again forces Adeimantus to recognize it is not some teachers or other but his own *ambitio* that drives his heart away from the quiet voice of justice.

<sup>2820</sup> ἄλλοιον (E3), with feigned derogation, states the converse of the idea above, ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἵους βούλονται εἶναι (B1-2: cf. τοιοῦτον, C8), there generalized for all kinds of humans regardless of age and sex. For the strong παρά (E4), cf. 529C5; and for the expression οὐ μὴ γένηται cf. *Leg.*696A2-3.

<sup>2821</sup> ἔξαιρωμεν λόγου (E6): the phrase means not only to make an exception but to do so out of respect: cf. *Paroem.Gr.*2.164 (=M.III.93) and n. *ad loc.*

<sup>2822</sup> οἶον (493A1) continues τοιοῦτον (492C8), ἄλλοιον (492E3) and οἵους (492B2).

<sup>2823</sup> καταστάσει πολιτειῶν (A1) brings forward Adeimantus’s empirical plural (489A9, 489A2, 488A8, 487D5).

<sup>2824</sup> Socrates’s δοξάτω (A4) picks up Adeimantus’s use of δοκεῖ (A3). δόξα becomes thematic just below.

<sup>2825</sup> ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται (A7): The psychology is as subtle as it is ubiquitous in democratic society and is the engine of fashion. That the mass creates its own leaders is something the mass refuses to acknowledge with one part of itself so that the other part can continue to feel flattered by them one day and complain about them the next. Dissatisfaction and fastidiousness are, after all, the readiest means we have to display our own good taste, as La Rochefoucauld somewhere said. Perhaps the deepest understanding of it we have so far is René Girard’s theory of mimetic desire, according to which we borrow our desires from others who then become our rivals (the groundbreaking treatment is presented in *Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque* [Paris 1961] = *Deceit, Desire and*

themselves teach nothing but these same opinions held by the many, the opinions they opine while they are gathered, and they call these opinions wisdom. It's as if there were a huge beast<sup>2826</sup> nourished to great strength, and somebody were getting to learn what made it angry and what it desired, and how to approach it and just how to pet it, and at what times it becomes most fierce and when most tame and from what causes, and what it means by its particular grunts and growls, as well as what sounds another can make to calm it down or stir it up. Say he had learned all this by hanging around the animal for a long time, and called what he learned "wisdom" and set to systematizing it and teaching it to others, utterly ignorant as to whether the animal's beliefs and desires<sup>2827</sup> were beautiful or ugly, good or bad, just or unjust. Instead he applies these terms<sup>2828</sup> as mere names in accordance with the great animal's beliefs, calling whatever it<sup>2829</sup> enjoys good and what it hates bad, and has no further brief on the good and bad as such but simply identifies the animal's requirements with the just and the beautiful. As to the truth about the necessary and the good<sup>2830</sup> and how much they differ from one another, this he has never come to recognize and thus could never teach it to another. By Zeus can you imagine having such a person for a "tutor"?

"I can only try."

Yet would you judge such a person to be any way different from the man who believes wisdom is getting to know the anger and the pleasures<sup>2831</sup> a motley crowd of people fix upon when they gather, whether about painting or music or politics for that matter?<sup>2832</sup> Whatever one sets out to display to

the Novel, eng.tr.Y.Freccero [Baltimore 1965]). Cf. Diomedean Necessity, 493D6.

<sup>2826</sup> οἶόνπερ ἀν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου (A9-10): The unity of the beast gives an image for the congealing of the individual members of the crowd, which had been as yet only verbally indicated by ἀθρόοι (492B5: cf. ἀθροισθώσιν, A9), since it required the plural to be retained (πλῆθος at 492B7 was a start but only an abstraction). It is the unanimity of the crowd that gives it its power: if it were merely large and unruly it would not have the concerted effect on the single individual that is envisioned. In the sequel to the image the term πλῆθος vividly denotes this unanimity (494A1) and by a virtual personification we can then come to speak of a mass as being a philosopher (A4). Shorey's citation of widely disparate parallels (*ad loc.*, 2.38, note e), by including the horrors of a many-headed beast, sacrifices pertinence for breadth, as often.

<sup>2827</sup> δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν (B8). The straddling between the language appropriate to the *comparandum* and the *comparans* begins (for "straddling" cf. n.2184): δογμάτων points back to the mass (A8) and ἐπιθυμιῶν to the animal (B1). τε καί is the usual way to link the metaphor and its meaning (cf. n.71296).

<sup>2828</sup> ὄνομάζοι and ἐπὶ ταῖς ... δόξαις (C1-2) correspond with φθεγγομένου (B4) and ἐφ' οἷς (B3). καλόν, ἀγαθόν, and δίκαιον (the usual triad for important things: cf. n.2279) become mere terms of praise; and αἰσχρός, κακός, ἄδικος mere terms of disparagement.

<sup>2829</sup> ἐκεῖνο (C3) is humorously approbatory, expressing the deference and constant attention (esp. τριβῆ, B6) that this expert must dedicate to the beast and its behavior.

<sup>2830</sup> τάναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ... μήτε ἔωρακώς ... (D4-6). By a non-distributive binary structure (all with all: n.2288, contrast n.2415) the triad is parcelled out over the positive and negative limbs, δίκαιον and καλόν in form going with the first limb and ἀγαθόν in form with the second, whereas in content all three go with both limbs.

<sup>2831</sup> τήν ... ὄργὴν καὶ ἡδονάς (D1), redoing τὰς ὄργας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας (B1-2): the singular ὄργήν is striking.

<sup>2832</sup> εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ (D3): On δή infixes with final item (cf.nn.38, 156). The list is redone just below with ἡ ποίησιν ἡ τινα ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἡ πόλει διακονίαν (D4), where the general terms δημιουργία (generalizing the arts of poetry and painting as acquired specialties) and διακονία

them when they are gathered, whether it is a poem<sup>2833</sup> or some other product of one's craft or a civic policy, if he makes the majority his master more than he needs, a Diomedean necessity makes their needs his needs, and forces him to do whatever the people in front of him will praise.<sup>2834</sup> On the other hand, that these things are good or beautiful in truth, have you ever heard one of these orators give an argument that was not utterly ridiculous?<sup>2835</sup>

“Never have and never will.”

So keep all this empirical material in mind and think back to that other thing, the beautiful in itself as opposed to the many beautifuls, or any thing-of-such-and-such-a-character, for that matter, as (494) opposed to the many suches: is there any way the mass will tolerate<sup>2836</sup> let alone adopt the outlook<sup>2837</sup> that they exist and have any significance?<sup>2838</sup>

“Far from it.”

So it is impossible for the mass to be a philosopher?<sup>2839</sup>

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(generalizing the political sphere and service rendered) reveal the meaning that the examples in the present list only suggest (cf. n. 1863 *ad* 420A5 and n.2030 *ad* 431C1-3)—namely the distinction originally drawn back in Book Two between work that requires skill and work that is merely ancillary (371CD).

<sup>2833</sup> ἐπιδεικνύμενος (D3) The speaker aspires to elevate the consciousness of the crowd by conveying something great (ἐπίδειξις): that a poem might be offered to a public gathering for its edification and benefit and not only its entertainment is an ideal since antiquity (*Leg.659B*) corruptible since antiquity (*Gorg.502BC*).

<sup>2834</sup> ή Διομηδεία λεγομένη ὀνάγκη (D6). The sense of the proverb (λεγομένη) is unknown. The phrase before it (κυρίους αὐτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλούς πέρα τῶν ὀναγκαίων, D5) suggests we should look for an interpretation according to which one brings the necessity onto oneself. The sense is that in courting forces beyond his control the man who set out to be leader becomes follower, as in the story of Odysseus and Diomedes stealing the Palladium during a night raid on Troy (cf. *Paroem.Gr. I.59-60* [=Z.III.8] and 2.367 [=Ap.VI.15]). On the way back Odysseus walking behind raises his sword to kill Diomedes so as to take all the praise for delivering the Palladium alone; Diomedes sees the shadow of the sword in the moonlight and maneuvers to capture Odysseus, and binds his hands and spans him back to the camp with the broad side of that same sword, producing a very different spectacle upon return from what Odysseus had envisioned. It is exactly this necessity that Tolstoy's General Kutuzov avoids by acquiescing to it in advance — that is, by ordering the army to do only what it would do anyway (*War and Peace* 2.7.15 et passim). Cf. the μακαρία ὀνάγκη that the tyrant brings onto himself (567D1).

<sup>2835</sup> καταγέλαστον (D8). The “needs” of the beast (τὰναγκαῖα, C4) become the necessity impinging on the ἐπιδεικνύοντα; and the account he would give in praising what they require him to praise would be absurd, since its needs are so far (ὅσον διαφέρει, C5) from the natural subjects of praise (i.e., the good, beautiful and just).

<sup>2836</sup> ὄντες (494A1), brought forward from 479A4, though again the emotional resistance is left unexplained (cf. 476D8-E2).

<sup>2837</sup> ήγήσεται (A1): of settled belief (n.438).

<sup>2838</sup> εἶναι (A2): “exist and have any significance.” Nothing prevents our expatiating on what Plato means by the single term εἶναι.

<sup>2839</sup> φιλόσοφον (A4). The unity of the mass allows it to be treated as a single person for the sake of satire. To call this conclusion, so hard won over the last fifty pages and still so fresh, “a commonplace among idealists,” as Shorey does, giving parallels, underestimates its importance to the development of

“Impossible.”

And necessary that those who practice philosophy<sup>2840</sup> be disparaged by them?

“Necessary.”

And disparaged also by these businessmen who work the crowd<sup>2841</sup> and desire to please it for their own profit?

“Clearly.”

Given all this what hope do you see that the philosophical nature<sup>2842</sup> can continue with its activity and make its way through to the goal?<sup>2843</sup> Consider what we have already established. We've agreed that aptitude to learn, good memory, bravery and magnanimity<sup>2844</sup> belong to this nature. As such, this sort of man even in childhood will stand out as best among the children, especially if his body should develop in a way that matches his soul. His family and fellow citizens will be planning to press him into civic service or the family business once he comes of age. Indeed they will subordinate themselves to him with requests and honors, trying to get an early purchase on his potential and flatter him on the come.

“That is indeed what tends to happen.”

So how do you expect him to react to such circumstances, especially if he comes from a big city and from the wealthy and noble class, and he's good looking and large in stature to boot? Will he not be filled with the highest hopes, feel assured he will be able to make his mark among Greeks as well as foreigners, and elevate himself to the very pinnacle, full in his proud outline but empty of intelligence

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the argument. To be philosophical requires dialogue and dialogue requires inwardness or thinking. But as soon as we begin down that path we will find ourselves sooner or later at the radical result Socrates reached with Glaucon at the end of Book Four and the powers and principalities will crumble once again!

<sup>2840</sup>τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας (A6) The participle is used, rather than the adjective in the adjacent context (φιλόσοφον), in order to refer back to the assertion as originally made by Adeimantus (487C6-D5), where, saliently, philosophy was for the first in the discussion described as an activity or area of study (ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ ὥρμήσαντες [C5-6], ἐνδιατρίψωσιν [D1]: cf. n.2719).

<sup>2841</sup>ὄχλῳ (A9) an alternative singular term for the plurality assembled. τούτων indicates that the ἴδιῶται he refers to are the μισθαρνοῦντες of 493A6 (cf. also 492A7), not the type of the “layman” Shorey finds at Gorg.481E, 510D, 513B. Philosophy is unavailable to the many as well as to the sophists that mouth their ideas back to them just when they were about to think them.

<sup>2842</sup>φιλοσόφῳ φύσει (A11): Still and again the man is called, by synecdoche, a φύσις (cf. 486A2). Socrates's questions recall the speech of Adeimantus in Book Two (365A6: τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς, etc.), and another chip has been taken off the table.

<sup>2843</sup>ἐπιτηδεύματι (A12): That philosophy could be an ἐπιτήδευμα is first said at 489C10 and D2. What approaching the goal of the ἐπιτήδευμα (πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν, A12) can mean was described in passing, at 490A8-B7.

<sup>2844</sup>ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν (B1), referring back exactly and only to 490C10-11, the reduced list of virtues he gently requested Adeimantus to approve, not the whole chorus he had reached with Glaucon at 487A, which in its plenitude had elicited Adeimantus's invidious interruption.

within?<sup>2845</sup> And how do you suppose a person in his condition would react if you approached gently<sup>2846</sup> and told him the truth, that for all he has, he lacks intelligence, that he needs this, that this is something a person cannot acquire without becoming a slave to the process of its acquisition. Do you suppose he will find this litany easy<sup>2847</sup> to hearken to?

“Far from it.”

But if in fact,<sup>2848</sup> given his inborn virtues and natural kinship with ideas and discussion, he had the insight<sup>2849</sup> to see this is true, and he changed direction and was drawn toward philosophy, what do you suppose those other people would do as they watched his usefulness<sup>2850</sup> to them coming to an end as well as their association with him? Would they stick at any act or any statement, or would they instead say and do whatever they could,<sup>2851</sup> both to him in order to prevent his being persuaded and to the persuader to keep him from succeeding, whether by private intrigue or by public enactment and suit?

(495) “Much compels them to do so.”<sup>2852</sup>

And so is there any way the young man will practice philosophy?<sup>2853</sup>

<sup>2845</sup> σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ ἄνευ νοῦ ἐμπιμπλάμενον (D1-2): For Socrates’s oxymoronic uses of empty and full compare 486C7-8, during his conversation with Glaucon. νοῦς is notably a new term in this context (cf. D5 below). The present passage may allude to the paradigmatic and notorious case of Alcibiades (cf. *Alc.I.104A4-C1*), but more importantly it (again) echoes, in language, style and method, the speech of Adeimantus in Book Two (πρόθυρα καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἔμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς, 365C3-4). Compare also the manner of citing poetry (the tragic rhythm and diction of ὑψηλὸν ἔξαιρεῖν and σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ [494D1-2]: cf. πότερον δίκῃ τεῖχος ὕψιον ἡ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβάζεις [365B2-3]), and compare the theme of outer show and inner substance with 365C3-6. Cf. the echoes at 494A11, 492C3, 492A5, and nn. *ad locc.*

<sup>2846</sup> ήρέμα προσελθών (D4) retains the notion of a wild animal, but προσελθών also suggests that this intimating of the truth is being done out of the earshot of others whom he would fain impress, another reminiscence of the conversation Adeimantus depicts occurring within the young man who, conversely and in truth, is trying to gather the nerve to drop his scruples (365C6-366B2).

<sup>2847</sup> εὐπετές (D6) one of the morally slippery words Adeimantus used in his speech (364A4 with n.794, and 364C6) repeated here in a wheedling litotes.

<sup>2848</sup> δ’ οὖν (D9): οὖν “marking the opposed idea as essential” (Denniston, 460 and 465).

<sup>2849</sup> Reading εἰσαισθάνηται (E1) with Burnet (based on ms.F), against the εἶς αἰσθάνηται of ADM, which is intolerable even without the τε of AD. Slings’s objection (*Crit.Notes*, 101) that the compound is absent from LSJ only begs the question. It comments upon the common compound εἰσακοῦσαι just above: even if his disposition is not such as to hearken, his inborn powers might instinctually notice.

<sup>2850</sup> αὐτοῦ τὴν χρείαν (E3), a cynical pun, revealing the mendacity of the ἔταιρία associated with χρεία. Their use for him (cf. χρῆσθαι, B8 supra) will pass away when he becomes useless in the same way all philosophers are (ἀχρήστους, 487D5).

<sup>2851</sup> πᾶν μὲν ἔργον πᾶν δ’ ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας (E3-4): The chiasm (E3-4), more the rule than the exception, clears the decks for the καί / καί parallelism that ensues (E5-7). For the collocation of λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν for political maneuvering, cf. n.4024. Socrates has now revealed to Adeimantus what the fathers’ and caretakers’ motives for giving a flawed moral upbringing might be (362E5-363A2)!

<sup>2852</sup> πολλὴ ἀνάγκη (495A1): The phrase should perhaps be seen as an affectation of Adeimantus’s (cf. 492D1, 496A4).

<sup>2853</sup> φιλοσοφήσει (A2), the verb is borrowed from the participle at 494A6.

“Barely.”

So now you can see<sup>2854</sup> that we were not making a vicious argument<sup>2855</sup> when we said that the very components of the philosophical nature, if raised in a bad environment, can in a way be responsible for its falling away from the practice of philosophy, they and the conventional goods, too—namely, wealth<sup>2856</sup> and the related apparatus.

“No, the argument was quite a correct one.”<sup>2857</sup>

So there you have it, how many and how great<sup>2858</sup> the forces that destroy and corrupt a man best endowed by his nature to pursue the greatest of callings, an endowment already rare among mankind, as we claimed;<sup>2859</sup> and how it is from such sources that the greatest malefactors in politics and in private life flow forth, as well as those who accomplish the greatest good if they have the luck to flow in a different channel, whereas a man of slight natural gifts has never had a great effect whether in private or public life.

“Quite true.”<sup>2860</sup>

And now that those who were best suited to pursue her have fallen away and left her neglected and unfulfilled,<sup>2861</sup> behold how instead they for their part go on to live lives unsuited to themselves and untrue, while she is left behind by them like an orphan bereft of her proper family, the prey of unworthy interlopers who handle her shamefully and bring ill repute upon her, that scornful reputation you repeated above, how those who commune<sup>2862</sup> with her are in some cases utterly incapable men but in most cases are men capable of many evils.<sup>2863</sup>

“These are indeed the criticisms one hears.”<sup>2864</sup>

<sup>2854</sup> ὄρρης οὖν (A4): Along with using empirical arguments from likelihood, Socrates continues to turn Adeimantus's privileging of sight back against him (ὄρρην repeated from 487C6 at 490D2; then θεάσασθαι, 490E2; then ὄρρης 494A11; and here, ὄρρης). ἄρα (A4) emphasizes that thought has brought new “insight.”

<sup>2855</sup> κακῶς ἐλέγομεν (A4) a rather broad expression, meaning not only making a bad argument but also, reminiscent of Adeimantus's challenge against argument *per se*, making the mistake of relying on argumentation.

<sup>2856</sup> πλοῦτοι (A7), a derogatory plural (cf. n. 1180), as παρασκευή (A8) is a derogatory characterization in place of a generalization (cf. nn. 2030, 2688).

<sup>2857</sup> ὄρθως (A9) the more proper term (than κακῶς, A4).

<sup>2858</sup> τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη (B1), answering to πολλοὶ ὄλεθροι καὶ μεγάλοι (491B4-5). The chiastic binary pleonasm (οὗτος / ὄλεθρος // διαφθορά / τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, A10-B1) is striking.

<sup>2859</sup> ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν (B2), recalling 491B1-2.

<sup>2860</sup> ἀληθέστατα (B7), a relatively unreserved response from Adeimantus. The superlative in answer usually acknowledges that one is agreeing to the preceding statement in all its complexity and perspicacity (n. 1936).

<sup>2861</sup> ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῆ (C1), relying on the picture of mutual fulfillment drawn at 490B1-7.

<sup>2862</sup> συνόντες (C5) is prurient, suggesting a perversion of the true philosophical ἔρως that was described at 490B1-7.

<sup>2863</sup> οἱ μὲν οὐδενός, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἄξιοι (C5-6): With this it seems Socrates affords a new interpretation for Adeimantus's criticism, as if these interlopers might somehow be the persons made either useless or evil by philosophy.

<sup>2864</sup> καὶ γάρ οὖν (C7): οὖν with καὶ γάρ describes the persistence of the ὄνειδος and γε approves

And likely true for that matter. Men of lesser natural gifts see the field wide open before them, a field still full of high sounding talk and pretensions.<sup>2865</sup> Like men who break out of prison and run to a temple for asylum they gleefully drop their tools to hop, skip, and jump over to philosophy, those of them at least who were especially clever at their particular specialty. For in comparison with the trades, given what they are, philosophy retains her lofty repute despite how poorly she fares. It is this esteem they are after, though the majority of them come to her with an incomplete endowment of natural gifts, and come from jobs that have left their mark not only on their bodies the way such work tends to do, but also have left their souls puny and enervated,<sup>2866</sup> inevitably so.

In your judgment do they make any better a spectacle<sup>2867</sup> than the bronze smith that has come into some silver,<sup>2868</sup> a little bald man who just emerged from his shackles and out of the bathhouse<sup>2869</sup> spanking clean, decked out in a brand new shirt like a groom, just now rich enough to marry the daughter his master left behind unprotected and destitute?<sup>2870</sup>

(496) “No better at all.”

Then tell me what sorts of offspring such men as these are likely to father? Can they be anything but illegitimate and insignificant?

“Much compels them to be.”

What should we say then about people who are unworthy by their natural endowments to receive education? When they approach her and commune with her so outmatched, what sorts of

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the accuracy of Socrates's portrayal of it, but with the passive participle Adeimantus disowns, as often, all responsibility for making the statement.

<sup>2865</sup> καλῶν δὲ ὄνομάτων καὶ προσχημάτων μεστήν (C9-D1): A description from the benighted point of view, like the description of the captain's bad hearing and eyesight (488B1-2). Only the ignoramus could find ἀλαζονεία in philosophy. The paradox of empty fullness (μεστήν, cf. 494D1-2 and n.2845) is lost on this pretender.

<sup>2866</sup> For συγκεκλασμένοι (E1) cf. *Thet.* 173B1: κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται, which itself describes σμικροί ... καὶ οὐκ ὄρθοι τὰς ψυχάς (173A3), relating the effect on the servant whose job is to protect an unjust master. κάμπτονται refers to οὐκ ὄρθοι and συγκλῶνται to σμικροί. The root metaphor is fragmentation; there is no warrant for LSJ's “mangled.” For ἀποτεθρυμμένοι cf. n.1036 on τρυφᾶν (aspiration transferred). The present passage is an exception to LSJ's note (s.v. θρύπτω, § I) that the literal sense (“shatter”) is found more commonly in compounds, while uncompounded the verb has moral senses. Again the underlying sense is fragmentation, now a short attention span and a nervous impatience with the larger unities, and τε καὶ links synonyms. The banausic occupations are directed to concrete and external goals that upon completion leave the mind nothing to occupy itself with (cf. *Leg.* 644A). – All three perfects (including λελώβηνται) suggest that these effects of his work are permanent.

<sup>2867</sup> ἵδεῖν (E4) an adverbial accusative (Smyth §2005), like ἀκοῦσαι at 491B11.

<sup>2868</sup> ἀργύριον κτησαμένου χαλκέως (E4-5): Socrates's metaphor incorporates the myth of the metals about the nature inborn (415A), into the job the man is imagined to have (χαλκός) and the wealth he is imagined to have come into (ἀργυρος), placing the adventitious event into the larger perspective of what the underlying nature of things (both his own and that of the world around him) has in store.

<sup>2869</sup> λελυμένου / λελουμένου (E6): note the satirical rhyme.

<sup>2870</sup> πενίαν, ἐρημίαν / δεσπότου // θυγατέρα / γαμεῖν (E7-8): The upstart imagines replacing his master, an undermeaning conveyed by the chiastic order; but the order requires δεσπότου to squint as a subjective genitive with the words before it as well as a possessive genitive with θυγατέρα after it.

thoughts are likely to be engendered, and what opinions? Would they not be the sort of clever claptrap one would find only appropriate coming from them, but nothing that is authentic or worthwhile by virtue of its connection with true mindfulness?<sup>2871</sup>

“Utterly true.”

Utterly small then is the remnant of persons left to commune with philosophy on her level. Perhaps he is a person protected by exile so that he can remain the noble and well raised character he was,<sup>2872</sup> enough bereaved of corrupting influences that he can continue in philosophy's company according to his natural inclination. Perhaps a person of large soul born in a city so small he can despise it and look beyond, or maybe he is the rare case of the person who out of his superior makeup despises the trade he finds himself in and deserves instead to approach her.<sup>2873</sup> So also perhaps could the so-called bridle of our friend Theages enable one to stay in contact with her. In his case he was completely qualified to fall away from philosophy<sup>2874</sup> except that nursing his sicknesses<sup>2875</sup> held him back from participating in political affairs. My own case of the nay-saying daemon is not worth mentioning: while it's possible somebody else in the past had such a sign, it's just as likely nobody did.

Now those who find themselves<sup>2876</sup> among this small population and have tasted this possession, so sweet and ambrosial, and conversely have recognized the madness of the crowd for what it is, and know that virtually everybody involved in politics is involved for unhealthy reasons, and that one will find no ally there he could call to his side in defense of a just cause so as to save it, but that he is a man fallen among a pack of beasts, as it were, unable either to join them in their nefarious plots nor to pit himself against them as one man against all, and that comes to know before he could achieve any gain for his city or his friends by fighting on their behalf he would end up useless both to himself and to the others<sup>2877</sup>—once he weighs all these facts in his mind and keeps quiet and minds his own business, and like a man taking shelter behind some little wall from a storm of dust and hailstones

<sup>2871</sup> Reading ἄξιον ως ἀληθινῆς with ms.D (496A8-9), against ἄξιον ἀληθινῆς (mss.AM) and ἀληθινῆς ως ἄξιον (ms.F), and against the deletion of ἄξιον by Ast (followed by Burnet and Chambray) and its emendation into ἄξιως by Campbell. The entire phrase, καὶ οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἄξιον ως ἀληθινῆς ἔχόμενον, ascends to an elegant closure by intimating that the authentic (γνήσιον) element rests on (καί) being worthy of mind (φρονήσεως ἄξιον), because connected that is with true mindfulness (ώς ἀληθινῆς ἔχόμενον [φρονήσεως])—the intimation forces the explanation into hyperbaton.

<sup>2872</sup> ἀπορίαι τῶν διαφθειρόντων (B2-3), an oxymoron: his loss is gain.

<sup>2873</sup> ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀν ἔλθοι (B6): The language of wooing is continued (cf. 496A5-7).

<sup>2874</sup> τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκένασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας (C1-2): That is, he was a man of significant mental and psychic virtues, with external goods besides (πάντα = all goods but the bodily)—another striking oxymoron.

<sup>2875</sup> νοσοτροφία (C2) another oxymoron: the word was coined at 407B1. The list of disabilities and unfortunate circumstances once again save a man from injustice, a transmogrification of the sentiment Adeimantus expressed at 366D2-3 (carrying forward what Glaucon had said at 359B1).

<sup>2876</sup> Reading τούτων τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι (C5) with mss.AFD and most edd. (vs. γενόμενοι M). For the construction J.-C. rightly compare Thuc.3.56.6, ὃν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι; and Adam finds, closer to hand, Rep.360A7-8; Leg.754D4; Parm.127D2-3; Phdo.69D2-4. Shorey adds Ar.Nub.107. It is not Plato's purpose to make a veiled allusion to certain individuals whose names we are supposed to guess, but Socrates's purpose to defend philosophy for the sake of Adeimantus, who might be too easily swayed by what the majority might think about him (cf. n.2787). Shorey discounts speculation with suave prudence (2.48 note a, 2.50 note b, 2.51 note f), but can't resist mentioning Alcibiades (2.43 note f).

<sup>2877</sup> ἀνωφελῆς αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις γένοιτο (D5), a euphemism for “dead.”

borne by the winds, and watches the others take their fill of utter lawlessness,<sup>2878</sup> he is satisfied to make his way through this life staying clear any way he can from the contagion of injustice and impious acts<sup>2879</sup> and looks forward to his release from it with good hope, joyful and at peace.<sup>2880</sup>

(497) “But to finish life having achieved this much would be no mean feat.”<sup>2881</sup>

But neither would he have achieved the great feat he could have, chancing as he did to live in a city not suited to him. In a suitable one he will<sup>2882</sup> conversely grow to greatness and save both his own friends and the common weal. But<sup>2883</sup> as to the topic of philosophy, why she has gotten this reputation and how it is an unwarranted one, I feel we have said about the right amount,<sup>2884</sup> unless you have something to add for your part.

### D.3d: Government by King-Philosopher is Possible

“No, I have nothing to add on those topics, but which of the existing kinds of government are you thinking is suited to philosophy?”

Not a one, and that’s what I am complaining about, that among the existing ways of organizing a city none is worthy of the philosophical nature, and also about the way nature is skewed and altered, the way a foreign seed planted in some new environment has a tendency to leave its own qualities behind and is forced take on local ones. This strain, too, at present, is barely holding on to its own proper nature and powers, but is falling away from them and taking on a new character. When it takes

<sup>2878</sup> καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας (D8-9), another oxymoron of empty fullness: cf. 495C9-D1, 494D2, 486C7-8.

<sup>2879</sup> ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων (D9): representing virtue in general with the pair δίκαιον / ὄστιον is a commonplace (cf. n.105), but pairing the abstract feminine singular with a concrete neuter plural achieves special elevation. καθαρός recalls the purity we had sought to protect in the guardians (416E6-417A5), though of course we are now speaking of the good ἴδιώτης. We shall be given another glimpse of him in Book Eight (549CD).

<sup>2880</sup> μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἵλεώς τε καὶ εὐμενῆς ἀπαλλάξεται (E2) To the extent that both the drama and the argumentation have now showed that the underlying intolerance toward philosophy derives from envy over the philosopher’s participation in truth, it becomes important to ask whether the philosopher feels some Schadenfreude when he looks back at those who would persecute him. The reader must decide for himself whether this passage, and whether the passage at the end of Book Three in which ἀκήρατον appears (416D3-17B8), adequately recognize, and provide a credible immunization against, such a temptation. Socrates, as Plato depicts him at the end of the *Apology* (esp. 41D5-42A2) and in the *Crito* and *Phaedo*, achieves the very state of mind that Plato here has him describe!

<sup>2881</sup> οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα (497A1): Adeimantus is responding to the litotes in ἀγαπᾶ (D9).

<sup>2882</sup> αὐξήσεται / σώσει (A4-5): His future indicative (rather than optative or past indicative with ὅν) implies that Socrates sees this eventuality as perfectly possible and even inevitable under the right circumstances. The “optimistic” tone encourages Adeimantus to infer a little too much from the remark – that there in fact (νῦν, A10) exists a πολιτεία that is suited to such a man.

<sup>2883</sup> Burnet marks the transition with a paragraph break. Transition to a new point is often effected by making an engaging remark (αὐξήσεται / σώσει, A4-5) followed by a self-interruption (μὲν οὖν, A6) to note that one’s comments on the topic at hand are complete. The interlocutor may then ask about the engaging point (ἀλλὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῇ τίνα, A9-10), which turns out to be the topic the speaker had in mind to bring up next.

<sup>2884</sup> μετρίως εἰρήσθαι (A7), cf. 450B5.

root in the best kind of city, best as itself is best, we all shall come to see that this city was something truly divine all along, and that other cities are merely human, measured by the natures of their citizens and the kinds of institutions they have. Clearly your next question will be which kind of city this is.

“Wrong! It wasn’t this I was going to ask but whether this best city is the one we have created in our conversation or some other type.”

In most respects it is indeed that city, but there was that one thing we mentioned before, that the city would need always to have a certain something in it that would preserve the idea of the constitution that you<sup>2885</sup> had in mind when as her lawgiver you laid down her laws.

“Yes that was mentioned.”

Mentioned it was, but left insufficiently clear. I was afraid it would make you all try to obstruct<sup>2886</sup> me, by which you would make clear how long and arduous the demonstration would be, a thing you have since already done.<sup>2887</sup> Mind you this last question, too, will not exactly be easy.<sup>2888</sup>

“Which?”

The question how the city is to remain involved in philosophy so as to avoid its own demise. All great projects are plagued with vicissitude. The saying is very true: fine things are difficult.

“Nevertheless, let the demonstration reach its goal and completion, by this last becoming plain.”

It’s not a lack of desire that prevents but if anything<sup>2889</sup> a lack of ability. You’re sitting right next to me and so you can see how eager and committed I am to try. Watch now with what eagerness and daring I speak when I broach the idea that exactly the opposite of the current practice with regard to

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<sup>2885</sup> σὺ ὁ νομοθέτης (D1), a strikingly personal reference to Adeimantus and their conversation about the details of legislation in Book Four. The particular point, that the preservation of the city rested on the continuing presence of “one certain thing” (C8-D1), was first made by Socrates and Glaucon, at 412A, the one thing being an ἐπιστάτης who manages the balance between music and gymnastics. In the subsequent conversation with Adeimantus at 423D8-424A2 Socrates brought this point forward, saying that he and Adeimantus may dispense with detailed legislative advice for their guards (*προστάγματα*) as long as they can rely on them to keep the one main thing in mind, the education (and as to the rest, κοινὰ τὰ φίλων!). In the present passage this “element” (τι, C8) is now said not to maintain the education *per se*, nor the balance between music and gymnastics *per se*, but the same λόγον τῆς πολιτείας Adeimantus (and Socrates) had in mind when they were formulating their legislation. This entirely vague way of referring to the *παιδεία* creates space for μεταχειρίζεσθαι φιλοσοφίαν (D8), itself an entirely new concept, to be introduced as a specification or elaboration of *παιδεία*. The personal reference emphasizes Adeimantus’s role in fostering Polemarchus’s interruption at the beginning of Book Five, for which Socrates now more explicitly attributes an anti-philosophical motive, now that philosophy has been defined (474B-480A) and Adeimantus’s objection to philosophy (487BD) has been answered. Alongside the ὄκνος motifs in the sequel we might by now suspect that Socrates is trying to bring or keep his interlocutor on board as he moves through another paradoxical or scandalous transition, like the ones he had to work his way through with great labor in Book Five, a task to which he ruefully refers with the perfect, δεδηλώκατε (D5).

<sup>2886</sup> ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι (D4), with Adam the opposite of ἀφίέναι (as used at 449B6, et passim). Cf. 505A1 with n.3016, and 336B2 with n.265.

<sup>2887</sup> δεδηλώκατε (D5), the plural referring to the whole group. The verb has now been used four times with four meanings in twelve lines (497C1-D5).

<sup>2888</sup> Reading πάντως (D6) with all mss., against Bekker’s πάντων read by edd. It is merely a litotes.

<sup>2889</sup> On εἴπερ (E3) brachylogical, cf. Stallb. *ad loc.*, Riddell *Digest* §252, Shorey *ad loc.*, and Denniston 489.

philosophy must become the city's rule.

“How is that?”

Currently, those who take it up at all do so as lads, (498) soon past their childhood but before they have to become householders and breadwinners.<sup>2890</sup> Just as they approach the most difficult aspect of the practice they leave it off, and yet think of themselves as fully philosophized (that most difficult aspect I refer to is the work with arguments). After this when now and then they are encouraged to sit through a course of lectures by others who are occupied with philosophy, the times they go to the trouble of accepting the invitation they put on airs of superiority for doing so, as having time to spare for such things. As old age approaches, with some exceptions, the flame is quenched more finally than the sun Heraclitus talks about,<sup>2891</sup> to the point that they never rekindle it.

“And how must it be instead?”

Quite the opposite.<sup>2892</sup> While they are lads and young they should be engaged in a youthful version of education and philosophy,<sup>2893</sup> and they should lavish special care on their bodies during the time they sprout up and become virile, so as to render it a secure support for their philosophy. When they come of age and the soul begins to reach maturity, they should increase the gymnastic that strengthens the soul.<sup>2894</sup> And when their physical energy begins to wane and they divert what is left of it away from politics and military activities, at that point they should be put out to pasture and allowed to do nothing else unless they have free time,<sup>2895</sup> if they are to live a happy life and after death to take on a role in the world beyond that befits the way they lived.

“I have to admit you are making your case with eagerness; but I'll bet the majority among<sup>2896</sup> your

<sup>2890</sup> ἄρτι ἐκ παιδῶν (497E9-498A1): Socrates here states positively what Adeimantus at 487C7-D1 (νέοι ὄντες) stated negatively. For μεταξύ designating something between an explicit and an implicit term, see the passages cited by Shiletto in Dem. *Falsa Leg.* 181; Aesch. *Choeph.* 63; Ar. *Ach.* 433, Av. 187; Dem. *Cor.* 233.32; E. *Hec.* 436; Thuc. 3.51; and cf. μεσότης at Arist. *NE* 1127A13, where Immelman's emendation is unneeded.

<sup>2891</sup> τοῦ Ἡρακλείτειον ἥλιον (A7-B1): cf. DK B6. The sun is new every day (but the day is new only because of sunrise). Some things don't come back.

<sup>2892</sup> πᾶν τούναντίον (B3), a reiteration of τούναντίον ἢ νῦν (497E6, above), for emphasis. The opposition runs through each stage of life and guides our understanding of the passage. In youth youthful studies rather than mature; in old age nothing but philosophy instead of none; and in the middle, laborious servitude (ἐπιτείνειν ... γυμνασίαν: cf. δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, 494D6) rather than supercilious dabbling.

<sup>2893</sup> μειρακιώδη παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν (B3-4): The παιδεία of Books Two and Three was aimed at this age group. To speak here of the development of the body as providing an ὑπηρεσία to the soul slants away from the internal temperamental balance sought, in Book Three, for younger persons in the balancing of gymnastics and music. We are moving closer to the conventional idea that gymnastics is for the body and music (*philosophical* music) is for the soul, but in a continued obeisance to the notion of balance Socrates next speaks of philosophy as the gymnastic of the soul.

<sup>2894</sup> τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια (B7-8): This gymnastic was what he called τὸ χαλεπώτατον above, and then described with signal vagueness as τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους (A3-4).

<sup>2895</sup> Contrast εἰ μὴ πάρεργον (C2) with πάρεργον αὐτὸ πράττειν (A6), and compare the Aristotelian proverb, ἀσχολάζομεν ἵνα σχολάζωμεν (EN 1177B4-5).

<sup>2896</sup> οἵμαι μέντοι τοὺς πολλούς (C6): Adeimantus according to his manner makes a condescending joke about Socrates's opinion of οἱ πολλοί: that he'll find that such πολλοί constitute the *majority* (τοὺς πολλούς) of his current audience.

auditors are even more eager to strain *against* what you say and are not about to be persuaded in the least, starting with Thrasymachus.”<sup>2897</sup>

Don't try to stir things up between Thrasymachus and me, who've just now become friends and before were never enemies anyway.<sup>2898</sup> No, we won't give up trying one bit, until we either succeed at persuading both your man Thrasymachus and the others,<sup>2899</sup> or give them some little advantage in their next life, when they will be born again<sup>2900</sup> only to encounter such arguments as these all over again.

“A time of course not so far off.”<sup>2901</sup>

Not far off at all when you measure it against all of time.<sup>2902</sup> As to your point that the many<sup>2903</sup> are not persuaded by this course of reasoning, that's not surprising. Their eyes have never witnessed what thought has now borne witness to,<sup>2904</sup> though they have seen such neat contrivances made of mere

<sup>2897</sup> ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξαμένους (C7-8): Again Adeimantus deflects the final responsibility to others at the same time that he insulates himself from Socrates's theme by condescending to his sincerity—though indeed Socrates set himself up for such treatment (*σκόπει ...*, 497E5-6). He singles out Thrasymachus because he is a teacher of rhetoric, just the sort to be hired by the rich to teach their lads how to become top people, and also because he is the most likely to jump in at this point and exonerate himself from having to agree in his own person.

<sup>2898</sup> ἄρτι φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐχθροὺς ὄντας (C9-D1): The only time that is neither since nor before at which they could have become friends, is the time during which they argued. The perfect indicates the friendship he refers to was produced during that time and the double negative οὐκ ἐχθρούς is a litotes that means there was nothing between them that brought the argument on. Διάβαλλε is a conative present: cf. *Symp.* 222D1.

<sup>2899</sup> ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον / ἀνήσομεν (C9, D2): The “us” consisting of Thrasymachus and Socrates (in relation to Adeimantus as the second person), is directly replaced by a “we” that consists of Socrates and Adeimantus (ἀνήσομεν), that places Thrasymachus and the others into the third person (Thrasymachus is referred to with “second person” τοῦτο because Adeimantus brought him up). And yet by hesitating or demurring to agree and redirecting the argument toward a fight among others than himself, Adeimantus indirectly but indisputably placed himself among the others Socrates still needs to persuade!

<sup>2900</sup> αὐθίς γενόμενοι (D4) suggests rebirth into this life more than the transmigration to another that was suggested for the others just above (τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν, C4). Socrates speaks darkly to Adeimantus's conscience, as does the prophet of Apollo. We shall see in the end how one's knowledge in this life might give him an advantage in the next (618B6-619B1).

<sup>2901</sup> εἰς μικρόν γε χρόνον εἴρηκας (D5) This is the fourth time Adeimantus indulges in bluffing misdirection (cf. καὶ φαινόν γε, 423C5 continued at D7; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, 424D7; σὺ δέ γε οἶμαι οὐκ εἰωθας, 487E6). In the presence of superiors such behavior borders on impertinence.

<sup>2902</sup> εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν (D6) By this retort of Adeimantus's remark Socrates trumps the assertion Glaucon made at the beginning of the treatment of the “paradoxes” at the beginning of Book Five. There, all of a man's life was the measure of how much time we should spend on the most important questions (450B6-7); but now a man's life is seen as a speck in all of time; and in a moment we will hear that it is *completion*, not simple termination, that qualifies something to be a measure. On μὲν οὖν adding a stronger term (οὐδέν vs. μικρόν), cf. Denniston, 476.

<sup>2903</sup> τοὺς πολλούς (D7): Socrates picks up only the conceptual meaning of οἱ πολλοί and slips past the reference to the persons present that Adeimantus had laid in his path.

<sup>2904</sup> εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον (D8).

words<sup>2905</sup>—like the jingle we just now chanced upon. It is a man whose life jibes<sup>2906</sup> with and is assimilated to virtue as nearly as human substance can allow, in action as well as mind, (499) ruling in a city virtuous in all his ways, that they have never beheld,<sup>2907</sup> not one nor many.<sup>2908</sup> Or do you fancy they have?

“No way have they seen that!”<sup>2909</sup>

Nor for that matter,<sup>2910</sup> my blessed<sup>2911</sup> friend, have they witnessed enough of arguments beautiful and free<sup>2912</sup> with their ears,<sup>2913</sup> the sort that seek after truth straining with vigor any way they can for knowing’s sake and admire only from afar<sup>2914</sup> the dazzling subtleties and eristic trickery that stab at<sup>2915</sup> opinion and at defeating and castigating others, whether in the law courts or in private gatherings.<sup>2916</sup>

“Nor these have they heard.”

<sup>2905</sup>ῥήματα (E1), in a context rightly dominated by λόγοι, become mere. He is referring to the accidental παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις in the expression, γενόμενον / λεγόμενον.

<sup>2906</sup>παρισωμένον καὶ ώμοιωμένον (E3) importing the sophisticated rhetorical figures of an Isocrates or a Gorgias (παρίσωσις / παρομοίωσις) into the actual life of the man.

<sup>2907</sup>οὐ πώποτε ἐωράκασιν (499A1): Socrates tenaciously continues to pit reliance on argument against reliance on what one sees (εἶδον [498D8], ἐωράκασιν [499A1], both taking participles). Cf. 487C6 and nn.2718, 2732, 2751, 2782).

<sup>2908</sup>With anticlimactic πλείους (A2) he nods to οἱ πολλοί.

<sup>2909</sup>οὐδαμῶς γε (A3): For that is not there to be seen.

<sup>2910</sup>οὐδέ γε αὖ λόγων (A4): He echoes Adeimantus’s γε (A3). Though the philosopher must enslave himself to truth he is free from the requirements (ἀναγκαῖα, 493C4) of the crowd.

<sup>2911</sup>ὦ μακάριε (A4), a term reserved for the highest things (cf.nn.259, 1853), the vocative revealing as usual Socrates’s attitude about the logos rather than his interlocutor (cf. nn.554, 2269 ad 450D2, 2313, 2623, 2641, 3053).

<sup>2912</sup>καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων (A4): ἐλευθέρων rather than formulaic ὀγαθῶν is striking, and proleptically frames the alternative he is about to describe.

<sup>2913</sup>Though they are here to be heard. ἐπήκοοι γεγόνασιν (A5), periphrastic for ἀκηκόασιν or ἐπακηκόασιν, stresses the merely auditory aspect of hearing arguments, in order to associate the experience with the visual experience he has been contrasting with thought.

The ἐπι- makes them eavesdroppers. In a moment of stunning candor Socrates leaves only one alternative open to Adeimantus, that he be an eavesdropper rather than a fellow researcher; but with ικανῶς he provides the small comfort that even the eavesdropper can be brought along if he hears enough.

<sup>2914</sup>πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων (A9-10): “embrace at a distance,” is strictly an oxymoron (cf.E.Hipp.102, πρόσωθεν αὐτὴν ἀγνὸς ὥν ἀσπάζομαι).

<sup>2915</sup>τείνοντα (A7) is pale in comparison to συντεταμένος (A5) with which it shares its etymon. The goal of mastering opinion (δόξαν) for the purpose of defeating others (ἔριν) refers back to the sophist as the philosopher’s counterpart, and to his attempts to make money (μισθωνούντων, 493A6) by managing the approval and disapproval of the beast, in contrast to the liberal (ἐλευθέρων, A4) pursuit of the philosopher whose only profit is coming to know the truth (τοῦ γνῶναι χάριν, A6). There is in the comparison a kind of παρίσωσις or παρομοίωσις of ideas rather than mere words.

<sup>2916</sup>συνουσίας (A8) refers to the present gathering as much as to any other.

“So now you can see<sup>2917</sup> my reasons and see what I saw coming when, before, I made the argument despite my apprehensions,<sup>2918</sup> forced by truth herself to continue,<sup>2919</sup> and asserted that no city, no type of government, nor for the same reasons any individual man,<sup>2920</sup> could ever reach his full potential unless and until these philosophers I describe, few as they are, scoundrels not a one nor useless though they are currently acclaimed to be, came by some conspiracy of chance and compulsion to put on the mantle of taking care of the city whether they wanted to or not, while the city for its part became heedful of them;<sup>2921</sup> or else<sup>2922</sup> if it chances that the sons<sup>2923</sup> of persons currently holding the offices of rule and kingship, if not the incumbents themselves, fall stricken with a genuine passion for genuine philosophy by some stroke of divine providence. To argue that either or both of these two alternatives is impossible of realization seems to me entirely unreasonable. If it were, we could justly be ridiculed for confusing vain dreams with argumentation – don’t you think?

“I do.”<sup>2924</sup>

Then you’ll have to agree that if ever it has devolved out of necessity on those best qualified for philosophy to take on the care of the city at some time in the infinite stretches of the past, or if it is

<sup>2917</sup>τοι (A11) is personal, but less confrontational than τοίνυν would be.

<sup>2918</sup>ἡμεῖς (B1): Socrates continues to use the first plural, even though at this point it can only include himself, because he wishes not to exclude those who have not participated.

<sup>2919</sup>ὑπὸ τάληθοῦς ἡναγκασμένοι (B1-2): A glance back at the topic of compulsion: cf. 490C8-D7 and n.2782. For the theme of yielding to the power of truth despite the implication of paradox cf. the expression ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ (n. 4844).

<sup>2920</sup>οὗτε πόλις οὗτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ’ ἀνήρ (B2): The πόλις is the empirical polis; the πολιτεία is the theoretical polis against which Polemarchus and Adeimantus had anti-philosophically raised problems of the empirical polis to criticize; and the ἀνήρ is the true subject of the whole treatise, the search for whose personal justice was the occasion to construct the theoretical πολιτεία in the first place. The implication, as at 472C4-D2, is that until the λογιστικόν within the man assumes command and his other parts acquiesce to it, the virtue that Glaucon and Socrates had discovered at the end of Book Four will never be achieved. With this bold assertion (reinforced by shift from οὗτε to οὐδέ γε, B2) Socrates finally begins to close the digression into paradox (C2-5: for εὐχαῖς ὄμοια, C4-5, cf. 450D1-2, μὴ εὐχὴ δοκεῖ ὁ λόγος) with which Book Five began. The last twitches of envy still need to play themselves out.

<sup>2921</sup>Reading dat. sing. κατηκόω (B6), Schleiermacher’s brilliant and slight emendation of the κατήκοοι of the mss. The meaning got by the dative is corroborated by πειθομένην at 502B5 and by the schol. here (ἀντὶ τοῦ κατακούμενοι). The scholiast’s plural is epexegetical and should not be taken as evidence that he read κατηκόοις, as Slings apparently did (“malim κατηκόοις”).

<sup>2922</sup>ἢ τῶν νῦν ... ἢ αὐτοῖς (B6-C2): The two alternatives are reproduced from 473B4-7 and C11-D2: cf. n.2556. Again the expression (here by the periphrasis, τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ... ὅντων, 499B7) distinguishes the name of the office from its truest function.

<sup>2923</sup>ὑέσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς (B7): Inheritance of rule is a new idea, preparing for the special inter-generational sequence among men (not πολιτεῖαι) that will provide the matrix for the decline of the city in Book Eight (n.b. for δυναστείαις, B7, cf. n.3595). It is perhaps a more likely “development” that a king’s son should become philosophical than that a king himself should. To attach this remark (with Adam) to tyrants off in the future of Sicily and putative events of the invisible author’s personal biography, require the reader to have ignored its immediate relevance to the avuncular role Socrates has assumed on behalf of Adeimantus and Glaucon’s father, Ariston.

<sup>2924</sup>ἢ οὐχ οὔτως; (Soc.) / οὔτως (Adeim.). Compare the prompting Socrates used at 499A2-3, 495E2-3, 491B2-3.

devolving on them currently in some clime foreign and far removed from our purview, or for that matter shall so devolve in the future, we will be ready to champion that event as proof that the constitution we have reached through reason has been possible, or is, or at least will be, just as soon as this Muse comes to prevail in a city. Indeed, our city in words is not inherently impossible of realization,<sup>2925</sup> nor are the conceptions impossible to which our reasons lead—though even we would agree with others that realization would be difficult.

“You and I may both see it this way ...”

But the many? Were you going to go on to say<sup>2926</sup> they would not?

“Perhaps.”

Bless you Adeimantus, don’t come down so hard on the many.<sup>2927</sup> I warrant you<sup>2928</sup> they’ll have a different attitude<sup>2929</sup> if only the argument be made to them not in condescension but with encouragement, defusing their prejudice against the love of learning—made that is by you<sup>2930</sup>—as to who you say the philosophers are, and if you show them in detail, (500) as we have done just now,<sup>2931</sup> their special natural gifts and the sorts of things they concern themselves with in life, so that they will not assume you are talking about the ones that *they* have in mind. Or are you going to deny that even if they do stop to think about it they won’t change their attitude and answer differently?<sup>2932</sup> Do you

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<sup>2925</sup>οὐ γάρ (D4). A single instance would show it possible, and we can reasonably wait for one as long as the conception itself is not already a logical impossibility, which of course it is not. The brunt of the objection never was logical or theoretical anyway, as we are next reminded by Adeimantus’s reaction.

<sup>2926</sup> αὖ (D8), again not otiose: cf. 468A3 and n. *ad loc.*

<sup>2927</sup>μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει (D10-E1): Compare Adeimantus’s strong condemnations of “somebody else,” and Socrates’s reactions to them, at 424D7-E2 and 426A1-427A1. Socrates knows that Adeimantus will take the point as long as he is sure somebody else still needs to be taught it. This very sort of “superior behavior” is perhaps one of the sources of resentment against those who would and could improve things. Socrates’s remarks are therapeutic and do not need to be “reconciled” with his characterization of *οἱ πολλοί* as a great beast, above. Shorey’s far-fetched attempt to exonerate Plato by quoting a contradiction in St. Paul (2.66, note *a*), only shows his insensitivity to the personal drama taking place in the conversation between Socrates and Adeimantus.

<sup>2928</sup>τοι (E1).

<sup>2929</sup>ἀλλοίαν (E1) suggests an opinion of a different sort (sc. different from the judgment designated above by δοκεῖ, D8), not just a different propositional content: cf. τίνα καρδίαν ἴσχειν (492C3-4 and n.2811). Once the questioner takes the edge off, the respondent will receive the question differently and will answer differently. It is merely a matter of rhetoric: Socrates is seeking to adjust Adeimantus’s attitude no less than that of the many.

<sup>2930</sup>, ἐνδεικνύῃ (E3): The hyperbaton holds back the surprise of the second singular verb just as long as possible!

<sup>2931</sup>ἄρτι (500A1) without its own verb exonerates Socrates from having to finesse the fact that the argument was his and not Adeimantus’s as he now makes it out to be.

<sup>2932</sup>ἢ καί ... ἀποκρινεῖσθαι (A2-4) could be saved from the wholesale excision of Burnet by construing ἀλλοίαν in a new relation: “Even if they do consider it, will you insist they will (continue to) adopt an opinion at variance with ours and answer at odds?” But the future λήψεσθαι suggests taking on a new opinion, and τοι pushes in the wrong direction after having had exactly the right meaning with the other ἀλλοίαν above, making dittography or scribal exegesis in the margin more likely. J.-C.’s expedient of reading ḥ for ḥ has Socrates ask the question for which (with ἔξουσιν, E1) he has just asserted an answer. Baiter (*apud* Shorey) ingeniously emends the τοι into τ’ οὐ, a single stroke

think a person responds harshly to a person who is not harsh or begrudges a person who does not begrudge him, as long as he himself is generous and mild in the first place?<sup>2933</sup> I am going to anticipate your answer<sup>2934</sup> and assert that it is only in some few that we find a disposition so harsh, not in the mass at large.

“I fully concur with you on this.”<sup>2935</sup>

And will you concur also on the central point, that who is to blame for their harsh attitude toward philosophy are those interlopers that rush in as a mob and slander their own kind,<sup>2936</sup> who like to stir up hatred and trade only in gossip,<sup>2937</sup> behaving all the while in ways that least befit philosophy?

“I will indeed.”

And I presume, Adeimantus, that the man who applies his thought to<sup>2938</sup> the things that truly are has no leisure<sup>2939</sup> to lower<sup>2940</sup> his gaze to the dealings of men and to squabble with them and fill himself up with envy and rancor.<sup>2941</sup> Instead it is ordered things forever invariant that he looks off to and contemplates, which each dispense with mistreatment and with suffering it likewise,<sup>2942</sup> remaining that removes all the problems and gives good sense (represented in the paraphrase).

<sup>2933</sup> χαλεπαίνειν / φθονεῖν // ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾶον (A4-5): The chiasm (of effect and cause) is to be expected. Plato does not here “(remarkably) assert the goodness of ordinary human nature” (J.-C.), nor allude “to the universally admitted προσότης of the Athenian δῆμος” (Adam). Socrates simply makes the argument that one can expect the sort of treatment he dishes out, or doesn’t.

<sup>2934</sup> προφθάσας λέγω (A6): The byplay is very delicate. There is a mild reminder of the give and take at 497C3-6 and of the promptings along the way (n.2924). The last thing Socrates would do is answer for his interlocutor! On the other hand he will do whatever he must to save the argument.

<sup>2935</sup> With καὶ ἐγώ (A8) Adeimantus succeeds to echo his καὶ ἔμοι from 499D6), but the gesture no longer suggests Adeimantus's derogatory sequel, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς. Adeimantus has made an adjustment, as his conciliatory ἀμέλει indicates. Socrates's repetition of συνοίεσθαι in retort (B1) shows he notices the gesture.

<sup>2936</sup> αὐτοῖς (B4) treats them as a closed group, where ἀλλήλοις would have treated them as the separate individuals they vie at being. Stallb.'s αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς φιλοσόφοις accepted by edd. olim) has no historical support, makes an unneeded point, and fits ill with the middle voice.

<sup>2937</sup> ἀεὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένους (B4-5): the expression continues the theme of describing normal human behavior from a standpoint divine and beyond (cf. 496D8-E2, 497C2, 498C4, 500B9, C9-D1, 501B5-7).

<sup>2938</sup> πρός (B9) is in tmesis with ἔχοντι (pace Smyth §1653).

<sup>2939</sup> οὐδέ ... σχολή (B8): cf. ὅτι μὴ πάρεργον, 498C2.

<sup>2940</sup> κάτω βλέπειν (B9): That he should refer metaphorically to human things as being “below” does not (pace Shorey) commit Plato or Socrates to identifying the objects of the philosopher's contemplation with “things above” in the narrow sense of heavenly bodies. It is certainly the eternal things he has in mind, Glaucon's error at 529AB notwithstanding.

<sup>2941</sup> φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας (C1-2). The force that has been at play beneath the surface of the conversation, since at least 487B (and μέμψῃ / Μῶμος, 487A) if not since the beginning of Book Five, can finally be named; now it will more and more become Socrates's explicit theme.

<sup>2942</sup> Reading ἀδικούμενον (C4) with AM and D (ex ἀδικούμενος *factum*) rather than the ἀδικούμενα of F, accepted by Burnet and Chambray (and Shorey). The distributive construction with singulars in exegesis of the plurals ὄρωντας and θεωμένους (C3) reestablishes these men's individuality in the way that αὐτοῖς above (B4) had submerged that of the others. There is no cogency in projecting

harmonious in their manner instead and reasonable: he imitates these objects and conforms himself to them as far as he is able. Or do you imagine there is some way to avoid imitating the thing a person dwells with and admires?<sup>2943</sup>

“Impossible.”

With the divine and with the orderly our philosopher by definition dwells: orderly and divine he therefore will become, to the extent a human can. Slander we will always have with us.<sup>2944</sup>

“Always indeed.”

But if some by some necessity he were forced to bring what he looks off to and sees beyond into practice<sup>2945</sup> and into the realm of human character, and to establish it in private and public life rather than merely conforming himself to it, do you imagine he would fail in the craft<sup>2946</sup> of producing temperance and justice and the other virtues in their public<sup>2947</sup> forms?

“Hardly.”

But if *hoi polloi* come to perceive that what we are saying about him is true, will they chafe at the philosophers and disbelieve us<sup>2948</sup> when we say that a city can by no other means achieve happiness than by assigning its portrait to be painted by artists<sup>2949</sup> who follow the divine model?

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a metaphor of unjust behavior (more exactly its absence) onto the objects of contemplation if the sole purpose is to explain thereby actual injustice (more exactly its absence) in the behavior of the men that contemplate such objects. The point is that in imitating the orderly, men avoid the disorderly behavior that is specifically human, i.e., injury to each other.

<sup>2943</sup>ὅτῳ τις ὄμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος (C6), just as the pretenders to philosophy imitate each other (αὐτοῖς for ἀλλήλοις, B4, and n.2936), and just as any man can be expected to return scorn for scorn (A4-7).

<sup>2944</sup>διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλῇ (D1-2): We may quote Bacchylides βρότων δὲ μῶμος πάντεσσι μέν ἐστιν ἐπ' ἔργοις (13.202-3 Maehler), and look back to the moment just before Adeimantus intervened (487A2-8, n.b. Μῶμος, A6).; nor should we forget the moment he brought up Thrasymachus (μὴ διάβαλλε, 498C9). Socrates's point, quite to the contrary of J.-C.'s assertion *ad loc.* that “the divine life is not complete until its excellence is acknowledged by mankind,” is that the ubiquity of envy proves nothing and makes nothing impossible, as an encomiastic poet knows better than anyone. With this remark the challenge Adeimantus brought at 487B, and the mood that drove him to bring it, are identified and dismissed.

<sup>2945</sup>μελετῆσαι (D5) picking up ἐπιμεληθῆναι from 499B6 and C8 but narrowing its meaning.

<sup>2946</sup>δημιουργόν (D6) begins to focus our attention, so as to prepare a place for the ζωγράφος below.

<sup>2947</sup>δημοτικῆς (D8). Socrates refers back, through the several moments at which he referred to the νόμομα καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια (484D1-2, 479D4, 451A7), to the moment when he and Glaucon first reached the conclusion that “public” virtues are but paltry likenesses of true virtue, which is intra-psychic rather than external (443C4-444A2. n.b. τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν, C10), an insight that was immediately forgotten at the beginning of Book Five, because exactly the forces of envy he has now exposed there diverted the conversation away from that conclusion with their scandalizing shift of focus to the community of wives.

<sup>2948</sup>χαλεπανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν (E1): As at 476D8-9 resentment expresses itself in resistance (χαλεπαίνῃ / ἀμφισβητῇ, *ibid.*). Compare the tinge of superciliousness in Adeimantus's response (ἐάνπερ αἴσθωνται) with the openhanded enthusiasm and naïveté of Glaucon's response at 480A6-10: ἐάν γέ μοι πείθωνται.

<sup>2949</sup>διαγράψειαν ... ζωγράφοι (E3-4): The metaphor of portraiture is presented without the

"They will not be harsh if they actually do perceive<sup>2950</sup> this; but (501) what is this portraiture you bring up?"

Imagine them taking up the city and the human mores found within it as if it were a canvas, and first let them wipe it clean—a thing not at all easy to do, but you recognize that whether it's easy or not the painters I have in mind will differ from others in being unwilling even to take up the portrait of the individual man or his city and to lay down the outlines of any laws, before they are either handed over a blank slate or have wiped it clean themselves.

"And they are right to insist."

Thereupon won't they begin to sketch the outlines of the constitution?

"Of course."

And as they work to fill in the picture wouldn't they be continually looking back and forth, off to the just by nature and the beautiful and the temperate and all rest, and then back toward the version of it that<sup>2951</sup> they are introducing into the world of men by mingling and mixing from the palette of men's activities and occupations a version that is human, but<sup>2952</sup> taking as their clue at every point what Homer<sup>2953</sup> called the godlike or<sup>2954</sup> godly element that finds its way into human form. I imagine here and there they would make erasures and try again until they had rendered the human characters as dear to the gods<sup>2955</sup> as they can be rendered.

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characteristic apologies, though a pertinent analogy between the theoretical work and portraiture was drawn at 472D4-7.

<sup>2950</sup> αἰσθάνεσθαι (D10, E5) is not otiose: the portrait will be the proof in the eyes of *hoi polloi*.

<sup>2951</sup> Reading the singular ἐκεῖνο (501B3) with all mss. which echoes the persistent singular of the list (B2-3) and ignores the plural with which it closes, so as to stress the contrast between τὸ φύσει and τὸ ἐν ἀνθρώποις. Doubled πρός with τε ... καὶ and αὖ explain ἐκατέρωσ. The "remote" demonstrative ἐκεῖνο is set up by ἐκατέρωσε (see next n.): They are already in progress (ἀπεργαζόμενοι, B1), and are looking both from their painting to the true and original version, and then back to the painting (ἐκεῖνο). The only problem is the syntax of τὸ and ἐμποιοῖεν. One solution is to read the poorly attested ὡ for τὸ (Monacensis 237 and Venetus 184 and 187); but ἐκεῖνο wants a definite article to establish its predicative position and once it is has been placed, *ad sensum*, its lurking potential as a demonstrative might become recrudescent so as to function as the object of ἐμποιοῖεν: "and to the other one, that one they are trying to implant." The optative ἐμποιοῖεν in a relative clause under leading potential optative is a virtual protasis and needs no special explanation, as also the optative after ἔως below (C1-2): cf. Goodwin GMT §§259, 613.4.

<sup>2952</sup> πρός τε τὸ φύσει / πρός ... τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις // συμμειγνύντες τὸ ἀνδρείκελον / θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον (B2-7): τὸ φύσει is akin to the θεοειδές, so that the entire construction is essentially chiastic (mentioning A and then B, elaborating B, and then limiting that elaboration by elaborating A) imitating the back and forth movement ἐκατέρωσε whose description is continued in the sequel (B9-C2).

<sup>2953</sup> καὶ (B6) is formulaic in quotation and certainly not derogatory. Cf. 404B10 (and n. 1616), 468C10. For the term in Homer cf. Il. I.131, Od.3.416.

<sup>2954</sup> θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον (B7), an instance of reverse καὶ, the epexegesis being placed before the expected term (θεοείκελον, announced as Homeric and parallel to ἀνδρείκελον). The term is eschewed by Hippocrates in his paraphrase of the passage (*apud* Photius Bibl.464B [7.200-201 H.]) The special sense of ἀνδρείκελον (of the human *tint*, e.g. Crat.424E2) occasions the etymological parallel with the old term by which Homer expressed what we might call a higher grade of reality.

<sup>2955</sup> θεοφιλῆ (C1), with all mss., completes the point made by the reference to Homer and the

"The drawing at least would be quite fine."

Are we making any headway at persuading those people you<sup>2956</sup> described a while ago as ready to run at us full speed, that this is the character of the person we were praising in their presence as the portrayer of constitutions,<sup>2957</sup> on account of whom they chafed at us for giving over the cities to him? Having now heard what we actually have in mind are they becoming milder?

"A lot milder if they are sober about it."

In what step after all<sup>2958</sup> could they could dispute what we say? Perhaps the philosophers are *not* the lovers of reality and truth?<sup>2959</sup>

"To dispute that would be absurd."

That their personal nature described by us is not kindred<sup>2960</sup> to the best?

"This too they cannot dispute."

That if the environment<sup>2961</sup> affords this nature the appropriate exercises and activities it will turn out virtuous and philosophical, if any nature could? Or is it more likely the other types will turn out that way, the ones we distinguished<sup>2962</sup> from the true philosophers?

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comparison of the ἀνδρείκελον with the θεοείκελον: the transfiguration of human society by this "painter" ignores the love (and hatred) of men to attend to the higher reward of the love of the gods. Badham's emendation into θεοειδῆ, by which he seeks to create a parallel with the previous statement, prevents this point from being made.

<sup>2956</sup> ἔφησθα (C5). Though Socrates to all appearances is addressing Adeimantus, it was Glaucon who made this remark (esp. διατεταμένους, 474A2), and did so at the time when he had decided to come over to Socrates's side and had offered to defend him against others, Adeimantus among them for all we know.

<sup>2957</sup> πολιτειῶν ζωγράφος (C5-6): The philosophical ruler introduced at 472D4-7 has now become an artist and produced a work they can understand and admire with their eyes, as Adeimantus's remark καλλίστη γοῦν (C3) suggests.

<sup>2958</sup> γάρ (D1) indicates the point has been substantially made and that ancillary corroboration can now be added. Socrates takes nothing for granted but gradually removes any basis for future resistance that may still lurk within, just as he did the last time he reached a pinnacle of speculation (442D10,ff. and n.2195 on εἴ τι ἡμῶν at 442E1; note derogatory use of ἀμφισβητεῖν here and there. For "pinnacle" cf. 445C4-5). Shorey (2.74, note *a*) notes the use of corroboration by means of refuting the opposite position in oratory (citing Lysias 30.26, 31.24, 13.49, 6.4), but Aristotle uses it in his "philosophical" πραγματεία as well: αἱ γὰρ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀποδείξεις ἀπορίαι περὶ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰσίν (de Caelo 279B6-7).

<sup>2959</sup> πότερον μή (D1): Socrates takes Adeimantus back to the first step in the attempt he and Glaucon had made to define the philosopher, the proposition that philosophers are ἐρασταί of reality and truth, from Book Five (474C8-11); with ὅτοπον (D3) Adeimantus accepts the proposition as virtually analytic.

<sup>2960</sup> τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείων (D4): With this expression Socrates retrieves for Adeimantus all the results he had reached with Glaucon at the beginning of Book Six (485A4-7A5), when Adeimantus had interrupted (487B).

<sup>2961</sup> With τυχεῖν and προσήκειν (D7) Socrates now moves forward into the territory he and Adeimantus had moved into (491D1-492A5, esp. A2-3).

<sup>2962</sup> ἡ ἐκείνους φήσει μᾶλλον (D9): Socrates now selects the matter most important for securing Adeimantus's continuing agreement, the misidentification of the philosophers and the ill reputation it

“Presumably not!”

So will they still react with violence<sup>2963</sup> when we argue that unless and until a city falls under the command of the philosophical type there will be no surcease of ills afflicting both it and its citizens, nor will the constitution we have described in our leisurely tale become perfect in fact?

“With less violence perhaps.”<sup>2964</sup>

Are you willing to say more than that, not only “With less,” but that they have become (502) entirely tame and fully persuaded, so as to make them accept the conclusion out of shame if nothing else?<sup>2965</sup>

“Very much so.”

Then let it be that these people of yours have now been fully persuaded of our position. But further, could anyone raise the objection that kings or whoever hold the offices of power will never in fact have an offspring endowed with the philosophical nature?<sup>2966</sup>

“No one could.”

Assuming then that such are born, could anyone argue that there is an overwhelming necessity that they become corrupted? That it is difficult for them to be saved even we agree; but that throughout the full stretch of time, out of all the men there were and are and will be not a one will be saved: could anybody argue this against us?

“Just how could he argue it?”

And yet a single such man would be able, assuming his city were persuaded as we have persuaded entails, which were Adeimantus's original reason, or pretext, for interrupting Socrates's conversation with Glaucon (487BC6-D3: cf. 495B8-6A9). For ἀφωρίσαμεν cf. 499B3-4 and διορίζῃ, 499E3.

<sup>2963</sup> ἀγριαίνουσι (E2), more than just χαλεπάίνειν, recalling (again) the extreme reaction Glaucon voiced when the paradox was first uttered (474A1-4).

<sup>2964</sup> οὐσιαὶ ... ἥττον (E6): On this, the most controversial point, Adeimantus characteristically wavers: the improvement of others diminishes his own relative superiority – and Socrates notices.

<sup>2965</sup> Reading ἄλλο (502A2) with all mss. This is insufficient warrant for Ast's conjecture of ἀλλά, accepted by editors. τι ἄλλο is adverbial, parallel with the adverbial (i.e. circumstantial) participle αἰσχυνθέντες. Cf. Symp. 222E7-8.

<sup>2966</sup> βασιλέων ἔκγονοι (A6): Again the two alternatives, this time taken one by one, that either philosophers take on power in addition to being philosophers (501E2-3), or that persons in power become philosophical, the latter event more and more explicitly being conceived of as a result of the education of the rulers' sons (an idea first broached with ὑέστιν ἡ αὐτοῖς, 499B7). The step by step recapitulation leaves Adeimantus, or more accurately some unknown persons on whose behalf he once again finds himself speaking, nowhere to go. For one more time, with οὐσιαὶ ἥττον, he tries for some wiggle room on their behalf, and Socrates calls him on it with a very strange locution (ἴνα εἰ μή τι ἄλλο αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν, A1-2). Subsequently (A3-C8) Adeimantus's answers are a study in ways to say “Yes,” as Glaucon's were just before he interrupted (485B-487A), so that it devolves upon Socrates to bring up the topic of envy (D4-8: parallel to Glaucon's Momus at 487A6).

Insisting that such a State should or could arise in time and space is not to be taken as an index of Plato's optimism or pessimism (sic Adam ad 502C) -- a question of little importance -- but within the drama represents the barest and most minimal inverse of the essentially anti-philosophical attitude that threatened the progress of the argument since the interruption of Polemarchus. Cynicism has by now been made to recede or else become so thoroughgoing as to deny any possibility anywhere and anytime.

these, to bring into perfect completion all these changes that are now thought unbelievable.

“Able he would be.”

Able since as ruler he would institute all the laws and practices we have established in our argument—unless somehow it is impossible that the citizens should be willing to act according to them.

“This is no way impossible.”

And as to the things we found reasonable, would it be somehow shocking or impossible that others should find them reasonable also?<sup>2967</sup>

“I at least don’t think so.”

And that they are the noblest measures, in addition to being possible, we have sufficiently proved in what we have said.

“Sufficiently.”

Thus the argument compels<sup>2968</sup> us now to say that as to legislation what we have established by argument is the best arrangement, if it could actually occur, and that for it to occur is difficult but is not impossible.

“So it compels us.”

Now that this argument has reached its goal with no strength to spare, we must cover the remaining issue. How we are to ensure, through their course of studies and their exercises and activities, that the preservers of the constitution we need will actually be there for us, and what are the age criteria for their taking on these various tasks and studies?<sup>2969</sup>

“Cover it we must.”

My clever trick came to nothing, my attempt to avoid the distasteful difficulty about the assignment of wives, and the production of children and the installation of the rulers,<sup>2970</sup> knowing as I did how the truth about them, when fully revealed, would be met with harsh resentment.<sup>2971</sup> The need

<sup>2967</sup> Socrates reverts (B11-12) to his admonition against Adeimantus's superciliousness: cf. 499D7ff.

<sup>2968</sup> συμβαίνει (C5), of the logical entailment of propositions previously agreed to. As such its primary use is impersonal (e.g., Gorg.459B5-6, 461B8, 481E3, 495B5, 496E4-5, 498B1, 508B3-4; Lach.213B8; Lys.217A1; Phdo.74A2; Polit.261E4) but since the speakers are responsible for having agreed to the underlying propositions, the entailment has personal repercussions, either on the upholder (σοι, Phdo.92B4-5) or on both interlocutors (because engaged in a common search: cf. ἡμῖν, Gorg.498A10-11; Lys.213B8; Phdo.80A10-B1; Phlb.35C3; Soph.223B6—and here). The fact that the entailment might be unforeseen (Gorg.479C5-6, 496E4-5) proves they are logically necessary rather than intended. The verb is used in the area of the συμπέρασμα and in the context of συλλογίζεσθαι (Gorg.498E10-11).

<sup>2969</sup> καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων ... καὶ κατὰ ποίας ἡλικίας (C10-D2): The pair of issues – παιδεία (here done with μαθήματα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα) and ἡλικία – had been broached just when Adeimantus interrupted (487A7-8). Together they stand for the criterion of ἐμπειρία desiderated at 484D6. But μαθήματα broaches a completely new topic as we shall soon see.

<sup>2970</sup> τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν τῆς κτήσεως δυσχέρειαν ... καὶ παιδογονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν (D4-6). All three items—κτῆσις, παιδογονία, κατάστασις—involved δυσχέρεια: the list expresses its own criterion—difficulty both emotional and argumentative—by synecdoche in its first item. Conversely, ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθής (sc. κατάστασις, D7-8) looks back at all three items, though its proximate and current application to establishing the truest kind of ruler is in the forefront.

<sup>2971</sup> ἐπίφθονός τε καὶ χαλεπή (D7) the phrase echoes the pair χαλεπαίνει / φθονεῖν (500A4-5):

to go through these subjects as such<sup>2972</sup> arrived regardless, and the questions about wives and children have been successfully answered. As to the question of the rulers we need to shift our position and begin again.<sup>2973</sup>

We had said, if you remember, (503) that our guards had to show their patriotism through tests of pleasure and pain; that they had to show they were able to maintain their belief and dedication to the city's interests in the face of toils and fears and any other shock; that the man who proved unable would be dropped from the group;<sup>2974</sup> that the one who emerged unscathed<sup>2975</sup> like gold tested in fire was to be installed<sup>2976</sup> as ruler and given honors during his life and to be memorialized after death<sup>2977</sup> with monuments. So much had we established when the conversation got off its path and began to lie low in fear of stirring up what we now find ourselves in the midst of.

### D.3d.I: EXCURSUS on Socrates's Summary (502D4-503B4)

We have to stop eavesdropping on the conversation and speak amongst ourselves about the accuracy of Socrates's portrayal of what has happened, since we, too, have been witnesses and therefore participants to some degree in this conversation. Indeed, though he is absent from the conversation, Plato's presence consists exactly of this, that he has made us feel as if he is not there but that we are direct participants in the conversation of his characters.

First (502D4-6) there is the fact that Socrates includes the paradox of the philosopher king among the paradoxes he had sought to avoid bringing up, although this paradox was not in fact raised by Polemarchus and the others at the beginning of Book Five, nor even alluded to in what they make Socrates "promise" to explain about his statement at 423E. Both this final paradox and, in all strictness, the first paradox of women and men sharing the job of ruling, which, with the term κτήσις, Socrates incidentally omits to mention at this point, were not among the things Polemarchus asked about but were inserted into the treatment by Socrates himself.

Second, Socrates now speaks (502E2-503A7) as if the point at which the conversation began to avoid dealing with paradox was all the way back at the end of Book Three when the rulers among the guards were being selected, after which he produced a picture of the rulers settling their encampment in a geographically appropriate place (412B8-417B9) and living in simplicity. It is true that the argument was interrupted at this point, not by Polemarchus and his request that Socrates take up what he has postponed but by Adeimantus and the objection that was provoked in him by the very image of their simple life. Socrates, he complained, had not made the rulers as happy as he should have (Book Four, init., 419A1ff).

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cf. χαλεπήν [500A7], χαλεπῶς [500B1], χαλεπαίνειν [500E1, E5, 501C7]), not (*pace Shorey*) χαλεπά as used at 502C6. The "difficulty" is the resistance that a social policy radically reliant on truth (παντελώς) can be expected to meet with, even at the mention of its being brought into reality (γίγνεσθαι).

<sup>2972</sup> αὐτά (D8), a treatment centering on these subjects *in themselves* (cf. n.1706), rather than treating them *obiter*, "in passing."

<sup>2973</sup> ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς (E2) simply describes what αὐτά already announced.

<sup>2974</sup> ἀποκριτέον (A4): cf. 414A4.

<sup>2975</sup> ἀκήρατον (503A5) from 414A1, but cf. also the climactic use at 417A1 (and n.1820).

<sup>2976</sup> στατέον (A6): cf. κατάστασιν (502D6), referring back to καταστατέον, 414A1.

<sup>2977</sup> καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι καὶ ἀθλα (A6-7): Cf. 414A2-3 (and 465D8-E2): even the chiasm is repeated. The καὶ 's, moreover, are striking.

Socrates's response to Adeimantus became a treatment, in partnership with him, of how the internal order of the city made it a unified whole, and this led to a second culmination of the construction of the city (ὠκισμένη ..., 427C6). It was at the end of that treatment that Socrates casually passed over the issues of wives and children (423E), and there the conversation was nevertheless able to move on, to what had been agreed upon as being the next thing, the search for justice in the city *en gros* (427E6-434C) with Glaucon taking on the role of interlocutor, and then to the experimental application of the versions of the virtues *en gros* to the soul (434D-445B). The experiment produced the unexpected discovery that justice and the rest of virtue is an inward state rather than a mode of interpersonal behavior, a result that in all strictness made the construction of the city obsolete (443B7-444A6).<sup>2978</sup>

Socrates at that moment (444C4ff) had suggested that from the heights they had reached (σκοπιά, 445C4) they would do well to revert to civic models *en gros* so as to firm up their result by studying the forms of vice as they might appear in other kinds of states. It was this reversion that provided Polemarchus with a plausible foothold for his scandalizing challenge, the objection that he provokes Adeimantus to voice on his behalf, that Socrates should hardly move on to the other types of state until he has given a fully adequate account of this one (Book Five *init.*, 449C2-50A2). There is a certain mendacity in their claim that they had long since been waiting for Socrates to treat at greater length what he chose to pass over at 423E (πάλαι περιμένομεν, 449D1) since there were many opportunities for them to bring this up along the way; but quite apart from that, the intervening discovery of the inward character of virtue made this objection totally irrelevant and therefore impertinent.

In his summary of what has happened here in Book Six, Socrates speaks as if he has forgotten his conversation with Adeimantus at the beginning of Book Four although it was during this conversation that the paradoxical points were mentioned (423E). Also, he speaks as if he had long been suppressing the topic of the philosopher king and indeed as if his continuation with the original program, to find justice in the state *en gros* and then to project it onto the individual, were part of his evasion. How are we to account for these seemingly careless inaccuracies?

Scholars' treatment of the dramatic transitions in the dialogues tend to take for granted the ones that make sense and to explain away the ones that don't as a literary apparatus by which Plato inserts himself into the conversation so as to expatriate on something that suits his fancy, despite the fact that such self-insertions would utterly vitiate whatever dramatic value the conversation might otherwise be accumulating. If on the other hand we read the book as it presents itself, attentively, seriously and liberally, it becomes plain that Polemarchus at the beginning of Book Five meant to bring on a scandal by pointing to 423E, and that he succeeds to spread the sense of scandal to Adeimantus and through him to Glaucon. Socrates immediately expresses his dismay and warns them this query is only the tip of the iceberg, because he recognizes that the interruption is a huge regression from the heights they had reached (445B4-5), that the construction of the city as a mediating metaphor for discovering virtue had failed to take root deep enough to have served its purpose, and that the fact that his virtual wards, Glaucon and Adeimantus, have been distracted from the teaching will require remedy through an elaborate and indirect argument, whether it be by restoring, resuscitating, and remedying the metaphor, or by some other method. As we saw, his treatment of the paradoxes in Book Five consisted not in making them less paradoxical but in requiring his interlocutor Glaucon to rise by increments above the doxic level on which scandal operates, and rely more and more radically on reason in the face of ridicule, culminating in his own introduction of the most incredible notion that such reliance implies, the paradox of the philosopher king, and Glaucon's resolution to be his ally

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<sup>2978</sup> Obsolete both in that the truth of the conclusion does not depend upon the civic construction that was their springboard to discovering it, and also in the special sense that the discovery is so radical that it makes virtue asocial and apolitical, the sort of thesis that would elicit Callicles's reaction – that it turns life as we know it upside down (*Gorg.*480B3-4).

against the indignation, anger, and even mob violence that such a notion would arouse.

With Adeimantus in Book Six a second drama takes place. The moment Glaucon is about to agree that the philosophical type is beyond reproach Adeimantus cannot abide it but interrupts to say, ‘Nobody can gainsay the clever and manipulative questioning method of Socrates; and yet it has nothing to do with the truth, as even he would see if he simply opened his eyes and looked around him (487B1-C6). The fact of the matter is, philosophical types are mostly weirdoes and scoundrels, or at best incompetent.’

The charge against philosophers and philosophy, whoever and whatever he takes philosophers to be, is also a charge against Socrates, though attenuated. In fact Adeimantus has brought the very charge of argumentative sophistry – making the weaker argument the stronger --that will be brought against him at his trial. In essence, Adeimantus has accused Socrates of the same things Thrasymachus accused him of in Book One, except that Thrasymachus was brash, confrontational and crass, whereas Adeimantus’s remarks are circumspect, attenuated, and attributed to anonymous personages.

We may not simply ignore the motive for his interruption. At the very least Adeimantus is playing the devil’s advocate—Socrates certainly is thinking so when he asks whether Adeimantus himself thinks the charges are false or true (487D6-7). But when Adeimantus says he does not know and wants to know Socrates’s response regardless, he passes over acknowledging that he is playing devil’s advocate exactly in order to cast the focus onto Socrates and require him to defend his position regardless of his own motives. Moreover, just as Thrasymachus had found Socrates’s conversation with Polemarchus tediously peaceable,<sup>2979</sup> Adeimantus seems to be provoked and peeved by the sweet description of the blameless (*Μῶμος*, 487A6) philosopher and the chorus of virtues that Socrates and Glaucon, by an easy-going kind of associative logic, have assembled on his behalf.

In his response Socrates as usual disarms the belligerent edge of his interlocutor’s complaint by agreeing with the charges,<sup>2980</sup> and then subsequently refuting and defusing them one by one. Useless the philosophers indeed are—to those who will not use them; corrupt the young philosophers do become—the moment they abandon philosophy; scoundrels you will surely find bearing the banner of philosophy—exactly because certain paltry types clamor there under false pretenses; weakness it is that prevents them from acting unjustly, a weakness that keeps climbing up to the podium in the courts. In order to reverse each of Adeimantus’s points Socrates unburdens himself of an unsolicited sociology of knowledge and discourse in a democratic regime,<sup>2981</sup> deploying a remarkable panoply of images<sup>2982</sup> and high rhetoric well suited to the brother so easily preoccupied by the evasions of literature.<sup>2983</sup> Indeed if we ask for a model of the well bred young man with philosophical potential who is spoiled by the power of public opinion and his parents’ respect for it, it is this very man who complained in Book Two that his parents failed to require him to do the right thing. The most Socrates can do is then to re-draw all the conclusions he had reached with Glaucon and to require Adeimantus (and his imaginary objector) to accept them one by one, and locking each door as they pass through it to prevent his going back on what they have agreed to (501C4-502C8).

Once this course is complete Socrates reaches the summary we have stopped to analyze

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<sup>2979</sup> He could not sit still and witness the sweet reasonableness with which Socrates and Polemarchus were “caving in to each other,” as he put it (*ἀλλήλους ύποκατακλινόμενοι*, 336B1-C2).

<sup>2980</sup> Cf. 372E2-373A8; 420A2-7; 487D6-6. The way he adds the paradox of the philosopher-king to the two paradoxes raised against him by Polemarchus is ultimately of the same ilk.

<sup>2981</sup> The far ranging observations resemble his rambling satire of valetudinarians and litigiousness during Book Four.

<sup>2982</sup> The sailors and captain, the echoing mob, the beast, the image of one’s forebears fawning over their youth, the oxymoronic escapes from corruption, the taking refuge below a wall, the painter of the orderly city.

<sup>2983</sup> The style and rhetoric of the passage is described in Appendix 3.

(502D4ff). He expresses relief at completing a task that he knew all along would be unpleasant in the face of the envy and discomfort it would incite if it were taken up with all seriousness—bringing now into the open the motives behind the resistance against the argument and the interruption these motives led to.

It is because he is responding to these dramatic undercurrents that Socrates includes in his summary the controversy of the philosopher king along with the others, and this is why in the course of drawing Adeimantus himself out of the quagmire (498C5-500D2) he can more and more explicitly identify the motive of Polemarchus's interruption as envy and resentment,<sup>2984</sup> caused by and directed against free philosophical inquiry, in the very deployment of which the lives and values of most persons, and perhaps more importantly any group of persons, are shown by comparison to be of little worth. Although Polemarchus leads Adeimantus to assert they have been waiting for Socrates to return to the community of wives, it was more likely the radical conclusion of Book Four that provoked him to interrupt when he did, which also and for the same reasons accounts for the success of his interruption among the rest of the company.<sup>2985</sup> And as to the reversion all the way back to Book Three as if Book Four and the crucial application of the imaginary city to the soul with its paradoxical conclusion had not taken place, the reason is that Socrates is now proposing to revert to the imaginary city, picking up the guardians right where we had left them. For now, in the intervening argument, we have discovered these guards need to become philosophers.

To return to our Silent Partner in all this, the only indications Plato gives us of the undercurrents at work are negative ones. He has contrived the dramatic detail that Socrates cannot hear the words with which Polemarchus incites Adeimantus to interrupt (449B5), and he has his Socrates forbear to speculate on what Polemarchus might have said to affect his interlocutor and his ward. Instead the two of them, Plato and his Socrates, leave it to us to fill in the blanks.

### D.3e: Establishing the Philosopher as Ruler: His Education

Though we shuddered to assert what by now we have braved, we may now go further to assert this culminating thesis also, that to perfect our guards we must adopt the policy of making them philosophers (503B3ff).

“Let it be asserted.”

Imagine in your mind’s eye<sup>2986</sup> how far and few between you will find them to be. After all, the

<sup>2984</sup> καταγελώμεθα at 499C4, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς at 499C8, φιλονικῶν at 499E1, χαλεπαίνειν ... πρᾶον at 500A4-5, φιλαπεχθημόνως at 500B4, φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας at 500C1-2, the maxim διαβολὴ δ’ ἐν πᾶσι πολλή at 500D1-2, ἀνδρείκελον / θεοείκελον at 501B5-7 [cf. n.2955], ἔχαλέπαινον at 501C7, αἰσχυνθέντες at 502A2.

<sup>2985</sup> The ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις ἀφανεστάτη δὲ λόγῳ, if you will (Thuc. I.23.6).

<sup>2986</sup> νόησον (503B7). The verb has been used in the common idiom of getting the meaning intended by the words (335E2, 440D7), but also and more lately of the impossibility of grasping shifting phenomena with the mind (479C4: cf. 478B7) and the act of grasping the essential element by which to judge them (ἐννοήσας, 493E2; cf. also 368D4 and n.937), and—in an instance similar to the present aorist imperative directed to Adeimantus—at the beginning of the simile of ship and captain. There, in response to Adeimantus enjoining Socrates simply to “look around him,” Socrates asked him to contemplate a simile with his *mind’s eye* (488A7: cf. n.2732).

As for the noun (*νοῦς*), besides its appearances in idiomatic phrases (ἐν νῷ ἔχειν: 344D, 362C, 490A1; ἔχειν νοῦν: 331B6-7, 396B3; κατὰ νοῦν: 358B3) it has appeared once to augment the sense of δόξα ἀληθής (431C5-6: cf. n. 2032), and to name very tellingly the part of the soul in which philosophical γνῶσις resides or occurs (490B5, γεννήσας νοῦν) and the crucial element whose absence allows the talented young man to go the wrong way (494D2 and 5).

natural endowments we required them to have only seldom congeal in a single person but most often show up scattered among many. People good at learning with good memories and quick and sharp wits and the other virtues that come with these don't tend, if<sup>2987</sup> they are vigorous and large-minded in their habits of thought, to be the sort that are willing to live life moderately, calm and steady.<sup>2988</sup> Instead these sorts are driven in all directions by their vigor, and whatever ingredient of stability they might have had is utterly expelled. Conversely, the more stable characters who do not adapt easily to change—the very types you would employ in positions requiring trust and imperturbability in the face of the dangers of war—exhibit these same characteristics when they study. They are stolid and slow to learn as if they had been drugged, and they tend to get drowsy and full of empty yawning<sup>2989</sup> when it is time to go through their lessons. Still, we blithely insist they be fine and good in both ways<sup>2990</sup> as a condition of their having any share in advanced studies and the honor of holding office.

“And it is right that we should.”

Don't you imagine this condition will be filled only seldom?

“Of course.”

Then we must test them not only with the toils and fears and pleasures we mentioned before,<sup>2991</sup>

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In the next few pages both noun and verb will be used many times.

<sup>2987</sup> ἄμα φύεσθαι ... οἵοι κοσμίως (C3-5). The construction is ἄμα φύεσθαι οἵοι κοσμίως, κτλ., with ἄμα drawing forward the notion expressed by εἰς ταῦτόν and the συμ- added to φύεσθαι above (B8). Despite the fact that the list (εὐμαθεῖς ... ὀξεῖς, C2) seemed to be closed by the generalization (όσα ἔπεται), καί (primum, C4) adds another pair of items to it (νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας) in order to set them into relief for comparison with κοσμίως, κτλ. For other lists resumed after generalization to highlight specific items, cf. 466A8-B2, 475DE, 529E1-3, 610B1-3; H.Maj.295CE, 298AB; Leg.759A2-4, 847B8-C4, 849C3-4, 949C7-D2, 956E1-7; Phdrs.238A6-C4; Phlb.11B7-8; Polit.288D7-E4; Symp.207D8-E3, 211A6-B1; and compare Leg.813D8-E3, 815A2-4.

<sup>2988</sup> ήν διήλθομεν φύσιν (B7-8) indicates that the list of attributes rehearses the master list at 487A4-5 that summarized the argument developed by Socrates and Glaucon, from the beginning of the Book, namely, μνήμων, εὐμάθης, μεγαλοπρεπής, εὐχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ συγγενής ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης (487A4-5: n.b. φύσει, A3). Of these attributes the ones most seldom found together are the last two, ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη (it is a commonplace to worry whether moderation can be reconciled with bravery). Of these the former is here done with νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας and the latter with κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος (θέλοντες) ζῆν. As to the former, νεανικοί is new but τε immediately announces that it is not meant to stand alone. καί then introduces μεγαλοπρεπεῖς (τὰς διανοίας), which mitigates the novelty of νεανικοί by associating it with a term already established (an instance of “reverse καί” done with τε καί as often: cf. n.444), while at the same time it shades the established term in the new direction of “boldness” (for the connotation of unruliness in νεανικόν cf. 491E4, 606C7, and n.2797). As to the latter, κοσμίως is a virtual synonym-in-use for σώφρων and therefore brings σωφροσύνη forward from the previous list, unaltered; but its elaboration with ἡσυχία and βεβαιότης pinch the virtue into a behavioral disposition, as νεανικός had done to μεγαλοπρεπής.

<sup>2989</sup> ὑπονού τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίμπλανται (D4), an oxymoron resembling λήθης πλέως (486C7) and πλάνης ἐμπλέω (505C7).

<sup>2990</sup> δέ γε (D7) is self-deprecating, as is the complacently approbative εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς (the adverbial version of the formulaic adjectival hendiadys καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, euphonically adjusted: cf. 400E2 and n.1556).

<sup>2991</sup> ἐν τε οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν (E1): Tests lately mentioned at 503A3-4: τότε refers back to 412Eff.

but also must add tests we there passed over,<sup>2992</sup> and require them to exercise<sup>2993</sup> their minds in a wide spectrum of lessons so as to investigate<sup>2994</sup> whether their natural endowment will enable them to bear the greatest lessons also, or will (504) shirk<sup>2995</sup> them as they might have done in the other areas we tested.<sup>2996</sup>

### D.3e. I: The Greatest Study

"Well I certainly agree with you it would be appropriate to try and ascertain this. But tell me what are these 'greatest lessons' you refer to?"

Do you remember the part of the discussion when we had set out three aspects or parts of the soul<sup>2997</sup> and were working our way together<sup>2998</sup> through justice, temperance, bravery and wisdom to find out what each was in itself?

"If I forgot that I would justly be denied to hear the rest of what you have to say."<sup>2999</sup>

Do you also remember what was said just before this?

"Just what?"

<sup>2992</sup> καὶ ἔτι δὴ ὁ τότε παρεῖμεν (E2): Socrates continues the conceit of confessing to the charge that he skipped important subjects.

<sup>2993</sup> γυμνάζειν (E3) not only continues the physical theme of πόνοις (E1) but also recalls Socrates's use of the gymnastic metaphor at 498B6-8, where he advocated a gymnastic of the soul.

<sup>2994</sup> σκοποῦντας (E3) a subject accusative rather than the more common possessive dative as agreeing with the subject of the verbal adjective (i.e. the "we" who must test them). The more common dative would suggest that the action described by the participle is the basis of the testing being incumbent upon us, as for instance the purpose we would mean to achieve by it: we are testing by investigating not in order to investigate. Cf. εὐλαβουμένῳ, 539A9 and n.3534.

<sup>2995</sup> ἀποδειλιῶν (504A1) was already used of themselves cowering at the prospect of theoretical difficulty, when their investigation seemed very early destined to fail (374E11). Cf. Crat.411A6, Euthyph.15C12, Euthyd.277D3.

<sup>2996</sup> ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις (A1). καὶ before μαθήμασι makes Orelli's emendation, ἄθλοις, redundant. It was not to test their love of honor that we had stressed the guards but their physical and emotional endurance (πόνοις τε καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς [503E1-2: cf.412C-14B]). The present point is that endurance plays a role in mental work as well as in the other areas (ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις) where its importance is already acknowledged.

<sup>2997</sup> διαστησάμενοι (A5) refers to 435E-441C.

<sup>2998</sup> συνεβιβάζομεν (A5), referring to 441C-443B, where it was Glaucon not Adeimantus that was Socrates's interlocutor. The metaphor depicts the careful step by step scrutiny of an argument—i.e., dialectic or dialogue. Cf. H.Min.369D4-5 (διαπυνθάνομαι καὶ ἐπανασκοπῶ καὶ συμβιβάζω τὰ λεγόμενα), where Socrates re-characterizes dialectical scrutiny against Hippias's characterization of it as nitpicking: πλέκεις λόγους καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων ὃ ἂν ἢ δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου, τούτου ἔχῃ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος, 369B8-C1).

<sup>2999</sup> μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων ... τὰ λοιπὰ ὃν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν (A7-8): There is dramatic irony as well as dramatic characterization in Adeimantus's reply. In his summary (502D4-3B1) Socrates had left out this entire section of his conversation with Glaucon (435-443), the very part that culminated in a conclusion that rendered further speculation about an ideal state unnecessary (443C4-444A3) and therefore rendered Polemarchus's objection, which Adeimantus himself had brought into the conversation with Socrates, irrelevant. Moreover, in the blush of succeeding to remember, Adeimantus characteristically imagines a punishment to mete out to others for failing (μὴ ἀκούειν).

We argued<sup>3000</sup> that although we could get the very finest insight about them by taking a longer and more circuitous way, a route that would make them completely manifest, we were able also to achieve an exposition that would follow suit with the character of the arguments we had made up to that point. You two<sup>3001</sup> said that this would be satisfactory, and so this was the way the argument was carried out, a way that in my opinion lacked something in accuracy<sup>3002</sup> but was satisfactory to you two, unless now you say otherwise.

“I thought it perfectly meet, and so it appeared to the others as well.”<sup>3003</sup>

And yet, my fine friend, to measure what is meet in such topics as these by a measure that lacks even a whit of the real and the true<sup>3004</sup> can hardly be meet, itself.<sup>3005</sup> An imperfect measure can't be the measure of anything. Still, some are of the opinion<sup>3006</sup> that the argument is sufficient as it stands and that we do not need to take the investigation any further.

“Yes, a good many suffer from that opinion—out of laziness.”<sup>3007</sup>

Yet this weakness must not be allowed to be present alongside the other attributes we look for in the person whose job is to guard the city and its laws!

“So it seems.”

Well there you have it, Adeimantus. The longer path is what a person of that sort is going to have to take.<sup>3008</sup> He'll have to study just as hard as he practices gymnastics. Otherwise, as we were just

<sup>3000</sup> ἐλέγομέν που (B1): at 435C4-D9.

<sup>3001</sup> ἡμεῖς (B4), referring to Adeimantus and Glaucon together, Glaucon after all having been Socrates's interlocutor for that part of the discussion (435C4-D9).

<sup>3002</sup> τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας (B5) repeated from 503B5, goes back to ἀκριβῶς μέν, 435D1.

<sup>3003</sup> ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε μετρίως: ... ἐφαίνετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις (B8): In one breath Adeimantus makes his own adherence to the position less questionable by mentioning the adherence of others; but in his next breath he will castigate others for failing to understand (below, C5, q.v.) -- a further portrayal of his “internal conflict,” which Socrates will now encourage him to resolve.

<sup>3004</sup> τοῦ ὄντος (C2), designedly open. Since 490B it has become able to mean truth or reality or both.

<sup>3005</sup> ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων (C1): Adeimantus's ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε μετρίως (B8) gives Socrates a chance to reverse the wordplay Glaucon had used on him to exhort him to present a full treatment of the paradoxes at the beginning of Book Five (450B5-7: cf. n. 2266), when he said all of human life would not be too long a time to listen to Socrates's answers on the weighty paradoxical questions. But now, as the comparison gives us occasion to notice, it is truth that has become the measure, not just all we have to give up for it. As usual Shorey misses the back-reference but finds an opportunity to wax eloquent with parallels from elsewhere (2.84, note a).

<sup>3006</sup> δοκεῖ (C3), hardly otiose.

<sup>3007</sup> καὶ μάλ' ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχουσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν (C5): Again Adeimantus readily allows his praise of the good to blend with condemning those who fall short of it, even naming their sin (ῥᾳθυμίαν): cf. 371CD, 424D, 425E-6E, 499DE, his over-broad condemnation of students of philosophy (487C6-D5), his supercilious diagnosis of their pathology (πάσχουσιν, 504C5 [and 487B3]; πάθη, 426A5), and his readiness to accuse even Socrates of the shortcoming he here condemns (449C2). We should replace Adam's remark, that Adeimantus betrays no consciousness that τισιν in 504C3 alludes to himself, by noting instead Socrates's forbearance to confront him directly, and his use of a vaguer expression (for which cf. his οὐδα ὅτου, 465E4-5). Adeimantus's reply does show an “unconscious consciousness” of his own fault, for he quickly sees it in others (!): indeed he had himself been guilty of accepting a moderately complete treatment just above (μετρίως, B8).

<sup>3008</sup> By the vocative ὦ ἔταῖρε (C9), Socrates expresses “solidarity” with the decision Adeimantus has (rather diffidently: εἰκός) made. At the same time, although he speaks of someone in the third person (τοιούτῳ, D1), he is arguing (with τοίνυν) that Adeimantus himself must rise to the level of the

saying,<sup>3009</sup> he will never reach that greatest object of study that he of all people must learn.

“I presume you are claiming<sup>3010</sup> that the studies we have already done are not the greatest, but that there is something higher than justice and the other values we have talked about?”

Not only is the subject greater: our method to reach insight about it may no longer be a sort of sketch-work<sup>3011</sup> we used before but must now be of the finest accuracy. Wouldn’t it be ridiculous after all if we should strain over getting things of smaller importance just right,<sup>3012</sup> but when it came to the greatest matters we should deem that something less than the greatest accuracy was adequate?

“That is a perfectly fine attitude to adopt<sup>3013</sup> – but as to this “greatest study” you have in mind and its subject matter, do you think anybody is going to let you off<sup>3014</sup> without asking you to tell what it is?”

I hardly think so – and why don’t you go ahead and do the asking?<sup>3015</sup> Surely you’ve already heard the whole tale several times, but just now it has slipped your mind—or else you are too busy (505) thinking<sup>3016</sup> how to hassle me with clever repartée. I suspect it’s the latter, since you’ve heard several

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study in question rather than shirk it (*ἀποδειλιάσει*, A1). In short, it is Adeimantus’s preparation for the μέγιστον μάθημα that is here being tested (*βασανιστέον*, 503E1) – and perhaps our own.

<sup>3009</sup> ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν (D2) placed right after ἢ with the sense “or else,” refers back to 503D7-9 where this same ἢ was used (D8). Hence translate “Or else, as we were saying, . . .”

<sup>3010</sup> γάρ (D4): Denniston (77-78) rightly detects a note of incredulity or disagreement in Adeimantus’s γάρ because of the way Socrates repeats his words (*οὐ μέγιστα*, D4) in response (*καὶ μεῖζον*, D6).

<sup>3011</sup> ὑπογραφήν (D6) as well as ἀπεργασίαν in the next line refer back to the metaphor of the painter (501A2-C2), but only to bring forward the distinction between a preliminary outline and the finished work. In fact Socrates means now to abandon the entire “rough draft” that constitutes their thought-experiment, namely the experiment of searching for justice written large in a city, for a method of study that is higher and finer than this: ἀπεργασία is now connected with ἀκριβεία and avoiding the ἀτελές (ἐπὶ τέλος, D3).

<sup>3012</sup> ἢ οὐ γελοῖον (D8). As the second play on μέτρον (B8-C4) already suggested, Socrates is comparing the subject he is about to take up and the seriousness it deserves, with the irrelevant questions about the paradoxes and the anti-philosophical attitude that forced them upon him. He is schooling Adeimantus just as he schooled Glaucon at 472B3-473B3. That it is laughable to worry about the small things rather than the large was a constant topic in his discussion with Adeimantus in Book Four (423C2-427A7).

<sup>3013</sup> Reading ἄξιον τὸ διάνοημα (E4) with all mss. (against Ficinus’s tr. which does omit the words [*Ridiculum prorsus. At enim putas...*], and against most editors, who have accepted Schleiermacher’s excision). διανόημα refers to the general attitude or methodological outlook Socrates has just articulated (for this sense cf. διανοεῖσθαι at *Phdr.228D8, 236C7*), which Adeimantus grants so as to ask Socrates for his position on the special question of the greatest study.

<sup>3014</sup> οἵει τιν' ἄν σε ... ἀφιέναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἔστιν; (E5-6): Despite all of Socrates’s preparation Adeimantus reverts to his old ways. His remark inimitably combines (1) bluffing challenge (οἵει τιν' ἄν); (2) threat (confinement, the opposite of ἀφιέναι, reminiscent of 449B6 and echoing back to 327C11); and (3) displacement of responsibility for his own criticism onto an anonymous “someone else” (τινα). There is something of a taunt in his repetition of μέγιστον μάθημα (cf. n.3010); and his question is churlishly off-center (*καὶ περὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ λέγεις*), as if he were asking for the title and the subject of the course before deciding to enroll. The problem returns at 506B2ff.

<sup>3015</sup> ἀλλὰ καὶ σύ (E7): Socrates calls on Adeimantus to be the person he warns Socrates about.

<sup>3016</sup> οὐκ ἐννόεις ἢ αὐ διανοῇ ἐμοὶ πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος (E8-505A1), the second use of a νοῦς-word and already placing mental vision in contrast with Adeimantus’s argumentative agenda (echoing Adeimantus’s own use of διανόημα just above). Though it is true that

times that the Idea of the Good<sup>3017</sup> is the greatest object of study, the thing by their involvement with which<sup>3018</sup> just acts<sup>3019</sup> and the rest become useful and beneficial. And you know more: that I am about to say also that we lack an adequate insight into this subject, and that if we lack this insight, even if we conceivably master the rest you know it will be worthless for us to do so, just as possessing<sup>3020</sup> something without goodness is useless. Unless of course you think there is some gain<sup>3021</sup> in possessing *per se*, regardless of whether the possession is a good one,<sup>3022</sup> rather than thinking that to be mindful and knowing<sup>3023</sup> of everything there is to know, absent the good, is a knowledge not at all beautiful or good.

“By Zeus not !!”

Then let me add something else you certainly know, that most people are of the opinion that the good is pleasure, whereas the more subtle types think it is mindfulness.<sup>3024</sup> And that yet those who

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Adeimantus has “hassled” Socrates before (not only near the beginning of Bk. Five but at the beginning of Bk. Four, too), αὖ means “instead, alternatively” rather than “again” (pace J.-C. and Adam), since it follows ή rather than διανοή. Socrates is responding to the riddled importunity of the question Adeimantus has just asked him. On ἀντιλαμβανόμενος (A1), cf. 497D4 and n.2886: the conative present shows Adeimantus is busy enough trying to obstruct Socrates to forget what he has often heard before. Why does he act dumb?

<sup>3017</sup> The full formal dress of the phrase (ή τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἵδεα, A2) resonates without having a specific reference or precedent in the conversation so far. Socrates (with the perfect, ἀκίκοας, A3 and 504E8) refers to it as something about which Adeimantus has witnessed several discussions before.

<sup>3018</sup> προσχρησάμενα (A3) a new term.

<sup>3019</sup> δίκαια καὶ τἀλλα (A3): the absence of the article with δίκαια (per all mss., contra Proclus) signifies, if anything, that “things that are just” is meant rather than justice, helping to make the point that justice is not *eo ipso* good but only *eo ipso* just, and leaving room for the point to be made that if justice is good it is because it is good to be just. τἀλλα stands for the usual complement, καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλά (cf.n.2279), but the current context requires him to suspend the narrower sense that ἀγαθά has as a co-species in that triad, in order to make room for the general sense he is trying to elucidate.

<sup>3020</sup> Reading κεκτήμεθα (B1) with all mss. Bekker's emendation (κεκτῆμεθα) is unnecessary: the analogy is empirical, not conceptual (whence indicative, not optative), as the following contrapositive assertion (κεκτήσθαι without ὅν) indicates.

<sup>3021</sup> πλέον (B1) significantly not ἄμεινον or βέλτιον nor even μεῖζον, since again he has to avoid using the good as a measure of the good (cf. note on τἀλλα, above). It is not an accident that the vice of materialism is called πλεονεξία not βελτιονεξία, *vel sim.* Cf. πλῆθος at 550E2 and n.3717.

<sup>3022</sup> πᾶσαν κτῆσιν κτᾶσθαι (B1-2): πᾶσαν plus the internal accusative indicates possession *per se*; conversely, Socrates takes it for granted that the goodness of the possession (expressed as a predicate with the adjective ἀγαθήν) is identical to the presence of good in it (the inverse of ἀνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, B1). The identification is repeated by the restatement of φρονεῖν ἀνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ with the expression καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν (B3).

<sup>3023</sup> φρονεῖν (B2,3).

<sup>3024</sup> φρόνησις (B6), apparently picking up φρονεῖν. The disagreement between the majority and the clever is permanent; there is no need to name names. There is moreover something fundamentally wrong about identifying the good and pleasure or the good and mindfulness, or identifying *any* characteristic with any other characteristic, as if they were one and not two. Thrasymachus's “answer” for instance, in its form identifies justice with the advantage of the stronger, but all he meant was that there is no justice in human affairs and therefore no sanction against πλεονεξία (cf. n.317). The “assertions” that knowledge is the good or that pleasure is the good likewise seek merely to identify the ultimate sanction with knowledge, or with pleasure. But this is only true because the good, *qua*

hold this latter position are not able to demonstrate what kind of mindfulness it is but in the end are reduced to saying it is mindfulness of the good.<sup>3025</sup>

“Yes, a ridiculous outcome!”<sup>3026</sup>

Obviously it is, if on the one hand they criticize us for not knowing what the good is but then they make an argument to us as if we knew. For they say that mindfulness is *per se* a mindfulness of good, as if we should be able to construe what they mean by this collocation simply on the force of their mouthing the word “good.”

“Exactly right.”

And as for those who define the good as pleasure, how can their position be any less fixed and sure<sup>3027</sup> than the alternative? Don’t you think they would have to admit there are pleasures that are bad? But then they would have to agree that the same thing is good and bad.

“Very much so.”

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good, is the ultimate sanction, and remains so after such assertions are made. Socrates has already made the point indirectly (504E7-505B3) and will do so again (505D5-506A2): this is why he loses patience with Adeimantus for ignoring it (506B5-7). The idea will receive explicit logical articulation at 509B8-9.

<sup>3025</sup> ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες (B9) The argument that the good is mindfulness but that mindfulness is mindfulness of the good, is circular; and yet a dialectical investigation will reveal that those who assert the former can only maintain it with the latter – as spelled out below (C1-4). ἀναγκάζονται refers to the logical necessity of a dialectical investigation and τελευτῶντες alludes to the endpoint or συμπέρασμα when the questioner connects the answerer's last answer, that the knowledge in question must be knowledge of the good, with his opening thesis, that the good is knowledge.

<sup>3026</sup> καὶ μάλα γελοίως (B11): Once again our Adeimantus is quick to ridicule error, in this case an error revealed in dialectical refutation, an event always witnessed by at least one other, in the face of whom one might be ashamed. And yet, as we know from the record of other Socratic encounters, anyone who does not know what is good but has an idea about it (we need to know, after all, whence it is an ὄνειδος not to [C1]), is liable to suffer this outcome, including Adeimantus. It is to only avoid the shame of such ridicule that one would prefer playing questioner to answerer (as Thrasymachus accuses Socrates), since in all strictness the answerer defending a false belief of his own would benefit to be disabused of it, even at the expense of ridicule – assuming, that is, that it is better to know you don't know than believe you do in error. All this implies that if pressed a person might respond to the Socratic encounter by claiming he has no beliefs, or avoiding to claim he does, so as to avoid what he himself sees as the ridicule of refutation (and we have seen Adeimantus behave just this way all along: nn. 3005, 2927, 2901, 2899, 2897, 2864); and it also implies as a corollary that Adeimantus is the very type of the group Socrates mentions in the *Apology* (23C2-7), the sons of the rich who have the leisure to go about imitating Socrates and to play at refuting people that think they know something – and (as I have noted above) there is a great abundance of such people (πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν, 23C6). Notably, Adeimantus's brother Glaucon is not of this type: in fact it is only Socrates that he subjects to Socratic treatment (357B3, 358A4-6, and nn.668, 686, 688).

<sup>3027</sup> μή τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεψ (C6-7): For the negative fullness cf.n.2989, 2865, 2845. The metaphor of πλάνη was introduced above in connection with opinion and the world of the many (479D9) but here has a sense, reminiscent of Euthyphro's complaint that Socrates's scrutiny of his arguments makes them seem to move like the lifelike statues of Daedalus [11C8-D2, 15B7-C1]. For the wide but ultimately analogous range of uses Plato makes of this metaphor cf. 602C12 and n. 4798).

Although the topic is obviously clouded with controversy,<sup>3028</sup> it is likewise<sup>3029</sup> obvious that when it comes to the just and the beautiful<sup>3030</sup> most people accept conventional beliefs in how they act, in what they own, and in what they believe,<sup>3031</sup> even if the beliefs are not true, and yet that when it comes to the good nobody is satisfied to get only what is believed to be good but they seriously seek out what really is. Belief, in this one case, fails to be enough and is credited not at all.

“Very much so.”

This thing that every soul pursues<sup>3032</sup> and<sup>3033</sup> makes the goal of every action it takes, even though aware of it only by intuition and quite unable to get a decent grasp as to just what it is, nor even able to consign the matter to some stable prejudice as we can in other matters, while on the other hand because of its insufficient grasp it fails also to garner whatever is good in other things—are we actually<sup>3034</sup> to (506) leave the best of our citizens, too, in the dark about a matter of so great and fine, into whose hands we shall be entrusting all?<sup>3035</sup>

“Hardly.”

But as to the just and the beautiful it's surely clear that if what is good about them is unknown, the guard they have secured for themselves will be of little worth unless he does know. Yet my intuition<sup>3036</sup> tells me no one will know the former before he knows the latter. We can say therefore

<sup>3028</sup>The ἀμφισβητήσεις (D2) have just been revealed for what they are, superficial refutations of circularity (B8-C4) and self-contradiction (C7-8): μεγάλαι καὶ πολλαί, the common auxesis by combining quantity and quality, portrays their bothersomeness not their importance or subtlety. Shorey notices the term is derogatory but understates the matter (“slightly disparaging”) because of the distinction drawn between it and ἐρίζειν, as for instance at *Prot.*337A. The point here is the futility of arguing either position when one lacks knowledge (μή τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεω, C6-7). The same kind of futility vitiated the ἀμφισβητήσεις of 436C8ff, 453A7ff, and 476D8ff.

<sup>3029</sup>Punctuate 505D5 thus: τί δὲ τόδε· οὐ φανερόν ... . Over against the disagreements (μέν) as to “what” the good is, we all clearly see (δέ) that it is the reality rather than the appearance of good that we want.

<sup>3030</sup>δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλά (D5): μέν suggests that the third member of the triad, ἀγαθόν, will be appearing with δέ, and it does: the traditional triad (suppressed a moment ago, A3) is now adduced only to be replaced by a higher interpretation.

<sup>3031</sup>Though tempted by M.Dixsaut’s *montrer* (*République Livres VI et VII* [Paris 1986] *ad loc.*), I take δοκεῖν to mean νομίζειν. Socrates reaches to make a paradox (τὰ δοκοῦντα δοκεῖν being circular). The paradox is then repeated by the contrapositive circularity of “credibility discredited” (δόξαν ἀτιμάζειν, D8-9).

<sup>3032</sup>διώκει (D11) adds vividness to ζητοῦσι (D8), pushes the complacency of δοκοῦντα, δοκεῖν, and δόξα still further into the background.

<sup>3033</sup>τούτου (D11): anaphora of the relative (οὗ) by expressing its unexpressed antecedent, as again below at E3. Cf. 357B8 (and Adam *ad loc.*), 412D5, and Smyth §1252. For the role of καί in such illogic cf. Denniston 295-6.

<sup>3034</sup>δή (E8) resumes the δή of D11 after the lengthy intervention of the relative clause in prolepsis.

<sup>3035</sup>περὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους (E4-506A1): Even though we do not know the answer, our guards need to! Again for the sake of the success of the theoretical project, Socrates requires himself and his interlocutor to reach beyond what they might otherwise expect from themselves (cf. 504C6-D3 and n.3008): he is here rediscovering a use for the indirect method of the imaginary state, even though it became a ladder to throw away at the end of Book Four.

<sup>3036</sup>μαντεύομαι (A6), repeated from 505E1, begins the self-instantiation of the problem of knowing the Good as it affects the present conversation; next will come οἴησις (C4-5) as a second

that our city will have received its finest crown if such a man should be her overseer.<sup>3037</sup> as does know this.

“So it must be. But as to you, Socrates which position do you take in the dispute? Do you say it is knowledge, or pleasure, or some third thing?”

What am I to do with you,<sup>3038</sup> Adeimantus! You made it perfectly clear<sup>3039</sup> some time ago<sup>3040</sup> that the opinions of others on these matters would not be passing muster with you!

“Nor does it seem right to me that a person should be able to recite the opinions of others but not his own,<sup>3041</sup> if the person has been working on the problem for such<sup>3042</sup> a long time.”

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best sort of grasp in the absence of a μόνιμος πίστις (505E2-3).

<sup>3037</sup> ἐπισκοπεῖν (B1), a new metaphor for the superintendence and supervision rendered to the city by the guards.

<sup>3038</sup> οὐτος ἀνήρ (B5), expressing exasperation with the anarthrous demonstrative (cf. *Euthyd.* 296A1; *Gorg.* 467B1, 489B7, 505C3; *Prot.* 310B5). The idiom is essentially comic: cf. *Ar. Plut.* 439, 926, etc.). It is quite out of character for Socrates to place his interlocutor into the third person with an expression like this, as if he were glancing around for support from the eavesdroppers to the conversation. The only other time we had a sign his patience was wearing thin was with Glaucon at 472B3-D2. when it was Glaucon's turn to take responsibility for himself. Where Glaucon rose to the occasion Adeimantus is about to fail (cf. Appendix 8). That “The Good” is unknown but, as here formulated, is the one thing a man needs to know so as to “realize” the goodness of the other things that are within his reach, like wealth or strength, is the conundrum Socrates promises, at the end of his defense speech (*Apol.* 37E5-38A7, cf. 29D7-30B3), that he will never to allow the Athenians to forget, and more than half their reason for silencing him (30E1-31A8).

<sup>3039</sup> καλῶς ἥσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανῆς (B5-6). Cf. καλῶς with δῆλος at *Soph. OR* 1008, *Ar. Lys.* 919.

<sup>3040</sup> ἀποχρήσοι (B6): The relatively rare future optative, along with πάλαι, confronts Adeimantus with the fact that in a previous context he went on record against the prospect of relying on mere opinion. In support of Socrates's claim we may cite Adeimantus's readiness to fault men for laziness (ρᾳθυμία, 504C5, cf. 449C2, 425E-6E) and his recent agreement that the present subject must be treated with the greatest possible rigor (504C1-E4); as to methodological eschewals of δόξα per se we can only point to *obiter dicta* at 499D7-8 and 426D5-6, but we can also include the more substantial objection to δόξα that Adeimantus raised at the beginning of the entire conversation (πάλαι, at 367B5, cf. 367D2, D4), when he insisted on achieving an account of the inherent goodness of justice independent of any profit that might accrue from reputation—a criterion whose relevance to the question of the Good the present argument has rediscovered just above (505D5-10, esp. οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι), with Adeimantus's strong approval. See next note.

<sup>3041</sup> ἔχειν εἰπεῖν (B8): being able, being in the position to, “express” (not criticize or question) other's judgments without expressing one's own. His remark is an attenuated version of the accusation Socrates always provokes, to which Thrasymachus gave full voice in Book One (337A3-7), and in response to which Socrates always has to reiterate his protestation of ignorance.

<sup>3042</sup> τοσοῦτον (B9), using the “second person” demonstrative but avoiding the personal pronoun is another Adeimantean finesse. The syntactical antecedent of τοσοῦτον χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον is αὐτοῦ but its semantic antecedent is Socrates, for with this phrase Adeimantus is reiterating the complaint he made at 367D8-E1, the passage Socrates has just reminded him of: διότι πάντα τὸν βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἢ τοῦτο (πραγματευόμενος = σκοπῶν διελήλυθας). In asserting he knows Socrates has been “working on” this question a long time he shows us Socrates was right to object above that he had heard the answer a thousand times (504E7-505A1). We find the interlocutors quibbling about whether even their approach to the ἀγαθόν is καλόν (B5, C7, C11) and δίκαιον (B8, C2).

And does it seem right to you for that “person” of yours<sup>3043</sup> to speak on matters of which he is ignorant as if he were knowledgeable?

“Not at all to speak as knowledgeable but having a notion of them to be willing to tell what his notion is.”

Really! I said to him.<sup>3044</sup> You are unaware, I presume, that opinions unsupported by knowledge are ugly and shameful, every single one. At best they are blind—or are you of the opinion that a person who holds a true opinion without intelligence<sup>3045</sup> is any better than a blind man walking in a straight line?<sup>3046</sup>

“No better.”

So, would you want to contemplate things that are ugly, whether as being blind or as being crooked,<sup>3047</sup> if you could<sup>3048</sup> hear things bright and beautiful from others?

“Please, in the name of Zeus!” Glaucon said. “Don’t stop<sup>3049</sup> just when you are on the verge of reaching the goal!<sup>3050</sup> We will be satisfied with the kind of treatment you provided us before when you

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<sup>3043</sup> With τις (C2), Socrates continues Adeimantus's conceit not to admit he is talking about Socrates; but what Socrates now impersonally asserts is, by a dramatic sort of irony, a profession of ignorance unique to himself, as the one man who “knows he does not know” – for what he now says is the essence of his famous profession. Because he is ignorant of the good he knows nothing important in the sense of being ignorant of what makes anything else important. On the dramatic level, the exchanges (B2-C5) are devolving into retorts and belligerence in the manner of iambic stichomythy.

<sup>3044</sup> With εἰπον (C6) Socrates reminds us he is narrating, as often at exceptionally dramatic junctures (e.g., 416C9, 378E7: cf. n.1185).

<sup>3045</sup> νοῦς (C8), the third use of a νοῦς-word in the present context (cf. 503B7 and n.2986).

<sup>3046</sup> ὄρθως (C8): The noblest opinions are the right ones (sc. ὄρθαι), but since the opiner cannot explain why he is right his rightness remains shameful (αἰσχραί); other opinions are less noble since they lack both explanation and rightness. Hence, below they are called crooked (σκολιά, C11).

<sup>3047</sup> αἰσχρὰ (θεάσασθαι), τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά, versus φανά τε καὶ καλά (506C11-D1): the chiastic configuration of opposites is usual. In abbreviating τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά to φανά (rather than ὄρθά τε καὶ φανά) Socrates stresses the quality of the seeing over the quality of what is seen, which takes us back to the imagery used for distinguishing the objects of philosophers' and philodoxers' loves at 475D-480A (e.g. σαφήνεια / ἀσάφεια (478C11); σκοτωδέστερον / φανότερον (478C14 and 479C8-D1), and prepares us for the analogy of φῶς (507E4 et seq.). The experience of luminosity (described below with an analogy, 508B12-D9) is sufficient to give the metaphor of blindness and vision cognitive value; supplementary tracking down of mysteries and revelations is unnecessary.

The images used to persuade Adeimantus before (490-498) were of quite a different order.

<sup>3048</sup> ξένον (C11): This circumstantial participle might be conditional (“assuming you have the chance”) or concessive (“even though you have the chance”). It is not obvious to Glaucon (though it may be to some commentators) that Socrates is referring to some particular sophist -- otherwise he would not have interrupted the way he does.

<sup>3049</sup> μὴ πρὸς Δίος ἢ δ’ ὅς ὁ Σώκρατες ὁ Γλαύκων (D2): Fearing the worst, Glaucon takes ξένον to be conditional and infers that Socrates might just be trying once again to wiggle out of the role of leading the conversation (cf. 427C6-E5), so he intervenes. His reaction is a dramatic index of the extreme to which the conversation has been stretched. Socrates as our narrator emphasizes his interruption for us, and the change of interlocutor that it entails, by weaving direct statement (ἢ δὲ ὅς / ὁ Γλαύκων) with indirect (μὴ πρὸς Δίος / Σώκρατες). Adeimantus will now fall silent until he interrupts in Book Eight (548D8-9).

<sup>3050</sup> ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὧν ἀποστῆται (D2-3): ὥσπερ temporal and objective (“right when you are actually on the verge of perfecting the account”) not causal and subjective (“thinking you are done”).

dealt with justice and temperance and the rest.

As if I, too, would not be quite satisfied to produce such a treatment!<sup>3051</sup> And yet I fear I shall prove unable and that my reward for showing such eagerness might be to cut a ridiculous figure.<sup>3052</sup> In any event, let us, my wondrous<sup>3053</sup> friends, pass over for the time being<sup>3054</sup> the question what goodness might be, itself and on its own. To reach an account of what I think just now about that is quite beyond the impetus and inspiration of our present inquiry.<sup>3055</sup> Instead, I will consent to describe what seems to me its offspring and its nearest likeness, if you would welcome<sup>3056</sup> this, or else we can let the whole thing go.

“Nay tell us! You can make good on giving us an account of the father some other time.”

### D.3e.1a:The Sun

(507) Ideally I wish I had the ability to remit the whole account and you the ability to receive it,<sup>3057</sup> rather than just the yield as I now propose. Do then receive and take in the following as the yield and offspring of the good itself, but take special care that I not unintentionally shortchange you with a counterfeit, in the account I am about to render.<sup>3058</sup>

τέλος means not end or limit but goal or perfection as at 502C9; 504C2, D3, D7; 506A9. Compare the related language of ἀκριβεία (503B5, D8; 504B5, E1, E3), ἀπεργασία (504D7) and κόσμος (506A9), and cf. the similar expression at 532A7-B2.

<sup>3051</sup> καὶ γὰρ ἔμοι ... ὁ ἔταιρε καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει (D6): His statement of “satisfaction” is emphatic, feigning relief as before (cf. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἔμοιγε καὶ πάνυ ἐξαρκέσει, 435D8). The vocative expresses his feeling about the turn of the conversation (cf. n.554), not Glaucon as opposed to Adeimantus, whom also he called ἔταιρε, a moment ago (504C9). His true sentiments about the problem are already expressed, at 504B4-6 and 506E1-3.

<sup>3052</sup> γέλωτα ὄφλήσω (D8). To worry about being laughed at is of course childish (451A1), but in the aftermath of Adeimantus's surly behavior (esp. 505B11 and n.3026), which has now been brought to an end by Glaucon stepping in, mentioning the fear only bespeaks the seriousness of his resolve.

<sup>3053</sup> ὁ μακάριοι (D8), the epithet again expressing his own feeling about how the conversation is going (n.2911), and so here expresses superhuman relief, or more exactly relief at being exonerated of a superhuman task.

<sup>3054</sup> τὸ νῦν εἶναι (E1). The dismissal is explained by the remark about ὄρμή. Again (cf. n.527) we would have to give up on following the drama Plato has created for us, and any concern for its verisimilitude, if we chose to wonder whether he is trying to plant a message in the mouths of his characters by which to promise us a fuller “treatment” in some other work.

<sup>3055</sup> κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὄρμήν (E2): The account he gives will leave something to be desired (cf. ἐλλιπῆ, 504B6); the measure of possibility is the ὄρμή, the vector of the conversation (consisting of its orientation and momentum). How long will it last?

<sup>3056</sup> εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν φίλον (E4): καὶ is correlative; φίλον is the emotion that would reciprocate his willingness (ἐθέλειν).

<sup>3057</sup> βουλούμην ἂν ... ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀποδούναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι (507A1-2): The mercantile metaphor hides whether he doubts they have the ability to absorb it (“take it in”). The word order helps not at all to determine whether κομίσασθαι (507A2) is governed by βουλούμην or by δύνασθαι with the subject alternating from ἐμέ to ὑμᾶς. Because it makes something easier to understand an image is serviceable both for difficult subjects and for less able students. Cf. the ambiguous ἐρωτᾶς ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως δι’ εἰκόνος λεγομένης (487E4-5 and n.2728).

<sup>3058</sup> κίβδηλον ἀποδιδούς (A5), a further comment on the problem of κομίσασθε. If the relation of the image to the “original” is misunderstood it becomes a counterfeit. Socrates warns them not to take the image too “literally.”

“We will take all the care we can—just speak!”<sup>3059</sup>

So I will, as long as I can rely on your agreement<sup>3060</sup> with several points I will remind you of, that have already been argued both here and elsewhere many times.

“Which points?”

The plurality of beautiful things and the plurality of good things and all the other specified pluralities that we speak of<sup>3061</sup> as existing and distinguished from each other by our reasoning.

“We do speak thus.”

And the itself-beautiful<sup>3062</sup> and itself-good and all the other distinct singularities<sup>3063</sup> we posited just now as pluralities,<sup>3064</sup> these also we posit in accordance with each one's single characteristic; and recognizing the characteristic as a singular self-same reality, we speak of each of them as what that characteristic “really is.”<sup>3065</sup>

“So we do.”

And we speak of the pluralities as being objects of sight but not of intelligence<sup>3066</sup> and conversely the pure characteristics as objects of intellect and not of sight.

“Right on all four points.”<sup>3067</sup>

With what part of ourselves do we see the objects of sight?

“With our vision.”

And likewise with hearing we hear the audibles and with the other senses we sense all the other sensibles?

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<sup>3059</sup> ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε (A6), repeated from 506E6, the request strengthened by μόνον. While it is true that his interlocutors hold his feet to the fire (as esp. in Book Five at 449B6-451B8 and 457D6-458B8, up to the point he turns the tables on Glaucon, 471C2-473B3), it is also true that Socrates, like some surgeons, might wait for his patients to beg (μόνον) him to perform a serious operation on them. Cf. 445B5-C3; 435D6-9; 432C1-6 (μόνον) and 432E8; 427D8-E5; ἐδέοντο, 368C4; and cf. 328A9-B1, where μὴ ἄλλως stands in for μόνον.

<sup>3060</sup> διομολογησάμενος (A7) of taking the trouble to secure agreement, through question and answer, to what will be used as premises in the ensuing argument cf. 527B3, 603A10 and D4; Phdr.237C3.

<sup>3061</sup> φαμεν (B3), of positions Socrates recommends Glaucon to take in response to his solicitations (a reciprocal relation, which they reiterate at 509C3-6). So again at 507B4, B9; 508B12 (imperatival infinitive), E3 (imperative); 509B7 (imperatival infinitive).

<sup>3062</sup> αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ὄγαθόν (B5). In Plato's continual insistence on a distinction that had never been made, his language of course becomes artificial. Likewise his use of ἔκαστα (e.g., B2), which sometimes is best translated “eaches” (e.g., at 533B2). To subject such straining expressions to rigorous logical or linguistic analysis could easily prove a fool's errand.

<sup>3063</sup> Borrowing ἔκαστα from above (B2).

<sup>3064</sup> ἡ τότε ως πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν (B6): The phrasing is an adumbration of τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν, 510B4.

<sup>3065</sup> τὰ μὲν ὄρᾶσθαι φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι δ' οὖ (B9): The distinction was explicitly drawn above at 475E5-6A8, where again Socrates presumed Glaucon would grant it (E6-7); but it was also assumed in all its substantial features in the earlier conversation with Glaucon at 400C7-402C9 as well as in the more recent conversation with Adeimantus at 490A8-B7.

<sup>3066</sup> νοεῖσθαι (B9), the fourth use of a νοῦς-word.

<sup>3067</sup> παντάπασι (B11), acknowledging the plurality of points being made (cf. n. 1936).

"Yes—and so?"

Well, have you ever recognized<sup>3068</sup> how much more exceedingly<sup>3069</sup> lavish the fashioner of our senses made the power of seeing and being seen?

"I can't say I have."

Well look at it the way I do. Is there something additional that hearing and sound need, different from the two of them, for the one to hear and the other to be heard, such that if this third something is absent the one won't be doing any hearing and the other won't be heard?

"No, nothing."

And I'd guess that of the other senses many—not to say all—don't need anything, either. Can you mention one that does?

"I can't."<sup>3070</sup>

But with vision and the visible,<sup>3071</sup> don't you recognize<sup>3072</sup> that it needs a supplement?

"How so?"

Say the ability to see resides in a given person's eyes, and say the person is trying to use it; and say there is color<sup>3073</sup> in the things he is trying to apply it to.<sup>3074</sup> If a certain third thing is absent whose very nature is uniquely suited to just this situation, are you aware that vision will see nothing and that the colored things will be invisible?

"What is this thing you are saying they need?"<sup>3075</sup>

<sup>3068</sup> ἐννεόηκας (C6) the fifth use.

<sup>3069</sup> ὥσῳ πολυτελεστάτην (C7) triply emphatic: (1) the dative of degree of difference (ὥσῳ instead of ὅτι), (2) the comparative prefix πολύ, (3) the superlative degree. One may think of Grand Opera, as the art most extravagant, needing the greatest expenditure on crew, scenes, and performers.

<sup>3070</sup> ή σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπειν (D5-6): Glaucon has not recognized (C6) that sight is an exception. In asserting that only sight needs a *tertium quid*, Socrates (or Plato) does not evince ignorance of the need for sound and hearing to have a "medium," since (1) light is not here conceived or described as the "medium" of vision (esp. 508B6-7); and (2) the "absence" of air, as distinct from the absence of light, is barely thinkable. Shorey's suave apology (*ad loc.*) that Plato is writing literature not science is gratuitous.

<sup>3071</sup> τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως (D8): We may supply either δύναμιν or αἴσθησιν with τήν, but the more important fact is that Socrates leaves out a noun. In the fuller statement below we see that the best noun to supply for what he here means would have been σύζευξις (508A1). Absence of the noun allows the main point to surface, that the sense faculty and the sense object are being paired, for which the precedent is ἀκοῇ καὶ φωνῇ (507C10) where a common noun was not even suggested.

<sup>3072</sup> ἐννοεῖς (D8), sixth use.

<sup>3073</sup> παρούσης δὲ χρόας (D12). Color and shape (χρῶμα / σχῆμα) are what is specifically visual (cf. n. 1046). χρῶμα here stands in for both.

<sup>3074</sup> ἐν αὐτοῖς (D12). αὐτά are things unqualified by color or by being seen. There is no need for an antecedent to the pronoun. Their identity is implied by the symmetrical pairing of ὄψις ἐν ὅμμασιν, χρόα ἐν X. That he can express their unqualification with αὐτός is an index of the adjectival power of this word, on which cf. LSJ s.v. αὐτός, *init.* Once again we do not need to nail down antecedents, but get the sense and move on.

<sup>3075</sup> τίνος ... τούτου (E3): with the genitive we must presumably supply προσδεῖν (from C10, D5) or προσδεῖται (from D8).

Just the thing you<sup>3076</sup> know by the name of “light.”

“Yes, what you are saying is true.”

Therefore it is not by an insignificant kind of measure<sup>3077</sup> that the yoke is superior that connects seeing and the ability to be seen, (508) to the yokes of the others, unless of course light is a thing of little honor.

“Well it’s far from being a thing of little honor.”

And which of the gods in heaven can you thank for being in charge of this, whose light makes sight able to see so admirably and the visible things to be seen?

“The same one you do<sup>3078</sup> and everybody else does: the Sun is obviously the god you are asking after.”

And is not sight by its nature related to the Sun as follows?

“How?”

Sight is not the Sun, neither in itself nor in the seat where it occurs, the thing we call the eye.

“Of course not.”

And yet the eye is the most sunlike<sup>3079</sup> of all the organs of sense.

“Very much.”

And the power that the eye has it receives as an influx from the Sun as if parceled out to it.

“Quite so.”

And can we not say conversely that the Sun is not sight, but while responsible for sight it comes to be seen by the sight that it caused?<sup>3080</sup>

“So we can.”

So now you have my account<sup>3081</sup> of the Good’s offspring, which the Good gave birth to as an

<sup>3076</sup> σύ (E4) finally scolds Glaucon for the obtuse impatience he began to exhibit at C5 and C9.

<sup>3077</sup> σμικρῷ ἴδεᾳ (E6), a “qualitative” dative of the degree of difference, with ἴδεᾳ varying γένος above (507E11): the dative answers the question asked by the parallel dative, ὅσῳ (C7).

<sup>3078</sup> οὐπερ καὶ σύ (508A7): Glaucon acknowledges he has been scolded by Socrates, by giving back to him the expression he had used just above (ἢ δὴ σύ καλεῖς, 507E4).

<sup>3079</sup> ἡλιοειδέστατον (B3): Though the εἰδ- suffix suggests the similarity of the shape of sun and eye the similarity needs not be restricted to this. There may be a sense that the seeing eye sends a beam as the sun does; and in any event the ears, nose, and tongue have no sense or awareness whether it is day or night. The question has the awkwardness of a proleptic skew (on which cf. n. 1556) that will be redeemed by its purpose being met, to set up the relation between γνῶσίς τε καὶ ἀλήθεια and the good: although these are very good they are not the good (508E3-509A5, where n.b. in all strictness the eye is replaced by φῶς τε καὶ ὄψις as the analogon, anyway).

<sup>3080</sup> Sight is not the Sun, but (as embodied in the eye) is sunlike, the eye being spherical like the sun (A10-B5); and conversely the Sun is not sight, but (in addition to being its cause) is sight-like—i.e., seeable (B9-10). The presentation of the analogy is paced. The two parts of the first limb (concession of non-identity followed by assertion of similarity) are done piecemeal (with three questions, 508A11-B7), and then the two parts of the converse limb are condensed into one (B9-10), by a usual sort of telescoping or pacing.

<sup>3081</sup> φάναι με λέγειν (B12), φάναι an imperative infinitive, as at 473A8 and 509B6, advocating that a position be adopted. Cf. n.3061 ad 507B3.

analogue to itself in the sense that the relation the Good has in the intelligible realm with the intellect and the things that are intellected,<sup>3082</sup> is exactly the same relation the Sun has in the visible realm with seeing and the things that are seen.

“How? Take me through the steps in more detail.”

In the case of the eyes, as you know,<sup>3083</sup> when you stop looking at things whose colors the day casts its light upon but turn instead to those upon which the glares of night<sup>3084</sup> are cast, their vision becomes dull and becomes like that of the blind, as if their ability to see were corrupted.<sup>3085</sup>

“Yes indeed.”

But then when the sun shines down upon such things, the eyes see distinctly and in these same<sup>3086</sup> eyes the power of sight seems to be<sup>3087</sup> present.

“And so?”

So also conceive<sup>3088</sup> the analogous element<sup>3089</sup> I have in mind that resides in the soul. Whenever it succeeds to focus upon something on which the light of truth and reality shines, it achieves intelligence<sup>3090</sup> and comes to know it as such, and appears in itself to possess mind; but when it attends to a thing riddled with shadows and darkness—something in the realm of coming to be and passing

<sup>3082</sup> ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα (C1): uses seven, eight, and nine. The first and third of these three rely semantically on the analogy with sight, the visible realm and the visible things being a springboard for the notions of an intelligible realm (*νοητὸς τόπος*) and intelligible things (*νοούμενα*), which are semantic stretches destined to do a lot of heavy lifting in the future “history of philosophy.”

<sup>3083</sup> οἶσθ’ ὅτι (C4). Here and elsewhere in this context the dead visual metaphor of the verb is being temporarily resuscitated: contrast *νόει* below (D4), in connection with the “sight” of the soul.

<sup>3084</sup> νυκτερινὰ φέγγη (C6): as for instance the artificial sunlight of a torch and shadowy light it casts.

<sup>3085</sup> ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως (C6-7). The first item presents the performance of the eyes and the second an inference one might make from the outside on the basis of (*ἥσπερ*) that performance.

<sup>3086</sup> The point of *τοῖς αὐτοῖς* (D2) is that whatever contribution the eyes make to the act of seeing, it is present whether light is present or not.

<sup>3087</sup> σαφῶς ὄρωσι, καὶ ... ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται (D1-2): Performance and inference again.

<sup>3088</sup> *νόει* (D4), the ninth use.

<sup>3089</sup> τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς (D4) is analogous to τὸ τοῦ ὅμματος, i.e., the ὄψις ἐν ὅμμασιν ἐνοῦσα (507D11) or ἐγγιγνομένη (A11). It is *νοῦς*, a term which just now he avoids using!

<sup>3090</sup> ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται (D6)—uses ten and eleven. The precedent for the list is D1-2, σαφῶς ὄρωσι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὅμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται, which explains the purpose of the last item (which would otherwise be anticlimactic), namely, that this thing in the soul was there all along (cf. *τοῖς αὐτοῖς*, D2). Note also that in the previous list the direct object of ὄρωσι goes unstated (it is the unexpressed antecedent of *ὅν*, D1), whereas in this list the object of *ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω* is made distinctive by *αὐτό*. The striking “gnomic” aorists (*ἐνόησεν* and *ἔγνω*, constituting the apodosis of a present general condition) express the way time seems to stop at the moment of intellection (cf. Gildersleeve, on the force of this aorist as analogous to that of the generic article, *Syntax* §563 [255,f], and compare the aorists used amidst imperfects to express a similar idea, at 490B3-6). *ἐνόησεν* (narrowly the analogue to *όρᾶν* or *ἰδεῖν*), receives exegesis from *ἔγνω*, which stresses the capturing of the insight.

away<sup>3091</sup>—it opines and loses its edge, taking on opinions topsy turvy,<sup>3092</sup> and in turn acts like something that has no intelligence.<sup>3093</sup>

“Yes, like that.”

Alright then:<sup>3094</sup> This thing that does supply the truth to the things that can be known and the power to the knower to know them you may say is the Idea of the Good.<sup>3095</sup> Since it is responsible<sup>3096</sup> for both knowledge and of truth,<sup>3097</sup> although you may think of it as being one of the known truths,<sup>3098</sup> still—however fine these two things knowing and truth may be—if you adopt the view instead<sup>3099</sup> that in itself it is distinct from them and finer still than they you will be adopting the correct view; while as to knowledge (509) and truth, as in the analogy it was proper to think of light and vision as being sunlike while believing either of them to be the sun was incorrect, so also here it is correct to think of both these as being good-like whereas to believe either of them is good in itself is not correct. Instead, one must honor the good as having a greater<sup>3100</sup> way of being.

“The beauty you describe it to have is far beyond us, if in addition to providing us what knowledge and truth we have it holds a rank above them in beauty! For I take it you do not mean to

<sup>3091</sup> τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον (D7): cf. γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, 485B2-3.

<sup>3092</sup> δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ὅνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι (D8-9), a triad corresponding with the triadic list before: δοξάζει (parallel with ἐνόησεν) expresses the relevant faculty (δόξα) with the narrow and exact term and then receives exegesis (ἀμβλυώττει, etc.: cf. γνῶναι αὐτό); third follows the resulting external judgment (καὶ ἔοικεν ...). ἀμβλυώττει is borrowed from the analogy with seeing (C6) but then itself needs the exegesis ὅνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, according to which the problem is not so much fuzziness of vision but the fluctuating impressions of what is fuzzily seen (“It’s a statue—no, no, it’s a man”: cf. Phlb.38C12-E4) as opposed to the stability the mind enjoys from coming to rest on a secure object (cf. ἀπερείσηται, D5). Cf. πλάνη, 505C7 and n.3027.

<sup>3093</sup> νοῦν (D9) usage twelve.

<sup>3094</sup> τοίνυν (E1) leads to the imperative φάθι. Since as we have learned sight is not a property of the eye *per se* nor is intelligence a power that belongs to mind (nor *pari passu* visibility and intelligibility properties inherent in their respective objects), in both cases the determinant end enabler must be located outside them.

<sup>3095</sup> τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν (E1-2), reverting to the original expression used for this *explicandum* at 505A2. The good “is an idea” as all the other characteristics are, and Plato/Socrates emphasizes this just as he is on the verge of saying it is something more than one idea among others, which is the burden of the next sentence.

<sup>3096</sup> αἰτίαν δ’ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας (E3-4) is grammatically parallel to αἴτιος δ’ ὃν αὐτῆς at B9, for the sake of the analogy, so that αἰτίαν here is just as adjectival as αἴτιος was, there.

<sup>3097</sup> γνώσεως τε καὶ ἀληθείας (E5): They arise simultaneously. Cf. νοῦν τε καὶ ἀλήθειαν (490B5-6) and n.2779.

<sup>3098</sup> We may now read γιγνωσκομένην (E3) with Laur.80.19 (Slings). The good, by enabling the mind to know and the knowable to be true (known), also enables itself to be known, just as the sun’s light renders even the sun itself visible (B10) though both are difficult to “look at” directly. Both the μέν clause (E4) and the participle ὄντων (E4) are concessive constructions, even though the latter forces the true content of the δέ clause (ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον, κτλ) into hyperbaton.

<sup>3099</sup> δέ (E4) though placed after οὔτω, should be felt after ἄλλο in ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον (E5), serving to contrast these predicates with γιγνωσκομένην μέν.

<sup>3100</sup> μειζόνως τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξιν (509A4-5): I take the construction to be a stately periphrasis for μειζόνως ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθόν. The good is first κάλλιον (E6) and then μειζόνως ἔχον, or μεῖζον, and these are nothing but the comparatives of the commonplace dyad, καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός.

be giving the palm to pleasure.”<sup>3101</sup>

Be still, clever boy! Instead let's take the analogy further. You will be able to say that the sun not only provides the visible world with its ability to be seen, but also provides its coming to be and growth and nourishment, while itself not being the coming to be<sup>3102</sup> it enjoys.

“How after all could it be?”<sup>3103</sup>

Likewise then, for the realm of things known, not only is their knowability conferred upon them by the good, but also their existence and what they are is added to them, while in itself the good is not a what but rather beyond whatness, because of its having been there before they were and having the power to make them what they are.<sup>3104</sup>

“Apollo! What a dazzling beyonditude!”<sup>3105</sup> said Glaucon, with a big laugh.

You asked for it, forcing me to present my thoughts on the subject!

“Yes and I won't let you stop, either. Go through the simile of the Sun again if there is something else in it you've left out.”

Oh well, there's plenty I've left out.

“I won't let you leave out the least detail.”

I imagine I will leave out quite a lot; but I will say as much as I can under the present circumstances,<sup>3106</sup> and will leave out nothing as far as in me lies.

<sup>3101</sup>οὐ γὰρ δῆπου σύ γε ἡδονῶν λέγεις (A7-8): Glaucon alludes to the contest between mindfulness and pleasure brought up by Adeimantus. His point is that if Socrates's remarks here were to be taken as a contribution to this objectively shallow and subjectively ignorant dichotomy (505B5-D3), then saying that “what is good” is greater than knowledge might be taken to imply, by a false conversion, that pleasure is left to be “what is good.” On γε stressing ἡδονή rather than the word it follows cf. Denniston, 151. Men's intentionalist habit of asking “whether pleasure of knowledge is the good” blindly narrows goodness to what is good for men, bypassing to wonder what good is done by their own existing.

<sup>3102</sup>οὐ γένεσιν (B4): sc. “nor growth nor nourishment.” Terminal truncation of this kind is again an aspect of pacing (cf. n.3080 in particular and n.202 in general), but here it also proleptically sets up the contrast between γένεσις and οὐσία (οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, B8-9).

<sup>3103</sup>πῶς γάρ (B5): Glaucon notices the paradox in the juxtaposition, γένεσιν αὐτῶν ὄντα. The cause of becoming can not itself become but must be there before the becoming. This priority will be spelled out below with πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει (B9).

<sup>3104</sup>πρεσβείᾳ and δυνάμει (B9) continue the elevated expression of the plain notion of causal priority set out above (508E3-9A5). These datives limit the sense in which ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ιδέα does not exist as οὐσία exists (οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος, B8), namely that the οὐσία (essence or nature) of the others is what it is because of the goodness that they should exist and be what they are, whereas the goodness of the good is already its own ground for existing and being as it is. In accordance with the parallelism of the analogy, the truncation of τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν (B7-8) into οὐσίας (B8) is formally parallel to the truncation of τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν (B3-4) into γένεσιν (B4), but in sense the participle ὄντος, although it plays a similar role in both limbs of the analogy (ὄντα, B4), has a special kinship with the second limb, with the world of being rather than of genesis (508D4-9), a kinship already brought near the surface by Glaucon in his answer, πῶς (see prev. n.).

<sup>3105</sup>δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς (C1): a genitive of admiration as in an admiring oath. ὑπερβολή is a double entendre, echoing the sense of ὑπερέχοντος but noting the “hyperbole” of adding it to ἐπέκεινα.

<sup>3106</sup>ὅσα γε ἐν τῷ πάροντι δυνατόν (C9-10): With this he alludes (a) to his own limitations, (b) to

"Yes, don't!"

### D.3e.1b:The Line

Alright then conceive<sup>3107</sup> of this. As we are saying, there is a pair of entities and the one is sovereign over the noetic kind or region<sup>3108</sup> while the other is sovereign<sup>3109</sup> over the visible (I won't call it "the heavens" lest you think I am making a play on words).<sup>3110</sup> Are you with me so far? A pair<sup>3111</sup> of types, the visible and the intelligible?

I'm with you.

Alright then<sup>3112</sup> thinking of them as a line cut into two unequal<sup>3113</sup> sections, cut each section by those of the lesser method, and also (c) to the capacity of his interlocutors to take it all in (so, κομίσασθαι, 507A2 and 4 and nn.3057, 3058; as well as τὴν παρούσαν ὄρμήν, 506E2 and n.3055). But the back and forth also reveals an experience taking place in both interlocutors, of reaching to grasp truth fully (compare οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος ... πρὶν ἄγασθαι [490B2-3] and ἄγασθαι [511B7]), an experience shared also by philosophical readers of this passage as witness the huge and loving commentary it has elicited. I will try to limit myself to exegetical remarks. It is no way my purpose or my hope to provide another set of words that could replace this text.

<sup>3107</sup> νόησον (D1): thirteen. Socrates to all appearances agrees to reiterate the simile (όμοιοτήτα αὐτοῦ διεξιών, C6: for διεξιέναι meaning to go through point by point, cf. 508C3), and indeed he does begin where he began before, with the distinction between the world of plural visibles and that of unique intelligibles (D1-4: cf. 507A7-B10). What follows this beginning is however The Line, a very different simile. Presumably we are meant to view the new simile as a parallel or similar simile.

<sup>3108</sup> γένους τε καὶ τόπου (D2): τε καί linking the meaning and the metaphor (cf. n.96). The metaphor of a noetic place is borrowed from the context of the visible world of space and time above, at 508C1.

<sup>3109</sup> βασιλεύειν (D2) embellishes πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει (B9) which itself expanded upon μειζόνως ... τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξιν (A4-5), itself based the assertion of causal priority (508B9) and the mythological formulation of the κύριον τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν (508A4-5).

<sup>3110</sup> ίνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δοξῶ σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα (D3-4): The omission of the noun in τὸ δ' αὐτὸν ὄρατον (D2-3) plus the sound play ὄρατον / οὐρανοῦ (cf.Crat.396C1) elicit this remark from Socrates, since the οὐρανός is the τόπος of the ὄρατὸν γένος. The Sun in heaven was said to be the god in charge of making all visible things visible.

<sup>3111</sup> διττά (D4), not δύο, stressing parallelism or comparability.

<sup>3112</sup> τοίνυν (D6): By repeating τοίνυν (cf. 508B12, D4, E1; 509B1, D1, *hic*; 510A6) Socrates indicates each new step, keeping the conversation on a short leash and making sure each step is secured before he moves on. Compare his deliberate use of αὐτὸν to underline parallelisms within the analogies (507B6, B9; 508D9, 509D2, 510B2, B6; also αὐθις, 510C1) as well as οὐ μόνον X ἀλλὰ καὶ Y (509B2-4, B6-7) and μέν / δέ (507C11-D2, 508B9-10, 508D4-9, 508E4-5, 509A1-2, A3-4, A6-7, 509D2-3, 509E1-510A6, 510B4-9).

<sup>3113</sup> Reading ἄνισα (D6) with almost all mss. (F has ἄν, ἵσα), and with Proclus (*in remp. I.288.18-20*[Kroll]) and Plutarch (QP 1001C), against the conjectures of Ast and Stallbaum. Even in antiquity ἵσα seems to have been read, by Archytas and Iamblichus (*de comm.math.sci.36.15-23, 38.15-28* [Festa]: cf. the long scholium *ad loc.* in the Leipzig ed. of Hermann [6.350.9-16]).

That this first cut should be *unequal* is doubly important, not only to illustrate the *gradus* from the bottom section to the top (whether from larger to smaller or smaller to larger is indifferent), but also because, after the second cut is made by the same ratio (ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, D7-8), the second and

the same proportion as the original—the section representing the seen world and the section representing the intellected<sup>3114</sup> world—and you will be able to represent, in the relation of their degrees of clarity and unclarity,<sup>3115</sup> first in the seen world, by the one subsection, likenesses, under which I include first shadows (510) and then images that appear in water and in anything else that is dense and smooth and shiny<sup>3116</sup> in its constitution, and all the rest of this sort of thing, if I have made my meaning intelligible.<sup>3117</sup>

“Quite intelligible.”

Alright then, as to the second subsection posit it to be what the first subsection<sup>3118</sup> resembles: the animals we see around us, all the plants and everything that falls into the category of artifact.<sup>3119</sup>

“I so posit.”

Would you be willing to assert that this section is also<sup>3120</sup> divided in accordance with its

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third of the four sections thereby created will derivatively be *equal* regardless of the equality or inequality of the first and second and the third and fourth (since  $A/B = C/D = [A+B]/[C+D]$  implies that  $B = C$ : See Appendix 4), which illustrates the immediate point that the contents of the second and third are “identical,” differing only in the way they are viewed (510B4-5, 510D57, 511A6-7). Plutarch’s treatment (QP 3.1001C-1002E) asks which is *larger* (which Plato leaves undetermined) and not why they are *unequal* (which is the only thing Plato says), which gives him an opportunity, under the guise of exegesis, to have Plato say something else that Plato agrees with (i.e., that the upper realm is “greater”), a common confusion among sympathetic interpreters and shared by Proclus who reaches the opposite conclusion by the same sympathetic method (I.289.6-18).

<sup>3114</sup> νοοῦμένου (D8): fourteenth noetic term.

<sup>3115</sup> σαφηνείᾳ (D9), reading the dative with ms.A and modern editors, against the nominative of FDM). The term, as a characteristic of things attended to by mind or sense, has neither been defined nor justified, but it is not new. It made its first appearance from out of nowhere at 478C, as the criterion by which δόξα was located, by means of an *eliminatio*, between knowledge and ignorance. To be beyond knowledge, δόξα would need to have more σαφήνεια; but in fact it is σκοτοδέστερον (although φανότερον than ignorance), so it belongs in the middle. Similar language then reappeared at 506C6-D1, at the beginning of the present ascent toward the higher μάθημα, again to distinguish knowledge from opinion: τυφλαὶ δόξαι versus φανά (blindness being the subjective correlate to objective darkness).

<sup>3116</sup> πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανά (510A2): The list is perhaps metabatic: something must be dense to be smooth, and must be smooth to be shiny.

<sup>3117</sup> καταγοεῖς (A3): fifteen (and καταγωῷ in reply [A4] makes sixteen). What we are supposed to grasp (and Glaucon claims just now to have grasped) is that the peculiar surface of the medium provides for reflections appearing “in” or “on” it (πᾶν refers to ὅσα, κτλ.). For the constitution and logical rank given to likenesses cf. 402B5-7.

<sup>3118</sup> τίθεται ὡς τοῦτο ἔσικεν (A5). The expression is loose but clear. It is not the subsection as such that resembles the other subsection (its only attribute is its length, and in fact in that respect it is unequal and therefore unlike) but rather its contents.

<sup>3119</sup> τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος (A5-6), objects we see over against us, real the same way we are. Just maybe he has in mind looking laterally (rather than downward as looking at shadows and reflections in water, or upward as toward the sun: cf. 532A3-5). Note the chiasm of πᾶν and ὅλον, for closure (on which cf. 350C10-11 and n.588).

<sup>3120</sup> καί (A8) goes with ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή, a second description of the relation embodied in the subdivision alongside σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ (D9). Its early placement with ἢ and ἐθέλοις ὃν is due to the fact that Socrates wants Glaucon to see that this next point will be added only with his

subsections' relations of truth and the lack thereof: that as the opined stands to the known, so also does the thing that has been made to be alike stand toward that to which it was made to be alike?<sup>3121</sup>

"I certainly would."<sup>3122</sup>

Then consider in turn the noetic<sup>3123</sup> section, also, how it is to be subdivided.

"How?"

Such that one subsection would be where<sup>3124</sup> soul finds itself<sup>3125</sup> compelled, using as likenesses the things that were imitated before,<sup>3126</sup> to investigate by starting from things taken for granted,<sup>3127</sup> unable<sup>3128</sup> to make her way source-ward to its cause<sup>3129</sup> but only end-ward to its effect; while in the

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consent, as opposed to being dictated and imposed on him (with another τοίνυν).

<sup>3121</sup> ὄμοιωθέν / τὸ φῶμοιώθη (A10): By its extreme periphrasis the language forces the mind to infer the notion of the original without giving it a name.

<sup>3122</sup> Glaucon's hearty and personal assent (εὐγωγε ... καὶ μάλα, B1) reminds us it was with him that Socrates had used σωφρήνεια as an index on the spectrum of δόξα and γνῶσις, at the end of Book Five (cf. n.3115).

<sup>3123</sup> νοητοῦ (B2) seventeen. τομήν is now used to distinguish the τμῆμα itself from the τέμνειν it will undergo.

<sup>3124</sup> ἡ (B4). This time the section, identified with its contents, is viewed in the relation between those contents and the soul, and in particular in the effect they have on her.

<sup>3125</sup> ψυχή (B5). The idea and the term is new to the context (we have had the senses and the mind): as such it might have deserved an article. ψυχή is often anarthrous (526E2, 529B4, 535E1, Leg.726A3; Phd.94B5: cf. Smyth §1135) but we would be wrong to assume it is a mere metonym for τις or for ὁ ζητῶν, as we shall see. Meanwhile my paraphrase gives it a predicative shading.

<sup>3126</sup> μιμηθεῖσιν (B4), casual variation for the terminology of ὄμοιωθῆναι. Again Socrates avoids giving a categorical name for the "things around us." The two sections as such have exactly the same content (i.e., if we continue to identify the line segment as nothing but quantities with their contents, B "equals" C [per 509D7-8: cf. Appendix 4]). The text gives no indication whether to take the circumstantial participle χρωμένη as causal or attendant: that is, it does not have to be either.

<sup>3127</sup> ζητεῖν ... ἐξ ὑποθέσεων (B5) is on the face of it an inference from εἰκόσιν χρωμένη (B4). An hypothesis is the ἀνάλογον of a visible image, i.e., of something seen or thought, in or with a reduced dimensionality. As a shadow or reflection is a two dimensional version of the three dimensional thing it resembles, held (in the world of three dimensions) by the alien (three dimensional) medium in which it is reflected (e.g., a body of water), so is an hypothesis an "opinion" held in the mind without the mind knowing its source or meaning, made thinkable at all by the essentially alien role it will be given as a counter in an argument associating it with other counters according to the rules of inference. The analogy was presented in the lemma that unobtrusively intervened between the description of the lower section of the line and the upper, at 510A8-10: as likeness is to what it likens itself to, so is opinion to knowledge.

<sup>3128</sup> οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη (B5-6) explains ἀναγκάζεται (what she must do) by excluding what she cannot do.

<sup>3129</sup> ἐπ' ἀρχήν (B5), anarthrous, is essentially adverbial. An hypothesis is laid down to begin but the motion begun cannot go source-ward. We are forced to grope for a meaning of ἀρχή as beginning that distinguishes it from ὑπόθεσις as beginning (to identify the two is the blind spot of all the special studies). Among other things we must notice that hypothesis is plural and source is singular. The insistence that we differentiate them is continued by the coinage ἀνυπόθετον a line below (B7), with no advance in clarification. We have been forced to move backwards, and upwards, several times in the last twenty lines.

other subsection, in turn, the source-ward one<sup>3130</sup> toward a source not merely taken for granted, she escapes taking things for granted<sup>3131</sup> and makes her way free from the likenesses connected with the other subsection<sup>3132</sup> using ideas alone and moving through ideas alone.

“Well that I did not quite get!”<sup>3133</sup>

Then let's try it again,<sup>3134</sup> since having heard this preliminary version you will have an easier time understanding.<sup>3135</sup> I imagine you are aware<sup>3136</sup> that people who work<sup>3137</sup> in geometry and calculations and other such specialties, taking for granted the odd and the even, and the geometrical figures and three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these according to the particular paths of study, acting that is as if they already knew these and making them as such<sup>3138</sup> their hypotheses—that such people

<sup>3130</sup> Reading the τὸ before ἐπ’ (B6), with all mss., which makes ἐπ ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον an appositive to τὸ δ’ αὐτὸν.

<sup>3131</sup> ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (B7): The plural (ὑποθέσεων, B5) is replaced with the singular. The phrase is an exegesis of ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον: to go in that direction is to leave the arena of what is taken for granted. Cf. the redo of this at 511A5-6, where the plural is kept but ἐκ is dropped: τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν (the genitive is primarily comparative).

<sup>3132</sup> τῶν περὶ (B7), the reading of Burnet. His apparatus: ex em. F (ὧν περὶ pr.) : ὥνπερ AM. The entire phrase (B7-9) is chiastic. From the inside out, εἰδεστὶ stands in contrast with εἰκόνων; περὶ ἐκεῖνο refers to the medium the εἰκόνες need (A1-3) whereas αὐτοῖς stresses that εἰδη need no medium; and δι’ αὐτῶν denies the use of hypothetical steps (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ιοῦσα).

<sup>3133</sup> οὐκ ἰκανῶς ἔμαθον (B10): Glaucon got part but missed part. What he understands enables him to know he does not understand enough. Compare his request above, ἔτι δίελθε μοι, 508C3.

<sup>3134</sup> The comment of Slings (*Critical Notes*, 113) and his emendation, hypothesizing a lacuna and then filling it with words that make the text say what it already said, in order to save Plato from saying something only once (ἀλλ’ αὐθις meaning by itself, “Nay I’ll say it again”), is not only characteristic of his edition and its overall contribution, but itself exemplary of the dianoetic method Socrates is describing, to boot.

<sup>3135</sup> ὅπου γάρ τούτων προειρημένων (C1). For προειρημένα cf. 491C7-9. Socrates claims that Glaucon’s partial grasp (οὐχ ἰκανῶς) of a preliminary version (the demonstrative τούτων προειρημένων looks backward, not forward – to point forward he would have used τῶνδε), will enhance his ability to understand the thought. The claim suggests that keeping a goal in sight will help in reaching it, but to the extent that the goal is seen dimly or is mistaken or mis-seen, the method courts circularity—the same circularity courted by the methodology of the large letters (on which cf. 368C7-D7, n.937 [on ἐννόησεν] and n.940; and cf. ὅπων καταμαθεῖν, 368E8). Moreover the claim describes, without acknowledging it, the pedagogical technique (as well as the epistemological viability) of the method of analogy that was used just before to illuminate the good through the image of the sun and now to illuminate that analogy with the simile of the line. We return to Glaucon “getting it” (ἔμαθον, B10) at 511B1 (μανθάνω).

<sup>3136</sup> οἷμαί σε εἰδέναι (C2): The language announces that his further explanation will consist of adducing an example with which Glaucon is already familiar (cf. 508C4-7, with οἶσθ’ ὅτι). The προειρημένα were the statement of an abstract principle, now to be illustrated by a palpable example. The illustration is made to pose (by the αὖ in αὖθις) as a virtual restatement of the abstract in, as we might say, concrete terms. Compare therefore αὖ at 509C6. The sun might come first so as to provide the basis for moving up to the Good (508C4-D9: n.b. inferential οὕτω, D4), but also the general statement might come first so as to provide the matrix within which to understand the case (508B12-C2, where as here Glaucon “needs more”).

<sup>3137</sup> πραγματευόμενοι (C3) in the sense we will come to associate with Aristotle, so used by Plato at Phd.99D-100B (cf. also πραγματείαν, 528D3). Contrast Adeimantus’s use at 506C1 (cf. n.3042), and

feel no incumbency to give any further account of them to themselves or to others,<sup>3139</sup> as if apparent<sup>3140</sup> to anyone; and instead proceeding from them as if from a true source and cause,<sup>3141</sup> leaving that question behind<sup>3142</sup> but going through the steps and maintaining consistency, that they conclude with the step they originally set out to search for.<sup>3143</sup>

“Yes, yes. This much I am aware of.”

Well is it also true to say that they use<sup>3144</sup> the ideas you can see with your eyes, and focus their arguments on them,<sup>3145</sup> although they are not thinking<sup>3146</sup> about these but about those other things<sup>3147</sup> that these resemble, making their arguments for the sake of the quadrilateral itself and the diameter *per se*, not the one they draw? And so it is in the other specialties. These objects<sup>3148</sup> that they mold or

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contrast the uses at 427A4 and 430D4-5, where it means to “bother with something.”

<sup>3138</sup> αὐτά (C6) already calls into question whether these items can stand on their own.

<sup>3139</sup> λόγον ... ἀξιούσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι (C6-D1) The incumbency to answer would require the question to be asked: somebody needs to be asking why, for them to ignore or refuse. Socrates points out that even they do not ask themselves, so who will be asking them? Every encounter we have heard of Socrates having with people is brought to mind with the words διδόναι λόγον (cf. 488B4-8 and n.2737).

<sup>3140</sup> ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν (D1) ὡς makes φανερῶν *their* term. Unwittingly it puts their hypotheses on an etymological par with the φαντάσματα of 510A1.

<sup>3141</sup> ὄρχόμενοι (D1): Their self-description with this term evinces their insensitivity to the distinction between a source and a first step.

<sup>3142</sup> This is the force of ἥδη (D1).

<sup>3143</sup> ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὐ ἀν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὄρμήσωσι (D2-3): The compact phrasing, “ending whither you set out,” echoes the formulaic conclusion of a geometrical argument, ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι (*quod erat demonstrandum*), which itself is the clearest indication that the scientific argumentation understands itself to be complete once it has found what it set out to find while maintaining consistency (όμολογονμένως, D2). Not far beneath the surface is the absurdity of calling it a σκέψις to look for what you already put there, yourself.

<sup>3144</sup> προσχρώνται (D5), restating χρωμένη (B4), where πρός makes an *apparatus* of the thing being used. Armed with the example (C2-D3) we now return to the obscure statement (B4-9); therefore we may presume that τοῖς όρωμένοις εἴδεσι restates τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν (B4). The shift in wording is a striking example of Socrates/Plato following the meaning rather than sticking at terminology, since εἶδος is now used for the optical characteristic (in contrast to the intelligible characteristic as above at B8, where αὐτοῖς had made the meaning clear).

<sup>3145</sup> αὐτῶν (D6), stronger than τούτων.

<sup>3146</sup> διανοούμενοι (D6) Socrates reaches for a term for thinking about one thing while arguing about something else (λόγους ποιούνται). Glaucon notices, as we learn when he repeats the term in his restatement at 511C7. Then (D2), he elevates it to the status of a technical term.

<sup>3147</sup> ἐκείνων πέρι (D7): Both the choice of pronoun and the anastrophe of πέρι (D7) elevate the forms above the visible cases (τούτων, D6).

<sup>3148</sup> αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα (E1): αὐτά stresses that their models (the ὄρώμενα εἴδη of D5) are actually objects and that they are using them without reflecting upon this fact (bringing forth C6 from above: cf. 511A6), as the next remark, that they can cast shadows and be reflected, corroborates. Socrates is working up a question he would ask them: in searching for noetic originals do you realize you are borrowing visibles, which are already mere images of noetics, and reusing them as images in a new sense of image? Why not go for the originals? But they would accept no such questions.

draw<sup>3149</sup> as such have shadows and images in water, but they turn them back into images again,<sup>3150</sup> whereas<sup>3151</sup> the purpose of their investigation is (511) to catch sight of those other things in their very truth, things which a person could never see except by the vision of thought.<sup>3152</sup>

“What you say about them is true.”

Accordingly<sup>3153</sup> I was saying<sup>3154</sup> that although this was noetic<sup>3155</sup> in character, soul<sup>3156</sup> necessarily becomes involved in investigating it by taking things for granted, moving not source-ward since she has no way to rise above her hypotheses and escape them, but instead uses as images the objects<sup>3157</sup> they had also been likened to by what was below them<sup>3158</sup> despite the fact that in comparison to those below they had always been honored and valued for their clarity.<sup>3159</sup>

“Now I understand what you are saying about the section that is under the control of<sup>3160</sup> the

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<sup>3149</sup> γράφουσιν (E2), repeated from E1, was implied by σχήματα above (C4); πλάττουσιν, in a mild use of reverse καί, now adds a sense of arbitrariness involved in all illustrative models that students experience and do not quite understand, early on, in better math classes (cf.n.2689); but also continues the idea that they are objects (three-dimensional).

<sup>3150</sup> ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ (E3): The second subsection of the first section is identical in content to the first subsection of the second section (τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν, B4, and n.3126), but different because it is being used (χρωμένη) by the mind rather than by sight. αὖ here stresses that this difference in use in effect turns that section back into something like the images it had cast in the visible realm. Thus the entire three tiered construction below serves as a scaffold from the top of which the fourth tier becomes articulable as a second set of originals which these imagized first originals image.

<sup>3151</sup> Reading δέ (511A1) with F (and Shorey, Burnet, Stallb. and Ast) against the τε of Burnet's ADM (read by Chambry and Slings and finally Adam) answering the repeated μέν (E1, E3): χρώμενοι looks backward and ζητοῦντες in contrast looks forward. Adam in the end yielded to the unlikelihood of δέ becoming τε and accepted it therefore (conversely ignoring how the τε could have become δέ since it is the minority reading), but his justification, that the contrast is otiose, leaves the absence of δέ after μέν unexplained and fails to recognize that in the first place these “scientists” are themselves confused, as Socrates goes on to say (511A4-9).

<sup>3152</sup> οὐκ ἀν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ (A1) “seeing” the “intelligible” again welcomes metaphor rather than requiring a consistent application of the distinction between vision and intellection on which the simile originally depends.

<sup>3153</sup> τοῦτο τοίνυν (A3): With both words Socrates scrupulously acknowledges that Glaucon has grasped the point so that he can now take the next step (cf. n.3112).

<sup>3154</sup> ἔλεγον (A3): The imperfect refers back to the paragraph that Glaucon did not “get” (i.e., 510B4-9) and therefore alerts him that he is now restating what he had said there.

<sup>3155</sup> νοητόν (A3), eighteen.

<sup>3156</sup> ψυχήν (A4) again, notably, anarthrous (cf. 510B5).

<sup>3157</sup> αὐτοῖς (A6) again stressing the operationally objective character of these things soul uses though they are only images or paradigms (cf. 510E1, 510C6).

<sup>3158</sup> τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν (A6-7) recalls the cumbersome periphrasis by which he avoided, above also (510A10), to give a name to what Aristotle will easily call τάδε even after Timaeus has argued they could never be more than τοιαῦτα (*Tim.*50B4, vs.50A1-2 and 49E2-3).

<sup>3159</sup> ἐνόργεσι (A7). The term is new: it stands in for σαφές from 509D9. The experience in the visible world of the inferiority of images to what they resemble (which lies fully within the grasp of common sense, whence the semantics and tenses of δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις), suggests that the cognition of the specialists is a mere shadow of knowledge undeserving of the honor and praise it expects and enjoys. Again a dialectical question to ask the specialists is being formulated but their discourse gives no place for them to be asked it.

<sup>3160</sup> With μανθάνω (B1), Glaucon acknowledges he is getting, in terms at least of the example of

geometrical technique of inquiry and kindred specialties.”

Move on then to understand what I was saying<sup>3161</sup> about the other section of the noetic<sup>3162</sup> part, that it is the part that reasoning unaided<sup>3163</sup> attaches itself to by its ability to converse,<sup>3164</sup> treating hypotheses not as causes and principles but literally as hypotheses—things to step on and use as places to set off from,<sup>3165</sup> toward<sup>3166</sup> the place where assumption becomes unnecessary, to the beginning and source of them all,<sup>3167</sup> and grasping this then to follow back down consecutively its consequences, and staying in that mode<sup>3168</sup> to descend to the end,<sup>3169</sup> using no apparatus<sup>3170</sup> of perception in any way at all<sup>3171</sup> but only pure ideas moving through ideas to ideas, so as to reach its culmination in ideas.<sup>3172</sup>

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the specialist arts, what he failed to get before (510B10). For the dative with ὑπό (B1) cf. 572C1, Symp.205C1, H.Maj.295D4.

