



Welcome to

Attack and Defense

2022

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Slides are available as PDF, kramse@Github
attack-and-defense.tex in the repo security-courses

Time schedule




17:00 - 21:00 including breaks

- 17:00 - 18:15
Introduction to Security problems and basics
- 30min break
Go eat with your family, hang around, get coffee
- 18:45 - 19:30 45min
Strategies for long-lasting protection in IT-security
- 15min break
- 19:45 -20:30 45min
More strategies for long-lasting protection in IT-security and Summary
- 20:30 - 21:00 Roundtable – open discussion, share your experience


Most slides are in english, some in Danish! Sorry

Introduction: Attack overview



Source: <http://www.sicherheitstacho.eu/>

DDoS Attacks Still a Problem



Security attacks and DDoS is very much in the media

Source: link<https://www.netscout.com/threatreport/global-ddos-attack-trends/>

DDoS Attacks are HUGE



Extremely hard to protect against from a small network

Source: link <https://www.netscout.com/threatreport/global-ddos-attack-trends/>

Ransomware Attacks are Common



Avaddon

Avaddon ransomware was first seen in February 2020 and by June 2020 had quickly evolved into ransomware as a service (RaaS). In January 2021, the group evolved again to include DDoS attacks in its extortion repertoire.

[READ MORE +](#)

REvil

Although currently not operational due to a global takedown, REvil was a prominent user of RaaS. With its highly adaptable encryptors and decryptors, REvil provided infrastructure and services for communicating with victims, as well as a leak site for releasing stolen data if the victim refused to pay the ransom.

[READ MORE +](#)

BlackCat

One of the newest ransomware groups, BlackCat (aka ALPHV), was discovered in November 2021. Operating as a RaaS, the group quickly gained notoriety for its sophistication and innovation.

[READ MORE +](#)

AvosLocker

First seen in summer 2021, AvosLocker is simple but effective ransomware that has utilized triple extortion from the start. AvosLocker operators advertise in underground networks for affiliates with active directory experience, as well as for "access brokers" who potentially could provide access to compromised systems.

[READ MORE +](#)

Suncrypt

Initially appearing in October 2019, Suncrypt was one of the first ransomware groups to launch DDoS attacks. Along with data encryption and theft, Suncrypt extorts its victims by threatening to attack infrastructure or networks.

[READ MORE +](#)

Make sure to backup your data! Test your backups!


Source: link<https://www.netscout.com/threatreport/global-ddos-attack-trends/>

Konklusion: IT-sikkerhed og IT-drift er præget af kaos og panik




- Vi starter godt, struktureret arbejde!
- Vi bliver afbrudt ... og det sker tit
- Vi bliver ikke færdige! Det bliver man sjældent i virkeligheden
- Microsoft alene frigiver opdateringer for mere end 100 sårbarheder om måneden
- Al software har sikkerhedsproblemer, og skal opdateres!

What can we do? – Good security



You always have limited resources for protection - use them as best as possible
Good security comes from structured work

Balanced security



Better to have the same level of security

If you have bad security in some part - guess where attackers will end up

Hackers are not required to take the hardest path into the network

Realize there is no such thing as 100% security

Work together



Team up!

We need to share security information freely

We often face the same threats, so we can work on solving these together




Information Risk Management

Life is full of risk.

Risk is the possibility of damage happening and the ramifications of such damage should it occur. **Information risk management (IRM)** is the process of identifying and assessing risk, reducing it to an acceptable level, and implementing the right mechanisms to maintain that level. There is no such thing as a 100 percent secure environment. Every environment has vulnerabilities and threats to a certain degree. The skill is in identifying these threats, assessing the probability of them actually occurring and the damage they could cause, and then taking the right steps to reduce the overall level of risk in the environment to what the organization identifies as acceptable.

