



Welcome to

## 7. Basic Cryptography

Communication and Network Security 2019

Henrik Lund Kramshøj hlk@zencurity.com @kramse  

Slides are available as PDF, kramse@Github  
7-basic-cryptography.tex in the repo security-courses

# Plan for today




## Subjects

- Basic cryptography - Encryption Decryption - Hashing
- Short introduction to algorithms RSA, AES
- Diffie Helman exchange and Transport Layer Security (TLS)

## Exercises

- <https://www.ssllabs.com/> and sslscan checking servers
- sslstrip <https://moxie.org/software/sslstrip/>
- mitmproxy <https://mitmproxy.org/>
- ssllibsplit <https://www.roe.ch/SSLsplit>

## Subjects





- Basic Cryptography
- Symmetric Cryptosystems
- Data Encryption Standard (DES) / Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- Public Key Cryptography
- Stream and Block Ciphers
- Example cryptosystems OpenPGP, IPsec, Transport Layer Security (TLS)
- Authentication and Password security, NIST guidelines

## Exercises

- sslscan scan various sites for TLS settings, Qualys SSLLabs
- Try Nmap and Ixscan
- Try ssh scanners, similar to sslscan
- Crack your own passwords

# Reading Summary



Bishop chapter 10: Basic Cryptography

Bishop chapter 12: Cipher Techniques

Bishop chapter 13: Authentication

Skim Bishop chapter 11: Key Management


Skim NIST Special Publication 800-63B

Enterprise Survival Guide for Ransomware Attacks

IT Security Guidelines for Transport Layer Security

Home-work, look into [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve\\_cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography)

# Exercise




Now lets do the exercise

## SSL/TLS scanners 15 min

which is number **15** in the exercise PDF.

# Exercise




Now lets do the exercise

## Nmap Ikescan IPsec

which is number **16** in the exercise PDF.

# Exercise




Now lets do the exercise

## SSH scanners

which is number **17** in the exercise PDF.

# Exercise



Now lets do the exercise

## Password Cracking

which is number **18** in the exercise PDF.

# What is data?




Personal data you dont want to loose:

- Wedding pictures
- Pictures of your children
- Sextapes
- Personal finances

Source: picture of my son less than 24 hours old - precious!



# Confidentiality Integrity Availability



We want to protect something

Confidentiality - data holdes hemmelige

Integrity - data ændres ikke uautoriseret

Availability - data og systemet er tilgængelige når de skal bruges

# Why think of security?



Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic age. Privacy is not secrecy. A private matter is something one doesn't want the whole world to know, but a secret matter is something one doesn't want anybody to know. Privacy is the power to selectively reveal oneself to the world. A Cypherpunk's Manifesto by Eric Hughes, 1993

Copied from <https://cryptoparty.org/wiki/CryptoParty>

# Solidaritetskryptering



Hvorfor skal vi kryptere?

Køn

Seksualitet

Tro religion

hatecrimes

Politisk overbevisning, eller blot aktiv

Whistleblowers

soldater      diplomater

Du bestemmer ikke hvem der diskrimineres eller trues i andre lande

Når vi krypterer hjælper vi andre! **Solidaritetskryptering**

# Basic cryptography



- Confidentiality - data holdes hemmelige
- Integrity - data ændres ikke uautoriseret
- A common attack category is children intercepting messages
- or MiTM Mini in the Middle in this case




Eric Lawrence 🎻

@erictlaw

Following

Wife wrote a shopping list and entrusted my 5yo to deliver it to me. [#infosecmetaphors](#)



4:40 PM - 16 Feb 2019

# Cryptography



Cryptography or cryptology is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication. Modern cryptography is heavily based on mathematical theory and computer science practice; cryptographic algorithms are designed around computational hardness assumptions, making such algorithms hard to break in practice by any adversary.

Symmetric-key cryptography refers to encryption methods in which both the sender and receiver share the same key, to ensure confidentiality, example algorithm AES

Public-key cryptography (like RSA) uses two related keys, a key pair of a public key and a private key. This allows for easier key exchanges, and can provide confidentiality, and methods for signatures and other services

Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography>

# Kryptografi er svært



**STANFORD  
UNIVERSITY**

## Cryptography


**Enroll / Login Now**  
Enroll in this online class for free  
with a Coursera account

**Professor Dan Boneh**  
Computer Science Department  
Stanford University



Åbent kursus på Stanford  
<http://crypto-class.org/>


# Kryptering: Cryptography Engineering



*Cryptography Engineering* by Niels Ferguson, Bruce Schneier, and Tadayoshi Kohno  
<https://www.schneier.com/book-ce.html>

# Encryption Decryption






Kryptografi er læren om, hvordan man kan kryptere data

Kryptografi benytter algoritmer som sammen med nøgler giver en cifertekst  
- der kun kan læses ved hjælp af den tilhørende nøgle


# Public key kryptografi - 1



privat-nøgle kryptografi (eksempelvis AES) benyttes den samme nøgle til kryptering og dekryptering

offentlig-nøgle kryptografi (eksempelvis RSA) benytter to separate nøgler til kryptering og dekryptering

# Public key kryptografi - 2



offentlig-nøgle kryptografi (eksempelvis RSA) bruger den private nøgle til at dekryptere  
man kan ligeledes bruge offentlig-nøgle kryptografi til at signere dokumenter  
- som så verificeres med den offentlige nøgle

NB: Kryptering alene sikrer ikke anonymitet

# Kryptografiske principper



Algoritmerne er kendte

Nøglerne er hemmelige

Nøgler har en vis levetid - de skal skiftes ofte

Et successfult angreb på en krypto-algoritme er enhver genvej som kræver mindre arbejde end en gennemgang af alle nøglerne

Nye algoritmer, programmer, protokoller m.v. skal gennemgås nøje!

