



Welcome to

4. Encrypting the Network

Communication and Network Security 2023

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Slides are available as PDF, kramse@Github 

4-Encrypting-the-Network-Layer.tex in the repo security-courses

Goals for today



Todays goals:

- Introduce Encryption
- Present the common algorithms, protocols, and tools used

Photo by Thomas Galler on Unsplash

Plan for today



Subjects

- Basic cryptography - Encryption Decryption - Hashing
- Short introduction to algorithms RSA, AES
- Diffie Helman exchange and Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Exercises

- <https://www.ssllabs.com/> and ssllscan checking servers
- Nginx exercises with TLS and load balancing



Time schedule



- 17:00 - 18:15
Introduction and basics
- 30min break
- 18:45 - 19:30
- 15min break
- 19:45 -20:30 45min

Reading Summary



It is not clear that the link layer is the right one for security. In a coffeeshop, the security association is terminated by the store: is there any reason you should trust the shopkeeper? Perhaps link-layer security makes some sense in a home, where you control both the access point and the wireless machines. However, we prefer end-to-end security at the network layer or in the applications.

Source: Cheswick-chap2.pdf Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker , Second Edition, William R. Cheswick, Steven M. Bellovin, and Aviel D. Rubin

- Read: PPA chapters 7,8,9
- PPA chapter 7: Network Layer Protocols
- PPA chapter 8: Transport Layer Protocols
- PPA chapter 9: Common Upper-Layer Protocols
- Skim: table of contents of RFC5246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.2
- wikipedia page https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security




Reading Summary, continued

```
user@Projects:~$ ping -s 1472 -M do 91.102.91.18
PING 91.102.91.18 (91.102.91.18) 1472(1500) bytes of data.
1480 bytes from 91.102.91.18: icmp_seq=1 ttl=244 time=7.43 ms
1480 bytes from 91.102.91.18: icmp_seq=2 ttl=244 time=7.20 ms
...
user@Projects:~$ ping -s 1474 -M do 91.102.91.18
PING 91.102.91.18 (91.102.91.18) 1474(1502) bytes of data.
ping: local error: Message too long, mtu=1500
ping: local error: Message too long, mtu=1500
^C
--- 91.102.91.18 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 0 received, +2 errors, 100% packet loss, time 1025ms
```

PPA chapter 7: Network Layer Protocols

- What is normal network traffic?
- Great reference chapter for basic protocols
- Plus basic IPv6
- Re PATH MTU etc. Linux MTU 1500 check ping -s 1472 -M do


Reading Summary, continued



PPA chapter 8: Transport Layer Protocols

- Again the TCP 3-way handshake is described Note: can be done in 4 packets
- Closed TCP returns Reset (RST) packet, closed UDP returns ICMP port unreachable

Reading Summary, continued



PPA chapter 9: Common Upper-Layer Protocols

- Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) port 67/udp and 68/udp, and options
- Domain Name System (DNS) common query types A, NS, CNAME, MX, TXT, AAAA, AXFR, IXFR

Why think of security?



Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic age. Privacy is not secrecy. A private matter is something one doesn't want the whole world to know, but a secret matter is something one doesn't want anybody to know. Privacy is the power to selectively reveal oneself to the world.

Source: A Cypherpunk's Manifesto by Eric Hughes, 1993

Solidaritetskryptering



Hvorfor skal vi kryptere?

Køn

Seksualitet

Tro religion

hatecrimes

Politisk overbevisning, eller blot aktiv

Whistleblowers

soldater

diplomater

Du bestemmer ikke hvem der diskrimineres eller trues i andre lande

Når vi krypterer hjælper vi andre! **Solidaritetskryptering**

Person in the middle attacks



ARP spoofing, ICMP redirects, the classics

Used to be called Man in The Middle MiTM

- ICMP redirect
- ARP spoofing
- Wireless listening and spoofing higher levels like airpwn-ng <https://github.com/ICSec/airpwn-ng>

Usually aimed at unencrypted protocols


Today we only talk about getting the data, not how to perform higher level attacks

Basic cryptography



Following

Wife wrote a shopping list and entrusted my 5yo to deliver it to me. [#infosecmetaphors](#)



4:40 PM - 16 Feb 2019

- Confidentiality - data holdes hemmelige
- Integrity - data ændres ikke uautoriseret
- A common attack category is children intercepting messages
- or MiTM Mini in the Middle in this case

Cryptography



Cryptography or cryptology is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication. Modern cryptography is heavily based on mathematical theory and computer science practice; cryptographic algorithms are designed around computational hardness assumptions, making such algorithms hard to break in practice by any adversary.