<sup>3161</sup>τὸ τοίνυν ἔτερον (B3): With τοίνυν Socrates again stays close to his interlocutor and acknowledges that he recognizes that Glaucon now understands what he didn't before, so that he can now move him on to the second half. The present participle λέγοντα represents an imperfect of citation (n.586).

<sup>3162</sup>νοητοῦ (B2): nineteen.

<sup>3163</sup> αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος (B4), in contrast to the soul as a whole (510B5, 511A4), which would include the participation of sight. We now see that ψυχή was anarthrous before to stress the predication that it was soul that was being compelled, and that this was part of the problem. True thought is possible, according to the present formulation, only as reason frees itself from soul.

<sup>3164</sup>διαλέγεσθαι (B4). The only preparation we have for the appearance of this term is the implicit refusal of it and absence of it in the kind of thinking exemplified by the specialties (cf. 510C5-D1, 510D5-511A2, and 511A7-9 with nn.3139, 3148, 3159). The questioning they had refused (510C6-7) now arrives, to make progress possible. To translate the verb with “dialectic” makes the meaning only more obscure. The important point is the contrast between the power (δυνάμει, B4) of the method and the soul's powerlessness described above (οὐ δυναμένην, A5).

<sup>3165</sup>τῷ ὅντι ὑποθέσεις (B5): Punning (literally [τῷ ὅντι]) on ὑπόθεσις: things “placed beneath” (ὑπό) the feet of thinking as it proceeds along step by step.

<sup>3166</sup> ἵνα (B6): quasi-spatial according to its original sense. The purpose clause “personifies” the direction and orientation given by the ὄρμαί (B6); μέχρι indicates the limit-point at which medial (hypothetical) steps reach their upper bound in an unhypothetical step; and ἐπί designates the fixed purpose to proceed beyond all such medial steps so as to find the step before their entire sequence (τοῦ παντός), at which point thought pivots and can now think a consecutive account by merely reading back through them as if it were descending a staircase.

<sup>3167</sup> ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχήν (B6-7) and μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου restate (n.b. λέγοντά με) and “unpack” what Socrates had said compendiously with ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον (510B6-7). The point at which a beginning ceases to be arbitrary (ἀνυπόθετον) is at the point beyond which there is no step in thought that is prior (ἢ τοῦ παντὸς [sc. λογισμοῦ vel λόγου] ἀρχή).

<sup>3168</sup> οὔτως (B8), strictly redundant (cf. n.939), but creating a berth to deny the contrary manner, αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος (C1).

<sup>3169</sup> τελευτήν (B8): Just as the starting point is no longer arbitrary, the end is no longer an artificial stopping point that one had been set before oneself from the beginning (cf. 510D2-3 and n. 3143).

<sup>3170</sup> προσχρώμενος (C5): Again, “apparatus” translates what πρός adds to the verb. Cf. 510D5. Conversely the mind's relation to the forms is unmediated (αὐτοῖς δι’ αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, C2).

<sup>3171</sup> παντάπασιν (C1) is not mere auxesis but refers to the “use” of images, a psychic process in which vision is tied to thinking. In contrast, the thinking now has no connection whatever with sight or any other sense.

<sup>3172</sup> The output of “technique” was to reach what it had put there before it started (510D2-3); here on the other hand thought stays with its element and achieves its ultimate purpose, which is a

"I am understanding, though not adequately—after all it seems what you describe in words is a complicated thing to carry out in actions. But I do<sup>3173</sup> understand that you are drawing a distinction to the effect that the portion of the real and the noetic contemplated by the power of dialogical thinking<sup>3174</sup> is more clear<sup>3175</sup> than the object of the so-called<sup>3176</sup> special arts, in which the principles or starting points of thought are simply what they take for granted, and where, though they are indeed compelled to use thought rather than the senses to contemplate<sup>3177</sup> what they are contemplating, since their study does not move up to the source but down from what they have taken for granted, you judge that they never achieve intelligence<sup>3178</sup> about them even though<sup>3179</sup> they were by nature intelligible all along if connected with the source;<sup>3180</sup> and you use this word 'thinking' for the state of mind in which the geometers and the others like them find themselves to be, rather than intellection, as if thinking were something in between<sup>3181</sup> opinion and intelligence."<sup>3182</sup>

You have taken it in quite adequately.<sup>3183</sup> Just add this for me: to the four sections of the line there perfection (*τελευτᾶ*, C2, a subjunctive with *ίνα*), i.e., complete understanding. It is this high activity that Glaucon now reacts to as a *συχνὸν ἔργον* (C3-4).

<sup>3173</sup> μέντοι (C4): Glaucon immediately cancels much of the uncertainty he had expressed with *ἰκανῶς μὲν οὖ*. What begins as a restatement at a distance of Socrates's intention (*βούλει*, C4) goes on much longer than Glaucon thought it would, as it seems, and is subject to the same sort of self-interruptions for added specificity that Socrates's remarks had been subject to. That is, it is a live, dialogical answer that instantiates the kind of thinking that is being contrasted with specialism.

<sup>3174</sup> τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ (C5-6): dialogue's portion of the noetic and real realm. The hyperbaton of the genitive (*τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ*, partitive with *τό*), sets the distinguishing term (*τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι*) into relief.

<sup>3175</sup> σαφέστερον (C4).

<sup>3176</sup> καλούμενων (C6) adds a derogatory note, articulating part of what Glaucon has learned.

<sup>3177</sup> θεωρεῖσθαι (C6): Glaucon finds a term hitherto unused in this context to articulate the virtually sensory and self-grounding cognition of *νοῦς* in distinction from the ratiocinative movement of *διάνοια* plodding through its own creature-images (so also θεᾶσθαι, C8).

<sup>3178</sup> νοῦν (D1)—the twentieth *νοῦς*-word. The translator must resist the temptation to add a magnifying adjective.

<sup>3179</sup> καίτοι νοητὸν ὄντων (D2): The construction *καίτοι* with participle, presented in all mss., has attracted much notice and worry, which we may easily evade by reading *καί τοι* instead, with *τοι* continuing (from *μέντοι*) the confidence and breathlessness of Glaucon's manner.

<sup>3180</sup> νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς (D2): twenty-one. Because *μετὰ ἀρχῆς* has two meanings ("from the beginning" and "when derived from the principle"), *νοητῶν* may be given an objective interpretation (as parts of the noetic section of the line, the subject matter is inherently noetic) as well as a subjective one (the items are seen in their noetic truth when understood dialectically: cf. 511B7-C2 with C8-D1). Slings has athetized this wonderful clause because *kaitoi* seldom is used where he would expect *kaiper*. But Glaucon is trying to describe Socrates's thought and feels more sympathy than understanding – whence his preference for sincere *τοι* over merely logical *περ*. We may say that Socrates, at least, understood and appreciated what he was saying to him (*ἰκανώτατα*, D6).

<sup>3181</sup> ὡς μεταξύ τι (D4) Glaucon's language of betweenness (that *διάνοια* should be *μεταξύ* opinion [*δόξα*] and intelligence [*νοῦς*]) recalls his agreement with Socrates at the end of Book Five to locate *δόξα* "between" *ἄγνοια* and *γνῶσις*. To the extent that we can safely associate the *δόξα* and *γνῶσις* of Book Five with the visual and noetic sections of the Line in Book Six, we can and should impose a like relation, within the second section of the Line, onto *διάνοια* and *νοῦς*, a relation whose meaning is made clearer by the distinction between the lower two subsections, namely, the shadow and the thing casting it (cf. "shadow of knowledge," n.3159).

<sup>3182</sup> νοῦς twice (D4), making twenty three uses.

<sup>3183</sup> *ἰκανώτατα* (D6): Socrates corrects the doubt Glaucon expressed with *ἰκανῶς μὲν οὖ* (C3) on the basis of his subsequent performance, the superlative acknowledging the complexity of

correspond four kinds of psychological event.<sup>3184</sup> The experience of intelligence<sup>3185</sup> corresponds to the highest section; to the second corresponds the experience of thinking. Give the name of trusting to the third and guesswork to the last, and then rank them in a proportion, with the experiences sharing in truth by the same proportions as the sections share in clarity.

"I understand, I acquiesce in your assertions, and I rank the experiences as you recommend."

## END OF BOOK SIX

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Glaucon's statement (cf. n.1936). Adequacy (*τὸ ἱκανόν*)—i.e., the raising of all questions and settling them all so as to reach *όμολογία*—always was the criterion of a successful conversation with Socrates. Glaucon's restatement of Socrates's presentation is an instance of the power of conversation in action, where the same thing is being said and even developed by similar but also different words. And so, the dialogue instantiates itself (for a detailed analysis cf. Appendix 5). As the employment of conversation has helped him grasp the meaning of *νόησις*, so has the use of the example of geometry helped him grasp *διάνοια*. Glaucon himself recognizes that the idea is clothed in exemplary material (B1-2); with *καλούμενων* (C6) he dismisses the particulars of their methods.

<sup>3184</sup> παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (D7), not faculties (as δύναμις [B4]) nor agencies (as designated by constructions with *ὑπό* [C5, 6]); but closer to *ἔξεις* (as at D4), the term also used at 533E4 (where n.b. the term *μοῖρα* is then used in the summary of this passage: 533E7-534A1).

<sup>3185</sup> *νόησις* (D8). Twenty three other uses of *νοῦς*-words in the last few pages establish a center of meaning that now culminates in the first use of the abstract noun, which therefore, within this argument, has the force of a coinage. Its use is not a matter of Plato forcing an abstract distinction between the action of mind (with the *-σις* noun) and mind itself (with *νοῦς*), since *νοῦς* has already had both these meanings during the argument. The fact that the term *νόησις* had already appeared by Plato's time in Diogenes of Apollonia (DK 51B3,4,5) is quite external and unrelated to what has happened, for the first time, within and through these pages.

## BOOK SEVEN

### D.3e.1c:The Cave

(514) Next, Socrates tells us he said,<sup>3186</sup> you must conceive of the human condition<sup>3187</sup> as it pertains to learning and ignorance by likening it to the following sort of experience.<sup>3188</sup> Imagine humans living underground in a sort of cave that is open onto the light back in the rear with a long pathway extending all the way through. They have been living here since childhood with arms, legs and heads<sup>3189</sup> bound so that their bodies are fixed in place and they can only look forward. Turning their heads around is out of the question due to the way they are bound,<sup>3190</sup> and what light they have<sup>3191</sup> is the glare<sup>3192</sup> of a fire burning above and at some distance behind them. Up between the fire and the prisoners there is a pathway alongside which you can see a low wall has been built, like the one puppeteers have in front of their audience,<sup>3193</sup> behind which their puppets move back and forth.

“I get the picture.”

Then add men to your picture, on the other side of the wall, who move objects back and forth that protrude above it—all kinds of artifacts and human statuettes (515) and animal ones, too, made of stone and wood and all sorts of stuff; and have some of the men accompany the movements of the objects they are carrying with voices or sounds, the way puppeteers do,<sup>3194</sup> while others keep silent.

“Strange is the image you conceive of, with strange prisoners.”

Strange like us.<sup>3195</sup> First of all, do you think people in their situation would ever have seen anything

<sup>3186</sup> εἰπον (514A1), stronger than ἦν δ' ἐγώ, and marking a transition.

<sup>3187</sup> φύσιν (A2) = Beschaffenheit (Passow). With ἡμετέραν (i.e., ἀνθρωπίνην) it almost means μοῖρα. Cf. Thuc.3.82.2 for the sense. As t does not reference this passage s.v. φύσις.

<sup>3188</sup> πάθει (A1) and ἡμετέραν φύσιν announces at the start that the account will be phenomenological—true to the flux of human experience—rather than allegorical. We should interpret what is coming more as we would interpret a dream than as we would an allegory full of secret ritual or metaphysical symbolism. Again (as with the correction of the intentionalist approach to the good: 505D5-507A5) the perspective is from beyond man, looking back at him. ἡμετέραν excludes nobody and includes everybody.

<sup>3189</sup> καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τὰς αὐχένας (A6), contrasted with αὐτούς as aspects with the whole to which they belong (cf. αὐτοῖς at 507D12). The αὐτούς of all the mss. is to be retained.

<sup>3190</sup> τε ... τε, (A6-B1): The bonds tying their limbs and neck have the two effects of keeping them in one place and looking forward. The result is then introduced by δέ. δεσμοῦ (B1), singular, is abstract.

<sup>3191</sup> φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς (B2) distinguished from the φῶς onto which the cave opens (A4).

<sup>3192</sup> φῶς ... καόμενον (B2-3): The image used on the way up to the Line may be allowed to influence our interpretation of the image used on the way back down, so that καόμενον φῶς may be likened to the νυκτερινὰ φέγγη of 508C6.

<sup>3193</sup> τῶν ἀνθρώπων (B5), designating not the puppeteers but the spectators they are entertaining. The term suggests generic human limitations embodied by the prisoners haplessly watching their shadows.

<sup>3194</sup> οἶον εἰκός (515A2): The carriers make sounds likely to be made, or not made, by the things their puppets represent.

<sup>3195</sup> οἵους ἡμῖν (A4): The asyndeton is noteworthy. Part of the force of the following γάρ is to apologize for it. Socrates's remark directs Glaucon to manage the strangeness of the image through empathy: cf. A1-2 and nn.3188, 3189. Socrates's use of the first plural is significant. One underestimates the power and truth of the passage if he views the cave as the place where somebody else lives (the ἀπαίδευτοι, says Adam *ad* 514ff and then *passim*) rather than the place we all begin or began (*n.b.*

of themselves or of each other besides their<sup>3196</sup> shadows, cast by the firelight onto the cave's wall in front of them?

"How could they, if they have been forced to hold their heads immobile throughout their lives?"

And what do they see of the objects<sup>3197</sup> being borne back and forth? Isn't it the same? So if they were able to converse with each other wouldn't you assume that their way would be to call by the same names as the things that are actually present behind them the very things they were seeing?<sup>3198</sup>

"Necessarily."

And what if there were an echo in the cave that bounced off the wall opposite them? If one of the items moving by made a sound do you think they could help but assume that what was making the sound was the shadow moving by?<sup>3199</sup>

"By God I'll bet they would assume that!"

So in every way<sup>3200</sup> people so situated would take the real and true to be nothing but the shadows of the artifacts.

"Quite necessarily."

So contemplate now what it would be like for them to be freed from their bonds and healed of

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πρώτης, 516C4); or if he looks for traces of contempt in the tone (Adam *ad* 514B5) rather than seeing how much the demeaning and pitiable account applies to oneself.

<sup>3196</sup> ἔαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων ... τι ... ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκίας (**A6-7**): the governance of the proleptic genitive extends to τὰς σκίας.

<sup>3197</sup> The genitive περιφερομένων (**B2**) is parallel with ἔαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων. There is no need with Stallb. to compare the "genitive of the topic" at *Phdo*.78D10.

<sup>3198</sup> Reading οὐ ταῦτά ἡγῆ ἀν τὰ παρόντα αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ὄνομάζειν ἄπερ ὄρφεν (**B4-5**) with the majority of mss. To strain for a sense based on mss. is perhaps preferable to importing "readings" from Iamblichus, in whom the passage is quoted entire (514A1-517C5) but merely as one of many edifying sermons (*Protrepticus*, ch.15 = 78.1-82.4 Pistelli])—especially when his readings are *faciliora* and they *interpret* the image philosophically, while the image is already an interpretation of human experience. I therefore attempt to read ταῦτά with AFM (*contra* ταῦτα **D**), and παρόντα with all mss. (*contra* the ὄντα of the editors, and the tempting παριόντα of the recd.), as well as νομίζειν ὄνομάζειν with ADM (and Stallb. and Shorey), *contra* νομίζειν, F. The prisoners' talking requires names. They would work with an unconscious policy of calling what they *actually* see (ἄπερ) by the names of things actually present (παρόντα) though invisible to them. For the force of ἄπερ cf. *Parm*.I30D3, *Tim*.51C1. That they can have those names in their heads having never seen the originals seems a logical impossibility but is a fact of life: cf. *Tim*.52A5, ὄμώνυμον.

<sup>3199</sup> παριοῦσαν (**B9**): What is really moving is the object casting the shadow. Characterizing the "phenomena" as παριοῦσαν as well as περιφερόμενα above and παριόντων below (**D4**), is reminiscent of the phenomenological description Socrates uses of the "many's" at 402A9 (περιφερόμενα, cf. n. 1584), 476A7 (πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα, cf. n. 2594), and 479D9 (πλανητών, cf. n. 2658), but also keeps within reach the observation that what one is seeing is in something else rather than κοθ' αὐτό (516B4-6). Cf. also *Tim*.52A6-7.

<sup>3200</sup> παντάπασι (**C1**) generalizing all sources of knowledge from two, the senses of sight and hearing, a pair commonly used to represent the whole spectrum (352C3-4, 367C7-D1 [after 357C2-3], 477C3-4; cf. *Charm*.I67D4-5; *Euthyd*.281D1; *Leg*.961D8; *Phlb*.51BC; *Tht*.I56C1-2). The fuller list, including touch and smell (*Phdo*.65B2, 96B6; *Phdrs*.240D2-3; *Tht*.I56B2-6, 188E5-9A5, 192D5-7), would hardly suit the present image.

their mindlessness<sup>3201</sup> by a change in their condition<sup>3202</sup> along the following lines. Say the bonds of one of them were one day loosed and he was forced abruptly to stand up and turn his head around and start walking and to look upward toward the light: in trying to do all this imagine how he would be pained and because of the glare<sup>3203</sup> would be unable to make out<sup>3204</sup> the objects whose shadows he had been watching.<sup>3205</sup> How would he react if someone told him that all he had seen before was sheer nonsense,<sup>3206</sup> but that now his very vision had improved<sup>3207</sup> because he had come somehow closer to reality and in turning around had become oriented toward things more real?<sup>3208</sup> Especially if that someone went on to point out the separate<sup>3209</sup> objects he saw moving by and asked him to discuss<sup>3210</sup> what each of them is? Don't you think that the man would be at a loss<sup>3211</sup> and find himself thinking the things he had seen before were more authentic<sup>3212</sup> than what he was now being shown?

"Very much."

And if he forced the man to gaze directly at the light, that he would feel pain in his eyes and try to avoid this by turning back to the things he had been able to take in before, and would find himself believing that these latter were actually more distinct and certain<sup>3213</sup> than the things he was now being

<sup>3201</sup> Reading λύσιν τε καὶ ἔσαιν τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης (C4-5), with A M (F D τῶν τε λαμβ.). The construction is distributive binary ("A and B a'ing and b'ing" meaning that "A a's and B b's": cf. n.773). The addition of the definite article with each member of the second pair already does whatever work τε after τῶν would have done.

<sup>3202</sup> φύσει (C5) is salient and therefore must mean what it meant at 514A2. τοιάδε points to a new πάθος they will undergo (cf. τοιούτῳ πάθει, 514A1: συμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς repeats the notion of πάθος). Adam is wrong to argue that φύσει here means they are released to "return to their true nature." The dramatic pedagogy of Socrates's argument is only undermined by imagining a pristine *status naturalis*, and the Plato who is giving him his words is not a gnostic.

<sup>3203</sup> τὰς μαρμαρυγάς (C9): again the φέγγη (cf. 514B2-3 and n.; and 508C6).

<sup>3204</sup> καθορᾶν (C9), the prefix stressing sight's ability to see detail, here and in the sequel.

<sup>3205</sup> ἐκεῖνα ὥν τότε τὰς σκίας (C9-D1) echoes τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν (511A6-7), ἐκείνων πέρι οἵς ταῦτα ἔσικε (510D7), τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν (510B4), and ὃ τοῦτο ἔσικεν (510A5).

<sup>3206</sup> φλυαρίας (D2): perhaps a tactful genitive singular (as at 485B1-2) rather than a broadly derogatory plural in the accusative (for which cf. Gorg.486C7, 490C8, 519A3; H.Maj.304B5).

<sup>3207</sup> ὄρθότερον βλέποι (D4): The verb is without object: his sensory faculty has undergone an improvement. The indicative of the original speech is attracted into the optative (contrast ἐώρα above) by the optativity of the entire protasis. We are to imagine the prisoner hearing without fully understanding what is being said, leading soon to his rejection of the whole description (D6-7).

<sup>3208</sup> μᾶλλον τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα (D2-3): It is the direction that is truer, more than the objects he is now trying to see, and his proximity to more real things rather than their presence, that the guide alleges: "Though you do not understand what is happening to you, I can tell you that you are closer to truth and reality than before."

<sup>3209</sup> ἐκάστων (D4), a term he has used for the ideas, i.e., the distinct, self-identical, and single characteristic exhibited in the plurality (476A6 [cf.A2], 484C7, 490B3, 504A6, 507B2 and B6, 596A6).

<sup>3210</sup> ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι (D5): the use of both verbs indicates dialogue and dialectic (cf. nn. 3296 and 3439), and in particular the Socratic elenchus of one's casual and unexamined beliefs, a conversation operating now on a higher level than the so-called διαλέγεσθαι imagined at 515B4.

<sup>3211</sup> ἀπορεῖν τε ... (D6-7), an allusion to the feeling of ἀπορία to which the Socratic elenchus characteristically brings Socrates's interlocutor, such as what Polemarchus came to in Book One.

<sup>3212</sup> ἀληθέστερον (D6). He will regress into thinking the real "horse" was the one he saw on the wall, not this three-dimensional object he is now being shown. Its difference (three dimensionality and the fact that it is in its own place) could be the proof it is realer but at this stage difference only means inauthenticity.

<sup>3213</sup> σαφέστερα (E4): of optical distinctness, the element that κατὰ in καθορᾶν grasps. He can see

shown?

“Yes.”

But if one continued dragging him by main force out of that place, along the ascending path so steep and awkward to climb, and did not let up before he had dragged him all the way into the light of the sun, that he would be miserable and (516) bothered all the while he was being dragged along and that once he had reached the light his eyes would be so full of sunbeams that he would be unable to see even one<sup>3214</sup> of the things he was just now told<sup>3215</sup> were the real and true things?

“Unable, if you mean<sup>3216</sup> right away.”

He'd need to become accustomed to it if he was to see the things above him. At first he would have an easy time making out the shadows, and then the images in water of men and the rest,<sup>3217</sup> and later the things themselves; after this, the things in the sky and the sky itself he would be more able to contemplate at night, since he would be looking toward the light of the stars and the moon, than during the day when he would be looking toward the sun and its light. And then finally the sun, not appearances of it in watery places nor in any alien seat<sup>3218</sup> or medium, but itself on its own terms and in its proper place would he be able to make it out and contemplate it in its true nature.

“Necessarily.”

And next he could put all this together and conclude that it is this that provides us<sup>3219</sup> the seasons and the years and is the custodian of everything else in the region of the visible, as well as being the cause somehow of those things he and his comrades had been staring at before.<sup>3220</sup>

“Clearly this is the conclusion he would reach after that process.”

And as he now recalls his original habitation, and what passed for wisdom there, and the men

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the shadow version more clearly because the light is low. Again the residual preference for the doxic dimensionality of experience pre-empts him from profiting from “illumination.” A similar distinction between ἀληθές and σαφές ran through the Line passage.

<sup>3214</sup> οὐδ' ἀν ἐν (516A2): οὐδέν in tmesis for emphasis.

<sup>3215</sup> νῦν (A3) refers to 515D1-4, with ἀληθῶν standing for ὄντα.

<sup>3216</sup> οὐ γάρ (A4) elliptical (as ἀλλὰ γάρ can be), omitting the reason why he agrees, which he then indirectly supplies with ἔξαίφνης γε.

<sup>3217</sup> τῶν ἄλλων (A7) relies for its content on τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς in the list at 510A5 (to which ἀνθρώπων compendiously refers back), i.e., things we look across to (like animals and trees), not down at (like the surface of a lake) nor up at (like the sun and sky): cf. n. 3119.

<sup>3218</sup> ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἔδρᾳ (B5): The distinct role and the alien status of the medium, which has been hinted at all along (510A1-3; cf. ἀνευ [510B7] vs. δι' αὐτῶν [B8] and the “materiality” of the geometer's paradigms [510E1-3] vs. the liberation from sensory models [511C1-2]) finally becomes explicit, introduced by illative οὐδέ.

<sup>3219</sup> οὗτος ὁ τάς τε ὥρας παρέχων ... (B9-10): For the participial periphrasis cf. Smyth §1857. The word order imitates the reversal of perspective, from looking up from below, to looking back down from above (compare πάλιν αὖ at 511B7, and the way the predicate becomes the subject at 508E3-6, 509A4-5, and 509B8-10).

<sup>3220</sup> σφεῖς ἐώρων (C1): Given the imperfect referring to duration in the past, I take the reflexive plural σφεῖς (C1) to refer to himself and his erstwhile fellows below (rather than himself and his guide with Shorey, *ut vid.*), which broaches a hint of fellow feeling for the persons he has left behind that is akin to the empathy Socrates wishes to incite in Glaucon: cf. ἡμετέρων [514A2] and οἵους ἡμῖν [515A5]). The feeling arises in the aftermath of illumination just as ἐκείνων adds some sense of the continuity of the process he looks back over, and is then acknowledged by the present participle, ἀναμιμνησκόμενον (C4).

who were then his fellow prisoners,<sup>3221</sup> do you think he would count himself lucky for the change he had since undergone, and feel pity for the others?

“Quite so.”

And if they had conferred honors and praise on each other in their world<sup>3222</sup> and gave an award to the person sharpest at making out what was moving on the wall<sup>3223</sup> and most capable of remembering which things come earlier and which later and which at the same time, and was thereby better than anyone else at guessing what would be coming next, do you think our man would feel a desire to be among them and would envy those upon whom the honors were conferred, and office and privilege, or do you think he would feel what Homer says, that he was perfectly ready to “work in a field for a daily wage as a hireling to a sharecropper,” or to undergo anything for that matter before being a member of that world of opinion and living the way he had before and they still do?<sup>3224</sup>

“I think he’d much sooner accept this than live like that.”

And so conceive one more thing for me. If our man went back down and returned to his original seat would his eyes become full of darkness<sup>3225</sup> when he had just arrived from the sunlit realm?

“Surely they would.”

And if he had to compete all over again at dilucidating<sup>3226</sup> those old shadows with the others who had remained prisoners all the while, (517) as long as his sight was still blurry and his eyes had not adjusted, wouldn’t he become a laughing stock to them—unless the adjustment took place very quickly? The word would be that he took a trip upward only to return with his vision spoiled, that even trying<sup>3227</sup> to go up is not worth it, and that anyone who should try to loose their bonds and lead

<sup>3221</sup> τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ σοφίας καὶ τῶν τότε συνδεσμωτῶν (C4-5): The list swiftly rehearses his original departure, his arrival at the higher perspective, and (with τότε and συν-) a tinge of “survivor’s guilt” in the aftermath.

<sup>3222</sup> αὐτοῖς and παρ’ ἀλλήλων (C8-9) indicate a self-contained group, a society living on its own illusions. Again we only ignore Socrates’s purpose when we think instead of Plato and hear into these words him reporting to us his supercilious attitude about the politicians of his day (e.g. Adam *ad* 516C). Socrates has shown us that it is ourselves *en masse* that are the greatest sophist (492A5-B3, 493A6-9). We will always find ourselves in a world where we can postpone our better goals to best our neighbors in the meanwhile, and will never have anybody else to blame for doing so.

<sup>3223</sup> τὰ παριόντα (C9), the substantivized participle conveniently makes it unnecessary to supply a noun that would say what the moving things are (i.e., that they are in a sense nothing since merely shadows): cf. αὐτοῖς, 507D12.

<sup>3224</sup> ἐκείνα and ἐκείνως (D7) remind us he is remembering (C4). The amount quoted this time from Homer (cf. 386C5-7) is enough to recall the comparison with Hades that ensues, the world below to which the Cave is herewith being likened by a bold inversion of the usual perspective.

<sup>3225</sup> Reading σκότους <ἄν> ἀνάπλεως σχοίη (E4-5) with Baiter’s added ὄν (though absent from all mss.), rather than Slings’s ὄν[α] πλέως, who drops one letter from all mss. instead of adding two, and quotes Cobet and Runken who argue that in other passages ὄνα- adds to πλέως a connotation of pollution, inappropriate in the present context. ὄνα- here is not copulative or emphatic: it indicates the returning man now realizes that his eyes were full of darkness *before* and thus experiences his return as a re-filling. It is on the force of this observation that he sees his fellows as bound by needless fetters. The paradoxes of full emptiness and empty fullness represent the experience of doxa with phenomenological accuracy.

<sup>3226</sup> γνωματεύοντα (E8), a recondite hapax, must be satirical. Cf. ὥμη and ματαχειρεῖται at 410B7-8 (and n. 1702), and εὐπαιδευσίαν, 560E5.

<sup>3227</sup> οὐκ ἀξίαν ουδὲ πειρᾶσθαι (517A4) It is the sympathetic οὐδέ that indicates the men are (with Adam *ad loc.*) assuaging their own conscience for ignoring “their higher promptings.” To try but then fail would be mortifying; the counsel of despair is therefore not even to try. One must then make

them up,<sup>3228</sup> if only they can get their hands on him,<sup>3229</sup> deserves to be killed?

“Very much so.”

Now this image, Glaucon, must be applied in its entirety to the ideas we set out in argumentative form, before. Liken the medium or seat of the appearances<sup>3230</sup> to the dwelling place of the prison and the light that the fire provides in it to the power of the sun. Think of the journey upward and coming to see the things above as the soul's upward path into the noetic world and you will grasp what I am hoping for<sup>3231</sup>—since that's what you desired to hear from me. God knows whether my hopes are realistic. But this is how it appears to me by my own lights -- that in the world accessible to knowledge the finishing step is the Idea of the Good;<sup>3232</sup> that to behold her is only barely possible; that once she is grasped and seen one must come to understand how for all things she is the cause of what is proper and fine<sup>3233</sup> in them after all,<sup>3234</sup> by virtue both of her giving birth<sup>3235</sup> to light in the visible world as its master and lord, and as herself being master in the noetic world as well, providing it with truth and understanding; and that it is this that a person must come to see if he would act and behave mindfully whether as an individual or as a public servant.<sup>3236</sup>

“I have the same sense, to the extent that I can grasp so large a conception.”

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a life out of the shadows he knows are only half-true (he must, that is, somehow fill himself with their emptiness). It is this charade of reason, this “reading the tea leaves,” that *γνωματεύοντα* is coined to denote, this canny and sophisticated ability of the “political consultant” to put ictus into doxa, which in the end consists only of saying what *hoi polloi* already believe (493A6-9).

<sup>3228</sup> λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν (A5) recapitulates, with an hendiadys of first and last, the sequence of actions the prisoner *underwent* (λυθείη ... ἀναγκάζοιτο ... ἀναγκάζοι ... ἔλκοι ... ἐξελκύσειν [515C6-E8]) and now in turn *performs*. τὸν ἐπιχείροντα is essentially εἰ ἐπιχειροῖ τις, for which cf. τῶν διακρινόντων, 348B2, and n. *ad loc.* καὶ alterum (A4) extends the governance of ὅξιον to the infinitive ἀποκτεινύναι ὁν (A6).

<sup>3229</sup> εἴ πως ... δύνατο (A5-6): The condition is optative, not unreal. Since it is he that is telling them the truth that frees their bonds, they might be able to return the favor and strangle him. The bearer of good tidings enables the complacent man to see just enough of the truth he is trying to avoid to require himself to be removed, as we saw in the second vote of Socrates's *Apology*, where more voted for his death than had voted for his conviction.

<sup>3230</sup> τὴν ... δι’ ὄψεως φαινομένην ἔδραν (B2), a *constructio praegnans*. That the phenomena are less real for being variable has already been asserted and argued; here we meet a second aspect of their inferiority, first alluded to in respect to the sun a page above: that they do not exist on their own (καθ' αὐτά:) but require a seat or a medium (cf. 516B5: ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἔδρᾳ), an idea introduced at 510A1-3 that receives full articulation in the *Timaeus* (the τρίτον γένος, 48E3-52D1, n.b. 52B1). There, in the cosmological context, the ἔδρα is the place in which the entire visible world appears (i.e., space, or the χώρα); here in the social context of opinion, it is the wall of the cave that provides a seat for the shadows (as the surface of water did for the likenesses at 510A1) which together constitute for the prisoners the part of the visible world that adumbrates the relation in which the entire visible world stands with the noetic world it “reflects.”

<sup>3231</sup> τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος (B6): ἐλπίς used as at 496E2.

<sup>3232</sup> ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα (B8-C1), the formal expression again (cf. 508E2-3, 505A2).

<sup>3233</sup> ὄρθων τε καὶ καλῶν (C2), a reminiscence of 505A2-B3 and 505D5-9, with ὄρθων standing in for δικαίων.

<sup>3234</sup> ὄρα (C2) acknowledges the new look things take on now that they are seen in connection with the Idea of the Good (cf. μετὰ ἀρχῆς, 511D2 and n. 3180).

<sup>3235</sup> τεκοῦσα (C3): From the new perspective looking down, the noetic ruler is the parent rather than the visible ruler (i.e., the sun), looking up to its parent, the offspring (ἐγγονον, 508B12-13).

<sup>3236</sup> ἡ ἴδια ἡ δημοσίᾳ (C5), reminding us of the original purpose of the present conversation, the education of the guards, to which he now returns.

Then get the sense also, and be not bewildered by it,<sup>3237</sup> that those who have gotten this far are not willing to pursue the things of the human world below. Instead, their souls always drive them toward pastimes<sup>3238</sup> in the upward realm. No less than this is to be expected if here, too, our image describes the way things really are.

“No less indeed.”

What then? Do you find it at all surprising that a person who leaves his godly studies behind and moves back to the human realm cuts a sorry figure<sup>3239</sup> and at first makes a ridiculous spectacle as if he were dimwitted, if he is compelled while he is still adjusting to such darker surroundings, to argue in the courtroom or some such place about the shadowy versions of the just or about the objects<sup>3240</sup> that cast such shadows, and to contend in close argument not about justice but about the presuppositions held about it by people who have never yet seen true justice<sup>3241</sup> for what it is?

“Not surprising at all.”

(518) In fact, if a person were intelligent about it he would be mindful that when it comes to the eyes there are two ways they become confused due to two different causes: when people go from light into darkness and when they go from darkness into the light. If he had the sense that the same thing might happen with the soul, and if he saw a soul confused and disturbed because it was unable to attain a clear picture<sup>3242</sup> he wouldn’t laugh without thinking but would first try to determine whether the soul in question had just arrived from a more luminous<sup>3243</sup> way of life and found itself surrounded by darkness because it had not yet adapted, or whether it might have moved from a life of relative ignorance into a more luminous state and was now overcome by the glare of greater brightness; and accordingly he would count the one soul happy for what had happened in its life<sup>3244</sup> and would pity the other; and if he chose to laugh his laughter would be the less laughable<sup>3245</sup> than if it were directed

<sup>3237</sup> οὐθὶ τοίνυν ... καὶ τόδε συνοιήθητι (C7). The Sun image had shown that just as the visible world has the sun, the world of truth has a *primum inter pares* that rules and causes all. The Line image had established an important difference between two types of mental activity (Glaucon stating the result in his own words at 511C3-D5). Now Socrates supplements his general instruction that Glaucon attach the Cave image to the other two (A8-B1) by specifying (καὶ τόδε) the special purpose he has in mind for this third image.

<sup>3238</sup> διατρίβειν (C9) the term Adeimantus used for continuing in the exercises “philosophy” beyond the preliminary stage (487D1: cf. 498B7-8 and χαλεπώτατα 498A3). Cf. 519C2 below.

<sup>3239</sup> ἀσχημονεῖ (D5): cf. 506D7.

<sup>3240</sup> σκιῶν ἡ ἀγαλμάτων ὥν αἱ σκίαι (D9). ἀγάλματα is essentially approbative but the sequel (ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὑπολαμβάνεται ...) shows its use is ironic, just as γνωματεύοντα was (516E8: cf. nn.3226 and 3227). We capture a similar modality in our terms “opinion-maker” and “pundit” which are approbative ... *in the world of opinion*; or the way we speak of individual persons as the “poster boy” by which to measure all the other ... shadows. Cf., with Shorey, the εἴδωλα μέγιστα of Polit.303C2 and the εἴδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων of Soph.234C6.

<sup>3241</sup> αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην (E1-2), allowed to be anarthrous for the economy of the attributive position in which it happens to be placed. From such a passage (as well as 507B5, where αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν stands in contrast [n.b. δῆ] with πολλὰ καλά) it is easy to see how Plato’s use of αὐτός came to sound like a technical term (cf. Arist.Met.1040B34 and Bonitz, Index s.v. αὐτός).

<sup>3242</sup> καθορᾶν (518A5): compare the use at Phdrs.247D5-6, and cf. 515C9 and n. 3204.

<sup>3243</sup> φαντέρου βίου (A6-7) bringing forward the metaphor of luminosity from 508B12-D9 (and 506C11-D1: cf. n.3047). The two states of cognition can now be called βίοι since the image has invented places in which they can dwell.

<sup>3244</sup> τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου (B2), tantamount to the πάθος of our φύσις at 514A1-2 and φύσει συμβαίνειν αὐτῷ at 515C5-6.

<sup>3245</sup> καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως (B3). Note that conversely to laugh for joy at escaping from the lower

toward a soul that had proceeded away from the upper region and out of the light.

“Your argument is extremely fair!”

Well then this is the way we must think about these things, if what I am saying is true. Education is not the sort of thing certain people go around advertising<sup>3246</sup> it to be, when they claim that they can install knowledge that is merely absent in the soul, as though they were able to put sight into blind eyes.

“So they do claim.”

But what we have now argued indicates that when it comes to this power present in a given individual's soul, this instrument by which any individual<sup>3247</sup> comes to know something,<sup>3248</sup> that just as an eye that is unable to see until the whole body is turned toward what is luminous and away from what is dark and obscure, in the same way this instrument needs to be turned along with the entire soul, away from what is becoming and toward what is real to the point that it is able to endure contemplating<sup>3249</sup> the most luminous aspect of the real, which by our argument is the good. An art to bring about this and this alone is what education would be, an art of “turning around,” knowing how to contrive that the soul be re-oriented effortlessly and permanently,<sup>3250</sup> rather than of implanting sight into it, since it had this ability all along but was improperly oriented and not looking in the direction it needed to.

“So it seems.”

So you must realize that whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul are more or less similar to those of the body, which are such that although they were not present before they can be instilled by measures of habit and practice, the virtue of intelligence, since it never loses its potency, belongs to a thing altogether more divine.<sup>3251</sup> Instead, depending on the soul's orientation it becomes either useful and worthwhile or useless and harmful. (519) Perhaps you have noticed, of men who are said to be evil but also wise, how forceful is the gaze of their little soul and how sharp and penetrating its perception of whatever it directs its attention to, since it is not their power of sight that is corrupt but rather its being forced into the service of corruption: the more acutely it perceives the more harm it can accomplish.

“Quite so.”

life is not ridiculous: cf.535E3-5.

<sup>3246</sup> ἐπάγγελλόμενοι (B7) of the sophist's ἐπάγγελμα or nostrum (cf. Euthyd.274A3, Gorg.447C2, 449B2, 458D8; Lach.186C4; Prot.319A5-6, and n.3250, *infra*).

<sup>3247</sup> τὸ ὄργανον ὃ καταμανθάνει ἔκαστος (C5-6). This is the central lesson of the cave image, the most crucial aspect of ἡμετέρα φύσις παιδείας τε περὶ καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας. It is one and the same man, and it is *any* man, that undergoes the entire experience.

<sup>3248</sup> καταμανθάνει (C6): the prefix associates this verb with καθορᾶν (A5) which expressed the same idea metaphorically.

<sup>3249</sup> ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη (C10) with complete explicitness breaks the metaphor καθορᾶν into its components: κατα- is done with the aoristic aspect of ἀνασχέσθαι and ὥραν is done with θεωμένη.

<sup>3250</sup> τέχνη (D3) and διαμηχανήσασθαι (D7): The language satirizes the sophist's tricks as well as the rhetoric he uses in advertising his product (ράστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα). For this latter pair cf. Socrates's description of the effect Hippias's teaching will have on him: ράδίως ὅρα μαθήσομαι καὶ οὐδείς με ἔξελέγξει ἔτι. (H.Maj.286E7). For superlatives in the ἐπάγγελμα cf. those of Gorgias (Gorg.448A2-3), of Protagoras (Prot.318A7-9), of Euthydemus (Euthyd.273D9), of Hippias (H.Maj.281A6, H.Min. 363D2 [ὅτι ὁν τις, *bis*], 364A8), and of Ion (*Ion* 530C7-D3). Socrates has no need for this momentous event to happen easily nor delusions as to its irreversibility or permanence.

<sup>3251</sup> Θειοτέρουν τινός (E2), parallel with the genitive τῶν τοῦ σώματος (D10), is a litotes for soul (Leroux).

If this aspect of such a nature was being held in check from early childhood and had been dealt a thorough pruning with respect to those congeners of its development that act like leaden weights, the things alike to eating and other such pleasures carried to the point of indulgence so as to bend the view of the soul downward—and if conversely, having been relieved of these, it was being reoriented toward true things, then it would be those things that this same element in these same men would be seeing, so very acutely as they see what they are now turned toward.

“That seems likely.”

And isn’t it likely, in addition to being necessary according to the logic of what we have argued, that we should neither entrust the city’s care to the uneducated whose experience of truth is still inadequate nor to those who have been allowed to devote their life to their exercises<sup>3252</sup> and carry their education through to completion,<sup>3253</sup> since the former lack an overarching orientation in their lives that would guide everything they would do both public and private, while the latter, if it were up to them, would not do anything, expecting as they do a happy sojourn to the Islands of the Blessed even in this life.

“True.”

### D.3e.2:The Greatest Course of Learning

So our work is cut out for us, as founders of the city.<sup>3254</sup> We must select those with the noblest natural endowment and compel them to make their way to the study that we have just now called the greatest one, to see the good and to climb that upward path.<sup>3255</sup> But once they have reached the top and achieved an adequate<sup>3256</sup> vision of the good, we must not grant them the privilege they are now granted.

“What would that be?”

The privilege to stay where they are, and to refuse to take the path back down<sup>3257</sup> among their

<sup>3252</sup> διατριβήν ([519C2](#)), from 517C9.

<sup>3253</sup> διὰ τέλους (C2): Reaching the vision or knowledge of the good is the completion he has in mind, as the next clause proves (cf. τελευταῖον [516B4], and 517C4-5). Short of this they are unqualified (ἰκανῶς ... ποτε, C1), but once qualified in this way they will never look back.

<sup>3254</sup> ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον (C8) The phrase (cf. 374E6 and n. 1089, 378B1-2 and n. 1168; cf. also 530E3) formally invokes their joint project to develop the city, and thus programmatically reverts to the task, from which we departed at 503E1ff, namely, the task of educating the guards.

<sup>3255</sup> ιδεῖν τε τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν καὶ ἐπειδὸν ἀναβόντες ἰκανῶς ἴδωσι μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ... (C9-D2): The ἀνάβασις was described at 515E6-B7. The chiasm suggests that ἐπιτρέπειν will introduce a regressive or downward step. On the relation between ιδεῖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν and ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν see next note.

<sup>3256</sup> The adequacy (ἰκανῶς) consists not merely of “seeing it” but recognizing in the vision how its goodness is the cause and explanation of all else he saw on the way up (cf. 517C1-5, 516B9-C2), a kind of cognition or understanding that was described in the Line passage in terms of the path up to the ἀνυπόθετον and back down (511B6-C2). ἰκανῶς therefore means what ἰκονόν means at Phdo.101E1, where a similar upward path is described.

<sup>3257</sup> καταβαίνειν (D5), a metaphor defined entirely by the upward path (and prepared for by the chiasm above, C10-D2), itself a creature of the cave image, though the term had also been used in the Line passage of the path of reasoning from the source and cause “down” to its derivatives and effects (511B8). To feel a reference to the first word of Book One reaches not too far but through too much. The fact that Socrates has taken a path “down” to the Piraeus is less important than the question whether Glaucon (not to mention Adeimantus) will end up taking the path upward that Socrates is

fellow prisoners and share in the agony of their lives and its glory, for better or worse.

“So we’re<sup>3258</sup> to do them the injustice of making their lives worse although they could be better?”

You’ve gone back on remembering<sup>3259</sup> that our law is not concerned to make one group fare particularly well but contrives instead the welfare of the entire city, by fitting (520) its citizens to one another by means of persuasion and force, so that they will contribute what they individually have to the common goods, the law itself<sup>3260</sup> having engendered such men as these in the city, not so as to allow them take whatever path they might wish but to press them into an employment that will strengthen the city’s unity.

“It’s true—I did forget that principle.”

And while you’re at it, note that we won’t be doing them an injustice after all,<sup>3261</sup> these people who became philosophers under our regime. To the contrary we will have a perfectly fair argument by which to require them to care for the others and act as their guardians: “Yes, it’s well and good that in the other cities persons who have turned out like you take no share in the bothersome toils of their cities. They show up spontaneously and without the help of their cities’ laws, and it is perfectly unobjectionable that what grows up independently and has no need for others to nourish it should be less than eager to pay somebody a fee for its nurture. But you are the products of us, and we have bred you as if in a swarm<sup>3262</sup> to be leaders and kings over yourselves and over the rest of the city. Better and more fully educated as you have now become than they, you are likewise more able to participate in both<sup>3263</sup> kinds of life. It is incumbent upon you therefore to take the path down, each of you in his turn, down into the community of the others, and to accommodate your vision to their dimmer sphere. Once you have become used to it you will be able to see a thousand times better than they and will recognize the likenesses they live among for what they truly are and what truth they have, knowing of what they are likenesses by dint of having yourselves beheld<sup>3264</sup> the truth about what

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here describing.

<sup>3258</sup> ἐπειτα (D8), in *interrogatione improbationis vel indignationis significationem habens* (Ast, Lex.*Plat.* s.v. ἐπειτα, comparing *Gorg.*466C, *Tht.*196D, .289C).

<sup>3259</sup> ἐπελάθου πάλιν (E1): πάλιν refers to that last time Glaucon succeeded at remembering (with Adam *ad loc.*). He is referring to the exchange at 465E4-466A7, where he had delicately avoided naming Adeimantus (*οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅτου, ibid.*) as the person whose objection had required him to articulate this principle (Book Four, *init.*). Thus Socrates is almost saying, “You’ve overlooked what that other person did.”

<sup>3260</sup> καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν (520A2): adds to the sequence of participles that it was law that in the first place had encouraged the development of such special skills in the citizens that it goes on to combine into an harmonious and happy whole.

<sup>3261</sup> οὖδ' (A6): cf. 475C4 and n.2580.

<sup>3262</sup> ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν (B5-6). Xen. *Cyrop.*5.1.24 recognizes a “natural” king arising as the head bee among the swarm (ἡγεμών, as here and there, is the normal term: cf. Bz. *Index Ar. s.v.*, 313B44-50). Socrates’s habit of borrowing freely from the animal world (375D3-376A10; 451D4-E7) is of a piece with his irony, and helps keep things in perspective, especially for his interlocutors. The gender of the head bee (king or queen) appears still to have been a matter of speculation: Ar. *GA* 3.10.

<sup>3263</sup> ἀμφοτέρων (C1). There is no advocacy here that a ruler should be both practical and theoretical, nor a vision of complementarity or interdependence of the practical and contemplative lives (time within the cave interrupts communing with the forms but not vice-versa) nor any doubt which is the better life. All that is said and meant is that his theoretical ability so hugely enhances his practical ability (cf. μυρίω, C3) that it would be hugely ungenerous of him to refuse short periods of service.

<sup>3264</sup> ἐωρακέναι (C5): The distinction between shadows and the σκευαστά that cast them, below, is a ladder thrown away once they are both fully understood (whence the perfect tense) from the

is beautiful, what is just, and what is good.<sup>3265</sup> In this way our city, and your city, will have a waking life, not the sleepwalking life the majority of cities now live<sup>3266</sup> with their internecine shadowboxing and clamoring for rule, as though ruling were a great and good thing. In fact the truth is more like this: the city whose rulers are drawn from those least eager to rule necessarily lives the best and most faction-free of lives, whereas the city that gets the opposite kind of rulers lives quite the opposite.”

“I quite agree with that.”

Will our nurslings fail to be persuaded by us once they have heard this? Will they be unwilling to share in the toils of the city, each taking his turn at it, although spending the majority of their time together in the pure unsullied world?<sup>3267</sup>

“Impossible! Being fair they will accept our command as fair!<sup>3268</sup> And above all they will each in fact approach the task of ruling as a necessity, quite the contrary of the rulers you find in any other city.”

So here is the crux of the matter, my companion. Once you discover there is a better life (521) than ruling for the persons whose job it will be to rule, then it will be possible for you to have a well ordered city, since only in this city will the rulers be persons truly wealthy, rich not in gold but in what a happy man needs to be happy, namely, a way of living that is good and mindful. On the other hand if it is the poor that make their way into public life,<sup>3269</sup> driven by their lack of personal wealth, as if here somehow is the place to acquire the good that life can afford, then it will not be possible. Then the office of rule becomes an object of contention, and contentious war among kindred, internal to the polis, destroys both those who fight to win it and the rest of the city to boot.

“Quite true.”

Can you name any other life that looks down upon political office with disdain<sup>3270</sup> besides that of the philosopher truly so called?

“By Zeus I cannot.”

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higher perspective of the Good which alone reveals what they are versions of and what is their potential worth (cf. 516C1-2 where notice the dismissal of the question with τρόπον τινά). Such understanding presumably includes recognizing something of the citizens' true nature as men with souls, souls with a divine element that could enable them to undergo the change the ruler himself underwent, rather than continuing in the doxic view that their identity consists only in the status and position they hold in the mural of shadows (515A6).

<sup>3265</sup> καλῶν τε κοὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι (C5-6): once again the μέγιστα (cf. n.2279).

<sup>3266</sup> ὕπαρ ... ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄναρ (C6-7), as a dream come true, echoing Od.19.547-550 (Leroux); but also referring back to the extraordinary metaphor from Book Five according to which persons who see the many without seeing the one behind the many are said to be living a dream (476C2-D3).

<sup>3267</sup> ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ (D8): for the substantival use as well as the sentiment cf. Phdo.79D2. The guards' inner dimension and the purity in which it participates gives positive content to what could still be described only negatively in the last paragraph of Book Three (where compare the term ἀκήρατον, 417A1).

<sup>3268</sup> δίκαια γὰρ δὴ δικαίοις ἐπιτάξομεν (E1), expressing agreement by taking the interlocutor's assertion one step further (after ἀλλὰ δίκαια πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐροῦμεν, A7-8).

<sup>3269</sup> ἐπί τε τὰ δημόσια ἴασιν (521A5) the motive is military or erotic, but certainly unwanted. The sentiment (οἰόμενοι) Socrates imagines them having was explicitly stated by Thrasymachus (343D6-344A6).

<sup>3270</sup> Once again (cf. n.2880 ad 496D) the reader must be cautious to watch for any trace of self-aggrandizement in the expression of this sentiment by Socrates, and in the interlocutor's agreement to it—as well as his own. Proof of Glaucon's innocence in this respect is the choice he made at 528A4-5. The reader is left to answer to himself, for himself, as usual.

You can be sure in any case that we must not have lovers of rule *per se*<sup>3271</sup> courting it, or else rival lovers will arise to contend with them.<sup>3272</sup> So what other men will you force into the role of guarding our city than the ones who are at once the most mindful of the ways a city is well ordered and at the same time enjoy other honors than the political ones and a life better than that of the political man?

“Only these.”

Would you have us investigate, then, how such men will be produced,<sup>3273</sup> and how someone will lead them up to the light just as some are said to have made their way out of Hades and into the place of the gods?

“How could I not?”

This, then, will not be a matter of how the sherd turns<sup>3274</sup> but how to turn a soul, away from a nocturnal sort of day<sup>3275</sup> upward toward a true day, true because it ascends to the real, a path we shall assert is true philosophy.<sup>3276</sup> We need to investigate which of the<sup>3277</sup> studies has the power to do this. What study could have the effect of drawing<sup>3278</sup> the soul away from the world of change and becoming, toward the world of being and truth? Something popped into my mind right as I asked that question: we did say that we needed them to be “athletes of war” even from a young age, didn’t we?

“So we did.”

<sup>3271</sup> ἐραστὰς τοῦ ὄρχειν (B4) distinct from the poor (A4-8), these desire power for itself whereas those desired power only as a means to acquire the wealth they thought it could bring.

<sup>3272</sup> ὀντερασταί (B5): Socrates adds a psychological observation, that a show of desire in one man arouses desire in another—hence the language of the ἐραστής and ὀντεραστής. Still, and again, the theme of envy is just below the surface.

<sup>3273</sup> ἐγγενήσονται (C2) referring back to the claim we have made to our guardians at 520B5-6.

<sup>3274</sup> ὁστράκου ... περιστροφή (C5), an allusion to a children’s game of ὁστρακίνδα: They break into two groups (in one version they stand east and west of a line drawn between); a shell or sherd painted black on one side and white on the other is spun or thrown up in the air; how it lands is announced (νύξ for black, ἡμέρα for white) and this determines which of the groups is to flee and which is to pursue (Plato Comicus f.153 [=1.640 Kock, quoted and elaborated upon in Hermias in Phdrm.Schol.241B (59.16-60.9 Couvreur]; the detail about east and west is added in Schneidewin’s ms.C ad D.6.95 [=Paroim.Gr. I.285]).

The expression is proverbial for sudden reversal (e.g., from offense to defense: cf. Paroim.Gr. I.285 [D.6.95], 2.84[GCL2.93], 2.570 [Ap.I3.3]), so that Socrates may be alluding to the topsy-turvy of politics (a continuation of the theme introduced by ἐρασταί and ὀντερασταί just above (B4-5: *n.b.*, it is in connection with the topsy-turvy of erotic relationships that Socrates uses the proverb in Phdrs.241B3-5); but the designation of the sherd’s colors in terms of night and day, and orientation of the players facing sunrise and sunset, must also be meant to introduce the turning of the soul’s orientation away the “nocturnal day” to the day illuminated by sun and truth, as described in the περιστροφή with which this περιστροφή is next contrasted.

<sup>3275</sup> νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας (C6), with τις used to apologize for the metaphor, almost turning it into a simile. Day is metonymy for life (βίος, 520E4, 521B1, B9). For the light of day contrasted with shadowy glare of artificial illumination cf. ἡμερινὸν φῶς / νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, 508C5-6.

<sup>3276</sup> Reading οὐσαν ἐπάνοδον (C7) with all mss., Iamblichus, Clement and Alcinous. Philosophy is a way of life (see last note), itself an ascent within the day-life of the world above (516A5-B7).

<sup>3277</sup> τί τῶν μαθημάτων (C10): The article indicates that Socrates presumes Glaucon is cognizant of some set of subjects that are taught. In the sequel we find only the studies we have taught above, gymnastics and music. The μέθοδοι of the πραγματευόμενοι mentioned at the end of Book Six (510C3,C5) do not come to Glaucon’s mind as quickly as they might to a professional student.

<sup>3278</sup> ὀλκόν (D3), the power to drag or draw, which metaphor was used in the cave (ἔλκοι, ἔξελκυσειν, ἔλκομενον: 515E6-6A1).

So the study we are looking for must pay attention to this aspect in addition to that one.

“What aspect?”

That the study be better than useless<sup>3279</sup> for military men.

“Well yes, if that is possible.”

They've already received their training in gymnastics and music; but gymnastics was dedicated to the realm of what comes to be and passes away,<sup>3280</sup> in the sense that it managed the growth and decline of the body; and so this one isn't the study we are looking for. (522) But how about music, as much of it as we covered it then?<sup>3281</sup>

“Well,” Glaucon replied, “that was the counterpart of gymnastics, if you remember, training our guards in respect to their characters and habits, its harmony giving them a kind of harmoniousness, but not knowledge, and its rhythm a kind of grace, and in its stories something akin to these along the lines of personality traits,<sup>3282</sup> both the stories that were fables and those that were more true than false.<sup>3283</sup> But as for a study that led<sup>3284</sup> toward the sort of thing your are talking about there was no trace of it there.

You recall most exactly what we said. In truth the musical training had no trace of it. So again, my clever Glaucon,<sup>3285</sup> what study would be of this sort? The effect of all the crafts seemed to be

<sup>3279</sup> μὴ ὄχρηστον (D11). The litotes evinces that Socrates is straining to make a point. It is not unusual for him to claim something has struck him (370A, 525C, *Euthyphr.*9C), nor for anyone else to. Such a thing happens commonly in conversation, as when one says, “You know what I was just thinking?” to apologize to the other for introducing an apparently irrelevant comment whose relevance, he trusts, will presently will become clear (here done with asseverative μέντοι). In general, and here, it marks the conversation as a friendly partnership. What is unusual in this case is how long it takes for the relevance to appear and, even when it does, how strained it is: these latter facts can produce a feeling that Socrates is manipulating his interlocutor, a feeling we also had the moment they were finding justice in the thicket (432B7-E7), and so did Glaucon (E8), and may have again when the whole game comes to nothing and he dispenses with the military uses of science (527D2-6 and n. *ad loc.*).

<sup>3280</sup> περὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον (E3-4) an amplification of τὸ γιγνόμενον (521D4), the dyad first used at 485B2-3. πον softens the strong expression; for the perfect (*τετεύτακεν*) of what is true in the nature and structure of things, cf. n. 4660.

<sup>3281</sup> ὅσον τὸ πρότερον (522A2), The limitation perhaps remembers and suggests the special sense ὡς Μοῦσα was given in a moment of enthusiasm at 499D4.

<sup>3282</sup> Glaucon connects Socrates's argument just above (518D9-519A1) about the imperishability of mind, with very specific moments in the argument at 400C7-401D3 including the very memorable expression, συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ (401D2). To continue the parallelism by saying κατὰ τοὺς λόγους εὐλογίαν, repeating a term that was actually used there, does not serve his present purpose of stressing the characterological effect of the training, and so he varies the expression.

<sup>3283</sup> ἀληθινώτεροι (A8): The comparative alludes to the language used at 377A5-6.

<sup>3284</sup> Reading ἄγον (B1) with Burnet, Chambry, Slings (Eusebius et γρ. D : ἄγ [sic] F : ἀγαθὸν ADM [et legunt Shorey, Leroux]). The expression ἄγειν πρός (A8-B1) substitutes for ἔλκειν.

<sup>3285</sup> With ὦ δαιμόνιε Γλαύκων (B3) Socrates notes they have come to an important pass. As we have seen (n.554), Socrates, and almost only he (contra, 365A4) plays with these vocatives. Sometimes a bare adjective is used, in earnest or not: ἀγαθέ: 344E7, 345A5; ὄριστε: 338D5, 381D8; εὔδαιμον: 450C6; ἐταῖρε: 506D6, 520E4 (Socrates only once calls Adeimantus ἐταῖρε, at 562A7); θαυμάσιε: 435C4, 495A10 (usual with imaginary interlocutors, 366D7, 420D1, 526A1); μακάριε: 345B2, 346A3, 354A8, 499D10, 506D8, 557D1, 589C7; φίλε (373E9, 435B9, 455D6, 485C6, 503B3, 504C1, 519E1, 563B4). Sometimes an adjective is added to the proper name: ἀγαθέ: 423D8 (Adeimant.); δαιμόνιε: 344D6 (Thras.), 522B3 (Glau.). σοφώτατε: 338D5 (Thras.); φίλε: 361D4, 416B8, 473D5-6, 518A8,

exhausted in their practical application ...<sup>3286</sup>

“Of course they are. And yet what other study is left, apart from the studies of music and gymnastics and preparation in the trades?”

Alright then, if there's nothing for us to latch on to outside them, let's latch onto something that touches them all!

“What would that be?”

The following for instance, a common element all crafts make use of, as do all processes of thought and all sciences,<sup>3287</sup> something that every person has to learn at the very outset.

“What?” he said.

This simple matter of distinguishing one from two from three.<sup>3288</sup> What I mean in general terms is number and calculation. Don't you agree with what I say about this, that everything from craft to science<sup>3289</sup> must have a grasp of it?

“Quite so.”

Even the military art?

“Necessarily.”<sup>3290</sup>

Agamemnon, in the tragic plots at least, is always being made out to be a most laughable general by Palamedes. Or don't you know how Palamedes claims he discovered numbers and established the organization of the armies on the field at Ilion and counted out the ships and all the rest for the first time, creating the impression that before this the army was simply innumerable and that Agamemnon, as he would have us believe,<sup>3291</sup> did not even know how many feet he had since he would not have

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533A1, 579D5, 608B4, 618B6-7 (Glauc.), 365A4 (Soc.), 376D6, 388D2 (Adeimant.). Three times two adjectives are combined, without a proper name: βαβαῖ ὁ φίλε ἐταῖρε (459B10 [Glaucon]); ὁ φίλε ἐταῖρε (562A7 [Adeimantus], 607E4 [Glaucon]). Combining an adjective with a proper name often adds asseveration (388D2, 423D8, 473D5-6, 533A1, 579D5, 608B4, 618B6-7) or heightens a transition, as here.

<sup>3286</sup> ξδοξων (B5) refers to 495D7-E2, a moment in Socrates's conversation with Adeimantus. For βάναυσοι cf. n.2866 *ad loc.* τε (B4) suggests Socrates was going to say more, and that Glaucon interrupts him, whence Burnet places a dash.

<sup>3287</sup> τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι (C1-2): The list elegantly goes from the lowest precedent term (τέχνη) to the highest (ἐπιστήμη, from A5) through διάνοια, which presents the grounds for including them. Cf. n.1488 *ad* 398A4-5.

<sup>3288</sup> φαῦλον (C5) masks with diffidence Socrates's hardly natural way of characterizing calculation, though as it will turn out it is exactly appropriate for the use he will make of it, namely, the very abstract work of distinguishing the same and the different. Socrates characteristically begins dialectical investigation with disarmingly simple questions (e.g. 475E9; 507B2-7; 596A6-8) which his interlocutors immediately understand.

<sup>3289</sup> τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη (C8): διάνοια having done its job, the list now goes back to expressing the diapason of studies with a polar doublet consisting of its lowest and highest terms.

<sup>3290</sup> πολλὴ ὀνάγκη (C11) of logical necessity, πολεμική by the feminine adjective now being made into an instance of τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη. The highly abstract inference is then filled in with a jocular but concrete example.

<sup>3291</sup> ως ξοικεν (D6) This phrase, within the suppositional participial phrase introduced by its own ως (ώς ὄντων ... εἰδότος, D5-6), begins to cast doubt on the validity of Palamedes's behavior, a feeling that is then continued by the imperfect ἡπίστατο, which suggests the foregoing was the apodosis of an irreall condition. καίτοι (D7) then dismisses this suggestion in order to ask that the picture be

been able to count. And yet if all that were true, what sort of a general do you think he could have been?

“A strange one indeed, if that were true.”

Must we then set it down that being able to count and calculate is a study that is necessary for a military man?

“Above all else, if he is to know anything at all about the organization of his troops, let alone be a man instead of a brute!”<sup>3292</sup>

Think<sup>3293</sup> whether you view this study the same way I do.

“How’s that?”

(523) My guess is this study falls among the studies we are looking for, which by their nature lead toward intelligence, but that nobody makes the right use of it while in itself it really and truly is something that draws the mind toward being.<sup>3294</sup>

“Why do you think so?”

I’ll try to make clear to you how I see it.<sup>3295</sup> Look at the distinction I use, according to my own personal judgment, to decide which things are conducive to the goal we have in mind and which are not. Come alongside me and give your verdict on it yea or nay. That way we might get a clearer sense whether the truth is the way I am guessing it is.<sup>3296</sup>

evaluated on its own merits. Glaucon’s response (D9) reproduces the straddling modality, with an apodosis that has no ὅν followed by an irreal imperfect protasis.

<sup>3292</sup> εἰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἔσεσθαι (E4). Leg.819D sheds the light we need on this remark—as if man were the “counting animal.” the second εἰ καί (E4) echoes the first (E3).

<sup>3293</sup> ἐννόεις (E5). The νοῦς language from the end of Book Six is starting to show up again (cf. 521D4, 522D3).

<sup>3294</sup> ἐλκτικῷ ὅντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν (523A2-3): the ἀγενή metaphor exchanges duty with the ἔλκειν metaphor (cf. Phdr.237D6-238C4). οὐσία should be heard as an abstract expression denoting what the participle τὸ ὅν referred to at 521D4. The “misuse” in question (χρῆσθαι δ’ οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὄρθως) is not a shortcoming of arithmeticians as such but the reason the philosophical value of arithmetic is not obvious in their deployment of it.

<sup>3295</sup> γε (A5). Here, as at 506E2-3 (cf.507A1-2), we have Socrates’s expression of diffidence, as if to counsel others not hold him responsible for what might pop into his head to say (Plato is afforded no such immunity, even though he never speaks in his own voice!). The elaborate and usual back and forth by which he suggests they conduct their investigation emphasizes to Glaucon that he desires a “search in common” (so, συνθεατής, A7)—a dialogue—and might, along with the νοῦς-language above, suggest we pay special attention.

<sup>3296</sup> οἶον μαντεύομαι (A8): With his characteristic diffidence Socrates warns Glaucon that the point will be abstruse (cf. his use of φαῦλον [522C5], and an expression like εὐηθικῶς [529B3, with n. 3393]); but there is also a methodological purpose in his rather extensive remark. The shared search of dialogue requires the answerer to present his thesis in order to check it and the questioner to ask questions in order to disambiguate it. Cf. 412E, 413B, 429C, 433A1, 450D8, 467D12, 515D5, 528A4-5, 531E4-5 (and n.3439) 577B7-8 (and n.4276), 578C9-D1, 580A1-7, 583C1-2, 595C5; and Crat.428D2; Euthyph.10A; Gorg.451E, 453B, 455A8ff, 463D, 474C1, 489D; Lach.189E-190A; Leg.626DE, 652A4-B1, 653D5-6, 654B9, 664E, 668D, 691B, 714C, 792C5, 835D, 862A1; Lys.216C4-5, 217CD, 218E1-2; Phdo.100A; Phlb.17A, 23E; Polit.297C, 306C; Prot.310A2-7; Thet.166DE; Stallb. ad Leg.630B8. Even stupid questions are appropriate if they will help the answerer clarify his meaning: 397E5-8, 456D8-10; Gorg.450E6ff, 490BC, 511CD; Parm.130E; Phlb.25C5-9, E5-9, 54A7-C5.

“Show me.”<sup>3297</sup>

Show you I will if you can get my meaning: One kind of things in our perceptions do not call upon the intelligence to make a closer study, since they are adequately distinct for us<sup>3298</sup> by dint of perception, whereas another kind calls for the intelligence to help them with an investigation any way it can since perception produces nothing at all solid.<sup>3299</sup>

“Things seen at a distance is clearly what you mean, or trompe l’oeil.”

Actually, you didn’t grasp my meaning.<sup>3300</sup>

“Well then what do you mean?”

In the class of things that do not call upon the intelligence I place everything that does not produce an opposite perception at the same time. Everything that does I place into the class of things that do call upon the intelligence, cases where perception fails to show that something is this any more than its opposite, whether the thing happens to be impinging on the perception from nearby or from a distance. But here’s a way you will see more exactly what I mean. These fingers you see<sup>3301</sup>—we say they would be three in number: the little finger, the ring finger, and the middle finger?

“Quite.”

Recognize they are being seen up close,<sup>3302</sup> mind you, as I make my argument. But my point is the following.

“What?”

First, a finger each of them appears equally to be, and in this respect at least each differs from the others not at all whether it is seen as being in the middle or is seen as being at the end of the row, and whether as black or white, as fat or slender, and so forth. In all these respects the soul of most people would not be compelled to call upon the intelligence<sup>3303</sup> to answer what a finger is, since the vision gave no indication whatever that the finger is the opposite of what a finger is.

“No it did not.”

<sup>3297</sup> δείκνυ', ἔφη (A9). By a small but significant increment Socrates treats Glaucon as a more truly equal investigator than before. The center of gravity shifts away from Glaucon receiving the benefit of Socrates’s teaching and toward the middle, with Glaucon taking responsibility for his part in providing means to reach truth. His response, by accepting this responsibility, speaks volumes; and Socrates notices (δείκνυμι, εἰ καθορᾶς).

<sup>3298</sup> ικανῶς (B1) designates subjective adequacy as also it does in dialectic (cf. n.486, *Phdo*.101E1, *Gorg*.448B1, *Rep*.511C3; *Ar. de Caelo* 279B11-12).

<sup>3299</sup> ικανῶς ... κρινόμενα (B1) is contrasted with οὐδὲν ύγιες (B3), a slang idiom like our “up to no good:” cf. 496C7-8, 584A9, 589C3, 603B1-2.

<sup>3300</sup> οὐ πάντα ... ἔτυχες ὃ λέγω (B7): In dialogue one has the opportunity to interpret what the other is saying and the other in turn to correct the interpretation if it is wrong. Thus the two might be able to stay on the same page.

<sup>3301</sup> οὗτοι (C4), second person, after ὥδε (first), suggests Socrates has held up his fingers in front of Glaucon’s face.

<sup>3302</sup> With τοίνυν (C8), which is late, Socrates emphasizes the proximity of his fingers to Glaucon’s face, in order to stress that obscurity due to distance is not the obscurity he has in mind (B5-7). The passive (όρωμένους, C8) is awkward just as προσπίπτουσα ἐγγύθεν and πόρρωθεν was above, and it sets up the passives he needs in the next step. He is taking pains to distinguish the purely perceptual aspects of experience from the thinking that subsequently reflects on them.

<sup>3303</sup> οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι (D3-4) The implicit conception of the entire soul being affected by sensation and of its thinking faculty being a part or aspect of it is continued from above: cf. 511A4 vs. B4 and 518C4-10.

And so it is reasonable to say that this kind of thing is not something that calls upon or weakens the intelligence. But as to their largeness and smallness, does vision adequately see that? Can we still say that it makes no difference to the vision whether the finger is in the middle rather than at the end? And similarly as to fatness and slimness or softness and hardness, does it make no difference to the sense of touch? Consider the other senses, too: isn't it the case that they indicate these attributes in a deficient way? (524) Isn't it more like the following,<sup>3304</sup> taking them one by one, first the sense that is assigned to hardness: isn't it also assigned to softness? Doesn't it pass along a message to the soul that the same thing is hard and soft in the course of its perceiving?

"Yes."

Isn't it unavoidable, at least in a situation like this, that the soul now finds itself at a loss to know what this<sup>3305</sup> perceptual faculty means by hardness when it asserts that the same thing is soft also? And the sense of the light and the sense<sup>3306</sup> of the heavy, what light and heavy can mean if it sends a signal that the heavy thing is light and the light thing is heavy.<sup>3307</sup>

"In very fact such messages would seem absurd to the soul, and such as to require further inquiry."

And so it is reasonable to say that in such cases the first thing the soul would do is call upon its ability to calculate and upon its intelligence to investigate<sup>3308</sup> whether the things about which these reports are coming in are one or two.<sup>3309</sup> And if it becomes clear to the intelligence that they are two, it also becomes clear that each of them is one, over against the other.<sup>3310</sup> If each is one over against

<sup>3304</sup> ὅδε ποιεῖ ἐκάστη αὐτῶν (524A1): Rather than allowing Glaucon to answer whether touch might give contradictory testimony about the fingers as vision would (so at least we have been left to infer from imagining Socrates holding up his fingers), Socrates immediately refocusses the question (524A1-4) onto the general potential for contradictory testimony to inhere in the sense experience, since each sense is assigned to a spectrum of qualities whose termini are themselves opposites.

<sup>3305</sup> With αὕτη (A7) soul recognizes that its presumption that the sense faculty giving the contrary reports should be self-identical, is integral to its aporia.

<sup>3306</sup> καὶ ἡ (A9) demurs to emphasize that of course the sense of the light (the genitive τοῦ κούφου incorporates the language of τεταχθῆναι ἐπί from above, A2) is the same sense as the sense of the heavy, even though or perhaps exactly because, the point was just made above.

<sup>3307</sup> εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μαλακόν (A8): The very expression of the sense's testimony goes further than the senses can or do. The senses did not declare that "the same thing" was hard and soft (A3-4, and A8), let alone declare that "the light" is "the heavy," as soul now (A9-10) formulates the matter (to itself).

<sup>3308</sup> λογισμόν τε καὶ νόησιν (B4), a paradigmatic instance of reverse καί (n.444). νόησις has consistently been the precedent term (523A1, B1, D4, D8) but now the aspect of intelligence that counts is what is called for, namely λογισμός, yet it is placed first rather than in the epexegetical second position.

<sup>3309</sup> παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν (B4-5): Soul proposes to itself a solution to the ἀπορία (it is not one and the same thing after all) and calls upon νόησις to test that solution, since it is νόησις that can count things.

<sup>3310</sup> κεχωρισμένα νοήσει (B10-C1). The cognition of twoness relies on the event of counting but once it is reached the sense of one which was implicit in the act of counting becomes *thinkable* as such. Socrates made the same move, with the same language, at 475E9-476A2. The comparative ἐκάτερον adds to ἔν that the oneness of the one relies for its meaning on the single otherness, or alterity, of the other-than-itself. The same thought and language were used even earlier, in the argument in Book Four about non-contradiction, which provided the method needed for distinguishing and counting the parts of the soul (cf. 436A9 and 439B3, and nn.2092 and 2141).

the other and taken together they are two, the intelligence will see that as two<sup>3311</sup> they are separated, since if they were unseparated<sup>3312</sup> it would not be seeing two things but one.

“Correct.”

Sight, too,<sup>3313</sup> saw large and small all the while, but saw them jumbled together<sup>3314</sup> rather than separate; and yet it did so with enough clarity<sup>3315</sup> that the intelligence was compelled to look, in its turn, at the large and small and see they are not jumbled together but distinct,<sup>3316</sup> opposite to the way that vision saw them.

“True.”

And was it from such an experience as this that it first occurred to us to ask what these two really are after all,<sup>3317</sup> largeness and smallness.

“Exactly so”

And it was pursuant to this question that we distinguished between an intelligible version and a visible version of them?

“Perfectly correct.”

Well, that is what I was just now trying to argue when I said that some things are solicitous of thought<sup>3318</sup> while others are not, and drew the distinction by calling “solicitous” those things in the perceptual world that can occur together with their opposites and saying those that don’t are not stimulants of intelligence.

“Now I get your meaning, and it seems right in my judgment.”

So, to which of the two groups does number and the one<sup>3319</sup> belong, in your judgment?

<sup>3311</sup> τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα (B10): the γε is causal with δύο (“being two”). The participle represents the indirect discourse of *mental perception*.

<sup>3312</sup> ἀχώριστά γε (C1): “causal” γε creates a virtual unreal protasis (i.e., εἰ ἀχώριστα ἦν) for the unreal apodosis ἂν ... ἐνόει.

<sup>3313</sup> μέγα καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἔώρα (C3), with καί ’s slightly jumbled, perhaps to imitate the garbled testimony of sense. The first καί treats ὄψις as analogous enough with νόησις that it can be compared directly with it. In addition, he had set out the program of going through the senses one by one (ἐκάστη αὐτῶν, A1). Note that this is the first time that sight’s contradictory testimony is inferred explicitly, though it has been assumed ever since Socrates held up his three fingers (523E3-5).

<sup>3314</sup> κεχωρισμένον, συγκεχυμένον (C4): The singular participles make the expression phenomenologically accurate at the expense of proper grammar, as will the plural participles below (C7).

<sup>3315</sup> διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν (C6): “by dint of the clarity the experience *did* provide.” There is no need for Shorey’s “final” διά (ad loc.).

<sup>3316</sup> The plural διωρισμένα (C7) replaces the singular κεχωρισμένον (C4), shifting the focus from the objective separateness (χωρίς) of the two items that sight failed to see, to the mental act (όρισμός) by which νοῦς redresses the error by seeing the distinction (όρισμός) that determines their separateness and recognizes them as plural.

<sup>3317</sup> τί οὖν ποτ’ ἔστι (C11): mind not only asks but focusses itself on asking (οὖν).

<sup>3318</sup> διάνοια (D3) here and at D5 momentarily substitutes for νόησις (used at 523B1, D4, D8; 524B4, C1, C7), as it had once before (523C8).

<sup>3319</sup> ἀριθμός τε καὶ τὸ ἔν (D7). I take the hendiadys to mean “the counting of units,” a more sophisticated characterization of ἀριθμητική than an arithmetician would give and also akin to the way he first characterized it (τὸ ἔν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγιγνώσκειν, 522C5-6).

"I don't see<sup>3320</sup> the answer."

Just<sup>3321</sup> go back to what we have already said by way of preliminaries and add it all together. If the object is sufficiently<sup>3322</sup> grasped in and of itself, whether by sight or some other sense, it would not function as a lure toward truth and reality, just as we were saying about the finger. But if there were always something contradictory in the way it looked, so that it kept giving the appearance that it was no more one thing than its opposite, an agent capable of further discrimination would be needed and soul would have no choice<sup>3323</sup> but be in a quandary about it and would stir up reflection within itself, and would confront<sup>3324</sup> itself with the question, "What after all is it that makes a thing one thing?" Thus, the study of the one is among the things that (525) spur a person on and reorient him toward a vision of reality.

"To be sure, the visual sight of the thing<sup>3325</sup> does have a lot of this element in it. When we look at something we see it as a unity and as an indefinite plurality<sup>3326</sup> at one and the same time."

Yes, and if so much is true about the one, aren't all numbers subject to the same problem?<sup>3327</sup>

"That's unavoidable."

But we have already agreed that calculation and arithmetic are wholly occupied with the study of number.

"Quite so."

So it is now plain that this study spurs one on to the truth of things.

"Exceedingly so."<sup>3328</sup>

Therefore we may conclude that this belongs among the studies we are seeking. A military man must learn it for the sake of managing his formations; a philosophical man must learn it because it is incumbent upon him to fix his grasp on being and truth as he rises up out of becoming, on pain of never becoming logistical.<sup>3329</sup>

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<sup>3320</sup> οὐ συννοῶ (D8): With his νοῦς-word Glaucon is looking in the right place, at least, for the answer! Moreover with συν- he evinces his awareness that what is needed is to bring ideas together.

<sup>3321</sup> ἀλλὰ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ... ἀναλογίζου (D9): ἀλλά is not impatient but insists on the order of the dialectic: "The answer is there for you in what we have already said." The arithmetical metaphor (ἀναλογίζου) is not accidental: we are thinking by doing arithmetic.

<sup>3322</sup> ικανῶς (D10) echoes 523B1.

<sup>3323</sup> ἀναγκάζοιτο (E4), another exigency the soul faces. The necessity is not logical but empirical, as at 510B5 and 511A4.

<sup>3324</sup> ἀνερωτᾶν (E6) of confrontation, as at 454C1 (cf. n.2331).

<sup>3325</sup> Reading αὐτό (525A4) with F and Iamblichus (and Stallb., Ast, Burnet, Shorey, Chambry), rather than τὸ αὐτό with AD (and Schmelzer, Adam, J.-C., Slings).

<sup>3326</sup> ὡς ἐν τε ὄρῳ μεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος (A4-5): Hitherto it had been the duality of the perceptual testimony that was stressed, two opposite attributes that because opposite were felt by the soul to be contradictory and therefore caused it to worry. Glaucon now makes the further empirical point that the testimony of vision is indefinite in general, an observation that will help Socrates make his next point.

<sup>3327</sup> σύμπας ἀριθμός (A6): The definiteness common to all numbers as such, as being this or that amount, will always run afoul of the indefinite plurality (ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος, A4-5) testified to by sight and the senses.

<sup>3328</sup> ὑπερφυῶς (B2): What drives Glaucon to agree that this is exceedingly true is exactly the increment of clarity the conversation has now achieved, for him, in contrast with the abstruseness with which it began.

<sup>3329</sup> λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι (B6), playing on the etymon of λογισμός as he will with that of

“That is how it is.”

But as it happens our guard is both a military man and a philosopher, so it is appropriate that we legislate and try to persuade those who are to take part in<sup>3330</sup> the highest tasks of the city, to make the study of calculation one of their pursuits<sup>3331</sup> and to become engaged in it<sup>3332</sup> not only in a casual way but to reach, through this study, a vision of the nature of numbers by the operation of pure intelligence, and practice it not for the sake of buying and selling as wholesalers or retailers do but for the sake of war and to enhance soul's facility to turn away, on its own, from the world of becoming toward truth and reality.<sup>3333</sup>

“You put the matter very well.”<sup>3334</sup>

And yet it has popped into my mind just now as the study of calculation was being described, that it has a special subtlety to it and broad application for our purposes, if a person practices it for the sake of being a knower rather than a retailer.

“Just how?”

Just in the way this was taking place in our conversation,<sup>3335</sup> how vigorously this study drives the soul upward, if you will, and forces her to ask and answer questions about numbers in themselves, but will not allow one to conduct the investigation at all if he directs his attention toward numbers to which the soul has access by sight, numbers embodied. Perhaps you are aware, if you think back<sup>3336</sup> how persons behave who are clever at calculations, that if one proposes in argument to divide the true unit they make a laughing stock of him and won't allow it; and that if you try to break it into pieces by main force they call it multiplication,<sup>3337</sup> changing their stance as necessary to prevent what is

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*ἀστρονομικός* (530A3ff), in order to stress that the technical sense itself patently relies on a deeper reality than the specialist acknowledges. The purpose of this treatment of special sciences is not to purify them but to reach to the pure rationality that is beyond them (cf. n.3321), upon which the sciences themselves in fact rely (cf. καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς, 511D2). Socrates is interested in creating a logical philosopher not improving the philosophicality of arithmeticians.

<sup>3330</sup> τῶν μεγίστων μεθέξειν (B12-C1) refers strictly to their temporary service (520C1-2).

<sup>3331</sup> ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν iέναι (C1): iέναι ἐπί was the expression used above for pursuing office (521A1, 521B4-5).

<sup>3332</sup> ἀνθάπτεσθαι (C1): The prefix turns the usual term ἀπτεσθαι into the opposite of ιδιωτικῶς (sc. ἀπτεσθαι).

<sup>3333</sup> The description (C2-5) of the philosophical use of arithmetic is far more lavish than that of the military use, as it began to be above (B3-6).

<sup>3334</sup> κάλλιστα (C7): Glaucon feels the edification of Socrates's remarks.

<sup>3335</sup> With σφόδρα (D5) Socrates acknowledges the trouble Glaucon had had grasping his point. “Drama precedes dogma,” in the *Dialogues*, and here it does so, explicitly. The instantiation of a topic as something arising in the actual give-and-take of viable dialogue provides the surest ground or basis for moving on to treating it *per se*. In the treatises of Aristotle the topic is blandly hypothesized (ώς παντὶ φανερόν: cf. 510D1), and dialogical legitimacy is reduced to a shadow of its former self in a manufactured review of predecessors' opinions. At least the review tends to come first (though sometimes it corroborates findings in the aftermath of their presentation: *Phys.A.8; EE H.5; EN A.8-9 [1098B9-1099B8]*).

<sup>3336</sup> Reading αὐ (D9), Burnet's emendation (δύο AD : punctis notatum A<sup>2</sup> : om. F).

<sup>3337</sup> τῷ λόγῳ (E1): The purely logical argument is that it is patently ridiculous to argue that the one is many; and if one follows up with some kind of breaking up of the one (by a conceptual κερματίζειν [E2] of the same ilk as the acts of molding and drawing [511E2] or “squaring, stretching, and applying” [527A8-9], which are nothing but *efflatus vocis* [φθεγγόμενοι, 527A9]), even then the result can be explained away as constituting a plurality of units (A: “Your 'one' has become fifteen parts!” —B: “No, fifteen that are one”). Similarly Socrates is puzzled in the *Phaedo* how one can become two by

a unit from ever seeming multipart rather than one.

“That is quite true.”

(526) What do you think would happen, Glaucon, if someone asked them, “Whatever strange<sup>3338</sup> numbers are you people talking about where the one is the way you claim it is, each and any one equal to any other,<sup>3339</sup> differing from it not in the slightest way and having no parts within itself?” What do you think would be their answer?

“I’d answer that they are talking about numbers that are accessible to contemplation only and can be dealt with in no other way whatsoever.”<sup>3340</sup>

And so do you see that this study might in very truth be necessary for us, since it has become obvious<sup>3341</sup> that it compels the soul to employ intelligence unmixed in the pursuit of unmixed truth?

“It bears repeating<sup>3342</sup> that it really does do this.”

And more, have you ever looked into this, how those who are natural mathematicians<sup>3343</sup> are also by nature sharp in all branches of learning, and that even those who are slow, if they are trained in this field and do the exercises, they become sharper than they were before, quite apart from any practical gain that might accrue to them?

“That is true.”

And yet you’d have to look far to find a study that imposes greater toil upon the person who learns and practices it,<sup>3344</sup> and you wouldn’t find many. Because of all this we must not leave this opposite processes, splitting up and combining together (97A7-B1).

<sup>3338</sup> ὁ θαυμάσιοι (526A1): The epithet, as often, describes the speaker’s attitude about the argument (cf. n.554 and J.-C. *ad* 527B). It is the usual epithet in conversation with an imaginary interlocutor (cf.366D7, 420D1) since perforce the interest is in the content rather than who is asking or being asked.

<sup>3339</sup> ποίων (A2). For lively *ποῖος* cf. 396C4 and n. The challenge formulated in the ensuing question presumes that if each number is a unit it has the quantitative value one, so that all numbers are equal, while it should have been the very essence of individual numbers to be unequal. The challenge is at best an *ignoratio elenchi* and can be answered by abstruse language as well as by mental experiments (for a full treatment cf. H.Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy I* [Baltimore, 1944] App.6: in short, the essence of the numbers is just their location in the series) but Glaucon’s answer is categorical instead.

<sup>3340</sup> περὶ τῶν τούτων λέγουσιν ὁν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ (A6-7): With a single stroke Glaucon, virtually quoting Socrates (cf. ἀ οὐκ ἀν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἡ τῇ διανοίᾳ, 511A1), sweeps aside the essentially physical idea that a number is an aggregate of units. The very notion of an aggregate requires spatiality and embodiment, which are wholly foreign to number and only begs the question, anyway, since the aggregated units imagined as constituting a given number cannot even constitute an aggregate unless the number in question is already available as the measure of their count (cf. *Phlb*.56E2-3, εἰ μὴ μονάδα ... θήσει). The nature of numbers, what they are in themselves, is just their position in the counting series and their unity consists in the simplicity of this fact. The point is stunningly abstract (whence σφόδρα, 525D5 and 526B4) and constitutes the first great hurdle by which not only the guardians’ minds but Glaucon’s, as well as the reader’s, are forced or led to experience the movement upward which is the theme of the passage.

<sup>3341</sup> φαίνεται (B1) dialectical (as at 525B1 in the same connection).

<sup>3342</sup> καὶ μὲν δὴ σφόδρα γε (B4), referring back to 525D5.

<sup>3343</sup> He says λογιστικοί (B5) but it also would serve his purpose for us to use the term “mathematician” since this sentence embodies the reason why the study of number ended up being named by the genus, μαθήματα.

<sup>3344</sup> μανθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι (C1-2) repeating the thought of παιδευθῶσιν καὶ γυμνάσωνται

branch of study out. Those who are by nature best must be trained in it from youth.

“I agree.”

So now we have set down one branch of learning. Second<sup>3345</sup> we can investigate whether the next<sup>3346</sup> study is appropriate for our purposes.

“Which do you mean? Geometry?”

Just so!

“To judge at least<sup>3347</sup> by how important it is for military matters it is clearly appropriate. Think of its application to the layout of the battlefield and to planning the capture of areas, and in the massing of troops and their deployment in long defiles, and all the other ways they configure<sup>3348</sup> their armies in actual<sup>3349</sup> battles and marches, how much better a man would do this with geometry than he could without it.”

But really, for these purposes a very small part of geometry and calculation would suffice.<sup>3350</sup> As to the much greater and more advanced part of it we must ask whether it somehow promotes our other purpose, making him see more easily the Idea of the Good.<sup>3351</sup> But we know that what promotes that goal is anything that requires soul to reorient herself<sup>3352</sup> toward that area we

(B7).

<sup>3345</sup> This “numbering” of the studies (έν, δεύτερον: C8) is not otiose. By alluding to arithmetic suggests how the determination of the curriculum itself embodies the thinking the curriculum is meant to stimulate.

<sup>3346</sup> τὸ ἔχόμενον τούτου (C9). ἔχεσθαι has a broad range of meaning from mere spatial adjacency (389E7, *Symp.*217D6) to the closest and purest logical entailment (*Rep.*511B8), and everything in between (Q. τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; - A. τί ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ἔξης; [484B2-3]). Cf. n.2670. It does have a special sense in the ordering of prerequisites in a curriculum, as we learn from *Lach.*182BC (ἔξης, B6 and n.b. καθηγήσαιτο, C4). But even there the mere claim of consecutiveness is not an argument. Likewise here, Glaucon suggests geometry is what Socrates has in mind (ἢ γεωμετρίαν ... λέγεις) without giving a reason and ἔχόμενον designates only a presumptive order (whereas Adam’s recondite argument *ad loc.*, which only reads back what happens later, is an *obscurum per obscurius* that would have been lost on the interlocutors). That both interlocutors have this subject in mind suggests that there does exist a standard curriculum somehow, which at least resembles the curriculum we have come to call the *quadrivium* (logistic, geometry, astronomy, harmonics). This quaternion does occur at *Tht.*145C7-D2 (though in the order GAHL) and at *Prot.*318E2-3 (LAGH—called there τέχναι and criticized for being such), where Protagoras gives us to believe Hippias specializes in teaching them (E3-4: cf. *H.Maj.*285B8-D3, *H.Min.*366C5-8A7). Cf. also *Leg.*817E6ff (LGA, after music has been treated) and *Leg.*747A2-5.

<sup>3347</sup> Glaucon’s μέν *solitarium* (D1) shows a little hesitation or uncertainty.

<sup>3348</sup> ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι (D3-4): The criterion of the list is expressed by the verb σχηματίζουσι, which makes the argument for the relevance of geometry with its σχήματα. The terms χωρίων and ἐκτάσεις refer to geometry with a slighter strain of language.

<sup>3349</sup> αὐταῖς (D4) stresses the practical application of the schematics. For αὐτός added to one item in a list cf. n.3831 ad 556C11.

<sup>3350</sup> ἀλλ’ οὖν δή (D7): With dismissive ἀλλ’ οὖν “reinforced” with δή (Denniston, 445) Socrates criticizes Glaucon’s answer as missing the main issue, including even a glance back to arithmetic (γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν μόριον). Next time (527D5-6) he will admonish Glaucon, in an indirect way, for relying on this easy path of answering instead of trying to articulate the ἐλκτικόν.

<sup>3351</sup> τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ιδέαν (E1): Again the formal expression (cf. 517B8, 508E2-3, 505A2).

<sup>3352</sup> μεταστρέφεσθαι (E3) is middle, the idea being repeated from 525C5, where the ῥάστώνη μεταστροφῆς is the soul’s own facility at refocussing its attention. With ῥάστώνη there, compare ῥάσον here (E1).

mentioned, where lies the most happy<sup>3353</sup> aspect of reality, which she must catch sight of any way she can.

“Quite correct.”

So if the study forces her to behold being it is appropriate, but if becoming it is not.<sup>3354</sup>

“We, at least, assert that this is so.”

(527) But this point nobody will dispute against us if he has even the least experience in geometry, that within this science there is a thoroughgoing contradiction between its reasonings and the way they are expressed by those who practice it. The way they express what they are doing is as ridiculous as it is unavoidable for them,<sup>3355</sup> as if they were carrying out some action and trying to bring about some result: they speak of “squaring” something and “extending” something and “applying” something. Despite all this verbiage the fact of the matter is that they practice the entire study for the sake of knowledge.<sup>3356</sup>

“Right in all respects.”

And must we reach agreement<sup>3357</sup> about this in addition?

“About what?”

That it is for the sake of a knowledge that is a knowledge of what always is<sup>3358</sup> rather than of

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<sup>3353</sup> εὐδαιμονέστατον (E3): The extra enthusiasm is striking (as is καλλιπόλει *infra*, 527C2) and not hard to understand after the mention of The Good. The philosopher already thought himself to be in the Isles of the Blessed (519C5-6), and recognized the happiness of escaping the Cave (εὐδαιμονίσειν, 518B1); but in the context of ή τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ιδέα the sense we are to grasp is that this entity and our awareness of it, is what gives all else its worth and gives us our knowledge of its worth, which knowledge, in terms of life, is happiness.

<sup>3354</sup> εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν ἀναγκάζει, προσήκει ... (E6-7): With this the “epistemological” value of the study is made both a necessary and a sufficient reason for including it, so that its military application (originally merely illustrative) can be demoted to a πάρεργον (527C3, *infra*).

<sup>3355</sup> γελοίως τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖως (527A6). Socrates can now characterize and criticize the mentality of the specialist as an amusing self-contradiction, a mentality he had first described with unmitigated abstraction at 510B4-6, then clarified with the example of the geometers at 510C1-511A1, and then restated abstractly at 511A3-8, with Glaucon’s restatement following at 511C6-D2. It is the repeated use of ἀναγκάζεσθαι in these passages that ἀναγκαῖως is here meant to echo (cf. 510B5, 511A4, 511C7). For τε καί used in striking juxtaposition of apparent self-contradictories cf. Leg.732C4 and 881A5, and *Euthyphr.*6A5, where Euthyphro fails to feel the paradox. For γελοίως used of the self-contradictory, cf. 430E1 1, 505B1 1; Phdr.229E5; *Parm.*128D1-2 (γελοῖα ... καὶ ἐνοντία αὐτῷ); *Prot.*340E1-2, 355A6, D1; *Tht.*154B6-7 (θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν), 205B1 1.

<sup>3356</sup> φιθεγγόμενοι / γνώσεως ἔνεκα (A9-B1). The point here being made about their behavior from the subjective side, was already made from the objective side at 510B4 and 510D5-511A1. The reader might stop a moment and ask how willing he would be, or has ever been, to stop relying on the terminology and conventions of his special competence in order to pursue truth—to give up the conversation those terms enable or have enabled him to have with fellow professionals and the immunity they give or have given him from criticism by persons coming from other fields or, most importantly, from strangers that come from no field in particular.

<sup>3357</sup> διομολογητέον (B3): The prefix introduces the need to work one's way through the steps leading to agreement: cf. 507D7 and n. *ad loc.*

<sup>3358</sup> τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος γνώσεως (B5): Adam's insistence (*ad loc.* and *passim*), relying on Aristotle, that according to Aristotle the mathematical objects are for Plato eternal and invariant “but not Ideas,” does not divert Socrates and Glaucon from their present argument.

something that somehow comes to be at one moment and passes away at another.

“An agreement easy to reach,<sup>3359</sup> since geometry is knowledge of what is always true.”

And so, my noble man,<sup>3360</sup> it would be a lure for the soul toward the truth, and would bring about the soul’s achieving a secure orientation for philosophical thinking upward in areas where<sup>3361</sup> at present we wrongly have a downward one.

“It would do so quite a lot, indeed!”

So just as much as can be we must set down the command that those who serve in your City of the Fine<sup>3362</sup> may no way avoid the study of geometry. For indeed even the byproducts of this study are not unimportant.

“Which are these?”

The ones you mentioned relating to the military, but more importantly<sup>3363</sup> toward the goal of advancing in all fields of study we know from experience that the man who has taken up geometry is head and shoulders above the rest.<sup>3364</sup>

“Above in every way, by Zeus.”

And so shall we set this down as the second branch of study for our youths?

“Let’s.”

Shall astronomy be third, or do you think not?

“Well I at least would say so.<sup>3365</sup> Being more perceptive about the seasons that belong to the

<sup>3359</sup> εύομολόγητον (B7), an *hapax* if the text is sound (*sic* FD et *in marg. scr.A* : εύ διομολογητέον A : εύδιομολόγητον Schneider). Glaucon fashions an enthusiastic response to Socrates’s emphatic διομολογητέον (B3), and adds to his enthusiasm with “assentient” γάρ.

<sup>3360</sup> Ὡ γενναῖε (B9), expressing his pleasure at Glaucon’s enthusiastic εύομολόγητον.

<sup>3361</sup> ὡ (B10): an adverbial accusative of respect. The ancipital things are exactly the sensory objects that might be left behind by noetic questions they cannot answer, as opposed to being kept in hand by a divided mentality and attention he called διάνοια in Book Six -- the objects, that is, that were there spoken of as belonging to both worlds, creating likenesses in the visible world and themselves likenesses of the intelligible: αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ὡ πλάττουσιν, ὃν καὶ σκίαι ἐν ὅδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσίν, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι ζητοῦντες αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ... (510E1-511A1).

<sup>3362</sup> καλλίπολις (C2), another *hapax*, used here and never again. It is like a nickname that you give to a pal to make a point; and what incites naming here is the vision of ourselves as the rulers, preoccupied with the noetic exercise of geometry *malgré* τὰ πολιτικά (compare the meaning of κάλλιστα at 525C7 and n.3334). The vision is a passing fancy and the nickname is not repeated, except by commentators.

<sup>3363</sup> ὡ τε δὴ σὺ εἶπες ... καὶ δὴ καί ... (C5-6) With proleptic τε Socrates nods in passing to Glaucon’s military application, but then answers it, and virtually cancels it, with καὶ δὴ καί which marks a category shift (not just a move from example to generalization as Denniston says [256]). Compare his trumping of Glaucon’s μέν (526D1) with ὀλλ’ οὖν δή (D7). Socrates again suggests, indirectly, that the military application has been superseded by what it helped to introduce.

<sup>3364</sup> τῷ ὄλῳ καὶ ποντὶ διοίσει (C7): The statement asserts of geometry what had been asserted of mathematics at 526B5-9, in phrasing borrowed from Glaucon’s opening praise of geometry (*n.b.*, διαφέροι, 526D5-6), with the minor difference that there the geometer does better than his ungeometrized self, whereas here he does better than the non-geometer in general.

<sup>3365</sup> ἔμοὶ γοῦν (D2): Glaucon accepts it as third not because it is third but because it is acceptable. Again, the presumed acceptability relies on a conventional list of subjects in the background, which, we now begin to see, is providing foil for Socrates’s presentation of a radical and new vision of *single*

months and the times of year<sup>3366</sup> is appropriate not only in farming and in sailing but equally so in military command."

What a push-over<sup>3367</sup> you are, worrying about *hoi polloi* and how they might judge you to be requiring useless<sup>3368</sup> studies! In truth it is not an easy matter but quite hard to believe that in these fields of study a certain instrument of the soul is purified for anyone who studies them and is rekindled though it tends to be<sup>3369</sup> ruined and blinded by everything else we do, an instrument more crucial to be preserved than ten thousand eyes.<sup>3370</sup> For only with this instrument may truth be seen. Among people that agree with you about this they will find what you say inexpressibly wonderful, but those who have no perception of it in their experience will simply think you are talking nonsense since they see no other benefit worth mentioning accrue from their study. So (528) at this point you have to

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purpose for the special studies that is beyond them all. A background list can either reveal the order upon which a given list relies (as the tripartite list goods underlies the lists at 361B4-5, 366D2 432A4-6, 443E3-4; and *Lach.*195E10-6A1; *Leg.*696B2-4, 744B7-C2; *Lys.*15D4-7; *Phlb.*48E1-9A2; *Symp.*205D4-5; or the list Sparta/Athens/Persia underlies the list Lycurgus/Solon/Darius at *Phdrs.*258C1; or the list of a perceptual object's attributes derives from the list of senses that perceive them at *Phdrs.*247C6-7); or it may as here have the reverse function of creating a structure of anticipation the author will exploit as foil for a new purpose. Compare the role of the list of the virtues and the list god/hero/man in ordering the treatment of subject-matter of stories in Books Two and Three (cf. nn. 1298, 1301, 1302).

<sup>3366</sup> περὶ ὥρας ... καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν (D2-3). For the collocation of the three terms cf. *Leg.* 886A2-4, 899B3-4; *Phlb.*30C6, and for the dependent genitive cf. *Symp.*188B5-6 (μήν is omitted in *Crat.*408E1 and *Rep.*488D5-7, where, incidentally, the connection with sailing was already noted).

<sup>3367</sup> ἡδὺς εῖ (D5). Thrasymachus called Socrates ἡδιστε for thinking he could attribute to him the ἔνδοξον that justice is a virtue and injustice a vice. After all, as Thrasymachus reminds him, he had just argued that injustice profits but justice doesn't (348C5-10). He thus gives Socrates the warrant to infer his position is the opposite, that justice is a vice—which he then needs to wiggle out of (C11-D2). The playful slur is likewise used against Socrates by Callicles (ώς ἡδὺς εῖ, *Gorg.*491E2) when logic and common usage go against his scandalous thesis that a man's virtue will enable him to dispense with ruling himself, an overstatement that he likewise will regret (Notably, in all three passages a reference to real fools is nearby: εὐήθειαν, *Rep.*348C12; ἡλιθίους, *Gorg.*491E2; and εὐηθικῶς here, at 529B3). Finally, it is used by Ctesippus against Euthydemus when the youth evades the sophist's trap and turns the tables on him (οὗτως ἡδὺς εῖ, 300A6). The sense that fits all the passages is that it criticizes the interlocutor for lacking the cleverness that is requisite for getting along in the world of cynical "grownups." Glaucon shows a lack of cleverness in worrying about the opinion of *hoi polloi*. This is a different thing from Socrates's dumbness at 529B, which consists of the way he appears to the many for insisting on a principle they do not understand or agree with, which he is about to present to Glaucon (527D6-528A3). Likewise, Thrasymachus, right after calling Socrates ἡδιστε, compliments the weak for being fools (εὐήθειαν, 348C12).

<sup>3368</sup> ἄχρηστα μαθήματα (D6). This ignorant complaint of the majority was already represented by Adeimantus in his objection at 487BC. The *prima facie* utility of the studies for the guardian, which had been a springboard for choosing logistic and geometry (but cf.526D7-8 and n.3350), can now be cashiered. It is an instance of stripping away (ἀναιρεῖν, 533C8; cf. 511B4-6 and 510B7-8) an hypothesis to make the very important point that the philosopher must not be deterred by public opinion from pursuing his special cognitive drives. He must realize the public will never understand, and make his choice accordingly. This criterion will eliminate many researchers, including those who would prefer to argue with each other about this very point (ἢ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἔτέρους, A1). Shorey (*ad loc.*) characteristically converts a remark Socrates makes to Glaucon into an indirect communication from Plato to his reader. Though the reader may do well to be admonished by the remark, its meaning and relevance and motivation is entirely integral to the drama and the decision Socrates will ask Glaucon to make, just below (527E6-528A3).

<sup>3369</sup> ἀπολλυμένων καὶ τυφλούμενον (E1):The present participles as well as τῶν ἄλλων

decide<sup>3371</sup> which of the two groups you are talking with, or decide that you are not so much speaking to either one<sup>3372</sup> but that your main purpose in making these arguments is for your own sake, though you would not begrudge a person the benefit of the conversation, if he could somehow profit from it.

“I choose this latter alternative, that it is in largest part for my own sake<sup>3373</sup> that I am arguing, in this conversation of questions and answers.”<sup>3374</sup>

Then move back a bit from what we were saying before. Just now we mistook what comes after geometry.

“By taking up what?”

By taking up, after the plane, the solid *already* orbiting in the heavens, before taking up the solid *per se*. The correct way, after the second dimension, is to take up what comes next,<sup>3375</sup> the third, the dimension of the cube and of what has depth.

“That makes sense, Socrates, but as far as I know solid geometry hasn’t yet been adequately  
ἐπιτηδευμάτων refer to and depict normal daily life.

<sup>3370</sup> μυρίων (E2): The “number” is repeated from 520C3.

<sup>3371</sup> οἵς μὲν ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ (E3): When there is no room for compromise between the answers the question becomes *primary*, as at *Crito* 49D2-5, of which this passage is reminiscent (note ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν there [D6] and compare here Socrates’s abrupt αὐτόθεν here [A1], for which cf. *Lach.*183C3). He has reached another turning point with Glaucon (cf. 473A1-4), and we have reached another stage in the upward path ourselves. In the *Crito* Crito’s own inability to grasp and accept what Socrates is saying a moment later (οὐκ ἔχω ... ἀποκρίνεσθαι, 50A4) requires Socrates by this very principle to complete the conversation with the undialectical but conventionally salutary prosopopoeia of the Laws (50A6ff).

<sup>3372</sup> Reading ή οὐδὲ πρὸς οὐδετέρους (528A1) with the majority (mss.AD); πρὸς οὐδετέρους (F) is also possible; Cobet’s conjecture (οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους), accepted by Burnet, is unnecessary; S.R.Slings’s argument that ή οὐ never receives a second negative in Plato is circular, and his suggestion to introduce a very different expression on the grounds that it accounts for the discrepancy between the two historical witnesses to the text (*Critical Notes on Plato’s Politeia* [Leiden 2005] *ad loc.*, 128) confuses variants with approximations.

<sup>3373</sup> ἐμαυτοῦ ἔνεκα (A4): Glaucon remembers the choice Socrates required him to make at 472B3-473B1 (n.b., καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, C9; σὴν χάριν, E7). The power of dialogue or dialectic will not be actualized unless the partners are each sincere: 337C3-6, 346A; and *Alc.*1 110A; *Apol.*33A; *Charm.* 166C7-D6, 173A3-5; *Gorg.*453C2-3 (and Dodds *ad loc.*), 495A (cf.500B7); *Meno* 83D (and Thompson *ad loc.*); *Phdo.*64C; *Prot.*346C6; *Soph.*246D (and Campbell *ad loc.*), 265A; *Tht.*154DE. The audience (and one’s standing in their eyes) must be ignored—a rule here stated in the converse, that one not begrudge them whatever benefit they might get from eavesdropping: *Leg.*627CD; contrast the attitude of Gorgias at *Gorg.*457DE, 458BC, 473E-4A and Callicles 482E, 494D; and contrast the role of Critias at *Charm.*162C and 169CD.

<sup>3374</sup> λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι (A4-5), a triad in which the first term is specified by an ensuing pair (A/a1/a2: a structure more specific than A/B<sub>1</sub>/B<sub>2</sub>, n.2422). Note that in such a triad τε may be placed early and perform the purely formal function of indicating proleptically that a list will ensue (i.e., A τε καὶ B<sub>1</sub> καὶ B<sub>2</sub>, as here and at 411D3-4, 476B4-5, 588A9-10; also *Gorg.*457D6, 483B6-8; *H.Maj.*304B2-3; *Leg.*744B6; *Soph.*260C8-9; *Symp.*219D4-5), rather than being placed between the second and third items, in its familiar role indicating that in content they form a doublet (i.e., A καὶ B<sub>1</sub> τε καὶ B<sub>2</sub>: cf. 412B3-4, 431B9-C1; and *Leg.*950E5-6; *Meno* 75C8-9; *Phdo.*85E3-4; *Prot.*325E1; *Symp.*213D3-4).

<sup>3375</sup> ἄναγε τοίνυν (A6): This time Socrates requires and then gives an explicit argument for the sequence of the studies (contrast 526C8-11 and n.3346). Stereometry comes after Geometry as 3 comes after 2.

established as a field, so as to be taught!”<sup>3376</sup>

And there are two kinds of reasons it hasn’t. First, since there isn’t a single city in the world that thinks it worthy, it is researched only half-heartedly while in fact it is quite difficult. Second those who would research it need a supervisor without whose aid they would never discover it, but for a supervisor to arise at all is difficult, and even if he did, in the current state of things the people who had the ability to research such a subject would be too arrogant to obey him.<sup>3377</sup> On the other hand, if a city unanimously supervised the study and held it in high esteem, then the researchers would obey and the subject matter itself would soon yield to the efforts of consecutive and concerted research and the wonders of its truths would be revealed. In fact even now, although the majority dishonor it and only obstruct its progress and the people who pursue it have no sense of its usefulness to mankind,<sup>3378</sup> it still enjoys some currency by dint of its charm, so that it would not be a complete surprise that it should come to light.<sup>3379</sup>

“Well I have to agree that its charm places it in a class by itself, but tell me more clearly what you were just now saying. First, you set down the study<sup>3380</sup> of plane figures as geometry.”

Yes.

“And you placed astronomy next, but then retreated.”<sup>3381</sup>

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<sup>3376</sup> οὐπω τὴν ρῆσθαι (B4-5). “Reality” has not caught up with the logical sequence Socrates envisions. Just as his use of the background list of studies is purely speculative (cf. n. 3365) so also is his criticism of their (unexplained) arrangement. Socrates (and Plato) have no interest in inventing such a field (as Adam agrees [*ad 528Eff*], after and before criticizing and praising how Socrates’s arguments would harm and help the organized sciences). Instead, the absence of the study provides Socrates an occasion to describe the social circumstances that are prerequisite to a given subject matter being acknowledged, supported and studied. His purpose is not to improve the various studies he passes through but to use them as foil for articulating, in theory and in fact, the dialogical method and its special purpose. Once done with this he will move on to astronomy ὡς ὑπαρχούσης τῆς νῦν παραλειπομένης (E4), i.e., disregarding thereby his own methodological qualm.

<sup>3377</sup> οὐκ ἀν πείθοιντο (C1): Turf wars within the modern academy, and even the figure of the Dean, are here anticipated. I am unable to infer that Plato speaks from rueful experience as head of a school of his own. The relentless sublation or ἀναίρεσις of “departments of learning” performed by his hero through these pages speaks against himself settling down into the management of a curriculum unless it were taught as a prelude to the theory of ideas, but the evidence indicates that those who would have been his students there and even his successors (Speusippus, Xenocrates, Aristotle) not only do not ascribe to the theory but reveal no knowledge of it beyond what can be learned from the written works (cf. H. Cherniss, *Riddle of the Early Academy* [New York 1962], ch.3).

<sup>3378</sup> οὐκ ἔχόντων καθ’ ὅτι χρήσιμα (C6): The moral drawn from the non-existence of the field is that the philosopher disregards social recognition and the practical application of his work, an attitude that leaves another division of intellectuals behind. Learned guesswork on Plato’s personal attitudes about solid geometry and geometers (e.g. Adam 2.120-124, *passim*) require us to ignore the dramatic context and only lose ourselves in irrelevancy. It is Socrates and Glaucon who are conversing, and the critique they are conducting together is tremendously important. Only a professional scholar with the poorest literary sense could imagine Plato sacrificing the verisimilitude of the dialogue for the mere purpose of carrying on a polemic. Plato’s profession was different.

<sup>3379</sup> φανῆναι (C8) repeats the metaphor of ἔκφανή (C4) with characteristic omission of prefix.

<sup>3380</sup> πραγματείαν (D3): cf. 510C3 and n.3137.

<sup>3381</sup> ἀνεχώρησας (D6): Glaucon echoes Socrates’s ἀναγε at A6.

Rushing to get through everything quickly I only delayed my progress!<sup>3382</sup> Although the study<sup>3383</sup> of the dimension of depth was next in order, since inquiry in that subject is so laughably ignored,<sup>3384</sup> I leapfrogged over it to astronomy, which studies the motion of that dimension. Instead, we must make astronomy our fourth course of study, and proceed as if that the study we now left out is there after all, functioning as its prerequisite—assuming the city does pursue it.

“Likely it will. And let me say, Socrates, in response to the criticism with which you just blindsided me about my praise of astronomy being so vulgar,<sup>3385</sup> that now I’ll praise it in accordance with the way you are doing your research<sup>3386</sup> instead. (529) It seems clear to everybody that *this* study<sup>3387</sup> forces the soul to look upward, away from the things of this world and off toward yonder.”

Clear to everybody but me, perhaps. This is not how I see it.<sup>3388</sup>

“How then do you?”

To me it seems that the way it is now practiced<sup>3389</sup> by those who mean to elevate it into philosophy,<sup>3390</sup> actually causes the soul to look downward.

<sup>3382</sup> σπεύδων ... μᾶλλον βραδύνω (D7-8), *vel sim.* sounds proverbial, like “Haste makes waste.” Shorey compares *Polit.*277AB, 264B; *S.Ant.*231; *Theognis* 335, 401, etc. Compare the immoderate eagerness to skip over moderation and move directly from the second to the fourth virtue, justice, at 430C8-F1.

<sup>3383</sup> μέθοδον (D8). Like πραγματεία above, the term derives from the actual pursuit and desire for knowledge (e.g. *Tht.*187E, *Polit.*263B) and comes to denote a treatise or a settled field of inquiry with its own set hypotheses (cf. *Ar.EN* 1.7: μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας (sc. τὰς ὁρχὰς) ἢ πεφύκασιν, 1098B4-5; cf. *de An.*1.1, 402A11-21, *Meteor.*338A25).

<sup>3384</sup> γελοίως ἔχει (D9): What is laughable is explained at 528AD. It is not the sorry condition of the study (something to regret but not ridicule), but the behavior of which that condition is the result (cf. Shorey *ad loc.*).

<sup>3385</sup> φορτικῶς (E7): more self-deprecating than accurate. Socrates had criticized him for stressing the military value of astronomy rather than the dialectical, saying that such behavior made him *look like* a person condescending to the tastes of οἱ πολλοί who find dialectics useless (ἔοικας, 527D5). As usual Socrates goes too far in order to make a point the interlocutor has not thought of (372E2-3A4; 420A2-7; 487D6-E5; and in the future, 592A7-B5). Characteristically contrite, docile, and one step behind Socrates, Glaucon accepts the criticism on its face and tries now to say something elevated instead (as his ἐπαινεῖν itself suggested he would), which is an “equal and opposite” error. The joke is, he introduces his sublime and recondite praise with παντὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ δῆλον (529A1).

<sup>3386</sup> μετέρχῃ (E7) the verb underlying μέθοδος, here still alive, not yet merely procedural.

<sup>3387</sup> αὕτη γε (529A1), with γε (causal or *vi termini*) alleging that the universal agreement is adequately implied by the nature of the study (αὕτη). The reason is indeed obvious (astronomy’s subject matter is “up”) but also wrong.

<sup>3388</sup> παντὶ δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοί (A3): Socrates remembers Glaucon’s remark at 398C7-8 and gives it back to him. Besides drawing out the joke about the “vulgar sublimity” of what Glaucon alleges in praise of the study, Socrates’s response applies the rule of dialogue and dialectic that majority opinion and even unanimity have, as such, no standing at all (contrast political “discussion” as well as the use of “we” for unassailable assertions in standard science, as depicted at 510D1). Cf. *Crito* 47A2-C4.

<sup>3389</sup> μεταχειρίζονται (A6) a term that already means what terms like μετιέναι and πραγματεύεσθαι will come to mean. Cf. its use at 497D8, where it has to cover both parts of the comparison at 497E9-498C4; and at 410B8 where it criticizes sophistication of technique (cf. n. 1702).

<sup>3390</sup> οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες (A6-7). It is important to remember that no Greek outside this dialogue thinks “philosophy” is a pursuit of the Platonic Ideas culminating in a vision of the Good. The term is therefore a suspicious misnomer here, referring to the sort of people that find astronomy edifying (and elevate it: αὕτην goes with ἀνάγοντες, too) because of the remote permanence of the

“How can you say this?”

You have a redoubtable<sup>3391</sup> conception of the upward way of study that you have accepted for yourself. In fact, if you saw someone tipping his head back<sup>3392</sup> and contemplating decorations in the ceiling and trying to make one of them out, you might just believe that it was with intelligence and not with his eyes that he was contemplating them. And your belief might be fine, and mine too simple-minded.<sup>3393</sup> I for my part cannot believe that any kind of study makes the soul look upward besides the study of being and the invisible,<sup>3394</sup> and that whether he gapes upward or squints downward, as long as it is something in the world of perception he is trying to learn about, he could never learn anything, since none of these things have a science. To take it one step further it is not upward but downward that his soul is looking, even if he studies lying on his back, swimming on shore or at sea.<sup>3395</sup>

“I deserved that: it was right of you to strike me down. But what did you mean about how astronomy should be studied contrary to the present practice, if they are to learn it in a way beneficial with respect to the goal we have described?”

Here's how. These stars and decorations<sup>3396</sup> in the vault of heaven, elaborate as they are,<sup>3397</sup> since stars, an error no less elementary than Glaucon's error that the senses are poor witnesses because the object is far away (523B5-6).

<sup>3391</sup> οὐκ ἀγεννῶς (A9). Socrates uses the litotes of Callicles's παρρησία, at Gorg.492D1. Cf. also γενναῖον, 414B9. With παρὰ σαυτῷ (A10) he is referring back to σεαυτοῦ ἔνεκα at 528A2, acknowledging Glaucon's sincerity, though he happens to disagree. Making room for “honest disagreement” is another feature of the dialectical method of joint search.

<sup>3392</sup> ἀνακύπτων (B1) The reference to posture stresses that it is the somatic eyes that are doing the looking. The sequence of postures smacks of comedy and may (with Adam) refer to the depiction of Socrates philosophizing in Aristophanes's *Clouds* (e.g., 171-4, 218-26), a description of which Socrates knew his accusers and the general Athenian public to be aware (Ap.19C).

<sup>3393</sup> εὐηθικῶς (B3): Socrates-watchers always take care when he apologizes for his simplicity, as for instance at Phdo.100Cff, where the tone is very similar. It is because he is ignorant of the most important things that Socrates's ignorance is so important (cf. n.3043, *supra*). How many men, for how long, could so easily dismiss the heavenly bodies' stately claim to permanence? Even the study of Greek can play the idol for an imperfect love of truth, by virtue of its temporal remoteness and exemption from the flux of fashion (the converse passion is exhibited at Parm.130C5-D5). Socrates's unhesitating clarity on the issue draws us back into the dispositional tension between the lover of spectacles and the lover of the “spectacle of truth” (475E4). The sentimental confusion of heaven with upward climes returns at Tim.91D where Timaeus imagines that lovers of such heavenly things come back in the next life as birds!

<sup>3394</sup> Νοτε τε ... καί (B5): To unite the true with the invisible is not a dogma with which Socrates tries to refute Glaucon's visible astronomy, but rather something in his simplicity he is unable to disbelieve, which he then corroborates anew by revealing that spatial elevation is relative, not absolute.

<sup>3395</sup> ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ βλέπειν τὴν ψυχήν (C1-2). The long-serviceable metaphor of a path upward as toward the sun, must now be cashiered. From the heights it has taken us to we have learned that space is merely relative. Lying supine and looking forward, one is looking upward at highest members of the inferior visible world.

<sup>3396</sup> ποικίλματα (C7) concedes the visible beauty of the night sky but then πεποίκιλται (C8) insists it is only visible beauty. We verge back toward the distinction between the φιλοθεάμων and the φιλόσοφος (475Dff).

<sup>3397</sup> κάλλιστα μέν ... τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν (C8-D2). With this distinction between beauty and truth he leaves behind another great band of the souls that had still remained. To fuse beauty and truth (reality) is one of the first and most powerful enthusiasms. Of course it is not a question whether truth, the subject matter of philosophy, is beautiful. It will be beautiful if it is good for it to be beautiful, as it most likely is; but the good—the reason things are as they are (509B7-10)—is

they in fact fall within the visible world, he should believe to be the most beautifully and most perfectly disposed things in that class, but to fall far short of the class of the true things: the motions<sup>3398</sup> of which true speed and the true slowness, in true number and in paths that are the true figures are the measure, such motions are they moved in, and move the things within them;<sup>3399</sup> all of which is ascertainable by reason and thought but not by sight. Or do you think they can be seen?

“No way.”

So one must use the decorations visible in the vault of heaven as models for the study oriented toward those<sup>3400</sup> things. It’s the same as if one came upon diagrams drawn wonderfully well by a Daedalus or some other artist or draftsman,<sup>3401</sup> drawn to perfection. A person who saw these, if he had experience in geometry, would recognize the fineness of their production, but it would strike him<sup>3402</sup> as ridiculous to accord them the seriousness appropriate to primary<sup>3403</sup> objects of study, as though by so doing one<sup>3404</sup> would discover within them the truth about the (530) equal or the double or any other ratio.

“Of course it would be ridiculous.”

But if he is an astronomer in a literal sense don’t you think he would feel the same way when he

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the ultimate subject matter Socrates has in mind throughout. His dialogue with Glaucon is running the gauntlet of the perennial distractions from true mental work.

<sup>3398</sup> ὅς (D2). The mss. are unanimous throughout this difficult passage (D2-4). The gender of the relative alone requires us to supply φοραί, the anticipated subject matter of astronomy (indeed the reason it had to be postponed after stereometry), which then appears in the accusative into which it has attracted the relative, perhaps from the dative, by a kind of incorporation.

<sup>3399</sup> φοράς (D3), here an internal accusative that gives place to the expressions πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει, the typical language for describing the subject matter of astronomy (περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει, *Gorg.* 451C8-9; περὶ ἡλίου ... καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τρόπων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, *Phd.* 98A2-3). For φέρειν active and passive cf. *Polit.* 270B7-8: τὸ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν τότε μὲν ἐφ’ ἂ νῦν κυκλεῖται φέρεσθαι, τότε δ’ ἐπὶ τάναντία. The meaning is simply that the purely mathematical truth underlying the bodies’ actual motions (such as we always see them presented in the astronomer’s simplified, i.e., idealized, drawings) is the truth our guardians are interested in replacing their phenomenal experience with. The point is (a) put with almost indecipherable abstruseness (here), and then (b) explained with a palpable example (529D8-530A1), and then (c) restated on its own ground (530A3-B4). The same three-step method was used to elucidate the penultimate cut of the Line (510B4-9 = 1; 510C1-511A1 = 2; 511A3-8 = 3).

<sup>3400</sup> ἐκεῖνα (D8), the true versions are ἐκεῖ with respect to space and time. Getting “beyond” the heavens has special conceptual difficulties. Besides the heavens’ upwardness and apparent permanence, it is hard to imagine a “beyond” of them, and also there is only one “heavens.” Many of the categorical attributes we had reserved for the forms apply also to the heavens—because the terms are ambiguous. All that matters is that the distinctions are real, and that we recognize them.

<sup>3401</sup> ὑπὸ Δαιδάλου ἡ τινος ἄλλου δημιουργοῦ ἡ γραφέως διαφερόντως γεγραμμένοις καὶ ἐκπεπονημένοις διαγράμμασιν (E1-2): The list goes from the proper name of a person famous for lifelike rendering (Daedalus’s métier happens to be sculpture) up to the arts in general (δημιουργοῦ), and then back down to drawing (γραφέως), the most pertinent specific category of art since the application of the metaphor is to σχήματα and number.

<sup>3402</sup> μέν (E4) is not just answered but trumped by μήν (which has ousted δέ).

<sup>3403</sup> ἐπισκοπεῖν αὐτά (E1): ἐπί is an index of the seriousness and αὐτά an index of their primary importance, used exactly as it was during the first attempt to articulate this problem (510E1).

<sup>3404</sup> ληψόμενον (E5) accusative, preferring the less personal construction with the dependent infinitive.

contemplates the movement of the stars? He will adopt the conventional view<sup>3405</sup> that as ever they could best be arranged, so has the maker of heaven arranged them, both in whole and in part,<sup>3406</sup> but when it comes to the equality of day and night and their relation to the times of the months and of the year, and of the other stars in respect to these and in respect to each other, don't you think he would consider a person strange for being so credulous as to believe that these factors behave with perfect regularity and that there should be no shift in speed even though the objects in question have bodies and are perceptible, and that he is seeking to grasp the truth of them by all means possible?

"So it seems to me at least,<sup>3407</sup> now that I hear you make the case."

Therefore it will be by using the visible objects as the occasions<sup>3408</sup> for contemplation that we will practice astronomy, just as we did geometry, and we will have no further use<sup>3409</sup> for the objects we see in the sky—if, that is, our engagement with astronomy shall truly make the soul's inborn talent for

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<sup>3405</sup> νομιεῖν (530A4), varying ἡγεῖσθαι (529C8) here in order to etymologize ἀστρονομικόν (as τῷ ὄντι warns us). Socrates is not interested in dictating how “true” astronomers would do astronomy (neither is Plato) but how astronomy can be used as a propaedeutic for the guards (as well as how he can use it as foil for the method and operation of dialectic in the present conversation with Glaucon). The man of dialectical bent will accept the normal conventional symbolism of the stars as “heavenly bodies” but will find strange a fundamentalistic belief (νομίζοντα, B2) in their ability to embody a truth beyond body and change.

<sup>3406</sup> αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ (A6-7): cf. πρός τε ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα (B1) and πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει (529D3-4). The order reaches every part but also orders the whole. What is here by conventional language called the demiurge is just the Idea of the Good; and the suggestion is not only that each thing is, and is as it is, because it is good for it to be and for it to be that way (509B6-10); but also that the same principle orders the entire field of being or reality, so that reality is a cosmos. It is understanding this second aspect of the truth about the good that ultimately will be designated as synoptic understanding (537C7). The idea had been adumbrated early with the term συλλογίζεσθαι (517C1) and will be more fully articulated when we reach dialectic itself on the next page (τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκηται καὶ συγγένειαν, καὶ συλλογισθῆ ταῦτα ἥ ἔστιν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεῖα, 531D1-3).

<sup>3407</sup> With γοῦν (B5) Glaucon acknowledges he and Socrates are exploring new territory. To worry with Adam about the beliefs of the old men in the *Laws* (821Bff) again forgets who is talking and why.

<sup>3408</sup> προβλήμασιν χρώμενοι (B6) immediately echoes παραδείγμασι χρηστέον (529D7-8), though the term προβλήμα (again below, 531C2) is new to the argument. Geometry, mentioned in exegesis, was the prime example of a study that deals with perceived objects in pursuit of a truth that is “beyond” them (more exactly, a truth they are unable to embody: cf. 510C3-D3 and D5-511A1). The language of “use” was used there also (χρώμενοι, B6: cf. 510B4, D5, and 511A4). Plato elsewhere uses προβλήμα without apology for a suggestive beginning point (*Charm.* 162B5, *H.Maj.* 293D2, *Leg.* 820C6, *Phlb.* 65D7, *Tht.* 180C5; cf. also *Leg.* 755C-6A where it means “nominate” and *Rep.* 536D7 where the verb merely means to expose someone to something). A search for guidance from outside the text for a more specialized meaning of the term is ill-advised, while to translate it “problems” is unmeaning. It means what had been expressed before with ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὄρμάς (511B6). Socrates suggests the guards use the objects visible in the heavens as vehicles for a study that he still calls “astronomy” although the purpose, content, and goal are no longer astronomical. It is again unlikely that anybody outside the text would argue this way about either astronomy or geometry (let alone the idiosyncratic description of number that elicited the reaction, ὦ θαυμάσιοι, περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε; [526A1-2], a description that Aristotle never understood [cf. Cherniss ACPA I App.6]).

<sup>3409</sup> τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἔάσομεν (B7): The commentators who express worry about Plato’s piety or extremism at this point, reveal just how closely they have been listening to and how well understanding and how seriously taking, the dialogue. Socrates prepared us with the admonition that a basic decision underlies the quest for reality (527D7-E6). Presently he merely keeps to the decision.

mindfulness something useful instead of useless.<sup>3410</sup>

“You are imposing labors many times greater<sup>3411</sup> than the work now done by astronomers.”

And yet by my own lights I think we will do the same in the other fields as well if it will be of any worth to us, as lawgivers, to do so. Still,<sup>3412</sup> can you mention a field in which such an injunction would be appropriate?

“Not off the top of my head.”<sup>3413</sup>

But look:<sup>3414</sup> motion comprises not one but many types, as I understand it. Some smart person would be able to list them all, but even by our lights there are two that are obvious. Besides this one<sup>3415</sup> there is its counterpart: just as the eyes find themselves attached<sup>3416</sup> to the astronomical phenomena, the ears are attached to the harmonic one. These two sciences are brothers, as the Pythagoreans say, and we agree.<sup>3417</sup> Shall we include this field, or not?

“Yes we shall.”

Since it's a large task we can call on experts to inform us<sup>3418</sup> how to talk about harmony, as well

<sup>3410</sup> χρήσιμον τὸ φύσει φρόνιμον (B8-C1): The old saw that philosophy is of no practical use, is now trumped. A mind that obdurately stays within the coordinates of the perceptual world, to the extent that it is still a mind, is a useless mind; only by reaching beyond, to a knowledge of the Idea of the Good, can any knowing faculty become useful (505A6-B3).

<sup>3411</sup> πολλαπλάσιον ... τὸ ἔργον (C2): cf. συχνὸν ἔργον (511C3-4), δαιμόνιον ... πρᾶγμα (531C5), and πάμπολυ ἔργον (531D5) in response to this same methodological suggestion.

<sup>3412</sup> ἀλλὰ γάρ (C5-6), returning after digression (Denniston, 103).

<sup>3413</sup> οὐκ ἔχω ... νῦν γε οὐτωσί (C7). It is possible that they had been relying on a conventional triad of studies and there is no fourth for him to mention (so Shorey *ad* 526C citing Isoc. *Bus.* 23[226]; cf. schol. *ad* 514A [246 Greene] and e.g., *Euthyd.* 290C1, *H. Min.* 366C5-8A7), and that the addition of harmonics goes beyond it; or else that the radical analysis of conventional study has allowed Glaucon to forget harmony as a traditional fourth (for which cf. n.3826). In either event, the only reason Socrates introduces a fourth field is for further practice and corroboration, and he does so with what might as well be an absolutely novel analogy between visual and audible motion, which is designed to give Glaucon the clue he needs to draw a parallelism between vigilant watching of the astronomer and the vigilant listening of the acoustician. I believe with ἀλλὰ γάρ (C5-6) he is affording Glaucon an opportunity to apply this analogy before offering it himself. To see in the sequel Plato indulging his desire to advertise his views on acoustics, is again to ignore the dialectical movement and drama of the discussion and to play at guesswork and learned irrelevancies instead. It is exactly this kind of wheel-spinning that Socrates will presently enjoin us to be on guard against (E3 et seq.).

<sup>3414</sup> Socrates's οὐ μήν (C8) is strong and abrupt (cf. μήν at 529E4). The move from stereometry to astronomy came with the addition of motion. The next step might be to look for a study that takes that new item a step further.

<sup>3415</sup> τούτῳ (D4), i.e., the φορὰ βάθους of astronomy (528E1, cf. ἐν περιφορᾷ ... στερεόν, 528A9).

<sup>3416</sup> πέπηγεν (D6): perhaps it has the metaphorical sense it has at 605A (the eyes are framed, so to speak, for a certain activity); but perhaps it denotes attention already and involuntarily *fixed on* and coalescing with the object (for this metaphor cf. συμπαγές, *Tim.* 45C4). Mind must free itself from the eye's involvement with and inadvertent reliance upon the physical world, and so also from the ear's (contrast ὡτα τοῦ νοῦ προστησάμενοι [531B1]).

<sup>3417</sup> ὡς οὖ τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασιν καὶ ἡμεῖς ... συγχωροῦμεν (D8-9). The mild anacoluthon avoids wordiness and is virtually idiomatic (cf. 424C6, *Prot.* 316A4-5, *Symp.* 186E2-3).

<sup>3418</sup> ἔκείνων (E1), refers to the body of experts alluded to at D1, not the Pythagoreans who were only brought in to corroborate the novel way that Socrates has paired astronomy with harmonics. πευσόμεθα (E1) already begins to dismiss their expertise as irrelevant, in this strictly dialogical context (cf. 328E2, 358D3, 476E5 and n.50). πολὺ τὸ ἔργον is ironic in the context of Glaucon's continual

as any other field in addition to the ones we have listed, but through it all we must take care of what is ours.<sup>3419</sup>

“What ‘ours’ do you mean?”

To keep those we are to raise up from trying to learn something fruitless on our watch, fruitless in the sense that it fails to reach<sup>3420</sup> the place where everything must ultimately reach, as we were just saying in the case of astronomy. Or perhaps you are unaware (531) that teachers of harmony make a mistake analogous to theirs, that they labor endlessly to find patterns within and among audible harmonies and timbres just as the astronomers<sup>3421</sup> did with visible objects.

“Yes, by the gods it’s quite funny the way they act!<sup>3422</sup> They talk about something they call minims and have a funny way of cocking their head<sup>3423</sup> so they can hear just right, as if they are trying to eavesdrop on a note next door to the one that’s there. Some of them talk about picking up still a further echo and that this is now the minimal interval and must be the basis for harmonic

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protests that the dialectical approach takes the work far beyond the usual range of the specialists (*πολλαπλάσιον ... τὸ ἔργον*, C2; *οὕπω ηύρησθαι*, 528B4-5; *συχνὸν ἔργον*, 511C3-4; and cf. 531C5, *δαιμόνιον πρᾶγμα*, on the horizon). Adam’s long notes nevertheless persist (e.g., *ad 531A1* and *in vocem πυκνώματα*, 531A4). The expertise is mere foil for *τὸ ήμέτερον*.

<sup>3419</sup> φυλάξομεν *τὸ ήμέτερον* (E3). The expression is vague, and includes the job we are to pay attention to (as elsewhere: n.3254) while the wise men are teaching, and “our interest”—i.e., the young men whom we must at all times protect. The first meaning is picked up by the ethical dative *ήμῖν* at E5 and the second by the change of subject there (*ἐπιχειρῶσιν*).

<sup>3420</sup> οὐκ ἔξῆκον (E6) explains *ἀτελές* (E5) by restating it. A subject is *ἀτελές* if it fails to reach the final point, which as we have learned all serious study must reach in order to be useful, that is, the vision of the Good upon which the value of all else and of the knowledge of all else depends. Conversely a pursuit that fails to break out of its specialist orbit becomes *ἀτελές* (or *ἀνήνυτον*, 531A3, if we are to follow mss.AD over the *ἀνόνυτα* of F [a reading that is given some credibility by 531D4]) in the other sense: endless because of its circularity (cf. *τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὖν ἀν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὄρμήσωσι*, 510D2-3). In the present cases (astronomy and harmonics), the endlessness consists of the essentially asymptotic fate of any attempt to find exact truth by comparing one sensible with another (visible or auditory): *νοῦς* supplies the criterion that measurement and remeasurement (*ἀνομετρεῖν*, 531A2) of material embodiments against each other (*ἀλλήλοις*) can only approach, although it governs the search all along.

<sup>3421</sup> αὖ (531A2).

<sup>3422</sup> *πυκνώματ'* ἄττα ὄνομάζοντες καὶ παραβάλλοντες τὰ ὥτα (A4-5): Glaucon succeeds to provide specifics that exemplify Socrates’s general criticism (531A1-3), and then to isolate the basic error (*ὥτα τοῦ νοῦ προστησάμενοι*, B1), proving he has learned the lesson Socrates just taught him in the case of astronomy (529A9-C3) including his imitation Socrates’s depiction of comic postures (531A5-6). But Socrates is not talking about an instrumentalist: he is talking about music theorists; and has a different point to make, logically closer to the case of the astronomers, so that Glaucon’s comments are strictly impertinent! Glaucon is again one step behind, and just keeping up; what keeps him on board is nothing but dialectic—i.e., the give and take of conversation. Socrates’s *σὺ μέν* (B2), like his *οὐκ ἀγεννῶς* (529A9) acknowledges Glaucon’s point rather than dismissing it, so as to engage in conversation where (again) there is room for different outlooks.

<sup>3423</sup> ἔτι κατακούειν (A6). The phenomenon he describes is real, as people know who have tuned, or witnessed the tuning of, a stringed instrument that has twenty or thirty strings, like the classical Indian sarod. By the time the tuning is complete everybody is staring. So much attention and focus has been commanded by the tuning that one’s consciousness is “emptied.” The music starts, deliciously, from almost nothing, establishing first the notes of the scale and with them the gestures of the raga, with melody appearing much later. Viewed through the other end of the telescope the whole affair would seem massively stupid.

measurement, while others disagree and say they already sound the same. But both of them give precedence to the ears over the mind.”<sup>3424</sup>

I see you are talking about the way those worthies<sup>3425</sup> assault the strings of the lyre as if to test them by cranking them tight on the pegs—we could pursue the image further, about<sup>3426</sup> beating the strings with a plectrum and the condemnations or denials or flattering answers the strings answer back, but I resist the desire since it isn’t these I was asking about, but the people who deal with harmony. They make the same mistake as the astronomers, in the sense that while they seek the numbers corresponding to these instances of audible consonance, analogous to the visual symmetry of astronomy, they never ascend to using the audible consonances as the occasion for taking the next step, asking which numbers are the consonant<sup>3427</sup> numbers and which are not, and why they aren’t or why they are.

“It’s a superhuman undertaking you describe!”<sup>3428</sup>

Call it helpful, rather, in the search for the beautiful and the good.<sup>3429</sup> Trying to track such a thing

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<sup>3424</sup> ἀμφισβητοῦντες (A8): Glaucon hardly realizes how his choice of the term reveals that dialogue or investigative conversation has for these instrumentalists devolved into a he-said she-said about what the ears “said,” a point he nevertheless articulates explicitly (B1).

<sup>3425</sup> χρηστούς (B2) ironic: cf. 479A1. Socrates’s subsequent elaboration in praeteritio (B2-6) satirizes them not for their physical postures (which evince their immersion in the sensory world, a critique Glaucon [with παραβάλλοντες, A5] had copied from Socrates’s criticism of the astronomers [529B1-C3]) but for their incompetence, as if they were masters who have fallen into argument with their slaves rather than employing them for their own higher purpose (so, the language of βασανίζοντας, and στρεβλοῦντας, and the use of force to get the answer they want [B2-6]).

<sup>3426</sup> τε (B5) after πλήκτρῳ anticipates καί. When καί arrives it introduces a genitive rather than a dative. At first the genitive appears to be constructed with πέρι in anastrophe, but χορδῶν at the end reveals that the entire phrase was a parallelism of πληγῶν and χορδῶν governed by πέρι, in which the one genitive is modified with the instrumental dative (πλήκτρῳ) and the other with a series of objective genitives (κατηγορίας καὶ ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας). The simile is about striking the strings and the strings’ responses. As I take it, the strings either agree with and correspond to the master’s anticipation (κατηγορία) or they disagree (ἐξάρνησις) or they embellish the tone the master expects (ἀλαζονεία).

<sup>3427</sup> σύμφωνοι ἀριθμοί (C3) might be a Platonic term (so Adam *ad loc.*, relying on Theon 72-5, though *n.b.* the term does *not* appear in *Tim.* nor elsewhere in the corpus), but in the context Socrates retains the musical metaphor only to press beyond it toward something inaudible (cf. the rhetoric of Phdr.230A3-6, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ’ ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θήριον ὃν τυγχάνω, κτλ.). The expression illustrates the ἀναίρεσις of the ὑποθέσεις, and embodies the ἀνοδος εἰς προβλήματα. Socrates’s argument (*pace Shorey*) does not presume there is a set of *a priori* harmonic relations separate from the audible harmony but only that empirical tones are empirically harmonious because the ratios of their frequencies (or wavelengths) are integral. It is the mathematical relation (recognized by mind) that accounts for the harmonic effect (recognized by the ears). A tone with half the wavelength as another will sound an octave above it regardless whether the first tone is a C, D, E, or F. One has to imagine the person who discovers, say with the aid of an oscilloscope, that this is true of the relation between middle C and the C above it, and then wants to see whether it is also true of D and A, or of F below and middle C, or of upper C and upper G. Socrates’s student will more likely ask what is the relation between middle C and the G below it, and thereby discover the ratio of the octave.

<sup>3428</sup> δαιμόνιον γὰρ πρᾶγμα (C5). Again the traditional study is being transmogrified into something quite unknown (cf. 530C2), moving Glaucon to use the term πρᾶγμα rather than μάθημα. He finds himself increasingly impressed by, but at the same time not quite equal to (530B5, 530C7, 531D5-6) Socrates’s remarks, culminating in his confession at 532D2-E3.

<sup>3429</sup> τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησιν (C6-7): The expression does not mean to suggest “the

down<sup>3430</sup> for any other reason is useless.<sup>3431</sup>

“That much I can certainly agree with.”

And yet by my own lights<sup>3432</sup> if this, and the rest of the path of learning we have now set out, does reach the common and general interrelation of things with each other, and does bring them together into one account that articulates how they are akin to each other, then going through them does contribute something in the direction we want our wards to go and the trouble we take with them would be worth the toil.<sup>3433</sup> If not, they would be useless.

“I would guess<sup>3434</sup> you are right, Socrates; in any case the work is huge.”

You mean the work of the prelude or what? Or have we sufficiently grasped that all we have said is a mere warm-up<sup>3435</sup> for the main piece<sup>3436</sup> we have to learn? After all I don’t expect you think the

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identity of the beautiful and the good” (J.-C. *ad loc.*, 343)—such an interpretation commits the very sort of error this whole passage is trying to leave behind—but is a typically pleonastic expression for value (in particular, τὸ χρήσιμον). So also he says καλόν … καὶ ἀγαθόν (505B3) right at the moment he is insisting on the separateness of “good” from derivative values (505A3-B3, and 505D5-9, where *n.b.* καλά D5).

<sup>3430</sup> μεταδιωκόμενον (C7) in place of ζητούμενον, suggests a wild goose chase, as παντὶ τρόπῳ did at 530B4.

<sup>3431</sup> ὄχρηστον (C7): Again the question of usefulness is trumped by being reoriented to a higher sense (cf. 530B8-C1).

<sup>3432</sup> οἶμαι δέ γε (C9) as at 530C4.

<sup>3433</sup> μέθοδος (D1): A path that leaves the special subject matters behind by discovering their grounds and the originals of which they study mere projections, is quite a different thing from those studies and their ways. Shorey is therefore wrong to see this term, and the term πραγματεία below (see next note) to be merging with their later meanings (as μέθοδος did above, 528D8). It seems more likely that the meaning Aristotle gives them (according to which for instance a given μέθοδος has its own principles that separate it from others and the treatment of a subject as such constitutes a πραγματεία, might already exist, and that Socrates is at pains to satirize the μέθοδος as a path that goes in a circle and the πραγματεία as not worth the πρόγματα.

<sup>3434</sup> μαντεύομαι (D5) gives the sense that Glaucon is agape trying to conceive what Socrates is saying.

<sup>3435</sup> προοίμιά ἔστιν (D8): Either preambles (to the law itself) or prelude (to the main melody). In either case what we must recall is the use of προοίμιον and ἀπηλλάχθαι at the beginning of Book Two (357A1-2). It is now Glaucon whose stamina is in question rather than Socrates's (cf. 533A2), and Socrates that is requiring Glaucon to keep going rather than Glaucon Socrates. Socrates's (and Plato's) common practice of dramatizing the teaching before extracting the moral, of making “drama precede dogma,” here becomes nearly explicit on the programmatic level, which is rare (cf. 525D5 and n. 3335). It is after all dialogue and its dialectic that has brought us to this as well as through the other studies.

<sup>3436</sup> τοῦ νόμου (D8): The use of musical beauty as a metaphor for truth (cf. σύμφωνοι above, C3 and n. 3427) continues. Socrates is referring to a beauty in living λόγοι that not all men feel, whence he elsewhere calls himself an ὀνήρ φιλόλογος (*Phdr*. 236E4-5). On the other hand νόμος might mean law and προοίμιον preamble: I cannot eliminate either, but the ambiguity leaves his meaning inchoate.

people who are clever in these fields<sup>3437</sup> are as yet dialecticians,<sup>3438</sup> do you?

“Not at all, by God, except in the rarest of instances.”

But do you think persons unable to give and take arguments back and forth<sup>3439</sup> will ever achieve the insight we require our guards to achieve?

“I would have also to agree they will not.”

(532) Have we then come to the main song we have to sing, which the faculty of asking and answering can perform,<sup>3440</sup> the which, although itself intelligible, the faculty of seeing could imitate, *mutatis mutandis*, in the sense as we said before of its attempting to contemplate the real animals in the light of day, and then the real stars in the heavens, and then to culminate in viewing the sun itself? Likewise, when someone endeavors by the activity of discussion free from all the senses and through reasoning alone to set out for<sup>3441</sup> the truth of what things are, distinct and in themselves, and slackens his efforts

<sup>3437</sup> δεινοί (D9) suggests the specialism of τέχνη (cf.525D9), as such detachable from the larger world and liable to be a μία δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων. Socrates is illustrating the notion of synopticality (D1-3, *supra*) by contrasting it with all the several sciences he has reviewed. It is not a criticism of the “mathematician’s ability to reason” (sic Adam, J.-C., Shorey), but (what might come to the same thing) the incompleteness of the special studies that though they might reach the forms that govern their subject matter, have not yet focussed on the Idea of the Good as the *primum inter paria* that is the reason the objects they study exist and are what they are as well as the principle that shows the relations of any one study to all the others. The meaning is exactly the same as that at *Euthyd.*290C1-C6, where the dialectician’s ἐπιστήμη τοῦ χρῆσθαι (C3, C5) is based on his knowledge of τὸ χρήσιμον, i.e., τὸ ἀγαθόν.

<sup>3438</sup> διαλεκτικοί (D9): The adjective is new and must be referring back to δύναμις διαλέγεσθαι that suddenly appeared at 511B4 (repeated by Glaucon at C5), to represent the ability to use the phenomena in the study of truth beyond them, or, as he now says, to use them as προβλήματα. The conversation of course has already been an exercise in and an illustration of the very science he purports to be introducing. We should not be surprised to find that he has already illustrated in action most or all of what he would have to say about it in theory, nor for that matter be too sorely disappointed if he leaves off theorizing it.

<sup>3439</sup> Reading μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες δοῦνοι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον (E4-5), with mss. A<sup>2</sup>FDM (οἱ μὴ δυνατοί τινες Α : μὴ δυνατοὶ οἵτινες *scripsit* Burnet). The phrase is an exegetical description of the δύναμις διαλέγεσθαι alluded to above, and is found as often and in as many places as anything else is to be found in the Platonic corpus. Cf. 534B4-5, *Alc.*I 106B7; *Charm.*165B3-C1, 166D8-9; *Crat.*390C10-11; *Gorg.*461E4-5; *Phdo.*78D1-2, 95D; *Polit.*286A4-5; *Prot.*336B9-C2, 338D1-2; *Soph.*230A5, *Tht.*175B9-D2, 202C2-3. The question/answer process can be expressed in terms of its results, with the questioning as λαβεῖν or δέχεσθαι λόγον and the answering as δοῦναι, παρέχειν, or ὑπέχειν λόγον: cf. Thompson *ad Meno* 75D and cf. *Gorg.*501A2-3; Rep.337E2-3, 489E3 (and my n. *ad loc.*); *Soph.*246C5; *Tht.*148D2. This is the reason that a thesis can be called an ἀπόκρισις (*Meno* 76C8; Rep.337D1, *Charm.*162C6; Leg.655B7-8; *Phdo.*100D9, E2, 101C9) and why ἀποκρίνεσθαι or ἐνδείξασθαι δι’ ἐρωτήσεων can mean “discuss” (*Parm.*137B6-8; *Soph.*217C4); and it underlies the fanciful etymology at *Crat.*398D. Cf. also 515D5 and n.3210.

<sup>3440</sup> περαίνει (532A2) make a way through to the end, used also of performing a piece of music (cf. πορείαν below, B4, which shares its etymon).

<sup>3441</sup> Reading ὄρμᾶν (A7), from Clement: the ὄρμᾶ of all the mss. is impossible. The verb echoes ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὄρμάς (511B6), and recalls the criticism of the level on which the discussion was operating at 506E2 (τὴν παροῦσαν ὄρμήν). J.-C. retains both subjunctives by taking οὔτω (A5) as the complement of ἐπιχειρῆ but it is a conjunction correlative to ὥσπερ (B2); it is preferable to read ἐπιχειρῆ ... ὄρμᾶν rather than ἐπιχειρῶν ... ὄρμᾶ as more closely parallel to ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν (A4).

not at all until he grasps goodness in itself by means of intelligence itself,<sup>3442</sup> then it is that he has reached the true goal and end<sup>3443</sup> of the intelligible world and participation in it, just as the man in the image<sup>3444</sup> reached the height and culmination of vision.

“The analogy is perfect.”

Well, don’t you call this the dialectical path of inquiry?

“Of course.”

But meanwhile, I said, the liberation from the bonds and the reorientation away from the shadows and toward models that cast them and toward the light behind; and then the ascent out of the cave into sunlight and day; and then the phase of at first still being powerless<sup>3445</sup> to contemplate the animals themselves and the plants of that world but able to contemplate them instead as they appear reflected in water and as divine<sup>3446</sup> shadows of realities, no longer<sup>3447</sup> the shadows of mere models produced by a light likewise<sup>3448</sup> mere and shadowy when measured according to the analogy of fire to sun—as to this, the entire curriculum and activity of specialized studies that we have now gone through truly has the power to achieve it and to drive the noblest element of soul upward and outward, toward its vision of what is best<sup>3449</sup> in reality and truth, just as in the analogy the most acute element in the body moved toward the vision of what is most clear<sup>3450</sup> in the somatic and visible realm.

“For my part I accept this account; and yet fully to accept it in every aspect seems difficult to me.

<sup>3442</sup> αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ὄγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ (B1). The expression recalls not only 511B3-C2, but also the description of the philosophical life that suddenly appeared at 490A8-B7, including a statement we could style as an *adaequatio* of the subject (*mentis*) to the object (*ad rem*): cf. γεννήσας νοῦν τε καὶ ἀλήθειαν (490B5-6) and n.2779. αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἔκαστον (A7) is the usual formula for the true nature of things in themselves: ἔκαστον does not depict a persistent specificity finally overcome when one “reach the good” (the idea and stately subjunctive are J.-C.’s): despite its special status it is truer to say the good is a *primum inter paria*.

<sup>3443</sup> μὴ ἀποστῇ ... ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει (A7-B2). Cf. μή ... ἐπὶ τέλει ὃν ἀποστῆς (506D2-3), and n.3050. The sense of *τέλος* here, illustrates what ἀτελεῖς meant at 530E5.

<sup>3444</sup> τότε (B2) referring to 516B4-7.

<sup>3445</sup> Reading Iamblichus’s ἔτι ἀδυναμία (B9) instead of the readings of the mss. (ἐπ’ ἀδυναμίᾳ ADM : ἀδυναμίᾳ F).

<sup>3446</sup> θεῖα (C1). To the pairs of indices of the two worlds, visible/intelligible, opined/known, changing/being, a new pair is now added: human/divine.

<sup>3447</sup> Finally and for the first time, the particular significance of the stage or grade of truth and reality represented by the puppets and the light of the fire (514B8-515A2) is revealed, by the μέν / δέ construction, as an adumbration of what was to come. The progressus in the darkness below, from shadows thought to be absolute to the originals that by being seen immediately relativize them even in the darkling light of the fire, was there experienced as alienating (515D1-7), but now is recalled and employed as a method for progressing within world of truth. Analogously, the discovery of one’s error by logical reduction in the first phase of the encounter with Socrates makes logical analysis at first hateful, but at the same time provides a sample of the method that will be employed in the second (constructive or probatory) phase of the encounter.

<sup>3448</sup> δι’ ἑτέρου τοιούτου φωτός (C2): derogatory ἔτερον (n.1197).

<sup>3449</sup> τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου θέαν (C6), i.e., the vision whose object is ἡ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα (505A2).

<sup>3450</sup> ὥσπερ τότε τοῦ σαφεστάτου ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου (C6-7): The σαφέστατον perceives visually the φανότατον just as the βέλτιστον perceives mentally the ἄριστον. Perhaps τὸ σαφές is the acuity of the seeing (or knowing: e.g. 509D9 and 511C4) and τὸ φανόν is the vividness of the seen (or known, e.g. 506D1).

Still and again, to refuse to accept it seems difficult also.<sup>3451</sup> Nevertheless—the question after all is not just something we are to hear the answer to at the present moment, but something we must climb back up to again and again—let us posit this to be as it has now been argued and move on to the central song of it,<sup>3452</sup> and try to go through that in the same way we went through the several arts of the prelude or the preamble to the law. Explain what is the manner of the power of discussion, what are its parts and what in turn are its methods. If you do, then we will know the pathways that will take us to the place where we can finally rest, having come to the end<sup>3453</sup> of our journey.”

(533) No longer will you be able to follow me,<sup>3454</sup> friend Glaucon,<sup>3455</sup> thought surely there is no shortfall of eagerness on my part.<sup>3456</sup> No longer will it serve to look at an image of what we are talking about, but itself instead, its truth unadorned,<sup>3457</sup> as it appears to me at least: whether it is truly the truth we have as yet no warrant to insist. Still, that it looks something like this we must insist, won’t you agree?<sup>3458</sup>

“Obviously.”

And ought we not also insist that the power of dialectic could reveal itself only to a person who has worked on the studies that we have just gone through? That otherwise this coming into view

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<sup>3451</sup> The tension of knowledge and ignorance Glaucon here describes (D2-4) corresponds very closely to Socrates’s original problematic of the good (e.g. 505D11-506A2), revealing how far he has come along. At the same time the repetition of the idea places the entire treatment into a perspective that points beyond itself.

<sup>3452</sup> ταῦτα θέντες (D6): Even though each step he has just taken in the criticism of the special studies has been upward and backward, Glaucon now fails to recognize that in asking Socrates to move forward and downward from an hypothesis, posited as if they really understood it (θέντες ἔχειν ώς νῦν λέγεται, D6) the soul would only be able to move downward (510C1-511A1). With this he does a perfect job of failing to persist, according to the way or path that Socrates has just described to be necessary (καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ ..., A7-B2). Is his eagerness (cf. σπεύδων μᾶλλον βραδύνω, 528D7-8) a failure of memory? Of intelligence? Of desire? Of nerve?

<sup>3453</sup> ὁδοῦ ἀνάπαυλα (E3). Glaucon speaks of the point in the journey where one can rest from travelling but then (with τέλος τῆς πορείας) hopes to assimilate stopping with completing the journey of which Socrates has been speaking (τελευταῖον, 516B4; τελευταία, 517B8; ίκανῶς ὕδωσι [not just ἀφικέσθαι], 519C9-D2; τάληθή ἐωρακέναι [note perfect], 520C5; τελευταῖον, 532A5; μὴ ἀποστῇ πρίν, A7; τέλει, B2).

<sup>3454</sup> ἀκολουθεῖν (533A1): Follow him he truly has, always one step behind. To proceed further he will have to leave off following behind. Socrates had warned him at the beginning of this entire section that the momentum or drive (όρμή) of the current discussion seemed insufficient for an ideal treatment (506D6-E5); his present demurral points back to that passage and thus announces the close of the section. Glaucon has been shown, through dialogue, all the rules of dialogue he craves, playfully applied in practice. An explicit statement of them, even if Socrates were capable of it, he might not able to take in (κομίσασθαι [507A2: cf. n.3057]).

<sup>3455</sup> φίλε (533A1): Again, the adjective is added to the proper name as an epithet, designating an important turn in the conversation: cf. 522B3 and n.3285.

<sup>3456</sup> τό γ’ ἐμόν (A2) answers ἐγὼ μέν (532D2). With οὐδὲν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι compare Socrates’s προθυμούμενος at 506D6-8 and contrast Glaucon’s hankering for an ἀνάπαυλα here (532E3).

<sup>3457</sup> οὐδ’ εἰκόνα ... ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθές (A2-3) reproduces the contrast between the ἔκγονος (506E3) and αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τάγαθόν (506D8-E1).

<sup>3458</sup> Reading μὲν δή (A5) with all mss. (rather than δεῖ μέν of the recd.). Socrates’s reply is as halting as Glaucon’s request was (D2-6ff). The two uses of ίδεῖν (A3, A5) are in tension with each other and convey his feeling that the real account cannot rely on illustrative material such as the traditional curriculum by means of which they have exhibited dialectic in action.

could never happen?<sup>3459</sup>

“On this, too, we deserve to insist.”

We can say at least that on the following point nobody will take the trouble to squabble with us,<sup>3460</sup> when we say that it is some other method than theirs that tries to achieve a grasp what each of the eaches is in itself.<sup>3461</sup> All the other specialties are directed either to the opinions of men at large and their desires, or else toward producing things that grow or things that are put together,<sup>3462</sup> or it is toward the maintenance of things growing or fabricated that they have been directed.<sup>3463</sup> As to the rest, the ones we did agree were involved in getting a kind of grasp on being and truth—geometry that is and the others that follow in her train<sup>3464</sup>—we now see that they dream about being and truth but that it is impossible for them to see it waking<sup>3465</sup> as long as they allow the hypotheses they use to be unassailable and absolute just because they are unable to derive them.<sup>3466</sup> After all, if a person's beginning point is something he does not know and his conclusion as well as the intermediate steps are woven out of what he does not know, how could such a tissue of consistency<sup>3467</sup> ever become knowledge?

“There is no way it can.”

And is it not the dialectical procedure alone that makes its way<sup>3468</sup> by doing just this, ousting and

<sup>3459</sup> ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνη ἀν φήνειν ἐμπείρῳ ὄντι ὃν νυνδὴ διήλθομεν (A8-9): This is perhaps the most important instance of self-instantiation, or “drama preceding dogma,” in all of Plato (cf. n.258). Socrates explains to Glaucon by instancing the limits of his own thought why a further treatment is impossible. Compare the way that the review of studies at Phlb.55Cff culminates in the striking remark at 57E-58A, ήμάς ... ἀναίνοιτ' ἀν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν and its followup, δῆλον ὅτιὴ πᾶς ἀν τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνοίη.

<sup>3460</sup> οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσει (B1). Nobody, that is, has a stake in arrogating to their chosen method the job of solving the problem that concerns us—to find the simple truth of things. They have other fish to fry.

<sup>3461</sup> αὐτοῦ γε ἔκαστον πέρι ὃ ἔστιν ἔκαστον (B2). Cf. n.3062 ad 507B5.

<sup>3462</sup> πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις (B5): the more usual list for designating the physical world is, for example, τά τε περὶ ήμάς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν γένος (510A5-6: cf. n. 1223). The special purpose here is to distinguish τὸ ὄν, the subject matter of true knowledge, as ἀγένητον (vs. γένεσις) and ἐν (vs. σύνθεσις).

<sup>3463</sup> τετράφαται (B6): the perfect used of givens in the “structure of reality;” cf. n.4660.

<sup>3464</sup> ἐπομένας (B8) referring to the logical sequence Socrates playfully required the studies to follow (τὸ ἔξῆς, 528A6-B3).

<sup>3465</sup> ὄνειρωττουσι μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἴδεῖν (B8-C1): The metaphor of sleeping and waking is brought forward from 476C2-D4. As in a dream, the likeness is taken for the real. The metaphor will have little cognitive value to the reader until he has actually experienced the inadequacy of the scientific way. The sleepwalkers will always disagree with what Socrates says since they dream they are awake. This is his strongest in an escalating series of criticisms and satires of the special studies: cf. γελοίως τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως, 527A6 and n.3355.

<sup>3466</sup> μὴ δυνάμενοι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν (C2-3): Socrates, still one step ahead, reminds Glaucon of the thing he had just forgotten (532D6-7).

<sup>3467</sup> τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν (C5) a direct reference to ὁμολογουμένως (510D2), which governs its meaning here. It is consistency not dialectical assent, though τοιαύτην might allude to dialectical assent: “If this agreement among their statements is the only kind of agreement they can produce.” Shorey is wrong to think Plato is likening geometric proof to dialectic, though Socrates may be measuring it by dialectic.

<sup>3468</sup> πορεύεται (C8): cf. πορείαν (532B4) and περαίνει (532A2). Socrates is to some extent singing the song of dialectic after all!

relativizing<sup>3469</sup> the hypotheses so that it can achieve its grounding and certainty in the real beginning and principle? It alone that gently coaxes<sup>3470</sup> the eye of the soul out of the alien mud in which it is interred unbeknownst to itself<sup>3471</sup> and leads it up out of the ground, using as servants in the task of its reorientation those specialisms we went through. We have become inured to calling them sciences though they need a different name, more clear<sup>3472</sup> than opinion yet fuzzier<sup>3473</sup> than science. We called it “thinking” in the account before,<sup>3474</sup> but quibbling about the name is hardly what concerns people who have such important matters lying before them.<sup>3475</sup>

“Surely not.”

All we need is a name that somehow distinctly indicates the mental state in soul that we are describing. As such, it will suffice as before to call the first condition one’s soul might find itself in<sup>3476</sup> science or knowledge, the second thinking, the third (534) trusting, and the fourth guesswork; to pair up the last two under the term opinion and the first two under the term intelligence; to take opinion as dealing with becoming and intelligence with being; to say that as being stands toward becoming, intelligence stands toward opinion; and that as intelligence stands toward opinion, knowledge stands toward belief and thinking stands toward guesswork. As for the ratio and division into pairs that likewise applies to their objects,<sup>3477</sup> the objects of opinion and the objects of intelligence, we can pass

<sup>3469</sup> ἀναιρούσα (C8) is a metaphor contrary to the metaphor ἀκινήτους ἐώσι above (C2). The step consists merely in asking why the statement in the hypothesis is true. It is called εἰς προβλήματα ἀνιέναι at 531C2-3 and then exemplified, in the case of astronomy, as ἐπισκοπεῖν τίνες σύμφωναι ἀριθμοί καὶ τίνες οὐ, καὶ διὰ τί ἐκατέρου (C3-4). If the metaphor is violent it is only due to the obduracy of the specialist in the face of having his “foundations” questioned (ἐπισκοπεῖν), as if we should ask a Latinist why his language has six cases instead of eleven, say; or a physicist how it can be that a neutron is colorless; or a psychologist what a soul, or even a psyche, is.

<sup>3470</sup> ἡρέμα ἔλκει (D2). There is nothing explicit in the text to justify the adverb. The prisoner was abruptly forced to turn (515C6) and then was forced to continue βίᾳ (515E1, E6-516A3), but the force was never depicted as gentle. The only proof we have is the gentle treatment Glaucon has just undergone from Socrates, and the climbing (ἀνάγει ὄνω, 533D2-3) he has encouraged him to continue, but more veridical proof comes from our experience as participants in that movement.

<sup>3471</sup> τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅμμα κατορωρυγμένον (D1-2), a strengthened description of the mind being confined within a soul stuck in a body sunk in a cave, relying on Orphic imagery. τῷ ὄντι refers to a state of affairs of which the mind becomes aware only after being freed (cf. ἀνάπλεως, 516E5, and n.3225).

<sup>3472</sup> ἐναργέστερον (D5) used at 511A7, as a synonym for σαφέστερον, to draw an analogy between the superiority of visible objects over their correlated shadows and reflections, and that of pure mental objects over the correlated visible objects in which they are “reflected.”

<sup>3473</sup> ἀμυδροτέρου (D6). ἀμυδρός, though not used so far, is the opposite of σαφές at *Soph.*250E8, and of both ἐναργές and σαφές at *Tim.*72B8-C1, which have both been used above. The sentence, as he next says, restates what Glaucon said at 511D4-5, according to which διάνοια lies between δόξα and νοῦς.

<sup>3474</sup> ὠρισάμεθα (D7): It was Glaucon who teased it out as a technical term (511D2-3).

<sup>3475</sup> In the same spirit I pass over the cruxes at E4-5 and simply accept Burnet: the meaning is not at stake. With his comment on ὄνόματα Socrates adduces still another rule or guideline of dialectical procedure. Cf. 437B4-5; and *Charm.*163D3-7; *Crito* 47E8,f; *Euthyd.*285A5-6, 277; *Gorg.*489B7-C1; *Leg.* 633A8-9, 644A6, 693C1-5, 864A8-B4, 872E1; *Phdo.*100D6-7; *Phlb.*26E6-8; *Polit.*259C2-4, 261E1-7; *Soph.*220D4, 259C3-5; *Symp.*218A4; *Tht.*177D5-E5, 184D3, 199A4-5.

<sup>3476</sup> μοῖρα (E8) adding, to the epistemological distinction among states of consciousness, the quality of life available to them (i.e., ἡμετέρα φύσις παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας [514A2], which had received synoptic description at 517B1-6). For the use cf. 472D1.

<sup>3477</sup> τὴν ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα ἀναλογίαν (534A4-5): ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα is an indirect question placed in

it over to avoid multiplying the relations that we have already gone through.<sup>3478</sup>

“I am sure I agree about the others, to the extent that I follow.”

But would you also call him a “dialectic” who tries to reach<sup>3479</sup> an account of each thing in its true essence, whereas the man who has no account, to the extent he is<sup>3480</sup> unable to give answers either to himself or to another person<sup>3481</sup> questioning him, would you deny that he lacks intelligence about the thing?

“How could I affirm that he possesses it?”

And does the same apply to the good?<sup>3482</sup> Whoever is unable to articulate what it is in argument, and to separate out from everything else the Idea of the Good as such,<sup>3483</sup> and unable as in a battle to keep fast hold on it throughout all the challenges he can bring, keenly arguing and testing the matter not on the level of opinion, but of truth and knowledge and running the entire gauntlet without a slip in his reasoning<sup>3484</sup>—will you deny that such a man knows the good as it is in itself, let alone knowing

attributive position (352D6, Leg.880D9-E1; Gildersleeve §579): “the analogy as to what these are correlated to as their proper objects.” For ἐπί cf. the precedent passage, 511D8-E4.

<sup>3478</sup> ἔωμεν (A7), dismissing further elaboration. The purpose of the Line was to illustrate the difference between διάνοια (so called) and νόησις. The peculiar proportionality of the cuts and sub-cuts (in particular the continuous proportion) implied nothing but the fact that the realm of visible objects was “equal” in length to the thought-objects of διάνοια. Since their length was the line-segments’ only property, their equality represented the identity or inseparability of physical models and thought in “dianoetic” thinking. The intervening review of special studies has exhibited the manner of this confusion in many forms and the ways to resolve it, over and over again, so that now the sameness that enabled us to recognize the difference becomes obsolete, a ladder to throw away or an hypothesis to oust. The distinction between the four types of mentality, however, remains important.

<sup>3479</sup> λαμβάνοντα (B3) conative present. λόγον λαβεῖν designates the goal of dialogue (cf. n.3439).

<sup>3480</sup> καθ’ ὅσον ἀν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι (B4-5): The inserted protasis affords the opportunity to make performance in dialogue serve right alongside attempting to grasp a λόγος τῆς οὐσίας for each thing, as equal or joint criteria for being a dialectician. By a common technique of exposition Riddell called binary structure (*Digest* §205A and 207-212), Socrates (or Plato) next elaborates these criteria (534B8-C3) at the same time that he moves to the target case (τὸ ὄγαθόν). By agreeing with the last (πῶς γὰρ ἀν φοίην, B7) Glaucon agrees with both.

<sup>3481</sup> λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι (B4-5) recalls λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ... διδόναι (510C7) which again recalls Glaucon’s failure at 532D4-7, at the same time that νοῦν ... οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν (B5-6) recalls his successful articulation of the failure of διάνοια at 511D1-2 (νοῦν οὐκ ἔσχειν). αὐτῷ includes unobtrusively the idea that dialogue can just as well take place within one person, a question that becomes thematic elsewhere (*Tht.* 189-90; *Soph.* 263E, *Phlb.* 39C; cf. M.Dixsaut “Qu’appelle-t-on penser,” in *Platon et la question de la pensée* [Vrin 2000] 53).

<sup>3482</sup> καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄγαθοῦ (B8): Having reminded his tiring student of the Cave Image (532AC) and the Line Simile (533B-534A), he now moves back to the question of the Good which led to and called for them (505B-509C).

<sup>3483</sup> μὴ ἔχει ... ιδέαν (B8-C1) elaborates λόγον ... οὐσίας (B3-4).

<sup>3484</sup> ὥσπερ ... διαπορεύηται (C1-3) elaborates the several aspects of λόγον ... διδόναι (B4-5): the vigorous back and forth of question and answer (μαχή), the zealousness of the activity (προθυμούμενος), the goal being truth rather than victory before an audience (μὴ κατὰ δόξαν), and the adequacy of an answer as criterion (ἀπτώτι τῷ λόγῳ). Each and all of these attributes came into play in the review and critique of the conventional curriculum. With Socrates’s help Glaucon kept on his feet until the end—and so did we!

anything that is good?<sup>3485</sup> Will you affirm that if he latches on to an example<sup>3486</sup> of goodness it is only with opinion that he grasps it and not with knowledge, and that he sleepwalks and dreams his way through his life here, and before he ever wakens from it he will have reached Hades anyway, the place where his oblivion will be final.

“Yes by Zeus, I do affirm all that!”

So to the contrary, in the case of these children of yours<sup>3487</sup> whom you are nourishing and educating in our argument, if you should raise them in fact you would not allow them, if they lack expression the way geometrical lines can be incapable of expression,<sup>3488</sup> to be empowered as rulers of our city to decide the highest matters. In fact you will set down a law that your charges must engage in this aspect of education most of all, since it will enable them to engage in questioning and answering with the very greatest mastery.

“Such a law I will set down, but only following you.”<sup>3489</sup>

Does this dialectical art seem to you, as it does to me, the very coping stone for the studies, placed in<sup>3490</sup> the top of their arch, and that beyond this no higher study can properly be added—that with dialectic the whole business of education achieves (535) its goal and final form?

“Yes it does seem so to me.”

<sup>3485</sup> οὐτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν ... οὐτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν (C4-5). He refers back to the argument that introduced The Good as the primary object of knowledge (505A2-B3), according to which nothing would be worthwhile without The Good, nor would knowledge of it be worthwhile without knowledge of The Good (the summary remark οὐτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν [C4-5] is broad enough to include both ideas).

<sup>3486</sup> εἰδώλου (C5). The term was introduced at 532B7 (cf. C7) as a designation of the “puppets” in the cave, where discovering they cast the shadows provided the pilgrim with a model for adapting his vision to the bright world above, namely, first to contemplate their εἴδωλα in water. The examples of the sciences are likewise the hinge between the two worlds, either the upper limit of truth from which all else can only be deduced, or else the springboards (*προβλήματα*) that can give mind an opportunity to move upward in search of the questions to which they provide the answers.

<sup>3487</sup> τοὺς γε σαντοῦ παῖδας (D3), in place of the much more usual first plural, is strikingly personal, as if to excite paternal feelings in Glaucon. Socrates refers back to the resolution he had reached with Adeimantus at 505E4-506A7 where he referred to them as ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους οἵς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν.

<sup>3488</sup> ἀλόγους ... ὥσπερ γραμμάς (D5): This deconstruction of the technical application of the term ἀλογον in mathematics (as of the diagonal of the square, inexpressible [“irrational”] as a ratio of “integers” [e.g., Arist.L.I., 968B18]) gives an opportunity to drive home once again the main point, which is to immunize the guardians’ reason from the laughably irrational confinement to cases (527A6) and to overcome the inability or refusal to διδόναι λόγον (533C2-3) that provides the foundation for all specialization.

<sup>3489</sup> μετά γε σοῦ (E1): Glaucon expresses his feeling of taking things on faith that began with his plea at 532D6 (ταῦτα θέντες). With μετά he places himself into a relation with Socrates analogous to that of the relation between the hypotheses of the sciences and the ἀνυπόθετον (καίτοι νοητῶν ὅντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς, 511D2).

