



Welcome to

# It-sikkerhedsupdate

2019

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Slides are available as PDF, [kramse@Github](mailto:kramse@Github)  
it-sikkerhedsupdate-2019.tex in the repo security-courses

slides are available on Github

# Formålet idag



Hvad skal en ansvarlig it-sikkerhedsstrategi være for 2019. Hvilke emner er de vigtigste, og hvad er truslerne, hvis man ikke straks kommer i gang med de 10 vigtigste punkter.

Planen for idag:

- 4 timer, med pauser
- Mindre præsentation, mere dialog

# Happy New Year 2019



- Same problems
- Repeat last year?
- ... or try something new!
- 2019 will become a nightmare of break-ins and data leaks
- GDPR is here and the snow ball is rolling



**Try not to panic, but there are lots of threats**

# Hackers don't give a shit



Your system is only for testing, development, ...

Your network is a research network, under construction, being phased out, ...

Try something new, go to your management

Bring all the exceptions, all of them, update the risk analysis figures - if this happens it is about 1mill DKK

Ask for permission to go full monty on your security

**Think like attackers - don't hold back**

**Hackers  
don't give a shit:**

- About your project's scope
- It's managed by a third party
- It's a legacy system
- It's "too critical to patch"
- About your outage windows
- About your budget
- You've always done it that way
- About your Go-Live Date
- It's only a pilot/proof of concept
- About Non-Disclosure Agreements
- It wasn't a requirement in the contract
- It's an internal system
- It's really hard to change
- It's due for replacement
- You're not sure how to fix it
- It's handled in the Cloud
- About your Risk Register entry
- The vendor doesn't support that configuration
- It's an interim solution
- It's [insert standard here] compliant
- It's encrypted on disk
- The cost benefit doesn't stack up
- "Nobody else could figure that out"
- You can't explain the risk to "The Business"
- You've got other priorities
- About your faith in the competence of your internal users
- You don't have a business justification

KIWICON III  
28<sup>TH</sup> & 29<sup>TH</sup> NOVEMBER 2009

# Fokus 2019



- Brugerstyring
- Asset management
- Laptop sikkerhed
- VPN alle steder
- Penetration testing
- Firewalls og segmentering
- TLS og VPN indstillinger
- DNS og email
- Syslog
- Incident Response og reaktion

Håber ikke I er alene om det, ellers vælg et par stykker ad gangen

# Fokus 2019: Brugerstyring



- Har I styr på brugerid?
- Hvor er brugere oprettet?
- Er det et kludetæppe - ja, mange steder er det

# Bruger login



## Local administrator?



- Findes der systemer som er helt åbne, med lokal administrator
- Er det stadig nødvendigt

# Centraliseret brugerstyring



Active Directory, mange danske virksomheder bruger det  
LDAP central brugerstyring

... men brug det mere

- Konfigurer applikationer til central styring
- Fjern applikationer som ikke tillader central styring

Generelt minimer brugere andre steder end i den centrale database

# Passwords vælges ikke tilfældigt



## The 50 Most Used Passwords

- |              |              |                |              |             |
|--------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1. 123456    | 11. 123123   | 21. mustang    | 31. 7777777  | 41. harley  |
| 2. password  | 12. baseball | 22. 666666     | 32. f*cky*u  | 42. zxcvbnm |
| 3. 12345678  | 13. abc123   | 23. qwertyuiop | 33. qazwsx   | 43. asdfgh  |
| 4. qwerty    | 14. football | 24. 123321     | 34. jordan   | 44. buster  |
| 5. 123456789 | 15. monkey   | 25. 1234...890 | 35. jennifer | 45. andrew  |
| 6. 12345     | 16. letmein  | 26. p*s*y      | 36. 123qwe   | 46. batman  |
| 7. 1234      | 17. shadow   | 27. superman   | 37. 121212   | 47. soccer  |
| 8. 111111    | 18. master   | 28. 270        | 38. killer   | 48. tigger  |
| 9. 1234567   | 19. 696969   | 29. 654321     | 39. trustno1 | 49. charlie |
| 10. dragon   | 20. michael  | 30. 1qaz2wsx   | 40. hunter   | 50. robert  |

Source: <https://wpengine.com/unmasked/>

# Your data has already have been owned by criminals



The screenshot shows a web browser window for <https://haveibeenpwned.com>. The main heading is '';--have i been pwned?'. Below it is a sub-headline: 'Check if you have an account that has been compromised in a data breach'. A search bar contains the email address 'hlk@kramse.org'. To the right of the search bar is a dark blue button labeled 'pwned?'. Below the search bar, the response is displayed on a dark red background with white text: 'Oh no — pwned!'. Underneath this, smaller text reads: 'Pwned on 7 breached sites and found no pastes (subscribe to search sensitive breaches)'. The browser's address bar at the top shows the URL.