Symmetric-key cryptography refers to encryption methods in which both the sender and receiver share the same key, to ensure confidentiality, example algorithm AES

Public-key cryptography (like RSA) uses two related keys, a key pair of a public key and a private key. This allows for easier key exchanges, and can provide confidentiality, and methods for signatures and other services

Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography>

Kryptografi er svært



**STANFORD
UNIVERSITY**

Cryptography


Enroll / Login Now
Enroll in this online class for free
with a Coursera account



Professor Dan Boneh
Computer Science Department
Stanford University


Åbent kursus på Stanford
<http://crypto-class.org/>

Kryptering: Cryptography Engineering



Cryptography Engineering by Niels Ferguson, Bruce Schneier, and Tadayoshi Kohno
<https://www.schneier.com/book-ce.html>

Serious Cryptography




Serious Cryptography A Practical Introduction to Modern Encryption by Jean-Philippe Aumasson November 2017,
312 pp. ISBN-13: 978-1-59327-826-7 <https://nostarch.com/seriouscrypto>

Encryption Decryption



Kryptografi



Kryptografi er læren om, hvordan man kan kryptere data

Kryptografi benytter algoritmer som sammen med nøgler giver en ciffertekst - der kun kan læses ved hjælp af den tilhørende nøgle

Kryptografiske principper



Algoritmerne er kendte

Nøglerne er hemmelige

Nøgler har en vis levetid - de skal skiftes ofte

Et successfult angreb på en krypto-algoritme er enhver genvej som kræver mindre arbejde end en gennemgang af alle nøglerne

Nye algoritmer, programmer, protokoller m.v. skal gennemgås nøje!

Se evt. Snake Oil Warning Signs: Encryption Software to Avoid

<https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/1999/0215.html#snakeoil>

Wikipedia Snake oil description [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snake_oil_\(cryptography\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snake_oil_(cryptography))



AES

Advanced Encryption Standard

DES kryptering - gammel og pensioneret!


Der blev i 2001 vedtaget en ny standard algoritme Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) som afløser Data Encryption Standard (DES)

Algoritmen hedder Rijndael og er udviklet af Joan Daemen og Vincent Rijmen.

Se også https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard

Findes animationer (med fejl) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mlzxpkdXP58>

AES Advanced Encryption Standard



- The official Rijndael web site displays this image to promote understanding of the Rijndael round transformation [8].
- Key sizes 128,192,256 bit typical
- Some extensions in cryptosystems exist: XTS-AES-256 really is 2 instances of AES-128 and 384 is two instances of AES-192 and 512 is two instances of AES-256
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard

RSA



RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) is one of the first public-key cryptosystems and is widely used for secure data transmission. ... In RSA, this asymmetry is based on the practical difficulty of the factorization of the product of two large prime numbers, the "factoring problem". The acronym RSA is made of the initial letters of the surnames of Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, who first publicly described the algorithm in 1978.

- Key sizes 1,024 to 4,096 bit typical
- Quote from: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_\(cryptosystem\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem))

RSA operation



The RSA algorithm involves four steps: key generation, key distribution, encryption and decryption.

A basic principle behind RSA is the observation that it is practical to find three very large positive integers e , d and n such that with modular exponentiation for all integers m (with $0 \leq m < n$):

$$(m^e)^d \equiv m \pmod{n} \quad (m^d)^e \equiv m \pmod{n}$$

and that knowing e and n , or even m , it can be extremely difficult to find d . The triple bar () here denotes modular congruence.


In addition, for some operations it is convenient that the order of the two exponentiations can be changed and that this relation also implies:

$$(m^d)^e \equiv m \pmod{n} \quad (m^e)^d \equiv m \pmod{n}$$

RSA involves a public key and a private key. The public key can be known by everyone, and it is used for encrypting messages. The intention is that messages encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted in a reasonable amount of time by using the private key. The public key is represented by the integers n and e ; and, the private key, by the integer d (although n is also used during the decryption process. Thus, it might be considered to be a part of the private key, too). m represents the message (previously prepared with a certain technique explained below).

Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_\(cryptosystem\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem))


Public key kryptografi - 1



privat-nøgle kryptografi (eksempelvis AES) benyttes den samme nøgle til kryptering og dekryptering

offentlig-nøgle kryptografi (eksempelvis RSA) benytter to separate nøgler til kryptering og dekryptering

Public key kryptografi - 2



offentlig-nøgle kryptografi (eksempelvis RSA) bruger den private nøgle til at dekryptere
man kan ligeledes bruge offentlig-nøgle kryptografi til at signere dokumenter
- som så verificeres med den offentlige nøgle

NB: Kryptering alene sikrer ikke anonymitet


Elliptic Curve



Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) is an approach to public-key cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. ECC requires smaller keys compared to non-EC cryptography (based on plain Galois fields) to provide equivalent security.[1]

- Today we use https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography

Hashing - MD5 message digest funktion



HASH algoritmer giver en næsten unik værdi baseret på input
værdien ændres radikalt selv ved små ændringer i input

MD5 er blandt andet beskrevet i RFC-1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm

Algoritmen MD5 er baseret på MD4, begge udviklet af Ronald L. Rivest

Både MD5 og SHA-1 er idag gamle og skal generelt ikke bruges mere

Idag benyttes eksempelvis <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2>

Base64



In computer science, Base64 is a group of binary-to-text encoding schemes that represent binary data in an ASCII string format by translating it into a radix-64 representation. The term Base64 originates from a specific MIME content transfer encoding. Each Base64 digit represents exactly 6 bits of data. Three 8-bit bytes (i.e., a total of 24 bits) can therefore be represented by four 6-bit Base64 digits.

