

UNIT 16 MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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16.1 INTRODUCTION

The pattern of international relations that was conspicuous in the Cold War days has faded into oblivion. There has been a complete transformation of world scenario and a new pattern of international relations is emerging. It has in its womb some positive as well as negative developments giving rise to both hopes and fears. This pattern has its bearings both on the developed as well as on the developing nations. These changes have also profoundly affected the role of international institutions which play a key role in the execution of various international instruments through which different dimensions of international relations are managed.

Prominent among all these international institutions or to put it otherwise at the apex of all these international institutions is the role of the United Nations in managing the international relations. In the last fifty years especially during the last ten years, the involvement of United Nations has increased sharply in almost every aspect of international relations—from peacekeeping and human rights to the environment, from women's and children's rights to air safety, from disarmament issues, economic and social concerns, further codification of international law to the refugees. In the very recent years, the world body has changed and refocused its orientations and concerns.

The UN has greatly contributed to the reshaping of the world through its role in the process of decolonisation, and promotion of international cooperation for economic, social and humanitarian progress. The non-political organs and specialised agencies of the UN, especially, the UNHCR, UNESCO, UNDP, WHO, UNICEF etc. have registered great successes in their own spheres of international activity. Deadly diseases like smallpox and plague have virtually been eradicated saving thousands of lives. The UN has fed hundreds of thousands of refugees and saved them from starving to death. It has been able to respond in many ways to the growing needs and aspirations of the world community and help lay the foundations of a world order in which fundamental human rights and the worth of the human persons are recognised. Indeed, one of the greatest achievements of the UN has been the codification of a remarkable body of human rights laws which it has initiated and which have been adopted by its member states. Credit is also due to the UN for its success in managing other problematic areas. The UN has facilitated conflict resolution and peaceful transition to independence and normalcy in a number

of countries such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa. We shall have a detailed discussion on most of these major problem areas of international relations in the subsequent paragraphs

At the same time, it is hardly possible to overlook the failures of the UN particularly in the political field. The utter failure of the UN in maintaining even a semblance of peace in the former Yugoslavia is a serious and indelible blot on its image; and has greatly undermined its credibility. To the victims of the Bosnian conflict, irrespective of race, the UN has become a cruel joke, a dirty word. Events in Rwanda provide yet another particularly depressing example of the UN's shortsightedness. When the genocidal killing in that country began in April 1994, the UN Security Council responded by reducing the peacekeeping force already deployed there to symbolic presence. By July, estimates of the number of people killed had risen to half million. About two million more fled into neighbouring Zaire as helpless refugees

The UN's debacle in Somalia is well known. Experience has shown that except in Kuwait in 1991, the UN has been unable to take effective measures to enforce peace. But it is to be remembered that Kuwait was basically a US action in the name of the UN, as was the Korean action in 1950-51. And the same US is presently just ignoring the UN absolutely by not adhering to its resolution and instructions and has gone on war in full scale against Iraq in the company of its friend and another permanent member of the UN Security Council namely the Great Britain. It has considerably undermined the UN system and is likely to have serious repercussions on its existence.

It is generally believed that the UN's peacekeeping has played a highly constructive role in maintaining international peace and security, a major thrust area in the management of international relations, as is evidenced by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988. But it is difficult to subscribe to this assessment especially after its failure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Rwanda. The UN's conflict resolution and peacekeeping functions were earlier hamstrung by the bipolar politics of the Cold War and after the end of the Cold War there was a spurt in demand for UN peace missions from Cambodia to Haiti and from Mozambique to Tajikistan. But the recent debacles have underscored the need for strengthening the machinery for safeguarding peace. A detailed discussion on UN peacekeeping functions will be undertaken in subsequent paragraphs.

The euphoria and optimism that marked the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s about the world body's perceived capacity to come to terms with a wider variety of conflict situations have evaporated sooner than expected. Earlier UN's failure could be blamed on Cold War. Today the UN has only itself to blame for allowing the only super power to usurp and sideline its role. It has now become clear that the UN is having great difficulty in coming to grips with new peace and security problems of the post-Cold War world. With the ending of the Cold War, countless conflicts, frictions and disputes have erupted in the form of civil, ethnic and religious wars. Is UN well equipped to face or manage such international problems? We shall deal with this question in subsequent paragraphs.

One of the major responsibilities placed on the UN by its Charter is to consider "the principles concerning disarmament and regulation of armaments". But it is frightening to realise that we live in a world which today continues to waste nearly \$ 1000 billion every year on mass killing machines whereas the UN's annual budget is less than \$ 2 billion a year. Over the years the world has made tremendous advances in developing and perfecting a war system but has failed to develop a peace system. Global military spending since the creation of the UN has added

up to a cumulative \$ 30-35 billion. The military sector absorbs substantial resources that could help reduce potential for violent conflict if instead they were invested in human security—health, education, housing, poverty eradication and environmental sustainability. If the governments pursued the building of a peace system with the same seriousness as they build military might, in all likelihood many violent conflicts could be avoided. A comparatively small investment, perhaps some \$ **20-30** billion per year, could make a tremendous difference in the global war and peace balance. This in fact is an overdue investment. Not making it will condemn humanity to bear the costs of the war system an infinitum. This is a task to which the UN should devote its primary attention with utmost urgency.

16.2 MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS

The UN and its family of agencies are engaged in managing a vast array of international problems that touch every aspect of people's lives around the world. Right from noticing problems of general nature like caring for child survival, environmental protection, health and medical search, alleviation of poverty and economic development, agricultural development and fisheries, education, family planning, emergency and disaster relief, air and sea travel to problems of serious nature of maintaining peace and security, resolving endless regional conflict

16.2.1 Managing International Problems of Peace and Security

By deploying more than 35 peacekeeping forces and observer missions, the United Nations has been able to restore calm which has allowed the negotiating process to go forward while saving millions of people from becoming casualties of conflicts. There are presently 16 peacekeeping forces in operation.

Some of the various instruments in the form of treaties, conventions, resolutions, declaration etc. that helped in resolving the problem of peace and security are mentioned below:

- the 1965 Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states and the protection of their independence and sovereignty;
- the **1970** declaration on the strengthening of international security; the **1980** declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the charter of the United Nations;
- the **1974** definition of aggression;
- the **1977** declaration on the deepening and consolidation of international détente;
- the 1981 declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of states;
- the 1981 declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe;
- the 1982 Manila declaration on the peaceful settlement of international disputes; the 1987 declaration on the enhancement of the effectiveness of the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations;

- the 1978 declaration on the preparation of societies for life in peace;
- the 1984 declaration on the right of peoples to peace;
- the 1988 declaration on the prevention and removal of disputes and situations which may threaten international peace and security;
- in 1980 the Assembly approved the establishment of the University for Peace, located in San Jose, Costa Rica;
- the Assembly has designated the opening day of its regular annual session – the third Tuesday in September each year - as the International day of Peace. The year 1986 was proclaimed the International Year of Peace.

Paramount in the minds of the drafters of the UN Charter was the establishment of a system for the maintenance of peace and security that would be more effective than the League of Nations system had been. In contrast to the decentralised League of Nations system, the drafters of the Charter sought to concentrate the decision making power in the Security Council by mentioning that concurrence of the five permanent members was required for any decision by the Council under Chapter VII of the charter. This was also evident in the various articles (art. 39 to 51) of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus those chiefly responsible for the drafting of the UN Charter came to favour a system that tried to harness responsibility to power, laid emphasis on the availability to the UN of adequate forces and facilities for keeping the peace, encouraged states to settle their disputes by developing the processes of conflict resolution by peaceful means of their own choice, accorded to the organs responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security a wide range of choice to achieve their desired ends. It was in continuation with this line of thinking that the United Nations further concretised the system of collective security and disarmament and evolved the concept of peacekeeping, veto and sanctions.

UN peacekeeping operations have evolved over the years as a pragmatic response to all conflicts, whether regional or international. In the UN context peacekeeping has been defined as the use of multinational forces, under UN command to help contain and resolve conflicts between hostile states and sometimes between antagonistic forces within a single state. There are two broad types of Missions and Peacekeeping operations: Military Observance Missions and Peacekeeping forces. Observer Missions are composed of unarmed officers and range in strength from a few dozen to several hundred observers. Peacekeeping forces are composed of military units; usually light infantry battalions and their strength have ranged from 1250 to 20000 troops. These troops are armed with light infantry weapons. The concept of peacekeeping is not specifically described in the UN Charter. It goes beyond purely diplomatic means for the peaceful settlement of disputes described in Chapter VI but falls short of the military or other enforcement provisions of Chapter VII. Till date there have been twenty peacekeeping operations. Of these ten used peacekeeping forces and the other ten were military observer missions. The Security Council has generally refrained from spelling out the provisions of the UN charter on which its decisions are usually based, but it did so in the establishment of the UNTSO—UN Truce Supervision Organisation and the UNMOGIP—UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, the two oldest peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping has over the years evolved as a flesible, internationally acceptable way of controlling conflicts, and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. As the tensions of Cold War receded, the international community turned increasingly to UN peacekeeping helping

resolve the various regional and international crisis and conflict situations. United Nations peacekeeping activities have increased and broadened dramatically in recent years. In the span of only five years, the organisation has launched more operations than in the previous forty years. In 1988 and 1989 alone there were five new operations. In September 1988, the Nobel Committee awarded the peace prize to the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations. The growth, however, is not only in quantity, but also in quality, for peacekeeping operations are taking on new tasks that often go far beyond traditional activities and which today include: (a) safeguarding humanitarian relief operations (b) supporting electoral assistance (c) assisting in mine clearance (d) monitoring human rights (e) providing police support (f) enforcing embargoes (g) restoring democracy (h) disarming warring parties (i) administrative management (j) responding to refugees' needs and (k) providing services for victims. In addition to peacekeeping there is also Peace-making, which means negotiations. It seeks to bring hostile parties to an agreement and uses the peaceful means outlined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. (ii) Peace-building, which is essential in the aftermath of a conflict. It means support for structures which solidify peace and build trust and cooperation among former enemies.

16.2.2 Managing the Problem of Global Disarmament

Disarmament is an important aspect in preserving world peace and security. The havoc caused by the two world wars convinced people that if humanity was to be saved from complete destruction, something ought to be done to reduce or limit certain or all types of armaments. Usually the term disarmament is used for reduction or elimination of armaments. The essence of the approach is to restrict the means of disarmament and includes everything which has to do with the limitation, reduction, abolition or control of certain or all armaments through the voluntary agreement of two or more nations. Thus, the strategy of disarmament is the exact reverse of the collective security system and the regional security alliances. Instead of trying to scare countries away from war by confronting them with a formidable deterrent force, disarmament seeks to establish conditions that will assure a nation that others are neither intending to attack it nor are capable of doing so, at least in the immediate future. The strategy is to reduce rather than to build up a confrontation of armed forces the institutional machinery set up by the UN to deal with disarmament issues, especially in the way it has developed since 1978, is complicated. Actually, it is only the UN General Assembly which deals with all aspects of this subject (The Security Council has never systematically dealt with disarmament issues, which is understandable in view of the use of veto.) The Department of Disarmament Affairs in the United Nations Secretariat, headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, assists the operative bodies. There is also a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. In addition to these advisory bodies, which have a global membership, there is the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which, as the name suggests, is a worldwide institution specifically concerned with disarmament questions but has a limited number of members. Though it is an independent body, the Conference on Disarmament is closely linked with the United Nations.

Some of the various instruments in the form of important international arms control agreements dealing particularly with the threat of nuclear weapons are listed below:

- the 1959 Antarctic Treaty;
- the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, called the Partial Test-Ban Treaty because it does not ban underground tests;
- the 1967 Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies (outer space treaty)

- the 1967 treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America
- the 1968 treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (non-proliferation treaty)
- the 1971 treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea bed and the ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof (sea-bed treaty)
- the 1972 convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction;
- the 1979 convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques;
- the 1979 agreement governing the activities of states on the moon and other celestial bodies (moon agreement);
- the 1981 convention on prohibition of restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons;
- the 1985 south pacific nuclear free zone treaty.

The General Assembly in 1969 proclaimed the 1970s as a **Disarmament** Decade. The first session on **disarmament** held at United Nations Headquarters from 23 May to 1 July 1978, was the largest, most representative meeting of nations ever convened to consider the question of disarmament. That first special session on disarmament evoked an unusual **universal** response. It was the 1978 special session that **made disarmament** the dominant topic in the UN, to some extent superseding that of a New International **Economic** Order which had dominated the preceding phase. As a result, the General assembly established a new **Disarmament Commission** as a deliberative body, composed of all UN members. In 1979, the Assembly declared the 1980s as the second **Disarmament** Decade. The second special session on **disarmament** was held at **UN headquarters** from 7 June to 10 July 1982.

Within the framework of the world **disarmament campaign**, the General Assembly has established three regional centres, **funded** by voluntary contributions, to provide regional activities under the **campaign**. They are: the Regional Centre for Peace and **Disarmament** in Africa located in Togo; the Regional Centre for **Peace, Disarmament** and Development in Latin America and Caribbean, located in Peru; and the Regional Centre for Peace and **Disarmament** in Asia, located in Nepal.

While assessing the multilateral **disarmament** process due note is to be taken of flaws in the UN system. Clearly, the United Nations and its associated institutions are not able to get directly involved in bringing about **disarmament** in the sense of destroying or reducing weapons. Nonetheless, it is but obvious that any **multilateral disarmament** policy of the foreseeable future will have to be governed by the conditions prevailing within the UN system, notwithstanding all the criticism and **difficulties**. Global **disarmament** diplomacy within the UN is essential for the safer and more stable world order. The global dialogue on security is indispensable; the **institutions that** have been created for that dialogue are valuable and deserve every support.

The United Nations has **developed seven** major instruments over the last **more than** fifty years to **maintain** international peace and security. These are:

- Preventive diplomacy and Peace-making

- Peace-Keeping
- Peace-Building
- Sanctions
- Peace-Enforcement
- The Collective Security Mechanism
- Disarmament

Despite its best attempts the United Nations evidently depends upon the measure of support it receives from the Great Powers in resolving international disputes. It has not been, nor will it ever be, in a position to force **an** unacceptable solution on a great power, or for that matter any solution against its wishes. It can therefore be said that the UN's record both in resolving disputes by agreement and in helping them become dormant, has been by no means unimpressive. Many disputes are referred to the UN simply because at a particular point of time there is no other way in which they are resolved. The mere taking of a dispute before the UN organs provides **an opportunity** for explaining all possible means for resolving it.

16.2.3 Managing the Problem of Economic and Social Development

The word 'economic' in the UN Charter was to be interpreted to include trade, finance, communications, transport, economic reconstruction, and international access to raw materials, and capital goods. The political struggle between the rich North and the poor South group of nations for the establishment of a more egalitarian world economic order plays a much more dominant role in the UN today than it did in the 1940s and 1950s. North-South politics in and outside the UN possess certain distinctive features which make it different from other political struggles in the world body. Firstly, it is not a power struggle between any two nations but definitely a bloc struggle between two major economic groups. Secondly, it is not associated with strategic issues like the problems of peace and war nor is it in the real sense a contest for supremacy between the two ideological viewpoints. It is rather a difference of economic interests represented by two broad economic groups of nations—the rich North and the poor South. Finally, it involves not cajoling and canvassing to win support among nations but one of confrontation and heated discussions, bargaining and negotiations between large organised groups.

Starting from the Algiers summit of Non-aligned Movement to subsequent summit meetings including a special session of the General Assembly which was convened at the behest of NAM, various attempts have been made to draw the attention of all nations towards these economic problems of southern nations. In the above-mentioned special session of the General Assembly a document and declaration was adopted for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). To reduce this existing enormous inequity between the North and the South is the main task assigned to NIEO and despite its best efforts for so many years NIEO also has not achieved any success.

16.2.4 Regional Commissions of ECOSOC

ECOSOC set up five regional commissions between 1947 and 1974: the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ESCAP), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA), and the Economic Commission for South Asia (ECSA). The main objectives of these regional

commissions have been to provide research and planning facilities that stimulate a spirit of self-help, while tackling regional problems through increasing regional integration. These are seriously engaged in increasing the pace of development in their respective region.

16.2.5 The UN and Global Conferences for Economic and Social Development

The UN is also constantly engaged in arranging from time to time global conferences to discuss prominent economic issues. Some of the main conferences summoned so far are as under:

- United Nations Conference on Desertification (Nairobi, 1977);
- United Nations Water Conference (Mar del Plata, 1977);
- United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among developing countries (Buenos Aires, 1978);
- United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (Vienna, 1979)
- World Conference on Agrarian Reforms and Rural Development (Rome, 1979)
- World Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women : Equality, Development and Peace (Copenhagen, 1980)
- United Nations Conference on New and Renewable sources of Energy (Nairobi, 1981)
- United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (Paris, 1982);
- World Assembly on Ageing (Vienna, 1982)
- International Conference on Population (Mexico City, 1984);
- World Conference to Review and Appraise the achievements of the United Nations decade for Women (Nairobi, 1985);
- United Nations Conference for the promotion of International Cooperation in the peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy (Geneva, 1987);
- International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (Vienna, 1987);
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Belgrade, 1983; Geneva, 1987);
- International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (New York, 1987);
- UN Social Summit (Copenhagen, 1995)

16.2.6 Role of World Bank and International Monetary Fund

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—the Bretton Woods twin institutions are managing the monetary and financial affairs of different countries of the world. The World Bank is supposed to be a lender of conunerciallp raised capital for development projects. Given

its essential structuring as a bank, borrowing (except for international development assistance) on the commercial market, there was never any possibility of it complying with the principles, processes and intended coordinating role of the UN. Even if it ceased to be subject to the influence of one or two industrial powers, it is difficult to see how it could ever fit into the non commercial, one country one vote, and shoe-string finance system of the UN. Only occasionally, do the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) manage to consult each other. To come to grips with the question of its future place in the system, UN delegations need to subject the Bank to as searching an evaluation as its controlling governments do the UN system's developmental activities. The Bank has, of course, done useful work, but the realities certainly do not match the mystique.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), far more than the World Bank, was supposed to intervene equitably in the economic policies of countries. It was supposed to be the multilateral instrument of coherent macro-economic policies designed to achieve the economic and social goals as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, the majority of the countries find the IMF's role essentially primitive. The 'donor' governments insist that macro-policies regarding world money should be discussed at the IMF alone and not at the UN notwithstanding the provision of article 58 of the UN. The Fund itself is so governed that although the developing countries constitute 74 per cent of its membership, they constitute barely 34 per cent of its voting strength. These are not the propitious conditions considering the provisions of the UN Charter.

Fortunately, pressures for reform of the IMF and the World Bank policies, for fair treatment of both surplus and deficit countries, are now increasingly being heard. It is also hoped that realisation of the dangerous consequences of a lack of macro-economic strategies for the world as a whole will also generate pressure for a genuine international trade organisation directed by the UN to secure equitable trading opportunities for all nations.

It is a common characteristic of public institutions that when they are not used, they gradually lose the capacity to be used. This syndrome is one major cause of the current impotence of the UN in relation to global economic problems. The UN has been steadily losing its ability to exercise intellectual leadership in the great economic and social issues of the world. Today there is obviously a need for a mechanism that can periodically assess the UN's achievements and shortcomings in the field of socio-economic development. It must be of a manageable size, yet at the same time be regionally representative.

16.3 OTHER GLOBAL CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

We have already discussed above the major areas of concern where international bodies have framed various instruments and with the help of those instruments these international institutions are trying to manage international relations. We shall discuss below some other latest pertinent concerns in the management of which different international institutions are deeply engrossed.

a) Protecting environment

The UN has played a vital role in fashioning a global programme designed to protect the environment. The Earth Summit, the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, resulted in treaties on bio-diversity and climate change, and all countries adopted 'Agenda 21'—a blueprint to promote sustainable development or the concept of economic growth while protecting natural resources.

b) Providing humanitarian aid to victims of conflict

More than 30 million refugees fleeing war, famine or persecution have received aid from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since 1951 in a continuing effort coordinated by the United Nations that often involves other agencies. There are more than 19 million refugees, primarily, women and children, who are receiving food, shelter, medical aid, and education and repatriation assistance.

c) Aiding Palestinian refugees

Since 1950, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has sustained four generations of Palestinians with free schooling, essential health care, relief assistance and key social services virtually without interruption. There are 2.9 million refugees in the Middle East served by UNRWA.

d) Alleviating chronic hunger and rural poverty in developing countries

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has developed a system providing credit, often in very small amounts, for the poorest and most marginalised group that has benefited over 230 million people in nearly 100 developing countries.

e) Focussing on African development

For the UN, Africa continues to be the highest priority. In 1986, the UN convened a special session to drum up international support for African economic recovery and development. The United Nations has also instituted a task force to ensure that commitments made by the international community are honoured and challenges met. The Africa Project Development Facility (APDF) has helped entrepreneurs in 25 countries to find financing for new enterprises. The Facility has completed 130 projects which represents investments of 233 million and the creation of 13,000 new jobs. It is expected that these new enterprises will either earn or save some \$ 131 million in foreign exchange annually.

f) Promoting Women's rights

A long term objective of the United Nations has been to improve the lives of women and to empower women to have greater control over their lives. Several conferences during the UN sponsored International Women's Decade set an agenda for the advancement of women and women's rights for the rest of the century. The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) have supported programme and projects to improve the quality of life for women in over 100 countries. They include credit and training, access to new food-production technologies and marketing opportunities and other means of promoting women's work

g) Pressing for universal immunisation

Polio, tetanus, measles, whooping cough, diphtheria and tuberculosis still kill more than eight million children each year. In 1974, only 5 per cent of children in developing countries were immunised against these diseases. Today, as a result of these efforts of UNICEF and WHO, there is an 80 per cent immunisation rate, saving the lives of more than 3 million children each year.

h) Promoting investment in developing countries

The United Nations, through the efforts of the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) has served as a "match maker" for North-South, South-South and East-West investment, promoting entrepreneurship and self-reliance, industrial cooperation and technology transfer, and cost-effective, ecologically sensitive industry.

i) Reducing the effects of natural disaster

The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) has spared millions of people from the calamitous effects of both natural and man-made disasters. Its early warning system, which utilises thousands of surface monitors as well as satellites, has provided information for dispersal of oil spills and has predicted long term droughts. The system has allowed for the efficient distribution of food aid to drought regions, such as Southern Africa in 1992.

j) Protecting the ozone layer

The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) have been instrumental in highlighting the damage caused to the earth's ozone layer. As a result of a treaty, known as the Montreal Protocol, there has been a global effort to reduce chemical emissions of substances that have caused the depletion of the ozone layer. The effort will spare millions of people from the increased risk of contracting cancer due to additional exposure to ultraviolet radiation.

k) Curbing global warming

Through the Global Environment Facility (GEF), countries have contributed substantial resources to curb conditions that cause global warming. Increasing emissions from burning fossil fuels and changes in land use patterns have led to a build up of gases in the atmosphere, which experts believe can lead to warming of the Earth's temperature.

l) Cleaning up pollution

UNEP led a major effort to clean up the Mediterranean Sea. It encouraged adversaries such as Syria and Israel, Turkey and Greece to work together to clean up beaches. As a result more than 50 per cent of the previously polluted beaches are now usable.

m) Fighting drug abuse

The UN International Drugs Control Programme (UNDCP) has worked to reduce the demand for illicit drugs, suppress drug trafficking, and has helped farmers to reduce their economic reliance on narcotic crops by shifting farm production towards other dependable sources of income.

n) Improving global trade relations

The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has worked to obtain special trade preferences for developing countries to export their products to developed countries. It has also negotiated international commodities agreements to ensure fair prices for developing countries. And through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which has now been supplanted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations has supported trade liberalisation that will increase economic development opportunities in developing countries.

o) Introducing improved agricultural techniques and reducing costs

Assistance from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) has resulted in improved crop yields. Asian rice farmers have saved \$12 million on pesticides and their governments, over \$150 million a year on pesticide subsidies.

p) Promoting stability and order in the world's oceans

Through three international conferences, the third lasting more than nine years, the UN has spearheaded an international effort to promote a comprehensive global agreement for the protection, preservation and peaceful development of the oceans. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into force in 1994, lays down rules for the determination of national maritime jurisdiction, navigation on the high seas, rights and duties of coastal and other states, obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment, cooperation in the conduct of marine scientific research and preservation of living resources.

q) Protecting intellectual property

The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) provides protection for new inventions and maintains a register of nearly 3 billion national trademarks. Through treaties, it also protects the works of artists, composers and authors worldwide. WIPO's work makes it easier and less costly for individuals and enterprises to enforce their property rights. It also broadens the opportunity to distribute new ideas and products without relinquishing control over the property rights.

r) Improving global communications

The Universal Postal Union (UPU) has maintained and regulated international mail delivery. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has coordinated use of the radio spectrum, promoted cooperation in assigning positions for stationary satellites, and established international standards of communications, thereby ensuring the unfettered flow of information around the globe.

s) Generating worldwide commitment in support of the needs of children

Through UNICEF's efforts, the Convention on the Rights of Children became international law in 1990 and has been adopted in 166 countries by the end September 1994; following the 1990 World Summit for Children convened by UNICEF, more than 150 governments have committed themselves to over 20 specific measurable goals to radically improve children's lives by the year 2000.

16.4 SUMMARY

During the last more than fifty years extensive international cooperation in solving economic, socio-cultural and humanitarian problems, which formed the core of international relations as they existed among different nations of the world, has taken place. Countries have joined hands within multilateral institutions to improve human condition in a way never before attempted. These multilateral institutions produced numerous instruments to organise and regulate their working. Guided by those instruments these institutions plunged themselves headlong and participated in major programmes in support of the economic development and worked together within the United Nations to assist millions of the most helpless and vulnerable of the world's

people—refugees, victims of natural disasters, women ;and children where the need has been greatest In the area of International Law, which comprises of the international instruments and guide the working of different international institutions, more has been done by way of codification in recent decades than in all previous history. On human rights, universal standards have been elaborated, and covenants, which enjoy broad support, have come into force. This can be seen as a major step forward, if we consider that never before have states acknowledged the legitimacy of international concern in this area. The awareness of the global problems and of interests common to all humanity has become widespread. On matters of major global concern such as safeguarding the natural environment and dealing with demographic trends, commonly agreed programmes have been developed on a multilateral basis. In many other areas; study consultation and planning have taken place within the multilateral institutions.

Despite these substantial achievements, there is also evidence of a decline in confidence in multilateralism and disillusionment with the UN approach to solving world's problems. This can be attributed to a combination of factors. The emergence of more than a hundred new independent countries has made multilateralism more complicated and, with the change in majorities, more subject to controversy. Disagreement among members of the UN Security Council had prejudiced the system of collective security provided in the Charter. Today, the way the United States has used or rather misused or when unable to bring to it to its own terms just ignored it, putting the entire UN system to anarchy, and that too using the entire UN system for the fulfillment of its selfish motives or to show to the world as to who wield the power, has also led to a great amount of pessimism both within the UN system and without. The requirements of an equitable global economy have not yet be met in full. The gap between the countries of the North and the countries of the South seems to be growing wider day by day. Discords over trading arrangements and treaties like NPT seem to be dominating the international arena today. Moreover the possibility of a renewal of a Cold War this time between the various trading blocs does not seem to be a far reality. There are problems to be recognised and, to the extent possible, to be overcome. They must not, however, obscure the value of the UN as it should be clearly understood that international problems cannot be dealt with any more by unilateral means.

The great human goals of peace, justice and prosperity are now understood to require ever widening cooperative effort for their achievement. A new array of problems of undeniable global dimensions that are beyond the ability of any single country or group of states to solve may arise. Moreover, the enormity of the tasks undertaken, have forced the international institutions and the world community to acquire a new realism—awareness that they have embarked upon a long path towards progress which would be marked by both successes and failures.

Now there is deeper understanding of where the sources of trouble lie in the world. There is an increasing awareness that security involves far more than questions of land weapons. Moreover, there is also a realisation that the lack of economic, social and political development is the underlying cause of conflict. In only redefining and bringing to fulfillment a renewed vision of development, can we begin to get at the roots of conflict? In the process can be built, enduring foundations for a secure, just and creative era for all humanity. This is the primary mission of the international institutions in the 21st Century. These institutions have helped restrain conflict from escalating to global proportions. The UN peacekeeping forces have prevented renewed resort to armed force where war has been halted.

Today, the realisation is dawning that for human beings around the world, in every land and of every background, the myriad of international institutions under the aegis's of United Nations

is more than **an** instrument of peace: justice and cooperative development among nations. **And** it is this faith in international institutions that **should** keep our tomorrow brighter and hopeful.

16.5 EXERCISES

- 1) What are the major failures of the UN in political field?
- 2) Discuss the highly constructive role of the UN peacekeeping operation.
- 3) Explain major instruments that helped in the resolution of problems of peace and security.
- 4) Discuss the efforts for managing the problem of global disarmament.
- 5) Analyse the role of the World Bank and IMF in the management of global economy.

UNIT 17 INDIA IN THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER

Structure

- 17.1 Introduction
- 17.2 The Concept of World Order
- 17.3 The Old Order and its Characteristics
 - 17.3.1 Cold War
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- 17.4 Break-up of the Old World Order
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 - 17.5.1 Salient Features of the New World Order: The Hegemon
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 - 17.5.3 Discriminatory Regimes
 - 17.5.4 Marginalisation of the UN
 - 17.5.5 Intensifying of Dependency Relations
- 17.6 Implications for India
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17.1 INTRODUCTION

After studying the units in Block 3 and 4, you must already be familiar with the changes in international relations that have come about in the last quarter of the 20th Century. Besides the dominance of the G-7 nations, and the US in particular, the rise of the new middle powers like China, South Africa and India, both economically and politically/militarily, has been an important factor in the new situation. The end of the Cold War has given a new dimension to the problem of security. It has also accelerated the process of globalisation and economic integration of the world. Formation of regional groupings of nations like European Community, ASEAN, NAFTA is but one response of the nations to the issues that these changes have raised. However, in considering these details a student of International Relations is likely to get lost and may overlook the larger picture. In other words, he may miss the wood for the trees! Therefore, it is intended to put these changes in the perspective of World Order. Seeing the total picture of international relations would make understanding the particular issues easier. It would also help to clarify or at least help speculate on, the causal factors behind some of the important phenomena in international relations. It will be endeavour of this Unit to draw for you an outline of this picture in the form of World Order.

A developing nation, in particular India, has limited options while facing this larger picture of international order. It has to steer itself through the pulls and pressures brought to bear upon it by other powers, especially the Great Powers, as best as it can in order to achieve its goals: national security, political independence and economic strength. It has to make best possible use of a given situation over which it has little control. It may, while exercising its options, influence to a limited extent the features of the World Order. This would be the case especially if it is successful in mobilising other developing nations in support of its stand on important issues—economic or political. This Unit will seek to define the options available to India and the possible strategies that it can adopt.

Before doing that we will try to discuss the concept of World Order and the structural aspects it involves. Against that background we will try to outline the features of the World Order that characterised the post-Second World War international relations for more than four decades—what we call here the Old World Order (OWO). After a cursory discussion of the factors that brought about a radical change in this, we will try to identify the features of the New World Order (NWO)—its structure and limits. And then, we will turn to the position of India in particular, and the developing nations in general, in this Order. At the end, we will speculate on the possibilities of changes in the New World Order and the forces that could be instrumental in bringing about these changes.

17.2. THE 'CONCEPT OF WORLD ORDER

The term 'order' may be interpreted as an arrangement of things, as against dis-order. It could also mean a particular way of distribution of goods or values among the units—people or nations—such that a pattern or structure emerges. In the context of international relations, the value distributed could be power. The pattern that emerges could be egalitarian where consensual cooperation could be a feature governing relations. It could be hegemonic where domination may be the governing feature or in an oligopolistic structure exploitation may characterise international relations. Or, it could even be a variant of these. These patterns, for their survival and successful operation, would prescribe rules or conditions that are logical. All this assumes that there exists close and frequent interaction between nations on different planes. If nations are isolated, as they were in primitive, ancient or pre-modern times the question of pattern would not arise. To put it simply: such a pattern of relations among nations could be called World Order. The terms *Pax Britannica*, Concert of Europe in some ways reflect this concept. As a result of a rise or decline in the power of nations these patterns may change. The Order is not permanent. Thus, at the end of the Gulf War 1990-91, George Bush Sr., then president of the US, suggested that such a change had occurred and a new order was emerging.