<sup>3490</sup> The θριγκός (534E2) is the topping course of plaster that makes the top of the wall smooth instead of being an uneven sequence of stones. If Plato had been a Roman he might have used the metaphor of a arch and its keystone; instead we have the course which when complete, like the ἀνυπόθετον, neither has nor needs anything above it (οὐκέτ’ ἄλλο ... ἀνωτέρῳ ὁρθῷ ὃν ἐπιτίθεσθαι). All along we have seen dialectic in action and now that Socrates has demurred to treat it separately it will be allowed to merge with and disappear into what has taken place.

### D.3f: Selection of Guards to Receive this Higher Education

So what is left for you to do is the allocation. To which of the guards will we assign this course of study and how will we choose?

“Clearly that’s what’s left.”

So do you remember the last time<sup>3491</sup> we made a selection of rulers, and what qualities we used as criteria?

“Of course I do.”

In general you may imagine the same sorts of natures are to be selected here—the most stalwart and bravest are to be preferred and the best looking ones as far as possible<sup>3492</sup>—but in addition we now need to seek among them not only those redoubtable and robust in his moral character<sup>3493</sup> but also in those respects that are conducive to the kind of education I have just now described, which they must also have.<sup>3494</sup>

“And what would you list among these elements?”

An inexorable tenacity<sup>3495</sup> for their studies, my divine fellow, must they have in ready supply, and must have no trouble learning. Mind you, souls are much quicker to recoil from demanding studies than from gymnastics, since the pain and labor involved in study belongs to the soul alone and she cannot ask the body to share it with her.

“True.”

Also they must have strong mental grasp and never flinch,<sup>3496</sup> indeed must take to all kinds of hard

<sup>3491</sup> τὴν προτέρων ἐκλογήν (535A6): Socrates refers to the sub-selection of the ἄρχοντες τῶν φυλάκων he carried out with Glaucon at 412Bff. The qualities (compare τοιούτους [412D9] with οἵους here [535A6]) were age, then ability (specifically guardliness), and then mindfulness, competence and solicitousness (C2-D8); but subsequently they were tested for their guardly ability *per se*, to keep solid grasp of the dogma about how things should be in the city despite suffering vicissitudes (412E5-414A7).

<sup>3492</sup> εὐειδεστάτους (A11): Good looks, something that appears to be entirely somatic, was entirely absent in the selection at 412Bff, to which alone he at first seems to be referring (προτέρων [A6] being singular); but as in previous summaries there is a looseness that prefers to give the overall picture, so we may imagine he is referring to the eugenic provisions of Book Five. Adding the term skews the previous selection in the direction of the body, so as to appropriate the virtues of strength to a new sphere, the *noetic* ability that will be needed, given our intervening discovery that our guards will have to be philosophers.

<sup>3493</sup> μὴ μόνον γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἥθη (B1-2), in restating A10-B1, continues the skewing toward the body, or at least away from the *noetic* center of the soul, with the merely dispositional term ἥθη (for which compare the use of the corresponding habituative term ἔθη, lately [522A4-7], in the rejection of the *paideia* in music as helping νοῦς in its ascent).

<sup>3494</sup> μὴ μόνον ... τὰ ἥθη ἀλλὰ καὶ ᾧ ... (B1-3). The word order suggests that it is τὰ ἥθη that goes with μὴ μόνον, leaving ᾧ to be construed, at least at first, as an accusative of respect parallel with it, so as to continue the reappropriation of strength to *nous*. At the end ἐκτέον αὐτοῖς is added unnecessarily in a mild anacoluthon for the sake of closure.

<sup>3495</sup> δριμύτητα (B5), the term he has so far reserved for the ethically important formidable acumen of evil men (519A2, *supra*; cf. 564D, *infra*) he now uses for the dialectician.

<sup>3496</sup> ὄρρατον (C1) an *hapax* in all Greek (except for *Crat.* 407D2-3, which glosses it with σκληρόν τε καὶ ἀμετάστροφον), and therefore striking. Passow gives ῥίγνυμι as the etymon. Alongside μνήμων it recalls the development of the notion of ἀνδρεία with the analogy of dying wool (429B7-430B5).

work<sup>3497</sup> easily—or is there some other way<sup>3498</sup> a person will be willing to endure the rigors of bodily training and then cap it off<sup>3499</sup> with such an extensive curriculum of learning and practice?

“Nobody would unless he were of the finest nature in every respect.”<sup>3500</sup>

We may support<sup>3501</sup> our claim by saying again<sup>3502</sup> that what is wrong these days, and the reason philosophy is dishonored, is that she is not being approached on the level she deserves. The illegitimate should never have taken her up, but only the genuine.

“What do you mean by this?”

First as to the dedication to work. The man who takes up philosophy must not be lame, industrious about one half of the work, but lazy about the other. We get just that when somebody labors long in gymnastics or hunting, industrious in all the things that are done with the body, but is he willing to study? No! Willing to listen to instruction<sup>3503</sup> or to hunt for the answer? No! He's averse to industry in all these areas. The lame man must be replaced by the man who walks with both his legs, as to his willingness to work.

In respect to truth also we have to require that his soul not be maimed, like one that despises intentional falsehood and is uncomfortable carrying it in herself and sorely bothered when others she is with are lying, though she accepts the involuntary sort of falsehood<sup>3504</sup> with gladness and although discovered to be living benighted, feels neither vexation nor scruples that she is wallowing in ignorance like a pig in slop.

(536) As to temperance and bravery and generosity and all the other parts of virtue, here no less must we be on the watch as to which man is illegitimate and which is genuine. Whenever an individual person or a city lacks complete<sup>3505</sup> command at assessing such things they end up becoming involved with people lame and illegitimate in all these areas, unbeknownst and subject to chance, the individual with respect to his friends and the city with respect to its rulers.

“That is quite true.”

It is our job then to take special caution with all these matters. If we escort men sound of limb and sound of mind into a course of study and exercise as great as this, then justice herself will have no brief against us and we will preserve our city and its way of life. But if we bring in men of another ilk<sup>3506</sup> we will get an outcome quite the opposite and at the same time bring still greater ridicule down onto philosophy.<sup>3507</sup>

<sup>3497</sup> πάντη φιλόπονον (C1): Because of the intervening remark that reappropriates the term πόνος to mental work (B6-9), this expression generalizes the set of attributes δριμύτης, μὴ χαλεπώς μανθάνειν, μνήμων, and ἄρρατος as expressions of φιλοπονία, the opposite of ἀποδειλιᾶν (B7).

<sup>3498</sup> ή τίνι τρόπῳ (C2): The question is meant to acknowledge his generalization of φιλόπονον with πάντη and justify it, by adding together bodily work and mental.

<sup>3499</sup> ἐπιτελεῖν (C3) brings forward and combines the metaphor of ἐπτίθεσθαι and the notion of τέλος, from 534E2-535A1.

<sup>3500</sup> Glaucon's παντάπασι γε (C4) answers Socrates's πάντη.

<sup>3501</sup> γοῦν (C6) of “part-proof” (Denniston).

<sup>3502</sup> ὁ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν (C6): at 495Cff.

<sup>3503</sup> φιλήκοος (D5): cf. ἐπήκοοι, 499A5.

<sup>3504</sup> τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον ... προσδέχηται (E3), a *constructio praeognans*: to accept learning that a belief you have is “unintentionally false” as opposed to being a lie you are telling. The ensuing metaphor then depicts the self-deprecation felt by the noble soul when it becomes disabused of its ignorance.

<sup>3505</sup> πάντη (536A5) means sound in all limbs (vs. χωλός).

<sup>3506</sup> ἀλλοίους (B4) in litotes as at 499E1 and 500A3. Compare the similar idiom of ἔτερος (n.1197).

<sup>3507</sup> The paragraph (A9-B6) has a nicer and nicer construction. First the anaphora of ἀρτι- in the

“And that would truly be shameful.”

Yes it would ... but perhaps I am being a little ridiculous, myself.

“How’s that?”

I forgot that in truth it's only play we are involved in, and I got myself too worked up and overwrought<sup>3508</sup> on behalf of philosophy. There she was in my mind's eye as I was speaking, and I saw her being dishonored by the mudslingers! I think I got more excited than I needed to and out of anger toward those who were to blame, I spoke too seriously.<sup>3509</sup>

“It hardly seems so to me, as your auditor at least.”

It does seem so to me, as the speaker. But let me add something else, lest we overlook it. In our previous selection we gave precedence to elders.<sup>3510</sup> That won't work here. We must not accept Solon's proverb that a person who is aging is able to learn a lot.<sup>3511</sup> In fact he's less able to learn than he is able to run. The largest efforts and indeed the majority of efforts great or small, are done in youth.

“Necessarily.”

Accordingly, arithmetic and geometry and the rest of the studies that prepare the mind for dialectic must all be put before our wards while they are still young, so as to avoid any impression that the teaching is being forced upon them. A free man must not feel anything slavish in the pursuit of his studies. Physical labor is no less beneficial for the body even if done under duress, but if you force a lesson on the soul, it just won't stick.

“That is true.”

So don't force-feed the studies on your children, my fine fellow. (537) Make learning a kind of play for them. While you're at it you'll be able to observe what their individual aptitudes suit them for.

“That makes sense.”

Do you remember that we also said we should escort the children into war as observers on horseback, and bring them near the scene of the battle as long as it was safe so that they could have, as it were, that taste of blood we use in training our dogs?<sup>3512</sup>

“I do remember.”

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mind-body doublet (*ἀρτιμελεῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίφρονας*, B1), followed by anaphora of *τοσαύτην* and homoioteleuton of the corresponding modifiers (*μάθησιν / ὄσκησιν*, B2), placed in chiastic order; then the unannounced shift into the apodosis with a pair of clauses presented as if closely parallel because linked by *τε ... τε* (B2-4) but actually quite different from each other (justice [personified] chastising us / we will save the city); then the elaboration by a statement of the converse with a corresponding pair of clauses, linked by *καί* (with the second *καί* in hyperbaton [*καὶ πράξομεν*]) and placed in chiastic order (we will have the opposite effect / philosophy [personified] will be scorned), this last pair of clauses exhibiting both rhyme and isocolia (*ἐπὶ ταῦτα τάναντία πάντα καὶ πράξομεν / ἔτι πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν*).

<sup>3508</sup> ἐντεινάμενος (C2), referring primarily to the high-strung rhetoric of last paragraph, which culminates in the indignant reiteration of the harsh metaphors of disability and illegitimate birth. It began with the reference to slop at 535E3-5. His rising indignation resembles that of Adeimantus at 424D7-E2 and 426A1-D6.

<sup>3509</sup> σπουδαιότερον εἰπεῖν (C4) standing in contrast with *ἐπαίζομεν* (C1).

<sup>3510</sup> πρεσβύτας (C8): Indeed this was the first criterion (412C2-3).

<sup>3511</sup> Solon's famous and marvelously ambiguous saw, *γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος* (18 West).

<sup>3512</sup> ἔφαμεν (537A5): The reference is to 466E4-7E7, but the analogy with *τοὺς σκύλακας* is new.

So in all these – work, study and danger – those that can keep at it without breaking their stride must be placed in a single group.<sup>3513</sup>

“At what age?”

Not before they are released from basic gymnastics. During those two or three years nothing else<sup>3514</sup> can be done, since fatigue and drowsiness are anathema to study; and besides, the gymnastics course itself is another<sup>3515</sup> one of the tests, and a significant one, for revealing what kind of person an individual will turn out to be, by the way he handles exercise.

“Of course.”

But after this period those picked out as superior among the twenty year-olds will receive greater honors than the others, and the smattering of studies to which they had been exposed in their childhood must then be drawn together by them, into a synoptic vision that recognizes the kinship of all the studies with each other as well as with the nature of being and truth.<sup>3516</sup>

“Only this kind of learning is well founded and solid, in the persons who achieve it.”

And it is the greatest test, too, for the aptitude for dialectic and the lack thereof. The man with a synoptic<sup>3517</sup> understanding is able to conduct a dialogue whereas the man who lacks that understanding cannot.

“I see it the same way.”

These are the things you must have in mind as you investigate which among them would be most qualified in these ways and also stalwart in their studies in addition to being stalwart in war and in lawfulness besides.<sup>3518</sup> And once they have reached the age of thirty you will choose in turn a subgroup and give them still greater honors and you will investigate them, using their ability in dialogue<sup>3519</sup> as the touchstone, to ascertain which of them is able to let go of what he sees with his eyes and the rest of his senses and make his way to being by following the path of truth.<sup>3520</sup> During this stage of the

<sup>3513</sup> εἰς ἀριθμόν τινα (A10-11), the addition of τινα suggests we will now be hearing more about this group. And indeed the sequence of parings down constitutes the rest of the argument to the end of Book Seven.

<sup>3514</sup> ἄλλο (B4) presumes the soul's activities are the complement of the body's.

<sup>3515</sup> ὅμα μία καὶ αὕτη (B5): gymnastics will help you test their mettle as the early education did (A1-2).

<sup>3516</sup> By φύσις (C3), another instance of the word not listed in Ast's *Lex.Plat.* (cf.514A2 and n. *ad loc.*). It means the relation between the highest study's object (*τὸ ὄν*), and the lesser studies that imply the higher study, lead to it, and call for it to solve the questions they raise—all of which was represented in the image by locating the cave below and the world above.

<sup>3517</sup> Plato's only use of συνοπτικός (C7), extending the semantics of σύνοψιν (C2) and relying on 531D1-4.

<sup>3518</sup> μόνιμοι δ' ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις (D2): He is looking back to the stage of development reached before, where the guardians at the end of Book Three were not only stalwart at war but also steady in the δόγμα of protecting what was best for the city (412D9-E8).

<sup>3519</sup> τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει (D5). For the triumphant first appearance of this periphrasis see 511B4. Whether it is a dative of agent (by what means to test them) or of respect (by what attribute of theirs to choose them) is indifferent since the give-and-take of dialogue make these one and the same. Truly, one great power of dialogue is its ability to raise both participants, as Socrates likes to say by quoting the remark of Diomedes asking Agamemnon for a partner on a night raid II.10.224-5: σὺν τε δύ' ἐρχομένῳ, καί τε πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν | ὅππως κέρδος ἔῃ (Symp.174D, Prot.348C; and cf. its applications at Rep.432C1-2 and 595C10-596A11 with n.4628).

<sup>3520</sup> μετ' ὀληθείας iέναι (D6-7), alluding to the path of questioning that the stimulating (όλκόν, 521D3; ἐλκτικῷ, 523A2) or problematic (προβλήματα, 530B6) phenomena drive the mind to require

process, my friend, there is need for especially cautious guarding.<sup>3521</sup>

“But why?”

Haven’t you noticed what a bad thing is happening these days in the practice of conversation and dialectic, and how many people are afflicted by it?

“What would that be?”

How utterly lawless they are.<sup>3522</sup>

“Quite so.”

Are you surprised by the condition they have fallen into? Don’t you feel sorry for them?<sup>3523</sup>

“But how could I?”

Here’s how. Imagine an adopted child, raised in great (538) wealth by a large and powerful family and surrounded by flatterers, and imagine that when he grew up and became a man he found out that his parents were not those who claimed to be and that he also could not find his true parents. Can you guess how he would feel about the flatterers and those who had adopted him unbeknownst, both before he found out he had been adopted, and then after he learned it? Would you like me to tell you my guess?

“I would.”

My guess is that when he did not know the truth he would hold the father and the mother and the rest of those he had believed were his family in higher esteem than the flatterers, and that he would be less inclined to see them as inadequate in some way and less inclined to do or say something unlawful to them, and less inclined to disobey them in major questions than to disobey the flatterers.

“That seems likely.”

But when he finds the truth my guess is that he would lose his esteem for his putative family and cease to take them seriously, but would extend these same feelings toward the flatterers instead and would obey them a lot more than before, and would adopt their manner of living, and would make no effort to hide his association with them. As for that “father”<sup>3524</sup> and the other family members so-called he would never give them a second thought, unless he were by nature a very decent person indeed.

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answers for (*ἐπερέσθαι*, 523D4), as a pursuit after truth—a test beginning we may imagine, with the questions we have seen the specialists fail to ask themselves (533B6-D4): Why they won’t test their hypotheses? Why do they think consistency constitutes knowledge? Why do they stay in the mire of visible cases when all along they are thinking about ideas, since their concrete cases are after all only images of ideas?

<sup>3521</sup> πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἔργον, ὃ ἐταῖρε (D7-8). Here, and indeed and ever since 504C6-D3, the work of the guards has more or less explicitly been identified with the work of the interlocutors. Compare 505E4-6B1 (and n.3035) with 506B2-7.

<sup>3522</sup> παρανομίας που ἐμπίμπλανται (E4), with A<sup>2</sup>M (rather than ἐμπίπλαται AFD). The plural is suggested by the notion that the taking up dialectic, *viz.* by the young, should be carefully supervised. Glaucon immediately recognizes who Socrates is referring to (as we learn below: τοὺς ἀπτομένους, 538C5) and what he is saying about them, while we halt over the nominative plural and have no idea what the παρανομία could be. Shorey, always ready to suavely proclaim that Plato has Socrates confuse his interlocutor in order to make a transition to his own new point, is silent about the deployment of the technique here, where it is we that are confused.

<sup>3523</sup> πάσχειν (E6). Their παρανομία (E4) turns out to be an *affliction*, as the passive ἐμπίμπλανται had already suggested; but it is just this that surprises Glaucon (πῇ μάλιστα:).

<sup>3524</sup> Anarthrous ἔκείνου (538C2) is derogatory.

"You describe what is likely to happen in every detail; but how does this metaphor apply to the men who have taken up the study of dialectic?"

Here's how. As children we all have accepted certain beliefs about the just and the beautiful—beliefs we were brought up believing just as sure as we were brought up under the regime of watchful parents, beliefs we believed and respected on authority.

"Yes, we did."

And aren't there certain other ways of behaving quite contrary to the behavior these beliefs prescribe, pleasurable ways that try to flatter our souls and seduce us into their clutches, but succeed at persuading no one who has any grain of decency in him? Instead, people honor those ancestral beliefs<sup>3525</sup> and treat them as authoritative.

"All that is true."

Alright then. Imagine a young man to whom all that applies. Say the question moves upon him,<sup>3526</sup> "What is beauty?" He answers with what he heard from his authorities, but the ensuing discussion completely refutes with reason it and refutes it many times with many refutations. Argument floors him into<sup>3527</sup> believing that the way he had been told to behave is no more<sup>3528</sup> beautiful than ugly—or no more just than not, nor good rather than bad, and so on with all the other values<sup>3529</sup> he had held in particularly high esteem. How do you think he would act toward those things<sup>3530</sup> in terms of honoring them and taking them on authority?

"Necessarily he would no longer honor them as he had, nor believe them."

Once he no longer accepts these as honorable and familiar<sup>3531</sup> ideas, as he did before, but not as yet has discovered what things truly are just and good and beautiful, is there any other (539) way of life he is likely to verge toward than one that flatters him?

"There is not."

And in the end we will find him lawless, although he was lawful before.<sup>3532</sup>

<sup>3525</sup> πάτρια (D4): for the political sense without the metaphor, cf. 427C2.

<sup>3526</sup> ἐλθὸν ἐρώτημα ἔρηται (D6) and ἐξελέγχῃ ὁ λόγος (D8): The impersonal constructions are striking. They represent the youth's feeling that he is being assaulted. As often, Shorey suavely suffocates the dramatic interest by telling us it is a habit of our Author ("The question is here personified, as the logos so often is," citing passages).

<sup>3527</sup> καταβάλῃ (D9) with mss. Fm and Burnet (καταβάλλῃ D : καταλάβῃ AM). From its primary usage as the take-down in wrestling (*H.Min.374A4, Prot.344C8*) the verb is used of verbal "take-downs" (*Euthyd.277D1*, and cf. Democritus DK68B125 and Protagoras's title καταβάλλοντες λόγοι [S.E.AM 6.60]). Plato is interested in the mental aftermath of the καταβολή, which is always negative (ἀπ' ἐλπίδος, *Euthyphr.15E5*; εἰς ἀπορίαν, *H.Maj.286C5, Phlb.15E4*; εἰς ἀπιστίαν, *Phdo.88C4*). εἰς δόξαν is likewise negative here, regardless what the δόξα is that he has been cast into believing.

<sup>3528</sup> οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (D9): cf. 340B4, 487C3, and nn.357, 2717.

<sup>3529</sup> οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἂ μάλιστα ἥγεν ἐν τιμῇ (D9-E2): Again, the most important things (τὰ μέγιστα). Cf. καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων πέρι (451A7), where νομίμων (cf. n.2279) adds what τιμῇ adds here, with respect to which passage we now understand Socrates's reluctance to waken the sleeping dog (450C6-451B1), especially in response to a challenge stirred up by a Polemarchus.

<sup>3530</sup> αὐτά (E3), rather than ἔκεινα as they had already been called (D4), stresses that they did not change, though he did.

<sup>3531</sup> οἰκεῖα (E5) straddles, in order to weld the analogy with the orphan's family. There is no need with Shorey to reach back to 433E and 443D nor to adduce affinities with Stoic οἰκείωσις.

<sup>3532</sup> παράνομος δῆ (539A3) now reveals Socrates's reason for using the paradoxical term

“Necessarily.”

Now isn’t it perfectly likely that this sort of thing will happen to the novice at conversational argumentation? And doesn’t it call for a good deal of sympathy?

“Even pity, I’d say.”<sup>3533</sup>

And so in order to avoid feeling such pity for your thirty year-olds, isn’t it necessary that you use every precaution in managing the way they take up the practice<sup>3534</sup> of argument?

“Quite so.”

But one measure you can take consistently and rigorously is to keep them from any involvement in dialectical argumentation while they are still young? I doubt it has escaped your notice how the younger lads, upon their first exposure to dialogue, make a game of it reducing it to the gimmickry of refutation and controversy, and how they imitate the people that refuted them by themselves refuting others<sup>3535</sup>—how whomever they bump into they treat him the way puppies treat their toys, dragging them around and ripping them to shreds.

“I see it all too often.”

Once they have refuted many<sup>3536</sup> and themselves been refuted by many, don’t they end up losing all of the convictions they had before? And as a result don’t they draw slander upon themselves and upon philosophy in general, from everyone else?<sup>3537</sup>

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παρανομία above (537E4), by now being juxtaposed with the *non-paradoxical* use of νομίμοις at D3, above.

<sup>3533</sup> καὶ ἐλέου γε (A7). Socrates’s εἰκόνων Glaucon quickly grasps (contrast 537D8). In the shadow of the sustained exercise in dialectic, the shift to an image comes home to him by reminding him of the existential uncertainties and their effects on conscience that he and his brother had confessed at the beginning of Book Two. It is noteworthy that (1) Glaucon is more forgiving than his brother, Adeimantus; that (2) the demoralization of the young man for which Socrates here gives a psychological explanation pertains to his brother Adeimantus and the blame he places on his elders in Book Two rather than to the brother with whom Socrates is speaking, and (3) that Socrates’s attitude of sympathy (συγγνώμης ἄξιον, 539A6) though initially surprising to Glaucon, was something Adeimantus expected, and perhaps felt entitled to, all along (πολλήν που συγγώμην ἔχει, 366C5-6).

<sup>3534</sup> ὀπτέον (A9) has the young men as subject accusative (unexpressed) and Glaucon as the person upon whom the necessity impinges, in the dative. Below, a personal construction will replace the accusatives: the subjects of the act will be nominative but the person on whom it is incumbent to that act will again be expressed in the dative (539E2-540A2). Cf. n. 2994 ad 503E3.

<sup>3535</sup> μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι (B4-5): The process is described without reference to the content of the logos. Instead of an uncertainty whether something is beautiful or ugly (538D8-E3) there is the uncertainty whether the outcome will be personal victory or defeat. We see the young man imitating such an argument in Adeimantus’s speech at the beginning of Book Two (365A4-366B2: for νέους ὄντας here [B1-2] cf. νέων ψυχάς, 365A6). The absence of Adeimantus is beginning to be felt.

<sup>3536</sup> πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοὶ ἐλέγχωσιν (B9). Proleptic πολλούς leaves us in the dark whether to supply ἄλλους or λόγους with it, and thereby again brings home the point that the emphasis has shifted from the student’s initial encounter with impersonal logos (538D6-9) to the attitude he later adopts that what is at stake is the personal victory and defeat of the arguer.

<sup>3537</sup> διαβέβληνται (C3): That is, they become vulnerable to the charge of being “ἄλλόκοτοι” in the eyes of “everyone else” (τοὺς ἄλλους, C3): cf. 487D2 and Appendix 2. That such a slander should have been brought by Adeimantus (487BD), the very person who proved vulnerable to the disillusionment Socrates describes, is both verisimilar and psychologically astute. The passionate escalation is eloquently represented at Phlb.15D8-16A2, and the contagious aspect (cf. αὐτοὶ ἄλλους

“Quite true.”

But once he is older he would not be willing to join in this madness, and instead would imitate the person who wants to participate in dialogue and investigate the truth of things rather than the person who plays at refutation just for the sake of the game.<sup>3538</sup> He will be more moderate in his own<sup>3539</sup> behavior and bring honor to the practice of dialectic rather than its opposite.

“Correct.”

And don’t all the foregoing requirements serve also as measures that will secure this, that only those who are temperate and steady by disposition should be allowed into the study and practice of dialogue, as opposed to the way it is now, where anybody and everybody can approach it<sup>3540</sup> regardless of his suitability?

“Quite so.”

It will suffice that they continue participating in argumentation with unremitting concentration and do only this, as the complement to the exercise in gymnastics for the body, but for a period twice as long.

“Do you mean six years or four?”<sup>3541</sup>

It doesn’t matter—make it five. What matters is what comes next: you’re going to have to send them back down into the cave and require them to take positions of rule in military affairs or civic offices that young men can handle, so that they not fall behind others in their experience.<sup>3542</sup> And in these duties too<sup>3543</sup> (540) you will have the opportunity to test them as to whether they can hold the center despite being drawn in every direction, or whether they start to wobble.

“How long a time do you set down for this?”

Fifteen years. Once they have reached the age of fifty, those of them that have made it through intact and have excelled in all these areas of study and in every kind of action must be led at last to the final thing,<sup>3544</sup> and be compelled to lift the gaze of their soul to it alone, which supplies light to

[B5] and ἐλέγξωσιν / ἐλεγχθῶσι [B9-C1]) is recounted at Ap.23C.

<sup>3538</sup> μιμήσεται (C7) For the comparison and choice between good imitation and bad (B4, *supra*) cf. 500B1-C7.

<sup>3539</sup> αὐτός τε μετριώτερος ... καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τιμιώτερον (C8-D1), echoing, for the sake of the contrast, the construction αὐτοί τε καὶ τὸ ὄλον, from 539C2-3: τε καί is here an abbreviated way of doing what μέν / δέ does.

<sup>3540</sup> ἔρχεται ἐπ’ αὐτό (D6). In contrast with a supervisor choosing who gets to join in (μεταδώσει τις) these operate *sua sponte* and their motive is that of the wooer (for ιέναι ἐπί τι cf. 525C1 and n.333I), 521B4-5, 521A1, 495C3, 489D4).

<sup>3541</sup> ἔξ η τέτταρα λέγεις; (E1): Glaucon doubles (διπλάσια, D10) the “two or three” years of 537B3 readily accepting the greater.

<sup>3542</sup> ἴνα μηδ’ ἐμπειρίᾳ ὑστερῶσι τῶν ἄλλων (E4-5). We have secured their learning and what is left is their ἐμπειρία. The litotes recalls the first mention of ἐμπειρία at 484D6-7. Later, just before Adeimantus’s interruption, that concept was recast as παιδεία τε καὶ ἡλικία (487A8). After the interruption was dealt with, the formulation with the doublet was redone (502C10-D2: μαθήματά τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, D1; ἡλικίας, D2). The age qualification naturally coalesces with the experience qualification, and so by a natural evolution of emphasis, ἡλικία at the end is replaced with ἐμπειρία, which was the original term.

<sup>3543</sup> καὶ ἔτι καί (E5), recalling the important opportunity to watch them at their studies, like καὶ ἄμα καί (537B5) and thus ἴνα καὶ μᾶλλον (537A1).

<sup>3544</sup> πρὸς τέλος ἥδη (540A6). τέλος is notably anarthrous, again pregnant for the Idea of the Good. Cf. 532B2, 530E5.

everything. And once they have seen the good for what it is in itself and can use it as their model and standard they are to spend the rest of their lives enhancing the order<sup>3545</sup> of the city, and of the citizens, and of themselves,<sup>3546</sup> taking turns with their peers. The greater part of their time they will tarry<sup>3547</sup> with philosophy, but when their turn comes around they will move into the political realm and apply themselves to the laborious toil<sup>3548</sup> of ruling, each in his turn and for the sake of the city, viewing the task not as something fine,<sup>3549</sup> but as something necessary, all along the way teaching others to be like them so as to leave replacements for themselves in the city when they make their way off to the Isles of the Blessed and take up habitation there.<sup>3550</sup> You must have the city raise up monuments to them and public festivals too, and if the Pythian so dictates<sup>3551</sup> they must receive the treatment of divinities, and if not then as men happy<sup>3552</sup> and godlike, that have been favored by the gods.

“It is as if you have sculpted perfect statues<sup>3553</sup> of the men who will rule.”

And the women also, Glaucon. Don’t take anything I have said as applying to males more than to females, as long as their inborn characteristics are adequate.

“You are right to correct me, if in fact they will share everything on an equal footing with the men as our narrative explained.”

Well then, do you two<sup>3554</sup> acquiesce and agree about the city and its constitution, that our account is not entirely a pipe-dream but, although difficult, is possible of realization – but only by one

<sup>3545</sup> κοσμεῖν (B1) the climactic term for what the philosopher-king’s ruling consists of.

<sup>3546</sup> καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἴδιώτας καὶ ἔαντούς (A9-B1): The Idea of the Good reveals the good of each, the good of the relations of the eache, and the good of the whole: cf. 530A6-7 and n. 3406.

<sup>3547</sup> διατρίβοντας (B2): cf. διατρίβειν at 519C2.

<sup>3548</sup> ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας (B3). Akin to the term Glaucon had used in mincing overstatement about the men who had no tables and chairs (372D8), here used with warranted emphasis!

<sup>3549</sup> καλόν τι (B4) connotes admiration and therefore almost means enviable. Socrates alludes to the problem that the desideratum that the rulers admire something else more than they admire ruling (520E4-521B10).

<sup>3550</sup> εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντας οἰκεῖν (B6-7). Again (as with διατρίβειν) we meet the language and imagery of 519C5-6 (compare also διατρίβοντες, B2, with 519C2). Elevation is achieved in this envoi to the philosopher kings by the way the governing verbs (ἀποβλέψω [A8] and κοσμεῖν [B1], but especially οἰκεῖν [B7] which ends up being otiose after all that) are postponed by the unremitting and scrupulous qualifications and stipulations done with the participles (ten in number). This will become the predominant style in Book Eight (cf. Appendix 7 for a continuous account of the style and syntax of that amazing Book).

<sup>3551</sup> The erecting of monuments and a reference to the auspices of the Delphic Oracle again serve as the crowning act in the formation of the City. Cf. 414A, 427BC, 461E.

<sup>3552</sup> ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε καὶ θείοις (C1-2): He etymologizes εὐδαιμονία!

<sup>3553</sup> ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς ἀπείργασαι (C3-4) Glaucon returns the compliment Socrates gave him at 361D4-6 when all of this began.

<sup>3554</sup> Reading ξυγχωρεῖτε (D1) with A<sup>2</sup>FM (ξυγχωρεῖν τε AD). Socrates addresses both Glaucon and Adeimantus. His request for agreement indeed looks as far back as the original challenge of Polemarchus (εὐχάρις [D2] referring back to 450D1) and then to Glaucon’s accepting his reply to the challenge (Book Five) and, only later, to Adeimantus’s (Book Six). The verb he uses, συγχωρεῖν, is appropriate to the resistance he had had to face from each of them, separately (whence μή, D2: cf. Smyth §2725). As always, looking farther back introduces a larger closure, and lays a suggestion that we will be reverting to the question raised just before the interruption of Polemarchus, namely, how from the high vantage point of the virtue derived from the ordered city (ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς, 445C4) we could evaluate viciousness through the prism of the disorderly or inferior orders of lesser cities.

way: once<sup>3555</sup> those who are philosophers in truth come into power in the city, whether many or one, and scorn the honors associated with rule as slavish and worthless, but concentrate instead on the right, and on the honors and rewards that derive from it, and on the just as the greatest and most needful element, and once they carry out a thorough instauration of the city they found themselves in by serving justice and extending its influence ...

“How?”<sup>3556</sup>

Once they send everyone in the city who is older than ten (541) into the countryside, sequester the younger children from life with their parents and bring them up in their own ways and laws as we went through them before. This is the way,<sup>3557</sup> you have agreed, that the city and constitution we have described, having most quickly and most easily been established, would be a city with a happy life and a city whose populace, spawned by this constitution, would enjoy the greatest of boons.

“Very much the greatest; and how it could come into existence, if ever it should,<sup>3558</sup> you seem to have articulated completely.”

Would you say that our arguments about the city in question and the man corresponding to it are by now quite enough?<sup>3559</sup> It’s clear I presume what sort of man we mean for him to be.

<sup>3555</sup> ὅταν ... καταφρονήσωσιν (D3ff): The subjunctive with ὅτι, instead of an ideal optative, beginning here and dominating the entire passage, has the force of an ultimatum. In the end the vision of the philosopher kings, though an “ideal,” is finally presented with a future more vivid condition (εὐδαιμονήσειν, ὄντειν: 541A6-7)!

<sup>3556</sup> πῶς; (E4): Glaucon interrupts before Socrates can supply an apodosis to these subjunctives. His interest was piqued by διασκευωρήσωνται (E3), an extremely rare word (*n.b.*, the active does appear in *Ep.3.316A5*). For other interruptions in mid-sentence after which Socrates continues with his construction, as he does here with his subjunctives, cf. 549C7 and 561B6. In the wake of the huge notions they have reached the description of the instauration is vivid, concrete, and unvarnished (540E5-541A4) whereas before the idea of the good was reached, the description (the διαγραφή of 501A2-B7) had been only conceptual and metaphorical. The common complaint that “Plato” is ready to “wipe the slate clean” with a genocide in the style of the Twentieth Century is an over-interpretation of a metaphor (501A3-7), as the concrete life-preserving measures of the present passage reveal.

<sup>3557</sup> οὗτω (541A4) brings forward οὐκ ἄλλῃ ἢ εἴρηται (from D3 above), and with it the main construction, ξυγχωρεῖτε, which now will govern the future infinitives. For αὐτήν τε ... καὶ τὸ ἔθνος, cf. 539C8-D1 and n.3539.

<sup>3558</sup> καὶ ὡς ὃν γένοιτο εἴπερ ποτε γίγνοιτο (A8): With his optatives Glaucon backs off from the vivid to the conceptual modality. It is an index of how deeply he believes what the logos has led him to. It would be premature to compare and contrast his mood at the end of Book Nine (592A5-B6).

<sup>3559</sup> ὅδην (B2), in all its other instances in Plato includes a note of satiety (341C4, *Charm.*153D2; *Euthyphr.*11E2) and therefore a reason for moving on to something else: Socrates has noticed how even Glaucon’s conviction wanes (prev. n.). The “man” Socrates refers to (ἀνδρός, B3) is not the dialectical guardian whose education he has just fashioned, but the man whose personal justice was derived from that of the just city according to the thought-experiment proposed by Socrates at 368C7-369B4. With this back reference Socrates points to the other side of the same moment in the conversation as he had with his summary of the agreements they had reached (540D1-E3). This one points to what ended Book Four and the other one points to what began Book Five and occupied us until now, namely, the challenge of Polemarchus which could only be answered by requiring a higher (philosophical) commitment from the interlocutors (first Glaucon and then Adeimantus, with Glaucon coming back to the rescue at 506D and himself reaching his limit at 532D): it is for the sake of these two, after all, the entire conversation is taking place.

“Clear indeed, and I would answer your question by saying it seems to me complete.”<sup>3560</sup>

END OF BOOK SEVEN

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<sup>3560</sup> καὶ ὅπερ ἐρωτᾶς ... δοκεῖ μοι τέλος ἔχειν (B5) The formality is not otiose, but represents dialectical or dialogical agreement. There are no more questions to ask and no more questions to answer.

## BOOK EIGHT

### D.4: Transition from the Digression back to the Original Project

A climax has been reached, and not reached. The question about the Good has come into view as the basis of all knowledge and value, but the question has not been answered. It is not a question whose answer can be laid out before the questioner, as Adeimantus had insisted Socrates attempt to do for him (504B-6C), but an experience of seeing which the questioner must undergo, with or without help. In his approach to the vision under the guidance of Socrates, Glaucon ran out of gas (532DE). The moment he required Socrates to give him such an answer, Socrates suddenly halted the dialogical ascent and pushed him no further.

Not all was lost. The goal of all studies had at least been identified, and a segue opened up to lead them to the residual problem of deciding which of the guards would be advanced to the higher studies and at what pace (534D3ff). But settling that matter did not move us out of the long shadow cast by Glaucon's failure to reach the Good. Socrates's acquiescence in that failure has introduced a new movement in the action and a new color to the whole proceedings. Up to that point we had always, by hook and crook, moved forward, by going around, through, or over the obstacles, sometimes positing a good enough approach to keep the inquiry going in hopes it might be improved upon or corroborated later. Because of the ultimacy and primacy of the question that has now been passed by, the vitality and the hopes of the inquiry have come up against a limit, perhaps an internal limit, and the spirit of the occasion declines precipitously.

Paradoxically, these heights had only been reached by dint of Polemarchus's essentially anti-philosophical interruption at the beginning of Book Five, when he had encouraged Adeimantus to encourage Glaucon to divert Socrates from the path they were on. Polemarchus's emulous and scandalizing accusation, that in proving that inner virtue is all that matters Socrates had raised intolerable paradoxes, has now been dispensed with. Socrates's response in its characteristic way aroused a still greater paradox than that of the equality of women and the community of wives: the paradox that rule must be handed over to *philosophers* if ever the city is to be ordered well. Glaucon rose to the higher plane of the argument, in Book Five, after he had gotten over the paradoxes stirred up by Polemarchus; and then in Book Six, Adeimantus, after a greater recalcitrance characteristically greater than Glaucon's, came around to accepting it, too.

Soon after Adeimantus accepted the conclusion, he became belligerent and Glaucon interrupted the conversation because he was afraid Socrates was threatening to quit.<sup>3561</sup> We have come to know the two brothers, how Glaucon's hasty enthusiasm might not carry him all the way to the goal,<sup>3562</sup> and how Adeimantus's cynical candor brings with it a burden emulousness and pride.<sup>3563</sup> We may ignore Polemarchus's reaction to what has transpired over the last three Books since he is not a party to the basic dilemma,<sup>3564</sup> but we may not so easily forget Adeimantus's chilly reaction to the way Socrates

<sup>3561</sup> 506C11-D5: cf. n. *ad loc.*

<sup>3562</sup> Cf. Parmenides, frg. I.1 (=28 BI DK): ὦποι ταί με φέρουσιν ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἵκανοι.

<sup>3563</sup> Often the brothers remind me of the more easily edified Simmias and the less easily convinced Cebes of the *Phaedo*.

<sup>3564</sup> Socrates has taken on the task of helping Ariston's sons because they confessed (Adeimantus more candidly than Glaucon) that their father had failed them (362E5)—to do any less than come to their aid would be impious (368A5-C3); Cephalus's son is not a party in that task (this is why he needed to ask Adeimantus, with whom Socrates was not talking, to interrupt Socrates and Glaucon, at the beginning of Book Five), even though his father also failed him, and did so right before our eyes. Cephalus asked Socrates to come down more often to chat with himself before he died and only

sought to frame the question of the Good, nor imagine that Socrates can, either, since in addition to Adeimantus's being an equal partner to Glaucon in the current endeavor (362D6), he is no less a son of Ariston, Socrates's contemporary and fellow Athenian citizen, than Glaucon (367E6-C3). To forget Adeimantus is to forget the goal of the inquiry, which was not to found an ideal state, but to show the truth about the just life so that young men like Adeimantus or Glaucon would choose it.

These then are the matters still unresolved at the end of Book Seven, where Socrates already in effect prepares for a return to the question reached at the end of Book Four by reminding both Glaucon and Adeimantus<sup>3565</sup> that they have now surmounted the fear of paradox and agreed to the viability and the necessity of a state ruled by philosophers, which takes us back to the beginning of Book Five where Polemarchus had stirred things up.

## 2.B.8: Unjust Cities and Injustice in the Man Resumed

(543) Socrates does not speak to us, but does indicate to us that he is continuing to talk to Glaucon.<sup>3566</sup>

Alright then. We can rely on<sup>3567</sup> these matters as agreed, that in the city that is going to be settled in the top<sup>3568</sup> way, the women will be held in common, the children will be held in common, and the entire education will be done in common; likewise their activities will be common, in war and in peace, and among the guards the ones that will be kings are those who have proved to be the best in philosophy and at war.

“All that is agreed.”

But there was more that we agreed to, as I remember:<sup>3569</sup> that once the rulers have been appointed they will lead their soldiers to a place where they will settle into housing<sup>3570</sup> of the sort we

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mentioned any benefit to his son in passing and anonymously (328C6-D6: *n.b.* τοῖσδέ τε τοῖς νεανίσκοις σύνισθι); and even himself forwent to converse with Socrates as soon as he had to begin thinking about things in a new way (331D6-7). At this point he passed the burden of the logos to his son since after all he would be inheriting everything else that was his (D8-9).

Every son suffers just such a mixed legacy from a father who is less instead of more self-aware: it was painful to watch this happen to Polemarchus for the umpteenth time. Once Cephalus leaves we see how well he can acquit himself (331E-336A). Though he fails at defending a conventional argument he had accepted on authority, he succeeds in recognizing that the question is more important than his inability to answer it (334A9, 334B7-9, 334D7-8, 335B13-C6), in disowning the putative authority-figure when his argument turns out to all appearances to be the argument of a tyrant (335C7-10), and in becoming Socrates's ally in the fight against their argument and then against Thrasymachus, who lies in wait for just such young men as him (340A1-C2).

<sup>3565</sup> ξυγχωρεῖτε (540D1), plural.

<sup>3566</sup> By naming him in the address, ὦ Γλαύκων (543A1).

<sup>3567</sup> ὠμολόγηται (A1): the perfect places the previous argument into a past that treats it as completed and presumed (although of course any agreement may be amended if one of the parties to it sees fit to), and adds thereby to the sense that a new phase is now being begun.

<sup>3568</sup> ἄκρως οἰκεῖν (A2): Socrates appropriated the colloquial expression (ἄκρως) for positive use at 459B11 (cf. 459E1): earlier it had been used in doxic praise (405A8, 366E6, 360E7).

<sup>3569</sup> τάδε (B1): With the “first person” demonstrative Socrates takes particular responsibility for the following more particular things he chooses to recall, from the end of Book Three (for ἀγοντες cf. ἥγονμένων, 415D8), namely the controversial asceticism of the guards’ daily life, which had immediately elicited an interruption and criticism from Adeimantus at the beginning of Book Four, itself a recrudescence of the fateful objection Glaucon had made in Book Two (372C).

<sup>3570</sup> οἰκήσεις (B3) Socrates selects this detail to recall the very dramatic moment at 415E4-416A1

described<sup>3571</sup> that would hold no private possessions for any one of them and would be open to all.<sup>3572</sup> And in addition to such quarters as these we also carefully reached an agreement about what possessions<sup>3573</sup> they should have.

“Yes, I remember that we were thinking none of them should possess any of the things that the others<sup>3574</sup> do, as things are now, but that in their role as athletes of war<sup>3575</sup> and guards they should receive pay from the others for their guarding service to cover their board for the year, for which in return they must watch over themselves and the rest of the city.”

You say rightly what we agreed to. But come—since we have finished our policy regarding that,<sup>3576</sup> let's recall what we were saying when we were diverted onto the path that brought us here, so that we might pick up where we left off.

“It's not difficult to remember,” he said. “Then, just as now, you were discussing what to talk about once you had completed the discovery of the best city, and you were saying that you posited<sup>3577</sup> the city you had described to be a good city, as well as the man who resembled it—though to all appearances you were able to tell us about an even better city and a better man to tell us about—[\(544\)](#) but<sup>3578</sup> that the other forms of government are flawed in that they differ from this correct<sup>3579</sup> model. The types of government worth discussing and observing for their flaws were four in

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(cf. nn.), where his description of the living accommodations of the guards (*εύνάς*, E4) recalled his description of the simple life of the original city at 372AB to which Glaucon had reacted so strongly; and how Glaucon in a sense corrected his use of the term *εύναί* by saying *οἰκήσεις δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν*, E8, eliciting from Socrates a distinction between what a soldier needs and what a businessman gets (*στρατιωτικάς γε [sc. οἰκήσεις] ἀλλ’ οὐ χρηματιστικάς*, E9), which he then explained with his powerful image of sheep and wolves (416A). Glaucon's acquiescence in the conclusion (*πάνυ γε*, 417B9) after the resistance he had shown at 372ff, marked one of the more dramatic moments in the evening so far, and served as an index of the progress that had been made.

<sup>3571</sup> Recalling the very beautiful page with which Book Three ends, 416D3-417B8.

<sup>3572</sup> ίδιον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲνὶ ἔχούσας, κοινὰς δὲ πᾶσι (B3-5) refers in particular to the prohibition of private areas within one's quarters and the hoarding of a *ταμιεῖον* (416D6-7).

<sup>3573</sup> *κτήσεις* (B5) recalls the discussion about the evil effect of possessions (416E4-417B6), which in particular aroused the interruption of Adeimantus.

<sup>3574</sup> *οἱ ἄλλοι* (B8): the others in the city (cf. *τῶν ἄλλων* below at C2), not the rulers of other cities or “rulers in the real world” (Slings) else *τῶν ἄλλων* would be. Glaucon is recalling Adeimantus's invidious objection to Socrates's rule against possessions, 419A5 (cf. nn. *ad* 419A5-420A1 and n. 1860 *ad* 420A3).

<sup>3575</sup> *ἀθλητάς* (B8): the metaphor was first used at 404A10, then repeated at 422C8, and then recalled at 521D5.

<sup>3576</sup> *ἐπεὶ τοῦτ’ ἀπετελέσαμεν* (C4-5): the antecedent is the construction of the best city which has just been completed once again, in the sense of completing the guardians' *ἐπιστήμη* to round out their *φύσις* and *μελέτη* (cf. n. 1743 *ad* 412B2-3).

<sup>3577</sup> *τιθείης* (C9) optative governed by *λέγων*, itself in secondary sequence after *τοὺς λόγους ἐποιοῦ*. The present optative represents an imperfect of citation (cf. 350C7 and n. 586). With *καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν ἐκείνη ὅμοιον* Glaucon is “remembering” Socrates's words at the very beginning of Book Five (449A1-5), *ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοίνυν τοιαύτην πόλιν ... καλῶ καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον... .*

<sup>3578</sup> *ἄλλ’ οὖν δή* ([544A1](#)) resumes the leading construction after the self-interruption. It corresponds to the *δέ* at 449A2, in the way it answers the foregoing *μέν* (543C9, cf. 449A1). The intervening proviso alludes to the entire discussion of Books Five through Seven only to dismiss it, despite its stunning content. All of that is after all strictly irrelevant to the original and still-outstanding task of the discussion.

<sup>3579</sup> For *όρθή* (A2) and the implication that others, as other, are *eo ipso* *ἡμαρτημένας*, cf. 449A3.

number,<sup>3580</sup> you said, as I remember, as well as the types of men that correspond to them, and that we should discuss them so that once we have seen all of the types of men and we have agreed about which of them was the most virtuous and which was the most vicious, we could go on to investigate whether the best of these men was also happiest and the worst the most miserable, or whether things were otherwise than this. Then, the moment I was asking you what were the four constitutions you had in mind,<sup>3581</sup> Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted. You shifted to their subject<sup>3582</sup> and that's how we got to where we are now."

You've remembered everything, said I.

"Alright then just as in wrestling, resume the same hold<sup>3583</sup> and try to say what you were about to say when I asked you that question."

Let's just see if I can.

"I really want to hear<sup>3584</sup> what you are saying the four constitutional forms are."

You won't have a hard time getting to hear them.<sup>3585</sup> The ones I have in mind each in fact have a reputation,<sup>3586</sup> as follows. First<sup>3587</sup> of all the one that most people<sup>3588</sup> praise: the Cretan and Laconian type of constitution. Second and second also in praise is the one called oligarchy, a constitution fraught

<sup>3580</sup> τέτταρα εἴδη (A3): The ways of error are indefinite in number but four were worth singling out (άξιον, 445C6-7), though no criterion was given, and none will be.

<sup>3581</sup> ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου (A8): He had asked, ποίας δὲ ταύτας; (449A6).

<sup>3582</sup> Socrates's ἀναλαβεῖν (B2) corresponds to Polemarchus and Adeimantus's ὑπολαβεῖν (B1).

<sup>3583</sup> λαβήν (B5), of a wrestling hold resumed when the match resumes after an interruption. The metaphor (cf. *Phdr*.236B, *Phlb*.13D, *Leg*.682C) became almost inevitable after ἀναλαβών (B2) had called it out of its hiding place in ὑπέλαβε (B1).

<sup>3584</sup> καὶ μήν ... γε (B9) again specifies just where he wants Socrates to start.

<sup>3585</sup> οὐ χαλεπῶς ... ἀκούσῃ (C1), echoes Glaucon's οὐ χαλεπόν (from 543C7) but more importantly responds to (ἐπιθυμῷ, B9), in which (pace Adam) there is no “rescinding of a polemical tone” suggested by the wrestling metaphor, but a frank confession of desire. We have the usual back and forth that announces and also inaugurates a new phase of the conversation, as follows: A: “Please tell me”—B: “I will try”—A: “I desire it so much even a try would be very welcome”—B. “That makes things much easier for me.” Such passages as these (367E6-368C3, 372E2-8, 427D1-E6, 435C4-D9, 449B6-451B9, 471C2-473B3, 506B2-E7) announce the modality of the conversation, that what is being said is being said in sincerity, candor, and reciprocal partnership (including χάρις) in the face of ignorance and uncertainty, and thereby indicate how the conversation should be taken by the eavesdropping reader. Such indications are universally ignored by Aristotle (as witness his criticism of this argument in *Politics* Book Five, 1316A1-B27), and typically ignored by the commentators that came after.

<sup>3586</sup> καὶ ὄνοματα ἔχουσιν (C2). ὄνομα ranges semantically from the very name (545B6) to the reputation true or false (here). Socrates's point is that Glaucon will recognize the forms he has in mind, as the modifier ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινουμένη next stresses. Cf. also the distinction ἐπαινουμένη / καλουμένη below (C4).

<sup>3587</sup> τε after ἡ (C2) indicates there are others to come.

<sup>3588</sup> τῶν πολλῶν (C2) is ambiguous as to value, suggesting either a positive (most) or a negative (*hoi polloi*) credential for this form of πολιτεία.

with evils.<sup>3589</sup> Next,<sup>3590</sup> the one that diverges from this and arises next in the order:<sup>3591</sup> democracy. And then<sup>3592</sup> comes tyranny, the whopper of the bunch that surpasses<sup>3593</sup> them all, the fourth and last disease that a city can suffer.<sup>3594</sup> Or perhaps you see some other type of constitution, distinct and salient? As for dynasties<sup>3595</sup> and purchased monarchies and other such arrangements, they fall somewhere in between these.<sup>3596</sup> One finds them no less among the foreign races than among the Greeks.<sup>3597</sup>

“I have certainly heard of some strange ones.”

Now do you recognize that likewise among men<sup>3598</sup> there must exist the same number of types as

<sup>3589</sup> δευτέρως ἐπαινούμενη (C4): Second best praise hardly comports with the description sandwiched in as if by a second voice (συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία), a participial phrase both jaunty and weighty. It is given a berth by the hyperbaton of πολιτεία.

<sup>3590</sup> τε (C5) virtually an ordinal, again. The dative ταύτῃ with διάφορος frees it from having its evaluative connotation, which is reserved for the ironic climax, πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα (see below). Its meaning here relies entirely on the dative. Though we can decide from the subsequent context how best to translate it, the main point is to see that at this moment its meaning is unclear.

<sup>3591</sup> ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη (C5-6), suggesting not just subsequent occurrence in a list, but an evolutionary succession of constitutions, an idea already mildly suggested but not insisted upon by διάφορος (as connoting a “parting of ways” or a “point of departure”). Socrates similarly presumed, without apology or explanation, that there is a μετάβασις from one to the next, the first time he suggested the subject (ἐξ ἀλλήλων μεταβαίνειν, 449B1 and n. 2250), where the interruption of Polemarchus mooted—or as we can now say, postponed—the question why.

<sup>3592</sup> On infixd δή (C6) announcing the final item of a list cf. n.38 ad 328B4-8.

<sup>3593</sup> Reading διαφέρουσα (C7), with Stobaeus. The unanimous reading of AFDM (διαφεύγουσα) seems impossible. Ficinus's *ab his omnibus differens* corroborates Stobaeus (cf. his *quae ab hic differt* for διάφορος above). The etymological figure with διάφορος (“different”), and with πασῶν τούτων moves into the role of a capping or climactic term for ending the list; and yet with γενναία and the genitive of superiority, the approbative denotation of the verb (“surpassing”) is also courted – and so it is a pun.

<sup>3594</sup> ἔσχατον πόλεως νόσημα (C7): The evaluative participial phrase that was slipped into the identification of the second constitution (συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν, C4-5) is here outdone by an appositive similarly sententious and metaphorical for the last constitution. ἔσχατον (C7) not only indicates that the list is a genetic sequence and that this is its final stage, but also, dispelling all irony, that the sequence is a devolution. The entire list is animated by a sardonic attitude that nevertheless refuses to acknowledge itself.

<sup>3595</sup> To include the δυναστεῖαι (D1) among the types of state (if we understand this type to be characterized by the provision of hereditary rule, by which in part Aristotle distinguishes it from others, *Pol.* 1292A4-7) would in fact work at cross-purposes with the special use Socrates will be making of the father-son relationship in his description of how the corresponding men evolve.

<sup>3596</sup> μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν (D2) is perfect nonsense, as τι and πού perhaps admit. The two new types raise an entirely new issue (how to manage succession) with a doublet of alternatives (succession by birth and by purchase). Between which of the narrated four types could these two, or this issue, possibly be placed? The reduction of many institutional forms to four was likewise finessed at the end of Book Four with a swift and imperious construction in μέν / δέ / δέ: ἐν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἄπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας, τέτταρα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄττα ὥν καὶ ἄξιον λόγου (445C6-7).

<sup>3597</sup> εὖροι δ' ἂν τις (D3-4): The purpose of the remark is to dismiss a far-flung and tedious collection of constitutions in the manner of an Herodotean περίπλους. Again Socrates makes a weak argument. He wants these four and that's that.

<sup>3598</sup> We may take the genitive ἀνθρώπων (D6) to be in prolepsis and governed by τρόπον, or we

the number of constitutions? Or do you imagine that constitutions are born out of oak and stone<sup>3599</sup> somehow, and not out of the personalities that are found in the cities, which force everything else that could go either way to gravitate in their own direction?

“I imagine them coming from no other place than there.”

So that if the types of city are five, then the ways individual men’s souls are set up<sup>3600</sup> would also be five.

“Go on.”

Now the man who resembles the aristocratic<sup>3601</sup> constitution we have already described, the one we have declared to be good and just<sup>3602</sup> in the correct sense.

“So we have.”

(545) Should we then next describe the inferior types, the man emulous of victory and of honor whose soul is set<sup>3603</sup> in a manner corresponding to the Laconic constitution,<sup>3604</sup> and the oligarchic type in turn and the democratic and the<sup>3605</sup> tyrannical, so that once we have seen what the most unjust man is like we can compare him to the most just man and complete our investigation of the question about how unmixed justice stands in comparison with unmixed injustice, as to the happiness or misery of the man who possesses the one and the other? That way we can decide whether to believe Thrasyphorus and pursue injustice<sup>3606</sup> in our lives, or believe the argument that is emerging in the may take it more loosely as a genitive of the sphere (as *Phdo.* τί δὲ τῶν καλῶν, 78D10).

<sup>3599</sup> ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας (D7-8): The phrase is proverbial since Homer (cf. *Paroim.Gr.2.158* [=M.III.40] and n. *ad loc.*). Its function is to dismiss irrelevancy, often the humble details of mere humanity, in order to get down to business or to end things before they drag on too long (*Hes.Theog.35*). For the undefended “axiom” that society and its ways are essentially human compare 435E1-436A4, where the inverse is dismissed as laughable (435E3). The postulate is another creature of Plato/Socrates’s strategy to present a subjective psychological content in objective political or historical form. Though Adam accepts this distinction (cf. his note *ad ἐφεξῆς*, 544C5), he goes too far by alleging (here, and again *ad 543Aff*) that Plato has a Philosophy of History that rests on psychology. ποθεν, like τι and που above, indicates Socrates is speaking loosely.

<sup>3600</sup> κατασκευαί (E5), repeated from 449A4 where it stood toward ψυχαί as διοικήσεις stood toward πόλεις.

<sup>3601</sup> ἀριστοκρατία (E7); the term is brought forward from the end of Book Four (445D6).

<sup>3602</sup> With ἀγαθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον (E8) Socrates refers back to the man whose soul is ordered according to the conclusion reached in Book Four, δίκαιον being the attribute that reaches the other three virtues while ἀγαθόν represents all the others, whether alongside it or as superintended by it. Superlatives are notably absent: the man is just good. Cf. 549C3.

<sup>3603</sup> έστωτα (545A3) replaces the metaphor κατασκευή (544E5) with the metaphor κατάστασις.

<sup>3604</sup> τὴν Λακωνικὴν (A3): With the proper adjective he once again skirts using a term for this species of πολιτεία (and only this type: cf. 544C2-7), though he does begin to characterize it by characterizing the source of whatever characteristic it has, namely, the personality corresponding to it (ὁ φιλόνικός τε καὶ φιλότιμος, A2-3).

<sup>3605</sup> Reading τόν (A4), with mss. ADM and modern editors (om. F). The reappearance of the article (after its omission with ὄλιγαρχικόν [mitigated by αὐτόν] and δημοκρατικόν) is climactic (as was δή at C6 above) and sets up this last term as the sole antecedent to τὸν ἀδικώτατον (A5). Riddell’s assertion (§237) that the appearance or absence of the article in such a series is “completely” irregular is an overstatement.

<sup>3606</sup> τὸν ἀδικώτατον (A5): That tyranny is the worst and the most unjust regime is assumed without argument, revealing that the purpose here is not to find which is worst but to hate it. The reference to Thrasyphorus refers specifically to his remarks at 344A3-7, where he attempts to scandalize and thrill his audience by praising τυραννίς as ἀδικία τελεωτάτη.

course of our discussion<sup>3607</sup> and pursue justice.

“That is exactly what we should do.”

Should we proceed as we did the first time, by looking for the character first<sup>3608</sup> in the constitutions rather than in the individuals on the grounds it is easier to see there,<sup>3609</sup> and investigate first the philotimic constitution (I know no current term for it other than this:<sup>3610</sup> let's call it timocracy or timarchy<sup>3611</sup>) and then in comparison with this investigate the man of like character; and next to describe oligarchy and the oligarchic man; and again, by using democracy as a reference, to contemplate the democratic man; and then fourth to arrive at the city ruled by a tyrant and having beheld its nature to direct our attention in turn to the tyrannical soul, all in the attempt to become adequate judges<sup>3612</sup> of the matter we have set before ourselves to decide?

“No one could fault<sup>3613</sup> how reasonable it is to proceed in this way, namely, to view them and then<sup>3614</sup> to judge between them.”

### 2.B.8.a: Timocracy and the Timocratic Man

Alright then let's proceed, and try to say how timocracy might evolve out of aristocracy.<sup>3615</sup> Or is this much<sup>3616</sup> true without qualification, that when any constitution, no matter what kind, undergoes an

<sup>3607</sup> τῷ νῦν προφανομένῳ λόγῳ (B1), dialectical φαίνεσθαι (334A10 and n.210) compounded with προ-. For the compound cf. Charm. I 73A3.

<sup>3608</sup> πρότερον (B3): Though according to the order of genesis the cities derive from the personality types (γίγνεσθαι, 544D8), the order of the inquiry will proceed in the opposite direction, from state to man. The vicious circle is accepted without cavil, as it was in Book Two (368D5 and n.940). Cf. Appendix 7.

<sup>3609</sup> ἐναργέστερον (B4), expressing in one word what had been recommended at 368C-369A3.

<sup>3610</sup> ὅλλο (B6), adverbial: it does not assert that φιλότιμος is the only current term he knows, but that apart from this term he has nothing to call it by that would recommend itself by virtue of being current. The theoretical validity of the term he uses has nevertheless been shown (A2-3 and n. 3604).

<sup>3611</sup> ᾧ (primum, B6): The abrupt asyndeton indicates that the choice between -κρατία and -αρχία is merely a matter of terminology. He suggests we imitate either of the terms used for the other πολιτεῖαι, whether ἀριστοκρατία (544E7) or ὀλιγαρχία (544C4). The τιμ- element comes from φιλότιμος (B5), itself an abbreviation of φιλόνικόν τε καὶ φιλότιμον at A2-3.

<sup>3612</sup> κριταί (C5) recalls the words of the challenge and instruction (here referred to with προυθέμεθα) that Glaucon placed before Socrates at 361D3 viz., κρίνονται ὥποτερος αὐτοῖν εὐδαιμονέστερος (cf. also κρίσιν, 361D5). The theme is picked up with great emphasis below (576D7 and n.4256).

<sup>3613</sup> κατὰ λόγον γέ τοι (C6), a rare combination of particles. Glaucon acknowledges the logic of the proposal (γέ) with a compliant and supportive tone (τοι). After all, Socrates's proposal resembles his own (at 360Eff) in all salient points. Compare τὸν ἀδικώτατον ιδόντες ὄντιθῶμεν τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ (A5) with διαστησόμεθα τὸν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον (360E2) // ἄκρατος (A7) with τέλεον (360E5) // ικανοὶ κριταὶ γενέσθαι (B5) with οἵ τε ἐσόμεθα κρίνοι ὥρθως (360E2-3).

<sup>3614</sup> τε ... καί (C6).

<sup>3615</sup> γένοιτ' ἄν (C9): A “genealogical” approach that assumes one state evolves from another is now formally adopted without methodological justification or objection, despite the fact that the order of genesis was above said to be from personality to state. The assumption has been suggested above but never formally proposed (cf. μεταβάλλοι ἐξ ἀλλήλων, 449B1; διάφορος καὶ ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη, 544C5-6 [with n.3591]; and ἔσχατον, 544C7, [with n.3594]). Has the notion been adopted merely as for the sake of having a program? Cf. 545E1 and n.3623.

<sup>3616</sup> μέν (C9) is *solitarium*.

alteration,<sup>3617</sup> the alteration arises entirely<sup>3618</sup> from the part of it that rules, due to faction arising within it, whereas conversely as long as that part maintains a consensus within itself, even if the part is quite small, the constitution can't be disturbed?<sup>3619</sup>

“Yes, that's true without qualification.”

So then how will our<sup>3620</sup> constitution undergo change? How, that is, will the helpers and the rulers<sup>3621</sup> fall into faction against each other and amongst themselves?<sup>3622</sup> Shall we take our lead from Homer and pray to the Muses to tell us “How first<sup>3623</sup> did faction befall it?”<sup>3624</sup> and then claim that they are answering us in their haughty way with tragic elevation, treating us as children and putting us on, as if their answer were serious?

“And what would that sound like?”

(546) Like this:“Hard it is to change a city founded so firm as yours; but since all that came to be will meet its end, here, too,<sup>3625</sup> an arrangement<sup>3626</sup> so fine as this cannot abide forever, but will dissolve. The

<sup>3617</sup> μεταβάλλει (D1) begins to configure the becoming as a shift from one stable form over to (μετα-) another stable form: this was the formulation initially used in Book Five (449B1).

<sup>3618</sup> αὐτοῦ (D1), as again at D2.

<sup>3619</sup> κινηθῆναι (D3) in the sense of political disturbance, not the κίνησις (or γένεσις) of Ionian φυσιολογία. Having posited the steps along the path of change Socrates now broaches the mechanism of change. The assertion that “faction” begins as dissension within the ruling group is true by definition: cf. 465B.

<sup>3620</sup> ἡμῖν (D5) the ethical dative of theoretical involvement (cf.371A8 and n.990), moving from the consideration of political change in general to the question presently before us, the shift of *our πολιτεία* from aristocracy to timocracy.

<sup>3621</sup> οἱ ἐπίκουροι καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες (D6): This terminology, distinguishing between the rulers among the guards and the guards who support them, was adopted at 414B1-6.

<sup>3622</sup> πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτούς (D7): We may guess the meaning is that two kinds of faction could take place within the ruling group given the special structure of the ruling class: a faction either between the two sub-classes or within that of the rulers themselves.

<sup>3623</sup> πρῶτον (E1): That the first event (merely the *initium*) should also be the ἀρχή (the principle cause of all that ensues)—i.e., that things are what they are because of where they came from—is one of the presuppositions of the mythological mode and will forever maintain a place in heaven for the work of the traditional Muses. Socrates and Plato revert to the old way here. A justification for the genealogical method Socrates has adopted is not forthcoming, though his extraordinary characterization of the Muses as haughty and playful (E1-3) immediately evinces Plato’s sensitivity to the problem (we may compare the tone of *Soph.*242C). Socrates and Plato have in fact told us that the true Music is philosophy (499D4). It will be entirely in Plato’s manner to supply us with the means to adjudicate between the relative virtues of myth and logos before too long (cf. ἀληθινὴ Μοῦσα, 548B8; and λόγου μουσικὴ κεκραμένου, 549B6). Meanwhile the heavy style of the Muses continues to give the problem a prominent mask.

<sup>3624</sup> ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος (D7-8) refers to the sort of thing we see at *Iliad* 16.113 (ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔμπεσε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν) and 1.6 (ἐξ οὐδὲ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε) where note στάσις is done with διαστήτην. But the transition is so characteristic of epic that we need not search for any specific passage or closest parallel.

<sup>3625</sup> Δέ in οὐδέ (546A2) is illative, as often.

<sup>3626</sup> To characterize the aristocracy as a σύστασις (A3; cf. συστάσαν, A1), as opposed to a κατάστασις for instance, in itself makes it vulnerable to λύσις.

dissolution is on this<sup>3627</sup> wise: not only in the world of earthbound plants<sup>3628</sup> but also for earth-roaming animals there come times of fertility and times of infertility, for soul as well as body, whenever the solstices and nadirs of the planets in their circular paths attach to one of them or another, now short of life to the short-lived and then opposite to the opposite.<sup>3629</sup> In the case of your race the times ideal for rich progeny and of barrenness, those men, though they be wise, whom you nurtured to be the city's leaders, will have no advantage from reason and sense to hit upon. They will miss these moments and soon or late will spawn children at a time they should not. Now the portion of the divine race<sup>3630</sup> that is begot has a cycle whose length is well set by a perfect number,<sup>3631</sup> but for the human it is just when first augmentations, dominant and dominated, having attained three lengths and four termini, consisting of things alike and things unlike and of things waxing and things waning, show themselves to be assignable and expressible in terms of one another. Of which the first ratio of one to the other a third again as great, linked to a five-some, yields a pair of harmonies when increased threefold, the one a product of equals multiplied by one hundred and the other equal in length if measured the one way but longer if measured the other, the one a hundred of the numbers got from the rational diameter of the five-some less one in each case, and less two if irrational, and the other a hundred of the cubes of the triad. Entirely geometrical is this number, and as such it holds the key to this sort of thing, the better as opposed to the worse times of birth. When these<sup>3632</sup> your guards do not know, but breed bride with groom inopportune, neither gifted nor lucky<sup>3633</sup> will the offspring be; and from this litter the forebears will install in office of rule the best of them, unworthy though they be; these in turn will enter the seats their fathers occupied and us, for the first time, they will now neglect, guards though they are, estimating their involvement in music at less than its worth, and second gymnastic, whence your young will turn out less cultured for you.<sup>3634</sup> Subsequently in ruling they will lose their edge<sup>3635</sup> at

<sup>3627</sup> ήδε (A4). The programmatic direction is declamatory in tone, more so than Socrates's was (A1). Cf. Hdt. I.1.

<sup>3628</sup> οὐ μόνον (A4): As at the start (χαλεπὸν μέν, A1), the movement of A4-7ff is from gnomic foil (οὐ μόνον ...) to the case at hand (plants / animals—animals / γένος ὑμέτερον).

<sup>3629</sup> The accumulation of four antitheses (A4-7: ἐγγείοις / ἐπιγείοις – φορά / ἀφορία – ψυχῆς / σωμάτων – βραχυβίοις / ἐναντίοις) is relieved, if relief it can be called, by a lapidary phrase consisting of a nominative, a dative, a genitive and an accusative, all anarthrous, and all tied together by the verb that follows them in hyperbaton: περιτροπαὶ ἐκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς συνάπτωσι (A6). This is the σεμνότης of the gods declaiming truth to mere mortals (cf. 617D6-E5 and n.).

<sup>3630</sup> Θείω μέν / ἀνθρωπείω δέ (B3-4), a third move from foil (θεῖον) to focus or cap (ἀνθρώπειον).

<sup>3631</sup> The ensuing description of the nuptial number makes no attempt to be clear; on the question how it should be clarified cf. N.Bloessner (*Abh.Geist.Sozial.Akad.Wiss.Lit.* [1997.1] Stuttgart, 1997). Perhaps it would suffice to say that it describes what the gods see when they look through their end of the telescope; but that what we must try to see, looking through our end, is why our προθυμία might fail, as Glaucon's did at 532D2-E3.

<sup>3632</sup> ὅς (D1): Connection done by the relative in order to make the declaration as longwinded as possible. Cf. C1 above and D3 below.

<sup>3633</sup> οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ' εὐτυχεῖς (D2). It seems the Muses have been listening to Gorgias: the rhyme proves it's true.

<sup>3634</sup> ἀμουσότεροι (D7): Music is first in the paideia and gymnastic second, but their balance is crucial to the value of each, and this is what ἀμουσότεροι infers: there is no “want of point” (Jowett *ad loc.*). Madvig's conj. τε is therefore needless, and Jowett's criticism that Spartans and Cretans (his paradigm of timocracy) were not negligent of gymnastics not only presumes Socrates is attempting to be historical, but also wrongly identifies this early stage in the process with the final result of the change, which is reached below, at 547B8ff.

<sup>3635</sup> οὐ πάνυ φυλακικοί (D8), in speaking of a degree of “guardliness” alludes to the argument made with Glaucon at 412C7-10 (γεωργικώτατοι: cf. n.1748). That music as the “guardian” was reached with Adeimantus at 423D8-E6 (and will be, again: 549B6 and n.3682).

assaying Hesiod's division, which we also share, of the races gold and silver, bronze and iron. (547)  
Instead, iron will mate with silver and bronze with gold<sup>3636</sup> and variation will infect the scene and  
inharmonious irregularity,<sup>3637</sup> which gives birth wherever it occurs to war and enmity. Lo, such is the  
source of faction,<sup>3638</sup> wherever it occurs."

"If they say this we'll declare their response to be correct."

How could they be any less than correct, being Muses?<sup>3639</sup>

"Well what do the Muses say comes next?"

"Faction born among them (they will say), the two pairs of races pulled,<sup>3640</sup> as you might imagine,  
the iron and bronze toward moneymaking and the acquisition of land and house, and gold and

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<sup>3636</sup> χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ σιδηροῦν (547A1): In the original version of the myth (414D1-5C7) there were four metals for three classes; only now does their fourness become operant, as providing an even match of crossbreeding, two against two: hence the duals below (B2-7).

<sup>3637</sup> ἀνομοιότης ἐγγενήσεται καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος (A3): ruination, all brought on because the fit between the elements (*ἀρμονία*) is imperfect, is here underscored by the series of privative *ἀν-* prefixes arranged in an alliterative chiasm.

<sup>3638</sup> ταύτης τοι γενεῆς (A4-5) a first hemistich of a dactylic hexameter, sententious and satirical, not necessarily borrowed from 11.6.211 or 20.241.

<sup>3639</sup> Μούσας γε ούσας (A7): Socrates makes a joke based on their high-sounding rhetoric (545E1-3). Even the fundamentalist cannot rely on the veracity of the Muses. Everybody knows what they said the first time a mortal heard them speak: ίδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὄμοια, | ίδμεν δ' εὐτ' ἔθέλοιμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσσασθαι (Hes.Theog.27-8).

<sup>3640</sup> εἰλκέτην (B2): The dual resumes the high and stately tone of the Muses. The speculative question, How will the ideal state be shaken? (κινηθήσεται, 545D5) was immediately replaced with a request that the Muses tell us how the process began (ἐμπεσε, 545E1), a shift to the epic "epistemology" that tells why things are as they are by telling where they came from (cf.545E1 and n.3623). Hence the imperfects εἰλκέτην and ἥγέτην (547B2, 7).

silver,<sup>3641</sup> and the other in turn, those golden and silver,<sup>3642</sup> since they felt no poverty but are rich by their inner nature,<sup>3643</sup> tried to lead the souls of the guards toward virtue and the original<sup>3644</sup> state of affairs. After forcing and pulling against each other they arrived<sup>3645</sup> at a compromise by coming half-way.<sup>3646</sup> The city's land and homes they would take over<sup>3647</sup> as their private possessions, while those who previously had been protected by them as<sup>3648</sup> friends reciprocating with their support, they would now reduce to the role of slaves, as dependents within their compounds and as serfs<sup>3649</sup> on their lands, while they themselves would look after war as well as keep an eye on<sup>3650</sup> them."

"This shift does seem to me to have its origin here."

And would you agree that this governmental form is something in between aristocracy and

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<sup>3641</sup> ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν γῆς τε κτῆσιν καὶ οἰκίας χρυσίου τε καὶ ἀργύρου (B3-4). The list presents the cause (*χρηματισμός*) and its effect (*κτῆσις*) linked by *τε* (*primum*) and elaborated in a sub-list of objective genitives done with two pairs notably configured as A<sub>1</sub> καὶ A<sub>2</sub> B<sub>1</sub> *τε* (*alterum*) καὶ B<sub>2</sub>.

It is not gainful occupation that they desire but its result (just as at *Symp.*205C4-*χρηματισμός* is listed as the desire for external goods alongside φιλογυμναστία and φιλοσοφία as the desires for somatic and psychic goods). They will not become businessmen (D5-6) but feudal lords (C2-3). Specifying wealth with the pair "land and house" recalls the first items listed in Adeimantus's objection at 419A5-6, a list that itself looks back at 416D4-417A5. Both those lists ended with gold and silver (416E4ff; 419A8-10), and so that pair is not out of place in this passage, but are its primary motive. This was suggested by *τε* after χρύσιον replacing καί before it, so as to set up a comparison with the same pair of "metals" as they inhere in the souls of the better guards (cf. 416E5-6).

This infix *τε* is not the resumptive *τε* of 412B3-4, 430A6-B2; *Crit.*107C3-4; *Leg.*93IB5-C1; nor the *τε* that appends exegesis (cf. Denniston, 502) as at 361B2, 495A7-8; *Leg.*633C1, 848A4-6; *Soph.*219D5-6; *Symp.*186A3-7; nor the merely redundant *τε* (doubled by καί) that reinforces the relatedness of two items, as at 357C5-7 (cf. n. *ad loc.*), 407B8-C1, 431B9-C1, 519B2, 611B2-3; *Crat.*407E6-8A1; *Leg.*733E1-2; *Meno* 75C8-9; *Symp.*206D3-5; *Tht.*149D1-3, 156B2-6, 176C3-4; *Tim.*28B7-8, 31B4; nor is it the *τε* that slows the pace just before closure as at 370D9-10; *Leg.*665C2-3, 735B1-2, 738C6-7, 842E1-3, 896C9-D1; *Polit.*288B2-4; *Tim.*24A7-8, 43B2-4, 92C8. The true parallels are *Crit.*114E10-5A1; *Leg.*733D8, 896D5-7, 899B3-4, 956E1-7(bis); *Tim.*42E8-9, 46D2-3, 80A3-4, 87D1-2—where almost always it introduces a new category of items. καί is varied with *τε* at *Tim.*42E8-9 and at *Leg.*880D6-7 (if indeed the καί after ταξίαρχοι is to be omitted: cf. Engl. *ad loc.*), merely to prevent ugly sing-song.

<sup>3642</sup> χρυσίου τε καὶ ἀργύρου (B4) is echoed by τὸ χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν (B5). This is the first instance of a figure I call "astigmatism" employed several times in the sequel, a figure that embodies the way the outlying range of the words' meanings needs to be redrawn when the wrong ideas begin to take over. Cf. φυλακῆς (C4) and ἀπλοῦνς / ἀπλουστέρους (E2-3) and nn.3650 and 3659. My optical metaphor is inspired by Riddell's metaphor of "binocular vision" by which he describes binary structure (§204).

<sup>3643</sup> φύσει ὄντε πλουσίω (B5-6). The Muses have been listening to Socrates: 416E4-6.

<sup>3644</sup> ἀρχαίαν (B6) blends the respectability of age with the prestigious notion of the source, in a way that continues to illustrate the Muses' antique and untheoretical way of thinking.

<sup>3645</sup> ὠμολόγησαν (B8): punctual aorist marking the definitive moment in a process so far described with imperfect indicatives and present participles. The new state once reached can then be described with presents and perfects (547D4-C2) using the present throughout except for the two perfects at the end [C1-2]).

<sup>3646</sup> εἰς μέσον (B8) is idiomatic for compromise (e.g. *Prot.*338A1), but also emphasizes what has already been suggested (B2-7), that the timocratic regime is unstably poised between the regime of the λογιστικόν (aristocracy) and the regime of the ἐπιθυμητικόν (oligarchy, already presumed to be epithumetic just below: 548A5-6), a suggestion corroborated by the expression ἐν μέσῳ τις (C6 and D2), and by his choice to describe it by its relation to them. The corollary implication, that this halfway

oligarchy?

“Quite so.”

So once it makes the shift, what will things be like under the new regime?<sup>3651</sup> Isn’t it clear that in some ways it would imitate<sup>3652</sup> the previous constitution but in others it would imitate oligarchy, since it lies between them, and that in still other ways it would be unique?<sup>3653</sup>

“Just so.”

On the one hand, in the way the city honors the rulers, and the way the group that fights for the

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regime belongs to the part of the soul between those two, namely the θυμοειδές, is included at E3 in the narration of the regime’s ὕδια and then becomes explicit and thematic at 550B6. It is the character of the φιλότιμος to honor the good more than he loves it because what he loves is to honor things. Thus he can easily allow the honor he accrues from others who believe him to be good, to substitute for actually being good regardless of their opinion. Because they can love belief over reality in this way, those who love honor tend to have more to hide than to praise. Compare also the way, in the case of Leontius (439E7-440A3), the θυμός is given the last word, but that word comes too late, for it is after the struggle between ἐπιθυμία and λόγος has been decided, and decided the wrong way.

<sup>3647</sup> κατανειμαμένους (B8): the prefix suggests invasion. It is the houses established by the workers that they come to own and occupy, whence the unstated corollary that their previous owners become their slaves. This is Adeimantus’s vision at the beginning of Book Four coming true.

<sup>3648</sup> ὡς (C2) expresses the subjective reasoning and motivation of the φυλαττόμενοι.

<sup>3649</sup> περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας (C3), the etymon of both terms evincing how the rulers’ appropriation of the homes (οἶκος) becomes the definitive index of all political identity and life.

<sup>3650</sup> φύλακες (C4) now “astigmatically” (cf. n.3642 above) takes on a *sensum inicum* in its domestic connection, as Adam notes, because those who were friends have now become slaves.

<sup>3651</sup> μεταβάσα δε πῶς οἰκήσει; (C9): The process once begun does not continue but stops at another “stable state” (cf. μεταβάλλει, 545D1 and n.3617). Since the genealogical method here adopted has been introduced without explanation or justification it becomes incumbent upon us to keep track of how it works: (1) the disposition of the rulers (their impurity due to mistimed births) causes a stasis or faction to arise within a state, particularly amongst themselves; (2) this faction constitutes a conflict (here the balanced tugging in opposite directions due to their different goals); (3) the conflict is resolved (here by a new ὁμολογία among these persons) by the adopting of a policy; (4) this policy results in a new state of affairs whose nature we do not yet know but must look at to see what it is, as if empirically (in this case guided by the very abstract and logically analytic expectation that the regime is somewhere in between aristocracy and oligarchy and should resemble both but also have some qualities peculiar to itself). The στάσις is not the movement but its cause, and the resolution of the στάσις is not the new state of affairs but its cause. See Appendix 7 for a fuller treatment of both the method and methodology of the Book.

<sup>3652</sup> μιμήσεται (D1): the verb is always potentially derogatory and here includes a strong warning. They may have the same policies but having them for different reasons or in different ways suggests that the resemblance is misleading.

<sup>3653</sup> τὰ μέν, τὰ δέ, τὸ δέ (D1-2): At the same time that the triad of possibilities is logically exhaustive it also begins to embody the ἀνομοιότης and the ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος mentioned above (A2-3).

city abstains from farming and artisanry and the rest of moneymaking,<sup>3654</sup> and<sup>3655</sup> they are provided with a common mess and they practice their gymnastics and their military<sup>3656</sup> exercises—in all these respects this regime will imitate the previous one.

“Yes.”

On the other hand, in the way the city fears elevating the wise into positions of power, insofar as it no longer possesses<sup>3657</sup> persons undividedly and totally dedicated<sup>3658</sup> to wisdom but mixed only, and tends instead to rely on willful and single-minded<sup>3659</sup> types, persons more suited by their inner nature (548) to war than to peace and to managing peace with trickery and deception<sup>3660</sup> because of its dedication to being perpetually at war,<sup>3661</sup> in these ways doesn’t the regime take on a character unique to itself?

“Yes.”

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<sup>3654</sup> ἀπέχεσθαι (D5): This provision does not assimilate the timocratic regime to the Spartan (Adam, citing Xen. Rep. Lac. 7.1-2), but to the “ideal” state (as Socrates says: τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται, D8). The list represents with two terms the “four or five” occupations needed for the simplest polis (369D6-12), and then characterizes them all as the money-makers in order to contrast them with the προπολεμοῦν element whose living expenses come from their profits (cf. the very similar three-part list at 551E6-2A1), but at the same time it reminds us that moneymaking suits the dominant element in their souls -- i.e., the epithumetic (434A9-B1 and C7-8). As we depart from the state we contrived, we would do well to keep in mind and remember how full and subtle was its harmony.

<sup>3655</sup> δέ (D6) notably substitutes for καί (D4).

<sup>3656</sup> γυμνοαστικῆς τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (D7): Music and gymnastic, the original pair of ἀντίστροφοι (411E4-412A7, recalled by Glaucon at 522A3), are now replaced with gymnastic and military contest, which on the face of it look like something and more of the same something. For the expression πολέμου ἀγωνία, cf. 374B1. To juxtapose ἀγωνία with ἐπιμελεῖσθαι is almost oxymoronic. The imitation indeed falls short of the original.

<sup>3657</sup> οὐκέτι κεκτημένην (E2): both words stress that wise men had been present in the city not merely by happenstance but as an asset that accrued to it by the careful work of the theoreticians that constructed it.

<sup>3658</sup> ἀπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς (E3). Notably this is not a criticism: the city’s prejudice against the “wise” is justified, recalling the skepticism of the conventional mind against interloping φιλόσοφοι as ἀλλόκοτοι (487D2).

<sup>3659</sup> The re-use of ἀπλοῦς (ἀπλουστέρους, E3) is striking (not feeble, as Jowett says), another indication that something is wrong (cf. the “astigmatism” in the use of φύλακες above, C4). The paradoxical effect gotten by such lexical juxtaposition will be used continually below to embody the ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος of which we were warned above (A3), in the description of mock versions of the old values as things decline into imitations of what once was. ἀπλῶς above denoted, with ἀτενεῖς, purity and undivided loyalty (vs. μεικτούς) but here it is a mere synonym for θυμοειδές (note τε καὶ) and takes on a completely new meaning: simple, direct, uncomplicated (next stop: stupid). That it stands in the comparative only adds insult to injury; and that these simpler types honor δόλοι τε καὶ μηχαναῖ evinces how, in their minds, means and ends are losing track of each other.

<sup>3660</sup> Taking ταῦτα (548A1) to refer to the “latter” (πρὸς εἰρήνην): their reliance on reason (as used in diplomacy) itself shrinks down to the very power to deceive for which they distrusted it (E1-2).

<sup>3661</sup> καὶ πολεμοῦσα ... διάγειν (A2): The syntactically subordinate participle does all the work of generalizing what came before, while the syntactical order is completed by διάγειν, a semantic blank, the first of many instances in the next thirty pages.

But they'd be<sup>3662</sup> desirous of material possessions like people who live in oligarchic regimes,<sup>3663</sup> holding gold and silver in high honor, fiercely but in secret,<sup>3664</sup> since now they had acquired treasure<sup>3665</sup> and household rooms where they can hide it, and walls also to surround their compound, with private lairs within them where they might lavish money on their wives<sup>3666</sup> and on any others it may please them to.

"Quite true."

But also stingy about material possessions since they accord them high rank although acquiring them behind the scenes, spendthrifts with the money of others because of that desire and indulging their enjoyment in secret, disobeying the law like children who go behind their father's back, educated as they were not so much by persuasion as by compulsion,<sup>3667</sup> because of their habits of neglecting the true Muse that teaches with arguments and philosophy and of holding gymnastics in greater esteem than music?<sup>3668</sup>

"You are describing a regime that is throughout a mixture of good and bad."

Mixed it is, with one thing most salient<sup>3669</sup> since here the willful part of the soul holds sway: everywhere you see the love of victory and the love of honor.<sup>3670</sup>

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<sup>3662</sup> ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε (A5): In the previous two paragraphs extenuated participial constructions were closed by an indicative (μιμήσεται, 547D8; ξει, 548A3); in the present case the governing indicative appears, chiastically, at the beginning (ἔσονται) and the participles continue on and on through a long paragraph (A5-C2) that even continues across an interruption by Glaucon (B2).

<sup>3663</sup> οἱ ἐν τοῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις (A6): It is here, in respect to the ἕδια of timocracy, that a comparison with Sparta is finally apt (for which cf. Adam, 212-6), the timocratic regime being the one in which rule by the θυμοειδές is written large (as he will say below, C5-7), namely, the force within the soul that is distinct from the λογιστικόν but also will not allow itself to be confused with the ἐπιθυμητικόν (this being the dispositional evidence by which τὸ θυμοειδές had been proved to be distinct from τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, as illustrated in the story of Leontius, 439E2-440A4).

<sup>3664</sup> ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου (A6-7): The juxtaposition again embodies the unstable ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος prophesied at 547A3. This, along with the ensuing juxtapositions (φειδωλοί ~ φιλαναλωταί // ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ~ ὑπὸ βίας (a dubious alternative when connected with πεπαιδευμένοι) // ἡμεληκέναι ~ τετιμηκέναι [B4-C2]), will elicit to Glaucon's remark. παντάπασιν μεμειγμένην ἐκ κακοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ (C3-4). τιμῶντες (A6) is, moreover, not otiose.

<sup>3665</sup> ταμιεῖα (A7) comments on ταμιεῖον at 416D6 and οἰκείους θησαυρούς (A8) specifies it, again marking the new role of οἰκία in the guards' lives (cf. n.3649 ad 547C3).

<sup>3666</sup> γυναιξί (B1): The reference to wives (not courtesans) continues the new role that the οἶκος plays for the timocrat (547C3, 550D12). Courtesans will come onto the stage later.

<sup>3667</sup> ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι (B7-8): an oxymoronic juxtaposition. Contrast 536D7-E4.

<sup>3668</sup> ἐπιθυμηταί (A5) / φειδωλοί (B4): Whereas the two previous statements (547D4- 548B2) retailed elements shared with aristocracy (D4-8), and retailed departures from it as being the regime's peculiarities (E1-548A3), the elements shared with the "next" regime, oligarchy (A5-C2) are now characterized with two countervailing forces, cupidity and stinginess (they want to have their cake and eat it too). This compound of an internally discrepant set of elements is then characterized by Glaucon as a *mixture* (μεμειγμένην [C3], with μέμεικται [C5] acknowledging the remark). Contrast the stabilizing effect of *blending* mentioned below (κεκραμένου, 549B6).

<sup>3669</sup> διαφανέστατον (C5) repeats the metaphor of εἶδος διαφανές (544C8) and alongside μέμεικται invokes an Anaxagorean conception of a dominant element determining the character of an object despite the mixture πάντα ὁμοῦ (cf. DK 59 B12 [2.39.5-7]), as Shorey noted. Plato or Socrates often mine the φυσιολογία for illustrative metaphors (cf. 380E3-4 and n.1214).

<sup>3670</sup> φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι (C6-7), with mss. ADM, against the singulars of ms. F. The plurals are as acceptable as those at 547D4-5, but here would have the supplemental force of asserting that

“Emphatically so.”

This, then, is how this regime would arise and this is what it would be like, to describe it in outline and not in full finish and detail, since it will suffice to view the most just and most unjust man on the basis of the outline whereas it would be an endless task to work our way through every type of regime without leaving anything out.

“This is the right way to do it.”

Then what is the type of man that corresponds to this regime? How does he arise and what is he like?<sup>3671</sup>

“In my opinion,” Adeimantus said, “he would verge quite close to this Glaucon here,<sup>3672</sup> at least in his constant desire to win.”

Maybe so in that respect; but he would seem to me not to resemble him in the following.

“Which?”

He has to be more headstrong,<sup>3673</sup> I said, and less enamored of culture, though fond of it still, and he has to enjoy listening to speeches, but not be so good at speaking himself.<sup>3674</sup> Also, toward slaves (549) this sort of man would be<sup>3675</sup> violent as opposed to treating them as insignificant the way an

these attitudes permeate the regime.

<sup>3671</sup> πῶς τε γενόμενος ποιός τέ τις ὁν (D6-7): The account of the regime is to consist of an account of the movement leading to it and then an account of what it is like once it has arisen (547C9), and the account of the corresponding man will follow the same order. The force of the aorist (γενόμενος) is sequential—along with sequential τε ... τε, for which cf. 553A3-4—and not absolute: Adam’s argument that the historical “vesture” of the account requires the aorist participle would likewise require ὁν to be πεφυκός. The important fact is that Socrates here avoids a finite form and therefore any tense (as again at 550B5 [ἢλθε]: see n.3704, another characteristic of the discourse we will be seeing often, in the sequel. Cf. Appendix 7.

<sup>3672</sup> τούτουί (D9): The anarthrous demonstrative with its deictic iota is rude. Adeimantus’s interruption finally comes, as if he could not resist an opportunity to put down his brother! His allegation of φιλονικία is, characteristically, more indicative of his own feelings than anyone else’s (compare how he projects shame onto the guardians for cutting themselves a bad deal at 419A1-420A1 [cf. nn. on ἔαυτούς, A3; and ἄλλοι, A5]), and cf. n.3537). To adduce corroboration from Xenophon (*Mem.3.6, cit. Stallb., Jowett*) that this rivalrous allegation is in fact true about *Glaucon*, and to rely on that text despite the present dramatic context, places more reliance on a remote and inferior source than the “source” we have before us: throughout the dialogue it is Adeimantus that has been animated by pride, worry about his self-image, and the like – and never *Glaucon*. The pot is calling the kettle black.

<sup>3673</sup> αὐθαδέστερόν τε δεῖ αὐτόν (E4): We had begun to presume Socrates would treat the genesis of the timocratic man and then his (resultant) nature (548D6-7); but Adeimantus’s interruption disrupts that order by requiring Socrates to correct—or at least supplement—his own remark about *Glaucon*. Thus the genesis is dealt with second (549C2ff), though no methodological query, objection or justification is voiced by anybody. The treatment has an order at the same time that Socrates does not insist on the order being followed.

<sup>3674</sup> The balancing adjectives (E4-5 et seq.) portray the man as being ἐν μέσῳ like the regime (547B8).

<sup>3675</sup> Reading μέν τις (549A1) with A<sup>2</sup>M (μάντις ἀν F | μέν τισιν D | μέν τις\*\* A | μέν τις ἀν recc. and edd. | μὲν ὁν τις *scripsit Slings*). ἀν is dropped in conversation by dint of the close parallelism, here that of the balanced adjectives as emphasized by μέν / δέ (cf. n.1280 *ad* 382D11). In this man’s disposition, his love of what is honorable *per se* entails hatred of the ignoble *per se*.

adequately educated person would, whereas toward free men he would be gentle<sup>3676</sup> and overly heedful of the persons in charge; a lover of rule and of honor, with the view that attaining office would not come to him from speaking and all that is related to it but from actions,<sup>3677</sup> actions military and related to the military, a lover of gymnastics and a lover of hunting.<sup>3678</sup>

“That is indeed the character that goes with that regime.”

And as for material possessions won’t this fellow despise them while he is young, but as he gets older come to embrace them, not only because of his inborn materialism but also because he has lost the unsullied<sup>3679</sup> orientation toward virtue since he has left behind the best of safeguards?

“Which?” asked Adeimantus.<sup>3680</sup>

Reason blended<sup>3681</sup> with music, which alone by its indwelling presence can preserve what virtue a man has.

“A cultured answer<sup>3682</sup> you give.”

So this is what the spirited<sup>3683</sup> timocrat will be like, resembling a city of that type; but<sup>3684</sup> as to his

<sup>3676</sup> ὄγριος / ἥμερος (A1-3): The two dispositions and their juxtaposition are reminiscent of the two opposite emotions that are reconciled within the dog, though the language is different (*πρᾶος* / *χαλεπός*, 375D10-6A8).

<sup>3677</sup> οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ... οὐδ’ ἀπὸ τοιούτου οὐδενός (A4-5), insouciantly dismissive. We have come some ways down from the heights of 473A1-3 and the ascent to the Good which it initiated.

<sup>3678</sup> The two pairs of terms, *τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά* (A5-6) and φιλογυμναστής *τέ τις ὁν* καὶ φιλόθηρος (A6-7) are metabatic, moving backward from civic activities (*ἔργα πολεμικά*) to analogous personal ones (φιλογυμναστής / φιλόθηρος). The transitional step is supplied by *τὰ περὶ τὰ πολεμικά* which invites us to imagine the “paramilitary” character of the gymnastics and hunting. The balance of music and gymnastic is being replaced (cf. 548B7-C2) with a spectrum of gymnastic activities whose termini are wartime and peacetime activities (cf. 547D7).

<sup>3679</sup> εἰλικρινῆς πρὸς ἀρετήν (B3) recalls the strong term *ἀκήρατον* at 416E6-417A1.

<sup>3680</sup> ὁ Ἀδείμαντος (B5): Socrates adds his name to indicate to us that he has formally become his interlocutor. Cf. 376D and n. 112.

<sup>3681</sup> κεκραμένου (B6) suggests the moderating effect of water on wine.

<sup>3682</sup> Adeimantus’s response, *καλῶς λέγεις* (B8), combines reason (*λέγεις*) with music (*τὸ καλόν*) so as to recall not only the wonderful vision Socrates reached with Glaucon at 401B-2A (n.b. *καλῶς λόγω*) but also that Adeimantus himself had reached this conclusion with him, at 423D8-424D (compare φυλάττωσι [423E1], φυλακτήριον, [424D1] with φύλαξ here [549B4]). There, Socrates had emphasized the importance of education by fatefully saying that as long as the guardian’s education was intact, other matters of public policy could be decided by the general principle *κοινὰ τὰ φίλων* (fateful because it gave Polemarchus his basis for stopping the argument a half hour later).

<sup>3683</sup> νεανίας (B10) has the same referent as ἀνήρ (550B7, *infra*), and so the term cannot refer to the young age of the person described but his willful temper (cf. Soph. 239D5 and LSJ s.v. §I.2) which if deprived of music may obstruct him from growing up. Perhaps Socrates for purposes of closure is pointing back at the age of Glaucon, in likening whom to the φιλοτίμος Adeimantus had required him to describe the type before the genesis, which is Socrates’s next topic.

<sup>3684</sup> δέ γε (C2) marks the transition within the treatment from “the type to the origin”, as Shorey notes *ad loc.* (2.256, note b). But with uncharacteristic inaccuracy he adds as parallels 547E, 553B, 556B, 557B, 560D, 561E, 563B, 566E to argue that Ritter’s stylometric inferences of relatively frequent use of the collocation are invalidated by a consistency in its use in transitions. However (if A is the evolution of the state and B its resultant character, and A’ is the evolution of the individual and B’ his character) the uses of δέ γε that Shorey then cites are located as follows: 547E2 is *within* B; 549C2 is between B’ and A’ (the order uncharacteristically reversed); 553B7 is *within* A’; 556B6 is *within* A; 557B8 is *arguably* between A and B (though the formal *transition* comes at 557A6-9); 560D8 is *within* A’; 561E2 is *within*

evolution it will be as follows. Imagine<sup>3685</sup> a young man who is the son of a father who is good<sup>3686</sup> and lives in a city that is not well governed, a father who avoids its honors and offices, its lawsuits and all the rest of that sort of business, perfectly willing to accept less than his due<sup>3687</sup> if only he can avoid trouble—

“But tell me about the son ...”<sup>3688</sup>

When first he hears his mother complaining that she has a husband who is not one of the rulers, and how she is outclassed by the other women because of this; that she sees he is less than whole-hog at moneymaking and doesn't even fight back when slandered in suits private and public,<sup>3689</sup> but takes

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B'; 563B4 is *within A*; 566E6 is *within B* (answering μέν, D8). Moreover, (1) there are other instances of δέ γε he does not cite (562D6, 564D4, 566C8); while (2) the points of explicit transition, other than this one, whether from character to evolution or evolution to character, or state to man or man to state, do not employ δέ γε (namely 550C1-6, 551B7-8, 553A12-7, 553E2-4, 555A8-B6, 557A6-B2, 558C3-9, 561AA6ff, 562A1-5, 566C10-D6, 569C6-571A3, 573C11-12).

<sup>3685</sup> ἐνίστε (C2) introduces a new “Once upon a time” modality into the discourse. It is the modality of empirical verisimilitude, supported by such words as τοιαῦτα (549C4, D4, E1) and ἀεί (D4) and ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ οἶα (D7-E1) and tending to adopt the point of view of the characters without warning (φιλοπραγμοσύνη [C5], for instance, is a “specious genus” [cf.n.2688 ad 485C8] depicting the husband's feeling; the parallelism of ἔαυτῷ and ἔαυτήν [D4-5] depicts the wife's odious comparison; cf. also their different uses of ἐλαττοῦσθαι, C5 and C9, and n.3687).

<sup>3686</sup> πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ (C2-3): Again the positive grade suffices (as it did above, 544E8).

<sup>3687</sup> ἐθέλοντος ἐλαττοῦσθαι (C5): the use of the term in its rarer sense, of the attitude of the ἐπεικῆς as opposed to the ἀκριβοδίκαιος (Arist. EN 1137B35-8A3, MM 1198B26-32), highlights the father's singular indifference to how the general public sees him (δόξα, τιμή: a sketch of such a man was given to Glaucon at 404AC). Note the sharp contrast with the wife's commonsense use of the term just below (C9), peeved to see him bested by somebody else's husband, another instance of astigmatic semantic juxtaposition. For Socrates or Plato to blame the “original sin” on the female is nothing new: her sequestered social position (cf. 579B8) requires her, after all, to rely on her husband's character for her own good name. What is more important in the present formulation is the all too human blind-spot about the double meaning of a term like ἐλαττοῦσθαι (as of its converse, πλεονεξία: cf. n. ad 373D). The objection (common from Adam on) that “Plato” is violating his own “program” by imagining the aristocratic man living in something other than the aristocratic regime presupposes a provision never mentioned or adopted. To adopt it would only weaken the illuminative power of the analogy between the political and personal realms, and in particular would distract us from the profound importance of the father-son relation which is inherently apolitical (except perhaps in connection with δυναστεῖαι [cf. n.3595 ad 544D1], which is a form not exploited in the decline).

<sup>3688</sup> ὅταν ... πρῶτον μὲν τῆς μητρός (C8): Socrates had continued the genitive participial constructions (dependent on ὃν νέος ὑός, C3) in order to describe the young man's father (C3-5: φεύγοντος / ἐθέλοντος) but Adeimantus interrupts, in effect to ask him to give a finite verb to the *son*, so as to show *his* change (γίγνεται, C7, vs. ὃν, C3), as if perhaps he found Socrates's admiration of the father a bit tedious, or excitingly reminiscent. After all it is Ariston the ἀγαθός (cf.368A1-4) that Adeimantus must be hearing Socrates describe, just as surely as it was Ariston that Adeimantus had in mind when he criticized parental guidance at 362E4ff. The reply he then gets, however, only re-postpones such a verb, for Socrates now turns to the *mother* and begins a second extended series of genitive participles (C8-E1).

<sup>3689</sup> ιδίᾳ τε ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ (D3): The word order directs us to take the symmetrical datives with the phrase between them. The choice between a public charge and a private one, a δίκη (ιδίᾳ) or a γραφή (δημοσίᾳ), is a merely tactical decision within the overall strategy of making scandal for one's enemy (λοιδορεῖν).

such things lying down;<sup>3690</sup> how she notices<sup>3691</sup> it is with himself he is always preoccupied and as for herself he neither honors her nor dishonors her; how, depressed by all this, she says that his father is unmanly<sup>3692</sup> and a pushover and goes on and on<sup>3693</sup> with all the rest that women are wont to say about this kind of husband.

“They do go on and on, always with the same complaints,” Adeimantus said.

Are you aware that sometimes<sup>3694</sup> the slaves also in such a household<sup>3695</sup> will talk about such things with the sons in secret—and who but these would seem to the sons to have their best interests in mind?<sup>3696</sup> When they notice that somebody owes the father money whom he does not track down or that somebody has done him an injustice, they admonish the son that once he grows up, he will of (550) course go after all these sorts and be more a man than his father is.<sup>3697</sup> Then he goes out of the house and encounters attitudes similar to these,<sup>3698</sup> and sees that people who mind their own business in the city are called fools and are not given the time of day, while those who mind what is not their own<sup>3699</sup> are honored and praised.<sup>3700</sup> Then comes the fateful moment<sup>3701</sup> when our

<sup>3690</sup> ῥᾳθύμως (D3) is derogatory, as at 504C5: the description reproduces the wife’s attitude, not the husband’s. φέροντα indicates that λοιδορούμενον is passive, as Stallb. notes: ‘He won’t defend himself!’ she thinks (whence ἄνανδρος, *infra*). Adam’s reference to 500B3 proves only that the form can be middle (as it must be in that passage since it is reflexive). Here, it is passive.

<sup>3691</sup> ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων (D6): The anacoluthon is mild and temporary: the construction gets back on track with the genitive participle ἀχθομένης. Compare καθεύδῃ at 572A5 and the slip from subjunctive to indicative below, 550A2. Adam notices the peculiar style without describing it, and wonders if Plato is being too free. The anacoluthon is however a feature of the special “ecphrastic” style that Socrates has been adopting, which tries to postpone or avoid indicatives and to avoid or postpone moving from subordinate to ordinary constructions. Cf. Appendix 7 for a fuller description of the style.

<sup>3692</sup> ἄνανδρος (D6): To depict the “Oedipal” effect of the mother’s remark on the adolescent son is the entire purpose of this paragraph, and is again the reason Adeimantus, always quick to criticize others, interrupts when he does. Again he finds the description “close to home;” his exposure to women outside his home would not be extensive enough to warrant the asseveration.

<sup>3693</sup> ὑμνεῖν (E1): cf. 329B2.

<sup>3694</sup> ἐνίστε (E4), continuing the “once-upon-a-time” mode, asserts the verisimilitude of what is truly a simile and does not need to be true.

<sup>3695</sup> καὶ ἐξίων (550A1): Socrates’s account fills out the rest of the young man’s home life and then moves to the outer world. That the powerless slaves should criticize his father for being weak (549E3-550A1) has a particularly corrosive effect on the adolescent, distinct from the effect of his mother’s charge of ἄνανδρία.

<sup>3696</sup> λάθρῳ (549E4) is subversive, so the participle δοκοῦντες has the sense it will have at 555E3: the slaves are the ones that take the trouble to appear to care.

<sup>3697</sup> ἀνὴρ μᾶλλον ἔσται τοῦ πατρός (550A1): To imagine the scene will give the sensitive reader some pause; he will be relieved to remember that the father’s generation would not have listened to the slaves in the first place: 549A2.

<sup>3698</sup> ἔτερα τοιαῦτα (A1-2): the ἔτερα of mild aposiopesis (cf. n.1197).

<sup>3699</sup> τοὺς δὲ μὴ τὰ αὐτῶν (A4) a paradoxical litotes for τοὺς τὰ μὴ αὐτῶν, busy-bodies.

<sup>3700</sup> τιμωμένους (A4), passive. He notices not their personal merits but only how they are “merited.”

<sup>3701</sup> τότε (A4), marking the definitive moment in the genesis or evolution, which is what Adeimantus asked for at 549C7 above. It corresponds to the punctual aorist used by the Muses (547B8): but they after all were speaking of the past whereas we are speaking of a generic present. The young man is said to “see,” calling into question whether he understands what he sees (όρη 550A2, governing participles: cf. 487C6 and n.2718, and 488A7 and n.2732).

young man, hearing and seeing all those sorts of things and hearing also what his father is telling him and watching how he behaves, which he knows so well<sup>3702</sup> in comparison with the behavior of the others, at one moment dragged in the one direction and at the next moment in the other, with the father ever seeking to nourish the reasonable part of his soul and make it grow and the others ever stimulating his desiring part and his will, since his natural heritage is not that of a vicious man but he has by now become inured<sup>3703</sup> to vicious associations with the others, as a result of their opposite pulling, one fateful day he moved<sup>3704</sup> to the middle<sup>3705</sup> and he conferred the office of rule within him onto the middle part, the one that likes to win, the thumoeidetic, and thereby he became a haughty<sup>3706</sup> man who loves honor.<sup>3707</sup>

“Well, you seem to me to have made very smooth work of telling us how he comes to be.”

Have we then found the second regime and the second man?

“So we have.”<sup>3708</sup>

### 2.B.8.b: Oligarchy and the Oligarchic Man

And shall we next tell of “another man aligned with another of the cities,” as Aeschylus would put

<sup>3702</sup> ἐγγύθεν (A7) betokens the personal image and admiration a son holds within himself for his father, and also the observation at 441A2-3, that θυμός is by nature the assistant of reason unless it is corrupted, as here, by its exposure to the masses. I believe Socrates is describing the psychology of Adeimantus, teetering between the alternatives we saw at 368A7-B3.

<sup>3703</sup> κεχρήσθαι (B4), the perfect stressing the cumulative effect.

<sup>3704</sup> ἦλθε (B5) / παρέδωκε (B6) / ἐγένετο (B7): The aorists are not required by what came before, but Adam's argument that they are proper only tries to explain them away. The narrative has hitherto been done in the present system (e.g. subjunctives, not optatives: ἀκούῃ, 549C8; αἰσθάνηται, D5; ξύδωσιν, E5; present indicatives: λέγουσιν, E4; διακελεύονται, E6; ἀκούει καὶ ὥρᾳ, 550A2). The most salient fact is the way Socrates has avoided not only indicatives but any finite form, relying on participles (another feature of the ecphrastic style: cf. Appendix 7). It is τότε that here invokes the aorist, which now describes a result irreversible once it is reached, which has special importance since he is narrating an evolution.

<sup>3705</sup> εἰς τὸ μέσον ... ἦλθε (B4-5): The “compromise” within that creates the philotimic man is made to echo the ὁμολογία among contending parties within the city that created the timocratic regime (εἰς μέσον ὁμολόγησαν, 547B8). For the aorist cf. E2, 551A8, 560A4-C4, and 566E2. That the main verb (ἦλθε) should be so otiose after so many colorful and dynamically arranged participles is another feature of this “ecphrastic” style.

<sup>3706</sup> ὑψηλόφρων (B7): an *hapax* in Plato, of course, gratuitously stronger than μεγαλόφρων. The ὕψ- prefix is a favorite in Pindar's epideictic language, as for instance in the passage about the ὕψιον τεῖχος that Adeimantus quotes in describing the high-minded aspirations of the young man in Book Two (365B3). But now it is the man, and not the height he aspires to, that the term describes. We have to read between the lines and see that the young man is trying to compensate for leaving the values of his father behind.

<sup>3707</sup> φιλότιμος (B7): Timocracy is rule by the thumoeidetic type of man (cf. νεανίας, 549B10), who wants honor (548C6-7) not rule by those who are honored (which is Aristotle's sense, e.g., EN 1160A36, B17). Jowett's criticism that “Plato” commits an historical error by distinguishing the timocratic regime from the oligarchic, despite the fact that several Greek regimes in fact combined Socrates's definition of oligarchy with Aristotle's definition of timocracy, is misguided.

<sup>3708</sup> ἔχομεν (C3): Adeimantus enjoys going “toe-to-toe” with his interlocutor by repeating a word from his question, even more than the usual Greek habit (compare 551D8, E5; 552B1, C1, D7; 553E4; 571B2, and cf. Appendix 8).

it<sup>3709</sup>—or, better—to keep with our program—tell the next city first?

“Quite so.”

Oligarchy would I think be the city that follows this last type.

“But tell me what kind of an arrangement you take oligarchy to be.”<sup>3710</sup>

It is the regime that requires<sup>3711</sup> persons to meet a property qualification, where the rich are the rulers and a poor man has no share of governing.

“I get it.”

Is our first task<sup>3712</sup> to tell how the change takes place<sup>3713</sup> from timarchy<sup>3714</sup> to oligarchy?

“Yes.”

Well even a blind man can see how it happens.

“How?”

That private treasure house<sup>3715</sup> filling up with gold that each of them has, is what destroys this kind of regime. The first step is that they contrive expenditures and lavish the money on themselves,<sup>3716</sup> perverting the laws rather than obeying them, both on themselves and their wives. Next, the one sees<sup>3717</sup> the other doing it and becomes envious, and the one works to make his own

<sup>3709</sup> ἄλλον ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον (C4-5) alluding to Aesch. Septem, 451 with its proleptic dative of ἄλλος (λέγ' ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πύλαις εἰληχότα), and remembering also his use of τάττω at 570 (*πρὸς πύλαις τεταγμένος*).

<sup>3710</sup> λέγεις δὲ τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν; (C10): Again the program gets ahead of itself and nobody objects. Just as Adeimantus's interruption (548D8-9) caused the timocratic type to be described (E4-549C1) before the evolution that made him that way (C2-550B7), so here his request for a definition of oligarchy (550C10) predetermines the outcome of the genesis from timocracy (reached below at 551A12-B5). The ποιότης of the oligarchy is not however this defining feature but its unintended result (the ἀμαρτήματα subsequently retailed, 551C2-553A4): cf. n.3651 ad 547C9.

<sup>3711</sup> ἀπὸ τιμημάτων (C11): For ἀπό cf. its use at 549A4-6.

<sup>3712</sup> ρήτεον (D4) indicates that the genesis is to be treated first—before the description of the resultant state, that is.

<sup>3713</sup> μεταβαίνει (D3) “impersonal,” as in all strictness it must be since timocracy is timocracy and oligarchy is oligarchy (cf. impersonal μεταβάλλει at 553A7, 555B8)—though the usage varies (μεταβάλλει personal at 562A8; cf. μεθιστάναι at 553E3 and 571A2).

<sup>3714</sup> τιμαρχίας (D3) the version of the term that resembles the diction of ὀλιγαρχία, the stage which follows it, as τιμοκρατία had been the version (549B9) that resembled the diction of ἀριστοκρατία, the stage that preceded it (cf. 545B6-7 and n.3611).

<sup>3715</sup> ἐκεῖνο (D9) = illud, as though it did not and could not go unnoticed; and yet the timocrat was scrupulous about keeping it secret and hidden (ὑπὸ σκότου, 548A7; κρύψεισαν, A8; οὐ φωνερῶς, B4-5; λάθρᾳ, B6). The original rule that the guards accumulate no treasure was supplemented by the provision that they have no hiding place to put it (416D7). Socrates's statement that the even blind man can see what is wrong is therefore something of a joke at the expense of the timocrat, suggesting that it is only from himself that he is hiding. Thus, ἐκεῖνο reaches far back, through Adeimantus's objection at the beginning of Book Four to the image of Gyges's self-delusion), and to something that is in the back of almost everybody's mind.

<sup>3716</sup> Cf. 548A9-B2. The δαπάναι they “invent” public expenditures they enact but spend on themselves, to which Thrasymachus had alluded in his great speech (343D6-E6), recalled by Adeimantus in his interruption at the beginning of Book Four (419A4-5). The expenditures remain secret – a family matter they share with their wives (cf. 548B1).

<sup>3717</sup> ὥρῶν (E1): There is psychological acuteness in noticing the wordless role that *vision* plays in

wealth comparable to the other's.<sup>3718</sup> There you have it: they move further and further in the direction of moneymaking, and the more they come to honor this, the less they honor virtue. Don't you agree after all that virtue and wealth are dead set against each other like weights in the scales of a balance, always tipping in opposite directions?

“Quite so.”

(551) If wealth and the wealthy are valued in the city, then virtue and the good are devalued.<sup>3719</sup>

“Clearly.”

But whatever<sup>3720</sup> is honored is practiced and improved, whereas what has lost favor is neglected.

“That's how it goes.”

And so in place of being men who love victory and the honor to which it leads, they end up becoming<sup>3721</sup> lovers of moneymaking and the material possessions it provides.<sup>3722</sup> The rich man they praise and admire and elevate into office, and the poor man they disenfranchise.<sup>3723</sup>

“Exactly.”

Then it is that the fateful step is taken.<sup>3724</sup> They set by law a financial requirement as the definitive criterion of the oligarchic regime—the more oligarchic the regime the higher the requirement and the less oligarchic the lower—and proclaim that office will not be available to a person that does not possess the determined amount of money. This policy they manipulate into existence by force of arms unless they had already established it by intimidation. Isn't this the way it goes?

“Yes it is.”

And can we say that establishing that policy is what virtually constitutes the regime?<sup>3725</sup>

envy (*invidium, a nimis intuendo fortunam alterius* [Cic.TD 3.9.20]), as well as the way envy confuses quantity and quality, which are confused in the phrase τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον.

<sup>3718</sup> ἀπηργάσοντο (E2): The aorist is again used of the permanent result: cf. 550B5-7 and n. 3704.

<sup>3719</sup> ἀτιμότερα (551A2): The monetary sense of τιμή and its cognates begins to be felt as we settle down into lower realms: the shift was begun by τιμημάτων (550C11) and continued with the mercantile image of the scales.

<sup>3720</sup> ἀεί (A4), in attributive position, gives the participle the sense of a subj. + ἀν in the protasis of a general condition. The truism is often repeated in later authors (Synes. de prov. 103; Them. Orat. 4.54, 15.195; Cic. Tusc. Disp. I.2).

<sup>3721</sup> ἐγένοντο (A8), aorist of result with subsequent patterns of behavior done in the present (A9-10, A12).

<sup>3722</sup> Cf. schol. ad loc.: φιλοχρηματισταὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες πορίζειν χρήματα, φιλοχρήματοι δὲ οἱ φιλοῦντες χρήματα. The two doublets (φιλονίκων / φιλοτίμων and φιλοχρηματισταί / φιλοχρήματοι, A7-8) compare cause and effect (cf. 555A1-3).

<sup>3723</sup> ἀτιμάζουσι (A10): the inference is based on the etymon and the reallocation of honor just described; but conveniently the term includes the political sense of ἀτιμία and the genetic account has reached its goal (cf. πένητι δὲ οὐ μέτεστιν ἀρχῆς, 550D1).

<sup>3724</sup> τότε δή (A12): cf. 550A4. The tenses of the indicatives are again almost purely aspectual.

<sup>3725</sup> κατάστασις (B7), under the influence of the verb above (B5) now serves as a synonym for the γένεσις of the πολιτεία or for the process by which it evolves (μετάβασις: cf. μεταβήσεται μὲν δὴ οὕτω, 547C9) as opposed to the structure reached by that process (which is what it meant at 550C10). ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν (B7) comments on the nominalization of that cardinal act with the term κατάστασις, and recalls the methodology of 548C9-D4, according to which a sketch is sufficient for the purpose of bringing into view the corresponding man.

"Yes, but what is the character<sup>3726</sup> of the regime? What are its distinct shortcomings, as we put it?"<sup>3727</sup>

First of all<sup>3728</sup> this thing we just mentioned: What is the quality of that fundamental policy? Look at what it would be like if one selected pilots on the basis of a property requirement, and never entrusted the job to a poor man even if he were the most qualified of pilots—

"A poor<sup>3729</sup> voyage they would make of it!"

So also in the case of any other kind of leadership position?

"I do think so."

Would you except the position of leading a city, or would you include this also?

"The city most of all, to the extent that this kind of ruling is the most difficult and the most far-reaching in its effect."

Then this is the first shortcoming oligarchy would have, and this is how great that shortcoming is.

"Clearly."

But is the following any less grave?

"What?"

The fact that this city cannot be one but must be two cities:<sup>3730</sup> a city of poor and a city of rich, both living in the same place and always plotting against each other.

"Not at all less grave."

But the following, too, is hardly fine, that they are unlikely to be able to fight much of a war, since they would be forced into choosing either to employ the masses and by arming them to make them more fearsome than the enemy, or to forgo employing them and show themselves on the battlefield to be oligarchs in the literal sense,<sup>3731</sup> having but few men under their control, not to mention their

<sup>3726</sup> τίς ὁ τρόπος (B8), perhaps with a hint of personification. The question asks what the question, μεταβάσα δὲ πῶς οἰκήσει; asked at 547C9.

<sup>3727</sup> ἡ ἔφαμεν ... ἀμαρτήματα (C1). Adeimantus reminds Socrates of his formulation at 544A2 (*tὰς ἄλλας ἀμαρτημένας*), itself a repeat of 449A3. The question slants the treatment away from observation of the result toward criticism of the result. Timocracy had been an unnamed regime and needed a description as between the two known ones (547C9-548C7), but oligarchy is already familiar (cf. e.g., 548A6) so that a fuller understanding of it could indeed consist of an inventory of its observable shortcomings.

<sup>3728</sup> πρῶτον μέν (C2) to some extent suggests that we should start counting the shortcomings, as the scholiast did (*ad loc.*). He counted only five since he did not count the appearance of the drones as a distinct shortcoming. Cf. 554A2 and n.3769.

<sup>3729</sup> πονηράν (C6): Adeimantus interrupts with a pun based on the etymological kinship of πονηρός and πόνος / πένης. He wishes to show that this time he has it right about the ship's captain (cf. 488AE). We should imagine his expression is a noun phrase in the "accusative of interjection" (cf. νὴ Δία and Gildersleeve, SCG §11). As usual, piloting (like doctoring) is adduced as a science needful to save life: cf. 341C4-2E11 and n.393 *ad* 341C9.

<sup>3730</sup> τὸ μὴ μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν (D5): The paradoxical expression was used above (422E8-423A1) where as here Adeimantus was the interlocutor.

<sup>3731</sup> ως ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικοί (E2). We say "literally" in English as the Greek says ως ἀληθῶς (or τῷ ὄντι, cf. 530A3 and n.3405), when the forgotten original metaphor of the is suddenly remembered. Why it "literally" or "truly" meant what it meant before (that ὀλίγοι ἀρχοντιν) has been sufficiently forgotten — eclipsed perhaps by the fact that it is the rich that rule, for which "the few" is perhaps a

reluctance to impose a war levy on themselves since they love their wealth so much.

“Far from fine.”

So that brings on the thing we were berating a while ago: dabbling in many (552) fields, where the same man farms and makes money and fights in war at the same time.<sup>3732</sup> Has that practice now come to seem proper in the case of this regime?

“Not at all.”

But observe whether, evil as all those evils are, this regime will be the first to allow the very greatest evil of all.

“Which?”

The lack of any bar to keep<sup>3733</sup> a man from assigning everything that is properly his<sup>3734</sup> to others, nor to keep others from taking possession of it, him having given it all up and living in the city as a nobody who plays no<sup>3735</sup> proper role, neither moneymaker nor artisan, nor horseman nor soldier,<sup>3736</sup> left only to be stigmatized<sup>3737</sup> as destitute and helpless.

“It will be the first.”

There is nothing to prevent this happening in the oligarchical<sup>3738</sup> cities. Otherwise, the one group euphemism — that the new combination of the etymons (ἀρχουσιν ὀλίγων) is felt to be an etymological meaning over against the conventional sense.

<sup>3732</sup> γεωροῦντας καὶ χρηματιζομένους καὶ πολεμοῦντας ἄμα (551E6-552A1): At 434AC Socrates said to Glaucon that allowing the moneymaker to do the work of the guards or their helpers was the ὅλεθρος of the state and its μεγίστη βλάβη and truest κακουργία. The string of negative characterizations was there contrived not to dispraise πολυπραγμοσύνη but to conclude that πολυγραφμοσύνη is ἀδικία, and thereby to corroborate the contrapositive thesis that δικαιοσύνη is οἰκειοπραγία. The present reference, on the other hand, is to 374A4-D7, and Socrates’s term ἐλοιδοροῦμεν (551E6) reminds Adeimantus of the withering and indignant *argumentum ex contrariis* (cf. n.1082) by which he there made the point to his reluctant interlocutor, Glaucon. ἄμα goes with πολεμοῦντας only and reinforces τοὺς αὐτούς. The order of the three items is species/genus/opposite genus: the underlying ideas, that χρηματιζομένους generalizes γεωργοῦντας and that the military occupation is distinct from these, were brought to the surface recently (547D4-8).

<sup>3733</sup> ἔξειναί (A7) designates the lack of a preventive policy: cf. διακωλύεται (B2), and εἴργειν (555C2), and 556A4-6 (with n.3822) which points back to this passage.

<sup>3734</sup> πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι (A7): For the rule against it, cf. Leg.741BC and 744DE. Given the reference to 374AD, τὰ αὐτοῦ here connotes more than his wealth. It includes all that τὸ ἔαυτοῦ πράττειν included there and has since come to include, including the practice of the one trade he is suited for (vs. πολυπραγμοσύνη). To the extent that the phrase does denote aspects of one’s οὐσία that are inalienable, it puts a strain on ἀποδόσθαι, a strain that evinces what is so unnatural and monstrous in the eventuality envisioned. Compare 555C4, where τὰ αὐτῶν is, from the point of view of the rich, replaced with τὰ τῶν τοιούτων, whereas those who have sold τὰ αὐτῶν to the rich still view what they have sold as τὰ αὐτῶν (555D10). The abominable notion of a man giving up “what he is,” which is tantamount to slavery, was broached by Thrasymachus in his praise of the tyrant (πρὸς τοῖς ... χρήμασι καὶ αὐτούς, 344B6).

<sup>3735</sup> μηδέν (A8) is proleptically neuter, by dint of the partitive neuter plural μέρων.

<sup>3736</sup> μήτε χρηματιστὴν μήτε δημιουργὸν μήτε ἵππεα μήτε ὄπλιτην ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ ἄπορον κεκλημένον (A9-10): The asymmetry of the list above (551E6-552A1: cf. n.3732), is now repaired: two terms for moneymaking are set off by two kinds of fighting; and then these two doublets are set off by a pair of derogatory “names,” πένης and ἄπορος.

<sup>3737</sup> κεκλημένον (A10) is parallel with ὄντα (A8) as λόγος is parallel with ἔργον.

<sup>3738</sup> ὀλιγαρχούμεναις (B2): The passive participle stands in for the adjective so as to distinguish

would not be super-rich and the other group totally poor.<sup>3739</sup>

“Right.”

But consider this: when the man that became rich in this way lavished his wealth, was he then of any worth to the city in respect to the jobs we just mentioned?<sup>3740</sup> Or would we say that although the man seemed to be one of the rulers, the truth was he was not a ruler, a man who tends the state,<sup>3741</sup> but just a man who spends his stake?

“So he seemed, but in reality he was just a spender.”

Would you want to say about him that just as in a beehive a drone showing up is a sign that the swarm is sick,<sup>3742</sup> so also for this sort of a drone to show up in one's hearth and home<sup>3743</sup> is a sign there is disease in the city?

“I would, indeed, Socrates.”

Now, Adeimantus, when it comes to the drones with wings, God made them all to lack stingers; but of these earthbound ones some are without stingers while others have very fearsome stingers indeed. The stingerless ones end up in their old age to be the beggars we see in an oligarchy, but it is from those that have stingers that oligarchy's infamous<sup>3744</sup> scoundrels come.

“Very true.”

It's therefore clear that in a city where one sees beggars, there also lurk thieves and cut-purses and temple robbers and perpetrators of all such evils as these.<sup>3745</sup>

“Clear it is.”

Would you say you see beggars in oligarchical cities?

“One would not go far wrong to say everybody is a beggar, except for the rulers.”

Perhaps then we may imagine there is also a good number of scoundrels that have stingers in such cities, whom the powers that be must take care and use force<sup>3746</sup> to constrain.

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the ideal type from the empirical examples.

<sup>3739</sup> ὑπέρπλουτοι (B3): The garish prefix ὑπερ- is balanced by the adverb παντάπασιν. The rich have it all, the poor have nothing, and there is no middle.

<sup>3740</sup> ἡ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν (B7), i.e., navigation and the rest, including political rule (551C2-11).

<sup>3741</sup> ὑπηρέτης ... αὐτῆς (B9) is epexegetical on ἄρχων, recalling the peculiar conception of the ideal state in which the rulers are helpers. For τε in exegesis cf. 361B2-3 and n.748. The expression sets up τῶν ἔτοίμων ἀναλωτής (B9), an alliterative chiasm with comic effect (cf. 375A2-3, 547A2-3). ἔτοίμα is the wealth he has on hand as opposed to what he might earn—if he worked.

<sup>3742</sup> σμήνους νόσημα (C3): Compare the similar appositive use of νόσημα at 544C7, of the tyrannical state.

<sup>3743</sup> οἰκία (C3) here stands for πόλις, as οἰκεῖν has been used (547C9, 551D6) and will be used (557A9) for the life of the polis. The immediate purpose of the metaphor is to weld the analogy to the hive.

<sup>3744</sup> κέκληνται (D1) recalls κεκλημένον (A10) and with it the notion that villainy is not a legitimate μέρος τῆς πόλεως but an *ad hoc* designation.

<sup>3745</sup> κλέπται τε καὶ βαλλαντιατόμοι καὶ ιερόσυλοι καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημιουργοί (D4-6): The list designates theft of property as opposed to violent crime. For generalization of the list done by a periphrasis with a filler term (κακῶν δημιουργοί, D4-5) cf. ἔργον at 374D8, and 431C1-2 (and n.2030), and n.1708 on διατεθώσιν, 410C10. κακῶν δημιουργοί analyzes the term κακούργοι in order to satirize their lack of a true civic role.

<sup>3746</sup> ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ (E2) Despite the attempts by Jowett and Shorey to adverbialize the latter feminine dative and Adam to adverbialize the former feminine dative, the double dative is an

“Imagine we may.”

Shall we to blame their presence in the city on its lack of culture, stemming from the faults in nurture and in the defining principle of the regime?<sup>3747</sup>

“So we shall.”

So then would this be the quality of the oligarchical city and this the scope of the evils to be found there,<sup>3748</sup> allowing that perhaps there are more?<sup>3749</sup>

“Close enough.”

(553) So we can say we have finished off this regime, too, the one they call oligarchy, which appoints its rulers according to a property requirement. The man that resembles it we must next investigate, how he evolves and, once evolved, what he is like.<sup>3750</sup>

“Quite so.”

Most likely,<sup>3751</sup> the oligarchic man evolves out of the timocratic man we saw before as follows. The timocrat has a son. At first he emulates<sup>3752</sup> his father and follows in his footsteps, but then he sees him suddenly run aground in his civic career as on a reef,<sup>3753</sup> and watches as all that he owns and all that he

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oxymoronic paradox, indeed a paradox that bodes ill for law and order. Cf. ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου (548A6-7). There is no need to smooth out things, with Slings (*Crit.Notes* 142-3). Socrates spells out the idea at 554C1-2. The astigmatism of timocracy is giving way to the oxymoron of oligarchy.

<sup>3747</sup> The list ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακὴν τροφὴν καὶ κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας (E5-6) is metabatic, moving backward from the ill result, to the failure of nurture that led to it, to the fundamental error in policy that allowed or condoned the nurturing to fail. Though the items are connected with flat καὶ only, the metabatic logic extends the governance of κακήν to κατάστασιν. For the form cf. Leg.800C2-3, ὀθυμίαν καὶ κακὴν ὅτταν καὶ μαντείαν, where again the initial noun in privative alpha sets the tone for κακός to govern both of the following nouns. Usually the extended governance of the adjective is made more obvious, whether by placing it after the first noun, by adding τε to tighten the link between the two nouns, by adding an article that tucks the common adjective into attributive position, or by a combination of these: Leg.686E5, δύναμιν ... πολλὴν καὶ ρώμην; Rep.442A1, λόγοις τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθήμασιν; H.Maj.304B3, τῶν αὐτοῦ χρημάτων καὶ φίλων; Leg.800A4-5, τὰ δημόσια μέλη τε καὶ ιερά. Leg.800D2-3, δύμασί τε καὶ ρυθμοῖς καὶ γοωδεστάταις ἀρμονίαις, achieves a climactic effect by exceptionally postponing the adjective to the last noun.

<sup>3748</sup> τοιαύτη / τοσαῦτα (E9-10): the doublet of quality and quantity along with the echo of Adeimantus's request that Socrates to tell the character (τοιαύτη, E9; cf. τρόπος, 551B8) of the oligarchic regime by retailing its shortcomings (κακά, E10; cf. ἀμαρτήματα, 551C1), indicates closure of this section.

<sup>3749</sup> ίσως δὲ καὶ πλείω (E10), a reference to the principle that an incomplete version may be sufficient (548C10-D4).

<sup>3750</sup> οἵος τε γενόμενός ἐστιν (553A4): Again the outcome (οἵος ἐστιν) is seen as an after-effect of the process (γενόμενος) rather than its stopping point, and again the treatment of the genesis is meant to come first: cf. 547C9 and 548D6-7 and nn. For τε ... τε linking this cause and this effect cf. 548D6-7, and for the usage cf. Phdrs.248B7-C2, and *Meno* 98E7, where μήτε ... μήτε links grounds and inference.

<sup>3751</sup> μάλιστα (A6), another story-teller's term as if to choose the most interesting instance out of many possibilities.

<sup>3752</sup> ζηλοῖ (553A9): there is a tinge of competitive rivalry in the term: the son's θυμός is animated by the sight of his father, whereas the virtuous man's son felt a different influence from his father, that his rational part was being “watered and tended to” by him (ἀρδοντός τε καὶ αὔξοντος, 550B1-2).

<sup>3753</sup> The ἔρμα (B1) is submerged and invisible; ὥσπερ πρὸς πόλει suggests it is a trap. The metaphor recalls Aesch.Ag.1005: ἔπαισεν ὄφαντον ἔρμα, where the Chorus expresses their consternation while Agamemnon, the proud and prideful general, enters his house on the purple

is<sup>3754</sup> is squandered,<sup>3755</sup> though he had been a general<sup>3756</sup> or held some other high office, and how then he is dragged into court by sycophants for further harm,<sup>3757</sup> and executed or exiled or stripped of office<sup>3758</sup> and everything that was his own.<sup>3759</sup>

“Likely.”

His son has seen all this, has felt the pain of all this, has lost his family wealth,<sup>3760</sup> and now – out of fear, as I imagine – he ousts the love of honor headlong from its throne<sup>3761</sup> in his soul along with that haughty will that supported it. Now humbled by his poverty, toward moneymaking he turns, and greedily.<sup>3762</sup> By scrimping and saving and hard work he gathers wealth. Don’t you think a person so disposed would at that moment choose to install into that now empty seat of honor in his soul his epithumetic and materialistic part, decking it out with turbans and necklaces and waist-swords as if it were the Great King?<sup>3763</sup>

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carpet (the lacuna in that passage affords us an opportunity to imagine that Plato might just be quoting it).

<sup>3754</sup> τά τε ἔαυτοῦ καὶ ἔαυτόν (B2): The personal calamity resembles the sale of “what one owns and is” that was described at 552A7-10 as a malady peculiar to oligarchy.

<sup>3755</sup> ἐκχέαντα (B1): the diction is tragic (Aesch.Pers.826, Choeph.520; Soph.Philoc.13, Elect.1219) but the metaphor ἐκχεῖν ὅλβον is as dead as the metaphor “squander wealth” in English (“squander” originally meant scatter, not waste: cf. Skspr.Merch.Ven.1.3.22; As You Like It 2.7.57), and was dead even as early as Aeschylus, or else Orestes’s remark at Choeph.520 (τὰ πάντα γάρ τις ἐκχέας ἀνθ' αἴματος) would lose its point. Plutarch can write δόξαν τῶν προβεβιωμένων ἐκχεῖν (de lib.educ. 10B), where literal pouring is impossible.

<sup>3756</sup> στρατηγήσαντα (B2): Military rank is the paradigmatic goal of the φιλότιμος (cf. 547C3-4, D7, E4; 548A2).

<sup>3757</sup> Reading βλαπτόμενον (B4) with all mss. The salient characteristic of this entire passage is the heaping or massing of circumstantial participles in a way that leaves the reader with the burden of construing their logical relations. For a full account of the deployment of this “ecphrastic” style in Book Eight, I again refer the reader to Appendix 7. Here, ἐμπεσόντα announces the fact of legal action, βλαπτόμενον the intent of the action (whence the conative present), and the three subsequent participles the conventional spectrum of punishments sought at law. The participial construction heaps them all into the consciousness of the son who is looking on (whence ιδών ... καὶ παθών, B7).

<sup>3758</sup> ἀτιμωθέντα (B5) stresses the pride, rather than the competence, with which he held office.

<sup>3759</sup> τὴν οὐσίαν ἄπασαν (B5) includes monetary wealth, but such was never his measure. In the next line, however, in the son’s understanding, τὰ ὄντα does come to mean wealth.

<sup>3760</sup> ιδών δέ γε ταῦτα παθών καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὄντα (B7): The logic of the three participles (B7) is metabatic: he witnesses the event (ιδών) and then feels the pain (παθών), and now suffers the objective result (ἀπολέσας); which in turn leads to his reactive response (δείσας) and behavior (ώθει). Compare Apol.21E3-4: αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδίως (where, n.b., καὶ [primum] legunt omnes mss.).

<sup>3761</sup> ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου (B8): Animated by φιλοτιμία the father had naturally has placed his own favorite onto a throne. The son’s headstrong reaction would have been moderated if he had been raised on the kinds of song Socrates asks Glaucon to retain in the ideal state, at 399AB (esp.B7-8).

<sup>3762</sup> ταπεινωθεὶς ὑπὸ πενίας πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος, γλίσχρως (C2-3): The reversal of affairs is expressed with an alliterative chiasm that makes γλίσχρως prominent for the way it dangles.

<sup>3763</sup> One part of the timocratic son still feels that mere wealth needs these accoutrements in order to deserve a throne (cf.B8 and n.3761), while the other part cynically revels in the empty pomp. The τιάρα, the στρεπτός and the ἀκινακή (C6-7)—terms occurring only here in Plato—are Oriental accoutrements appropriate to the μέγας βασιλεύς, and the plurals are both magnific (sic Jowett) and derogatory. The tiara is a loose turban (ἀπαγέας, Hdt.7.61.1) of which there is a royal version (A.Pers.661) distinguished from others by flaring upward like a bird’s comb (ὄρθήν, X.An.2.5.23). The

"I do."

While on the other hand the rational and the willful elements he now stations, prostrate on the left and right at the foot of the throne, to wait on desire's beck and call, disallowing<sup>3764</sup> reason to calculate or investigate anything but how to turn less money into more, and allowing pride to admire nothing and honor nothing but wealth and the men that have it, and to take pride in nothing<sup>3765</sup> but the acquisition of things and whatever conduces to it.<sup>3766</sup>

"There is no faster or more irreversible<sup>3767</sup> way than this for a young man to turn from a lover of honor into a lover of wealth."

So is this the oligarchic man?

"Well at least we can say that he was transformed out of a man that was like the kind of regime oligarchy resulted from."

Then let's investigate whether he would be like the resultant regime.<sup>3768</sup>

"Let's investigate."

(554) First of all<sup>3769</sup> would he resemble it in the way he cares about money more than anything else?<sup>3770</sup>

"Obviously."

And in his being stingy and industrious, allowing himself to indulge only those of his appetites as are necessary, but avoiding any other kind of outlay and subjugating<sup>3771</sup> any other desire to his will as

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στρεπτός is a plaited necklace (*περιαυχένιον*, Hdt.3.20.1). The ἀκινακή is a short sword (Hdt.7.54.2, etc.) worn on the right hip. All can be gold or gilded (*τιάρη χρυσόπαστος*, Hdt.8.120) and given as presents (Hdt.8.120; X.An.1.2.27) or stolen from corpses (Hdt.9.80.2). Plato may have in mind such a thing as a description of Cyrus as emerging in regal parade, as at X.Cyr.8.3.13 (where Plato's στρεπτός is Xenophon's διάδημα).

<sup>3764</sup> We may account for the shift from οὐ (D3) to μή (D5-6) by the word order, which makes the early οὐ (along with its mate, οὐδέ) virtually adhaerent to ἐάν whereas the later μή's follow the dependent infinitives.

<sup>3765</sup> μηδ' ἐφ' ἐνί (D6) is merely μηδενί in a tmesis that observes the rank of the preposition: compare 429B4 and 610E10, and contrast 516A2.

<sup>3766</sup> καὶ ἔάν τι ἄλλο εἰς τοῦτο φέρῃ (D7): What comes immediately to mind is currying the favor of "the right people" (i.e. πλουσίους, D5).

<sup>3767</sup> οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη ... οὕτω ταχεῖά τε καὶ ισχυρά (D8), virtual superlatives acknowledging the superlative μάλιστα in Socrates's claim at A6, and therefore closing the argument.

<sup>3768</sup> σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη (E4), after ἡ γοῦν μεταβολὴ αὐτοῦ (E2), again carefully maintains a distinction between the process and the outcome that results from it.

<sup>3769</sup> πρῶτον μέν (554A2) recalls that the description of the oligarchic state of affairs, to which the man transformed from timocrat is presently to be compared, was presented as an inventory of shortcomings (ἀμαρτήματα [551C1] or κακά [552E10]), and that these were more or less ordinalized (though with decreasing explicitness) as five or six, as follows: πρῶτον, 551C2 (cf. ἐν μὲν τοῦτο, D1): requiring wealth in rulers rather than competence (label this #1); τόδε, 551D3: that the city is two cities = #2; τόδε, 551D9: inability to form an army = #3; ὁ πάλαι ἐλοιδοροῦμεν, 551E6: multi-tasking = #4; τόδε, 552A4: the possibility of utter destitution = #5; and finally τόδε δὲ ἄθρει, 552B6: the evolution of drones with stingers, B6-E7 = #6. We now are inclined to watch for these five or six points in the description of the man.

<sup>3770</sup> περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι (A2): The oligarchic regime is after all based on the property requirement (550C11-D1).

<sup>3771</sup> δουλούμενος (A7): The resemblance to the regime falls under aspect #5, the regime's

being foolhardy.

“Quite so.”

As a grimy<sup>3772</sup> person, always thinking how to come away from every encounter with a gain, as an amasser of fortune of a sort that the masses of men in fact admire,<sup>3773</sup> wouldn’t<sup>3774</sup> such a man be the very likeness of this sort of regime?

“I, at least, agree with you on that. We surely can say that money is held in highest honor both by the city and by the man of this type.”

After all I would guess he has hardly paid any attention to culture.

“I think not, or else he would not have appointed a blind man<sup>3775</sup> to head the chorus nor be holding him in such high esteem.”<sup>3776</sup>

Well put—but consider this: Don’t we have to assert that dronelike<sup>3777</sup> desires will arise in him because of his lack of education,<sup>3778</sup> some of them beggarly desires but others villainous, though both are being forcibly held down at the behest of his overall concern?<sup>3779</sup>

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enslavement or disenfranchisement of the poor or working class (whose corresponding psychic function was desire): 551A10, A12-B5, D5-7; 552A7-10.

<sup>3772</sup> αὐχμηρός (A10): cf. Ar. *Plut.* 84 (αὐχμῶν βάδιζεις, of Ploutus), and *Symp.* 203D1 (of Eros).

<sup>3773</sup> θησαυροποιός (A11): Socrates alludes to the “demotic” conception of the four virtues, i.e., the brains, industriousness, guts and reliability needed to amass a fortune. The oligarch does it for money’s sake but accrues from the masses the honor the timocrat desired. Cf. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμάται, 582C5-6.

<sup>3774</sup> Reading ἦ (B1) rather than ἔ, which better acknowledges the way he has departed from the frame of the discourse with a series of characterizations in the nominative, including asyndeton. Socrates is slanting the individual in the direction of the image of the regime, and Adeimantus goes along with him (γοῦν, B2). The amassing of fortune is the only thing the oligarch rulers are interested in (551A7-10).

<sup>3775</sup> τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα (B5): The hegemonic “vision” that the blind man lacks is described at 484C6-D3. That Ploutos is blind (as he is said to be at Ar. *Plut.* 90) is the other ingredient in the metaphor, but the joke is inexact since the blindness of Ploutos there embodies the idea that men become rich regardless whether they are good or bad. The link is supplied by the first criticism of oligarchy above, according to which wealth is allowed to trump competence in rule: 551C2-D1.

<sup>3776</sup> Reading ἐτίμα μάλιστα (B6) with Schneider against ἐτι μάλιστα of the mss. For the inability compare #1. The astigmatism of τιμή (“estimation”) continues to be operant (cf. 551A2 and n. 3719).

<sup>3777</sup> κηφηγώδεις (B7): Socrates coins the abstract adjective for its theoretical serviceability: he is comparing the man to the regime on point #6. When are we to realize that the drone’s desires are desires for the honey produced by the working bees? So much is assumed 559D8.

<sup>3778</sup> ἀπαιδευσίαν (B8): The effect of “faulty education” on the man is borrowed from its effect on the city (552E5-6). There, ἀπαιδευσία allows not drones in general but scoundrel-drones to come into being; here it nurtures both types. Whereas there, neither ἀπαιδευσία nor its effect was one of the programmatically prominent ἀμαρτήματα, the parallel plays a prominent role here in the analogy. We must therefore curb our inclination to see the description of the man proceed *pari passu* with that of the regime and allow the order of the treatment to emerge on its own.

<sup>3779</sup> βίᾳ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας (C1-2). This same oxymoronic and unstable alliance of force and care was worded into existence in the policy of the oligarchic regime at 552E2 (cf. also 547D7 and n. 3656). The term ἐπιμέλεια resonates throughout Socratic discourse as the term for tending to one’s soul, not lucre: *Apol.* 29D9, E2, 31B5, 36C6; *Crito* 51A7; *Euthyphr.* 2D2; *Lach.* 179A5, 9, B5, 187A4; *Phdo.* 107C2, 115B6; *Prot.* 325C3-4, 326E2, D3, 328E2. The image of the oligarchic man trying to manage his wealth (called here, by a euphemistic misnomer, τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας, “his overall concern”) at

“Quite so!”

Do you know where you can catch sight of their<sup>3780</sup> villainy in operation?

“Where?”

The way such a man acts as guardian of an orphan<sup>3781</sup> or anything else it befalls him to manage where he has a golden opportunity to do harm and injury.<sup>3782</sup>

“Truly.”

From this it's clear that in the rest of his dealings with others, where he has the opportunity to accrue a good reputation by appearing to be a just man,<sup>3783</sup> it is by a certain kind of violent decency<sup>3784</sup> that he contains the villainous desires that lurk within him rather than by persuading them that this is the best course or by taming them with reason. Instead it is out of necessity and out of fear that he does so, cowering at the prospect of losing all that wealth<sup>3785</sup> of his.

“Yes, he does this a good deal.”

But I'll aver it by Zeus, my friend: whenever they see an opportunity<sup>3786</sup> to squander the wealth of others you will witness the dronelike desires<sup>3787</sup> that lurk within them.

“Yes, and powerful ones.”

And so such a person is not free from faction within. He is not a single man but a sort of doubleton, with his desires set against his desires, the better ones usually mastering the worse ones.<sup>3788</sup>

“That's how he is.”

For these reasons I'd guess a man of this sort would cut a finer figure than most, even though the true virtue of a soul like-minded and harmonized<sup>3789</sup> within would have eluded him completely.

the same time that he quells the costly desires with force (*βίᾳ*) corresponds to the oligarch's πολυπραγμοσύνη, having to be a warrior the same time he is a moneymaker (#4 above).

<sup>3780</sup> αὐτῶν (C4): subjective genitive. Its antecedent is ἐπιθυμίας (B7) not αὐτῷ (B8).

<sup>3781</sup> τὰς τῶν ὄρφανῶν ἐπιτροπεύσεις (C7): Cf. Leg.777DE, Hes.WD 330. In the case of the orphan there is no family to avenge mistreatment of the child.

<sup>3782</sup> πολλῆς ἔξουσίας λαβέσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν (C8-9): The expression recalls Glaucon's vision of such a golden opportunity expressed in his Gyges speech: τοιαύτης ἔξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος (360D2).

<sup>3783</sup> εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν (C12): For the mild redundancy cf. εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν, 358A5.

<sup>3784</sup> ἐπιεικεῖ τινι ... βίᾳ (C12-D1): Forced decency, another paradoxical (and unstable) combination. I take the liberty of inverting noun and adjective to get the oxymoron into English. The violence in question he wreaks onto himself.

<sup>3785</sup> τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας (D3) echoes τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας, with adverbial ἄλλης designating the overriding concern against which he measures all specific things.

<sup>3786</sup> δέη (D6) is not only a stretch of the sense of δεῖν in the direction of the Thucydidean δέοντα (e.g., I.138.3), but also a sort of oxymoron by which his desire to gain is as compulsive as his desire to appear moral (ἀνάγκη, D2 *supra*): if he can get away with misdeeds, he must.

<sup>3787</sup> τοῦ κηφῆνος συγγενεῖς ἐνούσας (D6-7) is a natural brachylogy for συγγενεῖς ταῖς ἐν κηφῆνι ἐνούσαις and should not give us any more pause in Greek (*Phlb.34C6, 41C5-6; Prot.358D1-2*) than it does in English.

<sup>3788</sup> οὐδὲ εἰς (D9-10): Not only is he two rather than one (for which compare point # 2): both parts of him are characterized by the same thing, desire. What is missing in the plutocrat is honor, just as mind was missing in the timocrat. His two-sidedness is what calls for the oxymoronic semantics we have been noticing.

<sup>3789</sup> ὁμονοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης (E4): The language recalls the “psychodynamic” theory of

"Seems so to me, too."

(555) And yet because of his inward stinginess he would be an insignificant<sup>3790</sup> rival for any civic prize or other endeavor in emulation of finer things,<sup>3791</sup> and unwilling<sup>3792</sup> to part with his money merely to burnish his reputation by engaging in such contests,<sup>3793</sup> fearing that he might rouse desires within him that would be wasteful after all<sup>3794</sup> and might muster them to his side in a grand alliance to achieve high things,<sup>3795</sup> but fights instead<sup>3796</sup> the oligarch's war,<sup>3797</sup> a minority of the elements within himself fighting against everything else that he is, so that he ends up a rich<sup>3798</sup> loser.<sup>3799</sup>

"Just right!"

And so, I said, can we doubt any longer the similitude according to which our niggardly moneymaker is aligned<sup>3800</sup> with the oligarchical regime?

"Not at all."

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temperance reached in Book Four (ἀρμονία, 431E8; ὁμόνοια, 432A7; cf. also 441E8-42A2). The εὐσχημοσύνη of such a man would be an outer show only, recalling Adeimantus's εὐσχημοσύνη κίβδηλος (366B4).

<sup>3790</sup> φαῦλος (555A1) is a term of abuse from the point of view of the others who *would* vie for honors.

<sup>3791</sup> ἡ τινος νίκης ἡ ἄλλης φιλοτιμίας τῶν καλῶν (A1): The unthinking association of victory, honor, and fine things into a seamless spectrum again represents the timocratic point of view in its own voice. Adam *ad loc.* reminds us of the rich Athenian's ambivalence toward λειτουργία. Note the tendency of the enclitic to come early (cf. 380D8 and n. 1212).

<sup>3792</sup> χρήματά τε οὐκ ἔθέλων (A1-2). *τε* may append an explanation or indicate that more is to come: here it does both. The participles parallel with ἔθέλων (*δεδίως, πολεμῶν*) are added without connectives.

<sup>3793</sup> The pairings of the nouns (νίκη ~ φιλοτιμία // εὐδοξία ~ ἀγῶνες, A1-2) are both pregnant: νίκη is the focus of φιλοτιμία τῶν καλῶν, while εὐδοξία is the goal of the ἀγῶνες (cf. 551A7-8 and n. 3722). The ephrastic style requires a both heightened involvement and greater diligence from the reader than Plato's (or Socrates's) normal style: cf. Appendix 7.

<sup>3794</sup> ἀναλωτικάς (A3), by its placement in postponed attributive position nicely depicts his own ambivalence.

<sup>3795</sup> συμμαχίαν (A4): The alternative he will reject is described in language that still knows the old glory (*agnoscit veteris vestigia flammae, if you will*). To rouse the desires that he would repress (*ἐγείρειν, A3, cf. βίᾳ κατέχει [554D1] and κρατούσας [E1]*) is tantamount to summoning them into an alliance dedicated to victory itself (συμμαχίαν *τε καὶ φιλονικίαν* recalls a well-travelled path), and his success at self-mastery is tantamount to his defeat (*ἡττᾶται, A5*). ὀλίγοις though elsewhere approbatory has only a derogatory connotation here, akin to that of φειδωλός.

<sup>3796</sup> ὀλίγοις τισὸν ἔαυτοῦ πολεμῶν (A4-5): There is no adversative particle, just the semantic contrast between συμπαρακαλεῖν εἰς συμμαχίαν and ὀλίγοις τισὸν. The concatenation of nominative participles requires us to supply their logical relation ourselves.

<sup>3797</sup> ὀλιγαρχικῶς (A5), remembers the new sense of "few-ruling" encountered in the oligarchs' dilemma about arming the citizens (551D9-E3) which is aspect #3, and the last of the six.

<sup>3798</sup> καὶ πλούτεῖ (A5-6): Stunning bathos. By the last word he is left mired in ... gold! The inversions and contradictions recall the paradox whether a man can be master of himself (430E11-431A1,ff.).

<sup>3799</sup> ἡττᾶται (A5) another term that would trigger shame in the φιλότιμος: cf. ἐλαττοῦσθαι, 549C9 and n. 3687.

<sup>3800</sup> τετάχθαι (B1), closing the treatment of oligarchy and the vicious man that goes with it by recalling the metaphor with which it opened (τεταγμένον, 550C6), although this time he retains the description germane to the individual man (contrast climactic φιλότιμος, 550B7).

### 2.B.8.c: Democracy and the Democratic Man

Democracy then we must next investigate, both out of what turn of affairs it arises and once it has<sup>3801</sup> what its character turns out to be, so that again we can get to know the turn of the corresponding man and bring him alongside the others for our judgment.<sup>3802</sup>

“If we did, we could say we were proceeding in a way consistent with ourselves.”<sup>3803</sup>

As to the evolution<sup>3804</sup> from oligarchy to democracy, do you think it somehow has to do with this, that the appetite and desire for the thing they set before themselves<sup>3805</sup> as the good is insatiable, namely this idea that one must become the richest he can?

“Just how?”

Since they hold the position of rulers because of the great wealth they have acquired, the rulers will not be willing to curb the young,<sup>3806</sup> who do after all become unruly,<sup>3807</sup> with rules forbidding them from wasting and losing their own inheritance – so that by themselves investing in what belongs to such persons and buying them out, they might become still richer and enjoy greater credit.<sup>3808</sup>

“Exactly.”<sup>3809</sup>

<sup>3801</sup> γενομένη τε ποιόν τινα ἔχει (B4): Again the result is thought of as unavailable for scrutiny until the evolution is discovered, but with his puns on τρόπος (B5, B8) Socrates plays with the methodological distinction.

<sup>3802</sup> παραστησώμεθ' αὐτὸν εἰς κρίσιν (B5-6): In all strictness we anticipate the judgment will compare only the most just man to the least just. Socrates tolerates the inaccuracy in order to remind us of the whole purpose, and thereby acknowledges how the depth of detail and pathos in the passage we have just completed might have let us forget the goal, while at the same time he clears the way for an entirely new episode.

<sup>3803</sup> ὁμοίως γοῦν ἀνήμιν αὐτοῖς (B7): Compare Glaucon's remark at 545C6-7 (κατὰ λόγον γέ τοι ἀν οὔτω), which also avowed commitment and confidence in the method and its methodology.

<sup>3804</sup> μεταβάλλειν (B8), again impersonal: cf. 553A7 and 550D3 and n.3713).

<sup>3805</sup> ἀπληστίαν τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ (B9-10), restating πρῶτον τοῦτο αὐτό (551C2) in a different way. προτίθεσθαι (as again at 562B3) denotes placing a goal before oneself (the σκοπός of later ethical theory), but a goal you cannot get enough of cannot be reached, and so the phrase is an oxymoron (contrast the corrective notion of the ίκανόν [cf. 423E2 and n.1931]).

<sup>3806</sup> The νέοι (C2) are seen here as a social class rather than as the immediate children of the rulers, though the line of demarcation is blurred below (cf. τοὺς αὐτοῦ, 556B8). The unthinkable and mortifying notions of the father exploiting the son and the son the father, are suggested before they are brought out into the open.

<sup>3807</sup> γίγνωνται (C3): The subjunctive (rather than optative) indicates that the youthful behavior is natural and likely. ἀκόλαστος means licentious and unruly only because it means they fail (ἀ-) to be reformed by punishment (κόλασις); and yet the problem is that the rulers make no rules more than that the young that don't obey them, and so the expression is oxymoronic. The irony was broached by the repetition of ἄρχοντες (C1). These “rulers” are already acting as if they have nothing to do with what is going on around them (E3-4, *infra*).

<sup>3808</sup> καὶ ἐντιμότεροι (C5): The motive evinces another vestige of φιλοτιμία, not the φιλοτιμία τῶν καλῶν (A1) but χρημάτων (551A4-10) first symbolized in the story by the Persian accoutrements (553C6-7): the ἀκινακή might have been of too soft a metal (gold) to be serviceable!

<sup>3809</sup> παντὸς μᾶλλον (C6): the generalized comparative is logically equivalent to superlative μάλιστα.

Is it not clear that, from this point on, the city's policy of honoring wealth is incompatible<sup>3810</sup> with a policy of acquiring<sup>3811</sup> a decent measure of self-control in her citizens? That one or the other must be neglected?

"Tolerably clear."

Well, does the misguided concern<sup>3812</sup> you see in oligarchies,<sup>3813</sup> and their lassitude as to intemperate behavior, sometimes drive<sup>3814</sup> even virtuous persons into poverty and destitution?

"Quite often."

So there they sit, inactive in the city but armed as it were<sup>3815</sup> with their stingers, some of them owing money to keep what they have, others already bought out and disenfranchised,<sup>3816</sup> and still others who both owe and have nothing, despising and plotting against those who have acquired what was theirs, and others like them.<sup>3817</sup> A New Way becomes the object of their yearning and desire.

"That's how it is."

Meanwhile the moneymakers, averting their gaze and as if not even to notice them, pricking with infusions of silver whichever citizens have not yet given in,<sup>3818</sup> reaping for themselves a yield and offspring many times greater than the principal sum and progenitor,<sup>3819</sup> engender an ever larger and (556) ever poorer class of drones<sup>3820</sup> in the city.

<sup>3810</sup> ἀδύνατον (D1) cf. 550E4-8.

<sup>3811</sup> κτᾶσθαι (C8): The diction and the construction (the subject of κτᾶσθαι should properly be the πολῖται) skew the expression toward the πλεονεξία in the rulers.

<sup>3812</sup> παραμελοῦντες (D3) replaces ὀμελεῖν (D1), suggesting not just the lack of care but, with παρα-, a misdirecting of care. Compare the warped uses of ἐπιμέλεια above (554C2, 552E2) and contrast the truism Socrates voices at *Euthyph.2D1-4* (τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι).

<sup>3813</sup> ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις (D3): The plural is empirical (cf. ὀλιγαρχουμέναις, 552B2 and n.3738).

<sup>3814</sup> ἡνάγκασσαν (D4), a gnomic aorist because of ἐνίστε. The verb seems to have a special sense in legal contexts like the present, according to which the constraint (ἀνάγκη) of law does not compel but encourage, just as their absence does not require, but allows, a pattern of behavior. Cf. 556A9, 601E8 (with 602A5), and Protagoras's use in connection with pedagogical and civil authority in the upbringing of the young (*Prot.326A1, C1, C7, D7; 327D2*).

<sup>3815</sup> τε καί (D7-8) linking metaphor with its interpretation: cf. n. 96 ad 330D7.

<sup>3816</sup> οἱ μὲν ὄφείλοντες χρέο, οἱ δὲ ἀτιμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότεροι (D8-9): The first two statuses correspond to whether the wealthy have loaned them money against their possessions or have bought them out (ώνούμενοι ... καὶ εἰσδανείζοντες, C4-5: cf. 552A7-8). The third and worst status combines these, in case their debt exceeds their collateral. Note again the shading of τίμη toward monetary worth.

<sup>3817</sup> τοῖς ἄλλοις (D10) pregnant for τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, representing a first stirring of "solidarity" among the disenfranchised, whence the sentiment νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες.

<sup>3818</sup> ἐνιέντες ἀργύριον (E4) echoes and contradicts ἐφιέντες ὀκολασταίνειν (D3-4): first the "rulers" give their victims freedom; second they prick them with a silver sword.

<sup>3819</sup> τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκγόνους (E5): The suggestion that these rulers are perverted fathers for their citizen-sons is continued by the language of loans and interest. The comparison of spawning sons to multiplying the principal recalls Cephalus's indignant response to Socrates's remark that the rich have many consolations (330B), and suggests reasons he would be satisfied to leave his sons as much his wasteful father had inherited, plus interest of course (ἀλλὰ βραχεῖ γέ τινι πλείω, 330B7).

<sup>3820</sup> πτωχόν (556A1) may be a noun in exegesis of κηφῆνα (sharing its article); but I prefer to take it as an adjective sharing predicative position with πολύν in the common figure that pairs quantity and quality.

“How could it be anything other than large?”<sup>3821</sup>

And yet by the policy aforementioned they are not willing to put out the fire spread by such an evil—preventing citizens from putting what is their own into whoever’s hands they want<sup>3822</sup>—nor by the following, a means by which such maladies are resolved in accordance with an alternate law.

“What law?”

The law that comes second after that one, and constrains the citizens to practice virtue.<sup>3823</sup> For as long as law and custom enjoin that with certain exceptions citizens enter contracts at their own risk,<sup>3824</sup> it would seem that business in the city would be less unscrupulous, and less therefore would the sorts of evil we are now contemplating be spawned<sup>3825</sup> in it.

“Quite a lot less,” he said.

But as it is,<sup>3826</sup> and because of all we have said, this is the way the ruled are treated by the rulers in this city—And how do they treat themselves and their own?<sup>3827</sup> As to their sons, wouldn’t they be an enervated bunch, untested in bodily exercises as well as the exercises of the soul, so as to be<sup>3828</sup> weak at standing up against pleasures and pains, and slothful?

“Obviously.”

<sup>3821</sup> πῶς γὰρ οὐ πολύν: (A3), a comment in the same vein as what he said at 552D10. It does not indicate that he takes πτωχόν in Socrates’s question to be a noun.

<sup>3822</sup> εἴργοντες τὰ αὐτοῦ ὅπῃ τις βούλεται τρέπειν (A5-6): We may read back into this phrase, from the next lines (ἔτερον, A6; and δεύτερος, A9), that the “means of prevention” it describes is also a law or custom, namely the provision or policy alluded to at 555C2 as being forgone (ἐξεῖναι, 552A7).

<sup>3823</sup> ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (A9-10): ἐπιμέλεια is finally returned to its proper context (cf. nn.3779 and 3812 ad 554C1-2 and 555D3).

<sup>3824</sup> A law of Charondas (attributed also to Plato *apud* Theophrastus fr.97.5 [Wimmer] = Stob. Florileg.44.22, cit. Adam) denies remedy at law for the creditor in case a debtor fails to repay (whether the principal or only the interest), on the grounds that lender is himself to blame for having trusted the debtor (αὐτὸν γὰρ αἴτιον τῆς ἀδικίας). Cf. Leg.742C3-6, 849E8-50A1, 915E2-6. At Leg.921AD an exception is made (*n.b.* τὰ πολλά, 556B1) for contracts that require an investment of time, since both parties in such cases need to rely on a future delivery and future compensation. The absence of a legal means of recovery will discourage predatory lending by the rich (χρηματίζοιντο ... ἀναιδῶς) and will dampen the growth and further impoverishment of the underclass that it encourages: ἀναγκάζων (A9) again means using the constraint of law to encourage a pattern of behavior (cf. 555D4 and n.3814).

<sup>3825</sup> φύοιτο (B3) continues the metaphor of “engendering” a class of drones in the city. Compare ἐμποιεῖν (A1), γενέσθαι (555D5), ἐγγίγνεσθαι (552E3, 552C3-4), and the psychological correlate, “generating” dronelike desires (ἐγγίγνεσθαι, 554B8) in the individual man.

<sup>3826</sup> νῦν δέ (B6): The shift to the optative in the apodosis (χρηματίζοιντο μὲν ἀν ... ἐλάττω δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ φύοιτο, B2-4) after the more emotional protasis (έάν plus subjunctive, A10-B2), began to treat the hypothesis as mere speculation. νῦν δέ (B6) now brings us back to where we left off at 556A2, in “reality.”

<sup>3827</sup> With σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν (B8) Socrates interrupts himself. The reflexives indicate that we can supply a verb of which they are also subject—presumably διατιθέασιν (for the usage cf. Lach. I 80B6-7). τοὺς αὐτῶν echoes τὰ αὐτοῦ, their existential assets or stake as individuals, but the masculine gender narrows these assets down to their sons, the other young in the city that are neglected (contrast 555C2). For the first time the ruler’s children are broached, and the subject will return below (568E-9C).

<sup>3828</sup> μέν / δέ (B8-C2), here comparing cause with effect.

And themselves completely negligent of the other things<sup>3829</sup> besides making money, and feeling a commitment to practicing virtue no greater than do the poor.<sup>3830</sup>

“No greater at all.”

So given this division of roles in the population, any time the rulers and the ruled come alongside one another, whether on the byways or at some kind of gathering, perhaps on an embassy or in the army, sailing together or mustering together, or indeed in the moment of danger itself,<sup>3831</sup> so as to view each other—when<sup>3832</sup> this time the poor do not go unnoticed by the rich<sup>3833</sup> and instead in all likelihood<sup>3834</sup> a lean man, poor<sup>3835</sup> and sunburnt, arrayed in the battle line beside a rich man lily-white<sup>3836</sup>

<sup>3829</sup> τῶν ἄλλων ἡμεληκότας (C4), including the care of their children. The vagueness of τῶν ἄλλων (C4) satirizes their unawareness of what they are neglecting. Cf. 562B6 and τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας, 554C1-2; and cf. Adeimantus's ἄλλα at 363E3.

<sup>3830</sup> οὐδὲν πλέον ἐπιμέλειον πεποιημένους ἀρετῆς ἢ τοὺς πένητας (C5-6): The comparison calls back to mind the mendacious saw of Phocylides (ὅταν τῷ ἥδῃ βίος ἦ, ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν, 407A8). ἐπιμέλεια is granted its proper context again (ἀρετῆς) only for the sake of denying the “rulers” have anything to do with it.

<sup>3831</sup> ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις (C11-D1): αὐτοῖς indicates that κινδύνοις is the heart of the matter since it is in facing danger during any of these various engagements that the comparison becomes critical. For αὐτός applied to one item in a list to indicate that it is the essential item underlying the others, cf. 526D2-5, 559A11-B1; and Prot.325C7-D1 (where the others are acting on behalf of the father) and cf. n.1706. αὐτοῖς does qualitatively what πᾶσι would have done quantitatively, namely, it gives a berth for a generalizing noun. Cf. 526D2-5 where αὐταῖς conspires with ὅσα τε ἄλλα to generalize. This use is to be distinguished from cases where αὐτός is added to an item to acknowledge that the item (usually listed first) was already being discussed (*Crat.*423E2-5; *Phdo.*69C1-2; *Leg.*747A2-5; *Soph.*254D4-5; *Thg.*124B5-7; *Tim.*60A7-8 [n.b., ἐλατήρον, A7]). In *Phdo.*85A7 αὐτή goes with the first in a list of the three birds involved in the Attic legend of Tereus, and means *illa*, a use perhaps akin to the Homeric use of αὐτός with names of gods.

<sup>3832</sup> The long list of places and circumstances (C9-D1), which we had already construed with παραβάλλωσιν (C8), ends up being re-construed with θεώμενοι (D1) in a sort of epanalepsis, which allows the absence of a connective with καταφρονῶνται, whose mood indicates it is syntactically coordinate with παραβάλλωσιν, to go unnoticed (I re-supply the temporal conjunction in my paraphrase). ἕδη (D4) then extenuates the protasis even further, to prepare for the climactic description of the poor man’s new insight (D5-E1), which constitutes the apodosis.

<sup>3833</sup> μηδαμῆ ταύτῃ καταφρονῶνται (D1) is a litotes. Whereas the “good man” simply ignored his slaves (549A2), in the present situation (ταύτῃ) the rich can no longer afford to ignore the poor they have created. Conversely, the poor man *will* see the rich man for what he is, on the bodily level at least (D2-5), and καταφρονεῖν *will* be the result.

<sup>3834</sup> πολλάκις (D2), of the typical fact considered in isolation: “betimes.”

<sup>3835</sup> πένης (D3): Socrates buries the social classification within the physical description. Even the fact that he is a man is presented first (ἀνήρ, D2, sympathetic: cf. 361B6 and n.752). The physical descriptions of the observing man and of the rich man he observes report the gross effects of the political order: both men notice and neither can ignore the implications. The chiastic order of the descriptors is typical.

<sup>3836</sup> ἐσκιατροφηκότι (D3): Contrast with ἐν ἡλίῳ, 422C2, and compare the fatness here with πλουσίοιν δὲ καὶ πιόνοιν there.

with an extra portion of flesh not truly his own,<sup>3837</sup> notices<sup>3838</sup> how full of asthma and inability that man really is:<sup>3839</sup> do you think he can avoid coming to the conclusion that it is because of the weakness and cowardice of his own group<sup>3840</sup> that men of their ilk are rich? And that when they are in their own company they pass the watchword amongst themselves, “We own these guys<sup>3841</sup>—they’re nothing.”

“I know full well that they do this.”<sup>3842</sup>

Just as a sickly body needs only a small push from the outside to catch a disease, and sometimes even without external impetus can fall out of sorts with itself, so a city analogously disposed<sup>3843</sup> needs little provocation,<sup>3844</sup> whether because the one party brings in some oligarchic allies from abroad or the other party some democratic ones, to fall sick and be at war with itself, sometimes becoming hobbled by faction even without external stimulus.

(557) “That is often quite enough.”

Democracy itself, as I see it, arrives once the poor become victorious, killing some of the opposite party and exiling others, and sharing the civic organization and its offices on equal footing<sup>3845</sup> with those that remain, the choice of officers now<sup>3846</sup> done by drawing lots, for the most part.

“This is truly the policy that establishes democracy, whether it is instituted by arms or only out of fear, the other party escaping into exile.”<sup>3847</sup>

Then what is the turn of the civic management that these men adopt?<sup>3848</sup> How, that is, does the

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<sup>3837</sup> ἀλλοτρίας (D4) wonderfully ambiguous: not his natural endowment and therefore more than he can use; but also μὴ τὰ αὐτοῦ, something he acquired that is properly “of” others, the poor he has exploited (contrast σάρκας οἰκείας, Leg.797E5). The meaning of the situation is dawning on the poor man.

<sup>3838</sup> The aorist ὢδη (D4) is concrete and particular after the present καταφρονῶνται.

<sup>3839</sup> ἀπορίας μέστον (D5) an irrisory oxymoron.

<sup>3840</sup> σφετέρᾳ (D6), third person plural possessive adjective, here reflexive. As with τοῖς ἄλλοις (555D10) the individual sees his own affliction in solidarity with the others of his class (and conversely sees the man beside him as representing all the others of his ilk: τοὺς τοιούτους, *ibid.*).

<sup>3841</sup> I read Ἀνδρες (D7), with Burnet (Ἄνδρες AFDM). Baiter’s emendation (παρ’ [for γὰρ AFDM] at E1) is easy and brilliant, but despondency and resentment are one step away from the step these poor are next said to take (νικήσαντες, 557A2): we need them ready to pounce (cf. 555D9-E1, esp. νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες).

<sup>3842</sup> Adeimantus’s ἔγωγε (E2) claims personal knowledge of such grumblings, and his μέν solitarium indicates his recognition that they would indeed be on the very brink of action.

<sup>3843</sup> διακειμένη (E6), in referring to the condition of the state, brings forward διατιθέασιν (B7). The drone element that oligarchy produces is conceived of as a νόσημα πόλεως (552C4).

<sup>3844</sup> ἀπὸ σμικρᾶς προφάσεως (E6): By dint of the comparison (an essentially “Ionian” sort of analysis) we can identify this as the so-called medical use of πρόφασις.

<sup>3845</sup> ἐξ ἴσου (557A4), a watchword of democracy, as at 561B2 and 561C4 (cf. 359C6 and n.4642): the concept is satirized at 558C5-6.

<sup>3846</sup> Reading γίγνονται (A5), the *lectio difficilior*, with F (γίγνωνται ADM): The shift to the indicative is a reversion to the indicative at the beginning (γίγνεται, A2), used to pinpoint the institution that marks the end of the genesis, the κατάστασις of choice-by-lot, a choice without choosing, which does not cause ἰσότης as Adam says, for reasons given by Isoc. Areop. 22-3, but is an implementation of it.

<sup>3847</sup> ἔάντε καὶ δι’ ὅπλων ... ἔάντε καὶ διὰ φόβον (A6-7): For the alternatives of force and fear cf. 551B3-5.

<sup>3848</sup> τίνα δὴ οὖν ... οὗτοι τρόπον οἴκουσι (A9): Socrates acknowledges Adeimantus’s recognition of the distinction between the μετάβασις culminating in a κατάστασις (as at 551B7), and the resultant character that ensues, without explicit terminology. As to the programmatic language, he continues to use the term τρόπος (cf. 555B5,8 and n.3801); and he reverts to the language of οἰκεῖν

character of this regime differ from the others?<sup>3849</sup> Already<sup>3850</sup> it is clear that the man who corresponds to the regime will turn out to be of a democratic sort.