- Encoding data is not secure, can be decoded
- <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base64>

Cracking passwords



- Hashcat is the world's fastest CPU-based password recovery tool.
- oclHashcat-plus is a GPGPU-based multi-hash cracker using a brute-force attack (implemented as mask attack), combinator attack, dictionary attack, hybrid attack, mask attack, and rule-based attack.
- oclHashcat-lite is a GPGPU cracker that is optimized for cracking performance. Therefore, it is limited to only doing single-hash cracking using Markov attack, Brute-Force attack and Mask attack.
- John the Ripper password cracker old skool men stadig nyttig

Source:

<http://hashcat.net/wiki/>

<http://www.openwall.com/john/>

Encryption key length - who are attacking you



Encryption key lengths & hacking feasibility

Type of Attacker	Budget	Tool	Time & Cost/Key 40 bit	Time & Cost/Key 56 bit
Regular User	Minimal \$400	Scavenged computer time FPGA	1 week 5 hours (\$.08)	Not feasible 38 years (\$5,000)
Small Business	\$10,000	FPGA ¹	12 min. (\$.08)	556 days (\$5,000)
Corporate Department	\$300,000	FPGA ASIC ²	24 sec. (\$.08) 0.18 sec. (\$.001)	19 days (\$5,000) 3 hours (\$38)
Large Corporation	\$10M	ASIC	0.005 sec. (\$.0001)	6 min. (\$38)
Intelligence Agency	\$300M	ASIC	0.0002 sec. (\$.0001)	12 sec. (\$38)

Source: http://www.mycrypto.net/encryption/encryption_crack.html

More up to date: In 1998, the EFF built Deep Crack for less than \$250,000

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFF_DES_cracker

FPGA Based UNIX Crypt Hardware Password Cracker - 100 EUR in 2006


<http://www.sump.org/projects/password/>

Encryption on the web – Diffie–Hellman exchange



Diffie–Hellman key exchange (DH)[nb 1] is a method of securely exchanging cryptographic keys over a public channel and was one of the first public-key protocols as originally conceptualized by Ralph Merkle and named after Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman.[1][2] DH is one of the earliest practical examples of public key exchange implemented within the field of cryptography. ... The scheme was first published by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976

- Quote from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie-Hellman_key_exchange
- Today we use https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography



Transport Layer Security (TLS)



Oprindeligt udviklet af Netscape Communications Inc.

Secure Sockets Layer SSL er idag blevet adopteret af IETF og kaldes derfor også for Transport Layer Security TLS TLS er baseret på SSL Version 3.0

RFC-2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.0 fra Januar 1999

RFC-3207 SMTP STARTTLS

Det er svært!

Stanford Dan Boneh udgiver en masse omkring crypto

<https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/cryptobook/>



SSL/TLS udgaver af protokoller

Check with your system administrator before changing any of the advanced options below:

IMAP Path Prefix: INBOX

Port: 993 Use SSL

Authentication: Password

Mange protokoller findes i udgaver hvor der benyttes SSL

HTTPS vs HTTP

IMAPS, POP3S, osv.

Bemærk: nogle protokoller benytter to porte IMAP 143/tcp vs IMAPS 993/tcp

Andre benytter den samme port men en kommando som starter:

SMTP STARTTLS RFC-3207

Secure protocols



Securing e-mail

- Pretty Good Privacy - Phil Zimmermann
- OpenPGP = e-mail security


Network sessions use SSL/TLS

- Secure Sockets Layer SSL / Transport Layer Services TLS
- Encrypting data sent and received
- SSL/TLS already used for many protocols as a wrapper: POP3S, IMAPS, SSH, SMTP+TLS m.fl.