In ancient India, Kautilya put forward the *Mandala* theory, which, to some extent, captures this concept. In this, he conceptualised, on geo-political basis, relations of alliance (*Mitra*), hostility (*Ari*), neutrality (*Udaseena*) between groups of twelve states. In his scheme of things each state was an actual or potential enemy, ally or neutral depending on its geo-political location in relation to the nation-on-the-march (*Vijigishu*) charting its foreign policy. A neighbouring state would be a potential enemy and the enemy's enemy would then be one's friend and so on. However, Kautilya's aim was not so much to theorise about world order as to guide the expansionist state in framing its policy for dominating the *Mandala* of states. Its ultimate aim was to become a *Chakravarti* – an emperor.

Morton Kaplan, in his book, *System and Process in International Politics* postulated six types of hypothetical models based on distribution of power: 1. The Unit Veto System; 2. Balance of Power System; 3. Loose Bi-polar System; 4. Tight Bi-polar System; 5. Universal System; and 6. Hierarchical System. These systems can be arranged as a continuum on the scale of integration from Unit-Veto to hierarchical system. From these he deduced rules for their structure, survival or remaining in equilibrium. Frequent violation of these rules would herald a change in the system. To put it briefly, in a Unit-veto system, each nation would be totally free to accept or reject an obligation and no rule would be valid without its acceptance. In a Balance of Power System, two or more states form alliances to prevent the emergence of a hegemon or a dominant power. In a Bi-polar System, essentially, the nations form two opposing groups or alliances Depending upon the discipline and solidarity within these groups. it would be termed tight or loose Bi-polar Systems. In a Hierarchical System, one nation is pre-dominant

like a Colossus stalking the earth. Universal System is an idealised version of a world government ruling with the aid of international law. These: of course, are ideal types and do not necessarily correspond with ground realities. However, it helps us in understanding the concept and operation of international system. One could describe the post-Second World War situation as a bi-polar one—its nature (solidarity) varying over time, moving from tight to a loose bi-polar system.

37.3 THE OLD WORLD ORDER AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS

The end of the Second World War saw the nations in the world clearly divided into two groups, based on ideology. The capitalist nations or free market economies (including the liberal democratic nations)—US, Western European nations, Australia, New Zealand, and their allies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—were at one end of the pole. To protect themselves from possible aggression—direct or indirect—of the communist nations, they formed defensive alliances. NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS were some of these. In addition to these, the US entered into bilateral security pacts with various nations. In opposition to these, and at the other end of the pole, were the communist nations: The Soviet Union, Peoples' Republic of China and the East European states which were overrun by the Soviet armies in the last phase of the war. They too formed military alliances. The Warsaw Pact between the Soviet Union and the East European nations and the security treaty between Soviet Union and China were the chief examples of these. The leaders of both these blocs were armed with nuclear and conventional weapons and, therefore, balanced each other. Political, economic, communication and cultural ties paralleled the security links between nations within these blocks.

17.3.1 Cold War

What ensued has been aptly described as a Cold War. The communist nations severed their relations with their rivals to such an extent that what Winston Churchill described as an Iron Curtain separated them. The rivalry between the two blocs was intense. Threats, propaganda, ideological diatribes and acts short of war characterised the relations between the nations of the two groups. Fear and suspicion pervaded the atmosphere. Its result was arms race and trade boycott. There was minimum tolerance for dissidence within the bloc. War was prevented only by deterrence or fear of reprisals. The situation was one of *pence at the centre and conflict on the periphery*. That is, while a direct armed conflict between the two blocs was avoided by a kind of negative consensus, each tried to test the preparedness of the other by provoking minor conflicts. Berlin blockade of 1949, Greek-Yugoslav conflict of the early 1940s, Korean War of the 1950s and the Iranian Crisis were examples of such brinkmanship. They were, however, not allowed to grow into larger conflagrations.

17.3.2 The Third World

This picture was complicated by the emergence of the Third World. (It is an ambiguous term, which negatively denotes countries, which are neither communist nor have developed a capitalist economy. More generally, it refers to the former colonies.) A host of the countries in Asia and Africa, at the end of the war, freed themselves from the shackles of colonial rule and emerged as independent 'new nations'. While some of these entered into formal or informal ties with the US bloc (like Malaysia, Ceylon, Pakistan, Philippines) and a few (e.g. Cuba) established military or economic ties with the Soviet Bloc, a majority of these nations preferred to remain non-committed or 'non-aligned'. These nations favoured peaceful co-existence, disarmament (especially nuclear), a *détente*, and toning down of ideological rhetoric. Though a formal bloc

was not organised, and the non-aligned remained more as a movement, there was sufficient coordination among these nations, both within and outside the UN, so as to forge a common agenda for the non-aligned. Anti-imperialism, de-colonisation, economic development, disarmament and multi-lateral (UN) diplomacy were some of the chief themes on this agenda. What is important from the point of view of our subject is that this altered the nature of the World Order somewhat. The existence of a large number of non-aligned nations tended to slacken the bonds holding the nations in each of these two blocs. On the one hand, it tended to shift the focus of the rivalry from the bloc members to this neutral space. Thus, progressively, in the 1960s locations of the conflicts were in the Third World rather than the territories of the members of the blocs (example, Indochina, Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, etc.). This helped reduce the rigour of bloc discipline and turn it into a Loose Bi-polar system. Dissidence on the part of Romania, Albania, China, France helped accomplish this change. Secondly, though unorganised, the non-aligned group of nations could tilt the balance between the two blocs one-way or the other politically, if not militarily.

These new nations whose domestic politics bristled with contradictions—racial, religious, class and ethnic—provided an opportunity for the Cold War rivalry to spill over into this space. Thus on the one hand, Soviet Union and China provided military, political and economic support to one faction; predictably, the Western bloc championed the cause of the other. The existence of the communist parties in some of these nations was a great advantage to the Soviet Union in this struggle (for example, in Malaysia: Indonesia and Philippines). That the former imperial powers, which ruled these colonies, were members of the Western Bloc (Britain, Portugal, Netherlands Belgium, France), was also a factor in its favour. What this meant was that many of these new nations became scenes of proxy wars. Congo, Angola, Namibia, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Yemen are prime examples of these.

To a degree this made world politics predictable and simple. Thus, if the Soviet Union supported one party to a regional or even a domestic conflict (say, India on Kashmir or a Lumumba in Congo) then almost automatically the Western Bloc would come to the help of the other party (Pakistan or Kasavubu in the above examples) and vice-versa. Though this exacerbated the conflict, it also offered scope for preventive diplomacy to insulate the conflict from Great Power rivalry. Thus, the Suez Crisis (1956), the Lebanese conflict (1958), or the Congolese conflict (1960) were sought to be isolated from Great Power politics in seeking their solutions. In some rare instances (e.g. the Indo-Pak conflict 1965) the negative consensus between the super-powers allowed one to assume a mediatory role to pacify the conflict.

Secondly, the bi-polar rivalry allowed the Third World nations to carve out political space for themselves. Leaders of the bloc competed in wooing the Third World nations offering them military/economic aid and laying a premium on the opinions of their leaders. Thus, nations like India, Egypt, or Indonesia used this to their advantage by seeking and obtaining aid from both the Soviet and the US bloc of nations.

The ideological divide between the two blocs offered to the Third World nations, practically, a choice between two models of economic development: centrally planned economy (socialism) or free market economy (capitalism). Some Third World nations (India, Pakistan, Egypt) made a cocktail of the two in the form of mixed economy to suit their conditions. This also meant easy availability of preferential trade or aid/technology options. Many such deals were struck by Third World nations in the 1960s and 1970s.

Finally, the Loose Bi-polar System allowed some political space to the UN. The organisation, which, in the early 1950s, was a gladiatorial arena for the two blocs for trading charges or

scoring points showed tendencies to, in the words of its dynamic UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, become a "constitutional system of international cooperation" rather than remaining as a mere "institutional system of international co-existence". In the 1960s and 1970s, the UN took a number of initiatives like peacekeeping operations, preventive diplomatic missions, technical task forces, UNCTAD, etc. to help small nations shield themselves from the Cold War and stand on their own. In fact, Hammarskjold felt that the UN was primarily 'their' organisation, for the Third World nations, especially the non-aligned. They took full advantage of this in using the UN to pressurise the developed nations in the First and the Second Worlds on questions like de-colonisation and development that were important from their point of view. (See Unit 18 on Right to Self-Determination).

17.4 BREAK-UP OF THE OLD WORLD ORDER

As seen earlier, the World Order was already moving from a Tight Bi-polar to a Loose Bi-polar one in the decades of 1960s and 1970s. However, dramatic changes in the Soviet bloc in the later part of the 1980s brought about a radical change in the world scenario. The Soviet Union collapsed and its bloc disintegrated. Not only did the units of the Soviet federation like Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgisistan, Ukraine, Bylo-Rus become independent nations but members of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe—Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East Germany severed their connections with the bloc and, in fact, many of them have now become members of the NATO! Moreover, Russia itself has conceded the inefficiency of a centrally planned economy and has embraced principles of liberal democracy and free market economy.

It may not be appropriate here to analyse in depth the factors responsible for this event. We will only take a cursory look at some of the factors involved and move on with our discussion. The chief factors responsible for the turn back were undoubtedly the inefficiencies involved in the centrally planned economies and the exploitation of the state by the party bureaucrats. The economy could not keep pace with growing competition in a globalised world. The policies of 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika' merely helped bring out in the open these deficiencies.

In fact, the hold of the ideology in keeping the flock of the communist nations together had already considerably weakened in the 1960s with China, Albania and Romania charting their separate paths. This had further affected the loyalty of communist parties' worldwide to the Soviet Union. The rise of Euro-communism was a case in point.

National identities in East-European communist nations had also caused cracks in the monolith. This was especially true of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This must have had its repercussions within the Soviet federation too. What gave a mortal blow to the Soviet edifice was its misadventure in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. Its army got mired in the guerrilla war and had to bent an ignominious retreat. The break up of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of its bloc was a cumulative effect of all these factors.

17.5 THE NEW WORLD ORDER

What emerged from the debris of the Old World Order is the New World Order hinted by president George Bush Sr. In many ways, the Gulf War (against Iraq) was a marking point in the change. Though Iraq was a recipient of economic and military aid of the Soviet Union and almost an ally, the war was waged by the US with little resistance or protection from Russia. US supremacy was unchallenged.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc implies the emergence of a unipolar world order. The last decade of the 20th Century witnessed the hegemony of the US in military and economic spheres, in trade and technology. Western European nations, Japan, China, India, etc. were left on the margins of this new power structure. Let us try to get together some of the features of this New World Order.

17.5.1 Salient Features of the New World Order: The Hegemon

A salient feature of the New World Order is the nature of the dominance of the hegemon—the US. Strategically, it is the only nation which has worldwide interests and ‘presence’. With 725 military installations outside its territory, of which 17 are fully-fledged bases, US has 1.4 millions active servicemen of whom 250,000 are deployed overseas. It is a necessary actor in all crisis situations, either as a participant, a mediator or a instigator—direct or indirect. The role of the US in the Irish Good Friday Agreements 1998, the Dayton Agreement and Kosovo crisis in Yugoslavia, the East Timor crisis in Indonesia 1999, de-escalation of the Kargil crisis 2000 and the subsequent Indo-Pak crisis, the North Korean crisis 1993-94 and 2002 are some of the prominent examples. In fact, it is the only power maintaining a military presence in all parts of the world. Figures of its defence spending would make this dominance more clear. US defence spending constitutes 36 per cent of world defence spending. US military budget exceeds that of the next 14 biggest defence spenders *combined*. The following table will give you an idea of the disparity in defence spending between US and some other countries:

Defence Spending as per cent of hegemon (hegemon = 100)

Year	US	Britain	Russia	Japan	Germany	China
1950	100	16	107	na	na	na
1985	100	10	109	5	8	10
1996	100	13	26	17	14	13
2000	100	11	20	15	10	14

Source: *Economist* June 29, 2002

To put it in concrete terms, in 2000 US defence spending was \$300bn while that of NATO-Europe was 160 bn and of Russia \$60 bn. The US also accounts for 40 per cent defence production worldwide.


This is paralleled by the US dominance in the economic realm. The US has the status of the largest economy of the world—home to the largest number of the MNCs.


Economic Dominance: GDP as per cent of the Hegemon (hegemon = 100)

Year	US	Britain	Russia	Japan	Germany	China
1950	100	24	35	11	15	na
1985	100	17	39	38	21	46
1997	100	15	9	38	22	53
2000	100	15	13	35	21	52

Source: *Economist* June 29, 2002

Measurements of Power





US: 40.6 per cent

Its share in the world trade is the largest (US accounts for 15.4 per cent of world exports compared to European Union's share of 18.4 per cent). and it, more often than not, occupies the position of largest trading partner for most of the nations. It is also important to note that for most of the technological innovations in sciences, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, information technology, etc. the US is the starting point. It dominates world financial bodies like the World Bank, the IMF or the WTO.

17.5.2 Unilateralism

This dominance inevitably culminates in unilateralism and discriminatory regimes. It is but natural for the hegemon to rank its interests first and to think that what is good for the US is good for the world too. Many of the actions of the US in this new role illustrate this point. The US opted out of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which was an essential ingredient of the structure of nuclear deterrence and launched a programme of nuclear missile defence. Despite a worldwide consensus, it rejected the Kyoto Protocol 1997 on environmental protection. The Protocol sought to lay down a timetable for regulating CFC gases emissions to prevent global warming. It not only refused to accept the instrument setting up the International Criminal Court but sought and obtained from the UN an immunity to its peace-keepers from prosecutions for war crimes. The US Senate rejected to ratify in 1999 the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The US also has pulled out of the Verification Protocol for Biological Weapons Convention. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, New York, it declared a war on terror and attacked Afghanistan to root out the Taliban regime there, UN being merely a witness to the happenings. Subsequent to the war, it has detained thousands of prisoners of war in disregard of Geneva Conventions. In 2002 it brought pressure to bear upon the UN Security Council to pass resolution 1441 warning Iraq to destroy weapons of mass destruction or face 'serious consequences'.

In the economic sphere, it imposed 'safeguard tariffs' on steel (March 2002) to protect its steel industry and violated the spirit of the Uruguay Protocol by dispensing a huge subsidy (about \$82 bn over 10 years) to its farmers. The US persists with its Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974 empowering its president to impose temporary trade barriers to protect US interests. The disagreements between domestic trade laws and the WTO have been a great impediment for nations trading with the US. Such unilateralism on the part of the hegemon is a chief characteristic of the New World Order.

17.5.3 Discriminatory Regimes

Being the hub of the capitalist world, the US is the prime mover behind many of the discriminatory regimes in the economic field. Its chief instruments for these are the IMF, World Bank and the WTO. Through the IMF, the Third World nations are 'persuaded' to adopt policies of structural adjustment favouring liberalisation, privatisation and free trade. This was clearly evident during the Southeast Asian nations economic crisis of 1997-98 when IMF relief was made conditional on the adoption of such policies. It was also a feature of the negotiations preceding the adoption of the Uruguay Protocol. The US has sought to consolidate its position in the world trade by establishing NAFTA, and free trade agreements with Latin American, Southern African and South-east Asian Nations. Though these regimes stand by free trade, actually, by linking trade with conditionalities like child labour, pollution norms and subsidies pre-eminence of the interests of the G7 nations (and US) is insured. The Uruguay Protocol by opening the field for investment, intellectual property rights and services insures the predominance of the capitalist concerns in the Third World.

17.5.4 Marginalisation of the UN

Another feature of the New World Order is the marginalisation of the UN. In the Old World Order the UN performed three important functions in international politics:

First, as defined by the Charter, it was 'Centre for Harmonisation of Relations' among nations. That is, it was one of the places where negotiations between nations took place—on the sidelines or through the fora of the UN bodies. These exchanges, especially, involving small powers, were fruitful in coordinating their stand and evolving a common approach on questions dealing with the developed nations. Many of the initiatives—e.g. the one on the study of the MNCs, or development—were the result of such collaboration.

Secondly, UN fora were used by the Third World nations to pressurise the Great Powers to modify their policies. Thus, the resolutions passed on de-colonisation or racial equality was quite successful in moulding world public opinion. Not all such attempts were equally successful. Its resolutions urging the great powers to take steps towards nuclear disarmament were given scant respect. But the attempts were significant. Thirdly, the UN was an institution to legitimise international behaviour, for example, in the field of human rights, and the use of force in international relations. In particular, its attempts at preventive diplomacy like Observation Groups and Peacekeeping Forces opened a new area for conflict resolutions.

In the New World Order, this role of the UN seems to be shrinking, if not getting obliterated. The UN now is, more and more, becoming an instrument of US foreign policy. The US has often threatened to withhold its contributions unless the UN followed its advice in administrative matters. And as in the early years of the UN (in the 1950s), the Security Council has been used to back up the steps already taken by the US (e.g. in Iraq).

17.5.5 Intensifying of Dependency Relations

Lastly, a feature of the New World Order, especially in the economic fields, is the intensifying of the dependency of the Third World nations in relation to the G7 nations in general, and the US in particular. The absence of the countervailing bloc (the Soviet Union) has meant that these nations have little room for manoeuvre. The volume of aid to Third World nations has dwindled to a trickle. Policies of free trade, and opening of their economies for investment and services has forced them to enter un-equal competition and has resulted in supremacy of the MNCs and

capitalist conglomerates. Thus, any weakening of the US or the Western economies has quite an adverse effect on the livelihood of the peoples of the Third World causing recession, unemployment and debt traps for these nations.

The question all this raises is, can the hegemony of the US be termed absolute, or are there any relieving features to this dark picture?

The US has a legacy of liberalism, individual freedoms and democracy. Even accepting that in international relations national interest rather than ideology is the deciding factor, the fact remains that the government needs to justify its actions within the framework of liberalism. Very often US self interest is benign when it favours free trade, free movement of men and money or democracy and rule of law. It has a constitution, which sets limits to absolute power of any one institution within the country. Though painfully slow, on many occasions, liberal values have triumphed—witness the end of McCarthyism or the anti-Vietnam war campaign. Further, the US being a land of immigrants, it offers scope for lobbies and groups championing causes not only in domestic politics but also in foreign policy matters. The Jews, the Irish and the Hispanics have made their presence felt in this area.

A more important factor is the variety of interests competing with each other in the US. It would be an over-simplification to argue that US policies are under the thumb of one or even one class of interests. Thus for example, the oil interests check the Jewish interest group. This open competition among interests makes for checks and balances which acts as a moderating influence on its hegemonic ambitions.

In a way its allies outside parallel these competing interests within the nation. Even if the Soviet Union is no more, the rise of the European Union, and Japan as second largest economies and a fast growing China means that the US does not have a total free way. It cannot always take its West-European allies for granted and has to rely on persuasion rather than coercion to make them fall in line. If European Union continues on its integrationist course and China on its reformist one they could soon prove counterweights to US hegemony. The uni-polar system could give way to a multi-polar one. Again, the US influence has limits when it affects the vital interests of even small powers. Thus, it has not proved effective in shaping the policies of parties to the Israel-Palestine or the Kashmir conflicts.

17.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Let us look at the implications for India of this New World Order. Against that background, we will see the options available to India in this new situation for safeguarding its interests.

First, the absence of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War makes the policy of non-alignment to that extent irrelevant. It can now only mean non-attachment to the remaining bloc—militarily and economically—not that in the changed circumstances, the US would be overly eager to have such entanglements. Thus, non-alignment remains only a slogan, a shell without substance. Secondly, the changed situation implies that there is so much less room for manoeuvre. Russia is in no position to offer economic aid and its political support on questions of India's national interest can only be symbolic—except where its use of the veto power in the UN is involved. India has to make space for itself based on its economic and military strength rather than its diplomatic initiatives. In fact, this attenuated role for India was already evident in the negotiating round preceding the signing of the GATT accords or the Kyoto Protocols. Adjusting to the new situation, India in the late 1990s has sought US attention, if not intervention, in its bilateral conflicts with Pakistan. Internally too, India has distanced itself from its earlier socialistic

policies and is downplaying the role of the state in industry and business. With the increasing irrelevance of the non-aligned, India is hard put to maintain its leadership role among the developing countries (Third World nations).

Three options appear to be available for India in this scenario:

- 1) India can choose to become a client state of the US: It can opt to follow the Western economic model of development increasing consumerism and following an elitist model of society based on inequalities. In such a model the role of the state in industry and business is minimal with greater scope for private enterprise. Internationally this would imply following a path of dependent development, that is, seeking foreign investment, and providing goods and services needed by the Western Nations. Politically, it may support, or at least acquiesce in, US policies of dominance, especially in central and East Asia. It could mean abandoning its long-standing position on nuclear arms and embarking on a policy of collaboration in military matters. Since 1990, India seems to be leaning towards this soft option.
- 2) A hard option for India would be to consistently follow a path of self-reliance. This could mean abandonment of the ambition of increasing its military and economic strength in order to support its claim to be a world power. Then it can stick to its high moral ground of nuclear disarmament and peaceful co-existence. This would entail organising its society on the basis of decentralisation of power, ethnic pluralism and an egalitarian approach to development. In such a model, the economy will have to respond to the needs of the masses rather than those of the elites. .
- 3) These two are extreme positions. Of course, India can combine elements of these two options picking and choosing paths to suit its peculiar circumstances. For example, it may offer stiff resistance to the pressures brought to bear upon it where its vital interests are involved (e.g. Kashmir, security from a nuclear threat, terrorism, etc.). It can try to build a support base for itself among the Third World Nations who face problems similar to that of India in matters of trade, environment issues, security concerns like terrorism etc. Lastly, it can try to influence the hegemon 'from inside' (through NRIs, MNCs, interest groups) as well as 'from outside' (in cooperation with other nations).

17.7 SUMMARY

No World Order is permanent. International politics is in a constant flux. Therefore, it is conceivable that the New World order could undergo change. The factors that helped its rise, and that have ensured its maintenance, change. According to an analyst, these causes of change can be grouped into four categories: changes in power relationships, in technology, in attitudes and values, and changes within major actors.

Thus, a change in the distribution of power, e.g. military or economic, could drastically affect the World Order. As remarked earlier in this Unit, if European Union emerges as an integrated unit with a strong leadership, or if China/India reforms its economy and polity then it could pose a major challenge to the hegemony of the US, especially if its world-view differs from that of the US. The hegemonic unipolar World Order, then, could be replaced by a tri-polar, if not a multi-polar, World Order,

Nuclear technology was the principal force that brought about a change in the world system after Second World War. However, comparable changes are occurring in the fields of

communications and biotechnology. The ways in which these technological changes could affect International Relations are yet to unravel. Already, new information technology is effecting changes in world economic activity, which only a few decades back would have been inconceivable.

Technological changes and their effects are sharp and dramatic to view. Changes in norms of behaviour or values are slow to perceive, almost imperceptible. Yet, they can bring about long lasting changes. For example, aversion to violence and war could result from catastrophic decisions to use weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical or biological. Trade, travel and television are important instruments in bringing about attitudinal changes.

We saw that changes that occurred in the domestic sphere of the Soviet Union had far-reaching international repercussions. These were totally unimaginable in the 1970s or even the early 1980s. A similar implosion within, say, China or the south Asian sub-continent could change the whole political geography. A more realistic and immediate factor is the turmoil within the Islamic world. Iran, Palestine, and Pakistan are its flesh-points. These would be subject matter for other units.

17.8 EXERCISES

- 1) Explain the concept and salient features of the old world order.
- 2) Write a brief note on the various characteristics of the New World Order
- 3) Write a note on the implications of the New World Order for the developing countries like India.
- 4) Write an essay on the increasing dependency relations in the New World Order

UNIT 18 RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Structure

- 18.1 Introduction
- 18.2 Self-determination and Nationalism
- 18.3 External Self-determination and Decolonisation
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 - 18.3.3 Racial Equality and Self-determination
- 18.4 Self-determination and non-colonial Societies
 - 18.4.1 Self-determination as Applied to Parts of Colonial Empires/States
 - 18.4.2 Self-determination and Multi-ethnic Societies: Internal Self-determination
- 18.5 Summary
- 18.6 Exercises

18.1 INTRODUCTION

In some of the earlier units in Book I, you have studied the important characteristics of the Third World countries now addressed as ‘developing countries’. A major part of the Third World was once a part of the colonial empires of Western European countries—chiefly Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Netherlands. Nationalist movements in these colonies, in the 20th Century, successfully made use of the slogan of the self-determination to win freedom from their European masters. But much before that, in Europe, diverse peoples, parts of old empires—the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian—claimed the right of self-determination to set up independent nations.

In this unit, in the first part, we will review briefly this historical application of the concept. In the latter part, we will analyse the difficulties and contradictions involved in interpreting this concept and the way in which international community and the UN have tackled this problem in its application to colonial and non-colonial societies. On the basis of this discussion, we will try to evaluate the utility of the concept, especially against the background of changing international relations.

18.2 SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONALISM

The *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* interprets self-determination to mean: “all people of one nationality are entitled to dwell together in order to govern themselves in a state of their own.”. Therefore, it is clear that this concept is anchored in that of nationalism. Nationalism implies a subjective feeling on the part of a community of its separate identity and an urge or aspiration to be self-governing or independent. The identity could be based on language, religion, race or a shared historical experience, which help in forging common emotional bonds amongst the people. The basis may be imaginary but the bonds are real. Hence, Anderson calls a nation an “imagined community”. In the late 19th and early 20th Century, these aspirations on the part

of a number of communities in Central Europe created a great deal of unrest and weakened the fabric of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires. This factor was, at least partly, responsible for the outbreak of the First World War. The promise of self-determination after the conclusion of the war and the Fourteen Points of US president Woodrow Wilson were addressed to this problem. At the end of the War, the Allied statesmen realised that the problem was more complicated than what the principle suggested. Even though as a result of the application of this principle a number of communities attained nationhood-Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia-it did not solve the problem. The division of Central and Eastern Europe into independent nation states still left a substantial number of people within the boundaries of these new nations who had deeper emotional, racial or linguistic ties with the neighbouring nation states. Thus, for example, Germans in Czechoslovakia, Russians in the Baltic States all resented their fate being linked with, what for them was, an alien rule. To alleviate, if not to solve this situation, a convention on the rights of ethnic minorities in these states had to be agreed upon while drafting the Covenant of the League of Nations. The fact of the matter is that, short of mass transfer of population, which today would be called 'ethnic cleansing', no clear division of people could be effected which would satisfy all sections of people. This problem has continued to haunt the statesmen right up to the 21st Century. The recent opting out of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia, from Yugoslavia and the split of Czechoslovakia would testify to this. As far as Europe is concerned, this is not the end of the story. The question of Chechnya, Basque, Cyprus, Northern Ireland still remain unresolved-and many of the potential ones remain under the surface. You will read more on this later in this unit.

18.3 EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND DE-COLONISATION

In spite of the promise implied in the Fourteen Points of president Wilson, after the First World War, the Principle of Self-determination was not applied to the peoples within the colonial empires-the British, French, Dutch and Portuguese-in Asia and Africa. The Covenant of the League of the Nations only said, members agreed to "undertake to secure just treatment of native inhabitants under their control" (Art 23.b). In fact, parts of the defeated empires in Asia and Africa were distributed among the Allies to be governed as 'Mandates' under the League of Nations system. The denial of right of Self-determination came as a deep disappointment to the colonial people. In fact, many of their leaders considered it a betrayal for, they had offered full-fledged cooperation to their colonial masters during the War on the premise that on its successful conclusion they would be rewarded with substantial, if not full-fledged, self-government. Therefore, in India in particular, it led to mass movements and non-cooperation with the rulers. This continued even during the Second World War.

During the Second World War, much before the formation of the UN, the Principle of Self-determination found an oblique reference in the Atlantic Charter issued by British prime minister Winston Churchill and US president Franklin D. Roosevelt, which laid down the objectives of the Allies. This was felt necessary to win the sympathy and cooperation of the people in the colonies. It said, the US and UK "respect the right of the people to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." (Later Churchill clarified that he had in mind the people attacked by the Nazis). The ambiguity in the declaration reflected the resistance to the concept offered by the Western European imperialists, chief of them being Britain and France.

18.3.1 UN and Self-determination

At the time of the drafting of the UN Charter, the founding fathers were obviously more concerned with peace and security, sanctity of the territorial integrity of the nations rather than the question of Self-determination. These concerns precede the mention of the Self-determination in the Charter. The latter finds mention only at two places in the Charter. One of the purposes of the UN mentioned is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and Self-determination of peoples”. (Art 1.2) It also finds mention as a principle on which the promotion of social and economic conditions and rights of people should be based. (Art. 55) It is now agreed that the term ‘people’ here refers to the people who were subjected to colonial domination of the salt-water variety. In a broader context the Charter makes provisions in Chapters XII, XIII and XI for Trusteeship Council and Non-self governing Territories. The mandates under the League of Nations along with territories/colonies of the enemy nations were included as Trusts in the charge of Administering Authorities, supervised by the Trusteeship Council. Its aim was to promote political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants and their progressive development towards self-government and independence. The Trusteeship Council had powers to receive petitions from inhabitants, reports of the Administering Authority, of conducting investigations and reporting to the General Assembly. Of the ten trust territories in 1950, all but two had become free by 1970.

Chapter XI of the Charter was a declaration on colonies, euphemistically called Non-self governing Territories. Under this, the member nations who had responsibilities for the colonies (except Portugal) committed to “accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost...the wellbeing of the inhabitants” and to develop self-government and free political institutions and provide information on economic, social and educational conditions to the UN. The UN listed 74 such territories in 1946. A regime to monitor the progress towards the goal of self-government was devised by the UN in the form of a committee on self-governing territories. The imperial power in Europe, in particular France, and Portugal followed a strategy of treating their outlying colonies (Algeria and Goa for example) as integral parts of their nations. They settled their nationals in those territories who along with the natives had representation in their legislatures. Thus technically the natives were not ‘subjects’ but were ‘free’ nationals of the metropolitan states. Any attempt by the UN to consider the question of these territories was opposed on the ground that it contravened Art 2(7) of the Charter.

18.3.2 De-colonisation in Asia and Africa

The omission in the Charter regarding Self-determination to the colonies was redressed to a certain extent when issues relating to freedom of colonies came up for consideration before the organs of the UN, especially the General Assembly. It is significant to note that out of the 3 founding members of the UN, 27 had some experience of colonialism. Therefore, it is not surprising that right from its inception the General Assembly of the UN took a stand favouring de-colonisation. The repeated resolutions of the General Assembly, passed with over-whelming majorities, lent an air of legitimacy to the principle of de-colonisation and by implication that of Self-determination. Resolution 1514 of the General Assembly passed in 1960 is a case in point. It was passed without dissent. It said: “All Peoples have the right to Self-determination, by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” It further appointed a special committee to examine the implementation of Resolution 1514. This pressure in the General Assembly was maintained in the 1960s and 1970s. The Non-aligned nations both inside and outside the UN continued their support to the process of de-colonisation. Thus the Bandung Conference of the Non-aligned

declared "its full support for the principle of Self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the Charter of the UN" and its resolutions. Thanks to the political support of the non-aligned, military and economic support to the insurgents extended by the Soviet Union and the grudging sympathy of the United States, most of the African colonies attained their independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus the membership of the UN increased from 50 in the first years of its existence to 170 at the end of the Cold War.

