



Welcome to

# Infrastruktursikkerhed og hacking

## Passende Paranoia for IT-folk

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Slides are available as PDF, [kramhoej@Github](https://github.com/kramhoej/svanninge-bjerge)

Try searching for `svanninge-bjerge.tex` in the repo

# Goals: Infrastructure security, what is that?



Pentest introduction, hacking introduction

Using hacker tools for protection

Defense in depth using big data - inspiration

Please give feedback and join me in discussions, dialogue ☺

# Agenda for today



KI 15:00-18:00 with breaks

Less presentation, more talk, towards the end

Trying to fit in demo and workshop-like stuff

# Generic advice



## Recommendations

- Lock your devices, phones, tables and computers
- Update software and apps
- Do NOT use the same password everywhere
- Watch out when using open wifi-networks
- Multiple browsers: one for Facebook, one for banking apps?
- Multiple laptops? One for private data, one for work?
- Think of the data you produce - where is it stored
- Use pseudonyms and aliases, do not use your real name everywhere
- Enable encryption: **IMAPS**, **POP3S**, **HTTPS** and full disk encryption
- Use Tor <http://torproject.org/>



# The current situation



Internet security sucks, laptops suck at security

Mobile devices suck even more at security - less CPU/MEM/storage

We depend on cloud services and underfunded infrastructure - OpenSSL

We depend on others and the whole internet - DDoS

New vulnerabilities, while we are already dealing with those from yesterday

# Challenges



Less resources available for IT and infosec

Lots of new malware, virus, vulnerabilities and hacking

Data loss, ransomware, theft

Loss of confidentiality, 2014: 700 million lost accounts, now even more


**Yahoo Says 1 Billion User Accounts Were Hacked, December 2016**

<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-hack.html>

Infosec charlatans, hype and lies

Your boss wants: No cost, and please show us great results

# Internet - Here be dragons



# Solutions



Automate your job, Ansible is our preferred tool

Backup your life, help others backup, Duplicity is my choice

Use hackertools to detect and identify

Categorise, sort, prioritize, group problems - solve more

Measure, collect and present - make it pretty

Learn from devops, Elasticsearch Logstash Kibana D3.js

<http://ssd.eff.org> Learn self-defense for yourself, practice infosec war

# Matrix style hacking anno 2003





# Trinity breaking in

```
80/tcp      open     http  
81/tcp      open     hostc2.nc  
10  
11 $ nmap -v -sS -O 10.2.2.2  
11  
13 Starting nmap 0.2.54BETA25  
13 Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (3). OS detection is  
13 inaccurate.  
14 Interesting ports on 10.2.2.2:  
14 (The 1539 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: cle  
51 Port      State       Service  
51 22/tcp    open        ssh  
58  
68 No exact OS matches for host  
68  
24 Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned  
50 $ sshnuk 10.2.2.2 -rootpw="Z10H0101"  
Re Connecting to 10.2.2.2:ssh ... successful.  
IP Attempting to exploit SSHv1 CRC32 ... successful.  
Resetting root password to "Z10H0101".  
System open: Access Level <9>  
$ ssh 10.2.2.2 -l root  
root@10.2.2.2's password: ■  
RTF CONTROL  
ACCESS GRANTED
```

<http://nmap.org/movies.html>

Meget realistisk <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PxTAn4g20U>



## Demo: Wireless hacking


But before we get to the tools, lets try something



Typical 802.11 based wireless network with Access-Point (AP)

Using a TP-LINK TL-WN722N Wireless USB Adapter  
cheap and great for demo - only 2.4GHz

# Demo: Hacking by pressing enter



Even script kiddies today can download the newest exploits and run them



# Paranoia defined

par·a·noi·a

/parə'noiə/ (l)

noun

noun: paranoia

1. a mental condition characterized by delusions of persecution, unwarranted jealousy, or exaggerated self-importance, typically elaborated into an organized system. It may be an aspect of chronic personality disorder, of drug abuse, or of a serious condition such as schizophrenia in which the person loses touch with reality.  
*synonyms:* persecution complex, delusions, obsession, psychosis [More](#)
- suspicion and mistrust of people or their actions without evidence or justification.  
"the global paranoia about hackers and viruses"

## Origin

GREEK

para  
irregular

GREEK

noos  
mind

More

GREEK

paranoos  
distracted

MODERN LATIN

paranoia  
*early 19th cent.*

Source: google paranoia definition

# Face reality



From the definition:

suspicion and mistrust of people or their actions **without evidence or justification**. "**the global paranoia about hackers and viruses**"

It is not paranoia when:

- Criminals sell your credit card information and identity theft
- Trade infected computers like a commodity
- Governments write laws that allows them to introduce back-doors - and use these
- Governments do blanket surveillance of their population
- Governments implement censorship, threaten citizens and journalist

You are not paranoid when there are people actively attacking you!