Encrypting traffic at the network layer - Virtual Private Networks VPN


- IPsec IP Security Framework, se også L2TP
- PPTP Point to Point Tunneling Protocol - dårlig og usikker, brug den ikke mere!
- OpenVPN uses SSL/TLS across TCP or UDP

Email er usikkert



Email uden kryptering - er som et postkort

Email med OpenPGP kryptering - afsendelse



En sikker krypteret email er ikke sværere at sende

Krypteret OpenPGP Email under transporten



```
Source of
Content-Description: OpenPGP encrypted message
To: Flemming Jacobsen <fj@batmule.dk>

This is an OpenPGP/MIME encrypted message (RFC 2440 and 3156)
--Apple-Mail=_B66E5C87-3EF1-461A-9D73-BDCE9C0E2E7A
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
Content-Description: PGP/MIME Versions Identification

Version: 1
--Apple-Mail=_B66E5C87-3EF1-461A-9D73-BDCE9C0E2E7A
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline;
filename=encrypted.asc
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name=encrypted.asc
Content-Description: OpenPGP encrypted message

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org

hQIMA2dXkaUMkJaZAQ//axZjPMGr89/1fc55Rbf1v0bjSw6IGgStEI4K8R20FNbP
0h0itcMCLx2Ec/01SRF4zrSpnUD0ihLFVwUcFBjimTHCLEYnI3MzpcalskSwueX
nXqRLMG8fGUVTnw9Mu/HdwwqkTG3PKS9daKi0tpJff2lbWrLCxGSPFd891gMi
y2SExy6Rh4xE3UEU0LSu10m0EBVRXMPsIJARM5/YgyPAmEPQ8mNbwcCeZb
KJQWa/KZqQ2M0S0ZKs77u0j5pEz2Kcgula/Z/S2NNl3n0L1ic31fonrpSSUe876F
RijqPrROVDJ6pIwd4TDCfrRHIVM109f673Ppopd42/c+J61pxb/g3mexx30eps3
K1NL93Ag63wCtyj52VmWclg/ktixlpwqfGXA/nfQXSor8+3ye625nYXuoab6aqG5
ZvLVxsoBxr2vR1GwhNMFmteMw0BHmA+KlixLms0k4Awctd+20K50q0lNs0CMb+
ARL1osrb9RaID0/hiy545fIevqr9cR92iITygsq02KLJWsdhDa1cvY9+bvdslY
+swdnffPX/y0cy+Un9Ks610sAjsmyetFcckmda49WqbpWTpemim0W-GbC0mHydN/n
PSC6u7T22oqf9BE0Cr98PW3IpvyViaZVKjgxfl2u8Na5BnreSl9iG5/3ppkeSpxF
AgwDBXNdeGcujuKUBD/9Hfmt5W+zrFU+PiLM2VNC52oNtk7ntBvs9AfY3g4qrU+bK
z072Z/7vhJP7VVZE3sGlyKPHm37at1zW49R8C7hjkForWrZpAifR78NPisvPiXKS
62V5/nuTiocEruiEGcLUNI10hBGaotY3tXn2Tmc90iaHudKseBY1x0R3Sxsxv8EfwsS
```

En sikker krypteret email er beskyttet undervejs

Fokus 2023: TLS og VPN indstillinger



```
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;
ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2; # not possible to do exclusive
ssl_ciphers 'EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:EECDH+\ \
  \aRSA+SHA256:EECDH:+CAMELLIA256:+AES256:+CAMELLIA128:+AES128:+SSLv3:!aNULL:!\
  \eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!ECDSA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256\ \
  \:-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA';
add_header Strict-Transport-Security max-age=15768000; # six months
# use this only if all subdomains support HTTPS!
# add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15768000; includeSubDomains";
```

Listing 2.6: SSL settings for nginx
[configuration/Webservers/nginx/default]

- De fleste har https nu, men er det konfigureret optimalt
- Vi bruger også VPN til at forbinde sites, kontorer
- Anbefaler at alle indstillingerne gennemgås!

Best current practice kan eksempelvis findes i dokumenter som dette

<https://english.ncsc.nl/publications/publications/2021/january/19/it-security-guidelines-for-transport-layer-security-2.1>

Nmap efter SSL og TLS



Example Usage

```
nmap -sV -sC <target>
```

Script Output

```
443/tcp open  https  syn-ack
| sslv2:
|   SSLv2 supported
|   ciphers:
|     SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
```

Nu vi har lært Kali og Nmap at kende

- Find nemt alle ssl version 2 og 3

```
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers
```

- Brug ssllabs <https://www.ssllabs.com/>

ssllscan



```
root@kali:~# ssllscan --ssl2 web.kramse.dk
Version: 1.10.5-static
OpenSSL 1.0.2e-dev xx XXX xxxx
```

Testing SSL server web.kramse.dk on port 443

...

SSL Certificate:

```
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
RSA Key Strength: 2048
```

Subject: *.kramse.dk

Altnames: DNS:*.kramse.dk, DNS:kramse.dk

Issuer: AlphaSSL CA - SHA256 - G2

Source: Originally ssllscan from <http://www.titania.co.uk> but use the version on Kali

SSLLscan can check your own sites, while Qualys SSL Labs only can test from hostname

Example Weak DH paper



Weak Diffie-Hellman and the Logjam Attack

Good News! Your browser is safe against the Logjam attack.

