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/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */ |
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/* lib/crypto/krb/enc_etm.c - encrypt-then-mac construction for aes-sha2 */ |
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/* |
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* Copyright (C) 2015 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. |
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* All rights reserved. |
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* |
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
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* are met: |
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* |
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* * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
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* |
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* * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
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* distribution. |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS |
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* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT |
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* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS |
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* FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE |
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* COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, |
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* INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES |
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* (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR |
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* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
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*/ |
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#include "crypto_int.h" |
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unsigned int |
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krb5int_aes2_crypto_length(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, |
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krb5_cryptotype type) |
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{ |
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switch (type) { |
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case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER: |
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return ktp->enc->block_size; |
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case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING: |
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return 0; |
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case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER: |
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case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_CHECKSUM: |
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return ktp->hash->hashsize / 2; |
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default: |
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assert(0 && "invalid cryptotype passed to krb5int_aes2_crypto_length"); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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} |
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/* Derive encryption and integrity keys for CMAC-using enctypes. */ |
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static krb5_error_code |
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derive_keys(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key, |
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krb5_keyusage usage, krb5_key *ke_out, krb5_data *ki_out) |
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{ |
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krb5_error_code ret; |
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uint8_t label[5]; |
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krb5_data label_data = make_data(label, 5), ki = empty_data(); |
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krb5_key ke = NULL; |
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*ke_out = NULL; |
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*ki_out = empty_data(); |
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/* Derive the encryption key. */ |
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store_32_be(usage, label); |
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label[4] = 0xAA; |
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ret = krb5int_derive_key(ktp->enc, ktp->hash, key, &ke, &label_data, |
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DERIVE_SP800_108_HMAC); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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/* Derive the integrity key. */ |
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label[4] = 0x55; |
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ret = alloc_data(&ki, ktp->hash->hashsize / 2); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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ret = krb5int_derive_random(NULL, ktp->hash, key, &ki, &label_data, |
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DERIVE_SP800_108_HMAC); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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*ke_out = ke; |
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ke = NULL; |
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*ki_out = ki; |
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ki = empty_data(); |
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cleanup: |
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krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ke); |
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zapfree(ki.data, ki.length); |
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return ret; |
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} |
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/* Compute an HMAC checksum over the cipher state and data. Allocate enough |
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* space in *out for the checksum. */ |
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static krb5_error_code |
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hmac_ivec_data(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, const krb5_data *ki, |
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const krb5_data *ivec, krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data, |
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krb5_data *out) |
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{ |
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krb5_error_code ret; |
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krb5_data zeroivec = empty_data(); |
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krb5_crypto_iov *iovs = NULL; |
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krb5_keyblock kb = { 0 }; |
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if (ivec == NULL) { |
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ret = ktp->enc->init_state(NULL, 0, &zeroivec); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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ivec = &zeroivec; |
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} |
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/* Make a copy of data with an extra iov at the beginning for the ivec. */ |
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iovs = k5calloc(num_data + 1, sizeof(*iovs), &ret); |
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if (iovs == NULL) |
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goto cleanup; |
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iovs[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA; |
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iovs[0].data = *ivec; |
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memcpy(iovs + 1, data, num_data * sizeof(*iovs)); |
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ret = alloc_data(out, ktp->hash->hashsize); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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kb.length = ki->length; |
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kb.contents = (uint8_t *)ki->data; |
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ret = krb5int_hmac_keyblock(ktp->hash, &kb, iovs, num_data + 1, out); |
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cleanup: |
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if (zeroivec.data != NULL) |
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ktp->enc->free_state(&zeroivec); |
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free(iovs); |
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return ret; |
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} |
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krb5_error_code |
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krb5int_etm_encrypt(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key, |
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krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec, |
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krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data) |
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{ |
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const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc = ktp->enc; |
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krb5_error_code ret; |
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krb5_data ivcopy = empty_data(), cksum = empty_data(); |
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krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer, *padding; |
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krb5_key ke = NULL; |
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krb5_data ki = empty_data(); |
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unsigned int trailer_len; |
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/* E(Confounder | Plaintext) | Checksum(IV | ciphertext) */ |
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trailer_len = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER); |
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/* Validate header and trailer lengths, and zero out padding length. */ |
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header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER); |
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if (header == NULL || header->data.length < enc->block_size) |
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return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; |
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trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER); |
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if (trailer == NULL || trailer->data.length < trailer_len) |
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return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; |
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padding = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING); |
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if (padding != NULL) |
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padding->data.length = 0; |
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if (ivec != NULL) { |
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ret = alloc_data(&ivcopy, ivec->length); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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memcpy(ivcopy.data, ivec->data, ivec->length); |
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} |
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/* Derive the encryption and integrity keys. */ |
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ret = derive_keys(ktp, key, usage, &ke, &ki); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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/* Generate confounder. */ |
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header->data.length = enc->block_size; |
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ret = krb5_c_random_make_octets(NULL, &header->data); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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/* Encrypt the plaintext (header | data). */ |
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ret = enc->encrypt(ke, (ivec == NULL) ? NULL : &ivcopy, data, num_data); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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/* HMAC the IV, confounder, and ciphertext with sign-only data. */ |
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ret = hmac_ivec_data(ktp, &ki, ivec, data, num_data, &cksum); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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/* Truncate the HMAC checksum to the trailer length. */ |
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assert(trailer_len <= cksum.length); |
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memcpy(trailer->data.data, cksum.data, trailer_len); |
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trailer->data.length = trailer_len; |
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/* Copy out the updated ivec if desired. */ |
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if (ivec != NULL) |
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memcpy(ivec->data, ivcopy.data, ivcopy.length); |
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cleanup: |
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krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ke); |
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zapfree(ki.data, ki.length); |
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free(cksum.data); |
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zapfree(ivcopy.data, ivcopy.length); |
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return ret; |
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} |
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krb5_error_code |
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krb5int_etm_decrypt(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key, |
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krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec, |
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krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data) |
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{ |
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const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc = ktp->enc; |
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krb5_error_code ret; |
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krb5_data cksum = empty_data(); |
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krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer; |
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krb5_key ke = NULL; |
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krb5_data ki = empty_data(); |
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unsigned int trailer_len; |
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trailer_len = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER); |
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/* Validate header and trailer lengths. */ |
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header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER); |
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if (header == NULL || header->data.length != enc->block_size) |
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return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; |
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trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER); |
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if (trailer == NULL || trailer->data.length != trailer_len) |
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return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; |
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/* Derive the encryption and integrity keys. */ |
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ret = derive_keys(ktp, key, usage, &ke, &ki); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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/* HMAC the IV, confounder, and ciphertext with sign-only data. */ |
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ret = hmac_ivec_data(ktp, &ki, ivec, data, num_data, &cksum); |
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if (ret) |
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goto cleanup; |
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/* Compare only the possibly truncated length. */ |
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assert(trailer_len <= cksum.length); |
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if (k5_bcmp(cksum.data, trailer->data.data, trailer_len) != 0) { |
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ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; |
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goto cleanup; |
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} |
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/* Decrypt the ciphertext (header | data | padding). */ |
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ret = enc->decrypt(ke, ivec, data, num_data); |
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cleanup: |
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krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ke); |
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zapfree(ki.data, ki.length); |
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zapfree(cksum.data, cksum.length); |
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return ret; |
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} |