# Security is not magic



Think security, it may seem like magic - but it is not

Follow news about security

Support communities, join and learn



# Hackertools are for everyone!



- Hackers work all the time to break stuff, Use hackertools:
- Nmap, Nping <http://nmap.org>
- Wireshark - <http://www.wireshark.org/>
- Aircrack-ng <http://www.aircrack-ng.org/>
- Metasploit Framework <http://www.metasploit.com/>
- Burpsuite <http://portswigger.net/burp/>
- Skipfish <http://code.google.com/p/skipfish/>
- Kali Linux <http://www.kali.org>

Most popular hacker tools <http://sectools.org/>

# Kali Linux the pentest toolbox



The most advanced penetration testing distribution, ever.

From the creators of BackTrack comes Kali Linux, the most advanced and versatile penetration testing distribution ever created. BackTrack has grown far beyond its humble roots as a live CD and has now become a full-fledged operating system. With all this buzz, you might be asking yourself: - [What's new ?](#)




Kali <http://www.kali.org/>

100.000s of videos on youtube alone, searching for kali and \$TOOL


Also versions for Raspberry Pi, mobile and other small computers

# Hackerlab opsætning



- Hardware: en moderne laptop med CPU der kan bruge virtualisering  
Husk at slå virtualisering til i BIOS
- Software: dit favoritoperativsystem, Windows, Mac, Linux
- Virtualiseringssoftware: VMware, Virtual box, vælg selv
- Hackersoftware: Kali som Virtual Machine <https://www.kali.org/>
- Soft targets: Metasploitable, Windows 2000, Windows XP, ...

# Metasploit and Armitage Still rocking the internet



<http://www.metasploit.com/>


**Armitage GUI fast and easy hacking for Metasploit**

<http://www.fastandeasyhacking.com/>

**Recommended training Metasploit Unleashed**

[http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/Main\\_Page](http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/Main_Page)

# Portscan med Zenmap GUI



Zenmap følger med i pakken når man henter Nmap <https://nmap.org>



# Nmap port sweep after webserver

```
root@cornerstone:~# nmap -p80,443 172.29.0.0/24
```

```
Starting Nmap 6.47 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2015-02-05 07:31 CET
Nmap scan report for 172.29.0.1
Host is up (0.00016s latency).
PORT      STATE      SERVICE
80/tcp    open       http
443/tcp   filtered https
MAC Address: 00:50:56:C0:00:08 (VMware)
```

```
Nmap scan report for 172.29.0.138
Host is up (0.00012s latency).
PORT      STATE      SERVICE
80/tcp    open       http
443/tcp   closed    https
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:46:22:FB (VMware)
```



# Nmap port sweep after SNMP port 161/UDP

```
root@cornerstone:~# nmap -sU -p 161 172.29.0.0/24
Starting Nmap 6.47 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2015-02-05 07:30 CET
Nmap scan report for 172.29.0.1
Host is up (0.00015s latency).
PORT      STATE            SERVICE
161/udp   open|filtered  snmp
MAC Address: 00:50:56:C0:00:08 (VMware)

Nmap scan report for 172.29.0.138
Host is up (0.00011s latency).
PORT      STATE            SERVICE
161/udp   closed          snmp
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:46:22:FB (VMware)
...
Nmap done: 256 IP addresses (5 hosts up) scanned in 2.18 seconds
```



# Scan for Heartbleed and SSLv2/SSLv3

## Example Usage

```
nmap -sV -sC <target>
```

## Script Output

```
443/tcp open  https  syn-ack
| sslv2:
|   SSLv2 supported
|   ciphers:
|     SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|     SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
```

```
nmap -p 443 --script ssl-heartbleed <target>
https://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/ssl-heartbleed.html
```

```
masscan 0.0.0.0/0 -p0-65535 --heartbleed
https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan
```