Diffie-Hellman key exchange is a popular cryptographic algorithm that allows Internet protocols to agree on a shared key and negotiate a secure connection. It is fundamental to many protocols including HTTPS, SSH, IPsec, SMTPS, and protocols that rely on TLS.

We have uncovered several weaknesses in how Diffie-Hellman key exchange has been deployed:

1. **Logjam attack against the TLS protocol.** The Logjam attack allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to downgrade vulnerable TLS connections to 512-bit export-grade cryptography. This allows the attacker to read and modify any data passed over the connection. The attack is reminiscent of the [FREAK attack](#), but is due to a flaw in the TLS protocol rather than an implementation vulnerability, and attacks a Diffie-Hellman key exchange rather than an RSA key exchange. The attack affects any server that supports `DHE_EXPORT` ciphers, and affects all modern web browsers. 8.4% of the Top 1 Million domains were initially vulnerable.
2. **Threats from state-level adversaries.** Millions of HTTPS, SSH, and VPN servers all use the same prime numbers for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Practitioners believed this was safe as long as new key exchange messages were generated for every connection. However, the first step in the number field sieve—the most efficient algorithm for breaking a Diffie-Hellman connection—is dependent only on this prime. After this first step, an attacker can quickly break individual connections.

We carried out this computation against the most common 512-bit prime used for TLS and demonstrate that the Logjam attack can be used to downgrade connections to 80% of TLS servers supporting `DHE_EXPORT`. We further estimate that an academic team can break a 768-bit prime and that a nation-state can break a 1024-bit prime. Breaking the single, most common 1024-bit prime used by web servers would allow passive eavesdropping on connections to 18% of the Top 1 Million HTTPS domains. A second prime would allow passive decryption of connections to 66% of VPN servers and 26% of SSH servers. A close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency's attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved such a break.

Source: <https://weakdh.org/> and
<https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy-ccs15.pdf>

Every year in different SSL/TLS implementations there have been problems.

FREAK March 2015



"A group of cryptographers at INRIA, Microsoft Research and IMDEA have discovered some serious vulnerabilities in OpenSSL (e.g., Android) clients and Apple TLS/SSL clients (e.g., Safari) that allow a 'man in the middle attacker' to downgrade connections from 'strong' RSA to 'export-grade' RSA. These attacks are real and exploitable against a shocking number of websites – including government websites. Patch soon and be careful."

Source: Matthew Green, cryptographer and research professor at Johns Hopkins Univ

<http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/03/attack-of-week-freak-or-factoring-nsa.html>

<https://www.smacktls.com/> <https://freakattack.com/>

OpenSSL, LibreSSL, Apple SSL flaw exit exit exit!, Android SSL, certs certs!!!111, SSLv3, Heartbleed, MS TLS

PS From now on its TLS! Not SSL anymore, any SSLv2, SSLv3 is old and vulnerable

Heartbleed CVE-2014-0160



The Heartbleed Bug

The Heartbleed Bug is a serious vulnerability in the popular OpenSSL cryptographic software library. This weakness allows stealing the information protected, under normal conditions, by the SSL/TLS encryption used to secure the Internet. SSL/TLS provides communication security and privacy over the Internet for applications such as web, email, instant messaging (IM) and some virtual private networks (VPNs).

The Heartbleed bug allows anyone on the Internet to read the memory of the systems protected by the vulnerable versions of the OpenSSL software. This compromises the secret keys used to identify the service providers and to encrypt the traffic, the names and passwords of the users and the actual content. This allows attackers to eavesdrop on communications, steal data directly from the services and users and to impersonate services and users.



Nok det mest kendte SSL/TLS exploit

Source: <http://heartbleed.com/>

Heartbleed hacking



```
06b0: 2D 63 61 63 68 65 0D 0A 43 61 63 68 65 2D 43 6F -cache..Cache-Co  
06c0: 6E 74 72 6F 6C 3A 20 6E 6F 2D 63 61 63 68 65 0D ntrol: no-cache.  
06d0: 0A 0D 0A 61 63 74 69 6F 6E 3D 67 63 5F 69 6E 73 ...action=gc_ins  
06e0: 65 72 74 5F 6F 72 64 65 72 26 62 69 6C 6C 6E 6F ert_order&billno  
06f0: 3D 50 5A 4B 31 31 30 31 26 70 61 79 6D 65 6E 74 =PZK1101&payment  
0700: 5F 69 64 3D 31 26 63 61 72 64 5F 6E 75 6D 62 65 _id=1&card_numbe  
0710: XX r=4060xxxx413xxx  
0720: 39 36 26 63 61 72 64 5F 65 78 70 5F 6D 6F 6E 74 96&card_exp_mont  
0730: 68 3D 30 32 26 63 61 72 64 5F 65 78 70 5F 79 65 h=02&card_exp_ye  
0740: 61 72 3D 31 37 26 63 61 72 64 5F 63 76 6E 3D 31 ar=17&card_cvn=1  
0750: 30 39 F8 6C 1B E5 72 CA 61 4D 06 4E B3 54 BC DA 09.1...r.aM.N.T..
```

- Obtained using Heartbleed proof of concepts - Gave full credit card details
- "can XXX be exploited- yes, clearly! PoCs ARE needed without PoCs even Akamai wouldn't have repaired completely!
- The internet was ALMOST fooled into thinking getting private keys from Heartbleed was not possible - scary indeed.