18.3.3 Racial Equality and Self-determination

If Trusteeship system and de-colonisation (freedom of non-self governing territories) were two elements of the UN activity in the area of Self-determination, the third element concerning this concept has to do with racial equality in South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Though South Africa was independent and was, in fact, a member nation of the UN, its policy of *Apartheid* meant that a white racial minority ruled it and the vast majority of the coloured people did not participate in the government. India was the first to raise this question in the UN. This was sought to be countered on the grounds of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the UN charter, which precluded UN interference in the internal affairs of a country. Notwithstanding these objections, the question was discussed and more than 60 resolutions condemning the policy passed, year after year in the UN General Assembly between 1946 and 1960. As early as 1962, the General Assembly passed a resolution recommending that its members break diplomatic relations and communications with South Africa and boycott its exports. Not satisfied with the Security Council imposing arms embargo against South Africa in 1965, the General Assembly urged the Security Council to use its powers under Chapter VII and impose sanctions against the country. Outside the UN, the Commonwealth of Nations took up the issue in the 1980s and organised a boycott of South Africa. Under the pressure of world public opinion, the UN Security Council took cognizance of the matter and imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions. Within the country, the African National Congress increased its level of resistance. Buckling under the combined pressure the white regime had to capitulate and accept democracy based on one-man-one-vote principle.

The situation in Rhodesia was similar to South Africa. The British colony of Rhodesia and Nyasa was dissolved in 1963 and Southern Rhodesia was made a self-governing colony. Its Constitution of 1961 provided for a weighted voting system which, in effect, resulted in a white minority government. The UN General Assembly in 1962 called for its suspension. The UN and the Commonwealth of Nations held Britain responsible for its transition to independence. Therefore, when the minority government of Ian Smith issued a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), it was not recognised by the international community. The UN Security Council imposed mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII and an oil embargo in 1968. All this finally led to its independence under the name of Zimbabwe and a democratically elected government. In both these cases racial discrimination was rejected and the right of the citizen to equal membership of nationhood was reiterated.

These cases were not directly related to the principle of Self-determination in the sense of assertion of national identity. However, the fact that a majority of the people was not considered a part of the identity and had to wage a relentless struggle to have a share in it, has relevance to the principle. The case of Southern Rhodesia makes this more explicit.

18.4 SELF-DETERMINATION AND NON-COLONIAL SOCIETIES

Freedom to the colonies does not mark the end of the role of the principle of Self-determination.

It remained relevant though somewhat problematic, in two types of cases to which we will turn now in this section. One of the questions this raises is, what should be the unit to which it would be appropriate to apply the principle? And, what is more, should a neighbouring state/nation, of which it once was a part, have any justifiable claims in the matter?

18.4.1 Self-determination as Applied to Parts of Colonial Empires/ States

India's former defence minister, V. K. Krishna Menon once said that 'colonialism is permanent aggression.' Therefore, when in the early 1960s India too resorted to military action to free Goa from Portuguese rule and annexed it, this was claimed as an unfinished business of decolonisation. Goa, then, was under Portuguese rule. The UN did not endorse India's action but nor did it uphold Portugal's claims to the territory. Similar were the claims of Indonesia to West Irian. Indonesia initially rejected a call for holding a plebiscite there on the grounds of its historical claims to the area. An agreement with the concerned parties was patched up and the territory was handed over to Indonesia in 1962. The UN later, through its presence there, confirmed that this had the approval of the local people.

There are many cases, more complex than these, a few of them a legacy of colonialism. The attitude of the international community in general, and the UN in particular, to these can at best be described as ambivalent. During the empire-building days, Britain had conquered Falkland Islands off the coast of Argentina. Though the British colonies of British Guyana and the islands of West Indies were granted freedom, Falkland continued to be a colony. The Island's meagre population was of mixed origin. Compared to the autocratic regimes of Argentina, it possibly preferred its administrative links with Britain thousands of miles away. When Argentina tried to force the issue in the 1980s and forcibly tried to capture the island, war with Britain ensued. Argentina was defeated and the situation has continued as it was since then. Should Falkland be considered a part of Argentina despite the wishes of the local people? The UN could not give a clear answer in 1982.

Another is the case of the Rock of Gibraltar. The Rock is geographically a part of Spain but was conquered by Britain in 1730. Spain claims it as a part of its nation. However, its population of a few thousand prefers the British rule. Recently, in November 2002 in an unofficial referendum 99 per cent of them rejected the claims of Spanish sovereignty.

The other similar cases need to be mentioned in this context. Before the 20th Century, Ireland was a part of Britain. While the Irish are of Catholic religion, a majority of people of Northern Ireland are Protestant-most of them of British descent settled there. After a prolonged struggle by the Irish for independence in the 19th Century, Home Rule followed by independence was granted to Ireland in the early 20th Century. However, the northern part of the island, because of its Protestant majority, was retained and, continued to be a part of the United Kingdom. For a long time Ireland laid claims to this part because of its historical, geographical and cultural links to the island. The Protestant majority of the northern part contested this. The Catholic minority of the northern part organised Irish Republican Army and waged a militant struggle for its union with the Republic of Ireland. Its political arm is Sinn Fein. The British refused to concede any role to the UN in the matter. A compromise of sorts was arrived at in 1998 called Good Friday Agreement. The Agreement gives autonomy to Northern Ireland, a share in the political power to the Catholic minority and its representative Sinn Fein. It also makes a connection between the North and the South of Ireland but the question of the union with Ireland is put on hold.

In East Asia, the island of Taiwan (Formosa) was part of the Republic of China before the

Second World War. After the 1949 Communist Revolution, the Nationalist Party took refuge in the island. Protected by the US navy, the island has remained separate from the mainland and was governed by the Nationalist party. Its democratically elected government seems to cherish this separation. Because of the liberal values, economic prosperity and higher standard of living that it brings with it, its population possibly wishes to maintain this separation. As against this, the People's Republic of China (on the mainland) claims Taiwan as an inseparable part of its nation. At present the government of Taiwan is recognised and has diplomatic relations with 30 nations.

The questions that these cases raise are, should Self-determination have reference only to the wishes of the inhabitants of a particular area or should its historical, geographical and cultural links to the neighbouring country be also considered relevant? This becomes all the more important when this has a colonial legacy. For, on many occasions the colonial rulers for strategic or economic reasons had an interest in keeping the part separate, or foster its distinctiveness. Would it be justifiable to correct the historical wrong irrespective of the wishes of the people of the area? And should this be considered a part of the wider process of decolonisation?

18.4.2 Self-determination and Multi-Ethnic Societies: Internal Self-determination

The concept of Self-determination, however, is not confined to colonies or to colonialism. It has contemporary relevance too. As in Europe, to which a reference was made in Section 18.2 of this unit, there are many states today, which include within them substantial sections of people who aspire to have an independent national status. Thus, according to a study, in the post-Cold War period, there have been more than 50 armed state formation conflicts, some beginning before the end of the Cold War. Many of these were in Europe. Thirteen of these have reached some kind of settlement. Some of these have found expression in the UN. Again, the response of the international community and the UN has been inconsistent. Let us turn our attention to some of these cases and analyse the factors involved in the application of the principle of Self-determination.

Broadly the cases fall into two categories: a) Break up of (or failed) states; and b) former colonies or failed cases of nation building.

- a) We noted in Section 18.2 of this unit that the term nation-hood, and the factors that go into determining one, are highly ambiguous and varying. It being a subjective feeling, nation-hood like any other form of loyalty, is a matter of degree. Thus, some nations may be closely knit while some others may be prone to disintegrative forces. Where the factors of dissonance (race, language, religion, history, economic conditions etc.) in relation to the national identity have geographical bases i.e. if they are concentrated in a geographical area, then it becomes a potential case for a claim to 'national Self-determination'. If we consider this with the fact that most nations are heterogeneous, we would realise the importance of the phenomenon. According to a study of 132 of the contemporary states, in 31 states (i.e. 23.5 per cent) the largest ethnic group was only 50 to 74 per cent of the population. In 39 cases (i.e. 29.5 per cent) the largest group failed to account for even half of the population. Therefore, it is no wonder that fissiparous tendencies are widespread.

We also noted that 'national consciousness' is mainly a *subjective* feeling. This means that a regionally concentrated religious/linguistic/ethnic minority may *perceive* that it is being discriminated against. Such a perception and the resulting alienation can result in a call for national Self-

determination. What is more, the feeling of identity may vary in intensity and time. It may also depend on the context. To illustrate the point, the ethnically divergent population of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo always had greater affinity to Albania. But it was only the repressive policy of Slobodan Milosovic and the imminent break up of the federation that brought out the discontent into the open. The open hostility of the neighbouring nations and the NATO to the Serbian regime gave it greater encouragement to use militant means to achieve its aims.

Thus, the fissiparous forces may remain latent, under the surface and could become active given the right opportunity. In Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union/Yugoslavia not only led to the complete independence of its federating states but also led to militant struggles within some of these states by ethnic identities for independence. Prominent among these are Chechnya in Russia and Kosovo in Yugoslavia.

The militant struggle of the Basque province in Spain is also worth mentioning in this context. The following table would give some idea of the on-going struggles and the ones, which have met with success in Europe.

Table 18.1

Country	Status	Result
UK-Northern Ireland	1998 Good Friday Agreement	Autonomy
Spain-Basque Province	Continuing	—
Czech-Slovakia	1991 forming of two independent nations	Independence
Yugoslavia-Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia	1994 Dayton Agreements	Independence
Yugoslavia-Kosovo	Continuing	Autonomy or Independence
Russia-Chechnya	Continuing	
Cyprus	Negotiations under UN auspices continuing	<i>de facto</i> partition at present

In all the above cases where some settlement was reached in the form of independence or autonomy, international community/UN had intervened in forms ranging from mediation (UK-Northern Ireland, by US) to the use of peace keeping forces (Bosnia- Herzegovina by NATO) or the use of force (Kosovo by NATO).

18.4.2 Self-determination and Multi-Ethnic Societies: Internal Self-determination

Most of the colonies and their boundaries were accidents of history, determined by the timing, and the process of their acquisition by the imperial powers. Therefore, apart from the legacy of the colonial rule, there was hardly anything common to mark their people. In most cases, their population was diverse in terms of religion/language or ethnicity. After Independence, when the uniting factor of anti-colonialism had worn off, there was hardly a bond strong enough to keep the people together. On the contrary, competition for economic resources, education, and

employment-what Myron Weiner calls “Politics of Scarcity”-brought in the open the dividing lines in the society. Where the new nation had adopted democratic form of government, party politics found the primordial loyalties of language, religion, etc. as convenient bases to build their organisations. These further sharpened the edges of the dividing lines. Where these lines coincided, especially with regional boundaries, the call for autonomy was natural. The response of the dominant group in the country was not always sympathetic. In fact such calls were looked upon with suspicions as evidence of treason. The groups were dubbed unpatriotic forgetting that the *State* had yet to emerge as a *nation*. Repression following turning the struggle militant. The accusations of treason became a self-fulfilling prophecy. If a struggle for freedom from colonial rule is called ‘external Self-determination’ then the struggle for separation may be called ‘internal Self-determination’. As this concept is related to nationalism or nation building, its application to cases in Europe was noted in the previous part. While it is not possible to describe its application to all the Third World-former colonies-here, as illustration only two cases are taken up briefly for discussion. However, Table 18.2 will give an idea of the importance of the problem in the Third World.

Table 18.2

Nation	Area Seeking autonomy/ independence	Status
Indonesia	Aceh	Low key struggle
Philippines	Mindanao	Militant struggle
Sri Lanka	Tamil North	Militant struggle/ negotiations
Iran-Iraq-Turkey	Kurds	Militant struggle in Turkey suspended de facto separation in Iraq
Nigeria	Biafra	Autonomy
Myanmar	Kachin-Karen Tribal belt	Low key militant struggle
China	Tibet	Peaceful struggle
India	North-eastern tribal	Low key insurgency
Ethiopia	Eritrea	Independence
Indonesia	East Timor	Independence

(The above list is not exhaustive. It excludes cases where an area is disputed between two nations)

As remarked earlier, in many of these areas, struggles at different levels are continuing. Some are movements for autonomy or for political identity, which, if not satisfied, may transform themselves into demands for Self-determination. Two cases will illustrate this point:

- a) **Emergence of Bangladesh:** Based on the fears of Hindu domination, provinces of British India with Muslim majority opted in 1947 to form a separate state, Pakistan. Its two parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan (East Bengal) were not contiguous. They also were divided by factors of language, culture and economy. After independence, within a brief period, the country passed under the rule of a coalition of military and bureaucracy. Though the East

Pakistan had half the population of the country, it was grossly under-represented in both of these, more so in the military. Therefore, after the 1965 Indo-Pak War, East Pakistan pressed for greater autonomy. The Awami League under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman carried on a peaceful mass movement for the purpose. In the elections in 1970, his party swept the polls and secured a majority in the National Assembly. However, the West Pakistani political and military elite did not allow it to assume power and unleashed a reign of terror and repression in East Pakistan. The struggle turned into a military conflict when Awami League organised its military wing, the Mukti Bahini and sought India's help. In the ensuing Indo-Pak war, Pakistan was defeated and East Pakistan decided to become independent as Bangladesh in 1971. It was remarkable that, though the struggle had unofficial sympathy of international community, it could get material help only from India. After its defeat, Pakistan accepted the separation and Bangladesh was accorded recognition by the international community and the UN.

- b) **Sri Lanka and the LTTE:** Sri Lanka, then known as Ceylon, was granted independence by the British along with India and Pakistan. The population of the country was predominantly Buddhist and Sinhalese speaking (Buddhist 63 per cent, Hindus 23 per cent, Christians 9 per cent and Muslims 7 per cent). Its significant minority of Hindus and Muslims (all Tamil speaking) settled in the northern and eastern parts of the Island. To quote Marshall Singer, a student of Ceylonese politics, "the ethnic groups that inhabit Ceylon have never shared a common identity-except as subjects of the British Empire. In all of Ceylon's history no Ceylonese nation has existed, except perhaps during the period of agitation for the political independence of the "State" of Ceylon....One that foreign enemy was gone. There was nothing to bind the diverse groups living on the island." In 1965, when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party under SWRD Bandaranaik came to power it followed a policy of declaring Buddhism as the state religion and Sinhalese, the official language.

This was interpreted as discrimination against the Tamil speaking Hindu minority. Both the mainstream ruling parties-UNP and SLFP, thwarted their successive demands for autonomy to the Northern and Eastern provinces, their union and for a federation. When the movement by the Tamils in the North was sought to be suppressed, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) took to insurgency. It now sought independence for the Tamil provinces for the North and the East. An agreement in 1987 resulted through the mediation of the then Indian prime minister. It involved an Indian peacekeeping force and negotiations for autonomy. However, this failed to bring peace or accord and the bloodletting continued. Finally, through the mediation of Norway, a ceasefire was agreed to in 2001-02 to be followed by negotiations.

In many of the areas listed in the table 18.2 and the above two cases different levels of struggle-some militant, some peaceful-had occurred. These movements for political autonomy or the political identity, if not satisfied, may transform themselves into demands for self-determination. In fact, this has already happened in some. Thus, East Timor, which was part of Indonesia, Bangladesh, a part of Pakistan, and Eritrea of Ethiopia, have gained their independence in the last few decades.

18.5 SUMMARY

The discussion of the concept of the right to Self-determination brings out certain features in the context of international relations and raises certain questions:

1. It is obvious that the concept, along with that of nationalism played a significant role in the

process of de-colonisation. In the later part of the 20th Century, holding on to empires had become un-economical. Possibly, the realisation that the economic benefits could be reaped through other means-like unequal trade, industrial and military domination, the use of ideas and world media-could have been at the back of this realisation. But the role of the liberal ideas of democracy and equality, education and the process of self-realisation worldwide (both among the colonisers and the colonials) should not be underestimated. Ideas and ideologies have no boundaries and wield their influence in many ways. It was these forces, which expressed themselves through the UN and through movements such as the Non-aligned and the African National Congress.

A second factor that helped to accelerate this process of de-colonisation and Self-determination was the helping hand lent by the Soviet Union. The threat of the spread of communism among the dependent people forced the Western powers and the United States to support/accept the rise of new nations in Asia and Africa.

2. The concept of Self-determination makes no provision for identifying the bases for defining the territorial limits. This has resulted in conflicts between claims and counter-claims. The question as to what should be the unit for the application of the principle of Self-determination remains unanswered. If small territorial limits are accepted for recognition of a national identity it may lead to economically non-viable states, which then become objects of economic exploitation and strategic manipulation for the Great Powers. While doing this one also has to weigh in the claims of the wider societies based on historical, strategic and economic factors. They cannot be ruled out as totally irrelevant. The application of the principle in the context of de-colonisation is called ‘external Self-determination’.
3. It is the application of the principle of Self-determination within multi-cultural societies that is most complex. This, we called internal Self-determination. State boundaries do not coincide with the limits of national self-consciousness. It is evident that in such societies, where there persists a self-perceived feeling of being discriminated against, of being exploited, a sense of alienation sets in. It provides a fertile ground for the spread of identity-based movements. Language, religion, race, culture, or any other factor then can become a rallying point for such an identity. What is more, identities may vary in intensity over time and the context. Just as a relatively innocuous identity today may grow into a full-fledged nationalist movement demanding its right of Self-determination in the future, such a movement may also dissipate over a period of time if met with timely recognition and steps to assuage the feelings of hurt.

Thus, mechanisms like granting autonomy, conceding demands relating to identity symbols often can satisfy the legitimate aspirations. The way the UK has dealt with the Scotch/Welsh identity demands should hold a lesson in this context. Another mechanism, fruitfully utilised is organising a federation, which to a large extent fulfils the demands of identity. Canada (in the case of Quebec) and India (in the cases of Jharkhand and North-eastern States like Mizoram, Nagaland) have taken this path to counter demands for Self-determination. Sri Lanka and Cyprus may follow the same route.

The movement for Self-determination may get a fillip and is vitally affected by its international context. Thus many movements have culminated in the forming of independent nations because of the military, material and political support from within the international community. Bangladesh, East Timor, Eritrea, Bosnia-Herzegovina became successful cases of Self-determination thanks to the support mobilised through international relations. As against this, the demands of Tamils in Sri Lanka, Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, Chechnya in Russia, Biafra in Nigeria were either cold-shouldered or opposed by forces in international politics. In fact, if closely examined, one can

see that the international community has always been reluctant to support a secessionist movement. It seems to attach greater importance to territorial integrity than to Self-determination. This was evident in the cases of Biafra, Cyprus and even Bangladesh. Even the UN General Assembly's resolution 1514 said that while 'alien subjugation, domination and exploitation' was against the Charter and the principle of Self-determination, 'any attempt aimed at partial or total disruption of national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN' (Para 6). This is especially so if the state is 'possessed of a government representing the whole people without distinction as to race, creed and colour'. Thus, Self-determination must ensure 'to all people...internal Self-determination, namely the fundamental constitutional liberties'.

Therefore, Self-determination is the cumulative result of factors like the intensity of the national aspirations of the people, the response it meets with from the country against which the claims are laid, and the attitude of the international community. One of these alone would be inadequate to bring about a permanent change.

18.6 EXERCISES

1. Explain the concept of self-determination and distinguish its elements.
2. Examine the problems involved in practicing self-determination in Europe in the 20th Century.
3. Discuss various issues of decolonisation.
4. Evaluate the role of UN to the concept of self-determination and its application.
5. Critically examine the concept of self-determination in its application to multi-ethnic societies

UNIT 19 INTERVENTION/INVASION

Structure

- 19.1 Introduction
 - 19.2 Concept of Intervention
 - 19.2.1 Origin of Concept of Intervention
 - 19.3 Types of Intervention
 - 19.3.1 Purpose of Intervention
 - 19.3.2 The Motive of Intervention
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 - 19.5 Interventions since Second World War
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19.1 INTRODUCTION

Intervention is a word used to describe an event, (something that happens in international relations). The event might take a form as significant as the entry of one state into a violent conflict within another state or as apparently insignificant as an ill-chosen remark made by a statesman about the affairs of a foreign state.

The fact that the same word is used to describe such diverse phenomena turns the focus of attention from intervention as an event to intervention as a concept, in order to decide what it is that is common to each case. This is the task of definition and three general observations about it arise from these statements:

In the first place, because intervention is a word used to describe events in the real world, and not a purely abstract concept, freedom to stipulate an arbitrary definition is limited. Second, because intervention is a term used to describe such a broad range of activities in international relations, it is unlikely that any definition can capture the whole of reality. And in the third place, disagreement about the concept of intervention, about the sorts of activity that are to be called intervention and what it is that makes them similar, casts doubt upon any idea that painstaking research could uncover the essential meaning of intervention.

19.2 CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION

When one country interferes by force in the internal affairs of another country, the act is called intervention. An example of intervention was the demand by the US government in April 1898 that Spain withdraw its troops from the island of Cuba, which was then in rebellion against Spanish rule.

Nearly all-powerful nations have at some time or other, intervened in the affairs of weaker neighbours. According to some international lawyers, a country has the right to intervene in the

affairs of another whenever it sees a threat to its own peace and safety or to the property or persons of its citizens. Today, it is generally believed that intervention should take place only under the authority of an appropriate international organisation, such as the United Nations.

Intervention in international law means the dictatorial interference by a state in the internal affairs of another state, or in relations between two other states. It is formally forbidden by a number of treaties, especially among American republics, and has been described as illegal in essence and justified, if at all, only by its success.

Not all intervention has been selfish, predatory, maleficent or unsought. Not all has involved a disproportionate exercise of strength by the great power, although the disproportionate strength was usually in the background. Much of it has been reactive.

Intervention, mediation and interposition

Intervention is distinguished from mediation or the offering of advice by a state after a request by other states, and from representations or protests that concern the demanding state's own interests or rights. It is also distinguished from interposition, or forcible action by one state in the territory of another to protect its nationals, and from defensive action against military action or aggression. It may take the form of another military or diplomatic action but diplomatic intervention implies resort to force if the demands are not complied with.

19.2.1 Origin of the Concept of Intervention

As a technical term the word "intervention" is of comparatively modern origin, but the idea comprised in it may be traced back to E. de Vattel, the Swiss jurist, whose *Droit des gens* was first published in 1758. He laid down the general rule of state independence that every state has the right to govern itself as it thinks fit, adding the corollary that no foreign power has a right to interfere with a state apart from friendly help unless it is asked to do so or unless prompted by special reasons. The notion that states were independent was recognised in theory, but in the European practice of that age little attention was paid to it by the more powerful states when it did not suit their purpose.

The writers on international law who succeeded Vattel forged and welded the materials scattered throughout his book into a more compact form, but it was some time before "interference" was insulated as a substantive branch of international law and longer still before it acquired "intervention" as a technical name. This hardened as a distinctive term during a period extending roughly from 1817 to 1830. The reason for its swift evolution during this period is paradoxical. The gross infractions of state interference were so numerous that jurists were forced to give the topic of intervention, whether justifiable or otherwise, an increasing amount of attention. Within the brief span of the twelve years between 1820 and 1832 the Holy Alliance exploited its principles of interference in Naples and Spain; Greece and Belgium became independent states by the intervention of foreign states and the French and Austrian interventions balanced one another in Italy.

19.3 TYPES OF INTERVENTIONS

There are three distinct varieties of intervention. The commonest type, the type which has been discussed in the above historical sketch, is **internal intervention** or interference by one state between disputant sections of the community in another state, the matter of dispute being usually but not invariably some constitutional change. Internal intervention, when it occurs, is directed

against abnormal conditions resulting from internal strife, and as a general rule, the expectant treatment of non-intervention has come to be preferred to the surgery of intervention.

A second type of intervention so called consists of **punitive measures** adopted by one state against another to enforce the observance of treaty engagements or the redress of illegal wrongs. Such interventions occurred with considerable frequency throughout the 19th Century, as for example, the blockade by France in 1838 of the coast of Argentina on the ground of the alleged ill treatment of French subjects by the local government; the warlike expedition sent jointly by England, France and Spain in 1861 to compel Mexico to repay their debt; the English embargo on Greek shipping in 1850 as a means of redressing the wrongs suffered by Don Pacifico and other British subjects; the naval expeditions dispatched against Korea in 1866 by France and the United States to punish in the one case, the murder of a French apostolic vicar and in the other, the destruction of an American vessel and the massacre of its crew.

A third type of intervention, usually referred to as **external intervention**, consists of interference by one state in the relations usually the hostile relations of other states without the consent of the latter. The great majority of such interventions have had as their aim the promotion or settlement of a war between the states interfered with. External intervention usually involves participation by the intervener in a war, and the modern international law does not profess to classify the causes of war as just or unjust. But since the institution of League of Nations (formed in 1919), this doctrine has been seriously modified. Article II of the Covenant of the League declared that any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any members of the League or not, is a matter of concern to the whole League, which shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. Not only are elaborate provisions made in other articles for the settlement of disputes between member states but also certain topics are expressly specified as generally suitable for arbitration.

Since all the three forms of intervention involve force or the threat of force, the question is raised as to the difference between intervention and war. This is found to lie not in the acts of the parties but in the intention of one of them. The intervening state in spite of the hostile character of its conduct and of its recognition as such by the state affected usually regards pacific relations as uninterrupted. The claim of the intervener may be reluctantly acquiesced, in which case the intervention is non-belligerent; or it may be taken up as a gauge of war, and then it becomes belligerent.

As to the distinction between intervention and war, W.E. Hall wrote:

[R]egarded from the point of view of the state intruded upon, it (intervention) must always remain an act, which, if not consented to, is an act of war. But from the point of view of the intervening power it is...a measure of prevention or of police, undertaken sometimes for the express purpose of avoiding war...it may be a pacific measure, which becomes war in the intention of authors only when resistance is offered...Hence although intervention often ends in war, and is sometimes really war from the commencement, it may be conveniently considered abstractedly from the pacific or belligerent character which is assumed in different cases.

Further, intervention, as a type of activity can be seen as **military intervention** or **economic intervention**. Military intervention might be one such type, taking place when troops are dispatched to keep order or to support a revolution in a foreign state, or when military aid is given to a government whose internal position is insecure or which is in conflict with a neighbouring state. It has been argued that the very presence or display of armed force, such as the location of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, has an effect on the politics of the littoral

states tantamount to intervention in their affairs.

Economic intervention might constitute another type of intervention, occurring when strings are attached by the great powers to aid given to the small or when an economically developed state denies a contract to an underdeveloped primary-producing state.

Various sorts of political intervention might be said to take place when hostile propaganda is disseminated abroad, when moral support is lent to a revolutionary struggle within another state, when recognition is refused to an established government, or when a member state of the Commonwealth insists on discussing the internal affairs of another member at a prime ministers' conference.

19.3.1 The Purpose of Intervention

The purpose of intervention is the end toward which it is directed, the thing that it is designed to achieve. The balance of power, the interests of humanity, and the maintenance of ideological solidarity are but three of the ends which states have pursued by intervention, and it might be argued that the compilation of a catalogue of purposes of intervention is of little value in defining intervention, because it would tend to become a general account of states' motives for action in foreign policy. If intervention takes place for the purpose of forcing a delinquent state to submit to the recognised rules of international law or to punish a breach of the law or to neutralise the illegal intervention of another, then it has been argued that it is a lawful activity.

Whenever an intervention can be said to take place by right, it never constitutes a violation of external independence or territorial supremacy. But this definition of intervention refers to "dictatorial interference" in the internal or external affairs of a state, and dictatorial interference clearly implies a violation of external independence or territorial supremacy. This is the core of the confusion between the use of the word intervention as a description of an event in international relations and its use as a normative expression by international lawyers. If intervention by right is held not to violate the independence of the target state, a violation which features in most definitions as the thing, which above all differentiates intervention from other phenomena, then it is to be understood that intervention by right is not intervention. However difficult it may prove, there can be no objection in attempting to distinguish lawful from unlawful intervention, but excluding "lawful intervention" from the class of events called intervention does not advance the attempt.

19.3.2 The Motive of Intervention

The motive of intervention is political rather than legal. The US has, in pursuance of policies related to the Monroe Doctrine intervened in Caribbean republics-in Cuba to establish the independence of that state, and in others to maintain order and international obligations. It has been party to treaties that permitted intervention in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and the Panama, although these treaties were subsequently terminated in accordance with the "good neighbour" policy. Since Second World War, the US has intervened in Greece, Lebanon, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam to "contain communism", although other grounds such as protection of national or collective self defence were also asserted.

Also, the Soviet Union had entered Hungary and Czechoslovakia to maintain communist control, and Great Britain and France have intervened in Egypt in 1956 to prevent nationalisation of the Suez Canal.

The great powers have frequently intervened, sometimes collectively, to prevent a state from becoming so powerful as to disturb the balance of power. A system of international relations based on equilibrium of power can hardly avoid occasional intervention of this kind. Intervention to stop gross inhumanities against minorities or dependent peoples has also occurred, and has been considered justifiable if the purpose was genuinely humanitarian. Often such interventions have veiled political objectives.

The League of Nations Covenant declared that “the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations,” and the UN Charter gives the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

Action authorised in pursuance of these provisions, as by the UN in Korea and Congo, has, sometimes been called “collective intervention”, and is undoubtedly legal if in pursuance of the authority given to the organisation by its members.

The prevention of situations that will induce states to intervene in the affairs of others is the major problem of international law and international organisation and can hardly be solved without, in some degree, subjecting the sovereignty of states to a world order. Nations continue to be reluctant, however, to surrender their sovereignty in this manner.

19.4 NATURE AND FREQUENCY OF FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS

The legal notion of sovereignty notwithstanding, governments frequently intervene in the domestic affairs of other states. But as intervention contradicts the international legal norm, officials usually take the position that only other (unfriendly) governments engage in interventions, whereas they themselves do not practice intervention. Moreover, to the extent that they admit their own intervention, they tend to justify their action as resulting from an “invitation” or a “request” by a friendly government under duress, or as being a regrettable reaction against a hostile government’s prior intervention. You should note, however, that intervention is not restricted to interference in the domestic affairs of another country. As already mentioned, we are using the term intervention to refer to any involvement by a government in a conflict situation that does not concern it in a direct or major way.

Intervention can take the form of covert activities. For example, in the early 1970s, the US government provided funds to friendly conservative politicians in Chile in order to prevent the election of Marxist president Salvador Allende, and it conducted secret bombings of Cambodia during the Indo-china War. Intervention can also take the overt form of massive and direct military assistance to a friendly regime in trouble, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the US participation in the Vietnam War during 1965-1973, and the Chinese entry into the Korean War in 1950. Between these two extremes, there is a great deal of variation in the secrecy, scale, and direct involvement of the intervener. For example, although in 1961 the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supplied and organised a group of Cuban exiles in their attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro’s communist government, the US military forces did not engage in direct combat when the invasion was launched. Moreover, although never officially acknowledged, the US government’s role in this attempt to overthrow another government (known as the Bay of Pigs episode, named after the place where the invasion forces landed) was an “open secret.” Until the Watergate era, the CIA’s other covert activities, such as its plots to assassinate Fidel Castro, of foreign intervention were less well known.

Among the 106 civil wars that were identified by Small and Singer for the period 1816-1980,

21 involved substantial foreign military intervention. That is, about 20 per cent of the civil wars became internationalised. More than one country intervened in some of these wars (e.g., the Russian Revolution and the Spanish Civil War). There were altogether 33 cases of substantial foreign military intervention in civil wars.

The following table shows the most active interventionists in other people's civil wars. The United States and the United Kingdom head the list with six interventions each. The five interventions undertaken by France place it a close third. The record of intervention showed in this table, however, is understated for two reasons. First, only substantial military interventions were counted. The coding rules used by Small and Singer define "substantial" as meaning that the intervening state must commit at least 1,000 troops or suffer 100 battle deaths. As a result, small-scale interventions are not included in this table. Second, there were many situations that did not qualify according to the definition of civil war used by Small and Singer, but that nonetheless experienced foreign intervention. The Bay of Pigs episode mentioned earlier is such an example. Similarly, Soviet military forces did intervene in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, most recently, Afghanistan, even though the internal turmoil of these countries did not qualify as civil war.