# September 2015: Heartbleed vulnerable servers



**John Matherly**  
@achillean

[Follow](#)

FYI: there are still more than 200,000 devices  
on the Internet vulnerable to Heartbleed

#### TOP COUNTRIES



United States	57,272
Germany	21,660
China	11,300
France	10,094
United Kingdom	9,125

#### TOP SERVICES

HTTPS	174,020
HTTPS (8443)	23,621
Webmin	8,148
8081	1,981
Symantec Data Center Security	1,307

Source: Data from Shodan and Shodan Founder John Matherly


# 2016: Heartbleed vulnerable servers



Source: Data from Shodan and Shodan Founder John Matherly

<https://www.shodan.io/report/89bnfUyJ>


# Good security



You always have limited resources for protection - use them as best as possible

Running Nmap requires almost nothing, verifies and checks a lot by itself!

# Balanced security



Better to have the same level of security

If you have bad security in some part - guess where attackers will end up

Hackers are not required to take the hardest path into the network

Realize there is no such thing as 100% security

# First advice



## Use technology

Learn the technology - read the freaking manual

Think about the data you have, upload, facebook license?! WTF!

Think about the data you create - nude pictures taken, where will they show up?

- Turn off features you don't use
- Turn off network connections when not in use
- Update software and applications
- Turn on encryption: **IMAPS**, **POP3S**, **HTTPS** also for data at rest, full disk encryption, tablet encryption
- Lock devices automatically when not used for 10 minutes
- Don't trust fancy logins like fingerprint scanner or face recognition on cheap devices

# Jumping through networks and systems



Hackers break into systems they can reach

and hackers break into systems they can reach from hacked systems 😊

In real life networks, a remote root exploit from the internet to the main database is rare  
but jumping through others can possibly break the whole network

There are a lot of hackers which have presented how they hacked companies, example

<https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/04/how-hacking-team-got-hacked-phineas-phisher/>


# Example hacks we have done during testing



My own examples include pentest assignments where we:

- Two servers under test, Solaris had NFS world export, we could mount, found a backup of the other system, extracted /etc/passwd from backup, user logins with empty password, Solaris Telnet allows login, your password is empty - enter one
- Another test had SRX firewall as a core component. Due to misconfiguration we could access with SNMP, and thereby found the complete network structure revealed, how many network segments, subnets, netmask, ARP, interface counters - which lead to access files with password pictures, it was a bank
- Countless times we have found either a password file for a database, and used the same passwords for the operating system, or vice versa
- Countless times we have found either a password file in test systems, and people have used the same password in production, or vice versa

# Defense in depth



Picture originally from: <http://karenswhimsy.com/public-domain-images>

# Chroot, Jails and Zones




Many types of *jails* in Unix-like operating systems

Ideas from Unix chroot, not a security feature originally

- Unix chroot - still used, but often combined with other things privsep
- FreeBSD Jails
- SELinux Mandatory Access Controls
- Solaris Containers og Zones
- VMware virtual servers, is that a jail?
- Docker, is that a jail or just a process?

# Defense in depth - layered security



Multiple layers of security! Isolation!



# First advice use the modern operating systems

Newer versions of Microsoft Windows, Mac OS X and Linux

- Buffer overflow protection
- Stack protection, non-executable stack
- Heap protection, non-executable heap
- *Randomization of parameters* stack gap m.v.

Note: these still have errors and bugs, but are better than older versions

OpenBSD has shown the way in many cases

<http://www.openbsd.org/papers/>

Always try to make life worse and more costly for attackers

# Security devops



We need devops skillz in security - automate, security is also big data  
integrate tools, transfer, sort, search, pattern matching, statistics, ...  
tools, languages, databases, protocols, data formats


Example introductions:

- Seven languages/database/web frameworks in Seven Weeks
- Elasticsearch the definitive guide
  - <http://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/guide/current/index.html>
- <https://www.elastic.co/products/kibana>
- <https://www.elastic.co/products/logstash>

We are all Devops now, even security people!

Do you even Github? ☺<https://github.com/stars>

# Network Security Through Data Analysis




Low page count, but high value! Recommended.