Your data is already being sold, and resold on the Internet

Stop reusing passwords, use a password safe to generate and remember

Check your own email addresses on <https://haveibeenpwned.com/>

Go ahead try the web site - hold up your hand if you are in those dumps

## Brug mere sikre passwords



### Pwned Passwords overview


Pwned Passwords are more than half a billion passwords which have previously been exposed in data breaches. The service is detailed in the launch blog post then further expanded on with the release of version 2. The entire data set is both downloadable and searchable online via the Pwned Passwords page.

I kan forhindre brugere i at vælge passwords der ALLEREDE er lækket

I kan bruge deres API eller download

<https://www.troyhunt.com/introducing-306-million-freely-downloadable-pwned-passwords/>

# Formål: sund paranoia



"Don't be silly — of course my passwords are safe. I keep them written on my window, but then I pull the shade if anyone walks in the room."

Opbevaring af passwords

Also problems with LastPass this week :-/

# January 2013: Github Public passwords?



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the GitHub homepage. The address bar displays the URL <https://github.com/search?q=-----BEGIN%20RSA%20PRIVATE%20KEY-----&type=Code&ref=searchresults>. The GitHub header includes the logo, navigation links for Explore GitHub, Search, Features, and Blog, and buttons for Sign up for free and Sign in.

The main content area is a search results page for code containing RSA PRIVATE KEY. The search bar at the top contains the query `-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----`. Below the search bar, a list of repositories is shown:

- kordless/zoto-server** – `paypal_production_key_private.pem`  
Last indexed 9 days ago

On the left, a sidebar menu lists Repositories (277), Code (77,468), and Users.

Code snippets from the repository are displayed in a box:  
1 `-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----`  
2 `-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----`

## Sources:

<https://twitter.com/brianaker/status/294228373377515522>

<http://www.webmonkey.com/2013/01/users-scramble-as-github-search-exposes-passwords-security-details/>

<http://www.leakedin.com/>

<http://www.offensive-security.com/community-projects/google-hacking-database/>

Use different passwords for different sites, yes - every site!



# Fokus 2019: Asset management



- Hardware
- Software
- Virtuelle maskiner
- IP adresser

# Hardware asset management



# Software asset management



# IP Address Management IPAM



- Recommend Nipap
-

# Har du styr på dependencies



- Skal det være helt flot så få også styr på dependencies
- Er jeres produktion afhængig af andres moduler, biblioteker osv.
- Tænk tilbage til Heartbleed, der gik flere år før de sidste opdateringer kom

# Fokus 2019: Laptop sikkerhed



# Secure Laptops



Start with your laptops (and mobile devices if you wish)

Are they *secure*, and to what extent

# Are your data secure - data at rest



Stolen laptop, tablet, phone - can anybody read your data?

Do you trust "remote wipe"

How do you in fact wipe data securely off devices, and SSDs?

Encrypt disk and storage devices before using them in the first place!

## Circumvent security - single user mode boot



Unix systems often allows boot into singleuser mode  
press command-s when booting Mac OS X

Laptops can often be booted using PXE network or CD boot

Mac computers can become a Firewire disk  
hold t when booting - firewire target mode

Unrestricted access to un-encrypted data

Moving hard drive to another computer is also easy

Physical access is often - **game over**

# Encrypting hard disk



Becoming available in the most popular client operating systems

- Microsoft Windows Bitlocker - requires Ultimate or Enterprise
- Apple Mac OS X - FileVault og FileVault2
- FreeBSD GEOM og GBDE - encryption framework
- Linux LUKS distributions like Ubuntu ask to encrypt home dir during installation
- PGP disk - Pretty Good Privacy - makes a virtual krypteret disk

- TrueCrypt - similar to PGP disk, a virtual drive with data, cross platform
- Some vendors have BIOS passwords, or disk passwords



## Attacks on disk encryption



Firewire, DMA & Windows, Winlockpwn via FireWire

Hit by a Bus: Physical Access Attacks with Firewire Ruxcon 2006

Removing memory from live system - data is not immediately lost, and can be read under some circumstances

Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys

<http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/>

This is very CSI or Hollywoord like - but a real threat

VileFault decrypts encrypted Mac OS X disk image files

<https://code.google.com/p/vilefault/>

FileVault Drive Encryption (FVDE) (or FileVault2) encrypted volumes

<https://code.google.com/p/libfvde/>

So perhaps use both hard drive encryption AND turn off computer after use?