Military Intervention in Others' Civil Wars, 1816-1980

The Intervener	Number of Interventions	Countries Experiencing Civil War
United States	6	USSR/Russia, Lebanon, Vietnam, Laos, Dominican Republic, Cambodia
United Kingdom	6	Portugal, Spain, Argentina, China, USSR/Russia, Greece
France	5	Spain, Argentina, Morocco, USSR/Russia
Portugal	2	Spain
North Vietnam	2	Laos, Cambodia
Japan	2	USSR/Russia, China
Syria	2	Jordan, Lebanon
Belgium	1	Zaire
Cuba	1	Angola
Egypt	1	Yemen Arab Republic
Finland	1	USSR/Russia
Germany	1	Spain
Italy	1	Spain
Russia	1	Iran
South Vietnam	1	Cambodia

Source: Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills, California:Sage, 1982). *16-1980* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1982).

19.5 INTERVENTION SINCE SECOND WORLD WAR

Korean War

Although two different political governments had emerged in Korea by 1947, the fact that they were still only provisional governments gave the Korean people hope for a possible unification. Up until this time, nationalists from both the North and the South continued their efforts to negotiate a unification treaty; however, irreconcilable differences between the US and the Soviet Union prevented any such goal. Eventually, the US concluded that the chasm that existed between the US and the Soviet Union in establishing a unified Korea was insurmountable and so they pressured the United Nations to allow for a general election in Korea. Suspicious of foul play by the US, the Soviets refused to allow the election to be held in North Korea.

Nevertheless, the US advocated that voting should still be carried out in the south in order to establish some sort of legitimate government, and so in May 1948, South Korea held its first general elections. Thereafter, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established and was promptly recognised by the United Nations as the legitimate government of Korea. Up until and through these elections there were heavy protests by Korean leftists who feared that this election would kill all chances for unification. During the same time the north followed with similar actions by holding its own elections. When the votes were tabulated, Kim Il Sung was declared president of the new Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPKR), which was immediately recognised, by the Soviet Union and other communist countries as the legitimate government of North Korea. By winter of 1948 the worst fears of Korean Nationalists were confirmed as Korea became permanently divided at the 38th parallel.

In May 1948, a communist government was formed in North Korea, and Soviet Union instantly recognised it. Other East European countries followed suit. The two Koreas were involved in mounting conflict with each other while the US and USSR forces moved out of the two Koreas. With deteriorating relations in the wake of Cold War, Korea became an additional point of conflict.

On 25 June 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea. The matter was immediately reported by the US to the Security Council. A UN unified command was set up, under the commandership of General MacArthur of US. The UN forces, hence, (most of them US troops) freed South Korea, but did not stop on the dividing line, the 38th parallel. They began pushing the North Koreans inside their territory and reached almost till the Chinese border. This certainly was not the spirit of the UN Security Council resolutions. An armistice was signed only in July 1953. The Korean War came to an end, leaving behind an intensified Cold War, heightened anti-Communist propaganda by the US and increased mutual hate and distrust.

Suez Crisis

The Egyptian decision to nationalise the Suez Canal in July 1956 led to a serious crisis involving the use of force by Israel, Britain and France. The invasion was universally condemned but the Soviet Union got the opportunity to threaten rocket attack on Anglo-French forces. America retaliated by counter threat. The United Nations compelled the British, French and Israelis to terminate their military action. The threatened rocket attack did not take place. Britain and France suffered humiliation. By their threatened intervention, the Soviets gained a sizeable propaganda victory in the Arab world.

In the mid and late 1950s, however, Cold War moved into new arenas. As position in Europe

and East Asia stabilised, the great powers increasingly turned their attention to the Third World, the newly independent states of the West Asia, South East Asia and Africa which were struggling to develop viable economies and to establish national identities. Soviet-American competition in the Third World produced the first of many explosive confrontations in the Suez Crisis of 1956, when the US withdrew an offer to assist Egypt in constructing a gigantic dam on the river Nile; the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalised the Suez Canal. Dependent on the Mediterranean lifeline, Britain, France and Israel subsequently launched military action against Egypt. The Soviet Union backed Nasser, and Khrushchev even threatened to use nuclear weapons against the Western allies. Fearful that the Soviet Union might exploit the crisis to extend its influence in the West Asia, the Eisenhower administration forced Britain and France to withdraw. The crisis ended, but it only added to intensify the Cold War rivalry. The Russians expanded their assistance to Nasser and sought to gain influence in the other West Asian nations. The US enunciated the Eisenhower Doctrine, which offered aid to any West Asian nation threatened by Communism.

Cuban Missile Crisis

The island of Cuba in the Caribbean is located at a distance of 90 miles from the US state of Florida. In 1898, United States freed Cuba from Spain. The United States acquired the right to intervene through the incorporation of Platt Amendment in the Constitution. In 1952, Batista, who had served as president of Cuba from 1940 to 1944, returned to power and established his dictatorship in Cuba that lasted till 1959, when Fidel Castro managed to capture power. In 1961 he formally declared himself as a Marxist. On the assumption of power, Castro tried to concentrate all the powers in his own hands and tried to establish a dictatorship. Castro also tried to free the Cuban economy from American dependence and decided to ally with a new paymaster - USSR. Thus he converted Cuba virtually into a satellite of Soviet Union. Cuba further proceeded with the nationalisation of American property. The US reacted by stopping purchase of Cuban sugar and even severed diplomatic relations with Cuba. In the meanwhile a large number of anti-Castro Cubans moved to the US. Their strength increased so much so as to be able to form a Cuban army in exile.

In April 1961, president Kennedy permitted the Cuban exiles to invade the island in the hope that the Cubans would rise and support the liberating forces against Castro. However, the invasion was a complete disaster. The failure of the mission (popularly known as Bay of Pigs) greatly enraged the American public opinion. In the meanwhile Soviet prime minister Khrushchev announced his decision to set up a Soviet base in Cuba with Soviet missiles, which posed a serious threat to the security of the United States. In fact, since mid-1961, Soviet Union had been supplying armaments including missiles to Cuba. As the installation of these missiles in Cuba put the United States in direct firing range from Cuba, US claimed that it posed a serious threat to its security. Though Khrushchev assured US that these missiles were installed only to strengthen Cuban defence and were not meant for any offensive use, this did not satisfy the US. In the meantime in October 1962, Soviet Union dispatched yet another vessel allegedly carrying long range missiles. However, before this could actually reach Cuba, US announced the blockade of Cuba. Although Soviet Union denounced the blockade, the Soviet missiles carriers moved up to the "quarantine" line and stopped there. Moscow finally ordered these ships to return home, thereby diffusing a situation, which could have converted into a nuclear war. Soviet Union subsequently, dismantled the missile bases in Cuba.

Vietnam War

The Vietnam War proved to be a disastrous adventure of the American foreign policy. The

Geneva Agreement of 1954 confirmed the exit of French from the whole of Indo-China. It also created two Vietnams, but they never lived in peace. The elections that were to be held in the two parts in 1956 were never held. Instead the war began which lasted almost twenty years and finally led to the creation of one unified Vietnam under the communist rule. While North Vietnam was helped by the Soviet Union, it was mainly the American intervention that made the Vietnam War different from other wars between the two neighbours.

Both China and Soviet Union were interested in bringing the conflict to an end and prevailed upon North Vietnam to accept the Geneva Agreement. As South Vietnam did not respond favourably to the Geneva Agreement, a war broke out between North and South which lasted for almost 20 years and proved to be the most destructive war in the post Second World War period.

The foreign policy-makers of the United States made several miscalculations and became responsible for a prolonged war in which large numbers of casualties were suffered by both the Americans and the Vietnamese. Eisenhower's decision to provide American military and economic assistance to Ngo Dinh Diem's regime was not in conformity with the US policy of free elections to decide the contentious issues. When Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, Vietnam was already America's costliest commitment.

By 1963, America got more deeply involved in South Vietnam. In 1964 the first bombing raid was made over North Vietnam, which soon became a regular feature for the Vietnam War. By the close of 1972, the futility of continued war with Vietnam was realised. This led to the Paris Agreement in January 1973, whereby a cease-fire was established, which did not last very long. In 1974-75 the North Vietnamese launched an offensive against South Vietnam. The then regime of South Vietnam collapsed and the city of Saigon was captured by the communist troops on 30 April 1975. This marked the end of Vietnam War and the whole Vietnam came under communist control.

Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia

Yugoslav secession in 1948, and the uprising in Poland and Hungary in 1956 had caused upheaval in the communist system. The USSR could not afford to allow Czechoslovakia to follow Yugoslav example. Josip Broz Tito was still alive and popular, and in Rumania, Ceausescu was making uncomfortable gestures. The prospects of Czechoslovakia, under Dubcek sliding out of the Soviet Bloc were disturbing. By June 1968, Soviet prime minister Kosygin had visited Czechoslovakia, and Dubcek and other reformist leaders had visited Moscow. When Warsaw Pact forces began manoeuvres in Czechoslovakia, the situation became very tense. The French and Italian Communist parties tried to mediate. West Germany got so alarmed that it withdrew its troops from the Czechoslovak border to belie the rumours that Germans were instigating the popular reformists.

During mid-1968, Soviet Union alleged that a *cache* of American arms had been found in Czechoslovakia. This allegation was sought to introduce Cold War politics in an essentially internal crisis of the Communists. Soon the Soviet troops began to move out of Czechoslovakia, but suddenly Soviet intervention took place on 20 August 1968, when the Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian troops marched into Czechoslovakia.

It was considered as a violation of the Czech sovereignty and in October 1968, Czechoslovaks were asked to sign a treaty permitting Soviet troops to be stationed in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was a mild intervention. From a Soviet point of view, it was a "regrettable" necessity.

Afghan Crisis

Tension was developing between the East and the West after the Helsinki Summit in 1975. The areas of tension were outside Europe. However, the Cold War returned with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The West described Soviet action as an invasion of Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a monarchy till Mohammed Daud deposed King Zahir Shah in 1973. Daud abolished monarchy and himself became the president of the new Republic. Daud decided to seek weapons from the Soviet Union to restore balance of power in the region. Earlier, Daud had been supported by People's Democratic Party, which soon split into two factions: one led by Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and known as the *Khalq*, and the other led by Babrak Karmal, called *Parcham*.

Having consolidated his position, Daud played off East against the West and sought help from the Shah of Iran. He persecuted both the factions of People's Democratic Party, and in 1977 put some of their leaders in jail. Meanwhile, both the factions had penetrated into the army and had even made a sort of truce with each other. The tables were turned and Mohammed Daud was ousted in 1978. Hafizullah Amin took over as Afghan president in September 1979. Meanwhile, in Iran, Shah had been deposed and Ayatollah Khomeini's volunteers had seized the US Embassy and taken many Americans as hostages. The USSR felt that America might organise a *coup* in Iran. In anticipation that Amin would join hands with America, Soviet Union decided to get rid of him and tighten its grip on Afghanistan. The Soviet forces entered Afghanistan towards the end of 1979. Amin was arrested and executed. Babrak Karmal came back from the Soviet Union and was named the president. This action was described and justified by the Soviet Union as a "painful intervention" to keep the "US imperialists" away from the country.

Gulf War

The first major international crisis after the Cold War occurred in West Asia during 1990-1991. The attack by Iraq on neighbouring oil-rich Kuwait, conquest and annexation of Kuwait into Iraq as its nineteenth province marked the first phase of the crisis. When all efforts to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait failed, and peaceful solution appeared to be impossible, the 28-nation coalition, led by the United States and authorised by the UN Security Council, waged a war on Iraq and liberated Kuwait. This was the second phase of what is called Gulf War II. The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 may be described as Gulf War I. The prolonged war had been generally indecisive, though Iraq claimed eventual advantage. As Iran had already come under the Islamic regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, America had generally supported Iraq in that war, without being actually involved in it. It is the Gulf War of 1990-91, which threatened the international peace with injected Arab-Israel conflict input and an attempt to give it an ideological colour.

19.6 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The concept of humanitarian intervention is not new—it has long been part of the inventory of European power politics. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention remained an integral part of the European powers' conduct of foreign policy from until the First World War. The theory implies that whenever its very government violates the "human rights" of the population of a given state, another state or group of states has the right to intervene in the name of the so-called "international community", thus temporarily substituting their own sovereignty for that of the state against which the intervention is directed.

More recently, in a space of just a few months, from March to September 1999, the global

community witnessed major interventions in defence of human rights and self-determination in Kosovo and East Timor. Although carried out by different coalitions of forces and acting under different mandates, these two interventions signalled that it could well be an increased emphasis on humanitarian intervention by the international community at the seeming expense of the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in a country's domestic affairs. Such interventions have sought to compel a change in behaviour regarding the widespread abuses of human rights (Kurds and Kosovars).

Intervention and Non-intervention

Intervention having been discussed, non-intervention might be said to be the circumstance in which intervention does not occur. But beyond the accident of non-intervention, a state might be said to follow a policy of non-intervention when it chooses not to intervene in a situation where intervention also is a possible policy. Publicists have expounded theories of non-intervention, which assert the desirability of states refraining from intervention from the point of view of the achievement of peace between states, or of providing for the best interests of a particular state. An international law asserts non-intervention as a principle, a rule which states are obliged to adhere to in their relation with each other.

The function of the principles of intervention in international relations might be said, then, to be one of protecting the principle of state sovereignty. In the first place, states might feel obliged to obey rules out of a sense of moral duty. Second, they might adhere to rules through a calculation that it is in their interests to do so, and third, they might be forced into obedience to rules. An account of the promise of each of these factors as inducements to rule-determined behaviour by states will emerge from the study of the practice of states with regard to the principle of non-intervention.

19.7 SUMMARY

Intervention has been and probably still is inevitable as one means of standardising the civilisation upon which the international law is now based. From the point of view of maintaining peace, there is something to be said for the suppression of internal discords in another state when it is a common knowledge that no revolution can break out in a European state without the likelihood of the balance of power between other states being upset. In many instances this is, at best, an excuse and not a justification, but it does show clearly that a policy of isolation, if it signifies absolute indifference to what occurs in other states, is neither advisable nor practicable. If any change in the trend of ideas about intervention is perceptible, it is this. In future, intervention is more likely to be undertaken collectively, and the threat in it will more probably be one of economic outlawry—which is one of the sanctions of the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Charter of the United Nations—rather than one of actual war.

Under international law, intervention may be legally justified (1) if the intervening state has been granted such a right by treaty; (2) if a state violates an agreement for joint policy determination by acting unilaterally; (3) if intervention is necessary to protect a state's citizens; (4) if it is necessary for self defence; or (5) if a state violates international law. The UN Charter also justifies intervention when it involves a collective action by the international community against a state that threatens or breaks the peace or commits an act of aggression. Nonetheless, politically, much less ideologically motivated, interventions are most likely to occur when a great power's hegemonic role is threatened within its sphere of influence. Interventions by small Third World states in the territory of their own neighbours, however, also are likely to become a frequent occurrence.

19.8 EXERCISES

1. What is meant by intervention?
2. Trace the origin and development of the concept of intervention.
3. Identify three distinct varieties of intervention.
4. What is the purpose of intervention?
5. What are the motives behind any kind of intervention?
6. Give examples of intervention in the post-Second World War period.
7. What do you understand by humanitarian intervention?
8. Explain the difference between Intervention and Non-intervention.

UNIT 20 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Structure

- 20.1 Introduction
- 20.2 Evolution of Non-proliferation Policy
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20.1 INTRODUCTION

The spread of nuclear weapons has been considered a grave threat to the security of the world at large. The debate is not so much about the use of nuclear technology, for the uses of nuclear technology in the development process of any nation has been well accepted. The debate is on the peaceful vs. the military uses of this technology. This debate has complicated over the years as this technology has been acknowledged as being ‘dual use’ technology and as such it would be difficult to differentiate from the end use for which the technology is pursued. Yet, the debate on the proliferation of nuclear weapons has dominated the writings on international security. The central concerns have been the horizontal and not vertical proliferation of these weapons.

Policies of nuclear proliferation present interplay of two sets of issues: one is the technical and political set of issues and the other relates to the capability and intent of the countries concerned. The technical element in non-proliferation seeks to either deny the critical technical assets to a country that seeks to embark on a nuclear programme or to make these assets available under a safeguard system. This places restraint on the possible use of nuclear technology for

weapons production and ensures that the technology that is transferred or acquired remains for civilian (or confines to) use only. The political component of the system operates at two levels: one that seeks to create an international pressure on the countries to desist from going nuclear and two, provide various incentives and disincentives to countries in the form of economic and other ways to dissuade them from going nuclear. The political component adds on to the technical component in providing a ‘political’ rationale for not going nuclear.

The capability of a state to go nuclear is dependent on the technical component. The development of nuclear technology and infrastructure that is capable of producing a nuclear weapon is a technical dimension of the problem of proliferation. A nuclear capable state may be technically ripe for nuclear proliferation, but it would be the political intention of exercising the choice to go in for a nuclear weapon that would determine nuclear proliferation. In fact, with the spread of nuclear technology and availability of nuclear material, the decision on whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons would be a political one.

The incentives to produce a nuclear weapon may be listed as follows:

- a) Increased international status: This is a psychological aspect of perceiving to have crossed the ‘threshold’ and become a ‘great power’.
- b) Domestic political requirements or political pressures: These pressures may be visible in both democratic and authoritarian systems of government.
- c) Increased strategic autonomy.
- d) A strategic hedge against military and political uncertainty, especially about the reliability of allies.
- e) Possession of a weapon of last resort.
- f) Bargain or leverage over the developed nations.

The disincentives that may discourage nations from going in for nuclear weapons include:

- a) Resource diversion to nuclear programme may lead to a loss of opportunity to pursue other pressing economic and social priorities.
- b) Adverse national and international public opinion that would reflect on the ‘status’ of the nation.
- c) Disruption of established or conventional security guarantees provided by some of the great powers.
- d) Infeasibility of developing the required technology and consequently the corresponding nuclear strategy.
- e) Fear of an adverse international reaction that would have an impact on the trade and other relations of the country.

Nuclear weapons programmes usually require a long lead time for countries that have no nuclear infrastructure. Any nation seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons must develop an appropriate source of fissile material. This is a major technical barrier. The core of a nuclear

bomb is made up of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Fifteen to twenty-five kilograms of highly enriched uranium or five to eight kilograms of plutonium are generally considered the necessary minimum for the core of a multi-kiloton atomic bomb.

A nation seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons must have a source of this fissile material. There are three main approaches that nations take to overcome this barrier: One is by developing nuclear facilities dedicated for the purpose of weapons development. The second is the development of a civilian nuclear programme that is free of safeguards and the subsequent acquisition of sensitive technologies for the development of a nuclear bomb. In case of safeguarded facilities the option may be of diversion of material from civilian facilities. The third option is theft of the raw material or the weapon itself.

20.2 EVOLUTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

Nuclear non-proliferation policy has emerged through four main stages:

- i) The post-war phase that was characterised by secrecy and efforts to retain monopolistic control on part of the United States as the sole nuclear weapons power in the world.
- ii) The ‘liberal’ policy ushered in by president Eisenhower through the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme announced in the United Nations in 1953.
- iii) The policy of controls through safeguards came to be sponsored by the nuclear weapon powers to contain the spread of nuclear weapons across the world. This came to be enshrined in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and subsequent efforts like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996.
- iv) The reactive phase on part of the nuclear weapon powers in the post Indian nuclear test of 1974 and subsequent testing by India and Pakistan in 1998. This phase saw the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Club and such other legislation like the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (1978) of the United States. It also saw the debate shift from technical to political discourse on the utility of nuclear weapons and the impositions of various sanctions against the new nuclear weapon states.

20.2.1 US Monopoly

The main aim of the Anglo-Saxon partners during the Second World War was to win the race to build a nuclear weapon before Nazi Germany. The Soviet Union had been kept out of this nuclear cooperation. The United States, Canada and Britain signed the Quebec agreement in 1943 under which they decided not to communicate any information to third parties without mutual consent. Following the detonation of the first atomic bomb in Hiroshima, they adopted a comprehensive non-proliferation policy towards the rest of the world. There was an agreement not to disclose the practical applications of atomic energy before effective, enforceable safeguards against misuse could be put in place.

The first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission received two reports that sought to link the development of commercial nuclear policy and nuclear weapons. The Baruch Plan (1946) proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority (IADA) to regulate and control all aspects of the development and use of atomic energy. The proposed IADA was to have complete regulatory authority over all nuclear activities that were potentially dangerous to world security and was to have statutory power to control, license and

inspect all other nuclear facilities. The second was the Acheson-Lilienthal Report (1946) that too realised that the current American monopoly over nuclear weapons technology would end sooner or later and that it would be necessary to install mechanisms to control the spread of this technology and the weapons that may follow. It recognised that nations with commercial nuclear technological capability may eventually launch into weapons production and hence proposed the creation of a strong international authority to regulate the commercial development of nuclear energy.

The failure to get either of the proposals adopted led the United States to enact the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public law 585). Under this law the American government obtained title to all nuclear facilities in which fissionable nuclear materials could be manufactured and became the sole proprietor of all fissionable material. The Act classified as secret all information relating to the utilisation of fissionable material for generation of commercial nuclear power and prohibited any sharing of data with other countries. The Canadians and the British viewed this new American policy with suspicion. The British, who had to shift their nuclear research programme to the United States during the Second World War, were upset over the American decision of prohibiting nuclear cooperation with other countries. The British embarked on their own general purpose nuclear programme that eventually came to focus on weapons programme due to political and security consideration. The Canadians who had eschewed the weapons programme did decide to cash in on their technological expertise and the raw material resources that they possessed.

The Soviet Union entered the nuclear field with its first explosion in 1949. The British exploded their first bomb in 1952. The French distrust of the professed American and British commitment to provide it with a security umbrella, defeat in Vietnam and the feeling of economic vulnerability in the post-Suez crisis eventually led them to go in for a nuclear programme that had both, commercial and security considerations. The French entered the nuclear club in 1960. The Chinese entry in 1964 brought in an entirely new dimension to the debate on proliferation, that of a poor Third World country gaining a new status.

The interest in nuclear technology that nations around the world showed in the 1960s came to be based on these two considerations: national security and commercial uses of nuclear technology. This, then, was to become the key issue of anti-proliferation strategy: nuclear powers simply concentrated on denying nuclear technology to non-nuclear powers rather than finding out the ‘motivations’ behind a nation’s interest in acquiring the technology. The efforts by nuclear states to promote institutional mechanisms to limit the spread of nuclear weapons were perceived by the non-nuclear states as self serving attempts to protect the political and/or economic interests of the nuclear powers.

20.2.2 Atoms for Peace

The gradual lessening of international tensions following the death of Stalin and the realisation on the part of the Americans of an end of their nuclear monopoly led to changes in American policy. In 1953 president Eisenhower enunciated his ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme before the United Nations. Under this proposal the United States, Soviet Union and other countries were to contribute fissile material to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which would be responsible for storage and security of this material. The IAEA would then be responsible for providing electrical energy to the world at large. The US Atomic Energy Act was amended to allow for the implementation of this new liberal policy. It took a little time for the political rhetoric to get translated into concrete policy. By 1955 the programme got under way. That year the Argonne Laboratory opened its School of Nuclear Science and Engineering staffed by a

group of scientists from twenty different countries; extensive declassification of papers was undertaken; the first United nations Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held in Geneva and the US had negotiated agreements with at least twenty seven nations for nuclear cooperation.

20.2.3 Safeguards

The impetus of the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme did not last long. The IAEA came to be established in 1957. The Agency’s role in inspection and verification was the key to the idea of ‘safeguards’ system. The IAEA’s function is to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure that assistance provided is not used to further any military purpose. The IAEA safeguards system was based on four main elements: (i) review of the design of nuclear facilities; (ii) specification of a system of records and accounts; (iii) specification of a system of reports and (iv) inspection of safeguarded facilities to verify compliance with the agreements. The IAEA safeguard system is not concerned with the physical protection of nuclear material, or with organisation to anticipate and prevent attempts at diversion to recover stolen or diverted material.

The logic of safeguards that formed the essential thrust of the nuclear policy was the essential ingredient of the problem of control over proliferation. The first level of control comes through detection of diversion of nuclear material from civilian facilities to military use. This is done through series of agreements between the supplier countries and the end users of the nuclear material defining what constitutes ‘peaceful uses’. The second level is that of a response to the detection of diversion of nuclear material. Institution of sanctions and recourse to political measures to bring pressure on the country are some of the means to tackle the problem. The third level is laying down restrictions on the supply of nuclear and related material. Supplier agreements are made to ensure that material is not supplied to countries suspect of a weapons programme.

The evolution of international safeguards went through two distinct phases. The first was the pre NPT phase wherein the focus had been on individual countries. The second was ushered in by the NPT that made safeguards a universal norm.

20.2.4 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

The entry of China into the nuclear club transformed the debate on nuclear issues from an East-West Cold War issue that was to be considered mainly by the developed world into a global concern. The earlier focus had mostly been on weapons systems, strategic parity and corresponding geostrategic considerations. Now the focus shifted to the problem of diversion of material from peaceful uses to weapons use. While this concern was expressed in the context of the discussions on the NPT, it was only after the 1974 Indian test that such a direct linkage came to be acknowledged as a reality. The acute concern for control over proliferation and possible safeguards finally led to the creation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The chief motivation of its sponsors, the USA, Great Britain and USSR, was to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The treaty divides the signatories into two categories: those who possess the nuclear bomb (those who possessed it prior to 1 January 1967) and those who did not. It commits the non-weapon states to inspection of their holdings of nuclear materials. The NPT commits them to negotiate safeguard agreements with the IAEA. These safeguards, however, are not binding on the weapon states. In exchange of the commitment by the non-weapon states to refrain from

producing or acquiring nuclear weapons the weapon states agreed to the following: (i) not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear weapon devices and not to assist non-weapon states to acquire such weapons or devices; (ii) to seek discontinuance of all (underground) nuclear tests as a corollary to the 1953 Partial Test Ban Treaty; (iii) to refrain from the threat or the use of force in compliance of the UN Charter; (iv) to develop research production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and help the developing countries in this regard; (v) to make available to all states the potential benefits from and peaceful uses of nuclear explosions; and (vi) pursue negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and move towards nuclear disarmament.

The NPT became the first step to the construction of an effective international regime designed to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There had been a consensus on the part of the Americans and the Soviets that unfettered proliferation of nuclear weapons would destabilise the international order. This view had not been shared by France and China, who were suspicious of the US-Soviet control over the nuclear weapons. Both the countries did not sign the NPT at the time of its creation.

The non-nuclear weapon states were also critical of the treaty. They perceived this to be a discriminatory treaty. Their main points of criticism were: (i) The asymmetric nature of the treaty provisions that imposed safeguards only on the non-weapons states; (ii) the preservation of commercial interests of the weapon states by providing them the right to explore peaceful uses programme; (iii) the vagueness of the commitments on part of the weapon states; and (iv) the failure to address legitimate security concerns of the non-weapon states.

Until the signing of the NPT the debate about safeguards had been structured within technological parametres and frameworks. The unbalanced nature of the Treaty obligations under the NPT and the universality of its approach resulted in the shift of the debate from the technical to the political arena. Unlike the earlier era, the NPT system of safeguards came to be perceived as an infringement on the political sovereignty of the State. Eventually it was the Indian test of 1974 that refocused international attention to the linkage between peaceful uses and weapons production.

The NPT had provided for periodic review conferences. In 1995 the conference decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely.

20.2.5 Suppliers Group

In 1970, shortly after NPT came into force, a number of countries had entered into consultations about procedures and standards to be applied to the export of nuclear fuel and materials. This group chaired by Claude Zangger, were members of the NPT or were suppliers of nuclear materials. Following the Indian test, several countries informed the IAEA of their intention to enforce the IAEA safeguards on their nuclear exports. This memorandum included a ‘trigger list’ of materials and items and was to become the first major agreement on the supply list of nuclear materials. Two major issues were discussed: Under what conditions, technology and equipment for enrichment and reprocessing be transferred to non-weapon states; and whether transfers are made to states unwilling to submit to full scope IAEA safeguards.

The Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines of the so called London Club, that eventually emerged included the following: One, nuclear export recipients pledge not to use the transferred material for nuclear explosives of any kind. Two, transfer of sensitive nuclear technology was to come under this safeguards system. However, such a transfer could take place with extreme restraint in

case the facilities were using only low enriched uranium.

In due course, the entire concept of suppliers group came to have a new meaning with the restrictions being placed on transfer of dual use technologies under several regimes instituted for that purpose. In 1987 seven missile technology exporters agreed to establish identical export guidelines to cover the sale of nuclear capable ballistic missiles. This agreement is known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It aims at limiting the risks of nuclear proliferation by controlling the transfer of technology which could contribute to nuclear weapons delivery. In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group in a meeting at Warsaw adopted the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear Related Dual Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology.

The Third World in general has been critical of the restrictive measures placed by these guidelines. They have argued that after having accepted the NPT they should have access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses. The Weapon states however point out that even under the NPT system the transfer of technology is not unrestricted and as such would have to be placed under safeguards. These restraints appear to have slowed down the pace of nuclear related developments in the Third World and have also put a restraint on the missile programmes of some of the countries.

20.3 NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSIONS

The question of nuclear weapons explosions has been on the international agenda ever since the 1954 Indian proposal that called for a stand still on testing. This has been one of the means of implementing the non-proliferation agenda. The main treaties that have been concluded in the context of nuclear explosions are:

1. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty
2. The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
3. The 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
4. The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty is a multilateral treaty which prohibits any nuclear explosion (including those intended for non-military purposes) in the atmosphere, outer space or under water or in any environment if the explosion would cause radioactive debris in any country. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty is a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in which the parties undertook to prohibit, prevent and not carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty was also a US-USSR bilateral agreement that sought to regulate the explosions which could be conducted outside the nuclear weapons test sites and which may therefore be considered as for peaceful purposes. Both the latter two treaties were, in a sense, additions to the Partial Test Ban Treaty that sought to cover the loopholes of the first.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was looked at as the most important means to tackle both, horizontal and vertical proliferation. It was claimed that, by banning all explosions, the CTBT would have (a) constrained the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; (b) end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; (c) contributed to the process of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and (d) strengthened international peace and security.

The negotiations on the CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament got bogged down on two contentious issues—that of the scope of the treaty and the verification arrangements. The issue of scope came into discussion because while the CTBT sought to outlaw all nuclear testing (including Peaceful Nuclear tests), some kind of weapon designing could continue, based on sub-critical tests and laboratory simulation. The problems raised in this context related to the defining of the concept ‘comprehensive’. The continuation of laboratory level testing provided an opportunity to the weapon powers to retain their weapons stockpile and also ensure that it is in workable condition by testing them in the laboratory. The differences over verification focused on the agency that was to monitor the implementation. The concern expressed was that if it were a national agency it would constitute an intrusion on the sovereignty of a country, besides the attendant biases of the country. After an indefinite extension given to the NPT in 1995, India linked the signing of the CTBT with a time bound global disarmament programme. Indian view was that the NPT had failed to tackle the question of global nuclear disarmament and the CTBT with its implicit limitations on its scope also did not proceed in the direction of the goal of disarmament. India maintained that the five nuclear weapon powers agree on a timetable for total removal of nuclear weapons as a precondition to its acceptance. The Conference on Disarmament concluded without taking any decision and then the CTBT proposal was placed in the United Nations General Assembly as a Resolution. This was eventually passed in 1996 as a UN resolution.

The acrimonious debates that took place on the CTBT illustrate the dilemma about nuclear proliferation. The key issue was the fear that the nuclear weapons powers sought to maintain a status quo on the number of nuclear weapon states. They were seen as states that sought to deny the non-weapon states their legitimate aspirations that were linked either to their security concerns or their efforts at exploring nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This position was especially articulated by the threshold states like India. The eventual nuclear testing by India and Pakistan in 1998 and their entry into the nuclear club (though it has not been formally recognised by the original weapon states) was an assertion of this position. The discussions have begun on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) as the possible next step to non-proliferation. The reactions on the part of the non-weapon states are likely to be as sharp as those in case of the CTBT.