Network Security through Data Analysis, 2nd Edition By Michael S Collins Publisher: O'Reilly Media 2015-05-01: Second release, 348 Pages


New Release Date: August 2017

# Graphs and Dashboards!




- Screenshot from Peter Manev, OISF
- Shown are Suricata IDS alerts processed by Logstash and Kibana

# Networks today



# Defense in depth - multiple layers of security




# Network visibility: Netflow with NFSen




## Profile: live


TCP




any



ICMP



other



Profileinfo:

Type: live


Max: unlimited

Exp: never

Start: Jun 23 2011 - 13:10 CEST

End: Jul 21 2013 - 11:00 CEST

Sun Jul 21 10:35:00 2013 Packets/s proto UDP



Select

Single Timeslot

Display:

1 day

<<

<

|

>

>>

>|

Lin Scale    Stacked Graph  
 Log Scale    Line Graph

An extra 100k packets per second from this netflow source (source is a router)



# How to get started

How to get started searching for security events?

Collect basic data from your devices and networks

- Netflow data from routers
- Session data from firewalls
- Logging from applications: email, web, proxy systems


**Centralize!**

Process data

- Top 10: interesting due to high frequency, occurs often, brute-force attacks
- *ignore*
- Bottom 10: least-frequent messages are interesting



# View data efficiently




View data by digging into it easily - must be fast

Logstash and Kibana are just examples, but use indexing to make it fast!

Other popular examples include Graylog and Grafana

# Network tools - examples



Net: Bro <http://www.bro-ids.org> Suricata <http://suricata-ids.org>

DNS: DSC and PacketQ <https://github.com/dotse/packetq/wiki>

Syslog: Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana, called ELK stack or Elastic stack

Packetbeat <https://www.elastic.co/products/beats/packetbeat>

Collect and present data more easily - non-programmers

# Example tool, let see what BRO IDS is



## The Bro Network Security Monitor

Bro is a powerful network analysis framework that is much different from the typical IDS you may know.

While focusing on network security monitoring, Bro provides a comprehensive platform for more general network traffic analysis as well. Well grounded in more than 15 years of research, Bro has successfully bridged the traditional gap between academia and operations since its inception.

<https://www.bro.org/>

# BRO more than an IDS



The key point that helped me understand was the explanation that Bro is a domain-specific language for networking applications and that Bro-IDS (<http://bro-ids.org/>) is an application written with Bro.

## Why I think you should try Bro

<https://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=15259>

# Bro scripts



```
global dns_A_reply_count=0;
global dns_AAAA_reply_count=0;
...
event dns_A_reply(c: connection, msg: dns_msg, ans: dns_answer, a: addr)
{
++dns_A_reply_count;
}

event dns_AAAA_reply(c: connection, msg: dns_msg, ans: dns_answer, a: addr)
{
++dns_AAAA_reply_count;
}
```

Source: **dns-fire-count.bro** from

<https://github.com/LiamRandall/bro-scripts/tree/master/fire-scripts>

Trust me, this IS better than having to write network parsers in C ☺



## Bro demo (on a Mac)

```
kunoichi:~ root# brew install bro
```

```
kunoichi:~ root# broctl
```

```
Hint: Run the broctl "deploy" command to get started.
```

```
Welcome to BroControl 1.5
```

```
Type "help" for help.
```

```
[BroControl] > install  
creating policy directories ...  
installing site policies ...  
generating standalone-layout.bro ...  
generating local-networks.bro ...  
generating broctl-config.bro ...  
generating broctl-config.sh ...
```



## Bro demo: Run bro

```
kunoichi:etc root# pwd  
/usr/local/etc  
kunoichi:etc root# grep eth0 node.cfg  
interface=eth0  
#interface=eth0  
#interface=eth0  
// My mac is not a Linux system, uses another interface naming scheme  
kunoichi:etc root# vi node.cfg  
kunoichi:etc root# grep en0 node.cfg  
interface=en0
```



## Bro demo: Run bro

```
// back to Broctl and start it
[BroControl] > start
starting bro
// and then
kunoichi:bro root# pwd
/usr/local/var/spool/bro
kunoichi:bro root# tail -f dns.log
```

More examples at:

<https://www.bro.org/sphinx/script-reference/log-files.html>



# Example, Using tools similar to PacketQ

## Using PacketQ

Let's have a practical look at how PacketQ works by trying to figure out what kind of DNS ANY queries are being sent towards our name-server.