“Yes, it is clear.”

So, first of all they will become free: the city will come to be full of freedom and candor,<sup>3851</sup> and a latitude or license will arise in it to do whatever one wishes.

“This is what is said about democracy.”

But wherever there is latitude each person would clearly design his own life according to his own private<sup>3852</sup> preferences.

“Clearly.”

So a veritable kaleidoscope of human types would arise under such a regime as this.

“Nothing to prevent that.”

This one might just be the most beautiful of the regimes.<sup>3853</sup> Like a robe decked out with the dyes of many flowers,<sup>3854</sup> this city, bedecked with a rainbow of character-types,<sup>3855</sup> might seem the prettiest. Think of the way children and women<sup>3856</sup> feel when they contemplate highly decorated things: the majority very well<sup>3857</sup> might judge this regime to be the most beautiful.<sup>3858</sup>

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(557A9: cf. 547C9) for the manner of life.

<sup>3849</sup> αὖ (B1).

<sup>3850</sup> δῆλον γάρ ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ δημοκρατικός τις ἀναφανήσεται (B1-2): Once again the transitional programmatic language is varied. γάρ (B1) explains that the characterization of democracy will be useful for their ultimate purpose since it is already clear that the man corresponding to the regime, which is the true *explicandum*, will be of a similar sort. By saying this “is clear,” he reminds us of the principle stated at 544D6-E2, that the character of a regime does not spring up from oak and stone but from the men that make it up.

<sup>3851</sup> ἐλευθερία, παρρησία, and ἔξουσία (B4-6) are all mottoes or watchwords of democracy (cf. Adam’s citations *ad loc.*). That is, Socrates is imitating the democratic mind by using them approbatively and without qualification (though ἐλευθερίας μεστή is vaguely oxymoronic). The very description of the phenomena begins to rely on the shortsighted perception of the participants (as Adeimantus notes with his λέγεται γε). The next step is for words to “mean” the opposite.

<sup>3852</sup> ιδίαν (B8) goes beyond the individuality of the adjacent ἕκαστος and stresses that the individual’s plan is private—that it entirely ignores the questions of public policy and the good and happiness of the whole with which we have been dealing all along, which in fact preserved and exploited “private” individuality according to the principle τὸ ἔαντοῦ πράττειν. The point will be isolated below, at D4-9.

<sup>3853</sup> καλλίστη (C4): The expression recalls the ephemeral name Kallipolis which arose in a very different context (527C2). Here, it is immediately taken in a merely aesthetic sense.

<sup>3854</sup> On ἄνθεσι (C5) as metonymy for dyes, cf. 429D8.

<sup>3855</sup> ἥθεσι (C6) echoes ἄνθεσι. In democracy, as in poetry, rhyme often makes a proof.

<sup>3856</sup> οἱ παιδές τε καὶ γυναῖκες (C8): For the notion that children and women enjoy variety cf. 431C1-3.

<sup>3857</sup> μέν (C7), which we may always presume to be concessive, warns us that the other shoe is about to drop.

<sup>3858</sup> κρίνειαν (C9) reminds us that we are laying out the regimes in order to judge them side by side, along with the lives of the corresponding men (544A2-B3, 555B4-6). The repetition of καλλίστη illustrates both the distinction between the pretty and the fine, and the failure to recognize it. For some, and indeed maybe the majority, the pretty or the beautiful is, *eo ipso*, the fine. This identification, including its unconscious character, becomes thematic in the criticism of poetry in Book Ten.

"Could well be."

And it really would just the place, my dazzling friend, to look for a regime.<sup>3859</sup>

"Just what do you mean by that?"

Just that it includes all the types of regime because of its licentiousness: indeed, a person who has a mind to design a city, as we ourselves were doing, might himself do well to visit a democratized city,<sup>3860</sup> to choose whichever style<sup>3861</sup> of city pleases him, as though he were visiting a showroom of regimes,<sup>3862</sup> and having chosen it to move on to<sup>3863</sup> its realization.<sup>3864</sup>

"At least he'd have no lack of models<sup>3865</sup> to choose from."

But the fact that there would be no requirement to rule in this city, not even if you<sup>3866</sup> were able to rule,<sup>3867</sup> nor to be ruled in case you wish not to be, nor to go to war when others are at war, nor to observe a treaty just because the others do, nor conversely, in case some law prevents you from ruling or acting as judge, that you may both rule and judge no less, (558) if that's what enters your

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<sup>3859</sup> καὶ ἔστιν γε, ὁ μακάριε, ... ἐπιτήδειον ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν (D1-2), a remark emphatically obscure, given the emphatic placement of ἔστιν, the striking vocative μακάριε, the multivocality of ἐπιτήδειον, and the pregnant and paradoxical use of πολιτείαν. καλλίστη had been repeated (on the one hand) but πολιτεία, the noun to which it owed its gender, hadn't. It was, after all, the sheer variety rather than an organizational scheme that had been admired. ἐπιτήδειον implies the propriety of the investigation but therefore also the incumbency upon them to complete it; μακάριε expresses confidence in Adeimantus's ability to help; and the emphatic ἔστι, with καί and γε, introduces the point as if it were in danger of being overlooked. All of this elicits Adeimantus's emphatically surprised response (τί δῆ, more emphatic than τί δὲ δῆ), and buys Socrates a chance to explain his new point (D4ff). Again he uses an obscure remark to buy himself time (cf. 382A7-9, 602C1-5 and n. 1259).

<sup>3860</sup> δημοκρατοῦμένην ... πόλιν (D6-7): With the participle he is making some effort to avoid calling the democratic situation a regime: it is rather a showroom of regimes (παντοπώλιον πολιτειῶν, D8). It should not be lost upon Socrates's audience, nor Plato's, that the Athens to which Socrates and the brothers will be returning after the conversation is just such a place.

<sup>3861</sup> τρόπος (D7): Socrates persists in using this metaphor (557A9, 555B3-10 and n. 3848).

<sup>3862</sup> παντοπώλιον πολιτειῶν (D8), another convincing jingle.

<sup>3863</sup> οὕτω (D9) in its common semi-redundant use linking participle with finite verb (cf. 368D6 and n. 938).

<sup>3864</sup> The language (βούλεσθαι, κατασκευάζειν, ἀρεσκεῖν, D4-9) impersonates that of the individual "citizen" writing his own ticket, from above (B8-10 and n. 3852) and turns the comparison with what Socrates and the brothers had been doing into humorous self-deprecation, which in fact anticipates much modern criticism of Plato's dictatorship. Not only has the "citizen" no πολιτεία but also the κατοικίζων (D9: cf. 433A2, 370E5, 453B4, and 558B3) has no other criterion other than his own pleasure for choosing which regime to impose upon the citizens. Shorey, with the remark "κατασκευή is a word of all work in Plato" (ad 557B9), recognizes something is going on but not quite what, i.e., that Socrates is making a bridge.

<sup>3865</sup> With παραδειγμάτων (E1) Adeimantus draws the further inference that the shopping policy-maker, in addition to having no criterion by which to choose but his pleasure, would also be choosing among "models" improvised by others.

<sup>3866</sup> ής (E3): With this striking use of the second singular here and in the sequel, Socrates appeals directly to the person of the interlocutor in a way that confuses his theoretical job with his personal preference, nicely implanting into Adeimantus the sense of release that is the present theme: cf. αὐτῷ σοι ἐπίη, 558A1.

<sup>3867</sup> ικανός (E3) recalling a faint echo of the justification for requiring certain others, who also have better ways to spend their time, to take up the job of ruling: 520B5-C1.

mind<sup>3868</sup> – wouldn't this be a sweet and blessed way to pass the time at every moment?

"Maybe so, for a while."<sup>3869</sup>

And this: Have you seen how delightfully mild the judicial condemnations<sup>3870</sup> sometimes prove to be? Or have you not yet witnessed how, when men<sup>3871</sup> have been condemned<sup>3872</sup> to death or to exile in such a regime, they hang around no less and keep popping up<sup>3873</sup> in your midst, with<sup>3874</sup> nobody caring or noticing if one of them haunts the place like a spirit returned from the grave?

"Yes, and many of them."

And the clemency<sup>3875</sup> that is all her manner with no hint of sticking at details, though she does take umbrage at the policies we argued for, high-toned and self-important, when we were establishing our city,<sup>3876</sup> that unless a person had a nature far and away<sup>3877</sup> superior he could never become a good

<sup>3868</sup> αὐτῷ σοι (558A1), yourself in your own private world (cf. ιδίαν, 557B8). ἐπιέναι conveys the first mild suggestion of an attack from the outside.

<sup>3869</sup> Adeimantus with γε (A3) fends off Socrates's vivid overture, prudently giving ἐν τῷ παραντίκα its objective sense.

<sup>3870</sup> δικασθέντων (A4): The passive, used of the charge, as δίκαιοι δικασθέντες (*Crito* 50B8). It is properly these rather than the criminal that should be described as being mild in democracy: cf. πρᾶγμα used of the ἄρχοντες (562D3). A transfer of the attribute to the criminal is not "ironic" (pace Shorey) but absurd.

<sup>3871</sup> Reading ἀνθρώπων (A5) with all mss., excised by Burnet.

<sup>3872</sup> καταψηφισθέντων (A5): The initial inference is that this is a genitive absolute, and that what we will be seeing (εἶδες, A5) is the behavior of the other party, the jurors, presented in the accusative; but exactly because these fail to enforce their own decrees, all that is left to watch is the behavior of the convicted, continued now in genitive participles (μενόντων. ἀναστρεφομένων) that, we discover only now, are participles in perceptual indirect discourse (pace Riddell, §26). Next (A7-8), it is the jurors that appear—exactly none of them that is (οὐδενός)—in the genitive absolute construction to which the condemned had been consigned (φροντίζοντος, ὄρῶντος), while the condemned man in turn achieves syntactical hegemony by appearing in the nominative (and majesty, to boot, by appearing in the singular), with an indicative verb and the climactic ὥσπερ ἥρως. This turning of the tables follows up the suggestion of aggression in ἐπίη above (A1 and n.3868), as a further adumbration of what will occur later, namely, the unforeseen arrival of the tyrant in their midst. We need to *ride* Plato's sentences, not replace them with "simplest" or "least unsatisfactory" interpretations (pace Adam).

<sup>3873</sup> μενόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφομένων ἐν μέσῳ (A6-7), chiastic with θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς. While the exile who is supposed to be somewhere else stays put, the one who is supposed to be six feet under keeps popping up, a slightly more alarming eventuality tantamount to visitation by a ghost, even though this, too, is allowed to pass "unnoticed" (οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὄρῶντος οὐδενὸς περινοστεῖ ὥσπερ ἥρως, A7-8).

<sup>3874</sup> Reading καὶ (A7) with all mss., excised by Weil. See prev. n. The καὶ is here "hypological" in the sense that it associates one word with the other without indicating any logical relation.

<sup>3875</sup> ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη καὶ ... σμικρολογία ... (B1): sc. οὐ κομψή: the construction is continued from A4, above.

<sup>3876</sup> ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύνοντες (B2): We may cite as instances Socrates's highly florid statement at 401B1-D3, his confidence at 402B9-C8, his resoluteness at 424E5-5A6, and Adeimantus's stringency at 424D3-E2, as well as Socrates's description at 487A which had elicited the envious reaction from Adeimantus.

<sup>3877</sup> ὑπερβεβλημένην (B3) is a caricature that overstates what they had said by its strengthening prefix and tense. Socrates adopts the point of view and the tone of the easygoing liberal, for whom any belief in principle is in principle fundamentalistic, and all lines drawn by others are drawn too sharply since any "this" might tomorrow be a "that."

man, without having played since childhood in beautiful surroundings and practiced and exercised himself in all such things. How large-hearted<sup>3878</sup> she tramples down all such admonitions wholesale<sup>3879</sup> and gives no second thought to the background of a person who is working<sup>3880</sup> to make his way into politics,<sup>3881</sup> but grants him her esteem if only he claims to have the people's interest in mind.

"So very impressive,<sup>3882</sup> I'd say."

Not only this then but a lot of allied qualities would democracy provide, and would be<sup>3883</sup> a sweet regime to all appearances, free of rules and fascinating for its variety,<sup>3884</sup> allocating<sup>3885</sup> a kind of equality to all whether they are equal or not.<sup>3886</sup>

"What you say is all too familiar."<sup>3887</sup>

Then look at the individual,<sup>3888</sup> and what he is like in private. Or should we first investigate how he evolves, as we did with his regime?<sup>3889</sup>

"Yes."

Isn't it this way? That stingy oligarch would have a son raised up on the same character traits as

<sup>3878</sup> μεγαλοπρεπῶς (B5) "is often ironic in Plato," says Shorey; but of the passages he cites, at Rep.362C2 Glaucon is serious, as is Hippias at 291E2; and at Charm.175C4 Socrates is only kidding, while at Meno 94B1 he is entertaining a popular belief to make a point; at Thet.161C6 it is the lack of μεγαλοπρεπεία that he criticizes. Only at Symp.199C7, and here, is the use truly ironic. Shorey's comment is an instance of a commentator trying to speak for a mind of Plato that he imagines and admires, separately from the minds of the interlocutors through whom alone we hear him speak.

<sup>3879</sup> I read ἄπαντα ταῦτα (B6) with DM over ἄπαντ' αὐτά (A, read by Burnet) and ταῦτα πάντα (F); but rather than also reading καταπατήσασ', a correction of the Monacensis against all mss., it might be easier to believe (with Slings Crit.Notes, 147) that the original text was καταπατήσασα πάντα ταῦτα. The καταφρόνησις sweeps all our scruples away with a single stroke rather than one by one.

<sup>3880</sup> ιὸν πράττει (B7) rather than ἐπίη: the periphrasis expresses suspicion as to the person's motives. For "positioning oneself to become ruler" cf. 347C.

<sup>3881</sup> ἔξ όποιων ὃν ἐπιτηδευμάτων (B6-7) incorporates an indirect question into a protasis that is minatory (given ὃν plus subj.), while the apodosis is suppressed. Democracy pays no heed to the wary question, "If it is from this background rather than that from which the man is contriving to make his way into politics, how he will turn out?"

<sup>3882</sup> γενναία (C2): Adeimantus ruefully adopts the ironic use (cf. 348C12 and n.544).

<sup>3883</sup> Reading εἴη (C4) with ms.A and edd., as the lectio difficilior, over εἴη ὃν of DF (as reported by Slings: Chambry reports the variant from F only and Burnet reports it not at all). It is a case of ὃν carried forward in a parallel clause: cf. n. 1280 ad 382D11.

<sup>3884</sup> ἡδεῖα ... καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη (C4-5): The triad summarizes what came before, in reverse order as we might expect (for ἡδεῖα cf. 558A2 leading to A4-C2; for ἄναρχος cf. 557E2-8A3 and for ποικίλη cf. 557C1-E1), and therefore closes the treatment of the "regime."

<sup>3885</sup> διανέμουσα (C6) includes a reference to νόμος and flatly asserts that the unequal can be made equal simply by a generous enactment or policy decision of the people.

<sup>3886</sup> ισότητά τινα όμοιώς ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις (C5): Adam tries to explain away the contradiction by distinguishing between arithmetical and geometrical equality, but Socrates has told a joke. It is not ἴσα but ισότητά τινα that is conferred onto everyone, as if they were made equal despite the fact that they aren't, whence τινα. Paradoxical juxtaposition and oxymoron are giving way to flat denial and inversion of meanings.

<sup>3887</sup> γνώριμα λέγεις (C7): Again one should keep in mind the Athens the interlocutors live in. Adeimantus is beginning to confess his own feelings.

<sup>3888</sup> ιδίᾳ (C8) is pregnant, again for the sake of varying the programmatic language.

<sup>3889</sup> ἡ πρῶτον σκεπτέον (C8): The goal must not be reached too soon: cf. 528D7, 430C8-E1. The point is made each time.

his father.<sup>3890</sup>

“How else?”

So he too, by using force to control those pleasures he feels within himself that expend resources but make no profit, the ones that are called non-necessary ...

“Yes... yes...”

Would you have me make the distinction between the necessary desires and the non-necessary more clear before continuing, so that we might avoid obscurity in our conversation?

“I would.”

Those we cannot conceivably avert would rightly be called necessary, as well as those that leave us with a net benefit, since in both cases it is necessary to our nature that we pursue them. Do you agree?

“Yes.”

It is appropriate that we use the term “necessary” of them.

(559) “Appropriate it is.”

But what about those that a person could be released from if he worked at it from his youth, which also<sup>3891</sup> as long as they are still present in him achieve nothing of value, as well as those that in fact do the opposite?<sup>3892</sup> Wouldn’t we do well to call these non-necessary?

“Quite well.”

Shall we select a model of each so as to have a grasp of what they look like?

“We ought.”

The desire to eat, up to the amount that promotes health and well-being, and the desire for food itself<sup>3893</sup> and relish<sup>3894</sup>—would these be necessary desires?

<sup>3890</sup> ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος (D1). Stallb. ad 391C3 says that in addition to the fact that the father raised him, the dative adds that the son was acquiescent in being so raised: the circumstances around him were a given. Cf. 538C7, 572C1, 574E1.

<sup>3891</sup> πρός (559A4) adverbial, announcing a second stipulation of the protasis. Though it often appears with γε (328A6, 466E4; Euthyd.294A2; Gorg.469B1, 513B6; Leg.746D8, 923A4; Meno 90E9; Soph.234A3), it sometimes appears without it (Euthyd.298D5 [reading the mss. rather than the ingenious emendation of Hoeffer accepted by Burnet]; Leg.702C2, 778E7; Prot.321D7; Arist.Lys.628, Plut.100I, Eur.Phoen.877).

<sup>3892</sup> Note the parallelism between 559A3-6 and 558D11-E3, with the avoidability of the pleasures done in the optative (ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν, 559A3 / οἶοί τ’ εἰμεν, 558D11) and their yield done in the indicative (δρῶσιν, 559A4 / ὠφελοῦσιν, 558E1).

<sup>3893</sup> Reading αὐτοῦ (B1) with ADM rather than αὗ τοῦ with F. For the sense, cf. αὐτοῖς 556C11 and n.383I. Jowett’s “simple,” Adam’s “merely” and Shorey’s “mere” read too much in. To refer to the use of αὐτό with δίψος and πῶμα at 439A as if the sense there, “unqualified,” can here mean “plain,” is a logical error. In the present passage the purpose for moving from eating to food, as the concrete item underlying the desire to eat, is to provide a place for mentioning ὄψον as an alternate to σῖτος, for which see next note. The commentator who argues αὐτοῦ means “mere” must explain how Socrates can add ὄψον with τε καί.

<sup>3894</sup> ὄψον (B1): The expected complement of σῖτος is πότος (cf. 329A5-6, 332C10-11, 389D9 [note the order], 404A12-B1, 437B7-8, 439D6-7, 445A6-8; Crito 47B9-10; Euthyd.280C2; H.Maj.298E1; Leg.782E1-783A4, 789D5-6, 831D8-E2, 839A7-B1; Phdo.64D3-4; Phdrs.238AB; Prot.353C6). Therefore the insertion of ὄψον in its place is emphatic, and the effect is to remind us of the fateful role that the

“I think so.”

The desire for food, on the one hand, is necessary in both senses: that it is beneficial and that it is able to stop<sup>3895</sup> a man from living.<sup>3896</sup>

“Yes.”

And the desire for relish is necessary also, if it advances well-being in any way.<sup>3897</sup>

“Quite so.”

But what about the desire that goes beyond this, the desire for all and sundry things you can eat,<sup>3898</sup> which can be disciplined from youth and brought along to give up most of such things, and is harmful to the body and harmful also to the soul with respect to its mindfulness and temperance? Would this correctly be called non-necessary?

“Most correctly.”

So these latter we will call luxurious and the former thrifty since they help us thrive<sup>3899</sup> in our work.

“Naturally.”

And shall we draw the same distinction in the case of the sexual and the other desires?

“So we shall.”

As to the man we were just calling a drone, weren’t we talking about a person who is full of such pleasures and desires as these and is ruled by the non-necessary ones, whereas the man who is ruled by the necessary ones was stingy and oligarchical?

“Yes, of course.”

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term and the idea played at 372C, where Glaucon’s desire was not satisfied with the odds and ends Socrates offered: he wanted *more*, and became enervated when he was asked to specify what (372D4-E1). Here ὅψον is “let back in” as long as it fulfills the condition (stated, with equanimity, in the indicative) of being beneficial. The classification is repeated at 585B13.

<sup>3895</sup> Reading ή τε παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή (B4) with AFDM (sc. *si non expleatur*, with Stallb), though variously emended by edd.

<sup>3896</sup> ή τε ὠφέλιμος ή τε παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή (B3-4): Note the usual chiastic shift (vs. 558D11-E2 [ἄς τε οὐκ ἀν οἶοι τε εἰμεν ἀποτρέψαι / ὅσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελοῦσιν ἡμᾶς] and 559A3-4 [ἄς γέ τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν / πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι] as between statement of cause and effect, principle and example, test and result.

<sup>3897</sup> ή δὲ ὅψουν, εἴ πή τινα ὠφελίαν (B6): By asserting it might be beneficial he indirectly denies that we *need* relish to live; but this does not place it into the category of the non-necessary since it may give some (*τινα*) benefit in some way (*πῃ*).

<sup>3898</sup> ἐδέσματα (B8) now replaces σῖτος. Plato uses the word only here and at *Tim.*73A2, where it refers to the extra food that the coils of the bowels were designed to store so as to make a man feel full longer, and thereby to protect him against the natural tendency toward gluttony. The excessive variety (*πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίων*) recalls what Socrates offered Glaucon at 373A2-C7 after he had rejected “mere” ὅψον (372C4-E1): *πέρα* and *ἀλλοίων* here are derogatory, as *παντοδαπά* was in that passage (373A4). The distinction provides us a criterion to manage the hinge item (*ὅψον*), the *tertium quid* (and absent such criteria there *always* is a hinge item and a *tertium quid* that, unmanaged, can bring on a landslide of excess, like the “little something” Winnie the Pooh wants to eleven o’clock or so).

<sup>3899</sup> χρηματιστικάς (C4): The term had been used of ἡδονού at 558D5, in connection with the stinginess of the oligarch (φειδωλοῦ ... καὶ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ, 558C11) but now χρησίμους draws out the etymon that almost always remains submerged within it. The English metaphor, *thrive* / *thrifty*, is not too different in sense. For ἔργα cf. ἔργαζόμενος (553C3) and ἔργάτης (554A5).

So let's return to the question how the democratic man evolves out of the oligarchic one. To me it seems in most cases<sup>3900</sup> to take place as follows.<sup>3901</sup> The young man has been raised as we said<sup>3902</sup> under the uncultured and stingy<sup>3903</sup> regime of his father. If one day he tastes the honey of the drones<sup>3904</sup> and falls in with certain agile brutes,<sup>3905</sup> clever ones that are able to procure for him pleasure of all types, all decked out and adjusted to every taste,<sup>3906</sup> that's the day his transformation begins, from the oligarchic<sup>3907</sup> order within him toward a democratic one.

"Irresistibly."

So now, just as the city underwent<sup>3908</sup> a transformation with the help of an alliance between one of the parties within her and certain outside elements that were similar to that party, so also our

<sup>3900</sup> τά γε πολλά (D5): γε is limitative, as if he were trying to be true to experience, though he is of course making the whole thing up. Cf. ἐνίοτε (549C2, E4 and nn.3685, 3694), τότε (550A4 and n.3701, 551A12), etc.

<sup>3901</sup> ὥδε (D5) resuming the first person ὥδε at 558C11.

<sup>3902</sup> ως νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν (D7): Strictly, he should return to the point he was making when he interrupted himself (558D4), where he had adduced as a circumstance of his upbringing (*n.b.* participle ἄρχων, *ibid.*) that the oligarch's son will resemble his father in controlling his pleasures with force (rather than reason: cf. 554C, D1-3: ἀπαιδεύτως reminds us that this other, surer means has been forgone).

<sup>3903</sup> ἀπαιδεύτως τε καὶ φειδωλῶς (D7-8): the uncultured upbringing is due to his father's stinginess (culture as well as honorable activities costing him more than they produce: 555A1-6, 554B2-6, 553D2-7), which has left him unable to raise his son properly (whence ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς πατρός, 560B1, *infra*).

<sup>3904</sup> κηφήνων μέλιτος (D8): Up until now the drone, as the unproductive member of the hive, has served as a metaphor for the citizen who no longer has any role in the city and therefore might become a criminal. The psychological analogue for drone-element is, so far, the desires that are being held down by the desire for money, worse desires being held down by a better or less bad one, though they constantly increase nevertheless because of the absence of παιδεία (552E5, 554B7-8, D2-3, E4-5; repeated at 560A9-B2), some of them being potentially aggressive (554B7-C2, cf. D6-7). It is only now that the metaphor is extended to include the honey (*pace* Slings), for which the psychological analogue is the sensory pleasure associated with those lower desires.

<sup>3905</sup> αἴθωσι θηρσί (D9) a striking metaphor that recalls Adeimantus's expression ἀλώπηξ κερδαλέα καὶ ποικίλη (365C5-6). αἴθων is an hapax in Plato which the schol. takes to mean "aggressive" (ὁξὺ τὴν ὄρμην: cf. schol. in Hom. II. I 5.690: τὸν κατὰ ψυχὴν ἔμπυρον, ὁξύν, σφοδρόν, describing the αἰετὸς αἴθων that stirs up all the other birds). The juxtaposition with θῆρες compounds the obscurity but exegesis follows. The ensuing δεινοῖς could take an infinitive (δύνασθαι σκευάζειν οἱ σκευάζειν *simpliciter*) but instead we have a third dative, strictly appositive, in epexegesis (καὶ δυναμένοις). The triad, as it were, consists of a striking image, a simple adjective, and a description that spells them out. This fateful "encounter" (συγγένηται, D8) corresponds, in the order of the narrative, to the eye-opening encounter of the sunburnt poor and the fat rich man (556C8-E1), but the point of view has shifted from the former to the latter. In a sense it is an exegesis of μηδαμῆ ταύτῃ καταφρονῶνται (556D1, on which cf. n. *ad loc.*): the better forces within the oligarchic son one day encounter, close-up, the lower pleasures they had hitherto succeeded to ignore (καταφρονεῖν).

<sup>3906</sup> παντοδαπὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἔχουσας (D8-9). ποικίλας interrupts the two generalizations (παντοδαπάς, παντοίως) in order to remind us of the inherent appeal of ποικιλία (557C4-9).

<sup>3907</sup> We do not need to posit a lacuna between μεταβολῆς and ὀλιγαρχικῆς (E1), with Burnet, or emend with Adam and others. As we could say that ὀλιγαρχία μεταβάλλει εἰς δημοκρατίαν (555B8 and n. *ad loc.* notwithstanding), it is a near reach to call the μετάβασις oligarchic, since it begins there. Cf. the expressions δημοτικὸς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γεγονός at 572D3 and ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ δημοκρατικὸς

youth undergoes a transformation when a group of desires working from the outside aids the faction of desires within him to which it is akin and similar.

“The analogy is exact.”

But if a counter-rescue should be carried out by some ally of the oligarchic element within him,<sup>3909</sup> whether from his father or even other family members who chastise him and reproach him,<sup>3910</sup> (560) then we have faction and counter-faction and a battle arising within him against himself.

“Clearly.”

And I imagine that sometimes the democratic element gradually yielded<sup>3911</sup> to the oligarchic, and of the pleasures some<sup>3912</sup> perished and others went into exile<sup>3913</sup> while reverence and respectfulness resumed hegemony as it were<sup>3914</sup> in the young man’s soul, and calm order<sup>3915</sup> was established in him once again.

“It does happen sometimes.”

But at another time, I imagine,<sup>3916</sup> though such desires were exiled, others like them were subtly coddled by the father’s ignorance of how to rear his son, and thereby flourished widely and became strong.<sup>3917</sup>

*γίγνεται above (D4-5).* What should be noted is that Socrates continues to vary the programmatic language with which he announces the transitions from section to section: cf. 558C8 (*ἰδίᾳ*), 557B1-2, 555A8-B6 (uses of *όμοιότητι* and *τρόπος*), 553E2-3 (periphrastic formulation).

<sup>3908</sup> μετέβαλλε (E4): On analogy with the imperfect of citation, the imperfect is preferred over the aorist for an event that took place in the discourse (namely at 556E3-8, immediately after the fateful encounter between the rich and the poor).

<sup>3909</sup> ἀντιβοηθήσῃ τις ... συμμαχία (E9-10): All βοήθεια is rendered by an ally (*σύμμαχος*); indeed allies are expected to reciprocate βοήθεια, and this is the usual sense of ἀντιβοηθεῖν (Thuc.6.18.7, X.HG 7.4.2). But also, when one side is helped by an ally, the help given to the other side by his respective ally can be called ἀντιβοηθεῖν (e.g., of the Syracusan allies in contrast with the those of Athens, Thuc.7.58), and that is the sense here, since the young man has two parts (*μέρει*, E5) allied to two inimical forces. Cf. παραβοηθεῖν (572E3) and n. *ad loc.*

<sup>3910</sup> ἥ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων (E10-560A1): The household is added to the father in order to create a plural to counterbalance the plural of the contending unnecessary pleasures.

<sup>3911</sup> ὑπεχώρησε (A4) the aorist (along with those following, through C3) creates an outcome in the past out of which a final result (τελευτώσαι, B7) will emerge, at which point the present can be resumed (*κατοικεῖ*, C6) to describe the resulting state of affairs. Adeimantus meanwhile treats these aorists as generic and thus answers in the present at 560A8 and B8 (cf. the aorist at 550B5 and 551A8, and the generic force of the related gnomic aorist cf. 508D6 and n. 3090).

<sup>3912</sup> καί τινες τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν... (A5). The pronoun *τινες* merely continues the indefinite modality announced by ποτε (A4). For its early placement cf. 380D8 and n. 1212.

<sup>3913</sup> ἐξέπεσον (A6): The metaphor of faction and μάχη is continued.

<sup>3914</sup> τινος (A6) apologizing for the metaphor.

<sup>3915</sup> κατεκοσμήθη (A7), the language of σωφροσύνη (cf. 329D4, 403A7, 410E3, 503C4, etc.).

<sup>3916</sup> αὐθίς δὲ οὖμαι (A9) answering ποτὲ μὲν οὖμαι above (A4), with ὑποτρεφόμεναι answering ὑπεχώρησε (A4).

<sup>3917</sup> ἀνεπιστημοσύνην (B1): The oligarch’s son is less “cultured” than the oligarch (who was brought up by the timocrat and emulated him and followed in his footsteps [553A9-10]). Despite what stinginess he may have learned from his father, his own dronelike desires have grown to be still greater. The father’s culpability for the way his son turns out is of a similar quality to the oligarchic ruler’s culpability for spoiling the populace: both neglect their duties because of their overriding devotion to wealth (*τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας*, 554C1-2). Misbehavior in the ruler we can easily resent: the father’s is painful even to contemplate.

"That sort of thing does tend to happen."

And they drag them back to those same associations and through secret intercourse with them they give birth to a teeming offspring.

"Obviously."

Finally,<sup>3918</sup> however, they captured that part of the young man's soul we may call the acropolis, recognizing how empty it had become of studies and activities that are fine<sup>3919</sup> and thoughts that are true, which are after all the best sentries and guards<sup>3920</sup> for the men upon whom the gods smile,<sup>3921</sup> residing in their minds.

"So they truly are."

Now false and flattering<sup>3922</sup> arguments and opinions<sup>3923</sup> instead of those ran up and seized that place in such a man.

"Quite so."

And so does he return to those Lotus-eaters<sup>3924</sup> and live with them openly,<sup>3925</sup> so that if someone now<sup>3926</sup> should come to rescue that stingy part of his soul, those braggart thoughts lock the gates of the royal<sup>3927</sup> compound within him and tolerate neither the alliance that is already at hand<sup>3928</sup> nor even

<sup>3918</sup> τελευτῶσαι (B7) indicates that the gradualist see-saw battle is over: that is, the metabasis is complete.

<sup>3919</sup> μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν (B8-9). The first two form a pair (with τε καί) as we learn in the *Laches* (179D7, 180A4, 181C8, 182C2-4 [bis], 183A1, 185B3, 190E2). Cf also *Prot.*327A3-4, *Tim.*87B7; and *Lach.*181C8, τὸ μάθημα ... ἐπιτήδειον; and *Rep.*527B1, μάθημα ἐπιτηδεύμενον. Close to the sense of the whole list is *Phdrs.*270B, λόγους καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις νομίμους.

<sup>3920</sup> οἱ δὲ ἄριστοι φρουροί τε καὶ φύλακες (B9-10): Referring back (as δή indicates), through 559D7, 554E4-5, D2-7, B7-8, and 552E5, to 549B4, which itself relied on 424D1-2.

<sup>3921</sup> θεοφιλῆς (B10) is close in sense and etymology to εὐδαίμων, a term he must avoid at risk of begging the question. Cf.382E3, 501C1; *Leg.*690C.

<sup>3922</sup> ψευδεῖς δὴ καὶ ἀλαζόνες (C2): False flattery is the psychological correlate to the democratic public policy of equality, if only one recognizes that it is desire and not clemency that motivates the democratic man to embrace it. Compare the first and last things said about democracy above: ἐξ Ἰσου μεταδῶσι πολιτείας καὶ ἀρχῶν (557A4); ισότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα (558C5-6), and nn.3845, 3881.

<sup>3923</sup> λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι (C2): λόγοι, whose primary virtue is to be true (ἀληθεῖς rather than καλοί: cf. the complex μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, B8-9), become false (ψευδεῖς) when pressed into the service of flattery; and since they are offered not for their truth but their effect on the soul they come to deserve the lesser name of δόξα.

<sup>3924</sup> Λωτοφάγους (C5): The reference to the Lotus-eaters of *Odyssey* 9 combines the general notion of an overwhelming pleasure (*Od.*9.94: μελιηδέα καρπόν) with the specific notion, also from that context, of forgetting home (νόστου τε λαθέσθαι, *ibid.* 97), which here corresponds to the son abandoning his father's influence.

<sup>3925</sup> φανερῶς (C6): Contrast the oligarchic father who either keeps his passions at bay or hides the ones he indulges to maintain a show of decency (554B7-D7).

<sup>3926</sup> τις βοήθεια (C6), begging to be compared with the rescue at 559E9-60A2.

<sup>3927</sup> τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας (C8): The rejected hegemony is recalled from exile to provide the democratic soul a way to exalt its universal egalitarianism and mediocrity, in unconscious self-contradiction.

<sup>3928</sup> αὐτήν (C9) refers to whatever degree of oligarchic restraint might still stand on its own within him (τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ [560A4-5] = τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ [559E9-10]).

admit the embassies of elder statesmen<sup>3929</sup> as if theirs were merely the counsels of unauthorized<sup>3930</sup> individuals. Instead they themselves beat everyone back in battle:<sup>3931</sup> what was reverence they now call stupidity and exile it disenfranchised; sobriety they call unmanliness, and heap ridicule upon it and drive it out; moderation and graceful expenditure they dub homely and illiberal<sup>3932</sup> and drive it abroad with the help of a surfeit of unbeneficial desires.

“Very much so.”

And once they have evacuated of such dispositions and cleansed<sup>3933</sup> the soul of this young man who is now in their thrall and is undergoing an initiation<sup>3934</sup> in their powerful rites, the time has arrived for them to restore hubris from exile<sup>3935</sup> and anarchy, profligacy and irreverence,<sup>3936</sup> all bright and brilliant with a great entourage and crowned,<sup>3937</sup> and usher them in with praise and seductive names:<sup>3938</sup> hubris now they call astuteness,<sup>3939</sup> anarchy freedom, profligacy generosity and the brash the brave.<sup>3940</sup> Isn’t (561) this the way that a man, while he is still young, evolves from being a person raised within the confines of necessary desires into<sup>3941</sup> a freedom, or a lassitude, that admits pleasures non-

<sup>3929</sup> οὗτε πρέσβεις πρεσβυτέρων (C9): The continuation of the analogy now redoes the scenario of 559E4-560B5: πρέσβεις πρεσβυτέρων alludes to his father (559A9-560A1), whom his pleasures have recast in the guise of a hoary counsellor from abroad, an idea developed further at 574C2-3.

<sup>3930</sup> ἴδιωτῶν (D1): The status of the father is “unrecognized” in the diplomatic sense, and accorded no respect.

<sup>3931</sup> αὐτοί τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι (D1): Finally we have moved beyond the oxymoronic and self-contradictory half-measures and verbal squabbling exemplified by such expressions as ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ (552E2). In place of the see-saw of contradiction we have conquest, inversion, and obliteration of the opposition.

<sup>3932</sup> μετριότης / κοσμία // ὀγροικία / ἀνελευθερία (D4-5): After contrary items we have a set of contrary pairs in a chiasm (missed by the schol. *ad loc.*).

<sup>3933</sup> καθήραντες (D8). Continuing the inversion of the meanings of words, Socrates now adopts the braggart manner of the new hegemony, whose voice does not notice its own cacophonic kappas (κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχομένου, D8-E1).

<sup>3934</sup> τελουμένου (E1) adds a ritual metaphor to κατεχομένου, as καθήραντες had to κενώσαντες above.

<sup>3935</sup> κατάγοντες (E3) continues the metaphor of changing political regimes.

<sup>3936</sup> ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναιδείαν (E2-3): The reiteration of privative alphas portends a vacuous liberation.

<sup>3937</sup> λαμπράς ... ἐστεφανωμένας (E3): These new regalia embody the ἀλαζονεία of the new order.

<sup>3938</sup> ὑποκοριζόμενοι (E4): echoing ὑπεροριζούσι at D6. Though the etymon is κοῦρος, it is hard not to hear κόρος after having heard ὕβρις. After ὕβρις and κόρος, all that’s left to wait for is ὄτη.

<sup>3939</sup> εὐπαιδευσίαν (E5), an *hapax* in Plato and rare elsewhere. Here it tells a lie with transparent crudity.

<sup>3940</sup> ἀναιδείαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν (561A1): Say it three times fast and you can’t tell the difference. It is notable that these positive designations are the opposites of the negative designations on the force of which they expelled the other characteristics, above (εὐπαιδευσία : ἡλιθιότης [D2], ἐλευθερία : ἀνελευθερία [D5], μεγαλοπρέπεια : ὀγροικία [D5], ἀνδρεία : ἀνανδρία [D3]). The sanctions remain constant: it is their meaning that is up for grabs.

<sup>3941</sup> Reading εἰς τὴν (A3) with FD rather than the bare τὴν of AM that has been read by most edd. since Schneider (1833, *ad loc.*), who defended dropping εἰς by insisting, oversubtly, that the release into pleasures and the democratic man are distinct, as cause and effect. It is merely a casual metonymy on the same order as the compression we noted at 554D6-7. The statement is programmatic, announcing the transition from treating the evolution to the life of the democratic man, not some halfway house between; Socrates uses metonymy to vary, once again, the programmatic language (cf. n. 3907 *ad*

necessary and non-beneficial?

“You’ve made it crystal clear.”

As to the way he goes on to live his life, he no longer countenances a distinction<sup>3942</sup> between necessary and non-necessary pleasures in the expenditure of whatever he has by way of money, strength and attention.<sup>3943</sup> If he is lucky and his rites of debauchery<sup>3944</sup> do not take him too far,<sup>3945</sup> and if he grows a little older and survives the turmoil of youth, and if he takes into himself some measure of the pleasures lately exiled<sup>3946</sup> and surrenders less than all of himself to the pleasures that lately invaded him, then, having placed all his pleasures onto equal footing,<sup>3947</sup> he glides along<sup>3948</sup> in life, conferring authority over himself onto whichever of them befall him as if by lot,<sup>3949</sup> now to one of them until he is sated of it and then to the next,<sup>3950</sup> scorning not a single one but nurturing them all without prejudice.<sup>3951</sup>

“Exactly.”

559E1).

<sup>3942</sup> οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (A6): The idiom for expressing skeptical (340B4) or despondent (538D9) indifference (cf. n.357), is now pressed into service to articulate the refusal to exclude (*καὶ ὄνεσιν*, A4), which is the heart of the democratic outlook.

<sup>3943</sup> καὶ χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς (A7-8): the three *καί*’s confirm that just as he no longer distinguished between the pleasures he no longer draws a distinction among the resources by which to procure them. The triad is based on the tripartition of goods into external (for which *χρήματα* is always the paradigmatic example), bodily (for *πόνους* used this way cf. Pol.294E5-6) and psychic (*διατριβή* does tend to be used for study), and this background list will serve to order the sequence of examples below (C7-D5).

<sup>3944</sup> ἐὰν εὔτυχης ἡ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῆ (A8-9): contrast διψήσασα ... τύχη, καὶ πορρωτέρῳ τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς μεθυσθῆ (562C8-D2). The suggestion that the obsessively free man is subject to external influence (ἐπίη [558A1], cf. n.3868) is strengthened. The bacchic metaphor elaborates the dangerous mystery of pleasure (560E1-2) he is wading into.

<sup>3945</sup> πέρα (A8) echoes πέρα at 559B8.

<sup>3946</sup> The necessary ones: cf.559E9-60A2.

<sup>3947</sup> εἰς ἴσον δή (B2). For this exasperated and ironic δή cf. 338B1, 396C4, 404A9, 420E7, 544C6. It becomes a constant refrain in present context: 562A4, 562D2, 562E9, 563B1, 563D8, 565E5, 566A2. This “equalization” is a makeshift whereby the unbridled elements in him are diminished just enough and the better elements restored just enough to achieve a precarious balance. It is only as long as this balance holds that he can insouciantly pursue the one and then the other as if they were “equal.”

<sup>3948</sup> διάγειν (B3) is nearly, but not quite, otiose: cf. διαγωγή used of the democratic state, 558A2.

<sup>3949</sup> ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ (B3-4): The analogy with the democratic style of choosing rulers by lot (cf. ἀπὸ κλήρων, 557A5), brought to the surface by the periphrasis in τὴν ἔαυτοῦ ἀρχήν, now conspires with the developing concept that he is subject to external influences that he does not understand.

<sup>3950</sup> καὶ αὐθίς ἄλλῃ (B5): It is as if he survives the effect of being ruled by one ἀρχῶν for his appointed term and then the next.

<sup>3951</sup> ἔξ ἴσου (B5), “without prejudice,” the democratic watchword. It is, after all, the sentiment and the dream of not having to choose that underlies the fantasy that all things are equal. τρέφων (B5) stresses unobtrusively the difference between the democratic man whose lassitude unintentionally foments these pleasures and his oligarchic father who consigned what rationality he still had to the determination whether they were necessary, and consigned what will he still had to the control of those which were not.

And as for true reasoning<sup>3952</sup> he accepts it not,<sup>3953</sup> nor<sup>3954</sup> does he admit into his citadel the argument, if someone should make it, that some of the pleasures go with desires fine and good<sup>3955</sup> but others are attached to knavish desires, and that one ought to practice and honor<sup>3956</sup> the one kind but chastise and constrain the other. All such argument he sweeps aside with the flat refusal and assertion that all pleasures are worthy<sup>3957</sup> and each must be given equal standing.<sup>3958</sup>

“If he is so disposed he will very truly act that way.”

And so he will live his daily life enjoying whatever pleasure comes his way, one day drinking and carousing while another day it's water only and some slimming down.<sup>3959</sup> One day you'll see him working out at the gymnasium, and another leisurely and carefree;<sup>3960</sup> and sometimes he'll spend a day working on his<sup>3961</sup> philosophy. Not seldom he will do some politics, popping up to say or do<sup>3962</sup> whatever enters his head. One day he envies some enemies and he wants to start a war; another day it's the moneymakers and he turns to that.<sup>3963</sup> The one thing he won't have in his life is order of any kind, nor will any norm impinge upon the way he lives it: instead he will just glide along<sup>3964</sup> telling himself how sweet life is, how free it is, nay, how his life's a blessed<sup>3965</sup> thing.

<sup>3952</sup> καὶ λόγον γε ... ἀληθῆ (B7): True argument is the complement of the μαθήματά τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καλά mentioned at 560B8-9, which he had already crowded out with his new regimen (οὕτω διακείμενος, C5) of using his efforts and concentration to pursue pleasure. The role of reason would be to call him back from abandoning them (whence ἐπιτηδεύειν, C2).

<sup>3953</sup> προσδεχόμενος (B7): Again (cf. 548A5-C2, 550A4-B7) the description of the resultant person prefers to be expressed with a series of participles syntactically dependent upon but semantically superior to “place-holder” verbs (ζῆ, A6; διάγει, B3), to the point that the construction is continued (οὐ προσδεχόμενος, B7) across an answer (πάνυ μὲν οὖν, B6). For such a continuation across answer cf. 548B2 and n.3662, and 558A7, B1.

<sup>3954</sup> οὐδέ (B7) is epexegetical, explaining οὐ προσδεχόμενος by pointing back to the metaphor at 560C2-D1.

<sup>3955</sup> καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν (C1), the loosely conceived and uncontroversial expression for value (cf. 400E2-3 and n.1556).

<sup>3956</sup> ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν (C2), correcting οὐδεμίαν ἀτιμάζων ἀλλὰ τρέφων (B5) with the usual chiasm. With τιμᾶν we have an echo of the thumoeidetic compromise long since abandoned.

<sup>3957</sup> ὁμοίας (C4) means not, of course, that they are similar to each other but that the very categorization or characterization of them as good versus bad is wrong-headed. For ἀνανεύειν cf. 437B1: it is only by saying “No” to every limit that he says “Yes” to everything.

<sup>3958</sup> ἔξ ίσου (C4): The language is slightly strained, as if the pleasures had rights, so as to weld the analogy with the much-vaunted ίσονομία of democracy (cf. Hdt.3.80), satirized at 558C5-6.

<sup>3959</sup> μεθύων καὶ καταυλόμενος / ὑδροποτῶν καὶ κατισχναιόμενος (C7-8): The expression reaches for a satirical isocolon. Here he spends his χρήματα (A7).

<sup>3960</sup> Here are his πόνοι (A8).

<sup>3961</sup> ὡς (D2) not merely *quasi* (Jowett) but suggesting his own outlook, that philosophy is of course a noble pursuit (cf. μεγάλα ἥγοῦνται, 498A5). Socrates is describing the diminishing perspective of the soul from its own point of view, allowing Adeimantus—and us—to judge for ourselves.

<sup>3962</sup> λέγει τε καὶ πράττει (D3) suggests that his standing up (ἀναπηδῶν) and voicing of his opinion is more a matter of πρᾶξις than λόγος, as usual in an open forum (cf. 564D9 and n.4024). Cf. πράττῃ (558B7 and n.3880).

<sup>3963</sup> Besides “philosophizing,” his διατριβαί (cf. A8) include dabbling at his pleasure in the triad of civic roles: government (πολιτεύεται), war (πολεμικούς), and business (χρηματικούς).

<sup>3964</sup> χρῆται αὐτῷ (D7): sc. τῷ βίῳ, still another expression that describes the process of his life in a way that keeps it from adding up to anything.

<sup>3965</sup> μακάριον (D7) is a climactic term as before (335E9, 419A9 and nn.259, 1853), here capping the list, which he repeats from the end of his description of the democratic state (ἡδεῖα ... καὶ

"You have utterly described the life of the man who embodies the isonomic<sup>3966</sup> ideal, if I may put it that way!"

And I fancy we could add that it is a life of many faces, packed with the greatest number of traits. And the man that corresponds to it is beautiful for his variety, just like this city, a man whom many men would envy for his life and many women<sup>3967</sup> alike, seeing him to possess the very greatest sampling<sup>3968</sup> of personalities just as that city had of regimes.

"That is the man."

Is it then this sort of man that must be associated<sup>3969</sup> with democracy, so that<sup>3970</sup> he would rightly be called the democratic man?

(562) "Let him be so associated."

## 2.B.8.d: Tyranny and the Tyrannical Man

The most beautiful of the regimes and the most beautiful of men is all that remain for us to treat: tyranny and the tyrant!<sup>3971</sup>

"Obviously."

Come then, by what turn<sup>3972</sup> does tyranny arise? That it evolves out of democracy we hardly need argue.

"Hardly."

Would you say that the way<sup>3973</sup> tyranny arises out of democracy is similar to the way democracy arises out of oligarchy?

"How do you mean?"

The thing that the citizens had set before themselves<sup>3974</sup> as the good and had served as oligarchy's

ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, 558C4-5).

<sup>3966</sup> ισονομικοῦ τινος (E1), the good old term now corroded into something less than itself: cf. n.3958 ad 561C4.

<sup>3967</sup> καὶ πολλαῖ (E5), in all truth a gratuitous addition, recalling 557C7-8.

<sup>3968</sup> The παραδείγματα (E6) are like samples on display in a παντοπώλιον (cf. 557D8).

<sup>3969</sup> τετάχθω (562A1) retrieving the language with which the treatment of oligarchic man had closed (555B1), which itself looked back to the close of the treatment of timocratic man (550C6).

<sup>3970</sup> I take the ὡς clause (A2) as an abbreviation of a clause like ὡς ("since") εἰ δημοκρατικὸς προσαγορεύοιτο ὄρθως ἀν προσαγορεύοιτο (sc. ύφ' ἡμῶν).

<sup>3971</sup> For the dripping irony (ἡ καλλίστη δῆ ... , A4) and postponed anticlimax (τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος, A5), compare the sentence with which tyranny was originally introduced: ἡ γενναία δῆ ... νόσημα, 544C6-7; and compare the hyperbaton Dante uses when he finally sees the devil, *Inf.34.1*: "Vexilla regis prodeunt inferni." Note also that in this case alone the personality corresponding to the regime (properly, the τυραννικός) is called for the first time by the political office (τύραννος). Not only is the rhyme (τυραννίς / τύραννος) irresistible: in the very end, as we will see, the τύραννος and the τυραννικός will become one and the same person.

<sup>3972</sup> τρόπος (A7), again; and the genitive formulation (τυραννίδος) again varies the programmatic language: cf. 561A1-4 and n.3941.

<sup>3973</sup> τρόπος (A10), reused in a similar but different meaning, again.

<sup>3974</sup> προύθεντο (B3): cf. 555B9 and n.3805.

very foundation<sup>3975</sup> was superwealth,<sup>3976</sup> no?

“Yes.”

But the insatiable desire for wealth and the neglect of the other things<sup>3977</sup> due to their moneymaking destroyed the regime, as we saw.<sup>3978</sup>

“True.”

Isn’t it the case that what democracy defined as the good, and an insatiable desire for it in turn, is the undoing of this regime as well?

“But what are you saying this regime set before itself as the good?”

Freedom, I said.<sup>3979</sup> This is on everyone’s lips in a democratized city,<sup>3980</sup> how it is the most beautiful state of affairs<sup>3981</sup> so that here alone can a person bear to live given his sense that it is his natural state to be free.<sup>3982</sup>

“Yes, one hears that slogan<sup>3983</sup> all the time.”

So, as I was now about to say,<sup>3984</sup> does the insatiable desire for this sort of thing and the consequent neglect of the others<sup>3985</sup> cause a transformation of this regime, also, so as to bring on a need for<sup>3986</sup> tyranny?

“How?”

<sup>3975</sup> καθίστατο (B4), as used of the ὅρος of oligarchy (550C10 [κατάστασιν], 551B5 and 7).

<sup>3976</sup> Reading ὑπέρπλουτος (B4) with ADM against πλούτος of F and most modern editors, as snidely meaning “superwealth” (Jowett compares such nouns as ὑπερσοφιστής, ὑπερθεμιστοκλής, ὑπέρδουλος, late or comical formations that are also snide, but cf. already ὑπέρσοφοι, *Euthyd.*289E3). Cf. ὑπερπλουτεῖν, *Ar.Pl.*354. The fact that the ὑπέρπλουτοι at 552B3 were a kind of persons (the adjective also found once in Aeschylus, *Pr.*466, though Aristotle will prefer ὑπερπλούσιοι: *Pol.*1295B7) rather than a kind of wealth, can hardly tell against taking it in the other sense here—both are virtual coinages. It is not wealth but more wealth than others have that is both the principle of oligarchy (*n.b.* 551B1-2, 555B10) as well as its undoing, as the term πλούτου ἀπληστία repeats just below (B6).

<sup>3977</sup> ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια (B6: cf. C5), again without πάντων, recalls the phrase τῶν ἄλλων ἡμεληκότας (556C4 and n.3829).

<sup>3978</sup> ἀπώλλυ (B7), the imperfect again, to cite the movement of the argument: cf. 559E4 and n.3908.

<sup>3979</sup> τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἶπον (B12): Socrates’s εἶπον goes far beyond the usual narrative insertion of ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, which denotes nothing but change of speaker, so as to stress for our benefit his one word answer.

<sup>3980</sup> ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ πόλει (B12-C1): Omitting the article avoids the hint of adjectivality in referring to this non-regime: cf. 555D6-7 and n.3813.

<sup>3981</sup> καλλιστον (C1), of democracy, again.

<sup>3982</sup> φύσει (C2) suggests a contrast with νόμος. This Rousseauian impatience with human institutions *per se* is not as provocative to the Greek ear as it was to that modern European, but it is just as much a fantasy.

<sup>3983</sup> ρῆμα (C3) stresses the “speech act” over its content (cf. 473E6). Again (cf. λέγεται γε δή, 557B7) an Athenian is speaking from experience. We may cite, with Adam, *Menex.*239Aff, *Eur.Ion* 669-675, and *Thuc.*2.37.

<sup>3984</sup> ὅπερ ἥα νυνδὴ ἐρῶν (C4): cf. 449A7. What he “says” or argues is a question, in the dialectical manner. Cf. 603A10 and n.4812.

<sup>3985</sup> Again he insists (C5) on using ἄλλα (or ἄλλοι) without πάντα (or πάντες): cf. B6 and n.3977.

<sup>3986</sup> δεηθῆναι (C6) introduces a new tone and a new force operating in the devolution of the polis, consonant with the new notion of ἀπληστία.

My sense is that, given the democratized city's thirst for freedom, one day it happens that evil stewards are in charge<sup>3987</sup> and serve up an undiluted draft of it and the city will become inebriated by a serving too large of a wine too strong, so that its rulers, such as they are,<sup>3988</sup> unless they are terribly mild and given to providing a very wide berth indeed to freedom, chastisement<sup>3989</sup> will hear from the city, expressed in the complaint<sup>3990</sup> that they are bloody oligarchs.<sup>3991</sup>

"This is what they do."<sup>3992</sup>

And the city trashes<sup>3993</sup> those who heed their rulers as being servile nobodies,<sup>3994</sup> but praises and honors rulers that act like subjects and subjects that act like rulers, not only in their public role but also in their private lives.<sup>3995</sup> Isn't it inevitable that in a city like this the gospel of freedom will spread to every quarter?

"How could it be otherwise?"

And inevitable that it seep into private households also and end up instilling anarchy<sup>3996</sup> even in their animals.

"How are we to describe such a thing?"<sup>3997</sup>

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<sup>3987</sup> προστατούντων (D1): This new term, a lurking semantic inversion, introduces a new kind of power or authority, new and intriguingly vague, a power lurking here in the job of pouring wine, a job entrusted to underlings. Might this be that unexpected external influence that has been lurking beneath the surface (compare τύχη here with εὐτυχής [561A8 and n.3944])? The governance of τύχη extends to both διψήσασα and προστατούντων, semantically if not syntactically. For the boundary gone beyond, in πορρωτέρω, cf. 561A8-9.

<sup>3988</sup> δή (D2) acts like τότε δή (551A12, 550A4-5), but also adds a tone of exasperation (cf. n.3947 ad 561B2).

<sup>3989</sup> κολάζει (D3), indicative, against our expectation of an infinitive (κολάζειν, dependent on οἶμαι [C8] with τοὺς ὄρχοντας as accusative subject). That is, we had expected the statement that the rulers, if they were not too easy going (πάνυ and πολλήν are wonderfully ambiguous), would choose this moment (δή, D2) to draw the line and chastise the drunken City. Instead the rulers' moderate lassitude only invites a demand for more lassitude (this is the meaning of ἀπληστία ἐλευθερίας), and the City's demand arrogates to itself the higher moral ground (κολάζει). Compare the unexpected change of subject at 558A4-8 (with n.3872 ad καταψηφισθέντων, A5).

<sup>3990</sup> αἰτιωμένη (D4) portrays the shallow tone of the City's rebuke, as a self-interested claim rather than a moral one and requiring a πρόφασις (i.e., an exonerating excuse or explanation) from the rulers. A judge would still be needed to settle the matter.

<sup>3991</sup> μιαρούς τε καὶ ὄλιγαρχικούς (D4): τε καὶ insinuates the criticism that the man's political outlook is due to his personal baseness, by baldly combining a galvanizing slur (μιαρούς) with a popular buzzword (ὄλιγαρχικούς). We approach the end of civil discourse and enter the world of coarse demagoguery.

<sup>3992</sup> δρῶσιν γάρ (D5): Adeimantus shifts to the plural because he is imagining the concrete city.

<sup>3993</sup> The πηλός in προπηλακίζει (D6) reveals that the uncleanness in μιαρούς above comes only from their rhetoric.

<sup>3994</sup> For οὐδὲν ὄντας (D7) cf. 556E1.

<sup>3995</sup> ιδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἐπαινεῖ τε καὶ τιμᾷ (D8-9): The gratuitous extension of equality and its praise to every aspect of life, even where its application would be unclear (ιδίᾳ), is characteristic of the rising obsession with "freedom." The extension provides a berth for the next point, about private homes.

<sup>3996</sup> ἀναρχίαν (E4): "No longer liberty, but anarchy" (J.-C.).

<sup>3997</sup> πῶς τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν (E6) cannot mean "What do you mean by that?" To the contrary, with the first person plural Adeimantus joins in the attempt to articulate the bestial outcome: cf. ἐροῦμεν at 563C1. We have missed the tone of the exchanges here and below (C1-2, C3-5, D2-3), perhaps

Like this: That the father accustoms himself to be like his child and fears his children, while child comes to be like father and feels neither shame nor fear in the face of his parents—all this in the name of freedom.<sup>3998</sup> Metic will be placed on an equal footing with citizen and citizen with metic, and foreigners likewise.(563)

“This is indeed the direction things go.”

Not just these things but other things down to the most minute<sup>3999</sup> detail. The teacher in this situation fears and flatters those who come to his classes<sup>4000</sup> while those who come treat their teachers with little respect, even down to the youths’ treatment of their tutors. Indeed the young will arrogate to themselves the manners of their elders in every way, and constantly contend with them in all they say and all they do, whereas those advanced in age will think again about being so stern toward the young and allow themselves to become suffused with their ingenuousness<sup>4001</sup> and charm by imitating their ways, so as not to be unappealing, let alone be thought of as despotic.

“Quite so, I’d say.”

But, I said, the furthest extent<sup>4002</sup> of freedom, my friend, and the widest can spread in such a city, is when it reaches the slaves, and they, male and female alike,<sup>4003</sup> are no less free than the owners who bought them. And we can hardly forget to mention how extensively the policy of equality and freedom permeates the relations of women to men and of men to women.

“Have we come to the point when, as Aeschylus put it, ‘we will utter what just now rose to our lips?’”<sup>4004</sup>

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because the extension of social freedom down to the level of animals strikes us as funny (at first), rather than appalling and even mortifying, as it apparently was felt to be by Adeimantus and would be, perhaps, by any Greek.

<sup>3998</sup> Exasperated δή (E9), again: cf. 561B2 and n.3947.

<sup>3999</sup> σμικρά (563A3), with ἄλλα: Socrates is not saying that teaching is a small thing (*sic* J.-C. explaining such a scandalous remark as ironic), but is voicing the same insight Ulysses is made to voice in *Triolus and Cressida* I.iii, 101-118 (“O when Degree is shaked...”), who likewise provides a wide spectrum of examples. The importance of the matter of degree, even in things that may seem small, is eloquently shown by René Girard (*The Theatre of Envy*, ch.18 [Oxford 1991], but earlier also in *Violence and the Sacred*, ch.2 [Baltimore 1977]), namely, that “undifferentiation” (such as our democratic city is approaching) unleashes forces of envy that lead to an orgy of violence on the social level. Cf. 586C1-5.

<sup>4000</sup> φοιτητάς (A4) rather than μαθητάς exploits the idiom that to “come around” (φοιτᾶν) means to study with somebody, and thereby makes palpable the threat that he is free to do otherwise. Socrates’s interest is less in the teachers *per se* than all relations involving respect, upon which social order depends, most importantly the relation of πατέρες τε οὐέσιν καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι, about which Adeimantus complained in Book Two (362E5-3A1).

<sup>4001</sup> εὐτραπελίας (A8): Schol. *ad loc.* defines εὐτραπελία as the ability to kid and be kidded, embodying the mean between criticizing everybody (βωμολοχία) and being offended by everybody (ἀγροικία).

<sup>4002</sup> Taking πλήθους (B5) with ἔσχατον and ἐλευθερίας with πλήθους (Schneider).

<sup>4003</sup> οἱ ἐωνημένοι καὶ αἱ ἐωνημέναι (B6), an even more gratuitous extension than 562D8-9, which helps him next to remember to include equality between the genders (B7-9).

<sup>4004</sup> ἐροῦμεν ὅτι νῦν ἥλθ’ ἐπὶ στόμα: (C1-2):Aesch.fr.696 Mette, referred to also by Plut. *amat.*763B and Them. *orat.*4.52. In both of whom it introduces a remark as no longer avoidable though previously postponed (whence the aorist, ἥλθε). With Aeschylus’s νῦν, Adeimantus is pointing to the exchange at E3-6.

Adeimantus’s aversion to describe this creeping insidiousness (καταδύεσθαι, 562E3), expressed here the second of three times (cf.562E6 and 563D2-3 and nn.) stands in strong contrast to the self-superior condemnation against a similar phenomenon that he eagerly voiced in Book Four (424D7-E2,

We certainly shall, and here is how I will put it: Regarding the status of animals domesticated by humans, how much freer<sup>4005</sup> they are in this city than another one could hardly believe, unless he has visited a democracy.<sup>4006</sup> In a democracy the proverb that dogs resemble their mistresses<sup>4007</sup> becomes true literally and extends also to their horses and their asses, who come to adopt the free man's gait and proudly bump into whomever they encounter on the path if he does not stand aside for them. And likewise in all other ways the tribe of animals becomes fully free.

"It's as if you were reading my mind!"<sup>4008</sup> That very thing happens all the time to me when I take a walk in the country!"

But do you recognize the chief effect of all these things as they come together, how soft and weak they make the citizens' soul, so that if someone introduces a measure that smacks at all of service<sup>4009</sup> they chafe at it and will not abide it? In the end you may be sure they will pay no heed even to the laws, written or unwritten, all for the sake of disallowing any trace of despotism to arise in their midst.<sup>4010</sup>

"I am quite sure of it."<sup>4011</sup>

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where note παραδυομένη [D3], ὑπορρεῖ [D8] and the deep breath Socrates takes in answering him [E3]: cf. nn. *ad loc.*). The cautionary tale that Book Eight is turning out to be, into which he injected himself as the interlocutor at 548D8, has enabled him better to recognize and even confess his own feelings.

<sup>4005</sup> ἔλευθερώτερα (C4), n.pl., modifying the periphrastic subject (*τὸ τῶν θηρίων*) agrees as usual with the "real" subject (*θήρια*, n.pl.). Cf. 567E8-8A2 (*χρῆμα ... ἀπολέσας*, 567E8); Leg.657D, Phlb.45E.

<sup>4006</sup> ἄπειρος (C5): Another allusion to the experience of life in Athens!

<sup>4007</sup> παροιμίαν (C6): The schol. *ad loc.* gives us the trimeter *οἵα περ ἡ δέσποινα τοία χ' ἡ κύων* but the sense given to that proverb is that the maid imitates her mistress (cf. Diog.3.51 [=Paroim.Gr.2.44], and Diog.5.93 [=I.269]), whence ἀτεχνῶς, as Adam notes.

<sup>4008</sup> *τὸ ἐμόν γ' ... ἐμοὶ λέγεις ὄναρ* (D2), another proverbial expression, again expressing more candor than usual from Adeimantus. "You've said aloud something I've only thought inwardly before!" *τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ* designates a hidden inward thought, outwardly unspoken *out of shame* (Callim.Ep.32,2 [Pf.= Anth.Pal.12.148]) or out of a sense of one's personal insignificance (Luc. ὄνειρον ἡ ἀλεκτρυών, 7; Callim.Ep.48,6 [Pf.= Anth.Pal.6.130]). The *Mantissa Proverbiorum* (Paroem.Gr.2.774) appears, from the word order it gives to the proverb (*τὸ ἐμὸν ἐμοὶ λέγεις ὄναρ*), to be quoting our passage and then gives this interpretation: *ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ ἔτεροις συμβάντα πρὸς τοὺς πεπονθότας διηγονυμένων* (one man recounts what happened to another man, without knowing the man he tells it to had the same experience). For similar uses of *ὄναρ* in Plato, cf. Charm.173A7, Symp.175E3, Tht.201D8. Adeimantus's remark is exactly consonant with Socrates's claim that a description of this nightmare of total licentiousness would be incredible except to a person who had witnessed it (C3-5). Such a rude experience Adeimantus has indeed had, out in the country.

<sup>4009</sup> ὅτιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται (D6): *δουλεία* can have a positive sense cf.494D6 as well as 442B1, and 590C8-D6; but "slavery" here merely expresses the enervated libertine's reaction to any requirement brought on from the outside (cf. ἔθελοδούλους, 562D7). *προσφέρειν* implies the motive of the suggestion is corrective or therapeutic: cf. 442E2. We will be able to drop Thompson's emendation (*προσφέρῃ*) from the apparatus as soon as we find a single instance of the verb used transitively in the middle (unless we count this as one). The force of the voice is to depict the phase during which the measure is still in the planning stages and not yet applied.

<sup>4010</sup> ίνα δὴ μηδαμῆ μηδείς (D8-E1): again a despotic refusal (*ἀνανεύει*, 561C3). Note exasperated δὴ and compare Thrasymachus's ὡς δὴ at 337C2.

<sup>4011</sup> καὶ μάλ' ... οἶδα (E2): Again a reference to his personal experience as an Athenian—but Plato's insistence on having Adeimantus speak this way reminds us Plato himself will have had similar experiences. The dialogue after all is about him and his brother and Glaucon, and about Socrates persuading them out of their own "best" ideas.

This then is the source, a state of affairs no less fine and thrilling,<sup>4012</sup> from which tyranny springs,<sup>4013</sup> as it seems to me.

“I get what you mean by thrilling, but what happens next?”

The same sickness<sup>4014</sup> that arose in oligarchy and destroyed it, here also, by growing larger and stronger out of democracy’s freedom, ends up enslaving it.<sup>4015</sup> In truth, after all, anything done in excess brings on a large reversal in compensation. This is how the weather works; it holds in the world of plants and animals;<sup>4016</sup> so also does it hold in political regimes.

(564) “Likely so.”

So it is likely that an excess of freedom would change into nothing else than an excess of slavery, in both the personal sphere and the civic.

“Likely indeed.”

So that’s why it is likely that tyranny comes about from no other regime than democracy, from the very height of freedom a slavery most far reaching and savage.<sup>4017</sup>

“That is only logical.”

But this is not what you were asking me about—but rather what was the sickly element,<sup>4018</sup> spawned in oligarchy, that now acts upon democracy so as to enslave it?

“Right.”

It is that element I was describing as a breed of lazy and spendthrift men, among whom the bravest are the leaders while the less manly ones follow<sup>4019</sup>—this group we are likening to drones,

<sup>4012</sup> καλὴ καὶ νεανική (E4): the former from the slogan and the latter used of youthful vigor so unformed as to have the potential for good or evil (425C5, 491E4, 503C4), but also to denote the charm or thrill of the new (363C3, Gorg.508D1). The fact that these two things often come together is the reason it is prudent to resist “innovation” (νεωτερισμός).

<sup>4013</sup> ἀρχὴ οὔτωσι καλὴ καὶ νεανική (E3-4): the notion and the paradox will be repeated more concretely when the tyrant actually sprouts up: προστατικὴ ρίζη, 565D2).

<sup>4014</sup> νόσημα (E6), referring exactly to 552C4, as we shall soon see.

<sup>4015</sup> καταδουλοῦται (E8): *Enslavement* is a new metaphor: before, the νόσημα was said to destroy the city’s order (ἀπώλεσεν [E7]: compare ἀπώλλυν and καταλύει [562B7, B10], used when the parallelism was first introduced). This paradox of freedom and slavery then stimulates a digression on ἀνταπόδωσις (563E9-4B2), which interrupts the narrative about what happens next with the νόσημα (i.e., τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, E5). The digression is then closed by a repetition of the metaphor that stimulated it (δουλοῦται [B2], the prefix characteristically dropped in repetition: cf. 399E8 and n. 1532).

<sup>4016</sup> ἐν ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασιν (563E10-564A1). For σῶμα designating animals in contrast to plants, cf. 380E4-5 and 401A4 (where ἄλλων is complementary-adverbial: cf. n. 1562). It is the ἀνταπόδωσις of the Ionian φυσιολογία that he refers to, a concept that characteristically confounds the moral and physical worlds. For Socrates’s use of the φυσιολογία cf. 380E3-4 and n. 1214. That it is only half-serious is felt by Adeimantus as his reply shows (εἰκός, A2 and A5, picked up by Socrates with εἰκότως τοίνυν, A6).

<sup>4017</sup> πλείστη τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτη (564A8): πλείστη picks up the use of πλέον above (563E7: cf. ὅσον, 563B5; and ἐπὶ πᾶν, 562E1), while ἀγριωτάτη is an extension and a narrowing of ἵσχυρότερον (563E8), adding an unexpected and unwelcome flavor that is quite the opposite of ἀπαλήν at 563D5.

<sup>4018</sup> ταύτον (B1): As Shorey succinctly says, “ταύτον implies the concept,” citing *Parm. 130D6; Phlb. 13B3, 34E3; Soph. 253D1-2, etc.*

<sup>4019</sup> τὸ μέν ... τὸ δέ ... (B5-6): The division of the drones into leaders and followers is new. Previously the distinction between them was that some were more dangerous than others, as he next reminds us (B6-7). They begin to embody a nightmarish inversion of the ideal ἄρχοντες with their

some having stingers and others not.

“It was a fitting simile.”

These two groups cause trouble in any regime, just as phlegm and bile do in bodies. The city needs a good physician or lawgiver,<sup>4020</sup> no less than the hive needs a competent honey-maker who plans above all to prevent them from arising, but if they do to see that they are rooted out of the group as fast as possible, honeycomb and all.

“Yes, by Zeus, any which way one can.”

So let’s approach the problem this way in order to make out what we are looking for more distinctly. Let’s divide up the democratized regime into three parts in our argument—three parts which actually are its constituent parties.<sup>4021</sup> First there is the group that lassitude engendered in it to be no less large<sup>4022</sup> than in the oligarchic regime.

“Yes.”

But it is far stronger and far more intense in this regime than it was in that one. There, because it was not held in honor, it got no exercise and was not strong; but in a democracy this is the group that is in charge,<sup>4023</sup> except for a few others, and the most intense and energetic members of the group do the speechifying<sup>4024</sup> while the rest swarm close around the rostrum and make a large hullabaloo<sup>4025</sup> that keeps the other side from being heard, so that everything that happens in the management of the city is determined by this group—apart from a few others.<sup>4026</sup>

“Quite so.”

ἐπίκουροι.

<sup>4020</sup> ιατρόν τε καὶ νομοθετήν (C1): The metaphor precedes the basic notion it elaborates (νομοθετήν) because the physiological humors had just been introduced (B10): cf. 343C6 and n.444 on “reverse καί;” 359A3, 381A4 and nn.716 and 1217. The medical metaphor of excision is continued below (567C5-7). Cutting away part of the hive inhabited by drones is known to Aristotle (*HA* 9.40, 624B21).

<sup>4021</sup> τριχῇ διαστησώμεθα (C9): Adam cites Theseus’s speech from E. *Suppl.* 238-245, which presents a tripartite division of the groups that constitute a city: the *useless rich*, the poor who envy them, and the demagogues who deceive the poor—a division that is more significant for its differences from the present passage than its similarities.

<sup>4022</sup> οὐκ ἔλαττον (D2) redoes the quantitative πλέον (563E7) with a litotes that prepares for the emphatically qualitative πολὺ δριμύτερον (D4, corollary to ισχυρότερον, 563E8), itself a further intensification of ἀγριωτάτη (A8).

<sup>4023</sup> προεστός (D8): cf. προστατούντων, 562D1 and n.3987. By the merest etymological reference we are given our only indication, and given it only after the fact, how this drone element came to be in charge (note the perfect): that it was because of the people’s enervation with practical politicians (τοὺς ἄρχοντας, 562D2). Finally we are given some reason for the distinction, repeated above in the abstract but never instantiated, between political changes that are λάθροι rather than βίαι (557A6-8, 551B3-5).

<sup>4024</sup> λέγει τε καὶ πράττει (D9) repeats the idea that the speeches are a kind of political action (cf. πράττῃ at 558B7; cf. 561D3 and 565B2 below; cf. 494E4-5, 589A7; *Phdrs.* 273E5. *Prot.* 318E5-319A2 suggests the pair covers politics in contrast to home management [=διοικεῖν]): a movement is afoot.

<sup>4025</sup> βομβεῖ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται (D10), echoic of the bumbling buzz of bees, τε καί linking metaphor with meaning (cf. 330D7 and n.96).

<sup>4026</sup> χωρίς τινων ὄλιγων (E2): This second awkward mention of these nameless few (cf. ἐκτός ὄλιγων, D8) ushers them in to be mentioned next (E4-7) as a group distinct from the πλῆθος (ἀποκρίνεται, E4). The awkwardness casts them in the role of the unneeded odd-men-out, and soon enough they will be made to feel that way themselves (565C1-4).

But there is another element that is always set apart from the mass.

“Which?”

Though everyone including the mass works at their jobs, those who are most gifted by nature<sup>4027</sup> tend to become the most wealthy.

“It’s likely.”

And have the most honey so as to be the easiest quarter from which the drones can harvest it.<sup>4028</sup>

“How after all could someone extract a lot from those who have little?”

Such rich persons as these I imagine are called the garden<sup>4029</sup> of the drones.

“Virtually.”

(565) The mass or the deme would be the third part, those who work on their own and mind their own business, unnoteworthy for their possessions though they constitute the largest party in a democracy and so the one that has the final say in a vote of the assembly.

“Yes it is, but they are hardly willing even to assemble, unless they can get some share of honey.”

But a share they will have, as long as the bosses<sup>4030</sup> are able to expropriate wealth from the “haves” and distribute it to the deme, keeping of course the lion’s share for themselves.<sup>4031</sup>

“And this is how the deme gets a share of it.”<sup>4032</sup>

But the “haves” are forced to defend themselves,<sup>4033</sup> by speaking in the assembly and agitating any

<sup>4027</sup> οἱ κοσμιώτατοι φύσει (E6). This designation is suspicious for its vagueness, and all the more suspicious for the assertion that this small (όλιγων, D8, E2) group always turns out to be rich, advanced without argument and accepted without cavil. In fact the term cherishes a certain envy of those whose talent makes it easier for them to become rich, for which cf. E. *Suppl.* 241, νέμοντες τῷ φθόνῳ πλέον μέρος (where πλέον pairs the vice of the poor with the vice of the rich: πλειόνων ἐρῶσ’ ἀεί, 239). The suggestion of envy returns with κολῶν κάγαθῶν λεγομένων (569A4) which refers back to this passage and therefore bars us from giving κοσμιώτατοι here the sense of temperate frugality that it is usually given in order to account for their turning out wealthy. The truth is, envy calls them κοσμιώτατοι because they are wealthy.

<sup>4028</sup> τοῖς κηφῆσι (E9): The metaphor of the drones is extended one step further (cf. 559D8 and n. 3904) by conceiving them stealing the honey produced by the hardworking bees in the hive.

<sup>4029</sup> βοτάνη (E13): The metaphor is repeated in Plut. *de rect.rat.* 42A.

<sup>4030</sup> οἱ προεστῶτες (565A7), the perfect participle drawn out of προεστός above (D8), now by dint of the definite article becoming a technical term for an established class or set of functionaries.

<sup>4031</sup> οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει ... ἀεί, καθ’ ὅσον δύνανται οἱ προεστῶτες, τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρούμενοι, διανέμοντες τῷ δήμῳ, τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν (A6-8): The construction holds a surprise. The semantics and the chiastic order of the two participles ἀφαιρούμενοι and διανέμοντες suggest that the money is simply being transferred from the rich to the deme, but then αὐτοὶ ἔχειν arrives, which being in the infinitive turns out to be the *principal* construction with δύνανται, though it introduces a new and unexpected element. For a similar surprise cf. κολάζει, 562D3 (and n. 3989). Διανέμοντες recalls the redistribution dreamed of by the democrat as the means to achieve “equality” (διανέμουσα, 558C6).

<sup>4032</sup> μεταλαμβάνει γὰρ οὖν οὗτος (B1): they “get a share”—of what the drones have confiscated! For γὰρ οὖν assenting to the obvious cf. 357D3.

<sup>4033</sup> ἀμύνεσθαι (B2): The abrupt change of subject requires us to infer for ourselves that Socrates refers to the κοσμιώτατοι, whom his terminology favors, as innocent victims: they are required to enter the buzzing hullabaloo against their better instincts (for they are truly κόσμιοι), and counteract

way they can, these ones from whom the bosses are expropriating money for their own use.

“How can they avoid it?”

The result is they are assailed<sup>4034</sup> by the others as being oligarchs plotting against<sup>4035</sup> the people, though they have no revolutionary<sup>4036</sup> pretensions at all.

“Yes.”

And in the end, when they see that the deme has no culpable role in all this, but that it is unaware of what is going on and has been deceived into mistreating them by those who are slandering them, then it will come about,<sup>4037</sup> whether they planned it or not, that they will fulfill the slogan and act the part of oligarchs<sup>4038</sup>—all this through no fault of their own since this evil, too, is the work of that same drone, which stung them.<sup>4039</sup>

“Certainly.”

Impeachments,<sup>4040</sup> judgments, and contests between the two groups ensue.

“Quite a lot of them.”

Doesn’t the deme usually fix upon just one person<sup>4041</sup> to be the boss<sup>4042</sup> over itself, head and shoulders above all others, and throw its support behind this one and confer great powers on him?

“Usually.”

So this much then is clear: whenever a tyrant is created he comes from this class of bosses and springs up from no other root.<sup>4043</sup>

the speechifying (*λέγοντες τε καὶ πράττοντες* [B2-3]: cf. 564D9 and n.4024) of the bosses.

<sup>4034</sup> αἰτίαν ἔσχον (B5), the regular passive form of the deponent (cf. the humorous syllepsis at 566C2-3). For the idea compare αἰτιωμένη (562D4 and n.3990). The aorist is used for the outcome, as above.

<sup>4035</sup> ἐπιβουλεύουσι τῷ δῆμῳ (B6): the alarmist accusation (*n.b.*, ώς) that the few are plotting against the many represents an inversion of the plotting of the many against the few that brought about democracy (551D6-7, 555D9, 556D6-E1), the plot being finally carried out at 560B7-561A4.

<sup>4036</sup> νεωτερίζειν (B6), is obviously a two-edged sword (cf. 555D10), but here it is a pejorative political term.

<sup>4037</sup> τότ’ ἥδη (C1), again, for the crucial point in the development.

<sup>4038</sup> ώς ἀληθῶς ὄλιγαρχικοί (C2): We have to presume the meaning is “rulers of few and none,” because that is what it meant last time (551E2), but as soon as we think of that passage we notice that the situation is completely different. As before their fewness is a measure of their lack of force, but this time they are the subjugated rather than the subjugators. In short, they will lose the status that made an awkward exception of them (above, 564D8 [*έκτὸς ὄλιγων*] and E2 [*χωρίς τινων ὄλιγων*]).

<sup>4039</sup> ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κακόν .. ἐντίκτει αὐτούς (C3): The κοσμιώτατοι are forced to stoop to the level of the demagogues: cf. B2-3 and n.4033.

<sup>4040</sup> εἰσαγγελίαι (C6), as trials before a large public body, are particularly amenable to demagoguery.

<sup>4041</sup> ἔνα (C9), placed in emphatic position. Socrates perhaps is quoting Ar.Eq.I 127 where Demos says βούλομαι τρέφειν ἔνα προστάτην. Up until now the bosses were in the plural (*διαβαλλόντων*, C1; ἔτέρων, B5; οἱ προεστῶτες, A7; etc.); note also the avoidance of this explicit singular for the demagogue at the rostrum (564D7-E2) done by means of the abstract expressions τὸ προεστός, τὸ δριμύτατον and τὸ ἄλλο.

<sup>4042</sup> προΐστασθαι (C9), being a verb, continues the *de facto* rather than *de jure* description of their empowerment and standing. The transition from the previous question to this one will become clear at 566A6-7: see next notes.

<sup>4043</sup> ρίζης (D2) continues the *metaphor* or τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν (C10). The mass’s tendency to

“Very clear indeed.”

So then what is the beginning point for the transformation<sup>4044</sup> from protector to tyrant? Or is it clear that it is when he first does that thing that the person did in the tale told<sup>4045</sup> about the temple of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia?

“Which tale is that?”

The tale about a person who tastes human innards, a single bit of it mixed in with the entrails of other sacrificial animals—that a necessity will be upon him<sup>4046</sup> to turn into a wolf. Have you not heard this story?

“I have.”

Is it not so also with the man that is boss and protector of the deme and holds in his thrall an enthused and unanimous crowd?<sup>4047</sup> Assume he fails to avoid shedding the blood of his own tribe,<sup>4048</sup> but in the course of bringing the usual<sup>4049</sup> trumped-up charges and dragging into court he commits an act of blood guilt, the act of snuffing out the life of a man,<sup>4050</sup> and so has a taste of kindred blood with

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throw all its belief behind a single champion is a necessary prerequisite (*ἄρα*) to the creation of a tyrant. *μέν* (D1) however suggests that something else will be needed. *ἄρα* reveals the statement is an inference rather than an observation, so that Adam’s comment, that if Plato means here to be historical he has failed at it, does not apply. The paradox that the tyrannical “volunteer” that springs up comes from “no other” root than the happy champion of the people—that in truth it is not a volunteer after all—has been prepared by *οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης* (564A6) and the law of antapodosis (563E9-4A1), as well as 563E3-4 (*καλὴ καὶ νεανική*): beautiful and vigorous as it seems, the *ἀπληστία* of freedom brings on an ugly and debilitating tyranny.

<sup>4044</sup> τίς ἀρχὴ οὖν μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ τύραννον; (D4). Presumably the root has pushed up a *προστάτης* who could, because of the deme’s desire for a boss and protector (C9-10) during a time of controversy (565B9-C8), become a tyrant (D1-2); now all that is needed is the fateful act or event that will *initiate* this transformation (*ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς*).

<sup>4045</sup> As by Pausanias, 8.2.

<sup>4046</sup> τούτῳ (E1), dative of the person upon whom the necessity impinges, after he was the subject. Of such an “inversion of government” in the syntax (one nominative yielding to another under which what was previously nominative becomes dative), Riddell offers several examples (§271). The change of construction emphasizes the inevitability and objectivity of the necessity. Cf. the shift at 558A4-8 (cf. n.3872).

<sup>4047</sup> σφόδρα πειθόμενον (E3-4) redoes διαφερόντως προΐστασθαι ἔαυτοῦ (C9-10).

<sup>4048</sup>, ἐμφυλίου αἴματος (E4) re-introduces a larger group with a higher sanction (the φυλή), which embraces the polis and all its various regimes. We also encountered it in Book Five (469B5-471C3) when the treatment of racially Hellenic enemies had to be distinguished from the treatment of barbarian ones (compare *ἀπέχεσθαι* at 469C7 with 565E4), and conflicts within the race were distinguished (as *στάσεις*) from conflicts against barbarians (as *πόλεμοι*).

<sup>4049</sup> οἵα δὴ φιλοῦσιν (E5) sc. οἱ προεστῶτες, referring to the institutionalized victimization of rich persons by the bosses. They distribute their wealth to the deme (and themselves) to keep the deme in their thrall (565A6-8), and they manufacture εἰσαγγελίαι καὶ κρίσεις καὶ ἀγώνες against them (565C6).

<sup>4050</sup> βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων (E6): “snuffing out some person’s life” (*ἀνδρός* is generic and has its usual sympathetic tone: cf. 361B6 and n.752). Amazingly, a direct object for all five acts committed by the *προστάτης* (E3-566A2) is absent, as if the boss is unaware what he is doing (as the person who eats the entrails on Mount Lycaea is unaware they contain human bits). Of translations I have consulted only Schleiermacher’s abstains from adding an object: most add two or three. For the aposiopesis compare 364B7-C1 and n. *ad loc.*; for the exceptional vagueness compare the amazing use of *αὐτῷ* at 588B6 (cf. n.4510).

the tongue and impious mouth that made the case,<sup>4051</sup> and banishes from house and hearth, causes to be (566) executed, and hints at the forgiving of debts and the redistribution of lands.<sup>4052</sup> It becomes necessary in the case of such a man, indeed a matter of inexorable fate, that he will either perish at the hands of his enemies or else he will become a tyrant—will turn, that is, from a man into a wolf?

“Yes, there is no way to avoid it.”

And this is the how the Warrior against the Wealthy<sup>4053</sup> arises?

“Yes.”

If he is exiled but then restored through force of arms<sup>4054</sup> by the city’s enemies, he returns as a finished<sup>4055</sup> tyrant.

“Clearly.”

On the other hand if they are unsuccessful in their attempt<sup>4056</sup> to exile him or to bring on a judicial execution by slandering him in the city, they prepare an unvarnished death for him to be carried out in secret.<sup>4057</sup>

“This is the sort of thing that would happen.”

And at this juncture the Tyrant’s Plea arises, discovered anew every time people come this far down the road, the request<sup>4058</sup> that the deme provide a personal bodyguard in order to keep the Champion of the People<sup>4059</sup> from getting killed.<sup>4060</sup>

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<sup>4051</sup> γενόμενος (E7): The climactic instance of the theme of public speechifying as a kind of action (cf. λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, 564D9 and n.4024): the mouth of the orator is bloodied by his victim’s flesh.

<sup>4052</sup> ἀποκοπάς and ἀναδασμόν (566A1-2) smack of revolution: Leg.684E1-2, ps.Dem.24.149, Isoc.Panath.259, Arist.Pol.I305A3-7 (cit.Adam).

<sup>4053</sup> ὁ στασιάζων πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας (A6), a title by which the deme now champions its boss and protector. Cf. ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός, B7-8 below. The astigmatism of timocracy, the conflicted oxymorons of oligarchy, and the flattering inversions of democracy, are being replaced with bald and murderous falsehoods, still flattering but now promulgated by forces the deme does not see. Socrates leaves it up to Adeimantus, and Plato up to us, still to recognize what words mean and what is actually happening.

<sup>4054</sup> βίᾳ (A9) as opposed to λάθρῳ (B3, *infra*). The distinction between the ways the final change is reached is repeated (cf. 557A6-8, 551B3-5), but what is truly λάθρῳ in the shift to tyranny is the intention of the tyrant (the change is in fact happening before everybody’s eyes), not the action of the κοσμιώτατοι that plot against him, as Socrates indirectly will assert at B10-11. Cf. προεστός at 564D8 (and n.4023).

<sup>4055</sup> ἀπειργασμένος (A10), an allusion to the celebratory, and final, restoration of unnecessary desires in the democratic man (λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατάγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας, 560E3-4).

<sup>4056</sup> ἐκβάλλειν (B1) conative present (contrast aorist ἐκπεσών, A9), as are the presents διαβάλλοντες and ἐπιβουλεύοντες (B2).

<sup>4057</sup> διαβάλλοντες ἐν τῇ πόλει / βιαίῳ δὴ θανάτῳ (B2): Here is the final version of the transition effected λάθρῳ or βίᾳ (cf.A9 and n.4054).

<sup>4058</sup> αἰτεῖν (B6) defensive, as was αἴτημα (B5). The tyrant is depicted as threatened, but the syntax succeeds at hiding his own role in fabricating the claim.

<sup>4059</sup> ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός (B7-8) a title suitably innocuous, vague, and brief—compare the studiously vague expressions “Il Duce” and “Der Führer” and “Big Brother.” In truth it is a large step that has been taken from his previous title (A6).

<sup>4060</sup> αὐτοῖς (B7): The ethical dative refers to the same personnel that constitute the deme, an irony lost on the voting mass (the deme). We are near the magical moment dreamed of by Thrasymachus (344B5-C2), which is identical to the disastrous moment foretold in Solon’s admonition (Diod.Sic. 9.20): frg.9West [ἀνδρῶν δ’ ἐκ μεγάλων πόλις ὅλλυται, ἐς δὲ μονάρχου | δῆμος ἀϊδρίη

“Quite so.”

And the deme, combining their fear that anything should happen to the great man with a high-spirited lack of concern about their own situation,<sup>4061</sup> grants the request.

“Quite so.”

And when the man who has money witnesses this state of affairs and sees that having money constitutes grounds<sup>4062</sup> for his being called an Enemy of the People,<sup>4063</sup> that is the moment, my friend, that he, according to the oracle that Croesus received “along the sandy bank of Hermus, flees and stays no longer, no longer fearing the lot of a coward.”<sup>4064</sup>

“He would hardly be given a chance to fear that lot for long!”

To the contrary he would be arrested and given<sup>4065</sup> a sentence of death.

“Necessarily.”

While the boss, far from “lying magnificently prostrate, once a magnificent man,”<sup>4066</sup> has brought down many others and now stands tall in the city’s chariot,<sup>4067</sup> once a mere boss but now a tyrant fully formed.

“How will he not do so?”<sup>4068</sup>

Should we then describe the happiness<sup>4069</sup> of the man and of the city<sup>4070</sup> where such a brave

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δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν], and frg. I I West [αὐτοὶ γὰρ τούτους ηὔξήσατε ρύματα δόντες | καὶ διὰ ταῦτα κακὴν ἔσχετε δουλοσύνην]: where compare ρύματα δόντες with διδόασι, B10.

<sup>4061</sup> Θαρρήσαντες (B10) suggests rashness without suggesting large-mindedness (e.g. the μεγαλοπρέπεια with which democratic citizens welcomed any political activist as long as he claims to be εὗνους ... τῷ πλήθει: 558B5-C1). With θαρρήσαντες Socrates uses a term they might well use of themselves, but at the same time by means of the balanced contrast with δείσαντες, suggests something else to us. With the invisible deception of the tyrant, the ignorance of the deme is now represented with “Sophoclean” irony. We have come, then, to the point where news is harder to believe than fiction (Karl Kraus).

<sup>4062</sup> αἰτίαν (C3) governed by ἔχων in a mild syllepsis. It is another trumped-up charge. Cf. ἐπαιτιώμενος οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν (565E5), αἰτίαν ἔσχον (565B5).

<sup>4063</sup> μισόδημος (C3) is as much a propagandistic label as was βοηθὸς τοῦ δήμου above.

<sup>4064</sup> Hdt. I.55.

<sup>4065</sup> θανάτου δίδοται (C8): The verb suggests we compare this enactment of the deme with its last one (διδόασι [sc. φύλακας], B10).

<sup>4066</sup> μέγας μεγαλωστί (C9-D1), quoting Homer II.16.776 which describes Hector’s felled charioteer, Cebriones, and how he was brought down low but retained his pride. After the oracle this allusion suggests that if the κόσμιος does stay, he will at least perish with honor.

<sup>4067</sup> τῷ δίφρῳ τῆς πόλεως (D2): The metaphor is used at Polit.266E8-I I, but here the pomp lives on blood.

<sup>4068</sup> τί δὲ οὐ μέλλει; (D4). Will Adeimantus cut through Socrates’s irony to express aversion, regret, consternation, or worry that this might happen to him, as he did in regard to the rude confrontation he has had with animals in democratic Athens?

<sup>4069</sup> τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν (D5) a euphemism for the quality of life that the evolution into tyranny results in, and therefore another variation in the programmatic announcement. It is “ironic” as was the characterization of tyranny (ἡ καλλίστη δή) with which the evolution of the tyrannical regime was introduced, an assertion made before the investigation even began (562A4); but the term also reminds us that the men are being described only for our own purpose (the purpose of the brothers, with Socrates aiding): to judge how happy their lives are, and ours would be if we were like him.

<sup>4070</sup> τοῦ δὲ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πόλεως (D5-6): The pairing of man and state is a suitable

human<sup>4071</sup> is spawned?

“We certainly should.”

Will we not expect that in the first days of his reign he greets everyone he happens upon with a glad hand and a warm laugh, and while<sup>4072</sup> he does not declare himself tyrant he makes a lot of promises, both in private and in public? He cancelled debts and redistributed the land,<sup>4073</sup> and to the people and those in his entourage, one and all, he makes himself out as merciful and mild.<sup>4074</sup>

“So he must.”

But then, I fancy, we can only expect that<sup>4075</sup> once he has dealt with the inimical forces abroad by appeasing some and destroying others and from those quarters things quiet down, he is always stirring up a some war or other, first of all<sup>4076</sup> so that the deme will find itself in need of a leader.

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characterization of the tyrannical πολιτεία, since the evolution of the regime (the πόλις) has been shown to be tantamount to the apocalyptic appearance of the tyrant (the ὀνύρ). Contrast the expression that introduced the treatment of tyranny as a whole, i.e. of the state and the personality—at 562A4-5: τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος (cf. n.3971). We could start to think that the τυραννικὸς ἀνήρ (i.e., the personality whose identification is the real goal for describing the tyrannical regime), is being identified with the τύραννος himself, and in a sense we will be right; but then we would, I hope, remember we are looking through the wrong end of the telescope: The personalities, in contrast with the regimes, have been described in terms of their *inward* order, including the marks left by parental relations (the youth in the oligarchic regime almost an exception: cf. 556B8 and n. 3827), rather than in terms of the individual’s relation with his fellow citizens.

<sup>4071</sup> βροτός (D6) tempts the boundaries between man and god, but also, because of the etymological connection with βιβρώσκω and the cannibalism of 565D9-E1, the boundaries between man and animal. Cf. ἕλεώς τε καὶ πρᾶος εἶναι (E3 and n.4074).

<sup>4072</sup> καὶ οὔτε τύραννός φησιν εἶναι ὑπισχνεῖται τε πολλά (D9-E1): The connectives juxtapose the fact that he forgoes to claim (or avoids to confess?) he is tyrant, with the fact that he makes many promises, without even broaching the logical relation between these claims, so as to require us to find his underlying strategy on our own.

<sup>4073</sup> χρεῶν τε ἡλευθέρωσε καὶ γῆν διένειμε (E2): The two actions, adumbrated above at A1-2, are put into the aorist in contrast to the preceding future promises; the present tense returns (προσποιεῖται, E4) to describe the present result of this record of action. Of course the description is one-sided: the “freeing” (ἡλευθέρωσε) of debts will burden the debtors with loss, and the “redistribution” (διένειμε: cf. 558C6 and n.3885) of land can only “redistribute” it from persons that happen to own it to persons who happen not to own it.

<sup>4074</sup> ἕλεώς τε καὶ πρᾶος (E3). The former term properly applies to the relation between the gods and man, and in particular the gods’ prerogative to look down *kindly* upon man, and man’s attempt to act well, so as to appease the gods (427B7 supra, Leg.792D2; Phdo.95A4-6; Iliad.1.583, 2.550; h.Cer.204). The term is formulaic therefore in the language of the kletic hymn (*h.Hom.1.17; 19.48, 20.8, 21.5, 23.4; Hes.Op.338,340; Pind.O.7.9; Soph.El.655*: cf. Leg.664C8, 712B5; Phdo.95A4-6), although it can be used in the context of appeasing a hero, as in II.9.639, 19.178; and it is used of a man superhumanly contented, namely, Socrates after drinking the hemlock (*Phdo.117B3*, cf. Rep.496E2).

While this term compares the tyrant to a god, the second term (πρᾶος) compares him to an animal, alluding also to his potential for violence (cf. ἀγριωτάτη, 564A8), as well as to the demos’s subconscious awareness of it.

<sup>4075</sup> γε (E6), here and throughout the passage (566C8, E10; 567A5, B7, C4, E7; 568A3, B3, B9, C2, C6; 569A8, B5) marks the lowered expectations to which Socrates is becoming inured; and οἵμαι (E6, 567A5) verges on “I daresay.” Contrast exasperated δή in the treatment of democracy (561B2 and n.3947).

<sup>4076</sup> πρῶτον μέν (E8) in a proleptic position, goes with the ἵνα clause.

“Likely.”

(567) And also so that having been impoverished by special assessments the people are too busy paying for things to foment plots against him?

“Clearly.”

Also, I'd guess, if he notices certain persons in whose hearts the spirit of freedom seems to stir and suspects they might not acquiesce in his rule, to secure him cover<sup>4077</sup> for destroying them by handing them over to the enemy—are all these reasons why a tyrant is always having to stir up war?

“Always.”

But doesn't his behavior bring on<sup>4078</sup> hatred for him among the citizens?

“How could it not?”

And bring on also that the inner elite that helped him seize power and still have some power to give voice to their indignation at these goings-on, confronting both him and each other—at least the most macho<sup>4079</sup> of them?

“Likely.”

Then root them out one and all, must the tyrant, and get rid of them,<sup>4080</sup> if he is going to stay in power,<sup>4081</sup> until nobody of any worth is left, whether friend or enemy.

“Clearly.”

He has to look very closely and ask himself: Which of them is brave? Which is large-minded? Who's aware of what's going on? Who is rich?<sup>4082</sup> So happy is his estate that he has to think of each and every one of these as an enemy, whether he wants to or not, and carry out plots against them until he purges<sup>4083</sup> the city.

“A pretty purgation,”<sup>4084</sup> one would have to agree.”

Yes, and opposite the type doctors use when they purge a body. They strip away the worst and leave the best, whereas he does the opposite.

<sup>4077</sup> ὅπως ἂν (567A6) varies ἵνα (E8, 567A1) under the force of the conditional ἂν in καὶ ἂν γε (A5): The tyrant stirs up an enemy to keep the citizens busy and *would* stir one up if he suspected that any citizens would prove recalcitrant to his rule. Cf. K.-G. §330.4 and GMT §328 (Smyth appears wrongly to restrict this conditionalizing use to object clauses: §2215, cf. 2201b).

<sup>4078</sup> ἔτοιμον (A10) neuter, in its stately and archaic idiom with the infinitive (sc. ἐστί), for the inevitable result or punishment (E.HF 85, Solon 4.8 [West]; Anac.50.11 [Page=395 PMG], Simon.103,7 and 15 [Page=608 PMG]). Cf. also πότμος ἔτοιμος, *Iliad* 18.96. J.-C. say the ellipsis of ἐστί is common.

<sup>4079</sup> ἀνδρικώτατοι (B5) a rough-hewn term that will be tamed down into ἀνδρεῖος below (B12).

<sup>4080</sup> For the tone of ὑπεξαιρεῖν (B8) cf. (with J.-C.) Thuc.8.70.2. ὑπό implies stealth and ἐξ implies irreversibility. We coined the transitive verb to “disappear someone” to describe analogous tyrannical phenomena, criminal or totalitarian, in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.

<sup>4081</sup> ἄρξειν (B9) future: cf. C8 below.

<sup>4082</sup> τίς ἀνδρεῖος, τίς μεγαλόφρων, τίς φρόνιμος, τίς πλούσιος (B12-C1): The list relies on the background list of the tripartite goods to provide a division of the types of benefit (ὅφελος, B10): ἀνδρεῖος here stands for bodily strength, μεγαλόφρων moves away from it to make a transition to the psychic goods (τίς φρόνιμος), and finally we have the external goods (πλούσιος). In short, anything of value is to him a threat (cf. the inversion of χείριστον / βέλτιστον below, C5-7).

<sup>4083</sup> καθήρῃ (C3), for the “purgation” of good things cf. 560D8 and 573B4.

<sup>4084</sup> καλόν γε καθαρμόν (C4): Adeimantus joins Socrates in his snide tone, here and in the sequel, and ruefully joins him in imagining the tyrant's development (C8, D10-11, E7).

"Yes, it seems he must if he is to retain power."

It's a blessed necessity<sup>4085</sup> then that binds him, constraining him to choose between living with men who are most of them worthless, indeed good at hating him only, and living not at all.

"Such is the necessity that binds him."

Now isn't it the case that the more he incurs the hatred of the citizens by acting this way, the greater the number of spear-carriers he will need and all the more loyal?

"Of course."

Which group will be loyal to him? From what quarter will he summon them?

"They'll make a bee line for his doorstep in great numbers if he offers them their pay."<sup>4086</sup>

Drones, then, by the dog, you appear to be suggesting<sup>4087</sup>—a whole new set<sup>4088</sup> of them, foreign and motley.

"So I do."

But whom can he find closer to home?<sup>4089</sup> Wouldn't he be willing—

"What?"

The slaves: to steal them from the citizens, free them, and replenish the ranks of his bodyguard with them.

"You bet. These are sure to be his most loyal types."<sup>4090</sup>

So it really is a blessed fix you are putting the tyrant into, if for stalwarts trusty and true he is (568) stuck<sup>4091</sup> with such as these, now that he has killed the ones he used before.

"Yet these are the sort he is stuck with."

And think how they admire him, these companions he has accrued, and how these newly

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<sup>4085</sup> ἐν μακαρίᾳ ἄρα ... ἀνάγκῃ (D1), a necessity not at all far from the Diomedean one (493D6 and n.2834).

<sup>4086</sup> ἔὰν τὸν μισθὸν διδῷ (D10-11): Adeimantus's definite article expresses a cynical certainty they will have their price; his present designates that the tyrant is adopting a policy.

<sup>4087</sup> κηφῆνας (D12): Working for pay is always ἀκούσιον (strictly speaking: 345E5-346D8) and always undignified (cf. 419A10, Achilles's remark in Hades [Θητεύεμεν, 386B5], and Demosthenes's demagogical use of the term against Aeschines at 18.43), and always involves an apolitical or politically unintegratable element (371E4). It is this last element, along with Adeimantus's metaphor πετόμενοι, that brings (winged) drones to Socrates's mind.

<sup>4088</sup> αὐ (D12): The local supply had turned into the bosses: now we have to rely on foreign types (ξενικοί, whence derogatory παντοδαποί).

<sup>4089</sup> αὐτόθεν (E3): Why go abroad when you have a supply of foreigners at home (our slaves)? The τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν of AFDM (versus τί on the Monacensis) is a brachylogical parallel to the two questions (τίνες / πόθεν) of D9. The disfigurement of the text by Slings (Crit.Notes, 153) is unwarranted: interlocutors often interrupt for reasons we do not immediately understand (e.g., 549C7, Phdrs.273D1, 277D5, al.). Adeimantus is surprised and apprehensive about a resource within and worried about what ends the tyrant will be willing to go (έθελήσειν).

<sup>4090</sup> τοι (E7) is derogatory: Adeimantus doesn't even offer an explanation or use a verb. We may infer he has in mind their having been inured to slavery (contrast 567A5-8, B12-C3).

<sup>4091</sup> The τυράννου χρῆμα (E8) consists of the χρᾶσθαι (568A1) he is left with. There is a reminder of the play on the etymology of χρᾶσθαι at 559C4, in addition to the idiomatic use of χρῆμα in metonymy (of a "monster": cf. Smyth §1249). ἀνδράς, predicative with φίλοις τε καὶ πιστοῖς, remembers ἀνδρικώτατοι, B5.

enfranchised citizens associate with him while all decent men despise him and shun his company.<sup>4092</sup>

“Why wouldn’t they?”

So it’s not for nothing that while tragedy in general seems a wise thing, Euripides stands out signal among the group. It was he that uttered an expression intimating a fine<sup>4093</sup> insight: “Wise the tyrants by their company with the wise.”<sup>4094</sup> By “the wise” he meant these men with whom the tyrant associates.

“That’s not all: he praises tyranny as being godlike<sup>4095</sup> and many other things like that, not only he but the rest of the poets, too.”

And yet you will have to admit that since they are wise themselves, the composers of the tragedies accept and acknowledge the position we have taken,<sup>4096</sup> we and anybody else that engages in politics the way we do, that we shall refuse to admit them into our state since their remarks propagandize for tyranny.

“I daresay they will acknowledge us, at least the more subtle<sup>4097</sup> among them.”

But elsewhere do they roam, I daresay, moving from city to city,<sup>4098</sup> drawing their huge crowds, producing their shows with hired<sup>4099</sup> voices high-sounding and persuasive, and the effect is that they draw the constitutions of the cities they visit toward tyranny and democracy.<sup>4100</sup>

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<sup>4092</sup>The ἔτοιροι ([568A4](#)) are the slaves he freed and the νέοι πολῖται are his imported mercenaries, making the usual chiastic order (ABBA) with 567D10-E2 and E3-7; whereas the converse attitudes (μισοῦσι / φεύγουσι) are ABAB with (θαυμάζουσι / σύνεισιν). σύνεισιν then reminds Socrates of Euripides’s συνουσία (B1) and triggers his digression.

<sup>4093</sup> πυκνῆς διανοίας ἔχόμενον (A11). For ἔχόμενον with gen. compare φρονήσεως [ἄξιον] ἀληθινῆς ἔχόμενον (496A8-9, where ἄξιον seems to be a *marginale* imported into the text). But φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς, in that passage, is incapable of the cynical meaning that πυκνῆς διανοίας here must bear, namely, “subtle intention.” The poet is playing with irony (“Yes, very wise indeed, these toadies are”) rather than calling a spade a spade and speaking straight about evil. That poets can be presumed to flatter tyrants with lies cf. [Prot.346B5-8](#).

<sup>4094</sup> σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ (B1) does make a trimeter. An Euripidean instance or version of the saying is not preserved, but we do have this line attributed to Sophocles (frg.12 [Dindorf] = frg.13 [Nauck]).

<sup>4095</sup> ισόθεον (B3): The claim, imported from Eur. *Troad.*1169 (γάμων τε καὶ τῆς ισοθέου τυραννίδος), suggests the source of the satirical hyperbole in μακάριον (567D1 and E8), and goes back to Glaucon’s admiring use of the term at 360C3.

<sup>4096</sup> τοιγάρτοι ... ὅτε σοφοὶ ὄντες ... συγγιγνώσκουσιν ἡμῖν (B5-6): Socrates hoists the poets on their own petard (cf. σοφόν, A8, with B1 and B5). We for our part recognize their clever speech to be the speech of unscrupulously clever persons, too clever to take responsibility for the demagogical effect of their words, which effect he next describes (C2-5).

<sup>4097</sup> κομψοί (C1): Adeimantus completely grasps Socrates’s point, corroborating it with another cynically two-edged adjective: they will do better being expelled by us than defending themselves by admitting their toadiness to the tyrants so as thereby to lose their patrons.

<sup>4098</sup> περιύόντες (C2) here suggests the meddlesome troublemaking of the travelling sophist. Cf. 338B2 (and n.) and the picture drawn at 600C6-E2.

<sup>4099</sup> μισθωσάμενοι (C3): These hirelings were listed as their ὑπηρέται at 373B7-C1.

<sup>4100</sup> τε καί (C4) provocatively stressing the continuity between tyranny and democracy, the order indicating we are to look backward in the discourse, and thereby bringing to mind the regimes still higher up in the text (ἀνωτέρω, C9) and earlier in the “decline.” Though we have become inured to the notion that Book Eight narrates a “decline,” the metaphor of a slope is entirely absent up until this point. The configuration of the list at 544C1-7, as well as the expressions μεταξύ 544D2, διῆτέον 545A2, πάλιν 545C4, and ἐν μέσῳ 547B8, each and all forwent an opportunity to introduce such a metaphor. Even the σκοπιά to which we ascended in Book Four (445C4-7) described the *theoretical*

“Quite so.”

And can't we go further and say that what money they make<sup>4101</sup> for such performances and what honor they enjoy comes mostly from tyrants, for very good reason, and second after that from democracy, whereas any higher up they go in the ranks of the regimes the more does the honor they would garner flag, as if it were winded by the climb.

“Very much so.”

But we've digressed. Let's go back to that army the tyrant assembles, fine and large and variegated and changing all the time. How does he pay to maintain it?

“Obviously, if there are sacred treasures in the city he will use them up, liquidating them to defray expenditures as they arise and reducing thereby his need to tax the deme.”<sup>4102</sup>

And when these come up short?

“Then, clearly, he will fall back on his patrimony to support him along with the people he drinks with,<sup>4103</sup> male and female.”

I get it.<sup>4104</sup> You mean that the deme that spawned the tyrant will be nurturing him as well as his associates.

“By a redoubtable compulsion it will be forced to do so.”

But<sup>4105</sup> what are you saying? What if Father Deme becomes vexed with him<sup>4106</sup> and argues it's not right for the son to live off the father once he has grown a beard and that it's the other way around: that the son is to take care of the father – and that he hardly raised him and set him up in life for this, (569) that once his son got to be big and strong, he, the father, would be enslaved to those who were his own slaves after all, and have to support both them and him along with whatever hangers-on they brought along with them!<sup>4107</sup> Rather, Father Deme would say, it was so that the son would become the

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ascent, not its subject matter. From that high vantage we beheld the “one” good (not “highest”) and the “countless” kinds of evil (not “lower”); and as the study of the worse states there began, the opportunity to introduce a “descent” was again passed over (*ἐξ ἀλλήλων μεταβαίνειν*, 449B1).

<sup>4101</sup> μισθούς (C7), deeply derogatory (cf. 567D10 and n.), governs τούτων.

<sup>4102</sup>Reading ἀποδομένων (D8) with all mss. (ἀπολομένων A<sup>2</sup>): There is no need to emend. With τε Adeimantus creates in advance a berth for a second item that he introduces only after Socrates interrupts him (E1). He wishes to depict the impiety by which permanent assets are liquidated merely for daily expenditures. By mentioning the indirect effect of tax relief he brings up the deme, to whom after all the tyrant owes his office, and thereby provides himself with a segue to the metaphor πατρῷα, just below, the abuse of which continues his theme of impiety. Compare the give and take by which the two categories of πιστοί are introduced, at 567D9-E7.

<sup>4103</sup> συμπόται (E3) replaces σύνεισιν (A5) with a more concrete image, then filled out with gratuitous insouciance by the exegetical ἐταῖροι καὶ ἐταῖραι.

<sup>4104</sup> μανθάνω (E4): Socrates announces he “gets” the jocular sense of Adeimantus's τῶν πατρών, a joke based on his own innocent use of θρέψεσται at D2, as γεννήσας shows. We are to imagine the tyrant “moving back in” with his parents (that he brings his entourage along makes it all the more ridiculous). For idiomatic μανθάνω in reply cf. 372E2 and n. 1035.

<sup>4105</sup> Reading δέ (E7) with all mss. except Ven. 184, and subsequent τε with AFD (over M) for unadversative connection. With πῶς Socrates reproduces the same sense of apprehensive indignation Adeimantus registered at 567E4.

<sup>4106</sup> ὀγκακτῆ τε καὶ λέγη (E7): τε καί announces the λόγος will be tinged with impatience, or that his impatience will be expressed in words—the impatience of a parent dealing with an irresponsible son.

<sup>4107</sup> συγκλύδων (569A3) must refer to the miscellaneous ἐταῖραι. Apart from the non-Platonic

boss and deliver him from the rich<sup>4108</sup>—the “noble class” so-called.<sup>4109</sup> Accordingly the Deme now orders<sup>4110</sup> him to leave the city along with his entourage, the way a father kicks his son out of the house along with his crowd of drinking buddies.

“Zeus be my witness, from that moment forward<sup>4111</sup> the deme will learn<sup>4112</sup> what sort of beast it gave birth to and coddled and raised up,<sup>4113</sup> and that a weaker man is driving out stronger ones.”<sup>4114</sup>

Now what are you saying?<sup>4115</sup> That he would dare lay hands on his father and even strike him if he did not obey, this tyrant?

“Yes, but only after stealing his weapons.”

A parricide, then, you are making the tyrant out to be, harsh in the nurture of his elders. This is the point at which the regime comes to acknowledge that tyranny is what it is,<sup>4116</sup> and the deme, in its attempt to avoid even the most fleeting sense of enslavement<sup>4117</sup> as free men,<sup>4118</sup> would now according to the proverb<sup>4119</sup> find itself subjected to the nightmare of slaves under a dynasty, switching out the mantle of great but immoderate<sup>4120</sup> freedom<sup>4121</sup> for the rags of a slave's most harsh and bitter enslavement.<sup>4122</sup>

“Yes indeed, that is how it goes.”

Ax.369A9, the word appears in Attic only at Thuc.7.5, in paraphrase of a speech, as in the present passage (Gulippus there addresses his men about the “riffraff” that have just bested them). We must therefore consider the term a creature of the *Umgangssprach*, which indicates the father's tone here. Later the word becomes acceptable in literature (though in Plut. *Mor.*201F it is again within a quote: contrast 661C, vit. *Marc.*45; *Luc.Alex.*16, *Merc. Cond.*24; *Hdn.*7.7.1). cf. Appian (*apud Gr.Lex.Man.*, s.v. συγκλύξ): *colluvie hominum vilissimorum*.

<sup>4108</sup> ἐλευθερωθείη (A5), the old nostrum of democracy now mouthed by the democratic father.

<sup>4109</sup> τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κάγαθῶν λεγομένων (A3-4). That they are rich (πλούσιοι) is a fact; λεγομένων goes only with καλῶν κάγαθῶν, a vague catch-phrase like κοσμιώτατοι φύσει (564E6 and n.4027), serving as an index of the envy the Boss foments in the masses.

<sup>4110</sup> καὶ νῦν κελεύει (A5) after the sputtering shambles of a protasis (568E7-569A5), shows with an apodosis how Father Deme's words result in deeds. καί is illative and κελεύει is a virtual quote: “Accordingly I now order you out.”

<sup>4111</sup> τότ' ἥδη (A8): This time it devolves upon Adeimantus to narrate the fateful moment. For his asseverative oath by Zeus in the accusative cf. 574C6 and n.4211.

<sup>4112</sup> For ominous γνώσεται (A8) used of πάθει μαθεῖν, cf. 362A2.

<sup>4113</sup> ἡσπάζετό τε καὶ ηὗξεν (B1), ruefully looking back and seeing the moments in reverse order: ἀσπαζεται, 566D9; τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν, 565C10.

<sup>4114</sup> ἀσθενέστερος ὃν ἵσχυροτέρους ἔξελαύνει (B1-2): Adeimantus demurs to be explicit.

<sup>4115</sup> πῶς ... λέγεις; (B3): Socrates reiterates indignant incredulity (cf. 568E7), to require Adeimantus to be explicit.

<sup>4116</sup> ἥδη (B7) temporal: in contrast with the tyrant's silence on the point during his first days at the helm (οὐ ... φησιν, 566E1). His conduct finally makes the confession (όμολογία) unnecessary (όμολογουμένη is middle).

<sup>4117</sup> καπνὸν δουλείας (B8-C1): cf. ὄτιοῦν δουλείας, 563D6.

<sup>4118</sup> ἐλευθέρων, δούλων (C1): The genitives, *pace Shorey*, are objective.

<sup>4119</sup> Cf. τὸν καπνὸν φεύγων εἰς τὸ πῦρ ἐνέπεσεν (Diogen.8.45 [=Paroim.Gr.I.314]).

<sup>4120</sup> ὀκαίρου (C2) suggests an impervious resistance to compromise.

<sup>4121</sup> μεταμπισχόμενος (C3), is a reference to the ἴματιον πεποικιλμένον of 557C5.

<sup>4122</sup> Note (B8-C4) the chiasm “of before and after” (φεύγων / δουλείας / ἐλευθέρων // δούλων / δεσποτείας / ἐμπεπτωκώς) corroborated by a restatement in parallel (πολλῆς καὶ ὀκαίρου ἐλευθερίας // χαλεπωτάτην τε καὶ πικροτάτην δούλων δουλείαν), with etymological redundancy for closure.

So, I said, can we rightly say we have sufficiently covered how tyranny evolves out of democracy, and, having evolved, what it is like?

“Quite sufficiently.”

END OF BOOK EIGHT

## BOOK NINE

### 2.C.5:Tyranny and the Tyrannical Man, continued

(571) The man himself, then, is all that's left.<sup>4123</sup> We have to investigate the tyrannic person, both how he is transformed<sup>4124</sup> from the democratic man and, once the transformation takes place, what sort of man he turns out to be and how he lives, whether he is a miserable soul or a blessed<sup>4125</sup> one.

"Yes indeed this last type is still left."

Do you know what else I still feel is lacking?<sup>4126</sup>

"What?"

A question about the desires, how many they are and what are their types. I don't think we have drawn enough distinctions; and in case we don't, the investigation we are trying to conduct will lack clarity.

"Is there still<sup>4127</sup> time?"

Yes there is, and let me tell you what it is I want to explore. Of the general class of non-necessary pleasures some of them seem to me unruly, of a sort that very well might afflict any individual but, upon being chastised by rules and the better desires along with argumentation,<sup>4128</sup> can be reduced to nothing in some men or diminished in number and strength, though in others they be left rather strong and numerous.

"But tell me just what desires<sup>4129</sup> you are speaking of in this way."

The ones that<sup>4130</sup> are wakened when it is time to sleep. On nights when all the rest of his soul

<sup>4123</sup> Though αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπός (571A1) constitutes a programmatic announcement that we are making the transition to the tyrannical personality corresponding to the regime, by its emphatic position αὐτός also looks back to the deme over against him, whose fate was finally revealed when his intentions became clear (569B8-C4), and λοιπός suggests there is no political capital left to decline further, and that the tyrant stands alone. Now that the deme discovers his motives they might very well ask who he was, all along, and why he wanted to take over. The programmatic announcement continues the ambiguity of τύραννος / τυραννικός (cf.566D5-6, 562A4-5).

<sup>4124</sup> μεθίσταται (A2): the personal construction is another variation of the programmatic language.

<sup>4125</sup> μακάριος (A3): Again Socrates substitutes it for εὐδαίμων: it is the latter that is the proper object of their inquiry (354C3, 361D3), but he never forgets the vaunting use of the former by Thrasymachus (344B7: cf. 354A8, 561D7, and 567D1 and E8), who silently watches.

<sup>4126</sup> ὃ ποθῶ ἔτι (A5): cf. Prot.329D1-2, ὃ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ; Phdr.234C5, Tim.19A8.

<sup>4127</sup> ἔτι (B2): Adeimantus again (cf.A4,A1) echoes Socrates's ἔτι (A5), in his manner of going "toe-to-toe" (n.3708). For the conversational idiom ἐν καλῷ cf. S.El.348, E.Herac.971, Ar.Eccl.321, Thesm.292.

<sup>4128</sup> κολαζόμενοι δὲ ὑπό τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν μετὰ λόγου (B6-7). The forces limiting the παράνομοι ἐπιθυμίαι are reminiscent of the alliance of θυμός and λόγος described in Book Four (440A8-B8): that psychology comes back more explicitly below (571D6-572B1).

<sup>4129</sup> λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας ... ταύτας (C2). The collocation of δέ and καί is condemned by Denniston where δέ is "purely connective" (306 [cf.585], who would presumably read δέ with FD). But Adeimantus's δέ is adversative, in the sense that he waits to know which pleasures Socrates has in mind before he accepts the category (ταύτας), whence also καί.

<sup>4130</sup> τὰς περὶ τὸν ὕπνον (C3): These desires and pleasures can affect us in waking life, too: the reference to sleep is merely for exemplification. Men are ashamed they feel such pleasures; hence

dozes, as much in him as is rational and tame and rules that part,<sup>4131</sup> while the beastly and savage part, brimming as it may be with food or drink, cavorts about and drives sleep off and seeks to rove<sup>4132</sup> and satisfy still more its own way of being. You know that at such times this part of him will dare all things, as if it had been unbridled and released from all the stays of shame<sup>4133</sup> and mindfulness. From the thought of trying to sleep with Mother<sup>4134</sup> it would not shrink, nor with any other human or god or beast. It would murder its own kin and there is nothing it would abstain from eating.<sup>4135</sup> In general there is no act of mindlessness and shamelessness<sup>4136</sup> it would pass up.

“Your description is very true.”

But when a person is keeping himself in a state healthy and temperate<sup>4137</sup> and goes to sleep after a wakeful day in which he feasted his rational part on arguments beautiful and studies too, and reached a mindful harmony within himself, and as to his desiring part<sup>4138</sup> he neither deprived it nor overindulged it<sup>4139</sup> in order that it might settle down and sleep rather than harass (572) his noblest part, whether with joyful enthusiasm or painful moanings, but allow it to study and reach for a glimpse

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Plutarch elaborates that they appear during sleep because μεθ' ἡμέραν ὁ νόμος αἰσχύνῃ καὶ φόβῳ καθείργυνσιν (*virt.profect.83A*: cf. ἀποφυγοῦντα [sc. κακία] δόξας καὶ νόμους καὶ πορρωτέρῳ γιγνομένη τοῦ δεδιέναι καὶ αἰδεῖσθαι, *virt.vit.101A*); and J.-C. are hard pressed to tell us they carry no moral opprobrium (*ad loc.,409*) though καὶ πάνυ δοκοῦσιν ... εἶναι immediately suggests Socrates and Adeimantus would disagree and 575A4-5 (the ἔνδοθεν θόρυβος) proves it. For purposes of the conversation Socrates needs to enable Adeimantus to acknowledge their existence without having to confess to them (cf.572B3-7); but Plutarch's comment also reminds us of Glaucon's confession that only fear of being seen makes the “just” man “just.” The story of Gyges might just as well have been a dream; but by now, because we have invented the tripartite psychology, we have reached a position from which we can ask and begin to understand where such dreams come from!

<sup>4131</sup> ἐκείνου (C5) inferring the part the above-mentioned pleasures affect, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. The list (λογιστικὸν καὶ ἡμερὸν καὶ ἄρχον) includes explicitly the rational part of the soul but the θυμοειδές only indirectly: ἡμερὸν suggests it is in a state of support and alliance with the λογιστικόν (cf. 441E4-2B3 for the whole nexus of ideas).

<sup>4132</sup> ιέναι (C6) is the continuation of ἀποσάμενον ὕπνον, and ἀποτιμπλάναι is its purpose. The presents are conative. For the sense of ιέναι cf. the cognate noun ιτης and *Prot.349E*.

<sup>4133</sup> αἰσχύνης (C8) alongside φρονήσεως invokes again the θυμοειδές (by its “Leontian” function, 439E6-40A2), alongside the λογιστικόν.

<sup>4134</sup> Anarhrous μητρί (C9) a virtual proper name (cf. *Soph.OT 981-2*): Smyth §1140.

<sup>4135</sup> βρώματος (D2) suggests cannibalism by its very sound (cf. βροτός). Cf. βρώσεις at 619C and n.407I. It is not merely eating unhealthy foods that Socrates has in mind. Cf. Plut., βρώσεις ἀθέσμους (*de virt. et vit.101A*).

<sup>4136</sup> οὕτε ἀνοίας οὐδέν ... οὕτ' ἀναισχυντίας (D3-4), repeating αἰσχύνης καὶ φρονήσεως (C9) in the usual chiasm of before and after (cf. n.18): again the reactions stemming from the λογιστικόν and the θυμοειδές, the latter now being brought closer to the surface.

<sup>4137</sup> αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ (D6): The juxtaposition recalls the paradox of self-mastery (430E11-431D5, esp. 431B5 and D5); and while ὑγιεινῶς points back to the sickly overindulgence of the previous description (C5-6), its exegesis with σωφρόνως revitalizes the etymon of that word, since keeping his pleasures under control will now be seen to preserve (σώζειν) the mindful treasures of his dreams. The entire paragraph (D6-572B1) recalls the vision of the noble soul's consciousness described at 372A6-C1.

<sup>4138</sup> μέν (D7) / δέ (E1): Postponing these to allow the substantive to follow its article is not uncommon (Denniston 186, 373 n.).

<sup>4139</sup> μήτε ἐνδείᾳ δοὺς μήτε πλησμονῇ (E1-2): For the dative with δούς cf. πληγαῖς ... δούναι, 574C3-4; θανατῷ δίδοται, 566C8; ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν, *Phdrs.254E5* (cf. *Hom.Od.17.567*); and ἀχέεσσι γε δώσεις *Hom.Od.19.167*.

of<sup>4140</sup> something it does not know and has not seen, whether something from the past or the present or the future;<sup>4141</sup> and likewise as to his willful part if he has calmed it down and is not trying to go to sleep just after a fight with somebody, his anger still stirring within him: if rather he has quieted those two parts and it is the third he sets stirring, where mindfulness dwells, and takes his leave of the day in this state, I'm sure in these circumstances he has the best chance of grasping some truth in his dreams and is least vulnerable to unruly visions.

"Utterly and completely<sup>4142</sup> correct."

Well that statement took us rather far afield! What we want to recognize is this, how there really is<sup>4143</sup> a dangerous, wild and unruly type of desire in every man, even in some of us that are to all appearances quite moderate men, and that what proves this beyond a doubt<sup>4144</sup> is what happens in our sleep. Think about it—am I making any sense? Do you agree?

"Yes I do agree."

So call to mind the demotic<sup>4145</sup> man as we described him. In our account of his evolution<sup>4146</sup> he was raised from youth under the regime of<sup>4147</sup> a stingy father who honored only those desires that made money, but despised the non-necessary desires as being devoted to play and pretty show.<sup>4148</sup> But

<sup>4140</sup> Based on the experience being described, I read τον καὶ (572A2) from the corrector of A, and take the genitive to be the object of αἰσθάνεσθαι. (cf. 485B1-2 and 515D2 [and n.]).

<sup>4141</sup> ἡ τι τῶν γεγονότων ἡ ὄντων ἡ καὶ μελλόντων (A3): The epic and mythological formula stresses the human limitations which the healthy and temperate man hopes, however briefly, to glimpse beyond.

<sup>4142</sup> With παντελῶς (B2) Adeimantus acknowledges the access of loftiness in the vision of the soul's inner workings to which Socrates has just given himself over, as does Socrates himself (ἔξηχθημεν, B3). We recognize the style of the passage—the balanced and sustained accumulation of participial phrases placing many balls in the air at one time and relying on the content more than hypotaxis or connectives to indicate the organization—as one of Plato's distinct styles we have called ecphrastic: cf. 372A5-C1, 399A5-C4, 511B3-C2, and the string of nouns at 532B6-C3 (cf. Appendix 7 for a full treatment of ecphrastic style in Books Eight and Nine). Pater, from his usual dreamy distance, famously called this passage Plato's "evening prayer" (*Plato and Platonism* 124, *apud* Bosanquet *ad loc.*) and indeed Socrates had described, in similar though more objective terms, the peaceable and moderate and evening of the men who dwell in his simple and true polis, including their bedtime prayer (372A5-C1).

<sup>4143</sup> ὥρα (B4), far from being skeptical (Denniston, 39), marks the acknowledgment of a fact despite the discomfort that the addition of δεινόν τι to the ensuing list of adjectives expresses.

<sup>4144</sup> ὥρα (B6), sympathetic with the ὥρα above (B4).

<sup>4145</sup> δημοτικός (B10) replaces δημοκρατικός. In the aftermath of the analysis of democracy and its evolution into tyranny the notion that the deme was ever in charge of anything has been debunked (as was the notion that δημοκρατία even deserved to be called a regime: cf. 557D6-7 and n.3860): the δῆμος was always a demotic mob.

<sup>4146</sup> ἦν ... γεγονώς (C1): The pluperfect is a virtual imperfect of citation (n.586), whence Adeimantus's answer, ἦν γάρ (D4).

<sup>4147</sup> ὑπὸ φειδωλῷ (C1), the dative again used with ὑπό to depict the coldness of the father's nurture: cf. 558D1 and n.3890. To say his father raised him "from youth" seems at first redundant, but see next note and n.4151.

<sup>4148</sup> παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἔνεκα (C3): Socrates (not Plato, *pace* Adam) speaks from the point of view of the φειδωλός. Fun and fancy show (cf. μωταίους, 554A8) are not the entire complement of, nor a particularly representative alternative to, the money-making desires, but rather are the desires that the φειδωλός takes pleasure in forgoing even, when his boy was a παις. There is another class, unmentioned, which he has succeeded to repress (554B7-C2), and which will presently

falling in with certain more subtle types<sup>4149</sup> who are equipped with an overflowing supply<sup>4150</sup> of the sorts of desires we have just described, and lurching toward hubris wholesale and that class of pleasures out of hatred<sup>4151</sup> for his father's stinginess, and yet having as he did a nature better than those who would corrupt him, tugged now in both directions, he adopted a middle path and moderately, withal,<sup>4152</sup> as he thinks, indulging in any and all<sup>4153</sup> pleasures, he lives a life neither slavish nor unruly,<sup>4154</sup> the life of an oligarchical man become demotic.

"That's how he was raised and our opinion of what became of him,<sup>4155</sup> given his nature."

So now posit this man getting older and having a young son who has been raised in the environment of *his* own habits, in turn.

"I posit him."

And set down<sup>4156</sup> all the same sorts of things happening to him as happened to his father. He's led into unruliness wholesale while those who lead him there call it freedom untrammeled; his father, with the help of his household, abets all those desires that played a compromise role for him,<sup>4157</sup> while the others apply their counter-support.<sup>4158</sup> But once these tyrant-making magicians<sup>4159</sup> resolve that there is

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rear its ugly head in his son.

<sup>4149</sup> κομψωτέροις ἀνδράσι (C6) redoes the striking expression αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς (559D9-10).

<sup>4150</sup> μεστοῖς (C6) means not only that they are themselves sated (cf. γεμόντα, 559C9) but that they have a full supply to share with others (cf. ἔχουσας δυναμένοις σκευάζειν, 559D10).

<sup>4151</sup> μίσει (C8) frankly and accurately identifies how he felt about his father caring about money more than τῶν ἄλλων (556C4 and n. 3829)—i.e., himself. Compare the spite with which the timocrat's son cloaked himself in Persian finery with the wealth he enthroned (553C4-7).

<sup>4152</sup> μετρίως δή (D1), exasperated (cf. n.3947 *ad* 561B2).

<sup>4153</sup> ἐκάστων (D2) depicts his eschewal to exclude: cf. τῇ παροπιπούσῃ ἀεί (561B3) and ὁμοίας φησὶν ἀπάσας (561C4), and the comic picture given at 561C6-D7.

<sup>4154</sup> οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον (D2) nicely describes with a doublet of double negatives his aversions to what he is backing away from without knowing where he is going. J.-C. miss the fastidiousness of the double negatives and see only, with the demotic son, "the mean."

<sup>4155</sup> ἦν (D4) answers ἦν at the beginning of Socrates's description (giving assent by repeating the interlocutor's key or important word, with γάρ); δόξα refers to the evaluative description of his resulting life as μετρίως (D1) along with its implicit exasperation (δή, *ibid.*); and τοιοῦτον refers to the intervening description of the character that led to it (C6-D1). As usual the programmatic language is varied (cf. the transitional programmatic language at 573C11-12).

<sup>4156</sup> τίθει τοίνυν (D8) answering (τοίνυν) Adeimantus's answer (τίθημι). The present imperative continues the process that was *initiated* by the aorist (θές, D5), and gives berth to the detailed elaboration that follows. The difference in verbal aspect belongs to the act of positing not (with J.-C.) the contents posited. Conversely at E. Hipp. 473-4 a present is followed by an aorist that views the process begun as being completed (cf. Barrett [1964] *ad loc.*).

<sup>4157</sup> ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ ταύταις ἐπιθυμίαις (E2): the word order directs our attention to D1-3 above: ταύταις is not so much in an improper attributive position with ταῖς ... ἐπιθυμίαις as in the proper predicate position with ἐν μέσῳ: "the pleasures we just referred to as in the middle." Cf. an expression like ὁ δεινὸς λεγόμενος γεωργός (Smyth §1170).

<sup>4158</sup> τοὺς δ' αὐτὸν παραβοηθοῦντας (E3): We are meant to compare the rescue and counter-rescue (ἀντιβοηθεῖν: cf. n.3909) that the democratic father had undergone when he was an oligarchic son on the road to democracy (559E4-560A2). Here as there the language of "rescue" becomes inarticulate because the person being rescued finds himself allied to both enemies. Hence the bastard formation παραβοηθεῖν, to "counter-aid," to all appearances an *hapax* in this sense.

<sup>4159</sup> δεινοὶ μάγοι (E4): Another reference to the αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς (559B9) faced by his

no other way<sup>4160</sup> they can get the young man under their spell, imagine them<sup>4161</sup> now contriving to implant into him an erotic desire that will rule as a boss and protector of the easy-going (573) desires that were content to browse on whatever comes their way,<sup>4162</sup> a drone large and winged, if you will pardon my metaphor for the master drive<sup>4163</sup> that such magicians have at their disposal?

“It’s just right.”<sup>4164</sup>

Imagine now<sup>4165</sup> the other<sup>4166</sup> desires crowding<sup>4167</sup> around him with their frenzied buzz, steeped in<sup>4168</sup> fragrances and myrrh, and festive headdresses, and wine, and the special pleasures that are let loose in gatherings of that sort,<sup>4169</sup> how, having swelled him up and fed him<sup>4170</sup> to the very peak of anticipation, they implant a stinger of yearning into the drone.<sup>4171</sup> Then it is, withal,<sup>4172</sup> that He arrives, protected by the raving and madness that surrounds him, and roves with his stinging yearning, this Boss and Protector of the Soul.<sup>4173</sup> Let him come upon any trace of an opinion in the man that worries

father.

<sup>4160</sup> ἄλλως (E5) is proleptic, as often, but the prolepsis adds an ominous tone. They are bringing out the ultimate weapon.

<sup>4161</sup> μηχανομένους (E6): The apodosis is supplied with another participle, dependent—ἀπὸ κοινοῦ with the others—on τίθεται (cf. schol. *ad loc.*). δέ after ὅταν (E4) indicates that at this point the γιγνόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν are no longer the same (D8-9) as what happened to his father (*pace Stallb.*).

<sup>4162</sup> καί (E6) is epexegetical. ἔτοιμα refers back to 552B9, the early life of the drone.

<sup>4163</sup> ἔρωτα (573A2), emphatically placed, is not a mere synonym for ἐπιθυμία but almost ”Ἐρως, the deity immanent (B6-7), for whom these ἐπιθυμίαι will henceforth play ancillaries (A4-8), at best (B2-4).

<sup>4164</sup> οὐδέν ... ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τοῦτο (A3): The corroboration is entirely empirical, as at 572B7-9.

<sup>4165</sup> If δή (A4) is to be read (FD : om. AM), it is preparatory to τότε δή below (A8).

<sup>4166</sup> ἄλλαι (A4) is again proleptic, indicating the antecedent αὐτῶν: these ἐπιθυμίαι are “other” than the master ἔρως they contrived above to implant (ὅταν δ’ ἐλπίσωσιν ... ἐμποιῆσαι, 572E4-6), and now proceed to implant, in regal detail (ὅταν ... ἐμποιῆσωσιν, 573A7-B4).

<sup>4167</sup> βομβοῦσαι (A4) recalls the image of the civic swarm of drones buzzing around the rostrum (βομβεῖ, 564D10) but the order of analogy is yielding to the disorder of passion.

<sup>4168</sup> γέμουσα (A5) redoes μεστοῖς (572C6).

<sup>4169</sup> As the great entourage approaches it is first heard (βομβοῦσαι, A4, borrowed from 564D10), then smelled (θυμιαμάτων, A5), then seen (στεφάνων, A5), then tasted (strikingly specific οὖνων, A5) and finally touched (conversely, an indirect euphemism that buries συνουσίαις in a periphrasis). The entourage is prefigured by ἐκβακχευθῆ, 561A9; their crowns by ἐστεφανωμένας, 560E3.

<sup>4170</sup> αὔξουσαι τε καὶ τρέφουσαι (A7): Their direct object is not expressed but must be inferred from περὶ αὐτῶν above, which expressed what had been the focus of all their other actions: cf. τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν, 565D10. These are αἱ ἑαυτῆς (i.e., ταύτης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας) συγγενεῖς ἐπιθυμίαι ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος of Phdr.238C1-2 which there also come on stage before we discover that the identity of αὕτη ἡ ἐπιθυμία they are sponsoring is ἔρως (C3-4).

<sup>4171</sup> κέντρον ἐμποιῆσωσι (A7): This is the stinger that also turned the κοσμιώταται of the democratic regime into something beneath themselves (ώς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικοί [565C2-4]), and that had earlier committed sundry villainies in the oligarchic regime (552D1-E3). The drone they stimulate thereby is the ἔρως they contrived to implant in the democratic son at 572E5: it was already within the boy but now becomes the master force in his soul (B1): cf. n.4177, *infra*.

<sup>4172</sup> τότε δή (A8).

<sup>4173</sup> οὕτως ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς (B1): another title, following those that emerged at 566A6 and B7. The arousal of Eros by the lesser ἐπιθυμίαι becomes also a shield of madness protecting him from the resistance of prudence or temperance.

about worth<sup>4174</sup> or a pleasure that still countenances any shame:<sup>4175</sup> he murders it to<sup>4176</sup> banish it from his presence,<sup>4177</sup> and he is not finished until he purges away all native temperance<sup>4178</sup> and fills the soul instead<sup>4179</sup> with a frenzy he imports from the outside.<sup>4180</sup>

“Utterly and completely have you described the evolution of the tyrannical man!”<sup>4181</sup>

Is this why Eros has all along been called a tyrant?

“In fact it may be.”

And wouldn’t you say that when a man becomes drunk he takes on a tyrannical state of mind?<sup>4182</sup>

“I would.”

<sup>4174</sup> χρηστάς (B2): Cf. μηδένα ὅτου τι ὄφελος (567B9-10).

<sup>4175</sup> δόξας ἡ ἐπιθυμίας ... ποιουμένας χρηστάς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας (B2-3) redoes the pair represented above by ἀνοια and ἀναισχυντία (571D4: cf. n.4136), δόξας going with χρηστάς and ἐπιθυμίας with ἐπαισχυνομένας (a distributed binary construction). In the ordered soul the λογιστικόν determines what is χρηστόν and instills, in the thumoeidetic, a δόξα (cf. δόγμα, 412E6, 414B6) which guides it to control the ἐπιθυμητικόν with the force of its Leontian, willful shame. We are witnessing the undermining of this alliance by the desires beneath.

<sup>4176</sup> ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὠθεῖ παρ’ αὐτοῦ (B3): τε καί is “i.e.,” not “or” (as if Eros were dealing with his enemies in the usual way, by killing some and exiling others [ἐκβάλλειν ... ἡ ἀποκτείναι, 566B1; cf. 560A5-6, 557A3]). The passage is parallel to the political passage on tyranny, at 567B3-C8 (which also uses the metaphor of an inverted “purification:” 567C3), and the psychological passage on democratic man, at 560C5-D6 (and again note “purification” at D8); in particular ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ὠθεῖ corresponds to political tyrant’s ὑπεξαιρεῖν ... δεῖ (567B8) whereas in the psychology of the democrat, there is the impatience of ὠθεῖν, but as yet no murdering (D1-6). In the present passage murder is a means to removing these despicable virtues from his sight (for τε καί linking means and ends or cause and result, cf. n.96), because “he” cannot tolerate their presence. The soul is having to demolish its conscience. We may (and must) compare the fleeting but violent affect Glaucon shows when he removes the perfectly just man from his sight (361E4-362A2) and confuses the lesson the just man is supposed to have learned (but didn’t since he was dead: καὶ γνώσεται, 362A2) with the “lesson” he wanted to teach him, as if he were being driven by a paranoid or paranoid dream.

<sup>4177</sup> αὐτῷ (B1) is read in all mss. though doubted by Adam. The shift from the direct to the reflexive αὐτοῦ (B3, again read in all mss.) presents the eros at first operating within the man as a second and alien subject; but as it banishes all else (B3-4), it becomes the only subject that is there. In other words, what had been a man becomes a zombie: cf. D4-5, *infra*.

<sup>4178</sup> καθήρῃ (B4): Removing the last vestige of σωφροσύνη echoes φανερῶς, 560C6. The purgation of temperance is of course a preposterous inversion. The irony of condescending approbation used in the depiction of democracy, is replaced by a depiction of tyranny in which even the most cynical perversion of language seems to know it would fall on deaf ears.

<sup>4179</sup> Reading καὶ μανίας δέ (B4) with mss. AM (καὶ om. FD), with Riddell (§144): “The δέ and the καί enter into the meaning abreast of one another.” The double connective stresses that the two acts are both contrary and separate.

<sup>4180</sup> μανίας ... ἐπακτοῦ (B4), alluding to the revelry of the prodigal son and his entourage of foreign riffraff in the description of the tyrannical polis (568E2-3) but also to the ousting of reason from the acropolis of the democratic son’s soul (560B7-C3: cf. esp. καθήρῃ / πληρώσῃ [B4] with τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον [560C3]; and the stimulating entourage [573A4-7] with ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀλαζόνες [560C2]).

<sup>4181</sup> λέγεις γένεσιν (B5). With the climactic paragraph the account of γένεσις is complete; next comes the ποῖος (cf. τοιοῦτον, 572D4 and n.4155, and τοιοῦτος below, C11) which will lead to the ζῆν.

<sup>4182</sup> φρόνημα (C1) the verbal noun, represents a momentary mood (contrast φρόνησις).

And that a man who is raving or in a disturbed state<sup>4183</sup> is wont to try, let alone imagine himself able, to rule not only over men but even over gods?<sup>4184</sup>

“Quite so.”

But<sup>4185</sup> he becomes a *tyrannical* man in the true sense of the word when he becomes a drunk, an erotic and a melancholic in his very nature and in his daily activities.<sup>4186</sup>

“In the fullest sense.”

Alright then, this is how the son becomes the tyrannical type of man;<sup>4187</sup> what’s his life like?

“Now that you’ve asked, let me in on the answer!”<sup>4188</sup>

Let you in I will. I imagine that what’s next is festivals among them and revels and cornucopias and consorts,<sup>4189</sup> all those over whose soul Eros holds tyrannical sway, having made his home<sup>4190</sup> within.

<sup>4183</sup> ὑποκεκινηκώς (C3): ὑπό specifies that the anxiety is superficial and therefore transient.

<sup>4184</sup> ἐπιχειρεῖ τε καὶ ἔλπίζει (C4), adduced as tyrannical acts. Variation in the presentation of parallel examples leading to a generalization is regular in epagoge (as we learned in the epagoge with Polemarchus in Book One). That the tremendously unjust man can convince even the gods lies beneath and comes to the surface of both brothers’ praises of injustice in Book Two (Glaucon: 362C1-8; Adeimantus 363A5-7 [n.b. εὐδοκιμήσεις]; 365E6-366A4).

<sup>4185</sup> δέ (C7) adversative, stressing the adjective.

<sup>4186</sup> μεθυστικός τε καὶ ἐρωτικὸς καὶ μελαγχολικός (C9). Eros, inebriation and madness each have a tyrannical aspect (B9-C4), but to call a man τυραννικός requires these elements to penetrate into his way of being (φύσις, C8: cf. 514A1-2, 515C5-6, 576A6 and B7) and his habits—linguistically speaking to become his adjectives (whence τοιοῦτος, C11 infra), and psychologically speaking to replace his personality (καθήρη / ἐμπλήση, B3-4). Hence, we have completed the γένεσις of the τυραννικός ἀνήρ since we have reached his ποιότης. According to the casualness of epagoge, the list restates the three attributes reached, in a new order that happens to place the most important one in the middle. For such change in order cf. Leg.727A4-5 vs. sequel to 728A; 733E3-6 vs. 734D2-4 (and England *ad* 734C3: “the ordering is not that of a parade”).

<sup>4187</sup> Reading ἀνήρ (C11) with all mss., instead of Campbell’s emendation, ὄνήρ, accepted by Burnet. The sentence repeats the programmatic terminology of 572D4, with which it is to be associated (since the treatment of the tyrannical man was there being introduced as a model for that of the democratic man): γίγνεται here repeats ἦν there (sc. γεγονώς from 572C1), τοιοῦτος repeats τοιοῦτον; what remains to be done is reach a judgment (cf. δόξα, 572D4, and our n.4155) about the life (as the democratic man had judged his own as μετρίως δή ... ζῆ, D1-3). The γένεσις forms a personality (τοιοῦτος) that reaches a critical moment (τότε δή, 573A8: cf. 550C4-5, 553C4, 560B7 [τελευτώσαι]) that determines the subsequent life (ζῆν). Cf. n.3651.

<sup>4188</sup> τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἔρεις (D1): “Why don’t you let me in on the answer, too?” with the scholiast (παροιμία ἥνικά τις ἐρωτήθεις τι ὑπὸ γινώσκοντος τὸ ἐρωτηθέν, αὐτὸς ἀγνοῶν). Cf. ἀνείπης, 408D6, and the jocular exchange at 608D5-12.

<sup>4189</sup> ἔορταί ... καὶ κῶμαι καὶ θάλειαι καὶ ἔταῖραι τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα (D2-4). ἔταῖραι reappears from its brief (568E3) but persistent (συγκλύδων, 569A3: cf. n.4107) appearances above. This item has a way of intruding regardless of what else is in the list (e.g., 373A3, and cf. αὐλητρίσι added at Thet.173D5): it does belong there, after all, since its presence is one of the principle reasons for the others. θάλειαι is to be read, with all mss., whatever noun is to be supplied with it (notwithstanding LSJ’s timid “*nisi hoc legend.*”, s.v.). Variation and inconsequence have a particular place (alongside variation of number and the inclusion of surprising items) in the rhetoric of the satiric epithemetic list, as ἔταῖραι next shows. Cf. Leg.842D3-5 (and Engl. *ad loc.*), and the converse use nominalized qualities in Alc.I 122B8-C2; Gorg. 484A4 (μαγγανεύματα), 490C8-D1; Leg.839A7-B1; Rep. 373A7; and cf. n.469.

<sup>4190</sup> οἰκῶν (D4) indicates the degree to which Eros has become the only “person that is there” in the man. Contrast the “man within,” of the Image that is coming, below (588C2-E1).

“Necessarily.”

And there is a proliferation of various off-shoot desires showing up every day and night,<sup>4191</sup> needing a lot of resources to satisfy them?

“Many indeed.”

So they quickly deplete<sup>4192</sup> whatever income there is.

“Of course.”

Next come loans and draw-downs from the principal.

“Yes.”

And once all these sources dry up won’t you necessarily have on the one hand the desires, teeming thick in their hatchery and groaning ever louder to be satisfied, and the men on the other, goaded on like a herd as it were<sup>4193</sup> by all those pleasures, Eros himself leading them one and all<sup>4194</sup> as if they were his bodyguard, to rove amuck on the lookout for anything they could part from whoever owned it, whether by deception or (574) main force.<sup>4195</sup>

“All too true.”

They will need to pillage<sup>4196</sup> from every quarter or else<sup>4197</sup> suffer greatly the pangs and the throes of withdrawal.

“So they will.”

And would you say that just as the pleasures that have increased in him have hogged<sup>4198</sup> a greater share than the original<sup>4199</sup> regime of pleasures did and stolen the resources that supported them, so also he will think, although himself a young upstart, that he deserves to get the better of his father and his mother and, in case he has spent all that is properly his own, deserves to take money from them as if it were an allocation to himself from his patrimony?<sup>4200</sup>

<sup>4191</sup> The language πολλαὶ καὶ δειναὶ παραβλαστάνουσιν ἐπιθυμίαι ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἐκάστης (D7-8) recalls παντοδαπὰς ἥδονάς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἔχουσας (559D9-10) but in the tone of cold observation rather than participation. “Day and night” describes the immersion in the pursuit of pleasure to which Eros subjects them (cf. Gorg.493E8-494A1).

<sup>4192</sup> ἀναλίσκονται (D10). The vestiges of the oligarch’s “frugal” outlook are wiped away (cf. Δανεισμοί, E1).

<sup>4193</sup> ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κέντρων ἐλαυνομένους (E5): ἐλαύνω draws out the second meaning of κέντρον and turns the men into goaded and herded cattle, a new metaphor mitigated by ὥσπερ.

<sup>4194</sup> τῶν τε ὄλλων ... καὶ ὑπ’ ἔρωτος (E5-6) is in strictness an appositive to κέντρων, as the meaning opposed to its metaphor. ὄλλων (E5) is proleptic in the manner of an ὄλλως τε καὶ construction, to highlight αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔρωτος, and has its case both by being appositive to κέντρων that came before and by dint of the ὑπό that comes after it (E6), placed in hyperbaton to emphasize ἔρως even more.

<sup>4195</sup> ἀπατήσαντα ἢ βιασάμενον (573E8-574A1): Again the inside (λάθρῳ) and the outside (βίᾳ).

<sup>4196</sup> φέρειν (A3) of inanimate booty, as in the phrase ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν.

<sup>4197</sup> Occasionally ἢ (A3) has the stronger sense of “or else” (n.407), introducing what is, as here, an emotionally (in addition to or instead of logically) unattractive alternative, in litotes.

<sup>4198</sup> When it lacks a genitive πλέον ἔχειν (A7) is not neutral. The reference is to 565A8.

<sup>4199</sup> ἀρχαίων (A7) means more than “older” (just as νεώτερος means more than “younger”) it refers to the early history of the man when he lived on necessary pleasures, and invokes the image of the alcoholic buying whiskey instead of milk with his last five dollars. Compare, below, the approbative sense of ἀρχαίότατον (C3, and n.4209) and the derogatory sense of νεωστί (B12, C1).

<sup>4200</sup> τῶν πατρώων (A10). To neglect bringing up one’s sons (as the oligarch did) is to forget where

“But then what happens?”

If they do not acquiesce to him, would he at first try to steal the money and deceive<sup>4201</sup> his parents?

“Absolutely.”

But say he fails at that: would he next simply pillage them by force?

“I daresay he would.”

Behold<sup>4202</sup> them, then, Adeimantus, haggling and battling with him, old man and old woman as they are.<sup>4203</sup> Would he proceed with care and try to spare them,<sup>4204</sup> lest he do something rash and tyrannical?<sup>4205</sup>

“I’m not too sanguine about the parents’ prospects if they have a son like this.”

In Zeus’s name,<sup>4206</sup> Adeimantus! For the sake of the love he has newly won from a consort gratuitous and at his option<sup>4207</sup> instead of his mother’s love that has been a given in his life<sup>4208</sup> since before he can remember, and for the sake of a new and ripe companion he just met instead of that dried-up old father he has always had to deal with, of all his friends the hoariest and the most ancient,<sup>4209</sup> would you say that a young man like this would bring blows against them? Would he

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things are going; but to attack one’s father (with the tyrannical man) is to forget where things came from. τῶν πατρών does mean his patrimony (*pace* Adam): it is money he will inherit when his father passes on, which he here arrogates to his own possession a little ahead of time (for the father’s contrary view of the matter cf. 568E8-569A5).

<sup>4201</sup> καὶ ἀπατᾶν (B2), is epexegetical to κλέπτειν in the manner of reverse καί (cf. n.444), directing us to associate this alternative (μέν) with ἀπατήσαντα ἡ βιασάμενον above (573E8-574A1). We already know what to expect in the δέ-clause, where in fact we get a corresponding reverse καί with βιάζοιτο (B4).

<sup>4202</sup> ὁ θαυμάσιε (B7), the vocative expressing the speaker’s feeling, as often (n.554).

<sup>4203</sup> γέροντός τε καὶ γραός (B7-8) are anarthrous because predicative (*pace* Stallb. who compares μητρί at 571C9, q.v.).

<sup>4204</sup> φείσαιτο (B8) another vestigial twitch of the φειδωλός oligarch long gone.

<sup>4205</sup> τῶν τυραννικῶν (B9): What had always been a *fugendum* is now just what we must expect him to pursue, for he is a τυραννικός.

<sup>4206</sup> ἀλλ’ ὁ Ἀδείμαντε, πρὸς Δίος (B12). As at the analogous moment in the development of the tyrant himself (568E7), Socrates expresses incredulous indignation, again before Adeimantus does, and in much stronger terms. The tyrannical man begins at home and breaks the taboos in an order reverse to that of the tyrant, whose *culminating* act is to violate his Father-Deme.

<sup>4207</sup> οὐκ ἀναγκαίας (B13) would be a pointless litotes except that it points to the distinction Socrates drew between pleasures necessary and non-necessary (558D8-559C1).

<sup>4208</sup> φίλην καὶ ἀναγκαῖαν (B13). In addition to the use of ἀναγκαῖος in family relations (E.Androm.671, *apud* Shorey; Xen.Mem.2.1.6, HG 1.7.10, *apud* Stallb.), Socrates here uses the word of the mother’s love to allude again to that same distinction: the necessary is that without which life is impossible and from which we ultimately benefit (558D11-E2). The ἀναγκαῖος of 527A6, cited by J.-C., has nothing to do with this: cf. n.3355. From the point of view of the enervated and debauched young man, the necessary is *eo ipso* unattractive.

<sup>4209</sup> ἀρχαίότατον (C3) The exaggeration expresses the tyrannized young man’s enervation at the same time that it reminds us his father is more than anyone else his ἀρχή (cf. ἐγέννησεν, 569A1). Compare the attitude of the democratized youth, who can at least *remember* having feelings of respect for his father: πρέσβεις πρεσβυτέρων, 560C9; and compare the story of the adopted child whose relation with his adoptive parents is not ἀρχαῖον enough to sustain the beliefs he learned from them (537E9-539A3), while this tyrannized son who has real parents will throw the beliefs he learned

enslave<sup>4210</sup> the latter on behalf of the former, in the event that he brought them under the same roof?

“Yes he would, may Zeus be my witness.”<sup>4211</sup>

How blessed it is and above the human plane to give birth<sup>4212</sup> to a tyrannical son!

“Very blessed, indeed.”<sup>4213</sup>

What happens when he is exhausting his parents' reserves, the pleasures calling him from within having by then organized themselves into a perfect swarm?<sup>4214</sup> First he will assail the wall of another man's house, or steal the cloak from a man out on a walk late at night. At the next stage he'll clean out a temple.<sup>4215</sup> In all these acts the opinions he had held from a child about what was fine and what was ugly, accounted all along to be beliefs that are just,<sup>4216</sup> will now face off against feelings freshly liberated<sup>4217</sup> from enslavement, pleasures that play the bodyguard for Tyrant Eros, and these will conquer those with the Great One's help, pleasures that before would break out only in dreams and during sleep when he was still himself and still lived under the laws and his father with a “democratized” conscience.<sup>4218</sup> Now that he has been tyrannized by Eros, the man he would only seldom be and only in his dreams he now becomes, in waking life and every day.<sup>4219</sup> There is no murder he will abstain from no matter how horrid, nor any horrid feast, nor any horrid deed.<sup>4220</sup> (575) Instead

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from them overboard (D5-E2, *infra*).

<sup>4210</sup> καταδουλώσασθαι (C4) echoing 569A2.

<sup>4211</sup> μὰ Δία (C6): Adeimantus's accusative answers the Socrates's genitive (*πρὸς Δίος*, B12), the genitive making a plea from the god (as it were) and the accusative making a proud asseveration he is called upon to witness (cf. Gildersleeve, SCG §11; the contrasting tones are reproduced at *Euthyphr.*4E4 [Socrates] vs. 5B8 [Euthyphro], and *Apol.*26E3 [Socrates] vs. 26D4 and 26E5 [Meletus]). At the analogous moment in the narration on the political tyranny (569A8) Adeimantus employs exactly this same accusative in an admonitory but asseverative understatement (*γνώσετάι γε νὴ Δία*) as if to disabuse Socrates of his naivete.

<sup>4212</sup> τό (C7) with τεκεῖν.

<sup>4213</sup> γε (C9): By repeating Socrates's γε at C7 he shares his sarcasm.

<sup>4214</sup> πολὺ δὲ ἥδη συνειλεγμένον ... τὸ σμῆνος (D2-3) describes the next stage (*ἥδη*) reached after the one described above as *πυκνάς τε καὶ σφοδρὰς ἐννενεοττευμένας* (573E4), the nest of plaintive babies replaced with an organized swarm. The harsh alternatives faced at A3-4 have only gotten worse.

<sup>4215</sup> νεωκορήσει (D5) “sweep out a temple.” The standard crimes are not listed by their usual names (*τοιχωρυχεῖν*, *βαλλαντιομεῖν*, *λωποδυεῖν*, *ἱεροσυλεῖν*: cf. 575B6, *infra*, and n.4228) but spelled out with verbs and objects as if being witnessed *in flagrante* (D3-5), with colloquialistic disrespect.

<sup>4216</sup> ὅς πάλαι εἶχεν δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας (D5-7), fuller statement of 573B2, δόξας ... ποιουμένας χρηστὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας, expressing greater pathos for what is at stake.

<sup>4217</sup> λελυμέναι (D7) echoing 571C8 (in addition to 567E5-6), and suggesting thereby that we should supply ἥδοναι with αἱ (from *ἥδονῶν*, D2) rather than δόξαι from ὅς πάλαι (D5). But by now the difference hardly matters (cf. 573B1-4, δόξας ἡ ἐπιθυμίας: cf. n.4175), which is echoed here. Complacent opinion is being uprooted by a force it was always too weak to resist (mature reason was always necessary: cf. 538C6-539A1); but also the ἐπιθυμία that had before been only occasionally “opined” in any man's dreams (*ὄναρ*), now threaten to eclipse all of his consciousness *ὑπαρ*. The language is phenomenologically accurate despite the lack of a technical vocabulary of psychology. His desires are becoming the only beliefs he has.

<sup>4218</sup> ἐν ἑαυτῷ (E2) apologizes for the political metaphor, as at 575C8-D1 (ἐν ἑαυτῷ ... τύραννον) and 579C5 (ἐν ἑαυτῷ πολιτευόμενος).

<sup>4219</sup> *ὑπαρ* τοιοῦτος ἀεί (E3): Opinion no longer limits desire.

<sup>4220</sup> οὕτε τινὸς φόνου δεινοῦ ἀφέξεται οὕτε βρῶματος οὗτ' ἔργου (E4). The triad looks back at

tyrannic<sup>4221</sup> Eros ensconced within him lives without rule and law, himself the only rule there is,<sup>4222</sup> and drives the man who has him inside<sup>4223</sup> as if he were the city he ruled, into every act of abomination, and strengthens thereby both himself and the violent disturbance<sup>4224</sup> that surrounds him, fed from both the outside through evil associations and from within by what has been released and liberated by similar<sup>4225</sup> habits of his own. Isn't this the manner of such a man's life?<sup>4226</sup>

"It certainly is."

And as long as the men of this ilk are few in a given city while the mass have pleasure under control, they might go into exile only to return as bodyguard to another tyrant or become mercenaries in case there is a war somewhere. But if they keep quiet and peaceable they perpetrate a

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571C9-D3: ἔργον is therefore apopisosis for incest. On βρῶμα cf. n.4135. On early placement of τε cf. n.1209.

<sup>4221</sup> Reading τυραννικός (575A1) with D (vs. τυραννικῶς AFM), which leaves ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ to be the adverbs with ζῶν. This quasi-political title is then explained with μόναρχος (A2).

<sup>4222</sup> ὅτε αὐτὸς ὣν μόναρχος (A2): Eros has ousted belief; he rules alone. But since he is unruly (ἀναρχία) and also the only ruler (ἄρχων in the sense of holding all power), i.e., the τυραννικός, there is no law.

<sup>4223</sup> τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτόν (A2). For the phrase ἔχων ἔρωτα cf. Leg.837B6, Phdrs.239C2; S.Ant.790; for other troublesome "possessions" cf. 366E9 and 591D9 (κακά), and 610C10 and E1 (ἀδικία); and Phdrs.231D1 (συμφορά), 238B1. The τε (A2, read by all mss.) re-focusses attention onto the man afflicted by Eros (hence its placement between the subject [τὸν ἔχοντα, who is also Eros's object with ἔξει] and his momentary object [αὐτόν, which is Eros, also the subject of ἔξει]). The mind shifts off Eros as subject just enough that αὐτόν is not αὐτόν. The entire paragraph is describing the man collapsing into his passion, and anacoluthon is inevitable, as it was between the reflexive and direct pronouns at 573B1 and B3.

<sup>4224</sup> τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν θόρυβον (A3-4) is the μωνία (573B4) that replaced the better δόξαι (574D5: cf. δόξας ἡ ἐπιθυμίας, 573B2) brought in from outside (ἔξωθεν, A4: cf. ἐπακτοῦ, 573B4)—an increasing population of side pleasures (παραβλαστάνουσιν, 573D7)—supplemented by a new population of pleasures unleashed from within (ἔνδοθεν, A5). For the brachylogy of αὐτῶν (A5) cf. τροφῆς κακῆς ἡ τινος ὄμιλίας, 431A7. θόρυβον of course echoes the sound of the supporters of the προστάτης that became political tyrant (βούμβεῖ, 564D10), a rabble recently re-encountered in the development of the tyrannical personality, confusing the man with noise and irrational distractions as they ushered Eros in (βούμβοῦσαι, 573A4-B1), as his bodyguards, whose population only increased from that moment on.

<sup>4225</sup> τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων (A5) alongside ἔξωθεν (A4) recalls the relation between a sympathetic external alliance or influence and an element within, and the role it played in the transition from oligarchy to democracy (556E3-9) and from the oligarchic to the democratic man (559E4-7: n.b., ὄμοιάς ὄμοιώ), though by now there is no other element against which the alliance has to contend, on which cf. n.4158 on παραβοηθοῦντας (572E3).

<sup>4226</sup> ἡ οὐχ οὕτος ὁ βίος τοῦ τοιούτου; (A6-7): This remark is the programmatic announcement that the description of the personal life is complete, which should be the end the sixteen part treatise. But the description is now allowed to continue without programmatic notice or notification (575A9-6B9, introduced with a flat καὶ that makes no claim as to the logic of the connection). In particular, for the first time we are given a prediction of the *individual* man's *political* fate, or the political excrescence of his internal turmoil, and the line between the individual (the *demonstrandum*) and the regime (the *demonstrans*) is crossed, just as in the account of the tyrannical regime the line between a regime (of rulers) and an individual (who rules) was likewise crossed without programmatic warning or notice. Cf. τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος (562A5), τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πόλεως (566D5-6) and nn.3971 and 4070.

host of petty evils right within the city.<sup>4227</sup>

“What sorts of acts do you mean?”

They steal, they break and enter, they cut purses, rob clothing, pillage temples and kidnap people.<sup>4228</sup> Sometimes you’ll find them spreading rumors, if they have a gift for speaking,<sup>4229</sup> or hiring themselves out as perjured witnesses, or arranging bribes.

“Petty are these evils only<sup>4230</sup> if the perpetrators remain few!”

It’s only in comparison with large things that small things are small; just so, if you take all these evils together, large and small, in comparison with the tyrant, they don’t hold a candle,<sup>4231</sup> measured against the baseness and destitution he brings about in a city. Really it is when the number of such men in a city become large as well as the number that follow them in their ways, to the point that they recognize that together they constitute the mass. Then it is that, with the help of the deme’s mindlessness,<sup>4232</sup> these become the persons that give birth to a tyrant, namely that one man we

The purpose of this departure from the method, accepted without complaint by Adeimantus and unnoticed by the commentators, will become clear at 578B9ff. The last time we witnessed such unnoticed neglect of a departure from the program was when Socrates began to linger on less and less relevant idealistic details in the ideal state rather than moving on to the promised treatment of practicability: the lingering there was very significant, interrupted finally by Glaucon at 471C2, and eliciting Socrates’s strong reply.

<sup>4227</sup> The two alternatives of leaving and staying (A9-B4) echo those presented at 560A4-B5, the moment in the struggle between the oligarchic father and his democratizing son, affected by abettors pro and con (for which cf. also 556E2-9 and 550A4-B5); but also echo those at 566A9-B3, when the democratic state teeters into tyranny by dint either of force or stealth (cf. n.4054).

<sup>4228</sup> κλέπτουσι, τοιχωρυχοῦσι, βαλλαντιοτομοῦσι, λωποδυτοῦσιν, ἱεροσυλοῦσιν, ἀνδραποδίζονται (B6-7). This list of six “petty crimes” (also in X.Mem.I.2.62, as a list of crimes for which the penalty is death!) reproduces all five of the crimes which Thrasymachus himself had adduced as petty, from an entirely different point of view (344B3-4). Socrates adds the rather recondite term, λωποδυτοῦσιν, perhaps on the force of the remark above (ἐφάπτεσθαι ... τοῦ ἴματίου, 574D3-4). He means also, of course, to allude to the behavior of the stingered drones which he had described with a list of only three crimes at 552D3-6.

<sup>4229</sup> έὰν δυνατοὶ ὥσι λέγειν (B8) continues to carve out a place for the likes of Thrasymachus, whose silence is becoming more and more noticeable as Socrates’s language recalls his speech more and more explicitly—though of course these uses for rhetoric are very low level (*σμικρά*) and he has much more important things to teach.

<sup>4230</sup> σμικρά γε ... κακὰ λέγεις (C1). For γε in negative answers (here it is conditional *assent*) cf. Denniston, 131-2. This is the third time Socrates and Adeimantus have played with the idea of smallness. Cf. in Book Six, 498D5-6; and in Book Four, 425A8-9, 424D5-E3, 423C5-E2. Adeimantus’s temperament is well adapted to casual snideness.

<sup>4231</sup> οὐδ’ ἵκταρ βάλλει (C4) a proverb (cf. Zenob.5.55 [=Paroem.Gr.I.143], DV 3.46 [=op.cit.2.43]), used also by Aelian (NA 15.29). The important point is not whether or how there can or cannot be a rough breathing alongside the delta of οὐδέ, but that the proverb is *approbatory*: The petty criminals cannot hold a candle to the tyrant! Socrates continues his imitation of or allusion to Thrasymachus’s scandalous praise of “perfect” injustice (*τελεωτάτη ἀδικία*, 344A4).

<sup>4232</sup> μετὰ δήμου ὀνοίας (C7) refers exactly to the political moment at 566B10-11 (δείσαντες μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, θαρρήσαντες δὲ ὑπὲρ ἔαυτῶν), but recalls also the personal condition of the oligarch’s son and the empty acropolis of his soul (560B7-9).

mentioned whose soul has the strongest and most dominant<sup>4233</sup> tyrant<sup>4234</sup> within him.

“He is the likely choice, since he would be most able to be tyrannical.”

If, that is, they yield to his rule willingly.<sup>4235</sup> If however the city does not acquiesce, then just as he was chastising his parents a moment ago, now it will be his fatherland that he upbraids by mobilizing his new companions if he can, and once the city is enslaved under the sway of these he will have it in his care and foster it,<sup>4236</sup> what was once his motherland as the Cretans put it or fatherland as we do. So much would be the final achievement and outcome of the desire that drives a man of this kind.<sup>4237</sup>

“So it would, in every respect.”

But consider how these men behave before they come to power.<sup>4238</sup> First, in all their associations they either require the others to flatter them and be ready to do anything to help, or in case they do need something from somebody (576) they themselves do the fawning and unscrupulously adopt any

<sup>4233</sup> μέγιστον καὶ πλεῖστον (C8) brings forward the vision of the fully invaded self lately described at 575A1-6, but οὗτοι and ἐκεῖνοι refer to the personages first imagined at 564C9-E2 (and n.b. προστατικὴ ρίζη, 565D2) and then reappearing in a different guise at 572E4-3B4. We are to realize that something was going on inside the drones during the devolution from oligarchy to democracy, and we are to learn where tyrants come from.

<sup>4234</sup> τύραννον (D1) is “tyrant” as Adam insists, but it’s still only a metaphor (from 575A1-2) for Eros regnant, for which again ἐν αὐτῷ (restated by ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) apologizes (cf. 574E2 and n.4218). Adam’s note, that “Plato” ignores the fact that what Adam suddenly calls “successful” tyrants are not slaves of passion, is at best a *petitio principii* and in any case irrelevant. Socrates has already said it is the δριμύτατον of the δριμύτερον that becomes προστάτης (564D4-E2): the presumption there and here is that he is not chosen by political scientists but by the drones, social wastrels, and bum pleasures that admire his superior δριμύτης. The relevant problem is to translate this notion into the psychological dynamic by which manageable pleasures yield to unmanageable ones. The first indication we have is from Thrasymachus (344C1-2).

<sup>4235</sup> ἔὰν μὲν ἐκόντες ὑπείκωσιν (D3): This protasis is a proviso following upon what came before: ἐκόντες ὑπείκωσιν is tantamount to the act of selection for which γεννῶντες was a metaphor, above (C7). Cf. 566B6-11 and n.4060. It is just this willing acquiescence, which Socrates now characterizes as ἄνοια δήμου, that Thrasymachus wants his audience of potential students to believe they can bring about by the kind of eloquence they might learn from him; and the proof is the internal reaction they feel from the sample he gives them (344B5-C2: n.b. οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, C1).

<sup>4236</sup> ἔξει τε καὶ θρέψει (D7-8), like κολάσεται and ἐκόλαζεν just above, are a continuation of the cynical language by which tyranny is being denounced unbeknownst to itself.

<sup>4237</sup> τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρός (D8-9): The phrasing suggests another programmatic conclusion about the tyrant (cf. A6-7): since the individual has been destroyed by the eros within him he becomes nothing but what his desire leaves him to be.

<sup>4238</sup> οὗτοί γε τοιοίδε γίγνονται (E2): Who or what is the subject Socrates now proposes? We have just now seen that, beyond the original program (A6-7 and n.4226), the tyrannical person has a political future as a *political* tyrant, so that it becomes possible to ask, in reference to the political tyrant (whose “political” or institutional origin we had dealt with in its place during the narration about the cities, 564C9-E2), what after all is his *personal* background. In truth, the investigation of ethics on the large canvass of the state was from the very beginning proposed only to make the search for personal justice indirect and palatable enough to pursue without derailments like the interruption of Polemarchus at the beginning of Book Five. The case of the tyrant has shortcircuited the experiment and brings it to an end!

pose or guise to seem close to him and kindred,<sup>4239</sup> though once they have succeeded<sup>4240</sup> they show a nature quite alien to that.

“Very alien indeed.”

So it is that all through their life they are friend to no man, now lording it over the one and then subservient to the other, while of freedom<sup>4241</sup> and friendship the tyrannical way of being<sup>4242</sup> never gets a taste.<sup>4243</sup>

“Quite so.”

And would we be justified to say these men are untrustworthy, too?<sup>4244</sup>

“Quite justified.”

And unjust we would most rightly call them, if our previous agreements about justice are correct.<sup>4245</sup>

“Quite so.”

Let's sum up it up: the man we described having a nightmare is what this worst of men is like in his waking life.<sup>4246</sup> The person who turns out this way is the one who becomes completely tyrannical

<sup>4239</sup> The description (E3-576A2) closely resembles the first appearance of the tyrant (566C10-E4): πρώτον μέν, 575E3 ~ ἐν ταῖς πρώταις, 566D8 / κόλαξιν, E3 ~ ἀσπάζεται, D9 / ἔτούμοις ὑπηρετεῖν, E4 ~ ὑπισχνεῖται, E1 / ὡς οἰκεῖοι, 576A1-2 ~ τοῖς περὶ ἐαυτὸν ... ἵλεώς, E3.