Source: Shon Harris *CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide*

Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability



We want to protect something

Confidentiality - data kept a secret

Integrity - data is not subjected to unauthorized changes

Availability - data and systems are available when needed

Security is a process



Remember:

- what is information and security?
- Data kept electronically
- Data kept in physical form
- Dont forget the human element of security

Incident Response and Computer Forensics reaction to incidents

Good security is the result of planning and long-term work

Security is a process, not a product, Bruce Schneier

Source for quote: https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2000/04/the_process_of_secur.html



Security Controls and Frameworks

Multiple exist – only subset listed below

- CIS controls Center for Internet Security (CIS) <https://www.cisecurity.org>
- PCI Best Practices for Maintaining PCI DSS Compliance v2.0 Jan 2019
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
<https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework>
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/sp800> - SP800 series
- National Security Agency (NSA)
<https://www.nsa.gov/Research/>
- NSA security configuration guides
<https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/security-configuration/>
- Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)
<http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/>

Center for Internet Security CIS Controls



The CIS Controls™ are a **prioritized set of actions that collectively form a defense-in-depth set of best practices** that mitigate the most common attacks against systems and networks. The CIS Controls are **developed by a community of IT experts who apply their first-hand experience** as cyber defenders to create these globally accepted security best practices. The experts who develop the CIS Controls come from a **wide range of sectors including retail, manufacturing, healthcare, education, government, defense, and others.**

Source: <https://www.cisecurity.org/CIS-Controls-Version-7-1.pdf>

Note: The CIS Controls were developed starting in 2008

Kom igang med CIS



CIS-kontrollerne består af 20 praktiske, pragmatiske kontroller, som er målbare og med direkte henvisning til, hvordan de implementeres samt forslag til, hvilke KPI'er der bør opstilles for målinger.

Forskellen på CIS-kontrollerne og fx ISO27001 er, at du ikke kan blive certificeret efter CIS, men til gengæld opdateres CIS-kontrollerne løbende, og de indeholder prioriterede lister af, hvad du i praksis skal gøre for din cybersikkerhed. Det australske forsvar har fx vist, at hvis man implementerer de første fire kontroller fuldt ud, kan man mitigere op mod 90+% af alt malware.

Dansk artikel fra Deloitte, version 7 indeholder 20 kontroller men version 8 med 18 kontroller
<https://www2.deloitte.com/dk/da/pages/risk/articles/vi-stiller-skarpt-pa-cis-kontroller.html>

Basic Security Controls



CIS controls 1-6 are Basic, everyone must do them. Today I have replaced 6 with 10.

- **CIS Control 1: Inventory and Control of Hardware Assets**
- **CIS Control 2: Inventory and Control of Software Assets**
- **CIS Control 3: Continuous Vulnerability Management**
- **CIS Control 4: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges**
- **CIS Control 5: Secure Configuration for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations and Servers**
- **CIS Control 6: Maintenance, Monitoring and Analysis of Audit Logs**
- **CIS Control 10: Data Recovery Capabilities**

Inventory and Control of Hardware Assets



CIS Control 1:

Inventory and Control of Hardware Assets

Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all hardware devices on the network so that only authorized devices are given access, and unauthorized and unmanaged devices are found and prevented from gaining access.

What is connected to our networks?

What firmware do we need to install on hardware?

Where IS the hardware we own?

What hardware is still supported by vendor?

Source: Center for Internet Security CIS Controls 7.1 CIS-Controls-Version-7-1.pdf

Inventory and Control of Software Assets



CIS Control 2:

Inventory and Control of Software Assets

Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all software on the network so that only authorized software is installed and can execute, and that all unauthorized and unmanaged software is found and prevented from installation or execution.

What licenses do we have? Paying too much?

What versions of software do we depend on?

What software needs to be phased out, upgraded?

What software do our employees need to support?

Source: Center for Internet Security CIS Controls 7.1 CIS-Controls-Version-7-1.pdf

Continuous Vulnerability Management



CIS Control 3:

Continuous Vulnerability Management

Continuously acquire, assess, and take action on new information in order to identify vulnerabilities, remediate, and minimize the window of opportunity for attackers.

Scan for updates automatically

Update when vendors publish critical patches

Listen to news sources about software and vulnerabilities

Source: Center for Internet Security CIS Controls 7.1 CIS-Controls-Version-7-1.pdf

Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges



CIS Control 4:

Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges

The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct the use, assignment, and configuration of administrative privileges on computers, networks, and applications.