DNS ANY traffic is currently commonly abused for DNS amplification attacks (See Blog post "[DDoS-Angriffe durch Reflektierende DNS-Amplifikation vermeiden](#)" in German). The first thing I want to know is what are the IP addresses of the victims of this potential DNS amplification attack:

```
packetq -t -s "select src_addr,count(*) as count from dns where qtype=255 group  
by src_addr order by count desc limit 3" lolo.20130118.070000.000179  
"src_addr" , "count"  
"216.245.221.243" ,933825  
"85.126.233.70" ,16802  
"80.74.130.55" ,91
```

Are you using existing tools? or build your own specialised tools from scratch?

<http://securityblog.switch.ch/2013/01/22/using-packetq/>

<http://jpmens.net/2013/05/27/server-agnostic-logging-of-dns-queries-responses/>



# Storing query logs, old school or needed?

- [policy/protocols/ssl/expiring-certs.bro](#)
- [policy/protocols/ssl/extract-certs-pem.bro](#)
- [policy/protocols/ssl/heartbleed.bro](#)
- [policy/protocols/ssl/known-certs.bro](#)
- [policy/protocols/ssl/log-hostcerts-only.bro](#)
- [policy/protocols/ssl/validate-certs.bro](#)
- [policy/protocols/ssl/validate-ocsp.bro](#)
- [policy/protocols/ssl/weak-keys.bro](#)

Looking at DNS PacketQ it was an Older link, but thinking the time is now for doing:

- DNS query logs, keep it for at least a week? - with DSC and PacketQ
- SSL/TLS full logs over sessions, certs, keys - with Bro/Suricata  
<https://www.bro.org/sphinx-git/script-reference/scripts.html>
- Log and search with Elasticsearch?  
<https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/guide/current/index.html>
- Even netflow session logging, full 1:1 - NFSen or Suricata Flow mode



## February 2015: Finding infected sources

"We were contacted by a client to help with their incident response in tracking down an infection on a clients machine with the new CTB-Locker ransomware (Curve-Tor-Bitcoin Locker) aka Critroni which had no signatures available at the time of infection for this variant.

LANGuardian includes a file share activity monitoring module which provided a very detailed forensic analysis of the ransomware and the paths it had taken in order to encrypt the clients system and also the fileserver in which it was connected to, the initial infection came from the opening of an attachment in an e-mail."

It has become critical to identify vulnerable or infected ASAP!

**Source:** <https://www.netfort.com/support-team-stories-detecting-the-source-of-ransomware/>



# Case: Maltrail

**Maltrail** is a malicious traffic detection system, utilizing publicly available (black)lists containing malicious and/or generally suspicious trails, along with static trails compiled from various AV reports and custom user defined lists, where trail can be anything from domain name (e.g. `zvpprsensinaix.com` for [Banjori](#) malware), URL (e.g.

`http://109.162.38.120/harsh02.exe` for known malicious [executable](#)), IP address (e.g. `185.130.5.231` for known attacker) or HTTP User-Agent header value (e.g. `sqlmap` for automatic SQL injection and database takeover tool). Also, it uses (optional) advanced heuristic mechanisms that can help in discovery of unknown threats (e.g. new malware).


Maltrail dashboard showing statistics for January 20, 2016:

- Threats: 6,945
- Events: 903,708
- Severity: medium
- Sources: 4,498
- Trails: 6,402