Key points after heartbleed



Source: picture source

<https://www.duosecurity.com/blog/heartbleed-defense-in-depth-part-2>

- Writing SSL software and other secure crypto software is hard
- Configuring SSL is hard
check your own site <https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/>
- SSL is hard, finding bugs "all the time" <http://armoredbarista.blogspot.dk/2013/01/a-brief-chronology-of-ssltls-attacks.html>

Decrypting TLS Browser Traffic With Wireshark



```
TLS Reassembled TCP Segments (13666 bytes): #18950(1400), #18951(1400), #18952(1400)
└ Secure Sockets Layer
  < ... >
  0000  48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 20 32 30 30 20 4f 4b 0d  HTTP/1.1 200 OK.
  0010  0a 53 65 72 76 65 72 3a 20 6e 67 69 6e 78 0d 0a  .Server: nginx..
  0020  44 61 74 65 3a 20 57 65 64 2c 20 31 31 20 46 65  Date: Wed, 11 Feb
  0030  62 20 32 30 31 35 20 30 35 3a 33 31 3a 30 39 20  2015 05:31:09
  0040  47 4d 54 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 71 65 6e 74 2d 54 79 70  GMT..Content-Type
  0050  65 3a 20 74 65 78 74 2f 68 74 6d 6c 3b 20 63 68  e: text/html; ch
  0060  61 72 73 65 74 3d 55 54 46 2d 38 0d 0a 54 72 61  arset=UTF-8..Transf
  0070  6e 73 66 65 72 2d 45 6e 63 6f 64 69 6e 67 3a 20  er-encoding:
  0080  63 68 75 6e 6b 65 64 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74  chunked. .Connect
  0090  69 6f 6e 3a 20 6b 65 65 70 2d 61 6c 69 76 65 0d  ion: keep-alive.

Frame (580 bytes) | Reassembled TCP (13666 bytes) | Decrypted SSL data (13637 bytes)
[REDACTED] File: "C:\Users\elitest\AppData\Local\Temp\... | Packets: 22624 · Displayed: 2264 (10.0%) · Dropped: 0 (0.0%)
```

- Firefox and Chrome both support logging the symmetric session key used to encrypt TLS traffic to a file
- Wireshark can read this file - and decrypt sessions - Nifty trick
- Another option is to use Burp

Source: great blog article about the features used

<https://jimshaver.net/2015/02/11/decrypting-tls-browser-traffic-with-wireshark-the-easy-way/>

sslstrip - transparently hijack HTTP



This tool provides a demonstration of the HTTPS stripping attacks that I presented at Black Hat DC 2009. It will transparently hijack HTTP traffic on a network, watch for HTTPS links and redirects, then map those links into either look-alike HTTP links or homograph-similar HTTPS links. It also supports modes for supplying a favicon which looks like a lock icon, selective logging, and session denial. For more information on the attack, see the video from the presentation below.

<https://moxie.org/software/sslstrip/>

- *First, arpspoof convinces a host that our MAC address is the router's MAC address, and the target begins to send us all its network traffic.*
- *supplying a favicon which looks like a lock icon*

mitmproxy - interactive HTTPS proxy



A screenshot of the mitmproxy web interface. The window title is "mitmproxy - http://localhost:8081". The main area shows a table of network flows. The columns are: Path, Method, Status, Size, Time, Request, Response, and Details. A tooltip over the "Request" column for the first row shows the full URL: "HTTP/1.1 302 Found". The "Response" column for the same row shows the status: "HTTP/1.1 204 No Content". The "Details" column for the same row shows the response headers: "Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8", "Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2016 15:57:48 GMT", "Server: gws", and "Content-Length: 0". Other rows in the table show various Google search results with their respective details.

<https://mitmproxy.org/>

- Command line, Web interface, Python API
- Intercept HTTP and HTTPS requests and responses and modify them on the fly
- Reverse proxy mode to forward traffic to a specified server
- Make scripted changes to HTTP traffic using Python
- SSL/TLS certificates for interception are generated on the fly

sslsplit - transparent SSL/TLS interception



Overview

SSLsplit is designed to transparently terminate connections that are redirected to it using a network address translation engine. SSLsplit then terminates SSL/TLS and initiates a new SSL/TLS connection to the original destination address, while logging all data transmitted. Besides NAT based operation, SSLsplit also supports static destinations and using the server name indicated by SNI as upstream destination. SSLsplit is purely a transparent proxy and cannot act as a HTTP or SOCKS proxy configured in a browser.