Se evt. Snake Oil Warning Signs: Encryption Software to Avoid

<http://www.interhack.net/people/cmcurtin/snake-oil-faq.html>



## AES

---

Advanced Encryption Standard

DES kryptering - gammel og pensioneret!


Der blev i 2001 vedtaget en ny standard algoritme Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) som afløser Data Encryption Standard (DES)

Algoritmen hedder Rijndael og er udviklet af Joan Daemen og Vincent Rijmen.

Se også [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced\\_Encryption\\_Standard](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard)

Findes animationer (med fejl) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mlzxpkdXP58>

# AES Advanced Encryption Standard



- The official Rijndael web site displays this image to promote understanding of the Rijndael round transformation [8].
- Key sizes 128,192,256 bit typical
- Some extensions in cryptosystems exist: XTS-AES-256 really is 2 instances of AES-128 and 384 is two instances of AES-192 and 512 is two instances of AES-256
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA\\_\(cryptosystem\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem))


# RSA



RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) is one of the first public-key cryptosystems and is widely used for secure data transmission. ... In RSA, this asymmetry is based on the practical difficulty of the factorization of the product of two large prime numbers, the "factoring problem". The acronym RSA is made of the initial letters of the surnames of Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, who first publicly described the algorithm in 1978.

- Key sizes 1,024 to 4,096 bit typical
- Quote from: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA\\_\(cryptosystem\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem))

# Hashing - MD5 message digest funktion



HASH algoritmer giver en næsten unik værdi baseret på input

værdien ændres radikalt selv ved små ændringer i input

MD5 er blandt andet beskrevet i RFC-1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm

Både MD5 og SHA-1 er idag gamle og skal ikke bruges mere

Idag benyttes eksempelvis <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2>

## Old skool NT hashes



NT LAN manager hash værdier er noget man typisk kunne samle op i netværk  
det er en hash værdi af et password som man ikke burde kunne bruge til noget - hash algoritmer  
er envejs

opbygningen gør at man kan forsøge brute-force på 7 tegn ad gangen!

en moderne pc med 10phcrack kan nemt knække de fleste password på få dage!

og sikkert 25-30% indenfor den første dag - hvis der ingen politik er omkring kodeord!

ved at generere store tabeller, eksempelvis 100GB kan man dække mange hashværdier af passwords  
med almindelige bogstaver, tal og tegn - og derved knække passwordshashes på sekunder. Søg  
efters rainbowcrack med google

# l0phcrack LC4



Consider that at one of the largest technology companies, where policy required that passwords exceed 8 characters, mix cases, and include numbers or symbols...

L0phCrack obtained 18% of the passwords in 10 minutes  
90% of the passwords were recovered within 48 hours on a Pentium II/300  
The Administrator and most Domain Admin passwords were cracked  
<http://www.atstake.com/research/lc/>

# Cracking passwords



- Hashcat is the world's fastest CPU-based password recovery tool.
- oclHashcat-plus is a GPGPU-based multi-hash cracker using a brute-force attack (implemented as mask attack), combinator attack, dictionary attack, hybrid attack, mask attack, and rule-based attack.
- oclHashcat-lite is a GPGPU cracker that is optimized for cracking performance. Therefore, it is limited to only doing single-hash cracking using Markov attack, Brute-Force attack and Mask attack.
- John the Ripper password cracker old skool men stadig nyttig

Source:

<http://hashcat.net/wiki/>

<http://www.openwall.com/john/>

# Encryption key length - who are attacking you



Encryption key lengths & hacking feasibility				
Type of Attacker	Budget	Tool	Time & Cost/Key 40 bit	Time & Cost/Key 56 bit
Regular User	Minimal \$400	Scavenged computer time FPGA	1 week 5 hours (\$.08)	Not feasible 38 years (\$5,000)
Small Business	\$10,000	FPGA <sup>1</sup>	12 min. (\$.08)	556 days (\$5,000)
Corporate Department	\$300,000	FPGA ASIC <sup>2</sup>	24 sec. (\$.08) 0.18 sec. (\$.001)	19 days (\$5,000) 3 hours (\$38)
Large Corporation	\$10M	ASIC	0.005 sec. (\$.0001)	6 min. (\$38)
Intelligence Agency	\$300M	ASIC	0.0002 sec. (\$.0001)	12 sec. (\$38)

Source: [http://www.mycrypto.net/encryption/encryption\\_crack.html](http://www.mycrypto.net/encryption/encryption_crack.html)

More up to date: In 1998, the EFF built Deep Crack for less than \$250,000

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFF\\_DES\\_cracker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EFF_DES_cracker)

FPGA Based UNIX Crypt Hardware Password Cracker - 100 EUR in 2006

<http://www.sump.org/projects/password/>

# Pass the hash



Lots of tools in pentesting pass the hash, reuse existing credentials and tokens *Still Passing the Hash 15 Years Later*  
<http://passing-the-hash.blogspot.dk/2013/04/pth-toolkit-for-kali-interim-status.html>

If a domain is built using only modern Windows OSs and COTS products (which know how to operate within these new constraints), and configured correctly with no shortcuts taken, then these protections represent a big step forward.