Remove local administrator from Windows workstations

Change default passwords

Use good passwords

Log if somebody tries to break in

Source: Center for Internet Security CIS Controls 7.1 CIS-Controls-Version-7-1.pdf

Secure Configuration for Hardware and Software



CIS Control 5:

Secure Configuration for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations and Servers
Establish, implement, and actively manage (track, report on, correct) the security configuration of mobile devices, laptops, servers, and workstations using a rigorous configuration management and change control process in order to prevent attackers from exploiting vulnerable services and settings.

Create secure configuration – check security settings

Select security mechanisms

Automate security settings

Source: Center for Internet Security CIS Controls 7.1 CIS-Controls-Version-7-1.pdf

Maintenance, Monitoring and Analysis of Audit Logs



CIS Control 6:

Maintenance, Monitoring and Analysis of Audit Logs

Collect, manage, and analyze audit logs of events that could help detect, understand, or recover from an attack.

... and present it, use it daily, report it to management!

Source: Center for Internet Security CIS Controls 7.1 CIS-Controls-Version-7-1.pdf

Data Recovery Capabilities



CIS Control 10:

Data Recovery Capabilities

The processes and tools used to properly back up critical information with a proven methodology for timely recovery of it

Backup is critical

If we loose orders we loose money

Data loss, means production capacity loss

Separation of duty – can one person delete both production and backup

Source: Center for Internet Security CIS Controls 7.1 CIS-Controls-Version-7-1.pdf

How do we get started?



“A goal without a plan is just a wish.”

– Antoine de Saint-Exupéry

- Get management support – without it, don't bother, get a new job, avoid the stress
- Create goals and plans
- Acquire the skills
- Follow the plan, let some servers burn, shut them down if you are doing something more important
- My suggestion is to start with the network, since it supports everything else

And, I mean it seriously, without management support, eject and go somewhere else!

My daily job – Security engineering a job role



On any given day, you may be challenged to:

- Create new ways to solve existing production security issues
- Configure and install firewalls and intrusion detection systems
- Perform vulnerability testing, risk analyses and security assessments
- Develop automation scripts to handle and track incidents
- Investigate intrusion incidents, conduct forensic investigations and incident responses
- Collaborate with colleagues on authentication, authorization and encryption solutions
- Evaluate new technologies and processes that enhance security capabilities
- Test security solutions using industry standard analysis criteria
- Deliver technical reports and formal papers on test findings
- Respond to information security issues during each stage of a project's lifecycle
- Supervise changes in software, hardware, facilities, telecommunications and user needs
- Define, implement and maintain corporate security policies
- Analyze and advise on new security technologies and program conformance
- Recommend modifications in legal, technical and regulatory areas that affect IT security

Source: <https://www.cyberdegrees.org/jobs/security-engineer/>
also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_engineering

Prerequisites for network security



Network security and most internet related security work has the following requirements:

- Network experience
- TCP/IP principles - often in more detail than a common user
- Programming is an advantage, for automating things
- Some Linux and Unix knowledge is in my opinion a **necessary skill** for infosec work
 - too many new tools to ignore, and lots found at sites like Github and Open Source written for Linux

IF you have some basic Linux skills you can immediately use 1.000s of existing projects like: Ansible, Git, Suricata, Zeek, Nmap, logging solutions, LibreNMS, maltrail, packetbeat, Elastic ECS, ...

They WILL make your work more efficient

Aquire Skills – books are one example



Recommended literature from my system security and communication and network security course::


- *Defensive Security Handbook: Best Practices for Securing Infrastructure*, Lee Brotherston, Amanda Berlin ISBN: 978-1-491-96038-7 284 pages
- *Applied Network Security Monitoring Collection, Detection, and Analysis*, 2014 Chris Sanders ISBN: 9780124172081 - shortened ANSM
- *Practical Packet Analysis - Using Wireshark to Solve Real-World Network Problems*, 3rd edition 2017, Chris Sanders ISBN: 9781593278021 - shortened PPA
- *Forensics Discovery*, Dan Farmer, Wietse Venema 2004, Addison-Wesley 240 pages. Can be found at <http://www.porcupine.org/forensics/forensic-discovery/>
- *Linux Basics for Hackers Getting Started with Networking, Scripting, and Security in Kali*. OccupyTheWeb, December 2018, 248 pp. ISBN-13: 978-1-59327-855-7 - shortened LBfH

All lecture plans for my courses are freely available at: <https://github.com/kramse/kea-it-sikkerhed>