<sup>4240</sup> διαπράξαμενοι δὲ ἀλλότριοι (A2), semantically and syntactically a quick turnaround at the end of a sentence that has reverted to the method of heaping participles we have seen before (most recently, 571D6-2B1: cf. n.4142 and Appendix 7), relying heavily upon us to be canny enough to know what is going on. The quick change in the tyrant once elected remains implicit in Thrasymachus's account (344B5-C2), but it is exactly this that Socrates here has in mind. διαπράττεσθαι often suggests underhanded dealings (either condemned by abhorrent aposiopesis [*Alc.* 2.143C9, D1; *Crat.* 395B4; cf. *Rep.* 411E1] or praised by savvy understatement [*Gorg.* 478E7, satirized in 479A, 510E1; *Parm.* 128C5; *Rep.* 586C8]), as well as suggesting hidden motives (*Rep.* 337E1, 360A7; *Symp.* 181B5, 183A1).

<sup>4241</sup> ἐλευθερία (A5) is not power over someone as Thrasymachus thinks and says (344C5-6: cf. Callicles at *Gorg.* 485E1) but a symmetrical relation (a two-way street as opposed to the one way street of despotism and slavery), which nourishes and is nourished by friendship. Contrast what the tyrant has for friends (here and before at 567E5-8A3), and compare what the tyrant has not tasted (ἄγευστος, A6) with what he *has* (565D9)!

<sup>4242</sup> φύσις (A6) is life-horizon (it pairs up with ζῶσι: see next n.), not inborn nature (cf. 573C8, 514A2, and 576B7 below).

<sup>4243</sup> The dyadic formulation (A4-6), with the ABAB parallelism of μέν / δέ operating in tandem with the chiastic ordering of the ideas (life, friends, slavery, freedom, friends, life [i.e., φύσις]) resembles the twin-verse rhetoric of the Psalms.

<sup>4244</sup> ἀπίστοις (A8), is inferred from their friendlessness: cf. the connection at 568A1. The personal life of the tyrannized man bereft of friends mirrors the institutional horror faced by the tyrant (567D1-568A2).

<sup>4245</sup> ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν (B1): He refers in general to the conclusions he reached with Glaucon about justice, at 441D-444E. The three aspects of the tyrannical person--his inability to have friends, his lack of trustworthiness, and his complete unjustness--are a new collection that appears to describe how his inner state disables him from having equal relations with other persons.

<sup>4246</sup> οἶον ὄναρ διήλθομεν ὡς ὃν ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος ἦ (B5): lit., “Anybody who is in waking life like the man we described in dream.” J.-C., ignoring or resisting, again, the pedagogical power of adducing nightmares (cf. *ad* 571B) take ὕπαρ and ὄναρ to refer to the “real world” in contrast with the world of the *dialogue* (ὄναρ), despite 574D8-E3. From Plato and Socrates we learn nothing if not that there is

inside<sup>4247</sup> and then becomes the actual monarch, a law unto himself.<sup>4248</sup> The longer he occupies the post as tyrant the more fully his personality becomes tyrannical.

## 2.B.9: Comparing the Just and Unjust Lives

“Necessarily,” said Glaucon, taking over Adeimantus’s position.<sup>4249</sup>

And whoever seems to be the basest, won’t he also seem the worst off? Whoever acts as tyrant the longest and the strongest, won’t he become that way in the strongest and longest lasting<sup>4250</sup> way in very fact, despite the fact that common folk will likely hold in common an opinion that differs from this?<sup>4251</sup>

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nothing more real than thinking (so ὅναρ / ὕπαρ at 476C and 520C). Horns of ivory and bone are things of the hazy epic past before a man asked himself if he was asleep or awake. The reason this description caps all that has come before (κεφαλαιωσώμεθα) is that the conception is horrific; but what makes it horrific is the notion that our nightmares could become our waking life.

<sup>4247</sup> τυραννικάτος φύσει (B7) refers not to congenital nature (this would lead to the ἀργὸς λόγος) but the “second” nature of habit, as in the definition of the “tyrannical man in the accurate sense” (ἢ φύσει ἢ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις [573C8, and n.4186]).

<sup>4248</sup> μοναρχήσῃ (B8), cf. 575A2 for what this means. Lacking the resistance of superior rulers or laws (ἀναρχία / ἀνομία, *ibi*) he becomes stronger and therefore only worse.

<sup>4249</sup> διαδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον (B10): In playing Socrates’s interlocutor Adeimantus has been the immediate witness to the debasement that a man undergoes who admits disorder (injustice) into the relation of the parts of his self. Glaucon on the other hand has been watching and so he can interrupt. His interruption is more than a sign from Plato that a new phase is beginning, since in all strictness the treatment of the decline already ended at 575A8.

We have come far enough in the drama to reflect again on the interruptions and the attitudes of the brothers. Twice, Adeimantus has interrupted the conversation to bring Socrates to task (419A, 487B); and twice Glaucon relieved Adeimantus to ensure that Socrates would continue (427D, 506D). With the exception of his first and very fateful interruption (372C), Glaucon has been the partner for constructive conversations (finding justice in state and soul, overcoming the paradoxes, reaching for the μέγιστον μάθημα and going through the propaideutics [and propaideutic exercise!], that lead to it), while the conversations with Adeimantus have been critical and defensive (censorship of poetry, defending the spare austerity of the guards’ regime, defending the philosopher against the opinion of the masses, narrating the decline of moral substance). In the case of Polemarchus’s interruption it was first Adeimantus and then even Glaucon that joined in.

This difference that the drama has gradually revealed between the two was presented emblematically at the very start, Glaucon accompanying Socrates as they were interrupted on their way back to Athens, and Adeimantus already planning to dine at Polemarchus’s (327AC). At the beginning of Book Two, the beginning of the present conversation, the difference was cast in the plaintive albeit frank way that Glaucon requested Socrates to answer his questions about the just life (357A-358E) in contrast with the way that Adeimantus, playful but rude, admonished Socrates that he would have to deal with *his* questions also (362D2-E1). Cf. Appendix 8 for a full analysis and evaluation of Adeimantus as interlocutor.

<sup>4250</sup> πλεῖστον / μάλιστα // μάλιστά τε καὶ πλεῖστον (C1-2): a chiasm of cause and effect (cf. n.1632).

<sup>4251</sup> τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ (C3-4), a joke: not many opinions but the many’s opinion: “Though the opinion on this matter is as common as those who hold it.” Socrates reminds Glaucon (and Plato reminds us) of the last time he required him to make his own judgment regardless of the many (473A2-3).

“Necessarily it is as you<sup>4252</sup> say it is.”

Now can't we say that the man who is most tyrannical shares a similitude<sup>4253</sup> to the tyrannical regime, and a demotic man something similar to the democratic, and so forth with the others?

“Of course.”

And that as the one city stands toward the other in terms of virtue and in terms of happiness, so also does the one man stand toward the other?

“How could it be otherwise?”

So what can we now say<sup>4254</sup> is the standing of the tyrannized city toward the monarchical city of the type we described at the beginning?

“They're perfectly opposite: the one is the best and the other is the worst.”

## 2.B.9.a: First Comparison

I won't ask you which you mean—that's obvious. But as to happiness and misery:<sup>4255</sup> would you judge<sup>4256</sup> them the same or different? And let's not allow ourselves to be dazzled by fixing on the image of the tyrant as a single man, or of him and his small entourage: we have to enter the city and observe

<sup>4252</sup> ταῦτα (C5), “second person” demonstrative.

<sup>4253</sup> πόλιν ὃν εἴη ὁμοιότητι (C7): For the construction cf. 555A8-9; for predicative ὁμοιότητι cf. *Parm.133A5, Tim.75D2.*

<sup>4254</sup> Reading ἄρα ή (D2) with FDM (“ἄρα ή F” as printed in Chambry is perhaps a typographic error). The sense is obvious without importing ἀρετῆ from the margin (with Schneider and all subsequent edd.): “As to virtue the relation of city to city stands in a direct relation to their corresponding men; but what is the relation between the top and bottom city? An inverse relation.” For the collocation οὖν ἄρα in Plato cf. *Thet.149B10, Charm.160E13.*

<sup>4255</sup> εὐδαιμονίας τε καὶ ἀθλιότητος (D7): For this absolute “genitive of the topic” cf. 577B3, 470A5, 375E1-2, 365A6, and in Book Ten 612D4; *Gorg.509D7, Phdo.78D10.*

<sup>4256</sup> κρίνεις (D7) the term is more specific than the language of dialectical exchange (e.g., δοκεῖ [C4] or λέγεις [D6]): Socrates calls on Glaucon to play judge (and Glaucon notices: cf. his expression, προκαλῆ, E3 and n.4261), as he warned him he would at the beginning of Book Eight (ἰκανοὶ κριταί, 545C5), before Adeimantus intervened. This verb and its cognates will be used twenty times during the first two proofs (576D7; 577A1,A6, B7; 578B2; 579C6, D6; 580B3, B5 (*bis*), B6, C1; 582A4-5, A6, D2, D7, D11, D15, E1; 583A; and cf. 585C1), many more uses than all the uses added together from elsewhere in the Platonic corpus -- and then it will be dropped completely. Compare the deployment of the language of νοῦς at the end of Book Six.

it as a whole,<sup>4257</sup> to immerse ourselves<sup>4258</sup> and view it from the inside, and only then<sup>4259</sup> hand down our opinion.<sup>4260</sup>

“Your stipulation<sup>4261</sup> is proper, and it’s clear to anybody that there is no more miserable government than a tyranny, nor a happier one than monarchy.”

If I insisted on the same stipulation<sup>4262</sup> when it came to judging the *men* would you still think it (577) proper?<sup>4263</sup> To insist, that is, on using such<sup>4264</sup> a person to judge between them as has the ability in his mind to put on<sup>4265</sup> the character of a man and see what he is like inside, and not become confused by looking at him from the outside as a child would,<sup>4266</sup> seeing the facade<sup>4267</sup> that tyrants are at such pains to maintain, but rather to insist that he be capable of seeing through such things? That is, if I felt

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<sup>4257</sup> ὡς χρή (D9): Here is the old theme of viewing the city as a whole, brought on (420B4-421C6) as a corrective to Adeimantus’s disappointed reaction (419A-420A) to the home-life of the guards as it had been triumphantly described by Glaucon and Socrates at the end of Book Three (416D-417B). Projecting the moral questions onto the larger canvas of the city enabled the young men to insert some distance between themselves and the problem of morality and then to remain objective in their analysis, but it came with the mortgage that they would identify with the citizens (Glaucon, 372AB) or imagine themselves as the leaders of the city by default (Adeimantus, 419A), rather than seeing the whole city as a model of their whole soul. The overarching moral goal of the conversation might, conversely, be said to be to enable the part of themselves they think is their ego actually to be in charge of the rest of their soul rather than enslaved by the soul’s lower elements. This is the radical conclusion reached at the end of Book Four, so intensely challenging to personal conscience that it there elicited the objection of Polemarchus, to which first Adeimantus and then even Glaucon acquiesced.

<sup>4258</sup> καταδύντες (E1) is a metaphor proleptic to ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ... ἐνδύς (577A2), which is itself part of Socrates’s crucial invocation that Glaucon “go within.” Adam’s association with sneaking in under the tyrant’s gaze (*ad loc.*, comparing καταδύναι with the perfects καταδεδυκώς at 579B8 and Gorg.485D6, with which it patently has nothing to do), is grossly impertinent.

<sup>4259</sup> οὔτω (E2) in its semi-redundant use: cf. 327C14, 511B8, 557D9, 577C2.

<sup>4260</sup> δόξαν ἀποφαίνεσθαι (E2) continues the juridical metaphor with the notion of a public announcement of the finding, and is remembered at 580B1. Cf. *Tht.*170D4-9, and *Leg.*780A1, *Lys.*214A2, *Phdrs.*274E3, *Tht.*168B4.

<sup>4261</sup> προκαλῆ (E3): Glaucon notices the legal connotations of κρίνεις (D7) and ἀποφαίνεσθαι (E2) and so identifies Socrates’s methodological suggestion as a πρόκλησις – in law, a stipulation suggested by one party to a lawsuit and accepted or declined by the other, as for instance an offer *in limine* to provide evidence extracted from slaves under torture, or a challenge that the other party provide such evidence. It seems such offers and challenges were used only to impugn the credibility of one’s opponent, were seldom accepted, and even then never perfected (R.J.Bonner and G.Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle* [Chicago 1930] 2.128-9).

<sup>4262</sup> τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα (E6): By claiming that the προκλήσεις Glaucon is suggesting are the same in the case of the man as in the case of the state, Socrates means to compel an assent as strong as the one Glaucon has just given. His claim, in turn, rests on the parallels he can produce in the two descriptions, announced by the verbal repetition of ἐκπλήττωμεθα, D8 (cf. ἐκπλήττεται, 577A3) but then continued by the more subtle language of his analogy, between looking at (βλέποντες, D8) one man and his entourage (περὶ ἐκείνον, D9) instead of entering (εἰσελθόντες, E1) and contemplating (θεάσασθαι, E1) the whole city from deep within (καταδύντες, E1) so as to get a picture of it as a whole (εἰς ἄπασαν ... ἴδοντες, E1), and looking from the outside (ἔξωθεν ὄρῶν, 577A3) at a person and (sc. i.e.) his facade (προστάσεως, A4) instead of putting on (ἐνδύς, A2) and contemplating (διιδεῖν, A3) his inner self (ἡθος, A2) from within (ἀνδρὸς ἡθος, A2) so as to get an adequate view of it in its entirety (ἴκανῶς διορᾶ, A5).

<sup>4263</sup> ὁρθῶς (577A1). Socrates’s focus on the κρίσις and the preliminary efforts that will ensure it is

it is a man like him we all need to listen to, a man who has the ability to judge and has lived in the man's home and has been right at his side,<sup>4268</sup> an eyewitness of his domestic dealings, and who sees how he treats each<sup>4269</sup> member of his household, the circumstances under which he could be seen stripped bare<sup>4270</sup> of his impressive trumpery, and then witnesses in turn his behavior in public affairs of crucial moment;<sup>4271</sup> and if we were to instruct him after he had seen all this to report back his brief<sup>4272</sup> on how the tyrant stands relative to other men on the spectrum of happiness and misery—

“Absolutely proper would such a stipulation be,<sup>4273</sup> both about the man as well.”

So, would you be willing that we put ourselves forward as numbering among those<sup>4274</sup> who are able to make a judgment and count ourselves as already having had the encounter with men of this

done properly (όρθως, 576E3; 577A1, B5) recalls the κρίσις suggested by Glaucon, along with the elaborate stipulations he insisted upon (359E1-361D6) to ensure it be done properly (όρθως, 360E3). It is the same κρίσις and the re-use of the term helps us realize we have come full circle. Glaucon did not there ask permission from Socrates for his elaborate προκλήσεις (*n.b.* on the contrary Socrates's reaction, βαβοῦ at 361D4). That Socrates should here ask Glaucon's permission is a fairer procedure; but beyond the procedural nicety his request provides him an opportunity to set out in advance how the judge must act, whereas in contrast Glaucon's stipulations were in fact designed to pre-empt and disable a judge from making the right choice and to make it easy for him to make the wrong choice (οὐδὲν ἔτι ως ἐγῷμαι χαλεπόν, 361D7-8).

<sup>4264</sup> ἐκεῖνον (A2) laudatory. The judge Socrates now describes is a greater man than most.

<sup>4265</sup> ἐνδύς (A2), of putting on clothes, echoes καταδύντες (576E1, spatial): the etymological similarity invites us to compare knowing something outside yourself (by steeping yourself in it) and feeling what you are from the inside, the most important and difficult thing that Socrates is requiring Glaucon to do.

<sup>4266</sup> ἔξωθεν (A3): Finally, thanks to the tyrant's insides, a derogatory edge is put on relying on the outer appearances, since they might cover it up. The distinction of insides and outsides was first drawn as a triumphant breakthrough at the end of Book Four (443C9-D1, *n.b.* ἔξω πρᾶξιν [C10] and the sequel), which in effect mooted the question whether justice involved civic action, a breakthrough from which Polemarchus and the company tried to make Socrates retreat – in a sense to protect their privacy!

<sup>4267</sup> σχηματίζονται (A4): The language recalls Adeimantus's youthful tactic for success: 365C3-4. For προστάσεως cf. προστήσασθαι, 599A8.

<sup>4268</sup> συνῳκηκότος (A6): The perfects are empirical (cf. 400A6 and n.3842). Home-life is the visible medium or metaphor for the conscience, as Adeimantus's climactic use of σύνοικος at the end of his speech indicated (367A4), to which this refers. It was after all the vision of home-life (*nothing political*) in the πολίχνιον that stirred Glaucon's reaction at 372AB. When the dispute re-arose at the end of Book Three (415E6-417B9: *n.b.* οἰκήσεις, 415E8; ζῆν τε καὶ οἰκεῖν, 416D4) Glaucon's objection had been quelled, but now it was Adeimantus that erupted (419Aff). It was, moreover, just the vision of home-life that inspired Polemarchus's objection and legitimated it in the eyes of the brothers, at the beginning of Book Five; and the vision became recrudescent once again in Book Eight, in the provision of the ταμιεῖον (548A7, cf. 416D6). Indeed it was the ταμιεῖον more than any dark discrepancy in divine numerology that was seen to start the devolution of the entire personality step by step. The devolution itself continually took its cue from the home-life of the young man (viewed now in terms of its emotional significance rather than the ταμιεῖον and the hidden parties it made possible). And in the end, the very culmination of the political decline was nothing but the destruction of the home, in the tyrant's rape of his metaphorical “parents” (*i.e.*, the deme that spawned him, 568E1,ff); but even this was only an adumbration in metaphor of the tyrannical man, whose marauding began at his *actual* home (cf. 574A6-10 and note the appalling mistreatment of his parents, 574B12-C8) and then spread to the city at large (574D3-5, finally to become institutionalized tyrannical marauding, 575C2-D9). The notion that Plato is suggesting to his reader his own experience with Dionysius (Adam) is a gross

sort,<sup>4275</sup> so as to be able to say we have on hand<sup>4276</sup> such a person as can render answers<sup>4277</sup> to the questions we are asking?

“Quite so.”

Alright then come along with me and investigate the matter as follows. Call to mind the similitude between the city and the man, and by looking close up at each of them tell me the experiences<sup>4278</sup> of the one and the other.

“What experiences?”

First, as to the city, will you declare the tyrannical city free or enslaved?

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misunderstanding of the moral metaphor of home; it is refuted by Socrates's next remark (B6-8); but worst of all it evinces a irremediable insensitivity to the problem that Socrates is trying to adumbrate for Glaucon and therefore to the entire purpose of the book. *The opinion of “Plato” of no interest to the argument whatever: the brothers' conscience and progress through the dialogue is all that matters.*

<sup>4269</sup> ἐκάστους τοὺς οἰκείους (A8) includes wife, father and mother, sons and daughters, and slaves. All these relations are brought to bear in the course of this Book even, indirectly, the relation with the wife.

<sup>4270</sup> γυμνός ... τῆς τραγικῆς σκευῆς (B1) proposes to follow Glaucon's lead from Book Two and strip away the irrelevant distractions (γυμνωτέος, 361C3).

<sup>4271</sup> τοῖς δημοσίοις κινδύνοις (B2): For κίνδυνος as the test of a man cf. 556D1.

<sup>4272</sup> ἔξαγγέλλειν (B3) suggests he has been sent on a mission to spy.

<sup>4273</sup> ὥρθότατ' ἀν (B5): Glaucon completes Socrates's rambling sentence for him, indicating how eagerly he agrees with the analogy and the changes in the conditions of the κρίσις that it entails. His acquiescence is more easily won here than it was the last time, at 472B3-473B2. How far he has come from blandly positing that the men were just and unjust and then adding elaborate externals contrary to their deserts (360E1-361D3)! There, he had pictured them from the outside as a child would see them (καθάπερ παιᾶς ἔξωθεν, A3). That Glaucon accepts these revisions is (next, B6ff) what qualifies him to act as judge: How dismal it is that Adam (*ad loc.*) must interpret the answer to mean that “Glaucō [sic] admits most fully the claim that Plato has earned the right to speak with authority on this subject.”

<sup>4274</sup> τῶν δυνάτων ἀν κρίναται (B6-7): The high-minded tone is continued (from ἐκεῖνον ὃς δύναται, A2).

<sup>4275</sup> ἡδη ἐντυχόντων τοιούτοις (B7). Though a reference to their experience confronting Thrasymachus in Book One cannot be ruled out, the instructive reference is to the recent description of the tyrannical personality, with which, as men, they can *inwardly* identify and which will guide the conversation from now on. At this point Adam announces that all critics agree with his own idea that Plato is speaking through his characters about what happened in Sicily, excepting the “strange” doubts of J.-C.

<sup>4276</sup> ἵνα ἔξωμεν ὅστις ἀποκρίνεται (B7-8) recalls 348A7-B4: καὶ ἡδη δικαστῶν τινων τῶν διακριγούντων δεησόμεθα. The solution there desired, ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν ἄμα αὐτοὶ τε δικασταὶ καὶ ὥρτορες ἐσόμεθα, is herewith achieved. For Glaucon's original presentation of the κρίσις was, as he confessed, *ex parte* (κατατείνας ἐρῶ, 358D3) and Adeimantus owned up to the same thing (κατατείνας, 367B2). Cf. ἀντικατατείναντες λεγόμεν, 348A7, and n.533. For the dialectical preparation cf. n.3296.

<sup>4277</sup> In ἀποκρίνεται (B8) there is a play on δυνατὸς κρίνειν, at the same time that by the pair of terms ἀποκρίνεσθαι / ἐρωτᾶν Socrates brings us out of the courtroom and into the quieter environment and dispositive certainty of dialogue, as ὅδε σκόπει (C1) confirms (cf. σκοπῶμεν, 348B3). For the pair cf. 515D5 and n.3210. Adam makes the sentence apologize that the dialogue form is unable to bring its author and inventor on stage, but the brunt of it is that Glaucon's ability to act as judge (κριτής) has been vetted so that dialogue (i.e., his ἀποκρίσεις) will provide a reliable solution

"As enslaved as ever it could be."

And yet can you see in it masters who are<sup>4279</sup> free?

"So I do, but this is a minor part. To speak of it as a whole and indeed to speak of the most decent part of it, it is abjectly and miserably enslaved."<sup>4280</sup>

So then if the man is similar to the city, wouldn't we necessarily find the same arrangement or proportion in him, so that<sup>4281</sup> a great amount of slavishness and illiberality<sup>4282</sup> would fill his soul, and that just those parts of the soul that were the most decent would be enslaved, whereas a small part, the part most bothersome and insane<sup>4283</sup> would be playing the role of master.

"Necessarily."

So will you declare this soul to be slavish or free?

"Slavish I would say, for my own part."

Now isn't it the case that the enslaved and tyrannical city is least able to do what it chooses to do?

"Quite."

So the tyrannized soul likewise will least be doing what it chooses,<sup>4284</sup> to speak of the soul as a whole.<sup>4285</sup> Goaded on by the sting of desire against its will, it will be filled with anxiety and regret.

"Unavoidably."

As to wealth will the tyrannical city of necessity be wealthy or poor?

"Necessarily poor."

(578) So the tyrannic soul likewise must always be beggarly and insatiable.<sup>4286</sup>

"Yes."

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(see prev. n.).

<sup>4278</sup> τὰ παθήματα (C3), a new term but an old idea. The original question the brothers asked about justice at the beginning and end of their speeches was τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; (358B5-6, cf. 366E5-6) and finally τί ποιοῦσα ἐκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆν (367B4, E3). The παθήματα are the answers to the question τί ποιεῖ;

<sup>4279</sup> καὶ (C8) illative.

<sup>4280</sup> ὁρῶ ... σμικρόν γε τοῦτο (C9): He has taken the lesson from 576D8-E1.

<sup>4281</sup> καὶ (D2) illative.

<sup>4282</sup> δουλείας τε καὶ ἀνελευθερίας (D2-3), τε καὶ used to link the parallel or borrowed term (δουλεία) with its ethical or psychic application (ἀνελευθερία, not used of a lack of political freedom but "slavishness").

<sup>4283</sup> μοχθηρότατον καὶ μανικώτατον (D5). Above, the small part of the city that was free (C8) was not characterized by an adjective. The warrant for the two adjectives used here of the man, is their opposition to ἐπιεικέστατον, itself rather vague. The first adjective again straddles the political and psychic realms and the second teases out the more properly psychic aspect. Ultimately the inference relies on personal experience.

<sup>4284</sup> ἡκιστα ποιεῖ ὁ βούλεται (D10-11), echoing the "Socratic Paradox" so well known to Glaucon (cf. 357B4 and n.670).

<sup>4285</sup> περὶ ὅλης εἰπεῖν (E2): Socrates echoes Glaucon's qualification (τὸ δὲ ὅλον ως ἔπος εἰπεῖν, C9), itself echoed from the πρόκλησις at 576D8-E1.

<sup>4286</sup> πενιχρὰν καὶ ἄπληστον (578A1): The former term is poetic, bridging from the political poverty to the psychic, and is then explained by the psychological term ἄπληστον. The soul comes up short because its desires are insatiable.

What about the experience of fear? Won't this kind of city as well as this kind of man<sup>4287</sup> necessarily be full of fear?

"Very much so."

Of moaning and wailing, of pleas and pains, will we find more here than in any other city?

"Nowhere else."

How about the man? Do you think there are more of these sorts of things in any other man than there are in the man driven mad by desires and lusts, this tyrannic man of ours?

"How could there be?"

My guess is that it was by considering all these instances and others like them<sup>4288</sup> that you reached the judgment not only that the city is the most miserable of all the cities—

"And wasn't I right?"<sup>4289</sup>

Right indeed!<sup>4290</sup> But as to the man in turn, the tyrannical one, what would you say about him if you now consider all these instances?

"By far he is the most miserable of all the others."

Ah—but this time you're not quite right.<sup>4291</sup>

<sup>4287</sup> τήν τε τοιαύτην πόλιν τόν τε τοιούτον ὄνδρα (A4-5): Socrates allows himself the latitude in his pacing of the argument to ask both questions at once, though he should according to the method ask them *seriatim*, and does in fact so answer them (A7-8, A10-12).

<sup>4288</sup> ταῦτά τε καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα (B1): The miseries heretofore collected and now generalized (τοιαῦτα) are (1) loss of autonomy to lust (577C5-E2); (2) impoverishment due to insatiability (577E5-578A2); and (3) fear and torment (A4-8). These items do not constitute a logical whole. They are selected to answer the promises Thrasymachus made for the tyrant in his large speech: autonomous sovereignty over others (δουλώσηται, 344B6), strength (ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον, C5), wealth (χρήμασιν, B6; cf. A7-B1), lack of fear (φοβούμενοι, C3).

<sup>4289</sup> οὐκοῦν ὄρθως; (B3). Glaucon's interruption keeps Socrates's τε (B2, in the reading of mss. AD: FM have γε) from receiving its καί. One anticipates the sequel will be καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀθλιώτατον—the conclusion we have so long been waiting for. Instead things become complicated, not only by Glaucon's interruption but also by the tense of ἔκρινας, with which Socrates suddenly points back to 576E3-5, preferring to note that all the detail we have accumulated about polis and man corroborates what he said with no preparation about the polis right when Glaucon interrupted. The reason for spelling out the details however was not to corroborate that decision but to give some detail to what the parallel conclusion about man would entail. Just as Socrates had sped up the pace in one of the lead-up questions above, the awkward byplay sets into dramatic relief Glaucon's coming answer to the target question.

<sup>4290</sup> Glaucon's worry (οὐκ ὄρθως; B3) and Socrates's approval (καὶ μάλα, B4) echo the exchange at 576D2-3, where Socrates was careful to ask the question about the city first—that tyranny is the most wretched city, which he agrees is obvious—and the question about the man second (E6ff), which is the burden of the entire conversation to decide in a conclusive and compelling manner. So here, as there, he asks the question about the man separately, and (with the present participle ἀποβλέπων, B5, instead of the aorist as above, B1) invites Glaucon to think things through before deciding it.

<sup>4291</sup> τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτι ὄρθως λέγεις (B7). Stunning irony and bathos at this most crucial moment! We have seen before that when the interlocutors disagree with Socrates they don't disagree enough (373A1ff, 420A2ff, 487D6ff). Here, where Glaucon agrees with the proposition they have been trying to reach all night, he doesn't agree enough! The surprise was however prepared for the attentive reader, who might have noticed that the description of the tyrannical man continued after it was said to be finished (575A6-7), and in particular went on to recount his *political* future (cf. n.4226).

“What!?”

I fancy this man is not yet the one who is the most especially miserable.

“But who else could be?”

I have somebody in mind that you might think is still more miserable than he.

“But who?”

A man who is of this tyrannical type but who does not live out his life as a private citizen but rather is so unlucky that by some calamity he has it laid on him to become tyrant!<sup>4292</sup>

“I get the sense that what you say, given what we said before,<sup>4293</sup> is true.”

Yes, but sensing and fancying is not what we need in this area. We need an investigation by the sort of reasoning we mentioned.<sup>4294</sup> After all our inquiry touches on a question of greatest import, the difference between a good life and a bad life.<sup>4295</sup>

“That is most correct.”

So then see whether what I have to say has any substance. It seems to me we must reach an understanding by an investigation that proceeds from the following aspects of the topic.

“From which?”

From looking at an individual case of those private citizens that live in the cities who have enough money to afford having many slaves. These people have something in common with the tyrants, namely that they rule over many—though they differ in terms of the number that that man<sup>4296</sup> has.

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Plato relied on his reader to notice Socrates running on past his program and requiring Glaucon to interrupt, in Book Five (cf. 466E1, 468A1-4, 469B5, with the climax at 471C2-E5, and cf. nn. 2483, 2489, and 2501). Shorey (citing his note c at 2.104) suavely mentions Plato’s penchant for “climax upon climax” but as usual something much more specific and wonderful is at work in the drama here.

<sup>4292</sup> ἐκπορίσθη ὥστε τυράννῳ γενέσθαι (C3): The impersonal construction is striking; and the limping transitional clause that prepares for it (δυστυχῆς ή) is suspicious. Are we meant to hear the phrase ἐκπορίζειν σύμφερόν τινι from Book One (341Aff) and sense that the Thrasymachean advantage (σύμφερον), to become tyrant, has been turned into a disaster (συμφορά)? It is, moreover, an appalling understatement that this eventuality would be a matter of luck, good (according to Thrasymachus there) or bad (Socrates here). We saw, after all, in the exceptional extension of the treatment of the man’s personal life that went on to narrate his political fate (575A9-6B9: cf. n. 4226) that to become an “outer” tyrant (a τύραννος) is the *natural outcome* for a man who is inwardly most tyrannical (the τυραννικώτατος φύσει, 576B7)!

<sup>4293</sup> Glaucon refers specifically to Socrates’s assertion at 576B11-C3, where the very degree (n.b. μάλιστα) of the tyrannical man’s unhappiness was increased in proportion to the time he spent as a tyrant, if such he became.

<sup>4294</sup> τῷ τοιούτῳ (C6), with all mss., a “second person” demonstrative that refers to the kind of argumentation they began to use at 577C (n.b., παθήματα, C3), as we shall see when the conclusion is reached below (n.b., πάθος, 579D5-7).

<sup>4295</sup> περὶ γάρ τοι τοῦ μεγίστου ἡ σκέψις, ἀγαθοῦ τε βίου καὶ κακοῦ (C6-7). With this solemn remark (C6-7) Socrates justifies the rigor he is proposing (compare 472B3-473B2), at the same time that he is reminding Glaucon (and us) to look back to the initial challenge raised by Thrasymachus’s long speech (343B-4C), to which he replied, *inter alia*, that much was at stake: ὅλου βίου διαγωγὴν ή ἄν διαγόμενος ἔκαστος ἡμῶν λυσιτελεστάτην ζωὴν ζῷη (344E1-3), reiterated at 352D5-6. For Socrates requiring certainty beyond mere agreement cf. *Meno* 89C7-10.

<sup>4296</sup> ἐκείνου (D6) technically a shift from plural (τοῖς τυράννοις) to singular, but the plural paired the private individual with the tyrant (the plurals ιδιωτῶν [D3] / τυράννοις [D5] each represented a

"Yes they differ."

Have you noticed that these men are not anxious and do not fear their slaves?

"What after all would they have to fear?"

Nothing—but do you understand the reason?

"Yes—it is that the entire city is ready to come to the aid of any individual citizen."

Well put. But think of this. Say there was some one man who had fifty slaves or more and some deity whooshed him away from his city and set him down with his wife and children in some desolate place, along with his possessions including his slaves, a place where no fellow citizen would be coming to his aid. What sort of fear would he feel and how great would the fear be, both for himself and his children and wife, that they might be murdered by the slaves?

"Utter and total fear,<sup>4297</sup> I'd say."

(579) Wouldn't he find himself in a position where he would have to fawn over his very slaves, and make them a lot of promises, and even grant them their freedom for no good reason,<sup>4298</sup> so that he would end up being a toady to his own underlings?

"He would have to do this, or perish."<sup>4299</sup>

And what if that god surrounded him with a lot of neighbors who would not abide a person who presumes any man may be master over another,<sup>4300</sup> who if they found such a person would impose upon him the gravest of punishments?

"In that case he would be even more completely bad off<sup>4301</sup> than before, hemmed in on all sides by enemies."

Wouldn't you say that, while it is in a similar sort of prison our<sup>4302</sup> tyrant finds himself confined, his personal character<sup>4303</sup> being such as we have described it—hemmed in, that is, on all sides by all sorts of fears and cravings—that, gluttonous though he is in his soul,<sup>4304</sup> he is the one person who

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class), whereas the comparison then remembers (with ἐκεῖνος, *ille*) that the tyrant always stands alone.

<sup>4297</sup> ἐν παντί (E8). There is no need to cite the idiom (LSJ s.v. πᾶς, § D.IV): Glaucon is simply answering the question ἐν ποίῳ ... τινι καὶ ὄπόσῳ φόβῳ (E5-6).

<sup>4298</sup> οὐδὲν δεόμενος ([579A2-3](#)) is an idiomatic litotes: to "feel no desire" in the sense of being above such things (cf. 367A8-B1, 405C5, 410B2, 581E3-4; *Apol.*21C3; *Gorg.*507D3; *Prot.*331C5, 347E3), though of course he does have good reason, as Adam notes, citing from Schneider the use of the idiom at *Plut.Vit.Tib.Gr.21.2*(834). Wonderfully, the measures the tyrannical individual is here forced to take to save his skin, are the very measures the political tyrant took in order to secure and then maintain his political power (566E1, 567E5).

<sup>4299</sup> ἡ ἀπολωλέναι (A4), again resembling the choice of the tyrant: cf. ἡ μὴ ζῆν (567D3). For the phrase cf. *Hdt.7.118*.

<sup>4300</sup> ἄλλος ἄλλου δεσπόζειν ἀξιοῖ (A6-7): Scruples about the justice of slavery surface again, in a criticism of Thrasymachus, at 590C8-D6.

<sup>4301</sup> ἔτι ... μᾶλλον (B1) shows how idiomatic is the idiom ἐν παντί, doubling a superlative in a way that mirrors the doubling in the concept of the τυραννικός τυράννων, who is ἔτι ἀθλιώτερος (578B11).

<sup>4302</sup> ὁ τύραννος (B3): the definite article designates the τυραννικός τύραννος γενόμενος of 578C3, as the exegetical participial phrase (φύσει ὃν οἶν διεληλύθαμεν) goes on to stipulate.

<sup>4303</sup> φύσει (B4) refers to the personality as opposed to the office as at 576B7.

<sup>4304</sup> λίχνῳ ... τὴν ψυχήν (B5): An essentially somatic affliction penetrates to his soul.

cannot enjoy a sojourn out of the city to visit the festivals that others enjoy<sup>4305</sup> as free citizens,<sup>4306</sup> that instead he is holed up<sup>4307</sup> in his own house and lives, on the whole, the life of a woman; that he is able only to watch in envy while his fellow citizens get out of the city and see something wonderful abroad.<sup>4308</sup>

“True in every detail.”

So in terms of such ills as these, a greater harvest<sup>4309</sup> is reaped by the man who not only is badly governed within—the man you just now judged to be the most miserable, the tyrannical man—but who also lives out his life not as a private citizen but constrained by some stroke of luck to assume the office of tyrant:<sup>4310</sup> who attempts to control others while at the same time he is unable to control himself, like a person afflicted with disease whose body cannot take care of itself, being in addition

<sup>4305</sup> ἐπιθυμηταί (B7), now of innocent desires.

<sup>4306</sup> οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι (B7): ἐλεύθεροι is almost predicative (with its etymon ἐλεύσεσθαι) and ἄλλοι is almost adverbial: “his fellow citizens who incidentally are free to come and go, in comparison to him.” The notion that Plato here “speaks *con amore*” about “his own sojournings” (Adam) further saturates Adam’s interpretation of this passage with tendentious fantasy and continues the undoing of the literary anonymity of the author whom he now romances personally into being an occasional φιλοθεάμων. If (per Adam) Xen.Hiero 111.1 is “singularly close” to our passage (although, by the way, it is linguistically quite independent), and if Plato gets his description from his personal experience with Dionysius, can Adam avoid the conclusion that Xen.’s source *must* be Plato? The envy with which Xenophon’s passage reeks (e.g., μειονεκτοῦντας) reveals, however, why debunking the tyrant’s happiness would be a popular pastime that would settle down into a series of standard stereotypes.

<sup>4307</sup> καταδεδυκώς (B8) cf. Gorg.458D6.

<sup>4308</sup> The point is to illustrate how circumstances of his external situation for which he cannot be blamed (~ the πόλις that he finds himself in) might exacerbate the difficulties of his internal makeup for which he can be blamed (~ the ψυχή he has allowed himself to take on). In this comparison ίδιώτης (578C1, 579B6) is the “ancipital” hinge-term (cf. nn.681, 1219, and 1397) between the soul in the individual and the individual in the polis; and the point of the illustration is to reveal that the individual with a tyrannical soul would never become tyrant by choice but only by chance (578C2, 579C7). Again the Thrasymachean fantasy is turned on its head: the everyday individual whom he seduces with the fantasy of becoming tyrant is fostering, with Thrasymachus’s help, internal passions that would render that superficially attractive goal more and more miserable as the passions the fantasy unintentionally fosters and serves become stronger. Clueless, Adam comments (*ad* 579B) that the description of this private man with slaves, which serves as a paradigm of the individual tyrannized by Eros, is drawn from Plato’s experience with Dionysius, which makes a failure of Socrates’s argument since it is predicated on postponing any reference to the political tyrant.

<sup>4309</sup> πλείω (C4), quantitative, asserts the demonstrandum: that he is worse off (ἀθλιώτερος, 578B11, correcting the assertion ἀθλιώτατος of the private τυραννικός, 578B6, cf. 579C5). τοῖς τοιούτοις is not a dative of degree of difference: the measurement implied by πλείω requires apples to be compared with apples and this is what τοῖς τοιούτοις (qualitative) stipulates, namely, fear (compare 578D8-E7 and φόβων ... μεστός, 579B5, with φόβου γέμειν, 578A4), torment of desire (compare ἔρωτων μεστός and λίχνῳ ὅντι, 579B5, with 577E2-3, 578A7-8 and A11), and enslavement (compare 579A1-3 and οὕτε ... ἐλεύθεροι, 579B7 with 577C5-D12). καρποῦται (C4) perhaps echoes, and answers, 362A8.

<sup>4310</sup> μὴ ίδιώτης καταβιῷ ἀλλὰ ἀναγκασθῇ ὑπό τινος τύχης τυραννεῦσαι (C6-7): By closely repeating the paradoxical language of 578C1-3 down to its inceptive aorist (μὴ ίδιώτην βίον καταβιῷ ἀλλὰ δυστυχῆς ἢ καί αὐτῷ ὑπό τινος συμφορᾶς ... τυράννῳ γενέσθαι), which was the initial statement of what needed to be proved, this sentence becomes a Q.E.D. Again Socrates has the speech of Thrasymachus in mind: after comparing the unjust individual with the just one in the public

disallowed private rest and peace, and being required instead to spend all his time haggling and struggling with the trouble made by other bodies?

“In every detail your description is a perfect and true likeness,”<sup>4311</sup> Socrates.”

And so, dear<sup>4312</sup> Glaucon the experience<sup>4313</sup> of such a man is entirely<sup>4314</sup> miserable, and in comparison with the type of man you judged to have the harshest of lives the one who in addition occupies the role of tyrant has a life still harsher.

“Obviously.”

So the real truth of the matter, though some may disbelieve it,<sup>4315</sup> is that the man who is an actual tyrant is actually<sup>4316</sup> a slave in the blandishments and the servilities<sup>4317</sup> he is bound to carry out, and a flatterer of the basest of men. He is revealed to be a man whose desires are no way satisfied, who lives in the direst of need, a poor man in truth -- once a person has the competence<sup>4318</sup> to view his soul as a whole -- and to be living his life in constant fear, tormented always and shot through with pains, if that is his own life is to resemble the disposition of the city over which he rules. And he does resemble it, doesn't he?

“Quite.”

(580) And shall we further freight him with the thing we mentioned before,<sup>4319</sup> to be bound by necessity both to continue to be, and to become more so than before he became ruler, an envious man, untrusted, unjust, friendless, godless, a haven and nurturer of every manner of evil -- and to top it off, because of all these things, that besides misery of being a man unlucky in his own life he makes those around him as miserable as himself?<sup>4320</sup>

“Nobody who has a mind will gainsay your conclusion.”

and private lives (343D1-344A1), he endeavored to make his point crystal clear by imagining the unjust man becoming tyrant (344A2-C4).

<sup>4311</sup> ὁμοιότατά τε καὶ ἀληθέστατα λέγεις (D3): in praise of the analogy of the κάμνων. Cf. similar praise, in answer, at Soph.252D1.

<sup>4312</sup> For the addition of φίλε to the vocative of the proper name cf. n.3285.

<sup>4313</sup> πάθος (D5), refers to the method suggested at 577C1-3 and acknowledges that that method has been deployed here.

<sup>4314</sup> παντελῶς (D5) suggests that his experience is comprehensively miserable. The inward misery and the misery from external circumstance exacerbate each other in the case of the tyrannical man become tyrant.

<sup>4315</sup> Reading κὰν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ (D9), reading the indicative supplied by a scr. in the Lobcovicianus (δοκῇ AFDM Stob.): it is a formula of strong asseveration for which the indicative appears to be integral (cf. 473A2-3). For the sentiment cf. 576C3-4.

<sup>4316</sup> τῷ ὄντι (D9-10) echoic in slightly different senses for the sake of paradox: the tyrannical man who becomes tyrant in fact (τῷ ὄντι) enjoys in fact (τῷ ὄντι) the role of slave.

<sup>4317</sup> δοῦλος τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας (D10), an elegant instance of reverse καί (cf. n.444). δοῦλος itself is a metaphor; the “internal” accusative θωπείας explains the metaphor and then the more “cognate” accusative (for which cf. 490D3, Apol.22E2-3) closes the whole figure by reverting to the metaphor.

<sup>4318</sup> έάν ... ἐπίστηται (E3): not optative but subjunctive, not ideal but vivid, acknowledging the work Socrates and Glaucon have done over the last few hours and just now resolved to apply, rejecting again the “childish” view with which they began (cf. 576E6-577B4: n.b. θεάσασθαι there and here, and cf. n.4262).

<sup>4319</sup> ἡ τὸ πρότερον εἴπομεν (580A2): Cf. 576B8-9, an agreement he had reached with Adeimantus.

<sup>4320</sup> μάλιστα μέν / ἔπειτα δέ (A5-7): Cf. 575C3-4, another agreement reached with Adeimantus, to which Glaucon is now asked to subscribe.

Come then and make a declaration yourself on the entire matter, in the manner of a paramount<sup>4321</sup> judge: Who is it that holds the first rank in happiness, and who the second, and so on for all five: the kingly man, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical.

“The judgment is easily rendered. I find them to rank in virtue and the lack thereof, and in happiness and its opposite, in the very order you just trotted them out on the stage.”

Shall we hire a herald then, or may I myself have the honor of proclaiming that the son of Ariston has judged the best<sup>4322</sup> and most just man to be the happiest, and that this is the most kingly man, ruling as king over himself; and has judged the worst and most unjust man to be the most wretched, and that this is the man who while inwardly most tyrannical holds also the position of tyrant both over himself and over his city.<sup>4323</sup>

“Let it be announced by you.”

And am I to announce in addition the proviso, “whether or not they escape the notice of men and gods as to what sort of persons they are”?<sup>4324</sup>

“Announce it in addition.”

## 2.B.9.b: Second Comparison

Alright then, this can serve us as one demonstration.<sup>4325</sup> Look now to my second one, if I may have leave to present it.<sup>4326</sup>

“What demonstration is that?”

The following.<sup>4327</sup> Since the soul of the individual man, just like the city, is divided into three

<sup>4321</sup> διὰ πάντων (A9) the idiom is old (Riddell §112). Even if it has a technical meaning (J.-C. and Adam *ad loc.*) it is nevertheless given a second meaning here, that Glaucon himself has gone through all the steps and considered all the data (ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, A5).

<sup>4322</sup> τὸν ἄριστόν τε καὶ δικαιότατον (B9): The play on Ariston’s name goes all the way back to the beginning of the inquiry (368A1-4).

<sup>4323</sup> τυραννικώτατος ... τυραννή (C3-4): The dyadic description with adjective and verbal form is repeated, with variation, from βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα (C1-2). Note that the best man is best without holding public office (he rules only himself), but the worst is worst only if he does. That the ἄριστος can be called βασιλεύς (B3-4) goes back to Glaucon’s remark at 576E3-5 and to Book Four (445D3-6). Now that we are contemplating the individual type, the image of the king over against the tyrant has special power.

<sup>4324</sup> έάντε λανθάνωσιν ... έάντε μὴ πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καί θεούς (C6-7) echoes the stipulation made by Adeimantus on behalf of both brothers, in their setting out of the question in Book Two (367E4-5).

<sup>4325</sup> ὀπόδειξις (C9), emphasizing the argumentative or logical aspect of what they are doing as they exercise the sound judgment (κρίσις) Socrates has been emphasizing.

<sup>4326</sup> Reading Adam’s bright and simple emendation δὲ ιδέ (D1), for the δεῖ δέ of the mss. It is corroborated by the ensuing έάν clause, idiomatic for requesting the interlocutor’s indulgence and commonly appended to mitigate a second singular imperative (“*si qua placuerit*,” Stallb.): cf. 358B1 (and n.693), 427D3-4, 432C2, 455B1-2.

<sup>4327</sup> The extra give-and-take (D1-7) emphasizes that Socrates is presenting this second proof to be examined dialectically by question and answer, as he did the one before (577B7-8 and 578C9-D1) and will do the third and final one, after (583B8-C3). Cf. n.3296.

kinds,<sup>4328</sup> the rational part of it will hearken to still another proof.<sup>4329</sup>

“And what is the proof?”

This: to the kinds, which are three, belong three pleasures one belonging to each, and likewise three desires and three regimes.<sup>4330</sup>

“How would you describe them?”

The one part was<sup>4331</sup> according to us the part by which a man learns; the second is the part by which he is angry and willful; as to the third, because it takes on many forms we have not fixed on any single name to call it though we did<sup>4332</sup> describe it as being the largest and strongest part that a man has in himself. Remember?<sup>4333</sup> We called it “desirous” because of the forcefulness of the desires associated with eating and drinking and sex and things like that, and also “moneyloving,” as you know, since it is by money that (581) such pleasures are usually procured.

“And right we were.”

If we should also<sup>4334</sup> say that the pleasure and the love of this part is a love for profit,<sup>4335</sup> would that give us a single and reliable rubric for the pleasure involved, for the sake of our discussion, so that it would mean something between ourselves whenever we should refer to this part of the soul; and in characterizing that part as a money-loving or profit-loving<sup>4336</sup> part, we would be calling it by an appropriate name?

<sup>4328</sup> εύδη (D3): It is easier to speak of parts, and I shall in the translation, but Socrates uses the qualitative language of εύδη. In some other context it might be necessary to decide (cf. nn. ad 615A4 and 435E2).

<sup>4329</sup> Reading τὸ λογιστικὸν (D4) with A (λογιστικὸν A<sup>2</sup>FDM : λογιστικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικὸν Par.1642) against the athetization of all modern editors except Apelt. It is the subject of δέξεται or an adverbial accusative with ψυχή understood as subject. For singling out the λογιστικόν without the preparation of listing all the parts compare 602E1. What makes this second proof possible is not the tripartition of soul *per se* but the fact the one of its parts is amenable to argumentation bearing on the entire soul, which in the event provides both the method and the conclusion of the present argument (cf. ἀμφισβητοῦντα, 581E6 and n.4353; and 583A4-II). By intimating as much to Glaucon at the outset Socrates is rekindling the mental state that he stimulated in him in Book Four with his digression on non-contradiction, so that Glaucon’s own rationality could be marshalled to decide the structure of the soul.

<sup>4330</sup> ἡδοναί ... ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὠσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί (D7-8): the list orders the items in the reverse of logical priority, as the move from ἡδοναί to ἐπιθυμίαι immediately suggests. The distinct ἡδοναί sought by the distinct ἐπιθυμίαι of the soul are pursued under the initiation or office (ἀρχαί) of the soul’s distinct parts. That ἀρχή should be used of the “unruly” parts is a paradox by which the comparative argument is made possible. Plato’s sensitivity to, and indifference to, the paradox is shown in a passage like Phdr.237E2-8A2, where for the moment the mind is said to exert κράτος over the desires and the desires to exert ἀρχή over the mind. There is a similar ambivalence in the terms ἄγειν and ἔλκειν (cf. n.3294).

<sup>4331</sup> ἦν (D10), the imperfect of citation (n.586).

<sup>4332</sup> εἶχεν (E1), the imperfect again citing previous discussion.

<sup>4333</sup> γάρ (E2) proposes to explain the claim by restating what they had said.

<sup>4334</sup> καί (581A3) moving on (A3-B11) to the identification of the respective pleasures (ἡδοναί, D7). The addition of φιλία (A3) as a synonym for ἡδονή prepares the way for naming or characterizing the pleasures with compounds formed with the adjectival prefix φιλο-.

<sup>4335</sup> κέρδος (A4), a term not yet relied upon in the conversation.

<sup>4336</sup> φιλοχρήματον (A6), the old term (from 580E5) precedes the newly proposed one (φιλοκερδές [A7], from τοῦ κέρδους [A4]).

“It seems so to me, at least.”

And what about the willful part? Don’t we agree that it is always driven toward mastery and winning and achieving a good reputation, speaking on the whole?

“Quite so.”

So that if we should call it victory-loving and honor-loving would this be appropriate?

“Perfectly appropriate.”

But as to the thing that enables us to learn, everyone can see that it is always oriented and committed as a whole<sup>4337</sup> to knowing the truth in all matters, and that money and honor concern it the least of these parts.

“Quite so.”

Accordingly, in calling it learning-loving and wisdom-loving we would be speaking correctly?

“Of course.”

Is it also<sup>4338</sup> the case that one or another of these parts functions as any given soul’s ruling principle, one for the souls of some men and another for the souls of others as the case may be, whence in fact we classify men themselves as being one of three primary types: lovers of wisdom, lovers of victory, and lovers of wealth?

“Obviously.”<sup>4339</sup>

And the pleasures are likewise three, to be listed under<sup>4340</sup> these loves, one each?

“Quite.”

Are you aware that if you were to go up and ask each of these three types of men, one by one, which of these three lives is the most pleasant, that each will<sup>4341</sup> praise his own far above the other

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<sup>4337</sup> πᾶν ἀεὶ τέταται (B6) redoes ἀεὶ ὅλον ὠρμᾶσθαι (A10): the perfects describe the loves or desires as fixed in the nature of the parts (cf. n.4660). The mind is in tension with truth it barely knows (cf. συντεταμένως, 499A4-6; συντείνας, 591C1; ἀτενεῖς, 547E2). The present μέλει (B7) draws an inference.

<sup>4338</sup> καί (B12), moving on from the ἡδοναί to the ἀρχαί (from 580D8).

<sup>4339</sup> κομιδῆ γε (C5): At 435E3-436A3 the belief was accepted axiomatically that men are characterized by one or another of the soul’s natural loves (*mutatis mutandis*, these very three: θυμοειδές, φιλομαθές, φιλοχρήματον, *ibid.*).

<sup>4340</sup> ὑποκείμενον (C6) perhaps evokes the image of a chart.

<sup>4341</sup> ἐγκωμιάσεται (C10), future indicative apodosis after optative protasis, forgoing to insist on the logical relation between protasis and apodosis so as to portray their responses as behavior known from experience rather than merely theoretically. Cf. n.4353 on ἀμφισβητοῦνται, E6.

two? First,<sup>4342</sup> the moneymaker<sup>4343</sup> will declare the pleasure of being honored or the pleasure of learning to be worth zero<sup>4344</sup> in comparison with making a profit, unless of course one of them produced some silver.<sup>4345</sup>

“True.”

What about the lover of honor? Won’t he deem the pleasure one gets from money to be crass, and as for the pleasure from learning, unless the lesson brought honor he would deem it smoke and nonsense?<sup>4346</sup>

“That’s how it is.”

But the lover of wisdom—What do we imagine his attitude is about the other pleasures as compared to that<sup>4347</sup> of knowing the truth and what it really is, and of being in this state of awareness for its pleasantness, all the time?<sup>4348</sup> Does he not think the others far removed and call them “necessary” in the new sense<sup>4349</sup> that in himself he can take them or leave them<sup>4350</sup> except for the

<sup>4342</sup> This is the force of τε (C10): The editors read and report the tradition variously: ὁ τε χρηματιστικὸς legit Slings, χρηματικὸς in F notans | ὁ τε χρηματιστικὸς legit Chamtry, ὅτι χρηματικὸς in F notans | ὁ τε χρηματιστικὸς legunt J.-C. et Burnet sine nota | ὁ γε χρηματιστικὸς legit Shorey Hermanno (apud Adam) tribuens | ὁ γε χρηματιστικὸς legit Adam “M” (=ms. Cesenas collatum Rostagno) nisus, Hermanno adiuendo | ὁ τε χρηματιστικὸς in A notans. Of comments, however, there is only J.C.’s excellent remark that “the second τε changes to δέ as the sentence becomes adversative,” which presumably means that what we anticipate will be a (second) τε, answering this first τε, becomes instead a δέ (the δέ, presumably, with which the φιλότιμος is introduced at D5) because what had started as a list of three positive examples has taken on the form of a disagreement among the three types, each certain that his own is best. The problem with τε however is not that it is answered by τε, but that if it is, then there is nothing to connect the sentence with what came before (a fault that Hermann’s easy but unsupported emendation into γε [“*anacoluthi vitendi causa*”] does not repair). The asyndeton is mitigated by the quasi-demonstrative force in τὸν ἔαυτοῦ ἔκαστος.

<sup>4343</sup> χρηματιστικός (D1) describes the *life* (cf. βίων, C9) that the φιλοχρήματος ἀνήρ pursues because of his love. Cf. 551A7-8 and n.3722.

<sup>4344</sup> οὐδενὸς ἀξίων (D2): οὐδενός quite quantitative (“not one”): presumably the man would measure “worth” by a quantity of drachmas.

<sup>4345</sup> ἀργύριον (D3) the χρηματιστικός will characteristically dispense with metaphors and abstractions.

<sup>4346</sup> καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν (D7-8): The high-sounding and insouciant doublet embodies, in turn, the language of the φιλότιμος who is making the judgment, as ἡγεῖσθαι referred to an opinion that the φιλότιμος feels safe to believe and as φορτικός is his colorful but inarticulate term to express disapproval. As for the way that learning might bring honor, think of the reduced use the timocrat finds for the λογιστικόν—to trick people in peacetime (548A1-2) when he can’t simply beat them, once and for all, in war. By using such language Socrates depicts the style and manner by which the thumoeidetic part of the soul would wield its rule (ἀρχή) over the other two parts.

<sup>4347</sup> Reading the mss. τῆς ἥδονῆς; οὐ πάνυ πόρρω (E2), adopting the punctuation of Adam. ἥδονῆς completes the question by expressing the noun that τίν (E1) had only alluded to. ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ asserts that the pleasure of learning is akin to that of knowing. The loving elaboration of the object of knowledge depicts the thinking and the attitude of the philosopher.

<sup>4348</sup> ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα (E2) represents the other meaning of Solon’s famous and ambiguous epigram, γηράσκω δ’ αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενο! Contrast its use at 536D1-3.

<sup>4349</sup> τῷ ὄντι (E3), as often, denotes a new sense that was always obvious. We had above condoned some pleasures as ἀναγκαῖαι because we need them to live; but the φρόνιμος now ignores them until they force themselves upon him.

<sup>4350</sup> For ως οὐδέν ... δεόμενον (E3-4) cf. 579A2-3: “have nothing to do with them,” but now for

operation of necessity?<sup>4351</sup>

“One must know well<sup>4352</sup> that that’s his attitude.”

Now when a dispute arises<sup>4353</sup> among the separate parts of the soul about their several pleasures, and about the actual life that the pursuit of each entails—not, mind you, a disagreement about which is the finer and which the better,<sup>4354</sup> but only about which is (582) more pleasurable and less painful<sup>4355</sup>—how will we be able to know which of the three men is speaking more truly than the others?

“I really don’t know how to answer that.”

Go at it as follows: By what faculty ought<sup>4356</sup> one judge things if they are to be judged well? By experience and by thoughtfulness and by argument?<sup>4357</sup> Could someone have a better means of judging<sup>4358</sup> than these?

“How could he?”

Then ask this question: of the three types of men which one is most experienced in all three of the pleasures we mentioned? Would you say the lover of profit, by virtue of studying truth itself and how it holds,<sup>4359</sup> is more experienced in the pleasure of knowing than the lover of wisdom is experienced in the pleasure of profiting?

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external necessity, as at 579A2-3. ὡς (plus participle) announces that the expression depicts his sense of superiority.

<sup>4351</sup> εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν (E4): The philosopher is given his own voice as the others were, and thereby reveals to us the order (*ἀρχή*) of his soul, imagining an unreal world (imperfect *ἦν*) in which the necessity might not be there (contradictory imperfect). His omission of *ἄν* with δεόμενον may serve as an index of how alien he feels the necessity to be.

<sup>4352</sup> εὖ ... δεῖ εἰδέναι. (E5) I take it to be a corrective assent to τί οἰωμεθα (D10), supporting the conjecture of Graser there (vs. ποιώμεθα AFDM), and playing back at Socrates’s remark at 578C4-6: οὐκ οἴεσθαι χρή ... ἀλλ’ εὖ ... σκοπεῖν.

<sup>4353</sup> ὅτε δὴ οὖν ... ὀμφισβητοῦνται (E6): Note the indicative. The foregoing depiction of the three parts’ attitudes in their own voices shows that disagreement is inevitable; but on whose terms can it be settled? What can serve as a criterion? The λογιστικόν is both asking the question and being asked the question (cf. 580D5).

<sup>4354</sup> κάλλιον / αἰσχιον // χεῖρον / ἄμεινον (E7): the comparatives of καλόν / αἰσχρόν and κακόν / ἀγαθόν. The constellation is based on καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, the conventional dyad for “value” (cf. n.1556), here serving as foil to emphasize the unusual attempt to evaluate them sheerly in terms of their pleasure. The chiastic order is common in lists of opposites (e.g., 429C9-D1 [cf. 430A6-B2]; and Crito 47C9-10; Gorg.459D1-2, 474D1-2; Leg.714E4-5; Phdr.277D10-E1).

<sup>4355</sup> ἥδιον καὶ ἀλυπότερον (582A1): The chiastic play with the contraries prepares us to notice that elaborating ἥδιον by denying its contrary (*ἀλυπότερον*) involves the contradictory, a very different animal from the contrary as we shall soon see (583C1ff).

<sup>4356</sup> τίνι χρὴ κρίνεσθαι (A4) asks for the method one can be praised for using; δεῖ κρίνεσθαι below (D7) is a different matter.

<sup>4357</sup> ἔμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ (A5): The list as such is unexampled in the corpus as far as I know. It might be a dyad (mental awareness done with the pair φρόνησις καὶ λόγος) and then it would resemble what Socrates imagines to be Protagoras’s sources of knowledge at Prot.320B6-8: ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι / μεμαθηκέναι / αὐτὸν ἐξευρηκέναι (where analogously the last two are mental).

<sup>4358</sup> κριτήριον (A6), drawn out of the verbs κρίνεσθαι and κριθήσεσθαι above. To translate with “criterion” loses the etymological connection still very alive in this very new word. Cf. Thet.178B6. Note that in Leg.767B5 it still can mean “tribunal.”

<sup>4359</sup> τὴν ἀλήθειαν οἶόν ἔστιν (A10), repeating the loving language of the philosopher from above (581E1).

"There's a great discrepancy there. For the one man it is inevitable that he has had a taste of both the one and the other<sup>4360</sup> pleasure from childhood, whereas for the lover of profit, as to his learning the inner nature of things and how they are, and of the pleasure that comes from this and how sweet it is,<sup>4361</sup> there is no necessity that he has tasted it so as to<sup>4362</sup> know it from experience. To the contrary, even if he were eager to do so he would not find it easy to do."

Therefore the lover of wisdom far surpasses the lover of profit at least, in his experience of both their respective pleasures.

"Very much so."

How does he measure up against the lover of honor? Is he more inexperienced in the pleasure that comes from being honored than the other is in that which comes from thinking?

"How could he be?<sup>4363</sup> Assuming a man succeeds at doing whatever his nature drives<sup>4364</sup> him to do, it comes to all<sup>4365</sup> men for the types they are. In fact, the rich man is praised by most,<sup>4366</sup> as well as the brave<sup>4367</sup> man and the wise man. Thus as to the pleasure that comes from being honored all three types are experienced in this. But of the vision of reality and the pleasure it brings, it is impossible for anybody to have had a taste<sup>4368</sup> except for the lover of wisdom."

Well then, as far as experience goes the most able of men to judge their merits is this one.

"Very much."

<sup>4360</sup> τῶν ἑτέρων (B2-3): Glaucon's plural answers about both the pleasures of the φιλότιμος and the φιλοκέρδης together, over against that of the φιλόσοφος, though Socrates is at the moment is asking only about the pleasure of the φιλοκέρδης, thereby easing his segue to the φιλότιμος.

<sup>4361</sup> ὅπῃ πέφυκε (B3) and ως γλυκεῖά ἔστιν (B4): In an uncharacteristically long-winded answer Glaucon vents his philosophical adoration twice, almost as if it to lord it over the moneyman, imitating the way Socrates imitated the three types of men in their answers, above (581C10-E4).

<sup>4362</sup> οὐδέ (B5) illative (cf. n.2580), cashing in the use of taste as a metaphor for empirical experience functioning as criterion.

<sup>4363</sup> Reading τί μήν (C4) with ADM (τιμὴν μὲν F : τιμὴ μὲν recc.). The subject of ἔπειται is ή ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆ (drawn from C3).

<sup>4364</sup> ὥρμηκε (C5) echoes ὥρμησθαι (581A10), of the motivations natural (n.b. tense: cf. n.4660) to the several parts of the soul.

<sup>4365</sup> πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς (C5), including not only the φιλόσοφος and the φιλότιμος but the φιλοκέρδης as well.

<sup>4366</sup> ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται (C5-6): Accumulating money draws admiration for the discipline involved: cf. ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος, 554B11.

<sup>4367</sup> ἀνδρεῖος (C6) now designates the φιλότιμος, slanting his desire in the direction of the cardinal virtue (compare previous characterizations of his desire: κρατεῖν / νικᾶν / εὐδοκιμεῖν [581A9-10]; τιμᾶσθαι [D1]): the use of a single article (reading ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος [AFD] with Burnet rather than ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος [A<sup>2</sup>M]) then associates this desire with σοφία as a second cardinal virtue, the virtue of the φιλόσοφος, together preparing for the ranking at 583A4-9.

<sup>4368</sup> γεγεῦσθαι (C8): The perfect caps the uses of γεύεσθαι above (B2 and 5) and adds to the notion of an empirical experience of the pleasure of knowing (582A10-B1, B5) an empirical experience of knowing itself (continued at E7). Socrates has often used taste and touch to describe the experience of reality and truth, because they allow him to place the object into the genitive, by which he depicts the participatory, rather than merely intentional or "objective" structure of the experience of reality, i.e., its incomplete and partial objectivity. Cf. 581B6 (and n.4337), 572A2 (and n.4140), 511B4 and 7, 496C6, 490B3, 484B5, 411D2. Cf. also 445E1, 517C1 (μόγις ὄράσθαι, ὄφθεῖσα δέ), Phdo.65B9, Phdrs.260E6, and Tht.186D4. Glaucon borrows the metaphor here and mixes the metaphor with an extraordinary synesthesia of tasting a sight (θέας), in a second uncharacteristically longwinded answer that joins the learning-lover in his enthusiasm.

But isn't it he alone that will have used his mind in the course of accumulating that experience?  
“Obviously.”

And we may also say<sup>4369</sup> that the very instrument by which judgment perforce<sup>4370</sup> is made is an instrument that belongs not to the lover of profit nor to the lover of honor, but to the lover of wisdom.

“Which instrument is that?”

We did say, didn't we, that one must make a judgment through the use of reasoning?

“Yes.”

Well reasoning is this man's instrument most of all.

“Undeniably.”

Now if it were by using wealth and profit as the criteria<sup>4371</sup> that things were best judged, then whatever things the lover of profit praised and dispraised would necessarily be judged most truly.<sup>4372</sup>

“Very necessarily.”

And if by using honor and victory and bravery,<sup>4373</sup> whatever the lover of honor and victory?<sup>4374</sup>

“Clearly.”

But since<sup>4375</sup> it is by means of experience and mind and argument ...

“Necessarily, whatever things the lover of wisdom and of argument<sup>4376</sup> praises are most truly<sup>4377</sup> judged.”

(583) Therefore, while there are three distinct kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of this part of the soul—the part we learn with—would be the most pleasurable; and the man among us in whom this part is the ruling part has the most pleasurable life.

<sup>4369</sup> ἀλλὰ μὴν δι' ὅ γε (D7) caps καὶ μὴν μετά γε (D4).

<sup>4370</sup> δεῖ (D7), depicting a necessity internal to the process of judgment, replaces the χρή (A4) of propriety and conscientiousness.

<sup>4371</sup> πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει (D15): reversion to the dative takes us back to the formulation of the means or “criteria” of judgment listed at A4-6, of which λόγος (just now expressed with δι' ὅ) was one.

<sup>4372</sup> The throwaway example of the φιλοκέρδης (D15-E2), stated contrafactually, allows Socrates to import the implicit premise that the best judgment (ἀριστα, D15) is the one that reaches the truth (ἀληθέστατα, E2), and thus to revert to the original question (A1-2).

<sup>4373</sup> ἀνδρείᾳ (E4) cf. C6 above. The next case, the φιλότιμος, is presented without a verb under the guise of abbreviation, leaving it contrafactual by implication only.

<sup>4374</sup> φιλότιμός τε καὶ φιλόνικος (E4-5). The designation of the φιλότιμος is expanded with φιλόνικος (E5), in tandem with the dative νίκῃ (E4).

<sup>4375</sup> ἐπειδή (E7) replaces εἰ. Though again the abbreviated form of the question has masked the verb, the conjunction (“since” rather than “if”) tells us the verb would have been the present indicative (no longer the unreal imperfect).

<sup>4376</sup> φιλόλογος (E8) expands φιλόσοφος in tandem with λόγῳ (E7).

<sup>4377</sup> ἀληθέστατα (E9): Glaucon states the conclusion in full dress: best judgment is truest. Only λόγος and φρόνησις can properly use this term: for the φιλοκέρδης the truest pleasures could only be the strongest that it has experienced; and for the φιλότιμος the truest could only be the ones *most* envied. The notion of “true” pleasures as something more than a term of praise, is adumbrated here and taken up next (παναληθής, 583B3).

“What else can we expect?<sup>4378</sup> After all it is as the man whose praise is definitive that the lover of wisdom praises his own life.”

And which life is second and which pleasure, according to our<sup>4379</sup> judge?

“Clearly the pleasure of the military and honor-loving man, since he is closer to his<sup>4380</sup> than he is to that of the lover of gain.”

And the pleasure of the profit-lover comes in last?

“It's hardly a surprise.”

### 2.B.9.c:Third Comparison

So that makes two wins in a row for the just man over the unjust. As for the third victory, which in the Olympian manner is to be dedicated to Zeus at Olympus the Preserver,<sup>4381</sup> focus now on the pleasure of everyone but the mindful man,<sup>4382</sup> and behold how it is not even true-blue<sup>4383</sup> pleasure but something impure and a sort of optical illusion,<sup>4384</sup> as I seem to have heard it said by some wise

<sup>4378</sup> With πῶς δὲ οὐ μέλλει (583A4) Glaucon brings forward the notion Socrates advanced at the beginning of this proof of what we are to expect as an expression of conviction (*τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθῆσεσθαι*, 582A4-5).

<sup>4379</sup> ὁ κριτής (A7), i.e., the κύριος ἐπαινέτης (A4). It was our job to become able judges (577B6-8) and our deployment of dialectic (cf. n.4276 on ἀποκρίνεται, 577B8) has enabled us to prove the φρόνιμος qualified to be our judge. On the other hand this judge is not anyone other than ourselves (cf. ἐν ὦ ήμῶν, A2) since it was exactly by our own experience (knowing how the money-man and the honor-man think: cf. nn.4344, 4345, 4346, 4350, and 4351), mindfulness (expressed exactly by the confidence we have placed in the dialectical method), and logic (the application one by one of the three criteria) that we achieved the proof.

<sup>4380</sup> αὐτοῦ (A9): sc. τῆς αὐτοῦ ἡδονῆς, a compression soon relieved by the fuller statement of the alternative, ἡ τοῦ χρηματιστοῦ. This relative “closeness” (έγγυτέρω) has not been mentioned or argued for explicitly. The idea was perhaps broached by characterizing the φιλότιμος as ἀνδρεῖος (582C6 [cf. n.4367], underlined at E4). J.-C.’s theory that the antecedent of αὐτοῦ is the κριτής (rather than the φιλότιμος) and that this κριτής is “not Glaucon or one of ourselves” (*ad loc.*) would have called for αὐτοῦ if Plato felt it made the difference J.-C. feel it makes. The methodological preliminaries introduced when Glaucon re-entered the discussion, with the strong allusions to and criticism of the κρίσις set up by Glaucon in Book Two (576D6-577B8 and nn.4256, 4258, 4262, 4263, and 4273), trumps J.-C.’s concern about drawing such a distinction. If anything Glaucon’s own thinking (and ours) has been elevated to the philosophical level by this proof (witness his long answers), so as to prepare him (and us) to participate as a partner equal to the κριτής in the next one.

<sup>4381</sup> τῷ σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὄλυμπιῷ Διί (B2-3): Charm.167A, Phlb.66D (and scholia *ad locc.*); Leg.692A; and Pind.lsth.6.7 (and schol.). The full allusion is uncertain (the Olympics must have to do with the wrestling metaphor below) but presumably indicates the coming proof will need, or will have, nothing topping it. In any event Socrates is announcing that this is the end (“last but not least”).

<sup>4382</sup> ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου (B3-4). The others (ἄλλων), in typical proleptic position, receive their gender from ὁ φρόνιμος.

<sup>4383</sup> οὐδὲ παναληθής (B3): The dialectical development finally allows for a penetrating critique of pleasure itself, which the philosopher had hitherto acquiesced in treating doxically (581D10-E4). παναληθής, an enthusiastic colloquialism like ὑπέρπλουτος (562B4), apologizes for the inconsistency.

<sup>4384</sup> οὐδὲ παναληθής / οὐδὲ καθαρά / ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις (B3-5): The program is set: the attributes to be revealed are three: falseness, impurity, and illusion.

man.<sup>4385</sup> Wherever I heard it, this would be the greatest and most dispositive fall.<sup>4386</sup>

“Yes it would, but what is it you are saying?”

Here is how I will discover whether it is true: by searching while you play the answerer.<sup>4387</sup>

“Go ahead and ask.”

Go ahead and answer. We say, don’t we, that pain is the opposite<sup>4388</sup> of pleasure?

“Quite so.”

And do we say there is a state of feeling that feels neither joy nor pain?

“We do indeed.”

As a state in between the two, is it a sort of quiescent state of the soul poised in the middle<sup>4389</sup> as to these feelings?

“Just so.”

Now can you recall the way sick people talk while they are sick?

“What way?”

They say that nothing is more pleasant than being healthy although they<sup>4390</sup> had failed to notice that it was the most pleasurable thing before they were sick.

<sup>4385</sup> τῶν σοφῶν τινος ἀκηκοέναι (B5-6): The indefiniteness is dismissive (cf. n.527), apologizing for the metaphor until it can be explained. It is not meant to send us on a wild goose chase tracking down who the σοφός τις might be: cf. *Meno* 81C, *Phlb.*44B.

<sup>4386</sup> πτωμάτων (B7). The idea of a wrestling match with “falls” was prepared by the reference to Olympus above; and the metaphor recalls the remark Socrates made between the first and second falls that justice underwent at the hands of the brothers in Book Two (*ικανά... καταπαλαῖσατ*, 362D8). Perhaps an allusion to winning the whole match by winning three falls in a row (cf. *Aesch.Eum.*59 with Paley and Blaydes *ad loc.*)

<sup>4387</sup> σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ζητῶν ὅμα (C1), another formula for the σκέψις ἐν κοινῷ of dialectic (cf. 577B8), embedded in another preliminary by-play of question and answer (B8-C3: πῶς λέγεις / ὥδε / ἔρωτα δή / λέγε δή: cf.580D1-7). Cf. n.3296. J.-C. append two long notes telling us what the argument will be and condemning it as obsolete “in modern times” (426,7); but what they say it will say it does not say (that the relativity of pleasure and pain *imply* they are illusory and unsatisfying): it is rather that believing our experiences requires us to embrace the contradiction that the neutral is not neutral but both positive and negative (583E4-584A10). Moreover what anybody outside the dialogue thinks about the argument, whether a creature of modern times or ancient, besides ourselves of course assuming we have grasped it, is an idle question.

<sup>4388</sup> οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμὲν (C3): The purer dialectic often begins with the simple assertion of abstract opposites or identities: 436B5-C1; 475E6-476A2, 523B9-D6. The final proof of the soul’s immortality in the *Phaedo* (103C10-5E6), like the present proof about pleasure, will stand or fall by the thinker’s refusal to the core that opposites may be the same.

<sup>4389</sup> μεταξὺ τούτοιν ἄμφοιν ἐν μέσῳ ὅν (C7): ἐν μέσῳ is not a pleonastic synonym for μεταξύ (Adam *ad loc.*). As before it designates a balance point in the center, at which countervailing forces are neutralized or cancelled (κατέστη εἰς μέσον, 572D1; εἰς τὸ μέσον ... ἡλθε, 550B4-5; εἰς μέσον ὠμολόγησαν, 547B8; cf. below ἐν μέσῳ στάντα, 584D7). As such, with ὅν it gives the grounds for the inference that the state is a sort of ἡσυχία. This in turn justifies the use of παύεσθαι for the cessation of pain and pleasure (D4, E1), and justifies the inference that the λυπηρόν and the ἡδύ are, conversely, κινήσεις (E10)—not vice-versa as Adam says.

<sup>4390</sup> σφᾶς (C13), reflexive, guarantees that their having failed to notice the truth about being healthy is part of what they testify to: in short, they are aware of their error.

"I do recall this kind of talk."

And as to people that are in the grip of excruciating pain, are you familiar with them saying that nothing is more pleasurable than their feeling of pain coming to a stop?

"I do hear this."

And in other cases likewise, many cases of this kind, I'd guess you have observed<sup>4391</sup> it happening to men that as long as they are in pain, not being in pain and a quiescence of it they praise as being the most pleasant thing, rather than having pleasure.

"The reason is, at that moment this state becomes somehow pleasurable and<sup>4392</sup> welcome, though it is really quiescence."

Likewise, when a person suddenly ceases to feel enjoyment for that matter, this quiescence of pleasure will be<sup>4393</sup> painful.

"Somehow."

What we were saying is *in between* the two of them, therefore, namely the quiescent state, will at some moment *be* the two of them, both pain and pleasure.<sup>4394</sup>

"So it seems..."

But is it possible that if<sup>4395</sup> something is neither, it can become both?

"I would say not."

And yet the pleasurable event that arises<sup>4396</sup> in the soul as well as the painful event are both of

<sup>4391</sup> αἰσθάνη γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (D6): The participle is noteworthy. Again Socrates is not asking whether we know or believe something on the testimony of the persons, but only whether we perceive the persons undergoing something (γιγνομένους). What happens to them is that they find themselves praising the painless state as a thing pleasurable, while they are in pain. Compare ἀκούεις λεγόντων, D3-4. These are participles of perception.

<sup>4392</sup> ήδὺ ἵσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται ἡσυχία (D10): ἵσως goes with ήδὺ, and Glaucon virtually means, "It changes into something 'pleasurable' perhaps, because it is welcome, though it is quiescence." He is suggesting the reason why ἡσυχία at that moment (τότε) becomes (γίγνεται) something it is not, in the mind of the person in pain. He is not offering a theory that Socrates refutes, as Adam (*ad* 583D) says.

<sup>4393</sup> ὥρα (E1) indicates Socrates is drawing an inference. However, all that truly can be inferred is that the man will *dispraise* the cessation as painful, not that it will *be* (let alone become) painful; yet this is what Socrates asserts. He is now quoting the praise of the γιγνόμενος ἀνθρωπος. Glaucon's moderated assent ἵσως echoes his own assertion ήδὺ ἵσως above, which itself was an interpretation of that praise.

<sup>4394</sup> With ὥρα (E4) Socrates continues to over-infer; and with ποτε (E5) he answers Glaucon's τότε at D10. It is chopping logic to cavil that the moment it seems painful (when one is experiencing pleasure) cannot be the same moment it seems pleasurable (the moment one is experiencing pain). All that Glaucon's temporal restriction meant was that the seeming is due to conditions: the assertion that the seeming leads the feeling person to make (whether praise or blame) will not so qualify itself.

<sup>4395</sup> τὸ μηδέτερον ὅν (E7): μή indicates that the participle (ὅν) is conditional. The assertion presumes a strong distinction between being and becoming that has quietly operated through the whole argument (εἰναί τι, C5; ὅν, C7 and D1; γιγνομένους, D7; γίγνεται, D10) but was disregarded at E2 and E5 in order to produce the paradoxical conclusion.

<sup>4396</sup> τό γε ... γιγνόμενον ... ἔστον (E9-10): The distinction between being and becoming is now restored.

them motions,<sup>4397</sup> aren't they?

"Yes."

(584) Whereas the neither-painful-nor-pleasurable is a quiescence, in truth, as being centered between them, as we just saw.<sup>4398</sup>

"So we did."

Well then how can one properly hold the position<sup>4399</sup> that not hurting is pleasurable, or not having pleasure is miserable?<sup>4400</sup>

"There is no way to do so."

And so this thing is not really,<sup>4401</sup> but only appears, in comparison with what hurts, to be pleasurable, and in comparison with the pleasurable to be painful at that moment – this quiescence.<sup>4402</sup> There is no validity in these appearances<sup>4403</sup> when it comes to what is the truth about pleasure; instead they belong to the order of bewitchment.<sup>4404</sup>

"The logic<sup>4405</sup> implies it."

<sup>4397</sup> κίνησίς τις (E10), a new notion, its unexpected appearance mitigated by τις. The notion is inferred from the contrast with ήσυχία. The noun, by making change into a thing, makes possible, in this context of γένεσις vs. οὐσία, that the verb ἔστον be used of it. Their real essence is not to be but, such as their essence is, to be in flux.

<sup>4398</sup> ἐφάνη ἄρτι (584A2) sc. ὅν. The subject is τὸ μήτε λυπηρὸν μήτε ἡδύ. ἐφάνη is "dialectical" (n.210) and means "as became clear a moment ago in our discussion," (i.e., at C7-8, for the interpretation of which cf. n. *ad loc.*). Mere appearance entered the conversation just after (C10ff). The late μέντοι stresses ήσυχία with a force similar to that of the γε after τό, both adducing the logical *vis termini*: It would not be poised in the middle if it were in motion.

<sup>4399</sup> ὁρθῶς ἔστι ... ἡγεῖσθαι (A4), not ὁρθόν: i.e., πῶς ἔστι τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι X ὁρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι; "How can adopting that position X really be correct if doing so would be to adopt incorrectly the position?" Glaucon notices the special adverbial expression in his reply (οὐδαμῶς, A6).

<sup>4400</sup> ἀλγεῖν / ἀνιαρόν (A4-5) The point having been made the terminology can change (ἀλγεῖν for λυπεῖσθαι; ἀνιαρόν for λυπηρόν). ἄλγος can be synonymous with λύπη (ἀλγηδών / ἡδονή, Rep.464D2, Phd.65C6-7), but from Crat.419Bff, Leg.727C4-5 and 792B6, Rep.578A7-8, and Polit.293B2-3, ἄλγος (and in Crat. ἀνιαρόν also) are specific or colorful where λύπη is general or drab. Striking specificity, like a clinching added example, has a dismissive, and therefore transitional, force.

<sup>4401</sup> ἔστιν (A7) paroxytone, relying on the ἔστιν at A4.

<sup>4402</sup> ἡ ήσυχία (A8): The article is "referential" or quasi-demonstrative, pointing back to the ήσυχία spoken of at 583D10-E2 (where the was no article). Indeed the whole sentence rehearses that passage, with its proleptic τοῦτο (A7: cf. 583D10) and its relativizing τότε (A8: cf. 583D10 and ὅταν, E1), in order to assert the opposite position as being implied (ἄρα) by the intervening argument.

<sup>4403</sup> φαντασμάτων (A9) replaces φαίνεται (A6). The English "appearances" turns these false things into objects more than the Greek φαντάσματα does, which retains their debt to the verb. "Appearings" would be closer but bad English, but in either case nominalizing the problem that appears in experience (like nominalizing the idea of change in the noun, κίνησις, above) is a large and indispensable step toward theorization.

<sup>4404</sup> πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις (A9-10): Absence of the article with ἀλήθεια and with γοητεία is striking, and makes them predicative.

<sup>4405</sup> ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει (A11): Glaucon acknowledges that what Socrates is saying is being said by a mind to a mind, and with γοῦν reveals a trace of vertigo (cf. Polemarchus at 334A9). There is no need to call this "metaphysics" (Adam *ad* 583Bff), a deadly and desiccating thing: it is closer to *Phänomenologie*. One of the virtues of the second proof above (580D3-583A11) was that it (like the argument from opposites in Book Four) aroused and encouraged the mind to acknowledge and

Then inspect the pleasures that do not stem from pains, in case you are sitting there thinking<sup>4406</sup> that the nature of pleasure is just the cessation of pain, and of pain the cessation of pleasure.

“Where do these stem from? Which pleasures are they?”<sup>4407</sup>

There are many of them other than the ones we have been considering, especially the pleasures having to do with smell, if you will. These can arise suddenly and overwhelmingly even for a person who has not just then<sup>4408</sup> been suffering pain; and conversely when they cease they leave behind no pain at all.<sup>4409</sup>

“You speak most truly.”

So let's not be persuaded that pure pleasure is the surcease of pain,<sup>4410</sup> nor pain the surcease of pleasure.

“Let's not.”

And yet the ones that reach the soul through the body,<sup>4411</sup> though still spoken of as pleasures<sup>4412</sup> and though perhaps greatest in number and power, do fall into this category as being releases from pain.

“Yes they do.”

And don't the feelings that arise out of expectation *before* things happen, as pre-pleasures and pre-pains,<sup>4413</sup> have the same status as these?

“The same.”

Do you see what they are like? Do you know what might be a good image<sup>4414</sup> for them?

assume its hegemony as judge. Cf. τὸ λογιστικόν (580D4) and τῷ γε λογιστικῷ (587D11).

<sup>4406</sup> ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω (B2): construe οὕτω with ἐν τῷ παρόντι (it is unneeded with τοῦτο πεφυκέναι). The participle never (pace Adam) points to the immediate future (as “presently” can in English) but always to the already present context. *Tht.* 158B9-10, οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, is an exact parallel. For this οὕτως cf. 530C7; *Euthyph.* 3B1; *Gorg.* 464B5, 478A2; *Leg.* 712D3; *Phdrs.* 235C2, 272C6; *Phdo.* 62B1.

<sup>4407</sup> ποῦ (B4) responds to οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν (B1) which only tells where they are *not* to be found (pace Adam who connects the spatial interrogative with temporal ἐν τῷ παρόντι, which he misinterprets to refer to a comment Socrates is about to make: see prev. n.), and ποίας refers to αἷ which came before it (B1).

<sup>4408</sup> ἔξαιρηντς (B7) nods to Glaucon's τότε (583D10). That a remote access or cessation would cause an attenuated reaction and a near cessation or access an enhanced one, is a natural corollary to the principle lately revealed, here added to make the argument *a fortiori*.

<sup>4409</sup> ἡδονή / λύπη (B1-3): The boiler-plate vocabulary returns for the new development.

<sup>4410</sup> καθαράν (C1): cf. παναληθής announced as *demonstrandum* and immediately elaborated by καθαρά, 583B4: the term arrives in the wake of Glaucon's answer, ἀληθέστατα (B9), an expression not otiose.

<sup>4411</sup> τείνουσαι (C5) recalling the speculative psychophysiology of 462C10-D5 (*n.b.*, τεταμένη [C12] and 464D4). The suggestion is that pleasures that combine the somatic and psychic natures are impure by the involvement of body as a second element.

<sup>4412</sup> λεγόμεναι (C5) in contrast with καθαράν (C1), πεφυκέναι (B2), and ἀληθέστατα (B9).

<sup>4413</sup> προησθῆσεις τε καὶ προλυπήσεις (C10): Both nouns appear to be coinages (προλυπεῖσθαι, *Phdrs.* 258E3, *Phlb.* 39D4 [and προχαίρειν, *ibid.*]), and mean the experience of pleasure and pain in advance, not just the anticipation of pleasure and pain. Although they are feelings that occur solely within the medium of the soul, they are inferred to be impure by a commutation of the principle of temporal sequence in ἀπαλλαγάι.

<sup>4414</sup> Ὡ μάλιστα ἐσίκασιν (D1), μάλιστα suggesting the image is wonderfully accurate. Cf. 586A2.

“What?”

You believe, don't you, that in nature<sup>4415</sup> there is an high region and a low region and also a middle region?

“I do.”

Do you imagine that a person who was being borne from the downward toward the middle would think he was being borne anywhere else than upward? And once he came to a stop in the middle if he looked back to the place from which he had been borne, would he think himself to be anywhere else but up, assuming he had never yet seen<sup>4416</sup> the truly upward region?

“By Zeus<sup>4417</sup> I really do think the person you describe would think<sup>4418</sup> nothing else but this.”

And then, if he were being borne back, would he think he was being borne to the downward region, and would he be correct to think so?

“Of course.”

And would he be subject to such thoughts<sup>4419</sup> because he lacked experience of what really is the truly upward region and the true middle and true downward?<sup>4420</sup>

“Clearly.”

So would you be surprised, likewise, that persons lacking experience<sup>4421</sup> of truth are generally left with unsound opinions, and that in particular they are so disposed toward pleasure and pain and what lies between them<sup>4422</sup> that when they are borne in the direction of the (585) painful they both truly think<sup>4423</sup> they feel and in fact they do feel pain, but when they are borne away from pain and toward

<sup>4415</sup> ἐν τῇ φύσει (D3): this modality is used also at *Parm.* 132D2, of the way the “forms” stand, unmoving, in nature (ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει). Cf. ἀληθῶς below (D9).

<sup>4416</sup> μὴ ἔωρακότα (D9): μή is conditional. The perfect is “empirical” (so ἔμπειρος, E4; ἄπειρος, E7), for which cf. n.1536; but the “empirical experience” involved is quite a different thing from the feelings of pleasure and pain described at 583C10-E2!

<sup>4417</sup> Μὰ Δί’ οὐκ ἔγωγε (D10): The asseveration is as strong as it can be. Compare 585A6 below.

<sup>4418</sup> οἶμαι οἰηθῆναι ὃν (D10). In the analysis of the example he thinks that they think (cf. οἴεσθαι bis, 584D6-7), just as before he perceived them to perceive (αἰσθάνη, 583D6; cf. n.4391).

<sup>4419</sup> πάσχοι (E4): again the logical contents, the thoughts, are made the result of raw perception (cf. γιγνομένους, 583D6 and n.4391).

<sup>4420</sup> τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ... ὄντος (E5): ὄντος and ἀληθινῶς replace ἐν τῇ φύσει above (D3), both going with all three “locations” (ἄνω, ἐν μέσῳ, and κάτω). The reader's mind strains to understand the distinct meaning and contribution of each term, though we have seen both (εἶναι, D3; ἀληθῶς, D9).

<sup>4421</sup> οἱ ἄπειροι ἀληθείας (E7): That there should in the first place even be a direct experience of truth, so alien to the thoughtworld of empiricism, had been broached above, in the argument about the relative authority of the parts of soul (cf. n.4368).

<sup>4422</sup> περὶ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων ... πρός τε ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων (E7-9): An ἄλλως τε καί construction linking, virtually, major and minor premise, the former a generalization of the case of up and down just studied and the latter the specific case of pleasure that is the target of the investigation.

<sup>4423</sup> ἀληθῆ τε οἴονται (585A1), sc. λυπηθῆναι, the expression relying on a parallelism in thought with κάτω τ' ὃν οἴοιτο φέρεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ οἴοιτο, above (584E1-2) where the infinitive could more easily be supplied in retrospect, and (as here) its coming was announced by τε.

the middle they think they feel a very strong access<sup>4424</sup> of<sup>4425</sup> fulfillment<sup>4426</sup> and pleasure, and that<sup>4427</sup> just as one who looks off to something gray in comparison with black without the experience of something white, so they in looking off to pain in comparison with the painless and lacking the experience of pleasure, are deceived in thinking they feel pleasure?

“Zeus be my witness,<sup>4428</sup> I would be more surprised if it were not this way!”<sup>4429</sup>

Try looking at it this way, for what it's worth.<sup>4430</sup> If we think of feeling hungry and thirsty and similar feelings as emptinesses<sup>4431</sup> in the bodily state, would you say that ignorant mindlessness<sup>4432</sup> is a correspondingly *psychic* state of emptiness?

“Quite so.”

And would the person be filled by taking in nourishment (in the first case) or acquiring<sup>4433</sup> understanding (in the second)?<sup>4434</sup>

“Of course.”

Which filling up is the truer of these two? Is it the filling of what is less real or of what is more real?<sup>4435</sup>

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<sup>4424</sup> σφόδρα (A2) echoes ἔξαιφνης ἀμήχανοι (584B7) and goes with (προσ)γίγνεσθαι, not οἴονται, which, as at 584D7 and E1-2, does not need strengthening.

<sup>4425</sup> πρός (A3) is in virtual tmesis with γίγνεσθαι.

<sup>4426</sup> πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ (A3): For the pairing cf. 439D8 and Gorg.496E1-2. Fullness is a new idea in this context constituting a “proleptic skewing” (n. 1556) of pleasure that will make a berth for the mechanism of κένωσις just below. The notion that pleasure is a filling is a commonplace flatly stated at 442A7, Gorg.492A2, and Phlb.31E8 and partially theorized at Phlb.34E9-36C2; and is palpable in the phenomenology of satiation.

<sup>4427</sup> καί (A4) links ἀπατῶνται (A5) with οἴονται (A2); μέν is “solitarium” with οἴονται, leaving implicit an unstated contrast with the correct belief: cf. Denniston, 382(§ iii).

<sup>4428</sup> Μὰ Δία (A6): The repeated asseveration serves as an index of the surprise or amazement (θαυμάζειν: A6 and 584E7) at how easily we are deceived by appearances or at how great a discrepancy there is between truth and appearance, or both, to the extent that sometimes our pleasures and pains are true but at other times they are false! We still know the surprise when we contemplate how the earth is round and people on the other side are standing “upside down.”

<sup>4429</sup> εἰ μὴ οὔτως ἔχει (A7) virtually telescopes εἰ μὴ ἔχοι ως ἔχει. Cf. Prot.315E2-3.

<sup>4430</sup> ὅδε γ' οὖν (A8): γε goes with ὅδε only; γ' οὖν is not γοῦν (Stallb. *ad loc.*). Denniston (449) compares H.Maj.292E4, εὐ γ' οὖν and the separation in ἔγωγε οὖν. Slings again disfigures the text with a lacuna to make way for what he sees as something lacking in the logic (cf.nn. 4089, 3134).

<sup>4431</sup> κενώσεις (B1), prepared for by πλήρωσις as κίνησις had been prepared for by ἡσυχία above (cf. n.4397). πεῖνα καὶ δίψα (A8) is the usual pair by which to designate bodily needs or desires.

<sup>4432</sup> ἄγνοια καὶ ἀφροσύνη are amalgamated into one, by the singular number of the predicate, κενότης (B3: contrast κενώσεις, B1). κενότης replaces κένωσις as state rather than process; moreover it is the privative alpha's in ἄγνοια and ἀφροσύνη that warrant the inference that they are emptinesses, quite a different thing from the full and empty stomach.

<sup>4433</sup> νοῦν ἴσχων (B6-7): for the expression cf. 511DI.

<sup>4434</sup> Ὡ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἴσχων (B6-7): while τε ... καί (as well as the singular πληροῖτο) asks us to compare them, the repeated article ensures we will keep them in their separate categories. For τε ... καί linking opposites or complements cf. n.96.

<sup>4435</sup> τοῦ ἥττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος (B9-10): The genitives with πλήρωσις may be subjective or objective (the filler or the filled). Truth and reality are again paired (584E5). This time their degrees are correlated (compare the similar corollary regarding degrees at 584B6-8: cf. n. 4408): the degree of realness of the filler (or of thing being filled) is the basis or cause of the relative “trueness” of the event of filling.

“Obviously of the more real.”

So which of the two categories do you believe partakes of the more pure reality,<sup>4436</sup> things like food and drink and relish<sup>4437</sup> and nutrition taken as a whole, or the category of true opinion and knowledge and intelligence and virtue as a whole?<sup>4438</sup> Here is how to make the judgment:<sup>4439</sup> Is the category of things that are connected to<sup>4440</sup> what is always the same and deathless and true,<sup>4441</sup> and that are themselves like that and undergo what changes they undergo<sup>4442</sup> in a medium of that character, are these in your judgment more real,<sup>4443</sup> or the category of things that are connected to what is never the same and is mortal, which are themselves of this latter nature and which move in a medium of this latter kind?

“The category of the invariant<sup>4444</sup> is far more real.”

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<sup>4436</sup> μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας (B12) purports to spell out what μᾶλλον ὅν meant (B9-10). The question now becomes, if the measure of truth is reality (ὅν, οὐσία), what is the measure of reality? Socrates will provide Glaucon with *criteria* so that he can be the judge (ῳδε δὲ κρῖνε, C1).

<sup>4437</sup> With these genitives (B13-C1) Socrates reveals that the genitive above (B9-10) was subjective (cf. n.4435): the food that *fills* the body and knowledge that *fills* the soul (still, we will get the objective sense next, D5). He is scrupulous, now in conversation with Glaucon, to continue including ὅψον in the category of true nutrition (B13) as he had with Adeimantus—the so-called necessary thing. After all, it is otherwise uncalled for once as here we are given the polar doublet σῖτος / ποτός (B13: cf. 585A8 and 559B1 with n.3894).

<sup>4438</sup> τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦνς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ συλλήβδην αὖ πάσης ἀρετῆς (B14-C1): In order for ἀρετή to be the genus (συλλήβδην πάσης) of δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς we need to supply the intermediate term σοφία (the traditional virtue) as the entity that the triad represents (for a parallel cf. Leg.688B2-4). In the immediate context this complex of terms is being compared with food generalized as nourishment (there is no “transition from plural to singular,” *pace* J.-C.), so that we are led to supply the terms *body* and *soul*, recognizing food as the filling of the former and virtue as the filling of the latter, guided by the pairing that came before, ὁ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἴσχων (B6-7). Adam’s edifying comment that knowledge is here conceived to be the τροφή of the soul, comparing *Phdo*.84B, is as inappropriately loose in this context as it would be to say that food is the “virtue” of body. That σοφία should be allowed to stand for virtue in general is neither unusual (again cf. Leg.688B2-4, and *Gorg*.467E4-5 vs. 477C2-5) nor strange, given the identification of knowledge and virtue that always lies behind the scenes in Socrates’s mind.

<sup>4439</sup> ὥδε δὲ κρῖνε (C1): Again the issue of judgment is raised (cf. nn.4379, 4358, 4274, 4256); the way to judge is again being stipulated—otherwise put, another “criterion” is being introduced.

<sup>4440</sup> ἔχομενον (C2) varies the metaphor of μετέχειν (B12) with a vaguer expression.

<sup>4441</sup> τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ... καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας (C1-2): The triad consists of the basic term ἀεὶ ὁμοίον and its elaboration by two terms connected with soul (ἀθανάτος) and its virtue, σοφία (ἀληθεία). Thus the measure of truth is reality and the measure of reality is the invariant, but the invariant in turn is connected with the true. The sequel (C7-13) makes the commutativity of these relations explicit.

<sup>4442</sup> γιγνόμενον (C3), semantically general (as at *Tim*.52A6-7), is specified by being paired with ὅν and by the predicative ἐν. The thing that in itself (αὐτό) is of such and such a nature (τοιοῦτον ὅν, i.e., more or less invariant), arises or changes or moves in something of such and such a nature (i.e., something more or less invariant). This general formulation will be specified, presently.

<sup>4443</sup> εἰναι μᾶλλον (C3): the participle (ὅν), the abstract noun (οὐσία), and the infinitive (εἰναι)—all three—have now been used for the same idea.

<sup>4444</sup> τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου (C6). The first list (C1-3) had five terms (ἀεὶ ὁμοίου, ἀθανάτου, ἀληθείας [ἔχομενον], αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον, ἐν τοιούτῳ); the second (C4-5) had four (μηδέποτε ὁμοίου, θνητοῦ [ἔχομενον], αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον, ἐν τοιούτῳ). Glaucon’s answer here reveals that the principle term of both lists is the first one, invariance vs. variability (ἀεὶ ὁμοίου [C1-2], μηδέποτε ὁμοίου [C4]).

Does the reality of the invariant partake in reality any more than it partakes in knowledge?

“Not at all.”

Or in truth?

“Nor that.”

But if it partook any less in truth, would it not also partake less in reality?

“Necessarily.”<sup>4445</sup>

Now on the whole do the kinds of things that have to do with<sup>4446</sup> caring for the body partake less in truth and reality than the kinds of things that have to do with caring for the soul?

“Much less.”

And does body considered in itself<sup>4447</sup> partake less than soul?

“I think so.”

As to the thing that is filled with things more real and that is in itself more real, is it more really filled than the thing with less real things that is itself less real?<sup>4448</sup>

“How could it not be?”

So let us conclude that if being filled by things that are naturally appropriate is a pleasurable thing,<sup>4449</sup> then what is more really filled in the sense of being filled by things more real<sup>4450</sup> would cause

<sup>4445</sup> ἀνάγκη (C13), of logical necessity. The sequence of questions (C7-13) removes what is at first unclear in the first question (C7-8). That the invariant can be realer than it can be knowable is a contradiction in terms, if the criterion of knowability (as opposed to opinability: cf. 478A12-D12) is invariance or truth. Hence the contradictory of the contrapositive (C12), that if the invariant were less really true it would also be less really real, is logically necessary. Emendation of ἀεὶ ὁμοίου (C7) is unnecessary.

<sup>4446</sup> τὰ περὶ τὴν ... θεραπείαν (D1) redoes τὸ ἔχόμενον ... (C1-2), the *first* of the three parts of the general formula above (C1-2 [and C4-5, τὸ ... θνητοῦ]). The things that “help” the soul have more “truth and reality” than those that help the body.

<sup>4447</sup> σῶμα αὐτό (D5) places body *qua* body (rather than *qua* ἔμψυχον) into the place of the second term of the general formula above (αὐτό, C2, C4). Soul has more “reality” (as invariant) than body.

<sup>4448</sup> πληρούμενον (D7): The notion of filling and being filled gives a specific and concrete instance ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον, the *third* term of the general formula above (C3). Becoming full (or empty) is the γένεσις the soul or body undergoes “in” the realm of food (nourishment) or intelligence (virtue). Knowledge, being of the truth of reality, is a realer (as true and invariant) thing than food. If both the filler (i.e., knowledge) is μᾶλλον ὅν (μᾶλλον ὄντων, D7) and the filled (i.e., soul) is μᾶλλον ὅν (D8), then the event that connects them, filling, is itself more real (ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται, D8). Note that πληροῦται is not repeated with the second limb (ἢ τὸ τῶν ἥττον ... ὅν, D8-9), nor did it need to be.

<sup>4449</sup> τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδύ ἐστι (D11): That being filled is *eo ipso* pleasurable was implicitly assumed at A3, in the phrase πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ (cf. n.961) which in turn introduced, or prepared for, the notion of κένωσις. The specification that the fillings be φύσει προσηκόντων (D11) has no precedent beyond the distinction drawn above according to which the soul undergoes κένωσις and πληρώσις on analogy with the body, each with its own filling (A8-B7) but this stipulation is not needed for the present conclusion (D12-E4).

<sup>4450</sup> τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον (D12): τῷ ὄντι and τῶν ὄντων are parallel descriptors of πληρούμενον, and μᾶλλον goes with both of them. Note chiasm around μᾶλλον, a chiasm of cause and effect or principle and inference parallel to the chiasm around εἶναι above (μᾶλλον ὅν ὄντως μᾶλλον, D8).

an enjoyment in a person more real and true by means of a pleasure that is true, whereas what partakes of<sup>4451</sup> things less real would both be less truly and securely filled and would share in a pleasure less reliable and less true.

“Most necessarily so.”<sup>4452</sup>

(586) So when it comes to persons who have no experience<sup>4453</sup> of mindfulness and virtue<sup>4454</sup> because they fill their hours attending feasts<sup>4455</sup> and such things, to apply our likeness,<sup>4456</sup> they are borne around within the lower region and then back up to the middle region, wandering disoriented<sup>4457</sup> throughout their lives. As to going beyond the middle toward what is truly above, never yet have they glanced thither nor been borne there, and so<sup>4458</sup> they never have really been fulfilled with the real, nor<sup>4459</sup> have they tasted the pleasure that is certain and pure.<sup>4460</sup> Instead, like browsing cattle, their gaze fixed downward and posture earthward prone, they graze at their tables<sup>4461</sup> as if feeding in pens,<sup>4462</sup> and

<sup>4451</sup> μεταλαμβάνον (E2) has the sense it had at B6. It was weaker than its parallel there (i.e., ὕσχων); and it is weaker than its parallel here (i.e., πληρούμενον): even the description of “filling up” is being withheld from the lesser real things (we have come further than the non-repetition just noted at D8-9: n.4448)

<sup>4452</sup> ἀναγκαιότατα (E5), of superlative logical necessity, is climactic.

<sup>4453</sup> With ἄρα (586A1), Socrates indicates he is drawing a conclusion, and ἀπειροι (A1) and ως ἔοικεν (A2) indicate the conclusion consists of a re-application of the likeness (ἔοίκασι, 584D1,ff) of the three regions and the inference he drew from it at 584E7-5A5 (n.b. ἀπειροι, E7).

<sup>4454</sup> Species (σοφία) and genus (ἀρετή) again (cf.585B14-15), using a different sub-species for the species (i.e., φρόνησις [cf. Leg.688B2-4] rather than the subspecies δόξα ἀληθής, ἐπιστήμη, and νοῦς [585B14]). The ἄρα indicates an inference and with ἀπειροι recalls the general or major premise from which the inference is being drawn (εἰ καὶ οἱ ἀπειροι ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων μὴ ὑγιείας δόξας ἔχουσιν, 584E7-8): it is inexperience of the truth about something specific that Socrates is now interested in.

<sup>4455</sup> εὐωχίαις (A1): It was εὐωχεῖσθαι that the *original* citizens enjoyed in their simple homes each night, according to Socrates (372B6)—which term elicited Glaucon’s strong reaction (ἄνευ ὅψου ... ποιεῖς τὸν ἀνδρὰς ἐστιωμένους (C2-3).

<sup>4456</sup> ως ἔοικε (A2) is not just “as it seems” but refers to the introduction of the εἰκών of up and down at 584D1.

<sup>4457</sup> πλανῶνται (A3), the metaphor used in the same sense it was in describing the φιλοθεάμονες at 484B6: cf. πλανητόν (479D9) and n.2658, where again the objective variation is connected with the variation and unreliability of subjective understanding.

<sup>4458</sup> οὐδέ (A5) illative after οὔτε, as at 475C4 (cf. n.2580).

<sup>4459</sup> οὐδέ (A6) again illative: the pleasure accompanies the process of being filled.

<sup>4460</sup> οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος ... οὐδὲ βεβαίου τε καὶ καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς (A5-6). The terminology approaches the three *demonstranda* announced at 583B3-5 (οὐ παναληθής, οὐ καθαρά, ἐσκιαγραφημένη), but there is more below.

<sup>4461</sup> εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται (A8), an impossible image that is meant thereby to turn the tables on the tables Glaucon asked for at 372D8! With εἰς (in place of ἀπό, *ibi*) Socrates reminds Glaucon, and us, of the semantic spats in their exchange there (παραβαλλόμενοι, B4 vs. παραθήσομεν, C7; κατακλινέντες, B5 vs. κατακεῖσθαι, D7; ἐστιωμένους, C3 vs. κατεσκεύαζες, D4). The present metaphor would after all be envisaging the impossible with Glaucon’s ἀπὸ τραπέζων δειπνεῖν unless they put their hoofs on the table!

<sup>4462</sup> χορταζόμενοι (A8): Socrates retrieves Glaucon’s choice metaphor of feeding pigs in a pen (ἐχόρταζες, 372D5).

hump. But they want more than they get<sup>4463</sup> and they kick and butt each other with horns and hoofs<sup>4464</sup> of iron; they kill each other out of an insatiability that stems from the fact that it is not with reality, nor is it the real part of themselves, which<sup>4465</sup> contains and protects<sup>4466</sup> them, that they are continuously striving be fulfilled.<sup>4467</sup>

“Flawless and uncanny your description of most men’s lives!”<sup>4468</sup>

And aren’t they also<sup>4469</sup> condemned to commune with pleasures that are contaminated with pain, mere likenesses and illusions of the pleasure that is true, magnified by their juxtaposition with each other so that they appear stronger than they are, and that incite rabid desires for themselves in

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<sup>4463</sup> ἔνεκα τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας (B1): Socrates had likewise described the process rapidly at 372E2-3E7. The τρυφαίνουσα πόλις had been purified λόγῳ (399E5); but now more importantly the cause of the problem—the forces within Glaucon that led to it—have been understood and healed: these βοσκήματα are what Glaucon embodied at 372C2-E1, and Glaucon was who these βοσκήματα are, here.

<sup>4464</sup> ὄπλαῖς (B2) suggests ὄπλοις of course. The chiasm closes the metaphorical patch. The transition from lust to war telescopes the admonition spelled out by Socrates at 373A1-374A2, but the metaphorical imagery indiscriminately blends voracious eating, sexual lust, and armed conflict (cf. 452C1 and n.2301) in the manner of the epithumetic list (on which cf. n.469).

<sup>4465</sup> Reading οὐτε (B3) with D against οὐδέ (mss.AFM): the power to control and contain the self is presented in close epexegetical apposition to the subjective part ( $\tauὸ\ ὅν$ ), which itself had been paired with the objective ( $\tauοῖς\ οὐσιν$ ) in a polar doublet of alternatives, by οὐδέ. The demonstrandum οὐ παναληθής (583B3) has been proved.

<sup>4466</sup>  $\tauὸ\ στέγον$  (B3): cf. Gorg.493B2 (οὐ στεγανόν, elaborated with the image of the sieve), Leg.714A5, and the inversion of the concept in connection with the River Ameles in the Plain of Lethe (621A6 with n.5268).

<sup>4467</sup> The paragraph broke into a heightened elegance that attracted the attention of Longinus, who quoted it *in extenso* (de subl.§13). The ideas that all creatures desire pleasure, and that pleasure consists of fulfillment, are assumed; and now a new inference can be drawn, that “unreal” fulfillment, which had been elaborated with the ancillary notions of security (βεβαίως [585E3, 586A6], objective) and untrustworthiness (ἀπιστοτέρας [585E3], subjective) will not only be less real and less satisfying, but positively unsatisfying. The ancillary notion of purity (καθαρά, A6, cf. 585B12, 584C1) is dealt with next (B7-C5).

<sup>4468</sup> χρησμῷδεῖς (B6): Glaucon grasps that Socrates’s parable describes the feelings he had had many hours ago, including the irrationality and violence that underlay them. Adam accounts for the oracular reference by comparing the completely transparent metaphor of metal κέροι τε καὶ ὄπλαῖς with the riddling wooden wall in the oracle to the Athenians (Hdt.7.141-4), but χρησμῷδεῖν invokes more than stylistic play. Subjectively it includes saying more than one can really know or understand (Apol.39BC; Meno 99); objectively it is an utterance that is true whatever it means and can be ignored only at one’s peril (e.g., Leg.712A, Rep.419): Socrates could not ignore it (Apol.22) and knew the Athenians could not ignore him (Apol.39). When, as here, one person says the other is speaking in an “oracular” way, he is therefore averring that what the other person says is ineluctably true even if the other person cannot be held responsible for knowing it. Glaucon does not explicitly acknowledge the close connection in language and thought between what Socrates here says and what he felt and said at 372C2-3E1, but he remembers it well enough to feel the truth in Socrates’s remarks. We should compare his remark to Adeimantus’s two proverbial remarks before and after Socrates describes the equalization of man and beast at 563C1-D3. Shorey (*ad loc.*) as usual glides by with the suave comment that “Plato laughs at himself,” claiming to hear Plato rather than the two persons who are speaking and what they are saying, sometimes more and sometimes less explicitly, to each other.

<sup>4469</sup> καί (B7) indicates a continuation of the new conclusion. μεμειγμέναις (~ οὐ καθαρᾶς) and

mindless persons and come to be objects of contention among them, the way Steisichorus says<sup>4470</sup> the mere picture of Helen became an object of contention among the men at Troy, since they didn't realize it wasn't truly she?

“It is inevitable that they became such.”

What about the willful part<sup>4471</sup> of the soul? Won't the same sort of thing<sup>4472</sup> necessarily take place with any man that strives to “stay the course” strictly on its own narrow terms,<sup>4473</sup> whether by means of envy to satisfy his love for accolades, or by force to indulge his love of winning, or by anger to gratify his unsociability,<sup>4474</sup> since he will be pursuing a fulfillment from honor or victory or will without the guidance of reason and intelligence?

“The same sort of thing will inevitably take place here as well.”

Then shall we brave<sup>4475</sup> the assertion that, of the desires that attach to the part of the soul that loves lucre as well as those that attach to the part that loves victory, those souls that pursue such pleasures in concert with knowledge and reason and achieve the pleasures that the mindful part directs them to,<sup>4476</sup> will in fact achieve the truest versions of such pleasures they are capable of enjoying, seeing that they are following truth, and pleasures akin<sup>4477</sup> to their nature, assuming that what

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εἰδώλοις ... καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις are the second and third *demonstranda* from 583B. We have reached the climax of the climax.

<sup>4470</sup> τὸ τῆς Ἐλένης εἶδωλον (C3-4): That Helen did not after all go to Troy is the argument of the famous *Palinode* Socrates attributes to Steisichorus at *Phdrs.*243A (cf. fr.15 Page [=PMG 192]). An early papyrological section of the *Palinode* that includes the story that an εἶδωλον of her was brought to Troy while she herself stayed with Proteus in Egypt, is printed by Page (fr.16 [=PMG 193]). For the story cf. also *E.Hel.*605ff, *EI.*1282-3. The realization that “the face that launched a thousand ships” might just as well have been only a picture is perhaps the strongest way a Greek can express “making a mountain out of a molehill,” which it is the first purpose of the example to illustrate, but there is more. The animals' insatiable desire turned them to rape each other and then to commit mayhem and murder (A8-B3); but only a human animal could allow his insatiable desire to focus so intensely on illusory details (ύπὸ τῆς παρ’ ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχρωτινούμεναις) and thereby be driven into a mindless slaughterfest in which the fighters don't even care whether the thing they are fighting over is really real.

<sup>4471</sup> περὶ τὸ θυμοειδές (C7): Conversely, he has been speaking of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, or the person ruled by it; but the *demonstrandum* announced at 583B included all types of men or parts of the soul (τῶν ἄλλων, 583B4).

<sup>4472</sup> ἔτερα τοιαῦτα (C7), derogatorily dismissive (cf. n.4186). The sameness consists in the fact that the objects pursued have an illusory worth so that reaching them is unsatisfying.

<sup>4473</sup> αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττεται (C8): the present tense is conative (as at 411E1). For the verb used of willful machination, cf. that passage, 440D2, and n.1147. αὐτὸ τοῦτο isolates the section of the soul, as if it could be.

<sup>4474</sup> δυσκολία (C9) is a new characterization of the θυμοειδές, designating its extreme tendencies in the absence of moderating mind: cf. (with Adam) 411C9-E2, with δυσ- striking a strong contrast with the φιλο- compounds before.

<sup>4475</sup> Θαρροῦντες (D4): Yes, it is another self-instantiation to place alongside the appearance of the λογιστικόν at 580D4: Socrates calls on the θυμοειδές to be his ally in affirming the truth reason has reached about itself as well as the ἐπιθυμητικόν.

<sup>4476</sup> ἐξηγήται (D7): ostendat et monstrat (Stallb.). The notion that reason chooses the pleasures to be pursued is strictly new, and is an inference from the explicit assertion that true pleasure derives from being filled by the φύσει προσήκοντα (585D11) and the idea that reason is required to determine what is προσῆκον, which is inherent in φρόνησις καὶ ὀρετή (A1).

<sup>4477</sup> τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε ... καὶ τὰς ἔαντων οἰκείας (D8-E1) Again (cf. A6 and n.4460) the

is best for each part<sup>4478</sup> is what is most akin to its nature.<sup>4479</sup>

“But clearly the best for a thing is the most akin!”

Therefore, if the soul as a whole follows the part that loves wisdom, eschewing internal strife, each of the several parts has in store<sup>4480</sup> not only that it will be doing its own proper work and in that sense be just, but also in each several part<sup>4481</sup> that it will garner the pleasures that are its own, that are best for it, and that are in that sense the (587) truest pleasures it is capable of.<sup>4482</sup>

“That much<sup>4483</sup> is clear.”

And more, if one of the parts perhaps<sup>4484</sup> subdues<sup>4485</sup> the soul, what lies in store for that part is not only that it will fail at finding its own proper pleasure but that it will compel the other parts, besides,<sup>4486</sup> to pursue a pleasure that is foreign to them and is not true.<sup>4487</sup>

“So it is.”

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language approaches that of the original demonstranda: οὐδὲ παναληθής ... οὐδὲ καθαρὰ ἄλλα’ ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις (583B3-5). The special sense of οἰκεῖον here is a notion extended, by inference, from the notions of purity and what is really there—i.e., the non-illusory.

<sup>4478</sup> τὸ βέλτιστον ἔκάστω (E2): it is the special operation of reason to choose what is βέλτιστον in each situation. τὸ βέλτιστον is the proper term for the goal of deliberation.

<sup>4479</sup> τοῦτο καὶ οἰκείοτατον (E2): The assertion, and the avowal in response, that what is best for a thing is what is most akin to it, makes no sense without the axiom that things are the way they truly are because it is good for them to be that way. Thus, we may conclude, the account of τὸ ἀγαθόν (509B6-8) is brought forward to enhance the present conclusion about soul and happiness.

<sup>4480</sup> ὑπάρχει (E5): The basis for the claim about what “lies in store” for the soul, is the discovery of the inner order of the soul in Book Four, which revealed the power of its unity as well reaching the controversial definition of justice as the soul’s inner order (441D-444A).

<sup>4481</sup> ἔκάστω (E5), a predicative dative with ὑπάρχει and continued by δικαίω (E6). The shift from the dative of the leading construction to the accusative within the noun phrase (ἔκαστον [E7], a subject accusative with the infinitive that is also the subject of ὑπάρχει) is not uncommon with verbs that have a dative construction, like ὑπάρχει or ἔξεστι (Stallb., citing *Euthyphr.5A3-5* [μοι / λέγοντα]; Xen. *Cyrop.2.1.15* [ὑμῖν / λαβόντας], Aeschin. *adv.Ctes.2* [πρεσβυτάτῳ / τὸν βουλόμενον]). Cf. also schol. *ad Euthyphr.5A*, Rep.606E4-5 (ἀναλαβόντι / κατασκευασμένον), Crito 51D4 φ / λαβόντα).

<sup>4482</sup> τὰς ἀληθεστάτας (587A1). The first demonstrandum (παναληθής) is now redeemed in a reduced form (εἰς τὸ δύνατον, E7) as relying, through the guidance of reason (τὰς βελτίστας), on the second demonstrandum (τὰς ἔαντοῦ ~ τὰς οἰκείας ~ μὴ ἐσκιαγραφημένας): what pleasures the other parts can have are not opposed by, but achieved for them by, the good and friendly services of the rational part.

<sup>4483</sup> μέν in μὲν οὖν (A2) limiting assent to what has been a μέν clause (586D5) so as to invite the speaker to move on to his δέ clause—a use Denniston does not note.

<sup>4484</sup> ὅρα (A3) acknowledging Glaucon’s invitation to tell the other part. For ὅρα with the back-up alternative that comes second to the mind, cf. 361A1 and n.742.

<sup>4485</sup> κρατεῖν (A3), rather than ἔξηγεισθαι (D7), of course—since the other parts, lacking the orientation of truth and virtue (586D1) cannot truly lead or rule, which it is the burden of this passage to show.

<sup>4486</sup> τά τ’ ἄλλα (A4) after οὕτε τὴν ἔαντοῦ is almost an ἄλλως τε καί construction in reverse, standing in chiasm with the alternative presented just above (586E5-587A1).

<sup>4487</sup> ἀναγκάζειν ἄλλοτρίαν καὶ μὴ ἀληθῆ ἡδονὴν διώκειν (A4-5). The usurping part forces or requires the other parts not only to seek pleasures akin to the usurping part and alien to themselves (ἄλλοτρίαν), but also to enjoy them although not truly pleasurable (μὴ ἀληθῆ). Again the claim about what lies in store relies on what has been stored up in previous argumentation, this time the example of the ἐπιθυμητικόν of the timocrat’s son dethroning reason and honor within his soul (553D1-7).

Consider the element that is farthest separated from<sup>4488</sup> from reason and the love of wisdom: would it have this effect most of all?

“Yes, by a large margin.”

And what is farthest away from reason is farthest also from orderliness and law?

“Clearly.”

And did we not come to see<sup>4489</sup> that what stood farthest away were the erotic desires of the tyrant?

“Farthest indeed.”

And closest were the temperate desires of the kingly<sup>4490</sup> type?

“Yes.”

At the furthest distance, therefore, from pleasure true and kindred, stands the tyrant; closest stands the other man.<sup>4491</sup>

“Necessarily.”

And therefore the tyrant’s life will be the least pleasurable whereas the king’s will be the most.

“Very necessarily.”

Now, do you know the margin by which the life of the tyrant is less pleasant than that of the king?

“I will if you tell me.”<sup>4492</sup>

There are three pleasures, one of them genuine and the other two counterfeit,<sup>4493</sup> with the tyrant

<sup>4488</sup> ἀφέστηκεν (A7): The metaphor of distance was introduced at 581E2-3 (reading τῆς ἡδονῆς), and the perfect tense represents the essential structure of things (cf. n. 4660). Compare οὗτω πόρρω που ... ἐσκήνηται, 610E3.

<sup>4489</sup> ἐφάνησαν (A13) dialectical: the point came into view at 573A8-C9.

<sup>4490</sup> αἱ βασιλικαί τε καὶ κόσμια (B3) a chiasm of alternatives with αἱ ἐρωτικαί τε καὶ τυραννικαί (A13-B1). The distinction between the best and worst man was articulated by Socrates as a choice between king and tyrant at 580C1-4, following suit with Glaucon’s remark at the beginning of the whole passage on judgment (576E3-5).

<sup>4491</sup> ὁ δέ (B6): The other man is of course the king: cf. 580B8-C4.

<sup>4492</sup> ὅν εἴπης (B13). For this reply cf. 573D1, 408D6. Again the broaching of a topic is announced by a reference to the back and forth method of dialectic.

<sup>4493</sup> γνησίας and νόθαιν (B14-C1) indicate that the three pleasures are those belonging to the three parts of the soul as just now analyzed, the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν having to rely on the guidance of the λογιστικόν to ensure their pleasures are “legitimate” (γνήσιον an inference from οἰκεῖον, 586D4-E2); but the reference to the tyrant suddenly reveals the presupposition that the three parts of soul are to be associated with the political types of Book Eight (aristocratic king, timocratic type, oligarchic type), something that remained attenuated there (cf. 547B3-7 if connected with 550B4-7; and cf. 553C1-D7). The demotic type is left out of the present scheme (as noted below, C7) since he is merely the precursor to the tyrant, no longer devoted to any of the three pleasures (561A6-8, B1-5: and note that 561C6-D5 has him pursuing each of them), but not yet having been carried “beyond” (561A8-9 and 572C7-9 vs. 572E4-7B4).

crossing the line beyond even the counterfeit ones,<sup>4494</sup> a fugitive from law and reason<sup>4495</sup> who shares his home with a bodyguard of other pleasures as if they were his slaves.<sup>4496</sup> To say by what amount he loses out in pleasure will not be very easy,<sup>4497</sup> but can it perhaps be done in this way ...

“What way?”

We said<sup>4498</sup> that the tyrant stands in third position after the oligarchic man, if I may remind you that the demotic man stood between them.

“Yes.”

So likewise does he live in the company of a third-rank image<sup>4499</sup> of pleasure as measured in terms of truth, if what we have just been saying is true?

“So he does.”

But the oligarchic man in turn stands in third position after the kingly one, if we place the aristocratic and the kingly man into the same category.

“Third indeed.”

<sup>4494</sup> ὑπερβάς (C1) in the sense of going beyond what is right (e.g., ὑπερβήῃ cited from Homer at 364E2). Characterizing the tyrannical man and his pleasure as a fourth to these three by means of saying he “goes beyond them” requires us to bring together three things: (1) the depiction of the “paranomic” pleasures by the device of the sick dream at the beginning of Book Nine (571C3-D4); (2) the analysis of these pleasures as relying on a profound disorder among the three parts of soul as evinced in the description of the healthy man’s dreams that follows this, in which the proper operation of the parts becomes explicit (571D6-572B1); and (3) the identification of the tyrannical man as a person whose soul in waking life undergoes at every moment what a normal man might undergo only in a sick dream. The swiftness with which the previous agreements are being accumulated is arresting while the focus intensifies.

<sup>4495</sup> νόμον τε καὶ λόγον (C2): τε καί draws together the notion of the παράνομοι ἡδοναί from 571B4-C1 and the description of the tyrannical man as a lawless monarch (ἀνομία, 575A1-2), with the theory of reason ruling soul and guiding its pleasures, lately recovered from Book Four.

<sup>4496</sup> δούλαις τισὶ δοροφόροις ἡδοναῖς (C2): The image of the bodyguard of pleasures of course refers to the fateful takeover of the soul by Eros, which these lesser pleasures had arranged (573A4-B5), and to Eros’s subsequent hegemony over them (573E3-574A1) as if they were slaves, manumitted to rove within the soul, freed from the constraint of childhood beliefs about what is right and good (574D5-8). What is new here is the appallingly forceful image of the tyrant’s *household* (συνοικεῖ, C3 and C10: cf. 577A6 and n.4268).

<sup>4497</sup> καὶ ... οὐδέ (C3) is καὶ ... δέ (with οὐ), announcing that whereas the point just made is clear the next question is hard, so as to justify introducing the arcane calculation proposed to answer it.

<sup>4498</sup> ἀφειστήκει (C6), pluperfect standing for an imperfect of citation (the perfect of ἀφίστημι in the sense of being at a distance describing an essential relationship, as at A7), parallel with ἦν (C7).

<sup>4499</sup> τρίτῳ εἰδώλῳ (C9). If τρίτον as above (C6) means the “third after the original” then τρίτον εἰδώλον, a “third image,” is an image of an image of an original, an essentially geometrical relation ( $f[f\{x\}]$  or  $f^2[x]$ ). Hence the ranking of the images is two-dimensional or “planar” (ἐπίπεδον, D6), the relation between the first and third pleasures (tyrant to oligarch) being  $3^2$ , which is re-iterated (from oligarch to king), giving another  $3^2$ . The total ratio of the king’s pleasures-to-be-enjoyed to those of the tyrant—the ratio of their truth or purity—is therefore  $3^4$ . Though J.-C. easily speak of a shadow of a shadow, which is unmeaning, the sense in which the pleasure of the oligarch is a “shadow” of the timocrat’s and the timocrat’s in turn a “shadow” of the aristocrat’s, was shown *in extenso* in the “decline,” though the point was there not explicitly made.

So by the numbers the tyrant stands at a triple remove, tripled,<sup>4500</sup> from true<sup>4501</sup> pleasure.

“Clearly.”

The distance of the tyrannical pleasure would then be the square of the length of three?

“Obviously.”

And in accordance with the factors involved, the total distance would require a third multiplication<sup>4502</sup>— clearly<sup>4503</sup>—measuring how far removed he ends up being.

“Clearly—to the logistical part<sup>4504</sup> of us.”

And if one tries to calculate by what degree of the truth of his pleasure the king, conversely, is separated from the tyrant, he will discover that he is living a life seven hundred nine and twenty times more pleasurable, by carrying out the multiplication, and that the tyrant is more miserable by the same interval.

Such a dispositive cadence of syllables have you (588) poured forth,<sup>4505</sup> to span the immense discrepancy between the two, the just man and the unjust, with respect to their pleasure and pain!

Immense but true, and appropriate as a measure of their lives to boot, to the extent that it makes sense to measure their lives as a quantity of days and nights, adding up to months and years.<sup>4506</sup>

“But it certainly does.”

And if it is by so great an amount that the good and just man wins out over the bad and unjust one,<sup>4507</sup> think how immensely more he will win out over him in the gracefulness of his life, in its

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<sup>4500</sup> τριπλασίου ἄρα ... τριπλάσιον (D3): The intervening step, that the oligarch's pleasure is third in rank after that of the kingly man (*pari passu* with C9-10, the timocratic man this time standing in between), is assumed. τριπλάσιον τριπλασίου means three times three, the arithmetical gap between the men being duplicated. Thus the ratio of the best and worst men—their ability to enjoy pleasure—is  $3 \times 3 = 3^2$ .

<sup>4501</sup> ἀληθινῆς ἡδονῆς (D3-4): Without the intervening dialectical development it would have been tendentious to speak of ἀληθής ἡδονή at 581E2 (*pace* Campbell *ad loc.*); by now, however, we have of course earned the warrant to do so.

<sup>4502</sup> τρίτην αὔξην (D9): The men multiplied (arithmetically) by each other gave  $3^2$ ; the pleasures multiplied geometrically by each other gave  $3^4$ ; third (τρίτην), we multiply (αὔξην) the men by the pleasures, and the final product is  $3^6 = 729$ . This is my guess, for what it is worth; we should be remembering the dilemma we were forced into by the narrative on the nuptial number at the start of this treatise on the best and worst man!

<sup>4503</sup> δῆλον δή (D9) in this late position is a bluffing overstatement as Glaucon notes (D11).

<sup>4504</sup> δῆλον τῷ γε λογιστικῷ (D11): Commentators have assumed Glaucon's expression corroborates their own difficulty understanding Socrates's calculation; but in case he has found the simple sense of it that I have suggested above, then the purport of his affirmation is parallel to that at 584A11 (ώς γοῦν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει), namely, that the inference is hyperlogical, and τῷ λογιστικῷ refers back to τὸ λογιστικόν at 580D4.

<sup>4505</sup> καταπεφόρηκας (E5): Cf. Stephanus s.v. καταφορεῖν, notes Adam quoting Schneider *ad loc.*, and Dio Chrysost. 10.386C.

<sup>4506</sup> ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες καὶ μῆνες καὶ ἐνιαυτοί (588A4-5) is the conventional list for measures of time (cf. Leg.809D1-2; Tim.37E1), and therefore constitute the more normal ways (προσήκοντα, A3) to quantify life, much easier to apply than the measures presently invented. The wonderful coincidence that 729 is very nearly the number of days and nights in one year is the motive for the arithmetical sleight-of-hand, corroborating the idea that the tyrant's daytime is plagued by nightmares (a notion that underlies Ar.EN 1102B57). There is no need to continue the numerology beyond days and nights.

<sup>4507</sup> τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου (A1): Glaucon correctly projects the relation of king and

fineness and in its virtue.<sup>4508</sup>

“Immensely indeed, by Zeus!”

## 2.B.10: Conclusion

Alright then. We've come to a point in our conversation where we ought to review the arguments that brought us here. The position was advanced at the beginning that it profits a man to do injustice if he is completely unjust but has the reputation of being just.<sup>4509</sup> Was this not the position?

“Yes it was.”

Then shall we now engage him<sup>4510</sup> in conversation, since we have now reached an agreement

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tyrant onto the true *investiganda*, the just man and the unjust man.

<sup>4508</sup> εὐσχημοσύνη τε καὶ κάλλει καὶ ἀρετῆ (A9-10). The list looks back to 581E7-582A1 (βίου answering to ζῆν), where Socrates had imposed on himself the task, now complete, of comparing their lives in terms of pleasure alone (αὐτὸ τὸ ἥδιον καὶ ἀλυπότερον), without the support of their relative fineness and goodness (traditional καλοκάγαθία: cf. n.4354). εὐσχημοσύνη may add the reminder that καλοκάγαθία can be faked, as Adeimantus had imagined (εὐσχημοσύνη κίβδηλος, 366B4 [cf.365C3-4]) and as the case of the oligarch actually showed (554E3), just as in a rather different context εὐσχημοσύνη is dispensable for the erotic man (as are τὰ νόμιμα: Phdr.252A4-5). Alternatively it is a climactic term that stands to καλοκάγαθία as μάκαρ stands to εὐδαίμων, answering the hyperbolic ἀμηχάνω, and then broken down into the two components we had expected (κάλλος / ἀρετή). From the list at 589C1-2 below we would be led to think both interpretations apply at the same time (! cf. n.4535).

For the constellation A τε καὶ b' καὶ b<sup>2</sup> with the unusual positioning of τε, cf. 411D3-4 (ἀσθενές τε καὶ κωφὸν καὶ τυφλόν) and n.1732, 528A4-5 (λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι), Soph.260C8-9. Cf. nn.2422, 3374).

<sup>4509</sup> λεγόμενον (B3): Socrates tactfully describes the position in the passive in order to adduce it without attribution (compare his tactful recall of Adeimantus's objection [419A], at 465E4-5). It is *not* the position of Thrasymachus but that of the brothers, since only Glaucon and Adeimantus included the desideratum of a reputation for justice (360E6-361B5, 362A3-C6): It is of course in response to *their* challenge that the entire investigation was framed. As to Thrasymachus, in boundless adulation of his own rhetoric he had imagined, in Book One, the unjust man was *admired* by persons fully aware of his complete wickedness, and that such admiration could even be incited by a mere reputation for it (344B6-C2: cf. 348D8 and n.550).

<sup>4510</sup> Reading αὐτῷ (B6), with all mss., Euseb., and Stob. Socrates's understatement is stunning and seldom preserved in translation. Bloom alone to my knowledge, with the miraculous “accuracy” that characterizes his translation (perhaps too literal now and then: cf. n.622), reproduces the bare pronoun “[him]”; and Schleiermacher comes close “[diesem]”. All others overtranslate: “its proponent” [Shorey]; “the author of this remark” [D.-V.]; “the author of this statement” [Cornford]; “its author” [Lee]; “the person who made the claim” [Griffith]; “the one who made that assertion” [Sterling-Scott]; “l'auteur de cette assertion” [Chambry]; “l'homme qui a parlé de la sorte” [Baccou]; “celui qui prétend cela” [Pachet]; “celui qui parle ainsi” [Leroux]; “dem Vertreter dieser Meinung” [Rufener]; “dem der dies behauptete” [Apelt]; “con chi la sostiene” [apud Vegetti]; Jowett, Grube and Waterfield make λεγόμενον or ἐλέχθη in the previous sentence active and add “someone” there so as to provide an antecedent, and then translate αὐτῷ “him.” In the next question the advocate of the position is assumed (ὁ ἔκεινα λέγων, B10-11), since the essential predication is there being carried by the remote demonstrative (ἔκεινα), which asserts that according to the intervening words his position has been refuted. αὐτῷ must already have conceived of its antecedent as the agent implied by the passives λεγόμενον and ἐλέχθη (B3,4). For the subtlety and power of the inchoate expression I would

about what effect<sup>4511</sup> living justly has and what effect living unjustly?

“How?”

Let's mold in words an image of the soul, so that the person<sup>4512</sup> who argued that position can see with his eyes what sort of thing his position implies.<sup>4513</sup>

“Whatever<sup>4514</sup> sort of image have you in mind?”

An image like those kinds of strange creatures<sup>4515</sup> that mythology speaks of aforetimes,<sup>4516</sup> a monster like the Chimaera and like Scylla and Cerberus, and other such in which many types of animal have somehow grown together into one creature.<sup>4517</sup>

“They do occur in myths.”

Alright then, mold first the image and type of a variegated beast with many heads, heads of compare the absence of a direct object in 565E4-566A1 (cf. n.4050). For the rhetoric of the pronoun compare the two Phaedruses Socrates addresses at Phdrs.228C3-5. The underlying idea is that the status of the position has changed but that the identity of the man has remained the same ( $\alphaὐτός$  always carries a hint of “sameness” in each of its three “great uses”): Has Glaucon changed? Will he join Socrates and go back to the person he was and tell him? Also, to the extent that Socrates's use of the singular suggests to Glaucon that he is referring to Glaucon himself, the use also excludes Adeimantus. Glaucon can only answer for himself, after all; and Adeimantus is out of the conversation.

<sup>4511</sup> With δύναμιν (B8) Socrates recalls the way that Adeimantus framed the question at the end on behalf of himself and Glaucon (366E5-6: cf. δύναμις, 367A7; and τί ποιοῦσα, B4 and E3; cf. also Glaucon's expression τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν at 358B5, so as to indicate to them that the agreements they have reached have now answered that question.

<sup>4512</sup> With οἱκεῖνα λέγων (B10-11) Socrates continues to distance Glaucon from his own (and Adeimantus's) position, as Glaucon had already done above (cf. χρησμῷδεῖς, 586B5-6 and n.4468) with respect to the remarks he had made about ὅψον at 372C. Things have changed over the course of the conversation, for Glaucon at least.

<sup>4513</sup> οἵα (B1) again suggests monstrosity (cf. nn.81 and 1457). It has been vivid depiction (372AB, 416D-417B) or the desire for it (in the case of Polemarchus, Book Five *init.*) that has elicited the interruptions that have so fatefully determined the course of the conversation and required it to be a treatment so complete and thorough, dealing as it has both with the initial problem and also the feelings or underlying motives that occupied the interlocutors at the outset and affected them along the way. Now Socrates presents a vivid image that nobody will gainsay, since it is an “objective” statement (in the sense that the subjects of the verbs are changed into the third person) of the actual but unintended disaster that the position they had then found irresistible would have entailed for themselves. The last time an image was “needed” was in the wake of Adeimantus's objection at 487B-D (n.b., δεομένου, 487E4); but to the astute reader Socrates's proposal to project the question of justice onto an imaginary city was another instance. It is not only the doctrine but also the man that Socrates seeks to rectify.

<sup>4514</sup> With ποίαν τινά (C1) Glaucon responds to the suggestion of monstrosity (cf. n.1457).

<sup>4515</sup> φύσεις (C3) stressing the (fictional) realness. For the use cf. 473D4, Phdrs.229E1-2.

<sup>4516</sup> With παλαιαί (C2) Socrates stresses not the *antiquity* of the conception as if to give it a credential, but its familiarity from the previous discourse (cf. n.1388), in order to deflect responsibility for the monstrosity of his own conception.

<sup>4517</sup> Chimaera (C3) is a lion in front and a dragon behind (*Iliad* 6.181); Scylla has the face and breast of a woman but beneath has six dog heads and twelve feet (*Od.*12.85ff); Cerberus is a dog with three heads and the tail of a dragon, and down along its back the heads of many snakes (*Hes.Theog.*311). Cf. schol.*ad loc.*, from *Apoll.Bib.*2.3.1, 2.5.12. We need not list, with Stallb., the subsequent imitators, but should note this is the first time the mythological creatures were placed within a man, an idea Socrates uses near the beginning of the *Phdrs.* (229E4-30A6).

animals both tame and wild, configured in a circle all about its body, and able to sprout all these from out of himself.

“The work of an awfully clever sculptor, you suggest; but since it’s easier to mold a picture in words even than in wax and other such materials, consider it molded.”

Mold next the image of a lion and the image of a man,<sup>4518</sup> and make the first of the three the largest by a good deal, and the second second in size.<sup>4519</sup>

“These are easier, and I’ve molded them up.

Now connect the three of them and make them into one, as somehow grown together.

“They are connected.”

Now mold a single outer image-work in the likeness of a man, that encases these, so that to a person unable to see what’s inside,<sup>4520</sup> he sees only the casing and it appears to be a single animal, namely a man.

“The surrounding casing has been molded.”

So let us now say, to the person who was arguing<sup>4521</sup> that it profits this man we have placed before him to live unjustly and that just behavior helps him not at all, that what that person is saying is

<sup>4518</sup> ἀνθρώπου (D3): We are meant to envision the man who ranks above animals and below gods, not as an individual among men (for which ἄνήρ: cf. n.752). As such he is threatened from below and dwarfed from above. Adam (*ad loc.*) dreams when he sees this man as a compound of the immortal and the mortal.

<sup>4519</sup> The superlative μέγιστον (D4) suggests there is a third, as do πρῶτον (a superlative) and δεύτερον. The implication is that the λογιστικόν is smallest, here figured as an inner man (ἄνθρωπος), the element that in Aristotle will become the *differentia specifica* of man in comparison with other animals. Though this element is later called “perhaps divine” (ἴσως ... θεῖον, 589DI), in the figure it is a very small and quiet thing, which symbolizes the fragile relation we have with the good, upon which our identity as humans, after all, relies. We might reconcile the two ideas by thinking of the “still, small voice.”

<sup>4520</sup> ὥστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὄρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἔλυτρον ὄρωντι ἐν ζῷον φαίνεσθαι, ἄνθρωπον (D11-E1): there is a slight inconsequence in saying that “the covering makes it appear, to a person who is unable to see what is within, that there is only one animal there,” since it is the covering that makes the man unable to see. It is not uncommon to present the leading idea (μὴ δυναμένῳ) in a subordinate construction (especially in the dative participle: Smyth §1497). The brief pause we are given will bring to mind the fundamental methodological requirement Socrates and Glaucon have adopted in the present version of the κρίσις, that we must have the ability to look *inside* the men (ὅς δύναται τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἡθος ἐνδὺς διιδεῖν καὶ μὴ καθάπερ παῖς ἔξωθεν ὄρῶν ἐκπλήττεται, 577A3 and n.4266: contrast μὴ δυναμένῳ here), in contrast with Glaucon’s method of adding false outer appearance in Book Two.

Moreover, the notion of a decent but beleaguered “man within” set in comparison with the impassive mask-of-a-man that hides him from without, evokes in us the feelings that made the invisibility of Gyges so attractive—the prospect, that is, that we might be able to experience ourselves as persons experience us from the outside, so that if we were invisible we might have as much trouble seeing ourselves sin as they would; and the prospect that the inner man who is by nature invisible will stay invisible. That is, this Image (and henceforth I shall use the capital for it) threatens to arouse the conscience from the latency into which it was lulled by the spell of Gyges’ ring, and to explode the delusion that the self can sin unravaged merely because unobserved. It is to the inner man after all that the Image is addressed, and ineluctably he will see himself in it.

<sup>4521</sup> λέγοντι (E3), the present participle representing an imperfect of citation (cf. n.586).

nothing else than<sup>4522</sup> that it profits this man to provide a feast for the variegated beast within him and make it strong along with the lion and the rest in him that holds these together,<sup>4523</sup> and that it profits him (589) to starve out the man within and make him so weak that he can be dragged about in whatever direction the other two parts lead, and that it profits him to do nothing to reconcile the parts to one another and make them friendly but rather to allow them to nip at each other and be at war among themselves until they eat each other up.

“Yes, all this is what the person who praises the unjust life would in fact be asserting.”

Conversely the man who argues that justice is profitable would be<sup>4524</sup> arguing that one must do whatever things and say whatever things<sup>4525</sup> will bring it about that the man inside will become sovereign over the whole man<sup>4526</sup> as far as that is possible, and manage the many-headed beast the way a farmer does his field, nourishing what is tame and cultivating it<sup>4527</sup> but preventing the wild weeds from growing, and by fostering the natural alliance<sup>4528</sup> he has with the lion, taking all the parts together in common cause<sup>4529</sup> under his care and making them friendly both to each other and to himself,<sup>4530</sup> in this way<sup>4531</sup> will cause himself to flourish.<sup>4532</sup>

“Clearly this is what the man who praises justice, on the other hand, is saying.”<sup>4533</sup>

So in every way<sup>4534</sup> the man that praises justice would be speaking the truth whereas the man who praises injustice would be telling a lie. Whether the person is looking for pleasure or for laudable benefit,<sup>4535</sup> the praiser of justice has the true answer whereas the man who dispraises it, dispraises it

<sup>4522</sup> This reductionist formula was used by Thrasymachus in Book One (338C2 and n.317) to contrast what his audience had always complacently believed with what he now meant to make them see in its naked truth. Socrates can now turn the tables and use it against Thrasymachus, but truly it is Glaucon and Adeimantus upon whom he is imposing this response, and they whom he forces see the heartlessness of Thrasymachus’s thrilling and fearsome “thesis.”

<sup>4523</sup> τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα (E6) denotes the tissues that connect that hold the three parts together (the lion being in the middle). The purpose of the expression is to outnumber the human part still further.

<sup>4524</sup> φαίη ὅν (589A6): Socrates now abandons the harsh οὐδὲν ἄλλο formulation and adopts the milder ideal-inferential formulation Glaucon had used in answer (ταῦτ’ ὃν λέγοι, A5).

<sup>4525</sup> ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν (A7): To “act in word and deed.” For the pairing of the verbs cf. n.4024. Anaphora of ταῦτα stresses his scrupulous resolve. For the spatial relative (ὅθεν) with nominal antecedent (ταῦτα) to express purpose (like ἵνα which is also spatial), compare τοῦτο ὅπόθεν (445B2), used there also of selecting behaviors with a view to their effect on soul (444E7-5B4), and cf. Phdr.239B3.

<sup>4526</sup> ἐγκρατέστατος (B1), rather than κύριος or κράτιστος, denotes temperance in the whole man (σωφροσύνη) achieved by the hegemony or power (ἐγκρατεία) of the inner man over the other parts of himself. The term therefore recalls the paradox of 430E6-431B2.

<sup>4527</sup> τιθασεύων (B3): Cf. ἀρδοντός τε καὶ αὔξοντος (550B2) of the just father nurturing his son.

<sup>4528</sup> σύμμαχον ποιησάμενος (B3-4): Cf. 440B3-4; for φύσιν cf. 441A2-3.

<sup>4529</sup> πάντων (B4) amalgamates the many headed beast and the lion.

<sup>4530</sup> As the rulers did their guards and the masses (417A6-B6, 423A1-5; cf. 463A10-B9) and as justice along with the other virtues did for the soul (442B5-D1, 443C9-444A2).

<sup>4531</sup> οὗτω (B5) semi-redundant (cf. n.939).

<sup>4532</sup> θρέψει (B6), rather than be eaten up (ἐσθίειν ἄλληλα, A4).

<sup>4533</sup> λέγει (B7): the truth of the vision inspires him to replace the optative (A5) with an indicative.

<sup>4534</sup> With κατὰ πάντα τρόπον δή (B8) Socrates uses the same oratorical move Adeimantus did at 366B3 (κατὰ τίνα ὃν λόγον: cf. n.867).

<sup>4535</sup> ἡδονή and εὐδοξία + ὠφελία (C1-2) redoes the constellation consisting of ἡδονή and εὐσχημοσύνη + κάλλος καὶ ἀρετή, above (588A7-10), while it continues to allude to Adeimantus’s

falsely without even knowing what it is that he is dispraising.<sup>4536</sup>

“No, he doesn’t, in my judgment, not at all.”

So then let us try to persuade him gently<sup>4537</sup>—his error after all is unwitting<sup>4538</sup>—by asking him, “My very good fellow,<sup>4539</sup> would we not agree that our notions of what is fine and what is shameful<sup>4540</sup> have been convened because of just such considerations as those?<sup>4541</sup> Have we not convened as fine the things that bring under the control of the human element in us—perhaps we should call it divine<sup>4542</sup>—those aspects of us that are beastly by nature?<sup>4543</sup> And do we not condemn as shameful what enslaves<sup>4544</sup> the tame element in our nature to the service of the savage?” Will he agree or what?

peroration. εὐδοξία replaces εὐσχημοσύνη under the influence of the notions of praise and blame in the present context, the praiser of justice now being found to be conferring *true* praise.

<sup>4536</sup> οὐδ’ εἰδώς (C3): both his praise and his blame don’t see (but ignore or are ignorant of) the effect on the inner man that has been revealed in the Image (cf. εἰδῆ, 588B10).

<sup>4537</sup> πράως (C6), because persuasion is directed toward the θυμός; it is this part that switched sides in the two accounts above (588E6 vs. 589B3). Compare Socrates and Glaucon’s attempt to persuade the φιλοθεάμων (πείθειν ἡρέμα, 476D8-E6), and Socrates and Adeimantus’s attempt to tell the bright young man he is a fool (ἡρέμα προσελθὼν τἀληθῆ λέγῃ, 494D4). The truth is not always welcome just because it is true. The real measure is whether a certain silent member of the audience will or can be tamed (contrast ὥσπερ θηρίον ..., 336B), or whether again he will accuse Socrates and his interlocutor of ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ἀλλήλοις (336C1-2); but Socrates’s task will be complete if he can help the brothers, or Glaucon at least, to tame the Thrasymachus within himself.

<sup>4538</sup> οὐ γὰρ ἐκών ἀμαρτάνει (C6): The Image has revealed or made clear an unintended implication of his thought (C3). If he were aware he would need κόλασις rather than πειθώ. We again have the converse of the Socratic paradox alluded to above in the observation that the tyrant οὐ ποιεῖ ὁ βούλεται (557D10-11, cf. 357B4), namely, that οὐδεὶς ἀμαρτάνει ἐκών. And at the same time we have the presumptuous hunch of Adeimantus that Socrates would “forgive” the erroneous outlook about justice (366C5-6), come true.

<sup>4539</sup> ὁ μακάριε (C7): thus did Socrates address Thrasymachus in Book One (345B2, 346A9, 354A8). Cf. n.3285 ad 522B3.

<sup>4540</sup> καλά / αἰσχρά here (C7) represent not beauty/ugliness within a list of goods including (say) virtue and wealth, nor do they represent one third of the triad καλόν / ἀγαθόν / δίκαιον, but simply denote the range of praise and blame, as ψέγεσθαι below confirms (590A6: cf. ψέγεται, A9). Cf. καλὴν, 443E5.

<sup>4541</sup> διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα (C8): points backwards to the Image of the soul’s components, aspects of which the participles (ποιοῦντα / δουλούμενα) now flesh out (so also διὰ τοιαῦτα and ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ at 590A5-6). The asyndeton (τὰ μὲν καλά) does not force τοιαῦτα to point forward; indeed the entire assertion in which it occurs is pregnant for explanation.

<sup>4542</sup> τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ (D1): the article indicates he is referring to the Image; and now that Glaucon’s sympathy for the best element in himself (the humble ἀνθρωπος) has brought him to accept the Just Argument for himself (B8-C5), the superhuman importance of this element can be acknowledged—μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ θείῳ (it is an adumbration of 611A10-612A6).

<sup>4543</sup> νόμιμα / φύσεως (C7, D2): having exploded the charm of Gyges’s ring with the Image, Socrates now presents, under the rubric of supplementary persuasion that will “save the phenomena” of conventional morality, a response to the thesis that Glaucon had brought in Gyges’s ring to prove: that injustice is good by nature and that our conventions are merely a contrivance by which we try to hide this fact from ourselves (359E3 vs. 359A2-4, C5-6).

<sup>4544</sup> δουλούμενα (D3): The hegemony of the best element over the lowest, within the Image, was the careful tendance of a farmer over his crops and fields (B2-3, where *n.b.* ἐπιμέλεια). Conversely the hegemony of the lower element can only be δουλεία, a term he uses here and just below (D7, E5: cf.

"He will agree if he listens to me."<sup>4545</sup>

Is there any way, then, on the basis of this argument, that a person can profit from seizing gold unjustly,<sup>4546</sup> if the consequence will surely be that in the very act of seizing the gold he will be enslaving the noblest part of himself to the most loathsome part? Or would you say that if in seizing the gold he were enslaving his son or his daughter<sup>4547</sup> and enslaving them to men evil and violent, it would not profit him to seize the gold even by the cartload under *that* condition; but that if he enslaves the most divine part in him<sup>4548</sup> to the part most godless and polluted without a second thought,<sup>4549</sup> are you going to tell me he is *not* a wretch, withal?<sup>4550</sup> Or that he accepted a bribe of gold on condition of a ruination somehow (590) less stunning than Eriphyle did when she accepted the golden necklace on the condition of her husband's death?<sup>4551</sup>

"I'll answer on his behalf and say it is a much more stunning ruination indeed!"

And don't you think that incorrigible behavior had its bad name all along<sup>4552</sup> through just such also 442B1). The redesignation of the "divine element" (D1) as τὸ ἥμερον (D2) suggests that the hegemony of the beast is violent. Cf. the expression τὸ ἥμερον ἐλευθεροῦται, 591B3).

<sup>4545</sup> συμφήσει ἢ πῶς; (Soc.) | έάν μοι πείθηται (Glaucon.) (D4-5): Both of them maintain the fiction Socrates introduced with αὐτῷ (588B6), that the man who asserted the doctrine being refuted is a "third person," not Glaucon. In a deep sense he is not the same man, just as he never was the same as Thrasymachus merely because he began Book Two as the spokesman for his thesis. The question whether Glaucon is or is not the same man is tantamount to the question whether his mind has really been changed. Here, Glaucon says that the then-Glaucon will agree with Socrates (συμφήσει) if only he obeys or is persuaded by (πείθηται) the now-Glaucon.

<sup>4546</sup> λυσιτελεῖ ... χρυσίον λαμβάνειν ἀδίκως (D5-6) replaces the general and colorless formulation (ἀδικεῖν, 588E3) with a vivid example (in fact the example nearest at hand, according to Mr Karabatsos, since λυσιτελεῖν inherently envisions monetary gain); and the prospect of harming oneself in so acting is now given great emotional force by the *argumentum ex contrariis* or *a fortiori* that catches us up by comparing the (invisible) abuse of the fragile man within, which we pitilessly tolerate (καὶ μηδὲν ἐλεεῖ, E5), to the abuse of a son or daughter (which only because it is visible to others immediately evokes the sense of shame). The argument reveals to θυμός the limits of its indignation, how its sense of shame relies on visibility; and how it needs reason as its ally.

<sup>4547</sup> ὃντος ἡ θυγατέρα ἐδουλοῦτο (E1-2): The observation that the duty we feel to protect our children is perhaps the strongest sense of duty we have, and yet should not be, adds still more power to the image of the man within: he would not be a man, we think, if he allowed his children to become enslaved. Conversely, the decline of the personality (Book Eight) was driven by the son's attempt to save or redeem or repair his father's errors in his own life; but it is only because the son feels, *mutatis mutandis*, that the little man within himself is his father that he falls prey to the belief that he will become a happy man or a good man when he fixes him.

<sup>4548</sup> θειότατον (E4), though superlative, confesses to a lower grade of divinity than the positive grade of the adjective had claimed, above (D1)! The contrast between gold and the health of the soul was Socrates's first riposte to Thrasymachus, at 336E2-9, a riposte Thrasymachus recalls against him in a taunt, in Book Five (450B3-4).

<sup>4549</sup> καὶ μηδὲν ἐλεεῖ (E5): The significance of his perfidy escapes his own notice, quite apart from that of men and gods.

<sup>4550</sup> ὄρα (E5) marking an *argumentum a fortiori*: cf. 374B6 and n.1082.

<sup>4551</sup> For Eriphyle cf. Od. I I.326. Family relations are more important than money but less important than the freedom of the little man within, the λογιστικόν.

<sup>4552</sup> οὐκοῦν καί (590A5): Socrates continues his "archeology" of convention (cf. νόμιμα ... γεγονέναι, 589C7-8). πάλαι (A5) merely points to a time before we had the insight provided by the newly coined Image (cf. n.1388), in order to compare what we have always believed with what we now have learned.

considerations, because it lets loose the fearsome element within the a man, as conceived in this Image, that beastly element so huge and many-headed,<sup>4553</sup> to rove about beyond due measure?

“Clearly.”

And arrogance and rashness: are these not<sup>4554</sup> condemned, when<sup>4555</sup> they rouse the lion and the snakelike element<sup>4556</sup> in us and concentrate its energies disproportionately?<sup>4557</sup>

“Quite.”

And enervation and softness: is it not on the occasion of the loosing and slackening<sup>4558</sup> of this same element<sup>4559</sup> that they are censured, when they inject fear into it?

“Obviously.”

Flattery and slavishness<sup>4560</sup> also, when a person subjects this same element, the willful part, to the beastly mob in him, and inures it to playing the patsy<sup>4561</sup> at the behest of its insatiable desire for money,

<sup>4553</sup> τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο καὶ πολυειδὲς θρέμμα (A6-7): The lingering appositive accords to the beast a prudent measure of awe, which is then put in its proper place by the reference to τὸ δέον: this argument is being made to the λογιστικόν in us.

<sup>4554</sup> ψέγεται οὐχ (A9): The late placement of οὐ in the ordinary clause (repeated below, B3) makes the Greek word order seem like the English order of the question (οὐχ almost needs an accent), but in truth the hyperbaton is dialectical pacing, and an index of Socrates's confidence in the wide scope and import of the position they have reached.

<sup>4555</sup> ὅταν (A9) is variation for ὅτι (A6): the occasion (when) is allowed to stand in for the cause (because).

<sup>4556</sup> τὸ λεοντῶδες τε καὶ ὄφεωδες (A9-B1): Given αὐτοῦ τούτου (B3), ὄφεωδες must be construed in hendiadys with λεοντῶδες: together they designate the θυμός. The snakelike element must be the “limbs” by which the lion is attached to the man on one side and the manyheaded beast on the other (cf. τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα, 588E6). The relevance of this characterization is that it is the job of this element to mediate between the two extremes: whereas the one of them cannot be too strong and the other cannot be too weak, this central element can be either. Cf. 387C4-5 and n. 1324.

<sup>4557</sup> συντείνηται ἀναρμόστως (B1) is almost an oxymoron: the point is that the willful power of the θυμός to marshal its energies, absent the hegemony of the λογιστικόν, will spoil the marshalling of the entire soul: cf. 410D3-5, 411C4-E2. For ἀναρμόστως cf. ἡρμοσμένου, 410E10.

<sup>4558</sup> χαλάσσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει (B3-4): reverse καί (cf. n.444), the new term placed before the old (from ἀνίεται, A6) since ἀνιέναι now has an opposite valence, a debilitating slackening rather than uncontrolled robustness (cf. ἀνεθέντος, 410E2, 412A1). For this, and for the oxymoron above, the λογιστικόν is being relied upon to supply needed sense to the words.

<sup>4559</sup> αὐτοῦ τούτου (B3), more emphatic than τούτου or αὐτοῦ alone, to indicate that whereas the link between the previous two steps was the strengthening of one and then the other inferior element, in this case the element stays the same and it is the opposite of strengthening that is being considered. Only this middle element can be both too strong and too weak. For δειλίαν cf. 411A3.

<sup>4560</sup> κολακεία ... καὶ ἀνελευθερία (B6): the pairing of terms of conventional moral opprobrium continues (cf. B3,A9). The parallelism of the pair allows Socrates to omit ψέγεται; but immediately he varies the ὅταν clause as having τις rather than the respective vice(s) as its subject; and it is no longer the slackening or the over-stimulation of a single element that is the problem (A5-B4, of the lower two parts) but, as in the first case (589C8-D3), the improper subordination of a superior element to its inferior (with the language of ποιεῖν τι ὑπό τινι bought forward from D1-2), a new tack continued in the sequel (C2-6, including repetition of the ὅταν τις formulation).

<sup>4561</sup> προπηλακιζόμενον (B8): “being put forward to receive mudslinging,” despite its pride. The psychology of the term and its connection with the θυμοειδές, is revealed at 536C. The lion in us is being roused to defend itself out of shame.

and so from its youth as a lion<sup>4562</sup> allows it to turn into an ape?<sup>4563</sup>

“Quite so.”

And repetitive physical work:<sup>4564</sup> why do you suppose it bears the opprobrium it does? Or shall we say it does so whenever someone<sup>4565</sup> has a weak endowment of the noblest element of the soul, so that he may be<sup>4566</sup> unable to govern the beasts within himself but fosters them, and proves incompetent to learn anything more than how to coddle<sup>4567</sup> them?<sup>4568</sup>

“So it seems.”

And in order that a man of this type should be ruled by an element alike to the one that rules the noblest man, do we agree he ought to be slave<sup>4569</sup> to that noblest man, the man who does have the divine element<sup>4570</sup> in himself functioning as his ruler, and do we say so not because we think the slave

<sup>4562</sup> ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος (B9): I take the phrase to refer to τὴν τοῦ λέοντος φύσιν (589B4) and to mean ἀντὶ λέοντος κατὰ φύσιν or ἀντὶ λέοντος νέου ὄντος. The θυμός is notoriously strong in a young person, stronger indeed than the reason (441A7-B1).

<sup>4563</sup> πίθηκον (B9): the ridiculous image plus the shameful treatment (προπηλακιζόμενον) that leads to it, arouse the indignation of the lion in us rather than the reason. We may compare the proverb that compares lion to ape in *Luc.Philopseud.5* ὑπὸ τῇ λεοντῇ γέλοιόν τινα πίθηκον περιστέλλων, of a speaker that makes something ridiculous seem serious; but more pertinent is the proverb that “imitation (i.e., aping) is the sincerest form of flattery;” and the ape as a mimic then calls to mind the ratio of Heraclitus quoted by Socrates at *Hipp.Maj.289B*: ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται.

<sup>4564</sup> βανανσία καὶ χειροτεχνία (C2) another pair that is a virtual hendiadys. For the effect of βανανσία on the rational element cf. 495D4-E2 and n.2866. The man of minor intellectual gifts (φύσει) might, we may guess, strengthen what endowment he has (μελέτῃ), by an occupation that requires as much thought as he is capable of even if it is merely keeping to a schedule.

<sup>4565</sup> ὅταν τις (C3) reverts to the language that was new in the previous example (B6), after the intervening departure into rhetorical questions (διὰ τί οἴει and ἢ δι' ἄλλο, C2-3).

<sup>4566</sup> ὃν (C4): for the potential optative in a ὥστε clause of “natural” result cf. Smyth §2270.

<sup>4567</sup> θωπεύματα (C5): the derogatory edge again appeals to the θυμός more than to reason, but asks θυμός to help reason retain its dignity.

<sup>4568</sup> ὥστε μὴ ὃν δύνασθαι ἄρχειν ... μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν (C4-6): After the strengthening of what should be weak (the beast:A5-7) and the strengthening (A9-B2) and weakening (B2-5) of what should neither be too strong nor too weak (A9-B4), Socrates has now reverted to the deformations in hierarchy among the parts envisioned at the beginning (589C8-D3): subordination of the spirited lion to the beast turns him into a monkey (B6-9). Subordination of the rational man to the beast turns him into a slavish publican keeping track of his customer’s pints and quarts (C2-6).

<sup>4569</sup> δοῦλον (C9) the term is now placed emphatically at the head of the clause, no longer held back as at 589D1-3 in the description of the higher’s rule over the lower (cf. n.4544 ad 589D3). To the degree that he is “advocating slavery,” Socrates is sailing very close to the wind. To argue it is better to be ruled by a better man is a common paradox (*Alc.I.135BC*, *Polit.296BC*, *Democ.fr.75DK*), but that enslavement can be justified thereby is a far more provocative assertion. *Phdo.62DE* approaches saying so; and clearly Aristotle’s doctrine of the δοῦλος φύσει (*Pol.1254B16-20*) is a reworking of the language of this passage (cf. also φύσει, 444B4); but within the present work the references to keep in mind are Thrasymachus’s vision of the general citizen voluntarily enslaving himself to the tyrant (δουλώσηται, 344B6), and Socrates’s remark, delivered from the high vantage at the end of Book Four (445C4), that injustice is the usurping of power by an element that by nature should be enslaved to its superior (444B4-5).

<sup>4570</sup> ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον (D1): In the original Image it was a little *man* within, but subsequently Socrates said “it might better be called divine rather than human” (per 589D1). He

ought be ruled for the sake of harming him as Thrasymachus thought about the ruled,<sup>4571</sup> but because by our lights it is better for any man to be ruled by the divine and the mindful element, first and foremost if it belongs<sup>4572</sup> to him as his own within himself, but failing that if it belongs to someone else that is placed in charge over him, in order that<sup>4573</sup> all of us might become alike as far as possible and friendly with each other, by virtue of navigating our way by the same element or principle.<sup>4574</sup>

“And we are right to think it for this reason.”

Law makes it clear that this is what its purpose is, being as it is the ally of all citizens in the city,<sup>4575</sup> as does also the principle by which we rule<sup>4576</sup> children, not to allow them freedom until we have as it were established a regime<sup>4577</sup> within them as if in a city and until by serving and nurturing the best element (591) in them by means of the best element within ourselves we have set up a similar guard to be our substitute and likewise rule within him:<sup>4578</sup> then and not before do we grant him his

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proposes to redeem even the horrid dehumanization of slavery by relying on the *divinity* of the element that qualifies the master to rule, which after all by hypothesis was *his* master also (ἀρχοντας); and thus he can go on to propose that the purpose of the “enslavement” is to optimize the *community and friendship* of the two men (όμοιοι ... καὶ φίλοι, D6: cf. ὑπὸ οὐμοίου, C8). These assertions are far more “provocative” than all that he will say about poetry and art in Book Ten. The reference to and reliance on the dimension of divinity is absent in Aristotle’s theory of slavery (*Pol.A5*); but in the present passage, the person who deserves to be a slave is just as rare as the person who is ruled by the divine.

<sup>4571</sup> ὔετο (D3), imperfect of citation (cf. 343B1-C1, and βλάβη, C5).

<sup>4572</sup> ἔχοντος (D4) and ἐφεστῶτος (D5) might as well be taken as a possessive genitives.

<sup>4573</sup> ίνα ... οὐμοίοι (D5-6): cf. ίνα ... ὑπὸ οὐμοίου (C8-9). By a common structure we revert the original point after an intervening explanation that affects the restatement of the original point.

<sup>4574</sup> τῷ αὐτῷ (D6). In the end the ruling principle is done with an instrumental dative rather than the genitive of agent with ὑπό, with which he had toyed along the way—making it thereby more a compass than a living personage. If a man’s natural endowment of reason is lacking it would be better that he be the slave of a rational man that can guide him, than externally free but enslaved by the chaotic forces of his desire. It is to distance his thesis from Thrasymachus that Socrates adopts the impersonal formulation of the master’s hegemony.

<sup>4575</sup> πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει σύμμαχος ὁν (E2): His conclusion supersedes Thrasymachus’s contention that laws are set up by rulers for their own benefit rather than that of the citizens (338E1-9A4), as well as Glaucon’s that law is a contract to forgo harming each other rather than a guide against harming oneself (358E3-9B5). Instead, the law is the ally of all—as we might say, it “knows no favorites.” The final chips are being taken off the table.

<sup>4576</sup> ἡ τῶν παίδων ἀρχή (E2-3): “ruling of children” is a semantic stretch (cf. Leg.809A1, which imagines an ἀρχὴ παίδων as an area of law to be enforced by a νομοφύλαξ but then uses the more idiomatic terms, τροφή and ἐπιμέλεια [809AB]). The semantic stretch is a proleptic skew (cf. n. 1556) that prepares for the moment when the principles by which a child is “ruled” from without become *regnant* within him (ἀρχοντα [591A2], cf. 590D1).

<sup>4577</sup> ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν (E8) brings back to the surface the metaphor of a political regime within, an analogy that has animated the entire discussion.

<sup>4578</sup> ἐν αὐτῷ (591A2): the singular substitutes for the plural (ἐν αὐτοῖς, E3) under the influence of the (natural) use of the singular in a metaphor (φύλακα). ἐν is not otiose, but means that the ruling force (ἀρχή, E3) which had operated on the child from the outside through his guardians, is finally superseded by an element internal to the young person that has by their fostering of it achieved hegemony over him from within. παρά conversely (A1) conveys the notion that the principle within the guardians (as within the βέλτιστος who rules the slave, *supra*: ἐν αὐτῷ, D1) can be externalized so as to influence the child: compare the shift from genitive of agent to instrumental dative at 590D6 (and n.4574).

freedom.<sup>4579</sup>

“They do reveal this to be their purpose.”

Is there any way,<sup>4580</sup> then, that we will be able to assert and defend the position that it profits a man to act unjustly or behave unbridled or to commit any ugly act<sup>4581</sup> on the grounds that although he becomes a baser person by it, he shall realize a gain in wealth or some other kind of power?<sup>4582</sup>

“There is no way.”

Or to assert that it profits a man who has done wrong to get away unnoticed and not pay the penalty? Isn’t it clear that although the man who goes unnoticed becomes even more base, the man who is caught and chastised has the beast within calmed and tamed while the tame element is set free from its thrall, and that his soul as a whole thus reaches the order of its best nature<sup>4583</sup> and takes on a state more honorable,<sup>4584</sup> in its acquisition<sup>4585</sup> of temperance and justice along with mindfulness,<sup>4586</sup> than that of a body that has acquired strength and beauty along with health, more honorable indeed by the measure that soul is worth more than body?

“I agree completely.”

And a man, if he is intelligent, will adopt a manner of living in which he directs everything that in

<sup>4579</sup> ἐλεύθερον ἀφίεμεν (A2-3), as if it were a manumission. From the notion of the slave and the child he next moves to the notion of the criminal.

<sup>4580</sup> πῆ δή (A5) with future, in peroration, to pre-empt any future objection as at 501D1, where also it marks the end of a long and thorough proof and refutation (Shorey there gives parallels from the oratory: Lysias 30.26, 31.24, 53.49, 6.46). Compare also κατὰ πάντα τρόπον (589B8), and Adeimantus’s peroration in Book Two, at 366B3 (κατὰ τίνα ... ἔτι λόγον) and C1 (τίς μηχανή).

<sup>4581</sup> λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀκολασταίνειν ἢ τι αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν (A6): The list consists of two specifics and a generalization (ἢ τι αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν), and recounts the items reviewed above in the order of presentation, ἀδικεῖν corresponding to 589D5-590A2 (which was the vivid version of ἀδικεῖν in general, 588E3-589A4); and ἀκολασταίνειν to 590A5-7. The other items are then dismissed with the generalization τι αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν, borrowed from the formula that introduced the persuasive review of νόμιμα (589C7-8).

<sup>4582</sup> πονηρότερος μὲν ἔσται, πλείω δὲ χρήματα ... κεκτήσεται; (A7-8). Since μέν is essentially concessive we must imagine the ἔξ ὧν clause belongs to the advocate of injustice, and that the antecedent of ὧν is not the several acts, but the answers to πῆ and κατὰ τίνα λόγον. The tables are turned in the next μέν / δέ construction, *infra* (B1ff).

<sup>4583</sup> εἰς τὴν βελτίστην φύσιν (B4) refers back to τὸ βέλτιστον at 590E4; and φύσις substitutes for what was there a κατάστασις (590E4, 591A1), adding the inference that under this best regime the parts are not deformed against their nature (as at 590B6-C6), an inference drawn from the distinction between the calming hegemony of the best part (ἡμεροῦται, B3) and the enslaving hegemony of the worst part (implied by ἐλευθεροῦται, B3): cf. n.4544 *ad* 589D3, and κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι, 444D4.

<sup>4584</sup> τιμιωτέραν (B4): that the better state of soul is more honorable continues the idea introduced by εὐδοξίᾳ at 589C2 and the καλά / αἰσχρά of 589C7 and 591A6. The remedial effect of punishment was broached at 380B1-2.

<sup>4585</sup> κτωμένη (B6) mocks κτήσεται at A8.

<sup>4586</sup> σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως (B5): As at Leg.906A7-8, the expression (A καὶ B μετὰ C rather than flat A καὶ B καὶ C) does not separate φρόνησις out from among the other virtues but is part of the *ogkos* style, as in Leg.661D6-E1, 693D8-E1 (after three καί’s were used above at C7 and B4), 696B2-4 (where ὄνειρα means οὐδέ); contrast 630A8-B1. Cf. also Rep.411E2. Compare the logic of the items listed in the mirror list of bodily goods immediately following: ἴσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ ύγιείας (B6).

him lies to this single goal,<sup>4587</sup> first<sup>4588</sup> by honoring those studies that will render his soul able to reach this state, and accounting the others worthless?<sup>4589</sup>

“Clearly.”

And second, surely, he will manage the condition and nourishment of his body not to cater to savage and irrational<sup>4590</sup> pleasure with the result that his life takes on an orientation toward this alone, but rather, disregarding his health and revering not at all the fashionable worry<sup>4591</sup> about becoming strong or healthy or good looking—unless<sup>4592</sup> such pursuits will redound in favor of his retaining temperance—instead he will always be seen to tune the body only for the sake of the role it is to play in the symphony of the soul.

“Yes he will, if he is going to be musical<sup>4593</sup> in the true sense of the word.”

And will he not do likewise<sup>4594</sup> with respect to maintaining order in his material acquisitions and harmony?<sup>4595</sup> As to the sheer bulk<sup>4596</sup> of his wealth, the envious emulation<sup>4597</sup> of the masses will not

<sup>4587</sup> πάντα ... εἰς τοῦτο συντείνας (C1-2): This was already said in a general way above (589A7ff: compare the exact parallel at 445B1ff), but now it will be spelled out in exhaustive detail (exactly as it was by Glaucon at 445A5-B4).