Source:


<http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/penetration/pass-the-hash-is-dead-long-live-pass-the-hash/> <https://samsclass.info/lulz/pth-8.1.htm>

# Diffie Helman exchange



Diffie–Hellman key exchange (DH)[nb 1] is a method of securely exchanging cryptographic keys over a public channel and was one of the first public-key protocols as originally conceptualized by Ralph Merkle and named after Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman.[1][2] DH is one of the earliest practical examples of public key exchange implemented within the field of cryptography. ... The scheme was first published by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976

- Quote from: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie-Hellman\\_key\\_exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie-Hellman_key_exchange)
- Today we use [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve\\_cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography)



# Elliptic Curve



Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) is an approach to public-key cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. ECC requires smaller keys compared to non-EC cryptography (based on plain Galois fields) to provide equivalent security.[1]

- Today we use [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve\\_cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography)

# Transport Layer Security (TLS)



Oprindeligt udviklet af Netscape Communications Inc.

Secure Sockets Layer SSL er idag blevet adopteret af IETF og kaldes derfor også for Transport Layer Security TLS TLS er baseret på SSL Version 3.0

RFC-2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.0 fra Januar 1999

RFC-3207 SMTP STARTTLS

Det er svært!

Stanford Dan Boneh udgiver en masse omkring crypto

<https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/cryptobook/>



# SSL/TLS udgaver af protokoller

Check with your system administrator before changing any of the advanced options below:

IMAP Path Prefix: INBOX

Port: 993  Use SSL

Authentication: Password

Mange protokoller findes i udgaver hvor der benyttes SSL

HTTPS vs HTTP

IMAPS, POP3S, osv.

Bemærk: nogle protokoller benytter to porte IMAP 143/tcp vs IMAPS 993/tcp

Andre benytter den samme port men en kommando som starter:

SMTP STARTTLS RFC-3207

# Secure protocols



## Securing e-mail

- Pretty Good Privacy - Phil Zimmermann
- OpenPGP = e-mail security

## Network sessions use SSL/TLS

- Secure Sockets Layer SSL / Transport Layer Services TLS
- Encrypting data sent and received
- SSL/TLS already used for many protocols as a wrapper: POP3S, IMAPS, SSH, SMTP+TLS m.fl.

## Encrypting traffic at the network layer - Virtual Private Networks VPN

- IPsec IP Security Framework, se også L2TP
- PPTP Point to Point Tunneling Protocol - dårlig og usikker, brug den ikke mere!
- OpenVPN uses SSL/TLS across TCP or UDP

# Email er usikkert



Dette er en mail uden kryptering

To: lund@diku.dk

Cc:

Reply To:

Subject: Dette er en mail uden kryptering

Account: Henrik Lund Kramshøj <hlk@security6.net>

Signature: Henrik

PGP:  Signed  Henrik Lund Kramshøj <hlk@security6.net>  Encrypted  Keys

Hej Lund

Når vi sender e-mail normalt er det uden kryptering.

Mvh

Henrik

--  
Henrik Lund Kramshøj, Follower of the Great Way of Unix  
hlk@security6.net, +45 2026 6000 cand.scient CISSP CEH  
<http://www.security6.net> - IPv6, sikkerhed, netværk

Email uden kryptering - er som et postkort

# Email med OpenPGP kryptering - afsendelse



The screenshot shows an email client window with the following details:

- To:** Flemming Jacobsen
- Cc:** (empty)
- Bcc:** (empty)
- Subject:** (empty)
- From:** Henrik Lund Kramshøj – hlk@kramse.org
- Signature:** Kramse

The message body contains the following text:

Hey Flemming  
Your new initial password for the service is - [HelloWorldofEncryption](#)  
Mvh/Best regards  
Henrik  
—  
Henrik Lund Kramshøj, Follower of the Great Way of Unix  
internet samurai cand.scient CISSP  
hlk@kramse.org hlk@zecurity.dk +45 2026 6000

En sikker krypteret email er ikke sværere at sende

# Krypteret OpenPGP Email under transporten



```
Source of
Content-Description: OpenPGP encrypted message
To: Flemming Jacobsen <fj@batmule.dk>

This is an OpenPGP/MIME encrypted message (RFC 2440 and 3156)
--Apple-Mail=_B66E5C87-3EF1-461A-9D73-BDCE9C0E2E7A
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Description: PGP/MIME Versions Identification
Version: 1
--Apple-Mail=_B66E5C87-3EF1-461A-9D73-BDCE9C0E2E7A
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline;
filename=encrypted.asc
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name=encrypted.asc
Content-Description: OpenPGP encrypted message

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
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-GbC0mHydN/n
P5C6u7T22oqf9BE0C98PW3IpvyVlaZVKjgxfl2u8Na5BnreSl91g5/3ppkeSpxF
AgwDBXNdeGcujkUBD/9hfmt5W+zrFU+PiTM2VNC52oNtk7ntBvs9AfY3g4qrU+bK
z072Z/7vhJP7VVZE3sGlyKPHm37at1zW49R8C7hjkForWrZpAifR78NPisvPiXKS
62V5/nuTiocErufEGcLNU10hBGaoy73fXn2Tmc90iaHudKseBY1x0R3Sxsxv8EfwsS
```

En sikker krypteret email er beskyttet undervejs

# Fokus 2019: TLS og VPN indstillinger



```
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;
ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2; # not possible to do exclusive
ssl_ciphers 'EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:EECDH+\ \
\ aRSA+SHA256:EECDH:+CAMELLIA256:+AES256:+CAMELLIA128:+AES128:+SSLv3:!aNULL:! \
\ eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!ECDSA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256\ \
\ !-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA';
add_header Strict-Transport-Security max-age=15768000; # six months
# use this only if all subdomains support HTTPS!
# add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15768000; includeSubDomains";
```

Listing 2.6: SSL settings for nginx  
[configuration/Webservers/nginx/default]

- De fleste har https nu, men er det konfigureret optimalt
- Vi bruger også VPN til at forbinde sites, kontorer
- Anbefaler at alle indstillingerne gennemgås!