## ... and deleting data



```
Darik's Boot and Nuke beta.2003052000
Options
Entropy: Linux Kernel (urandom)
PRNG: Mersenne Twister (mt19937ar-cok)
Method: DoD 5228-22.M
Verify: Last Pass
Rounds: 1
Statistics
Runtime: 00:00:21
CPU Load: 96%
Throughput: 5973 KB/s
Limiter: Disk I/O
Errors: 0

(IDE 0,0,0,-) VMware Virtual IDE Hard Drive
[04.33%, round 1 of 1, pass 1 of 7] (writing) [5973 KB/s]
```

Getting rid of data from old devices is a pain

Some tools will not overwrite data, leaving it vulnerable to recovery

Even secure erase programs might not work on SSD - due to reallocation of blocks

I have used Darik's Boot and Nuke ("DBAN") <http://www.dban.org/>

# 2018 attack



Drive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Impact
Crucial MX100 (all form factors)	X	X	X							X Compromised
Crucial MX200 (all form factors)	X	X	X							X Compromised
Crucial MX300 (all form factors)	✓	✓	✓		X	✓	✓	✓	✓	X Compromised
Samsung 840 EVO (SATA)	X	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	X	✓	~ Depends
Samsung 850 EVO (SATA)	X	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	~ Depends
Samsung T3 (USB)				X						X Compromised
Samsung T5 (USB)				X						X Compromised

<sup>1</sup> Cryptographic binding in ATA Security (High mode)

<sup>2</sup> Cryptographic binding in ATA Security (Max mode)

<sup>3</sup> Cryptographic binding in TCG Opal

<sup>4</sup> Cryptographic binding in proprietary standard

<sup>5</sup> No single key for entire disk

<sup>6</sup> Randomized DEK on sanitize

<sup>7</sup> Sufficient random entropy

<sup>8</sup> No wear leveling related issues

<sup>9</sup> No DEVSLP related issues

*self-encrypting deception: weakness in the encryption of solid state drives (SSDs)*

<https://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/909282/draft-paper.pdf>

# Recommendations - Comply Everywhere, Act Anywhere



## Laptop storage must be encrypted

Firewall must be enabled

### Suggestions

- Try sniffing data from a laptop, setup Access Point/Monitor port
- Portscan your laptopping networks - use Nmap
- Write an email to everyone in your organisation:  
"Hi All, we need to identify laptops without full disk encryption  
- come see us, we have christmas cookies left, Best regards IT"






## Fokus 2019: VPN alle steder



# Your Privacy



- Your data travels far
- Often crossing borders, virtually and literally

## Data found in Network data



Lets take an example, DNS

Domain Name System DNS breadcrumbs

- Your company domain, mailservers, vpn servers
- Applications you use, checking for updates, sending back data
- Web sites you visit

Advice show your users, ask them to participate in a experiment

**Join this Wireless network SSID and we will show you who you are on the internet**

**Maybe use VPN more - or always!**

# Fokus 2019: Penetration testing



# Start Attacking from the Inside



- Now imagine you were in control of a company laptop
- Do you have a large internal world wide network?  
Having a large open network may cost you 1.9 billion DKK - ref Maersk
- Try scanning everything, start in a small corner, expand
- Scan all your danish segments, one by one, then the nordic, then the world
- Yes, things may break - FINE, BREAKING is GOOD

**Better to break while we are ready to un-break**

# How to break stuff



Think like an attacker

I sit here, but where am I connected:

```
reading from file cisco-lldp-1.cap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet)
16:39:43.468745 LLDP, length 328
    Chassis ID TLV (1), length 7
        Subtype MAC address (4): 70:ff:1a:01:03:02 (oui Unknown)
        0x0000: 0470 ea1a a0b3 2f
    Port ID TLV (2), length 8
        Subtype Local (7): Eth1/47
        0x0000: 0745 7468 312f 3437
    Port Description TLV (4), length 12: Ethernet1/47
        0x0000: 4574 6865 726e 6574 312f 3437
    System Description TLV (6), length 158
        Cisco Nexus Operating System (NX-OS) Software 14.0(2c) TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 2002-
2020, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
```