<sup>4588</sup> πρῶτον μέν (C2): The ordinal already suggests the same tripartition of goods that underlay the conclusion as it was articulated by Glaucon in the parallel passage at 445AB (σώματος / πλούτου καὶ ἀρχῆς / αὐτοῦ τούτου ὥς ζῷεν: cf. n.2235). Hence we can infer that the relative clause in ᾧ (C2-3) is “restrictive”—i.e., that we are to understand μαθήματα with τὰ ἄλλα at C3. The same point will be made about worthwhile and worthless studies, at 618C1-E3.

<sup>4589</sup> ἀτιμάζων (C3): this strong statement might bother professional students, but Socrates is talking with Glaucon.

<sup>4590</sup> Θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ (C6) alludes to the Image, with its rational man and its beastly pleasures.

<sup>4591</sup> τοῦτο (C7) as if all too familiar.

<sup>4592</sup> ἐὰν μὴ καί (C8-D1): Health and beauty (as well as wealth, below) are not lesser goods but good only if they also help soul: this is the radical, inevitable and universal climax of all sustained Socratic investigation (e.g., 505A1-B3; *Apol.*30B3-4): those who like Glaucon have undergone the lead-up to it, are edified by the result; for others the climax might appear nothing but puristic or ideological extremism, or as with Adeimantus in Book Six, make one impatient of being ignorant of the soul's good, and the goal of life.

<sup>4593</sup> Glaucon notices Socrates's extended metaphor (ἀρμονία, συμφωνία) and replies by alluding to what they said to each other at 443D-444A.

<sup>4594</sup> Mere καί (D6) is sufficient, after πρῶτον μέν (C2) introduced the first category of goods and ἔπειτά γε (C5) the second, to introduce the third (τῇ τοῦ χρημάτων κτήσει). The second καί (D7) is responsive. Note the parallel structure: topic announced in proleptic accusative (C5, D6), what he will not do about it (C5-8, D7-9), and then what he will do about it (C8-D3, E1-4).

<sup>4595</sup> σύνταξίν τε καὶ συμφωνίαν (D6-7): the τε καί abbreviates the logic spelled out in the expression above (it is the τε / καί of cause and result): just as the ἀρμονία (attunement) within the body enables it to join in the συμφωνία (“symphony”) with the soul (D1-3), so a σύνταξις or controlled disposition of one's material possessions—σύνταξις an appropriately physical and spatial term—enables this third and least category of goods to participate in the συμφωνία of the soul, which in both cases is the only value. The idea that the internal arrangement of the lower parts must be such as to enable them to convene with the order of the entire soul, with reason in charge, was negatively broached by the oxymoron συντείνηται ἀναρμόστως (590B1 and n.4557). For the tuning of each component so that it forms an harmonious chord with the others cf., again, 443D5-444A2.

<sup>4596</sup> Pleonastic τὸν ὕγκον (D7) makes the quantity visible to concupiscent eyes as a “heap.” Shorey appositely compares Horace's use of *acervus* (*Od.*2.2.24, *Ep.*1.2.47, etc.).

<sup>4597</sup> μακαρισμοῦ (D8) finally names the motive that underlies Thrasymachus's climactic use of the

dazzle<sup>4598</sup> him into trying to increase it endlessly, and take on endless<sup>4599</sup> evils thereby.

“I think not.”

To the contrary he will keep his eye fixed<sup>4600</sup> on the regime within *himself*.<sup>4601</sup> He will guard<sup>4602</sup> against disturbing some aspect of *himself* by having too much money or too little.<sup>4603</sup> This<sup>4604</sup> will be his compass for steering<sup>4605</sup> the safest course he can, saving some now and spending some then.<sup>4606</sup>

“Clearly he will.”

(592) And as to honors he will keep his eye fixed on the same standard, partaking in and tasting willingly whichever of them he deems<sup>4607</sup> will make him a better man; but whichever he deems will weaken the basic order within he will avoid whether in his private or his public life.

“I conclude he will be staying out of *politics*,<sup>4608</sup> then, if he really cares about this.”

term, that the tyrant be thought godlike by others (344B7 and n.456).

<sup>4598</sup> ἐκπληττόμενος (D8): The term, in the context of our moving from inner psychic goods to bodily goods (C1-D3) leading now to outer goods, suddenly recalls our confrontation with the tyrant’s dazzling outer show (ἔξωθεν ὄρῶν ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως ἢν πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω σχηματίζονται, 577A3-5), to be able to see through which was the first prerequisite to our being able to judge the great question of happiness. As Glaucon asserted in Book Two, we will be able to judge the question if only we set out the κρίσις *properly* (360E1-3); here we have learned that it is *ourselves* that must set it out properly.

<sup>4599</sup> ἀπέραντα (D9) is something of a pun: what makes the evils boundless is exactly that the desire for money knows no bounds (compare the sense of ἀπαλλαγή ... κακῶν, 610D6-7 and n.5029). Another of the early problems (373D10) has been solved.

<sup>4600</sup> ἀλλ’ ἀποβλέπων γε (E1): critical contemplation (cf. n.1692)—the converse of ἐκπληττόμενος, as ἀλλά ... γε insists—repeated in virtual anaphora at 592A1.

<sup>4601</sup> τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν (E1): The metaphor of a city within now appears as the crowning expression for the order within the soul, which the Image of the soul’s inner structure has made possible (589B3-6, C8-D3; 590C4 [ἄρχειν], C8-D6, E3-591A3, 591B4 [καθισταμένη]). Note that this “city” does not even include a man’s οἰκία and his worldly possessions, which here play the role of a foreign power, let alone his body. Compare the dismissal of the πατρίς below (592A8).

<sup>4602</sup> φυλάττων (E2) continues the political metaphor, but the repetition of the reflexive (αὐτοῦ, E2) re-emphasizes that the regime is within even as τῶν ἐκεῖ reveres it as if it were removed to a high place.

<sup>4603</sup> διὰ πλήθους οὐσίας ἢ ὀλιγότητα (E2-3): with this phrase Socrates looks back two hundred twenty five pages, through the provision imposed on the guards (μήτε περιεῖναι ... μήτε ἐνδεῖν, 416E2-3), to the individual man’s life in the healthy πολίχνιον (εὐλαβούμενοι πενίαν ἢ πόλεμον, 372C1). We may now perhaps understand the wisdom of looking for justice in that idyllic scene of his home life rather than out in the πολίχνιον around him, mere trace of a city as it was.

<sup>4604</sup> οὗτως (E3), semi-redundant, allows the means (to which the demonstrative adverb then refers) to be placed before the goal, for the sake of emphasis (cf. n.939).

<sup>4605</sup> κυβερνῶν (E3) echoes κυβερνώμενοι (590D6): here as there the term stresses the vulnerability of the internal moral order to external influences that might set it off course.

<sup>4606</sup> προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει (E3-4): Compare the simple and sure instruction for managing bodily desire at 571E1-2: μήτε ἐνδείᾳ δοῦς μήτε πλησμονῇ.

<sup>4607</sup> ἡγῆται (592A2) recalls ἔξηγῆται, 586D7.

<sup>4608</sup> τά γε πολιτικά (A5): γε indicates it is in the nature of political involvement that one’s internal balance is threatened, either *eo ipso* or because an indiscriminate desire for honor and money is its motive (for the expression πολιτικὰ πράττειν cf. 443E4, the near parallel at 558B7; *Apol.*31D7, 32E2-3). The last two pages have returned us to the heights reached at the end of Book Four: the order of the soul is the only value, all other putative goods are good only if they foster this. Whereas at that

No, by the Dog: he *will* do politics, and vigorously so, at least in the city that is his own, though not in all likelihood in the city of his birth,<sup>4609</sup> absent a divine intervention.<sup>4610</sup>

“I get it: he will do the politics we have now just done, founding a city in the world of thought, since I’d guess you’ll find it nowhere<sup>4611</sup> on earth!”

Nay in heaven, perhaps,<sup>4612</sup> it has been laid up,<sup>4613</sup> as a model for the person who chooses to view it there and use what he sees as a pattern to civilize himself.<sup>4614</sup> It makes no difference whether it exists in some place, nor if it ever will, since it will be the politics of this city alone that he would practice and no other.<sup>4615</sup>

“I would expect nothing else.”

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stage the city, as soul written large, had made speculation about the self tolerable (visible: 368D4), at this stage the Image of the inner constitution of the soul corroborates the theory of the self and makes it unforgettable (visible: 588B10). At that point, when the state was discovered to be unnecessary to the attainment of justice, Polemarchus intervened in order to save place for a less conscientious and more mediocre form of existence, by raising the scandalous question about the community of wives; at the present point Glaucon says what Polemarchus *thought* at that moment: that “politics” is over (note its sudden appearance in the list at 443E2-3, with n.2212). Now Socrates surprises us, not by agreeing that of course he will not participate in that life, but by insisting that he will, once “politics” has been redefined as the life of ordering the city within, a paradoxical utterance he sees fit to repeat at the end of the *Gorgias*. The soul is so much more important than the city that even the politics of the soul is more important than the politics of the city!

<sup>4609</sup> To force a distinction between τῇ ἐαντοῦ πόλει and τῇ πατρίδι is a riddle, whence Glaucon's μωνθάνω in reply (A10).

<sup>4610</sup> Θεία τις συμβῆ τύχη (A8-9). J.-C. cite 492E, and Adam cites the definite eventuality mentioned at 499B, and they may be right; but the language θεία τις ... τύχη is completely general (Shorey compares θεία μοῖρα [493A; Leg.875C, 642C; Meno 99E] and θεῖον at 492E; to which we may add θείᾳ φύσει, 366C7). Such a wholesale dismissal of social participation might, after all, evince a self-esteem unduly high, as Socrates warned Adeimantus at 499D4-500A. God, not man, is the ultimate measure.

<sup>4611</sup> ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ (A11). There is no other πόλις in which he might practice politics (πολιτικά) in any normal sense than in his home-city (πατρίς), so Glaucon infers the undermeaning of a “utopian” politics taking place in the inner world of thought. ἐπεὶ ... γε (on which cf. n.706) evinces his self-consciousness and conviction in drawing the inference.

<sup>4612</sup> Άλλ, ... ἐν οὐρανῷ (B2). Again (cf. A7) Socrates corrects Glaucon, with a new metaphor describing a still higher vision.

<sup>4613</sup> ἀνακεῖται (B2) continues Glaucon's metaphor of κεῖσθαι from ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ (A11), just as κατοικίζειν continues his metaphor of οἰκίζοντες (A10).

<sup>4614</sup> κατοικίζειν (B3): Socrates borrows the term back from Glaucon. There is no question of a *pis aller* imagined by the commentators (Adam: “If a philosopher is prevented from founding a city after the pattern in the Heavens he can at all events ‘found himself’ ”): the philosopher as such wants nothing else. Heaven is a word for the οὐδαμοῦ where truth is located. The negation designates not a lack of place but the lack of a need for one, since the truly real subsists on its own (καθ' αὐτό) without the foothold of a medium (the ἔδρα of 516B4-5, elaborated in Tim.52B1).

<sup>4615</sup> διαφέρει δ' οὐδέν (B3-4): The paradoxical conclusions Socrates and Glaucon reached before, that justice is inward (Book Four, 443C9ff) implying that external justice and the state are not needed for its realization, and that for the purposes of choosing justice the issue of the state's realizability is a red herring so that the need for philosophy to rule must be evaluated on its own merits (472B3-473B3ff: *n.b.* τό ... μετὰ τοῦτο, B4), are herewith reiterated, this time without objection, and the inquiry comes to a peaceful close.

END OF BOOK NINE.

## BOOK TEN

We feel no need to ask why Book Nine ends where it does. Even without the back-references and allusions to the beginning of the conversation and the general ascent reminiscent of the ascent at the end of Book Four, the sheer elevation of the argument and its importance for our lives may easily have allowed us to forget that we are hearing an account of what happened yesterday, in the Piraeus, at the house of Cephalus; and even after we remember this we find ourselves still forgetting that the conversation never happened! Instead, as soon as Book Ten begins we might wonder why more conversation is needed since the argument is complete, except for the fact that we have heard nothing from Adeimantus since the end of the Decline (576B). It is Socrates who continues the conversation and so we listen; and he begins by acknowledging things might seem all done by asserting they are not.<sup>4616</sup>

### 3.A. Poetry Revisited

(595) Truly, I can say, of the many ways I see in my mind that we organized it<sup>4617</sup> with consummate correctness, upon reflection I admire especially our provision concerning poetry.

“What provision do you have in mind?”<sup>4618</sup>

Our refusal to admit any and all of poetry that was imitative. That it is consummately important not to admit it has now become even more evident, as it seems to me,<sup>4619</sup> because of our analysis of the soul into parts distinct from one another.

“How so?”

As I would put it to you personally<sup>4620</sup>—I trust you won’t denounce<sup>4621</sup> me to the writers of tragedy and all the others that are mimetic artists—a mutilation of the mind is what all these sorts of things effect,<sup>4622</sup> of anyone in their audience that has not been inoculated against them by a knowledge

<sup>4616</sup> This is the force of the καὶ μήν, with which Book Ten begins (595A1).

<sup>4617</sup> αὐτῆς (A1), the antecedent being the “city in heaven” that they have established (592A10-B1), which had just been referred to with ταύτης μόνης and ἄλλης (B4-5). Halliwell, treating Book Ten in isolation from its immediate context, gives the pronoun a general antecedent (*ad loc.*)—namely, the city developed in Book Three and Four as if nothing had come between. But μόνης (592B4), by restricting the mindful man’s politics to the politics of his “city within” (592A7), insists that even participation in the “theoretical city somewhere” is obsolete (making it, too, ἄλλης, B5). That city has now become only an idea and its only worth is as a pattern for the soul. Because the accent has shifted to the “city within” as depicted in the great Image of Book Nine, Socrates’s mind is now brought to focus on the psychic effect of poetry. It is only in connection with the elaboration of the tripartition in that Image that the language of mutilation (λώβη, B5) can arise.

<sup>4618</sup> The topic is poetry but Adeimantus does not intervene as he did at 376D4-5: (cf. n. I 122).

<sup>4619</sup> ἐναργέστερον (A6). Here is the justification for going on beyond Book Nine. The critique of poetry (Books Two and Three) was made before the partition and order of the soul was theorized in Book Four, and now that the Decline and the Image of Book Nine have vividly depicted the structure and pathology of that psychic order, prudence dictates that the critique be given the full theoretical foundation that the psychology can provide. To point back to 568AD, 394D, and 392C (with for instance J.-C., 439-40) as if “Plato” meant by those passages to promise he would write Book Ten, only ignores the dramatic development, and neglects the verisimilitude of its outcome.

<sup>4620</sup> ὡς μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς (B3), the first hint of reluctance to bring up a touchy matter: μέν is *solitarius*. The shift to the plural presumably includes Adeimantus.

<sup>4621</sup> κατερεῖτε (B3) already presupposes an environment of contentiousness and recrimination.

<sup>4622</sup> λώβη (B5) used pregnantly, of the thing that causes λώβη. The expression is strong, indignant,

of what these things are in fact.<sup>4623</sup>

“But what is it you are thinking about as you make this remark?”

Say it I must, though a distinct love and respect for Homer that I have always felt since my youth tends to hold me back. Of all these fine and high and tragic mimetics he seems to be the first teacher and fountainhead,<sup>4624</sup> and yet one must not hold a man in higher honor than the truth—so as I said I must speak.<sup>4625</sup>

“Quite so.”

Hear then what I have to say—or better, answer my questions.

“Ask away.”<sup>4626</sup>

### 3.A.I: The Nature of Imitation

Can you say what imitation is, in general? I myself do not have a particularly clear sense of what it is really about.

“And so<sup>4627</sup> you think I will have a clear sense!”

It would not be so strange that you should. Than sharper viewers ([596](#)) persons looking with duller sight often see things earlier.<sup>4628</sup>

“That much is true, but as long as you are present I don't have it in me to hazard<sup>4629</sup> some answer

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and inflammatory (cf. *Meno* 91C for a similar outburst). Such a rash charge would incite great resentment if the poets got wind of it. For διάνοια cf. 395D2-3: καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. Socrates uses the same terminology of the damage to the soul (without naming it), done by choosing an unjust course of action, in the *Crito* (47D4, E8).

<sup>4623</sup> τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας (B5-6): in blaming poetry for its telling effect (here, λώβη) on the way people *think*, Socrates is voicing the position of Adeimantus (e.g., 365A5-B1, 366D5-367A3), and indeed is fulfilling a request to deal with this problem that is only his; and yet Adeimantus, who had intervened the last time poetry came up in order to insist it get a thorough treatment (376D4-E1), here remains silent.

<sup>4624</sup> τῶν τραγικῶν (C1): For Homer as tragic poet (here as at 598D and 607A), cf. *Tht.* 152E. It is perhaps explained in Aristotle *Po.*4.

<sup>4625</sup> οὐ ... πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ὀνήρ (C2-3): The demurral is imitated by Aristotle at *EN* 1.6, where he places himself in the place of Plato and Plato in the place of Homer: the misrepresentation of Plato's “doctrine,” in that passage and generally in the writings of Aristotle, vitiate the sincerity of his remark or his standing to make it, or both.

<sup>4626</sup> ἀκούε δή, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποκρίνον (C5). Again the announcement of the dialectical method or procedure of question and answer prefaces the treatment (cf. n.3296).

<sup>4627</sup> ἡ που (C9): cf. 450D5, *Euthyphr.*4A11, *Phd.*84D9; *Dinarchus* 57.

<sup>4628</sup> ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὄρωντες (C10-596A1). It is unlikely Socrates is alluding to their relative age (cf. *Soph.*232E6-8 versus *Leg.*715D7-E2). He acknowledges Glaucon's presumption that he himself should see things more clearly, but replies with the saw that the sharp viewer can miss the forest for the trees. Behind the byplay is the standing joke in praise of shared dialectical search that “two should investigate together since one always sees things before the other” (it being just true that the other sees things later). Cf. 432C1-2 and the proverb he cites from Homer (σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένῳ ..., n.3519). The strained word order would then be part of the joke.

<sup>4629</sup> προθυμηθῆναι ([596A2](#)): One of the elements of dialectical success is that the answerer have the courage to be wrong, as here, and the spirit to try to make his point, as at 533A2. Cf. n. 37 on προθυμία and 376B1 on θαρρεῖν.

that might strike my fancy. No, you do the looking."

Would you be willing, then, for us to begin our investigation<sup>4630</sup> in the way that has become usual for us? We usually posit for ourselves a single and distinct character corresponding to the distinct but plural<sup>4631</sup> things to all of which we refer with one name. Do you follow what I am saying?

"I follow."

So posit<sup>4632</sup> any of the pluralities you wish. For instance there is a plurality of couches and a plurality of tables.<sup>4633</sup>

"Of course."

But when it comes to the ideas or characters corresponding to these artifacts, there are two: one of couch and one of table.

"Yes."

And is it our usage to say, of the makers of each of the two artifacts, that it is by looking off to their idea that<sup>4634</sup> the one manufactures couches and the other manufactures tables, actual ones that we can use, and so on for the rest. After all none of the makers manufactures the idea itself: how could he?<sup>4635</sup>

"No way he could."

But now see what name<sup>4636</sup> you would give to the following sort of maker.

"Which?"

The one that makes all the things that each of the specialized craftsmen makes.

"A clever and amazing man he would be."<sup>4637</sup>

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<sup>4630</sup> The preliminary byplay (595B9-596A4), the formal methodological terminology (ἐνθένδε ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου, 596A5-6), the deployment of a method the two may now refer to as their usual and therefore reliable one (εἰωθυίας, A6: cf. 475E5ff [n.b. σύ γε, of Glaucon]; 507B2-B8 [with similar preliminaries: 507A1-9]), and the asking of a purely logical question (cf. n.4388) all conspire to indicate that the subject is a serious one and deserves to be treated with the greatest care.

<sup>4631</sup> ἔκαστα τὰ πολλά (A7), the usual expression for the plural versions of a distinct character: cf. e.g., 507B6-7, 490B1, 476A7. There is no difference (pace Halliwell) between the way they describe their "way of arguing" here (A6-8) and the way they described it at 507B2-8: the eachness we see in plurality (ἔκαστα, 507B2) relies for its name and its reality on an eachness of certain unique eaches (ιδέαν μίαν ἔκάστου ώς μίας οὐσης, 507B6-7; εἶδος ... τι ἐν ἔκαστον, A6).

<sup>4632</sup> θῶμεν (A10) aorist, of the particular case.

<sup>4633</sup> κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι (B1). The examples he suggests to Glaucon may as well be the sample items Glaucon asked him to provide at 372D7-E1 (ἐπί τε κλινῶν ... καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν). Socrates recalled them at 586A8 by having the cattle eating off these same tables (though he could hardly have them recline on κλῖναι!). The reason for his choosing artifacts will soon become clear (597B6 and n.4652).

<sup>4634</sup> οὗτω (B7), semi-redundant, to emphasize the circumstantial participle (βλέπων): cf. n.939.

<sup>4635</sup> πῶς γάρ (B10) casually dismisses the possibility: how after all could he look off toward it, as a δημιουργός does, while he was making it?

<sup>4636</sup> τίνα καλεῖς (B12): τίς asks for a one-word answer (cf. 597B3 and D13 below; 374E7; and Gorg.447D1 [and Dodds *ad loc.*]), and in particular for a professional designation.

<sup>4637</sup> δεινόν τινα λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστὸν ὄνδρα (C3): The answer reaches adjectives for ὄνδρα but does not reach a name.

That's nothing: as I go on you'll be all the more dazzled.<sup>4638</sup> This craftsman is able to make not only all artifacts but also all the things that come up out of the ground, and fashions all animals including himself, and in addition the earth and the sky he fashions, and the gods and the things in heaven and the things in Hades beneath the earth, one and all.

"Well, you are talking about an utterly amazing *sophist*."<sup>4639</sup>

So you don't believe me? Tell me: do you altogether rule out that such a maker could exist, or could there be a certain manner in which a person could become a maker of all these things, though in another<sup>4640</sup> not? Don't you realize that even you yourself could be able to make all these things, in a certain manner.

"And just what is this certain manner?"

Nothing difficult, in fact a manner that can be produced<sup>4641</sup> quickly and anywhere. The quickest<sup>4642</sup> way in fact is to get your hands on a mirror and carry it around, pointing it in every direction. Right then you'll produce a sun and the things in the sky; right then you'll produce an earth; right then yourself and all the animals and artifacts and plants and the rest we just listed off.

"Sure, appearances of them, but certainly not ones that really exist in truth."<sup>4643</sup>

Well put, and put in a way that advances the argument.<sup>4644</sup> After all,<sup>4645</sup> you would include the painter among those who produce in this way, wouldn't you?

"Of course."

But you will affirm, I think, that what he makes are not true things, though in a certain manner even the painter makes a couch—no?

"Yes, in the sense<sup>4646</sup> that it is the appearance of a couch, he too makes a couch."

(597) But what about the couchmaker? Didn't you just assert that it is not the idea that he makes, which we speak of as being "what it is" to be a couch, but a sort-of<sup>4647</sup> couch?

<sup>4638</sup> For τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις (C4) cf. Crat.410E5.

<sup>4639</sup> σοφιστήν (D1) now replaces the vague noun ἄνδρα, and πάνυ redoes its adjectives (C3). Glaucon has found a noun to call him by. This is the μᾶλλον φάναι Socrates predicted. Socrates's response (ἀπιστεῖς, D2) shows he believes Glaucon is skeptical about the professions and pretensions of sophists. The term is almost always embarrassing or troublesome. Cf. Meno 91C (where Socrates's accuser Anytus calls sophists a λόβη τε καὶ διαφθορά); Prot.312A4; and Aesch.P.V.944, where it is a taunt.

<sup>4640</sup> τινὶ ... τρόπῳ (D3) Socrates riddles Glaucon with this vague term which will be clarified in the solution.

<sup>4641</sup> The τρόπος is δημιουργούμενος (D8), an ugly stretch of a metaphor that answers the riddle by redefining manufacture (δημιουργία) as the manufacture of a means (τρόπος) of "manufacture:" One must simply "produce" a mirror (as we say of the magician).

<sup>4642</sup> τάχιστα (D9): The shift to the superlative indicates there are less quick ways. These, we soon can gather, would be drawing and other kinds of imitation.

<sup>4643</sup> φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γέ που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ (E4): Glaucon himself resuscitates the association of being and truth over against appearance from the third argument of Book Nine (584A7-10, 585B12-E4).

<sup>4644</sup> καλῶς ... καὶ εἰς δέον ἔρχῃ τῷ λόγῳ (E5).

<sup>4645</sup> γάρ (E6): Socrates promises to apply Glaucon's distinction between appearance and reality to take the argument further.

<sup>4646</sup> Socrates's τρόπῳ γέ τινι (E10) begins to recede into its usual meaning, "in a sense."

<sup>4647</sup> κλίνην τινά (597A2) now τὶς is added to the "vocabulary" of the "theory:" cf. A4, D2-3 below.

“So I did.”

So if it is not “what it is” that he makes, he would not be making the real thing. Instead he is making something like the real thing that is not really it.<sup>4648</sup> If someone should assert that the work of the couchmaker, or that of any other kind of craftsman, is a completely and perfectly real thing, in all likelihood his assertion would not be true.

“No it wouldn’t, at least in the judgment of people that make it their business to talk as we do.”<sup>4649</sup>

And so let’s not be surprised if the product is also rather unclear<sup>4650</sup> in respect to its truth.

“No, let’s not.”

Would you like to look for the nature of the imitator we are trying to understand,<sup>4651</sup> in terms of this example?

“If you think so.”

It turns out there are three kinds of couches: one that really exists in nature<sup>4652</sup>—which I imagine we would say was the creation of god, if anybody.

“Nobody else.”

Then there is one that the carpenter made.

“Yes.”

And one that the painter made, correct?

“Granted.”

<sup>4648</sup> ὃν δὲ οὐ (A5) is parallel with the predicate, τοιοῦτον οἶον τὸ ὅν. For all its likeness, what he makes lacks the quality by virtue of which we can refer to the εἶδος, or to ὁ ἔστι κλίνη, as τὸ ὅν. This predicate it lacks is then immediately clarified as τελέως ὅν (*ibid.*).

<sup>4649</sup> τοιούσδε (A8): With his first person demonstrative (“as we do”), Glaucon acknowledges that he joins Socrates in what he had asserted above (596A5-8, B6-10). In addition to the original “vocabulary” of 596E5-8 (ἔκαστον vs. ἔκαστα / ἐν vs. πολλά) we have since accumulated φαινόμενα vs. ὄντα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ (E4), ὁ ἔστι vs. τὶς (597A4), τὸ ὅν vs. τοιοῦτον τι (A4-5) and τέλεως ὅν (A5).

<sup>4650</sup> ἀμυδρόν τι (A10), primarily optical. What is ἀμυδρόν is the ἔκαστον-identity as embodied in the product, as the term was used in describing the many and the one (cf. 596A6-7 and n. 4631). In addition (καὶ) to the object being only οἶον with respect to the ὅν, our perception of the idea in it is fuzzier than the cognition of and the truth of the idea, the ὅν. The distinction between truth as the subjective and being as the objective characteristic of the really real arose in the context from which Glaucon resuscitated the distinction between the φαινόμενον and the ὅν (i.e., Bk. 9, 584E5 [and n. 4420], 585B9-10 [and n. 4435], 586A4-6), whence Socrates’s γάρ at 596E6. Socrates and Glaucon simply understand themselves to be applying what they agreed on before, though by now they both have acknowledged that not everybody talks this way (cf. A8-9 and n.).

<sup>4651</sup> τοῦτο (B3) refers to the original question, which was cast in terms of μίμησις not μιμητήν (595C7-8).

<sup>4652</sup> ἐν τῇ φύσει (B6): That it exists “in nature” is either a warrant for saying, or merely another way of saying, that god made it—whence the relative clause with potential optative. The figure of a divine maker enables the comparison to be made between and among the three types of couch; nothing more should be made of it, as Socrates suggests with ἡ τιν' ἄλλον. The metaphor of φύσις is now introduced to draw a contrast between the higher reality of the εἶδος and the output of the craftsman and the painter. We may use the language of creation to convey the metaphor; and the reading ἐν τῇ φύσει in mss. FD comports better with such metaphorical language than does the bare dative (φύσει) found in AM. Cf. D3 below and n. 4658.

Painter, couchmaker, god: three kinds of masters responsible for three kinds of couch.<sup>4653</sup>

“Yes, three.”

Now as for god, whether he did not want to or there was some necessity constraining him not to make more than one couch in nature, he made one and one alone,<sup>4654</sup> that selfsame couch that is what it is to be a couch. Two that are like each other,<sup>4655</sup> or more than two, were not created by the god nor is there any chance they might sprout up on their own.<sup>4656</sup>

“Why?”

Because if he should make two only, a third would suddenly appear *de novo*, of which those two would both in turn have the character,<sup>4657</sup> which third thing would therefore be what it is to be a couch, and not those two.

“Correctly argued.”

Knowing this, as I imagine, and having in mind to be truly the maker of what it truly is to be a couch rather than to be a sort-of couchmaker of a sort-of couch, he *created* a couch in its singular distinctness to exist *by nature*.<sup>4658</sup>

“So it seems.”

Would you then have us call him the creator<sup>4659</sup> of this or something along these lines?

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<sup>4653</sup> τρισὶν εἶδεσι (B14), one of which is the εἶδος, in another sense of the term. Dialectical exchange thrives on varying the terminology even at the expense of risking confusion, in order to encourage and reinforce reliance on thought instead of language. Likewise, ἐπιστάτης is not “mock-official” (Halliwell) but struggles to articulate the new idea with a transcategorical common term. We will need it below in our exegesis (*ad* D13).

<sup>4654</sup> μίαν μόνον (C3): cf. 548C6, *Apol.*25B8, *Crit.*47B2, *Symp.*184C2.

<sup>4655</sup> δύο δὲ τοιαῦται ἡ πλείους (C4): τοιαῦται is strictly pleonastic, and broaches the problem to come by recalling the use of τοιοῦτον at 597A5, which there stood in contrast with ὅν. Being like is less than being real; resemblance has a weaker foothold on being than self-identity does.

<sup>4656</sup> ἔφυτενθησαν and φυῶσιν (C4-5) continue the metaphor of φύσις from above. φυῶσιν (pres. subj.) is transitive in the apparently intransitive sense noted by LSJ s.v. §A,II. Quite apart from the figure of the divine maker, a “spontaneous generation” of multiple ideas must also be ruled out: this was the reason for the alternative εἴτε τις ἀνάγκη ἐπῆν (above, C1).

<sup>4657</sup> ής ... τὸ εἶδος ἔχοιεν (C8): So much follows from τοιαῦται (C4), casually added above.

Socrates anticipates the core idea of Aristotle’s “third man” argument, though that argument relies on the supplementary error of conflating the orders of being—what the singular something *is* versus what the plural somethings *have* (εἴη ὁν [sc. τὸ εἶδος] and ἔχοιεν, C8-9).

<sup>4658</sup> ὄντως bis (D1-2): The syntax of ὄντως κλίνης ποιητής ὄντως οὔσης is clarified by the denial of the alternative: μὴ κλίνης τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις (D2-3), which by employing the new language of τις from 597A2 indicates that the first ὄντως goes with ποιητής not κλίνης, and the second with οὔσης. The ensuing main clause μίαν φύσει αὐτήν ἔφυσεν (D3) then restates what ὄντως denoted by means of the φύσις metaphor (ἔφυσεν formulating ὄντως ποιητής and μίαν φύσει αὐτήν restating ὄντως οὔσης). With the dropping of the preposition ἐν, φύσις and φύσει now enter the special “vocabulary” of the theory. The triadic structure that asserts the positive, denies the negative, and then reasserts the positive in different or stronger terms (D1-3) is a favorite technique in Plato, noted by Riddell (§304). It resembles the triadic order of statement, analogy, and a restatement that borrows terms from the analogy—e.g., 604D2, 605A8-C4 and n.4864. The *argumentum ex contrariis* or *a fortiori* often employs this form (e.g., 600C2-E2 and n.4742).

<sup>4659</sup> φυτουργόν (D5): The word conveniently brings together the god’s comparable aspect (as a maker: -ουργός) and his contrasting aspect (as creator: φυτ-), per notes above, in the same way that the language of creation already came to our aid above. God is in a sense making a φύσις, not a φυτόν

"The usage would be correct if he has made this and all the other things so as to be 'by nature.'"<sup>4660</sup>

What are we to call the carpenter? A "manufacturer" of a couch?

"Yes."

Should we likewise call the painter a manufacturer or maker of this sort<sup>4661</sup> of thing?

"By no means!"

But then what is he to the couch?<sup>4662</sup>

"By my lights it would be fairest<sup>4663</sup> to call him an imitator of the things of which those two<sup>4664</sup> are makers."

Alright then, I gather that you are calling the man who deals with what belongs in the third generation from nature an imitator.<sup>4665</sup>

"Quite so."

Therefore the tragic poet will fall into this category of yours, if in fact he is an imitator, and will be

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(which is the metaphor that underlies the term); but the language is being stretched to say something there was no way to say, before. The notion of a maker-god is here advanced by Socrates and Glaucon purely for their present dialectical needs (the definition of mimetic ποίησις); it is of a piece with the narrow characterization of art (ποίησις) as painting for the sake of exploiting an analogy between painted likeness to original and likeness of spatio-temporal of things to forms. Neither of these ideas needs to be taken to represent a phase of "Platonic metaphysics."

<sup>4660</sup> φύσει γε (D7): with γε (*vi termini*), Glaucon notes and accepts the new term into their special vocabulary. His perfect πεποίηκεν also attempts to confer, onto the god's making, the character of being something that happened outside of (before) time. We shall see more such perfects below (e.g., E7, 598B1; cf. elsewhere, ὥμοιωται, 431E8; τετεύκακεν, 521E4; πέπτηγεν, 530D6; τετράφαται, 533B6; τέταται, 581B6, ὥρμηκε, 582C5; ἀφέστηκεν, 587A7; ἐσκήνηται, 610E3), designating the structure of reality as separate and distinct from events that might take place in it.

<sup>4661</sup> δημιουργὸν καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τοιούτου (D11): Instead of asking whether we should call the painter a δημιουργὸς κλίνης, the expression used of the carpenter, Socrates asks whether he is a ποιητὴς τοῦ τοιούτου. The casual pleonasm with ποιητὴς neutralizes the question whether δημιουργός *per se* is appropriate, but by casually substituting τοῦ τοιούτου for κλίνης he also narrows the κλίνη of the carpenter into being a "sort-of" couch, as opposed to the "what is really couch," which god established in nature; and this in turn pushes the drawn couch into the echelon of a "sort-of sort-of" couch. It is then this stratification of sorts, or the meaningless of a "sort of sort of" (articulated below as a τρίτον γέννημα, E3), that elicits Glaucon's strong response (οὐδαμῶς, D12).

<sup>4662</sup> With ἀλλά (D13) Socrates plays dumb. The genitive (κλίνης) is objective, leaving Glaucon a blank in the dialectical "matrix" (cf. 332C9 and n. 153) to fill with a verbal noun for the specific ἐπιστάτης, parallel to δημιουργός.

<sup>4663</sup> μετριώτατα (E1) bespeaks Glaucon's reluctance to go too far, just as his δίκαιον (D7) had insisted on going far enough on behalf of the god. Notably the reluctance here is Glaucon's and not Socrates's (who is reluctant according to the preamble, 595B9-C3): it is Glaucon as it turns out that has insisted on "demoting" the artist.

<sup>4664</sup> ἔκεινοι (E2): Glaucon would sooner revert to grouping the god with the carpenter as a fellow δημιουργός of a couch (compare the early formulation, θεὸν ἐργάζεσθαι [B6-7]) than to allow the painter to be grouped with a carpenter, even though both create artifacts.

<sup>4665</sup> τὸν τοῦ τρίτου γεννήματος (E3) is the "first" accusative of καλεῖς, answering with its genitive the question τί ... κλίνης above (D13): the man who oversees the third couch is to be called an "imitator" thereof.

at a sort of third remove from the king<sup>4666</sup>—the true by nature<sup>4667</sup>—as will all the other imitators.

“He probably would.”

Alright then, we have reached an agreement about the imitator.<sup>4668</sup> Now answer me the following question using (598) the painter as example. Do you think he tries to imitate that distinct thing in itself that exists by nature, or does he try to imitate the works<sup>4669</sup> of the craftsmen?

“The works of the craftsmen.”<sup>4670</sup>

Do you mean as they are or as they appear? I need you to specify this further.

“What do you mean?”

The following. Take a couch, when viewed from the side or from the end or whatever angle: does it differ in itself from itself or does it not differ at all but appears in different ways?<sup>4671</sup> I’m asking in general, not just about couches.

“The latter: it takes on different appearances but differs<sup>4672</sup> not at all.”

So focus on just this point. Toward which is the art of painting set up by nature<sup>4673</sup> with respect to the thing<sup>4674</sup> it draws: toward the real, how the thing really is, or toward the appearance, how it appears? Is it of appearance or of truth<sup>4675</sup> that it is an imitation?<sup>4676</sup>

<sup>4666</sup> τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ ἀληθείας (E7): τις and the addition of the article to ἀληθείας suggest that τρίτος ἀπὸ βασιλέως is a catchphrase (describing perhaps a position in a board game) introduced as a metaphor (whence τις) whose meaning is then added as exegesis (καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας). An allusion to the ranking of the types in Book Nine (587AD, *pace* J.-C.) is a reach that adds nothing. Adam reviews several suggestions in a separate Appendix (2.464-5).

<sup>4667</sup> πεφυκώς (E7) brings to bear both the new use of φύσις in the theory and Glaucon’s special use of the perfect, onto the imitator.

<sup>4668</sup> ὡμολογήκαμεν (A10), referring back to B2-3 where they agreed to find out about him. The generalization from painter through dramatist (εἰπερ μητής = *qua* imitator) to πάντες asserts that they have reached a definition.

<sup>4669</sup> ἔκαστον (598A2) is enough to designate the form, and the grammatical plural (τά ... ἔργα) enough to designate the ἔκαστα.

<sup>4670</sup> τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν (A4): The answer is a foregone conclusion (it is implicit in the metaphor of the τρίτον γέννημα that Glaucon has already accepted; but it functions to set up the next question as further specification (ἔτι διόρισον, A5) of that position.

<sup>4671</sup> διαφέρει αὐτὴ ἔαυτῆς and φαίνεται ἀλλοία (A8-9) almost constitute the language of the theory, to distinguish the manufactured couch from the many ways it appears to observers. Beneath the surface there is something of a continuous analogy (form: artifact :: artifact: painted image), in itself reminiscent of the Line passage (cf. n.3113).

<sup>4672</sup> διαφέρει δ’ οὐδέν (A10): In another context the wooden couch will indeed differ from itself, as when it ages and begins to squeak: its self-identity is not that of ὁ ἔστι κλίνη.

<sup>4673</sup> πεποίηται (B1) echoes the perfect πεφυκώς (597E7) and πεποίηκεν (597D8): Socrates speaks of the art of painting as existing within the fixed structure of reality, just the sort of outlook modernism always thinks it is overthrowing. For the perfects cf. 530D6 and 605A2-4, below.

<sup>4674</sup> ἔκαστον (B2) is now allowed to refer to a single particular as it does in normal parlance and can within the loose vocabulary of the theory (cf. 515D4).

<sup>4675</sup> ἀληθείας (B3) replaces τὸ ὄν (B2) for which it is a synonym in the language of the theory (e.g. 596E4): what is objectively τὸ ὄν is to cognition ἀλήθεια. Cf. n.4650 ad 597A10.

<sup>4676</sup> φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὖσα μίμησις (B3-4) re-asks the question πότερα πρὸς τὸ ὄν ὡς ἔχει μιμήσασθαι, ἢ πρὸς τὸ φανόμενον ὡς φαίνεται (B2-3). To restate the question before waiting for an answer is as common in Plato as in real life, as is placing the restatement in a subordinate construction, as with circumstantial participles here; but adding chiasm to the mix (πρὸς τὸ ὄν / πρὸς

“Of appearance.”

Then it is somewhere far from truth, and what in fact enables it to imitate so many things is that in a way it barely<sup>4677</sup> needs to grasp the thing<sup>4678</sup> it imitates, and merely mere a likeness of it to boot. For example we say that the painter is going to paint a shoemaker<sup>4679</sup> for us or a builder or any other worker<sup>4680</sup>—though he knows nothing of their trades;<sup>4681</sup> but nevertheless for children at least<sup>4682</sup> and foolish men, too (assuming he is a worthy painter), if he paints<sup>4683</sup> a carpenter and shows it to them from a distance he would delude them into concluding it was a real carpenter.

“Of course.”

Instead we have to adopt the following attitude in all such cases. Anytime someone tells us that τὸ φαίνομενον // φαντάσματος / ἀληθείας confuses things more than usual, unless of course we are meant to see the answer as a foregone conclusion – which in fact it is. What makes it foregone is the strange mental gymnastic that the last question (A7-9) already put us through. We have never seen, nor been asked to try to see, the physical couch as it is in itself.

<sup>4677</sup> σμικρόν τι (B7) adverbial accusative, as is εἴδωλον in exegesis of it, below. The underlying idea is crass but commonsensical: the output of the painter is not infinitely greater than that of the craftsman because he “makes” only only a little of the many things he makes. Their total output would thus be of the same order of magnitude.

<sup>4678</sup> ἐκάστου (B7) used here of the essence in things as at 596A8, a sense akin to the sense it has when used of the forms, as at 596A6. Cf. n. 3209 ad 515D4.

<sup>4679</sup> ζωγράφησει ἡμῖν σκυτότομον (B9) In the context of σμικρόν τι (B7) adverbial accusative, as is εἴδωλον in exegesis of it, below ἀπεργάζεται (B7) we find ourselves speaking as if a shoemaker is the result of the painting; and just by taking it literally we realized in how weak and illusive a sense it is that a shoemaker is being produced.

<sup>4680</sup> σκυτότομον, τέκτονα, τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς (B9-C1). Listing items in asyndeton (B9) without special rhetorical purpose or effect is as impossible in English as it is common in Greek. Contrast the rhetorical use of such asyndeton, e.g. at 361E4-2A1 (Glaucon’s “punishments” for the just man), and 373B7-8 and C2-4 (the flood of functionaries necessitated by the acceleration of luxury), and Phdrs.241C1-5 and Rep.580A3-5 (both expressing exasperation), with the present list as well as those at 399C1-3, 434C7-8, 490C10-11, 597B13-14; Crito 51C8-9 (Cf.50E2); Gorg.478B4, 504A2-3 (of δημιουργοί), 517D4-5; H.Maj.291D9-E2; Leg.710C5-6, 797D10-E2, 897A1-3 (and Stallb. ad loc.); Phdo.65D12-14; Phdrs.239A2-4, 240D12-3, 253D4-E1, E1-5, 255E3; Phlb.19D4-5; Prot.319D; Symp.173B2, 197D3 (Agathon), 207E2-3, 211E1; Tht.171E2-3, 186D10-E1, 207A5-7. English allows asyndesis if the final two items are connected, the last often being a generalization (as Leg.649D5-7, Phdrs.240D2-3, 246D8-E1; Polit.260D11-E2; Rep.395C4-5, 580A3-5: cf. Denniston, 104-5) but Greek, as in the present list, does not require terminal syndesis, either (e.g., Gorg.504A2-3, 517D4-5; Symp.186D7-E1; Tht.171E2-3, 178B4-5; and cf. Denniston, xliv). Asyndeton is mitigated or caused by anaphora at Polit.268A7-B5. A list of unconnected items appended in apposition to a general term or in summary should be considered a special use of asyndetic list (Crat.426E2-3; Crito 51C8-9; Leg.710C5-6 (cf.709E7ff), 733E5-6, 964B5-6; Rep.471D3, 487A3-5, 580B3-4; Symp.186D7-E1; Tht.207A5-7) and is not unrelated to the use of asyndeton in the summary recitation of dihairesis (e.g. Soph.223B2-5, 224C10-D2, 226A2-4).

<sup>4681</sup> περὶ οὐδενὸς τούτων ... τῶν τεχνῶν (C1). Adam’s worry about whether he is ignorant of the men or their arts is insignificant (601A1 below proves what he means here), in comparison with the subtle point being made, that a drawing of a δημιουργός will depict him *at work* so that the painter needs to know what, for instance, a carpenter does and does not do with a coping saw or any other tool, in order to depict him properly. It is even true that knowledge of the ultimate use of the artifact the depicted artisan is making will help the painter depict him, as witness the extra tight cinching-up you would add if your were imitating a father tightening the lug nuts on a wheel of the family car after changing a flat on the highway. For the meaning cf. n. 4763.

he encountered a man that knew all the trades and all the other things that each individual type of person knows, and had mastered them all with no less finish than anybody else, we mustn't sit still for such behavior<sup>4684</sup> but tell him he is something of a fool, and that apparently what he encountered was some kind of magician or imitator<sup>4685</sup> and was deluded by him into concluding he was omniscient,<sup>4686</sup> since he was unable to make his own test of the person's knowledge or lack thereof, and see whether it was an imitation.<sup>4687</sup>

"Exactly right."

### 3.A.2: Critique of Poetry as Imitation

So mustn't we next investigate<sup>4688</sup> the art of tragedy and its great leader Homer, since we do hear people say<sup>4689</sup> that these poets "know all the trades, know all human matters having to do with virtue and vice, and know divine matters to boot?<sup>4690</sup> After all"—they say—"it is necessary that a good<sup>4691</sup> poet, if he is to compose a fine piece on some subject, compose on a subject he knows, to be sure, or else<sup>4692</sup> be unable to." And so we must inquire carefully whether – being imitators these persons they

<sup>4682</sup> παῖδάς γε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους (C2): The case of children is inherently credible and gives a foothold to extend the argument to certain adults if they are foolish enough: the list is therefore metabatic and γε is to be read with ms.D (against τε of AFM).

<sup>4683</sup> γράψας (C3): the ζω- prefix is dropped in repetition (n. 1532).

<sup>4684</sup> τῷ τοιούτῳ (D1-2) masc.: "break in on the man when he is acting this way": for ὑπολαμβάνειν c. dat. cf. Prot.320C5.

<sup>4685</sup> γόντι τινὶ καὶ μιμητῇ (D3): This is Socrates's attempt to supply a workable answer to the question that Glaucon bailed out on answering above, when he said the δημιουργὸς ἀπάντων must be a σοφιστής (596D1: cf. n.4639).

<sup>4686</sup> πάσσοφος (D3) a term of marvelling approbation, of ironic praise (for Socrates: e.g., Lys.216A), or of derogatory resentment (cf. διασόφων, 607C1): with it Socrates acknowledges Glaucon's reason for bailing out at 596D1.

<sup>4687</sup> ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μίμησιν (D4-5): the first καί links the alternatives and the second represents an inference from or exegesis of the second alternative.

<sup>4688</sup> ἐπισκεπτέον (D7), echoing ἔξετάσαι (D5): we have to do it or else we will leave ourselves in the position of the fool.

<sup>4689</sup> ἐπειδή τινων ἀκούομεν (D8-E1): the stiff and pedantic style of the ensuing ὅτι clause (including the anaphora of πάντα and the ordering of the list with its γε [= "no less"]]) indicate it is either a quotation (double quotes—n.b. ἀκούομεν) or characterization of the τινες (single quotes). The ensuing sentence in γάρ, with its postponed ἄρα clause and its overconfident ἢ ("or else"), is likewise either quotation or pseudo-quotation, giving not Socrates's explanation why the poets must be omniscient but that of the τινες (note how the tone resembles that of the list at 596C5-9 with its confident anaphora of πάντα). It is less important to speculate about the identity of these persons, a point Socrates himself passes over, than to notice their argument is circular: "The poets know everything, since a good poet will only compose well if he composes with understanding: just think about it (ἄρα)! Otherwise he couldn't!" The ἄρα hopes to compel assent by depicting as patent exactly the point that needs to be proved. Socrates will explore the contrapositive, namely, if the poet does not know, how can we still believe his poetry to be fine?

<sup>4690</sup> καὶ τὰ γε θεῖα (E2): for γε marking the last item in the list as extreme cf. 329D2 and n.70.

<sup>4691</sup> τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν (E3) continues the parallel with the painter above (εἰ ἀγαθὸς εἴη ζωγράφος, C2): but there what it meant to be good was that he was able to convince fools without himself knowing anything about what he was painting; here his goodness is an inference from the fineness (καλῶς, E4) of his composition.

<sup>4692</sup> ἢ (E4) meaning "or else" (cf. n.407).

have encountered<sup>4693</sup> – they have come away from their encounters deluded, and though they have seen their works they still (599) do not perceive about them they are at a third remove from reality and truth, and would as such be easy to compose for a person who does not know the truth, since after all<sup>4694</sup> it is appearances and not the realities<sup>4695</sup> that they are composing. Or is it the case that there is<sup>4696</sup> something to their claim, that in truth their “good” poets do have knowledge of the things they write about so “well,”<sup>4697</sup> as so many people think.

“We must indeed conduct the test.”<sup>4698</sup>

Now do you imagine that if a person had the ability to make both the object that is to be imitated and a likeness of it,<sup>4699</sup> he would allow himself to become serious about the manufacture of likenesses and adopt this as the goal of his life, thinking that having this he would have the best of things?<sup>4700</sup>

“Myself I do not.”

And yet at the same time I imagine that if he should *have*<sup>4701</sup> real competence about the things that he also imitates, he would far sooner get seriously involved in real acts<sup>4702</sup> than the realm of

<sup>4693</sup> μιμηταῖς τούτοις (E5): Richards's argument for emending the τούτοις of the mss. to τοιούτοις, ignored until Slings adopted it, was obviated all along by the fact that the demonstrative is anarthrous. The sense is not “these imitators” but “these men, given the fact that they are imitators.”

<sup>4694</sup> φαντάσματα γάρ (599A2): The fact their versions engage only the imagination of the audience (φαντάσματα) enables the makers to produce them “easily” (ράδια ποιεῖν), i.e., even without knowledge (μὴ εἰδότι), since the audience will not perceive their unreality or falseness.

<sup>4695</sup> φαντάσματα ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντα (A2). Here and just above (τοῦ ὄντος, A1), “being” replaces what was done with “truth” in the version about the painter (φαντάσματος ἡ ἀληθείας, 598B3; τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, B6). Cf. n. ad 598B3.

<sup>4696</sup> On this sort of ἡ καί (A3) Denniston (306) quotably says, “ἡ separates two ideas objectively, in point of fact, while καί denotes that, subjectively, both must be kept before the mind.”

<sup>4697</sup> Now εὖ (A4), the adverb of ἀγαθός, replaces καλῶς (598E4), the adverb of καλός. Though the judgment may now be more comprehensive rather than purely aesthetic, it is still the verb and not the noun—the writing or speaking and not the content (περὶ ὅν, A4 and 598E3)—on which *hoi polloi* base their judgment. By adding δοκοῦσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς (A4) Socrates aligns this restatement of the sponsors' claim about poetry (598E1-5) with the remark he had made above about the “good” painter that can fool the unwary (598B8-C4).

<sup>4698</sup> ἔξεσταστέον (A5). By returning Socrates's ἐπισκεπτέον (598D7) to the ἔξετάσαι it echoed (D5), Glaucon agrees both that the investigation must be made and why it must be made.

<sup>4699</sup> τό τε μιμηθσόμενον καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον (A6-7): The original is depicted as a future verbal modification of itself (μιμηθσόμενον: it will have been imitated), whereas the artifactual imitation of it is elevated to the ontological status of a substantive (εἴδωλον)! The syntax and semantics are imitating the error of treating imitations as reals by itself putting the cart before the horse (cf. 510A9-10 and B4-5, and n.3121).

<sup>4700</sup> ὡς βέλτιστον ἔχοντα (B1): taking βέλτιστον as a secondary predicate of τοῦτο the (understood) direct object of ἔχοντα. All four terms (ἀφεῖναι, σπουδάζειν, προστήσασθαι, βέλτιστον) cast the person's choice as a moral decision about his life, in which his θυμός is involved, rather than about art. They do not “anticipate” the point made at 602B8 below (Halliwell), but motivate and *imply* it.

<sup>4701</sup> καί (B4) is “displaced.” It emphasizes ἐπιστήμων but is placed with μιμεῖται. Cf. Denniston, 295-6.

<sup>4702</sup> ἔργα (B4), with its moral connotation (vs. λόγοι, a contrast made explicit below with ὁ ἔγκωμιαζόμενος [the doer] vs. ὁ ἔγκωμιάζων [the talker] B7) shades the “action” of the poet's ποίησις into a μίμησις of action. The paradox is worked another way at Leg.817B1-D8 (ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν

imitations.<sup>4703</sup> He would be involved in an effort to leave behind deeds great and many, as memorials<sup>4704</sup> to be remembered by; and he would be eager to be the person praised rather than the person praising.

“I imagine so. Both the honor and the usefulness of the two are hardly on a par.”

So when it comes to all the other things<sup>4705</sup> let's not require Homer or any other of the poets—as we would for instance if he were<sup>4706</sup> a physician and not just an imitator of physicians' talk—to answer the question, What men has any poet, whether current or aforesome, known to have made<sup>4707</sup> healthy, as Asclepius did? nor What group of medical students has he spawned,<sup>4708</sup> like the progeny that great man spawned.<sup>4709</sup> And let's not ask them about the other skills,<sup>4710</sup> either: let all that go. But when Homer tries to talk about the greatest and the finest subjects,<sup>4711</sup> about wars and generalships and the

τραγωδίας αύτοὶ ποιηταί ...).

<sup>4703</sup> πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ... ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς μιμήμασι (B4-5): the pair replaces τὸ τε μιμηθησόμενον καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον (A6-7), and now the semantics and syntax correspond with the order of reality: the ἔργον is real (vs. λόγος, a slap in the face to poetry: see prev. n.) and the εἴδωλον is revealed to be the verbal modification of the original (verbal noun μίμημα replacing εἴδωλον): contrast n.4699. The shift from ἐν (with ἔργα) to ἐπί (with μιμήματα) suggests a fuller participation in the already present (whence πρότερον) surroundings as opposed to a translation of consciousness into an alternative realm.

<sup>4704</sup> μνημεῖα (B6) suggests the (imitative) art of statuary and therefore effects the transition to the actor as *laudandus* and poet as *laudator* in the next lines. Socrates is not (pace Halliwell) denying all value to the imitator and commemorator of great deeds but only making the comparative point that if one were capable of both he could never find the latter nobler than what it is its job to enoble. If the poet finds himself more serious than what there is for him to praise he should, and if truly serious will, give up poetry and do something inherently more important, assuming (with Socrates, A6-7) that he is able. If for instance a Pindar is able to discover in a concrete victory at Olympia a larger historical and political significance, even to the point of immortalizing it, then Pindar should be a ruler rather than a poet.

<sup>4705</sup> τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων πέρι (B9), that ἄλλος is proleptic (as in ἄλλως τε καί) is acknowledged by the anastrophe.

<sup>4706</sup> ἦν (C2): the imperfect quietly intimates that the premise is irreal.

<sup>4707</sup> τίνας ὑγιεῖς ποιητής τις ... λέγεται πεποιηκέναι (C2-3). The periphrasis ποιεῖν ὑγιεῖς (for ἀκεῖσθαι or ἰᾶσθαι) has a satirical edge: ‘who ever got his poetry to heal somebody?’

<sup>4708</sup> μαθητὰς ιακτρικῆς κατελίπετο (C4-5), a group for which he could be said to be ἡγεμών in the way Homer is said to be the ἡγεμών and πρῶτος διδόσκαλος of tragedy (598D8, 595C1-2).

<sup>4709</sup> ἐκεῖνος τοὺς ἐκγόνους (C5). Mentioning Homer's “progeny” (which consists of poets—see prev. n.) allusively grants him greatness as a poet (pace Halliwell, *passim*) at the same time that it denies him competence in any matter he writes about (cf. the adverbs εὖ and καλῶς [599A4, 598E4] versus περὶ ὅν of [599A4, 598E3]).

<sup>4710</sup> τέχνας (C6), after the single example of medicine, articulates what the “other” subjects are (τῶν ἄλλων, B9) whose credentials we are not interested in challenging (ἀπαιτεῖν λόγον, B9), as being insignificant in comparison with the subject matters involved in important deeds of the sort poetry sees fit to recount (B3-7). The techniques of composing poetry would of course be among these former τέχναι, but Halliwell faults “Plato” for ignoring to accord praise to Homer for teaching it, nevertheless.

<sup>4711</sup> περὶ δὲ ὅν μεγίστων τε καὶ καλλίστων (C7) the two (nominal) adjectives designate the περὶ ὅν and match (as superlatives) with the grounds on which audiences praise the “manner” of poetry (εὖ and καλῶς being the positive grade) so as to throw down the gauntlet. The two adjectives represent the superlative grade of the commonplace expression, ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν. Cf. n.1556.

organization of cities and about the way a man is educated, then I'd say we have every warrant<sup>4712</sup> to question him by way of information, "Friend Homer, if you are not at the third remove from truth when the subject is virtue<sup>4713</sup> and not a manufacturer of images<sup>4714</sup>—which for us became the definition of a mimic—but are in fact at the second remove, and thus were<sup>4715</sup> able to judge which sorts of behavior make men nobler or baser both in their private lives and as citizens, then tell us about<sup>4716</sup> a city that achieved a nobler organization because of you,<sup>4717</sup> the way Lacedaemon did because of Lycurgus and many cities large and small did, because of many other men? When it comes to you, what city claims you as a man who became a good lawgiver and brought benefit to it? Charondas Italy can claim and Sicily, and we claim Solon:<sup>4718</sup> but which when it comes to you?" Will he be able to mention<sup>4719</sup> one?

"I imagine he won't. The very Homerids have no such tales to tell about their favorite."<sup>4720</sup>

(600) But perhaps there's a war<sup>4721</sup> during Homer's life,<sup>4722</sup> whether run by the great man, or he served as an advisor, that is commemorated<sup>4723</sup> as having been well fought?

"Not a one."

<sup>4712</sup> δίκαιον που (D1) picks up the notion of warrant implicit in ἀπαιτεῖν above (B9) and continues to indicate that the question tempts confrontation (cf. κατερεῦτε, 595B3 and n.4621).

<sup>4713</sup> ἀρετῆς πέρι (D3): hazards a category for τὰ μέγιστά τε καὶ κάλλιστα, which have been said to include war, generalships, governance, and education.

<sup>4714</sup> The appositive (εἰδώλου δημιουργός, D3) is an exegesis of τρίτος, since δημιουργός brings him down to the second level (cf. κλινοποιός, 597D1-3 leading to δημιουργός, D10) and εἰδώλου brings him down to the third (597E3-8, fleshed out at 598B1-4 and summarized with εἴδωλον at B8).

<sup>4715</sup> ἡσθα (D4) shifts from the present indicative of a simple protasis (εἰ, D3) to an imperfect that again shades the protasis toward irreality (cf. ἦν, C2).

<sup>4716</sup> πυνθανομένους (D1) invited him to take the floor, and the present λέγε (D6) asks for a story (such as we might expect from Homer), not just a name.

<sup>4717</sup> With ἐπιτηδεύματα and ὕκησεν (D5-6) Socrates is looking back toward his list of the μέγιστά τε καὶ καλά and sees παιδεία and διοικήσεις (C8-D1).

<sup>4718</sup> That Solon wrote poetry as well as laws hardly (*pace Halliwell*) vitiates "Plato's" argument that a man who could act would take action more seriously than writing about it, even without the remark attributed to Critias at *Tim.*21C, which has to do only with the reason the story Solon told Critias is incomplete.

<sup>4719</sup> εἰπεῖν (E4): As Homer's prospects slim, the present λέγε yields to an aorist. Contrast λέγεται in the next line.

<sup>4720</sup> Όμηριδῶν (E6). "Homer-lovers" (cf. *Ion* 530E7, *Phdr.*252B4), identical to the Όμήρου ἐπαινέται of 606E1, and perhaps the προστάται ποιήσεως of 607D6. The patronymic recalls the metaphor of Asclepius's ἔκγονοι (599C5), which in turn recalls the metaphor of Homer as ἡγεμών (595C2). αὐτῶν stresses their intimate connection with him. Together, these lay an insinuation that they, if anyone, could well have made up such a tale, which οὔκουν ... γε then emphatically denies.

<sup>4721</sup> Άλλὰ δή τις πόλεμος (600A1): Socrates takes a further step backwards in the list (πολέμων τε πέρι καὶ στρατηγιῶν, C8) and as he does the prospect of truth gently becomes stranger than fiction.

<sup>4722</sup> ἐπὶ Όμήρου (A1) as opposed to the wars he sings about, which took place before he could have served. Socrates is looking for action not talk (ὕρχοντος), but of course allows the talk of strategizing (συμβουλεύοντος).

<sup>4723</sup> μνημονεύεται (A2): again Socrates leans over backwards to include the "record" of lore.

But<sup>4724</sup> often you hear tell of practical applications stemming from a wise man's insights,<sup>4725</sup> something that can readily be translated into the arts or other activities—like the stories about Thales<sup>4726</sup> and Anacharsis?<sup>4727</sup>

"Nothing at all like this."<sup>4728</sup>

But let go the public sphere. Isn't there some story about him becoming an overseer of the education of some individuals or other<sup>4729</sup> during his life, who were much pleased by their association with him and handed down to their descendants a "Homeric" way of living, the way Pythagoras in his own person was such a signal success at this and likewise had successors even down to the present day, calling themselves "Pythagorean" for the way they live their life, and who went on to stand out<sup>4730</sup> in the other departments of human affairs?

"Nothing like that, either, even in lore. As for 'associates' of Homer's all we have is Creophylus, Socrates; and as for his education, if anything it is more ridiculous even than that name of his,<sup>4731</sup> assuming the stories about Homer are true.<sup>4732</sup> They say he largely ignored Homer even while he was alive."<sup>4733</sup>

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<sup>4724</sup> With his second ἀλλὰ δή (A4: cf.A1) and then his third (A9) Socrates appears to be pleading on Homer's behalf against the implacable severity of Glaucon. For the collocation cf. Denniston, 242; and compare 365D6, Crito 54A1, Prot.338C1, Tim.21A4.

<sup>4725</sup> With ἐπίνοιαι (A4) Socrates reaches the bottom of the barrel, scraping for thoughts that might have occurred to Homer about "something" (*περὶ τίνος*). This expression implicitly acknowledges the topic to be unimportant, and we are asked to conceive some serendipity by which some "thought" might have an unforeseen benefit in a practical area! It must not be technical knowledge—this has been excluded (599C9-C6)—but the casual insight of a "particularly talented man" (*σοφοῦ ἀνδρός*). The conception is illogical but absolutely commonplace and underlies the potent advertising device of the "celebrity-spokesman." We might compare the great and wise legislator, Benjamin Franklin, inventor of bifocals and the lightning rod.

<sup>4726</sup> For Thales's practical abilities, cf. Hdt. I.75, 170; A.Av. 1009; at the same time he is the "poster boy" for the skygazing dreamer out of touch with practical things: cf. his ἀστρονομέν in Tht.174A.

<sup>4727</sup> D.L. has Anacharsis inventing the anchor and the potter's wheel (I.105) but his credentials as a σοφός are less sterling.

<sup>4728</sup> οὐδαμῶς τοιοῦτον οὐδέν (A8): Glaucon's answers become more severe and more unforgiving. Cf.B6.

<sup>4729</sup> ιδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμῶν παιδείας (A9): More grasping at straws, certainly less than μέγιστα, even if κάλλιστα; and ἡγεμῶν (A9) is a stretch. The idea is broached that perhaps we know of no achievements because they were private (ιδίᾳ).

<sup>4730</sup> διαφανεῖς πῃ δοκοῦσιν (B4): πῃ finesses the need to be specific, while δοκοῦσιν makes tracking things down a waste of time. Likewise τοῖς ἄλλοις includes everything by leaving it out.

<sup>4731</sup> Κρεώφυλος (B6): Call.Epig.6 apud Strabo 14.638-9 and S.E. Adv.Math.I.48; Paus.4.2.2; Souda s.v.κρέωφυλος. He appears to have entertained Homer (i.e., fed him meat, whence the joke about his name) and received from him a poem which he then claimed he wrote himself (Call. Ep.6.4 notwithstanding). Whatever the joke, the comparison with Pythagoras makes Homer look ridiculous.

<sup>4732</sup> λεγόμενα (B8): Worse than the lack of stories to corroborate or commemorate Homer's importance there are some λεγόμενα about him that diminish it. Perhaps at least they are merely λεγόμενα, and aren't true!

<sup>4733</sup> ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου (C1): i.e., ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ χρόνου ἐκείνου referring to the time envisioned in Socrates's question (αὐτὸς ζῶν, A10), the time while there was an opportunity for a συνουσίᾳ that could have a lasting and beneficial effect (A10-B5): He would *a fortiori* have no posthumous following as others did. Glaucon's extended answer (B6-C1) creates a closure of the survey, and now Socrates will sum up the results (C2-E2).

So the story goes, indeed. But then can you imagine, Glaucon, that if in fact Homer was able to educate men and make them better out of an ability not just to imitate such things but to know and judge things, that he would not, after all,<sup>4734</sup> have amassed a lot of associates and would not be honored and loved<sup>4735</sup> by them, while conversely Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Cos<sup>4736</sup> and that whole slew of others prove able so to dispose the individuals they spend time with personally, during their own lives, as to make them feel unable to take the first step in managing even their own households and cities<sup>4737</sup> before they themselves supervise them with their instruction, and are so fervently loved<sup>4738</sup> for this wisdom of theirs that these people do everything short of carrying them around on their shoulders; whereas when it comes to Homer after all, assuming he was able to benefit men in their pursuit of virtue, and Hesiod for that matter, are we to believe that the men of their time would allow them to go hither and yon performing their epic lays and would not cling to them more than to their gold and try to prevail upon them to come and be in their very homes,<sup>4739</sup> and if they failed would themselves take on the tutors' job of escorting children<sup>4740</sup> to their lessons wherever they might hold them, until by eavesdropping on their education<sup>4741</sup> they had their fill of what such men have to teach?<sup>4742</sup>

"I think what you say is entirely true."<sup>4743</sup>

So, shall we set it down that all the poetical men<sup>4744</sup> from Homer forward<sup>4745</sup> are imitators of

<sup>4734</sup> ἄρα indicates (C5) and then (in repetition with both μέν, C7, and δέ, D5) reminds us, that the outer structure is an *argumentum ex contrariis* (cf. n.1082).

<sup>4735</sup> ἔταιρους ἐποίσατο καὶ ἐτιμάτο καὶ ἡγαπᾶτο (C5-6) digests the account of Pythagoras, with ἡγαπᾶτο a direct repetition (A10), ἐτιμάτο digesting the autonomasia (Πυθαγόρειον, B3), and ἔταιρους coming from the enjoyment of συνουσία (B1), which had been digested into ἔταιρος at B7.

<sup>4736</sup> Πρωταγόρας ... καὶ Πρόδικος (C6-7): Socrates now supplements the historical examples with contemporaries, and dubious ones at that, laced with irony.

<sup>4737</sup> οὗτε οἰκίαν οὕτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν (D1). The ἐπάγγελμα to teach both private and public management (διοίκησις) is a commonplace: cf. Gorg.520E3-4 (τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν), Meno 91A3-4, Prot.318E5-319A2. τὴν αὐτῶν, emphatic in hyperbaton, stands in contrast to the fact that these experts come from elsewhere (Abdera and Cos, C7). Cf. περιιόντας (D6), which applies as much to the sophists as the rhapsodes with whom they are being compared.

<sup>4738</sup> σφόδρα (D3) suggests amorous attraction: cf. Thompson ad Meno 70B.

<sup>4739</sup> οἴκοι (E1) creates the image of lectures on how to manage the household (διοικεῖν, D1) being given them within the households.

<sup>4740</sup> αὐτοὶ ἐπαιδαγώγουν (E1-2): If the teachers will not visit them at their homes but insist on teaching in their schools, then these eager men would themselves stoop to the slave's job of παιδαγωγός and escort children there so as to eavesdrop on their lessons, as Socrates proposes to Crito at Euthyd.272D2-3.

<sup>4741</sup> παιδείας (E2): the παιᾶς in παιδεία is ultimately the same as the παιᾶς in παιδαγωγεῖν: this is Socrates's (and Plato's) criticism of the "professional student."

<sup>4742</sup> Another version of the triadic structure (n.4658 ad 597D3) is the *argumentum ex contrariis*, which denies A (C2-6), asserts B (C6-D4), and re-denies A (D5-E2) in new terms borrowed from the assertion of B (e.g., σφίσιν οἴκοι ~ διοικεῖν).

<sup>4743</sup> παντάπασιν ... ἀληθῆ (E3): that is, the premise that leads to the impossible conclusion must be entirely false: Glaucon recognizes the foregoing to be an *argumentum ex contrariis*.

<sup>4744</sup> τοὺς ποιητικούς (E4-5), not ποιητάς.

<sup>4745</sup> ἀπὸ Ὁμέρου πάντας τοὺς ποιητικούς (E4-5) echoes the language of Adeimantus's challenge in Book Two: πάντων ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡρώων ἀρξάμενοι (366D7-E2), as does the agreement of ἀρξαμένους with ποιητικούς rather than (per the reading of Aristides and Eusebius) with the subject of τιθῶμεν.

images or likenesses<sup>4746</sup> of virtue and of the other things they write poems about, and that they never actually come in touch with the truth;<sup>4747</sup> and that rather, as we were just now saying,<sup>4748</sup> the painter will create what looks like a shoemaker, (601) both to himself<sup>4749</sup> who is ignorant of shoemaking and<sup>4750</sup> to an audience likewise ignorant, who train their eyes only on his use of colors<sup>4751</sup> and shapes.

“Quite so.”

And I suppose we would make a similar assertion about the poet, that he would color in, as it were, the colors and quality of the several arts from his palette of words and phrases,<sup>4752</sup> ignorant all the while of everything but the techniques of imitation, so that to others likewise ignorant,<sup>4753</sup> contemplating only his statements, his poems would seem—as for instance if he were talking about shoemaking in meter and rhythm and rhyme—would really seem quite well done,<sup>4754</sup> as also they would if his subject were the conduct of a war<sup>4755</sup> or anything else—so great a charm do these elements naturally have in themselves.<sup>4756</sup> After all if you strip away the musical color from the poets’ works and look at what is being said in and by the language, well, I’d guess you know what their qualities are, since I’m sure you’ve witnessed<sup>4757</sup> the effect.

<sup>4746</sup> μιμητὰς εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς (E5): he cannot simply say they produce imitations of virtue, since the imitations are oriented to the way virtue appears, not the way it is (cf. 598B1-5). As the painter paints the bed in the context of the space it appears in and perforce from a certain angle, the poet imitates virtue operating in a concrete context such as the battlefield or the courtroom. He therefore imitates an “appearance” of virtue.

<sup>4747</sup> τῆς δ’ ἀληθείας οὐχ ἄπτεσθαι (E6) repeats the metaphor ἐφάπτεσθαι (598B8) introduced in connection with the poet’s orientation to appearance rather than truth (598B2-4).

<sup>4748</sup> ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν (E6-7): referring to 598B8-C4, which the present restatement clarifies (answering Adam’s worry: cf. n.4681). For the reason he envisions the painter painting the craftsman instead of the artifact, cf. n.4763.

<sup>4749</sup> αὐτός (601A1), “as such”—that is, as painter. Cf. αὐτόν, A6. I’ve taken the liberty to translate him into a dative parallel to that of the audience.

<sup>4750</sup> αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαίων ... καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπαίουσιν (601A1-2): a rare instance of τε / καί linking items semantically but not syntactically parallel (ἐπαίων / ἐπαίουσιν).

<sup>4751</sup> ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων δέ (A2): such a postponement of δέ is not unexampled: cf. 417A1, 571E1; Denniston, 186.

<sup>4752</sup> τοῖς ὄνόμασιν καὶ ρήμασιν (A5) a doublet to match and balance σχήματα / χρώματα: a technical distinction between the terms is not needed.

<sup>4753</sup> ἔτεροις τοιούτοις (A6-7), i.e., οὐκ ἐπαίουσι, the correlation referred to by ἔτεροις having been created with τε / καί above. One can see from this passage how the use of ἔτερος in mild aposiopesis (n.1197) comes about.

<sup>4754</sup> πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι (A8-9): their judgment (δοκεῖν) is fervent (πάνυ) at the same time that it is vague (εὖ λέγεσθαι). Halliwell’s “think ... his words are those of a *real expert*” over-specifies their evaluation: they are very pleased by the sayings but not by their expertise or accuracy. The vagueness expresses their confusion, as at 598D8-E1 (where cf. n.4689) and it should not be translated out.

<sup>4755</sup> With the single example of στρατηγία (A9) the merely illustrative case of shoemaking is replaced by a subject of greater moment (cf. μεγίστων τε καὶ καλλίστων ... πολέμων τε πέρι καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ διοικήσεων πόλεων, 599C7-8), and with the addition of ὄτουοῦν the power of poetical charm is shown to be both more and less than it seems. There is no “blatant irony” (pace Halliwell) in the transitional use of shoemaking.

<sup>4756</sup> αὐτὰ ταῦτα (B1) refers to the musical elements of poetry as separable, and separate, from the content of the poem.

<sup>4757</sup> For the perfect τεθέασσαι (B4) cf. 400A6 and n.1536. It is hard to imagine why Socrates can be so sure Glaucon has witnessed poetry stripped down unless he is referring to the exercise he

“So I have.”

So is it like the faces of boys who are youthful but not so good-looking, and what happens to their looks once the bloom has left them?

“Exactly.”

Move on, then, to the following point. About this maker of likenesses, this imitator: we say he knows nothing of the reality but only the appearance, no?

“Yes.”

So we ought not leave it half said:<sup>4758</sup> let's get a complete picture of it.

“Say on.”

A painter will for instance *paint* the reins and the bit.

“Yes.”

But the *maker*<sup>4759</sup> of it will be the cobbler<sup>4760</sup> and the smith?

“Quite.”

Now when he set about painting was the painter knowledgeable about how<sup>4761</sup> the reins should be and how the bit? Or is it the case that even the maker does not know—the smith and the cobbler,<sup>4762</sup> that is—but that there is another man that does, the man who knows how to use these things—the horseman, that is, and he alone.<sup>4763</sup>

“Quite true.”

And shall we not say that this applies to everything?

“How?”

In any individual case there are three skills, the one suited to using the thing, the one suited to performed for Adeimantus at 393D-4A. Few of us are lucky enough to have had the eye-opening experience he describes; Socrates makes it palpable, especially to the erotic Glaucon, with the metaphor that follows.

<sup>4758</sup> ήμίσεως (C3), adverbial: changing the accent (with Stephanus) is perhaps easier than positing a “genitive used adverbially” (with J.-C.).

<sup>4759</sup> In δέ γε (C8) Shorey rightly notes a tinge of retort: cf. 407A9, 487E6 and n.2729.

<sup>4760</sup> σκυτότομος (C8). The “cobbler” according to the Greek idiom was a “leather-cutter” from the start, and only therefore cobbled shoes (cf. n. 1882).

<sup>4761</sup> οἵας δεῖ ήνιας εἶναι (C10): οἵας (of the *qualia*) now has a very different sense from above (B4, B7), where the poet, with τὰ χρώματα τῆς μουσικῆς, produced only the *qualia* (ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσιν, A2) of things. There the *qualia* were pleasing (καλά [?], but called *good*: n.b. εὖ, A8); now the *quale* is ἀγαθὴ ἡ κακά (D9) in the sense χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν (E4).

<sup>4762</sup> γραφεύς ... χαλκεύς ... σκυτεύς (C11): placing all three *makers* all in a homoioteleuton with -εύς (γραφεύς replacing ζωγράφος and σκυτεύς replacing σκυτοτόμος) helps make the new point that the true master of all, the *user*, belongs to an entirely different category (-ικός, for which cf. 374B2 and n.1067).

<sup>4763</sup> Finally (601C10-602A1), we revert to the argument of 374B6-D7 where the absurdity of the contrary, that “tools make the man,” dashed Glaucon’s hopes that we would not need to staff an army. The peculiar notion that the painter paints the shoemaker rather than the shoes (600E7, 598B8-C1) turns out to have been an adumbration of this notion of the sovereignty of use (χρᾶσθαι). The conception of a craftsman using a hammer to tighten a screw, which a painter ignorant of carpentry could just as easily paint as not, sets into strong relief the practical involvement of the craftsman in comparison with that of the painter.

making it, and the one suited to imitating it.

“Yes.”

Isn’t the virtue and the fineness and the correctness<sup>4764</sup> of any specific thing, whether it be a piece of equipment or an animal or an action,<sup>4765</sup> determined by the use for which it was contrived or for which its nature suits it?

“So it is.”

Therefore we can be quite certain that the person who makes use of a given thing is the most qualified by his experience to act as<sup>4766</sup> messenger and report back to its maker<sup>4767</sup> what was good or bad<sup>4768</sup> in the manufacture, based on the use that he puts it to?<sup>4769</sup> For example a flautist reports back to the flute maker about the flutes he has made, whichever makers<sup>4770</sup> are assisting him in his flute-playing. He will direct the maker as to what qualities the flutes he makes must have, while the maker in turn will serve his need.

“What else?”

So the one, because he knows, will report back<sup>4771</sup> which flutes are worthy and which are poor;<sup>4772</sup> while the other by trusting<sup>4773</sup> him will manage his manufacturing?

“Yes.”

Therefore, for one and the same artifact the man who makes it will have a justified trust<sup>4774</sup> about whether it is fine or poor,<sup>4775</sup> by virtue of associating with the knower and of being constrained (602)

<sup>4764</sup> ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὄρθοτης (D4): the first two items represent the dyad of value, ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν (n.1556). For the sense of κάλλος here bringing it into the semantic field of ἀρετή, cf. 353A4. After these, ὄρθοτης selects a very specific value, close to the notion of usefulness, that helps to clinch the idea that utility is the genus they all fall under.

<sup>4765</sup> ἐκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζῷου καὶ πράξεως (D4-5). Listing “all there is” tends to be done with a triad cf. 510A5-6, Gorg.506D5-6, H.Min.292D1-3, Thet.155E5-6. The element that unifies the triad is unstated—it is man as the user or actor.

<sup>4766</sup> γίγνεσθαι (D9), as the result of ἐμπειρότατον εἶναι.

<sup>4767</sup> ποιητής (D9) is now taken away from the “poet” and given its literal meaning (with ποιεῖ, D10).

<sup>4768</sup> ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά (D9) alludes compendiously to the three criteria enunciated at D4 (ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὄρθοτης) by turning its first term into a polar doublet of adjectives.

<sup>4769</sup> The antecedent of ϕ (D10) is ἐκάστω; the subject of ποιεῖ is the ποιότης (see n.4767).

<sup>4770</sup> οἵ ὃν ὑπηρετῶσιν (E1) is a *constructio praegnans* describing which αὐλοποιοί he will employ, namely, the ones who will act as his subordinates (as described below, 601E8-602A1 and A5-6). The flute is not his subordinate but his instrument. ὑπηρετεῖν does not (*pace* J.-C.) undergo a remarkable “shift of connexion.” The clause, rather gratuitous, is a proleptic skew (n.1556) for the sake of introducing this hierarchical idea.

<sup>4771</sup> ἔξαγγέλλει (E4): the maker is not even present to witness the use of the flute! Both participles are circumstantial; ὁ μέν and ὁ δέ are nouns.

<sup>4772</sup> χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν (E4) redoing ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά above (D9), under the force of the intervening repetition of the cognates χρῆσθαι and χρεία (D10).

<sup>4773</sup> πιστεύων (E5): Now πιστεύειν is added to ὑπηρετεῖν. We are accumulating a set of terms for a dialectical matrix.

<sup>4774</sup> πίστις here enters the argument as a specification of ὑπηρεσία, the deference the servant accords to his master – quite a different conception than the πίστις of the Line passage.

<sup>4775</sup> περὶ κάλλονς καὶ πονηρίας (E8): overlapping substitution (n.159) repeats πονηρῶν from E4 and κάλλος from D4.

to wait upon the knower's<sup>4776</sup> instructions, whereas the man who uses it will have knowledge.

“Quite so.”

But as to the imitator, which will it be? Will he have knowledge about what he paints gotten from using it, knowledge as to whether or not he is drawing something fine and correct,<sup>4777</sup> or<sup>4778</sup> will he have correct opinion<sup>4779</sup> by virtue of being constrained to wait upon the knower and to receive instruction how he is to draw it?<sup>4780</sup>

“Neither.”

Therefore he will neither know nor have correct opinion, our imitator, about what he imitates, as to whether it is fine or poor.<sup>4781</sup>

“It seems not.”

Amusing then would be the figure our mimic cuts in his atelier, and the wisdom<sup>4782</sup> he deploys in the course of making what he is making!<sup>4783</sup>

“Hardly amusing.”

And yet he will move right along with his imitating nonetheless,<sup>4784</sup> in perfect ignorance about what makes things poor or serviceable.<sup>4785</sup> Instead, as it seems, the aspect of things that appears to be fine and pretty<sup>4786</sup> to the many, who likewise know nothing,<sup>4787</sup> will be the aspect he imitates.

“What else?”

<sup>4776</sup> εἰδότος (602A1) emphatic in repetition after τῷ εἰδότι (601E8).

<sup>4777</sup> καλὰ καὶ ὄρθα (A4): ὄρθα in exegesis of καλά prevents it from sliding out of the semantic field it was put into at 601D4 (prevented also by ἀγαθά and χρηστά along the way) and into its purely aesthetic sense.

<sup>4778</sup> πότερον ... ἢ (A3-4) suggests it will be one or the other, as it was for the user and the maker above: anything besides these is “outside the loop.”

<sup>4779</sup> δόξαν ὄρθην (A4-5), Plato’s more usual expression, reached by a slight shift from πίστιν ὄρθην (601E7) which itself was drawn out of πιστεύων at E5.

<sup>4780</sup> All the language of 602A3-6 imitates the language used above of the maker (601D8-602A1), with minor dialectical variations to avoid slavish parallelism.

<sup>4781</sup> πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν (A9) the pair repeated from the conclusion about the maker (E8).

<sup>4782</sup> σοφίαν (A11) mordantly plays the ignorant sense of the multitude that the poet is wise, against the notion of understanding or knowledge, all forms of which have now been denied to him as mere imitator.

<sup>4783</sup> χαριεῖς (A10) as at 426A1 and A6-B4, where the folly of a person’s behavior might afford a laugh, or else a scolding (οὐ πάνυ, A13: cf. 426B3, οὐ πάνυ χαριέν). We will see him acting with purpose without knowing the purpose of his actions! The asyndeton marks it as a sudden insight of Socrates.

<sup>4784</sup> ἀλλ’ οὖν δὴ ὅμως γε μιμήσεται (B1): the particles express the corollary awareness that the poet would not even understand Socrates’s objection.

<sup>4785</sup> πονηρὸν καὶ χρηστόν (B2): The chiastic order in comparison with the pairs above suggests that we have turned the corner on the proof and are now applying the results. The overlapping substitution (retaining πονηρόν but substituting χρηστόν for καλόν) now lets go of the question of aesthetics and insists on moral value.

<sup>4786</sup> οἶον φαίνεται καλόν (B3): καλόν now exposes what had always underlain the appreciation of the masses, though they were not aware of it and easily dubbed it “goodness” (cf. εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, 601A8-9, and n.4754).

<sup>4787</sup> μηδὲν εἴδοσιν (B3) echoes οὐκ εἰδώς (B1) as the μὴ ἐπαίσουσιν had echoed οὐκ ἐπαίσων at 601A1-2.

Alright then. We have reached agreement on the following points, as it appears: that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning about what he imitates; that instead<sup>4788</sup> his imitation is play and not serious; and that the persons who have taken up tragic poetry in iambs and in dactyls are imitators par excellence.<sup>4789</sup>

“We have indeed.”

By Zeus!<sup>4790</sup> When it comes to<sup>4791</sup> this imitating that they are involved in—it’s about something at a third remove from truth?

“Yes.”

### 3.A.3: Effect of Poetry as Imitation

What about what it affects?<sup>4792</sup> Over which aspect of man does imitating wield its power?<sup>4793</sup>

“What sort of aspect are you talking about?”<sup>4794</sup>

About the following:<sup>4795</sup> An object of a certain size appears, for us men, not to be equal in size if we view it from a close distance and from a far distance.

“You’re right, it doesn’t.”

And the same things appear bent and then straight when we look at them in water and then out

<sup>4788</sup> ἀλλ’ εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν (B8): subject and predicate are reversed in the assertion of what is true, after the denial of what is false (τόν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ... B7), in a chiasm of the contrapositive (cf. 451A1, 612D7-9, and 410C8-10 with n. 1708 and 2698).

<sup>4789</sup> ἐν ἰαμβείοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι (B9-10): Reference to the meters suggests that he finds poetry especially mimetic because of the spellbinding effect that the musical element adds to words (601A7-B4).

<sup>4790</sup> Πρὸς Δίος ... τὸ δὲ δή (C1): The oath is strong enough to postpone δέ: With his abject πρός plus genitive Socrates still feigns diffidence as to the results he is reaching about poetry.

<sup>4791</sup> δὲ δή (C1) focusses, after μὲν δή (B6), on the relation of imitating to reality, after the comparison of the imitator to other makers. The focus is expressed with the preposition περί.

<sup>4792</sup> πρὸς δε δὴ ποιῶν τι (C4) responding to περὶ τρίτον μέν τι (C2) so that the degree of remove (τρίτον) “about” which (περί) mimesis works is being compared with a part in or aspect of man (ποιῶν τι) it operates “on” (πρός).

<sup>4793</sup> τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (C4): The question is impossibly unclear (n.b. τῶν AD : τῷ F : τὸ A<sup>2</sup>M), as Glaucon recognizes, because we do not know what kind of aspect or possession of man ποῖον is asking for. All we have to go on, if we have perceived it at all, is a syntactical matrix that suggests an analogy, to-wit: περί : πρός :: τρίτον : X :: ἀλήθεια : ἀνθρωπος. We must wait for Socrates to clarify his meaning, with an idea that he acknowledges, with τοιοῦδε (C7), he cannot expect his interlocutor to have anticipated. We have seen Socrates ask unanswerable questions or make obscure remarks to buy an opportunity to expatiate, before (557D1-2), and have seen cases where the question lays out a matrix whose blanks we cannot fill in (e.g., at 382A7-9, κυριωτάτῳ dative and κυριώτατα object of πρός: cf. nn. 1260 and 153). The matter is resolved at 603A10ff (cf. n. 4812).

<sup>4794</sup> τοῦ ποίου τινὸς πέρι (C6): The article and the anastrophe express Glaucon’s bewilderment.

<sup>4795</sup> τοῦ τοιοῦδε (C7): By the “first person” character of the pronoun Socrates acknowledges what he is saying is unclear and new; by its case he pretends to be answering Glaucon’s question directly (περὶ τίνος) but in fact interposes an extended treatment about cognition (602C7-603A9) that will lead to an answer περὶ τίνος.

of water;<sup>4796</sup> and concave and convex for that matter, when you add the contribution that colors<sup>4797</sup> make to sight's moorless wanderings.<sup>4798</sup> Indeed sight clearly presents nothing but confusion in the soul, and this weakness in our nature is further exploited by the application of optical illusions so as to make way for boundless bewitchment, as does the manufacture of mechanical marvels and other<sup>4799</sup> such contrivances.

“It’s true.”

Would you say that measuring and counting and weighing have come into existence<sup>4800</sup> to aid us in such difficulties, so that mere appearances that occur in us, of larger and smaller and of the more and of the heavier, do not hold sway,<sup>4801</sup> but rather the thing that calculated and measured and weighed?<sup>4802</sup>

“Of course.”

But at the same time<sup>4803</sup> you would have to agree that the performance of these tasks would belong to the logical element within the soul.

“To this element indeed.”

But to this aspect, when it measures and declares that the one thing is larger or smaller than the other or equal, things might at any time<sup>4804</sup> appear quite contrary to sense, and they do so at the same time about the same things.<sup>4805</sup>

<sup>4796</sup> τε / καί (C10, C11) both times meaning either/or.

<sup>4797</sup> μέγεθος and καμπύλα / εὐθέα (C7, C10) had to do with line (*σχῆμα*); now we move on to the other aspect of the visible, χρῶμα (C12: cf.373B6 and n.1046), whence αὖ (C12) which conspires with proleptic δή. The preceding τε / καί’s disambiguate what would have been unclear in the collocation καὶ A τε δὴ καὶ ~A.

<sup>4798</sup> πλάνην (C12): the metaphor can be used suddenly and without apology because it has appeared several times before (e.g., 586A3 and n.4457, 505C7 and n.3027, 484B6, 479D9 and n.2658, 444B7 and n.2222). It is a favorite of Plato’s for the way it brings together into one phenomenologically accurate description the very wide spectrum of characteristics that are associated with degraded levels of truth and reality, from subjective uncertainty and anxiety to objective indistinctness or variability.

<sup>4799</sup> Reading καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί (D3) with mss. FD rather than καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πολλαί (AM) with its redundant αἱ.

<sup>4800</sup> ἐφάνησαν (D7): cf. φανῆναι, 528C8.

<sup>4801</sup> ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν (D7): the language recalls both the second great argument of Book Nine (580C9-583A10) and the “hegemony” of reason in the disquisition on slaves children and criminals near the end of that Book (590C8-591A3).

<sup>4802</sup> Note the minor variations in repetition (D9): μετρεῖν / ἀριθμεῖν / ιστάναι (D6) = A,B,C; μεῖζον – ἔλαττον / πλέον / βαρύτερον (D8) = A<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub>, B, C; λογισάμενον / μετρῆσαν / στήσαν (D9) = B,A,C. The connectives are varied from καί to ἤ and then in the third list connective καί is varied with ἤ καί. Such minor variations avoid slavish parallelism at the same time that they assist in closure.

<sup>4803</sup> ἀλλὰ μήν ... γε (E1) introducing the minor premise: the parts of soul and their hegemonic relations from Book Nine, alluded to just above with ἄρχειν (D7, cf. n.4801), and which Socrates mentioned at the beginning of Book Ten as providing new implications about the effects of poetry (595A7-8), are finally coming into play.

<sup>4804</sup> πολλάκις (E4) has its adventitious meaning (stressing the unreliability of senses) rather than its quantitative one (in which case it would be making a needlessly statistical sort of argument).

<sup>4805</sup> τάναντία (E5) sc. τοῖς ὑπ’ ὄψεως θεωμένοις: the measuring self reaches results quite contrary to what the seeing self has seen even as it sees it. The rigor in the formulation (ἄμα περὶ ταῦτά) prepares the logical basis for the radical conclusion, as in the argument about pleasure at 583C3-584A10 (cf. concurrent notes).

“Yes.”

And haven’t we said that having contrary opinions about the same thing in the same part of oneself is impossible?<sup>4806</sup>

“We did, and we were right to do so.”

(603) So, the element of soul that believes what contravenes measure could not be the same as the one that knows the measure.

“It could not.”

And meanwhile<sup>4807</sup> the aspect of the soul that puts its trust in measure and calculation<sup>4808</sup> would be the noblest<sup>4809</sup> aspect of the soul.

“Obviously.”

And so the part that opposes this part would, oppositely,<sup>4810</sup> be one of the mean elements<sup>4811</sup> in us.

“That follows.”

Alright then. The step in the argument I was trying to secure your agreement to by means of that opening question,<sup>4812</sup> was this, that the painter’s kind of making, and mimetic creations in general, not

<sup>4806</sup> Alluding to the λογιστικόν reiterates an agreement they have reached (584A4-11), but also re-invokes the level of judgment that that agreement ushered in, namely the very “metaphysical” third argument of Book Nine. Behind these lies the role of non-contradiction in the discovery of the tripartite soul in Book Four (436AC), the importance of which discovery to the critique of poetry was announced at the beginning of this Book (595A7-B1) and now comes into play.

<sup>4807</sup> ἀλλὰ μήν ... γε (603A4) of the minor premise, again.

<sup>4808</sup> λογισμός (A4) designating the genus of all species of measurement rather than being a mere restatement of the arithmetical measurement that we saw at 602D9.

<sup>4809</sup> Calling the λογιστικόν the βέλτιστον (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς, 603A4) again relies on and brings forward the last set of arguments in Book Nine and their concern for the health of the soul.

<sup>4810</sup> ἐναντιούμενον (A7) suggests the logic. As in English, what “opposes” would be the “opposite.”

<sup>4811</sup> Throughout the argument (602E1-603A8) a noun (corresponding to “elements,” which I have added in tr.) has scrupulously been avoided: the aspects or elements or parts of soul here being distinguished are designated with the definite article and adjective (τοῦ λογιστικοῦ, 602E1; τούτῳ, E4; τῷ αὐτῷ, E8; τό ... δοξάζον, 603A1; τό ... πιστεῦον, A4; τὸ ἐναντιούμενον, A7), an idiom much more limited in English than Greek. I have reproduced the indeterminacy by using several nouns. Cf. n. 508I, and compare nn. 210I and 210S.

<sup>4812</sup> τοῦτο (A10) refers to what he was “arguing” (ἔλεγον) at 602C1-5, with his μέν / δέ construction culminating in the indecipherable question, πρὸς ποῖον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (cf. n. 4793), and ὅτι restates it. Now that he has clarified that question by the description of τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (i.e., τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς) and their relative ποιότης (βέλτιστον and φαῦλον, A4-8), and has secured Glaucon’s agreement that it is the φαῦλον part that visual art works on (602D1-4 combined with 603A7-8), he now has the license to assert the argument as agreed upon, and does so with the ὅτι clause in μέν / δέ. With διομολογήσασθαι βουλόμενος (its object unexpressed) he apologizes for the question at C4-5, acknowledging that it was indecipherable, by saying he wanted to be sure to secure Glaucon’s agreement, i.e., to remind him that they are proceeding dialectically. In a sense what has happened is that he asked the question before setting it up. This is exactly what happened at 382A7-10. Cf. also 557D1-2.

only<sup>4813</sup> produce something that in fact is far from the truth, but engages<sup>4814</sup> an aspect of ourselves that is likewise in fact far from mindfulness, and plays courtesan and lover with it in a way that is up to no good<sup>4815</sup> and false, too.

“Completely correct.”

But as a mean consort consorting with a mean element in us, mimetic art gives birth to offspring likewise mean.

“Likely so.”

And does the point I made apply to visual art only or does it apply to the art of audible creations as well, which we do after all<sup>4816</sup> call poetry?

“Likely this kind of making would be analogous.”

But let's not rely on what is *likely* based on an analogy drawn from painting but penetrate to the very aspect of our mentality<sup>4817</sup> with which poetry as a mimetic art<sup>4818</sup> consorts, and see whether this element is a mean one or a serious<sup>4819</sup> one.

“We really ought to.”<sup>4820</sup>

<sup>4813</sup> μέν (A11) is concessive, parallel to the μέν of 602C2, for they had already agreed to this (602A1-3). The anaphora of πόρρω is not “for the sake of emphasis” (J.-C.) but is the pivot of the argument: just as mimesis makes something (the περί τι of 602C1) far from truth, it also (δ' αὖ) engages a part of oneself (the πρός τι of C4: cf. n.4792) that by dint of the tripartition, itself is far from truth.

<sup>4814</sup> προσομιλεῖν replaces the συνεῖναι of consultation we have been hearing about (602A5, 601E8)—in which the artist was instructed (ἐπιτάττειν [602E5, 601E2] cf. ὀκούειν [602A1]) how to produce his art and thereby learned how best to serve (ὑπηρετεῖν 601E1-2)—into something more casual: a sexual under-meaning comes into play.

<sup>4815</sup> ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ (B1-2) cf. 584A9, 523B3 and n.3299.

<sup>4816</sup> δή (B7): draws attention to the fact that the name for ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὄκοήν (sc. ποίησις) is called by the generic term itself (as also the term “poetry,” in English).

<sup>4817</sup> ἐπ' αὐτὸ τῆς διάνοιας ... τοῦτο (B10). διάνοια, echoed from 595B6 where it was salient for its vagueness, announces we have finally reached the topic of the λώβῃ διανοίας, announced at the beginning of the Book. αὐτό and ἐπελθεῖν add the sense of confrontation the problem and “facing the music.” For διάνοια as the most general term for what goes on in one's head, clearly including more than φρόνησις (A12), compare 395D3, 400E3, 455B9, 476D5, 503C4, 511A1, and cf. n.3289 ad 522C8. The “likeness” that their argument pertains to poetry as well as painting, because of the alikeness of hearing to seeing, both being forms of perception (B6-7), is a joke by which Socrates effects a segue to the treatment of poetry and the λώβῃ it wreaks on the ὄκούοντες, which is the stated purpose of this entire argument (cf. λώβῃ ... τῆς τῶν ὄκουντων διανοίας, 595B5-6).

<sup>4818</sup> ἡ τῆς ποιήσεως μιμητική (C1): Rather than arguing “laterally,” from one species of mimetic art (ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς, B9-10) to another (poetry) through the likely method of analogy based on the senses (sight: hearing :: painting : poetry), we will argue vertically from the species poetry to its generic nature as mimetic, leaving the (specious) analogy based on the sense faculties behind, and considering it now in immediate reference to the aspect of thought (ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἔλθωμεν, B10, i.e., unmediated by sense) with which it communes.

<sup>4819</sup> φαῦλον ἡ σπουδαῖον (C2). Pairing these as opposites relies on “overlap substitution:” παιδιά / σπουδή (602B8) describing mimetic art, and βέλτιστον / φαῦλον (603A4-8) describing the parts of soul to which it fails and succeeds to appeal.

<sup>4820</sup> ἀλλὰ χρή (C3): the expression voices not only consent but that the interlocutor thinks, for his own reasons, it is the right thing to do (e.g., 376E1).

Let's set the problem<sup>4821</sup> as follows: it is people in action that mimetic art imitates,<sup>4822</sup> either in compulsory acts such as in war or the voluntary acts of peacetime,<sup>4823</sup> and then the attitudes they form in the aftermath<sup>4824</sup> as to whether they did well or poorly, and whether, at every stage, they are troubled or they are joyful.<sup>4825</sup> Was<sup>4826</sup> there anything beyond this?

“Nothing.”

Now is it the case that in all such matters a man is undivided in his attitude? Or, just as in the experience of vision he felt a conflict because he had opposite opinions within himself at the same time about the same things,<sup>4827</sup> so too in the realm of human action does a man feel internal conflict and fight with himself? My memory tells me that on this point at least there is no need for us to talk our way to an agreement<sup>4828</sup> since we adequately<sup>4829</sup> talked through all of those conflicts before, how our soul fairly teems with countless numbers of such simultaneous contradictions as these.<sup>4830</sup>

“Correct we were to agree.”

Correct indeed, but what we there<sup>4831</sup> left out we must finally go through, as it seems.

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<sup>4821</sup> προθώμεθα (C4), of the orienting goal, as at 562B3, 555B9-10, 413C8, 375D4. It is the deliberate setting of the “problem,” in contrast to a problem in the true sense, which imposes itself on thought (cf. Bk.7, 530B6 and n.3408).

<sup>4822</sup> πράττοντας (C4). The formulation is consistent with 599B4-5, but φαμέν points elsewhere.

See next n.

<sup>4823</sup> βιαίους / ἐκουσίας (C5) immediately recalls the balanced simplicity of the description of legitimate poetic topics at 399A6-B6, and thereby explains the reference of φαμέν.

<sup>4824</sup> For ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν (C5-6) cf. ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα, 399B7.

<sup>4825</sup> For λυπουμένους / χαίροντας (C7) cf. παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως (399B2) and σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως (399B9).

<sup>4826</sup> ἦν (C7): imperfect of citation (n.586), restored by Ast (ἢ AM : ἦ FD). The categories here said to exhaust the scope of human action, do indeed underlie the scope of proper human action that Socrates deployed in conversation with Glaucon at 399A5-C4, while they were determining which musical modes should be retained. The present passage sets out the spectra on which human action can be evaluated; the previous passage presented only the successful terminus or pole of the spectra. It is the back-citation that explains why Glaucon agrees (οὐδέν, C9).

<sup>4827</sup> ὅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν (D2): as at 602E8-9, the thoroughness with which the opposition is spelled out already suggests the “logical impossibility” that all the opinions are true.

<sup>4828</sup> διομολογεῖσθαι (D4), used of reaching a conclusion through the step by step (δια-) method of question and answer, exactly as at 603A10 above (cf. n.4812).

<sup>4829</sup> ἰκανῶς (D5) the criterion of dialectical truth as always (cf. 344D7 and n.486).

<sup>4830</sup> ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις (D5): The notion of self-contradiction that he has so carefully framed (n.b., ἐναντιώματα, D6), as well as his shift away from ἀνθρωπος (C10) to ψυχή (D7), are sufficient to indicate that he is referring to their conversation at 439C2-441C3, and corroborated by D9 below (cf. n.4831). Still, it is uncharacteristic that the strikingly specific language used here (γέμειν, μυρίων) is not matched there; back-references are usually clinched by linguistic details (cf. n.363). We might supply the interpretation that the soul can be said to be *full* (γέμει, D7) of such contradictions because it was exactly by virtue of discovering the various types of contradictory tension, in Book Four, that we deduced the contents (the parts or distinct aspects) of the soul: once we had found all of these (πάντα, D5) we had found all its parts or aspects or elements. On the other hand the corroboration of the Image by the review of conventional moral attitudes in Book Nine did produce an elaborate variety of specific tensions among the parts (589C6-590C6).

<sup>4831</sup> ὃ τότε ἀπελίπομεν (D9): that the current discussion of the deleterious effect of poetry on one's διάνοια should consist of developing the tripartition of Book Four, was in effect the promise with which this Book began (595A5-B1).

“What was that?”

Take the decent man<sup>4832</sup> who is dealt a piece of bad luck such as losing his son or some other thing people make much of: he will bear it more easily than the others, as we agreed.

“Quite.”

But now let us look further into this. Will he be afflicted by it not at all, or, that being impossible, will he measured<sup>4833</sup> his reaction to the pain?

“The latter is closer to the truth.”

(604) So tell me this about this man: do you think he will fight with his pain and have more strength to hold off against it more while he is being observed by his peers, or more once he is off by himself, alone in his own company?

“Presumably he will do much better as long as he is being observed.”

But once he is alone I’d guess he will dare<sup>4834</sup> to give vent to all sorts of utterances that he would be ashamed for others to overhear, and would do all sorts of things he would never let anybody see him<sup>4835</sup> doing.

“That’s how it is.”

Now isn’t it reason and lawfulness<sup>4836</sup> that consistently counsel him to contain himself, whereas the part dragging him to indulge his suffering is just the suffering he is undergoing?<sup>4837</sup>

“True.”

Since an opposing tension arises within the soul of the man, about the same thing and at the same time, do we assert that he<sup>4838</sup> is necessarily two?

“Of course.”

<sup>4832</sup> ἐπιεικής (E3) immediately reveals that the present reference is to Socrates’s discussion of the ἐπιεικής with Adeimantus, at the beginning of Book Three (387D4-E7: *n.b.* ἐπιεικής, D5).

<sup>4833</sup> μετριάσει (E8) quotes μετρίως at 399B8; but the strikingly rare verb (only twice elsewhere, both in *Laws*) also suggests, and even adduces, the operation of the soul’s logical aspect as described above (602D6-603A8).

<sup>4834</sup> τολμήσει (604A6), αἰσχύνοιτο, and δέξαιτο describe feelings and actions of the θυμοειδές.

<sup>4835</sup> δρῶντα (A8) refers, *pace* J.-C., to himself not to τινα, which is the subject of *ἰδεῖν*. The parallel construction allows the reflexive pronoun to be omitted, just as the participle φθεγγομένου could be omitted in the first limb. The mild anacoluthon is psychologically accurate, since the person’s point of view shifts from that of a subject wailing to that of a subject watching himself wail, as object, alongside his peer. Compare Socrates’s preference for the accusative over the nominative at *Phdrs.230A1* in order to generalize beyond himself. πολλὰ φθέγξασθαι / πολλὰ ποιεῖν (A6-7) represent λέγειν and πράττειν, and πολλά is derogatory (*n.1966*), more language coming from the θυμός, illustrating its natural, unspoken, and crucial alliance with the λογιστικόν.

<sup>4836</sup> λόγος καὶ νόμος (A10): Compare the way the relation between the two terms is climactically spelled out at 607A7-8: νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῆ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου. Much more than mere custom (Halliwell), it is the νόμος of 590E1 (Book Nine), the ally of everyone in the city which fosters peaceable order among the citizens.

<sup>4837</sup> αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος (B1): the pain so dominates the baser aspect as to make it its conduit or agent, and the pain itself (αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος) is in charge.

<sup>4838</sup> Reading αὐτῷ (B4) with mss. ADM, as a dative upon which the necessity impinges (cf. θεῷ, 381C7). The man is and is not two, of course. Chambray reports and adopts ἐν αὐτῷ as the reading of Monac. but Burnet reports it to be a *scribitur* while Slings reports ἐν αὐτῷ as a correction in its exemplar, Laur.80.19. Morgenstern’s conj. αὐτῷ (read by Burnet) adds unneeded polish.

And is the one part ready to obey the law wherever the law leads it?

“How so?”

Well, the law argues<sup>4839</sup> that the finest<sup>4840</sup> course of action is to stay as calm as possible in times of crisis and not to become disturbed since, while it is not yet clear<sup>4841</sup> what will end up being good or bad about what is happening and things are not in any case improved by taking them hard, nothing in human affairs is of any great moment or importance, anyway, while the very thing we most need to avail ourselves of under the emergent<sup>4842</sup> circumstances is made the harder to call into play by our being aggrieved.

“What very thing do you mean?”

The ability to deliberate about what has come about and, as if it had been a throw of the dice, to conform our affairs to the way the dice have now fallen<sup>4843</sup> in whatever way reason requires<sup>4844</sup> will make the best of the situation; not to waste time constantly patting the wounded part and wailing but instead to accustom the soul to turn its attention as quickly as possible toward the task of healing and restoring the thing that has fallen or become ill, and dispel the moaning dirge with the medical art.<sup>4845</sup>

“Such would certainly be the best of ministrations<sup>4846</sup> against the vagaries of luck.”

And isn’t it the case, as we are saying, that the best part of ourselves is ready to follow<sup>4847</sup> this rational course?<sup>4848</sup>

<sup>4839</sup> λέγει (B9): “decrees” (Halliwell) misses the truth and the spirit of the passage. These sentences are persuasive exhortation, in the manner of the Laws speaking to Crito.

<sup>4840</sup> κάλλιστον (B9): the law is speaking paraenetically, encouraging the person to act in a praiseworthy (καλόν) way.

<sup>4841</sup> The construction (B10-C3) consists of four participial phrases joined by οὐτε and τε, the first being genitive absolute (ὄντος, B11) and the other three being nominative periphrastic constructions with ἔστι understood (προβαῖνον, B12; ὄν, C1; γυγνόμενον, C2). The genitive describes what we cannot know but will sometime learn and therefore *cannot* now act upon, while the other three tell what we do now know (and would therefore take ἔστι) and what *can* guide our current action. For the shift of case, Stallb. compares *Euthyph.*4D, *Xen.*Mem.2.2.13, *Thuc.*7.25.

<sup>4842</sup> αὐτοῖς (C1) stresses the facts of the situation in contrast to our attitude about them.

<sup>4843</sup> πεπτωκότα (C6), the perfect echoing γεγονός (C5). Socrates’s point is not at all that life’s vicissitudes are as trivial as a game of dice (Halliwell), but that once the dice have fallen there is no use wishing they had fallen differently.

<sup>4844</sup> Reading ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ βέλτιστ’ ἔχειν (C7). Burnet’s (and Chambry’s) apparatus has αἱρεῖ int.vers.F Plut. Stob. : ἐρεῖ AM : ἔρρει pr.F D. Slings sees no αἱρεῖ in F but reads it. λόγος αἱρεῖ is an expression from Herodotus (I.132.3, 2.33.2, 3.45.3, 4.127.3\*, 6.124.2, 7.41.1; cf. 2.43.3 [ἢ ἐμὴ γνώμη αἱρεῖ]); behind it may lie a metaphor of “adding things up” (cf. Burnet ad *Crito* 48C6, citing Aeschines 3.59 and Demosthenes’s reply at 18.227). Plato reserves the phrase for describing the dispositive authority of reason over other considerations or criteria (*Cleit.*407D8, *Crit.*48C6-7, *Leg.*663D, *Parm.*141D6), its sovereignty over the other parts of the soul (*Rep.*440B5, *Phlb.*35D6), and a certain vertigo one feels when he acknowledges these truths. Compare ώς γοῦν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει (584A11, 334A9), another formula for acknowledging a radical reliance on reason, and cf. 499B1-2. The expression is echoed below, in the apology for the radical criticism of mimetic poetry (607B3).

<sup>4845</sup> Reading Plutarch’s and Stobaeus’s ιατρική (D2) with Burnet (ιατρικὴν AM : ιατρικὴν καὶ FD). Again the triadic structure (n.4658): assertion (C5-7), denial of opposite (C7-9), and reassertion (C9-D1). The metaphor was prepared at 595B6-7 (φάρμακον).

<sup>4846</sup> προσφέροιτο (D4) of the administration of a drug: cf. 403A10, 442E2 and n.2194, 563D6.

<sup>4847</sup> ἐθέλει ἔπεσθαι (D6): the language brings us back to the question above (ἔτοιμον πείθεσθαι, B6), as φαμέν announced.

<sup>4848</sup> λογισμῷ (D5) acknowledges what is sane though unromantic in the deliberative calculation

“Clearly.”

While the part that leads us toward recalling the experience over and over<sup>4849</sup> and is never able to get enough<sup>4850</sup> of moaning over it is irrational, we shall say, and feckless, and the friend<sup>4851</sup> of timidity.

“So we shall say.”

And does the one provide a great and varied spectrum of material for imitation—this excitable part—while the mindful and quiet strain within the self, since it always remains pretty much the same, is neither easy to imitate nor even when imitated<sup>4852</sup> is at all easy to grasp directly<sup>4853</sup> for what it is, especially in the midst of a rambunctious assembly of all sorts<sup>4854</sup> of people such as you encounter in a theatre. For them what is being depicted is alien to their experience.

(605) “I will completely agree with this much.”

Indeed the mimetic poet is not naturally suited for this aspect of the soul nor<sup>4855</sup> is his bag of tricks<sup>4856</sup> set up to please that part, if he is to succeed with the crowd.<sup>4857</sup> Rather he is suited to the

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just described (C5-D2).

<sup>4849</sup> ἀναμνήσεις (D8): the plural is derogatory (n.1180).

<sup>4850</sup> ἀπλήστως (D9): the language of *satiation* indicates the operation of the ἐπιθυμητικόν in its pursuit of pleasure (cf. n.2157), continued at 606A4-7.

<sup>4851</sup> ἀλόγιστόν τε ... καὶ ἄργὸν καὶ δειλίας φίλον (D9-10), an idea prepared at 590B3-5. The first privation designates this part as the opposite or the enemy of the λογιστικόν (cf. τῷ λογισμῷ, D5); the second item in the list is also a privation, and we may associate it with the other part of the soul, the θυμοειδές, which is the “natural ally” of the λογιστικόν. The periphrasis with which the list closes, δειλίας φίλον, then comes into view as the assertion of what the second denies: the ἐπιθυμητικόν is friend of timidity since if the θυμός is weak the ἐπιθυμητικόν will not be stopped by it, unless of course λόγος αἱρεῖ (cf. 440B5). The order of the list is therefore ~A, ~B, ~ ~B. For closure with a pair of opposites. cf. 342E10-11 and n.430. The ideas of laziness and timidity begin to specify the allusion of ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ ύγιεῖ at 603B1, namely, the area into which consorting with poetry leads the φαῦλον of the soul.

<sup>4852</sup> Epanaleptic μιμουμένου (E4) continues with the same voice and subject as μιμήσασθαι (E3), which itself, by the idiom with ράδιον, may mean that the thing is difficult to imitate (and have a passive sense) even if it says that imitating it is difficult (standing as it does in the middle): the anaphora extends the same ambivalence to the participle. The old question of Schneider, whether μιμεῖσθαι can be used passively in the middle, therefore does not arise. The difference between the accusative and genitive devolves into a choice between a more or less emphatic anaphora, and the genitive emerges as the *lectio difficilior*.

<sup>4853</sup> εὐπετέες (E4) of direct or unmediated cognition, as at 369A9. The difficulty of the poet (μιμήσασθαι) is compared with the difficulty of the general audience (καταμαθεῖν).

<sup>4854</sup> παντοδαποῖς (E5) suggests that these people do not have trouble understanding (with J.-C.) but make trouble for anyone present who tries to: ἀνθρώποις is a virtual hendiadys with πανηγύρει. For the idea cf. 492B5-C8: the discussion has waded into matters Socrates had discussed with Adeimantus in the aftermath of his critique of the philosopher. Halliwell *ad loc.* wrongly takes the unruliness of the crowd to disable the artist: but the artist means to please the crowd.

<sup>4855</sup> The late τε (605A3) suggests that the second assertion (ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν) describes the other side of the same coin: what his art enables him to imitate determines what part of his audience’s soul he can please. For the perfects cf. 597E7, 598B1 and nn.; and for the pairing cf. A9-B2 below.

<sup>4856</sup> σοφία (A3): the use is pointed, as at 602A11. There we saw what his special skill did not suit him to do, but now we learn what it does suit him to do. In the background is the bedazzled use of the term at 596D1 and n.4639).

<sup>4857</sup> ὁ δὲ μιμητικὸς ποιήτης ... εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς (A2-3): εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν echoes the quotation from the defenders of poetry (εἰ μέλλει ... καλῶς ποιεῖν [598E3-

excitable and multifaceted aspect since that aspect is so easy to imitate.

“Clearly.”

Won’t you agree<sup>4858</sup> that we would now<sup>4859</sup> have sufficient warrant to try to restrain him and treat him as the counterpart to the painter? In fact, both in the way he composes things that are mean in comparison with the truth and in the way he consorts with an aspect of soul likewise mean<sup>4860</sup> rather than with the noblest part, his likeness to him is fixed.<sup>4861</sup> So now we would be right not to admit him into the city we had set out to make well governed, because it is this aspect of the soul that he arouses and nourishes, and by so strengthening it tends to destroy the soul’s rational element,<sup>4862</sup> just as when in a city a person brings evil men to power and betrays his city and undermines the finer<sup>4863</sup> citizens: likewise, shall we say, the mimetic poet implants an evil regime<sup>4864</sup> within the soul of the individual man in his private life, gratifying the mindless aspect of his soul which is unable to tell large things from small and finds the same thing at one moment important and at another paltry, because the poet is fashioning mere likenesses,<sup>4865</sup> and himself stands so far removed from truth and reality.

“Very much so.”

But mind you we have not yet lodged the greatest accusation against his art. The fact that it is

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4]), which Socrates had already relativized in that context (*περὶ ὧν δοκοῦσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς εὖ λέγειν* [599A4 and n.4697]).

<sup>4858</sup> οὐκοῦν (A8), pressing for assent, the fourth in a series (604E1, D5, B6).

<sup>4859</sup> δικαίως ἀν ἡδη ἐπιλαμβανούμεθα (A8) is echoed by ἡδη ἀν ἐν δικῇ οὐ παραδεχούμεθα below (B2-3): ἡδη marks the point at which the old case for censorship from Books Two and Three receives permanent justification from the theory of the soul’s inner division and balances, themes which are then tied together (B2-C4) by the analogy of the notional city of the early books with the psychic city with which the argument culminated in Book Nine. Cf. 348B2, 565C1, and n.156 *ad* 332D2.

<sup>4860</sup> ἔτερον τοιοῦτον (A10-B1): derogatory ἔτερον in dismissive aposiopesis (cf. n.1197).

<sup>4861</sup> ώμοιώτατι (B2): The perfect continues to describe the objective structure of reality despite appearance and opinion (cf. 605A3,A4: cf. *πεποίηται*, 598B1; *πεποίηκεν*, 597D8).

<sup>4862</sup> τὸ λογιστικόν (B4-5) implies and imports the tripartite division although the element called φαῦλον rather than βέλτιστον has not been identified. The language of feeding and strengthening the φαῦλον so as to destroy the λογιστικόν recalls the Image of the tripartite soul in Book Nine (588E5-9A1, 589B2-3), bringing all the force of that Image to bear on the current question.

<sup>4863</sup> χαριεστέρους (B6) is meant to straddle between human types in society and the noblest part of the soul. An instance of the political event is described in the Decline (where these χαριέστεροι are called κοσμιώτατοι, 564E6-565E4).

<sup>4864</sup> πολιτείαν (B7): again the triadic structure (n.4658) consisting of positive statement (about soul, B3-5), supportive analogy (about city, B5-6), and restatement of the point about soul in terms borrowed from the analogy (cf. also χαριεστέρους, B6, and n.4863). At the same time that the “Decline” is adduced from Book Eight, the metaphor connects the present argument with the vivid treatment of soul at the end of Nine, and again attaches this critique of poetry to the very highest and most radical viewpoint reached in the discussion.

<sup>4865</sup> Reading εἰδωλοποιοῦντα (C3) with the edd., preserved only in *pr. F* (εἰδωλοποιοῦντι ADMf): εἴδωλα stands in contrast with τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς, with μέν omitted in the way noticed by Denniston (165: cf. 398A4-5, 601A1-2, 616B5-6), and makes εἰδωλοποιοῦντα parallel with ἀφεστῶτα, obviating any need for the ingenuities of Schneider and J.-C. *ad loc.*

powerful enough with very few exceptions<sup>4866</sup> to mutilate<sup>4867</sup> even decent persons, is, I should think, particularly horrible and dangerous.

“How would it not be, if truly it does *that!*!”<sup>4868</sup>

Hear what I have to say, and then decide.<sup>4869</sup> Imagine the noblest among us<sup>4870</sup> listening to a recitation of Homer’s poetry or some other tragic poet imitating one of the heroes suffering and spinning out a long speech to accompany his wailings, surrounded by singing<sup>4871</sup> and the beating of breasts. I would guess you are aware how we enjoy the recitation and surrender ourselves to it as we are borne along in sympathy, and then in all seriousness<sup>4872</sup> we applaud the poet as a “great” poet<sup>4873</sup> because he brought us to this state.

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<sup>4866</sup> ἔκτος πάνυ τινῶν ὄλιγων (C7-8, cf. 595B6-7): The immediate pertinence of these words as well as καὶ τὸν ἐπιεικεῖς is not to send the reader looking for who these few might be, in Socrates’ or Plato’s mind, but to extend the criticism of poetry beyond the effect it has on “the majority” (τοῖς πολλοῖς), 605A4). Halliwell says Socrates “of course” refers to a certain small set of persons mentioned in passing at 498A7, but the entire context of Book Nine with its stress on the vicissitudes of man’s psychic balance and ethical health (590C8-592A4, taken to be enough reason to stay away from politics [A5-6], and cf. δεδιότι, 608B1) already gave the phrase a more edifying and relevant meaning, which is corroborated in turn below (606A7-8) when Socrates imagines that although every man is endowed with reason, which is naturally the noblest element, his nurture and learning may prove inadequate to enable this “man within” (588D3) to keep the beast under control.

<sup>4867</sup> τὸν ἐπιεικεῖς ... λωβᾶσθαι (C7): After the re-introduction of διάνοια above (603B10) we now focus in on the other aspect of the thesis announced on the first page of the Book (λώβη ... τῆς διανοίας, 595B5-6), which Socrates now calls the “greatest accusation,” reverting to the forensic metaphor he used there (κατερεῖτε, 595B3). The expression is abbreviated (as if it is the persons that are mutilated rather than their διάνοια) in the same manner as the prepositional prefix is dropped in repetition (n. 1532). All we have done so far is therefore to be regarded as preliminary. Accordingly, we should anticipate that a large role will continue to be played by the division and order of the soul in this phase of the critique of mimesis.

<sup>4868</sup> Both δρᾶ and αὐτό (C9) add a tone that is ominous, on a par with πάνδεινov.

<sup>4869</sup> ἀκούων σκόπει (C10) is portentously forceful, as programmatic γάρ now explains: Socrates invites Glaucon to look, with him, into *themselves* (ἡμῶν) as examples or models of the ἐπιεικεῖς that poetry might harm, just as with the Image in Book Nine he had invited him to look at the effect on his inner self of the attitude toward justice and injustice he had voiced in Book Two (588B6-11, 588E3-589B7, and nn. *ad locc.*). The reader is indirectly invited to join them.

<sup>4870</sup> οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν (C10): He claims to be shifting to the effect it has on the best persons (βέλτιστοι) but the more important shift is that he moves *ourselves* into the audience (with ἡμῶν). What is happening in truth is that he is shifting the perspective of the criticism to our inward conscience, which is always what he does and is always hazardous to the conversation. It is not about someone else we will be speaking, at this climactic moment in the argument, but ourselves and our own experience in the theatre.

<sup>4871</sup> ἄδοντας (D2) shifts to the plural, perhaps to designate the chorus (J.-C.) responding as with a κομμός to the hero’s ρήσις (D1). The juxtaposition of overwrought vocal and choreographic expressions (ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς / κοπτομένους) with the contrived and metrically controlled poetic compositions (μακρὰν ρήσιν / ἄδοντας) is ironic and funny.

<sup>4872</sup> συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες (D4): The direct reversal of mood, from following sympathetically to soberly applauding, is portrayed by the chiasm of verb and participle but is not explained: it is just something that happens in us.

<sup>4873</sup> ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν (D4-5) again quotes (with ὡς) the appellation. There is patently no basis in what came before for us to call him ἀγαθός, besides the fact that we suddenly became serious (σπουδάζοντες): the term is merely an index of how much we have been moved. We may compare the

"I am aware—how could I not be?"

But think, when some matter of great concern<sup>4874</sup> happens to one of ourselves,<sup>4875</sup> how in this case we take pride in showing the opposite reaction—staying calm and bearing through it with strength, that is—thinking<sup>4876</sup> that this is the sign of a “real man,” whereas it would be womanly to act in the way we praised just now.

"I do think so."

So is this praising such a fine thing after all? To sit there watching a man act in a way one would be ashamed to act oneself, and instead of having one's stomach turned by it<sup>4877</sup> to enjoy it and praise it?

"No, in Zeus's name! The praise flies in the face of reason, as it seems"<sup>4878</sup>

(606) Right you are, especially if you should view the case a certain way.<sup>4879</sup>

"What way?"

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way that Wagnerians happily surrender their critical objectivity in the way they refer to Wagner as The Master. Analogously, at 598E3 the admirer of the “good” poet is said simply to presume he must know what he is writing about or else he would not be “good,” but we then learned he does not; and subsequently we learned that the judgment of the poet's εὖ λέγεσθαι (601A8-9 and n.4754) really boils down to his καλῶς λέγεσθαι (602B3 and n.4786). The true reason for loving poetry, and loving it seriously (σπουδάζοντες) needs to be explored, and this time the explanation will arise out of an analysis of our own subjective experience.

<sup>4874</sup> κῆδος (D7) already moves beyond the πάθημα we suffer in the “story” of our own lives, to something we are responsible to repair (ιᾶσθαι τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν, 604D1): compare κήδεται, 596A2. He has already warmed us up to what he is going to say, since he has already argued that poetry depicts behavior that real men would only do in private (603E3-604E6); what is new is, again, that he has shifted the focus onto ourselves.

<sup>4875</sup> τινι ἡμῶν (D7) echoes τινα τῶν ἥρωών (D1) and therefore compares us with the heroes on the stage.

<sup>4876</sup> ὡς again (E1), turning ὀνδρός into an appellation. The appellation relies upon what we said two pages ago (603E3-8, where note the prominent position of ὀνήρ, E3).

<sup>4877</sup> βδελύττεσθαι (E6) an *hapax* in Plato (idiomatic βδελυρός [338D3] is mere name-calling) unsurprisingly found in Aristophanes ten times (thrice more than νοεῖν, for instance). The forceful language sets shame against pleasure, the θυμοειδές against the ἐπιθυμητικόν.

<sup>4878</sup> εὐλόγῳ (E7) suggests irrationality and self-contradiction within the person: cf. n.4899 ad 606C7, but Glaucon's asseverative tone (οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία) is offset by his less than certain ξοικεν. Socrates notices, as he noticed his slightly reticent εἰκός γε at 602B8 and turned back at him with μὴ τοίνυν τῷ εἰκότι πιστεύσωμεν (B9).

<sup>4879</sup> With ἔκεινῃ (606A1) Socrates vaunts the importance of what he has to say, and Glaucon hearkens. γε suggests there will be a special pertinence in Glaucon's use of the term εὐλόγῳ, to describe which will strengthen Glaucon's resolve. The ensuing statement is one of Socrates's longer speeches and is of a piece with the magisterial tone he has adopted. On ναί cf. Shilleto's commentary of Dem.Fals.Leg. (Cambridge 1864), Appendix C: “to strengthen the words coming from the preceding speaker by way of taking an objection to their sufficiency.”

If you should consider<sup>4880</sup> that the element in us that in the one case was forcibly<sup>4881</sup> being held back in our own time of trouble, starved of the opportunity to have a good cry and to slake its desire to mourn and satisfy<sup>4882</sup> itself, which by its very nature it desires to do, is in the other case the very element fulfilled and gratified by the poets, while meanwhile the part of us that by its very nature is the noblest but by dint of inadequate schooling or habituation<sup>4883</sup> lets down its guard against this mourning part and, since in truth it is someone else's sufferings that it sits and watches from a distance<sup>4884</sup> and since it redounds not at all to his own<sup>4885</sup> dishonor, if some other man who claims to be virtuous should mourn inappropriately, that he should approve of the poem and pity him. To the contrary he believes that now he only *profits*<sup>4886</sup> from that feeling,<sup>4887</sup> the pleasure he was avoiding in his own case, and he would not acquiesce in being deprived of this pleasure as a result of shunning the

<sup>4880</sup> ἐνθυμεῖσθαι (A3): to entertain in the mind a relatively complex set of ideas all at once (whence ἐνθύμημα, with its weighing of relative possibilities), used by Socrates to describe his inner reflections upon hearing the oracle (*Apol.*21B3). Cf. also *Phdo.*86B, *Phdrs.*D1, *Prot.*327A3, *Symp.*182D5. ἐννοεῖν can also be so used (e.g., *Apol.*40C4-41C7). The apodosis is understood: 'you would see that the ἔπαινος truly is not reasonable.' Socrates's long speech must show the failure in reasoning (cf. *λογίζεσθαι*, B5).

<sup>4881</sup> βίᾳ (A3). Halliwell (*ad loc.*; cf. also *ad* 605B4) infers from the language that Socrates is thinking the lower part of the soul has the character of a wild animal; and of course he is right since it was the burden of the Image in Book Nine to make it out to be that way.

<sup>4882</sup> τοῦ δακρύσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ικανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι (A4-5), a genetic list: two activities leading to satiation. The aorists as well as the expansion of the second activity (όδύρασθαι) with ἀπό-, indicate an intention to be done with ὁδυρμοί, corroborated by the ἀπό of ἀποπλησθῆναι, "to be done with filling up," a depiction of the rational satiation of pleasure. Contrast the presents, πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαῖρον, also genetic, just below (A6-7), with which compare the initial description of the appetitive satiation at 604E9-10: πρὸς τοὺς ὁδυρμοὺς ἄγον καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχον αὐτῶν.

<sup>4883</sup> τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἄτε οὐχ ικανῶς πεπαιδεύμενον λόγῳ, οὐδὲ ἔθει (A7-8): Behind lies the triad, φύσις, μελέτη (here ἔθει), ἐπιστήμη (here λόγῳ).

<sup>4884</sup> Θεωροῦν (B1), an accusative absolute with ἄτε (cf. Smyth §2078). Its subject is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, which the man, with his λογιστικόν, is allowing to watch. The term invokes the theatre (Θέατρον) but also the vicarious semi-participation of an onlooker.

<sup>4885</sup> ἔαυτῷ (B1), masc., is the man (and the subject of καταφρονήσας below, B5), in comparison with whom the man on the stage is another man (ἄλλος ἀνήρ). He is thinking and arguing the ἄτε clause with, or in, his λογιστικόν.

<sup>4886</sup> κερδαίνειν (B3), "gain," can in itself with a certain irony connote profiting undeservedly as well as avoiding loss (e.g. *Xen.Apol.*9). It expresses a claim he is making to himself with his λογιστικόν, to the effect that although it would cost him to indulge the wailing in his own case, it costs him nothing here. But this according to Socrates is a miscalculation (*λογίζεσθαι*), or a failure of logic.

<sup>4887</sup> ἐκεῖνο (B3) pointing to what he had formerly avoided as an evil, during his own misfortunes (A3-6).

entire poem.<sup>4888</sup> Indeed I imagine few people<sup>4889</sup> can reckon that one necessarily takes home with himself something of what he receives abroad<sup>4890</sup> in the sense that by nourishing the pitying element in himself, though on cases remote<sup>4891</sup> from himself, he has strengthened it,<sup>4892</sup> so that it is not easy for him to keep it under control<sup>4893</sup> when the case is his own.

“Quite true.”

Doesn’t the same argument apply to the ridiculous, too? If<sup>4894</sup> you would deem it shameful that you yourself should do some ridiculous act,<sup>4895</sup> but if attending a comic performance or for that matter reading in private<sup>4896</sup> you find yourself overcome<sup>4897</sup> with pleasure<sup>4898</sup> rather than aversion to it as base, you are behaving the same way as in the case of the pitiable. The part of yourself that at first

<sup>4888</sup> ὄλου τοῦ ποιήματος (B5): His desire for the pleasure (in particular the desire of the ἐπιθυμητικόν) requires him to accept the whole poetic apparatus that produces it rather than to shun poetry as a shameful thing (καταφρονέν, a function of the θυμοειδές in alliance with the λογιστικόν) because of what it does to him, the way that Leontius’s θυμός cursed his eyes for what they wanted to see (cf. n.2158 ad 440A2-3). Poetry has brought us very close to dissociating the θυμός from the λόγος (440A8-B9), and this is the grave λώβη τῆς διανοίας that Socrates is at pains to reveal to Glaucon. Moreover, this is where the joinder of issue lies for those readers who cannot accept Socrates’s expulsion of mimesis. Halliwell tries to carve out room to appreciate the skill of the poet apart from its effect (*ad loc.*, 146), what I call the “apparatus” above, but that only begs the question why Halliwell wants to make this argument. It is not, after all, Socrates or Plato that need to be corrected but the confusion of the λογιστικόν and the faction in the soul. The last time we saw the λόγος being split from the θυμός was when the personality was taken over by Eros (573BC: cf. n.4175).

<sup>4889</sup> ὀλίγοις τισίν (B6), i.e., the πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων of 605C7-8. Few retain the rational objectivity needed to calculate correctly the effect that poetry is having on them, the sort of objective ability envisioned at 602D6-603A9 and 603E3-8, but also in the critique of pleasure in Book Nine.

κερδαίνειν is all they see in the balance sheet, and even this is only a denial of the cost they know they would inflict on themselves if they indulged the pleasure in their own lives. We may compare, and finally understand in its inner truth, how it is that Glaucon’s story of Gyges might overpower the διάνοια as he said it would (τῇ διανοίᾳ, 359C1), likewise bedazzled by the prospect of not being seen.

<sup>4890</sup> ἀπολαύειν ... ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα (B6-7): The expression and the idea is repeated from 395C7-D1 (ίνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν). There it was a bare assertion; here, and now, it has been explained.

<sup>4891</sup> ἔκείνοις (B7) now used of other persons’ misfortunes (contrast ἔκείνο, B3) which were pushed outward by ἀλλοτρίων (B5), in order to return the focus to τὰ οἰκεῖα, what is going on inside him.

<sup>4892</sup> ισχυρόν (B7): the argument “few can reckon” is that allowing the appetitive part of the soul to have its way makes it stronger in its struggle with the rational part. The assertion plainly relies on conclusions expressed in the Image of Book Nine (588E5-589A4 and B1-6: cf. n.4862 ad 605B4-5).

<sup>4893</sup> κατέχειν (B8), the last word of this long paragraph, fulfills the promise of showing the illogic (cf. 606A1 and n.4879) by pointing back to the successful κατέχειν with which the paragraph began (A3).

<sup>4894</sup> We either need Schneider’s ὅτι, ἂν (C2-3) or Madvig’s ὅτον ὁ, against the ὅτι ἂν of all mss., in order to achieve agreement for πονηρά (C4); but we also need a second ἂν for the coming subjunctives (C4) or else view it as a relative subjunctive protasis without ὁ, rare if not unexampled in later prose (cf. Leg.737B3 [emended]; Thuc.4.18, 6.21: cf. GMT §540; Smyth §§2327, 2339). It cannot be ὁ carried forward (Smyth §1767 and n.1280), since the optative’s ὁ in apodosis is a different ὁ from the subjunctive’s ὁ in protasis. See Adam’s judicious note. Perhaps read ὅταν τιν' ἂν. The tenses and moods and parallelism of the argument present much of the sense even without the needed

you were holding in check from wanting to act the clown, since you feared you would come to be thought a crass person, you now release,<sup>4899</sup> and with that rash act<sup>4900</sup> you face the likelihood of being carried off before you know it, and turning out to be a comedian<sup>4901</sup> in your own right,<sup>4902</sup> after all.<sup>4903</sup>

“Very much so.”

And it applies also to sexual drives and anger, and to all the appetites and the pains and pleasures that arise in the soul, which do in fact attend us in all the things we do, as we aver,<sup>4904</sup> that these are the sorts of things that are brought about by the operation<sup>4905</sup> of mimetic poetry on us. It nourishes them by irrigating them when they should be parched,<sup>4906</sup> and enthrones them as rulers within us though they should be ruled, in order that we might become nobler persons and therefore happier

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repair: see following notes.

<sup>4895</sup> αὐτός (C3): Instead of analyzing the experience in terms of the separable parts of the soul Socrates continues the personal formulation announced above (τίνι ἡμῶν, 605D7, cf. 605C10).

<sup>4896</sup> ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμῳδικῇ ή καὶ ιδίᾳ ἀκούων (C3-4): ἀκούων goes with both, so we are to imagine attending a public comic performance (μιμήσει) or reading the comedy in private (ιδίᾳ). This small and passing detail broaches the great problem that our reluctance to be seen doing certain things does not extend to a reluctance to be seen watching and praising those same acts in a large public gathering. Why not?

<sup>4897</sup> σφόδρα (C4) describes that extra ingredient of force and confusion attributable to one's emotional state, as at 585A2 and 586C1.

<sup>4898</sup> χαρῆς καὶ μὴ μισῆς (C4): the corrected ms.A is certainly correct, against all others. We have, after δέ (C3), a second protasis qualified by a circumstantial participle (ἀκούων) alternative to the first protasis represented by the optative αἰσχύνοιο, which itself was qualified by the parallel and contrasting circumstantial participle, γελωτοποιῶν. We need the two protases so that ταῦτὸν ποιεῖς (C5) can play the role of the apodosis: otherwise they would have been apodoses to protases represented by the two participles, namely, εἰ γελωτοποιῶντος (ideal) and ἐὰν ἀκούης (vivid). The punctual aorist subjunctives (χαρῆς καὶ μὴ μισῆς) stand in contrast with the rational resolution of the present optative (αἰσχύνοιο).

<sup>4899</sup> Reading ἀνιεῖς (C7) with Burnet (ἂν εἴης AFM : ἀνείης D : ἀνίης recc.). By switching to the second singular (compare the impersonal construction with τὸ λογιστικόν, A8), Socrates makes vivid to Glaucon (and us, if we wish) that his reaction, whether to his own troubles or those of another, is managed by one and the same part of the self, the rational part, the rationality of which makes it φύσει βέλτιστον so that it least of all should contradict itself (cf. εὐλόγῳ, 605E7 and n.4878) and could do so only unconsciously (ἔλαθες, C8): the evolution of this unforeseen outcome is managed by the shift from optative αἰσχύνοιο to subjunctive χαρῆς.

<sup>4900</sup> καὶ ἐκεὶ νεανικὸν ποιήσας (C7) parallel to the apodosis above, ταῦτὸν ποιεῖς (C5); νεανικόν plays the role that ἀκαίρως played at B2: the grounds for, if not the very term of, censure.

<sup>4901</sup> κωμῳδοποιός (C8) etymologized under the force of nearby ποιήσας (C7) and ποιεῖς (C5).

<sup>4902</sup> ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις (C8): cobbled together out of ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ (B8) and εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα (B7).

<sup>4903</sup> ἔλαθες (C8) gnomic, with ἔξενεχθείς, not ποιήσας.

<sup>4904</sup> φαμεν πᾶσι πράξει ἡμῖν ἔπεσθαι (D3), as if proverbial. It is prudence to recognize that such feelings are always there to influence us, and must continually be managed. ἔπεσθαι is not as strong as the connection suggested by ἐφάπτεσθαι in Phdo.79C, where the very issue of disconnectability (i.e., death, and the separate survival of the soul) is the subject. After exhausting the realm of fiction (tragedy / comedy) Socrates now generalizes again by discovering fiction's complement, namely, real life situations.

<sup>4905</sup> ἐργάζεται (D4) ominous in its vagueness, as δρᾶν can be (604A8 and 377E8) and hence (c.dupl.acc.) usually negative (L.S.J. s.v., § II.2).

<sup>4906</sup> ἄρδουσα / αὐγμεῖν (D4-5). That is, mimesis undoes the work of the λογιστικόν: as described in the Image in Book Nine (589B2-3). For the metaphor used of the parts of the soul compare the

rather than worse and more miserable.<sup>4907</sup>

“I cannot gainsay you.”<sup>4908</sup>

And so,<sup>4909</sup> Glaucon, I said, whenever you encounter<sup>4910</sup> those fans<sup>4911</sup> of Homer who brag that all Hellas owes its education to this poet,<sup>4912</sup> and that his works should be taken up<sup>4913</sup> and studied for their help in the organizing<sup>4914</sup> and teaching of human affairs, and that this one poet<sup>4915</sup> is the guide to follow in managing every aspect of one's personal life, you should greet them in a friendly manner and with admiration,<sup>4916</sup> recognizing they (607) have achieved what goodness they can, and grant them that Homer is surely the most poetic<sup>4917</sup> of tragic poets and also the first among them;<sup>4918</sup> but know at the

“good” man's fathering at 550B1-3.

<sup>4907</sup> ἵνα βελτίους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ... (D6-7): Generalizing to include the θυμοειδές as well as the ἐπιθυμητικόν (“marginalizing” the θυμός is not a characteristic of Book Ten, *pace* Halliwell: compare 589C8-D3, which this passage is quoting), and capping the generalization with the precious conclusion reached in Book Nine that psychic order entails happiness and disorder misery, an issue important enough to justify the use of the term λώβη for the effect of mimesis. There is no puritanism: the conception admits of degrees (*n.b.*, the present infinitives with δέον, the comparatives [D6-7], and the present subj. γιγνώμεθα) and these aspects of life are to be governed (ἄρχεσθαι), not eradicated. Assembling all these ideas and images constitutes a climax achieved by Socrates's reference to the ultimate sanction, happiness vs. destitution (cf. 344E1-3, 352D5-6, 472B3-473D2, 578C6-7), so that finally, with Glaucon's agreement, Socrates can draw with full force the controversial implication about Homer.

<sup>4908</sup> οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως φάναι (D8): there is no joy but if anything regret in his acceptance of this conclusion. He acquiesces, that is, to the dictates of reason.

<sup>4909</sup> οὐκοῦν (E1), the fifth. Socrates, as our narrator, adds emphasis for us by saying εἰπον.

<sup>4910</sup> ὅταν ... ἐντύχης (E1-2): this is the third time we have countenanced this enthusiastic message (cf. 598C7-D5 and 596B12-E4), and now we are prepared to see it dashed a third time. Plato (and Socrates) are fully conscious that their audiences will resist the conclusion and that they must prepare it in every way possible and construct it part by part, so that at least the audiences will grant, as Glaucon has just done, that they cannot gainsay it.

<sup>4911</sup> Ὁμέρου ἐπαινέταις (E1): For the expression cf. Prot.309A6 and for the popular sense of ἐπαινέτης cf. 426B5-9. Halliwell astutely notices the continuing importance throughout the re-evaluation of poetry of the term and the idea of praise (cf. 598D8-9A4, 601A2, 605A4, 605D3-4, E2, E4-6, 606B3), but mistakes its importance. People praise Homer and call him “good” because they like his poems; the problem is what aspect of themselves they are liking him with. The underlying principle, that praise is the unreflective response of the soul's parts, was introduced in the Second Argument of Book Nine (580C9-583A11, esp. 581C8-E4) and is brought back at 602C4-4D11 and 605A8-B2 (stressed by the parenthetical remark at 606A5-6) in accordance with Socrates's promise at the opening of the Book to show how the partition of the soul illuminates the issue of how to judge poetry properly (595A1-B1: cf. 580D3-4 and n.4329). That “contradictions” in what is praised and blamed must be settled by the λογιστικόν was proven there, in Book Nine, and represents the ruling principle in the “devaluation” (or, more exactly, the re-evaluation) of poetry in Book Ten. Halliwell (146-7, *ad loc.*) tries to carve out a way for the λογιστικόν to praise poetry after all, one that Socrates does not see, but neither saving nor condemning poetry is Socrates's purpose but rather to save the soul as he has just now said (and reiterates at 608B6-8).

<sup>4912</sup> οὗτος ὁ ποιητής (E2-3): Socrates quotes their praise (“this poet”) but their unthinkingly approbative use of the term has now been called into question, unbeknownst.

<sup>4913</sup> ἀναλαβόντι (E4), of the written matter itself, as at Apol.22B2, Phdo.95E2. For the shift to the accusative (κατασκευασάμενον [E5] aorist middle) cf. 586E5-6 and n.4481.

<sup>4914</sup> διοίκησιν (E3): cf. διοικεῖν, 600D1, and n.4737.

same time that you can accept no more of his work into your city<sup>4919</sup> than his hymns to the gods and his praises of good men.<sup>4920</sup> If you accept the sugared Muse<sup>4921</sup> and her poems both short and long,<sup>4922</sup> it will be pleasure and pain that will sit in twain<sup>4923</sup> as rulers over your<sup>4924</sup> city, rather than law and public consensus ever adjusted by the best dictates of reason.<sup>4925</sup>

“Very true.”

So let this stand as our defense and explanation<sup>4926</sup> that, looking back on what we said about poetry, it was reasonable after all for us to send her packing<sup>4927</sup> given what we have now discovered to be her true nature: reason forced us<sup>4928</sup> to this conclusion. And let us not omit to tell her,<sup>4929</sup> in order to pre-empt a charge of rancor or unsophistication being brought against us, that a dispute between

<sup>4915</sup> ποιητήν (E5), again emphatic and again dubitative.

<sup>4916</sup> φιλεῖν μὲν χρή καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι (607A1): cf. the similar concessive μέν clause done with these verbs at *Apol.*29D3: ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, where again he wants to defuse resentment about his higher calling (compare English, “Please don’t take this personally”). It is exactly consonant with the sentiment *amicus Homer, maior amicus veritas*. The pair of verbs constitute a colloquialism found also in Xenophon but not Demosthenes. For Plato’s uses cf. 479E10 (ἀ. τε καὶ φ.: welcoming what is akin), Leg.689A (φ. τε καὶ ἀ.: “welcoming evil!”), Lys.217B4 (ἀ. καὶ φ.: a sick man “appreciates the doctor”). Literally meaning hugs and kisses, it seems to mean “greet with open arms,” usually in a context where one might expect otherwise.

<sup>4917</sup> ποιητικώτατον (A2). For the complement cf. ποιητικώτερον (387B4) used there also in παραίτησις (B1-6), but in the present passage it is worse than damning by faint praise because of its patent circularity (cf. ποιητής, E5 and E3). We are, after all, on the verge of deciding that poetry might be a bad thing: the most poetical poet would then be the worst thing one could be. Still, the fans of Homer would not notice the circle, given their approbative use of ποιητής above (E3).

<sup>4918</sup> φιλεῖν μὲν χρή ... εἰδέναι δέ (A1-8): The gentle but firm treatment of Homer’s sponsors echoes Socrates and Glaucon’s treatment of the mimetic poet imagined to be in their midst at the very end of their discussion of poetry in Book Three (398AB): compare φιλεῖν καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι here (607A1) with προσκυνοῦμεν (398A4); βελτίστους and ποιητικώτατον (A1-2) with ιερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἡδύν there (A4-5); for ὕμνους and ἐγκώμια (A4) cf. αὐστηροτέρω καὶ ἀηδεστέρω ... ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν (A8-B2). Again we have an indication of tension just beneath the surface (cf. κατερεῖτε, 595B3 and n. *ad loc.*, and δίκαιον που, 598D1 and n.), as does ἀπολελογήσθω just below (B1).

<sup>4919</sup> παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν (A4), anarthrous, means “admit civically.” Socrates diverts the discussion from the rancor of personal disagreement to the “larger” question of the fate of the “city,” for which the sanction was finding personal happiness. Since the last few lines of Book Nine, πόλις can only designate the personal soul, of Glaucon for instance. It is perhaps the indeterminacy of the reference of “city” that accounts for the absence of the definite article, here and below (607C5). Cf. the “personal” use of the public expression, κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος, below (n.4925).

<sup>4920</sup> ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (A4): This is simply a specification of the “less sweet and more austere” poetry accepted into the city at 398A8-B4. Halliwell’s assertion that it alludes to the evening songs of the idyllic life at 372B7-8 is an overstatement, but the suggestion calls attention to the interesting fact that there is no praise of good men there, only hymns to gods: The idyllic picture of man in the πολίχνιον in fact depicted him in the presence of gods, but not other men!

<sup>4921</sup> ἡδυσμένον (A5) points to ἡδονήν (606B4). The verb suggests culinary sweetening: the poet after all adds his pleasing effects (601A4-B4). Contrast τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ (398A8, denying ιερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἡδύν at A4-5).

<sup>4922</sup> ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν (A5-6): whether short or long: cf. D4 below and 379A8-9.

<sup>4923</sup> βασιλεύσετον (A6): the dual emphasizes the fact that pain and pleasure pursued without mind are illusory and behave like a two-headed monster, the one leading to the other in a ridiculous antapodosis of the Ionian type (cf. the truism at 563E9-564A1 and Socrates’s remark in the prison

philosophy and poetry is not after all a novel<sup>4930</sup> thing. We hear for instance of that “hound noisesome at her master” who bawls;<sup>4931</sup> of a man “great with his empty declarations of foolishness;” of the “mob putting the strong arm on men so very wise,”<sup>4932</sup> and that men of “rarified meditations” for all that<sup>4933</sup> go begging.<sup>4934</sup> You could multiply instances at will showing that the opposition of these poets<sup>4935</sup> is nothing new. But in the face of all that<sup>4936</sup> let us put ourselves on record saying that as far as we are concerned, if the poetry of pleasure working through imitation should have an argument according to which it ought to have a place in a city whose laws and customs are good,<sup>4937</sup> we would restore<sup>4938</sup> her gladly—after all we are quite aware<sup>4939</sup> how enjoyable it is to surrender to her charms. In the meanwhile, to betray what we see as the truth<sup>4940</sup> would be impious. After all, aren’t you charmed by

[Phdo.60B3-C1]).

<sup>4924</sup> σοι (A6) the familiar ethical dative of the theorist (371A8 and n.990), but homing in also on the intimate connection between the city in heaven and its effect on the constitution (*πολιτεία*) of Glaucon’s soul (Book Nine *sub fin.*).

<sup>4925</sup> τοῦ κοινῆ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βέλτιστου λόγου (A7-8), paired with τοῦ νόμου, is an elaboration of λόγος καὶ νόμος at 604A10, and climactic for its dense succinctness. βέλτιστος λόγος is by metonymy a *constructio praegnans* for ὁ τοῦ βέλτιστου λόγος, a notion relied upon just below (B3): cf. 604C7 and n.4844. κοινῆ ἀεί indicates the dialogical equivalent of ongoing public debate (namely the current search for agreement between Glaucon and Socrates, always subject to revision: cf. *Crito* 49D5-E2).

<sup>4926</sup> ἀπολελογήσθω (B1) The juridical term (rather than the accountant’s ἀπολελογίσθω presented in mss.AD) points back to the opening of the Book where Socrates first adopted a defensive posture (595B3, B9-C3, and n.4621). ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἥρει is likewise “apologetic” (that is, it presents the πρόφασις that their behavior was reasonable [εἰκότως]), and is supplemented (regarding προσείπωμεν, cf. n.4929, below) with a countercharge (an αἰτία), namely that poetry started the whole thing (on παλαιά cf. n.4930).

<sup>4927</sup> ἀπεστέλλομεν (B2), the imperfect of citation, referring specifically to ἀποπέμπομεν (398A6), just as the beginning of Book Ten referred more generally to the expulsion of poetry.

<sup>4928</sup> ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἥρει (B3). If we were able to follow the dictates of reason in our own darkest hours (604C7 and n.4844), our decision to expel Homer on such severely rational grounds should *a fortiori* (whence γάρ) be immune from a charge of rancor or ill will. But ἥρει is an imperfect of citation, so the assertion is that the current reasons corroborate the decision we made there.

<sup>4929</sup> προσείπωμεν (B3): The prefix pertains to the entire sentence, as at 521D8, per Riddell §129: cf. also *Apol.*20A2; *Gorg.*516D8; *Phdo.*74A6; *Soph.*250B10; *Tht.*208E4, 209D4.

<sup>4930</sup> παλαιά (B5). There cannot be an “Ancient Quarrel” between poetry and philosophy, since philosophy is new. If Socrates is claiming there was such a standing quarrel this first announcement of it in literature would hardly appear in a concessive μέν-clause; the representatives of poetry would hardly themselves be so σκληρός and ὄχυροικος; their charge would pit the important essence of poetry (e.g. as Musically inspired) against philosophical method rather than popular *ad hominem* cracks; and of course Socrates would have needed to produce counter-volleys from “philosophy” to prove his claim. The term παλαιά only indicates that a falling out had already started so that Socrates’s criticism today is not an opening salvo (cf. n.1388). His proof he did not start it consists of specific poetic citations (whence καὶ γάρ) that and there are no volleys previously launched against poetry by philosophy for him to cite (cf. n.4935 *ad τούτων* [C3]). Halliwell finds their absence striking and tries along with the others to supply some by citing Xenophanes and any other quotation that criticizes a poet (though none of these criticize poetry *per se* and themselves are written in verse!). Such citations (e.g. *apud* Adam, the Pindar fr. quoted at 457B2-3, where cf. n.2370) presume a notion of philosophy expanded far beyond Socrates’s present intention. Nor is antiquity needed in the passages Socrates quotes to justify the term, παλαιά; all that matters to him is the content, and in particular the behaviors for which they have made philosophy and philosophers infamous with overblown slurs

her just as I am, my friend,<sup>4941</sup> particularly when you behold her powers as deployed by Homer?

“You can be sure of that.”

And<sup>4942</sup> under those circumstances<sup>4943</sup> would she rightly be restored to the city, having presented a defense whether in melic meter or any meter she chooses?<sup>4944</sup>

“Quite so, she would.”

And I guess we would grant a forum even to her sponsors,<sup>4945</sup> those who themselves lack poetic talent but love and support poetry nonetheless, to present speeches on her behalf unmetrical and plain, to the effect that she is not only pleasant but also beneficial to constitutions and to the lives we

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supported by no argumentation. The poetic hemistichs quoted offhand by Callicles in the *Gorgias* (485E6-486D1) are of a piece with these and corroborate Socrates's claim that “poetry” is readily used to articulate slurs against philosophy.

<sup>4931</sup> λακέρυζα πρὸς δεσπόταν κύων (B6), accepting the breakout of D.Page (*fr.adesp.69* [=Bergk 135] in *PMG* 987 [p.524]), who takes ἐκείνη κραυγάζουσα as epexegetical. The slander of poets against cosmological speculators cited at *Leg.967C* makes a different kind of dogs out of them.

<sup>4932</sup> I read διασόφων (C1), with Burnet (*Slings ad loc.* attributes the conjecture to Wilamowitz [2.386-7]). Burnet's apparatus reports: δία σοφῶν A : διὰ σοφῶν D : διασοφῶν FM. Stallb. reports that Bekker reads A as capitalizing Δία, and this is what he, J.-C., and Chambry read, construing Δία as accusative object of κρατῶν though it is buried in the attributive position of a partitive genitive qualifying that participle's subject, ὅχλος! Slings places the quoted phrase in daggers, as did D.Page in *PLM* (*cit.supra*). The reading διασόφων, taken as genitive object of κρατῶν, expresses the envious anger of the mob (just as πάσσοφος is uniformly derogatory in Socrates's ironic uses of it). Cf. διασοφίζεσθαι in *Aristoph.Av.1619*. Note that merely to be σοφός was sufficient to incite the mob, according to Socrates in his *Apology* (see note below). ὁ (C1) is not part of the quote but cites the passage by citing its noun (like ἡ, B6 and οἱ, C2; cf. the quotations in Bks.2 and 3; *Phdrs.236C4*; and passages quoted in *Ar.Batr.*) and therefore does not force the genitive plural into attributive position. Adam's emendation of κρατῶν to κράτων (whence his paraphrase, ‘the rabble rout of all-too-sapient heads’) requires an unlikely plurality of wise men: an unruly ὅχλος is after all unanimous in its unruliness, and is unruly only measured against rule and reason.

<sup>4933</sup> ὄρα (C2) portrays the critic as snide.

<sup>4934</sup> The first charge (B6-7) mischaracterizes the philosopher as an aggressive antilogician like the puppy that tears everything apart (“master” being a metaphor for an elder or for the man in authority: cf. the behavior of his young imitators that Socrates describes at *Apol.23C2-D2*, and of the σκυλάκια at 539B6). The second (B7-C1) imagines what might appear stately and serious in the demeanor of the philosopher (μέγας) being betrayed by what the critic at least finds to be his empty abstractions (κενεαγορίαισι): cf. *Aristoph.Batr.1496-7* ἐπὶ σεμνοῖσιν λόγοισι καὶ σκαριφησμοῖσι λήρων and the dactyl of Timon, ἀνθρωποι κενεῆς οἵσιος ἔμπλεοι ἀσκοί (*apud Euseb.Pr.Ev.14.18.28*: To allege from his actual behavior that Socrates is interested in τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς [*Apol.23D5-6*, which he there calls τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα, D4-5] is one of those lies that betrays what it is trying to hide—the way Socrates made people feel empty *within*). The third (C1) consoles itself (i.e., ourselves, the mob) by putting these terribly clever types (διασόφων: Socrates reveals the mechanism of the envious term σοφός at *Apol.23A3-5* and *38C2-3*) in their place, if not by reason at least by main force (κρατῶν: the phrase summarizes his entire trial!). The fourth (C2) complacently asserts that for all their rarified musings they end up poor (a commonplace in Aristophanes; e.g. *Batr.1497* διατριβὴν ἀργόν: cf. *Apol.23B7-C1*, with its biting inversion of σχολή and ἀσχολία, and 31B5-C3). In all, the criticisms resemble the criticism Adeimantus levels against Socrates near the beginning of Book Six (cf. nn.2719 and 2720). Plato is dead serious about the power of poetry to move the mob, and here as elsewhere gives his Socrates every opportunity to foretell the consequences of his own devotion to wisdom and virtue.

humans lead.<sup>4946</sup> And we will listen with patience and clemency. Great will be our gain, after all, if she proves to be not only pleasant but also useful.<sup>4947</sup>

“Yes, how could that be anything but a gain for us?”

But if on the other hand she does not, you and I will be stuck, my friend.<sup>4948</sup> Just as those who have fallen in love with someone<sup>4949</sup> sometimes get the sense that their love is not beneficial to them and must force themselves to stay away from their beloved cold turkey,<sup>4950</sup> so will we. Because of the way a desire for such poetry was indeed engendered<sup>4951</sup> in us by the nurture and culture we received from (608) our worthy<sup>4952</sup> political institutions as children, we shall indeed<sup>4953</sup> be glad for her to come

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<sup>4935</sup> τούτων (C3), not αὐτῶν: The antecedent is the poets, not φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητική; and the genitive is subjective. All the quotations constitute evidence of poetry's opposition to philosophy (more exactly, philosophers); while conversely there is no evidence within this passage, nor before it in this book or outside it, of any philosophical opposition to poetry *per se*: Heraclitus criticized not poetry but poets alongside others. Poets were nearly all the authors there were and poetry *per se* had not even been sufficiently distinguished from anything else that it could be criticized. Indeed it is exactly this distinguishing that Socrates understands himself to have performed for the first time in these last pages (*n.b.*, τοιαύτην οὖσαν, B3, referring to the results they have reached, and contrast his uncertainty at the beginning, 595C7-8): it is this present event that he is trying to put into perspective with παλαιά.

<sup>4936</sup> ὅμως δέ (C3-4) answers παλαιὰ μέν (B5): despite poetry's history of mistreating philosophy we will give her a hearing if she has a real case to make. The rueful certainty of his position continues to make itself felt with several γε's in the ensuing lines (C4, C6, D6, E4).

<sup>4937</sup> εὐνομουμένη (C6) alludes to the rule of νόμος above (A7) and to εὐνομεῖσθαι, 605B4. It is the function of νόμος to preserve order: its provisions should be kept and defended (νομιστέα, 608B2: cf. 451A4-B1) until something better is found *through reason* (λόγον, C4: cf. D7 and 608A3) but since poetry by its nature uses effects and undermines reason, our very giving it a hearing must be controlled.

<sup>4938</sup> καταδεχοίμεθα (C6): of restoration after exile. By imagining poetry being able to produce a λόγος on its own behalf despite its devotion to the emotions (for the severity of the alternatives cf. 607A5-8), he gives an instance of reason's openness to modify policy in accordance with continuing discussion and deliberation, the method he proposed above (ὁ κοινῆ ἀεὶ δόξας εἶναι βέλτιστος λόγος, A7-8).

<sup>4939</sup> σύνισμέν γε (C6). The prefix (cf. συνειδέναι at *Apol.*21B4 and *Phdrs.*235C7) evinces the experience of conflict within the soul felt by Socrates and Glaucon as “founders of the city,” which few can reason their way through. It is sincere enough that Socrates needs to give Glaucon a confirmation that he feels it, too (C8-D2).

<sup>4940</sup> τὸ δοκοῦν (C7) relying, along with the previous line, on the expression at A7-8 (δόξαντος). The aorist there alluded to a decision reached by the δῆμος (note κοινῆ and the expression, ἔδοξε τῷ δῆμῳ) whereas here it is the continuing openness of reason in the individual that is needed so that the present is used.

<sup>4941</sup> ḥ γάρ (C8): The combination requests confirmation of the interlocutor's previous agreement rather than silently presuming it, at a crucial point in the argument, as often. Regularly ḥ γάρ follows an assertion, turning it into a question at the last minute (*Crat.*390A2, 421C7; *Euthyphr.*10E, 13A; *Gorg.*449D3, 468C7, D4; *Parm.*153B1; *Phdo.*93D4; at *Rep.*475C8 Socrates is brought up short by Glaucon disagreeing). Sometimes it appears in the middle as if the speaker finds himself asserting something that he meant to be asking (*Euthyd.*286C7, *Phdr.*266D9, *Tht.*160E2 [with vocative]). When it appears at the beginning, as here and at *Gorg.*494E9, it challenges assent. The collocation ḥ γὰρ ὅν (=alioquin), e.g. *Euthyd.*280A8, is an idiom quite distinct: cf. Hoogeveen *Doct.partic.* (Leipzig, 1806) 256-258. The vocative ὁ φίλε acknowledges again that the experience of κήλησις is shared (cf. σύνισμεν,

across as<sup>4954</sup> most noble and true,<sup>4955</sup> but as long as she is unable to defend herself<sup>4956</sup> we will sit in her audience chanting to ourselves this argument we are making as an incantation,<sup>4957</sup> and take care not to fall back into a love both childish<sup>4958</sup> and common. We know from our experience<sup>4959</sup> that such poetry<sup>4960</sup> is not to be taken seriously as though it had some truth to tell of great import, but something that a member of the audience must listen to with care, out of a fear for the effect it might have on the city within himself;<sup>4961</sup> and that he must adopt as his own rule and custom<sup>4962</sup> what we have said about poetry.

“I agree with you completely.”

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C6, and cf. 607A2-3, 605C10-D5). Halliwell (*ad loc.* and *ad* 605C7) recognizes the “confessional” tone but infers they are “diffident” about their decision to censor poetry when they express only regret.

<sup>4942</sup> οὐκοῦν (D3) six.

<sup>4943</sup> οὕτω (D3), i.e., if she can make an argument (C4-6) it is irrelevant what meter it is in. There is neither irony nor humor, just even-handedness (cf. 607A5-6), based on a distinction available only to reason since poetry as such cannot speak until it has chosen a meter.

<sup>4944</sup> Reading ἀπολογησαμένη (D3), in the original hand of A (ἀπολογισαμένη FD : ἀπολογησομένη A<sup>2</sup>M). The point is not to force poetry to change but require it to take responsibility for its effect: until it does it must be kept at a distance. Contrast the *prose* arguments of its sponsors (D6ff).

<sup>4945</sup> προστάται (D6) recalls the ἐπαινέται of 606E1 and the Ὄμηρίδαι of 599E6, but now casts them, as Schleiermacher saw (*apud* Stallb. *ad loc.*: cf. LSJ s.v., III.2), as persons with citizenship who represent the metic’s interests, in this case the interests of Poetry which has since been sent into exile (ἀπεστέλλομεν, B2: the metaphor is continued with καταδεχοίμεθα [C6] and κατιέναι [D3]), and held there. The point of the metaphor is that discussion and debate about poetry may be allowed to take place in the city since such would lack the mimetic magic; and even the mimetic magic would be permissible if it were used in a rational apology (D3-4). The prophylactic measures evince not some puristic horror of Plato’s: the measure and scope of its magical powers are intimately known and remembered by the interlocutors, too (C8-D2: *n.b.* σύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν, C6), as also by any reader who has ears and will allow his personal experience to affect his interpretation of the passage.

<sup>4946</sup> τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον (D8-9): The pair varies διοίκησίν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, 606E3-4.

<sup>4947</sup> κερδανοῦμεν (E1) comments on κερδαίνειν at 606B3, by correcting it. The vivid condition is sanguine and not an indirect dismissal. With the overall sentiment Horace (*Ars Poet.*343) will famously agree: *omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci*. Cf. *Gorg.*502AB.

<sup>4948</sup> Ὡ φίλε ἔταίρε (E4), indicating strong asseveration: cf. n.3285 and 608B4 below.

<sup>4949</sup> του (E4) may be presumed to be masculine by the specific sense that ἔρως tends to have: cf. n.2688.

<sup>4950</sup> For the telescoped expression βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δέ cf., with Shorey, *Ep.*3.316E *Ep.*7.325A; and parallel brachylogies from drama, e.g., *A.Nub.*1363; *E.Phoen.*1421; *S.Antig.*1105.

<sup>4951</sup> ἐγγεγονότα (E6) stresses that the feelings we have for poetry were inserted into us before we could think: cf. 377B1-9 (*n.b.* ἐνσημήνασθαι) and 378D7-E1 (*n.b.* δυσέκνιπτα).

<sup>4952</sup> καλῶν (E7) is “ironic.” He is speaking empirically, of how the men’s unexamined admiration of the poets has unquestioningly led them to include their works in the nurture of the young.

<sup>4953</sup> μέν (608A1), extenuating the μέν-clause (begun at E7) into the apodosis, in order to hold in suspension the inherently apodotic transition to the δέ clause (at ἔως δέ, A2).

<sup>4954</sup> φανῆναι (A1).

<sup>4955</sup> ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην (A1-2): Again the lover’s willingness, whether an ability or a weakness, to overlook flaws: cf. 474D7-475A2.

<sup>4956</sup> ἀπολογήσασθαι (A2): Socrates imagines poetry actually making the ἀπολογία he made room

Great is the struggle, dear Glaucon<sup>4963</sup>—truly it is great,<sup>4964</sup> nor small as people think, this struggle whether a man turns out good or bad: so great that<sup>4965</sup> the enticements<sup>4966</sup> of honor, nor of money nor office, nor those of poetry for that matter,<sup>4967</sup> can compensate a man for neglecting justice and the rest of virtue.

“I do agree with you, given the discussion we have been through; and I think anyone else would too.”<sup>4968</sup>

### 3.B.The Rewards of Virtue

for above (607C3-7).

<sup>4957</sup> ἐπάδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς (A3). The understanding we have reached about poetry (λόγος, A3) will provide us an ἐπωδόν (A4): that is, the line between surrendering to κτήλησις and protecting oneself by ἐπωδαί (cf. Phdo.77E; Charm.155DE, 157A) is to be drawn by the λογιστικόν, whose proper role—the role of the φάρμακον mentioned at 595B6—is being described in the present λόγος. The metaphor of an inward incantation (ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς) gives concrete content to the abstract act of “knowing” we were meant to do at 607A3.

<sup>4958</sup> τόν παιδικόν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα (A5), a genetic list (cf.375A5-7 and n.1094), referring to the stamp poetry makes on the unwitting child (cf. ἐγγεγονότα above), which the majority of youth will not be educated out of, given the prejudices of our fine institutions (καλῶν above), so that most of the population continues to feel ἔρως for poetry. Cf. παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν, 387B4.

<sup>4959</sup> Reading αἰσθόμεθα δ’οὖν (A6) with all mss., a form of the present indicative not unexampled. Madvig emends into ἀσόμεθα (read by Burnet); but δ’οὖν cannot introduce the content of the incantation. Instead it presents the prudential justification for closing our ears. Adam’s emendation ἀκροασόμεθα is impossible since it ignores this prudential resolution to delimit the participation of listening. With αἰσθάνεσθαι Socrates refers to the bewitching experience he and Glaucon have undergone (he compared notes with him at about it at 607D1-2) as the empirical warrant (δ’οὖν) for the incantation. It is constructed ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, with ώς for the intellectual perception inferred (οὐ σπουδαστέον [sc.ἐστί]) and with the participle for the empirical basis of the inference (εὐλαβητέον ὅν). The δεδιότι clause tells what is at stake and thereby calls for the verbal adjectives.

<sup>4960</sup> τοιαύτῃ (A6) “poetry such as we have seen it to be” (cf. τοιαύτην οὖσαν, 607B3: for the expression cf. Charm.171D2): the demonstrative does not imply (pace Adam) that there is another kind: the participle is circumstantial, not attributive. This kind is quite enough!

<sup>4961</sup> τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας (B1): With the metaphor he refers back to the analogy between the psychic and civil effects of mimesis that he drew at 605B2-C4, and through that passage back to the climactic close of Book Nine (592A5-B6).

<sup>4962</sup> νομιστέα (B2): to keep on the safe course and disallow mimetic poetry to enter into the city of our soul (607C3-8 and n.4937).

<sup>4963</sup> ὁ φίλε Γλαύκων (B4): again cf. n.3285.

<sup>4964</sup> μέγας ... ὁ ἄγων ... μέγας (B4). Such anadiplosis is rare (cf. Leg.624A3; Phdrs.228B7, 242D4); the emphasis Socrates seeks by continuing by his ampliative denial of the opposite, is extreme. It is notable, for all that, that the outcome of the struggle—turning out good and bad (B5)—requires no rhetorical auxesis or amplification. For the expression ἄγων μέγας (vel μέγιστος), cf. LSJ s.v.III.5; Gorg.526C3,A.Nub.958 (adjacent to ἄπας κίνδυνος, 955-6, for which cf. 618B7 below), Pax 276; Eur.Hec.229, Hipp.496 (both of a life-or-death matter), Med.235-6 (ἢ κακὸν λαβεῖν | ἢ χρηστόν), Ph.860; Soph.OC 587; Thuc.2.89.10 (in a speech); and compare Phdrs.247B5. It is always a spoken admonition.

<sup>4965</sup> ὥστε (B5) introduces a correlative clause of result: “So great is it that . . . ” The οὕτως that would be the antecedent to ὥστε is suggested by ὕσος.

<sup>4966</sup> ἐπαρθέντα (B6): the dangerous psychic force represented by this verb and the need to avert

But still we have not discussed the greatest prizes such virtue holds in store,<sup>4969</sup> both for the present and in the future.

"You might be suggesting a greatness barely manageable, if there are others greater than the ones already spoken of."<sup>4970</sup>

Yet what could be great in such a small amount of time? Even the entirety of one's time from childhood to old age would be a small amount measured against all of time.<sup>4971</sup>

"Virtually nothing!"

So then<sup>4972</sup> do you think for an affair<sup>4973</sup> that is deathless one ought to take it seriously with a view to the length of a life but not with a view to all of time?

or pre-empt its operation, were brought up twice before in similarly emphatic passages (416D1, 434B1). At 416B8-D1 (at the end of Book Three) it is to avert this force that Socrates warns Glaucon (who was less worried about its arousal [B6], but himself had been aroused to object to the simplicity of their beds at 372C2-3 [cf.nn. ad 415E3-416A1]) that the guards must adopt the severe regimen that distinguishes them from the others, a regime that includes the prohibition against a personal ταμιεῖον (416D6-7), which policy immediately aroused the spirited objection of Adeimantus (419A, Book Four init.); and the subsequent repeal of which, moreover, was the first step onto the path of decline for the πολιτεία (548A7-8). In the second passage where the verb was used (434B1-2) it is just this "arousal" that might lead a lesser man to arrogate to himself the prerogatives of a greater one, and by this act of injustice to effect nothing less than the destruction of the city (ὅλεθρον, B7). The present passage alludes to the latter passage by means of its parallel list of stimulants: cf. ἐπαιρόμενος ἡ πλούτῳ ἡ πλήθει ισχύι ἡ ἄλλῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ there (434B1-2: cf. n.2063), with οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ ἄξιον ἀμελῆσαι δικαιοσύνης here. Compare the list at Leg.716A5-7, where the leader warns the colony against being ἐξαρθείς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, ἡ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος ἡ τιμᾶς, ἡ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ ἀμα νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ' ὕβρεως, where φλέγεται takes us back to the φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις of 372E8 and indicates that Glaucon's behavior at 372CD is itself that of an ἐξαρθείς.

<sup>4967</sup> οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ (B6-7): The list brings forward the last page of Book Nine (591CE) in which the goodness of all traditional goods was made to be conditional on their contributing to the order of the soul. By pointing back in order now to include poetry among such putative goods, adding an otherwise incongruous item to the usual list, Socrates announces the close of the treatment of poetry, evincing once again the intimate connection of that theme to the health of the soul, and in turn the connection of this Book with the previous one (against those who would "separate" it). The list moves from a vaguely generalizing plural to a definitive denial of any counterexample (ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ) of the complementary item (money and office standing for "external goods"), and then to a climactic and unexpected item (ποιητικῇ), which we may now view as a source of bodily pleasure (for which cf. 606D1-4, 607A5-6, 607C4-5). The shift from οὔτε to οὐδέ and the addition of γε acknowledge the unexpected turn and then insist on it. For such a shift highlighting the ultimate item one may compare 492E3 and 499B2, and distinguish on the other hand the shift to δέ in connection with closing a list by adding not an additional item but an amplification of the penultimate term by the inclusion of its opposite (e.g., Phdo.65C7, Polit.305B8-C1, Rep.382E9-11, cf.Leg.840A).