# Nmap efter SSL og TLS



## Example Usage

```
nmap -sV -sC <target>
```

## Script Output

```
443/tcp open  https  syn-ack
| sslv2:
|   SSLv2 supported
|   ciphers:
|     SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
```

## Nu vi har lært Kali og Nmap at kende

- Find nemt alle ssl version 2 og 3

```
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers
```

- Brug ssllabs <https://www.ssllabs.com/>

# ssllscan



```
root@kali:~# ssllscan --ssl2 web.kramse.dk
Version: 1.10.5-static
OpenSSL 1.0.2e-dev xx XXX xxxx
```

Testing SSL server web.kramse.dk on port 443

...

SSL Certificate:

```
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
RSA Key Strength: 2048
```

Subject: \*.kramse.dk

AltNames: DNS:\*.kramse.dk, DNS:kramse.dk

Issuer: AlphaSSL CA - SHA256 - G2

Source: Originally ssllscan from <http://www.titania.co.uk> but use the version on Kali

SSLLscan can check your own sites, while Qualys SSL Labs only can test from hostname

# Example Weak DH paper



## Weak Diffie-Hellman and the Logjam Attack

Good News! Your browser is safe against the Logjam attack.

Diffie-Hellman key exchange is a popular cryptographic algorithm that allows Internet protocols to agree on a shared key and negotiate a secure connection. It is fundamental to many protocols including HTTPS, SSH, IPsec, SMTSP, and protocols that rely on TLS.

We have uncovered several weaknesses in how Diffie-Hellman key exchange has been deployed:

1. **Logjam attack against the TLS protocol.** The Logjam attack allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to downgrade vulnerable TLS connections to 512-bit export-grade cryptography. This allows the attacker to read and modify any data passed over the connection. The attack is reminiscent of the [FREAK attack](#), but is due to a flaw in the TLS protocol rather than an implementation vulnerability, and attacks a Diffie-Hellman key exchange rather than an RSA key exchange. The attack affects any server that supports `DHE_EXPORT` ciphers, and affects all modern web browsers. 8.4% of the Top 1 Million domains were initially vulnerable.
2. **Threats from state-level adversaries.** Millions of HTTPS, SSH, and VPN servers all use the same prime numbers for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Practitioners believed this was safe as long as new key exchange messages were generated for every connection. However, the first step in the number field sieve—the most efficient algorithm for breaking a Diffie-Hellman connection—is dependent only on this prime. After this first step, an attacker can quickly break individual connections.

We carried out this computation against the most common 512-bit prime used for TLS and demonstrate that the Logjam attack can be used to downgrade connections to 80% of TLS servers supporting `DHE_EXPORT`. We further estimate that an academic team can break a 768-bit prime and that a nation-state can break a 1024-bit prime. Breaking the single, most common 1024-bit prime used by web servers would allow passive eavesdropping on connections to 18% of the Top 1 Million HTTPS domains. A second prime would allow passive decryption of connections to 66% of VPN servers and 26% of SSH servers. A close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency's attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved such a break.

Source: <https://weakdh.org/> and

<https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy-ccs15.pdf>

Every year in different SSL/TLS implementations there have been problems.

# Why?, because things like Superfish February 2015



Thursday, February 19, 2015

## Extracting the SuperFish certificate

By Robert Graham

I extracted the [certificate](#) from the SuperFish adware and cracked the password ("komodia") that encrypted it. I discuss how down below. The consequence is that [I can intercept the encrypted communications](#) of SuperFish's victims (people with Lenovo laptops) while hanging out near them at a cafe wifi hotspot. Note: this is probably trafficking in illegal access devices under the proposed revisions to the CFAA, so get it now before they change the law.

Lenovo laptops included Adware, which did SSL/TLS Man in the Middle on connections. They had a root certificate installed on the Windows operating system, WTF!

Sources:

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superfish>

<http://blog.erratasec.com/2015/02/extracting-superfish-certificate.html>

<http://www.version2.dk/blog/kibana4-superfish-og-emergingthreats-81610>

<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/further-evidence-lenovo-breaking-https-security-its-laptops>

# FREAK March 2015



"A group of cryptographers at INRIA, Microsoft Research and IMDEA have discovered some serious vulnerabilities in OpenSSL (e.g., Android) clients and Apple TLS/SSL clients (e.g., Safari) that allow a 'man in the middle attacker' to downgrade connections from 'strong' RSA to 'export-grade' RSA. These attacks are real and exploitable against a shocking number of websites – including government websites. Patch soon and be careful."

Source: Matthew Green, cryptographer and research professor at Johns Hopkins Univ

<http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/03/attack-of-week-freak-or-factoring-nsa.html>

<https://www.smacktls.com/> <https://freakattack.com/>

OpenSSL, LibreSSL, Apple SSL flaw exit exit exit!, Android SSL, certs certs!!!111, SSLv3, Heartbleed, MS TLS

PS From now on its TLS! Not SSL anymore, any SSLv2, SSLv3 is old and vulnerable

# Heartbleed CVE-2014-0160



## The Heartbleed Bug

The Heartbleed Bug is a serious vulnerability in the popular OpenSSL cryptographic software library. This weakness allows stealing the information protected, under normal conditions, by the SSL/TLS encryption used to secure the Internet. SSL/TLS provides communication security and privacy over the Internet for applications such as web, email, instant messaging (IM) and some virtual private networks (VPNs).