20.4 NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION

An important dimension of the discussion on nuclear proliferation is the understanding of the perception and policies of the nuclear weapon powers, especially the US and the USSR. What have been their nuclear strategies? What have they done to reduce the nuclear tensions amongst themselves? Answers to these questions will provide an insight into the approaches that they take towards the countries that aspire to become weapon powers and are seen as a threat to world peace by the established nuclear weapon powers. Nuclear doctrines define the role of nuclear weapons in both deterring and waging nuclear war. These doctrines have evolved with changes in technology and have been affected by the changing political and security environment. It is therefore necessary to look at the key doctrines and the important agreements that came to be made in the context of these doctrines.

20.4.1 Nuclear Doctrines

The United States believed that the vague threats of the use of nuclear weapons forced North Korea and China to the negotiation table in the Korean War. The policy of deterrence evolved in the 1950s was a security doctrine of the United States. The US declared the intention to

retaliate instantly by means and places of its own choosing. It articulated the policy as nuclear deterrence by threat of ‘massive’ retaliation in 1954. Deterrence is the core of nuclear strategy. Deterrence is often conceptualised as a function of capability and will. Its key function is to keep peace and prevent war. In fact, it has been argued that the key function of the military establishment in the nuclear age is not to win wars but to avert them. Credible deterrence is possible only when the contending parties have a retaliatory (second strike) capability. The American policy evolved since the 1950s keeping in mind the Soviet threat. Soviet nuclear doctrine had also argued along the lines of developing a deterrent capability.

20.4.2 The ABM Treaty

In 1969 the US and USSR initiated bilateral negotiations on possible restrictions on their strategic nuclear arsenals. One agreement concluded in the first phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) was the treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). The ABM Treaty (1972) prohibits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems for the defence of the territories of the United States or the Soviet Union. The treaty had provided for two specific areas where ABM systems can be deployed in the country, eventually, this was reduced to one area. The treaty prohibits the development, testing and deployment of mobile ABM systems and components, including those that are sea based, air based, land based or space based. Although the ABM Treaty had constrained the countries on ABM deployment, they continued their missile defence technology programmes. The Soviets tried to get around the treaty by constructing radar for ballistic missile detection and tracking in Siberia under the guise of space tracking. The US launched an ABM programme called the Strategic Defence Initiative in 1983 to provide a shield to protect the US from possible Soviet attacks.

20.4.3 SALT Agreement

The first SALT agreement on limiting offensive strategic arms was signed and came into force at the Moscow Summit of 1972 that finalised the ABM treaty. This agreement set limits on the number of strategic ballistic launchers of the US and USSR for a period of five years pending a comprehensive agreement. After the completion of five years the two countries agreed to continue to observe the provisions of the Interim Agreement of 1972 and also specified some more specific limitations on ICBMs and SLBMs. In subsequent negotiations the US and USSR adopted a new framework that permitted a long-term agreement on limits below the overall ceiling decided earlier. They set short term goals for more contentious issues and agreed to more far reaching goals to be achieved in the next phase of SALT agreements. This arrangement was to become the structure of the SALT II agreement signed in 1979. SALT II was not ratified due to the deterioration of the international situation following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

20.4.4 INF Treaty

The SALT agreements limited only the long range ground and sea based ballistic missiles. Both, the US and USSR continued to develop and deploy intermediate and shorter range missiles. By early 1980s the two countries initiated negotiations on this area. The main issue raised in the course of negotiations on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) concerned the types of delivery vehicles to be covered by the limitations, the geographic coverage of such limitations, the involvement of third countries and the stringency of verification measures. The INF treaty came to be signed in 1987 covering the intermediate range missiles and shorter-range missiles. This was applicable to all the American and Soviet missiles in Europe and Asia, but excluded

British and French armaments. The INF eliminated only a small fraction of nuclear delivery vehicles, yet the treaty is significant as it successfully eliminated an entire category of missile systems.

20.4.5 START Agreements

In 1991, after almost a decade of negotiations the US and USSR concluded a treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, subsequently called the START I Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) The treaty provides deep cuts into the arsenals of the two powers but unlike the INF does not provide for the elimination of any specific category of weapons systems. This treaty was followed by the START II agreement in 1993. It has been maintained that these agreements further reduce the risk of nuclear war because of the political impact of the dramatic cuts in the nuclear inventory of the superpowers. At one level it represents a cessation of a nuclear arms race between the US and Russia yet at another it retains nuclear forces with both that far exceed the levels which are deemed sufficient by advocates of a minimum nuclear deterrence.

Two points need to be made about the approaches of the US and the USSR about their position on nuclear arms limitation:

1. The central concerns that prompted the two countries to undertake series of negotiations on limiting and reducing their nuclear arsenals was the fear of a nuclear war that would be detrimental to the world at large. The core of these concerns was structured within the conceptual framework of deterrence that was the underlining principle of security for both the countries. These countries had thus built their security policies around centrality of nuclear weapons and would therefore have no incentive to move towards nuclear disarmament.
2. From a Third World perspective, therefore, the nuclear weapon states took a status quoist position on the world order based on capability of a nation state determined by its nuclear status. If the Third World countries wanted a space in the decision making apparatus of the world, they realised that they would have to get that space through a demonstration of a nuclear power capability.

20.5 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

20.5.1 Denuclearised Zones

The idea of establishing nuclear weapon free zones in populated areas of the world, as opposed to areas like the Antarctic, was conceived with a view to extend the purview of nuclear non-proliferation and ensure that new states do not go in for nuclear weapons. The motive was to remove the regional security pressures for the countries to opt for nuclear weapons. The NPT had encouraged the creation of such zones. These zones had another asset-they not only prevented the countries of the region from going nuclear, they also proscribed the entry of weapons in the area. While the former was met with a fair amount of success, it was always difficult to implement the latter objective.

Some of the prominent arrangements include the following:

- i) Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) covering the Latin American region.

- ii) Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) covering the South Pacific region
- iii) Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula (1992). South Korea had been a member of the NPT since 1975, while the North Koreans joined the NPT in 1985. In 1992 the two Koreas signed this agreement with an aim to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. However after North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 1993 this agreement has come into jeopardy.

20.5.2 India and Pakistan

The debates during the CTBT negotiations had identified India, Pakistan and Israel (the P- 3) as threshold powers that had the capability to produce a nuclear bomb. Some of the other countries of concern included Iraq and North Korea. South Africa, a country long identified as a capable power had joined the NPT just prior to the transition to a non-*apartheid* route, hence was taken off the list of countries to be concerned about. Following the Gulf War of 1991, the question of Iraq's compliance with the NPT has become a matter of grave concern for the nuclear powers. The efforts made to send a team of IAEA inspectors to verify the Iraqi compliance has met with resistance and the issue has now become a major international controversy. North Korea has also been put under severe pressure by the United States to ensure that it does not proceed with its nuclear weapons and missile development programmes. There is very little public debate on the Israeli position about nuclear weapons. Of these countries, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998 and declared themselves as nuclear weapon powers thus raising the debate on nuclear proliferation to a very different level.

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan had generated a great deal of debate on the rationale and implications of these actions taken by both the governments. Much of the debate focused on the security considerations of this action, the regional threat dimensions, internal political compulsions and the problem of proliferation. At one level these tests constitute a symbolism of the Third World defiance that seeks to challenge the post-Cold War order in international relations; at another they present a challenge to the policies of international nuclear non-proliferation.

Over the years the issue of nuclear and related technologies like space and electronics had come to symbolise the core of the developed world's *status quoist* agenda. The NPT regime with its multifarious dimensions like the Nuclear Suppliers group, MTCT, FMCT, etc. had sought to place the P-5 (Nuclear Powers) in a monopolistic managerial framework. The problem was compounded by the restraints placed on 'dual use' technologies. The key threats to national security as articulated by the technologically advanced countries of the developing world came to focus on these restraints of the G-7 regime. The first symbolic defiance of this restraint came in the form of the 1974 nuclear test at Pokhran. The 1974 test had a limited agenda. It presented its revisionist defiance in terms of technological competence of a Third World country. The international situation of the 1970s did not merit a demonstration of weapons capability. The labeling of the test as peaceful and the creation of resultant ambiguity in nuclear policy satisfied the technological and political requirements of an anti-*status quoist* approach.

The May 1998 tests represent this defiant independence at an age where the nuclear regime had become more stringent over the years. The indefinite extension of the NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for dual use technologies and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, represented the new era of global management. Given the thrust of the global agenda on the nuclear and related issues, the Third World defiance of this new order was bound to manifest in the area of nuclear technologies. The Iraqi and Korean efforts represent one kind of defiance. Their efforts were 'managed' and

a crisis (or threat) to the world order as perceived by the Developed World was averted. The Israeli method of quietly building a nuclear capability under the American umbrella represents another approach. The Indian demonstration of its independence came as a follow up to the earlier efforts of 1974.

The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 thus came to represent a demonstration of capabilities- technological and political. Technological capabilities were in the context of the denial of access to advanced technologies that India experienced over the years. The political capability represents the demonstration of political will of the elite to take on the G-7 regime. It is this reassertion of the ability to take independent decisions in face of anticipated sanctions that makes the nuclear test a symbol of a resurgent Third World. It is at that level that both, the Indian and Pakistani tests, demonstrate a commonality of approaches.

The problem of nuclear proliferation, it needs to be reiterated, did not start with the Indian test of 1974. It arose with the first atomic bomb dropped over Japan in 1945. The problem became complicated when the US monopoly of nuclear technology ended in the years that followed. The shifts in US policies and that of the other weapon states since have been aimed at keeping the number of nuclear weapon states within limits. In the 1960s the acuteness of this problem was recognised when an underdeveloped Third World country, China, entered the exclusive club of nuclear powers. The year 1968 therefore marks the first institutional step in the fight for exclusivity. The NPT regime created in 1968 has continued to retain its hold through the new Century. It has refused to acknowledge the two new states India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states under the ambit of the NPT definition.

20.6 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TODAY

The international nuclear non-proliferation regime has been subjected to severe stresses over the past decade. The Indian and Pakistani tests have been identified as major setbacks to the efforts at non-proliferation. Many had believed that the norm of nuclear non-proliferation had become almost universally accepted. No state had openly joined the nuclear club in several decades. The membership of the NPT had grown and it had now become a permanent agreement. The South Asian states had not been considered as ‘rogue’ states by the international community. One was a flourishing democracy, the other an old ally of the United States. These countries not only declared themselves nuclear, but also they asserted their aim of integrating these weapons into their military doctrines. This open nuclearisation was complicated by the situation in Iraq and North Korea.

If avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons is an objective of the weapon states, they have failed to implement their share of the responsibility. If at the end of the Cold War both the US and Russia had undertaken to reduce their own nuclear arsenal with vigour and a sense of purpose, this may have conveyed a more positive message for non-proliferation. Further, both Washington and Moscow need to devalue the nuclear weapons by downgrading their role in their own security policies. Until 2000 the Russians had embraced nuclear weapons in their military doctrine to compensate for the seriously weakened states of its conventional forces. The US continues to expand the rationale of its nuclear posture. NATO’s strategic concept asserts that the alliance views nuclear weapons as necessary for the indefinite future. From a non-proliferation point of view these claims are problematic.

The nuclear weapon states would have to consider the uses of security guarantees as a means for non-proliferation. It has been argued that the United States may have to take up the issue of such guarantees more seriously. Several of the proliferation trouble spots like Iraq, North

UNIT 21 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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21.1 INTRODUCTION

The role of sovereign nation-state has been considerably curtailed, particularly since the end of Second World War. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. edited, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* highlighted the growing importance and role of a number of non-state actors in international relations. As Couloumbis and Wolfe comment: “[A] considerable body of literature has challenged the predominance of nation-states are nearing obsolescence despite their obstinacy.” The focus has shifted from nation-state to “non-state actors.” These actors include terrorist organisations, religious movements, ethnic groups and multi-national corporations. Of all these non-state actors, only the terrorist organisations have assumed a violent role and have become a serious threat to peace and nation-state system.

In this unit, an attempt is made to understand not only the meaning, nature and operations of terrorist groups within one or the other country, but also largely examine international dimensions of terrorist activities. These activities are conducted from one country against other countries or peoples of other faiths. Cross-border terrorism like the militancy and killings of innocent people in India by several groups trained in, and supported by authorities, across the border, in Pakistan, has become a threat to the stability of India. There are killings by certain Irish groups

in England or by terrorist groups from across the borders in Israel. The increasing terrorist activities have now spread their net all over the world. The unprecedented damage caused in the USA in September 2001 allegedly by *Al Qaeda*, an organisation that is based in Afghanistan aroused the international community to stop the menace for all times to come.

This unit discusses international terrorism in all its dimensions and manifestations. These include killings of innocent people by conventional weapons, use of human bombs, suicide squads, even the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, killer gases and use of aircrafts as missiles for terrorist attacks.

21.2 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM DEFINED

In order to understand international terrorism, the origins and expression of terrorism as a weapon of revenge will have to be clearly analysed and comprehended.

21.2.1 Meaning of Terrorism

The term ‘terrorism’ is derived from Latin words ‘*terrere*’ and ‘*deterre*’. The word *terrere* means to tremble, and the term *deterre* implies to frighten. Thus, terrorism means to harm people so that they are so frightened that they start trembling. It is a strategy to achieve avowed objectives through the systematic use of violence thereby undermining the lawful authority of a government or a state. In the past, violence was resorted to when the rulers failed to redress the grievances of the people, and they resorted to oppression and infringement of the rights of the people. Terrorism has political overtures, and violence is the means resorted by it.

The term terrorist clearly raises pejorative connotations. According to Couloumbis and Wolfe, “a more detached, value-free definition of terrorist organisations would describe them as non-state actors employing unconventional as well as orthodox techniques of violence in order to attain certain political objectives.” Actually, terrorism is the organised use of violence for political ends and is directed primarily at innocent people, or soft targets. Like war, terrorism involves the use of organised force in pursuit of political goals. As a political instrument, both oppressors and the oppressed have used terror. Normally, one’s friends or allies are called “freedom fighters”, and one’s enemies or opponents are described as the terrorists.

Walter Laqueur defined terrorism as “the use or threats of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals; that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim; that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy.” This definition is so clear that its careful analysis makes the learner fully understand this evil, this curse, and this scourge.

Thus, terrorism is a well thought out strategy, in which the terrorists make use of violence to create fear and terror among the people. The terrorist groups may or may not have a specific goal. Their goal may be quite vague at times. The Irish Republican Army wants the end of British rule in Northern Ireland and its merger with the Irish Republic. The People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand in India are fighting against, what they allege, oppression by capitalist-controlled state. The Armed Islamic Group is an extremist group that seeks to overthrow the secular Algerian government and replace it with an Islamic state. The HAMAS, or Islamic Resistance Movement, emerged in 1987 from the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It pursues the goal of the Palestinian State in place of Israel. The *Al Qaeda*, on the other hand, does not have any limited goal. It wants to destroy the Americans in

particular, and all alleged anti-Islamists in general. Its area of operations is worldwide.

The above definition by Laqueur highlights the point that terrorism has no human face and that it is ruthless. Its approach is far from humanitarian. Terrorists can kill any number of people, and destroy any amount of property, just to spread fear and terror. Nobility of means is not their concern. Lastly, terrorism believes in publicity. They seek to make themselves known as widely as possible by their acts of terror.

Terrorism is generally identified with attempts made by individuals or groups to destabilise or overthrow existing political institutions. At the global level terrorism has been used in anti-colonial conflicts whether by both the sides or by one side (Algeria and France); it has been used by groups of different religious denominations (Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland); in conflict between two national groups over possession of contested homeland (Palestinians and Israel) and also in disputes between revolutionary forces and established governments (Iran, Indonesia, Argentina, etc.).

21.2.2 Cross Border Terrorism

In this sub-section, you will learn that terrorism that originates within one country and operates only there-Maoists in Nepal, Peoples War Group (PWG) in India, Irish Republican Army (IRA) in UK-is different from terrorism that has its roots in one country and it operates with the support of the country of its origin, but it uses violence to create terror in another country. This second type of terrorism is described as cross-border terrorism as its activists are sponsored and trained by a country other than its victims. The terrorism that India has been subjected to since 1980s has its origin, training and full support across the Indian borders in Pakistan or Pak-occupied Kashmir. There are large numbers of training camps across our borders where young men are taken after being misguided, and there they are motivated, trained, financed and equipped with armaments to indulge in violent activities in India. Thousands of innocent people have been killed in India as a result of this cross-border terrorism. Similarly, the terrorist acts against Israel are perpetrated from across its borders. Thus, while Chechen militancy in Russia is from within the country, terrorism against India is certainly of a cross-border nature.

21.2.3 International Terrorism

There is only a technical difference between cross-border terrorism and international terrorism. While in the former, terrorists are trained in one country to operate in just one other country, the international terrorism has its victims in several countries. *Al Qaeda*, for example, is not limited to its victims in any one country or region. Its “enemies” are found worldwide, though its main targets may be a few countries. The *Al Qaeda* seeks the predominance of Islamist principles and all those who come in its way must be targeted. Thus the United States and the United Kingdom today are the general victims of international terrorism. India, Russia, Sri Lanka, Nepal and many other countries are also victims of terrorism. The difference between cross-border terrorism and international terrorism is rather indistinct. All terrorism involving two or more countries may be, broadly speaking, termed as international terrorism.

21.2.4 Liberals, Conservatives and Realists on Terrorism

There are two main streams of thinking on the causes and remedies for terrorism-Liberal and Conservative. To these may be added the third, the Realist approach. We shall very briefly refer to the three views.

Liberals feel that terrorism is a response to economic, social and political deprivation as well as bad government. People who have a sense of grievance will turn to violence to dramatise their misery or to change the conditions that are responsible for it. Since in modern times the governments are generally held responsible for miseries of the people, it is against them that the rebellions are usually directed. Some of the governments may fail to provide basic amenities, and refuse or may be unable to correct social injustices. Governments may often dispossess people of their basic rights and may be corrupt and inefficient. Such governments often become targets of terrorist attacks.

Conservatives, on the other hand, attribute terrorism to the natural stresses and strains of nation-building. New systems of laws and institutions backed by a government often frighten some people. Classes, castes, religious and linguistic groups-all may find difficult to adjust under a new government, and new laws. The state tries to enforce its laws. Various groups may resent these attempts. The state may use force to check violence by resistant groups. A cycle of violence and counter-violence may then begin.

Realists see terrorism as arising out of competition between nation-states. States normally settle their disputes through the threat, or actual use of force. Realists consider terrorism as a consequence of competition among nation-states for increasing their powers. Realists, being total believers of power, attribute terrorism to the struggle for power, which as Morgenthau had said, is the essence of international politics.

In view of their different perspectives of terrorism, liberals, conservatives and the realists naturally have different responses to the curse. For liberals, the way out of terrorism is to improve the lot of the people, including those who might be seeking secession, and to provide better governance. Liberals, thus, feel that timely and imaginative social, economic, political and administrative engineering can redress the grievances of the people, and check terrorism.

The Conservatives, on the other hand, do not think that the remedy offered by liberals can be a solution. They feel that good governance is, in any case, the responsibility of every state. Conservatives argue that a responsible government must use violence to end terrorist violence. For conservatives, force is a reality, and it should not be used as a last resort. The state should use violence (force) as quickly and as firmly as possible. Pre-emptive violence will end terrorism and save innocent lives.

The prescription suggested by the Realists is closer to the views of the conservatives. The realists say that in the nation-state system that operates in the contemporary world, there is only one way of defending a state, and that is the use of force against the rivals, whether groups of terrorists or a state that threatens. The governments are fully justified in using force to stop the terrorists from harming one's interests. Realists argue that no amount of economic development and good governance will prevent a rival state (as Pakistan, in case of India) from instigating and sustaining violence. Only the threat or actual use of counter-violence can effectively defeat terrorism.

21.3 MOTIVES AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

21.3.1 Motives of Terrorist Groups

Terrorism is a tactic of the powerless against the powerful. Thus, political or social minorities

sometimes engage in terrorism. Terrorist groups are difficult to identify because their motives, tactics, and membership differ widely. Terrorists are generally defined as the groups seeking through the threats or use of violence to further their political objectives, usually in opposition to the governments concerned.

Tracing the history of terrorism, Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf explain: "Terrorism was known in ancient times, as seen in the assassination of tyrants in ancient Greece and Rome, and by the Zealots of Palestine and the Hashashim of medieval Islam. In the 19th Century, terrorism became associated with the anarchist bombings and with murders and destruction of property by nationalist groups such as the Armenians and Turks." The above-mentioned writers suggest that today terrorism flourishes as a tactic growing out of this history. They say: "The religious, ethnic or political movements and minorities now practising terrorism seek through violence to obtain the advantages of the majority, and to extract revenge and vengeance against those states and majority populations that the terrorist groups perceive as oppressors. Terrorist groups seek freedom, privilege and property-values they think, persecution has denied them." However, it may be mentioned that their perception may not always be correct.

Whereas religious fanaticism was (in 1995) responsible for nearly 20 per cent of international terrorist incidents, the primary goals of most terrorist groups are independence and statehood. Many of the terrorists are supposed to be "international homeless". But, it would be wrong to identify the goals or motives of all the groups as same. Although they share violent tactics often crossing national borders, terrorist movements are more diverse than their similarities.

There are numerous motives of the terrorists. For example, the Bodos in India are seeking a separate Bodoland-at least as a separate state within the Indian Union. There is a separatist Manipur People's Army, or the People's War Group in India seeking end to so-called oppression. Those seeking independence include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil *Eelam* (LTTE), who wanted a separate state by dividing Sri Lanka till they expressed their willingness for maximum autonomy early in 2002. Those seeking sovereign statehood also include the Basques in Spain, and Chechen rebels in Russia. Religion also sometimes rationalises terrorist activities, as, for example, was the case with the erstwhile separatist groups who were seeking an independent *Khalistan*. Since these groups were mainly sponsored from across the borders, and did not have much support from the Sikh community within the country, they could not succeed. The HAMAS tried to destabilise Israel in the name of religion, and in November 1995 right-wing Jewish fanatics in the Kach religious terrorist group killed the Israeli Prime minister Yitzhak Rabin.

In the industrialised countries, terrorism often occurs where discrepancies in income are severe, and where minority groups feel deprived of the political freedom and rights. But, as Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf suggest: "Consideration of terrorists motives often obscures the perception of terrorism as a disease. One person's terrorist may be another person's liberator. Ironically, both governments and counter-government movements claim to seek liberty", and both are condemned by the others as terrorists.

Reference must also be made to hateful and vengeful terrorism as symbolised by the dreaded *Al Qaeda* outfit headed by Osama-bin-Laden. His organisation originally designed to help the Pakistan-trained Taliban fanatics in Afghanistan, turned its fire against the United States and its friends. The latter are perceived to be killers of Muslims and thus deserving punishment of being killed. A separate section is devoted to *Al Qaeda*.

21.3.2 Methods of Terrorists

Violence is the principal means of all terrorist groups. This assumes different manifestations, and different groups use different methods. The terrorist methods have gradually evolved from primitive means to the most modern sophisticated weapons and even killer gases. They used, and sometimes they still use, the simple weapons like country-made pistols or crude bombs. In the past the terrorists merely tried to seek publicity, and people were generally not killed, they were only frightened. Bombs were sometimes thrown only to attract attention, with the clear aim of not killing the innocent people. But, with the beginning of contemporary wave of terrorism in the West Asia since 1968, the terrorist groups have rapidly refined their methods and weapons.

The 20th Century brought about revolutionary changes in the techniques and use of terrorism. Technological upgradation gave the terrorists a new mobility and lethality. Political movement of all shades of the political spectrum began to use such tactics. In fact the totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler and the Soviet Union under Stalin virtually adopted terrorism as their state policy though they did not acknowledge it publicly. In these states techniques like torture and execution were carried out without legal restrictions to make people fearfully adhere to their policies and ideologies. Mao introduced a reign of terror on a much wider scale than Stalin. Iran too experienced a phase of terror and counter-terror during the regime of Khomeini when executions and mass murders were carried out on a large scale. Similarly Spain too experienced violence of numerous kinds of terrorists, leftists, state-sponsored and the like.

Depending on the goal and resources at the disposal of a terrorist group, it may select either soft targets or hard targets. In some cases indiscriminate firing is resorted to, in crowded places, like markets or places of worship. For example, during the *Khalistan* agitation, killing of individual opponents was a common feature. At times indiscriminate firing on groups of people, by modern weapons like AK 47 etc. resulted in murders of large number of innocent people.

Use of bombs has now become an important weapon of terrorism. For example, car bomb was used unsuccessfully in the parking area of World Trade Centre in 1993. It simply attracted the publicity desired by the terrorists. Serial bomb blasts, and the use of dreaded RDX in Bombay in 1993 killed hundreds of innocent people, and many times more wounded, almost simultaneously at different places in Bombay. The excuse was the destruction of disputed site at Ayodhya, which was claimed by some as ancient *Ram Mandir*, and by others as a mosque built by Emperor Babar. But, whatever the provocation may be, serial bombing was indeed an inhuman act of terror.

The assassination of president Anwar Sadat of Egypt for having agreed to the peace process with Israel at the Camp David Summit of 1978, by the opponents of the peace and normalisation process was an act of terror in which an individual was targeted. The assassinations of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 or of Sri Lankan leader Premadasa, or of Lord Mountbatten by the Irish militants were some of the many examples of individual killings. Explosion of bombs kept in the cars, or auto rickshaws, or even the bicycles has become a common method of killing of large number of innocent people in crowded places. This is common in India, Israel and Sri Lanka, besides other countries.

Hijacking of aircrafts to make demands that cannot be easily met cause mental torture of the hostages. Sometimes individual passengers are killed, as was one in the case of Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu that was hijacked in 1999. One passenger was killed, and the others

kept hostages for nearly a week by the hijackers who were Pakistanis. The plane remained parked at Kandahar in Afghanistan till India agreed to release three dreaded Pakistan-sponsored terrorists from Indian jails. The hijackers as well as released militants later freely moved about in Pakistan. Much earlier an Indian plane was hijacked, taken to Lahore, where it was blown off after the passengers were disembarked. Hijacking of aircrafts in different parts of the world is a very inhuman terrorist activity.

Lastly, the use of hijacked aircrafts to kill thousands of people on ground and destroy property worth billions of dollars became a new technique when World Trade Centre in New York, and part of Pentagon building in Washington DC were attacked by the American planes hijacked allegedly by *Al Qaeda* terrorists. This incident of 11 September 2001 was most gruesome. Later, a number of people were killed in a car bomb explosion outside Jammu and Kashmir Secretariat in October 2001. As if that was nothing, a daring attempt was made to attack the Indian Parliament in session on 13 December 2001. The attempt was foiled as five Pakistani terrorists were gunned down in a battle outside India's Parliament, in which over half a dozen brave Indian security persons lost their lives.

In a case of mistaken identity, thirty civilians were killed in November 2002 in Andhra Pradesh, when the People's War Group Naxalites blasted a road transport bus assuming that policemen were travelling in it. But, even if they were policemen, the militants have no mercy for all are human beings whether in uniform or not. In another incident, seven jawans of Central Reserve Police Force were killed by the Manipur People's Army which is an armed wing of separatist United National Liberation Front. This was the result of an ambush. Landmine blasts is another device followed by militants and terrorists not only in Jammu and Kashmir, but also elsewhere. Eight persons of Jharkhand Armed Police were killed when a landmine triggered by the People's War Group blew up their jeep. Earlier, in 2002 itself, a number of terrorists entered the *Akshardham* Temple in Gandhinagar in Gujarat and fired indiscriminately killing and injuring large number of devotees, though later the security forces overpowered them and they were also killed. In Jammu and Kashmir, it has happened several times that the terrorists enter a mosque and take shelter there, till security forces are able to kill them or arrest them. Their aim is to engage the police in cross fire so that the mosque may be damaged and they can call it communal act of Indian security forces.

21.3.3 Suicide Squads

Highly motivated terrorists have adopted a unique method of eliminating their target by killing themselves in the attack. In 1991, during the election campaign for Lok Sabha, the former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a woman terrorist. She had allegedly tied powerful explosives round her waist, and as she proceeded to garland Rajiv Gandhi, she exploded herself killing both herself and Rajiv Gandhi. This technique of suicide killing had been repeated several times since then, both in India and abroad. The self-proclaimed *jehadis* have formed suicide squads, and they destroy themselves while eliminating the target. Its opponents have followed this practice late in 1990s and early 21st Century in Israel. The Islamist suicide militants, or *jehadis*, describe themselves as '*fidaeeyen*'.

One of the worst examples of suicide attacks was the terrorist destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001. Hijacked aircrafts were forced by the suicide terrorists to crash against the twin towers, thus killing themselves, all the crew and passengers of the aircrafts as well as thousands of innocent people then working in the Centre. Besides destruction of aircrafts, the suicide killers took thousands of lives with themselves.

Later in October 2001, a car was smashed into a portion of the Kashmir legislature building. It was full of RDX explosives, and caused loss of lives and property. In December 2001, five terrorists attempted an attack on India's Parliament in New Delhi. These foreign mercenaries failed to attack the Parliament, but our security forces killed them, and it was detected that at least one of them was carrying high-powered explosives on his body. Thus, terrorist methods include not only traditional weapons to kill and terrorise, but also many newer methods of mass killings.

In yet another example of suicide terrorists, a Palestinian suicide bomber was reported in November 2002, to have blown himself up in a crowded bus carrying many school children in Israeli capital Tel Aviv. In the suicide attack 11 persons were killed and over 45 were injured. Thus, the terrorists do not even hesitate in killing innocent children. In another case of *fidayeen* (suicide) attack two terrorists stormed into a CRPF camp in Srinagar in Kashmir. When challenged by a constable of Central Reserve Police Force, one of the terrorists detonated a grenade killing himself and the constable. The other '*fidayeen*' terrorist hurled grenades in the camp killing in all six jawans and injuring many others.

21.4 TERRORIST GROUPS AND ORGANISATIONS

As mentioned earlier, terrorism has been prevalent throughout history, engulfing all regions of the globe. Use of terrorist techniques by factions against regimes is an age-old phenomenon. The first prominent instance of a movement resorting to terrorism as a major weapon was the Assassin Sect of the West Asia, which had sent its agents throughout the Muslim world to carry out a chain of murders during the 11th and 12th centuries. Significantly enough, the contemporary wave of global terrorism received a major boost in the late 1960s from the same area. Terror was openly sponsored during the French Revolution in order to instill a revolutionary fervour among the people. From 1865 to 1905 the scene of international terrorism was restricted to the countries where prime officials were killed by anarchists' guns or bombs.

With advancement in the means of communication and media, the public impact of any terrorist act gets wide coverage thereby bringing the event directly to millions of viewers worldwide who in turn become aware of the grievances or political goals of the terrorists. Modern day terrorism sometimes pursues unrealistic goals thereby losing popular support and alienating themselves from the political mainstream. As such, they resort to such violent acts like hijackings, bombings, kidnappings etc. The prominent terrorist groups of the latter 20th Century include the Baader-Meinhof Gang of Germany, Italy's Red Brigades, France's Direct Action, *al-Fatah* and other Palestinian organisations. International collaboration is an essential feature of modern day global terrorism. The terrorists operating on a global scale are today establishing linkages worldwide and their connections are based on religion, race or political ideology. Sometimes terrorist groups are trained, financed and equipped by agencies of countries other than those where they operate. The incidence of terrorism thus has grown alarmingly. Some countries are today using the instrument of terror and violence to pursue their foreign policy goals. Thus the main sponsors of global terrorism are those who have no regard for international frontiers, making terrorism a preventing phenomenon.