<https://www.roe.ch/SSLsplit>

- SSLsplit implements a number of defences against mechanisms which would normally prevent MitM attacks or make them more difficult
- SSLsplit can deny OCSP requests in a generic way. For HTTP and HTTPS connections, SSLsplit mangles headers to prevent server-instructed public key pinning (HPKP), avoid strict transport security restrictions (HSTS), avoid Certificate Transparency enforcement (Expect-CT) and prevent switching to QUIC/SPDY, HTTP/2 or WebSockets (Upgrade, Alternate Protocols)

Exercise



Now lets do the exercise

⚠ Enable firewall - 15min

which is number **6** in the exercise PDF.

Exercise




Now lets do the exercise

⚠ SSL/TLS scanners 15 min

which is number **33** in the exercise PDF.

Exercise



Now lets do the exercise

⚠ Internet scanners 15 min

which is number **34** in the exercise PDF.

Exercise




Now lets do the exercise

⚠ Nginx as a Transport Layer Security (TLS) endpoint 20 min

which is number **35** in the exercise PDF.

Exercise




Now lets do the exercise

Run Nginx as a load balancer - 15min

which is number **36** in the exercise PDF.

Exercise



Now lets do the exercise

⚠ Nginx logging 20 min

which is number **37** in the exercise PDF.

Exercise



Now lets do the exercise

⚠ Nginx filtering 40 min

which is number **38** in the exercise PDF.

Other crypto related stuff





Debian OpenSSL [edit]

In May 2008, security researcher [Luciano Bello](#) revealed his discovery that changes made in 2006 to the random number generator in the version of the [OpenSSL](#) package distributed with [Debian GNU/Linux](#) and other Debian-based distributions, such as [Ubuntu](#), dramatically reduced the entropy of generated values and made a variety of security keys vulnerable to attack.^{[10][11]} The security weakness was caused by changes made to the openssl code by a Debian developer in response to compiler warnings of apparently redundant code.^[12] This caused a massive worldwide regeneration of keys, and despite all attention the issue got, it could be assumed many of these old keys are still in use. Key types affected include SSH keys, OpenVPN keys, DNSSEC keys, key material for use in X.509 certificates and session keys used in SSL/TLS connections. Keys generated with GnuPG or GNUTLS are not affected as these programs used different methods to generate random numbers. Non-Debian-based Linux distributions are also unaffected. This security vulnerability was promptly patched after it was reported.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_number_generator_attack#Debian_OpenSSL

The random number generator is VITAL for crypto security

Check out modern CPUs and Linux response to this

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RdRand>

Is your data secure - data at rest



...et labore et dolore magna aliquam. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quod nostrud exercit. Irure dolor in reprehendit ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse, cillum. Tia non ob ea soluad inco, que egen ium imp, end. Officia deserunt mollit animus. Et harum dереud faciat, er expedit distinct. Gothica quam nunc putamus parum, aposuerit litterarum formas humanitatis per secula quarta; modo typi is vindetur, clari fiant sollemnes in futurum; litterarum formas humanitatis per secula quinta dicenda, modo typi qui nuntur parur, sollemnes in futuro cima et quinta dicenda, modo typi tum pioque civili, que pecunia modic honor et imperium et, conse ing elit, secundum dolore magna aliquam is nostrud exercitatio, lo conse in voluptate vel esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. At vero etiam dignissimum qui blandit est praesent.

Stolen laptop, tablet, phone - can anybody read your data?

Do you trust "remote wipe"

How do you in fact wipe data securely off devices, and SSDs?

Encrypt disk and storage devices before using them in the first place!

Circumvent security - single user mode boot



Unix systems often allows boot into singleuser mode
press command-s when booting Mac OS X

Laptops can often be booted using PXE network or CD boot

Mac computers can become a Firewire disk
hold t when booting - firewire target mode

Unrestricted access to un-encrypted data

Moving hard drive to another computer is also easy

Physical access is often - **game over**

Encrypting hard disk



Becoming available in the most popular client operating systems

- Microsoft Windows Bitlocker
- Apple Mac OS X - FileVault
- FreeBSD GEOM og GBDE - encryption framework
- Linux LUKS distributions like Ubuntu ask to encrypt home dir during installation
- Some vendors have BIOS passwords, or disk passwords

Attacks on disk encryption



- Firewire, DMA & Windows, Winlockpwn via FireWire
Hit by a Bus: Physical Access Attacks with Firewire Ruxcon 2006
- Removing memory from live system - data is not immediately lost, and can be read under some circumstances
Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys
<http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/>
- This is very CSI or Hollywoord like - but a real threat
- VileFault decrypts encrypted Mac OS X disk image files
<https://code.google.com/p/vilefault/>
- FileVault Drive Encryption (FVDE) (or FileVault2) encrypted volumes
<https://code.google.com/p/libfvde/>

So perhaps use both hard drive encryption AND turn off computer after use?