<sup>4968</sup> σύμφημί σοι (B9): The reason he agrees is the *arguing they have gone through*. His statement that anybody else would likewise agree is a means by which he seeks to warrant that that agreement seems to him "objectively" true. That is, while the criterion of dialectical truth and success is ὁμολογία and nothing more, Glaucon strengthens his already strong previous statement (παντάπασιν σύμφημι, B3) by asserting that his experience of going through the argument has endowed the resulting agreement with what seems to him to be a *universally* valid warrant. Dramatically, his remark provides an opening for the others present to voice whether they agree or disagree. Adeimantus who is already of greater dramatic importance than all the others, remains silent, all the more conspicuously since it was poetry and its effect on the young that his speech particularly focussed on, whether in confession

"No, but I do<sup>4974</sup>—yet what is this 'affair' you are talking about?"

Have you not perceived<sup>4975</sup> that the soul we have is immortal and will never perish?

He looked into my eyes<sup>4976</sup> and said, bewildered, "By Zeus I have not; but you — can you prove it?"<sup>4977</sup>

### 3.B. I: Immortality of the Soul

Unless I'm wrong;<sup>4978</sup> and I think you can prove it, too.<sup>4979</sup> It's not hard.

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as to its effect on himself or in complaint as to Socrates's failure to correct the poetic tradition, or both; yet both have now been dealt with.

<sup>4969</sup> τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ὀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ὁθλα (C1-2): Now that Glaucon has agreed, on the basis of the argument they have gone through (διεληλύθαμεν, B9), that neglecting virtue for the sake of external goods would have a catastrophic effect on how a person turns out in life, it becomes safe to go through (διεληλύθαμεν, C2) the question of what rewards virtue does entail. ἐπίχειρα is an *hapax* in Plato (as in several other authors. A.PV.319, S.Ant.820, Ar.Sph.581, Antiph. I.20, Dem.Ep.2.38: cf. Hesych., τὰ ὑπὲρ τὸν μισθὸν διδόμενα τοῖς χειροτέχναις). Paley (*ad* A.PV.319) claims that ἐπι- denotes reciprocation (contrast ἐπι- in ἐπιχειρεῖν). I take the word to be virtually adjectival, contrasted with προκείμενα, to designate rewards (ὁθλα) ready to hand as opposed to those that await us later (cf. 460B2 and n.2395). This is the division actually followed below at 613E6-614).

The question of rewards as formulated by the brothers (363A6-E4; 364A5-365A3; 368B7-366B2) could be designated by the former term, but hardly by the latter (let alone νικητήρια, 613B6), so Socrates's doublet begins to draw an important distinction. ὁθλα are honorific privileges accorded to the living, and monuments are accorded to the dead, by means of which the rest of us, or the gods, commemorate their behavior and achievements as exemplary: cf. 414A2-4, 465D8-E2, 503A6-7, 516C8-9. Here ὁθλα denotes the trophy for winning the ἀγῶν ὀρετῆς (cf. *Phdo.* I 14C8). The closest Adeimantus had come to this sort of reward is the blandly abstract εὐδοκιμήσεις (363A2), which are conceived not as an end in themselves but as a means to greater power and wealth (cf. 358A5 and n.690, 554C12 and n.3783).

<sup>4970</sup> ἀμήχανόν τι (C3) echoes the language Glaucon used, and Socrates copied, during their comparison of the just man's and the unjust man's happiness (587E5-588A10: *n.b.* ἀμήχανον, E5; ἀμηχάνω, A8). Glaucon's μέγεθος responds to Socrates's superlative, μέγιστα. How, after all, could any effect be greater than the 729 times greater happiness that virtue was discovered, in Book Nine, to confer on a man?

<sup>4971</sup> τί ... ἐν ὀλίγῳ γε χρόνῳ μέγα (C5): Socrates continues the play on μέγα by adding the dimension of time. The scale of a whole human life now reappears, in transition, as it did at the beginning of Book Five introducing the discussion of radical ideals with Glaucon (450B5-7), and again in the conversation with Adeimantus in Book Six (498D1-6) on the occasion of their radical agreement about the scope of education. This topic has ultimately to do with the paradox that coming to understand life is an event that takes place within the life that comes to be understood, and therefore always involves the tantalizing question, How much of that life should be spent in this way? Even the byplay of question and answer in the latter passage (εἰς μικρὸν γε ... ἢ εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ... , 498D5-6) is reproduced here (for μὲν οὖν cf. Denniston, 476).

<sup>4972</sup> With τί οὖν (C9) Socrates requires Glaucon to take the next step after his own μὲν οὖν. What was a transitional topic has now become the topic of conversation!

<sup>4973</sup> πράγματι (C9): The sense as well as the syntax is strange and obscure, and provokes Glaucon's question (cf. next n.).

<sup>4974</sup> οἶμαι ἔγωγε (D2): Glaucon says yes when he means no: Instead of answering the question *per se* his οἶμαι ἔγωγε grants what he knows, from the logic of the last two questions, that Socrates wants

“But to me it is! I’d be happy to hear about this ‘not hard’ thing from you.”

And hear it you may.

“If only you say it.”<sup>4980</sup>

Do you call some things bad and some good?

“I do.”

I wonder if you think the same thing about them as I do.

“What is that?”

Anything that destroys or corrupts is bad; but what preserves and benefits<sup>4981</sup> is good.

“I do think that.”

Would you also say there is a bad and a good for each specific type of thing? The eyes, (609) for instance, have ophthalmia<sup>4982</sup> and the body as a whole has disease; for grain mildew, rotting for wood, for brass and iron there is rust and, as I am arguing, for just about<sup>4983</sup> everything there is an illness or

him to grant (that it would be for the sake of all time that one would consider the ἀθάνατον πρᾶγμα) because he is in a hurry (note his ἀλλά) to ask a question about Socrates’s question, namely, what does Socrates mean by “πρᾶγμα”?

<sup>4975</sup> ἥσθησαι (D3): The verb and its tense treat the deathlessness of the human soul as if it were empirically obvious (cf. n. 1536), a still greater paradox that arrests Glaucon’s attention so much that it makes him speechless. Thus the verb and tense buy Socrates a berth to elaborate (cf. n. 1259).

<sup>4976</sup> καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέψας μοι θαυμάσας (D5), the first “stage direction” we have had since the beginning of Book Five (449A7-B6). For ἐμβλέπειν cf. *Charm.* 155C8, 162D4; *Alc.* I 132E7-3A5.J.-C. are surprised that Glaucon should be surprised to hear a notion that was expressed and even proved in several other dialogues – most notably on the day of Socrates’s death -- but they forget that Glaucon did not enjoy the pleasure they have had of being present for those discussions -- especially not that last one in the prison. In the discussion for which he has been present, on the other hand, soul has for several hours been contemplated as the vehicle for living life well or poorly and nothing else.

<sup>4977</sup> σὺ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔχεις λέγειν (D6), somewhere between question and incredulous assertion, strengthened by the personal pronouns.

<sup>4978</sup> εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε (D7), idiomatic in strong affirmation: cf. 430E1 and n. 2020.

<sup>4979</sup> οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σύ (D7) sc. ἔχεις λόγον: In a dialectical context ἔχειν λόγον entails the ability to διδόναι λόγον. That is, Socrates invites Glaucon to answer.

<sup>4980</sup> The back and forth about λέγειν and ὀκούειν (D6-12) again signals and arouses the dialectical partnership of asking and answering. Thus, what Glaucon first “hears” is a question (D13): he will not be a passive ἀκροώμενος (cf. 608A) for long. The question brings up a logical relation, which is the usual opening for a dialectical investigation.

<sup>4981</sup> ἀπολλύον / διαφθεῖρον // σῷζον / ὠφελοῦν (E3-4): the absence of chiasm is to be expected at the opening of the argument, just as we would expect a chiasm at the closing (cf. n. 588). The statement of a simple opposition signals, as often, the beginning of dialectic (cf. n. 4388).

<sup>4982</sup> ὄφθαλμοῖς ὄφθαλμίαν (E6-[609A1](#)): Socrates exploits the etymological connection to illustrate the principle of specificity (ἐκάστῳ, E6) with a particularly palpable example (cf. 375A2-3 and n. 1092). The rest of the list can then present a casual sampling in an open-textured way. What is striking about it is the discovery of recondite (i.e., specialized) κακά for common items, which suggests the point he is trying to make, that nature has provided specialized κακά for distinct things (σύμφυτον κακόν, A3).

<sup>4983</sup> σχεδόν (A3) modifies πᾶσι but its purpose is to soften σύμφυτον, the very strong claim that the goods and bads that affect individual things are “assigned” them by nature.

evil<sup>4984</sup> fit to it by nature.

“I would agree.”

And would you say that when one of them afflicts its object it makes it poorer<sup>4985</sup> and in the end destroys it entirely and kills it?<sup>4986</sup>

“Of course.”

So the evil natural to each type of thing and the cause of its becoming poorer<sup>4987</sup> tends to kill it, and if it shall fail to do so there is nothing else left<sup>4988</sup> to destroy it. After all, its good will not do so, nor would that which is neither bad nor good for it.<sup>4989</sup>

“How could they?”

If then we find some specific type of thing for which there is indeed some ill that makes it worse off, but which is not able to demolish it though it tends to debilitate it,<sup>4990</sup> will we not from that moment on<sup>4991</sup> know that for the thing of this nature, nature has provided no demise.<sup>4992</sup>

“It is likely so.”

Alright then, for the soul isn’t there something that tends to make it bad?

“Quite so: just the things we have been speaking of—injustice and incorrigibility and timidity and ignorance.”<sup>4993</sup>

So would any of these demolish and destroy it? Be mindful not to let us be deceived by the notion that in the case of the man who is unjust, and witless,<sup>4994</sup> that when he is apprehended for his

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<sup>4984</sup> τε (A3). The strongest aspect of the exemplary material (*νόσημα*, 609A4) informs, or infects, the general conclusion (*κακόν*), regardless of whether we read τε (AFD) or τι (M).

<sup>4985</sup> πονηρόν (A6): More like “poor” than “evil:” for the sense cf. 551C6.

<sup>4986</sup> διέλυσεν καὶ ἀπώλεσεν (A7): The distinction or gradation between weakening and destroying is now repeated, from E3 (ἀπολλύον καὶ διαφθεῖρον); the aorists are gnomic. διέλυσεν introduces a mechanism of destruction as a synonym for the process of διαφθείρειν.

<sup>4987</sup> πονηρία (A9): the abstract term is drawn out of the adjective presently used for its effect (πονηρόν τε ποιεῖ, A6).

<sup>4988</sup> ξτι (A10) is given the work that λείπειν does in an *eliminatio*.

<sup>4989</sup> The *eliminatio* (B1-2) is weakened by the way it forces into relief the less than fully articulate premise that while there is a distinct evil for each thing this evil is the only evil important enough to cause its demise. Drawing this objection into relief turns out to be Socrates’s way of making a transition to dealing with it (609C2-610C2).

<sup>4990</sup> λύειν ἀπολλύον (B5-6) entertains a corroborative but accidental rhyme.

<sup>4991</sup> ἥδη (B6) in the meaning it had at 605A8 and B2.

<sup>4992</sup> ἦν (B7), the philosophical imperfect, so called. As we discover that there *is* not, we also discover that there *never was* an appointed mechanism for its demise.

<sup>4993</sup> ἄδικία τε καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀμαθία (B11-C1): In short, the four vices that are opposite to the four virtues, or the κακία that is the opposite of ὄρετή.

<sup>4994</sup> ἀνόητον (C4) is added in quasi-predicative position after τὸν ἄδικον ἄνθρωπον so that it can both embellish his viciousness with a supplemental vice in addition to ἄδικον (ἀνόητον varying Glaucon’s ἀμαθήτης) but also predicate what it is that leads to his getting caught (by denoting only the conventional notion of cleverness), and broaching thereby the devil’s argument that he might do injustice and be clever enough to get away with it, in this life at least.

unjust acts it is by his injustice that he is destroyed,<sup>4995</sup> his injustice being the badness that pertains to soul.<sup>4996</sup> Instead go at it this way: Just as in the case of the body the ill of the body corrupts and destroys it and takes it as far as not even<sup>4997</sup> to be a body any more, so also in the case of all the things we have just spoken about, through the agency of their specific evil and its deleterious presence and indwelling, they approach the very cessation of the being what they are.<sup>4998</sup> Is that not so?

“Yes.”

Then take up the case of the soul and examine it in a parallel way. When injustice and the rest of vice is present in it, does this by its presence and indwelling degrade the soul and snuff it out to the point that it finally leads it to death and separates<sup>4999</sup> it from the body?

“No way does it go that far.”

But the alternative would make no sense, that the baseness that belongs to some other thing destroys a given thing while the baseness that belongs to the given thing does not.

“No sense at all.”

Realize, Glaucon, that neither it is by the baseness of food,<sup>5000</sup> whatever we are to identify as the evil proper to that particular thing, whether that it is past its prime<sup>5001</sup> or rotten or whatever, that we think a body must be destroyed. Rather, if once the baseness peculiar to food implants into a body the peculiar cause of body's<sup>5002</sup> ruination, we will declare that because that happened the body perished by

<sup>4995</sup> The sense is that he would be executed at law, but for the sake of the argument this “demise” is given the natural term ἀπολωλέναι, “perish.”

<sup>4996</sup> καὶ ἐννόει μή (C2-3): This counterexample or *distinguo* (C2-5) clarifies the argument about causation, but at the same time it indirectly exposes not only the hope that if a man were smart enough not to get caught he could sin all his life, but even more the hope that if he is does get caught the penalty will actually kill the part of him that was unjust, a hope that obviates any fear of psychic punishments in the life to come—a hope, moreover, that the Epicureans will later buy at the cost of becoming atomists. This underlying point becomes more explicit below (610D5-7). Though this entire argument for immortality has almost comical weaknesses, it is a formidable exhortation to virtue in case it turns out to be correct even though it might not be valid. Compare the implication of Socrates's proof in the *Phaedo*, that how he lives his life here is something he no longer has to worry about since he is dying -- though his students do since they will go on living (115A3-C1, pointing back to 107C1ff).

<sup>4997</sup> For μηδέ (C7), “not even.” cf. 420D3, 394D4.

<sup>4998</sup> εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀφικνεῖται (D2): sc. αὐτά (in parallel with τὸ μήδε σῶμα εἶναι above)

<sup>4999</sup> χωρίσῃ (D7): The mythical or metaphysical notion of death as separation of soul from body is assumed without cavil or proof, and it is *this* characterization of a φθίσις of the soul that Glaucon refers to (with τοῦτο γε, D8) and easily denies.

<sup>5000</sup> σιτίων (E2): food (e.g., as opposed to drink: 332C9-10, 445A8; *Euthyd.*280C2, *Gorg.*490B3, *Phd.*64D3 [σίτων BW]), in contrast with σῖτος as used above for the farinaceous plant itself and its fruit (A1: cf. perhaps 404B1). Still, Plato often uses σῖτος for food: *H.Maj.*298E1, *Leg.*789D5 (σιτίων fecit Ο<sup>2</sup>), 839A8 (σιτίων Ο<sup>2</sup>), *Prot.*353C6.

<sup>5001</sup> παλαιότης (E2), again (n.1388) does not mean ancientness but just that their prime has passed.

<sup>5002</sup> τῷ σώματι σώματος μοχθηρίων (E5): The article is used of the specific (human) body affected, but is then omitted (as in E3 and C6) in the reference to (human) body generically, which as such has its generic κακόν or agent of degradation (here, μοχθηρίαν). So also ψυχή is anarthrous at C5 and D4.

the agency of<sup>5003</sup> the evil that belongs to it, in turn, that evil being disease. (610) But we will never judge that it is by the agency of food's evil, food being one thing, that a body, being another thing than food, has been destroyed—by the agency that is of an evil foreign to it--unless that evil implants body's own<sup>5004</sup> evil into it.

“We would correctly so judge what you are arguing.”<sup>5005</sup>

By the same argument then,<sup>5006</sup> unless the baseness of body implants the baseness of soul into soul, let's never accept that by some evil other than the one assigned to soul the soul can perish,<sup>5007</sup> absent the soul's own proper baseness—by the evil, that is, of a thing alternate to the thing that the soul is.

“So much is reasonable.”<sup>5008</sup>

Accordingly, let us either attack this position by showing our reasoning is bad, or as long it remains unassailed let's never say<sup>5009</sup> that by fever or<sup>5010</sup> by disease in general, nor by cutting the throat,

<sup>5003</sup> δι' ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ κακίας (E5-6): ὑπό (by the agency of) is being distinguished from δία (because of, as below: 610B1 vs. B5, and C10-D1).

<sup>5004</sup> ξύμφυτον (610A2) varying σύμφυτον (609A3,A9), to locate the operation of the κακόν *within* the entity as opposed to the notionally “outer” operation of the evil that operates notionally “within” the other entity (ἄλλων,A1).

<sup>5005</sup> ὄρθότατ' ἂν, ἔφη, λέγεις (A4), the reading of all mss. against Stephanus's conjecture of αὐ (read by Burnet) requires only a connective like ὅτι between λέγεις and ὄρθότατ' ἂν (sc. οὐδέποτε ἀξιοῦμεν); whereas, on the other hand, nothing precedes for Stephanus's αὐ to refer back to. Alternatively emend to ὄρθότατα with Ast (read by Chambry).

<sup>5006</sup> κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον (A5): As food is to body so is body to soul: in each case the demise of the one might occasion the demise of the other (δία), but only if the destructive agent of the one happens also to implant into the other its own respective destructive agent will the other in fact be destroyed (sc. by [ὑπό] its destructive agent).

<sup>5007</sup> ἀπόλλυσθαι (A7), a conative present.

<sup>5008</sup> ἔχει γὰρ λόγον (A9): cf. 608D6 and n.4977.

<sup>5009</sup> μή ποτε φῶμεν (B1) picking up the hortatory μή ποτε ἀξιῶμεν of A6, just as that use of αξιοῦν picked up the use at A3. The double exhortation (A10-B1) prepares us for a strong statement of the thesis.

<sup>5010</sup> μηδ' ὑπ' ἄλλης νόσου μηδ' αὐ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς ... (B1-2): Omitting αὐ (primum) with ms.F, read by ADM and edd. If Plato wrote it he shouldn't have. The first μηδέ corrects the narrowness of πυρετοῦ by adducing the entire species (νόσου, with dismissive adverbial ἄλλης – for it is νόσος in general that is the σύμφυτον κακόν of body in general: 609A1). To link the species and genus with αὐ is a use alien to the force of αὐ (at 585B13-C1 αὐ does introduce a generalization [ἀρετή], but only to associate it with the generalization that closed the first sublist [τροφή]: compare αὐ introducing parallel inference at 508D8-9 and 602C10-12). The τε with μήτε before μηδέ anticipates not this αὐ (pace Slings, 174) but the next one, μηδ' αὐ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, where (conversely) αὐ is completely appropriate. The proper function of αὐ within lists is like that of our semicolon: it separates one sublist from another, whether because it is an opposing list (Leg.819C4-5 [war/peace], Phdo.71B1 [converse]; Phdrs.268C8; Phlb.26B6 [body/soul]; or a complementary list (Charm.158A1 [father/mother]; Leg.889C3-5 [sky/earth], 935B6 [god/man]; Phdrs.238C1); or simply a new list without a special logical relation (Charm.168E9, Leg. 679B8-C1 [carrying forward the distinction between πλεονεξία / φιλονικία above], 872A7-B1, 902D7-9; Phdo.105B1-3; Polit.299B6, Soph.222A9-10; Tht.146D1). See. n.1985 ad 427B7 for exx. from Rep. The only exception is when αὐ is used in decorative *variatio* for

if you will, nor even if someone should cut the whole body up into tiny pieces,<sup>5011</sup> that soul comes any the nearer<sup>5012</sup> to perishing, unless and until someone demonstrates to us that because<sup>5013</sup> of what the body undergoes, the soul, in and of itself and distinct from body,<sup>5014</sup> becomes more unjust or more impious.<sup>5015</sup> If however a foreign evil<sup>5016</sup> arises in some other thing while the evil peculiar to the specific<sup>5017</sup> thing does not arise in it as a byproduct,<sup>5018</sup> let us not allow anyone<sup>5019</sup> to say that the thing perishes, whether soul or anything else.

“But you can be sure nobody will ever prove this, that while persons are in the process of dying their souls become more unjust, because<sup>5020</sup> of their dying, that is.”

But if ever someone braves going toe to toe<sup>5021</sup> with us on just this point and tries to argue that a

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other connectives, as *Polit.259B9-10*, *Tim.69D2*, and perhaps *Leg.949C6-7*. In the present case the second sublist presents very new items, indeed!

<sup>5011</sup> ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ μηδ' ὑπ' ἄλλης νόσου μηδ' αὐτὸς εἰ τις ὅτι σμικρότατα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα κατατέμοι (B1-2): The first two items present in species and genus the body's proper or inherent κακόν (i.e., the ὑφ' οὐ proper to the body), that as such are sufficient for the argument. The second pair go further, and constitute the “stronger” statement of the thesis we were made to anticipate by the double exhortation (n.5009), presenting under the guise of ὑφ' ὥν (μηδ' ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, B2), what are in reality two “external” causes (i.e., διὰ ὅτινα) that would most palpably lead to the demise of the body, but for all that show no indication they have introduced the element of its proper demise, let alone that of soul. Fear is being pitted against logic, as it was by Polus at *Gorg.473B12-D*. There, as here, the threat of murder does not constitute the argument Polus thinks it does (ἐξελέγχειν, D2), as Socrates tells him: μορμολύττει ... καὶ οὐκέ ἐλέγχεις (D3): cf. ἐξελέγχωμεν and ἀνέλεγκτα above, 610A10 and B1). But there and here, as well as where Glaucon suggested the same series of tortures Polus did (361E3-362A3), the dispositive issue will always be, what part of the soul is listening?

<sup>5012</sup> μηδὲν μᾶλλον (B3-4): The formula emphasizes the *logic* of the claim (n.357), whence ἀποδείξῃ just below. Only the pure logic of argumentation will be enough to refute us; but only by the soul and its λογιστικόν can such a strong position be accepted, let alone understood.

<sup>5013</sup> δία (B5), as at 607E5 above.

<sup>5014</sup> αὐτὴ ἐκείνη (B5): cf. 609E2.

<sup>5015</sup> ἀδικωτέρα καὶ ανοσιωτέρα γίγνεται (B6): i.e., to refute (ἐλέγχειν, cf. A10. B1) the position we have adopted, one must prove that the insults to body *eo ipso* introduce the agent of soul's demise into soul, the necessary evidence for which would be her moral decline. Virtue (and vice) had just been represented by the usual quaternion (609B11-C1) and now are represented by the usual dyad, for which cf. 331A4 and n.105. The idea is that even the greatest violence to body – its being diced into a thousand bits – could only affect or harm soul in the way soul can be affected or harmed.

<sup>5016</sup> κακοῦ (B6): Characteristically, at the end of the argument he reverts to the language used at the beginning when the *demonstrandum* was announced (κακόν, 608E3, E6), after having used a variety of other expressions along the way (κακόν τε καὶ νόσημα, 609A3-4; πονηρία, A9, C5, C6; κακία, D1, D5; μοχθηρία, E5).

<sup>5017</sup> ἐκάστῳ (B7) also reverts to the original expression (608E6-609A10) after several other expressions have intervened (namely, αὐτό, 609B5; the bare genitive [ψυχῆς, B5; σώματος, B6; ἄλλου and αὐτοῦ, D9-10; σιτίων, E2, etc.]; οἰκεῖον, D1; ἀλλότριον, 610A2, A7, B6; ἔμφυτον, A2; ἴδιον, B7).

<sup>5018</sup> ἐγγιγνομένου (B7) of which the crucial destructive element is the subject, replaces ἐμποιεῖν from above (A6), of which it was the object.

<sup>5019</sup> τινα (C1) refers to the same person as τις (B4).

person who is dying does get worse and worse even in respect to his virtue,<sup>5022</sup> thinking that by this stratagem<sup>5023</sup> he might avoid being compelled<sup>5024</sup> to agree that our souls are immortal, we will clearly require him to warrant<sup>5025</sup> that if what he says is true, then injustice is fatal to the person who has it<sup>5026</sup> as if he had a disease, and that by its agency, as the thing whose nature it is to kill<sup>5027</sup> a person, the person that elects injustice will die, those most strongly the sooner and those less strongly more leisurely -- rather than thinking as we did just now<sup>5028</sup> that although it is because of this injustice he has elected that he dies, it is nevertheless by the agency of others, those who impose the just penalty, that unjust persons come to die.

“But by Zeus<sup>5029</sup> injustice will then turn out to be a thing less than thoroughly horrible<sup>5030</sup> if by his

<sup>5020</sup> τῶν ἀποθνησκόντων (C4): Grasping Socrates's point (ἀλλὰ μέντοι τοῦτο γε), Glaucon redoes the mortal somatic παθήματα listed above (B1-3) with the present participle so as to slow down the process of somatic death and isolate the circumstances under which the corresponding showing (δεῖξει redoing ἀποδεῖξει with prefix dropped: n. 1532) about soul must be made -- a showing, that is, that *psychic* degradation is occurring in their souls (whence γίγνεται and the comparative ἀδικώτεραι) in tandem with the degradation of their bodies, which process must precede their psychic demise.

<sup>5021</sup> ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ ... ιέναι (C6): To meet someone on their own grounds, often, as in poker, raising the ante (cf. *Euthyd.*294D5-7, *Euthyph.*3C5, *Thet.*166A1): the objector is going out on a limb.

<sup>5022</sup> πονηρότερος καὶ ἀδικώτερος (C7): A metabasis moving from the general term for degradation (from the argument about πονηρία above) to the degradation specific to the soul.

<sup>5023</sup> ἵνα δή (C8): δή “describing an ingenious stratagem or device” (Denniston 232, though he misclassifies our passage).

<sup>5024</sup> ἀναγκάζηται (C8) straddles the two meanings of accepting the thesis as proved by reason (cf. 611B10, *Thet.*153C8, 196B10, 205B11; and cf. *Rep.*490C9 and n.2782, and 527A6 and n.3355), and being compelled as by another person to accept the thesis against one's will (e.g., 473A5 and 490C9 [if it is to be read there]). The term therefore (with the collaboration of τολμᾷ and δή) impugns the motives of the opponent.

<sup>5025</sup> ἀξιώσομέν που (C9), with the same modality as at A3 and B2 above.

<sup>5026</sup> For τῷ ἔχοντι (C10) of an affliction: cf. 575A2.

<sup>5027</sup> ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ἀποκτείνοντος τῇ φύσει (C10-D1): ὑπό (not δία, saved for D3), as corroborated by the exegetical τῇ ἐαυτοῦ φύσει (D1), stresses that the objector is accepting the general theory of the distinct and sole agent of destruction; but ἀποκτείνοντος now substitutes for all the terms that have been used for that agent: with this the objector suggests that ἀδικία only kills him: that it leaves him to live his unjust life more or less unscathed. But the way he says “unscathed” is, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα θάττον τοὺς δ' ἡττον σχολαίτερον. In conceding (with μέν) that the *most* (μάλιστα, superlative) unjust men might die sooner (θάττον, comparative), he already degrades the influence of the evil, and at the same time creates a berth to assert (with δέ) the more delicious alternative, that the moderately unjust man might be dealt with in a more “leisurely” way. The rhetoric is exactly the same as Adeimantus's καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι (364A2-3 and n.794).

<sup>5028</sup> ὥσπερ νῦν (D3) refers to the correction of 609C2-5 that we adopted at C6-D2, that it is because of soul's injustice (δία, as opposed to ὑπό, C10) that the man underwent effects that actually killed him (viz., ὑπό the judicial execution by poison).

<sup>5029</sup> Μὰ Δία (D5): This is not the beginning of a new argument, *pace* Adam: φανεῖται is dialectical and depicts, with ἄρα, an inference. Glaucon with his asseveration breaks through to grasp the motive

lights it turns out to be fatal to the person who elects it,<sup>5031</sup>—for the implication is that it would portend for him a final surcease from evils. To the contrary, by my lights injustice will prove to be quite the opposite of that: it will be a killer alright, but of other men,<sup>5032</sup> while as to the man afflicted<sup>5033</sup> by it it will hobble him still further with nothing but robustness and vigilance to boot<sup>5034</sup>—so far from being deadly has it contrived to stake its claim.”<sup>5035</sup>

A fine argument you make! As long as its own baseness and specific evil is not strong enough to kill (as he says) or destroy (as we say) the soul, there is all the less basis to believe<sup>5036</sup> that an evil associated with the destruction of something else will destroy the soul or anything else<sup>5037</sup> besides what it is appointed to destroy.

“All the less, in all likelihood.”

And as long as it is not destroyed through the agency of any<sup>5038</sup> evil, whether (611) its own evil or an alien one, then it is necessary<sup>5039</sup> that it is a thing always existent; and if always existent, immortal.

“Necessary indeed.”

Then let's take that to be the truth<sup>5040</sup> of the matter. If it is, then you can see<sup>5041</sup> that souls are always the same.<sup>5042</sup> For they could not become fewer if none of them perished. Nor could they become more numerous, for if any type of immortal things were to become more numerous it could

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for the previous argument against immortality, that a person might hope to be unjust until it kills him, nothing surviving to be punished in Hades. The obverse of the irrational hope that my vices will release me from themselves and their outcome ( $\alpha\pi\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\gamma\eta\ k\alpha\kappa\omega\nu$ ), is the irrational fear that resolutely evil persons are strengthened by their vice, which obverse Glaucon now voices in appropriately rueful terms: ζωτικόν, ἄγρυπνον, ἐσκήνηται (E2-3).

<sup>5030</sup> οὐκ ἄρα πάνδεινον (D5) points to an unexpected ( $\ddot{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ ) diminution in the fearsomeness of an unjust life – for the unjust man.

<sup>5031</sup> ἔσται (D6): the future indicative vividly envisions a world where the opponent's thesis is true, a world which we however have not yet entered.

<sup>5032</sup> τοὺς ἄλλους ὀποκτεινόσαν (E1), quite the contrary of the objector's view, as vividly stated above, that his injustice will “kill” himself, being the οἰκεῖον κακόν of his soul.

<sup>5033</sup> ἔχοντα (E1) reverts to the language of disease (C10) instead of election (D2, D6), in order to add παρέχουσαν to it in oxymoron.

<sup>5034</sup> ἄγρυπνον (E3) suggests unjust acts committed while the victims are asleep.

<sup>5035</sup> ἐσκήνηται (E3): J.-C. compare ὀπωκίσθη, *Polit.*284E7.

<sup>5036</sup> σχολῆ ... γε (E7) marking an argument *a fortiori*: cf. 395A1 and n. 1432.

<sup>5037</sup> ψυχὴν ἡ τι ἄλλο (E8) repeats μήτε ψυχὴν μήτε ἄλλο from C1.

<sup>5038</sup> μηδ' ὑφ' ἐνός (E10): μηδέν in tmesis to accommodate the preposition, as at 553B6.

<sup>5039</sup> ἀνάγκη (611A1), asserting the logical necessity of the *eliminatio* (μήτε οἰκείον μήτε ἄλλοτρίον being exhaustive).

<sup>5040</sup> ἔχέτω (A4) with μέν announces the point as secure in order to distinguish it from for the next step.

<sup>5041</sup> ἐννοεῖς (A5), a seeing that is in the mind, the third use of this verb in a page or two (609E1, 609C3).

<sup>5042</sup> αἱ αὐταί (A5): the sense in which they are “the same” is not yet clear.

only be by drawing off the mortal supply, and sooner or later everything would end up immortal.<sup>5043</sup>

“True.”

So we won't accept those implications<sup>5044</sup>--the argument won't allow us to<sup>5045</sup>—nor that in its truest nature<sup>5046</sup> soul is such a thing as to teem with any great variegation or with disuniformity and quarrelsomeness and self-contradiction within itself.<sup>5047</sup>

“Why do you say this?”

It is not easy for a thing to be eternal if it is composed of parts that are many according to a formula that is less than the fine<sup>5048</sup> -- eternal as our argument has now seen<sup>5049</sup> the soul to be.

“It seems not likely.”

So as to the fact<sup>5050</sup> that the soul is immortal, the present argument and the others require it to

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<sup>5043</sup> πάντα ὃν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα (A8): Perish the thought! The argument is something of an absurdity, as all *reductiones ad absurdum* are. I think it refers to the Ionian doctrine of antapodosis, in order to assert that our new conclusion about soul's immortality proves that its manner of existence transcends the world of Ionian process (φύσις). Instead, logic (λόγος, A10) requires us to recognize that mortality is the eternal condition of mortal things only!

<sup>5044</sup> τοῦτο (A10) referring to the (more fully elaborated) second possibility (οὗτ' αὐτὸν πλείους), but denying thereby both possibilities with them the entire *reductio*, according to the conversational convention of “answering the whole by answering the last” (cf. n. 204).

<sup>5045</sup> ὁ γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἔάσει (A10-B1) echoes ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἥρει, 607B3 (cf. 604C7), but the principle was stated in a different way more recently (610A10-C2, n.b. ἔωμεν, C1): the admonition to rely on reason further prepares us for the ensuing argument about soul's purity, which only reason could believe.

<sup>5046</sup> ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει (B1): In the context of a heavy reliance on ἔλεγχος (610B10) and logic (λόγος οὐκ ἔάσει, A10) the notion of degrees of truth is a surprise.

<sup>5047</sup> γέμειν αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτό (B3): He retracts the assertion made at 603D5-7 (n.b. ἐναντιωμάτων ... γέμει, D7), and the previous elements of the discussion on which that relied (cf. n. 4830), so that Glaucon is taken aback (πῶς λέγεις; B4). For ἀνομοιότης as a cause of διαφορά, cf. 547A2-4 (political); for ποικιλία used of the passions of the soul, cf. 604E1 (πολλή adding quantity to qualitative ποικιλία). That αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτό depicts contradiction *within* (Shorey) is confirmed by ἐναντιωμάτων in 603D6.

<sup>5048</sup> σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ κεχρημένον συνθέσει (B5-6) now alludes to another argument against immortality drawn in Ionian terms. If our soul is a composite (σύνθετον ἐκ πολλῶν) as the Ionian πάντα are, and especially if the formula of its compounding is so imperfect (μὴ καλλίστῃ κεχρημένον συνθέσει) as to allow διαφορά to arise within it as we have been seen it arise in soul (indeed it was exactly its internal διαφοραί that enabled us to prove it was many not one, in Book Four [where incidentally the language of σύνθεσις is not used: cf. 612A4 and n.5081], when we needed it to be if we were to achieve our search for the analogue of civil justice in it), then soul would likely undergo ὅλεθρος in the form of the διάλυσις that the πάντα are subject to (for διάλυσις as one model of ὅλεθρος cf. 609A7 and n.4986). By another indirect argument (cf. A5-8), our new conclusion that soul is immortal exempts it from being an Ionian type of thing after all.

<sup>5049</sup> ως νῦν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχή (B6-7) i.e., ἀίδιον (B5) with ἐφάνη (dialectical, n.210) referring to what the argument has just now (νῦν) revealed, the conclusion just now secured and nailed down (τοῦτο μέν ... οὔτως ἐχέτω) at 611A4: cf. n.5040).

<sup>5050</sup> ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν (B9): the fact about soul contrasted with its nature (οἶον δέ, B10) that presumably is the cause of the fact.

be true.<sup>5051</sup> But as to its character in very truth,<sup>5052</sup> one must not view it in its mutilated condition<sup>5053</sup> as we for our purposes have been trying<sup>5054</sup> to do, beset by its community with the body and by other evils.<sup>5055</sup> Instead its character must be carefully discerned<sup>5056</sup> with our reasoning ability as it truly is<sup>5057</sup> when it becomes purified,<sup>5058</sup> and thus reason<sup>5059</sup> will discover it to be a thing that on its own is far more beautiful, and will see through to the essentials<sup>5060</sup> that underlie the many forms and aspects of justice and injustice<sup>5061</sup> and the rest we have now gone through. Instead, while we have told the truth about it as it presently appears,<sup>5062</sup> we have adopted<sup>5063</sup> a view of it beset, just as when people seeing<sup>5064</sup> Glaucus of the Ocean<sup>5065</sup> have a hard time making out his original nature. Of what had formerly been his body's distinct parts, some have now been broken off and others worn down and utterly mutilated by the action of the waves; and in their place barnacles and seaweed and pebbles

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<sup>5051</sup> ἀναγκάσειν ὄν (B10): For ἀναγκάζειν meaning “to prove necessarily to be true,” cf. n.5024; Tht.153C8 (with all mss), 190E6, and 196B10. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι (B9-10) alludes to the body of arguments from which he has just drawn two. It ruins the verisimilitude to imagine that Plato is having Socrates allude, for our sake, to arguments within other dialogues, when Socrates's interlocutor Glaucon was not present for them. As usual it is for the purpose of dismissal that Socrates points beyond the present conversation (n.527), and for the sake of emphasizing the next point in the present context: No matter how many arguments we adduce, we must face the implication (ἀναγκάσειν ὄν, B10: cf. ἀναγκαζόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν: cf. 609C8-9 and 472C8-9) first that the soul is a divine sort of thing, and also as its possessors that we must live this life well. The verb connotes also that the arguments would have the effect of forcing the person who has the deathless soul to face life.

<sup>5052</sup> ἀληθείᾳ (B10) bringing forward new category of “truest truth” broached above, τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει, B1 and n.5046.

<sup>5053</sup> οὐ λελωβημένον δεῖ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι (B10-C1): λελωβημένον alludes narrowly to poetry's pathological effect on the soul (605C7, 595B5 [λώβη]), for the sake of which we had lately been viewing the soul in terms of the tripartition that explains this pathology; but this is soon broadened or reformulated as an effect of its κοινωνία with body and other evils. Given the proof that she exists as a thing outside and beyond the “Ionian” realm, we must view her as undergoing a purification (καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον). Socrates returns to the Image of Book Nine, where the ordering element within soul was “perhaps divine” (589D1; cf. E4). Later this divineness reappeared as a justification for nothing less than a sort of enslavement of one man to another (590C8-D6, n.b. θεῖον, D1), as man might properly be slave to god. In the Image proper, that “divine” element was figured as *man* (588D3, 589A1,A7,D1), but at the same time the whole man-lion-beast of a soul was made to seem a single animal by an outer casing with the look of – a man. There has always been a tension, therefore, between the two men, a tension each of us knows in the vicissitudes and joys and regrets of our mortal, but moral, existence. There is the outer man that others see and Gyges's Ring could hide, and the inner man hidden by that outer show who lives an inner life fuller or flatter, more or less harmonious, with its own history of darker and brighter times, but most importantly, and always, lives it with conscience and memory. After the long and painful analysis of vice and sin, which in fact extends back to the beginning of Book Eight and ultimately was put upon us by no greater exigency than the boyish needs of Plato's brothers, the present paragraphs are a clarion call by the part of oneself that honors the best part of oneself as a gift from god immanent in the self, now to witness the soul being transformed (καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον), to view the constant imperfections of its life as like the barnacles of Glaucus, external only and affecting the inner glow and focus not at all, something another man could see if only he looked into Glaucus's eyes, the “windows of the soul.” The call itself is too urgent for us to worry about remedial niceties as to whether there are two forms or states (διαθέσεις: cf. the passive διακείμενον, C7) of soul (the objective formulation) or two theoretical orientations we might adopt (the subjective formulation). Phenomenologically it makes no difference; Plato is again at the edge of language; Socrates drove him to it but this is one of the places Plato makes the problem his own. The confusion or interplay between the subjective and the objective will only continue.

have grown upon him, so that in effect he resembles some kind of a beast rather than what he was in his true nature: so also with the soul, we are conceiving of her<sup>5066</sup> being beset by myriad evils. Enough of that, Glaucus ... *Glaucon*, I mean.<sup>5067</sup> Instead, we must look off thither.<sup>5068</sup>

“Whither?”

Toward her love of wisdom and her philosophy.<sup>5069</sup> We must conceive<sup>5070</sup> what things she tries to grasp<sup>5071</sup> and the kinds of consorts<sup>5072</sup> for which she strives, recognizing her kinship<sup>5073</sup> to what is divine and immortal and everlasting, and what character she takes on by virtue of her zealous and undivided<sup>5074</sup> pursuit of a thing of that character, taken up as she is and delivered by this impulse of hers<sup>5075</sup> from out of the sea,<sup>5076</sup> and knocked clean all around of the rocks (612) and the barnacles<sup>5077</sup> that have grown onto her during this earthly smorgasbord of a life she is living, growths earthy and

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<sup>5054</sup> ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα (C2). The punctual aorist of the foregoing infinitive (θεάσασθαι, C1) sets out this present indicative as conative. ἡμεῖς, emphatic because expressed, points up a contrast between our (present and subjective) theoretical purposes as students of justice with the (eternal and objective) “truest” truth of soul, which now imposes a new and higher purpose upon us.

<sup>5055</sup> ὑπό τε τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν (C1-2): Emphatically proleptic τε instructs us to pair ἄλλων κακῶν with τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας, not just with τοῦ σώματος. Thus κοινωνία describes only the relation between soul and body, not soul and “this life.”

<sup>5056</sup> Reading διαθεατέον (C3), the correction of Laur.80.19 [*apud Slings*] instead of θεατέον (M), as suggested by διαθετέον of AFD. Thereby we boldly edit a very rare word into the text. After the change of tense between θεάσασθαι (C1) and θεώμεθα (C2) a mere repetition of the verb does not achieve the required contrast, the new and clearer focussing that will be explained below (cf. C5).

<sup>5057</sup> οἶόν ἐστιν καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον (C2-3) echoes οἶόν ἐστιν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ above (B10), and therefore καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον redoes τῇ ἀληθείᾳ: the implication is that soul has a true (ἀλήθεια) and essential (ἐστι) *nature* that it (paradoxically) becomes through purification, in contrast with the mutilated state (λελωβημένον) we have now been theorizing it to be in (ὅσπερ θεώμεθα). Are there truly two states of soul, or are there two theoretical points of view?

<sup>5058</sup> καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον (C3): Since the participial formulation is parallel with λελωβημένον we should have expected καθαρὸν γεγονός.

<sup>5059</sup> εύρήσει (C4): sc. ὁ λογισμός. Again at the highest level of theoretical activity Socrates personifies Reason (cf. ὁ λόγος ἥρει, 607B3 and n.4928; 604C7 and n.4844; λογιστικόν, 580D4 and n.4329). The personification is more than rhetoric. It will seem alien, just as the expulsion of poetry will seem rash, to the extent that we fail to recognize our own rational experience as real; but when we do, we see there is no clearer way to speak.

<sup>5060</sup> διόψεται (C5) continuing the fine focus of διαθεατέον (C3), recalls the search for the inner psychic state that Socrates invoked at 577A2-5 (τῇ διανοίᾳ [577A2] ~ λογισμῷ [C3] // διιδεῖν, διορᾶ [577A3,5] ~ διόψεται [C5] // εἰσελθόντας θεάσασθαι [577E1] ~ διαθεατέον [C3]).

<sup>5061</sup> δικαιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας (C5): the plurals of the abstracts are striking, and denote the phases of the argument as it studied the forms of justice and injustice in cities and in souls of various kinds. Compare πάθη τε καὶ εἴδη (of soul, 612A5). The new vision of soul will enable us to see the theoretical (θεώμεθα, θεάσασθαι above) work we did previously in a new light.

<sup>5062</sup> οἶον ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαίνεται (C6-7): οἶον associates the phrase with οἶον ἐστιν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ (B9) and οἶον ἐστιν καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον (C2-3), and therefore lays stress on the shift from ἐστίν to φαίνεται. There at two “truths” (as above there was a gradation of truth: nn. 5052, 5054): the truth of how soul appears ἐν τῷ παρόντι and the truer reality of the soul purified. ἐν τῷ παρόντι, temporal, refers back to νῦν (C2) and continues the (subjective) contrast between our present theoretical orientation and the new one being proposed (described in prospect by the futures εύρήσει and

rocklike, various and rough,<sup>5078</sup> regaled by the feasts<sup>5079</sup> that count for happiness during her sojourn here. Then and there one might for once<sup>5080</sup> catch sight of her true nature, whether it is manifold or simple,<sup>5081</sup> and whatever the whys and the wherefores of her existence may be.<sup>5082</sup> But for the present we may count ourselves to have done a decent enough job of reviewing the aspects she shows and the life she undergoes during her human period.<sup>5083</sup>

“Thoroughly decent, indeed.”

### 3.B.2. Redress for Withholding Praise from Virtue

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διόψεται); but how can ἐν τῷ παρόντι not also refer (objectively) to the present state of soul (λελωβημένον), the state of soul in this life?

<sup>5063</sup> τεθεάμεθα μέντοι (C7) answering εἴπομεν μέν (C6): “What we have been arguing (μέν) is true (ἀληθῆ) but is so only (δέ) from the theoretical stance we had adopted, which stance placed soul in a state (διακείμενον)” -- the subjective formulation, according to which we placed soul in that state. Alternatively we can give the sentence an objective interpretation, that we have been viewing a soul placed in a state (namely, λελωβημένον).

<sup>5064</sup> ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον ὄρῶντες (C7-D1): the vagueness of διακείμενον (in both its reference and its syntax) leads us to anticipate that ὥσπερ will specify the soul's state (i.e., we anticipate διακείμενον ὥσπερ τὸν Γλαῦκον). Instead, ὥσπερ introduces a description of the *theoretical position we have taken* (i.e., τεθεάμεθα ὥσπερ οἱ ὄρῶντες), the subjective version described in the previous note, and repeats therefore the ὥσπερ of C2 (λελωβημένον ... ὥσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα).

<sup>5065</sup> The fisherman Glaucus (D1) ate a strange herb that made him immortal but turned him into a monster with fins. Though rejected on the shore because of his looks, by Scylla, he was received by Oceanus and Tethys to dwell in the sea, where he guided wayward sailors with his prophetic powers. So also (objectively) the soul lives within an alien and monstrous body affected by the sea of phenomena, but nevertheless retains its orientation to the world beyond change; while also (subjectively: see prev. n.) we may imagine ourselves wayward and lost in that sea and looking into Glaucus's prophetic eyes for the guidance and mooring we lack, wandering disconcerted through this world (602C11-D1 and n.4798, 444B7-8 and n.2222). The idea is developed just below (E1ff).

<sup>5066</sup> τὴν ψυχήν (D6): Soul (ψυχή, B9) moved into the neuter gender for the description of her degraded state (B9-C7) -- at first her predicates, starting with οἶον (B10), but then even herself: αὐτό (C4), αὐτοῦ (C6), αὐτό (C7). Now as we see her being purified (καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον, C3) she returns to her true gender and stays there (E1-612A6). Compare the “hominification” of soul at 620E (n.5265).

<sup>5067</sup> ὁ Γλαύκων (D7): the phonetic proximity of the two names may as well be part of Socrates's paraenesis: cf. n.4869.

<sup>5068</sup> ἐκεῖσε (D7) is more than ἄλλοθι as it is often translated: Socrates is speaking anamnetically, as βλέπειν as opposed to σκοπεῖν, confirms (cf. n.1692).

<sup>5069</sup> This image of Glaucus of course reformulates the Image of Book Nine. There the “man within” was depicted as outnumbered by the other parts of soul (cf. esp. 588E6 and n.4523), though being their natural leader and perhaps divine (ἴσως, 589D1). Now the “perhaps” becomes factual and the other parts of soul are seen as mere accretions to the leading part that so obscure its nature that in order to know it we must look off to the object that forms it by being the object of its love, to ‘know it even as it is known,’ if you will. In the Image the turmoil within our soul was hidden by a covering that itself made us look like men and indicated there was a man inside; here it is the inner truth and order that is hidden and we can come to see it only by remembering its true orientation. The argument has brought us far enough and raised our consciousness by such a high degree that it is

And<sup>5084</sup> while we have resolved the other matters in our discussion,<sup>5085</sup> can we say that all the while<sup>5086</sup> we have succeeded to avoid praising<sup>5087</sup> any payoffs and good reputation that stem from acting justly of the sort you two<sup>5088</sup> had found in Hesiod and Homer, but rather we have discovered that justice all by itself is the best thing<sup>5089</sup> for the soul in itself,<sup>5090</sup> and that she must behave justly regardless whether she has the ring of Gyges on her finger as well as Hades's helmet on her head.<sup>5091</sup>

"Most truly we have done what you say."

Then will it no longer<sup>5092</sup> create a scandal,<sup>5093</sup> Glaucon, if now we should add to those reasons the payoff<sup>5094</sup> that justice and the rest of virtue provides to the soul, and say how great it is and what kind it is, both from men and from the gods, while still the man is living and after his life is through?<sup>5095</sup>

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within our reach to *identify* with that part, and within the reach of Glaucon to identify with Glaucus.

<sup>5070</sup> ἐννοεῖν number four (E1).

<sup>5071</sup> ἄπτεται (E1): Conative present. For the expression cf. the climactic remark at 490A8-B7 describing the philosopher's love (*n.b.* αὐτοῦ δὲ ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἄψασθαι ω̄ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου [490B3-4]).

<sup>5072</sup> ἔφίεται ὄμιλιῶν (E2): cf. πλησιάσας καὶ μιγείς (490B5), in obvious contrast to the consorting of the lesser parts of the soul with mimetic art (603A10-B2, *n.b.* προσομιλεῖ).

<sup>5073</sup> συγγενής (E2): cf. συγγενεῖ, 490B4. ω̄s reminds us that we just proved her immortal.

<sup>5074</sup> πᾶσα (E4) is adverbial. It is more important to recognize the total dedication of the "true nature" of soul to this dogged pursuit than to glance back at the previous version of soul as tripartite by saying the "true" part has separated from the others and therefore is all that is there. Though he had alluded to the tripartition in the argument about the σύνθετον and its σύνθεσις (B5-6), he rather emphatically abandons any continued reference to it at C1-2 when he characterizes the causes of soul's "mutilation" (λελωβημένον, a process that had originally been articulated exactly on the basis of the tripartition: 595A5-B7) as ή τοῦ σώματος κοινωνία καὶ ἄλλα κακά. Moreover, in the end (612A4) he is not certain whether the soul in its true nature is simple or manifold.

<sup>5075</sup> The reciprocal relation here described (E4) of the zealous search (ἐπισπομένη) met with the response of guidance from beyond (ἐκκομισθεῖσα), symbolizes the primary experience of reason (cf. γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῷη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ωδῆνος, πρὶν δ' οὖ, 490B5-7), and can be placed alongside many later equivalents—e.g., Knock and it shall be opened; We shall know Him even as we are known. We have seen (and even felt), the soul being purified incrementally by (and during) the theorization of standard studies, in Book Seven (e.g. 527D6-E2). The idea Socrates here proposes, to study the truth of soul by studying the object toward which in its best condition it is oriented, is perhaps the most *philo-sophical* idea there could be!

<sup>5076</sup> ἐκ τοῦ πόντου (E5): The analogy between soul and Glaucus now begins to be drawn, an analogy that prefers opportunistic allusiveness over internal consistency, like the explosion of metaphors at 586A6-B4, a passage to which it presently alludes.

<sup>5077</sup> γεηρὰ καὶ πετρώδη (612A1-2): The chiastic order (cf. ὄστρεα ... πέτρας, 611D5) of "before and after" applies the comparison or the metaphor of Glaucus to the soul.

<sup>5078</sup> ὄγρια (A2) brings forward the notion of the beast in θηρίῳ (611D5) but the heap of images becomes slovenly and even ugly. Earth and sea are mixed together, and then eaten, and then many and wild. For its lurching nonsense the passage resembles the absurd picture of the cattle, heads earthward, eating at table and mounting each other, and their horns becoming metal armaments since they are men after all (586A6-B3). This mess of images stands in strong contrast to the concerted and powerful image of the soul freed, reminiscent of the contrast between the descriptions of the moderate home life (372AB) and the feverish city at (373AC).

“Certainly it will not.”

Will you two then<sup>5096</sup> pay back the loan you borrowed from me in our conversation?<sup>5097</sup>

“What in the world are you talking about?”<sup>5098</sup>

I did front you your argument by conceding that the just man appear unjust and the unjust man just.<sup>5099</sup> You requested<sup>5100</sup> that I do it; and even if it were impossible to hide the truth from gods and men, still you said it had to be granted for the sake of the argument so as to enable<sup>5101</sup> us to judge justice in comparison to injustice. Or perhaps you don't remember?

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<sup>5079</sup> ἔστιάσεων (A3), following and emphasizing ἔστιωμένη (A1), now treats the entirety of earthly life as a feast, recalling the εὐωχίαι of 586A1-6 that disable persons from knowing real pleasure, and recalling the senseless revelry (μέθην αἰώνιον) fabled to await the good in Hades (363C4-D2), than which Adeimantus had criticized his caretakers (362E4-3A1) for having nothing more to promise in the afterlife (363E3).

<sup>5080</sup> ὕδοι (A3) corresponds with ὕδοιεν (D1). The aorists denote making out what is being seen.

<sup>5081</sup> εἴτε πολυειδής εἴτε μονοειδής (A4): it is not impossible that she might have many aspects after all. The language of εἴδη recalls the analysis in Book Four, which was, after all, a logical analysis and not a mechanical one.

<sup>5082</sup> ὅπῃ ... καὶ ὅπως (A4-5) cf. 621B; Leg.652A, 899A9, B8; Phd.100D6 (and Leg.872D7, Phlb.12C3, Prot.358A7, Tim.28B2; Aesch.Ag.160, etc.): a formula by which the speaker acknowledges his puniness in the face of what he tries to articulate (or calls upon: Crat.400E1), hoping his ignorance will not limit the illumination he may receive, comparable if you will to the worshipper in a kletic hymn aporizing over what epithets or sedes to adduce, or which hypomnesis, to secure the god's attention and clemency. It is more of the symbolization of participation. By equivalent formulas Plato elsewhere attributes such important knowledge to god, while men must guess and hope: Leg.641A, Phdrs.246A, Tim.72D. Cf. n.1438.

<sup>5083</sup> καὶ τότ' ᾧν (A3): No more will be said, or needs to be said, about the truth of the soul purified, beyond these adumbrations. Halliwell is surprised to find no “philosophy” in the Myth of Er; but that story deals with persons temporarily dead, not souls purified and not metaphysical entities, as he presumes (in his notes *ad* 611C1, 611E1); nor does the myth present “philosophical” symbolism (*contra* his note *ad* 614B2), but moral beings of flesh and blood.

<sup>5084</sup> οὐκοῦν seven (A8).

<sup>5085</sup> ἐν τῷ λόγῳ (A8), a new expression by which Socrates looks back over the discussion which he has just declared to be complete (ἐπιεικῶς ... διεληλύθαμεν, A6), indirectly announcing thereby a large closure that reaches back at least to the beginning of Book Two. Cf. n.5097.

<sup>5086</sup> τά τε ἄλλα ... καί (A8-B1) another virtual ἄλλως τε καί construction, dismissing the treatment of soul's human life (A5-6) which itself constituted the brunt of the answer to the challenge the brothers had put before Socrates, in order to highlight the fact (καὶ οὐ ..., B1) that now that the treatment is done they can truly say they stayed clear of considering the rewards.

<sup>5087</sup> ἐπηνέκαμεν (B1): surely the corrector of A is right, against ἐπηνέγκαμεν of AFDM: Socrates is quoting Adeimantus at 367D3 (ἐπαίνεσον), D6 (ἐπαινούντων), and 366E3 (ἐπήνεσεν), another instance of “accuracy” in quotation (n.363), along with ἄριστον, 612B3 (n.5089); δόξης, 612D4 (n.5104); and ἀνέξη, 613C8 (cf. nn.5127 and 907).

<sup>5088</sup> ἔφατε (B2): Socrates uses the plural because while it is Adeimantus that said this (ώσπερ ὁ γενναῖος Ἅστιοδός τε καὶ Ὄμηρός φασιν, 363A7-C2), it is Glaucon that he is speaking to. In looking

"That I should forget would be less than fair."<sup>5102</sup>

Then since the judgment between them has been rendered, I now enter a counterplea on behalf of justice, that we now agree with each other to grant her the reputation<sup>5103</sup> she enjoys in the judgment<sup>5104</sup> of both gods and men, so as to enable<sup>5105</sup> her to receive her prize and garner the things people confer by dint of her good name on those who have her, since our argument has already shown us what goods she herself confers on them by dint of her real and actual presence, and how she does not disappoint and delude<sup>5106</sup> those who strive<sup>5107</sup> to attain her.

"Your counterplea<sup>5108</sup> is justified."

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back he appropriately quotes, with the words οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τοὺς δόξας (B1), the end of the two brothers' speeches (on the expression μισθοὶ καὶ δόξαι cf. 367D4, and D6-7 and n.905). This is the attention to detail and the literal accuracy of back-reference more typical than what we saw at 603CE (n.4830). Thrasymachus is *not* included in the second plural, here or below: he refused to participate in the dialectic, and always will. Moreover, Socrates owes him nothing and lent him nothing. If Socrates had explicitly included him, his tyrannical manner and temperament would have compelled him to interrupt the argument.

<sup>5089</sup> ἄριστον (B3) cf. ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη, 366C5; and cf. 366E8-9.

<sup>5090</sup> αὐτῇ ψυχῇ (B3). To show this particular point, that soul *in itself* benefits from justice, was not part of the charge that Glaucon and Adeimantus placed upon Socrates. They wanted to know the benefit justice confers on the man who has it in his soul by virtue of its being in his soul (358B5-6; 366E5-6; 367B4-5, D3-4, E3). Strictly, the discovery that justice is a matter of the soul's internal order only, and that how "the man" is virtually identical to how his soul is, with the implication that a civic construction of justice is irrelevant and obsolete, was reached at the end of Book Four (443C9ff).

<sup>5091</sup> καὶ πρὸς τοιούτῳ δακτυλίῳ τὴν Ἄιδος κυνῆν (B5): anarthrous τοιούτῳ is derogatory; the repetition of δακτύλιον indicates he is joking about a sartorial ensemble; but the mention of Hades (cf. *Iliad* 5.844-5) also alludes to the implication with which the proof of immortality is pregnant: that the unjust soul will be miserable not only whether discovered or not, but also whether here (where he will need the ring) or in Hades (where he will need the cap). In reverting to the arguments of the brothers in Book Two, the reference also recalls the more "extreme" position (ἐπὶ πλέον, 363A5; cf. θαυμασιώτατοι, 364B3) Adeimantus there presented about the gods and in particular the afterlife, no less than three times (363C3-D7, 364B5-365A3, 365D6-366B2).

<sup>5092</sup> νῦν ἥδη (B7): νῦν means now as opposed to then, referring to the attitude adopted during Book Two; ἥδη means from this point forward (into the future) as at 605A8, B2, and 609B6.

<sup>5093</sup> ἀνεπίφθονον (B7). Truly just behavior will incite the admiration of others, once it is understood as the expression of a beautifully ordered soul as we now do (cf. D3-9 below); and as such the just man should, and may, receive ἀθλα—honor and respect—from his neighbors; unless of course we find it more convenient to have him killed. In returning to the hypothetical that Glaucon required of him in Book Two, Socrates now brings out into the open the element of envy in Glaucon's gratuitous outburst of tortures (361E1-362A3 and nn.762, 768, 769). Compare the topic of envy at the crucial stage of the argument with Adeimantus in Book Six (502D7 and n.2971; and the role of envy in the resistance to philosophy: nn.762, 1872, 2251, 2710, 2712, 2801, 2880, 2920).

<sup>5094</sup> μισθούς (B8) again denoting the distinction Glaucon drew at the beginning of Book Two.

<sup>5095</sup> ὅσους τε καὶ οἵους ... παρ' ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν ζῶντός τε ἔτι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐπειδὸν τελευτήσῃ (C1-3): the thorough and balanced recitation of the rewards imitates the proud challenge Adeimantus made in his peroration (καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις ... ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες, 366B5-6: cf. n.869). The brunt of his speech was a critique of poetry and in particular

### 3.B.3a: Rewards for Virtue in this Life

First then will you allow me to take back my concession<sup>5109</sup> that the gods are hardly unaware, as gods,<sup>5110</sup> which men are just and which unjust?

“We pay that back herewith.”

But if the gods are aware which is which, then the one would be god-beloved and the other hated by them, as we agreed<sup>5111</sup> at the beginning of our discussion.

“That is correct.”

But as to the god-beloved man won’t we agree that as many things as come from the gods, (613) its promises for the afterlife: clearly these background ideas provide the program for Book Ten.

<sup>5096</sup> By repeating his ἀρ' οὐν (C5) from above (B7), Socrates acts as if he were cashing in on Glaucon’s good will.

<sup>5097</sup> ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ (C5): For the metaphor of an interlocutor “borrowing” an hypothesis from his interlocutor like a loan to start a business, cf. *Polit.*267A. Compare the different but also financial metaphor of postponing to pay the principal by paying the interest, at 506D8-507A4. For ἐν τῷ λόγῳ cf. n.5085: we can now say that the logos in question is the joint venture of building a city and looking for justice in it, and that Adeimantus and Glaucon’s speeches provided the terms.

<sup>5098</sup> τί μάλιστα: (C6): Glaucon is brought up a bit. Calling in a loan always provokes a little amnesia (whence Socrates’s ή οὐ μνημονεύεις, D1); but more importantly in his eager zeal to present (and confess) his position in Book Two, he failed to recognize how it might have grated on Socrates to have to hypothesize it.

<sup>5099</sup> ὔδωκα (C7): The asyndeton feigns indignation. He is referring in particular to Glaucon’s postulates at 361A5-B1 and B8-D1, presented impersonally with verbal adjectives and the third person imperatives of geometrical proof; and to Adeimantus’s restatement of them, delivered with characteristic belligerence as διακελένματα (367B6) and with the threat of slander in case Socrates should not grant them (B7-C5).

<sup>5100</sup> Reading ἡτεῖσθε (C8) with A (ἡτεῖσθε M Stob. : ἡγεῖσθε FD). With the imperfect Socrates recalls the importunity of their request in contrast with the generosity he exhibited in his granting it, which he now wishes Glaucon to reciprocate.

<sup>5101</sup> ἵνα ... κριθείη (C10-D1): remembering Glaucon’s claims at 360E1-3ff and 361D7-E1. Cf. the prominence Socrates gave the notion of κρίσις in Book Nine (cf. nn.4263 and 4276).

<sup>5102</sup> ἀδικοίην μεντῶν (D2): At the same time it is idiomatic (meaning “I would be quite off base:” cf.608D7 and n.4978), Glaucon tunes in on Socrates’s joke: cf. E1.

<sup>5103</sup> δοκεῖσθαι (D5): the passive represents an expression with δοκεῖν plus verbal adjective such as δοτέον δοκεῖν or θετέον δοκεῖν, serving now as the counterplea to Glaucon’s ἀφαιρετέον τὸ δοκεῖν (361B8).

<sup>5104</sup> ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης (D4): the genitive of the topic (cf. n.4255): Socrates is again quoting a remark by Adeimantus in Book Two: ὡς ... ἔχουσι τιμῆς, 365A5-6.

<sup>5105</sup> ἵνα κακί (D6) answering *pari passu* Glaucon’s purpose in his request for the opposite hypothesis as Socrates just depicted it (C10-D1: cf.360E1-2).

<sup>5106</sup> ἐξαπατώσα (D8) recalls the corrosive and dispiriting effect on men when they contemplate being deceived by the gods (cf. 382E9, the example at 383B involving Thetis, and n. 1295), but a specific reference is not needed. The expression (ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰναὶ / διδούσα // ἐξαπατώσα τῷ ὅντι λαμβάνοντας) is a chiasm of the contrapositive (n.1708), in which ἐξαπατώσα plays the converse of

they will all come to him in the best way possible, assuming he does not have in store some compulsory bane<sup>5112</sup> set down on him because of a previous transgression.

“Quite so.”

This is what we must assume about the just man, whether he falls into poverty or illness or another of the things that shortsighted mortal insight counts<sup>5113</sup> as evil: Given who he is,<sup>5114</sup> everything will turn out good while he is still living or at least<sup>5115</sup> once he is dead. For the gods never neglect a person who tries in earnest to become just, and who by practicing virtue makes himself like god<sup>5116</sup> as much as human substance will allow.

“One who is like this would probably not be abandoned by another who is like him.”

διδοῦσα..

<sup>5107</sup> λαμβάνοντας (D9), present. Cf. its use with ἀδικία at 610D2 and D6 (vs. ἔχειν, E1). It is not only that her deserts had been withheld by the hypothesis Glaucon and Adeimantus forced onto Socrates, but also that the hypothesis was in itself offensive to those who know her, as resembling the cynicism of a Thrasymachus. We are moving beyond the question of knowing what justice is, and moving toward dropping our envy and hatred of it, and loving it instead for what it is.

<sup>5108</sup> δίκαια ... αἰτή (E1): αἰτή refers to Socrates's ἀπαιτῶ of D3 (not ἡτεῖσθε, C8) the prefix being dropped in repetition as usual (cf. n. 1532).

<sup>5109</sup> ἀποδώσετε (E2) returns to the metaphor of the loan. The bold claim that the gods do not know or can be deceived was voiced by one part of the young man's soul against the other, in Adeimantus's oration (365D6-E6).

<sup>5110</sup> θεούς γε (E3). γε in a single gesture indicates and passes over spelling out the assertion that gods by their very nature are not likely to be unaware. So it was used, and for a similar purpose, at 379B1.

<sup>5111</sup> κατ' ἀρχὰς ώμολογοῦμεν (E6). It is not and cannot be to his request that Thrasymachus grant that gods love the just and hate the unjust (352A10-B2) that Socrates here refers (per Halliwell) -- not only because Thrasymachus does not there grant it but more importantly because Thrasymachus refused to participate in the common work of the dialectic, in which case ώμολογοῦμεν would become empty of meaning (cf. nn. *ad* 612B2 and *ad* 588B3). The proposition is in any case an ἔνδοξον: Cephalus does not need to defend it at 330D7-331A10, nor does Socrates at 501C1-2. Socrates only means to remind Glaucon of the peroration of his own speech, in which he initially (κατ' ἀρχάς) laid out the problem, and in particular to his remark that the unjust but just-seeming man would even be θεοφιλέστερον in comparison with the just but seeming unjust man, by virtue of his greater ability to afford sacrifices from his ill-gotten gains (362C4-6: *n.b.* καὶ θεοφιλέστερον). Having now taken away the “seeming” that Glaucon required us by hypothesis to add, which it is the burden of the present argument to do, the gods would behave according to the usual expectation, to which Glaucon's own καί had there taken exception. In short, Socrates's ώμολογοῦμεν is pointing to Glaucon's καί.

<sup>5112</sup> ἀναγκαῖον ... κακόν (613A2). On divine punishment cf. 380A7-B6. That the προτέρα ἀμαρτία took place in a previous life (*pace* J.-C.) is not implied by the imperfect ὑπῆρχεν (*pace* Adam), I think.

<sup>5113</sup> τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν (A5-6). πενία and νόσος are as truly evil as health and wealth are truly goods (of the “external” type). The sense is not that they might seem but not be bad, but that from the short sights of the man involved it is unclear how to measure them against the ultimate outcome, as we learned from the νόμος at 604B9-C3-4: οὔτε δήλου ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καί κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων (sc. συμφορῶν).

<sup>5114</sup> τούτῳ (A6): emphatic as at 582D11. Cf. n.5116 below.

<sup>5115</sup> ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι (A6-7). Cf. n.4696. For the fulfillment of this promise cf. 614B1ff and

And for the unjust man mustn't we adopt the opposite outlook?

"Emphatically so."

Such then would be the prize granted by the gods to the man who is just.

"That is surely what I believe."

What about the prizes men can give? If it is the truth we are now supposed to tell,<sup>5117</sup> this is how I see it. The clever unjust<sup>5118</sup> behave like runners who run well on the way out but not the way back. Quick as rabbits they leap out of the blocks but by the end they cut a ridiculous figure, holding their heads between their legs and running off the track without a wreath. The real contenders keep running to the end; they take the prize and receive a wreath as crown. Isn't this the way it usually turns out when it comes to men who are just, that upon completion of any particular undertaking or common endeavor, or of a whole life for that matter,<sup>5119</sup> they achieve a reputation that is good and carry off the rewards men have to offer?<sup>5120</sup>

"So true."

And so will you tolerate<sup>5121</sup> my saying about these men the same things you had said<sup>5122</sup> about the unjust? For now it is I who will say that the just, in their later years, "come to rule in their own cities, and to hold the offices they wish to hold, and to marry out of whatever family they wish or into whatever family they wish."<sup>5123</sup> Indeed everything you said about them I now say about these.<sup>5124</sup>

n.5134.

<sup>5116</sup> The theme of an ὁμοίωσις θεῷ (B1) has broken through before: cf. 383C4 and n.1297, 501B5-7; and it underlay the converse notion that to know the soul in its true state we must look off to the divine (611D7-12A5). The communication goes both ways: it is by virtue of my own kinship with god that I now believe in the face of life's vicissitudes that he will preserve me! See further 614B1 and n.

<sup>5117</sup> εἰ δεῖ τὸ òv τιθέναι (B9-10) In contrast again with impossible hypothesis (κὰν εἰ μὴ δυνατόν, 612C8) Socrates had been constrained to loan him (*ibid.*, C7-D1: ὅμως δοτέον εἶναι), as well as the envy behind it: cf. 612B7 and n.5093 (to posit truth needs no special motive).

<sup>5118</sup> δεινοί τε καὶ ἄδικοι (B10): τε καί dispositively and without fanfare associates Thrasymachus's appeal (δεινοί) with his substance (ἄδικοι).

<sup>5119</sup> τοῦ βίου (C5): adding the article breaks the governance of ἔκαστος which had in any event become weak.

<sup>5120</sup> The metaphor of the race minimizes our lurking readiness to envy virtue: athletics is the only field of human activity in which rewards are given immediately and unstintingly (whence its name) with maximal popular unanimity (though, even so, φθόνος is a major theme for Pindar!). Here more than elsewhere we find it palatable to hope that "the best man win," and we admire the winner and feel sorry for the loser (B12-C1). All that is at stake in their εὐδοκιμεῖν and ἀθλα φέρεσθαι (C5-6) is other persons' willingness to grant them these things—i.e., to honor virtue rather than allow envy to ignore, or lynch, or contrive a judicial murder for the good man.

<sup>5121</sup> ἀνέξῃ ἄρα (C8): The semantics of the verb implies that Socrates imputes some envy into what Glaucon had said (ἄπερ αὐτὸς ἔλεγες): cf. *ad* E4, below.

<sup>5122</sup> ἔλεγες (C8), imperfect of citation: cf. next note.

<sup>5123</sup> With γαμοῦσί τε ὁπόθεν ἀν βούλωνται ἐκδιδόσι τε εἰς οὓς ἀν ἐθέλωσιν (D3-4) it becomes ineluctably clear that he is quoting Glaucon's peroration, from 362B3 (γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἀν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἀν βούληται), where again the expressions refer to alliances achieved by the marriage of one's son or of one's daughter, respectively.

<sup>5124</sup> ἐκείνων / τῶνδε (D5): With a diplomatic use of the demonstratives, Socrates embraces his

Conversely, when it comes to unjust people, speaking on the whole,<sup>5125</sup> while they are young nobody notices they are bad but in the home stretch they are found out and repudiated as ridiculous and then become miserable old men, scorned by foreigners as well as citizens, and are whipped, and as you had said, apologizing that it was crass to say so (and you were right to apologize), “and next<sup>5126</sup> they will be placed on the rack and have their eyes burnt out”—Take it you have heard me also give voice to all that, saying that the unjust men suffer it. Just look and see if you will tolerate<sup>5127</sup> all this.

“Tolerate it I will: what you are saying is just!”<sup>5128</sup>

And so the question of what prizes, rewards and gifts<sup>5129</sup> are made available by gods and (614) men to the just man while he is still alive, in addition to those other goods justice provides him in and own candidates as his own (with “first person” *τῶνδε*) while he creates a salubrious distance between his interlocutor’s candidates and his interlocutor himself by placing them into the *third* person (*ἐκείνων* rather than *τούτων*). Moreover he demurs to go through the rest of Glaucon’s list in the same detail since the abuse of power cannot so easily be made to resemble the execution of a privilege.

<sup>5125</sup> οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν (D6): Socrates provides a fleeting opportunity for the naysayer to cite counterexamples.

<sup>5126</sup> With εἰτα (E2), which bothered Ast into excision and Stallb. into transposition, Socrates “quotes” the perverse deliberateness of Glaucon’s sequence of tortures, just as he had quoted the privileges of the unjust, above (DI-5).

<sup>5127</sup> ἀνέξῃ (E4), repeated from C8 above. When used of one person’s reaction to another (as opposed to the uses at 518C10 and 363B7) ἀνέχεσθαι has only appeared in the negative (as a reaction in conversation, cf. 479A4, 480A4, 493E4 [of the unphilosophical refusal to accept the Ideas], cf. Charm.162D2; or as a response that threatens to prevent a course of action by force, cf. 564D10, 579A6): thus we do not really know what it means to *abide* (in the positive) a statement being made. In his present question, Socrates is inviting Glaucon to say “No” (for he does not ask, οὐκ ἀνέξῃ; which would make way for the answer, “Yes”). From the cases we have seen it would appear that not tolerating a statement consists of more than the dialectical responses of disagreeing, or denying, or declining to grant or to agree (ἀποδέχεσθαι has this range of meaning: 340C2 and n.361), but apparently threatens even more than quitting the conversation.

At 367D5 Adeimantus told Socrates that from others he would “accept” (ἀποδεχοίμην, mss.F et in marg. γρ.AT) a praise of justice only for its outcomes, but not from him. For that passage the apparatus of Chambry gives the fullest report: ἀποδεχοίμην F et in marg. γρ.AT : ἀποσχοίμην AT et in m. γρ.W : ἀνασχοίμην T<sup>2</sup>W (sic). Socrates throughout the present passage is turning the tables on the brothers in response to the speeches they made at the beginning, so that the presence of ἀνέξῃ, here, even though it is here addressed to Glaucon rather than Adeimantus and despite its inferior historical credentials, is dispositive for adopting ἀνασχοίμην at 367D5 (cf. n.907).

<sup>5128</sup> δίκαια γὰρ λέγεις (E5), in comparison with ἀδικοίην μεντάν (612D2) and δίκαια αἰτή (612E1) brings the playful ambiguity of speaking in a dialectically *just* manner about justice still closer to the surface. One might hear an echo of πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἢ λέγω at Apol.17C2-3 and 18A4-5 cf. also 28B5), where Socrates ended up being wrong in the belief that the Athenians would acquit him simply because his position was just. Why is it, after all, that persons resent the philosopher asking about the truth? Why was the reaction against the Ideas so strong in Book Five (the other time ἀνέχεσθαι was used)? Why the resistance of Polemarchus and then the entire group at the end of Book Four? How can it be that calling Socrates σοφός (though, as he says, he is not) is an instrument of calumny (at Apol.23A3), but that Socrates’s admirers will castigate the jurors that voted against him, for killing a σοφός (though, as he again says, he is not, at 38C3-4)? Cf. n.4932. From the elevated plane Socrates and Glaucon have reached, these questions are less vivid and less lethal than usual.

by herself, have now been listed?

“Quite so. How fine and secure<sup>5130</sup> they are!”

### 3.B.3b: Rewards in the Afterlife: The Myth of Er

Yet these are as nothing, in number or in greatness, when measured against those that await the two men<sup>5131</sup> after death. These too must be heard so that the two of them be paid back in full what the account we finished still owes<sup>5132</sup> us a turn to say<sup>5133</sup> about them.

“I would hope you would tell them to me as to a person who would find such a telling more pleasant<sup>5134</sup> to hear than most any other.”

Well let me say first<sup>5135</sup> I won’t be giving you a Response to Alcinous,<sup>5136</sup> but the story of a man

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<sup>5129</sup> ἀθλά τε καὶ μισθοὶ καὶ δῶρα γίγνεται πρὸς ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (614A1-2) repeats πρὸς ἐκείνοις καὶ τοὺς μισθούς from 612B8, and thereby closes the section by repeating the words with which it opened; but the triad that redoes μισθούς marks (with ἀθλα and δῶρα) the advance that has been made against the forces of envy, and it also resembles the triad that Adeimantus had used when he enjoined Socrates to supplement the wisdom literature with a praise of justice *per se*, in addition to dealing with δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν (sc. δικαισύνης καὶ ἀδικίας) γιγνομένας (366E4-5); there the more venal term μισθούς (cf.n.4969 ad 608C1-2) was of course absent as being unpraiseworthy, since μισθοί are *intrinsically* valuable.

<sup>5130</sup> καλά τε καὶ βέβαια (A4): Glaucon remembers ἀγαθὰ διδοῦσα ... καὶ οὐκ ἔξαπατῶσα (sc. ή δικαιοσύνη), 612D8.

<sup>5131</sup> ἐκάτερος (A7): the just *and* the unjust man. Adeimantus, similarly, referred compendiously to the consequences of both a just and an unjust life with positive terms only (the negative terms implied), in the statement Socrates has just now (perhaps) quoted (cf. n.5129, *n.b.* the plural αὐτῶν).

<sup>5132</sup> τελέως ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν ἀπειλήφῃ ... ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὄφειλόμενα (A7-8): Again the metaphor that the conversation of Books Two through Nine (ὁ λόγος, as at 612A8 and C5) was made possible by the brothers “borrowing” a false hypothesis from Socrates, which must now be “paid back.” Now that Glaucon has “tolerated” Socrates turning his own assertions on their head (n.5127), it is only to the men themselves, the just and unjust, that this last payment will be rendered. Socrates is not alluding to Polemarchus’s definition of justice as repayment since that would be pointless.

<sup>5133</sup> With ἀκοῦσαι (A7-8), repeated (*pace Stephanus*), Socrates continues the notion of giving truth its proper hearing (cf. 613E3, echoing λέγοντος and ἔρω at 613C8-D1). As Socrates’s begins to forgo dialogue and analysis for praise, Plato indicates to us that the dialogue is coming to an end.

<sup>5134</sup> ἡδιον ἀκούοντι (B1): With ἀκούοντι (as opposed to ἀποκρινομενῷ) Glaucon recognizes and acknowledges that he will be “treated” to a performance. For ἀκούοντι describing the passive disposition of the listener, cf. ἀκούει τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος, the expression with which Socrates introduces his “autobiographical” narrative at *Phdo*.96A6. The reason this will be so pleasant (οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλ’ ἡδιον) is that it will fulfill the promise and resolve the paradox of 613A5-7.

<sup>5135</sup> ἄλλὰ οὐ μέντοι (B2) continued by ἄλλ’ ἀλκίμου μέν (B3) along with the absence of an answering δέ, steps back to a preliminary point (*pace Denniston*, 378).

<sup>5136</sup> Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον (B2): The diction (ἀπόλογος rather than ἀπολογία) and the order of the phrase (Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος), reproduced twice by Aristotle, is distinctive and fixed. From the *Poetics* (1455A2-4) we learn that the Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος is the response of Odysseus as guest to his host’s (Alcinous’s) request that he tell him who he is, a request completely polite due to his noticing Odysseus weep at hearing the minstrel Demodocus sing the story of the Trojan Horse (Od.8.531-586).

no less signal than he for his strength and courage:<sup>5137</sup> Er the son of Armenius,<sup>5138</sup> a member of the tribe of Pamphylius. He died, one day, in a battle. The corpses around him had been rotting for ten days when they were picked up, but he was picked up fresh. They took him back to his home town and while they were preparing to bury him on the twelfth day and had laid him on the pyre, he came back to life; and once he did,<sup>5139</sup> he told what he had seen on the Other Side.<sup>5140</sup> He said that:

When it had gotten out of himself,<sup>5141</sup> his soul went on a journey with a crowd. They all<sup>5142</sup> came to a rather enchanted area where there were two

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At Rhet.3.16 (1417A) the Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος serves as an example of the tactic of answering a charge (*n.b.*, ἀπολογουμένῳ, 1417A10) with a vivid narration (λέγειν πραττόμενα rather than πεπραγμένα) so as to incite pity or fear. In both cases the citations point to the response as being *autobiographical*. Whereas the formula οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ λόγος (for which cf. Apol.20E5, Symp.177A2; Eur. Hel.513, f.484 Nauck; D.H.Rhet.9.11; Call.Hym.5.56; Plut.QC 661A, 718A; Luc.Hermot.47; Julian 197C, 387B; Hor.Sat.2.2.2) introduces a story as resting on better authority than the man's authority who is telling it, to call a story an Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος recommends it as certainly true because the teller is the person the story is about and knows what happened first hand. Only later comes its proverbial sense (*Paroim.Gr.* I.210, 2.13) of going on with nonsense at too great a length – a thing we all tend to do, after all, when speaking about our favorite topic. Cf. K.Tuempel, *Philologus* 52(1896)523-33 for a complete assembling of the evidence.

<sup>5137</sup> ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός ... (B2-3): The sound play trumps his shift from the (awkward) objective genitive of the byword (Ἀλκίμου) to the subjective genitive he now needs (ἀλκίμου ἀνδρός). Socrates will not, to reproduce the solecism in English, “tell a tale he underwent himself, but a brave man did, a man called Er.” The μέν *solitarium* recommends Er as deserving our attention by suggesting there is more to be said about him than that he is ἄλκιμος. With the relative ὃς ποτε (B4) his storytelling is suddenly underway and we learn what that “more” is. An allusion to the *Nekuia* of the *Odyssey* is no more than a happy tangent. Like anyone else Socrates must credential his source when he retells a story (e.g., Phdo.108C); but here as in the *Odyssey* citing a source is unnecessary since the story is the teller's own. Thus, it is an Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος after all: it's just that Socrates is not the “himself” the story is about. The fact that it is *autobiographical* embodies the crucial truth-modality of the ensuing myth, that the adventurer survived to tell it so that the story itself survived for us in this world. We are constantly reminded and almost never allowed to forget this crucial modality by the style of the telling, namely, the fact that the whole tale is presented in *oratio obliqua*. I have adopted an orthography to reflect this fact, by indenting Socrates's quotation of Er's narrative, and double-indenting Er's quotation of personages in Hades (615D3-6A3, 617D6-E5); but when Socrates interrupts his narrative of Er's narrative in order to address Glaucon directly (at 618B6-9B3, 619D5-E5, and of course at the end 621B8-D3), I revert to the normal margins.

<sup>5138</sup> τοῦ Ἀρμενίου (B3): The evidence that Armenios is his patronym rather than a designation of his nationality comes from Clem.Al. Strom.710§24, who identifies Er with Zoroaster, whom he goes on to place into the nominative in order to say he wrote the story, and then describes him as Ἀρμενίου τὸ γένος Πάμφυλος. (where note the nominative).

<sup>5139</sup> ἀνεβίω, ἀναβιοὺς δέ (B7): such epanalepsis is a feature of the Ionian storytelling style we find in Herodotus.

<sup>5140</sup> ἐκεῖ (B7): cf. τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν, 498C4.

<sup>5141</sup> οὐ ἐκβῆναι (B8): that is, once he had died. The language will be simple in the story-telling of this mystery of mysteries! To the extent that he *is* his soul, *he* is who departs; and to the extent that he *is not*, it is *himself* that he departs, so the reflexive is as appropriate as not. Compare the borderline

chasms<sup>5143</sup> next to each other, opening into the earth below, and two others opening into heaven above. Between them sat judges. Once these had made their decision they would order<sup>5144</sup> some of the men<sup>5145</sup> to continue on their journey by the chasm up and to the right<sup>5146</sup> that led to the heavens, after marking them on the front<sup>5147</sup> with the particulars of their judgment; but the unjust men they would send to the chasm down and to the left leading into earth, these too having received marks indicating all their wrongdoings, but on their backs. When it was his own turn to approach, they told him that *his*<sup>5148</sup> fate was to act as messenger to mankind about the Other Side, and that they were imposing on him the task to listen and watch all that was going on in that place.<sup>5149</sup>

case when Eros takes over the self of the democratic personality and the direct pronoun is replaced with the reflexive (573B1 and 3 and n.4177) and how the λογιστικόν also watches what the ἐπιθυμητικόν wants to see, at 606B1. For the infinitive invading even subordinate clauses of infinitival *oratio obliqua*, cf. 617D2, 619C2, *Symp.* 174D7. *GMT*§755 calls it “assimilation” and restricts the phenomenon to relative and temporal clauses (though noting that it extends to *εἰ*-clauses in *Hdt.*). In relative clauses it is easier to re-supply the verb of direct speech since the relative can virtually be functioning as a coordinating conjunction (e.g., 490C6: cf. n.5169 *ad* 615E1).

<sup>5142</sup> σφᾶς (C1): In narrating his story to his audience he now “identifies” himself with the group of people he accompanied.

<sup>5143</sup> χάσματα (C2) recalls Glaucon’s story of Gyges in the field (χάσμα, 359D4), if the Herodotean storytelling style (including the epanalepsis at B7 [ἀνεβίω, ἀναβιοὺς δέ]) hadn’t already reminded us of it. The “underground” subconscious Glaucon hoped to rely on but ignore is becoming the eschatological realm we will end up in whether we knew it or not.

<sup>5144</sup> κελεύειν (C5), the present infinitive representing an imperfect in the original speech.

<sup>5145</sup> τοὺς μὲν δικαίους (C4-5), masculine. That they are disembodied souls (B8) is already forgotten; they have become the persons that they were, again. The myth is not geological (where does not matter [*pace Halliwell ad* 614B7]) nor philosophical (the metaphysical status according to which the souls can see, etc., though disembodied, does not matter [*pace Halliwell, extensively, ad* 614B8]). As we have seen, the pursuit of philosophy is a separate matter (cf. φιλοσοφία, 611E1 and n.5075): this is a meditation on the personal morality of life as lived by all men (as Socrates announces when he interrupts the story at 618B6-619B1, below), including philosophers, who are merely men.

<sup>5146</sup> The linking with τε καί (C5) suggests three other possibilities: up to the left, down to the right, and down to the left.

<sup>5147</sup> σημεῖα περιάψαντας (C6): cf. ἐπισημηνάμενος, *Gorg.* 526B7. ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν here (C8) pre-empts any confusion as to their moral stature as other souls encounter them, the converse of both versions of the devil’s advocacy we got from Adeimantus and Glaucon.

<sup>5148</sup> αὐτὸν (D1), is an adjective (emphatic) not a pronoun (which would have been ἔαυτόν); διακελεύοιντο (D2) is parallel with δέοι and represents a first plural present. As souls approached the judges would look at them and send them along, pointing this way or that way. But when Er approached (ἔαυτοῦ δὲ προσελθόντος) they did something different. “Your fate,” he said they said, “is different. You are not to go through either chasm but to act as messenger for mankind of the goings-on here. We are commanding you (διακελευόμεθά σοι, with σοι now unemphatic, replaced in Er’s direct speech by simple indirect reflexive οἱ: ‘they said [εἰπεῖν ὅτι] that they were commanding me’) to watch and listen.”

<sup>5149</sup> τῷ τόπῳ (D3) is just the place he is in (cf. τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον, C1), soon referred to as ὁ λειμών (E2) and then as δεῦρο (615D3) by the souls that have sojourned under earth and in heaven

There he saw the souls leave into the two chasms, down into earth and up toward heaven, once the judgments were made on them, but over at the other two chasms souls were emerging,<sup>5150</sup> coming up and out of the one from beneath, full of smoke and dust, and down out of the other from heaven, souls all clean and pure.<sup>5151</sup> And each of them as they arrived seemed to have made a great and long journey. They were pleased to be coming back to the meadow and camping there as in a festival.<sup>5152</sup> Those that knew each other from before greeted and inquired after each other with gladness, the ones that had come up from earth asking what heaven had been like and those from heaven what it had been like below. They told their stories in detail, the one group (615) wailing and brought to tears as they recalled all the horrid things they had suffered and had seen<sup>5153</sup> in their sojourn into the earth below—it took a thousand years after all

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and then again as ὁ λειμών (616B2): it is not coextensive with ἐκεῖ (614B7) but is just the part of ἐκεῖ that Er is allowed to visit. Of the rest of the place he will know only by hearsay (hence ἀκούειν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι), just as we know of the place he has reached and returned from only by hearsay from him. As elsewhere in the Dialogues, the more layers we have to peer through or relays we need to rely on to see things in our mind first hand, the less incredulity we have time to interpose.

<sup>5150</sup> ἀνιέναι (D6) and καταβαίνειν (D7) represent imperfects, and revert to first-tier indirect discourse from the second-tier construction with the participle ἀπιούσας (D5), a supplementary participle in indirect discourse with the verb of perception ὄραν, already an infinitive in indirect discourse. If we really are to hear what Er has been commanded to hear and watch (ἀκούειν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι), the rest of the tale would have been done in participles subject to verbs of perception like ὄραν (D3) itself subject to ἔφη (sc. ὁ "Hρ), understood. Instead, once the report is said to be what he saw (όραν δή, with δή asserting he *complied* by watching) this second level of subordination can be allowed insensibly to coalesce with the first, as I have made it do in my translation.

<sup>5151</sup> καθαράς (E1) means “clean” and has nothing to do with the “philosophical” metaphor of purity at 611C3 (pace Halliwell), though a sojourn in the heaven of Hades would perhaps feel similar to what philosophers strive for.

<sup>5152</sup> οὗτος ἐν πανηγύρει (E3): In a πανήγυρις everybody (πᾶς) gathers (ἄγω) no matter what their “walk of life.” That here in the meadow of Hades the “lucky” ones eagerly speak to the “unlucky” and vice-versa, once they return to “society” in the meadow, is a canny and humane touch. In our world “above,” we persons of these two types surely avoid each other; but there in Hades we are more comfortable together than we were alone, having been de-socialized and having suffered our private moral rewards for a thousand years in *both* places, the better and the worse. It is this basic human truth, that men feel better together than they do alone with their conscience (ἀπάνθρωπος, Aesch.P.V. 20), that divides the normal run of mankind from philosophers (and madmen). The reader will and should decide in which group he belongs. This simple and common human impulse, I believe, was the motive for Polemarchus’s interruption at the beginning of Book Five. The forces that draw us together are somehow allied with the mechanism of envy we immediately feel once we gather — again René Girard is the prophet for painful truth. The souls in Hades are attractively portrayed as immune to this problem, just as run-of-the-mill persons living on earth above are pessimistically portrayed as vulnerable to it (586B1-3 and C1-3, and n.4470). For Plato, it seems, an adumbration of the Christian vision of humanity is available only in Hades.

<sup>5153</sup> ὅσα τε καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν (615A1-2): The doublet of quantity and quality is for auxesis (whence πολλοῦ χρόνου below. The doublet πάθοιεν / ἴδοιεν distinguishes the punishment the narrating soul suffered from the punishment of other souls that it witnessed. Its own wailing and moaning in the memory of these things thus evinces its feeling of pity and solidarity with the other destitute souls.

—while the others told how pleasant their experience was<sup>5154</sup> and how it was almost too beautiful<sup>5155</sup> to bear.

Their stories were long, Glaucon, and so they took a long time to tell, as he said; but the main thing was this. For all the acts of injustice they had ever committed and all the persons they had wronged, they had been punished in turn, for each and every one of them, and for each act they were punished tenfold—ten times one hundred years, this being the length of a human life. The policy<sup>5156</sup> was that they pay tenfold for each act of injustice, and that<sup>5157</sup> those who were responsible for a mass of deaths because they had betrayed whole cities or armies or had enslaved a mass of people or were proved accessories in bringing on another such horrid state of affairs,<sup>5158</sup> would pay for each deed by suffering ten times the pain they had inflicted on all those persons; just as if, conversely, they had committed good deeds and had shown signs of being just and pious they would be provided what was due to them by the same formula.<sup>5159</sup> As for persons who had just been born and lived a life too short to do anything<sup>5160</sup> Er had other things to say but they aren't worth recalling.<sup>5161</sup>

He did go into detail about the still greater rewards that lie in wait for persons who have committed acts of impiety and of piety, toward the gods and

<sup>5154</sup> εὐπαθείας (A3) answers πάθοιεν. The abstract noun answering the verb suggests something like a state of mind rather than physical torture, as does θέας answering ἴδοιεν, even though in all strictness it is souls that are involved. ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος depicts, in virtual quotation, their being overwhelmed by the beauty, which is made to correspond to the others' being overwhelmed by pain (όδυρομένους τε καὶ κλαούσας). The absence of envy and odious comparison in these very different interchanges is a relief, and is somehow credible in this world beyond, or beneath, the world. They express their joy and sorrow freely in public; and to feel the other person's sorrow and joy in sympathy (606AB) will not harm but will help the auditors' souls!

<sup>5155</sup> Θέας ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος (A4): but the goodness of the good, available to reason, is better than its beauty, which the senses cannot describe. Their beautiful experience will be leaving these souls flaccid (ἀγυμνάστους, 619D3).

<sup>5156</sup> ἵνα (B1).

<sup>5157</sup> καὶ οἶον εἴ (B2), introducing a second example or expression of τὸ κεφάλαιον (A5-6), parallel to ὅσα πώποτε ... καὶ ὅσους (A6-7) which introduced the first.

<sup>5158</sup> οἶον εἴ ... μεταίτιοι (B2-5): The non-distributive binary construction (a A'ing and b B'ing, meaning that both do both: cf. n.2288). Murder or the permanent ruination of a person's life, such as enslaving him, is the crime, and they are guilty of it whether as the main perpetrator (αἴτιοι) or as an accessory (μεταίτιοι). The permanence is expressed by the perfect ἐμβεβληκότες and its durative aspect is done by the hapax legomenon κακουχία (= κακῶς ἔχειν: it generalizes δουλεία and is passive, *pace* LSJ, s.v.).

<sup>5159</sup> καὶ αὖ ἐΐ τινας (B6-C1): The credits for being good, and the litotes by which they are described, suggest that it is only remedial punishment and not envious or resentful revenge that the policy is seeking to achieve.

<sup>5160</sup> τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένων καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων (C1-2): sc. ὀποθανόντων, an aposiopesis, not a *lectio manifesta corrupta* (Stallb., *ad loc.*).

<sup>5161</sup> οὐκ ἄξια μνήμης (C2): The dismissive generalization (for which cf. 616A8-B1, 618B4-6, 620D2-5) suggests we should break the paragraph here (C2) rather than at C4 (with Burnet, Slings, Chambry).

toward parents, and the act of suicide. He got onto this topic<sup>5162</sup> in the course of telling how he came upon two people one of whom was asking the other where Ardiaeus the Great was to be found. This Ardiaeus had become tyrant in a town in the district of Pamphylia some thousand years ago. According to the story he had murdered his aging father and his older brother<sup>5163</sup> and had committed a lot of other impious<sup>5164</sup> deeds. Er said that the man who was asked answered by saying,

He has not returned, and don't waste your time thinking he will.<sup>5165</sup> For in fact we saw many things in that place<sup>5166</sup> and among them was this: when we came near the mouth of the chasm to make our way back up, having suffered all we were allotted to suffer there, we suddenly caught site of him, and of others too, of whom the great majority were tyrants<sup>5167</sup> though there were also persons who had committed huge<sup>5168</sup> sins in private life. They<sup>5169</sup> thought they were about to go up but the mouth of the chasm would not let them. Instead, every time a person irremediably base as they were would try to go up, or someone who had not yet paid all the punishment due,<sup>5170</sup> it would make a belching sound. Men were stationed there, savage and fiery as they appeared, to stand watch and hearken to the call. Some they would pick out and lead them on their way, but Ardiaeus and the others with him they bound up, (616) arms, legs and head, and threw them down

<sup>5162</sup> γάρ (C5) promises that the next event in the story of what Er heard and saw will answer the question about these “greater rewards.” δή adds to γάρ the promise of arresting detail (cf. Denniston, 243).

<sup>5163</sup> ὡς ἐλέγετο (D2). Clearly he had no ring to keep him invisible. The detail about the older brother reveals that his purpose was to become tyrant himself by a two-step plan, like Gyges's plot to seduce the king's wife and then kill the king with her help.

<sup>5164</sup> δή (D1) in ἀλλα δὴ πολλά τε καὶ ἀνόσια indicates that his story will serve as an example of the general policy about the other more heinous acts.

<sup>5165</sup> οὐδ' ὅν ἥξει (D3): for ὅν with future indicative cf. 492C4 and n.2812. Goodwin (GMT 205) compares S.Ant.390 for the tone: σχολῆ ποθ' ἥξειν δεῦρ' ὅν ἐξηγουν ἐγώ. Richards collected many instances (CR6[1892]336-42).

<sup>5166</sup> ἔθεασάμεθα and θαυμάτων (D3, D4) remind us that both above and below there were things done to the sojourners in addition to things they witnessed (A1-4).

<sup>5167</sup> τυράννουν (D7): Still and again it is this life and this sin that the entire conversation has had to expose, thanks to Thrasymachus's remark at 344A6-7.

<sup>5168</sup> μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκότων (E1): cf. Thrasymachus's οὐ κατὰ σμικρόν ... ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην (344A7-B1).

<sup>5169</sup> οὓς (E1): the relative pronoun is another of the connectives characteristic of the story-teller's λέξις εἰρομένη, alongside epanalepsis (cf. 614B7 and n.). Compare 616B6, C5; 620E1; and the formulaic ὃς ποτε used to begin (615B4). For the connective being not so far from the demonstrative cf. 616E2, 620D8.

<sup>5170</sup> Whence the assertion καὶ τάλλα πάντα πεπονθότες above (D5)

on the ground and flayed them, and then dragged them off the path to the side and scoured them with nettles, and to all the passersby would indicate why and wherefore these men were about to be thrown into Tartarus.

The man went on to tell, said Er,<sup>5171</sup> that of all the many and varied fearsome things they had undergone there, one was more formidable than all the rest, the fear that just as one was making his way upward the belch would sound, while conversely the greatest relief came when it remained silent at one's passing. So much about the judgments and the punishments: for good deeds also there were corresponding rewards as well.

The people were to rest in the meadow for seven days<sup>5172</sup> and on their eighth day, depending on when they arrived,<sup>5173</sup> they were to get up and march on. After four days' walking they reached a place from which they beheld a column of light that extended all the way from the heaven above down to earth, like a rainbow if anything but the light was purer and brighter. This they reached with another day's walk, and Er along with them,<sup>5174</sup> and standing in the midst of it they could see that it stretched down from tributaries of light tied at their ends to the heavenly vault. They came to see<sup>5175</sup> that this light was the girdle of heaven—that like the girding of a trireme this light held the whole revolving vault together. From its extremities was stretched the spindle of Necessity, through which<sup>5176</sup> all the revolutions of the spheres were governed. The spindle's staff<sup>5177</sup> and its hook were made of the strongest of metals,<sup>5178</sup> but its whorl was a compound of this and other kinds. The nature<sup>5179</sup> of the whorl was as follows.

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<sup>5171</sup> ἔφη (616A5) sc. Er: the direct quotation of the ἐρωτώμενος that began at οὐχ ἥκει (615D3) has come to an end and we revert to Er reporting what he said (ὑπερβάλλειν, “was exceeding”).

<sup>5172</sup> ἐπτὰ ἡμέραι (B2). The time from Er dying in the field to his being placed on the pyre was twelve days (614B5): seven of these have now passed. Add next the four days of walking (τεταρταίους, B4) and only one is left.

<sup>5173</sup> ἐκάστοις (B2) implies that whatever associations they had during their rest, when they departed they regrouped with those they happened to arrive with.

<sup>5174</sup> Reading προελθόντες (B7), with all mss. (against the scribitur in the Monacensis). The shift to the nominative (from the acc. τεταρταίους, B4) reminds us our narrator was part of the group that went forth and saw this. Cf. shift from τὴν ψυχήν to σφᾶς, 614B8-C1, with n.5142.

<sup>5175</sup> γάρ (C2) means that from their closer perspective they came to understand the purpose of the light's configuration.

<sup>5176</sup> δι’ οὖ (C5): the genitive suggests the spindle is a central *mechanism* of the movement rather than merely its cause.

<sup>5177</sup> οὐ τὴν μὲν ἡλακάτην τε καὶ τὸ ἄγκιστρον (C5-6): The ἡλακάτη referred to must be not the distaff (a separate rod on which the carded wool was poised to be drawn off by the hook [ἄγκιστρον] of the entire spindle [ἄτρακτον]), but part of the spindle itself (as οὐ indicates) fitted with the hook on the end (as τε καὶ indicates). This is confirmed below (E2).

<sup>5178</sup> ἐξ ἀδάμαντος (C6): Whatever the chemical identity of the metal, the point is that the staff is not merely of wood as in this world. This is a spindle that has not, and will not, wear out.

<sup>5179</sup> φύσιν (D1) following upon καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν continues the idea that the σφόνδυλος will be *interesting*, whereas the staff and hook were durable.

In its outer appearance it resembled the ones we have in our world,<sup>5180</sup> but you need to make a mental picture of it based on his description.<sup>5181</sup> It was as if within a large whorl that was concave and had been hollowed out smoothly, another just like it was fitted within, as large on the outside as the other on the inside, like those measuring cups that fit into one another; and that there was a third within the second and a fourth, and so on, with four others. There were eight whorls in all, as he said, each lying within the next<sup>5182</sup> with the lips of the cups appearing from above as circular bands, whereas from the back side and beneath they formed a single whorl with the staff in the center. As to the staff, it pierced clean through the eighth.<sup>5183</sup> The first and outermost whorl had the broadest circle of a lip,<sup>5184</sup> and the sixth had the second broadest; third broadest was that of the fourth, and fourth that of the eighth; fifth came that of the seventh, sixth that of the fifth, seventh the third and eighth the second.<sup>5185</sup> As to

<sup>5180</sup> ἐνθάδε (D2), the opposite of ἐκεῖ (614B7, D2): with μέν it dismisses the outer shape as uninteresting and not worth describing.

<sup>5181</sup> ἐξ ὧν ἔλεγεν (D2): Socrates now presents a *reformulation* of a portion of Er's narrative. He returns to Er's narrative proper when he reverts to the accusative/infinitive construction at καὶ οὕτω δὴ τρίτον ἄλλον ... , D5.

<sup>5182</sup> ἐν ἀλλήλοις (D5) again in a less than strictly *reciprocal* sense: cf. 461C8-D1 and n.2407.

<sup>5183</sup> διαμπερές (E3): The sequence of the description moves from outside in and then from top to bottom to top. Hollow out the whorl and place another within it: viewed from the top the result looks like eight circles, though viewed from beneath it appears a single hemisphere with the staff centered. As for the staff, going back to the top and looking down, it pierces all the way through the eighth. The original σφόνδυλος is of course rigid with the ἡλακάτη (whose whole purpose after all is to give angular momentum to the rotating spindle), but the added pseudo-σφόνδυλοι are pierced through by it so that they can rotate freely around it as free from an axle, although (the orientation now reverting to ἀνωθεν) only the eighth can be seen to be pierced. The ἡλακάτη itself continues on, though and beyond and above them, with its hook fitted to its the end.

<sup>5184</sup> τὸν τοῦ χείλους κύκλον (E4-5) the genitive is used to phase out the metaphor: from now on the tops of the metaphorical cups (χείλη) will be spoken of as they appear from above, namely, as circular bands (κύκλοι).

<sup>5185</sup> Mapped in two dimensions these ordinals and cardinals (E3-8) and the others below (E8-617A4,A6-B3) have ennealogical significance, to limn which I leave to the pious (cf. J.-C. 475-6; Adam's Appendix VI). It is consistent with the entire tale that the architecture of the universe should have a hidden order; but to search for an esoterical message from Plato or from Socrates without consideration of the moral lesson, is at best an amusing pastime (witness Adam's lucubrations, 2.441-453) but more likely an irresponsible *divertissement*. For example J.-C. (478) can misperceive the practical lesson that Socrates extracts from the tale, when he is moved to interrupt it at 618B6-619B1, as spoiling the tale's integrity!

Most important is it to see how the myth allows the hearer to recognize only gradually that this mechanism represents the solar system in microcosm, seen now by the souls from without who in truth, along with ourselves, are a mere speck within it as within the rest of the time both past and future. Our morality, whose limit we always feel as intentional—i.e., as being merely “our” morality, fraught with presuppositions of ours that are perhaps even the most significant part of the problem—is being given a ground in the all-enveloping world, to which and by which our hitherto merely intentional consciousness is now being awakened and by which illuminated!

their coloration<sup>5186</sup> the first was speckled,<sup>5187</sup> the seventh was brightest -- so bright that (617) the eighth had its color projected on it by this one.<sup>5188</sup> The circle of the second (and the fifth) were similar in hue, yellower than those; the third was the whitest; the fourth was light red; and second in whiteness was the sixth.<sup>5189</sup> He said that as for what it did, the spindle revolved in a circle, as a whole, but that within the whole which was moving that way, the seven inner circles revolved gently backward<sup>5190</sup> the innermost and eighth going the fastest in that direction, then the seventh sixth and fifth at the same speed; third<sup>5191</sup> fastest in this motion was the fourth, or so it appeared to him and his group<sup>5192</sup> since it would turn back on itself,<sup>5193</sup> fourth was the third and fifth was the second. He

<sup>5186</sup> καί (E8) in its simplicity suggests that we should anticipate a qualitative differentiation among the circles (*χρῶμα*, though the term does not appear until 617A1), after the quantitative one (*σχῆμα*).

<sup>5187</sup> ποικίλον (E9): Presumably the star-studded sphere is meant.

<sup>5188</sup> λαμπρότατον / προσλάμποντος (617A1). As to the order, from the first (the μέγιστος σφόνδυλος, i.e., the first and outermost with which he also started in the quantitative list, E4-8) he skips to the one that is most notable, qualitatively, because of its brightness (the sun, which happens to be seventh), and then parenthetically to the moon (which happens to be eighth) since it receives its brightness from it. After this parenthesis he picks up where he left off when he was distracted by the λαμπρότης of the seventh, reverts to the ordinal protocol (τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, A2), and then sticks with that protocol to the end (δευτέρου [with parenthesis on the πέμπτον because of its close relation], τρίτον, τέταρτον and τὸν ἕκτον [the fifth having been covered] which is last since the seventh and eighth had been covered). The subsequent colorations appear to represent the colors of the other planets: cf. Adam *ad* 617A.

<sup>5189</sup> δεύτερον ... τὸν ἕκτον (A4): The ordinal predicate (anarthrous δεύτερον with λευκότητι) is allowed to exchange positions, but not roles, with the ordinal subject (ἕκτον). The article τόν subsequently confirms that ἕκτον is subject and τὸν ἕκτον is a compendious expression for τὸν τοῦ ἕκτου κύκλου. The inversion of order along with the brachylogy effect closure (cf. nn. 588 and 1708, respectively). After the adjectival description of the nested σφόνδυλοι is completed (i.e., their quantity and quality presented) they are ready to be set into motion (κυκλεῖσθαι δὲ δή, A4-5).

<sup>5190</sup> τὴν ἐναντίαν (A7): I take him to mean they would appear to be going backward in relation to the outer circle.

<sup>5191</sup> Reading τὸ (B1) with F (τὸν AM : om. Monacensis). In running through the circles and their relative sizes he adopted a formula that kept the ordinal designating which circle, distinct from the ordinal designating the rank in width, using τὸν τοῦ with ordinal for the circle and anarthrous ordinal for the rank (616E3-8); but he did take the liberty to vary their order in the middle of the run-through (between the second and third rank: E5). Next, in the run-through of their colors (616E8-617A4), he again attaches the ordinals that pertain to the circles *per se* with τὸν τοῦ but suddenly drops this technique when he comes to the third and fourth circles, at which point he uses the anarthrous ordinal he had used for rank (τρίτον δέ ... τέταρτον δέ, A3-4); and finally, to cap it off says δεύτερον δὲ τῷ λευκότητι τὸν ἕκτον (A4), on which cf. n. 5189. Given the variation in those descriptions, the only thing objectionable about the τὸν (B1) of mss. AM, here, is that it is masculine: the mere fact that the other ranking ordinals are anarthrous cannot be counted against the viability of τὸ (the reading of F). φοραί is added to confirm that τρίτον represents the rank.

<sup>5192</sup> σφίσι (B2): Again Er speaks to us of himself as a member of a group of souls: cf. 614C1, 617D1, 621A5 and n. 5174.

<sup>5193</sup> ἐπανακυκλούμενον (B2): I take the meaning to be that it would be “lapped” by the outer rings which rotate faster.

said that the whole spindle was being spun<sup>5194</sup> in the lap of Necessity, and that on its circles stood Sirens, one on each, each singing a distinct note in a distinct timbre, and that the combination of all eight notes made a consonant chord;<sup>5195</sup> and that there were three others there, stationed around the spindle at equal intervals, each sitting on a throne: the daughters of Necessity—Moiras—gowned in white and filleted with crowns, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos,<sup>5196</sup> and that these were singing in tune with the Sirens' chord, Lachesis singing the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future. And he said that Clotho would grab onto the outer circle with her right hand and push it along, leaving off betimes, and that Atropos in turn would reach into the inner ones with her left and likewise leave off, while Lachesis would grab now one and then another, with one and then the other hand.

What happened when his group arrived there was that they had to approach Lachesis right away, where her Spokesman made them stand in formation. He reached into her lap and brought forward a bundle of lots and of life models, stepped up onto a sort of high podium, and declared the following:

Necessity's Daughter, Maid Lachesis speaks:<sup>5197</sup>

“Souls that live for a day, another mortal generation begins its circuit, a harvest for death.<sup>5198</sup> To you a genius<sup>5199</sup> will not be assigned by lot: by you a genius will be

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<sup>5194</sup> στρέφεσθαι (B4): passive, though above (A5) it was middle since the agent (indeed agents, as it will turn out: C5-D1) doing the spinning had not yet been included in the picture. Now we discover Ἀνάγκη is the spinster with the spindle laid across her lap, a configuration we see on several vases (cf. *A History of Technology*, ed. C.Singer, et al. [Oxford 1956] 2.200-202).

<sup>5195</sup> φωνήν (B6): Next (after setting it in motion: cf. n.5189) he presents the sound of the apparatus.

<sup>5196</sup> The unremitting elaboration without connectives (C1-3) is striking and magisterial and sets the tone for the Spokesman's address, below (D6ff).

<sup>5197</sup> The Spokesman's exordium (D6), with its “rising” word order (H.Weil) is magisterial, lapidary, and abrupt (Proclus: ρήματα ἀφιεὶς ὥσπερ βέλη νοῦ γέμοντα καὶ ὑψηλῶν ἐπιβολῶν, 2.269.4-5 [Kroll]). The exordium begins with a genitive (Ἀνάγκης) which is governed by the subsequent genitive (θυγατρός), itself expanded by an appositive genitive (κόρης) and a proper name in the genitive (Λαχέσεως), both added without connective. This string of genitives is then followed by a bare nominative without copula, abruptly implying that the genitive that came before is subjective and that the sentence is over. Plut. Mor.568D characterizes the style as οὐ τραγικῶς ἀλλὰ θεολογικῶς (on which cf. Chalcidius §143 (203.13-16 [Wrobel])).

<sup>5198</sup> Lachesis's exordium (D6-7) is likewise abrupt. This time the word order “descends:” we begin with a bare nominative, which this time governs a predicative genitive without copula (adjective plus noun, ἄλλης περιόδου, this time objective), followed by a dependent genitive (adjective plus noun, θηντοῦ γένους, another descending step); and a genitive is then appended that closes the sentence by virtue of the semantic fact that it modifies the earlier genitive (περιόδου).

<sup>5199</sup> δαίμων (E1), the personal guiding spirit in our lives, famously spoken of by Heraclitus (ἡθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων, B119 [DK]).

chosen.<sup>5200</sup> Who draws<sup>5201</sup> the first lot, let him be first to choose a life, which thereafter will be his by necessity.

Virtue is nobody's to own:<sup>5202</sup> one may accrue a greater or lesser share of her in accordance with the amount he honors or dishonors her.<sup>5203</sup> The blame belongs to the chooser; god is blameless."<sup>5204</sup>

Once he uttered these words, Er went on, the Spokesman cast forth the lots into their midst, and each picked up the one that fell at his side except himself (the Spokesman wouldn't let him). As soon as they picked them up they knew where they stood in the order of choosing. (618) Then the Spokesman took up the life-models and laid them out before them on the ground. There were far more lives than souls and they made up a great variety, with lives of every type of animal, especially<sup>5205</sup> the human and all the kinds of life a human can live. There were careers of tyrants, some that held their power to the end, others that were interrupted in the middle because they ran out of wealth or were forced into exile, and some that ended up living the life of beggars.

Conversely<sup>5206</sup> there were lives of distinguished men, of those esteemed for their bodies in terms of its beauties or its strength and vigor,<sup>5207</sup> and those esteemed for their family connections and the excellences<sup>5208</sup> of their forebears, as well as

<sup>5200</sup> Elevation is again achieved (E1), this time by expressing an antithesis by parallel word order with shift of cases (ὑμᾶς, δαίμων / ὑμεῖς δαίμονα) rather than the more direct method of reversing the order.

<sup>5201</sup> ὁ λαχών (E2): Lachesis oversees λαχεῖν.

<sup>5202</sup> ἀρετὴ δ' ἀδέσποτον (E3), quoted by Plutarch QC.9.740D: ἀρετὴ γὰρ ἀδέσποτον καὶ κακία, who takes it to mean that whether we are good or bad falls to our free will and the choices we make in the life we subsequently live. Cf. 618B3-4 below with n.

<sup>5203</sup> Again (E3-4) the word order is parallel (τιμῶν, ἀτιμάζων / πλέον, ἔλαττον) rather than chiastic.

<sup>5204</sup> αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος (E4-5): Closure by chiasm after the parallelisms in word order. The entire passage is a lesson in avoiding the article.

<sup>5205</sup> καὶ δὴ καί (618A4) selects the human species out of the genus of all animals, and then ἄπαντας includes every kind of life available within that species.

<sup>5206</sup> εἶναι δὲ καί (A7): the καί answers τυραννίδας τε (A4). The spectrum of human lives (τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους ἄπαντας) is represented with a pair of categories: a subspectrum of tyrannical careers (namely, A4-7) and a sub-spectrum of lives reputed (δοκίμων) to be upstanding (namely, A7-B6), with the grounds for the good repute retailed according to the usual categories of good (cf. nn. 5207 and 5211). As in the distinction of lives leading to the distinction among punishments (615A5-616A3), the common spectrum of lives is set apart from the extreme case(s) of the tyrant (615C2ff. Cf. n. 5161). The warped division corresponds to and answers Thrasymachus's warped division between the common run of unjust acts which he despises and the "perfection" of ἀδικία embodied in tyranny which he adores (344A6-C2).

<sup>5207</sup> καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ισχύν τε καὶ ἀγωνίαν (A8-B1): ἄλλην is of course adverbial (= *praeterea*). The bodily virtues are generalized to allow the transition to "external" goods (here γένος / πρόγονοι).

<sup>5208</sup> The plurals εἴδεσιν, κάλλη, ἀρεταῖς (A8-B1), where we would expect generic singulars, invite the mind to imagine a concrete plurality (in accordance with πλείω and παντοδαπά above) rather

lives of men undistinguished in these ways, and models of women's lives as well. The order of their individual souls<sup>5209</sup> was not set out in the models: the way the soul turns out is determined by the choosing of the life she does;<sup>5210</sup> but all the other attributes were there to choose among, mixed also with degrees of wealth and poverty and degrees of health and sickness, or indifferent amounts of these.<sup>5211</sup>

This is the moment, it seems to me, dear Glaucon,<sup>5212</sup> when everything hangs in the balance<sup>5213</sup> for a person's life. Because this is so, we must each of us disregard all other studies and devote our energies to learning just this<sup>5214</sup>—whether by his own research or by becoming a student, if he proves able to learn of or to discover<sup>5215</sup> somebody that can enable him to master – through distinguishing

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than move through the abstract categories unreflectively.

<sup>5209</sup> ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν (B2-3): τάξιν is a new and very vague expression: we are not meant to know just what it means. If anything we might remember the notion of differing ἀρχαί in the soul that appeared at 580D8 (cf. ἀρχει, 581B12) and were shown at work in their responses to the questions about what was more important (581C8-E4).

<sup>5210</sup> ἄλλον ἐλομένην βίον ἄλλοιαν γίγνεσθαι (B3-4): Cf. ἀρετῆς ἀδέσποτον, E3 above. The ἄλλος ἄλλο construction provides a berth for a chiasm of cause and effect (cf. n. 1632): the choice (ἐλομένην) of the soul is what determines the way the soul turns out (ἄλλοιαν γίγνεσθαι, present).

<sup>5211</sup> τὰ δ' ἄλλα (B4) refers to the salient features of body and family excluding the τάξις of soul, but then there is more: the external conditions of wealth and health. Once we notice that the traditional tripartition of goods (psychic, bodily, and external) underlies this configuration, we notice how different from ours is the point of view of these souls. They are about to choose what in this life we think we are born with, including even who shall be their forbears! Thus health takes on the aspect of an external good like wealth; and family lineage, elsewhere an external good, takes on the aspect of personal bodily goods like beauty and strength.

<sup>5212</sup> With ὡς ἔοικεν, ὥ φίλε Γλαύκων (B6) Socrates boldly interrupts his narration of the narrative of Er to express his own view to Glaucon directly (the vocative alone had not been enough to initiate an interruption at 615A5). Again a paragraph break in the printing of the text is to be placed here (again after a dismissive generalization: cf. 615C1-2). For the vocative to indicate change of addressee cf. Lys.204C7 and 204E9. On the asseverative force of an adjective added to the proper name in the vocative, cf. n.3285. Socrates's admonition to Glaucon is made all the more emphatic by the hyperbaton of ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος and by the fact that he switches into his own voice without announcing it to us (as for instance with ἦν δ' ἐγώ). One might wonder what the others present think of these two ignoring them at this moment, a moment representatively crucial for all mankind.

<sup>5213</sup> ὥ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἀνθρώπῳ (B6-7), echoing ὥ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας ὁ ἀγών at 608B4, and therefore associating this passage with that. For ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος cf. Phdo.107C4, P.Nem.8,21, Antiph.5.43, and ἐν δλῷ κινδυνεύοντα, Rep.424C4. For the collocation of this with ἀγών cf. Ar.Nub.955. Cf. also ἐν τούτῳ πᾶς εὐδαιμονία, Gorg.470E8. To repeat the lesson of that passage (i.e., 608B) here corroborates what should be obvious, that Socrates's purpose in telling the Myth of Er is to help in the way we live this life.

<sup>5214</sup> τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας (C1-2): Cf. 591C2-3. This dictum would include my study of Plato's *Republic*.

<sup>5215</sup> καὶ ζητητὴς καὶ μαθητής (C2): One may seek the knowledge on his own or find a teacher. The second possibility is then subdivided: he may either find the teacher on his own or learn of him somewhere (μαθεῖν καὶ ἔξευρεῖν, C3). The chiasm is characteristic.

which life is worthy and which is base, to learn to choose at every moment and at every turn the better as opposed to the worse alternative among the possibilities available. We need truly to know,<sup>5216</sup> by taking into account all the aspects of life we have just listed<sup>5217</sup> and what their effects are on the goodness of one's life,<sup>5218</sup> how they work together and how separately:<sup>5219</sup> just what effect beauty has when it is blended<sup>5220</sup> with less or more wealth in connection with this or that kind of soul,<sup>5221</sup> what effect noble birth<sup>5222</sup> and ignoble birth,<sup>5223</sup> and private pursuits or public office, physical strength and weakness, being quicker or being slower at learning, and all the other habits of soul either inborn or acquired: what is the combined<sup>5224</sup> effect all these things have when they congeal in idiosyncratic mixtures—so that he will be able to make a fully reasoned<sup>5225</sup> choice,<sup>5226</sup> from all the

<sup>5216</sup> Reading εἰδέναι (C8) with mss.AFM rather than καὶ εἰδέναι with D. I take the accusative-infinitive construction beginning at C6 to be the “antecedent” of τούτου in C2, the intervening lines (C3-6) being a self-interruption to describe the teacher one might seek that broaches in general and unscientific terms the goal of the learning.

<sup>5217</sup> τὰ νυνδὴ ρηθέντα (C6): We may say as a rule of thumb that τὰ ρηθέντα are the subjects adduced whereas τὰ εἰρημένα are the things said about them. Cf. *Thg.123A9-B1*.

<sup>5218</sup> πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου (C7): ἀρετή, “goodness,” functioning as the noun for the adjective ἀγαθός (cf. n.548). The life chosen in Hades will contain one set of attributes or another as “contained in” (ἐνεῖναι, B3 cf. ἐνοῦσαν, 619C1) the παραδείγματα (A1-3). The choice of these will “necessarily” produce one τάξις of soul or another (B2-4); but Socrates has interrupted that narrative to talk about “us” in *this* world, and how “we” might manage, day by day and under varying circumstances, to make the best of the situation (ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν, C5: cf. the admonition at 604C5-D2) in *all* our choices (ἀεὶ παντάχου) in this life as well. Finally we are being shown what ἡ προύργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον meant, at 498D3!

<sup>5219</sup> συντιθέμενα ἄλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα (C7) suggests the application of the methods of dialectical scrutiny (e.g. *Phdrs.266B*) to the empirical lives where attributes are already bundled, i.e., the empirical *mixtures* displayed in the παραδείγματα (μεμεῖχθαι, B5: cf. κραθέν, C8).

<sup>5220</sup> κραθέν (C8): The actual effect (τι ἐργάζεται) of combining them (κραθέν) will be predictable (εἰδέναι) based on our evaluation (ἀναλογιζόμενον) of both their individual essences (διαιρούμενα) and the compounding of them (συντιθέμενα).

<sup>5221</sup> τί κάλλος ... (C8-D5): The list is governed by the infinitive (εἰδέναι) and instantiates the generalized formulation that precedes (πάντα ... συντιθέμενα ... διαιρούμενα, C6-8), which is governed by the circumstantial participle (ἀναλογιζόμενον, C6). The pairing of the phrases mirrors the previous pair (participial phrase [C4-5], infinitival phrase [C5-6]), but there the participle described the means and the infinitive the end, whereas here the participle describes the method and the infinitive describes the resultant prediction. The first section (C8-D1) lays out the *matrix* of variant attributes (n.152), by instantiating the triad, body (~κάλλος) / externals (~πενίᾳ / πλούτῳ) / soul (~ποίας ... ἔξεως), with the specific κάλλος chosen to confirm the allusion to τὰ νυνδὴ ρηθέντα (C6), namely, the list of *praiseworthy* attributes at A7-B1 [n.b. κατὰ κάλλη, A8]).

<sup>5222</sup> εὐγένειαι / δυσγένειαι (D2): The plurals insist that the knowledge he desiderates should include detailed differentiation among the gradations of more and less noble and ignoble birth, and likewise with all the other items in this section of the list (D2-3): cf. the plural κάλλη at 618A8 and n.5208.

<sup>5223</sup> The matrix having been set up, the list in its second section (whose governing construction will be a restatement of τί κακὸν ἡ ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται? [C8-D1], namely τί συγκεραννύμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐργάζεται? [D5]), continues to regurgitate the νυνδὴ ρηθέντα. εὐγένειαι brings forward ἐπὶ γένεσιν (B1) and is expanded with political office (ἀρχαί), an expansion naturally associated with

types and ranges of attributes recognized for what they are<sup>5227</sup> and keeping his sights on the development<sup>5228</sup> of the soul, between<sup>5229</sup> the worse and the better course of life, calling<sup>5230</sup> worse the life that leads the soul off in the direction of becoming more unjust and better the life that leads it to become more just. Knowing this he will dismiss all other considerations.<sup>5231</sup> We know that he will, because now we have seen that this choice is the only one that really matters<sup>5232</sup> for a man, during his life as well as hereafter. (619) He must hold to this outlook and opinion with adamancy as he makes his way to Hades,<sup>5233</sup> so that there as here he will not be dazzled<sup>5234</sup> by the accoutrements of wealth and other such evils<sup>5235</sup> and so that he will avoid falling into tyrannical ways and other such types of conduct, committing many unhealable evils and suffering still more of the same himself, but instead will have the measure by which to choose a middle life among such things<sup>5236</sup> and to avoid excesses in

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family in such lists (since family connections lead to offices). Then bodily strength (*ἰσχύες καὶ ἀσθένεια*) is brought forward from A8-B1 (*τὴν ἄλλην ισχύν τε καὶ ἀγωνίαν*). But while in the previous passage Er was preoccupied with the fact that the *τάξις* of the soul was not presented in the *παραδείγματα*, since it is an *outcome* of the choice, Socrates has shifted to the topic of the choices men need to make in the real world daily, in which context the suppression of psychic attributes is less necessary (whence *ποίας ... ἔξεως*, D1), so that he may now include the consideration of psychic ingredients and the effects of their presence or absence along with bodily and external attributes. His example is *εὐμάθεια* and we are reminded of the attributes of the philosophical type at the beginning of Book Six. Still, as before he must keep separate the virtue of the soul and of the man, since this is to serve as the criterion of the most choiceworthy mixture (D6-E2, cf. *πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου*, C7). From all this we can sense the difference in meaning between a *τάξις* or order of the soul (the determinant or even the constitution of its virtue or viciousness) and the soul's *ἔξις* or *ἔξεις* (as mere *ποιότης*). Since the psychic category is new and not among the *νυνδὴ ῥῆθέντα* from the previous page, it receives not only a specific instantiation (*εὐμάθεια*) but also an elaboration (*καὶ πάντα ... ἐπικτήτων*, D3-4). The distinction between inborn and acquired habits (*φύσει / ἐπίκτητα*) is meant to stress the need for a comprehensive grasp of the variables (which *πάντα* insisted upon, above [C6]).

<sup>5224</sup> συγκεραννύμενα (D5): A variation on *κραθέν* (C8), again depicting the empirical effect, with *σύν-* generalizing all the various headings of ingredients.

<sup>5225</sup> *συλλογισάμενον* (D6) repeating *ἀναλογιζόμενον* from C6, and, now construed with *αἱρεῖσθαι*, replacing the less scientific expression *διαγιγνώσκοντα* used with it above (C4-6), before the scientific description of the *μάθημα* had been articulated.

<sup>5226</sup> *αἱρεῖσθαι* after *συλλογισάμενον* (D6) instead of *ἀναλογιζόμενον* above (C6): note the chiastic order, indicating that the point has been made.

<sup>5227</sup> *ἀπάντων αὐτῶν* (D5-6), stricter than *τούτων*, for the items have been submitted to close dialectical scrutiny (cf. n.5219).

<sup>5228</sup> *φύσιν* (D7), as the sequel shows (*n.b. γίγνεσθαι*, E2) has a very different meaning from just above (*φύσει*, D4). It means the *condition* of the soul; it corresponds to *πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου* above (C7); and it restates what was said by *τάξιν* at B3.

<sup>5229</sup> *τόν τε χείρω καὶ ἀμείνω βίον* (D7-E1): *τε ... καί* linking opposite alternatives (*n.96*). The phrase *redo*s *βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν* above (C4-5), continuing the chiastic order.

<sup>5230</sup> *καλοῦντα* (E1): Rather than accept the list of *καλούμενα* or *λεγόμενα ἀγαθά* he will judge those items as good or bad, better or worse, in reference to their effect on the *ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς*, according to the argument reached at the end of Book Nine (591C1-592A4: cf. nn. 4587 and 4592).

<sup>5231</sup> *χαίρειν ἔάσει* (E3) *redo*es *τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας* (C1-2). What had began as a chiasm is widening out into an annular construction!

<sup>5232</sup> *κρατίστη* (E4) – “influential, crucial” – brings forward the notion of *κίνδυνος* with which the passage began (B2).

<sup>5233</sup> The annular structure is continued as Socrates next (618E4-619A1) reverts to Er’s topic of the choice the souls make in Hades, from which he digressed at 618B6.

either direction, both for the life we live here,<sup>5237</sup> to the extent he is able, and throughout his sojourn in the world hereafter as well. After all, this is the path by which a man turns out to be as happy as man<sup>5238</sup> can be.

Just so,<sup>5239</sup> at that point in his narrative our Messenger from the Other Side reported that the Spokesman<sup>5240</sup> made the following pronouncement:

“Even for the last to come forward, if he choose mindfully and live conscientiously,<sup>5241</sup> a life lies in store for him satisfactory, not bad. Let not the first to choose be careless, let not the last despair.”

With this he who was first to choose went directly for the life of the most powerful tyrant. Mindless gluttony led him to make the choice, and he made it without a second<sup>5242</sup> look and a complete perusal so that he failed to notice that it contained the predestiny<sup>5243</sup> of eating<sup>5244</sup> his own children and other evils. Once he had the time to look again<sup>5245</sup> he beat his breasts and wailed about his choice, and did not acquiesce in the admonitions of the Spokesman<sup>5246</sup> since he blamed not himself for the evils that were to befall him but bad luck, or the geniuses, or indeed anything and everything but himself. Er said that he was one of those whose sojourn had been in heaven, a man who had lived his previous

<sup>5234</sup> ἀνέκπληκτος (619A2): He refers specifically to his admonition to Glaucon at 576D6-7B4 (n.b. ἐκπλήττεται, 577A3).

<sup>5235</sup> πλούτων (A2): A plural, like the empirical plurals above, but at the same time it is derogatory and dismissive. Even though the value of wealth has now with all the rest been seen to be strictly indifferent, he calls it (and them) evils (*τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν*) because now that the choosing soul (*έλομένην*, 618B3) has been equipped with science, she knows these are not *eo ipso* good and is immune to ἔκπληξις. The paradoxical ambiguity of 618B2-4 (cf. n.5210) is therefore resolved!

<sup>5236</sup> τὸν μέσον ... βίον (A5): μέσον with the same meaning as *μεσοῦν* at 618B6. It is less an adumbration of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean than of the Stoic doctrine of the ἀδιάφορα. Compare the expressions for adjustment at the end of Book Nine (n.4603).

<sup>5237</sup> τῷδε (A6): Socrates uses the first person demonstrative to distinguish speaking to Glaucon in his own voice (about this life) from retelling the tale of Er (about the other world).

<sup>5238</sup> οὕτω γὰρ εὐδαιμονέστατος γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος (B1) closes the annular structure of Socrates's interruption by referring to its beginning: ἐνθα δή ... ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἄνθρωπῳ (618B6-7), completing what is to me one of the most beautiful pages in all of Plato.

<sup>5239</sup> καὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ τότε (B2), a rare collocation of particles, by which he makes the transition back to the narrative of Er.

<sup>5240</sup> τὸν μὲν προφήτην (B2-3). μέν is answered by εἰπόντος δέ (B7), where Er moves the focus to the man who is choosing. Though the events are merely a linear sequence these particles are used to place them over against each other in order to return us notionally to the space between them.

<sup>5241</sup> συντόνως (B4) says, in the laconic manner of the Spokesman, what Socrates said with συντείνας at 591C1-2 (cf. σύνταξίν τε καὶ συμφωνίαν, 591D6-7 and n.4595).

<sup>5242</sup> ἀνασκεψάμενον (B9).

<sup>5243</sup> εἰμαρμένην (C1) bringing forward the admonition φόρου συνέσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης (617E2-3).

<sup>5244</sup> βρώσεις (C1): for the plural cf. πλούτων (A2) and n.5235. It is accusative in apposition to the participial noun εἰμαρμένην, itself the subject of ἐνοῦσαν a supplementary participle with λαθεῖν.

<sup>5245</sup> σκέψασθαι (C2): the prefix ἀνα- dropped in repetition (n.1532).

<sup>5246</sup> τοῖς προρρηθεῖσιν τοῦ προφήτου (C3-4). The phrase is echoic but not etymological: the first προ- means “before” and the second “on behalf of.”

life in accordance with an orderly regime<sup>5247</sup> and had what virtue he had by habit and without philosophy;<sup>5248</sup> and indeed it seemed that virtually<sup>5249</sup> as many of those that made this sort of mistake had come from heaven as had come from the other place, unexercised as they had been there in toils and pain, whereas the majority of those who had sojourned in the lower place, given the pain they had undergone and that of others they had witnessed,<sup>5250</sup> were not making their choices so precipitously. Because of this, a virtual<sup>5251</sup> reversal of good lives for bad took place for the majority of souls, the luck of the lots contributing as well.<sup>5252</sup>

After all, if at every turn from the moment of his arrival to live his life here<sup>5253</sup> a person maintains a healthy philosophical dedication<sup>5254</sup> and his own lot does not fall among the very last ones, then there is every reason to believe, on the basis of the reports we are receiving from the life on the Other Side, that he will not only be happy in this life but also that the circuit of his journey from here to there and back will not be earthbound and rough but smooth and heavenly.<sup>5255</sup>

This spectacle,<sup>5256</sup> he said, was very much worth witnessing, how in every

<sup>5247</sup> ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ (C6-7), more general than ἐν πόλει εὖ πολιτευομένῃ (cf. 549C3, which uses the inverse expression) as if to be general enough to include the conclusion reached at the end of Book Nine (591E1, cf. n.4601).

<sup>5248</sup> ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας (D1): Er is given the Socratic term as if he had been present for Book Five. The surprisingly strong term emphasizes that the ability described on the previous page (618C1-619B1) is truly crucial (ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος), and the point will be drawn out by Socrates in his own voice just below (D7-E5). This first soul to choose learned nothing from the beauties of his sojourn above (cf. n.4601).

<sup>5249</sup> ως δε καὶ εἰπεῖν (D1) δέ links this statement of Er to the last one; the infinitive is adverbial in the expression ως εἰπεῖν; and καὶ means “in fact,” adding to the surprise.

<sup>5250</sup> πεπονηκότας / ἔωρακότας (D4-5): again rehearsing the two sources of knowledge made available to the penitents (cf. πάθοιεν / ἕδοιεν, 615A1-2; εὐπαθείας / θέας, A3-4; πεπονθότες / κατείδομεν, D5-6; and cf. τοῖς ἀεὶ παριοῦσι σημαίνοντες, 616A3) as well as to Er (614D3).

<sup>5251</sup> καὶ μεταβολήν (D6). The notion is close enough to an Ionian process that it casts a comic light on the whole human spectacle. Cf. nn.249, 1214, 1340, 4016, 4923, 5043: cf. n.5255 below.

<sup>5252</sup> καὶ διὰ τὴν ... τύχην (D7), adding luck as a factor in addition to the antecedent factor διό (D5). The story does not dismiss the role of luck; instead, the factors within our control are described in rueful detail. Contrast the reaction of the first chooser above (C4-6).

<sup>5253</sup> ἐνθάδε (D8), along with the indicative, κινδυνεύει, that follows (E2), announces another shift from the voice of Er to the voice of Socrates, or more exactly a shift from Socrates retelling Er's narrative to his own agenda of deriving its lesson for our life here (note tense of τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλομένων, E2, referring to the time of Socrates narration of it to Glaucon). We almost need a paragraph break at ἐπει (D7).

<sup>5254</sup> ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῦ (D8) is Socrates's interpretation of the Spokesman's συντόνως ζῶντι (B4), who could hardly be expected to use such an expression (cf. n.5241). His use of ὑγιῶς echoes expressions like ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ (603B1-2, 523B3, n.3299).

<sup>5255</sup> οὐκ ... χθονίαν καὶ τραχεῖαν ... ἀλλὰ λείαν τε καὶ οὐρανίαν (E4-5): The chiasm is characteristic in closure (n.4802). While a man might live a good life here and be rewarded by a heavenly sojourn in Hades, only the man who lives philosophically is exempt from the μεταβολή from virtue to vice and happiness to sadness that he would undergo on his way back (καὶ δεῦρο πάλιν) due to a poor choice of his next life in the manner of the majority of men, which choices make them the butt of a comic and futile Ionian ἀνταπόδωσις, as the tale from Hades is now teaching us.

<sup>5256</sup> With ταύτην and ἔφη (E6) Socrates abruptly reverts to Er's narrative. As to γάρ δή, Shilleto's examples of γάρ used to return to narrative after a parenthesis (in Dem. *Fals. Leg.* §107 [=19.94: *ubi legit*]

case the souls (620) would choose their lives—pitiable, laughable, amazing.<sup>5257</sup> Most of the time they would choose in accordance with the perspective of their former lives. He saw the soul that had been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan, unwilling out of its hatred for the female sex (he had died at women's hands) even to be gestated by a woman. He saw<sup>5258</sup> the soul that had been Thamyras choose the life of a nightingale; he saw a swan undergoing a transformation into the life of a human that it chose, and many other musical animals likewise.<sup>5259</sup> The twentieth soul to choose chose the life of a lion. It was the soul of Telamonian Ajax, trying to avoid becoming a man since he remembered the contest for Achilles' armor. After him came Agamemnon, and he too out of hatred for the human race and what he had undergone exchanged his human life for the life of an eagle. Halfway through came the soul of Atalante, and having witnessed how greatly a male athlete was honored it could not pass by the chance to become one but grabbed<sup>5260</sup> that life. After that he saw the soul of Epeius, Panopis's son,<sup>5261</sup> entering the life of a female craftsman. Far down the list and among the last he saw the soul that had been the ridiculous Thersites<sup>5262</sup> donning the form of an ape.

As chance had it the very last lot fell to the soul of Odysseus! Now healed of its prideful behavior, by its memory of the punishment it had suffered,<sup>5263</sup> it went to great lengths to find a life of a private man who minds his own business, and almost had to give up before he found one, discarded and buried under a heap of others, and it remarked that even if its lot had been first it would have done the same, and selected this life with gladness. Moving on, he saw souls from other kinds of beast turning into men and into each other, the unjust ones becoming wild beasts and the just ones tame and all the possible combinations in between.

Once all the souls had chosen their lives they approached Lachesis in the same order, and he said that Lachesis assigned each to the genius it had chosen and sent the genius along with them to guard over their life and guarantee that

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τοῖς γὰρ τὰ δίκαια] citing also 44.21, 45.84, 47.59; E.IT 38 [seclusit Murray], Pl.Gorg.454C1) are not convincing; moreover, Denniston does not note this use. Its resemblance to the γὰρ δή at 615C5 (cf. n. 5162) is, however, striking. We may keep part of Shiletto's idea and say that the particles announce that the reversion to narrative (Denniston 243) will prove, or justify, the intervening "parenthesis" (in this case, the interruption by Socrates [D5-E5]).

<sup>5257</sup> ἐλεινήν τε γάρ ... καὶ γελοίων καὶ θαυμασίων (620A1-2): The polar emotional reactions give way to a general sense of amazement.

<sup>5258</sup> The anaphora of ἵδειν (620A3,A6,A7) recalls and imitates the Nekuia of the *Odyssey* (ἵδον, Od.II.235, 260, 266, 271, etc.).

<sup>5259</sup> Reading ώσαύτως. εἰκοστήν (A8-9) with ms. F (rather than ώσαύτως εἰκός. τὴν with ADM), a reading corroborated in comments by Plut.(Mor.739E) and Proclus (2.265.20 [Kroll]).

<sup>5260</sup> λαβεῖν (B7) varies ἐλέσθαι above. For Atalante cf. Ov.Met.10.560ff.

<sup>5261</sup> Hom.Od.8.493,II.522; Verg.Aen.2.264; Hygin.Fab.108.

<sup>5262</sup> Hom.II.2.212-69.

<sup>5263</sup> μνήμῃ δὲ τῶν προτέρων πόνων φιλοτιμίας λελωφηκυῖαν (C5): The adversative δέ points up the contrast between its being last to choose and choosing slowly, and its prior *modus vivendi* of always "being first" (φιλοτιμία). Odysseus' soul is therefore the opposite of the first soul who spent its sojourn in the heavenly realm but then chose the tyrant's life too quickly (619B7-D1): as a pair they illustrate both the remedial effect of punishment and the insecurity of good habits and heavenly rewards (n.5155) unless they have the undergirding of "philosophy" (619D1 and n.).

the fate they had chosen would be fulfilled. The genius<sup>5264</sup> in turn would first escort the soul to Clotho and place it under her hand as the agency that causes the spindle to turn, with the purpose of confirming the fate the man<sup>5265</sup> had chosen; next, once the man had attached himself to his fate, it would lead him to the spinning work of Atropos in order to make what Clotho had woven impossible to reverse. Irreversibly from there he went beneath (621) Necessity's throne, and once he got through that, and all the others had likewise gotten through, all of them together made the journey to the plain of Lethe<sup>5266</sup> through a desert perilously hot and choking dry. It was barren of trees and all else the earth yields. Since it was already late in the day the group of them<sup>5267</sup> camped there, on the bank of the River Careless, whose water no vessel can hold.<sup>5268</sup> Everyone was required to drink a measure of this water but those whose mindfulness did not protect them drank more than their measure. As they drank they would forget everything. Then they settled in and went to sleep, and in the middle of the night there was thunder and the earth shook, and suddenly everyone was borne off in many directions like so many shooting stars, upward and back into life. He himself, as he said, was prevented from drinking the water, but even so he had no idea how in the world<sup>5269</sup> he made it back into his body—all he knew was that at dawn<sup>5270</sup> he looked up and saw himself lying on the pyre.

And there you have it, Glaucon: that is how the story was saved instead of<sup>5271</sup> perishing; and it

<sup>5264</sup> ὃν (E1), again a relative used as connective in the storyteller's manner.

<sup>5265</sup> αὐτήν (E2). The soul (fem.), by getting a “life,” insensibly merges into the masculine λαχών (E4), the man; and once the δαίμων has led him (άγειν) to the weaving of Atropos in order to render (ποιοῦντα) irreversible (άμετάστροφα ~ Ἀτροπος) what was woven into him (ἐπικλωθέντα ~ Κλώθω), the δαίμων insensibly merges into the man and the man goes on “unavertibly” (άμεταστρεπτί, E6, indicates that he has “internalized” the guiding force of the δαίμων), apparently no longer accompanied (ιέναι). For the subtle and sensitive play with the gender of the soul cf. 611B9-612A6 and n.5066.

<sup>5266</sup> τὸ τῆς Λήθης πέδιον (621A2-3) The πέδιον is not an invention of Plato: cf. Ar.Batr.186.

<sup>5267</sup> σφᾶς (A5): Er was excluded from the choosing (617E7-8) but now has rejoined the group: cf. n.5192 ad 617B2.

<sup>5268</sup> ἀγγεῖον ούδὲν στέγειν (A6): By a kookie logic, drinking it therefore makes the soul that drinks it unable to hold *its* contents, and it forgets everything. For the metaphor applied to soul compare the climactic remark at 586B3, where Socrates identifies τὸ στέγον with φρόνησις (cf.586A1), as he implicitly does here (A7).

<sup>5269</sup> ὅπῃ μέντοι καὶ ὅπως (B5), another index of experience beyond human ken (cf. 612A4-5).

<sup>5270</sup> ἔωθεν (B6) a nice detail that makes the time elapsed exactly twelve days: cf. 616B2 and n.5172.

We may imagine that Er, too, was transported back up as a shooting star.

<sup>5271</sup> Reading ἀλλ' οὐκ (B8) with FDM (on καὶ misreported from A by edd. cf. now Slings, *Critical Notes*, 184). Antique testimony on the two expressions is as follows—for μῦθος ἐσώθη, Photius, 279.I: ἐπίρρημά ἔστι λεγόμενον ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ τοῖς λεγομένοις μύθοις τοῖς παιδίοις; for ὁ μῦθος ἀπώλετο, Greg.Cypr (Leid.) 290 (=Paroem.Gr.2.83): ἐπὶ τῶν τὴν διήγησιν [κοὶ] μὴ ἐπὶ πέρας ὀγόντων (=schol. in Thet.164A); and Greg.Cypr.(Leid.)291: τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ χρῶνται οἱ λέγοντές τι πρὸς τοὺς μὴ προσέχοντας (schol. Phlb.14A). The theme of a μῦθος preserved (σώζεσθαι) and perishing (ἀπολλύναι) occurs also at Leg.645B, where the allegory of the golden cord as both best and weakest is “saved” by the telling and continuing corroboration it receives from our moral experience. The redundancy here, that the story was “preserved but not lost,” conveys that the words are meant both literally (the powers that be contrived that Er return to report to mankind: 614D1-3) and figuratively

could save us, if only we believe and hearken to it, and will indeed make an auspicious crossing of the river Lethe and avoid polluting our souls.<sup>5272</sup> But if we believe and hearken to what I myself<sup>5273</sup> am saying, and believe that the soul is deathless and as such is able to endure all the evil that may befall it as well as all the good,<sup>5274</sup> then we will always be cleaving to the upward path<sup>5275</sup> and mindfully<sup>5276</sup> be practicing justice at every turn,<sup>5277</sup> in order to be friends to ourselves<sup>5278</sup> as well as to the gods<sup>5279</sup> both while we dwell in this place and also the day we garner the prizes that justice has to yield<sup>5280</sup> and gather them up as athletes do their trophies; and in order that both in our life here and on the sojourn to come of a thousand years, the which we have now described,<sup>5281</sup> we might fare well.<sup>5282</sup>

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(the story he told has perennial truth, which in fact Socrates stopped to extract: 618B6-9B1). The two senses are wonderfully bound together by the ensuing comment, that the story, preserved, will preserve us, if we believe it (see next note).

<sup>5272</sup> With rising conviction the hope is first expressed by an *ideal apodosis* (the “less vivid” ἀντίστροφη σώσειεν), its conditional prerequisite then expressed by an *anticipatory protasis* (the “more vivid” subjunctive, πειθώμεθα ἄν), augmented by what I take to be a continuation of the *protasis* in confident future indicatives (διαβησόμεθα, μιανθησόμεθα). Harkening to the story will enhance the prospect (the enhancement expressed by shift from subjunctive to future indicative) of our crossing the river well (εὖ, i.e., “saved” by φρόνησις: A7-8) and, by retaining thereby some ability to remember (στέγειν), even though we have been made to forget everything, the prospect of protecting our souls from maculation within the life we subsequently enter, here in the world, which, if we achieve it, would in essence constitute “salvation” (ἡμᾶς ἄν σώσειεν, C1).

<sup>5273</sup> ἐμοὶ πειθώμεθα (C3): The contrast Socrates draws is between the story (αὐτῷ) and his own interpretation of it (ἐμοί, emphatic oxytone); and yet it was he that offered it in the first place, to confirm his own admonition about the rewards of a just life (begun at 608C1-2: οὐ διεληλύθαμεν). The admonition begins with the casual observation that the soul is deathless (608D3-4), which Socrates repeats here (νομίζοντες ἀθάνατον), along with its particular entailment that the soul sustains itself under the experience of any evil as well as any good (δυνατήν, C4). Thus, it is his own admonition that the story is meant to corroborate, and the belief in this admonition that will save us. In a sense the story Er tells is Socrates's story and therefore a Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος after all.

<sup>5274</sup> The coupling of κακά and ἀγαθά (C4) recalls the argument for immortality at 608D13-611A4, and states its special moral purpose here: to confirm that neither one's own evil deeds nor the baneful punishments they provoke can destroy the soul (cf. 609D2-5, 610D5 and n.5029).

<sup>5275</sup> τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ (C4-5) now a metaphor for the character of the just life in this world, as unsullied (we should associate χθονίαν [619E4] with μιανθησόμεθα [C2]), though the language is “literally” appropriate also to the sojourn in Hades.

<sup>5276</sup> δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως (C5): contrast ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα (619C7-D1). For the expression cf. 591B5, 431C5-6 and nn.2032 and 3520.

<sup>5277</sup> ἀεὶ ἔξομεθα ... ἐπιτηδεύσομεν (C5-6): That is, we shall indeed prevent our souls from being polluted (C2).

<sup>5278</sup> ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς φίλοι (C6): cf. 586E4-5, 589B1-6, 590D3-6, 591D1-9.

<sup>5279</sup> φίλοι ... τοῖς θεοῖς (C6-7) implies θεοφιλεῖς (recalling 612E2-613B7).

<sup>5280</sup> τὰ ἀθλα αὐτῆς (C7): that is, the reward of a heavenly sojourn in Hades in communion with beauty and goodness (εὐπαθείας καὶ θέας ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος, 615A3-4) lasting ten and twenty times the life of a man (τῇ χιλιέτει πορείᾳ, D2).

<sup>5281</sup> ἦν διεληλύθαμεν (D2), announcing that the lacuna mentioned at the beginning of the section (607C2) has now been filled.

<sup>5282</sup> The closing sentence announces Socrates's purpose in presenting Er's story, and states it twice by an elaborate binary construction that makes a closing. There are two purpose clauses after ἵνα, the second a result or generalization of the first (φίλοι ὥμεν, C6 / εὖ πράττωμεν, D2-3). They flank two

END OF BOOK TEN  
END OF PLATO'S REPUBLIC

## APPENDICES

### Appendix I: 393D-394A: Socrates's Direct Narration of *Iliad* 1.12-42

#### *Iliad* 1.12-42

..... ο γὰρ ἥλθε | θοὸς ἐπὶ νῆσος Ἀχαιῶν  
λισσόμενός τε θύγατρα | φέρων τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα,  
στέμματ' ἔχων ἐν χερσὶν | ἐκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος  
χρυσεῷ ἀνά σκήπτρῳ, | καὶ λίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιούς 15  
Ἄτρεϊδη δμάλιστα δύω, | κοσμήτορε λαῶν  
“Ἄτρεϊδαι τε καὶ ἄλλοι | ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί,  
νῦν μὲν θεοὶ δοιέν | Όλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες  
ἐκπέρσαι Πριάμοι | πόλιν, | εὖ δ' οἴκαδ' ικέσθαι·  
παιδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε | φίλην, | τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι,  
ἀζόμενοι Διὸς νύδην | ἐκηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα. 20

“Ἐνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες | ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοί  
αἰδεῖσθαι θ' ιερῆα | καὶ ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα·  
ἄλλοι οὐκ Ἀτρεϊδη | Ἀγαμέμνονοι ἡνδανε θυμῷ,  
ἄλλα κακῶς ἀφίει, | κρατερὸν δ' ἐπὶ μῦθον ἔτελλε· 25  
“μή σε, γέρον, κοίλησιν | ἐγὼ παρὰ νηυσὶ κιχείω  
ἢ νῦν δηθύνοντ' | ἢ ὑστερον αὗτις ιόντα,  
μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμῃ | σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο·  
τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω | πρίν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἐπεισιν  
ἡμετέρῳ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ, | ἐν Ἀργεϊ, τηλόθι πάτρης,  
ιστὸν ἐποιχομένην | καὶ ἐμὸν λέχος ἀντιώσαν. 30  
ἄλλος ίθι, μή μ' ἐρέθιζε, | σαύτερος ὃς κε νέηαι  
“Ως ἔφατ', ἔδεισεν δ' ο γέρων | καὶ ἐπείθετο μύθῳ  
βῆ δ' ἀκέων παρὰ θίνα | πολυνφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης·  
πολλὰ δ' ἔπειτ, ἀπάνευθε | κιῶν ἥραθ' ο γεραιὸς 35  
Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι, | τὸν ἡύκομος τέκε Λητώ·  
“κλῦθι μεν, ἀργυρότοξ', | δὲς Χρύσην ἀμφιβέβηκας  
Κίλλων τε ζαθέν | Τενέδοιο τε ἴφι ἀνάσσεις,  
Σμινθεῦ, εἴ ποτε τοι | χαρίεντ' ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα,  
ἢ εἰ δή ποτε τοι | κατὰ πίονα μηρί' ἔκηα 40  
ταύρων ἡδ' αἰγῶν, | τόδε μοι κρήνην ἔέλδωρ·  
τείσειαν Δαναοὶ | ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν.”

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compound adverbial phrases to form a chiasm, phrases that themselves twice state the two spatio-temporal worlds in which the drama of human life takes place (αὐτοῦ τε μένοντες ἐνθάδε ... / ἐπειδάν ... κομιζώμεθα, C7-D1; ἐνθάδε / ἐν χιλιέτει πορείᾳ, D2). The first goes with the subjunctive before and the second with the subjunctive after. καὶ at D1 links the two adverbial phrases and therefore the two purpose clauses as well. In its balanced amplitude the sentence is more beautiful than the famous sentence with which the First Book opened; on the other hand, in his attempt to say everything Socrates tolerates a halting rhythm (esp. ἦν διεληλύθαμεν), as if regretting the end, perhaps. It is probably better that he omits a second envoi, to the audience that heard him say κατέβην at the beginning, so many hours ago!

### Socrates's Direct Narration of this Passage (393D-394A):

Chryses arrives in priestly vestment and suppliant posture, his chaplet placed on his sceptre, and delivers his "prayer" to the Achaeans and in particular the two Atreids who rule them. The Achaeans at large would concede to his wishes out of piety but not Agamemnon, who has taken Chryses's daughter to himself as an emblem of his honor as leader (even to raise the issue of the other Atreid's consort would be unseemly). Instead he becomes angry and warns Chryses to get out, and stay out, of his sight. He expresses his willful refusal to grant the priest's request for his daughter in the proudest way possible, with a prediction that the priest's daughter will grow old in his court and in his bed back in Argos. He closes by again telling Chryses if he wants to save his neck he'd better leave. The old priest acquiesces and leaves without a response, but once out of earshot of the army he finds himself in the earshot of Apollo and delivers a second "prayer," this time a prayer both skillful and efficacious to a more welcoming audience, the very god of whom he is priest. He asks Apollo to repay previous services to him by using his far-darting shafts to make the Achaeans pay for the tears that they have made him shed.

### Analysis

In Homer the episode has annular structure, with Chryses's two pleas ringing the refusal of Agamemnon, which is itself a ring since it consists of a threat that he will kill the priest, a refusal of his plea, and a reiteration of the threat. The "prayer" to the Achaeans (Homer says λίσσετο and Plato ηύχετο) consists of two steps clearly set apart in both versions by μέν and δέ (though Plato avoids the slightly distracting δέ that intervenes in Homer's line 19, by using αὐτούς). First Chryses prays that the gods grant them success at Troy and a safe return home, and second he prays that they give him back his daughter in consideration of his ransom and his special relation to Apollo. The prayer to Apollo likewise consists of two parts, done not with μέν and δέ but with a very formulaic condition: "If ever I gave you joy, then come to me to assuage my need today." This standard form of kletic prayer will become the basis for the kletic hymn-genre that we subsequently find in dactyls and lyric meters alike, with its calling to the god by his names (ἐπωνυμίαι), its evocation of his nature and good will for previous service (ὑπόμνησις), and then its pressing request for help at the present moment. The "prayer" to the Achaeans seeks to persuade them in a similar way. First Chryses does the Achaeans the favor of praying that the gods (not just Apollo) grant them victory and therefore safe return; and only then does he ask them for a favor in return, the return of his daughter. Instead of pointing to past services he has rendered to the Achaeans he makes a request to the gods to give them benefits in the future.

The Achaeans, like Apollo, are assuaged by the request (both authors bury their description of the Achaeans' response in a verb that describes their disposition: Homer says ἐπευφήμησαν αἰδεῖσθαι (τε καὶ) δέχθαι [22-3] and Plato says ἐσέβοντο τὸν θεὸν καὶ συνήνουν [393E4]). μέν / δέ is used by both authors to contrast the mood of their response with the mood of Agamemnon's. Rather than being assuaged (the technical term in the context of prayers to gods is ἰλαρός), his mood changes in the opposite direction (Homer: οὐκ ἤνδανε θυμῷ / ἀλλὰ κακῶς ὀφίει κρατερὸν δ' ἐπὶ μῆθον ἔτελλε ... || Plato: ὁ δ' Ἀγαμέμνων ἡγρίαινεν ἐντελλόμενος ...). In response to Chryses' solicitous concern about the Greeks' safe return home he feigns concern over the safe return of Chryses to the rock under which he's been hiding. This close correspondence sets into higher relief the difference between Chryses' power and Agamemnon's, to which Agamemnon here alludes by saying that Chryses will not find his priestly vestments "sufficient" -- a prideful and threatening litotes. He counts the far-darting Apollo to be too far absent to be a threat and speaks as if only his emblems are present. With a similar highhanded tone he replies to Chryses' request not by owning up to refusing but by predicting that his choice will indelibly change the future. Not only will the Achaeans win the war and return home safely, but also Chryses' daughter, he claims, will grow old in his bed, far from her father

and fatherland. We of course know he won't even live to see his bedroom but will suffer a fate that has to do with something he did to another helpless daughter. We see in his prediction the height of hybris and blind folly.

Homer has placed his prediction in the center of their exchange by his favorite device, ring structure. The telling structural feature is the repetition of Agamemnon's threat against Chryses' person, which Plato preserves. In Plato's version the dramatic irony of Agamemnon's blindness is depicted by the way that his σῶς οἴκαδε (394A1) echoes Chryses' σωθῆναι. Homer achieves a similar effect with Agamemnon's σάωτερος ὡς κε νέηαι (32) echoing Chryses' εὖ δ' οἴκαδ' ίκέσθαι (19). Though a mere summary could have dropped the repetition of the threat, Plato's "metaphrase" into prose retains it and the ring structure, and by doing so it reproduces the dramatic irony.

Homer's uses about 120 words (if we measure from about v.16 to v.32) to Plato's 130. He had laid the important detail about Apollo operating at a distance (14), had mentioned in advance (14) the priestly vestments that Agamemnon will refer to (28); and has made it clear that Chryses is preparing to ask for his daughter by dint of ransom and piety, not in order to pray for Greek victory which is mere suasion (13-14). But even within the total of 120 words there are many beat-filling epithets and modifiers (ἐϋκνήμιδες, Ολύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες, Δίος θύιὸν ἐκηβόλον, ἀγλαά, κοίλησιν, πολυφλοίσθιοι, τὸν ἱύκομος τέκε Λητώ) which are capped by the sedes and eponyms in the prayer to Apollo (37-9), where Plato speaks abstractly (τάς τε ... ἀπαιτῶν, 394A3-4). That Homer can fit all this in with so few words is a measure of his swiftness, which is all the more impressive since Plato's slightly longer version is itself nothing if not economical and direct.

Whether *mutatis mutandis* the ametrical metaphrasis is as pleasing as Homer's dactyls is not the right question to ask, since Socrates is so far just illustrating how a story can be told in different ways. Even later he will not be proposing a reform of poetry but an improvement of certain students' textbooks, not students who are being groomed to study comparative literature in college but a special set of students who need to be prepared to embrace good morals once they grow up and find out what good morals are (377A12-B9). Socrates defuses any impression that he is trying to supersede Homer by deferential (but not slavish) borrowings of Homer's language (ἄποινα, 393E2; ἐντελλόμενος, E5; possessive ὁ, 394A6), while at the same time his own prose is very fine, in the clean and clear way that "the march of the syntax is made to hew closely to the march of the ideas" (H.Weil). The only instance of prolepsis or hyperbaton occurs in the climactically placed central sentence, Agamemnon's prediction (393E7-8).

Where Homer can achieve emphasis and comparison by the placement of caesura, Plato has the resources of subordination and parallel syntactic structures. The list of good deeds is done in Plato's ametrical prose with ἦ ἐν ναῶν οἰκοδομήσειεν ἦ ἐν ιερῶν θυσίαις (394A4-5), parallelism in syntax being set off by variation in rhythm; whereas in Homer's monostichic dactyls we have ... εἴ ποτέ τοι χαριέντ' ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα, Ι ἦ εἰ δή ποτέ τοι κατὰ πίονα μηρί' ἔκηα (39-40), a doublet with parallelism of tmesis, but with a characteristic tendency toward amplitude makes the second limb fill out the line and then allows it to spill over unforeseen into the next stichos with ταύρῳ δ' αἰγῶν. Homer can employ metrical means to have Chryses compare the Greek goal of sacking Priam's city (πόλιν) with his own goal of retrieving his beloved daughter (φίλην) by placing these two words into halting caesurae in successive lines (19-20); whereas Plato for his part can compare the first and second parts of Chryses's prayer to the Achaeans with a chiastic ordering of participle and main verb (ἔλόντας σωθῆναι | λῦσαι δεξαμένους καὶ αἰδεσθέντας, 393E1-2). Homer's οὐκ ... ἤνδανε θυμῷ ἀλλὰ κακῷς ἀφίει κρατερὸν δ' ἐπὶ μῆθον ἔτελλε (24-5) would be counted standard parataxis that Plato's prose should be expected to reproduce with hypotaxis, and it does (ἡγρίαινεν ἐντελλόμενος, 393E5). Conversely, ἐσέβοντο καὶ συνήνουν (393E4) counts as an hendiadys in the naturally hypotactic Plato, whereas in the same place the usually paratactic Homer achieves striking effect by the use of an uncommon subordination that is ultimately a *constructio ad sensum* (ἐπευφήμησαν [22] with

dependent infinitives borrowing ἐπί from ἐπινεύειν: cf. Munro *ad loc.*).

There is nothing in the art or the rhetoric of Homer that Socrates eschews in his metaphrase except for direct quotation of the speakers' words. It is his need to avoid this that requires his striking use of the future optative ἐπαρκέσοι (393E7) in reported speech, and his strikingly abstract and technical description of the the κλῆσις (ἀνακαλῶν καὶ ὑπομιμνήσκειν καὶ ἀπαιτῶν, 394A3-4); and we may note in ὃν δὴ χάριν (A6) with its only half-conscious pun on κεχαρισμένον a harbinger of a kind of self-conscious punning that prose will ever fall prey to in its revolt against its own plainness.

## END OF APPENDIX ONE

## Appendix 2: ἀλλόκοτος

καὶ πάνυ ἀλλόκοτους γιγνομένους ἵνα μὴ παμπονήρους εἴπωμεν (487D2-3).

The term occurs few times in only a few authors: once in the Hippocratic Corpus, once in Sophocles, once in Thucydides, twice within a few lines in Aristophanes, but seven times in Plato (*Euthyd.*306E, *H.Maj.*292C, *Leg.*747D, *Lys.*216A5, *Prot.*346A2, *Tht.*182A, and here (Ernesti [s.v.] claims to find ἀλλοκόταιος in Eur. but it is absent from Allen's *Concordance*).

The lexicographers give it a range of meanings. Timaeus *glosses* with ἔξηλλαγμένον where Phryn. *ad loc.* (*apud* Ruhnken) adds κυρίως μὲν οὖν οἱ τὸν νοῦν βεβλαμμένοι καὶ ἐμπληκτοὶ ἀλλόκοτοι καλοῦνται. Also Phryn. *PS* p.14,28 (*apud* Ellendt, *Lex.Soph.*, s.v.): σημαίνει μὲν κυρίως τὸ παρηλλαγμένον τῆς καθεστώσης διαιτῆς καὶ τρόπου ... ἥδη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ σώματα παρὰ φύσιν διακειμένων. Κράτης δὲ ἐπὶ οὐείρατος ἡλλαγμένου καὶ τερτώδους. Ernesti *glosses* [1] *monstrosus*, *prodigiosus*; [2] *inusitatus*; [3] *absurdus, rationi non consentaneus*; [4] *peregrinis moribus praeditus*; and Bekker (378.31) gives ἐναντίον, ξένον, ἀλλοφυές, ἀσυνάρμοστον, ἀλλότριον. Two etymologies are given: ἀλλο + κότος (i.e., ὁργή: e.g. Phryn. *PS* p.23B) and ἀλλο + τόκος (i.e. *partus* e.g., Ernesti, Passow).

At Thuc. 3.49.4, it describes the mission of the first ship sent by the Athenians to Mytiline, i.e., to kill all adult males, which ship οὐ σπουδῇ πλεούσης ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον, was overtaken by the second ship later sent to stop the mission on the force of Diodotus's speech against Creon. In Soph. (*Ph.*1191) the chorus uses it to describe the sudden change in Philoctetes's mind when after sending them off he calls them back: the scholiast thinks it means nothing but ἔτερον or ἐναντίον, but it also expresses the awkwardness the Chorus feels in the face of this suffering noble man. In Aristoph. *Wasps* (47 and 71) it describes an inauspicious dream in which Theorus turns into a crow and twenty lines later it is used to characterize the strange disease of loving-to-be-on-a-jury. In Hippocrates (*Fract.*1) it describes a rare fracture.

The Platonic uses are objective and subjective. It can describe how the climate can have an "inauspicious" effect on the development of a person, as in *Leg.*747D6 (where its opposite is ἐναίσιος), or the "weird" noun ποιότης, which is both abstract (like θερμότης) but also general. Or it can describe offensive behavior, such as, in *Prot.*346A2, that of a "cranky" father that the loyal son must nevertheless defend out of filial piety rather than condemn as being inherently πονηρός (n.b., A5); or, in *H.Maj.*292C5, the conversational behavior of the importunate interrogator (ρήματα χαλεπά τε καὶ ἀλλόκοτα) that Socrates hopes to come back to, with an answer he will have extracted in a more kindly way from the wise Hippias. In *Lys.*216A5 (whether we read ἀλλοκότως with the corrector of T (Burnet's t) or ἀλλόκοτων with mss. BT [as a genitive of the mark] or ἀλλόκοτον with Baiter and Burnet) it describes the perversely tendentious behavior of the ἀντιλογικοί who will jump on us just as soon as we assert that opposites love opposites, by saying that the opposite of love is hate so that love would love hate and hate would love love. It appears at the end of the *Euthyd.* (306E6-7A2) when Crito returns to the question how he should bring up his sons (306D). From Socrates he keeps coming to the realization that it is foolish to worry about their wealth or whom they marry more than their education (παιδεία), but every man he has met that professes to educate boys, such as the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus we have been watching, each seem to him πάνυ ἀλλόκοτος, ως πρὸς σὲ τὰληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως προτρέπω τὸ μειράκιον ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν (306E-

7A2).

Obviously the context of these last three passages is closest to that of our present passage, where the term is used to describe how the clever arguer makes us feel. The fourth from last, however (*Prot.*346A2), is important in showing the relation between ἀλλόκοτος to πονηρός: it suggests that ἀλλόκοτος acknowledges the effect of the actor's behavior on others without taking the further step of condemning his nature, which is exactly parallel to Adeimantus's εἰ μὴ παμπονηρούς here (*Crito* sees fit even to apologize for the milder expression, πάνυ ἀλλόκοτος).

In short, the term expresses embarrassment about how to react to someone else's behavior. The embarrassment makes its meaning hard to pin down since its rhetoric is to express vague disapproval and hope the interlocutor will simply agree. When push comes to shove condemnation is not far behind, and so for a person like Callicles who succeeds in avoiding embarrassment, the use is the beginning of a critique of the weirdo philosopher that will end with a vision of him being brought into court and proving unable to answer scurrilous charges (484C5-6D1). Conversely, Crito who in a sense can only feel embarrassment since he cannot internalize and come to possess the outlook he always takes on merely by being with Socrates (ὅταν σοὶ συγγένωμαι οὕτω διατίθεμαι,<sup>5283</sup> *Euthyd.*306D6ff; compare the entire dramatic situation of the *Crito*), uses the term to express his discomfort with those who practice philosophy too far. At least he (as opposed to his counsellor on the previous page, a mere speech writer who like Callicles wants to erase the reputation of philosophy altogether in order to seem the wisest) believes there is a difference between philosophy and what Socrates has now reported to him that the brothers have been doing; but he will not internalize what philosophy is securely and bravely enough to rely on it in the upbringing of his sons. The term ἀλλόκοτος comes to his aid to apologize for his fear to rely on the apolitical truth of the good life that always seems true to him when he is with Socrates, but which he never can remember when he isn't.

## END OF APPENDIX 2

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<sup>5283</sup> It is Crito's nous that is “set” (διατίθεμαι) or ordered by being with Socrates; just above he confessed he felt embarrassed (it was laughable: ) trying to give advice to Socrates (again a matter of setting one's nous: νοῦθετεῖν, 304D3) about his admiration for Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, which advice he was stimulated to give Socrates by a man that walked up to him afterward, who ended up being a speechwriter; who like Callicles needed only to remove the philosophers from competition (*Gorg.*484CD).

## Appendix 3: Style Shift in Book Six (490ff)

### I. The Transition from Glaucon to Adeimantus.

Book Six talks about philosophy as if it had a recognized meaning just after Book Five ends by asking for and inventing a definition of it as if it were a term that needed defining. In Six there is a concept of an ἐπιτήδευμα τῆς φιλοσοφίας; there is the verb, φιλοσοφεῖν; and there may even be a hint of doxographical history (in the expression, γένεσις καὶ φθορά). This seems something of a leap to me, something that might for the first time justify the almost unanimous sense among commentators that the whole *Republic* is a patchwork of pieces written at different times, rather than the delicate and psychologically acute account of the brothers' gradual acquiescence to reason and rise into philosophical commitment and responsibility -- or failure at these things -- that it has been so far. This primary story line is indeed continued, with the intervention of Adeimantus (his third, in the wake of Glaucon being carried along by Socrates's argument, and indeed the first intervention where he explicitly objects to Socrates's method as if it were imperious).

It appears as if perhaps Adeimantus is finally going to be dealt with -- whatever this might mean. Since the speeches at the beginning of Book Two we have been able to detect a difference about him: he is pre-occupied with the opinions of others where Glaucon is impressionable; he is more worried about what others will say than moved by what Socrates has just said. And to the extent that it is not just Socrates but Socrates and his interlocutor that on any occasion reach the position, the problem may be not that he is afraid of trusting Socrates but of trusting himself and his own credulity. We may then become interested in observing how such preoccupations will affect the way he participates in live conversation. Will his concern for others' opinions distract him from thinking on his feet, and prevent him from following the logos wherever it leads, and ultimately from letting go his fear of being convinced?

His description of the position that Socrates's interlocutor finds himself in, that it is as if one were playing draughts with an expert and suddenly finds himself hemmed in (487B7-C3), reveals just this sort of fear. Moreover, what he introduces as his means of escape from being hemmed in by the dialectical process with Socrates is plain empirical experience (as if it were a matter of deeds over words and sight over thought), though in fact what he goes on to adduce as the controlling fact is nothing but the confused and unanimous belief of *hoi polloi*.

In all, then, the "non-academic" drama continues. Plato is still absent. The mind behind the talk is still Socrates's, and the agenda behind the conversation is still his avuncular work of encouraging maturity and hope and courage in the brothers. But since Book Five we have reached a height in the subject matter that will no longer wait around for validation or corroboration by public opinion.

The theme of Book Five had been finding the courage to withstand ridicule and take one's inner vision seriously. The challenge against Socrates at the beginning of the Book stemmed from a failure of nerve in the face of the radically inward definition of virtue reached at the end of Four. In Glaucon, his interlocutor during the subsequent Book, Socrates then aroused a desire to participate in the description of the ideal arrangement, and then made him carry his end of the conversation afterwards (472B3-473B3). In this access of erotic inspiration the great paradox of the philosophic king or the regal philosopher was introduced, and a distinction between philosopher and philodoxer began to

explore its plausibility. Book Six then began as a continuation of this exploration, with the "next" question (484B3), whether this philosophical type would in fact be best qualified to take the job of guard that had been envisioned in the polis they had constructed (this even though the theoretical purposes for developing that polis had already been exhausted, and any allegiance to its existence in perpetuity had become gratuitous). Glaucon is still the interlocutor. In a great wave of enthusiasm and sustained reasoning he and Socrates infer that the philosophical occupation is so admirable that its exponent is even beyond the reach of envy (Momus, 487A).