Today, terrorism has become a lethal weapon for initiating a process of destabilisation. It owes its origin to a few evil men who laid down the basic tenets for terrorist activities and initiated a trail of blood and violence. The most noted among them was Carlos who originally hailed from Venezuela. Also known as the Jackal, he is universally regarded as the chief protagonist of terrorists. He codified the aims of terrorists and the means of achieving them and enumerated

a test of skills to be acquired by terrorists. He posed a challenge to governments around the globe till he met his death. In the early 21st Century, Osama-bin-Laden emerged as the master terrorist heading the *Al Qaeda*.

21.4.1 Various Groups and Their Objectives

Mention has been made above of some of the past and present terrorist groups. In this sub-section their objectives will be briefly dealt with. The most powerful, *Al Qaeda* will be separately explained in the next sub-section.

According to the US State Department records (1994) some of the prominent terrorist groups were as under: (i) *Abu Nidal Organisations* (ANO) led by Sabri al-Banana, the ANO with its headquarters in Libya operates internationally to coordinate the activities of various Muslim terrorist groups; (ii) *Armed Islamic Group* seeks to overthrow the secular government of Algeria and replace it with Islamic regime; (iii) *Basque Fatherland and Liberty* founded in 1959, the group once committed to Marxism, now seeks the creation of an independent homeland in Spain's Basque region; (iv) *HAMAS* emerged in 1987 from the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, it pursues the goal of an Islamic Palestine State in Israel; (v) *Hizballah* (Party of God) is a radical *Shia* religious group which seeks to establish an Iranian-style Islamic Republic in Lebanon; (vi) *Kach and Kahane Chai*'s declared goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel and to halt the peace process in Palestine; an extremist member of this group had assassinated Israeli prime minister Rabin in November 1995 to stop his plans to withdraw Israeli troops from the West Bank; (vii) *Provisional Irish Republican Army* is a radical group formed in 1969 as the secret armed wing of Sinn Fein, the lawful political party seeking to remove British forces from Northern Ireland and to unite it with Ireland; and (viii) *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) is a guerrilla group founded in late 1960s and has the goal of clearing Peru of foreign influences, destroying existing Peruvian institutions, and replacing them with a peasant revolutionary regime.

This list is by no means exhaustive. There has been a proliferation of terrorist groups in recent times. During the decade of 1980, India suffered foreign sponsored and financed terrorism in the name of creation of *Khalistan*, or the Sikh homeland. This was the game plan of anti-India forces mainly in Pakistan and some individuals in Canada who wanted to destabilise India. Fortunately, the foreign designs did not succeed, though the militancy took a heavy toll.

Pakistan has never reconciled itself to the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Having failed in its attempts through wars to get Kashmir, Pakistan has been training, financing and sponsoring several terrorists to terrorise the people of India in general and of Kashmir in particular. Since 1989, cross-border terrorism has continued unabated. Several thousand innocent lives have been lost, children orphaned, women widowed and property damaged in Kashmir by terrorist outfits like *Jaish-e-Mohammad*, *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and many others who keep on changing their names. There are hundreds of training camps in Pakistan to train, misguide and motivate youth to carry on killings of innocent people.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil *Eelam* have been carrying violent agitation in Sri Lanka for the creation of a homeland for Tamil minority living mainly in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. This movement, going on since 1980s, has also taken a heavy toll of lives. Its targets have been not only Sinhalese people and some of their leaders, but also some persons outside the country. Its aim of creating terror has caused misery for a long time. Even if its demands and grievances may have been genuine, yet resort to gun and suicide killers have taken the shape of terrorism. There were indications in 2002 of possible peace being returned to the

Island as the LTTE and the government began negotiations with Norwegian mediation.

In addition to the terrorist groups identified above, there are others that may be briefly mentioned here. These include *al-Fatah* operating in the West Asia; the Gray Wolves in Turkey; the Red Army Faction that operated in Germany; the Red Brigades in Italy; Omega 7 (anti-Castro Cubans) throughout North America; National Liberation Movement in Uruguay; and the *Contras* in Nicaragua. Like the United States, Canada has also banned a number of terrorist organisations. Canada added, in November 2002, to its existing list the following groups also: HAMAS (explained elsewhere), the Islamic Army of Aden, *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen*, the *Asbat Al-Ansar* (League of Palestinians), the Palestinian Islamic *Jihad*, and the *Jaish-e-Mohammed*. Writing in 1986, Couloumbis and Wolfe had stated: “The methods of these encompass bombing in such crowded places as commercial centres; hijacking of aircrafts and ships and abductions and assassinations of prominent figures in government and public.” As new terrorist groups emerge (like “Army of Palestine”, first heard of in November 2002), some keep changing their names to confuse the victims. The terrorist organisations have continued to grow, though some of the above mentioned have ceased to be active and effective.

21.4.2 Al Qaeda and Its Network

Not many people had heard of an organisation called *Al Qaeda* till after the 11 September 2001 attack on World Trade Centre in New York. The United States then concluded that it was the act of *Al Qaeda* led by Saudi dissident Osama-bin-Laden who was operating from Afghanistan in collusion with the then fundamentalist rulers of that country called the Talibans. Once the United States decided to liquidate Osama and his *Al Qaeda*, the power situation changed, as Pakistan, the creator of Taliban, decided to join the US led coalition against *Al Qaeda* and entire international terrorism. However, Pakistan did not desist from promotions of terrorism against India.

Abdullah Azzam founded *Al Qaeda* al Sulbah in 1987 in order to create societies founded on strictest Islamist principles. Osama bin Laden, one of the 52 children of his father, was a trusted colleague of Azzam, but Osama allegedly got his mentor Azzam killed so that he could become the supreme leader of *Al Qaeda*. Earlier in 1984, the two men had jointly founded the *Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al Arab* (MAK), in Peshawar, Pakistan. The MAK network was spread in 35 countries, and it “housed, trained and financed the anti-Soviet Afghan *jihad*.” In a well-researched work *Inside Al Qaeda*, Rohan Gunaratna summed up the nature and activities of Osama bin Laden and the *Al Qaeda*. He says that the charismatic fanatic Osama bin Laden provides much of the brainpower and much of an inspiration behind *Al Qaeda*. He had his mentor and *Al Qaeda* founder Azzam assassinated in order to take over the organisation and the other *Al Qaeda* officers who stood in his way were also murdered. He says that, *Al Qaeda* had planned to destroy the British Parliament on 11September 2001, and to use nerve gas on the European Parliament. The link between *Al Qaeda* and the Iran Hezbollah provided the knowledge required to conduct coordinated, simultaneous attacks on multiple targets, including failed plans to destroy Los Angeles international airport, US Ship *The Sullivans*, the Radison Hotel in Jordan and 11 US commercial airlines over the Pacific Ocean. These revelations are horrifying. According to Gunaratna, *Al Qaeda* infiltrates one-fifth of Islamic charities and NGOs. He feels that the US response is effective militarily only in short term but insufficient to counter *Al Qaeda*’s ideology and strategy in the long term. Finally, he argues that, for *Al Qaeda* to be destroyed or seriously weakened there needs to be a multipronged and multi-national response by the international community.

Today *Al Qaeda* appears to have become a symbol of terrorism and *jihad*. However, it is

believed that terrorism that is killing of non-combatant, innocents is forbidden in the Holy Koran, unless they fall in the category of conspirators. The religious scholar most quoted by Osama, Ibn Taymiyyah says: "As for those who cannot offer resistance or cannot fight, such as women, children, monks, old people, the blind, handicapped and their like they shall not be killed". But, we find that this basic tenet is often forgotten.

Al Qaeda members are highly motivated to kill anybody or die themselves for the sake of Islam. *Al Qaeda* founding document had laid down rules. The first of these says, its volunteers must jump into the fire of the toughest tests and into the waves of fierce trials. Full loyalty and devotion is expected of them, and *Jihadis* are expected to know of the existence of anti-Islam machinations all over the world.

Although Afghanistan was *Al Qaeda*'s principal military training base, it also trained recruits in Sudan, Yemen, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia and even Philippines. *Al Qaeda* has a vast network. According to Gunaratna: "*Al Qaeda* pursues its objectives through a network of cells, associate terrorist and guerrilla groups and other affiliated organisations. While *Al Qaeda* cells mostly operate in the West, its associate groups are more numerous in the South or developing world." Some of the countries where *Al Qaeda* has its network include Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Germany, Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Iraq, Sudan and The Caucasus. Its new centres are now functioning in China, South East Asia, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Japan, Korea, Singapore, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Thus, *Al Qaeda* is a worldwide network that can have its targets easily eliminated.

The 11 September 2001 attack in New York was an eye opener to all. Subsequent attacks on Indian Parliament and in 2002 in Bali in Indonesia are all directly or indirectly linked with the terrorist network. The United States-led coalition tried to finish *Al Qaeda* network, but its short-term success was limited only to Afghanistan. As late as November 2002 there were reports of possible use of poisonous gases of mass destruction likely to be used in underground trains in London. These are all threatening the civilised world.

21.5 STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

There is a perception that terrorist activities are carried out by oppressed or disempowered groups of people to seek justice. In the process they resort to violence. However, in certain cases the state becomes involved directly or indirectly in supporting or even promoting terrorism. Terrorists' organised groups do function as non-state actors. But, as Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf assert: "State terrorism must also be included in any objective assessment, for some of the most ruthless acts of violent terrorism have been practiced by states' governments against those opposed to them." Some of the earlier examples of state terrorism include the reign of terror by the French revolutionary government against the counter revolutionary opposition, or the violence practiced by Russian *Bolsheviks* after 1917 against its opponents, or the actions of genocide by the Nazi regime of Adolph Hitler in Germany killing millions of Jews.

Making a comparison between non-state actor terrorists and the state-terrorism, Kanti Bajpai wrote: "Both seek to frighten. Both can be bloody. Both may seek to shock and disrupt. Both may be defensive in nature, seeking to protect society against the oppression of the other. Both try to undermine the legitimacy of the other. Neither tolerates rivals-the state will not permit the instruments of violence in the hands of terrorists; the terrorist organisation will not permit other terrorist groups to flourish." There can be similarities as well as differences.

Achin Vanaik has pointed out two key differences between terrorism and state terrorism.

Firstly, terrorist organisations usually take, even if they do not positively affirm, responsibility for their violence, for example, *Lashkar-e-Taiba* took responsibility for terrorist attack on *Raghunath* Temple in Jammu (2002), and a new outfit called “Army of Palestine” claimed responsibility for suicide bomb attack on a hotel at Mombasa in Kenya (November 2002), where many Israeli tourists were staying, though both Kenya and Israel quickly blamed *Al Qaeda* for the attack. States, on the other hand, are reluctant to acknowledge the use of violence to frighten and intimidate. Secondly, terrorist groups seek publicity for the outrage; but the state does not. In fact the two differences are related to each other, and Bajpai feels that even these differences are not inherent; “in the right circumstances, (even) the state might well admit to and advertise its use of violence.” Thus, conceptually speaking, terrorism and state terrorism are not very different in nature, though in form, they indeed are.

In contemporary period many states have been active in terrorist activities against other countries. Proxy war has been going on against India for a long time. The nature of militancy against India since 1980s has been praised by a foreign power as “freedom struggle”, but the whole world now knows that it is a war against Indian people in the form of militancy and terrorism in which several thousand innocent people of all communities have been killed. Our neighbouring country even described the occupation of Kargil heights in 1999 by its own fully armed men as the freedom struggle by the people of the state, which nobody believed.

The way Serbs carried out the so-called ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina killing large number of Bosnian Muslims and depriving them of their homes was certainly an act of state terrorism. Americans have been talking of certain countries, like Libya, which have been allegedly promoting state terrorism. India believes that Pakistan is a terrorist state.

21.6 GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

Terrorism seeks to disrupt the smooth functioning of democratic societies by demonstrating that governments are not in a position to provide basic security measures. It is a normal human urge to oppose terrorism but on some occasions nothing productive can be done. Terrorists generally operate in a discreet manner and they use covers to protect themselves from being detected. As such another requirement for fighting terrorism is to bring about improvement in the technique of intelligence collection, infiltration and surveillance and the like. Through a concerted programme of public information and education, public assistance against terrorism should be sought for and people should be made more security conscious.

Freeing a hostage is a risky job. As such the main goal of the police should be to arrange the release of a hostage unharmed and to apprehend the offender. If apprehending the offender seems more important an attack may be launched. If release of the hostage seems very important and if demand cannot be met, the police should attempt to kill the offender. Thus hostage seizure is a complicated process. The Indian authorities faced uphill task in freeing more than 150 hostages from the hijackers of Indian Airlines plane in 1999, hijacked and parked at Kandahar, which was then controlled by the Talibans with whom India did not have diplomatic relations. In the bargain India had to set free certain hardcore terrorists from Indian jails. Different tactics may be followed for different incidents as each situation is an unique one. Freeing places of worship from the terrorists who hole them in is also often very difficult task.

With every passing generation new forms of terrorism are being thrown up. To meet the challenge, a more positive attitude towards peace making process should be developed so that people at large can be protected from terrorism. Technological development especially in the

detection of explosives, access control surveillance and intelligence should be relied upon as a means of preventing the terrorists from abusing people's civil liberties and in extreme cases taking their lives as well.

The growing incidence of terrorist violence has, over the years, engaged the attention of the entire global community. The US has taken a lead to promote international efforts to tackle their menace. Nations around the world have been taking serious steps to protect diplomats and embassies. This has lessened the incidence of embassy seizures. Similarly, the world has been seriously considering promoting air safety measures. But the most formidable obstacle hindering the prosecution of hijackers, thereby putting at stake the international attempts to foil illegal aircraft seizure attempts, is the asylum phenomenon. As the term 'political offence' remains unclarified, nations always find justification for granting asylum to political refugees or political groups. Giving shelter to the fugitives under the guise of political crimes poses a serious threat to international aviation because unlawful aircraft seizures involve many serious crimes.

Considering the seriousness of such cases, European countries have taken steps to curb terrorism. Their efforts, though primarily aimed at unlawful interference with civil aviation, also cover offences involving the use of bombs, grenades, rockets etc. An informal international agreement on hijacking between these countries (17 July 1978) have not only taken a decision to extradite or prosecute hijackers but also to boycott the airports and airlines of those countries which failed to do so.

One of the main aims of the terrorists is to make the legal system unoperative by intimidating witnesses and juries, thereby creating credible grounds for accusing the government of repression and torture. This calls for incentives to be given to informers for providing evidence and extending protection to them when required. If desired, and if feasible, adequate funds should also be made available to the informers to enable them to start a new life at a new place. It is but true that the costs involved in granting rewards and protection is negligible when compared to cost of damage inflicted by the terrorists. Still other forms of intimidation like demands for protection, money and racketeering should also be tackled firmly. The legal process should also be strengthened for exercising strict control on the possession and movements of explosives, armies and ammunition.

One of the biggest sponsors of terrorism and criminal violence in the world is the profit ensuing from narcotics trade. Drug trafficking not only generates illegal money but also encourages fraud, extortion and counterfeiting. Thus, narcotics consumption should not only be checked but the laundering of money from all these sources should also be tackled. To make these possible, banks should be legally obliged and willing to make customers' accounts available to the police and judiciary so that illegal money can be easily detected and seized. Governments, particularly in Western countries, should pass legislations to prevent their banks from undertaking transactions with foreign banks, which do not have proper records. Prevention of terrorism also requires improved technological research in some urgent areas like detection of explosives, developing anti-impersonation systems and equipments in aid of intelligence.

Over the years, the nature of weapons has not changed much. The hand-held missiles, which were recently made available to terrorists, were developed in 1984. However, one positive feature is that advancement in security technology has been far greater especially in explosive detection techniques. Nevertheless, the terrorists groups are always on the look out of possessing all kinds of weapons and explosives. But what is creating a dangerous situation is the fact that with the entry of criminals in the sphere of terrorism, the very nature of terrorism has changed from a politically motivated one to a criminally motivated terrorism.

21.6.1 International Coalition against Terrorism

While India and some other countries have suffered at the hands or guns of the terrorists for quite some time, the United States experienced a massive onslaught on its mainland in September 2001. That shook the conscience of the world, as it proceeded to put together an international coalition to eliminate international terrorism. Writing in 1980s, Coulumbis and Wolfe had expressed the fear of much bigger disaster than what the world had till then suffered. They say: "A series of hijackings, letter-bomb explosions, and bloody airport incidents involving scores of casualties has mobilised many governments to seek international regulation of terrorist activity.... [What] has been perpetrated so far by various terrorists is not the real problem. What is at stake is the awesome and terrifying potential of terrorist activity in the decades to come." This prophecy indeed came true in Israel, India and finally in the United States.

India has received promise of full support in its fight against terrorism by several countries, including Britain, Russia, France, Vietnam and many more both before and after 11 September. Israel, a victim of terrorism, however, is willing to be part of a coalition to fight the menace, including terrorism in India. Russia suffering Chechen rebels now has been one with India in the fight against terrorism. After 11 September attack in the United States, the Bush Administration has adopted a very tough line against international terrorism, and put together a coalition to liquidate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. But its remarkable success in clearing Afghanistan, in just two months, of *Al Qaeda* and the Talibans, did not complete the task. Neither the declared enemy of the US-Osama bin Laden-could be apprehended, nor apparently eliminated. Not only this, the evil has continued to haunt several countries. The periodic killings in India, taking of large number of hostages by Chechen militants in a Moscow theatre, in which hundreds of lives were lost, the terrorist killings of large number of foreign terrorists in Bali Island of Indonesia, and the alleged plot to attack London metro are some of the many examples of terror that has remained unabated even after US success in Afghanistan. Pakistan, which sided with the US in the international coalition, is known for being a major nursery of international terrorism. How can the United States win the war against terror to "save the civilised and democratic world" with the terror-promoting Pakistan as its ally? It was reported late in 2002 that there still existed number of Al-Qaeda training camps in Pakistan.

The threat to humanity posed by terrorism is now a concern of almost all parts of the globe. The ASEAN came forward late in 2002 to issue a declaration to underline its commitment to fight this menace. The ASEAN efforts were fully supported by China, Japan and South Korea. India indeed welcomed this commitment. Meanwhile, the countries of Asia-Pacific Rim extending from Japan to Australia, along with the United States have sounded a bugle to eliminate terrorism. Yet, it is not an easy task. Just to give one example, a Pakistani national Aimal Kansi who had gunned down two CIA detectives in the US in 1993, and who was finally executed by the US authorities in 2002 was treated as a hero by a section of Pakistani youth, just as the hijackers of Indian Airlines plane in December 1999 were allowed freely to move about in Pakistan and spread hatred against India.

21.6.2 UN and Fight against Terrorism

The United Nations has been seriously concerned with the spread of international terrorism. The determination of the UN to defeat this evil was expressed in the Security Council Resolution No.1373 adopted in the wake of the attack on the World Trade Centre in September 2001. The resolution had called upon the international community to fight this scourge through international cooperation through political, diplomatic, financial and other means. Meanwhile, as many as 12 conventions have been authorised by the UN General Assembly to the humankind to unite and

fight the curse. However, the General Assembly was conscious of the fact that in the process of fighting terrorism, human rights violation must not be allowed to take place, though at times the reconciliation between the two may be a difficult problem.

The action that was initiated by a coalition led by the US in October 2001 against terrorist mastermind was in accordance with the authorisation done by the United Nations. Accepting the Nobel Prize for Peace, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in December 2001, that the UN General Assembly and the Security Council has provided a solid foundation for the struggle against terrorism. Kofi Annan said: "I would urge all Member States to sign the 12 conventions that have been authorised by the General Assembly." He urged, "Sign, ratify and implement them so that we all have common framework as we move forward."

However, it is not easy to have all the conventions signed and ratified as there are many elements in the world who still talk of the United States as the "killer" of people of a certain faith, who still declare moral support, and give material aid, to the so-called freedom fighters in Jammu and Kashmir, and those who consider the very existence of Israel as a curse. Besides, the over-enthusiastic supporters of human rights, even in case of terror creators are not easy to be convinced that rights of vast majority of civilised world, of innocent women, children and disabled must get precedence over the rights of the fidayeen and other terrorists.

21.7 SUMMARY

Terrorism has become a scourge to humankind in recent times. The objectives of terrorists can be varied and their goal may be political or simply to frighten people. It is generally identified with attempts to destabilise or overthrow existing political institutions or regimes. Its means are invariably violent. The terrorists may use traditional weapons, or go to the extent of abduction, indiscriminate killings by automatic weapons, hijacking of aircrafts, throwing bombs or exploding devices to kill people in crowded places. Lately, terrorists have used car bombs, and even used themselves as human bombs. Members of suicide squads or the *fidayeen* explode the human bombs.

It is not only groups of individuals who resort to terrorise people, sometimes a state may sponsor terrorist activities against their opponents. India has been subjected to this cross-border terrorism for a long time. Terror has become an international phenomenon. It has to be fought and finished by the international community to save democracy and the civilised world from the curse. The international coalition that was put together by the US in the aftermath of attack on WTC in New York was an attempt to end the curse. The United Nations called upon the civilised world to fight and defeat international terrorism. The General Assembly has adopted a number of conventions, which must be ratified by Member States and acted upon.

21.8 EXERCISES

1. Explain the nature and characteristics of international terrorism and differentiate it from cross-border terrorism.
2. Describe briefly the theoretical perspectives on terrorism.
3. Briefly explain the motives and the methods adopted by the terrorists to perpetrate violence and terror.

UNIT 22 ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Structure

- 22.1 Introduction
 - 22.2 Evolution of Modern Science and Technology
 - 22.2.1 Trends in Science and Technology
 - 22.3 Impact on International Politics
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 - 22.3.2 Science and Technology and International Dependencies
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22.1 INTRODUCTION

The relationship between technology and international relations has been continuous and intimate. From the time of man's most primitive polities, the foreign policy problems and opportunities of states have been influenced by the nature of their technology for transport, communications, warfare and economic production. And the relationship between technology and international relations is not a new area of study. Political geographers have sought to explore how technology has enabled man to adapt to and alter the conditions imposed by his geographic environment. Other scholars engaged in the effort to develop quantitative means for measuring and comparing national power have made use of technological indices such as steel or energy production. Some studies on nationalism and international organisations have focused on the part played by the developments in transportation and communication in the formation of modern states and regional or international arrangements. With the advent of nuclear weapons, scholars have focussed attention on the interrelationships among weapons technology, military strategy and foreign policy.

The accelerated pace of technological advances in recent years, however, bestow the subject with added significance. With science becoming a major propeller of technological innovation, we will have to examine the role of both science and technology, though technology is the more prevalent of the two in their interactions with international affairs.

A familiar problem that one encounters in analysing the role of science and technology in international relations is that of making general observations about the effects of a single variable. Taken in their aggregate, the technological developments in the past four or five hundred years have had extensive and cumulative impact on international relations. But as the technological capabilities have expanded, so have the choices available for individuals, organisations, industries and governments. Considered individually, technological innovations are increasingly less determinative in their effect.

22.2 EVOLUTION OF MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The scientific age can be said to have begun in the 16th and 17th Century Europe. The environment for the growth of modern science and technology was provided by the Renaissance which itself was partly due to the gradual development of technology. Though the main feature of the Renaissance was the revival of the ancient art and humanities, it marked a point of transition in which deference to the ancient began to be replaced by a consciously dynamic, progressive attitude. Even while the Renaissance men looked back to classical models, they looked for ways of improving upon them. Technological developments such as the printing press, the telescope, the microscope, accurate clocks, and countless other tools of science and scientific research became a major intellectual activity. In the early 17th Century, Francis Bacon recognised the significance of disciplined method for development, testing, and verification of theory and advocated experimental science as a means of enlarging man's dominion over nature. It was the adoption of this scientific method that distinguished science in Europe from Islamic science or China where science and technology accomplishments were well in advance of those in Europe at that time. The vitality of this approach to the study of natural phenomena has been amply demonstrated by the achievements of the scientific community in the West over succeeding centuries.

In the early 17th Century itself, the practical role of science was recognised. Bacon urged scientists to study the methods of craftsmen and craftsmen to learn more science. Many societies and academies came up to promote these ideas. But no real convergence between science and technology emerged in the next two hundred years. Carpenters and mechanics-practical men of long standing-built iron bridges, steam engines, and textile machinery without much reference to scientific principles, while scientists-still amateurs-pursued their investigations in a haphazard manner. Nevertheless, the beliefs in change and control over nature that were promoted by the rise of science guided many technological innovators in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution.

The Industrial Revolution started in the 18th Century (most notably with the invention of a steam engine, a mechanised thread spinner and the cotton gin in the United States). Britain was tied to its emerging leadership role in world economy. British developments were quickly copied and other inventions added in Western Europe and the United States. The industrial revolution thus was a Western-wide phenomenon, despite some variations within the West. New sources of inanimate energy-the internal combustion engine and electrical energy-were developed and applied in transportation, communications, and industry. The abundance and transportability of inanimate energy resulted in an enormous increase in productivity and made possible a whole complex of technological developments.

With the advent of the satellites and digital technologies, the speed and capacity of communication has outpaced our expectation. Satellites have transformed communications both within and between nations. The cost of the communication services is no longer related to distance and terrain. Digital technologies, on the other hand have virtually eliminated the technological distinction between voice, text, data, and video services. The convergence of these communication and digital technologies resulting in the rapid spread of electronic networks is appropriately designated "information revolution", to draw the parallel with the industrial revolution in its expected significance for human affairs.

By the turn of the 19th Century, the United States began to overtake Europe in technological

innovations, leading the world in converting from coal to oil and from horse-drawn transportation to motor vehicles. New technical innovations, from electricity to airplanes, also helped push the US economy into a dominant world position. The springs of innovation did not dry in Europe: many important inventions of the 20th Century originated in Europe. But, like Britain during the Industrial Revolution, it was the United States which came to possess the capacity to assimilate innovations and to take full advantage from them. Other nations have been deficient in one or other of the vital social resources without which an invention cannot be converted into a commercial success.

Social involvement in technological advances

Social conditions are thus of the utmost importance in the development of new techniques...To simplify the relationship as much as possible, there are three points at which there must be some social involvement in technological innovation: social need, social resources, and a sympathetic social ethos. In default of any of these factors it is unlikely that a technological innovation will be widely adopted or be successful.

The sense of social need must be strongly felt, or people will not be prepared to devote resources to a technological innovation. The thing needed may be a more efficient cutting tool, a more powerful lifting device, a labor-saving machine, or a means of utilising new fuels or a new source of energy. Or, because military needs have always provided a stimulus to technological innovation, it may take the form of a requirement for better weapons. Whatever the source of social need, it is essential that enough people be conscious of it to provide a market for an artifact or commodity that can meet the need.

Social resources are similarly an indispensable prerequisite to a successful innovation. Many inventions have foundered because the social resources vital for their realisation-the capital, materials, and skilled personnel-were not available. The notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci are full of ideas for helicopters, submarines, and airplanes, but few of these reached even the model stage because resources of one sort or another were lacking. The resource of capital involves the existence of surplus productivity and an organisation capable of directing the available wealth into channels in which the inventor can use it. The resource of materials involves the availability of appropriate metallurgical, ceramic, plastic, or textile substances that can perform whatever functions a new invention requires of them. The resource of skilled personnel implies the presence of technicians capable of constructing new artifacts and devising novel processes. A society, in short, has to be well primed with suitable resources in order to sustain technological innovation.

A sympathetic social ethos implies an environment receptive to new ideas, one in which the dominant social groups are prepared to consider innovation seriously. Such receptivity may be limited to specific fields of innovation-for example, improvements in weapons or in navigational techniques-or it may take the form of a more generalised attitude of inquiry, as was the case among the industrial middle classes in Britain during the 18th Century, who were willing to cultivate new ideas and inventors, the breeders of such ideas. Whatever the psychological basis of inventive genius, there can be no doubt that the existence of socially important groups willing to encourage inventors and to use their ideas has been a crucial factor in the history of technology.

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In the post-Second World War period, the Soviet Union, which had adopted a socialist model

of industrial development, quickly mastered nuclear technology and heralded the dawn of the Space age by launching the *Sputnik* satellite into outer space as a part of the international scientific study in the International Geophysical Year of 1957. These achievements demonstrated its scientific and technological prowess, but as it never sought to commercialise these capabilities, it lagged behind as a technological innovator. The United States, by actively supporting the commercialisation of the technological breakthroughs that were emerging out of its massive research and development activities, dominated the world as a technological innovator. Beginning in the late 1970s, new centres of technological innovation which have emerged in Europe and Asia are challenging the US dominance in the international economy. These nations have developed sophisticated technical infrastructure and acquired the capacity to directly use the results of basic research, whether developed domestically or elsewhere. Some of them have demonstrated the ability to rapidly commercialise new and emerging technology, and prosper in an environment of shorter product, process and service life cycles.

22.2.1 Trends in the Evolution of Science and Technology

We have hinted earlier that scientific research has become a necessary preliminary to technological innovations. Since the beginning of the 20th Century, technological advances have increasingly come to depend on science. The emergence of the industrial research laboratories illustrates this very well. Industrial research laboratories first appeared in the late 19th Century. They were set up as it became necessary for commercial exploitation of technology to understand how and why things worked as they did, and in part as the subject matter of technology-electricity, magnetism and chemical processes-required specialised knowledge and experiment which was not accessible even to the experienced artisan. In the West, this form of structured research and experimentation in the interest of innovation gradually evolved into a self-sustaining system. Further technological advances in the coming years may be almost completely based upon advances in science.

Secondly, scientific knowledge and technological innovation are increasing at an exponential rate, though mainly in the industrial world. These scientifically literate and technically advanced countries are in a better position to generate and absorb new information and technologies. As we saw, structured research and experimentation in the interest of innovation has become a self-sustaining system in these countries.

Thirdly, both the costs of acquiring new scientific knowledge and costs of product innovation are increasing. As science expanded its horizons, it began to rely on sophisticated tools of research such as the radio telescope, the electronic microscope, accelerators, sounding rockets and reusable space vehicles, satellites and high-speed computer equipment. Not only high-energy physicists, astronomers, and oceanographers who were initially associated with 'big science' but also the chemists, biologists and the molecular physicists have come to rely on increasingly complex and costly instrumentation. One result of this is that it has become harder to distinguish between science and engineering at least with respect to the tools they use. Another is that the pursuit of scientific research and technological developments has gone beyond capabilities of individual scientists working in isolation. They have to work as members of a team, often in tandem with engineers. Thus, the most overwhelming aspect of modern science is its magnitude in terms of money, equipment, number of workers and scope of activity.

Finally, scientific research has become increasingly subject to government control and direction. States were long interested in technological innovation for application to armaments and the waging of war. But they were predominantly interested as potential customers of independent developments. Their support to science and technology, therefore, had remained erratic and

sometimes capricious. This began to change in the 20th Century. Governments made primitive effort to put scientists to work on military problems during the the First World War. Funded by the government, German chemists played a key role in the development of poison gas. This was a harbinger for the physicists to play in the development of the atom bomb. In the inter-war period, when the developments in science were found to have military implications, governments in the industrial world began to fund science and technology programmes. But it was during the Second World War that the industrial nations brought the resources of their scientists and technologists to bear on the problems of war. Developments in nuclear energy, radar, proximity fuses, rockets, bombers, bombs, communications, intelligence, materials, organisation, operations research, and countless other fields were all supported largely with government funding. The mobilisation of science during the Second World War not only helped the Allies win the war, but also set a pattern that profoundly influenced the post-war world. The partnership between government and the scientific community that had proved so successful during the war got consolidated with the onset of the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this conflict, both the powers harnessed science and technology not only for the political-military strategy of maintaining a balance of terror, but also for the advancement of diverse foreign policy goals in such diverse fields as the exploration of space and oceans, birth and disease control, weather modification, and global communications.

The net result of these trends has been a science and technology system that is dedicated to stimulating advances in technology so as to expand capabilities and performance. The incentives and the structure that make the system work in this way are now institutionalised in the scientific and technological enterprises themselves and in their economic and social setting. The result is a stream of technological outcomes that contribute to a steady, sometimes spectacular growth in the capability to carry out new tasks and to perform existing tasks at a faster rate, at a greater (or much smaller) distance, with greater precision, with higher quality, with greater efficiency, with fewer people, at lower costs, with more power, and with other enhanced characteristics.