I love LLDP, but it does reveal software version, so flaws available


# Nmap the world



```
80/tcp      open     http  
81/tcp      open     basic2-nse  
10 [!] 8 nmap -v -sS -O 10.2.2.2  
11  
13 Starting nmap 0.2.54BETA25  
13 Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (3). OS detection is  
13 inaccurate.  
14 Interesting ports on 10.2.2.2:  
44 (The 1539 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)  
51 Port      State       Service  
51 22/tcp    open        ssh  
58  
68 No exact OS matches for host  
68  
24 Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned.  
50 8 sshnuke 10.2.2.2 -rootpw="Z10HD101"  
   Connecting to 10.2.2.2:ssh ... successful.  
Reattempting to exploit SSHv1 CRC32 ... successful.  
IP Resetting root password to "Z10HD101".  
System open: Access Level <9>  
No 8 ssh 10.2.2.2 -l root  
root@10.2.2.2's password: █
```




# Really do Nmap your world



- Nmap is a port scanner, but does more
- Finding your own infrastructure available from the guest network?
- See your printers having all the protocols enabled AND a wireless?

# Hackerlab setup




- Create hacker labs, encourage hacker labs!
- Software Host OS: Windows, Mac, Linux
- Virtualisation software: VMware, Virtual box, HyperV pick your poison
- Hackersoftware: Kali Virtual Machine <https://www.kali.org/>

# Hacking is not magic



- Hacking only requires some ninja training
- We have been doing this since 1995 when SATAN was released
- Listen, Plan, Act, Do hacking


# Book: Linux Basics for Hackers (LBhf)



*Linux Basics for Hackers Getting Started with Networking, Scripting, and Security in Kali* by  
OccupyTheWeb December 2018, 248 pp. ISBN-13: 9781593278557

<https://nostarch.com/linuxbasicsforhackers>

## Book: Kali Linux Revealed (KLR)



*Kali Linux Revealed Mastering the Penetration Testing Distribution*


<https://www.kali.org/download-kali-linux-revealed-book/>

Not curriculum but explains how to install Kali Linux

# Fokus 2019: Firewalls og segmentering



# Imagine Attacks from the Inside



- Now imagine you were in control of a company laptop
- Do you have a large internal world wide network?  
NotPetya cost Maersk about 1.9 billion DKK
- entry thought to be via software update of M.E.Doc [uk] an Ukrainian tax preparation program
- Attackers are very creative and have a large attack surface to most companies

# Netværk generelt




- Måske også på tide lige at se om der er opdateringer til switcher
- Jeg anbefaler LibreNMS

# Fokus 2019: TLS og VPN indstillinger



# SSL og TLS



Oprindeligt udviklet af Netscape Communications Inc.

Secure Sockets Layer SSL er idag blevet adopteret af IETF og kaldes derfor også for Transport Layer Security TLS. TLS er baseret på SSL Version 3.0.

# RFC-2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.0 fra Januar 1999

## RFC-3207 SMTP STARTTLS



Nu vi har lært Kali og Nmap at kende

- Find nemt alle ssl version 2 og 3  
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers
- Brug ssllabs <https://www.ssllabs.com/>
- 
-



# Weak DH paper



## Weak Diffie-Hellman and the Logjam Attack

Good News! Your browser is safe against the Logjam attack.

Diffie-Hellman key exchange is a popular cryptographic algorithm that allows Internet protocols to agree on a shared key and negotiate a secure connection. It is fundamental to many protocols including HTTPS, SSH, IPsec, SMTPS, and protocols that rely on TLS.

We have uncovered several weaknesses in how Diffie-Hellman key exchange has been deployed:


1. **Logjam attack against the TLS protocol.** The Logjam attack allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to downgrade vulnerable TLS connections to 512-bit export-grade cryptography. This allows the attacker to read and modify any data passed over the connection. The attack is reminiscent of the [FREAK attack](#), but is due to a flaw in the TLS protocol rather than an implementation vulnerability, and attacks a Diffie-Hellman key exchange rather than an RSA key exchange. The attack affects any server that supports `DHE_EXPORT` ciphers, and affects all modern web browsers. 8.4% of the Top 1 Million domains were initially vulnerable.
2. **Threats from state-level adversaries.** Millions of HTTPS, SSH, and VPN servers all use the same prime numbers for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Practitioners believed this was safe as long as new key exchange messages were generated for every connection. However, the first step in the number field sieve—the most efficient algorithm for breaking a Diffie-Hellman connection—is dependent only on this prime. After this first step, an attacker can quickly break individual connections.