The Heartbleed bug allows anyone on the Internet to read the memory of the systems protected by the vulnerable versions of the OpenSSL software. This compromises the secret keys used to identify the service providers and to encrypt the traffic, the names and passwords of the users and the actual content. This allows attackers to eavesdrop on communications, steal data directly from the services and users and to impersonate services and users.



Nok det mest kendte SSL/TLS exploit

Source: <http://heartbleed.com/>

# Heartbleed hacking



```
06b0: 2D 63 61 63 68 65 0D 0A 43 61 63 68 65 2D 43 6F -cache..Cache-Co
06c0: 6E 74 72 6F 6C 3A 20 6E 6F 2D 63 61 63 68 65 0D ntrol: no-cache.
06d0: 0A 0D 0A 61 63 74 69 6F 6E 3D 67 63 5F 69 6E 73 ...action=gc_ins
06e0: 65 72 74 5F 6F 72 64 65 72 26 62 69 6C 6C 6E 6F ert_order&billno
06f0: 3D 50 5A 4B 31 31 30 31 26 70 61 79 6D 65 6E 74 =PZK1101&payment
0700: 5F 69 64 3D 31 26 63 61 72 64 5F 6E 75 6D 62 65 _id=1&card_numbe
0710: XX r=4060xxxx413xxx
0720: 39 36 26 63 61 72 64 5F 65 78 70 5F 6D 6F 6E 74 96&card_exp_mont
0730: 68 3D 30 32 26 63 61 72 64 5F 65 78 70 5F 79 65 h=02&card_exp_ye
0740: 61 72 3D 31 37 26 63 61 72 64 5F 63 76 6E 3D 31 ar=17&card_cvn=1
0750: 30 39 F8 6C 1B E5 72 CA 61 4D 06 4E B3 54 BC DA 09.l...r.aM.N.T..
```

- Obtained using Heartbleed proof of concepts - Gave full credit card details
- "can XXX be exploited- yes, clearly! PoCs ARE needed without PoCs even Akamai wouldn't have repaired completely!
- The internet was ALMOST fooled into thinking getting private keys from Heartbleed was not possible - scary indeed.

# Key points after heartbleed



Source: picture source

<https://www.duosecurity.com/blog/heartbleed-defense-in-depth-part-2>

- Writing SSL software and other secure crypto software is hard
- Configuring SSL is hard
  - check your own site <https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/>
- SSL is hard, finding bugs "all the time"<http://armoredbarista.blogspot.dk/2013/01/a-brief-chronology-of.html>

# Feb 2015 Decrypting TLS Browser Traffic With Wireshark



```
[+] [TLS Reassembled TCP Segments (13000 bytes): #18950(1400), #18951(1400), #18952
[Secure Sockets Layer

< >

0000  48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 20 32 30 30 20 4f 4b 0d  HTTP/1.1 200 OK.
0010  0a 53 65 72 76 65 72 3a 20 6e 67 69 6e 78 0d 0a  .Server: nginx..
0020  44 61 74 65 3a 20 57 65 64 2c 20 31 31 20 46 65  Date: Wed, 11 Fe
0030  62 20 32 30 31 35 20 30 35 3a 33 31 3a 30 39 20  b 2015 05:31:09
0040  47 4d 54 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 71 65 6e 74 2d 54 79 70  GMT..Content-Type
0050  65 3a 20 74 65 78 74 2f 68 74 6d 6c 3b 20 63 68  e: text/html; ch
0060  61 72 73 65 74 3d 55 54 46 2d 38 0d 0a 54 72 61  arset=UTF-8..Tra
0070  6e 73 66 65 72 2d 45 6e 63 6f 64 69 6e 67 3a 20  nsfer-Encoding:
0080  63 68 75 6e 6b 65 64 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74  chunked. .Connect
0090  69 6f 6e 3a 20 6b 65 65 70 2d 61 6c 69 76 65 0d  ion: keep-alive.

Frame (580 bytes) Reassembled TCP (13666 bytes) Decrypted SSL data (13637 bytes)
● File: "C:\Users\elitest\AppData\Local\Temp\... | Packets: 22624 · Displayed: 2264 (10.0%) · Dropped: 0 (0.0%)
```

Firefox and Chrome both support logging the symmetric session key used to encrypt TLS traffic to a file

Wireshark can read this file - and decrypt sessions - Nifty trick

Source: great blog article about the features used

<https://jimshaver.net/2015/02/11/decrypting-tls-browser-traffic-with-wireshark-the-easy-way/>

# HTTPS Everywhere



HTTPS Everywhere is a Firefox extension produced as a collaboration between The Tor Project and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. It encrypts your communications with a number of major websites.

<http://www.eff.org/https-everywhere>

# TLS Server Name Indication extension



HTTPS skal der til!



Vi skal kryptere, men desværre så skjuler vores HTTPS ikke hvad site vi tilgår.