22.3 IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

None of the key elements in the international political process has been untouched by scientific capabilities and technological developments. The international system based on the sovereign states system, the states themselves, the purposes and expectations moving state policy and the means available to states for achieving their purposes have all been altered by developments induced by science and technology.

22.3.1 The Rise of Territorial State and the International System

The introduction of new technologies played an important role in the rise of the territorial states in Europe and the gradual evolution of an international system. The gunpowder which was known to the ancient Chinese came to Europe via the Islamic world in the 15th Century. The Europeans put it to purposeful military use, by replacing the cavalry with gun wielding infantry. This made their neighbours insecure and compelled them to acquire similar weapons. The growth in the size and complexity of the army gradually pushed up the costs of equipping an army. Even the wealthiest aristocrats could no longer afford to raise large armies of professional soldiers. The rising costs of warfare in the early 16th Century Europe had immediate political consequences. They made political power increasingly dependent upon national wealth, and pressured kings and princes to invent new ways of raising revenues. This, in turn, stimulated the growth of modern state and state system.

Taxation was one way to increase the revenues of the state. The other option was long-distance trade. Advances in the transportation technologies in the form of new ship models and improved means of navigation tools made this option possible. Expeditions of discovery and adventure connected Europe with other regions of the world. With overseas trade emerging as a new source of revenue, the European monarchs could build large armies and equip them with more guns.

With the Industrial Revolution, Western nations became anxious about the stability of their own changing economies. Their search for secure markets and supplies ultimately resulted in the plunder and colonisation of the other regions of the world. By the end of the 19th Century, virtually all the regions of the globe had come under the direct or indirect rule of the European nations. Never before has so much territory been acquired in so little time. The establishment of European hegemony over the rest of the world owed very much to the fact that the industrial power, emerging out of advances in technology, got translated into military power and to an extent into cultural superiority. The gains brought by industrial revolution, improved organisation, better health care, and expanded literacy, fed the growing belief that the West was superior to the rest of the world, with the right and duty to rule over the technically inferior polities. An English poet, Rudyard Kipling, described a widely held sentiment in arguing that the West had such superior moral and political values that it was the responsibility-the 'white man's burden'-to reshape the rest of the world. Thus, trade and colonialism made possible by advances in transportation, communication and improved ordnance resulted in the emergence of world economy that was interdependent.

New technology also affected the structure of the state system. With technological innovations coming to have a bearing on economic and military strength of a nation, the relative position of states got affected. Britain, taking advantage of early industrialisation emerged as a world power. On the European continent, Germany outpaced France in technological capabilities and displaced France as the dominant power. These changes in the relative power and location of states in the international system in turn had great consequences for the stability of the system. The rise of German and Japanese power introduced instability in the system resulting in the two world wars. The Second World War had a debilitating effect on the European nations resulting in the rise of the United States (which had already become a centre for technological innovations) as a super power. The war also weakened the links between the European nations and contributed to the collapse of the European empire within a short span of two decades.

Technological advances have also resulted in the emergence of new actors-multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the international scene. Previously isolated from one another, NGOs are becoming global actors, with the increase in their power and capacity to communicate both within and across national borders. Playing a prominent role at the United Nations and other world forums, NGOs and citizen advocacy groups are taking up issues like environment protection, disarmament, human rights, consumer rights, etc, issues and problems whose scale confounds local and national solutions. There is some evidence to suggest the emergence of a fledgling global civil society which is part of our collective lives that is neither market nor government but is so often inundated by them.

22.3.2 Science and Technology and International Dependencies

Imperialism concentrated the accumulation of wealth in Europe and northern America (core) and drained the economic surplus from the other regions of the world (periphery). Once colonialism was overthrown, it was expected that the accumulation of wealth would take off in these countries and that the economic and technological gap between the developed core and

the developing periphery would close. This did not happen. Instead, the economic and technological gap kept on widening. One reason for this was that as colonies, the economies of these countries have been developed in a narrow way to serve the needs of the European home country. Liberation from colonial rule did not change underlying economic realities. The main products were usually those developed under colonialism and the main trading partners of these countries were usually their former colonial masters. As before, most developing states continued to occupy the same peripheral positions in the world system after independence.

The developing countries, in their multilateral negotiations with the industrial countries on the economic development issues, popularly known as the 'North-South dialogue', have sought to correct this dependency relationship through the restructuring of the international economic order. The main components of the restructuring efforts were better terms of trade with the industrial nations by way of greater investments and technology transfers, more local control over productive assets such as labour, capital and technology and greater participation in world economic institutions. In the 1970s, they succeeded in passing a UN resolution on New International Economic Order (NIEO) and sought to establish a New Information Order as well. But in the 1980s, the debt crisis, the ascendancy of the market forces in the industrial world (and in some parts of the developing world), the manifest failure of the non-market forces, and splits within the coalition of developing nations have weakened the NIEO policies. The emphasis in the North-South negotiations has shifted from long-term restructuring goals to coping with short-term coping strategies.

Since the 1980s, there has been an intensified integration of national economies and societies, moving nations to new levels of interdependence. Advances in transportation and communications technologies, in particular, have stimulated the growth of multinational corporations, of international trade and of integrated information networks making possible instant communications and transactions throughout the world. Have these developments altered the substance and character of the dependency relationships between the industrial and developing nations? Three changes of broad, generic impact stand out.

The first change in the character of dependency relations is a result simply of the greater significance of technology transfers in the relations between industrial and developing nations. Some countries in Southeast Asia, the so-called Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) have been successful in strengthening their technological capability and some among them (notably, Taiwan and Korea) have even become substantial producers and exporters of high technology. Other countries, like India and Brazil, have tried with extensive import substitution policies for technology coupled with protectionist measures to shield infant industry from external competition. But, barring a few selected achievements such as those of India in space technology and information technology services, their products have not been competitive in performance with foreign technologies.

While a couple of NICs have been able to turn their technological dependence into the more nearly equal mutual dependency, most developing countries remain dependent on the importation of technology from the industrial nations-some simply for the hardware which they cannot produce at home and others for the continuing flow of knowledge needed to infuse their indigenous scientific and technological efforts. By all indications, this dependence is most likely to continue with little overall change. Developing countries can do little to reduce the dependency, at least in the short run. The technology-transfer will continue to remain a central issue in the relations between the industrialised and the developing countries.

The second generic change in the nature of dependency relations stems from the effects of

technology on comparative advantage in trade and industrial relationship. Until recently, the comparative advantages that developing countries had were their low cost labour and raw materials. It was because of these advantages many firms of the industrialised countries had set up manufacturing units in the developing countries. Technological advances are eroding these comparative advantages. Technological developments in automation and management procedures are reducing the wage content in the cost of many manufacturing products. Natural resources are also becoming a smaller portion of the value added in manufacturing as technological change allows substitution or design that avoids costly inputs, and as economies move to knowledge-based high-technology industry with relatively much lower raw material content in final product. In a sense, the economies of the developing countries are hostage to technological developments over which they have no control or even inputs.

The development of global technological systems for information and other services is the source of another generic change in the character of dependency relations between the industrial and the developing nations. The economic importance of some of the systems that are characteristic of the advent of the space age in the late 1950s-space-based and ground-based weather, communication, remote-sensing, and navigational systems-is increasing steadily. Though the capability to design and develop satellites is limited to a few countries, and the capability to launch them into space to even fewer numbers, several countries have built massive infrastructure necessary to tie to these systems and to exploit the new services provided by satellites of various types. Over time, reliance on these systems has grown and the systems and their many offshoots have become integral parts of the economy in several countries. Equal access and assurance of continued availability of these systems are therefore important.

This system dependence makes the management and operating arrangements an important issue for all participating countries. When a system is owned and operated by an international entity such as the Intelsat (the organisation responsible for operating the primary international satellite communication system) participating countries are less concerned about the access and continuity of the system. When such a system is owned and operated by an individual country (like the United States, Soviet Union or France which had acquired those capabilities), there are heightened concerns over the access and continuity of the system for access could be denied for political reasons and continuity may not be assured as the system is controlled by domestic decision processes. It was these concerns over dependence on foreign services that prompted India in the 1960s to go for a self-reliant space programme with the capability to design, develop, and launch satellites for varied applications.

Though access to space systems has not been denied to anyone in the last four decades of space age, continuity of remote sensing services by the Landsat satellite that was owned by the United States were disrupted in the 1980s because of domestic pressures. The French SPOT satellite and later the Indian IRS satellites provided remote sensing data to users across the globe.

The dependencies on global technological systems are important additions to existing forms of dependency. Countries capable of providing these systems are growing, with India and China ready to enter the commercial market hitherto dominated by the United States, Russia and France. Developing countries see this development as a small consolation as they continue to be dependent on a very small number of systems and hence nations, if they wish to take advantage of the technologies. Many developing countries, therefore, prefer to see global technologies managed by international organisations. Their ideas struck sympathetic chords in the 1986 Soviet Union proposal of a World Space Organisation to manage all global activities. But, by and large industrial nations that first developed and deployed the systems prefer to reap

the benefits and to continue their control, rather than submit to international management.

22.3.3 Impact of Science and Technology on Military Affairs

Military power has been traditionally seen as the primary ordering principle in the international political system. Elements that affect military power are thus important to international affairs; science and technology have long been of particular significance, as a technological advantage in weapons or in support capability often lead to decisive superiority on the battlefield. As we saw, the expansion of the European empire in other regions of the world that began with the sail boat was completed with steam-ship and improved ordnance.

In the 20th Century, the growth of the institutional system for stimulating technological innovation has stimulated the tendency to stretch all parameters in weapons, their size, speed, power or capacity. This tendency has been fuelled further by the predisposition in security matters to use 'worst case' scenarios as a way of defining needed capabilities. The impact of this development has been two fold. At one level it led to the deployment of massive weapon systems in the Cold War confrontation between the East and the West, of a scale and character that far exceeded what could have been predicted at the outset of the arms race, or what is needed for these nations actual security. At another level, it has accelerated the pace of technological change in conventional weapons. Today, because of the arms transfer policies adopted by the industrialised nations to fulfil their strategic, political and military objective as well as because of the growing technological capabilities of the developing nations the military capacity generally available even to small states is expanding in attributes such as destructiveness, speed of response, mobility, reach, accuracy and cost-effectiveness.

The development of nuclear weapons provides a striking demonstration of the effort of changes in military technology on international relations. Like the railroad and the steamship before them, nuclear weapons have revolutionised the character of war and the power relations among states. These new weapons have widened the disparity between large (the two super powers which have amassed a huge stockpile of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems) and medium powers (the other nuclear powers) leading to a bipolar world. They have also increased the influence of scientific and military elite in state structures, and elevated new goals, such as deterrence and arms control, into the higher ranks of state purposes. Most important, because of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, war involving or threatening to involve nuclear weapons on both sides, is no longer seen as a rational policy option. Nuclear weapon states have also felt constrained in their use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states-even to the point of accepting defeat, as in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Nuclear weapons, in short, have come to serve the traditional purpose of ensuring the survival of the state only if they were never fired in anger.

An important technology related change in the security sector is its impact on geography as a geopolitical factor. Long range missiles, aircraft and submarines have reduced the significance of physical location as a determinant of the vulnerability of a nation.

Today, the effectiveness and relative strength of a nation's military forces are now a function of technology-of various aspects of the development, quality, and deployment of technology-more than at any time in the past. But the steady march of technology, the reduced time for delivery of weapons of mass destruction; the vulnerability of key command and control facilities and individuals; the increased flood of information that must be processed, selected and interpreted in severely limited time and the sheer complexity of the military systems and their interconnectedness are all diminishing the ability to maintain human control over central decisions

on the use of military force. This effect is particularly evident in control systems in which the applications of technology have made human intervention difficult, sometimes uncertain, and necessarily dependent on pre-programmed response.

22.4 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

One of the central organising elements of international affairs, cited often as the element on which science and technology has had the largest impact, is the principle of sovereignty. Some recent developments that have been stimulated or made possible by technological changes such as, the increase of economic interdependence, or the rise of multinational corporations, or the growing role of international institutions or the intensified world-wide communications are seen as the primary cause or causes of the erosion of national sovereignty.

It is true that there has emerged a large and expanding sector of national and international activities not under the direct control of the governments, nor accountable to them. This impinges on the authority of governments and constrains to varying degree their freedom of action or ability to order events. While this is indeed a significant aspect of the evolution in international affairs, has it really affected state sovereignty?

From the point of the realist school which equates sovereignty with the idea of statehood, the rise of alternative sources of power and influence outside the direct control of the government has not affected sovereignty. States remain sovereign as before. In this realist argument, the world remains an anarchic system of independent sovereign states which cooperate for the purpose of serving national interest-or are forced to cooperate by more powerful states-and allow the growth of interdependence for the same reasons. None of these alternative sources of power, whether they are multinational corporations or international organisations (whether governmental or non-governmental), have an independent status in the international system. They are dependent on the fundamental power of the nation state which still has the power to control and regulate these organisations. Whatever constraints exist on the authority and autonomy of the states are those that have been accepted by states, either voluntarily or under pressure of circumstances. The constraints imposed by interdependence on nation states do not challenge the principle of statehood.

Is the change in the autonomy and authority of the state large enough to be considered a system change? James Rosenau argues that a fundamental transformation in world politics has occurred, with the dynamics of technology serving as a major driving force. He argues that breakpoints or discontinuities occur when the primary parametres of the international system are transformed and such a transformation has indeed taken place due to the effects of technological change. Parallel to and overlapping the state-centric world, a multi-centric world has emerged in which no-state actors such as the international organisation, multinational corporations and even individuals are active. The emergence of these new actors on the international stage has reduced the predominance of states in the actual conduct of international relationships.

There is indeed a relative decrease of state power over the details of international activities. But this has not affected the substance of the international relations in any significant way. In fact, the traditional concepts have adapted to rapid changes in the international relations. Technology related changes may be modifying the dimensions of national autonomy but are not assumptions of autonomy in national policies, changing the substance of dependency relationships but not the fact of dependency, altering the nature of weapons but not denying a role for power

in international affairs, modifying the distribution of power and capabilities but not the significance of those attributes of states, creating new patterns of economic interaction among societies but leaving the management of the economic system largely in national hands, altering the relationships between government and nongovernmental actors but not the basic authority of governments, raising wholly new issues and altering traditional issues that must be dealt with internationally—but thereby making foreign policy more complex, not fundamentally different.

22.5 SUMMARY

In examining the evolution of the modern science and technology enterprise we have seen a few trends and patterns. First, since the late 19th Century, science has become a major impulse for technological development. A higher proportion of technology is science based than in earlier years. Secondly, there has been an exponential growth of scientific knowledge and technological innovations in the 20th Century, at least in the developed countries. Thirdly, both the cost of acquiring new scientific knowledge and the costs of product innovation appear to be increasing. Finally, we noted that scientific research and technological change has become increasingly subject to government control and direction.

We also examined the cumulative effect of scientific research and technological development in the four hundred years or so. These developments had a critical role in the evolution of modern states and the international system. They have accelerated the pace of integration of economies and societies, but have not substantially altered the dependency relationship between the industrial and the developing countries. In the security sector, advances in science and technology resulting in long range weapon system have diminished geography as a geopolitical factor. And nuclear weapons have led to a change in the expectations about the suitability of general war as a foreign policy option, at least when it involves nuclear weapon states.

22.6 EXERCISES

1. Describe the main trends in the development of technology in the 20th Century.
2. What has been the role of technology in the evolution of the international system?
3. In your assessment, what are the essential social resources necessary for technological innovations?
4. Examine the impact of the advances in science and technology on the developing countries.
5. Critically examine the impact of technological advances on state sovereignty.

UNIT 23 INEQUALITY AMONG NATIONS

Structure

- 23.1 Introduction
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23.1 INTRODUCTION

In the broad theory and practice of international relations, no less significant has been the subset of economic relations among nations over the centuries. During 19th Century, for instance, classical dictum ‘Trade as an Engine of Economic Growth’ dominated the economic thinking and had a persuasive appeal and a wider acceptability among the nations. Second, inequality among nations was not despicable since it was considered as the source of growth. Growth required capital accumulation, and it was the accumulations made possible by concentrating incomes that justified an unequal class structure. This system worked well-so long as growth did occur and the working classes enjoyed the benefit of a steadily rising living standard. But the First World War sounded the death-knell of this model.

Further, until the postwar years, the world economy witnessed not only the scourge of two world wars but also its collapse during the Great Depression of 1929-33. The creation of Bretton Woods ‘twins’ i.e., IMF and World Bank in 1944 set the stage for steady progress, stability and development in the industrial and developing countries till early 1970s. This period is often described as the ‘golden age of the world economy’ in terms of expansion of international trade and economic growth. However, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, characterised by fixed but adjustable exchange rates and international supervision of capital flows, ended a period of stable growth. Of course, there followed a short period of oil and commodity boom, with declining inequality fuelled by commercial debt. Global inequality thus fell in the late 1970s. Poor countries had the benefit of low interest rates and easy credit and high commodity prices, especially for oil. But in 1980-81 the phase of low interest rates and high commodity prices

ended. Since 1982 there was a beginning of unprecedented debt crisis in developing countries in the wake of high interest rates and low commodity prices, forcing severe cutbacks in the imports of developing countries. During 1980s there was resurgence of neo-liberal ideology with set back to the idea of national sovereignty and end of Keynesian policies. This led to an extraordinary systematic increase in inequality between rich and poor nations. However inequality in the decade of debt (1980s) also followed the period of rising inequality in the age of globalisation (1990s). The only significant region of declining inequality was Southeast Asia (till 1997); the direction changed however subsequently.

23.2 NATURE AND PATTERN OF INEQUALITY

23.2.1 Some Evidence on Inequality

A study of 77 countries with 82 per cent of the world's people shows that between 1950s and 1990s inequality rose in almost 45 countries and fell in 16. Many of these countries with rising inequality are those in Eastern Europe and the CIS that suffered negative or low growth in the 1990s. Latin America and Caribbean countries have among the world's highest income inequality. In 13 of the 20 countries with data for the 1990s, the poorest 10 per cent had less than 1/20 of the income of the richest 10 per cent. This high income inequality places millions in extreme poverty and severely limits the effects of equally shared growth.

Countries in East Asia and the Pacific exhibit no clear pattern, varying from the fairly equal Korea and Vietnam to the much equal Malaysia and the Philippines. In China, inequality has followed a U-shaped pattern, with inequality falling until the mid-1980s and rising since then. In India, inequality first fell and now has come to a halt. In 16 of the 22 Sub-Saharan countries in 1990s, the poorest 10 per cent of the population had less than 1/10 of income of the richest 10 per cent, and in 9 less than 1/20. Among OECD countries there is also diversity in income inequality, from the low levels in Austria and Denmark to the relatively high levels in the United Kingdom and the USA. These countries seem to have experienced a U-shaped change in inequality with declines in the 1970s, changing to increases in the 1980s and 1990s.

Another study compares the richest and the poorest people across the globe, providing a much more complete picture of world inequality than a simple comparison of country averages would. Some of the results of the study are notable: a) world inequality is very high. In 1993, the poorest 10 per cent of the world's people had only 1.6 per cent of the income of the richest 10 per cent; b) the richest 1 per cent of the population received as much income as the poorest 57 per cent in 1993; c) the richest 10 per cent of the US population had a combined income greater than that of poorest 43 per cent of the world's people; d) around 25 per cent of the world's people received 75 per cent of the world's income.

Further, according to UNDP's 1996 Human Development Report, in 1993 only US\$ 5 trillion of the US\$ 23 trillion global GDP was from the developing countries though they accounted for more than 80 per cent of total world population.

A number of studies estimate that the ratio of the incomes of the richest to the poorest countries increased at least six-fold between 1970 and 1985 and the average income gap between the richest and the poorest countries grew almost nine-fold i.e. from \$1500 to \$ 12000 during this period.

Efforts to reduce inequality through donors' aid to poorer countries could not solve the problem, since aid flows from rich to poor countries dropped more than 20 per cent during 1990s.

Another indicator of inequality is the spending on R&D in rich and poor countries. Nearly 85 per cent of total world spending on R&D occurs in OECD. USA and Japan each represent 2.5 per cent of their GDP spending on R&D as against 0.5 per cent in case of developing countries. Evidently, the world economy has witnessed increasing inequality and polarisation in the distribution of wealth. The above findings also show that the benefits of global economic growth have disproportionately gone to the previously wealthy nations and have led to accentuating the level of inequality.

23.2.2 Defining Inequality and Poverty

Inequality is not the same as poverty. Whereas the poverty is concerned with the absolute standard of living of a part of society i.e. the poor-inequality refers to relative living standard across the whole society. At maximum inequality, one person has everything and clearly, poverty is high. But minimum inequality (where all are equal) is possible with zero poverty (where no one is poor) as well as with maximum poverty (where all are poor). Poverty is thus the inability to attain a minimum standard of living.

But inequality is possible both in the case of poor and non-poor with different magnitudes. Inequality is, therefore, a stark and undeniable feature of present day world economic and political order.

23.2.3 Approaches to Measuring Inequality

Two major approaches to measuring inequality are i) currency rate conversions in assessing global income inequality and ii) purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates used to convert incomes into a common currency in which differences in national price levels are eliminated. Both approaches to measuring inequality produce different results. Using exchange rates not only produce much higher measure of inequality, but also affect trends in inequality.

Based on country averages, income inequality between the world's richest and poorest in 1970 and 1997 was as follows: with the exchange rate measure, the ratio of the income of the richest 20 per cent to that of the poorest 20 per cent grew from 34 to 1 in 1970 to 70 to 1 in 1997. With the PPP measure, the ratio fell from 15 to 1 to 13 to 1 during the same period. Although both measures show increasing inequality between the richest and the poorest, the exchange rate measure shows much larger increase than the rise in real living standards (shown by purchasing power parity measure). Income levels across countries have been both diverging and converging-with some regions closing the income gap and others drifting away. In 1960 there was a bunching of regions, with East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa having an average per capita income around 1/9 to 1/10 of that in high income OECD countries. Latin America fared somewhat better but still had just 1/3 to ½ of the per capita income of those OECD countries. By 1990s however, Asia Pacific per capita income rose to 1/5; in South Asia after worsening in the 1960s and 1970s remains about 1/10 of that in OECD. In Sub-Saharan Africa, per capita income deteriorated to 1/18 by 1998 as against 1/9 in 1960.

23.2.4 Inequality and Development: Differing Views

Writing on development theory, Simon Kuznets' famous hypothesis linked equality to the development process. Kuznets argued that as industrialisation began, it might lead to an increasing inequality at first; but as industrialisation deepens, the centre of economic activities would shift to cities. And the growing share of wage-earning class would have access to purchasing power to demand consumption goods and thus tending to move in the direction of more money

incomes.

However Kuznets hypothesis has recently come under attack. With trade union movements in disorder and welfare states in disrepute, the Kuznets hypothesis is dismissed as non-conforming by recent data suggesting that there is no contradiction between inequality and development.

The ‘East Asian Miracle’ (EAM) hypothesis that development and rising equality normally occur together also vindicated the results of the Kuznets hypothesis and it has been argued that despite many efforts to measure inequality at the national level, nothing much has happened to bring these measurements together in a single global data set. However, a study undertaken by Klaus Deigning and Lyn Squire of the World Bank on income inequality shows no consistent pattern emerging among the much sought-after systematic relationship between inequality, income and growth. Some analysts seem to confirm the Kuznets hypothesis. Others argued instead that inequality first falls and then rises with rising income: the opposite pattern. The EAM findings of a relationship between low income inequality and later growth was supported, and then questioned, on the ground that the relationship seemed to rest on continent-specific differences between Latin America and Asia.

Technical development raises the relative productivity of the well trained, therefore, pay the skilled more and the unskilled less. In these cases, inequalities expressed as clusters of privileged opportunity will foster more rapid growth. Economists have broached four different possibilities each with different implications for the strategy of economic development.

The redistributionist view holds that egalitarian social policies are a pre-condition for growth and points to the Asian miracle as evidence. This view emphasises land reform and education, but tends to resist intervention in market processes once preconditions have been successfully met.

Neo-liberal view is that policymakers should go for growth, concentrating resources on comparative advantage, exports, and the fostering of technological change. Inequality may well rise, but the success of a growth strategy makes the sacrifice worthwhile.

The Kuznets and Keynes view implies that increasing equality is the normal outcome of a process of rising incomes-whether fast or slow-and that social welfare policies are normal outgrowths of the transition to an urban industrial economy. This perspective does not presuppose that redistribution should precede growth; it only implies that inequality will decline as the development process matures.

The Scotch verdict is that development process may be unrelated to social and economic inequalities in any systematic way; this is the fallback position of some who argue for growth as the sole development objective.

23.3 INEQUALITY: MAJOR CAUSES

23.3.1 Uneven International Economic System

Historically, factors explaining inequality among nations have been neo-colonial patterns of centre-periphery dependence shown by adverse terms of trade of developing countries *vis-à-vis* developed countries. In 1949, Raul Prebisch, the Argentine economist revealed in his study that during 1870-1914, the developing countries of Latin America suffered terms of trade losses against the industrial countries and hence there was lot of divergence between the level of incomes of Centre and Periphery members.

More recently, during the 1980s for example, prices of many primary commodities fell to their lowest levels since Second World War. Non-oil commodity prices declined for most of the decade, although they recovered a little in 1988. By 1989, average commodity prices were still 33 per cent lower than in 1980. Oil prices also fell steadily between 1980 and 1986.

The decline in terms of trade during the 1980s has been most pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. The fall in prices during the 1980s cost Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa 13 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively of their exports' real import purchasing power relative to the 1970s.

The world economy turned a new leaf when in 1982, negative real interest rates turned positive which led to an increasingly noticeable division between the Haves with capital assets and the Have-nots depending only on income from work and the job markets.

23.3.2 Power Game in International Politics

The power game in international politics has co-opted certain countries and aligned them with the rich countries while majority of the developing countries are marginalised. The Bretton Woods twins established (IMF and World Bank) in 1944 moved in a unilateral way in imposing their adjustment programmes on debt-ridden countries in the early 1980s. The 'Washington Consensus' further strengthened the forces of market-friendly policies in case of raising funding from IMF-World Bank. Although in United Nations Organisations, there is an overwhelming majority of developing countries, the decision-making power still vests with a select group of developed countries. In seeking loan from IMF-World Bank, USA exercises the veto power, owing to its major quota holding in these institutions. The functioning of the WTO is another example where the will of the 'richmen's club' reigns supreme to promote and facilitate the expansion of world trade. Market access for the commodities of developing world still suffers from a variety of NTBs imposed by the developed world. Massive subsidies provided by European governments to their farmers block the exports of agriculture commodities from the developing world. All these factors accentuate inequality among the rich industrial countries and the poor developing countries.

23.3.3 Emerging Labour Markets and Skill Differentials

In the 1990s, two disturbing tendencies in the labour market were noticed which added pressure in the direction of greater inequality. The first is the growing disparity between the wages of highly skilled workers and those who have lower levels of skills. The second tendency is the low level of generation of formal employment and the consequent deterioration in the quality of jobs. Almost 8 out of 10 jobs created in the 1990s correspond to low-quality jobs in the informal sector.

The sudden resurgence of inequality is also manifested in the post-industrial revolution that is currently taking place. Four categories of income earners emerge in these scenario-symbolic analysts i.e. the producer/generator of ideas; workers in the services sector; workers linked with the welfare state, and workers in routine production jobs exposed to the dangers of factory relocations or sectoral restructuring. While the first three categories of workers enjoy certain in-built immunity system from the vagaries of markets, the last category suffers the most in terms of unemployment or shrinkage of wage rate. For example, the advent of information technology and the opening of world markets have created an economic order, which is founded on the production/generation of ideas. Consequently, it manifests greater inequality than

manufacturing products at the lowest possible cost. Unskilled workers are the first victims and pay high price for this transformation.

The growing inequality in wages as a function of levels of skill does not seem to be confined to a particular region. Indeed a recent report by UNCTAD (1997) indicates that this may be an almost universal pattern, since it has also affected a number of industrial countries and some rapidly growing economies in the Asia Pacific region and has particularly given rise to pressure on the middle class in many countries.

23.4 INEQUALITY: EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES

- a) **Reverse Flow of Resources:** The debt crisis of early 1980s had deleterious effects with reverse flow of resources from poor to rich nations and savage cutbacks in the volume of imports of the debt-ridden countries. This has been one of the major effects of the process of integration carried out in the 1980 under circumstances of unsustainable finance in which wealth has flowed upwards from the poor countries to the rich, and mainly to the upper financial strata of the richest countries.
- b) **Pitfalls of Concentration of Wealth:** Inequality can exacerbate the effects of market and policy failures on growth and thus on progress against poverty. Inequality turns out to be a special problem in poor countries where imperfect markets and institutional failures are common. In case of weak capital markets poor people lacking good collaterals are unable to borrow, limiting their start-up of small businesses and reducing overall growth and limiting opportunities for poor people. Although growth is not always sufficient to advance human development and reduce income poverty, the experiences of several Asia Pacific countries suggest that it makes a big contribution.

Concentration of income at the top can undermine the kinds of public policies such as support for high quality universal public education. Developing and implementing good social policies are especially difficult where inequality takes the form of concentration at the top combined with substantial poverty at the bottom.

- c) **Damaging the Social Fabric:** The forces of globalisation have, further, led to an increase in inequality not only amongst the nations but also within countries during 1990s. The advent of the market economy has also spilled over to form a separate market society that has had a destructive effect on the social fabric of the nations embedded in the globalisation process. Inequality, therefore, erodes social capital, including the sense of the trust and citizen responsibility that are key to the formation and sustainability of sound public institutions. Differences in income inequality across countries are closely associated with differences in rates of crime and violence.

23.5 STRATEGY TO REDUCE INEQUALITY

Neo-colonial patterns of centre-periphery dependence and crushing debt burden left the developing countries to fend themselves off. There has hardly been any assumption of responsibility by the rich countries for this state of affairs of the poor countries. Not only this, the rich countries have done away with the pretence of attempting to foster development in the world at large, but also have preferred to substitute the rhetoric of ungoverned markets to take automatic care of developmental issues.

Following the debate between Rawlsian and Utilitarian Schools of Thought, while the former emphasises that society's sole economic goal should be to improve the position of the least disadvantaged and limiting the inequality can benefit the poor; the latter School opines that accelerated growth can take care of the disadvantaged group in the society. By limiting inequality, the society's consumption may fall. However given the centrality of redistribution in modern politics, most rich societies are still divided on this issue.

In the struggle against inequality under the presence of globalisation, the poor countries are advised to implement pro-poor growth policies, improve poverty and social impact analysis and amongst multilateral and bilateral development agencies, efforts need to be carried out in the direction of aligning their programmes with country-specific strategy. The UN Millennium Declaration has a target till 2015 to bringdown the proportion of the world's people living on less than \$1 a day.

Second, with regard to the functioning of the labour markets particularly in the developing countries, perhaps the single change that would do most to reduce global inequality over the medium term would be closing of the "knowledge gap", giving people in developing countries access to new technology and quality education.

23.6 SUMMARY

Inequality among nations, in the economic sense, shows disparate and uneven standards of living enjoyed by the people of different nations. Although inequality has persisted since time immemorial among nations and was not as much acute and magnified in 19th Century as it has been witnessed at the end of 20th Century.

Inequality and poverty, though different in letter and spirit, reinforce each other. Inequality, according to the neo-liberal view, should not be despicable as it leads to higher rate of capital accumulation and growth in the country. Redistributionists take a contrary view as the experience of East Asia has shown that equality and development co-exist.

Inequality has several adverse effects leading to the successive periods of economic crisis in developing countries, concentration of wealth and finally damaging the social fabric. Rawlsian prescription to reduce inequality is to emphasise society's sole economic goal to improve the position of the least disadvantaged. The opposite camp of neo-liberals is highly obsessed with growth, which can automatically take care of the disadvantaged group.