threat	sensor	events	severity	first_seen	last_seen	sparkline	src_ip	src_port	dst_ip	dst_port	proto	type	trail	info	reference	tags	
419fect	blitvenica	33288	low	2016-01-00:00:00	2016-01-23:59:59		175.6.228.149	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	175.6.228.149	bad reputation	alienVault.com	+3		
ba483ca0	blitvenica	4	low	2016-01-18:04:40	2016-01-23:59:59		51.255.65.22	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	51.255.65.22	bad reputation	botscout.com			
feaa59ka	blitvenica	1111	low	2016-01-00:02	2016-01-23:59:58		71.6.158.166	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	71.6.158.166	carinet	alienVault.com			
785399eb	blitvenica	3939	low	2016-01-00:03	2016-01-23:59:58		71.6.135.131	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	71.6.135.131	shodan.io	mass scanner	(static) +3		
cf308719	blitvenica	2808	low	2016-01-00:32	2016-01-23:59:58		22.186.21.34	22	22 (ssh)	TCP	IP	22.186.21.34	known attacker	autoshun.org	+3		
e11b7a74	blitvenica	127	medium	2016-01-13:16:13	2016-01-23:59:58		54.231.50.44	22	22 (ssh)	TCP	IP	54.231.50.44	(s3.amazonaws.com)	malicode.com			
d2929bd6	blitvenica	403	low	2016-01-23:40:34	2016-01-23:59:58		125.64.93.78	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	125.64.93.78	known attacker	badips.com	+1		
00031c13	blitvenica	30298	low	2016-01-00:00	2016-01-23:59:57		185.130.5.224	53413	53413 (netis)	UDP	IP	185.130.5.224	known attacker	badips.com	+6		
e1603064	blitvenica	21	low	2016-01-16:09	2016-01-23:59:57		91.200.12.106	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	91.200.12.106	shodan.io	known attacker	blocklist.de +2		
46185819	blitvenica	137	medium	2016-01-24:55	2016-01-23:59:57		53	53 (dns)	53	53 (dns)	UDP	DNS	53 (dns)	consonant threshold no such domain (suspicious)	(heuristic)		
aeb2ba46	blitvenica	7082	low	2016-01-00:32	2016-01-23:59:55		198.20.99.130	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	198.20.99.130	shodan.io	mass scanner	(static) +3		
wf1ca13	blitvenica	2837	low	2016-01-00:50	2016-01-23:59:55		94.102.48.195	43905	43905	80 (http)	TCP	IP	94.102.48.195	ecall	bad reputation	alienVault.com	+3
a996e144	blitvenica	627	low	2016-08-37:38	2016-01-23:59:54		141.212.122.194	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	141.212.122.194	reccs.umich.edu	mass scanner	(static)		
f18c52d9	blitvenica	564	low	2016-08-39:29	2016-01-23:59:54		141.212.122.193	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	141.212.122.193	reccs.umich.edu	mass scanner	(static) +2		
975ca61d	blitvenica	55	medium	2016-01-07:21	2016-01-23:59:53		8.8.8.8	53	53 (dns)	UDP	DNS	8.8.8.8	8.8.8.8	domain (suspicious)	(static)		
61994405	blitvenica	801	low	2016-08-45:14	2016-01-23:59:53		141.212.122.207	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	141.212.122.207	reccs.umich.edu	mass scanner	(static)		
7a893446	blitvenica	413	low	2016-09:55	2016-01-23:59:53		141.212.122.206	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	141.212.122.206	reccs.umich.edu	mass scanner	(static) +2		
4fd172	blitvenica	4828	low	2016-00:10	2016-01-23:59:50		149.202.238.216	8080 (http-alt)	8080 (http-alt)	TCP	IP	149.202.238.216	shodan.io	bad reputation	alienVault.com	+1	
d97d3a3c	blitvenica	101	low	2016-03:52	2016-01-23:59:50		141.212.121.40	443	443 (https)	TCP	IP	141.212.121.40	reccs.umich.edu	mass scanner	(static)		
2d0b2843	blitvenica	3999	low	2016-00:05	2016-01-23:59:49		71.6.165.200	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	71.6.165.200	shodan.io	mass scanner	(static) +3		
07420ef7	blitvenica	967	low	2016-00:45	2016-01-23:59:49		82.221.105.7	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	82.221.105.7	shodan.io	mass scanner	(static) +2		
db5b2271	blitvenica	5	medium	2016-07:43	2016-01-23:59:49		8.8.8.8	53	53 (dns)	UDP	DNS	8.8.8.8	amnsrelojy.ru	excessive no such domain (suspicious)	(heuristic)		
5699ba30	blitvenica	1	low	2016-23:59:48	2016-01-23:59:48		67.21.35.231	43025	53 (dns)	UDP	IP	67.21.35.231	http	spammer	sblam.com		
81e04940	blitvenica	1875	low	2016-00:04	2016-01-23:59:47		188.138.17.205	80	80 (http)	TCP	IP	188.138.17.205	plusserver.de	bad reputation	alienVault.com		
2cc66ed3	blitvenica	43	medium	2016-00:21:23	2016-01-23:59:47		8.8.8.8	53	53 (dns)	UDP	DNS	8.8.8.8	eease.com	excessive no such domain (suspicious)	(heuristic)		