At this moment Adeimantus intervenes with a two-fold objection. On the one hand the method by which Socrates led Glaucon to reach this result is deceptive and unfair; on the other the result reached is patently false. And yet the method he criticizes is nothing but conversation (which as such he can only fault in the aftermath for not involving him, a deficiency that will shortly be remedied), and the falseness he sees as patent ends up resting only on the general opinion of *hoi polloi*, which turns out to be an inarticulate misperception that Adeimantus himself will soon abandon after all, when he is led to see that the uselessness of the philosopher consists in the fact that *hoi polloi* have no use for him and that the knavery of philosophical types is due the fact that the types in question abandon her, in fact, to curry public favor instead.

Throughout his rebuttal of Adeimantus's supposedly "patent" objections, Socrates continues the theme of patency in contrast to thought, surface appearance in contrast to the world within, external result in contrast to invisible cause. In fact his first argument is addressed to the *mind's eye*: it is an image (the sailors, ship, and captain: 488). His next step is to examine what for Adeimantus had been a throwaway point, the allegation that most "philosophers" are scoundrels (489Dff), and he finds the accusation to be based on an opinion entirely wrong even though widely held, wrong when we behold the eros and the activity of the true philosopher, which now Socrates for the first time describes in stunning terms (490A8-B7).

It is with this stunning paragraph that his response to Adeimantus takes on the new style that this Appendix is meant to characterize.<sup>5284</sup>

## 2. The New Style.

In the wake of the extended simile of ship, captain and crew, the new style is characterized by an unsettled tension between extravagant and ampliative metaphor on the one hand and prolepsis, hyperbaton and self-interruption on the other -- as if a deeper urge to praise the beloved in elevated terms on the one hand can easily surrender, on the other, to impulses the laudator feels along the way.

2A: Certain characteristics evince that the speaker's own desire to participate in the truth he has been called upon to describe, undermines his success and even trumps his concern to be clear.

### Hyperbaton:

ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής (490A9)

πολλοῖς and ἐκάστοις (B1)

τῆς φύσεως (B3)

### Self-Interruption:

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<sup>5284</sup> A fuller analysis of Adeimantus as answerer is presented in Appendix 8, *infra*.

προσήκει δὲ συγγένει (B4)

Courting obscurity:

By aposiopesis: ϕ (B3, B5)

Bold metaphor and unprepared extravagance:

μιγείς, γεννήσας (B5)

λήγοι ϕδῖνος (B7)

νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν (B5-6)

2B: In the sequel to this striking statement about the philosopher's pursuit of truth and reality, in which Adeimantus wholly concurs, down to the place when Socrates judges that he has said enough about where the slander against philosophy came from (490B8-497A8), the elements of this new style become only more ubiquitous and elaborate:

Prolepsis:

ἢν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν... (492A1)

ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ (494E3)

οἵς μάλιστα προσήκει (495B8)

ὅμως γὰρ δή ... φιλοσοφίας (495D4-6)

προαπολόμενος (496D4)

Hyperbaton:

οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν (491E6)

αὐξανομένην (492A3)

ἢ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσιν (493A8-9)

κατανενοηκέναι (subj. of omitted εἶναι) (493D1)

οὐ καταγέλαστον (493D8-9)

οἴ τε οἰκεῖοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται (494B9-10)

καὶ τοὺς ἴδιώτας (495B4)

ώς ἀληθινῆς ἔχόμενον (ms.D: 496A9)

εὐφυές (496B6)

κατασχεῖν (496B7)

ἄνθρωπος (496D2)

Nested word order (Prolepsis and Hyperbaton combined):

αὐτοί τε βίον οὐ προσήκοντα οὐδ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν δὲ ... ἄλλοι (495C1-3)

ἀτελεῖς μέν ... λελώβηνται (495D7-8)

διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ δεσπότου τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος

γαμεῖν (E7-8: δ. placed early to make θ. seem his revenge)  
τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν ὄμιλούντων φιλοσοφίᾳ (496A11-B1)  
nested circumstantial participles (496B1-3)  
τούτων ... οἱ γενόμενοι ... καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὐτῶν ... ἴδοντες τὴν μανίαν  
(genitive of subject, then of object: 496C5-7)  
οὔτε ίκανὸς ὃν εἰς πᾶσιν ἄγριος ὀντέχειν (496D3-4)  
nested circumstantial participles (496D5-9)

#### Self-interruption:

ἢ οἴει ... (491E3)  
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς (491E4)  
ἢ καὶ σύ ... (492A5)  
ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου (492A7-8)  
ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα (492D6)  
θεῖον .. ἐρεῖς (492E5-493A2)  
πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων (493D5)  
ὁλίγης καὶ ἄλλως γιγνομένης (495B2)

#### Courting Obscurity

##### By Paradox:

inverted use of ἀνάξιον (491A2 [cf.inverted ἄξιοι, 495C5])  
492A6-B1 (about the sophists)  
double-entendre on ἀνάγκη (492D2)  
κενοῦ / ἐμπιμπλάμενον (494D2)  
δουλεύσαντι (494D6)  
κενήν ... μεστήν (495C9-D1) immediately mixed with a  
simile (D1-2) followed by another metaphor  
(ἐκπηδῶσιν, D3)

Primary predication accorded to subordinate participle  
(ἐφιέμενοι, D7): cf. Riddell, Digest §303.  
the bronze and silver at 495E4-5

##### By Omitting Words:

sc. εἶναι with κατανενοηκέναι (493D1)  
sc. ἔστι with ποιεῖν (493D6)  
sc. ἔστι with ἀδύνατον (494A4)

sc. φιλοσοφία with οἵς μάλιστα προσήκει (495B8)

sc. εἰκός ἐστι with ἀκοῦσαι (496A7)

sc. τῆς φιλοσοφίας (proleptically from αὐτῇ) with ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως, meaning τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀναξίους (496A5)

#### Bold Metaphor and Simile:

σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα (492A3-4)

echoing rocks (492B9-C1)

κατακλυσθεῖσαν ... κατὰ ρόῦν (492C5-6)

extended simile of the beast (493A9-C6)

συγγενὲς λόγων (494D9, relying on 490B4)

κάμτηται καὶ ἔλκηται (494E1)

ρυέντες (495B5)

όρφανὴν συγγενῶν (495C2-3)

Collapsing metaphors: imprisonment, job, slavery (495D1-E8)

συγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι (495E1)

elaborated simile of the bald tinker (495E4-8)

εἰς θηρία ... ἐμπεσών (496D2)

οἶον ἐν χειμῶνι ... ἀποστάς (496D6-8)

#### Unprepared Extravagance:

ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἵους βούλονται εἶναι (492B1-2)

ὑψηλὸν ἔξαιρεῖν (494D1)

σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ ... ἐμπιμπλάμενον (494D1-2)

ἀνθρωπίσκοι (495C9)

τεχνίον (495D4)

μανίαν (496C7)

οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιές (496C7-8)

καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας (496D8-9)

τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον ... καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ (496E1)

#### Pleonastic Parallelism:

πανταχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας (491A4)

τοιαύτην φύσιν ... καὶ πάντα ἔχουσαν (491A8-9)

όλιγάκις ... καὶ ὄλιγας (491B1-2)

σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα (492A2-3)

διαφθειρομένους τινάς / διαφθείροντας δέ τινας (492A6-7)  
νέους / πρεσβυτέρους, ἄνδρας / γυναῖκας (492B2-3)  
γίγνεται / γέγονεν / μὴ γένηται (492E3)  
σωθῆ τε καὶ γένηται οὖν δεῖ (492E6-493A1)  
λέγων ... ἐρεῖς (493A1-2)  
anaphora of ὅπῃ with τε ... καί (493B1: cf.Denniston, 512)  
πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν (493C10-D1)  
ampliative variation (in the lists at 493D4 and 494C5-7)  
ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι (494A1-2)  
πλούσιός τε καὶ γενναῖος / εὐειδῆς καὶ μέγας (494C6-7)  
πᾶν μὲν ἔργον πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντάς (494E3-4)  
ὅλεθρός τε καὶ διαφθορά (495A10)  
τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη (495B1)  
τῆς βελτίστης φύσεως εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἐπιτήδευμα (495B1-2)  
καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακά ... καὶ οἱ τὰγαθά (495B3-5)  
σμικρά / μέγα (495B5-6)  
οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα (495B5-6)  
οὔτε ίδιωτὴν οὔτε πόλιν (495B6)  
οῦτοι .. οὔτως (495B8)  
όνειδίζειν τοὺς ὄνειδίζοντας (495C4)  
οἱ μὲν οὐδενός, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν (495C5)  
series of six participles (κτησαμένου ... μέλλοντος: 495E5-8)  
ἀναξίους / μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν (496A5-6)  
διανοήματά τε καὶ δόξας (496A6-7)  
οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς ἔχόμενον (496A8-9)  
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ... ή δὲ τοῦ σώματος (496C1-3)  
ἢ ... τινι ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδενί (496C4)

#### Studious Non-parallelism:

όργην καὶ ἡδονάς (singular / plural: 493D1)  
τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς τῶν λόγων (494D9-E1)  
οὐ προσήκοντα οὐδ' ἀληθῆ (495C1-2)  
ἢ που / ἢ / βραχὺ δέ που / εἴη δ' ἄν / τὸ δέ (496B1-C3)  
ώς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον (496C6)

ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων (singular/plural: 496D9-E1)  
μετὰ κολῆς ἐλπίδος ἵλεώς τε καὶ εὐμενής (496E2).

**Echoic Wordplay and Homoioteleuton:**

προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες (494C1-2)  
τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις (494C4)  
καὶ ιδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ ... καθιστάντας (494E6-7)  
ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου (495E5-6)  
γενόμενοι καὶ γενσάμενοι (496C5-6)

2C: Socrates concludes the section (496A11-7A8) by asserting that whereas the philosopher can only survive in normal cities by lying low, he will, conversely, flourish if chance should place him in an appropriate environment, leading Adeimantus to ask him which of the existing types of city would be appropriate (497A9-10). His response to Adeimantus (497B1-E7) continues in this higher style.

**Hyperbaton:**

κατάστασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως (double hyperbaton, 497B2)

**Self-interruption:**

δῆλος ... (497C3-4)

**Courting Obscurity:**

**By vague expression:**

δεήσοι τι ὁεὶ ἐνεῖναι ... λόγον ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας (497C8-D1)

**By metonymy:**

ὅν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε (497D4-5)

**Bold Metaphor:**

στρέφεσθαι καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (497B3)

ῷσπερ ζενικὸν σπέρμα (497B3-5)

**Unprepared Extravagance:**

θεῖον (497C2)

**Pleonastic Parallelism:**

τά τε τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων (497C2-3)

προθύμως καὶ παρακινδυνευτικῶς (497E5)

2D: He next offers a σύγκρισις or comparison of the way cities currently manage philosophy with the way they ought to (497E9-498C4). Some twenty-five of these stylistic features occur in the space of twenty lines:

### Prolepsis

καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων (498A4)

### Hyperbaton

οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι (498A2)

ἐθέλωσιν (498A5, with καί in A4)

πρέπουσαν (498C4)

### Nested Construction

πλησιάσαντες αὐτοῦ τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται (AbaB: 498A2)

### Self-Interruption

λέγω δέ ... λόγους (498A3)

ἐκτὸς δή τινων ὀλίγων (498A7)

### Courting Obscurity

By Vague Expression:

τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους (498A3)

By Omitting Words:

sc. τὸ ἐθελεῖν with μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται (498A5)

sc. μόνον with πάρεργον (498A6)

sc. χρόνῳ with ἐν ὦ (498B5)

### Bold Metaphor

ἀποσβέννυνται / ἐξάπτονται (498A7-B1)

τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια (498B7-8)

ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι (498C1)

### Unprepared Extravagance

τοῦ Ἡρακλείτείου ἥλιον (498B1)

τὴν ἐκεī μοῖραν (498C4, relying on 496E1)

### Pleonastic Parallelism

οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ (498A1)

βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦνται (498B5)

ἐν ὦ / ἐν ᾧ (498B5,7)

πολιτικῶν ... καὶ στρατειῶν (498B8-C1)

### Echoic Wordplay and Homoioteleuton

ἀπτόμενοι (*ad init.*, 497E9) / ἐξάπτονται (*sub fin.*, 498B1)

μειράκια ... καὶ παιδαῖς / μειρακιώδῃ παιδείαν (498B3-4)

ἐκτὸς δή τινων / ἐκτὸς γίγνηται (false contrast: 498A7, C1)  
πάρεργον / μὴ πάρεργον (pseudo-contrast: 498A6, C2)  
τῷ βίῳ τῷ βεβιωμένῳ (498C3-4)

Adeimantus acknowledges Socrates's spirited enthusiasm (ώς ἀληθῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν γε προθύμως) -- but only to warn him that his audience might be even more eager to disagree with what he says, starting with Thrasymachus (498C5-8).

END OF APPENDIX THREE

## Appendix 4: ἴσα / ἀνισα (509D6)

A is the lower sub-cut of the lower cut

B is the upper sub-cut of the lower cut

C is the lower sub-cut of the upper cut

D is the upper sub-cut of the upper cut

Proof that B=C whether we read ὁν' ἴσα or ἀνισα:

According to 509D68,  $A/B = C/D = (A+B)/(C+D)$ , if we read ὁν' ἴσα,

$A+B=C+D$  and  $A=B$  and  $C=D$ .

Thus:

$A+B = 2B$  and  $C+D = 2C$  by substitution of equals, and

$2B = 2C$  by substitution of equals, and

$B=C$ , QED.

But if we read ἀνισα, given  $A/B = C/D = (A+B)/(C+D)$ , then

(1)  $A/B = C/D$  implies by cross-multiplication that  $AD = BC$  and

(2)  $A/B = A+B/C+D$  implies by cross-multiplication that  $AC+AD = AB+B^2$  and

(3)  $C/D = A+B/C+D$  implies by cross-multiplication that  $C^2+CD = AD+BD$ .

Thus,

$AC+BC=AB+B^2$ , by substituting (1) into (2); and

$C(A+B) = B(A+B)$  by factoring, and

$C=B$  by common division.

Therefore  $B=C$ , QED.

Similarly,

$C^2+CD = BC+BD$ , by substituting (1) into (3); thus

$C(C+D) = B(C+D)$  by factoring, and

$C=B$

Therefore  $B=C$ , QED.

END OF APPENDIX FOUR

## Appendix 5: 511C3-D5 as a *dialogical* response to what has come before.

Glaucon feels at first unsure, but as he tries to show what he *has* understood he produces a very adequate summary indeed, which even advances beyond Socrates's articulation of the position, as a close analysis of his words will show:

### I) 511C4-6

Here is his opening remark: σαφέστερον είναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τού ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλούμενων (511C4-6). τὸ σαφές was the index for cutting the lower half of the line (509D9) but it has not been used since except for the passing but important use of its synonym ἐναργέσι at 511A7, the relevance of which Glaucon here shows he caught, that if the shadows below are so obviously less perspicuous in meaning, the specialists should not be willing to rely on shadows or images in their pursuit of the noetic originals (the perfect participles [511A8] are concessive).

His restatement of the comparison mentions the superior method first. For the first time the goal of the simile is mentioned first and described on its own terms rather than in terms of what is beneath it. Up until now Socrates has presented the foil first -- from the periphrastic description of the originals as 'that of which there had been images or imitations,' to the description of the technical before the philosophical kind of thinking, to the description of the visual images used by the specialties as imagized versions of what had been imagized below.

In short, Glaucon has gotten the final point as well as the first one. He now refers to the upper part of the line as τὸ ὄν τε καὶ νοητόν (C5-6), which combines the first designation of it (as νοητόν, 509D4; and νοούμενον, D8) with the second (from 510A9 [ἀλήθεια], which itself referred to the argument at the end of Book Five: he replaces the term ἀλήθεια with ὄν). His term θεωρούμενον is new. It is inspired by the fact that the term he would otherwise use, ζητεῖν, has in the course of the argument taken on the sense of seeking without finding (510B5, E3, and 511A4). Likewise, he had already (511B2) characterized geometrics and calculations and the rest, which Socrates had generalized with the term μέθοδος (510C5), as τέχναι, because of the instrumentalism with which their method is described (χρᾶσθαι, 510B4; the behavior described at C3-6; προσχρῶνται κτλ, D5-511A1; χρᾶσθαι, 511A4), but by now he tires of any hint of approbation the term may carry and adds καλούμεναι (C6).

### 2) 511C6-D5

Socrates's description of these μέθοδοι and his analysis of the alloy of thought and observation that they involve, came in two parts which occupied about fourteen lines (510C3-D3 and D5-511A1). Glaucon now restates them in just over six (C6-D5).

The first part he covers with the three-word statement that their hypotheses are allowed to take the position of ἀρχαί (C6-7: cf. 510C3-D1). The second part (510D5-511A1) he re-does much more extensively (C7-D2). Of them he says, 'Although forced to operate with thinking because sensation cannot "see" the things they are looking for, their grasp is limited because they do not move

source-ward but from arbitrary starting points; and the result, in your judgment, Socrates, is that they never grasp with the mind what they always would have and could have grasped, if connected with that source.' At the point it comes to their noetic competency, he distinguishes what has been Socrates's description from his evaluation of them, and continues in this vein by remarking (D2-5) how Socrates is using a special term for this hobbled kind of thinking (similar exigencies had led Glaucon himself to introduce the terms θεωρεῖσθαι and θεᾶσθαι, and had made him question his own use of the term τέχναι): 'You have called "διάνοια" this peculiar situation the geometers and their ilk find themselves in (he avoids now the term τέχναι) rather than intelligence, as if διάνοια were something halfway between opinion and intelligence.'

His remarks add structure to what Socrates had been able to say in the give-and-take of conversation, and also include a re-application of the language of betweenness they had used together at the end of Book Five. His re-use of this result fits exactly with the proportion of the Line itself since the second and third parts of the four (which are really two sides of one coin) lie between the first part (shadows, the paradigm of change and opinion) and the fourth (the forms, the paradigm of knowledge and reality).

#### END OF APPENDIX FIVE

## Appendix 6: Dialectic in the Search for Dialectic in Book Seven

The dialogue with Glaucon employs the techniques and discovers the guidelines and rules for dialectical procedure. Socrates is leading, and the drama consists in watching how closely and how far Glaucon can follow. The goal of the method, dialectical competence, is at the same time, in Plato's dramaturgy, the means for achieving success – as the following sets of observations show.

1. τὸ δὲ ἐννοῶ λέγων ἄμα (521D4): the fortuitous beginning point that might yield a result.
2. Review of known μαθήματα which evinces criteria at the same time that it excludes the likely candidates (521D13-522B1).
3. Glaucon gets the lesson from Socrates and repeats it (ἀντίστροφος) on his own (he refutes μουσική as a candidate [522A3-B1] after Socrates had refuted γυμναστική [521E3-5]). He relies on Socrates's remark at 518D9-19A1, reminded of οὐδέποτε ἀπόλληνσιν (518E4) by γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον at 521C3.
4. The exhaustion of givens leads to a new question, the language of which moves upward (κεχωρισμένον, 522B7; ἐπὶ πάντων τεινόντων Β9; τὸ κοινόν, C1).
5. At 523A5-10 Socrates invokes the dialectical method of joint scrutiny as a way to acquire a clearer sense whether a δόξα (523A5: cf. παρ' ἐμαντῷ, μαντεύομαι) is true. ίκανῶς itself (523B1) is accepted as the criterion.
6. The qualified answer (B5-6) reveals that Glaucon actually does not (οὐ πάνυ) understand what Socrates meant and affords Socrates an opportunity to fend off future misunderstanding by refining his meaning (523B9-C4)
7. ἐπέρεσθαι (523D4) reveals that the way the soul initiates an ἐπίσκεψις (B1, B3) is itself to initiate a dialogue.
8. The language of shared thinking is both loose and tight. It is scrupulous about new points but can afford to be casual on the whole, relying on shared motives and shared understanding which can be checked any time either party wants to. Once a point is grasped, the language can vary, substituting new words for old -- and it does. The thought can move to the next point without apology or demarcation. At some points Socrates/Plato even shows a penchant for intentionally courting ambiguity as if to require the reader to keep up with what the interlocutors are already doing, and not to rely on words that were said before (e.g. the use of διάνοια at 511A1) All this is quite different from the language and courtesies we expect and find in an author who is writing for an absent audience consisting of persons he does not know, so as to help them understand and agree with what he wants to say to them for some reason. Plato gave us an extended opportunity to watch, as eavesdroppers, what is loose and what is tight in dialogue, during the long elenchus of Polemarchus in Book One. In the first closely argued passage in the paideia we have typical instances of less than systematic and perfectly dialogical expression. Cf., for examples, nn. 3304, 3305, 3307, 3308, 3310, 3313.

## Appendix 7: Method and Style in the Decline of the Polis, and their Aims

### 1. BACKGROUND: METHODS SO FAR

#### 2. METHOD IN BOOK EIGHT

- 2A.The List of Regimes
- 2B. Succession of Regimes
- 2C. Regimes are Projections of Personality Types
- 2D.The Personality Types
- 2E.Alteration Stems from the Ruling Part
- 2F.Order of Treatment: Evolution and Outcome

#### 3. STYLE IN BOOK EIGHT

- 3A.1:Timocracy, the Regime (547B2-548C7)
- 3A.2:The Timocratic Man (548D6-550B7)
- 3B.1: Oligarchy, the Regime (550C8-552E10)
- 3B.2:The Oligarchical Man (553A6-555B1)
- 3C.1: Democracy, the Regime (555B3-558C7)
- 3C.2:The Democratic Man (558C8-562A2)
- 3D.1:Tyranny, the Regime (562C4-569C8)
- 3D.2:The Tyrannical Man (Book Nine, 571A1-575A7)
- 3E: A Note on the Evaluation of Plato's Style in Antiquity

#### 4.WISDOM IN HINDSIGHT

- 4A: Decline as Disorder among the Constituents of State and Soul
- 4B. Political Decline as a Vehicle for Developing a Pathology of the Soul
- 4C.The Decline as a Study in the Relation of Fathers and Sons

#### 5.THE WORK REMAINING

### I. BACKGROUND: METHODS SO FAR

Our long conversation has come to consist of several sustained investigative projects. The overarching project, formulated a few pages into Book Two, was to compare the life of the just man with the life of the unjust man, in order to test the scandalous assertion of Thrasymachus that the unjust life is good not bad, and happy not unhappy, a thesis given touching and problematic credibility by the confessions of Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of Book Two.

The task was to come up with a picture of the just life and investigate its happiness and compare

it to the unjust life and its happiness, and immediately Socrates proposed as a method that they look for a just city, on the grounds that the justice of a city would be easier to see than the justice of a single man for persons whose eyesight is less than perfect, since it would be spelled out in larger letters. The construction of such a city occupied only three pages (369-372), but the conversation derailed when Glaucon found the simplicity of their lives tedious. Adding what he wanted made the thing spin out of control and quickly (in two pages) called for the institution of guards, to protect it from trouble within and trouble from without. The paradox whether such guards could be found (*quis custodiet custodos?*) was tentatively solved by the image of the dog, who combines the contradictory qualities of fierceness and loyalty; given men of such an inborn nature, the question becomes their nurture: how to educate them.

Beyond this point, the units of investigation became larger. Formulating the education in music and gymnastics, including digressions, occupied approx. thirty three pages (376E-412B); the search for justice in the state and the soul, in Book Four, occupied about eighteen (427D-445A); Socrates's response to the Polemarchus's challenge of paradox, in Book Five, took about twenty two pages (449B-471B), which were extended at the last minute by about ten pages due to his own inclusion of the extra paradox of the philosopher king (473-487).<sup>5285</sup> Socrates's offer to attempt to describe the guards' final knowledge, now that they were to be philosophers, occupied about thirty five pages (504B-541) and spread itself out into four subparts (Sun, Line, Cave, Curriculum). At the beginning of Book Eight he and Glaucon revert to the project the two of them agreed to pursue, at the end of Book Four, just after the image of the just man and the just state had been reached -- namely, to develop conceptions of regimes (*πολιτεῖαι*) lesser than this best one down to the worst, as a means to find their corresponding men, so that the original purpose, to compare the happiness of the best man's life with worst man's, could be achieved.

These larger units of discourse are presented dramatically, as investigations shared by Socrates and his two interlocutors, now with the one and then with the other. The tradition of commentary has turned them into something more like treatises written by Plato for the edification of his readers, as well as for their criticism, largely because such commentary has become a conversation among commentators. Conversation always objectifies its subject in order to ensure that it has something to talk about, but the talking is the live part.<sup>5286</sup> This truism makes paradoxical the fact that the platonic dialogue genre succeeds in creating an illusion of life, so that the dialogues always resist being reduced to objects that might provide subject matter for other conversations and any reducing for such purposes always, and always palpably, leaves something behind that is vital to the meaning. It is safer and more conservative, therefore, to see the dialogues as nothing but verisimilar conversations on which we have been allowed to eavesdrop.

I re-warm this old interpretative chestnut only because what gives these subsections of the *Republic* their structure, these investigative projects adopted by Socrates and his interlocutors, is first and finally the questions the two of them feel pressed to ask each other, their shared sense of what would constitute an adequate treatment, their willingness to digress, and their willingness to change horses midstream. We have seen that when the commentators find themselves explaining Socrates's long responses to Polemarchus's challenge in Book Five by imagining that Plato is taking an

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<sup>5285</sup> The numbers do not add up exactly because the Stephanus edition left blank but numbered pages between the Books.

<sup>5286</sup> Homer was poor. His scholars live at ease, / Making as many Homers as you please. And every Homer furnishes a book. / Though guests be parasitic on the cook / The moral is: It is the guest that dines. / I'll write a book to prove I wrote these lines. -- J.V.Cunningham.

opportunity to vent his feelings about contemporary politics, they have really missed the boat. In fact what happens is that Socrates starts by responding to the anti-philosophical demagoguery of Polemarchus but finishes by requiring Glaucon (and us) to take philosophy more seriously than ever, by posing the ultimate "paradox." Also, when commentators imagine that the discussion of the specialisms in Book Seven is Plato's announcement of a curriculum for his "Academy," they do so at the expense of neglecting or simply missing the drama and humor of Glaucon's struggle and ultimate failure to keep up with Socrates.

Looking for the answer to a question or set of questions is not the same as treating a subject matter. We have become so completely inured to identifying question-and-answer with the treatise (Aristotle paved the way with his pseudo-dialectical technique of exposition), along with the authoritative-author scenario it assumes (here again Aristotle is a founder), that we are too ready to view a live conversation made up by the author Plato, as being a treatise by Plato himself, whoever that is. For instance -- and indeed it is the first instance in the *Republic* -- in order to answer what sort of education would foster and balance the essentially unstable inborn element of fierce loyalty, Socrates begins by asking Adeimantus whether *paideia* includes music and gymnastic, and whether music includes tales and tales include true and false ones. These questions provide a structure for the ensuing investigation, charting how it can move from part to part. We saw moreover that background lists (god--hero--man and the list of the four virtues) could effortlessly and implicitly guide the questioning just as a division of a treatment into chapters according to the divisions within the subject will come to do in the more formal treatises of later authors, starting (again) with Aristotle. But it is important to recognize that Plato had no literary precedents for such a treatment, and that besides, his own decision was to burden himself and at the same time lavish upon himself the hypotheses of fiction and verisimilitude rather than to adopt the *ex cathedra* method of specialists with their hypotheses such as Socrates criticizes at the end of Book Six and again in Book Seven (533CD). This, Plato leaves to Aristotle.

The upshot of all this is to remark that at every moment within the structures we have encountered in the several investigative projects that make up the *Republic* so far (excluding Book One and the two responses to Adeimantus's objections [4.419-427 and 6.487-504]), we have always had a clear sense of where we are and where we are going, in the sense that we could step back from the immediate flow of the conversation and see what we treated before and what we are supposed to treat next, both within the sub-investigation and within the whole investigation. Indeed the structure has allowed the conversation to be interrupted by the characters' interventions, objections, catcalls, and dubitations, without destroying the investigation or erasing the incremental results and progress it has made, which have been preserved and can be carried forward. On the one hand, going into unnecessary detail has been postponed to avoid tedium (Damon and  $\chiωρεία$  in Book Three; the other "motions" in Book Seven); on the other hand, the interest of a new topic has never been sacrificed merely for the sake of systematic balance or completeness, nor has an objecting voice been silenced for the sake of continuing to develop some doctrine without interruption. Larger undertakings, such as formulating a new  $\pi\alpha\iota\deltaεί\alpha$  in Books Two and Three or the review of existing fields of study in Book Seven, have relied on traditional divisions such as the distinction of the four virtues, or on new distinctions such as the distinction between  $\lambda\όγος$  and  $\lambda\έ\xi\varsigma$  in poetry and the list of subjects forming the quadrivium; but while such divisions or formulae have provided a starting point they have not been allowed to limit the treatment (witness the discovery that both music and gymnastics are for the sake of the soul [Book Three], and the stunning insistence that we have no business doing astronomy until

the essentially non-existent study of stereometry has been worked out![Book Seven]). Socrates's attempt to describe the Offspring of the Good, like his presentation of the *conditio humana* vis à vis knowledge and truth in the Cave Allegory (514A2), relies on analogy; but even here the analogies are allowed to be imperfect in order to accommodate the shift in the landscape achieved during the very investigation for which analogy provided an expository structure.<sup>5287</sup> Polemarchus's attempt to bring down the high-flying inspiration reached by Socrates and Glaucon at the end of Book Four (ἀπὸ σκοπιῶς, 445C4) with his trumped-up scandal about the community of wives, is "over-trumped" by Socrates's praise throughout Book Five of reason and of its dictates regardless of ridicule, culminating in the most paradoxical assertion a Greek could make, that λόγος is realer than ἔργον (473A1-4) and the kindred paradox that kings must become philosophers, or that philosophers, such as Socrates and Glaucon have been deciding they really are during Book Five, will inherit the responsibility of becoming the rulers and setting things right, if ever they will be set right at all.

## 2. METHOD IN BOOK EIGHT

With all this in the background we move, in Book Eight, into a new investigatory project, a project which Socrates and Glaucon had agreed to attempt at the end of Book Four: to develop conceptions of regimes (*πολιτεῖαι*) that deviate from this best one, so as to find their corresponding men, and then to solve the original problem, by comparing the happiness of the just man's life (corresponding to the best regime) with that of the unjust man (corresponding to the worst) to decide which life is happier.

Given all we have seen, we should by now anticipate that the investigation will unpredictably combine the methodical and the imaginative. Being quite long (544-576: 31 pages not counting Stephanus's gap between Bk. 8 and 9) it needs a structure so that as before we will know "where we are" all along, and be able to continue to the next point, but from all we have seen we should anticipate<sup>5288</sup> that the structure adopted will be allowed to yield to interruption and modification as the investigation proceeds. We may illustrate how this tension between form and content will play out, under a few separate headings.

### 2A. The List of Regimes

First of all the very list of *πολιτεῖαι*, like the list of studies in Book Six, is half systematic and half arbitrary.<sup>5289</sup> It includes a constitution that does not even have a generic name (the Spartan or

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<sup>5287</sup> Cf. M.Dixsaut's sensitive and wonderful presentation of the problem in "L'Analogie intenable" and N.Bloessner's judicious and balanced account of the analogy of City and Soul.

<sup>5288</sup> Rather than criticizing deficiencies of one or another aspect of it as for instance Jowett's long note arguing that the sequence of the regimes is not historical (*ad* 545B, p.363-4; also *ad* 546D p.373; *ad* 550C pp.378-9; *ad* 559D p.392), and then praising other passages for succeeding to be historical (e.g., Jowett *ad* 548C, 548E), or citing historical parallels just for the fun of it, without following up why Socrates did not raise them or why Plato would make him or not make him do so (e.g. Jowett *ad* 551B, 551D). Adam's treatment is much more judicious (cf. 2.199, his note on ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη, 544C5-6), going so far as to argue that "historical narrative" is merely a form Plato has adopted as a vehicle for a psychological analysis of the decline.

<sup>5289</sup> Setting the number at four is not at all a matter of convention. Cf. Shorey 2.236. note d.

Laconian). Socrates rules out others as mere halfway houses (544CD), without giving a definition of a whole house, if you will; but just as soon as he does he uses exactly the notion that timocracy is a halfway house between aristocracy and oligarchy as a means to isolate its essential attributes (having something of the former regime, something of its own, and something of the latter regime, oligarchy, a something that Socrates has no trouble supplying even though oligarchy has not yet been treated: 547D-8C, esp.548A5-B2).

## 2B. Succession of Regimes

Although Socrates justifies the method of finding the regime first, on the grounds that this will make it easier (ἐναργέστερον, 545B4) for us to see the corresponding character written small in the individual man<sup>5290</sup> he applies the method with discretionary laxity (548C10-D4); and though even there he had without justification slipped in the idea that the way to find the regime is to trace its evolution (γιγνομένην, 369A5), he gives no justification for his further decision to assume that the present regimes evolve, not from nothing nor from myriad historical circumstances, which is more likely the truth, but from one another. To the contrary, he acts as if it were so much in the nature of things for regimes to succeed each other and to do so in the very order he has adopted that we will be able, once the evolution stops at a given state of affairs, to discover what the nature of this resultant regime is by simply stepping back and looking at it. In one instance, however, Adeimantus feels free to request, and Socrates is perfectly ready to supply, the institutional *definiens* or criterion (*κατάστασις, ὅρος*) by which he designates a regime an oligarchy -- namely the institution of a property requirement for participating in government -- before the regime has been seen to evolve from its forbear (550C10-D2).

## 2C. Regimes are Projections of Personality Types

Though he acts as though the one regime comes from another and that the evolution determines the character of the regime as its result, he also argues as axiomatic<sup>5291</sup> that the political forms borrow their essence from the preponderance of one among a spectrum of personality types or ethical make-ups embodied in its citizens on the grounds that political forms could not indeed come from anywhere else (544D6-E2). We might begin to wonder how the order of evolution could operate according to one set of dynamics whereas the stopping places could be predetermined by another set of rules, as if they were electrons jumping from one orbit to the next, but as soon as we tarry with this question the conversation has moved on without us and we have to assume our worry is moot.

## 2D. The Personality Types

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<sup>5290</sup> He cites their previous agreement to this effect (B3), itself a very weak argument (cf. 368D-8A and my nn. *ad loc.*), though in fact it is a significant variation of that method. The larger city was to make justice more easy to see, not the man who corresponded to it in temperament or character. There is no talk here of the difficulty of seeing character in man: to the contrary the axiom is enunciated that the character of the larger is *derived* from the character of the smaller.

<sup>5291</sup> The function of the proverb about oak and stone (544D7-8) is to dismiss all cavil. Cf. 435E1-36A3, where he uses the same axiom to divide the soul and dismisses disagreement as ridiculous (γέλοιον, E3).

When it comes to the individuals that are meant to correspond to the types of regimes we meet similar questions. Are these truly the only "stable states" of personality? Are they actually stable after all? The conundrum of a discontinuous continuity comes to be solved by the poetic and fictional invention of treating the evolution or "generation" of one type of man out of the other as an event that takes place between the generations of father and son. Very credibly and moreover very touchingly we see how the son's personality is formed by the collision of the father's personality with the society and political world around him and by the son's reaction to this collision. And yet in case we think to ask, we will notice that the political world within which these several sets of fathers and sons operate is never described: most notably it is not identified as one or another of the regimes that are evolving out of each other.<sup>5292</sup> If anything it is contemporary Athens, taken for granted for better or worse, with its lawsuits and its assembly, its private citizens making civic donations,<sup>5293</sup> and its relative freedom for civic involvement and private enterprise -- but to think of this Athens as a democracy the way democracy comes to be described within the evolution, too greatly slants the case since it either requires that Athens be a democracy as defined by the theory, or that the definition of democracy be appropriate to the historical instance of Athens.

## 2E. Alteration Stems from the Ruling Part

There is moreover the claim, stated as an axiom at the beginning, that a state alters only when there is an alteration within its ruling element (545C), and that as long as the ruling element is solid and unanimous the state cannot be budged.<sup>5294</sup> In the event, it turns out this rule is only analytically true, and therefore circular, since it can only be true only as long as the regime truly *has* rulers, whereas (1) the rulers of oligarchy fail to rule because wealth has come to rule them, and the regime

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<sup>5292</sup> It is a common error among the commentators to presume that the aristocratic man, for instance, lives and rules in the aristocratic state (despite οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένη and φρέγοντος ... τὰς ἀρχάς, 549C3-4), which forces them to wonder why Socrates has their wives act the way normal wives do (cf. for instance Adam's notes *ad* 549C); and likewise common to overlook that the reason the "timocratic" father holds an office paradigmatically military (553B2-3) is that it his own private life of honor his son is meant to see him fall from.

<sup>5293</sup> λειτουργία. Cf. 554E7-555A3, of the oligarchical man.

<sup>5294</sup> The assertion may call to mind the statement at the end of Book Four that constitutions as well as men degenerate because a *stasis* among the constituent elements disturbs their proper configuration and a lower element arrogates to itself the work of a higher one (444B1-8). But the treatment in Book Eight narrates an evolution, or devolution, in which one thing follows another according to an *internal* logic of events, and forgoes to describe the several temporary states of affairs as reconfigurations of the constituent elements, with two exceptions that only prove the rule. The first exception is in the transition of the polis from aristocracy to timocracy (547B2-8) when we are told that the λογιστικόν fights with the ἐπιθυμητικόν; although the compromise they reach (εἰς μέσον, B8) is tantamount to placing the θυμοειδές in charge (the element "in the middle" between the λογιστικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν in both state and soul) the point is made only to be forgotten (548C5-7). The second exception comes in the personal transition from timocratic youth to oligarchic adult (553C1-D7) where the ἐπιθυμητικόν is explicitly said to take charge and to press the λογιστικόν and the θυμοειδές into its own service but nothing more is made of it. In the other fourteen parts of the treatment the description is concrete and the three elements are not mentioned as such. Of course the human and political behavior described are amenable to an analysis that employs the tripartition, but to do so is left to the reader.

is subsequently changed not by internal dissension but by a coup; (2) the rulers of democracy, i.e., the demos (565A3), unanimously assign their rule to a προστάτης rather than exercising it, and the transition to tyranny takes place because they grant him a bodyguard; and (3) all that rules in the tyrannical state, as well as in the tyrannical man, is the passions of the tyrant which by their nature can never achieve unanimity, though a master passion might arise in their midst.<sup>5295</sup> As things turn out we can only say that the axiom was enough to get things going (leading to the invocation of the Muses), but that once the process achieved its own momentum it was conveniently forgotten.<sup>5296</sup>

## 2F. Order of Treatment: Evolution and Outcome

The logic in the order of treatment -- first the evolution and then the new "state of affairs" that is its result (whether regime or personality type) -- would seem necessary to the very conception of the investigation but it is violated almost as soon as it has been established, when Adeimantus interrupts at the beginning of the search for the individual type corresponding to timocracy by making a wisecrack about his brother (548D), and Socrates acquiesces in describing the timocratic man (548E4-9C1) before he has told us how he got that way (549C2ff).

There is finally the problem that the very premise of the method fails to survive the regimes it sets out to describe: the distinction between evolution and stable state becomes a distinction without a difference in the final case of tyranny. The evolution consists of the tyrant's rise to power out of the rabble of drones, but no stable state *can* ensue since having reached the top he must consume the state's assets and destroy it in order to stay in power. The narrative concludes because nothing is left to talk about.

As a method the program is a shambles,<sup>5297</sup> but it does help us keep track what the next step is,

<sup>5295</sup> Shorey is misled by an expectation of consistency on this point (2.lii) to worry that whereas the individual corresponding to democracy is a member of the deme, the individual corresponding to tyranny is not the tyrant but the tyrannized.

<sup>5296</sup> Though the idea has conventional support (cf. Shorey 2.244, note a) the narrative does not need it to be true.

<sup>5297</sup> And as such provides still another occasion for commentators to criticize this Book, just as the hyper-idealism of the curriculum allowed them to criticize Book Seven, and the paradoxes allowed them to find Plato venting about Greek politics in Book Five, and the partition of the soul in Book Four might have failed in logic, and the criticism of the poets in Book Two and Three make Plato a bowdlerizer. The *Republic* would not have survived in our literary canon if these criticisms were true; and conversely the fact that it has survived suggests they are false, or irrelevant.

Aristotle's criticism that the account of Socrates οὐ καλῶς λέγεται (*Pol.*5.12, 1316A2-3,ff) on the grounds that the sequence of πόλεις is not an historical account, if indeed it is sincere, is simply an *ignoratio elenchi*. How seriously can anybody imagine that Socrates is interested in the history of political regimes, or that Plato would depict him as being so, or that such a history would serve Plato's purpose here? And even if one could imagine this might be the case, how could he continue to think it was the case, once he had read the account? Because he holds Socrates and Plato to this paltry standard, Aristotle is forced to ignore the central message of the narrative as a whole, that with the arrival of the tyrant who will kill his father and eat his children, the entire race will be wiped out: instead he blithely remarks that Socrates fails to tell what tyranny turns into (1316A25-29)!

The value, purpose and worth of the account all become evident at the end. They have nothing

at least until we reach the utter chaos of the end. The program enables us to proceed, but we will only know the meaning and purpose behind the writing when we have absorbed it.

### 3. STYLE IN BOOK EIGHT

The large narrative project, a four-part treatment of each of four regimes with the last and final section spilling over into Book Nine, calls into play a massive deviation from the style we have become used to.<sup>5298</sup> Socrates's speech is now characterized by a preference for nouns and adjectives over verbs and for participles and infinitives over indicatives, for parataxis instead of hypotaxis, and for the use of "auxiliary" or "place-holder" verbs<sup>5299</sup> in periphrasis with supplementary or circumstantial participles. Apart from a few interruptions for the sake of methodology or for presenting a definition or an axiom, the content of the Book is, after all, *imaginative description*, whether of an evolution (γένεσις, μετάβασις, μεταβολή) from one "stable state" to another in regime or in man, or of the stable states that constitute the resultant regimes and correlated personality types or lifestyles (ποίος, οἰκήσεις, ζῆν). The style has made brief appearances before, as for instance in the bucolic description of home-life in the "trace of a city" (πολίχνιον, 372A6-C10), where I called the style ecphrastic;<sup>5300</sup> but in Book Eight the deployment of this style becomes the rule rather than the exception.<sup>5301</sup>

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to do with an historical development, but just the range of depravation that a single individual is capable of undergoing, even in one lifetime, as Nettleship (p.295) saw a long time ago, even though this is nowhere the stated program of Socrates or of Plato. Adam in his opening note (543Aff, 2.195-6) agrees to take exception to Plato's stated program and accepts Nettleship's position, saying, truly, that the treatment gives a psychological account of the state; but then he also goes beyond the explicit program as well as Plato's true intentions when he says that Plato has here attempted the first Philosophy of History, which would be not only unmeaning to Plato but, more importantly, irrelevant to his (i.e., Socrates's) purpose here.

<sup>5298</sup> Socrates also shifts his manner of speaking when Adeimantus interrupts in Book Six. Cf. Appendix 3.

<sup>5299</sup> E.g. εἶναι, διάγειν, ζῆν.

<sup>5300</sup> In the Commentary, *ad loc.* For other instances cf. 359D2-60B2, 363C4-D2, 390B6-C6, 395D-6B, 396D, 399A5-C4, 406AB and 406DE, 411D, 416B, 420E, 439E, 441E9-442A2, 443DE, 504A4-C2, 540D1-541A7.

<sup>5301</sup> Cf. 548A5-C2, 548E4-549A7, 549C6-E1, 550A1-B7, 551D9-E4, 551E5-552A1, 553B1-C7, 553D1-7, 554A5-B1, 554B7-C2, 554E7-555A6, 555D7-E1, 555E3-556A2, 556B6-C2, 560D8-561A1, 561C6-D7, 562C8-D9, 565E3-556A4, 566A6-10, 569B6-C4, 571D6, 572B1, 572B10-C4, 572C6-D3, 572D8-E4, 573A4-B4, 573B12-C5. The commentators barely remark upon it: at 559D which describes the devolution of the oligarchic man into the democratic, Jowett speaks, at last and in passing, of "the rhetorical and grandiloquent character of this part of the *Republic*," though he had not noted the style in his comments on the previous 16 pages of Book Eight (except to note a "load" of participles at 555A; thereupon he compliments the paragraph at 560A); and Adam says that this passage "is one of the most royal and magnificent pieces of writing in the whole range of literature, whether ancient or modern," citing Longinus's praise at 12.2 *ipsissimis verbis* and 33-36 (he did cite Longinus earlier, at 549D5 to beg us to excuse Plato for anacoluthon [αἰσθάνηται] for the "fire" he achieves in the expression that would be unavailable to mere correctness), and Dionysius of Halicarnassus's criticism

Descriptions of the stable states are naturally amenable to such a style since they are in essence nothing but a bundle or congeries of simultaneous attributes adding up to patterns of behavior. The descriptions of the evolutions, as we might expect, pick out fateful transitional events (marked with τότε δή, vel sim. and expressed with the indicative), but even here the background of events and developments that lead to these fateful moments tends to be expressed in this descriptive or "ecphrastic" style, with a juxtaposition of ideas massed together by coordinate participles or infinitives, rather than being expressed in a temporal or causally consecutive series done with finite verbs and the usual alternation of ordinary and subordinate clauses.

We will now go through the text closely in order to accumulate a sense of this style, and of its manner and its powers.

### 3A.1:Timocracy, the Regime (547B2-548C7)

Once the Muses have started things off (546A1-7A5), the evolution into timocracy is presented with the normal vigorous style that lever subordinating verbs off of ordinary verbs (547B2-C4). But the description of the resultant state of affairs (timocracy) is then presented in three sections to retail the ways it resembles the old regime, the ways it is unique, and the ways it resembles the next regime (547D4-548B2). The first two sections are made parallel by the use of articular infinitives describing the characteristic behaviors in the dative of respect (τῷ μέν, D4, introducing four infinitives; τῷ δέ γε, E1, introducing four infinitives this time modified by intervening circumstantial participial phrases). But the third section breaks that pattern by directly describing the persons with an adjective (ἐπιθυμῆται, in the nominative after those subject accusatives and followed by the indicative future ἔσονται, 548A4-5). Their desirousness is then elaborated by a circumstantial description supported by participles (τιμῶντες, κεκτημένοι, ἀναλίσκοντες) until the final verb (δαπανῶντο, B2) arrives to close the sequence. Glaucon interrupts to agree (ἀληθέστατα, B3) but then Socrates continues the description with another nominative adjective (φειδωλοί) and their desirous stinginess is then elaborated by a description (relying on ἔσονται implicitly carried forward) consisting of five circumstantial participles in five lines (τιμῶντες, κτώμενοι, καρπούμενοι, ἀποδιδράσκοντες, πεπαιδευμένοι) and then closed with a pair of extended noun phrases in a prepositional phrase in διά whose objects are parallel articular infinitives in the perfect (ἡμεληκέναι / τετιμηκέναι, B8-C2).

The first of these elaborations broached the ecphrastic style and the second presents it in all its glory; and with its arrival the description of the timocratic type is brought to its completion. The simultaneity of the amassed attributes, headed by cupidity and stinginess, elicit from Glaucon the remark that the regime is deeply divided against itself (548C3-4).

### 3A.2:The Timocratic Man (548D6-550B7)

The timocratic man is next, and Adeimantus's wisecrack interruption (548D8-9) adventitiously leads Socrates into describing the personality (548E4-9A7) before telling the story of its evolution (549C2-550B7). It is natural that the settled personality should be described with a set of predicate adjectives or nouns. There are ten, set in a self-correcting array, plus three circumstantial participial

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(Pomp.2 [= Dem.5-8]), for what may be the same sort of floridity of style (*n.b.* neither of these ancient critics illustrates his comments with particular citations from Book Eight nor anywhere else in the Platonic corpus). Thesleff in his voluminous work on Plato's style does not isolate or characterize this style nor notes its presence in Book Eight.

phrases also in the nominative (οὐ καταφρονῶ / ἀξιῶν / ὅν) that support them by giving reasons, the last participle adding two more nominative predicate adjectives. The combination of an ordinary construction with εἶναι supported by explanatory participial phrases repeats exactly the structure used at the end of the description of the timocratic regime (548A5-C2). Socrates then completes the description of the timocratic personality by telling how it develops with age, something strictly off-topic, with a sentence that employs the usual balance of ordinary and subordinate constructions (549A9-B4).

Next comes the evolution of the timocratic man (549C2-550B7), which opens with a "once upon a time" temporal particle (ἐνίστε), suggesting we will get a finite verb. Instead we get a participle (όν, C3) in the nominative, which indicates we are being given a description of the person who will come to be the subject of such a verb. But this participle (merely the copula) does nothing but give a berth to a predicative genitive (πατρός) which itself will be described with concordant genitive participles (οἰκοῦντος, φευγόντος, ἐθελόντος). Adeimantus interrupts, impatient to ask Socrates about the original subject and his evolution (C7), and Socrates responds with another temporal particle (ὅταν, made more promisingly vivid than ἐνίστε by the addition of ὅν) followed by a subordinate subjunctive (ἀκούῃ) that quickly yields to a description not of the son but of the person he hears, his mother, described again with participles of perception that tell what the son hears from her (ἀχθομένης, which is spelled out with her statement in indirect discourse that her husband, his father, is not among the rulers [mere ἔστι], but then elaborated with a second participle, ἐλαττονυμένης). A third such participle (όρώσης) introduces in turn a series of participles in perceptual indirect discourse describing what she sees her husband, the young man's father, doing (μαχόμενον, λοιδορούμενον, φέροντα). To these participles is added a fourth accusative participle (προσέχοντα) that receives a new construction from an unexpected subjunctive (αἰσθάνηται, D5) parallel in sense with ορώσης but now by an anacoluthon elevating the mother into the role of subject in a protasis of which the son had originally been the subject ever since ἀκούῃ (C8). This fourth accusative participle is then balanced (through μέν / δέ) with a fifth and sixth that form a complementary pair (τιμῶντα, ἀτιμάζοντα). The construction is by now lost but ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων (introduced without a connective) simply dismisses the problem: the original participle ἀχθομένης, in its original case and gender, brings us back to where we began (D6: cf. C8). This participle now receives exegesis with another participle λεγούσης (linked by τε καί because what he heard was her remarks [λεγούσης] but her remarks bespoke her frustration [ἀχθομένης]) and we are brought back to the boy listening to his mother complain. ως then introduces more of her remarks but the quotation has no finite verb, just an adjective (ἄνανδρος) and still another participle (ἀνειμένος) which require us to supply the copula. This rambling wreck of a sentence then closes with a generalization that happens to allow us to breathe the clean air of an indicative (φιλοῦσιν) even though it governs what is only a throwaway subordinate clause (D7-E1).

Adeimantus has himself forgotten his interest in the development of the boy, which had led him to interrupt before, and remarks instead on Socrates's very last remark, saying that women do talk that way (549E2). His looking back allows Socrates to move forward to his own next step, to describe how the household slaves talk to the young man, and the sentence reverts to the usual balance of ordinary and subordinate constructions (549E3-550A1). But next, the young man goes out of the house and hears and sees other things, acts which can and do bring back the perceptual participles (five in three lines: πράττοντας, καλούμενους, ὄντας, τιμουμένους, ἐπαινουμένους; A2-4). Thereupon we are given a climactic temporal particle (τότε δή, A4-5) that as before suggests an indicative is

coming to announce the definitive and crucial step in the boy's evolution, but immediately we lapse back into participles that summarize what we have already heard him hearing and seeing (*ἀκούων τε καὶ ὄρῶν*, twice: A5 and A6), continued even further by another participle (*έλκόμενος*). He is drawn by forces whose movement is in turn presented with participles (not one but two: *ἄρδοντός τε καὶ αὐξόντος*, B2); and next we have the intervention of a new construction, a διά phrase with double articular infinitive (the same construction we saw at 548B8-C2), completely proleptic and only postponing the indicative further. When the indicative finally comes it is a semantically flaccid anticlimax (*ἡλθε*, B5) buried at the end of a clause with its complement (*εἰς τὸ μέσον*) placed so early that the sentence limps to it, but is then redeemed by an exegesis that employs another indicative (*παρέδωκε*, B6). The whole huge sentence (A4-B7) is then closed by the programmatic statement announcing that the genesis of the timocratic man has now been described (B6-7).

What was anticlimactic about the arrival of the main verb is offset by the rising awareness that the passage is drawing up an analogy between the development of the timocratic man who is tugged in opposite directions by reason and by cupidity, and the guardian class of the timocratic state similarly torn (547B2-C4). In particular, *έλκόμενος ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων* (550A7), heavy-handedly set up by the repetition of *ἀκούων τε καὶ ὄρῶν* (A5-6), recalls *βιαζόμενον δὲ καὶ ἀντιτεινομένων* from 547B7-8; so that the *εἰς μέσον* of 547B8 anticipates *εἰς τὸ μέσον* of 550B4, and renders the late-placed *ἡλθε* (B5) something of a forgone conclusion.

### 3B.I: Oligarchy, the Regime (550C8-552E10)

The treatment of oligarchy opens with a preliminary question from Adeimantus: What after all is the distinguishing mark, for purposes of definition? It is the institution of a property requirement as prerequisite to political standing. This "keynote" idea leads to the notion that oligarchy arises from a certain trouble attaching to the private treasure that the timocratic state allowed the guards to own. The description of the trouble is done with normal variation of subordinate and ordinary constructions (550D9-551B7).

To describe the character of the regime once it has evolved, Adeimantus suggests they retail its shortcomings (*ἀμαρτήματα*, 551B8-C1). This suggestion provides the structure for the treatment, and the list soon settles down into a set of articular infinitives. After the *όρος* itself (C2) we have, second, *τό ... ἀνάγκη εἶναι* (D5); then *τὸ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι* (D9); *τὸ πολυπραγμονεῦν* (E6); *τὸ ἔξεῖναι* (552A7); and sixth and finally the appearance of the drone (*κηφῆνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι* [C4]) which is then elaborated by question and answer (552D3-E7). The list complete, so is the description of the oligarchic regime (E9-10).

Elaboration of an articular infinitive construction will naturally consist of modifiers to the subject accusative (as in the second, *τὴν μέν / τὴν δέ*, D6-7). The first extensive elaboration, which comes in the third *ἀμάρτημα*, is done with a hyperextended hypersubordinate construction of a sort we have already seen twice (548B8-C2, 550B3-4), namely an extended prepositional phrase in διά with an articular infinitive (*τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι*, D10) that in this case itself governs three subordinate articular infinitives (*δεδιέναι, φανῆναι, ἔθέλειν*), each of them modified by participles subordinate to their subject accusatives (*χρωμένους, μὴ χρωμένους, ὅντας* understood with *φιλοχρημάτους*; D10-E4).

The fourth *ἀμάρτημα* is elaborated with a set of participles subordinate to the accusative subject of the primary articular infinitive (*πολυπραγμονεῦειν*, E6), configured in a list: *γεωργοῦντας καὶ χρηματίζομένους καὶ πολεμοῦντας* (551E5-552A1). The list is an excellent example of how the massing of syntactically coordinate items can ignore and even mask the subordinate and superordinate

semantic relations that obtain between and among the very items being presented. We are required to rediscover the relation of the three terms by recalling the context in which the criticism of πολυπραγμοσύνη was first made (the passage referred to by ὁ πάλαι ἐλοιδοροῦμεν at E6, namely, 374A3-E2). In light of that passage (esp. C3-5) the list of participles is seen to consist of a single example of χρηματιστική (namely, γεωργοῦντας) followed by a generalizing term (χρηματιζομένους), followed by the target term (πολεμοῦντας) that had been distinguished from all peacetime occupations: though the syntax is A-B-C, the logic of the semantics is a-A-B. The ecphrastic style, to the extent that it avoids finite verbs and subordination and instead uses nouns (including articular infinitives) and adjectives (including participles), can deploy only parataxis and prepositional phrases; and the result is that the audience, as here, is left on its own to supply implicit relations among the ideas that might have been articulated more explicitly with hypotaxis.

The fifth ἀμάρτημα is introduced by the remark that it might be the worst of all (552A4-5). It is the possibility within this regime that a citizen can become a disenfranchised nobody. The possibility is again done with an articular infinitive (τὸ ἔξειναι) elaborated by a triad of dependent articular infinitives (ἀποδόσθαι, κτήσασθαι, οἰκεῖν) the last of which is elaborated with the participial copula (όντα) dependent on their implicit subject accusative, which in turn gives a berth for a predicate (μηδέν ... τῶν ... μερῶν), itself then specified by the various μέρη that he is none of, presented in a list: μήτε χρηματιστὴν μήτε δημιουργὸν μήτε ἵππεα μήτε ὄπλιτην, ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ ἄπορον κεκλημένον (A9-B1). The list relies again on the passage from Book Two, articulating the two roles of worker and warrior each with a pair. Δημιουργόν is an alternative designation for χρηματιστήν since it has an identical extension (cf. 374D4); and ἵππεα / ὄπλιτην breaks down the genus πολεμοῦντες into two representative types of soldier (374D2-3).<sup>5302</sup> Since they are nothing or do nothing in the city (μηδὲν ὄντα) they can only be labelled: and so the description ends with a second participial phrase parallel with the phrase in ὄντα, namely, ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ ἄπορον κεκλημένον (A10). The perfect participle suggests their destitution is permanent.

Socrates now inserts (B2-9) the reflection that the citizen, here imagined to have been wealthy but to have wasted all he had, never really was a ruler (though he had met the property qualification). He was not a leader but a loser (note alliterative echo between ἄρχων / ὑπηρέτης and ἐτοίμων ἀναλωτής, B8-9). The notion of such an idle person recalls Hesiod's metaphor of the drone, ἀεργός ... κηφήνεσσι ... εἴκελος (WD 303-4; cf. Th.594-9), the appearance of which in the oligarchic polis now becomes its sixth and final shortcoming (νόσημα πόλεως [C4] being a sort of climactic variation of ἀμάρτημα). He goes on to draw a distinction between drones that have no stingers who constitute the destitute, and those that do who constitute the city's villains. Wherever there are poor there are villains, and oligarchy always has poor, namely everyone who is not rich. The presence of these types of drone, this last shortcoming of oligarchy, is said summarily to be caused by ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακήν τροφὴν καὶ κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας (E5-6). Apart from this open-textured list<sup>5303</sup> the entire description of the final ἀμάρτημα or νόσημα (552B2-E7) has employed a balanced variation of subordinate and ordinate constructions.

### 3B.2: The Oligarchical Man (553A6-555B1)

The oligarchic man is next, how he develops and how he turns out (553A3-4). The description of

<sup>5302</sup> Commentators, failing to see the ecphrastic balancing, explain that demiurge and soldier are listed because they are required to supply tools and weapons which a poor man could not afford.

<sup>5303</sup> κακήν goes with both τροφὴν and κατάστασιν (cf. Leg.800C2-3).

his development begins with a temporal particle and begins, as did that of the timocratic man, with the young man's perception of his father. At first he emulates him but then he sees something happen (A9-10). The verb of perception (*ἴδῃ*, 553A10) as before (*ἀκούῃ*, 549C8; *ἀκούει καὶ ὥρᾳ*, 550A2) can and does introduce a description in participles, and hereby coordination replaces subordination. We get ten<sup>5304</sup> participles in five lines describing what he sees happening to his father (B1-5); and then we get his reaction to having seen it (*ἰδὼν δέ γε*, B7ff, itself prepared by three other participles (B7-8) before his action is told, which is to oust (*ώθεῖ*, indicative, B8) the willful sense of honor from the throne of his soul. *καί* (C2) then suggests that another indicative is coming but a second flurry of circumstantial participles intervenes (four in three lines, C2-4) whose vividness, in comparison with the vagueness of the indicative (*χρήματα συλλέγεται*, C4), render it anticlimactic. Thereupon however a temporal climax is announced by *τότε* (C4): the empty throne is now filled with the epithumetic sense of moneymaking, enthroned as if a Persian king within his soul, decked out (with circumstantial participle) in diadems, necklaces, and scimitars (C6-7). Adeimantus agrees and Socrates continues with a picture of the new regime of his soul done with two participles, a single indicative, and a series of five dependent infinitives (D1-7), completing the description of the oligarchic man's evolution.

The ecphrastic elements in this description (553A9-D9) include both the large preponderance of participles over indicatives (twenty to three once the thing gets going at A11) and also a principle of organization we have not yet noted, the use of paratactic pairs. Besides the two larger structures in *μέν / δέ* (C4-D2 and D2-7) there are ten smaller ones done with coordinate connectives (B1, B2-3, C1, C3, C5, C6, D2, D3, D4-5, D5). Indeed each of the three paragraphs of the description is closed exactly by relaxing such dyadic pairing with open-textured triads (three participles linked by *ἢ* at B4-5, the list of three items at C6-7, and the three-step generalization at D6-7).

Paratactic pairing turns the heap of ten participles at B1-5 into two pairs (*πτωίσαντα / ἐκχέαντα*; *στρατηγήσαντα / ἄρξαντα*) that give way to a larger pairing that consists of a single participle (*ἐμπεσόντα*) linked with a triad of participial outcomes (*ἀποθανόντα, ἐκπεσόντα, ἀτιμωθέντα*), the last re-expressed with an epexegetical fourth (*ἀποβαλόντα*). Pairing is also used to indicate the connection (with characteristic *τε καί*) between the description of the institutional behaviors of the regimes and the psychic correlates within the respective persons (*φιλοτιμία τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές* [C1] and *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον* [C5], where note the chiasm of before and after). The pair *ἐγκαθίζειν / ποιεῖν* (C6) allows for elaboration of the obverse of *ώθεῖ* (B8) by the metaphor of oriental luxury. The pair *περικαθίσας / καταδουλωσάμενος* (D2) makes the transition from the metaphorical picture of the throne to a statement of the new order that it embodies, itself described by the paratactical pairing of *μέν* and *δέ* (D2-7). Within this large *μέν / δέ* construction the pair *λογίζεσθαι / σκοπεῖν* (D3) describes the higher use of the rational element (musical *σκοπεῖν*) along with the lower use for which it is now to be employed (mercantile *λογίζεσθαι*); and *θαυμάζειν / τιμᾶν* (D4-5) likewise present the abject (*θαῦμα*) as opposed to the edifying (*τιμή*) aspects of *θυμός*.

The point to gather about the ecphrastic style is not only that pairing constitutes a substructure by which a heap can be discovered to be a series, but also that exactly by the paratactic juxtaposition of two items the mind is invited or instructed to find their unstated relation, an unstated relation that is at least as important to the meaning as the two items that invoke it.

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<sup>5304</sup> I do not excise *βλαπτόμενον* with Burnet (B4). D.Lee (Penguin 370) takes the circumstantial participles *στρατηγήσαντα ... ἄρξαντα* (553B2-3) to describe the activity in which the father lost his fortune; I take them to describe the high office he falls from; the ecphrastic style *per se* supplies no cues to determine the question. This is a good example how the style requires that the reader or audience supply their own prejudices to arrive at a meaning.

The evolution of the oligarchical man has been described, so now Socrates turns to describing what he is like. The description will take the form of a comparison of his life to the life of the parallel state (553E2-554A1), resembling the description of the timocratic state because again done with articular infinitives in the dative of respect (574D4ff). Moreover, since the description of the parallel state, oligarchy, itself took the form of retailing six ἀμαρτήματα, we might anticipate hearing six shortcomings of the oligarchic man that correspond to them, an anticipation immediately corroborated by the fact that the first point of comparison is introduced by the ordinal expression, πρῶτον μέν (554A2), and that it repeats (if loosely) the first oligarchical error, giving wealth too great a role (the ὄρος at 551C2). We are provided a structure of anticipation and so we will have some sense where we are even if the ensuing presentation is a mere parataxis of similarities.

Let us consider the style and syntax of the comparison point by point.

#### Comparison One (~#1)

As in the case of the timocratic articular infinitives, these nominal infinitives allow for adjectival elaboration in the form of modifiers of their grammatical subjects (which happen now to be in the nominative because the subject of the infinitives is the same as the subject of the leading construction [e.g., τῷ ... ποιεῖσθαι ὅμοιος ἀν εἴη, 554A2-3]).

#### Comparison Two (~#5)

The modifiers can be adjectives (φειδωλὸς καὶ ἐργάτης, A5) but immediately these are elaborated by circumstantial participles (three in three lines [A6-8]: ἀποίμπλας, παρεχόμενος, δουλούμενος). The pattern consisting of adjectives explained by participles then continues to describe (Ὥν, ποιούμενος, θησαυροποιός -- A10-11), interrupted by question and answer (B1-6) which introduces the drones.

#### Comparison Three (~#6)

The drones, the sixth of the ἀμαρτήματα of oligarchy (552C2-D1), are now the third topic of comparison with the oligarchical man (B7-C2). The description of his drone-like desires reverts to adjectives explained with a participle (πτωχικάς, κακούργοντας, κατεχομένοντα -- B8-C2).

#### Comparison Four (~#4)

Question and answer returns to make a transition to his need to multitask internally (cf. πολυπραγμονεῦν, the fourth ἀμάρτημα [552E6]), which is described with a relative clause and a main verb but then elaborated with a circumstantial participle (accusative ἐνούσας, D1) itself explained by a series of three nominative participles (two denials [πείθων. ἡμερῶν] and one affirmation [τρέμων] -- D2-3).

#### Comparison Five (~#2)

A single statement (D5-7) then brings on the schizophrenia of the oligarchical man (corresponding to the second ἀμάρτημα, the breaking up of oligarchy into two cities [551D5-7]), which is presented with a schizophrenic pair of potential optatives, the first done with three adjectives (two denials [ἀστασίαστος, εἰς] and one affirmation [διπλοῦς τις] -- D9-10) and the countervailing second describing a balance, done with an adjective (βελτίουντας) supported by a participle (κρατούσας). The contradiction in his soul is then restated (E3-5) by saying that he might cut a good figure but "of a soul reconciled to itself and harmonized, the true virtue has left him far behind" -- the proleptic

dependent genitive phrase consisting of a noun (*ψυχῆς*) described with an adjective (*όμονοητικῆς*) explained (again) by a participle (*ήρμοσμένης*).

### Comparison Six (~#3)

The final point of comparison corresponds to the oligarchic rulers having difficulty raising an army (551D9-E4). As a contender in matters of excellence the oligarchical person can be characterized as φαῦλος (ἀνταγωνιστής ... ὁ φειδωλὸς φαῦλος [sc. ἐστι], 554E7-555A1). This adjective is then explained by a triad of participial phrases, stunning for their asyndeton and their elaboration by balanced paratactic pairs (εὐδοξίας ἔνεκα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγώνων / ἐγείρειν καὶ συμπαρακαλεῖν / συμμαχίαν τε καὶ φιλονικίαν) and capped by retrieving the pun on oligarchy from the parallel passage about the regime, with a *figura etymologica* (ὁλίγοις τισίν ... ὀλιγαρχικῶς, A4-5: cf. 551E2). The sentence, and the description of the oligarchic man, then closes with a final and climactic pair of paratactic indicatives that capture his schizophrenia with a bathetic joke (*ήτταται καὶ πλουτεῖ*).

After all this no reason remains for doubting that the oligarchical regime corresponds with the stingy materialistic personality (555A8-B1).

### 3C.I: Democracy, the Regime (555B3-558C7)

The other sections have begun with a “keynote” event or remark. The mistimed births started the evolution toward timocracy; description of the timocratic state was pre-programmed as a combination of previous, current, and future attributes; the timocratic man's life was initiated by Adeimantus's interruption; the evolution of the oligarchic state was made to derive from the property law; the life of oligarchic regime followed the program of retailing its defects; the life of the oligarchic man was programmed as a search for defects parallel to those of the regime. The “keynote” this time is a paradox: the previous regime is destroyed by too much of what it had held up as being the good, the ἀπληστία of wealth (555B8-10). The paradox is then explained by question and answer employing the normal alternation of subordinate and coordinate constructions, and it leads to *pictures* of the drones and of the rich who in their boundless desire for wealth have made them more and more destitute.

Drawing a picture naturally brings on the ecphrastic style. First we see the drones. There they sit in the city, supplied with stingers, armed as it were, some owing debts others having become utterly destitute, and still others both, feeling hatred against the rich and plotting against the people who have acquired all that was once theirs, and desiring revolution (D7-E1). The entire description is done in four lines with eight participles syntactically subordinate to the verb *κάθηνται*, a colorless placeholder that merely gives the participles their syntactical berth. The participles are distributed into substructures that we have seen: paratactic pairing of the metaphor with its interpretation (κεκεντωμένοι τε καὶ ἔξωπλισμένοι: D7-8); the pairing of *μέν* and *δέ* (with a third that combines both where we must supply a ninth participle, ὄντες: D8-9); paratactic pairing of motive with action (*μισοῦντες* τε καί ἐπιβουλεύοντες: D9); "everyone" done with a polar doublet (*τοῖς ... ἄλλοις*: D10). The entire pastiche is then summarized with the pregnant expression, *νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες* (D10-E1).

Second come the rich, for whom they lie in wait, rendered by a second ecphrastic sketch done again with participles (five in four lines) leading to a single verb (*ἐμποιοῦσι*, 556A1) that merely describes the result of the actions depicted in the participles. The participles break down into pairs, the first explained by the second (*ἐγκύψαντες* by *οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες* and *ἐνιέντες* by *τιτρώσκοντες*), the

results of these actions leading to κομιζόμενοι which describes how their actions affect themselves (they become richer and richer) while the closing finite verb describes how their behavior affects the city (the drone class becomes larger and poorer). Closure is achieved by the pairing of quantitative and qualitative adjectives (*πολύν / πτωχόν*) straddling their noun (*τὸν κηφῆνα*).

Given these two sketches of the personnel, Socrates analyzes how the ἀπληστία of the desire for wealth, by forgoing usual norms of behavior, can only make things worse (556A4-B5). He goes on to compare the rulers' attitude toward the ruled with their attitude toward "themselves and theirs," but interrupts himself to describe the rulers' sons (B8-C2), a description done with participles and adjectives only, configured in a μέν / δέ pair that sets off their dainty lack of industry against their concomitant weakness to resist the lures of pleasure. The two limbs each consist of a pair of modifiers ordered chiastically, the first pair consisting of a one-word modifier (*τρυφῶντας*) followed by a modifier elaborated by a universalizing doublet (*ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς*) and the second consisting of a modifier elaborated by a universalizing doublet (*μαλακοὺς καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας*) followed by a single-word modifier (*καὶ ἀργούς*). The symmetry is gratuitous but it provides a good example of the purely esthetic possibilities of the static style of ecphrasis. His self-interruption now complete, he picks up where he left off, resuming *σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν* (556B8) with *αὐτοὺς δὴ* (C4): toward themselves they are disposed to allow themselves utterly to neglect everything for the sake of making money and to be no more committed to practicing virtue than the poor. The two attributes are made static and fixed with perfect participles.

What follows is a third picture that imagines a moment when (ὅταν, C8) the two groups as separately described (οὕτω δὴ παρασκευασμένοι, C8) might find themselves in each other's company in such a way as to be compared (παραβάλλωσιν), at one of many possible venues listed and linked by ἢ, generalized by ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις and then closed off by ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι (C11-D1).<sup>5305</sup> "If (without καί) the poor might not attract the benign neglect of the rich but perhaps one of them (ἰσχνός, πένης, ἥλιωμένος [without καί]) finding himself beside a rich man (ἐσκιατροφηκότι πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας [without καί]) might notice how poor is his physical condition (ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, an oxymoron), don't you imagine, Adeimantus, that he will recognize that such weaklings as these are well off only out of his own cowardice, and will pass the word along to his fellows as soon as they are alone that they could easily take them down?"

It turns out that the comparative picture set out in bold strokes with the modifiers in asyndeton, was drawn for Adeimantus's sake, so that he could answer this question. The other ecphrastic element besides the depiction of the men side by side, is the long list of six venues generalized by the element crucial to each, that there is some danger or that "the chips are down." The list of six breaks down into three pairs each done with a different construction (double prepositional phrase in ἐν, double prepositional phrase in κατά, and double predication of the place-holding participle γιγνόμενοι).

Adeimantus is quite sure this is what will happen and Socrates adduces a maxim, that sometimes a sickly person falls ill by a very slight influence from the outside, sometimes even with none. Now he is ready to define the moment democracy actually comes into existence: when the poor take over by violence (557A2-5).

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<sup>5305</sup> With θεώμενοι (D1) the syntax is eclipsed by the semantics: this participle envisages the event of the comparison hypothesized at the beginning (ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν, C8) and becomes the springboard for the second subjunctive καταφρονῶνται (D1: n.b. there is no καί) as if this were now the protasis.

We are ready therefore to ask what the daily life is like. The description begins with the keynote of freedom (557B4-6). Everyone who has the chance will design his life as ever he wishes, and the city will fill up with a variety of types. The variety itself might be cause to call this city the most beautiful, like the beauty of the Panathenaic πέπλος. Yet this gets us nowhere on our search for the nature of the regime: it is not a regime but a showplace of regimes on display. The theoretician might just visit it to choose his favorite. All this narrative (557B4-E1) is done with the normal balance of subordinate and insubordinate constructions, but hereupon Socrates introduces an articular infinitive ( $\tau\ddot{o}\ \delta\acute{e}$  ..., 557E2). By now we are wary that nominalization of the verb is a sign that we are moving into the ecphrastic mode, and that he will use it tell us what this bazaar of regimes is like.

Dependent upon the articular infinitive ( $\tau\ddot{o}\ \dot{\alpha}\nacute{a}g\kappa\eta\ \varepsilon\dot{\iota}\nu\dot{\alpha}\iota$ ) is a list of no less than six infinitives (557E2-8A2) which syntactically are apodoses modified as it were by protases in the subjunctive with  $\dot{\alpha}\nu$ : 'The fact there is no necessity *to rule* even if you are able, nor for that matter *to acquiesce in being ruled* in case you'd rather not; nor *to go to war* while others do nor *remain at peace* while the others do if you do not desire peace; nor, in case some law prevents you from serving in office or on a jury, to *refrain from serving in office or jury* if it should occur to you: how could such a life be anything but divinely sweet?' The paratactic series is articulated into pairs, first an active paired with its passive ( $\ddot{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\eta$  /  $\ddot{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ ), then opposites ( $\pi\dot{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\mu\dot{\alpha}\iota\eta$ ,  $\varepsilon\dot{\iota}\rho\acute{\eta}\nu\eta\ \ddot{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon\iota\eta$ ), and finally a pair of terms whose relation is not patently logical as the others' was ( $\ddot{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\eta\ \kappa\dot{\alpha}\iota\ \delta\iota\kappa\acute{\zeta}\epsilon\iota\eta$ ).<sup>5306</sup> The modifying protases are placed after the apodotic infinitives, one for each verb in the first and second pairs. The second set of protases is done with genitive absolute participles rather than  $\dot{\epsilon}\acute{a}\nu$  plus subjunctive, with the subject of the genitive absolutes (the same in both cases, namely,  $\tau\dot{\omega}\ \ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\eta$ ) placed in hyperbaton with the second only. As for the third pair of infinitives, for the sake of closure by chiasm the protasis comes before them, a single protasis covering both apodotic infinitives, and then its converse is repeated after.<sup>5307</sup> The sentence is ecphrastic in that it is static (it envisions a stabilized way of life, or  $\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\eta\acute{\eta}$ ), its logic depends upon the pairing of terms, and subordination is used not to move forward in a straight line but to facilitate recursion. Since the manner of presentation relies on a matrix, every opportunity needs to be taken to vary it so as to keep it as interesting as the democratic man thinks it is. The entire complex turns out to be a *nominativus pendens*, and Socrates closes with a nominative predicate implying  $\dot{\epsilon}\acute{a}\nu\iota$ : Isn't such a  $\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\eta\acute{\eta}$  pleasant?

Next, with  $\tau\dot{i}\ \delta\acute{e}$ ; Socrates announces another of democracy's attractive aspects, the fascinating clemency of its legal verdicts ( $\dot{\eta}\ \pi\rho\acute{a}\dot{\alpha}\tau\eta\dot{\varsigma}\ \tau\dot{\omega}\ \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\sigma\theta\acute{e}\dot{\nu}\tau\omega\eta\ ... \ o\dot{u}\ \kappa\o\mu\eta\acute{\eta}$ ; (558A4)). What is fascinating about it is then described with a pair of genitive absolute phrases again employing paratactic pairs ( $\theta\alpha\dot{\alpha}\acute{\eta}\tau\omega\eta\ \dot{\eta}\ \phi\dot{\nu}\eta\acute{\eta}\zeta$ ,  $\mu\dot{\alpha}\nu\eta\tau\omega\eta\ \tau\dot{e}\ \kappa\dot{\alpha}\dot{\alpha}\sigma\tau\dot{\nu}\rho\phi\dot{\mu}\eta\acute{\eta}\nu\eta\$ ,  $\o\dot{u}\tau\dot{e}\ \phi\dot{\nu}\eta\acute{\eta}\zeta\dot{\nu}\tau\omega\eta\ \o\dot{u}\tau\dot{e}\ \dot{\delta}\dot{\rho}\dot{\omega}\eta\acute{\eta}\tau\omega\eta$ : note the variation in the connectives) one describing the condemned and the other the population that condemned them, followed by another simple indicative ( $\pi\dot{\alpha}\rho\acute{\eta}\nu\sigma\tau\dot{e}\ \ddot{\alpha}\sigma\pi\dot{\nu}\ \eta\dot{\rho}\omega\zeta$ , A8). The first genitive absolute ( $\kappa\dot{\alpha}\tau\phi\dot{\mu}\eta\acute{\eta}\tau\omega\eta$ ) suggests that the true object of observation ( $\varepsilon\dot{\iota}\delta\acute{e}\zeta$ ) will be the jurors who condemned them; but since the jurors do not act after all, only the condemned are observable, and the genitives are continued, now as perceptual participles ( $\mu\dot{\alpha}\nu\eta\tau\omega\eta$ ,  $\dot{\alpha}\dot{\alpha}\sigma\tau\dot{\nu}\rho\phi\dot{\mu}\eta\acute{\eta}\nu\eta\$ ); and conversely in the next phase of the description ( $\kappa\dot{\alpha}\dot{\iota}$  is to be read at A7, exactly the hypological connective we need to show how one thing gives way to another) the inert

<sup>5306</sup> The two terms represent the category of periodic civic duties with a "sample slice" consisting of two cases. Notably  $\ddot{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\eta$  can be repeated with a new meaning (E6, hold a particular office; cf. E3, be ruler rather than ruled).

<sup>5307</sup> Adam *ad loc.* fails to see that  $\mu\eta\delta\acute{e}\nu$  (E6) is *sympathetic* with  $\mu\eta\delta\acute{e}$  (E5) and then he gets tangled up, as he acknowledges, in an oversubtle double negative.

jurors are consigned to the genitive absolute and the condemned man achieves the autonomy of the leading construction (nominative with indicative) and becomes a hero (ὅσπερ ἥρως).

Next Socrates moves on to the city's συγγνώμη (B1), but appends an exegesis: καὶ οὐδ' ὅπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία αὐτῆς ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις (expanded in indirect discourse [B2-5] as a disdain for the sorts of worries we had expressed in Books Two and Three): to this subject (συγγνώμη) so described is then appended a "lilies of the field" construction: ὡς ... οὐδὲν φροντίζει ... ἀλλὰ τιμᾶ ... (B5-C1), made of two indicatives each modified by protases (ἐξ ὅποιων ὃν ... , and ἐάν φῆ ...). The paragraph consists of nothing but an elaborated noun without any simple closing indicative at the end for it to be the subject of. We are left to construe it as parallel to the προφότης from the last paragraph. It is Adeimantus that supplies the requisite predicate (*γενναία*), in his answer (C2).

Socrates then continues with ταῦτά τε δή, which already suggests he is about to summarize before we even reach καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφά (C4). The summary consists of three adjectives ordered retrospectively: ἡδεῖα (covering the συγγνώμη and the προφότης: 558A4-C2), ἀναρχος (covering the list of infinitives: 557E2-8A3) and ποικίλη (covering the bazaar of pretty civic wares: C1-E1).

Adjectives, nouns, participles and infinitives produce a static picture that might stimulate a reaction. Note how easily the second singular fits in at 557E2-8A2: Socrates is drawing a picture for Adeimantus to contemplate. We must recall how the first ecphrastic passage in the *Republic*, at 372AB, likewise placed a vivid picture before Glaucon's mind, and how strong a reaction it elicited.

### 3C.2: The Democratic Man (558C8-562A2)

In the two previous cases (549C2ff and 553A9ff) the development of the corresponding man began with his childhood, and in particular his early relation with this father -- and so does this one. He would be raised according to the stingy and oligarchical habits of his father, which implies that he, too, will allow himself only the "necessary" pleasures. This new term requires clarification, however, and the storytelling yields to a preliminary diaeresis that will play the role of "keynote" for the section, namely the distinction between necessary and non-necessary pleasures, which occupies a whole page (558D4-559D4).

This passage should be dialogical rather than ecphrastic, and it is -- until the logical distinction is articulated and agreed to (558D4-559A7). Thereupon the two types of pleasure will be exemplified (559A8-10) and for this the ecphrastic method returns, particularly in the description of the appetite that is non-necessary in the sense of being excessive (B8-C1). A desire for meals (ἐδέσματων, verbal noun emphasizing the activity over its purpose) of other kinds beyond what is healthy (ἀλλοίων an understatement inviting imaginary fillings in), amenable to being chastised from youth and educated into quietude in most persons (a double phrase consisting of predicate-participle and participle-predicate: E9-10), harmful not only to the body but also the soul with respect to its mindfulness and moderation (a double phrase in μέν / δέ, the former concessively repeating what has been said about bodily effects in order to provide a berth for stating the psychic effects, which need to be described, and are described with a double phrase [*πρός τε φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν*, B11] elegant and rhythmical for its pairing of an anarthrous abstract noun with an articular infinitive).

The distinction made, it is applied to the drone (C8-D2): τὸν τοιοῦτον ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων. The new point is that the drone's appetites are non-necessary and it is presented by a logic of association, with a double construction including chiasm of

grounds and inference. The drone's desire is distinguished from the oligarchy's type ( $\tauὸν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων φειδωλόν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν$ ), which returns us to the moment the distinction needed to be drawn (whence, πάλιν τούνν, D4).

The story of the young man now begins: his father has raised him ignorantly and stingily and one day (ὅταν envisions a single occasion [cf. ἐνταῦθά που, *infra*]) he tastes the honey of the drones and begins to associate with certain αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς, παντοδαπὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἔχούσας δυναμένοις σκευάζειν (D9-10). This surprising and compact phrase will need unpacking later but meanwhile has ominous tragic elevation, due to the hyperbaton of the second adjective with καί after its noun, and the similar trajecture of the extra modifiers ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἔχούσας – again with καί -- after their noun. The unstable contention within the young man that then ensues, between the stinginess that denies pleasures and the sting of the drones that makes him itch for them, is then described dynamically as a see-saw battle alive with indicatives (559E4-560D1), the ecphrastic element intervening with bundled modifiers only to describe the parties to the battle (560B7-10, C2-3).

The victorious forces drive off what had been virtues as if they were vices (D2-6) and replace them with what had been vices, which they now style as virtues (D8-561A4). For the expulsion of the oligarchical moral regime ecphrastic elements do not so much intervene as join up in alliance with the more vigorous narrative style. It is done with a tricolon crescendo (D2-6), each colon having its own vigorous and vivid indicative, the first colon made of nine words ( $\grave{\omega}\thetaοῦσιν$ ), the second eight ( $\grave{\epsilon}\kappa\beta\grave{\alpha}\lambda\lambdaοῦσι$ ), but the third seventeen ( $\grave{\nu}\pi\epsilon\rho\grave{\rho}\iota\zeta\grave{\o}\nu\sigmaι$ ), achieving its length by paratactical doubling of nouns and adjectives, each presenting a virtue and the misnomer they castigate it with, the second containing two in chiasm.

With the installation of the new moral regime the dust settles and the ecphrastic style takes over (D8,ff), passing through a series of four participles and a series of four nouns before reaching its first indicative (κατάγουσιν, E3), which is then followed by a series of three nominative participles and the same four nouns paired off with four others (560D8-561A1). The four participles come in two pairs κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες and κατεχομένου τε ... καὶ τελουμένου, D8-E1) the first of each pair giving the concrete metaphorical meaning and the second the moral and figurative meaning. The four nouns are roughly the opposites of the four virtues that had been expelled in the tricolon crescendo (i.e., they are the four vices with which they are to be replaced), arriving in crowns and laurels. Those who are “installing” them (κατάγουσιν, the only indicative in a sentence with eight participles) are then described by a pair of participles in which the second again evaluates the first ( $\grave{\epsilon}\gamma\kappa\omega\mu\iota\grave{\alpha}\zeta\grave{\o}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$  καὶ  $\grave{\nu}\pi\kappa\kappa\grave{\rho}\iota\zeta\grave{\o}\mu\epsilon\nu\iota$ ), and now, in contrast to the tricolon crescendo used to expel the virtues above, the four vices and the misnomers by which they are being praised are presented with minimal vigor: a single colorless participle (καλοῦντες, E5) linking the first of the four pairs and left to be understood with the subsequent three.

We notice that the number of vices installed is equal to the number of virtues expelled, and expect nothing else since the hypothesis of the whole passage, according to which the guards in the citadel of the soul are being exchanged one set for another, but there is no time to ask whether the four virtues correspond one to one with the four vices. As in the passage from Thucydides that this one consciously or unconsciously recalls,<sup>5308</sup> we are too busy performing the series of mental acrobatics, one after the other, by which αἰδώς could be seen as ἡλιθιότης, σωφροσύνη as ἀνανδρία, and μετριότης καὶ κοσμία δαπάνη as ἀγροικία καὶ ἀνελευθερία; and by which conversely ὕβρις

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<sup>5308</sup> Thuc. 3.82.4-83.4; cf. Isoc. *Antid.*283-5, *Areop.*20.

could be seen as εὐπαιδευσία, ἀναρχία as ἐλευθερία, ἀσωτία as μεγαλοπρέπεια, and ἀναίδεια as ἀνδρεία. By the end our heads are spinning and everything seems the same as its opposite -- an effect playfully echoed in the last pair (ἀναιδεία / ἀνδρεία, 561A1) as well as by the echo between ὑπερορίζουσι in the first part (D6) and ὑποκοριζόμενοι in the second (E4). In other words, the paratactic pairing can on the one hand corroborate a connection in the back of the reader's mind (κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες, κατεχομένου τε ... καὶ τελονυμένου, ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ ὑποκοριζόμενοι, ἐλευθέρωσίν τε καὶ ἄνεσιν), but on the other it can force upon the reader's mind a connection he would never make. In either case a lot of teaching is going on without reliance on an apparatus of otherwise positive (and falsifiable) statements assembled into chains of inference (valid or invalid). The "epistemology" of the ecphrastic method is quite another thing, a category unto itself.

Given this evolution of the democratic man, what is his life like (ζῆ, 561A6)? The verb is a place-holder that is now filled in with a characterizing circumstantial participle ἀναλίσκων that is given three nouns (καὶ χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς), an open-textured list with three καί's. The corresponsive καί before χρήματα suggests that the three items are meant to be considered separately and on their own merits.<sup>5309</sup> If he does not lose control of himself in revelry he will achieve a sort of balance, indulging in one pleasure after another as occasion allows: the description is characterized by a balanced pair of verbs (καταδέξηται / μὴ ἐνδῷ, B1-2), and adjectival and participial constructions (B2-5) stemming from place-holder verbs (ζῆ, ή, διάγει). As for true reasoning (καὶ λόγον γε, B7ff) he uses it not, but adopts a likewise non-prejudicial acceptance of everything. His non-use of reason is depicted with two participles, οὐ προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ παριεὶς εἰς τὸ φρούριον. The reasoning he will not listen to argues with paratactic pairs (μέν / δέ [B8-C1], καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν [C1], ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν [C2], κολάζειν τε καὶ δουλοῦσθαι [C2-3]); his response is an accelerating triad: ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀνανεύει τε καὶ ὁμοίας φησὶν ἀπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἔξ ίσου (561C3-4).

His attitude described (561C6-D7), we can now observe him wasting the money, labor, and practice that were listed at 561A7-8. The description is done with another place-holding verb that gives a berth for participles (διαζῆ [C6], a sort of combination of ζῆν and διάγειν). We get eight of them in five lines, giving us a quick succession of snapshots presented as moments in time (τότε μὲν, αὐθίς, τότε δ' αὖ); then a re-infusion of verbal support from the indicative ἔστιν δὲ ὅτε (D1), that brings on a set of clauses with real indicatives done in three parts (D2-5). The upgrade to indicatives turns snapshots into moving pictures, and replaces the simultaneous pastiche with a sequence of vivid events occupying time. For a moment the ecphrastic portrait comes to life. The picture and the moments of observation are then summarized and we revert to adjectives and the place-holding verb, χρήται (D7). There is no hint of order or necessity (τάξις / ἀνάγκη) in his life. He does have something to say for himself, but καλῶν indicates it is something less than an argument: ἡδύν τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον τοῦτον χρήται αὐτῷ διὰ παντός (D5-7). The three adjectives describe his mood but not his life: slogans are replacing descriptions. Adeimantus sums it up by saying this is a man that gives "astronomic" a new meaning, and Socrates responds with more adjectives, now to describe not his life but the man himself, this time telling how he looks to others, how attractive for his many-sidedness just like the democratic regime, and how he would incite the envy of men and women alike (E3-7).

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<sup>5309</sup> The triad probably represents the three categories of "goods" (external, bodily, psychic) so that the sense is, he is spending everything that is worth anything on pleasures.

### 3D.I:Tyranny, the Regime (562C4-569C8)

If the democrat was καλός and his regime καλή, tyranny is immediately (with δή) introduced as καλλίστη (A4). By question and answer Socrates suggests they take as their keynote the same kind of keynote they used in describing democracy's evolution, for here, too, we encounter the paradoxical problem of an ἀπληστία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ -- "too much of a good thing." There it was wealth, and here it is freedom (562A4-C7).

Adeimantus wants to know how this takes place and Socrates begins a story (with ὅταν, C8). The situation is set up with participles and the place-holder verb τύχῃ: the city is democratized (the regime is done with a participle); one day it happens that those who are in charge of pouring the wine are evil and they slake the city's thirst for freedom with a portion too liberal: Next we have τοὺς ἄρχοντας δή ("Then it is, that") where δή promises a climactic verb, but since the rulers have been introduced by ἄρχοντας we get another protasis that will first to describe them (ἀν μή, parallel with opening ὅταν): "Assume the rulers show any defect of mildness and any holding back of freedom: chastisement ensues" (κολάζει, D3) -- but the singular verb indicates it is deme that is doing the chastising, and not the rulers as we may have expected. The chastisement is voiced with the complaint that they are "bloody oligarchs" (ώς μιαρούς τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς). We have entered a realm of expression suited for the inversion of values (560D2-561A2) replete with the unexpected. The deme does not stop here but moves on to those who still obey their rulers, besmirching them as "slavish nobodies" (ἐθελοδούλους τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὄντας, another sloganneering pair linked by τε καί). Rather, as we learn only at the end of a front-loaded construction, it is only rulers who resemble the ruled and the ruled who resemble rulers that they praise and honor, in private and in public. This last remark with its paratactic pairs contrasts the two groups (with μέν / δέ, D7-8) only in order to identify them and to say that the deme that had reviled the ones that act different from each other will praise only those that act the same. The description brings out the loud and indiscriminate fatuity of their sloganneering by shading τιμᾶ with ἐπαινεῖ (D9) and adding the doublet ιδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ (D8-9).

Socrates now infers what would necessarily ensue, with ὀνάγκη (sci. ἔστι, D9) which will take an infinitive (ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ιέναι), and we are set up for ecphrastic description consisting of a series of infinitives that will take us there (ἐπὶ πᾶν) brushstroke by brushstroke. It will sink into each household and in the end be engendered even in beasts (καταδεύεσθαι / τελευτῶν ἐμφυομένην: again a placeholder verb receives specification from a participle).

Adeimantus is wary of the direction the argument is going<sup>5310</sup> but Socrates moves on in his account of what he will call the beginning (ἀρχή) of the evolution of tyranny (562E7-563E4). He continues with ecphrastic infinitives, having the father assimilating himself to his son with two infinitives appropriate to son not father (ἐθίζεσθαι ... καὶ φοβεῖσθαι, the former governing a third infinitive, ὄμοιον γίγνεσθαι) and son to father with two more infinitives (μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι μήτε δεδιέναι) denying traditional elements of filial behavior, all this for the sake of "freedom" (δή [E9] adds the scare quotes). The leveling of rulers and ruled by the double formula used above (D7-8) is then extended to the relation between citizen and metic, and then telescopically extended to foreigners (562E9-563A1), which exhausts the supply of political relationships.

Adeimantus agrees this is what happens and Socrates continues (563A3-B2) with the leveling of another category of relationships that is essentially hierarchical, that of teacher and student, which he then extends to all relations between old and young, with paratactic doubling in every comparison (φοβεῖται καὶ θωπεύει / διδασκάλων ... καὶ παιδαγωγῶν / ἀπεικάζονται καὶ διαμιλλῶνται / ἐν

<sup>5310</sup> πῶς τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν (562E6) evinces consternation.

λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις / εὐτραπελίας τε καὶ χαριεντισμοῦ / μηδὲ ἀηδεῖς ... μηδὲ δεσποτικοί). We may pause to review the kinds of relations that the method of paratactic pairing here used leaves us, and requires us, to recognize on our own. ἐθίζεσθαι / φοβεῖσθαι and αἰσχύνεσθαι / δεδιέναι pair the expected behavior with the motive against neglecting to perform it, where conversely φοβεῖται / θωπεύει and ἀπεικίζονται / διαμιλλῶνται pair the motive with the behavior it leads to; εὐτραπελείας / χαριεντισμοῦ pair the technique and the positive feeling it achieves, while ἀηδεῖς / δεσποτικοί pair the negative feeling with the condemnatory expression it elicits.

The obliteration of hierarchy in other human relationships (master to slave and woman to man) is next mentioned for the sake of thoroughness, only to be dismissed after they give Socrates an occasion to retrieve the pair of highly charged terms, *ἰσονομία* and *ἐλευθερία* (B8: for the former cf. 561E1). But we are not finished: beasts had been mentioned above as the final case (*τελευτᾶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων*, E4), and now we must include them in our account. You could not believe the scene unless you witnessed it with your own eyes: dogs resemble their masters, and horses and donkeys do, too, unfettered and proud in mien, and they just bump into you if you happen to be on the path the same time they are (C3-D1). Paratactic pairing is again the governing structural principle, with the old saw that dogs resemble their masters now being extended to include a resemblance of horses and asses to them also. In the absence of any resistance their unfettered demeanor (*ἐλευθέρως*, C7) expands itself (with a mere *καί*) into wordless self-importance (*σεμνῶς*, C8).

The expansion of freedom is complete: Adeimantus is appalled<sup>5311</sup> and Socrates sums it up (*κεφάλαιον*, D4) by telling its final effect on the inner soul of the citizens. They become soft and enervated, easily irritated by any boundary written or unwritten: this is the beginning of the evolution toward tyranny. Adeimantus asks what comes next and Socrates brings up the *νόσημα* that afflicted oligarchy: this same disease afflicts democracy and will be the cause of its demise. Here he interjects a new keynote, the axiom that the pendulum swings both ways: a great swing toward freedom bodes a reverse swing toward slavery! But Adeimantus has asked about the *νόσημα*, and what it does once the souls have become soft (*τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο*, E5); how, that is, it will bring on the reversal toward slavery (564A10-B2). Socrates reminds Adeimantus that his term *νόσημα* was introduced (552C3) to characterize the drones created in the hive of oligarchic community, subdivided into the braver ones with stingers and the less manly ones without. The good and doctorly lawgiver, like a beekeeper, has to keep these under control (564B4-C4). But again another axiom is needed, the observation that the "democratized city" consists of three subgroups: the drones, the rich and talented (*κοσμιώτατοι*, 564E6), and the deme itself (C9-565A3).

Socrates's description of the deme as being too busy to worry about politics but sovereign nevertheless by dint of its numbers (565A1-3), elicits from Adeimantus the remark that to exercise their sovereignty they have to show up in the assembly, and this gives Socrates his opening to describe the political story by which the diseased part destroys democracy (565A6-B8) by taxing the rich few and using the proceeds to attract the deme to show up and vote.

At the crucial moment (*καὶ τελευτῶντες*, B9) the talented few suddenly see what is going on (*όρωσι*) and resist. As before (549D1, 550A2, 553A10) *όρων* enables us to see what they see, which can be presented in a series of perceptual participles (here, five plus an one attributive [*τῶν διαβαλλόντων*, C1], which is no less ecphrastic). What they see is not so much a series of events, however, but a series of interpretations: they watch the deme being unwilling, being ignorant, being

<sup>5311</sup> τὸ ἐμόν γ' ἐμοὶ λέγεις ὅναρ, 563D2.

deceived (*οὐχ ἐκόντα ἀλλ’ ἀγνοήσαντά τε καὶ ἔξαπατηθέντα*), trying (*ἐπιχειροῦντα*: the first visualizable and therefore properly perceptual participle after the triad that described the deme's state of mind in the abstract) to injure themselves. Their reaction to what they see, introduced with punctual and climactic *τότ’ ήδη* (565C1), is a striking understatement (*ώς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικὸν γίγνονται*, C2): in the act of resisting they feel how few they truly are.

The talented having dug in their heels, a contest begins between them and the demagogical drones (C6-D3); but demes always show a tendency to choose a champion over themselves. Here Socrates inserts another axiom, particularly striking: the drone that emerges as champion will be like the man described in the story who tastes human flesh in the ritual of Lykian Zeus in Arcadia and is fated thereby to turn into a wolf. This axiom then introduces the second fateful moment in the development of tyranny, a description of the deed by which the boss-drone becomes tyrant by "tasting human flesh," as it were, done with three participles giving way to a series of five coordinate subjunctives in an extended protasis with participial modification interspersed (four participles in all: 565E3-566A4): "Whoever, in the position of boss (*προεστώς*), capturing the attention (*λαβών*) of the mob as it hangs wholeheartedly on his every word (*σφόδρα πειθόμενον*), fails to abstain (*μὴ ἀπόσχηται*) from tribal blood but by bringing unjust allegations (*ἐπαιτούμενος*), dragging into court (*ἄγων*) he performs murder (*μιαυφονῆ*) polluted by the snuffing out of a kinsman's life (*ἀφανίζων*), tasting tribal murder with his mouth and tongue (*γενόμενος*), and drives from home and kills and signals a division of property (*καὶ ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτεινύῃ καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ*) -- wouldn't it be necessary that such a one would either be killed by his enemies or else become tyrant and be changed from man into wolf?"

The apodosis is impersonal (*ἀνάγκη ... καὶ εἴμαρται*) but, for all its vivid third singular verbs and nominative participles, there is also something stunningly impersonal about the protasis, too. The individual that is the direct object and victim of all these participles and verbs is omitted! The transformation from man to wolf is presented dramatically rather than ecphrastically, but it takes place without our even seeing or having to imagine a victim, as if it took place wholly *within* the man that committed all those deeds. The sequence of subjunctives starts with the language of religious violation (*ἀπόσχηται, μιαυφονῆ*) specified by participles (*ἐπαιτούμενος* and *ἄγων* tell us his method is judicial, setting up the role of the mouth; and *ἀφανίζων* and *γενόμενος* explain *μιαυφονῆ* with striking metaphors). Thereupon three coordinate subjunctives are added to portray his acts with concrete detail (*ἀνδρηλατῇ, ἀποκτεινύῃ, ὑποσημαίνῃ*).

The ecphrastic syntax places all this into a subjunctive protasis, already a subordinate form, but then forgoes the dynamism of shifting to the indicative apodosis by inferring only an abstract judgment (*ἀνάγκη, etc.*) in the apodosis. Within that protasis it forgoes temporal division but simply places the verbs side by side and relies purely on semantics to make the point, the language of the courtroom done with participles modifying the language of religious taboo and closing with the language of judicial verdicts. Buried in the middle of all this is the hinge of the analogy with Lykian Zeus: the mouth that there in Arcadia ate human innards, is here the mouth and tongue that tasted kin-murder by speaking words in a courtroom. The ecphrastic style relies maximally on the reader to "connect the dots," giving him just enough syntactical clues and no more, and just enough semantical content to glimpse the whole meaning in a pastiche of brushstrokes that might as well be simultaneous. By making the reader do the work, it achieves elevation. Presenting an array of ideas already assumed, it is dogmatic, organizing thoughts rather than arguing for them; and in relying on explanations previously made it is evaluative.

Socrates continues in the aftermath with participles and place-holder verbs (A6-10): Hence arises

(γίγνεται) the Champion (*στασιάζων*) of the Deme who opposes the Holders of Wealth (*έχοντας*)! If banished (*ἐκπεσών*) but restored (*κατελθών*) he returns (*κατέρχεται* drawn out of that participle) as a fully formed tyrant (*ἀπειργασμένος*). His next problem is to find funding and the deme grants it to him, their state of mind described with two participles in *μέν / δέ*: fearing (*δείσαντες*) on his behalf (instead of their own) and sanguine (*θαρροῦντες*) about their own safety (rather than cautious). The coordinate participles leave it up to us to see that the deme has it backwards and should be fearing for themselves rather than him and should be cautious rather than sanguine (B10-11). Once the talented few emigrate, the evolution of the tyrant and tyranny is complete: he stands alone in the chariot of the state (C2-D4).

The description of life in the regime will naturally center on describing the life of the tyrant, which by a bold metonymy is immediately referred to as his *εύδαιμονία* (566D5, one step better than calling the tyrannical regime *καλλίστη* before even beginning to describe it: 562A4). Because this new subject is static, relative to the dynamic process that brought it about, we should expect more ecphrastics rather than less.

We begin (566D8ff) with something like his first day in office, described with finite indicatives rather than participles or infinitives. We have seen finite verbs used in ecphrasis just above (565E3-566A4): what made them ecphrastic was their open-textured syntactical coordination rendered articulate by the semantics. What is striking in the present case is the alternation between *καὶ* and *τε* as connectives both within and between the clauses (I underline them for clarity): *τοῖς μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελᾶτε καὶ ὀσπάζεται ... / καὶ οὕτε τύραννός φησιν ... ὑποσχνεῖται τε πολλὰ καὶ ιδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ / χρεῶν τε ἡλευθέρωσε ... καὶ διένειμε δῆμῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἐσυτῶν καὶ πᾶσιν / ἕλεώς τε καὶ πράος εἶναι προσποιεῖται* (D8-E4). The forward movement of proclitic *καὶ* alternating irregularly with the backward movement of enclitic *τε* adds a lilt of sweetness and light to the early moments of the tyrant's rule.

But that was only the *μέν* clause (D8). What comes with the *δέ* is the whole series of less attractive measures by which the tyrant finances his regime, as well as their increasingly disastrous sequelae, these described one by one in question and answer and culminating in the tyrant's attacking his own father -- which is of course the deme that spawned him -- and the spirited and indignant reply of this "father," all employing the usual balance of subordinate and ordinary constructions (567A1-569B5). The final picture of this happy regime calls him a parricide, and then closes with a look back onto the deme and how it got itself into this predicament (569B6-C4).

This last paragraph prefers participial periphrastics over simple finite forms (*όμολογουμένη ... εἴη, ἔμπεπτωκώς εἴη* [569B7-C2]) and otherwise consists of participles and adjectives only. The effect is to present a reflection on all that has happened, now resulting in a final state in which nothing more can happen: the son has killed his father and the deme is enslaved. The proverb cited about the frying pan and the fire is cast into participles (B8-C2), and then restated with an alternate metaphor about the garment of freedom (a quick and unexpected glance back to 557C5) exchanged for the wrapping of a slave that likewise relies on a single participle held to the very end (*μεταμπισχόμενος*, C4).

The treatment of the tyrannical regime finishes the first two parts of the four-part treatment of the fourth regime, and therefore the thirteenth and fourteenth parts of sixteen in all. It also ends Book Eight, so that the balance of the treatise, on the tyrannical personality, is left for Book Nine. The tyrannical regime occupied fully seven pages (562A-569C), about the same amount as the entire treatment of democracy, including both the regime and the democratic man (555B-562A), which itself was about as long as the treatment of both the previous two regimes and their men put together (547B-555B). Though something remains to be done, there is also a strong sense in which the Book

ends with a stop. In terms of form this is the first time a transition is summarized with such strong terms; as to the content, with the attack on the father, which is the deme, there is no more political capital to spend.

### 3D.2: The Tyrannical Man (Book Nine, 571A1-575A7)

Book Nine begins with the programmatic announcement that the tyrannical man is next. The prominent *αὐτός* indicates what we already knew, that what is coming is both the culmination and purpose of the entire narrative of the decline.

Immediately Socrates introduces a keynote for the treatment, a further differentiation among the pleasures he had divided at the beginning of the treatment of democratic man, who was in fact the last man he treated (558D4-559A7). Among the non-necessary pleasures some are unruly but in most cases manageable by training and discipline (571A7-C1). As before (559A8-C7) examples from experience are to be given, and we have two marvelous paragraphs (571C3-D4, 571D6-572B1), the first describing the bad pleasures which we encounter only in dreams, and the second describing a sleep that is exempt from them. The two paragraphs are an adumbration of the comparison of the most unjust with the most just man which is the goal of the whole treatise.

The unruly pleasures are the sorts that "wake up" when we fall asleep-- at least that part of us that is rational and calm and rules over the whole man; while the beastly and wild part, full of food or drink, wanders abroad and having driven sleep away seeks to replace it with its own character. From your experience you know that in this condition nothing is beyond it, cut loose and released as it is from shame as well as mindfulness. From an attempt to seduce and sleep with Mother it shrinks not at all, nor with any other whether it be god or man or beast, nor to hold off from any kind of feasting. In fact, it has no shortage whether of mindlessness or shamelessness (571C3-D4).

In its syntax this paragraph resembles the description of the fateful act by which a demagogical boss became a tyrant (565E3-A4):<sup>5312</sup> we have a mixture of participles and finite verbs, with subordination and ordination too. But still it is ecphrastic because the parts of the soul differentiated in Book Four, now broached with full explicitness, reintroduce and rely on a previously agreed framework in which the action of the soul is now described.<sup>5313</sup> The list describing the rational part (*λογιστικὸν καὶ ἡμερον καὶ ἄρχον* [C4]) is balanced by a list that characterizes the part of the soul that takes charge in its absence: *θηριώδές τε καὶ ὄγριον ἢ σίτων ἢ μέθης πλησθέν* (C5-6). The action of this part is then done with a pair of verbs, the second introduced with a circumstantial participle that tells its prerequisite (*ἀπωσάμενον*). The main assertion is now made, that in its dreams a soul ruled by this part will stop at nothing, deeming itself to have been cut loose (*λελυμένον*) and released (*ἀπηλλαγμένον*) from all shame and mindfulness. The pair of participles presents a physical metaphor and its moral interpretation, and the pair of dependent genitives (*αἰσχύνης / φρονήσεως*) again refer to the logistic and the thumoeidetic parts of the soul, leaving us to recognize that it is the appetitive part that is in charge. Proof that it will stop at nothing is then provided by a list of infinitives (C9-D2).

<sup>5312</sup> The overall structure again includes an extended protasis and a conclusion that appeals to the interlocutor for agreement: cf. 571C3-C6 with 565E3-566A2, and *οἴσθ' ὅτι* (571C7) with *ἄρα ... ἀνάγκη* (566A2).

<sup>5313</sup> The tripartite analysis lies behind all of the regimes and men of Book Eight, but since the treatment of oligarchy and democracy it has been submerged (cf. n.5294, *supra*), so that it seems almost new in this paragraph (cf. also *αἰσχύνης καὶ φρονήσεως* (C9) and its obverse *οὔτε ὀνοίας ... οὔτε ἀναισυντίας* (D3-4)).

dependent on οὐδὲν ὄκνεῖ which is placed in their midst (D1). Peculiar in this list is that the items are connected by postpositive τε rather than proclitic καί -- not only the several direct objects of the first verb (ἄλλω τε ὁτιοῦν, D1, which suggests that the opening τε might have gone with μητρί more than with ἐπιχειρεῖν and μείγνυσθαι) but also the second verb to the first verb (μιαιφονεῖν τε ὁτιοῦν, D2) and the third to the second (βρώματός τε ἀπέχεσθαι μηδενός, D2-3). The sense is that items could be added one after another *ad libitum*; but given the aposiopesis attaching to the final item<sup>5314</sup> we hardly relish the prospect. Instead Socrates summarizes by remarking on the absence of the other two psychic elements, whose presence might have prevented all this.

The second paragraph (D6-572B1) describes an alternate night of sleep, the sleep of the man whose soul is healthy and temperate. Like the first paragraph its overall structure is an extended protasis in ὅταν with apodosis supplied by οἶσθ' ὅτι and indicative, but this time the kind of vigorous alternation of finite participle and participle that we saw there (and in the passage it resembled in Book Eight), gives way to the stately and knowing rest of the ecphrastic style, with a single place-holder verb (εἰς ὕπνον ἥη, D7, brought forward with the words καθεύδῃ, A5, and ἀναπαύσηται, A7) providing a syntactical berth for eight juxtaposed participial phrases. When the man with a healthy balance in his soul is on his way to sleep (εἰς ὕπνον ἥη) he awakens (ἐγείρας) the rational part of his soul and feasts it (έστιάσας) on arguments beautiful and on researches, having come (ἀφικόμενος) to a conciliation within by having, first with respect to the appetitive part, given (δούς) it something but not too much, so that it would doze off and not bother the best part with either its joys or its sorrows but would allow that best part, pure and alone by itself, to think and strive to perceive what it does not know, whether something of the past the present or the future; and likewise<sup>5315</sup> with respect to the willful part having soothed (πραύνας) it, and does not try to go to sleep<sup>5316</sup> right after coming (ἔλθων) from an argument while his will is all astir -- nay rather it turns in, having brought peace (ήσυχάσας) to both those parts and having bestirred (κινήσας) instead the third part, in which thinking takes place, then it is, as you know, that it is most likely he will come in touch with truth and it is least likely that the unruly sights will appear in his dreams.

Surely it is one of the most beautiful sentences in all of Plato, and all its virtues are ecphrastic.

In the course of illustrating the unruly pleasures just as he had illustrated the necessary and non-necessary ones after drawing the distinction in the abstract, Socrates goes beyond the program (as he admits afterward, ἔξήχθημεν, B3) to fill out the picture by describing what, conversely, a life *without* the unruly pleasures might be like. The picture is inspiring, edifying and hopeful -- Adeimantus admiringly replies, παντελῶς οὔτως, B2 -- whereas, conversely, for the last twenty pages the spectacle of human existence we have not only been witnessing and undergoing but because of the ecphrastic style also conspiring with Socrates to articulate, is silly, sad and pitiable, and finally an ugly nightmare. But now a lighter touch, bathing us in simultaneous participles, enables us to feel the quiet joy of the just man's sleep. We already know, from the picture of tyranny we were served up in the last Book, that the revelation of the tyrannical personality that is coming will be a very great nightmare, indeed; and we might already feel that our refuge in this island of order, though a welcome relief from the decline we have been undergoing, will soon be even more sorely needed to gird us up against the devastating final

<sup>5314</sup> Βρώμα suggests the ἀνθρώπινον σπλάγχνον of 565D9, just as μιαιφονεῖν recalls 565E6.

<sup>5315</sup> ὡσαύτως δὲ καί (572A3-4), the first connective between the participial phrases so far, needed to point the parallelism of the thumoeidetic with the epithumetic above.

<sup>5316</sup> There is anacoluthon here (καθεύδων would have been more consistent with πραύνας and ᔁλθῶν), mitigated by the resemblance of the verb to the leading expression (εἰς ὕπνον ἥη), an anacoluthon similar to the one at 556D1 (cf. n.3832, *supra*).

vision with which we are about to be confronted.

The point of isolating the savage pleasures is to show that they lurk within every man, even those of us who are relatively moderate and civil. The evidence that they lurk within us is what happens in our dreams. This having been established as a sort of "keynote" (572B2-9), the treatment of the tyrannical man is ready to begin, first his evolution and then his nature (as set out at the opening of the Book, at 571A1-3). The first step, as in each of the other cases, is a fictional vignette of the son's development, beginning with his relation to his father.

Socrates first asks us to recall the "demotic" (i.e., democratic) father, and inserts something new, a thumbnail sketch of his own development as a sort of reminder (572B10-3A6). The first words, ἦν δέ ποι, by providing Socrates with a place-holder verb, enables him to compose the sketch entirely in participles (five in four lines), a nominative representing the young demotic (democratic) man-to-be (*τεθραμμένος*) that introduces a dative with ὑπό for the stingy (oligarchical) father under whose care he was raised. A pair of dative participles (*τιμῶντι, ἀτιμάζοντι*) can then be added to describe that father's values: he respects necessary desires only, and despises the non-necessary, the pleasures of frivolity and garish display. The indeterminacy inherent in the circumstantial participle *γιγνομένας*, by means of which these pursuits are introduced as predicates, leaves it to us to realize that this characterization belongs not to Socrates but to the stingy father (*ώς* could have been added, but did not need to be added). The reader should notice how his own decision to supply this interpretation in itself forces him to believe that the characterization is true -- i.e., verisimilar and appropriate, the analogues of truth in the realm of fiction.

Adeimantus agrees with the characterization (572C5), and Socrates then continues with the evolution and quality of life that the demotic youth grows into, starting immediately with a nominative participle (*συγγενόμενος*, C6) that relies on the nominative from the previous sentence for its antecedent. He is continuing to add brushstrokes to the picture by means of participles. As to his evolution, the demotic youth meets up with certain more subtle pleasure-lovers who convert him away from his father, but his inner nature keeps him from going all the way to perdition so that he ends up in the middle (C6-D1). The quality of his ensuing life is a moderate and decent enjoyment of everything, neither slavish nor unruly: emerging from oligarchic roots he has turned into a demotic man (D1-3).

My own summary of the evolution (C6-D1: "As to his evolution ... in the middle") employs two independent clauses and two subordinate clauses (relative and result clauses), but the Greek is done with four participles leading to a virtual place-holder indicative (*κατέστη*). My summary of the quality of the life that ensues for him ("The quality ... demotic man") consists of a place-holder ("is") providing place for a single predication ("enjoyment") modified by adjectives, an objective prepositional phrase, and a second pair of adjectives; the Greek is done with a place-holder verb followed by two more participles. The similarity between the constructions in the latter case (on the quality of life) evinces the fact that ecphrastic syntax is naturally suited to describing a state of affairs or a quality -- indeed that it is the "default" method for doing so. The very great difference between the former constructions (on the evolution), however, shows that the ecphrastic method can also be used even to describe a dynamic and evolving series of events, especially in Greek, even though the default syntax is more likely, like my paraphrase, to mix and combine ordinate and subordinate clauses. Socrates's use of the ecphrastic style to describe the evolution as well as the quality is therefore all the more emphatic.

Having rehearsed the development of the father from oligarchic roots to a demotic maturity,

Socrates can now turn to the demotic man's son who will become a tyrannical soul. We must first posit ( $\thetaές$ , D5) that as before the son will be raised in his father's ways and also will undergo similar experiences (D8-E4). This part is done with circumstantial participles *only* (two, D5-6, and then five, D8-E4, plus one attributive [ $\dot{\alpha}γόντων$ , E1]), all dependent on the parallel imperatives  $\thetaές$ , (D5) and  $\tauίθει$  (D8). In the first case the two participles repeat the language used to describe the (analogous) initial relationship between father and son in the previous generation (compare  $\gammaεγονότος$ ,  $\tauεθραμμένον$  [D6] with  $\gammaεγονώς$ ,  $\tauεθραμμένος$  [C1]); in the second the five participial phrases are meant to redo what was done in the description of the young democrat's evolution (C6-D1). First there is  $\gammaιγνόμενα$  (D8 [sc.  $\varepsilonίναι$ ], dependent on  $\tauίθει$  and standing in for  $\gammaενέσθαι$ ); then these (analogous)  $\gammaιγνόμενα$  are then re-done with an appositive consisting of a series of participial phrases concordant with  $\gammaιγνόμενα$ . They are introduced with  $\tauε$ , which might link them to what comes before but also ends up being corresponsive with a second  $\tauε$  below:  $\dot{\alpha}γόμενό τε είς πάσον παρανομίαν$  ( $\dot{\alpha}νομαζομένην δέ ... \dot{\epsilon}λευθερίαν$ ),  $\betaοηθοῦντά τε ... πατέρα ... τοὺς δ' αὐτούς παραβοηθοῦντας$  (D9-E4). The young man is led into *hybris*, though the leaders call it freedom; his father helps him, though the others counter-help him ( $\piαραβοηθοῦντας$  in this sense is a coinage). The choice of connectives is striking: a flaccid and naturally ambiguous  $\tauε$  (the first one appears to be connective but perhaps ends up being corresponsive), followed by a  $\deltaέ$  which is likewise hypological by its nature but whose full adversative potential is being exploited. It is the *content* of the four clauses that guides us to see their logical relations, relations that their connectives allow them to have rather than guiding us to see. Ultimately the reason we are able to understand what is being said is that it has been said before.

So we encounter another feature of the *ecphrastic* method, how its light touch relies on us to recognize allusions. In the present case the allusion has been announced by  $\tauὰ αὐτὰ \varepsilonκεῖνα$  (D8) but all through we have had ancillary adjectives or nouns or participial descriptors added by hypological connectives that allude to parallel passages or images or ideas within the previous stages of the "decline," with less explicit announcements than  $\tauὰ αὐτὰ \dot{\epsilon}κεῖνα$ , and the like. Again, there is a sense that the *ecphrastic* voice is telling us something we already know rather than trying to persuade us of something we do not know, as for instance by means of question and answer. Adeimantus's contributions have been corroborative insertions varying only in degree of emphasis;<sup>5317</sup> and several times Socrates has continued with the syntax of his previous remarks as if Adeimantus had said nothing at all.<sup>5318</sup> The oracular manner of the Muse with which we began has in fact never given way to something more open and dialogical: it is as if we are meant to receive all this as true for the same sort of reason we accepted what the Muses say as true (547A7).

The background situation of the young tyrannical type to be has been posited with this series of participial phrases (D8-E4). Its point of difference from the career of the young democrat-to-be will next be presented, with the ominous  $\dot{\sigma}ταν δέ$ .<sup>5319</sup> At the moment during the seesaw battle that these magical tyrant-makers realize they will never gain control of the young man any other way, they contrive ( $\muηχανομένους$ , carrying forward the construction with  $\tauίθει$  with still another participle) to

<sup>5317</sup> His responses merely effect a transition to Socrates's next point, e.g., 547E1, 548A5, 548B4, 549A9, 549C8, 549E3, 553B7, 553D1, 555E3, 556A4, 556B6, 556C4, 557E2, 558B1, 558D4, 560D8, 561B7, etc.

<sup>5318</sup> For such "bridged" syntax cf. 548B4, 549C8, 558B1.

<sup>5319</sup> The  $\deltaέ$  goes really with the ensuing apodosis and it is needed. Stallb. is misled by the unusual *ecphrastic* style and deletes it (as he does the  $\tauε$  at 575A2). Nowhere does he note or acknowledge the imposing style Socrates has adopted (except to notice the interesting  $\kappaαί$  between the participles at 549D2).

implant a certain desire in him (ἔρωτά τινα, E5). The sentence is then closed by a chiastically ordered double appositive that describes that desire: προστάτην (=A) τῶν ἀργῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτοιμα διανεμομένων ἐπιθυμιῶν (=B), ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν (=B) κηφῆνά τινα (=A) (572E5-573A2). With his ecphrastic manner Socrates is expanding on what he had said about the drones before, how the ease of democracy (ἀργῶν, κτλ.) enables them to come to power (ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν): this winged drone with a stinger is the "particularly forceful" (δριμύτατον) element within the drone-like class that we heard about at 564D4-E2.

Socrates gives Adeimantus an opportunity to agree with the new metaphor and then re-begins the tale of the fateful moment with another ὅταν (A4). The entourage that the drones had brought in when they took over the democratic man's soul (560D2-561A4, esp. λαμπρὸς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατάγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας) now becomes a vanguard that ushers in the master desire, which all the easy desires of democracy now will serve. The arrival of the vanguard is presented with nominative participles depicting our sensation of them in the order of their arrival (A5-6): the sound, the smell, the sight and finally the taste and the touch; two more participles then describe the mounting effect of their arrival on the democratic youth (αὔξουσαι τε καὶ τρέφουσαι, A7), now called a drone (κηφῆνι, 573A8), who has been sensing them; and the protasis is then summed up by a virtual place-holder verb (ἐμποιήσωσι, A7) since we already expect it from above (cf. ἐμποιήσαι [572E6]: the punctual aorist is here repeated). The apodosis is now revealed (by climactic τότε δή, A8), describing the arrival of the master passion with vigorous diction, metaphor, and syntactical subordination (A8-B4).

Adeimantus accepts this to be a perfect account of how the tyrannical personality comes to be, and Socrates now adduces confirmation from the data of empirical experience by means of question and answer. These data are summed up at C7-9 and now it is time to move on to the *life* of the tyrannical personality.

We first get a list of the wasteful daily activities with the place-holder γίγνονται (D2-4): these activities spawn still others (D7-E2: παραβλαστάνουσιν [D7] is simply a vivid synonym for γίγνονται), but then these bring about the result that the tyrannical profligate at some moment runs out of cash. At this moment (ominous ὅταν ... δή, E3) two reactions are arrayed within him, described (573E3-4A1) by infinitives in μέν and δέ and filled out with a nest of participles and other modifiers in subject accusative, the whole thing depending on the place-holder indicative construction, ἀνάγκη (sc. ἔστι), announced at the beginning (E3). It is ecphrastic in the way that it contrives to describe the two contending sides in simultaneous array without having to indicate which way things will go. Note also how a participle (here, ἐλαυνομένους) can introduce a noun (ἔρωτος) that is in turn modified by its own participle (ἡγουμένου) that takes its own noun (ταῖς ἄλλαις), which shows how ecphrastic syntax can in principle go on forever without "touching down" in a finite verb.

The shortfall in funds will not be tolerated, and so the unthinkable becomes a reality: the young man goes after his parents (574A6-B11). Socrates shrinks from believing the picture, which he presents ecphrastically with a drawn-out proleptic description, relying on participles and adjectives, of the two parents placed in an accusative that awaits a main verb for which they will serve as the hapless objects (ἔνεκα ... ἀρχαιότατον, B12-C3). He brings this to a culmination by asking Adeimantus whether he can conceive (δοκεῖ ... σοι) that the youth would beat and enslave his own parents (πληγαῖς τε ..., C3-6). These descriptions of the parents embody the point of view of the tyrannical youth at the same time that they condemn that point of view -- irony being still another power of the ecphrastic method that derives from its prerogative for unexplained juxtaposition. In the comparison of νεωστὶ φίλης καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας ἐταίρας (B12-13) and τὴν πάλαι φίλην καὶ ἀναγκαίαν μητέρα (B13-C1), οὐκ ἀναγκαίας is approbatory from the young man's view but derogatory from the point of

view of Socrates and Adeimantus; likewise ἀναγκαῖαν, which means to the youth that he must care for her but to Socrates and Adeimantus that she is truly related to him<sup>5320</sup> and, like the necessary pleasures, is something that his life needs. A similar ambiguity affects these same terms as used of the father. Similarly νεωστί / πάλαι can each be derogatory as well as approbatory, as can ἀρχαιότατον, meaning the most basic or fundamental as well as the most hoary and out of date.

Having pillaged his parents' wealth he roves abroad, and the description is vigorous and vivid but replete with ancillary descriptors all along the way (574D1-575A7): First, οἰκίας ... τοίχου (574D3) elaborated with strikingly specific ἡ τινος ὁψὲ νύκτωρ ιόντος τοῦ ἴματίου (D3-4); and then the δόξαι about the fine and the shameful that he held from youth (D5-6), about which he adds, αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμέναι, δορυφοροῦσαι τὸν Ἐρωτα (D7-8). They will master him with Eros's help, αἱ πρότερον μὲν ὅναρ ἐλύοντο ἐν ὑπνῷ. The δέ clause then changes subjects from the pleasures to the man they have taken over (τυραννευθεὶς δέ, E2) and he is presented to us with an ecphrastic apodosis of simultaneous attributes supported by place-holder verbs (έγένετο, γενόμενος, οὔτε ἀφέζεται [a litotes done with negated, instead of positive, verb]), followed by an adversative apodosis (ἀλλά) that continues with place-holder participles providing berths for adjectives (ζῶν, ὕν) and then leaves us with him wreaking a noisy havoc (θόρυβον) described with extended balanced participles (A4-6).

With this, the evolution and life of the tyrannical type is complete and the entire treatise is finished.

### 3E.A Note on the Evaluation of Plato's Style in Antiquity

This detailed explication of the style of this section of the *Republic* might enable us to answer whether the chapters in which Longinus famously praises Plato are meant to refer to this passage or to some other one (cf. n.5301, supra). In ch.12 he is at pains to distinguish τὸ ὕψος from αὔξησις. For him, τὸ ὕψος lies in the δίαρμα, while αὔξησις relies on πλήθος. He associates the latter with Plato and the former with the directness of Demosthenes. Then comes a lacuna after which the text resumes in mid-sentence, as follows: πλουσιώτατα καθάπερ τι πέλαγος εἰς ἀναπεπταμένον κέχυται πολλαχῆ μέγεθος (the passage Adam quotes in connection with 559D). After then briefly comparing Demosthenes to Cicero, Longinus announces (ch.13, *init.*) that he will revert to ὁ Πλάτων ... τοιούτῳ τινὶ χεύματι ἀψοφητὶ βέων, from which we can infer that the subject of the clause after the break was Plato. He goes on to make the point that even Plato's ample waves of discourse are capable of achieving ὕψος, and he quotes as proof a passage from *Rep.*, namely, 586A, which comes after the treatment of the regimes.

That passage is characterized by expansive and indulgent elaboration and detail, and in this it embodies our ecphrastic style; but its alternation between subordinate and ordinary constructions along the way, to which it owes its undulating vigor, departs from the static and cumulative assembling of a picture by means of nouns, adjectives and participles with place-holder verbs that is the salient characteristic of ecphrasis. Thus, to associate Longinus's πλουσιώτατα καθάπερ τι πέλαγος εἰς ἀναπεπταμένον κέχυται πολλαχῆ with the ecphrastic method used in the treatment of the regimes might be wrong.

Conversely the style that Dionysius of Halicarnassus (whom Adam also quotes [*Pomp.2*, which is copied in *Dem.5-6*]) criticizes as being Plato's high style, does resemble the style we are calling ecphrastic. He illustrates his criticism (*Dem.7-8*) from several passages in the *Phaedrus* among which

<sup>5320</sup> Another of the meanings of ἀναγκαῖος in this passage: cf. Shorey *ad loc.*, citing Eur. *Androm.* 671.

the syntax at 238BC is particularly ecphrastic. His criticism of that passage's prolixity (*τοσαύτην ἐκμηκύνας περίφρασιν*) echoes the general criticism with which he began (Dem.5):

... μελαίνει τε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ ζόφῳ ποιεῖ παραπλήσιον ἔλκει τε μακρὸν ἀποτείνασα τὸν νοῦν, συστρέψαι δέον ἐν ὄνόμασιν ὀλίγοις. [...] μάλιστα δὲ χειμάζεται περὶ τὴν τροπικὴν φράσιν, πολλὴ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, ἄκαιρος δ' ἐν ταῖς μετωνυμίαις, σκληρὰ δέ καὶ οὐ σώζουσα τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐν ταῖς (μεταφοραῖς).

In particular we recognize the obscurity (μελαίνει, ζόφῳ), the sustained incompleteness of expression (ἀποτείνασα τὸν νοῦν), the heaping of appositives (πολλὴ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις), and the misleading metonymies (ἄκαιρος δ' ἐν ταῖς μετωνυμίαις).

Style for Plato, however, who is less bound by the chains that bind others, may be assumed to embody the content; whereas the style critics, whether Longinus, Dionysius, or Demetrius, tend ultimately to evaluate style by the personal congeniality of the author and his respect for the reader. If Plato uses an obscure style it will be for a purpose, and it is this purpose we must grasp. And surely we take our own philology too seriously if (with Adam) we excuse what appears to us to be faults of grammar by the expedient of Longinus's four chapters (33-36) where he advocates that leniency in such matters must be accorded to "greatness" -- chapters whose content reveals little more than his awareness of the limitations intrinsic to his own science.

#### 4. Wisdom in Hindsight

The program Glaucon and Socrates had adopted at the beginning for reviewing the regimes, despite the many points of incoherence in its formulation and glitches and detours in its execution, has for all that succeeded to keep us on track through the sixteen parts. As elsewhere -- paradigmatically in Book Five with its trumping of Polemarchus's paradoxes, and in Books Six and Seven with the failure of Adeimantus and then Glaucon to finish the ascent to dialectic -- we may now look back at what we have read, to learn what the program has enabled Socrates to say, despite its reversals and failures.

#### 4A. Decline as Disorder among the Constituents.

Let us attempt to summarize the devolution according to the principle enunciated in Book Four (though it was not systematically applied in Book Eight) that the inferiority of other regimes and souls are due to disorders in the three elements constituting both polis and soul, namely, Reason (perfected by paideia), Will (the natural ally of the good, though it Honors it as extrinsic<sup>5321</sup>), and Desire (appearing now as a desire for Pleasure and then as a desire for the Wealth, the means of acquiring it: 580E5-81A1). I capitalize the terms that refer, shiftingly, to the Constituents. Here is a summary along these lines:

The admixture of metals creates a conflict between the forces of Reason and Desire in the ruling group and the two resign themselves to a compromise governed by the element between them, the

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<sup>5321</sup> Cf.44IA2-3.

Will.<sup>5322</sup> Ruling now consists only of denying the hegemony of either, since the Will both fears Reason<sup>5323</sup> and feels Desire,<sup>5324</sup> but having turned its back on the pattern of Reason<sup>5325</sup> no longer knows how to manage desire except by Fortitude.<sup>5326</sup> Next these Prideful rulers notice each other's Wealth and their Envy drives them to get more and more.<sup>5327</sup> They neglect virtue, which only Reason knew,<sup>5328</sup> and their neglect only allows the lower and irresponsible Desires to grow.<sup>5329</sup> Finally they confer all Honor<sup>5330</sup> on Wealth, allocating all hegemony to it. Desire<sup>5331</sup> now rules, but it rules only to its own detriment since in quelling its own Desires merely for the sake of saving Money that is useless<sup>5332</sup> except to procure them, it only allows them to fester repressed and to grow, hastening the moment when they will rebel. At the same moment that Wealth becomes the highest good, nothing good is left for it to buy except the objects of epithumetic desire.<sup>5333</sup> The ruling element is captured and ruled by the dilemma of having its cake and eating it, too,<sup>5334</sup> even though its rueful dedication<sup>5335</sup> to amassing a fortune elicits the admiration of most men.<sup>5336</sup> Insofar as the Will and the Reason are constituents of the state and the soul, they cannot be utterly abolished, but under the regime of Desire the self loses consciousness of its constituents and becomes a playground for "infra-personal" forces it no longer recognizes or understands,<sup>5337</sup> so that the very operation of those constituents barely shows through in a description of the man's behavior. When he resigns himself to chance as if to cancel the operation of Choice and Will, and insists on enjoying things that come his way on an equal and democratic footing,<sup>5338</sup> it is Reason that must invert the meaning of words<sup>5339</sup> and Will, after all,

<sup>5322</sup> The betweenness is described at 439E-441C.

<sup>5323</sup> 547E.

<sup>5324</sup> 548AB.

<sup>5325</sup> ὅσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, 548B6-7.

<sup>5326</sup> 548B7-C2.

<sup>5327</sup> 550D10-E2, properly interpreted: τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν ἀπηργάσατο means "they bring it about (empiric aorist) that their own amount of wealth (τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν) should be comparable (τοιοῦτον) to that of the others" (τοιοῦτον eagerly proleptic).

<sup>5328</sup> Placing it, as it were, onto the scales by which value (τιμή) is assessed in the market: 550E4-8.

<sup>5329</sup> 554B7-C2, 555D3-5, 555E5-6A1-2.

<sup>5330</sup> Note the repeated use of τιμ- words, straddling in their meaning value, honor, and monetary worth: τιμώτερον / ἀτιμώτερον, 550E5-6; τιμωμένου / ἀτιμώτερον, 551A1-2; ἐπαινοῦσιν / θαυμάζουσιν / εἰς ἀρχὰς ἄγουσιν // ἀτιμαζουσι, A9-10.

<sup>5331</sup> The ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ φιλοχρηματικόν: the connection was first made at 436A1, then described at 442A5-B3, and then explained at 580.

<sup>5332</sup> The guidance gained from paideia is absent since paideia itself has been abandoned as unprofitable: the λογιστικόν that had known logos blended with music (549B6-7) is confined to bookkeeping, and the θυμοειδές that had admired at least the gymnastic half of the paideia (548B7-C2, 549A6-7) may now honor and praise only wealth: 533D1-7.

<sup>5333</sup> One is reminded of the demiurges at their leisure, 420D5-E7.

<sup>5334</sup> Hence the oxymoronic juxtaposition of ἐπιμέλεια and βία (552E2, 553C1-2), and the expression ἐπιεικεῖ τινι ... βίᾳ, 554C12.

<sup>5335</sup> 553B8-C4.

<sup>5336</sup> 554A11.

<sup>5337</sup> αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς κτλ 559D9-10; 560B7-10.

<sup>5338</sup> ἐξ ἵσου, 557A4; ἀπὸ κλήρων, A5; potentially ominous ἐπίῃ, 558A1; ισότητά τινα κτλ, C5-6; 561A8-9; 561B3-4.

<sup>5339</sup> The pleasures install ἀλαζόνες λόγοι into the acropolis of the young man's soul, but the

that must force the unequal to be equal.<sup>5340</sup> He does nothing but enjoy himself, and his loss of direction finally<sup>5341</sup> takes its toll. A master Desire<sup>5342</sup> and its Pleasure conquers his soul and irreversibly expels all measure and temperance.<sup>5343</sup> Rather than say he pursues pleasure it becomes more accurate to say that pleasure pursues, and finally conquers, him.<sup>5344</sup> In the end he is nothing but a conduit for the pouring out of his own substance.<sup>5345</sup>

#### 4B. Political Decline as a Mere Vehicle for Exposing the Destiny of the Soul

Regardless of the methodology and its assumptions about the dynamics of change, about the relation between process and result, and about the relation between political forms and human personality types, there is nothing to contradict the idea that the account of the regimes and the men in tandem might at bottom be a vehicle for presenting a pathology of the soul, in particular the tripartite soul and its order as discovered and articulated in Book Four.

Even the most superficial looking-back will show that this is true. The transition from aristocracy to timocracy was essentially a devolution from the best part of the soul ruling, to a compromise between the higher (*λογιστικόν*) and lower (*ἐπιθυμητικόν*) parts that in effect put the middle part (*θυμοειδές*) in charge, presiding over a struggle between beauty and truth on the one hand and wealth and pleasure on the other, but covering over the struggle with an aegis of respectability (*τιμοκρατία*). This unstable arrangement gave way to a new hegemony under the rule of a ruefully prudent appetite, employing the motivating part (*θυμοειδές*) and the calculating part (*λογιστικόν*) now as mere counselors for the acquisition of wealth. Such a soul sacrifices all values for money, tolerating the unemployment and withering away of any of the forces and powers within it that give it no material profit, using them and abusing them only for their cash value (oligarchy); but its neglect of the proper work of reason (namely, culture) allows the lower pleasures to grow within him. These next invade the seat of authority and pervert it to their own ends, using Mind as a policy-maker to declare the equality of the unequal and to invert the meaning of all moral terms, leaving only freedom, which in the absence of Judgment and Pride tends toward the slaking of bodily desires, though it still includes indulging the moribund twitchings of Reason and Pride, but only when desire sees fit (democracy). In the end this growing regime of Desires becomes organized on its own terms, and all the easy desires are subordinated to one master desire that "plays for keeps," enslaving the rest of the soul to itself.

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λόγοι are false, inverting the meaning of all moral terms (560C2-1A4).

<sup>5340</sup> 558B1-C1, C5-6; 561C3-4.

<sup>5341</sup> The democratic sons are neglectfully (*ήμεληκότας*, 556C4) brought up by their money-loving fathers *ἀπαιδεύτως* (559D7), which means both incompetently (cf. *ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς πατρός*, 560B1) and destitute of the paideia (*κενήν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν*, 560B8-9) that a competent upbringing would include and that might equip the young man to know what is happening inside him (*ὑποτρεφόμεναι*, 560A9). While the wealthy fathers generally could keep their son's desires under control half the time, the democratic re-compromise of the sons rendered the sons they subsequently raised only one chance in four against the bad appetites (compare *εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῦ*, 572D1, with *ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ ταύταις ἐπιθυμίαις*, E2).

<sup>5342</sup> Sexual pleasure is suggested by the imagery of 573A4-B1: *ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὐξουσαί τε καὶ τρέφουσαι πόθου κέντρον ἐμποίησαί τῷ κηφῆνι, τότε δὴ δοροφορεῖται τε ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ οἰστρῷ ...*

<sup>5343</sup> καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης, 573B4.

<sup>5344</sup> ἀρχόμενον, 559D1.

<sup>5345</sup> 568E-9C; 574BC.

But the slaking of desire creates no revenue and the soul must scrounge around for resources from the outside to pay its expenses. In the end nothing can be spared, and finally it consumes its own source or substance -- but the story stops. Here, just before this darkest and final state, Socrates reminds us of the healthy soul and its order (571D6-2B1), by reascending to the vantage point<sup>5346</sup> from which the descent began.

It would be unwise to reduce the many facets of this extraordinary treatise to some one thing.<sup>5347</sup> But of the several levels on which it operates, surely the most important is that of the inward order of the soul, the order discovered at the conclusion of Book Four. It is therefore not too much to say that the goal of the whole ramshackle method and all of its assumptions has primarily been to provide a vehicle for revealing the pathologies of the soul. The principle that regimes change only when the ruling class changes, makes it possible to characterize the distinct pathologies in terms of which wrong natural element is in charge. The principle that civic regimes come from predominant personality types enables Socrates again<sup>5348</sup> to project onto mere political institutions personalistic understandings that they might embody so as to keep the allegory alive and keep the audience open to the illumination of reason by shielding it from feeling the sting of criticism. The idea that one regime comes from another enables him to show how the reorganization of the soul's parts truly does lead in a certain direction: that bad choices do have unforeseen and unintended consequences some of which remain unnoticed (as for instance when the oligarch subjugates reason to his own ends and reason then becomes so weak that it can be misused to subvert meanings; or that when he subjugates pride and honor to those alone who have wealth, he has surrendered the ability to emulate honorable behavior even if it is merely out of envy) while others become forces for disorder (as the ὄπος of oligarchy makes possible the radical disenfranchisement of citizens, which in turn spawns a class of drones that will lead to its own demise; or the deme's gospel of freedom brings about the insouciant assignation of its own sovereignty to a tyrant).

In fact it is only as metaphors for states of the individual soul that the sequence aristocracy – timocracy – oligarch --, democracy, and tyranny constitutes a natural declension. While the political sequence could have gone otherwise (as Aristotle was the first to assert), one needs only remove the sections about the regimes and set the four parts of the narrative about the soul's decline end to end: the logic of their development requires nothing from the intervening passages on the regimes. While the latter are little stories and need to be verisimilar, exactly because they must be verisimilar they consist of events that could have gone otherwise; but the former -- the stages of devolution in the personality – are much more inevitable and almost predetermined as if by gravitational forces and the coefficients of the resistance of materials.

#### 4C. The Decline as a Study in the Relation of Fathers and Sons

The events in both arenas, the arena of the regimes and the arena of the persons, are depicted with painful accuracy; but while the devolution of regimes is pitiable, the devolution of the sons' relations to their fathers are likely to evoke a deeper emotional response in the hearts of the sons or fathers that read them.

In the first instance the son's courage is both undermined and (Oedipally) stimulated by his

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<sup>5346</sup> ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς, 445C4.

<sup>5347</sup> Shorey very succinctly asserts that what gives the analogy between man and state cogency here "is the cumulative impression of the detail it makes possible" (2.lii).

<sup>5348</sup> As he did in Books 2 through 4, searching for the best state.

mother.<sup>5349</sup> The household slaves, the other familiars of his tender youth,<sup>5350</sup> and then the public at large, only add to his being distracted away from his father's advice. He knows inside that his father is right<sup>5351</sup> and has to digest the fact that he lacks the courage to stand with him against the rest of the world; his own love of honor then represents the amount of honorability owed to his virtuous father that he can bear to inherit, and with compelling psychological economy this same love acknowledges the mortgage he owes to public opinion.

When he becomes a father, in turn, his son does honor him implicitly; but since the father has now surrendered his true worth to the opinions that others have of him he has lost the autarky of virtue. Sooner or later the son recognizes this, but in the absence of an awareness of virtue, due to a degradation of his education that lays too strong a stress on outward acts (gymnastic), he is mortified by his father's downfall and has no recourse. Betrayed by what he now has learned was a reliance on mere opinion, he resolves to escape vulnerability. By an overreaction he enthrones wealth in his soul, but knowing deeper down that wealth lacks and does not deserve honor, he debases himself by investing it, cynically, with the empty pomp of a Persian king. His rueful soul contracts to the regimen of a bank balance, recognizing only increase and decrease in the total,<sup>5352</sup> with virtue's value being only that it might protect the sum (indeed when there is no financial loss at stake his conduct is despicable).<sup>5353</sup> He comes to shun contests of honor not because honor is a fragile asset, as his father's experience showed him in the past, but because to allow the desire for it to waken in himself might cost him too much in the future.<sup>5354</sup>

By the time he, in turn, becomes a father honor and culture and virtue are long gone. His son sees in him only a stingy man forcing himself to deny his unnecessary pleasures while doing nothing to understand them, his only purpose in life being to maintain savings that he cannot spend, neglecting even his son all the while. Although the father's distinction between needful and unneeded pleasures fosters virtues of discipline and industriousness admired by *hoi polloi*, only culture and mindfulness can truly immunize<sup>5355</sup> a man against the ingenious seductions that pleasure can wield, and the son, now unguided, now becomes their prey. As if they were a force outside him these many pleasures now unify and rise up against the jejune hegemony of stingy industriousness he had learned from his father which he resented more than anything else for the way it ousted him<sup>5356</sup> from his father's care. What reason he may have seen his father use for calculation he now sets free, allowing the sophistries of pleasure, which are of course only his own idiosyncratic pleasures and his own idiosyncratic sophistries, to invert the language of moderation (the culture that could recover or give him an account of the meaning of such words is long since gone). Freedom, the son now believes, is the all. Unbeknownst to himself, and yet perfectly aware of it, his will and his reason are now playthings of the pleasures that

<sup>5349</sup> Her charge of ἀνανδρία (549D6) will leave an especially indelible mark on him.

<sup>5350</sup> οἱ δοκοῦντες εὖνοι εἶναι (549E4-5) describes exactly his innocent naivete as to his familiars.

<sup>5351</sup> This is what ἐγγύθεν means at 550A7.

<sup>5352</sup> ἐξ ἐλαττόνων χρημάτων πλείω 553D4; ἀπὸ παντὸς περιουσίαν ποιούμενος (554A10-11)

<sup>5353</sup> 554C4-D3.

<sup>5354</sup> 555A3.

<sup>5355</sup> μόνος, in the clause ὃς μόνος ἐγγενόμενος σωτήρ ἀρετῆς διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι (549B6-7), goes with σωτήρ, not ἐγγενόμενος as it is often taken.

<sup>5356</sup> The son is among the unspecified ἄλλα that the father neglects: this is what makes Socrates's continual use of the expression τῶν ἄλλων, ambivalent even of gender (556C4, 562B6, 562C5; and contrast τῆς ἄλλης, 554C1 and D3), so poignant (it is not equal to "all else" as it is almost universally translated: there is no πάντα [πάντες?]).

entertain him: one day he diets and the next he debauches.

When he in turn becomes a father, his son is left to discover the rest of the ravaging that his own ignorant resignation to pleasure has in store for him by way of a legacy, namely, the operation of those pleasures decent men know only in their nightmares. That his son should return to reduce and overpower him in his older age with his youthful strength, is a fitting penalty for the father having resigned the authority of age.

In the second iteration (toward oligarchy) the father can truly run aground since what he came to rely on was the opinion of others, and when he does the son enthrones and idolizes wealth as a cure against having his admiration ever dashed again; but in the third iteration (toward democracy) the son feels no such deference for this father. In seeing his father embrace wealth he only learns he is not worth embracing himself, and now he expresses his frustrated envy of wealth by giving it away. In the fourth iteration (toward tyranny) the liberality that the fourth son inherits as idleness leaves him prey to whatever desire may occupy him, and he finds himself enslaved to it, and wakens into living a nightmare in which he finds himself willing to murder his father at its behest.

The story is credible, and because credible, powerful. We may know from the reaction it invokes in us that such a story would be the most eloquent and unforgettable way to bring home to the young sons of Ariston the dangers of toying with psychic disorder, and with the order of the tripartite soul that they reached at the end of Book Four.

## 5. THE WORK REMAINING

The unjust life that Thrasymachus somehow made so attractive now needs to be reviewed in the context of the soul's pathology that has been revealed. This is the work of the rest of Book Nine. In particular the result of the story splits Thrasymachus's vision: by him the tyrant is conceived in terms of the outward show, and the question of his own inner autonomy is obscured by the fealty shown him by the others that flock about him though he has not earned it. We may therefore ask, Is Thrasymachus's tyrant Socrates's tyrannical man (*τυραννικός*) or is he Socrates's tyrant (*τύραννος*)? He is not Socrates's tyrant since it is only that man's inner circle of toadies that admire him, and they only feign it, while his overall position is insecure. Is he then Socrates's tyrannical man, racked by a desire within himself that tyrannizes him? Despite all appearances, the answer is Yes. Anyone who is unlucky enough to have been a slave to passion knows the delusion by which he can forget that he is enslaved while he enslaves others. Deep down, if he is being consumed by his passions he senses that he can provide them still more of himself to consume, by himself consuming others. Only the man whose better parts are being abused by passion can fantasize that he restores these better parts, his autonomy and his dignity, by stealing the dignity and autonomy of others. But of course, in the real world, the people around him won't tolerate the deviant behavior by which he sustains this delusion in himself, and he is left alone to face a private uphill battle, trying to stay ahead of the forces that consume him though unable to, since they consume him from within.

Thrasymachus portrays the tyrant as a man who wants to ascend to this "office" and whose fellows welcome his abuse. But the portrayal only portrays the craven man's delusion about himself! In truth he is a man who has already given up on himself and for exactly this reason wants to ascend to tyrant, and the image of himself ascending and being accepted by his fellows is his ultimate delusion since once he reaches this pinnacle his neighbors in fact will no longer ignore him but will finally

dispense with him. That is, he is the man that Socrates portrays as internally tyrannized (the τυραννικός), who then is *unlucky* enough to become a tyrant (τύραννος) in fact.

END OF APPENDIX SEVEN

## Appendix 8: Adeimantus ἀποκρινόμενος.

Some readers of Plato who plan to write about him act as though their job were to watch for a thesis to be asserted and then review the reasons “Plato” gives for it so as to write about whether the reasons are adequate. The refutable content or “thesis” of Adeimantus’s speech, near the beginning of Book Two, could only be said to be that the corpus of Greek poetry, despite its reputation for wisdom, fails to guide bright young men toward a life of virtue and even fails to discourage them from imitating the usual patterns of self-serving conduct they see around them. However, I have seen no writing that has noticed the affective content of the speech – that it is the “testament” of a son dissatisfied by the way his father has brought him up, and that as such it raises both perennial and recognizable questions about the transmission of values from father to son, and indeed the structure of the father-son relationship itself.

The perennial structure of the relation of father and son involves each of them in a difficult tension between his desire for the other’s love on the one hand, and his aspirations about each other’s virtue on the other. The son wants his father to be the god he originally thought he was, and to teach him justice; while the father hopes the son will become his legacy in the world and thereby justify<sup>5357</sup> his life. The father, however, is not a god, just another mortal, and as the son moves out into the world he discovers as much. Maturity arrives when he comes to the resolution that winning his father’s love is less important than becoming a man on his own, free of his father’s faults. Still, the paternal roots keep reasserting themselves and the son constantly finds himself whip-sawed between going forward into the unknown and regressing back toward the known, often until his father is dead.

There is perhaps less need to describe the father’s problem, since every father remembers being a son and, as someone has said, the child is father to the man. Within the corpus of the dialogues we have two dramatic glimpses of the father’s dilemma, the case of Crito at the end of the *Euthydemus*, and the case of Lysimachus and Melesias at the beginning of the *Laches*. Crito respects Socrates but relies on his presence to recreate in him the state of mind he respects him for (306D6-E3), so that in his absence he can easily be dissuaded of it (304D3ff). He makes the father’s error of hoping to compensate for his own wishywashiness by sending his son to a teacher that is more reliable than himself; but he has a further problem: all the teachers that advertise seem to him to be perfect weirdoes (306E3-4: πάννυ ἀλλόκοτος). The problem is, Crito is not confident as to what is and what is not philosophy.<sup>5358</sup>

The *Laches* begins with Lysimachus confessing that he and his friend Melesias have discovered that the only edifying stories they have to tell their sons are not about their own behavior and accomplishments in life but the military and political exploits of their fathers (and while on the one hand they blame their own lassitudinous unimportance on their fathers’ neglect of them, they have both in fact named their sons after fathers!). Therefore, because they want to do the best they can for their sons, they ask Laches and Nicias to recommend teachers of fighting in armor they can send them to (*Lach.*179A1-180A5). But Laches and Nicias confess they too were too busy with public affairs to pay proper attention to their sons and should hardly be giving Lysimachus any advice, but marvel that

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<sup>5357</sup> ὄρθοῦν (*Lach.*181A4).

<sup>5358</sup> Cf. T.H.Chance, *Plato's Euthydemus: Analysis of What Is and What Is Not Philosophy* (Univ.Calif. 1992).

Lysimachus should not be asking Socrates about this, who is right there with them, for Socrates is always busying himself with the topics they are worried about (180A6-D3). Lysimachus now remembers his sons had mentioned a Socrates about whom they had the most wonderful things to say, and now he puts two and two together and realizes the Socrates before him must be the son of his old, lifelong friend, Sophroniscus (180D4-181A2). Lysimachus praises Socrates for justifying<sup>5359</sup> his father's reputation as an excellent man, but Laches reminds Lysimachus that Socrates has "justified" his "fatherland" as well, by his military exploits at Delium, and so Lysimachus is completely certain that he should ask Socrates for advice about his sons – and asks him whether he should have them learn fighting in armor! (181A4-181C9) Think how any son that had found the company of Socrates so worthwhile would be embarrassed by his father acting this way!<sup>5360</sup>

Third, we do have a stunning glimpse of Socrates's manner of fathering. At the very end of his defense speech he enjoins the jurors who unjustly condemned him merely out of anger for the pain he gave them in his interviews, to take out their anger on his children and inflict that same pain upon them, in case they find his children valuing money or anything else above virtue or having a high opinion of themselves – that in doing this the jurors would be giving him just reparations (for they will be carrying on his own mission), as well as treating his children with justice (as Socrates's treatment of them was itself just).<sup>5361</sup> We know nothing of his sons but we can guess it was such fathering as this that Adeimantus, and any son, would crave.

To return to Adeimantus, who casts himself as a son, his speech does not in fact criticize the poetic tradition of Greece but his parents' negligent reliance on it. Accordingly, he makes his point not by presenting a theory of good and bad poetry nor by citing statistics about how many well-educated young men turn out to be scoundrels, but only by describing what is likely to be happening within a young man without the parents knowing. He knows what is happening within the young man because it happened, and is still happening, within himself. He is talking, that is, about his own experience. The thesis about poetry is less important to him, and in fact less important to his future well-being, than the crisis he still feels within himself; and in this respect the most important problem that his speech reveals about himself is that he still is bent on blaming his problems on his parents and his elders, on the whole tradition, and even on Socrates,<sup>5362</sup> rather than taking responsibility for himself and "moving on." The mendacity he discovers within poetry and its interpretation, which he reveals to us by his sequence of run-throughs,<sup>5363</sup> is the very image or projection of the mendacity he feels he has been subjected to by his parents, who, he feels, neglected him in his upbringing by deferring to the poets, and did so hypocritically.

Adeimantus delivers the speech to Socrates – he could not deliver it directly to his father (even assuming Ariston is still alive) nor to his other guardians. By the same token in the very act of presenting it to Socrates, who is his elder, he has more or less consciously pushed Socrates into an avuncular role.<sup>5364</sup> Socrates notices he has done this and immediately rises to the occasion in his

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<sup>5359</sup> ὄρθοῖς, 181A4.

<sup>5360</sup> Conversely the precious description we have of Sophroniscus, that he was "best of men" (181A5) without reference to any exploits, suggests the model Socrates has in mind as a father to his own sons, which we hear something about at the very close of his defense speech (41E2-42A2), to hear which would certainly bring his sons to tears.

<sup>5361</sup> *Apol.* 41E1-42A2.

<sup>5362</sup> Everyone is brought in toward the end of his speech: 366D5-367A4.

<sup>5363</sup> This is why it is structured as it is, in the form of three run-throughs: cf. Commentary. §2A2.

<sup>5364</sup> His manner, to scold Socrates for thinking his brother had already said enough (362D2-E1),

response by mentioning Adeimantus's father (367E6-368A7). His subsequent proposal that they look for justice in the neutral – dare I say avuncular? -- medium of an imaginary city is just the sort of thing an uncle can do.<sup>5365</sup>

We may apply the old maxim, “As a man speaks,<sup>5366</sup> so is he.” In an unconscious imitation of the way he feels he has been brought up, Adeimantus has developed the habit of quoting others rather than speaking with his own voice. Such behavior indicates that a person is more acutely pained and despondent about his own failings than sanguine about his ability to cope and deal with them. Because misery loves company he is quicker to condemn the shortcomings of others than to sympathize with and forgive them.<sup>5367</sup> Most poignantly of all when he meets a man like Socrates, whom he believes has mastered the anxieties and the vices he fears he himself cannot, he treats him with a conflicted deference,<sup>5368</sup> combining in a single gesture his desperation<sup>5369</sup> with a self-protective show of indifference.

This psychological profile<sup>5370</sup> accounts for all the details of behavior that Plato has given Adeimantus as interlocutor through the course of the dialogue, and, more poignantly, accounts for the role he is given in the overall plot. He bluffs having knowledge by criticizing others for lacking it;<sup>5371</sup> his intrusions into the conversation tend to be at the expense of those whose feet he is stepping on;<sup>5372</sup> he presents his own opinions as belonging to others in order to voice them but at the same time provide himself a way to be forgiven for believing them in the first place.<sup>5373</sup> He is quick to criticize persons who might not have reached the understanding Socrates has just now brought him to,

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suggests he is deliberately unconscious of what he is doing! Cf. nn.3007 and 5375, *infra*.

<sup>5365</sup> I hope we will someday say that in Plato's *Republic* justice in the city is “uncle” to justice in the man!

<sup>5366</sup> Or, in the dialogical context, “As he plays answerer (ἀποκρινόμενος), so is he.”

<sup>5367</sup> E.g., 371C5-D3, τῶν πολλῶν 426D5-6 (and n.); καὶ μάλα γελοίως at 505B11 (with n. *ad loc.*).

<sup>5368</sup> Cf. esp. 366B7-D7 and nn. *ad loc.*; and nn. *ad* 367C1, D8.

<sup>5369</sup> Cf. nn. *ad* 365A6, 366C1, 487D8, 504E8-5A1.

<sup>5370</sup> For a fuller statement cf. Commentary §2.A.2.

<sup>5371</sup> Thus ἄλλα (363E3) for which cf. n. *ad loc.* and notes *ad* 364A4, B2; 366D6.

<sup>5372</sup> Cf. 362D2-3, 362E1 and n., 504A7-8 and n., 548D8-9, 549D6 and n., and n. *ad* 369B4.

<sup>5373</sup> Not only the prosopopoeia of the young man arguing with himself but also the τις at Book Four (419A2: cf. n. *ad* 419A9) and Book Six 487C5 (cf. n. *ad* 487B3 and nn. *ad* 506B9 and C2) and the presumption at 498C that Socrates will have to argue with Thrasymachus. Cf. also nn. *ad* 449D1, 489B2, 491C10, 495C7, 498C7-8, and 498C9,D2. Recognizing his tendency to project his own thoughts onto someone else Socrates criticizes the behavior of a “them” when in truth his remarks are directed toward Adeimantus's (498-501, *passim*).

himself.<sup>5374</sup> He disowns responsibility in a churlish way,<sup>5375</sup> lurks in halfway positions,<sup>5376</sup> and shows a penchant for clever byplay or bluffing indirection in a way that laces friendliness with derision.<sup>5377</sup> He is puritanical rather than lighthearted.<sup>5378</sup>

The drama taking place within Adeimantus expresses itself in three interruptions (419A, 449B and 487B) and then reaches its climax in Book Six, when he tries to force Socrates to give him an answer that Socrates does not possess.<sup>5379</sup> He presses his suit because Socrates has now come to the answer he most sorely needs:<sup>5380</sup> this is the closest he comes in the entire dialogue to confessing his desperation. But the fact that Adeimantus needs an answer is not a condition incumbent upon the rest of mankind to fulfill for him. Indeed the rest of mankind needs an answer to this question, the question of the ultimate sanction and of the ultimate purpose of life, no less than he does, as Socrates now shows (505A2-506B1). Upon being pressed a second time<sup>5381</sup> he refuses to give Adeimantus what would after all be only his best guess, and refuses in terms that Glaucon overhears to be a threat to stop participating, so that Glaucon interrupts to ensure that Socrates stay rather than leave, and continue on whatever terms he should choose.<sup>5382</sup> Thanks to Glaucon a very great discussion, indeed, ensues -- including the "Sun, Line and Cave" and the long and arduous dialectical ascent through the curriculum -- a discussion that succeeds to stay on track just as long as Glaucon has the stamina to hold up his end of the discussion.<sup>5383</sup>

<sup>5374</sup> Cf. n. *ad* 487B7; 424D7-E2, 426A1-7A1, 487B7 (and n.), and ἀλλὰ διδάξω at 489B2 (though he quoted the nay-sayer he will now be first to enlighten him). At 498C5-8 (ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξάμενος) he passes on the final responsibility to others at the same time that he insulates himself from Socrates's theme by condescending to his sincerity (though indeed Socrates set himself up for such treatment [σκόπει ..., 497E5-6] Adeimantus singles out Thrasymachus because he is a teacher of rhetoric, just the sort to be hired by the rich to teach their lads how to become top people, and also because he is the most likely to jump in at this point and exonerate himself from having to agree in his own person). Cf. also 499D7-E1 (and n. *ad* D10); and cf. ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε μετρίως ... (504B8), soon followed by σύχνοι πάσχουσιν διὰ τὴν ῥᾳθυμίαν (C5).

<sup>5375</sup> Cf. 495C7 and n. *ad* 367D5.

<sup>5376</sup> The paradigm of his in-betweenness is shown in his ability to argue with himself 365A4-366B2. Cf. also nn. *ad* 364C2, 365A3, 420A1, 501E6, and 504E8-505A1.

<sup>5377</sup> He answers by turning one of the questioner's words back upon him, overmuch (nn. *ad* 371A10, 549C3, 550C3, and 571B2); and continues with bluffing indirection and litotes a little too long (423C5 and D7, 424D7, 487E6, 498D5, 575C1 and nn. *ad locc.*; also n. *ad* 504E5-6). In the presence of superiors such behavior can border on impertinence).

<sup>5378</sup> οὐ πάνυ χαριέν (426B3 and n.); cf. 426C5.

<sup>5379</sup> 504E4-6,ff. Cf. nn. Several aspects of his behavior combine in this crucial passage, as they do again at 563C1-2 and 563D2 (cf. nn.).

<sup>5380</sup> The μέγιστον μάθημα, which Glaucon, too, recognizes to be the overall goal: 506D2-3. Cf. n. *ad* 506B5. Adeimantus pushes Socrates but Glaucon pleads: the two of them act the same way as they did in Book Two.

<sup>5381</sup> 506B2: note Adeimantus's importunate ἀλλὰ σὺ δή.

<sup>5382</sup> As he had at 427D8-E2. In giving him *carte blanche* Glaucon indirectly offers himself up as a sympathetic and cooperative interlocutor: Even the ugliest best guess can be redeemed now be presented as an hypothesis shared by persons pursuing beauty.

<sup>5383</sup> What Socrates called ὄρμή at 506E2. Cf. οὐκέτι at 533A1.

During that entire conversation Adeimantus is silent and forgotten, but suddenly he butts in at what appears to be a random moment a few pages into Book Eight, when Socrates, with the Muses' aid and Glaucon's participation, has just gotten underway with the "Decline". This section of the *Republic*, the narrative of the decline of the city and of the self, is a very different animal from anything else in the work.<sup>5384</sup> It is nothing like the dialectical investigation of Books Six and Seven that we had just been through with Glaucon after Adeimantus dropped out of the conversation, nor like the dreamy but logically consecutive development of the ideal state in Book Five, again with Glaucon; nor like the logical investigation of soul and corresponding search for the virtues in Book Four, also carried out with Glaucon. Instead it is a disheartening and all-too credible story of the gradual disintegration of the human personality once it has been cut off from the source of its order. The narrative about the self<sup>5385</sup> is guided through each stage by a preliminary consideration of decline on the large and impersonal canvas of the city, just as the ascent to the vision of human virtue had been achieved through the construction of an ideal city in Books Two through Four.

By the time Adeimantus butts in Socrates has led Glaucon through the first transition on the large scale of the city and how it might take place – the decline from the aristocratic state to the state based on honor – and what the new state looks like. Socrates can now ask Glaucon to shift his focus to the personality, and ask the corresponding question on the scale of the individual: How does the man who is a lover of honor evolve from the man who loved virtue, and once he has evolved, what is the lover of honor like? Adeimantus interrupts: "He will be a lot like Glaucon here." The remark is impertinent not only because it is opaque but also because the *transition* to the new type of man is the present question, not the description of the type that results from the transition. Socrates however takes the reversal of order in stride (in the subsequent stages he will take care to revert to the proper order), and the net effect of the disruption is that Adeimantus has become the interlocutor.

He has not interrupted because he believes he can advance the argument but because he wants to ridicule his brother even if it will slow things down. It is wrongheaded therefore to adduce, with the scholars, the remark of Xenophon that Glaucon is a lover of honor as a "justification" for his intervention. The question is how the man of virtue devolves into a lover of honor, not whether Glaucon embodies the outcome more than Adeimantus. The distraction of his interruption only draws our attention to the fact that from everything we have seen it is Adeimantus that is the brother that cares about what people think about him.<sup>5386</sup> That he should now be stepping in might just be a good thing, as Socrates said in response to Glaucon's interruption in Book Two.<sup>5387</sup> It may be somehow right that Socrates's interlocutor should himself be subject to the forces being faced in the narration!

Socrates, as usual, "goes with the pitch." He accepts the condition imposed on him by Adeimantus's interruption by starting with the description, by describing the lover of honor in terms of his *difference* from Glaucon, and then turning to what should have been the prior question, how the evolution takes place.<sup>5388</sup> Without setting out a methodology or program he simply begins with a

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<sup>5384</sup> I have accordingly added a special appendix analyzing its form and content and trying to ascertain its purpose (Appendix 7).

<sup>5385</sup> This is the significance of the "keynote" technique described in Appendix 7 (*passim*).

<sup>5386</sup> After all that has happened in the dialogue it is clear that it is Adeimantus rather than Glaucon who cares about what people think of him. The choice of honor or reputation over virtue is exactly the dilemma he depicted so painfully in Book Two, whereas Glaucon was tempted not by others seeing him but by slaking his passions unseen.

<sup>5387</sup> 372E2-8.

<sup>5388</sup> 549C2: γίγνεται δὲ ὥδέ πως.

description of a father and son, the father a good man living in a not-so-good city who does not care about public office or reputation but would just as soon remain anonymous as get involved in politics ... -- but Adeimantus interrupts: "Just how then does he evolve?" He is pushing Socrates to get on with telling about the son.<sup>5389</sup> The first words of Socrates's response, "Right when ...,"<sup>5390</sup> do give the impression he is about to describe how the evolution begins, about which Adeimantus asked him, but no – he first goes on to tell about the young man's mother! She faults her husband for being worsted by everyone and wants him to be more ambitious rather than so "unmanly." Adeimantus recognizes the wife's banter and takes the opportunity to make a characteristically disparaging remark – "That's the sort of thing you always hear from them." But at the same time, the dialogue he imagined within the bright young man in Book Two has now become a quarrel between husband and wife; and the son (i.e., the one who will be deciding which path to take – i.e., Adeimantus!) has now has been served up a choice that is complicated by Oedipal forces. The young man wavers for a while but chooses the mother's prompting, just as Adeimantus's young man chose the life of power and fame regardless of justice. What remains for Adeimantus, and that young man, to learn is what lies in the future for a person who has made that choice – for it has consequences unforeseen, and this is what the entire tale of the decline will teach him. The love of honor is not a stable outlook, neither for the constitution of a city nor as a personal moral ideal for the next generation, the son that Adeimantus in turn would have. There is nothing so painful as the narration that follows, since it is so true,<sup>5391</sup> especially in its description of the gradual but complete debasement of the relation between father and son.

At the end of the account, just before Adeimantus departs from the dialogue for the rest of the evening, Plato contrives a telling and unmistakable detail that speaks volumes about him. He is a little more ready to weather the decline than Socrates. At the lowest moment in the devolution of both the tyrannical state and the tyrannical personality, the tyrant turns against his own parents. In the case of the tyrannical state it is a metaphor: the deme has "fathered" him into being tyrant and when he runs out of money and goes back to his "fatherland" to strip them of whatever wealth they have. Socrates now imagines the deme responding with a paternal claim: "We did not raise you to rip us off but to take care of us in our old age!" Then he asks Adeimantus what would happen if the tyrant "son" came to fisticuffs with the parent "deme," and Adeimantus replies with admonitory litotes, "Soon enough the deme will learn what sort of beast it spawned,"<sup>5392</sup> and Socrates is appalled, the same way Adeimantus had been appalled about the beasts obstructing his path (568A1-B5). At the analogous point in the narration of the tyrannical personality, where the tyrannical son turns against his parents not in nightmarish metaphor but in waking fact, we have exactly the same play of affect (574B7-C6): Socrates imagines the son coming to blows with the old man and the old lady, and he asks Adeimantus whether the son might go lightly on them, but Adeimantus replies, "I for my part would not be particularly

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<sup>5389</sup> πῆ δή, ἔφη, γίγνεται (C7) repeats the first words of Socrates's paragraph and the subject of the verb is the same, the νέος. Adeimantus is impatient with the talk about the father.

<sup>5390</sup> ὅταν (C8) indicates that an anticipatory subjunctive is coming (almost "as soon as"), but the anticipation is immediately postponed by the next words, (πρῶτον μέν) which introduce more preliminary conditions!

<sup>5391</sup> And indeed the drama consists of how long he will go on witnessing the horror story before being overwhelmed with disgust (cf. n. ad 576A10). The moment comes with the vision of the dog asserting his right to the man's path, during the discussion of democracy (563B4-E2 and nn. ad loc.).

<sup>5392</sup> γνώσεται γε νὴ Δία τότ' ἥδη ὁ δῆμος οἵος οἶον θρέψμα γεννῶν ἡσπάζετό τε καὶ ηῦξεν (569A8-B1).

sanguine about their prospects.<sup>5393</sup> Socrates again is appalled and describes incredulously ("for the love of Zeus") what he imagines this means, how the son would sell out the mother that bore him for a babe he met at a bar and his gray old father that gave him all he is for a ripe young boy; Adeimantus flatly agrees, repeating his asseverative oath that Zeus is his witness.<sup>5394</sup> It is clear that the nightmare is closer to Adeimantus's waking mind than it is to Socrates's.

The role of Adeimantus as dialogical partner devolves into being the person in whose mind this lesson is received and absorbed, and once the lesson is complete he falls back out of the conversation and leaves the final and crowning question – the judgment between the two lives -- to be worked out through an agreement between Socrates and Glaucon, who effortlessly glides back into the role of interlocutor a moment later (576B10). Even the return to the topic of poetry, which had been Adeimantus's special subject<sup>5395</sup> and as such had provided him the justification for interrupting in Book Two (376D4-5), is subsequently carried out with Glaucon, with nary a peep from Adeimantus nor even any reference to his speech.

It is Socrates's manner to go the whole distance with his interlocutors. Although in truth Adeimantus was complaining in Book Two about his upbringing and not about poetry, the case of poetry, now that it had been brought up, deserves and receives an adequate treatment. Likewise, Glaucon's requirement in Book Two that Socrates in his analysis must ignore the rewards of being just, a requirement of the devil's advocate, will not be forgotten but will be redressed and repaired, now that they have come to see that justice is indeed good in herself (612BD). These subjects are the content of Book Ten.

## CODA

A very influential commentator on the English text of the *Republic* tossed off the comment that in the *Republic* Thrasymachus is the only character Plato draws with any vividness, and that the interlocutors of the ensuing Books so lack dramatic characterization that the balance of the dialogue is virtually a monologue by Socrates. This reader has failed altogether to empathize with the candid confessions Glaucon and Adeimantus make at the beginning of Book Two, which constitute a voicing of moral neurosis asking to be healed more sincere and honest than anywhere in the Platonic corpus -- so much so that it would be scandalous for the author to put the confessions into anybody's mouths other than those of his own brothers. In comparison with them, Thrasymachus, for all his showy behavior, is the least interesting character in the story, not only because he is a one dimensional bombast unwilling to participate in the action except on his own terms, but more importantly because he is useless to the drama since he is unable to develop as a character.

## END OF APPENDIX EIGHT

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<sup>5393</sup> οὐ πάνυ θαρρῶ ἔγωγε περὶ τῶν γονέων τοῦ τοιούτου (574B10-11).

<sup>5394</sup> Socrates says πρὸς Δίος (574A12) but Adeimantus μὰ Δία (574C6), just as he had said νὴ Δία at 569A8. For the difference between the genitive and the accusative cf. Gildersleeve, SCG §11.

<sup>5395</sup> Though only putatively, as we saw near the beginning of this Appendix.