Primary literature for SIEM and Logging course



Primary literature:




Free graphics by Lumen Design Studio


- *Data-Driven Security: Analysis, Visualization and Dashboards* Jay Jacobs, Bob Rudis ISBN: 978-1-118-79372-5 February 2014 <https://datadrivensecurity.info/> - short DDS
- *Crafting the InfoSec Playbook: Security Monitoring and Incident Response Master Plan* by Jeff Bollinger, Brandon Enright, and Matthew Valites ISBN: 9781491949405 - short CIP
- *Intelligence-Driven Incident Response*
Scott Roberts ISBN: 9781491934944 - short IDI
- *Security Operations Center: Building, Operating, and Maintaining your SOC*
ISBN: 9780134052014 Joseph Muniz - short SOC

All lecture plans for my courses are freely available at: <https://github.com/kramse/kea-it-sikkerhed>

Goals: Gain insight using Graphs and Dashboards!




Graphs and Dashboards!



- Screenshot from Peter Manev, OISF
- Shown are Suricata IDS alerts processed by Logstash and Kibana


View data efficiently




View data by digging into it easily - must be fast

Logstash and Kibana are just examples, but use indexing to make it fast!

Networks today




Defense in depth - multiple layers of security



Netflow NFSen





Profile: live



An extra 100k packets per second from this netflow source (source is a router)

DDoS traffic before filtering



Only two links shown, at least 3Gbit incoming for this single IP

DDoS traffic after filtering



Link toward server (next level firewall actually) about 350Mbit outgoing
Knowing what it going on, is half the battle

How to get started



How to get started searching for security events?

Collect basic data from your devices and networks

- Netflow data from routers
- Session data from firewalls
- Logging from applications: email, web, proxy systems

Centralize!

Process data

- Top 10: interesting due to high frequency, occurs often, brute-force attacks
- *ignore*
- Bottom 10: least-frequent messages are interesting

Sounds easy, but is complex in practice

Hændelseslog og Økonomi



Tag et stykke papir eller en computer

- Vi er lige blevet afbrudt i vores vigtige arbejde med CIS kontroller
- Vi skal udfylde en Hændelseslog og der er nogle økonomiske aspekter
- Når der sker en sikkerhedshændelse skal den helst håndteres effektivt
- Hvis man ikke har sikkerhedsprocedurer på plads bliver det typisk længerevarende og dyrere

Det er en erkendelse i sig selv at vi skal være klar til at håndtere sikkerhedshændelser, for de kommer

March 2021: ProxyLogon/ProxyShell CVE-2021-26855 CVSS:3.0 9.1 / 8.4



In March 2021, both Microsoft and IT Professionals had a major headache in the form of an Exchange zero-day commonly known as ProxyLogon. The vulnerability, widely considered the **most critical to ever hit Microsoft Exchange**, was quickly exploited in the wild by suspected state-sponsored threat actors, with US government and military systems identified as the most targeted sectors. **Ransomware variants such as DoejoCrypt were soon actively exploiting unpatched Exchange instances**, attempting to monetise the vulnerability.

A follow-up exploit, dubbed ProxyShell, was evolutionary in nature and targeted on-premise Client Access Servers (CAS) in **all supported versions of Exchange Server**. Due to the **remotely accessible nature of Exchange CAS**, any unpatched instances would be vulnerable to Remote Code Execution. **High profile victims included the European Banking Authority and the Norwegian Parliament**.

Source - for this description:

<https://chessict.co.uk/resources/blog/posts/2022/january/2021-top-security-vulnerabilities/>

ProxyLogon CVE-2021-26855 CVSS:3.0 9.1 / 8.4



ProxyLogon is the formally generic name for CVE-2021-26855, a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the admin. We have also chained this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write vulnerability, CVE-2021-27065, to get code execution. All affected components are vulnerable by default!

As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on Microsoft Exchange Server through an only opened 443 port!