<https://github.com/stamparm/maltrail>, demo hvis tid

# Suricata with Dashboards



Picture from Twitter

<https://twitter.com/nullthreat/status/445969209840128000>

<http://suricata-ids.org/>

# Security Onion



- Security Onion is a Linux distro for IDS, NSM, and log management
- <http://securityonion.blogspot.dk>
- <http://blog.securityonion.net/p/securityonion.html>
- Not so great in production, focus on fewer tools, or buy BIG CPU ☺

Nice starting point for researching dashboards/network packets



## Next steps

In our network we are always improving things:

Suricata IDS <http://www.openinfosecfoundation.org/>

More graphs, with **automatic identification** of IPs under attack

Identification of **short sessions without data** - spoofed addresses

Alerting from **existing** devices

Dashboards with key measurements

**Conclusion: Combine tools!**



# Logstash pipeline

```
input { stdin { } }
output {
  elasticsearch { host => localhost }
  stdout { codec => rubydebug }
}
```

- Logstash receives via **input**
- Processes with **filters** - grok
- Forward events with **output**



# Logstash as SNMPtrap and syslog server

```
input {
    snmptrap {
        host => "0.0.0.0"
        type => "snmptrap"
        port => 1062
        community => "xxxxxx"
    }
    tcp {
        port => 5000
        type => syslog
    }
    udp {
        port => 5000
        type => syslog
    }
}
```

- We run logstash on port 5000 - but use IPtables port forwarding

Have you even configured SNMP traps?

Maybe you have a device sending SNMP traps right now ...

# IPtables forwarding



```
*nat  
:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]  
# redirect all incoming requests on port 514 to port 5000  
-A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 514 -j REDIRECT --to-port 5000  
-A PREROUTING -p udp --dport 514 -j REDIRECT --to-port 5000  
-A PREROUTING -p udp --dport 162 -j REDIRECT --to-port 1062  
COMMIT
```

Inserted near beginning of /etc/ufw/before.rules on Ubuntu

Remember defense in depth, dont run a privileged Java VM as root ☺



# Grok expresssions

```
filter {
  if [type] == "syslog" {
    grok {
      match => { "message" => "%{SYSLOGTIMESTAMP:syslog_timestamp}
%{SYSLOGHOST:syslog_hostname} %{DATA:syslog_program}
(?:\[%{POSINT:syslog_pid}\])?: %{GREEDYDATA:syslog_message}" }
      add_field => [ "received_at", "%{@timestamp}" ]
      add_field => [ "received_from", "%{host}" ]
    }
    syslog_pri { }
    date {
      match => [ "syslog_timestamp", "MMM d HH:mm:ss", "MMM dd HH:mm:ss" ]
    }
  }
}
```

- Logstash filter expressions grok can normalize and split data into fields

Source: Config snippet from recommended link

<http://logstash.net/docs/1.4.1/tutorials/getting-started-with-logstash>



# Grok expressions, sample from my archive

```
filter {
# decode some SSHD
if [syslog_program] == "sshd" {
  grok {
# May 20 10:27:08 odn1-nsm-01 sshd[4554]: Accepted publickey for hlk from
10.50.11.17 port 50365 ssh2: DSA 9e:fd:3b:3d:fc:11:0e:b9:bd:22:71:a9:36:d8:06:c7

match => { "message" => "%{SYSLOGTIMESTAMP:timestamp} %{HOSTNAME:host_target}
sshd\[%{BASE10NUM}\]: Accepted publickey for %{USERNAME:username} from
%{IP:src_ip} port %{BASE10NUM:port} ssh2" }

# "May 20 10:27:08 odn1-nsm-01 sshd[4554]: pam_unix(sshd:session):
session opened for user hlk by (uid=0)"
match => { "message" => "%{SYSLOGTIMESTAMP:timestamp} %{HOSTNAME:host_target}
sshd\[%{BASE10NUM}\]: pam_unix\(sshd:session\): session opened for user
%{USERNAME:username}" }
```

- Logstash filter expressions grok can normalize and split data into fields

# Are passwords dead?



google: passwords are dead



About 6,580,000 results (0.22 seconds)

Can we stop using passwords?