- HTTPS er idag TLS Transport Layer Security
- Verifikation sker med certifikater der præsenteres af server
- Der kan være flere sites på en enkelt IP - med SNI
- Desværre vælges det rigtige certifikat før krypteringen starter

## TLS Server Name Indication example





```
▼ Secure Sockets Layer
  ▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
    Content Type: Handshake (22)
    Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
    Length: 198
  ▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
    Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
    Length: 194
    Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
    ▶ Random
      Session ID Length: 0
      Cipher Suites Length: 32
      ▶ Cipher Suites (16 suites)
      Compression Methods Length: 1
      ▶ Compression Methods (1 method)
      Extensions Length: 121
      ▶ Extension: Unknown 56026
      ▶ Extension: renegotiation_info
    ▼ Extension: server_name
      Type: server_name (0x0000)
      Length: 16
    ▼ Server Name Indication extension
      Server Name list length: 14
      Server Name Type: host_name (0)
      Server Name length: 11
      Server Name: twitter.com
    ▶ Extension: Extended Master Secret
```

0050	a4 1d 52 8f 2c 18 99 91 54 68 0a 77 0d 95 73 64	..R.,... Th.w..sd
0060	7d 00 00 20 5a 5a c0 2b c0 2f c0 2c c0 30 cc a9	}.. ZZ.+ ./.,.0..
0070	cc a8 cc 14 cc 13 c0 13 c0 14 00 9c 00 9d 00 2f	..... ....../
0080	00 35 00 0a 01 00 00 79 da da 00 00 ff 01 00 01	.5.....y .....
0090	00 00 00 00 10 00 0e 00 00 0b 74 77 69 74 74 65	..... .twitte
00a0	72 2e 63 6f 6d 00 17 00 00 00 23 00 00 00 0d 00	r.com ...#....
00b0	14 00 12 04 03 08 04 04 01 05 03 08 05 05 01 08	.....

# Basic cryptography



Eric Lawrence Following

Wife wrote a shopping list and entrusted my 5yo to deliver it to me. [#infosecmetaphors](#)

- coffee filters  
- freezer ziplock bags (small).  
- Weiman stainless steel cleaner  
Toys

4:40 PM - 16 Feb 2019

- A common attack category is children intercepting messages
- or MiTM Mini in the Middle in this case

## sslstrip - transparently hijack HTTP



This tool provides a demonstration of the HTTPS stripping attacks that I presented at Black Hat DC 2009. It will transparently hijack HTTP traffic on a network, watch for HTTPS links and redirects, then map those links into either look-alike HTTP links or homograph-similar HTTPS links. It also supports modes for supplying a favicon which looks like a lock icon, selective logging, and session denial. For more information on the attack, see the video from the presentation below.

<https://moxie.org/software/sslstrip/>

- *First, arpspoof convinces a host that our MAC address is the router's MAC address, and the target begins to send us all its network traffic.*
- *supplying a favicon which looks like a lock icon*

# mitmproxy - interactive HTTPS proxy



<https://mitmproxy.org/>

- Command line, Web interface, Python API
- Intercept HTTP and HTTPS requests and responses and modify them on the fly
- Reverse proxy mode to forward traffic to a specified server
- Make scripted changes to HTTP traffic using Python
- SSL/TLS certificates for interception are generated on the fly

# sslsplit - transparent SSL/TLS interception



## Overview


SSlsplit is designed to transparently terminate connections that are redirected to it using a network address translation engine. SSlsplit then terminates SSL/TLS and initiates a new SSL/TLS connection to the original destination address, while logging all data transmitted. Besides NAT based operation, SSlsplit also supports static destinations and using the server name indicated by SNI as upstream destination. SSlsplit is purely a transparent proxy and cannot act as a HTTP or SOCKS proxy configured in a browser.

<https://www.roe.ch/SSlsplit>

- SSlsplit implements a number of defences against mechanisms which would normally prevent MitM attacks or make them more difficult
- SSlsplit can deny OCSP requests in a generic way. For HTTP and HTTPS connections, SSlsplit mangles headers to prevent server-instructed public key pinning (HPKP), avoid strict transport security restrictions (HSTS), avoid Certificate Transparency enforcement (Expect-CT) and prevent switching to QUIC/SPDY, HTTP/2 or WebSockets (Upgrade, Alternate Protocols)

We will not really run SSlsplit, but its interesting

# Exercise




Now lets do the exercise

??

which is number ?? in the exercise PDF.

# Exercise




Now lets do the exercise

??

which is number ?? in the exercise PDF.

# Exercise



Now lets do the exercise

??

which is number ?? in the exercise PDF.

# Exercise



Now lets do the exercise

??

which is number ?? in the exercise PDF.

## Other crypto related stuff





## Debian OpenSSL [edit]

In May 2008, security researcher [Luciano Bello](#) revealed his discovery that changes made in 2006 to the random number generator in the version of the [OpenSSL](#) package distributed with [Debian GNU/Linux](#) and other Debian-based distributions, such as [Ubuntu](#), dramatically reduced the entropy of generated values and made a variety of security keys vulnerable to attack.<sup>[10][11]</sup> The security weakness was caused by changes made to the openssl code by a Debian developer in response to compiler warnings of apparently redundant code.<sup>[12]</sup> This caused a massive worldwide regeneration of keys, and despite all attention the issue got, it could be assumed many of these old keys are still in use. Key types affected include SSH keys, OpenVPN keys, DNSSEC keys, key material for use in X.509 certificates and session keys used in SSL/TLS connections. Keys generated with GnuPG or GNUTLS are not affected as these programs used different methods to generate random numbers. Non-Debian-based Linux distributions are also unaffected. This security vulnerability was promptly patched after it was reported.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random\\_number\\_generator\\_attack#Debian\\_OpenSSL](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_number_generator_attack#Debian_OpenSSL)

The random number generator is VITAL for crypto security

Check out modern CPUs and Linux response to this

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RdRand>

# Fokus 2019: DNS og email



- Vi er afhængige af email, modtagelse og afsendelse
- Når vi modtager skal det helst gå hurtigt
- Når vi sender skal vi ikke ende i spam mappen
- Phishing, hvem kan sende *fra vores domæne*