Sources: <https://proxylogon.com/>

<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>

Incident Handling: ProxyLogon



Hvis jeres organisation har implementeret CIS Control 2: Inventory and Control of Software Assets, noter følgende:

- Hændelseslog: Marts Proxylogin - nem oprydning, ingen nedetid
- Økonomi: Marts Proxylogin oprydning EUR 3.000

Hvis jeres organisation *IKKE* har implementeret CIS Control 2: Inventory and Control of Software Assets, noter følgende:

- Hændelseslog: Marts Proxylogin – mailservere inficeret 3 steder, ekstern hjælp nødvendig, nedetid 2 dage
- Økonomi: Marts Proxylogin oprydning EUR 3.000
- Økonomi: Marts ProxyLogon hændelseshåndtering ekstern hjælp EUR 10.000

June 2021: PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527 CVSS:3.0 8.8 / 8.2



In June, Microsoft released a critical security update to address weaknesses in the Printer Spooler service on Windows desktop and server platforms. Unfortunately, it was released out-of-band outside of the standard patch Tuesdays due to the severity. Microsoft even released patches for Windows 7, an supported operating system that does not normally receive updates.

Initially categorised by Microsoft as a local privilege escalation on Windows, security researchers subsequently identified an additional **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** vector resulting in an updated advisory from Microsoft. As ever, the ability to test and deploy patches in a time-sensitive manner is key to minimising the impact of such vulnerabilities.

Additionally, PrintNightmare had the additional horror factor of dropping during the **summer holiday season in the northern hemisphere**. Our consultants continue to see systems vulnerable to PrintNightmare on client engagements, which can be trivially leveraged to obtain privilege escalation on unpatched Windows systems.

Source - for this description:

<https://chessict.co.uk/resources/blog/posts/2022/january/2021-top-security-vulnerabilities/>

See also <https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>

Incident Handling: PrintNightmare



Hvis jeres organisation har implementeret CIS Control 2: Inventory and Control of Software Assets, noter følgende:

- Hændelseslog: Juni PrintNightmare - nem oprydning, ingen nedetid
- Økonomi: Juni PrintNightmare oprydning EUR 3.000

Hvis jeres organisation *IKKE* har implementeret CIS Control 2: Inventory and Control of Software Assets, noter følgende:

- Hændelseslog: Juni PrintNightmare – servere inficeret, geninstallation nødvendig, nedetid 3 dage
- Økonomi: Juni PrintNightmare oprydning EUR 3.000
- Økonomi: Juni PrintNightmare hændelseshåndtering ekstern hjælp EUR 10.000

Da denne skete i ferien er der desværre også brugt mere tid på at håndtere sagen, alle sætter ekstra EUR 3.000 på listen med teksten "Grundet ferie og manglende ressourcer 3.000"

November 2021: Log4Shell



It would not be possible to discuss 2021 in the context of vulnerabilities without the mention of Log4Shell. **A widely used Java-based logging library caused headaches for Security professionals worldwide.** Many scrambled to quantify their use of Log4j within their estates.

A zero-day exploit quickly followed, confirming the worst - **Remote Code Execution (RCE) was indeed possible.** However, what made the nature of the vulnerability even more challenging was the ability to exploit a backend logging system from an unaffected front end host. For example, an attacker can craft a weaponised log entry on a mobile app or webserver not running Log4j. The attacker could make their way through to backend middleware itself running Log4j, which significantly extends the attack surface of the vulnerability.

The NCSC even took the step of recommending the update was immediately applied, whether or not Log4Shell was known to be in use. As is commonly the case with critical vulnerabilities, two successive Log4j patches were subsequently released in the week following the original addressing Denial of Service (DoS) and a further RCE. This further increased workloads of Security and IT teams just as they thought the worst of 2021 had been and gone.

Source - for this description:

<https://chessict.co.uk/resources/blog/posts/2022/january/2021-top-security-vulnerabilities/>

See also <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Log4Shell>

Incident Handling: Log4Shell



Hvis jeres organisation har implementeret CIS Control 1+2 og ingen Java har, noter følgende:

- Hændelseslog: November Log4Shell - nem oprydning, ingen nedetid
- Økonomi: November Log4Shell oprydning EUR 3.000

Hvis jeres organisation ***IKKE*** har implementeret CIS kontroller, noter følgende:

- Hændelseslog: November Log4Shell – mailservere inficeret 3 steder, ekstern hjælp nødvendig, nedetid 2 dage
- Økonomi: November Log4Shell oprydning EUR 3.000
- Økonomi: November Log4Shell hændelseshåndtering ekstern hjælp EUR 10.000

Hvis jeres organisation har et stort netværk uden segmentering og filtrering:

afsæt EUR 100.000 til fremtidige sikkerhedsproblemer nu

Vulnerabilities - CVE



Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE):

- classification
- identification

When discovered each vuln gets a CVE ID

CVE maintained by MITRE - not-for-profit org for research and development in the USA.