Muffett on Passwords has a long list of password related information, from the author of crack [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crack\\_\(password\\_software\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crack_(password_software))

<http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/muffett-passwords>

# Storing passwords



PasswordSafe <http://passwordsafe.sourceforge.net/>

Apple Keychain provides an encrypted storage

Browsere, Firefox Master Password, Chrome passwords, ... who do YOU trust

# Google looks to ditch passwords for good



"Google is currently running a pilot that uses a YubiKey cryptographic card developed by Yubico

The YubiKey NEO can be tapped on an NFC-enabled smartphone, which reads an encrypted one-time password emitted from the key fob."

Source: <http://www.zdnet.com/google-looks-to-ditch-passwords-for-good-with-nfc-based-replacement>

# Yubico Yubikey



## › YubiKey Standard

Our flagship product, making strong two-factor authentication, easy and affordable for everyone.



## › YubiKey NEO

Our premium YubiKey, combining USB, NFC, one-time password and PKI technology.



## › YubiKey Nano

The world's smallest one-time password token, designed to stay inside the USB-slot.



## › YubiKey VIP

A YubiKey Standard pre-configured with a Symantec VIP credential, enabling two-factor authentication against Symantec VIP enabled services, such as PayPal.



## › LastPass YubiKey

LastPass Premium is the leading cross platform password manager supporting the YubiKey. We offer a number of discounted bundles of YubiKey + LastPass Premium Subscriptions.



## › Password Safe YubiKey

Password Safe is an open source password manager initiated by Bruce Schneier. The YubiKey is used in Challenge-response mode to for 2 factor encryption of the database.

A Yubico OTP is unique sequence of characters generated every time the YubiKey button is touched. The Yubico OTP is comprised of a sequence of 32 Modhex characters representing information encrypted with a 128 bit AES-128 key

<http://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/>



#### **Push Notification**

Quickly view login or transaction details and tap "Approve" on your iOS or Android device.  
Learn more at [duosecurity.com/duo-push](http://duosecurity.com/duo-push)



#### **Smartphone Passcodes**

Easily generate login passcodes — no cell service required. Duo Mobile is available for free on all smartphone platforms.



#### **Text Message**

Login passcodes sent via text message. Works on all phones with SMS support.



#### **Phone Call**

Simply answer a phone call and press a key to authenticate.

Video <https://www.duosecurity.com/duo-push>

<https://www.duosecurity.com/>

# Low tech 2-step verification



Printing code on paper, low level pragmatic

Backup verification codes	
1. 355 08 761	6. 610 51 765
2. 913 59 489	7. 559 81 367
3. 954 22 666	8. 853 38 617
4. 528 79 761	9. 406 55 536
5. 265 65 742	10. 769 44 800

Login from new devices today often requires two-factor - email sent to user

Google 2-factor auth. SMS with backup codes

Also read about S/KEY developed at Bellcore **in the late 1980s**

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/KEY>

Conclusion passwords: integrate with authentication, not reinvent

# Integrate or develop?



From previous slide:

Conclusion passwords: integrate with authentication, not reinvent

Dont:

- Reinvent the wheel - too many times, unless you can maintain it afterwards
- Never invent cryptography yourself
- No copy paste of functionality, harder to maintain in the future

Do:

- Integrate with existing solutions
- Use existing well-tested code: cryptography, authentication, hashing
- Centralize security in your code
- Fine to hide which authentication framework is being used, easy to replace later

# Conclusion



If there is any conclusion ... it might be

There are existing - free tools

Open Source tools may integrate better with other open source tools

Syslog is de facto, but standards in other areas are coming along

Dont use block lists alone, but they may help in identifying problems

## Questions?



Henrik Lund Kramshøj [hlk@zencurity.dk](mailto:hlk@zencurity.dk)

Need DDoS testing or pentest, ask me!

You are always welcome to send me questions later via email

Did you notice how a lot of the links in this presentation use HTTPS - encrypted