... and deleting data



Getting rid of data from old devices is a pain


Some tools will not overwrite data, leaving it vulnerable to recovery

Even secure erase programs might not work on SSD

- due to reallocation of blocks

I have used Darik's Boot and Nuke ("DBAN")

<http://www.dban.org/>



2018 attack



Drive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Impact
Crucial MX100 (all form factors)	X	X	X							X Compromised
Crucial MX200 (all form factors)	X	X	X							X Compromised
Crucial MX300 (all form factors)	✓	✓	✓		X	✓	✓	✓	✓	X Compromised
Samsung 840 EVO (SATA)	X	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	X	✓	~ Depends
Samsung 850 EVO (SATA)	X	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	~ Depends
Samsung T3 (USB)				X						X Compromised
Samsung T5 (USB)				X						X Compromised

¹ Cryptographic binding in ATA Security (High mode)

² Cryptographic binding in ATA Security (Max mode)

³ Cryptographic binding in TCG Opal

⁴ Cryptographic binding in proprietary standard

⁵ No single key for entire disk

⁶ Randomized DEK on sanitize

⁷ Sufficient random entropy

⁸ No wear leveling related issues

⁹ No DEVSLP related issues

self-encrypting deception: weakness in the encryption of solid state drives (SSDs)

<https://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/909282/draft-paper.pdf>



PGP/GPG verifikation af integriteten

Pretty Good Privacy PGP

Gnu Privacy Guard GPG

Begge understøtter OpenPGP - fra IETF RFC-2440

Når man har hentet og verificeret en nøgle kan man fremover nemt checke integriteten af software pakker

```
hlk@bigfoot:postfix$ gpg --verify postfix-2.1.5.tar.gz.sig
gpg: Signature made Wed Sep 15 17:36:03 2004 CEST using RSA key ID D5327CB9
gpg: Good signature from "wietse venema <wietse@porcupine.org>"
gpg:                               aka "wietse venema <wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl>"
```

Secure Shell - SSH og SCP



Hvad er Secure Shell SSH?

Oprindeligt udviklet af Tuu Ylönen i Finland,
se <http://www.ssh.com>

SSH afløser en række protokoller som er usikre:

- Telnet til terminal adgang
- r* programmerne, rsh, rcp, rlogin, ...
- FTP med brugerid/password

SSH - de nye kommandoer er



kommandoerne er:

- ssh - Secure Shell
- scp - Secure Copy
- sftp - secure FTP

Husk: SSH er både navnet på protokollerne - version 1 og 2 samt programmet ssh til at logge ind på andre systemer

SSH tillader også port-forward, tunnel til usikre protokoller, eksempelvis X protokollen til UNIX grafiske vinduer

NB: Man bør idag bruge SSH protokol version 2!

SSH nøgler



I praksis benytter man nøgler fremfor kodeord

I kan lave jeres egne SSH nøgler med programmerne i Putty

Hvilken del skal jeg have for at kunne give jer adgang til en server?

Hvordan får jeg smartest denne nøgle?

Installation af SSH nøgle



Vi bruger login med password på kurset, men for fuldstændighedens skyld beskrives her hvordan nøgle installeres:

- først skal der genereres et nøglepar **id_dsa og id_dsa.pub**
- Den offentlige del, filen id_dsa.pub, kopieres til serveren
- Der logges ind på serveren
- Der udføres følgende kommandoer:

```
$ cd skift til dit hjemmekatalog  
$ mkdir .ssh lav et katalog til ssh-nøgler  
$ cat id_dsa.pub >> .ssh/authorized_keys kopierer nøglen  
$ chmod -R go-rwx .ssh skift rettigheder på nøglen
```



OpenSSH konfiguration

Sådan anbefaler jeg at konfigurere OpenSSH SSHD

Det gøres i filen sshd_config typisk /etc/ssh/sshd_config

```
Port 22780      // eller anden tilfældig port
Protocol 2

PermitRootLogin no
PubkeyAuthentication yes
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
PasswordAuthentication no

UseDNS no
#X11Forwarding no
#X11DisplayOffset 10
#X11UseLocalhost yes
```

Det er en smagssag om man vil tillade *X11 forwarding*

Exercise




Now lets do the exercise

i Configure SSH keys for more secure access

which is number **27** in the exercise PDF.

For Next Time



Think about the subjects from this time, write down questions

Check the plan for chapters to read in the books

Visit web sites and download papers if needed

Retry the exercises to get more confident using the tools