National Vulnerability Database search for CVE.

Sources: <http://cve.mitre.org/> or <http://nvd.nist.gov>

also checkout OWASP Top-10 <http://www.owasp.org/>

The Internet Worm 2. nov 1988



Exploited the following vulnerabilities

- buffer overflow in fingerd - VAX code
- Sendmail - DEBUG functionality
- Trust between systems: rsh, rexec, ...
- Bad passwords

Contained camouflage!

- Program name set to 'sh'
- Used fork() to switch PID regularly
- Password cracking using intern list of 432 words and /usr/dict/words
- Found systems to infect in /etc/hosts.equiv, .rhosts, .forward, netstat ...

Made by Robert T. Morris, Jr.

Stuxnet



Worm in 2010 intended to infect Iran nuclear program

Target was the uranium enrichment process

Infected other industrial sites

SCADA, and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are becoming very important for whole countries

A small *community* of consultants work in these *isolated* networks, but can be used as infection vector - they visit multiple sites

More can be found in <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet>

Ransomware



Definition 23-21 *Ransomware* is malware that inhibits the use of resources until a ransom usually monetary, is paid.

Book mentions 1989 example, PC CYBORG targetting PC/DOS computers

Uses cryptography to render data unreadable

Has become a huge problem for enterprises during the last 5-10 years

Often uses crypto-currencies today, like BitCoin (BTC) for payment

Often contains errors so decryption is impossible, or possible without payment!

Source: *Computer Security: Art and Science*, Matt Bishop ISBN: 9780321712332

<https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-education/program/Bishop-Computer-Security-2nd-Edition/PGM25107.html>

MITRE ATT&CK framework




MITRE ATT&CK™ is a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. The ATT&CK knowledge base is used as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies in the private sector, in government, and in the cybersecurity product and service community.

With the creation of ATT&CK, MITRE is fulfilling its mission to solve problems for a safer world – by bringing communities together to develop more effective cybersecurity. ATT&CK is open and available to any person or organization for use at no charge.

ATT&CK™

Great resource for attack categorization <https://attack.mitre.org/>

Attack trees



- Attacks can be said to be based on a chain of dependencies, or graphs
- To achieve goal, need to achieve sub goal x, y, and z – Break the chain and the attack fails!
- Simple example, installing updates remove a dependency for a vulnerability
- Attack trees, picture from Bruce Schneier Attack Trees article December 1999:

https://www.schneier.com/academic/archives/1999/12/attack_trees.html

Exposure, Attack surfaces, and reducing them



- Incident prevention
- Real-time intrusion detection systems (IDS/IPS)
- **Definition 27-7** An *attack surface* is the set of entry points and data that attackers can use to compromise a system.
- Reducing the chance of success also helps, randomization
- Use stack and heap protection
- Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is a host-level moving target defense.
- OpenBSD even randomizes the kernel on install – kernel address randomized link (KARL)
- Limit number of listening services, change insecure defaults, implement access control and firewalls
- Remove anything but the necessary request methods on web servers GET, HEAD and POST
- Restrict access to administrative interfaces
- Implement network segmentation

CWE/SANS Monster mitigations



Monster Mitigations

These mitigations will be effective in eliminating or reducing the severity of the Top 25. These mitigations will also address many weaknesses that are not even on the Top 25. If you adopt these mitigations, you are well on your way to making more secure software.

A [Monster Mitigation Matrix](#) is also available to show how these mitigations apply to weaknesses in the Top 25.

ID	Description
M1	Establish and maintain control over all of your inputs.
M2	Establish and maintain control over all of your outputs.
M3	Lock down your environment.
M4	Assume that external components can be subverted, and your code can be read by anyone.
M5	Use industry-accepted security features instead of inventing your own.
GP1	(general) Use libraries and frameworks that make it easier to avoid introducing weaknesses.
GP2	(general) Integrate security into the entire software development lifecycle.
GP3	(general) Use a broad mix of methods to comprehensively find and prevent weaknesses.
GP4	(general) Allow locked-down clients to interact with your software.