# Various key attack types, clients and employees



- Phishing - sending fake emails, to collect credentials
- Spear phishing - targetted attacks
- Person in the middle - sniffing and changing data in transit
- Drive-by attacks - web pages infected with malware, often ad servers
- Malware transferred via USB or email
- Credential Stuffing, Password related, like re-use of password, see slide about being pwned

**If we all wait a bit, and not click links immediately**

Hackers try to create "urgency", click this or loose money



# DNS er mere end navneopslag

består af resource records med en type:

- adresser A-records
- IPv6 adresser AAAA-records
- autoritative navneservere NS-records
- post, mail-exchanger MX-records
- flere andre: md , mf , cname , soa , mb , mg , mr , null , wks , ptr , hinfo , minfo , mx ....

IN	MX	10	mail.zencurity.dk.
IN	MX	20	mail2.zencurity.dk.

# SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol



```
hlk@bigfoot:hlk$ telnet mail.kramse.dk 25
Connected to sunny.
220 sunny.kramse.dk ESMTP Postfix
HELO bigfoot
250 sunny.kramse.dk
MAIL FROM: Henrik
250 Ok
RCPT TO: hlk@kramse.dk
250 Ok
DATA
354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
hejsa
.
250 Ok: queued as 749193BD2
QUIT
221 Bye
```

- RFC-821 SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol fra 1982
- [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple\\_Mail\\_Transfer\\_Protocol](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Mail_Transfer_Protocol)

# DNS attacks, Your registrar



## 26 Webnic Registrar Blamed for Hijack of Lenovo, Google Domains

FEB 15



Two days ago, attackers allegedly associated with the fame-seeking group **Lizard Squad** briefly hijacked Google's Vietnam domain (google.com.vn). On Wednesday, **Lenovo.com** was similarly attacked. Sources now tell KrebsOnSecurity that both hijacks were possible because the attackers seized control over **Webnic.cc**, the Malaysian registrar that serves both domains and 600,000 others.

DNS insecurity has huge impact on your security!

Most are denial of service, by may create Mitm or confidentiality concerns

Select DNS providers with care

Sources:

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/02/webnic-registrar-blamed-for-hijack-of-lenovo-google-domains/>

<http://www.version2.dk/artikel/google-og-lenovo-defaced-som-foelge-af-overset-sikkerhedsproblemstilling-91295>

# DNSSEC get started now



The screenshot shows a web browser window for the 'DNSSEC/TLSA Validator' add-on. The URL is https://www.dnssec-validator.cz. The page features a large 'Download' button and icons for DNSSEC and TLSA. Below the download button, there's a 'News' section with a 'Version: 2.2.0' heading and a 'New Features' list:

- New js-types-based implementation for Firefox.
- New validator implementation for Chromium/Chrome/Opera based on Native Messaging.

The 'About' section contains a detailed description of what the add-on does, mentioning it checks DNSSEC and TLSA records for various browsers.

"TLSA records store hashes of remote server TLS/SSL certificates. The authenticity of a TLS/SSL certificate for a domain name is verified by DANE protocol (RFC 6698). DNSSEC and TLSA validation results are displayed by using several icons."

## DNSSEC and DANE



"Objective:

Specify mechanisms and techniques that allow Internet applications to establish cryptographically secured communications by using information distributed through DNSSEC for discovering and authenticating public keys which are associated with a service located at a domain name."

DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (dane)

# Email security 2019 - Goals



- SPF Sender Policy Framework  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender\\_Policy\\_Framework](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework)
- DKIM DomainKeys Identified Mail  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys\\_Identified\\_Mail](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail)
- DMARC Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance  
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC>
- DANE DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based\\_Authentication\\_of\\_Named\\_Entities](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities)
- Brug allesammen, check efter ændringer!

# Fokus 2019: Laptop sikkerhed



- Relevant for alle
- Hvordan sikrer vi at vi ikke mister værdierne, hardware og data typisk

# Secure Laptops



- Laptops (og mobile enheder)
- Hvad kendetegner en laptop?
- Hardware naturligvis, en Macbook koster officielt mere end en brugt mellemklassebil
- - og husk brugen af laptops
- Er laptops sikre, og hvad betyder det?



## Circumvent security - single user mode boot



Unix systems often allows boot into singleuser mode  
press command-s when booting Mac OS X

Laptops can often be booted using PXE network or CD boot

Mac computers can become a Firewire disk  
hold t when booting - firewire target mode

Unrestricted access to un-encrypted data

Moving hard drive to another computer is also easy

Physical access is often - **game over**

# Encrypting hard disk



Becoming available in the most popular client operating systems

- Microsoft Windows Bitlocker
- Apple Mac OS X - FileVault
- FreeBSD GEOM og GBDE - encryption framework
- Linux LUKS distributions like Ubuntu ask to encrypt home dir during installation
- Some vendors have BIOS passwords, or disk passwords

# Attacks on disk encryption



- Firewire, DMA & Windows, Winlockpwn via FireWire  
Hit by a Bus: Physical Access Attacks with Firewire Ruxcon 2006
- Removing memory from live system - data is not immediately lost, and can be read under some circumstances  
Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys  
<http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/>
- This is very CSI or Hollywoord like - but a real threat
- VileFault decrypts encrypted Mac OS X disk image files  
<https://code.google.com/p/vilefault/>
- FileVault Drive Encryption (FVDE) (or FileVault2) encrypted volumes  
<https://code.google.com/p/libfvde/>

So perhaps use both hard drive encryption AND turn off computer after use?