We carried out this computation against the most common 512-bit prime used for TLS and demonstrate that the Logjam attack can be used to downgrade connections to 80% of TLS servers supporting `DHE_EXPORT`. We further estimate that an academic team can break a 768-bit prime and that a nation-state can break a 1024-bit prime. Breaking the single, most common 1024-bit prime used by web servers would allow passive eavesdropping on connections to 18% of the Top 1 Million HTTPS domains. A second prime would allow passive decryption of connections to 66% of VPN servers and 26% of SSH servers. A close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency's attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved such a break.

Source: <https://weakdh.org/> and  
<https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy-ccs15.pdf>



# Audits



## Truecrypt audit

<https://isecpartners.github.io/news/2014/04/14/iSEC-Completes-Truecrypt-Audit.html>

## Cryptocat audit

<https://blog.crypto.cat/2013/02/cryptocat-passes-security-audit-with-flying-colors/>



# VPN indstillinger



PPTP, hvis du bruger det så er det godt du er kommet :-D

Check:

- Certifikater/nøgler - ligesom TLS lange og rulles indimellem
- Algoritmer DES/3DES bye bye, husk både encryption og auth algoritmer
- DH-Group - +15 tak
- Check både client VPN og site-2-site

# ssllscan



```
root@kali:~# ssllscan --ssl2 web.kramse.dk
Version: 1.10.5-static
OpenSSL 1.0.2e-dev xx XXX xxxx
```

Testing SSL server web.kramse.dk on port 443

...

SSL Certificate:

```
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
RSA Key Strength: 2048
```

Subject: \*.kramse.dk

AltNames: DNS:\*.kramse.dk, DNS:kramse.dk

Issuer: AlphaSSL CA - SHA256 - G2

Source: Originally ssllscan from <http://www.titania.co.uk> but use the version on Kali



# Fokus 2019: DNS og email



# Various key attack types, clients and employees



- Phishing - sending fake emails, to collect credentials
- Spear phishing - targetted attacks
- Person in the middle - sniffing and changing data in transit
- Drive-by attacks - web pages infected with malware, often ad servers
- Malware transferred via USB or email
- Credential Stuffing, Password related, like re-use of password, see slide about being pwned

**If we all wait a bit, and not click links immediately**

Hackers try to create "urgency", click this or loose money

DNS



# DNS query log?



Skal vi logge ALLE DNS opslag fra klienter?

- Uetisk?
- Smart hvis man vil spore hvor malware kom ind

# DNSSEC



# DMARC



- SPF
- DKIM
- DMARC

# Fokus 2019: Syslog







# Fokus 2019: Incident Response og reaktion



# Overlapping Security Incidents



New data breaches nearly every week, these from danish news site  
version2.dk

Problem, we need to receive data from others

Data from others may contain malware

Have a job posting, yes

- then HR will be expecting CVs sent as .doc files

**Flere detaljer i gigantisk hotel-hack: 5,25 mio. ukrypterede pasnumre taget**

Jakob Møllerhøj | Sikkerhed | 07. jan 2019

3

**7,6 millioner spillerkonti løkket fra populært onlinespil**

Niels Møller Kjemstrup | Sikkerhed | 07. jan 2019

2

**Største løk i tysk historie: Politikeres og kunstneres data smidt på nettet**

Morten Egedal | Sikkerhed | 04. jan 2019

2

**Gentleman-aftale mellem politiske partier skal danne mur mod dataløk, hacking og fake news**

Louise Holst Andersen | Sikkerhed | 04. jan 2019

12

**Boligfond beklager løk af følsomme persondata: En menneskelig fejl**

Sikkerhed | 28. dec 2018

6



or the other way

## Attackers used a LinkedIn job ad and Skype call to breach bank's defences

### The attack

One of these is the Chilean news site's claim that the attack started with a LinkedIn advert offering a developer role to which a Redbanc employee replied.

The attackers set up a Skype call to conduct an interview during which the individual was tricked into downloading a file called ApplicationPDF.exe, sent via a weblink, which subsequently infected the employee's computer.

<https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/01/21/attackers-used-a-linkedin-job-ad-and-skype-call-to-breach-banks-defences/>



## Spørgsmål og mere debat



*"On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."*

Henrik Lund Kramshøj [hlk@zecurity.com](mailto:hlk@zecurity.com)