See the [Monster Mitigation Matrix](#) that maps these mitigations to Top 25 weaknesses.

Source: use the more updated list online <http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html>

Principle of Least Privilege



Definition 14-1 The *principle of least privilege* states that a subject should be given only those privileges that it needs in order to complete the task.

Also drop privileges when not needed anymore, relinquish rights immediately

Example, need to read a document - but not write.

Database systems can often provide very fine grained access to data

Source: *Computer Security: Art and Science*, Matt Bishop ISBN: 9780321712332

<https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-education/program/Bishop-Computer-Security-2nd-Edition/PGM25107.html>

Principle of Fail-Safe defaults



Definition 14-3 The *principle of fail-safe defaults* states that, unless a subject is given explicit access to an object, it should be denied access to that object.

Default access *none*

In firewalls default-deny - that which is not allowed is prohibited


Newer devices today can come with no administrative users, while older devices often came with default admin/admin users

Real world example, OpenSSH config files that come with PermitRootLogin no

Source: *Computer Security: Art and Science*, Matt Bishop ISBN: 9780321712332

<https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-education/program/Bishop-Computer-Security-2nd-Edition/PGM25107.html>

Principle of Separation of Privilege – Defense in Depth



Definition 14-7 The *principle of separation of privilege* states that a system should not grant permission based on a single condition.

Company checks, CEO fraud

Programs like *su* and *sudo* often require specific group membership and password

Fokus 2022



- Brugerstyring
- Asset management
- Laptop sikkerhed
- VPN alle steder
- Penetration testing
- Firewalls og segmentering
- TLS og VPN indstillinger
- DNS og email
- Syslog og monitorering
- Incident Response og reaktion

Check eventuelt IT sikkerhedsupdate 2019 præsentationen:

<https://github.com/kramse/security-courses/tree/master/presentations/misc/it-sikkerhedsupdate-2019>

Design a robust network Isolation and segmentation




Hvad kan man gøre for at få bedre netværkssikkerhed?

- Bruge switcher - der skal ARP spoofes og bedre performance
- Opdele med firewall til flere DMZ zoner for at holde utsatte servere adskilt fra hinanden, det interne netværk og Internet
- Overvåge, læse logs og reagere på hændelser

Husk du skal også kunne opdatere dine servere

Basic Network Security Pattern Isolate in VLANs



Du bør opdele dit netværk i segmenter efter trafik

Du bør altid holde interne og eksterne systemer adskilt!

Du bør isolere farlige services i jails og chroots

Brug port security til at sikre basale services DHCP, Spanning Tree osv.

Example incident response procedures



5.4 Handling an Incident

Certain steps are necessary to take during the handling of an incident. In all security related activities, the most important point to be made is that all sites should have policies in place. Without defined policies and goals, activities undertaken will remain without focus. The goals should be defined by management and legal counsel in advance.

- *Incident Handler's Handbook* by Patrick Kral, SANS Information Security Reading Room
<https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/paper/33901>
- *Computer Security Incident Handling Guide*, NIST Paul Cichonski, Tom Millar, TimGrance, Karen Scarfone
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf>
- Quote from RFC2196 *Site Security Handbook* September 1997, IETF
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2196#section-5.4>
- <https://cloud.google.com/security/incident-response/>
- Microsoft Azure <https://medium.com/@cloudyforensics/azure-forensics-and-incident-response-c13098a14d8d>

Incident Handling Checklist from NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf



Table 3-5. Incident Handling Checklist

	Action	Completed
Detection and Analysis		
1.	Determine whether an incident has occurred	
1.1	Analyze the precursors and indicators	
1.2	Look for correlating information	
1.3	Perform research (e.g., search engines, knowledge base)	
1.4	As soon as the handler believes an incident has occurred, begin documenting the investigation and gathering evidence	
2.	Prioritize handling the incident based on the relevant factors (functional impact, information impact, recoverability effort, etc.)	
3.	Report the incident to the appropriate internal personnel and external organizations	
Containment, Eradication, and Recovery		
4.	Acquire, preserve, secure, and document evidence	
5.	Contain the incident	
6.	Eradicate the incident	
6.1	Identify and mitigate all vulnerabilities that were exploited	
6.2	Remove malware, inappropriate materials, and other components	
6.3	If more affected hosts are discovered (e.g., new malware infections), repeat the Detection and Analysis steps (1.1, 1.2) to identify all other affected hosts, then contain (5) and eradicate (6) the incident for them	
7.	Recover from the incident	
7.1	Return affected systems to an operationally ready state	
7.2	Confirm that the affected systems are functioning normally	
7.3	If necessary, implement additional monitoring to look for future related activity	
Post-Incident Activity		
8.	Create a follow-up report	
9.	Hold a lessons learned meeting (mandatory for major incidents, optional otherwise)	