## ... and deleting data



Getting rid of data from old devices is a pain


Some tools will not overwrite data, leaving it vulnerable to recovery

Even secure erase programs might not work on SSD

- due to reallocation of blocks

I have used Darik's Boot and Nuke ("DBAN")

<http://www.dban.org/>



# 2018 attack



Drive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Impact
Crucial MX100 (all form factors)	X	X	X							X Compromised
Crucial MX200 (all form factors)	X	X	X							X Compromised
Crucial MX300 (all form factors)	✓	✓	✓		X	✓	✓	✓	✓	X Compromised
Samsung 840 EVO (SATA)	X	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	X	✓	~ Depends
Samsung 850 EVO (SATA)	X	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	~ Depends
Samsung T3 (USB)				X						X Compromised
Samsung T5 (USB)				X						X Compromised

<sup>1</sup> Cryptographic binding in ATA Security (High mode)

<sup>2</sup> Cryptographic binding in ATA Security (Max mode)

<sup>3</sup> Cryptographic binding in TCG Opal

<sup>4</sup> Cryptographic binding in proprietary standard

<sup>5</sup> No single key for entire disk

<sup>6</sup> Randomized DEK on sanitize

<sup>7</sup> Sufficient random entropy

<sup>8</sup> No wear leveling related issues

<sup>9</sup> No DEVSLP related issues

*self-encrypting deception: weakness in the encryption of solid state drives (SSDs)*

<https://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/909282/draft-paper.pdf>

# Github Public passwords?



-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----  
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

## Sources:

<https://twitter.com/brianaker/status/294228373377515522>

<http://www.webmonkey.com/2013/01/users-scramble-as-github-search-exposes-passwords-security-details/>

<http://www.leakedin.com/>

<http://www.offensive-security.com/community-projects/google-hacking-database/>

Use different passwords for different sites, yes - every site!

# kryptering, OpenPGP



kryptering er den eneste måde at sikre:

- fortrolighed
- autenticitet

kryptering består af:

- Algoritmer - eksempelvis RSA
- *protokoller* - måden de bruges på
- programmer - eksempelvis PGP

fejl eller sårbarheder i en af komponenterne kan formindske sikkerheden

PGP = mail sikkerhed, se eksempelvis Enigmail plugin til Mozilla Thunderbird



# PGP/GPG verifikation af integriteten

Pretty Good Privacy PGP

Gnu Privacy Guard GPG

Begge understøtter OpenPGP - fra IETF RFC-2440

Når man har hentet og verificeret en nøgle kan man fremover nemt checke integriteten af software pakker

```
hlk@bigfoot:postfix$ gpg --verify postfix-2.1.5.tar.gz.sig
gpg: Signature made Wed Sep 15 17:36:03 2004 CEST using RSA key ID D5327CB9
gpg: Good signature from "wietse venema <wietse@porcupine.org>"
gpg:                               aka "wietse venema <wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl>"
```

# Secure Shell - SSH og SCP



Hvad er Secure Shell SSH?

Oprindeligt udviklet af Tuu Ylönen i Finland,  
se <http://www.ssh.com>

SSH afløser en række protokoller som er usikre:

- Telnet til terminal adgang
- r\* programmerne, rsh, rcp, rlogin, ...
- FTP med brugerid/password

# SSH - de nye kommandoer er



kommandoerne er:

- ssh - Secure Shell
- scp - Secure Copy
- sftp - secure FTP

Husk: SSH er både navnet på protokollerne - version 1 og 2 samt programmet ssh til at logge ind på andre systemer

SSH tillader også port-forward, tunnel til usikre protokoller, eksempelvis X protokollen til UNIX grafiske vinduer

**NB: Man bør idag bruge SSH protokol version 2!**

# SSH nøgler



I praksis benytter man nøgler fremfor kodeord

I kan lave jeres egne SSH nøgler med programmerne i Putty

Hvilken del skal jeg have for at kunne give jer adgang til en server?

Hvordan får jeg smartest denne nøgle?

# Installation af SSH nøgle



Vi bruger login med password på kurset, men for fuldstændighedens skyld beskrives her hvordan nøgle installeres:

- først skal der genereres et nøglepar **id\_dsa** og **id\_dsa.pub**
- Den offentlige del, filen id\_dsa.pub, kopieres til serveren
- Der logges ind på serveren
- Der udføres følgende kommandoer:

```
$ cd skift til dit hjemmekatalog  
$ mkdir .ssh lav et katalog til ssh-nøgler  
$ cat id_dsa.pub >> .ssh/authorized_keys kopierer nøglen  
$ chmod -R go-rwx .ssh skift rettigheder på nøglen
```



# OpenSSH konfiguration

Sådan anbefaler jeg at konfigurere OpenSSH SSHD

Det gøres i filen sshd\_config typisk /etc/ssh/sshd\_config

```
Port 22780 // eller anden tilfældig port
```

```
Protocol 2
```

```
PermitRootLogin no
```

```
PubkeyAuthentication yes
```

```
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
```

```
PasswordAuthentication no
```

```
UseDNS no
```


```
#X11Forwarding no
```

```
#X11DisplayOffset 10
```

```
#X11UseLocalhost yes
```

Det er en smagssag om man vil tillade *X11 forwarding*

## For Next Time



Think about the subjects from this time, write down questions

Check the plan for chapters to read in the books

Most days have less than 100 pages, but some days may have more!

Visit web sites and download papers if needed

Retry the exercises to get more confident using the tools