Concrete advise for enterprise networks



- Have separation – anywhere, starting with organisation units, management networks, server networks, customers, guests, LAN, WAN, Mail, web, ...
- Use Web proxies - do not allow HTTP directly except for a short allow list, do not allow traffic to and from any new TLD
- Use only your own DNS servers, create a pair of Unbound servers, point your internal DNS running on Windows to these Create filtering, logging, restrictions on these Unbound DNS servers
<https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/unbound/about/> and also <https://pi-hole.net/>
- Only allow SMTP via your own mail servers, create a simple forwarder if you must

Allow lists are better than block list, even if it takes some time to do it



Capture data and logs!

- Run DNS query logs – when client1 is infected with malware from domain malwareexample.com, then search for more clients infected
- Run Zeek and gather information about all HTTPS sessions – captures certificates by default, and we can again search for certificate related to malwareexample.com
- Run network logging – session logs in enterprise networks are GREAT (country wide illegal logging is of course NOT)

Make sure to check with employees, inform them!

Default permit



One of the early implementers of firewalls Marcus J. Ranum summarized in 2005 The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/ which includes the always appropriate discussion about default permit versus default deny.

#1) Default Permit

This dumb idea crops up in a lot of different forms; it's incredibly persistent and difficult to eradicate. Why? Because it's so attractive. Systems based on "Default Permit" are the computer security equivalent of empty calories: tasty, yet fattening.

The most recognizable form in which the "Default Permit" dumb idea manifests itself is in firewall rules. Back in the very early days of computer security, network managers would set up an internet connection and decide to secure it by turning off incoming telnet, incoming rlogin, and incoming FTP. Everything else was allowed through, hence the name "Default Permit." This put the security practitioner in an endless arms-race with the hackers.

- Allow all current networks today on all ports for all protocols *is* an allow list
Which tomorrow can be split into one for TCP, UDP and remaining, and measured upon
- Measure, improve, repeat

We cannot do X



We cannot block SMTP from internal networks, since we do not know for sure if vendor X equipment needs to send the MOST important email alert at some unspecific time in the future

Cool, then we can do an allow list starting today on our border firewall:

```
table <smtp-exchange> { $exchange1 $exchange2 $exchange3 }
table <smtp-unknown> persist file "/firewall/mail/smtp-internal-unknown.txt"
# Regular use, allowed
pass out on egress inet proto tcp from smtp-exchange to any port 25/tcp
# Unknown, remove when phased out
pass out on egress inet proto tcp from smtp-internal to any port 25/tcp
```

Year 0 the unknown list may be 100% of all internal networks, but new networks added to infrastructure are NOT added, so list will shrink – evaluate the list, and compare to network logs, did networks send ANY SMTP for 1,2,3 years?

DROP SOME TRAFFIC NOW



- Drop some traffic on the border of everything
- Seriously do NOT allow Windows RPC across borders
- Border here may be from regional country office back to HQ
- Border may be from internet to internal networks
- Block Windows RPC ports, 135, 137, 139, 445
- Block DNS directly to internet, do not allow clients to use any DNS, fake 8.8.8.8 if you must internally
- Block SMTP directly to internet
- Create allow list for internal networks, client networks should not contact other client networks but only relevant server networks

You DONT need to allow direct DNS towards internet, except from your own recursive DNS servers

If you get hacked by Windows RPC in 2022, you probably deserve it, sorry for being blunt

Best would be to analyze traffic and create allow lists, some internal networks to not need internet at all

Roundtable



- Lets discuss
- Are the proposed methods workable, why or why not
- Do you have time and skills
- Can't we just hire someone

Open mike night

Contact information



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