The industrially developed world eulogises the virtues of free market ideology

and the poor developing world is advised to implement pro-poor growth policies and at the same time remove the 'knowledge gap' to participate in the evolving world economic order. Whatever inequalities remain, they are themselves to be blamed and should rectify the existing imbalances and disparities in their countries.

23.7 EXERCISES

1. Trace briefly the evolution of the concept of inequality.
2. Show some major indicators of inequality at the global level.
3. Distinguish between inequality and poverty.

4. What are the two approaches to measuring inequality?
5. List the different views on inequality and development.
6. Identify major causes of inequality.
7. List any four of the effects of inequality.
8. Distinguish between Rawlsian and Utilitarian Schools of Thought.
9. Give two strategic planks to reduce inequality among nations.

UNIT 24 GLOBAL CORPORATISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Structure

- 24.1 Introduction
 - 24.2 Globalisation and Globalism
 - 24.3 Core Characteristics of Global Corporatism
 - 24.4 Constituent Corporatist Global Structures
 - 24.5 Sovereignty of State
 - 24.6 Impact on State Sovereignty
 - 24.7 Limited Sovereignty or Enhanced Sovereignty
 - 24.8 Summary
 - 24.9 Exercises
-

24.1 INTRODUCTION

In an earlier unit, an attempt was made to understand the term “globalisation” both in respect of its content and significance in order that it serves as a basis to apply it or appreciate it in the study of International Relations. Based on an evaluation of the meaning and dimensions of globalisation along the lines delineated in the earlier unit, an attempt is made in the present unit to raise the issue of nation-state sovereignty in the current context of the ‘globalising’ world. In doing so, in this unit answers to two basic questions are sought: 1) what kind of structure is evolving with which the process of globalisation is closely associated; and 2) what impact the evolving structure is making on the nation-state especially in respect of its sovereignty.

According to most observers, the evolving structure is drastically different from the institutionalised international structures that determined and influenced world politics in the past. So much so, the present so called “new” world order is already impacting adversely on the past structures, as is evidenced in the reduced scope and efficacy of the United Nations system and, at the same time, enhancing the hegemonic role of certain global corporatists’ interests in world politics and economics. As a consequence, the currently perceived shift, in the view of some observers, has profound implications for the nature of interactions both among and within nation-states impinging critically on the exercise of their inherent sovereignty.

24.2 GLOBALISATION AND GLOBALISM

It is generally agreed that globalisation is a multivalent concept explaining a diverse variety of complex and interrelated processes, structures, forces, agents and effects. In that sense the phenomenon of globalisation is historical, multilevel, inter-disciplinary and holistic in perspective. Admittedly therefore, questions that concern globalisation are as follows: Whether the currently witnessed globalisation in the sense in which it is perceived is really under way? Is it producing convergence and integration? Does it characterise the present era, and if so, how does this era differ from the past? Is the process producing a global culture, a global economy and a global political system? Above all, is it undermining or enhancing the authority of sovereign nation states?

Generally speaking, globalisation is regarded as a global process of increasing cross-border flows of products, services, capital, people, information and culture. Seen in this perspective, some are of the view that globalisation has “compressed” the world both in terms of time and space whereas others are of the view that it has caused “distanctiation” of space and time. Therefore, the discourse on globalisation has been increasingly heated between those who employ the concept as the label for what they consider to be an unfolding process of global economic, political and cultural integration that is bringing about the progressive integration of the human society and those who use the concept to describe a largely inequitable process of transnational ‘corporatist’ expansionism that involves the increasing and indiscriminate exploitation of both human and natural resources by some vested interests.

In close association with the concept of globalisation, the term “globalism” is also employed in a multivalent and contested manner. While some use the concept of “globalism” to denote an ideology that seeks to advance the global integration through “free” markets and trade as well as the global application of new information, communication and transportation technologies, others use it to identify a process dominated by large transnational corporations and inter-governmental institutions and structures that are both inherently undemocratic and detrimental to both human welfare and natural resources.

In yet another sense, “globalism” is being used to characterise the view that globalisation has created a new historical epoch of “globality” as opposed to “modernity” or “post-modernity”. In this process, global agents are undermining the political and economic sovereignty of the nation-state and in its place laying the foundations for a single global economic, cultural and political system.

24.3 CORE CHARACTERISTICS OF GLOBAL CORPORATISM

Before identifying the core characteristics of global corporatism, it is necessary to understand what denotes corporatism. In Political Science discourse, the term “corporatism” is defined as a system of interest representation in which constituent units are organised into limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive and functionally differentiated categories. They are granted by the state a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories for observing some controls for articulation of demands and supports. In nation-state systems, certain interest groups say, labour or peasantry, is deliberately reorganised and, thereby, essentially “captured” by the government. As a result, these reorganised groups function not as pluralist interest groups negotiating independently with employers, but presented their demands mostly through state apparatus. By granting representational monopoly to these interest groups within their respective categories, the state exercises authority and control for articulation of demands of the interests they represent and extends supports. Often, distinctions are also made between what are called “inclusionary” and “exclusionary” corporatism wherein the former seeks to integrate new groups into the bosom of the state before they become organised on an autonomous basis, and the latter attempts to bring groups under control after they begin to act and function independently. Finally, corporatist experiments have normally been a response to real or imagined political crisis that threatened the dominant interests of groups or class, be it economic or otherwise.

In many respects the evolving global system seems to reflect the above-mentioned features of corporatism at a global level. As some scholars contend that whereas globalisation is a process, globalism is a project based on a “new” logic, which as a “historical category”, encompasses

all processes and structures of domination developing on a worldwide scale.

Mention was made earlier that the corporatist experiments have more often been a response to crisis that threatened the dominant interests groups. At least three major and unprecedented events in the recent past have cumulatively contributed to a situation of crisis to the world capitalist class. The first is the end of the super power Cold War and the consequent collapse of the socialist ‘Second World’ often portrayed as the triumph of transnational capitalism. The second is the disintegration and further marginalisation of the so-called ‘Third World’ developing countries saddled with high levels of external indebtedness. The third, is the far-reaching changes brought about by the multiple and profound innovations in a variety of technology areas including in the information and communication resulting in the reduction of time, space and cost.

As a consequence, the polarities that existed in the post-Second World War among nation-states-between the East and the West and between the North and the South-have been replaced in recent years by a single core-periphery global order. The Western core or the so called ‘First World’, has remained as it was-an interdependent and stratified bloc of dominant economic interest, whereas the other two-the ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ worlds have collapsed into a complex set of actors, including the ‘newly industrialising’, ‘developing’, ‘poor’ and ‘transitional’ countries.

24. 4 CONSTITUENT CORPORATIST GLOBAL STRUCTURES

In the wake of these developments, interactions are taking place no more between nation-states as in the past but between transnationally integrated dominant capitalist class and its clients on the one hand and the fragmented mass of subordinate social and economic sectors on the other. Towards the task of evolving such a global regime, the dominant economic interests have been engaged in rebuilding the institutions of the past and also building a number of new functionally differentiated non-competitive structures for observing and exercising controls for articulation of demands and supports for the fragmented mass of subordinate social and economic sectors.

The formal decision-making structures of the emerging global economic regime are the recently established World Trade Organisation (WTO) superceding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the already existing International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) commonly known as the World Bank; the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the so called Group 7 countries (G-7) which includes since recently one more-Russia-in a more subordinate role, the already established major trading blocs such as importantly North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), European Union (EU) and a host of lesser trading blocs across the world; and above all, a sizeable number of multinational/transnational corporations (MNCs/TNCs) in production, manufacturing and service sectors.

Such as it is, the evolving global structure finds its correlate in the internal mechanisms of macroeconomic management and restructuring within nation-states such as the finance, economic and trade ministries, treasury boards and central banks. The formal linkage with the nation-state systems is provided by international agreements and external conditionalities attached to fiscal, monetary and credit policies. In the process certain interest groups say, labour or peasantry, is deliberately reorganised and, thereby, essentially “captured” by the global economic regime. As a result, these reorganised groups are no more able to function as pluralist interest groups negotiating independently as in the past. Instead they have been forced to abide by the rules set by the formal decision-making structures at the global level. By granting representational monopoly to these decision-making regulatory global institutions within their respective categories,

the dominant world economic elites exercise authority and control over the global economy to serve their common interests. Decisions that reflect their interests are presented as the “desire of the world community” in order to give global legitimacy to their actions and initiatives made in these international economic institutions.

Seen in this perspective, as some scholars justifiably argue, globalisation is not an “inevitable and natural” phenomenon in its current phase. Rather it is the result of a vast and prolonged conflict for the control of power by the forces of “free” capitalism. One of the serious consequences of this process of globalisation is the increasing erosion of the sovereignty of the nation-state—an aspect that is dealt in the following section.

24.5 SOVEREIGNTY OF STATE

According to most scholars, states today act and function in an environment massively transformed and distorted by forces of globalisation. Globalisation is thereby presented as an “exogenous” factor. It has created a new environment in which states have to find their way. At its best, as one line of argument suggests, state should act and react uniformly in consonance with globalisation. At worst, as the other line of argument suggests, the state should not act at all! In either event, the traditional function of the state has come under question.

Both positions are based on the state because what is at risk from globalisation is after all the state’s sovereignty. And sovereignty, according to conventional wisdom, penetrates to the very essence of the state. Among the different attributes of the state, sovereignty has traditionally been regarded as the foremost. So much so, these two terms-sovereignty and state-are often deemed to be inseparable.

Having stated thus, what however needs some clarification is whether sovereignty has always been static or otherwise. In other words, whether or not states have, in the past, delegated or devolved their range of powers and at the same time assumed new ones. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, namely that sovereignty has not always been static but fluid and flexible and that the states had delegated traditional powers and traded for and acquired new powers, can it then be said that the state sovereignty under the impulse of globalisation may perhaps actively refashion itself and, to that extent, determine the future course of globalisation.

This is a question that undoubtedly needs critical consideration. On that basis, it may be possible to gain some useful insights on the formulation whether or not globalisation and sovereignty can be construed as each other’s negation. Put simply, will the tragic retreat of the sovereign state pave the triumphal march of a global system or *vice versa*?

24.6 IMPACT ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY

The question of the impact of globalisation on state sovereignty may be examined from two perspectives-1) from the perspective of the traditional understanding of nation-state sovereignty and 2) from the perspective of the phenomenon of globalisation. Let us see from the side of sovereignty about which our ideas, as belonging to the different discipline of International Relations (IR), are somewhat definitive. For, IR scholars have not always felt easy or at ease with the concept and meaning of sovereignty. Needless to state, sovereignty has long remained a controversial subject for them.

Many scholars dismissed any analysis of sovereignty as a meaningless academic “exercise” but

they could not, however, ignore it as a working functional concept in their analysis. With that came their formulation that for purposes of IR theory, sovereignty has to be treated as dualistic in nature-double-faced, having both an internal and external dimension. Paradoxically therefore, we have landed ourselves in a situation where the very unity of sovereignty finds expression in its bifurcation when we study IR.

In turn, this paradox had triggered fierce academic argument between the pundits of Political Science on the one hand and the scholars of the IR on the other. Eventually, Political Scientists yielded ground on account of the appeal of dualism implicit in the concept of sovereignty. Equally relenting and compromising were the IR scholars who acknowledged that after all the “external” aspect of sovereignty is but intrinsically a by-product of the “internal” elements of sovereignty. Such acknowledgement to the state’s internal/external sovereignty became the progenitor of international relations.

Over the years, the dualistic consideration was subjected to further modification, perceiving the state and its domestic sovereignty as themselves partially created by an international system of which both state and sovereignty are an integral part. Thus sovereignty proceeded at two levels with a finer distinction brought to fore between state “authority” and state “control”. State “authority” depicted sovereignty as a status bestowed on the state by recognition and, therefore, it is constant in time whereas state “control” is to mean its substantive capacity, and therefore, it is a historic variable. So much so, inter-state relations may tend to reduce a state’s autonomy in respect of its “control” but cannot and never question the legal entitlement of sovereignty.

In other words, it may limit a given state’s *effective control* but not the *authority* on which it is based. This distinction underlines that individual areas of capacity to control may diminish but the overall form will remain constant, such that state control or capacity is variable but the state’s identity is rooted in authority and, therefore, remains unchanged. Implicit in this distinction is also the claim that sovereignty is an absolute and, therefore, there can be no degrees of sovereignty nor can it be progressively eroded or enlarged.

Against the above delineation of the evolution of the concept of sovereignty, let us now move forward to address the question from the side of globalisation viz. is globalisation by its very nature the negation of state sovereignty? Are they inversely related? Put positively, can the two co-exist peacefully? Or, more plainly, what is the relationship between globalisation and sovereignty?

Odd as it may seem, if it is suggested, as some scholars do, that globalisation needs sovereignty not only as a political infrastructure to sustain it but also conceptually. They argue that were not sovereignty still a meaningful part of the way we describe the present world order, we would have no need for a concept such as globalisation. From this perspective, they point out that the very idea of globalisation is inherently dependent upon that of sovereignty.

That the two-globalisation and sovereignty-are not locked in a zero sum game, is, as some suggest, evident when we turn the pages of history. For, if any one political practice has become globalised during the past Century then it is admittedly sovereignty. As a consequence of the retreat of imperialism and empire states, a process of political globalisation had set in thanks to which sovereignty had expanded at least in the numerical sense. There are approximately more than 200 “sovereigns” on the face of the earth. Also, sovereignty has proliferated geographically, reaching out to the remote corners of the world. In that sense, it may be argued that the earlier phase of globalisation i.e. the decolonisation phase has been a win-win outcome for both globalisation and sovereignty.

In the current phase of globalisation, catalysed largely by technology and concretised by the emergence of a powerful, paramount global economy, the ability of the state to delineate and manage a separate national economy independent of the global economy is no doubt severely impaired and drastically curtailed. But this is not anything new. For, constraints on the autonomy have always been the case as the structuralists contend. We are all familiar with the constant refrain of the Marxists and *Dependencia* scholars in the larger discipline of International Political Economy, claiming that for states in the developing or the Third World, the formal recognition of sovereignty coinciding with their peripheral role in the capitalist global order, has resulted in the failure to achieve sovereignty substantively. Therefore, as some of the strident votaries of this persuasion often argued, the Third World countries were ever condemned to the status of “quasi-states”.

If that were the case, why then should we have to perceive the current phase as a new phenomenon and call it ‘globalisation’? It is here one has to differentiate the impact of globalisation from the effects of interdependence. For, the consequences of globalisation are recognisably different from those resulting from interdependence. Whereas the interdependent world system impinged solely upon the autonomy element of sovereignty, globalisation on the other hand, additionally unsettles the core element of sovereignty, namely the formal “authority”. As some scholars have convincingly argued that not only is globalisation distinct from interdependence, but also it represents a much more fundamental assault on the traditional barricades of sovereignty. To them, it entails a shift in both the domestic and international manifestation of sovereignty. Also, it produces a new realignment between its constituent elements such as authority and autonomy. For these reasons, they say that arguments deployed to demonstrate that interdependence has not irreparably damaged state sovereignty, cannot be simply extended to the effects of globalisation. Upon this, they are of the view that globalisation and interdependence cannot be treated as the same process.

This is evident admittedly from the challenge that globalisation poses to the concept and content of sovereignty. Not only globalisation has impacted adversely on the territoriality element of sovereignty, but also more vitally it has impaired the “identity” and “authority” elements of sovereignty. These unsettling effects of globalisation have led to a new situation in which decisions and outcomes do not correspond to the choice of the sovereign states and also are not contained within the territorial confines of the state. National boundaries have become truly porous. The identity element of sovereignty is also compromised with the emergence of civil society to which absolute authority reposed in the state has now become diluted.

24.6 LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY OR ENHANCED SOVEREIGNTY

In its wake, the process of globalisation has also yielded place to new networks of authority such as importantly, the international regimes quite vocal and visible in the realm of global security in all its dimensions. Here, mention may be made of such of the recently conceived and enforced international regimes on issues relating to vital human security such as human rights, environmental protection and so on. The emergence of new norms envisaged in these international regimes, it is argued, need be neither a constraint nor a signal of the decline of sovereignty. Rather, they represent an evolution of what sovereignty signifies. It may therefore be postulated that in terms of globalisation, sovereignty is undergoing a process of readjustment reflecting thereby the different terms of engagement between its external and internal dimensions.

Just as in the past, when sovereignty’s formal and substantive elements repositioned themselves,

in the present context it is being reconstituted as part of its engagement with globalisation. In its reconstitution some shifts are apparent in its substantive elements too. If in the past, the “control/capacity” aspects tended to become variables and “authority” remained a constant, now in the currently globalising phase, both have become variables. Thus, as some analysts argue, sovereignty might be undergoing transformation rather than being undermined or becoming redundant.

What then are the indications of such transformation? They are to be found mainly in the new identities, and in the less territorialised and sometimes totally deterritorialised practices as mentioned earlier. Whereas, for much of its historical development, the state forged a close link between its territoriality and its primary functions-economic, political and security—that link has now become more tenuous. Perhaps, in the future, it may be no longer necessary to the effective performance of these functions. Instead, the state through its exercise of sovereignty in the post-Cold War era is legitimised less by its relationship with a given piece of territory and more by its ability to ensure the political rights of its citizens.

As sovereign, the state therefore seeks to remake and refashion itself in response to the conflict in domestic and international pressures by discarding some of its traditional capacities. While abdicating, it is also at the same time and by the same token acquiring new capacities. While it delegates some functions to the international and transnational bodies, (yet) it arrogates for itself, some authority to monitor the effective functioning of these bodies and regimes. In turn, such shifts in the delegation and arrogation of state capacities are likely to transform the content of the formal doctrine of sovereignty.

24.7 SUMMARY

Based on an evaluation of the meaning and dimensions of globalisation, an attempt was made, in the course of this unit, to raise the issue of nation-state sovereignty in the current context of the ‘globalising’ world. In doing so, a preliminary question was raised namely whether or not the current globalisation, regarded as a process of increasing cross-border flows of products, services, capital, people, information and culture in its wake, is creating a ‘global corporatist’ structure. If that be so, in what ways it affects the nation-state sovereignty. Regarding the first question, it was suggested that in many respects the evolving process of globalisation is admittedly developing ‘corporatist’ structures across the world. By granting representational monopoly to the decision-making regulatory global institutions within their respective categories, the dominant world economic elite exercise authority and control over the global economy to serve their common interests.

The second issue discussed at length in the unit related to the question of nation-state sovereignty and globalisation. The question of the impact of globalisation on state sovereignty was examined from two perspectives—from the perspective of the traditional understanding of nation-state sovereignty and from the perspective of globalisation. Seen from the former perspective, it was pointed out that state sovereignty—defined as authority and control—historically speaking, was not static and was often traded for new and additional capacities. Whereas seen from the latter perspective of globalisation, it was pointed out that while the state, in effect, has delegated and surrendered some functions to the international and transnational ‘corporatists’ structures, yet it could by networking with the civil society acquire for itself authority and additional capacities to monitor the effective functioning of these bodies and regimes. In turn, such shifts in the delegation and arrogation of state capacities themselves may, in the future, redefine the concept and content of the formal doctrine of nation-state sovereignty.

24.9 EXERCISES

1. Briefly examine the concepts of globalism and globalisation.
2. Describe the core characteristics of global corporatism and identify the global structures, which embody ‘corporatist’ features.
3. What, in your view, is the impact of globalisation on nation-state sovereignty?
4. Do you agree that nation-state sovereignty has historically been changing?
5. It is said that under the process of globalisation nation-state sovereignty has become enhanced and eroded. Discuss.

UNIT 25 HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Structure

- 25.1 Introduction
 - 25.2 Internationalisation of Human Rights
 - 25.3 The Growth of World Trade: An Overview
 - 25.4 The Role of World Trade Organisation
 - 25.5 Transnational Corporation's Accountability of Human Rights
 - 25.6 Rights of Indigenous People
 - 25.7 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
 - 25.8 Marginalisation of Poor Countries
 - 25.9 Regulating International Trade: Code of Conduct for TNCs
 - 25.10 Summary
 - 25.11 Exercises
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25.1 INTRODUCTION

Contemporary International Relations has been witnessing two significant developments. One, since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 a huge corpus of human rights law has been evolved under its aegis. As a result, the term 'human rights' has become a "catch word" in contemporary discourses. In fact, human rights can be said to have become, as the former Secretary General of the U.N., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, said in his opening statement to the World Conference on Human Rights (14-25 June 1993) in Vienna, Austria, "the common language of humanity and the ultimate norm of all politics". Second, we are witnessing the globalisation of the world economy. There has been a rapid transformation of the world economy: the reduction of national barriers to trade and investment, the expansion of telecommunications and information systems, the introduction of e-commerce, the increasing role of multinational enterprises, global inter-firm networking arrangements and alliances, regional economic integration and the development of a single unified world market. Under such a milieu, there has been a consistent and faster growth of international trade which has been institutionalised and regulated with the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, which had, for long, controlled economies and markets, has contributed further to this process of globalisation of the world economy and trade.

Many scholars and nations assert and believe that the participation of developing/poor countries in international trade will contribute greatly to their economic prosperity and industrial growth and this will consequently help in raising the standard of life of their people. Further, it is assumed that this prosperity might ultimately improve human conditions and the prospects of human rights of everyone. Contrary to such assertions and beliefs of the protagonists of free trade, human rights are at great risk as international trade primarily works on the principle of profit making rather than promoting and respecting them. Professor Upendra Baxi critically

remarks that the paradigm of human rights of all human beings is steadily, but surely, subverted by trade-related practices. The main focus of this unit is to explain how human rights of the people, specially the workers, are violated by profit making Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and industrialised states that are under their tremendous influence.

25.2 INTERNATIONALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

One of the greatest, in fact, revolutionary, developments in the annals of human history is that for the first time in international relations a comprehensive list of “human rights” has been recognised which every individual, irrespective of his/her origin, religion, race, colour, sex, nationality, etc. can claim as a member of human society. Since 1948 the United Nations has adopted nearly 100 human rights instruments (such as declarations, conventions, covenants, protocols, and resolutions) on various facets of human rights, covering the entire gamut of human relationship. However, it must be noted that the most important among all these instruments are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966, which together form the parts of the International Bill of Rights. This Bill, the first ever adopted in the history of the world, has brought the matter of promoting human rights on the agenda of international relations.

Let us briefly discuss the rights that are mentioned in the International Bill. The UDHR, which was Magna Carta of mankind, proclaims civil-political and economic, social and cultural rights. The two Covenants of 1966 further elaborate these two sets of rights mentioned in the UDHR. The Covenants are legally binding on ratifying states unlike the provisions of the UDHR. It may be noted that the right to property included in UDHR (Art.17) is missing in the two Covenants.

The ICCPR sets out the following rights (under Articles 6-27): right to life; freedom from torture and inhuman treatment; freedom from slavery and forced labour; the right to liberty and security; the right of detained persons to be treated with humanity; freedom from imprisonment for debt; freedom of movement and of choice of residence; freedom of aliens from arbitrary expulsion; the right to a fair trial; protection against retroactivity of the criminal law; the right to recognition as a person before law; the right to privacy; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; prohibition of propaganda for war and of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred; the right of peaceful assembly; freedom of association; the right to marry and found a family; the rights of the child; political rights; equality before the law and rights of minorities. Thus, this is an exhaustive list, and there are more rights in ICCPR than in the UDHR or the European Convention on Human Rights.

Similarly, the ICESCR also provides a detailed list of rights (under Articles 6-15) to be protected by State Parties. These include: the right to work; the right to just and favourable conditions of work including fair wages, equal pay for equal work and holidays with pay; the right to form and join trade unions, including the right to strike; the right to social security; protection of the family, including special assistance for mothers and children; the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing and the continuous improvement of living conditions; the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the right to education, primary education being compulsory and free for all, and secondary and higher education generally accessible to all and the right to participate in cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.

Thus, these two Covenants provide the most basic human rights. Besides these two UN instruments, there are two other sets of human rights norms which conflict with international

trade practices. They are rights of the workers and the environmental rights. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has adopted around 150 Conventions, dealing with, among others, conditions of work, remuneration, child and forced labour, the provision of holidays and social security, prevention of discrimination in employment and trade union rights. There are some 200 multilateral environmental agreements in existence today containing some form of trade measures.

25.3 THE GROWTH OF WORLD TRADE: AN OVERVIEW

Let us briefly look at the phenomenal growth of world trade in contemporary world. During the last five decades the world exports have increased ten fold, even after adjusting for inflation, consistently growing faster than world Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Foreign investment has risen more rapidly; sales by TNCs exceed world exports by a growing margin, and transactions among TNCs are a rapidly expanding segment of world trade. Foreign exchange flows have soared to more than \$1.5 trillion daily, up from \$15 billion in 1973. According to 1996 annual report of the WTO, there was a strong growth in both merchandise and service trade in 1995. The value of total cross-border trade in goods and services exceeded \$6,000 billion for the first time. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, disclosed in his millennium address to the UN that the market for e-commerce was \$2.6 billion in 1996; it is expected to grow to \$300 billion by year 2002. Another study had estimated that the growth of world trade would exceed \$8 trillion annually by the year 2000.

25.4 THE ROLE OF WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION

The WTO was established on 1 January 1995 replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is the result of many rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. The Marrakesh agreement was negotiated as a climax of the Uruguay round of trade negotiations under the umbrella of GATT. The last round of negotiations was concluded on 15 December 1993 and the participating governments signed the Final Act, which included over 22,000 pages, at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 April 1994. The “Marrakesh Declaration” affirmed that the new trade law would “strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment, employment and income growth throughout the world.” The Marrakesh agreement was the most comprehensive trade deal in world history, covering everything from paper clips to jet aircraft. The bulk of the document symbolised its breadth.

The WTO has a much broader scope in terms of the commercial activity and trade policies to which it applies. GATT applied only to trade in merchandise goods; the WTO covers trade in goods, services and “trade in ideas” or intellectual property (innovations, inventions etc.). The functions of the WTO include: (i) monitoring the implementation of multilateral trade agreements, which together make up the WTO; (ii) acting as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations; (iii) seeking to resolve trade disputes among trading partners. (The findings of its arbitration panels are binding); (iv) overseeing national trade policies; and (v) co-operating with other international institutions involved in global economic policy making.

The principles governing international trade system outlined in the WTO Agreements are worth noting. There are four significant principles: (i) Trade should be conducted without discrimination among members and between imported and domestically produced merchandise. (ii) The WTO agreements seek to ensure that conditions of investment and trade are more predictable by making it difficult for member governments to change the rules of the game at will. The key to predictable trading conditions is often the transparency of domestic laws, regulations and practices. WTO agreements contain transparency provisions, which require disclosure of these

rules at the national level or at the multilateral level through formal notifications to the WTO. (iii) The WTO promotes open and fair competition in international trade. It is not the “free trade” institution as it permits tariffs and limited forms of protection. (iv) The WTO agreements encourage development and economic reform. Many of the underdeveloped countries have been following the policies of economic reforms or liberalisation during the last one decade.

25.5 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS' ACCOUNTABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

It has long been recognised that the TNCs that operate across national boundaries have enormous impact on the modern world. If we compare the revenues of the twenty-five largest MNCs with revenues of states, we learn that only six states—USA (\$ 1,248 billion), Germany (\$ 690 billion), Japan (\$ 595 billion), UK (\$ 389 billion), Italy (\$ 339 billion) and France (\$ 221 billion)—have revenues larger than the nine largest MNCs—Mitsubishi (\$ 184 billion), Mitsui (\$ 182 billion), Sumitomo (\$ 168 billion), Marubeni—(\$ 161 billion), Ford Motor (\$ 137 billion), Toyota Motor (\$ 111 billion) and Exxon (\$ 110 billion). Because of their enormous economic power, TNCs are often beyond the effective control of national governments, including those, which are within their own jurisdictions. Moreover, TNCs normally have considerable influence in national political systems, especially through pro-business political parties and personalities. This makes regulation of business difficult to achieve.

Today there are more than 38,500 transnational parent companies with their more than 250,000 foreign affiliates. These TNCs and their foreign affiliates produced 25 per cent of global output in 1998, and the top 100 (ranked by foreign assets) had sales totaling \$ 4 trillion. Between 1980 and 1992 the annual sales of TNCs doubled (\$ 2.4 to \$ 5.5 trillion), and the annual sales of many are now greater than the GDP of some states. For example, in 1997, General Motor's worldwide sales (\$ 168 billion) exceeded the combined GDP of Indonesia and Pakistan. (Indonesia: \$115 billion; Pakistan: \$ 45 billion). Again, the combined revenue of two US-based business corporates - General Motors (\$ 168 billion) and Ford Motors (\$ 147 billion) is nearly equal to India's GDP (\$ 324 billion).

The primary objective and concern of TNCs is profit making. In order to make profits TNCs often move their capital and production units to those places where they attract cheap labour. There is a global competition to attract TNC investment both among developing and developed countries. In the hope of attracting TNC investment, nations bid against each other to offer the lowest levels of environmental, labour and human rights regulation. This competitiveness is directly contributing towards fewer social benefits, lower salaries of workers and violation of many social, political and trade union rights. One may find many horror stories of unprincipled TNCs making handsome profits at the expense of clearly exploited employees. Various TNCs, from United Fruit to Coca-Cola, actively opposed progressive governments and laws designed to advance labour rights and other human rights. In fact, United Fruit in Guatemala (1954) and ITT in Chile (1973) actively cooperated with the US government in helping to overthrow politicians (Arbenz in Guatemala and Allende in Chile) who were champions especially of labour rights for their nationals.

What follows here and in the next two sections is a selection of examples where contemporary trade practices lead to human rights violations. Both the TNCs and the elite of national governments demonstrate their intolerance to any alternative world-view expressed by individuals and groups in defence of their economic, social, civil and political rights. When alternatives are expressed, they routinely engage in violating human rights. The statement of former president

of Ecuador, Abdala Bacaram, is case in point: he had asserted that “if oil workers seek to halt the production of basic and strategic services such as oil, I will personally witness the police and the armed forces giving them a thrashing to make them return to work.” Though this statement is perhaps more blunt than most, the attitude of many corporations and governments is similar. Following select examples testify this.

Mexico’s *maquiladora* sector provides a further example. The *maquiladora* produces \$29 billion in export earnings and offers employment for more than 500,000 people from the poorest, least experienced and least educated groups in society. Human rights violations are reported in many parts of the sector, particularly in relation to attempts by workers to establish free trade unions. Where possible, the corporations operating in the *maquiladora* prefer to employ women, because they are more committed to the job and are less informed about their rights, less radical than men, more tolerant of substandard working conditions and less likely to engage in politics or trade union activism.

Moreover, women employees have faced discrimination during pregnancy. Applicants for jobs are routinely subjected to pregnancy tests before being hired. In some cases employees questioned women about their sexual activities, when they last menstruated and whether they used contraceptives. If women do become pregnant, managers attempt to create such conditions, which may compel them to resign. Managers use several methods intended to intimidate, including picking on every conceivable error in the quality of work, no matter how insignificant it is; they provide substandard machines so that their poor performance will not attract bonus payment; refuse to allow time off to attend the doctor, and transfer them to heavier, more physically demanding work usually not suitable for pregnant women. Since women are desperate to keep jobs, they tolerate discriminatory treatment.

Although Mexican labour law forbids such discrimination, the government frequently tolerates such practices. It is regrettable that neither the corporations nor the government seem interested in responding to internationally recognised prohibitions on pregnancy-based discrimination. Under Article 26 of the ICCPR, all people are entitled to equal treatment before the law regardless of sex. Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) condemns all forms of discrimination against women, particularly in the field of employment (Article 11:1). Discriminatory pregnancy-based practices are also a violation of the right to privacy (ICCPR Article 17, UDHR Article 12) and the right to decide freely the number and spacing of children (CEDAW Article 16:1). It may be recalled that Mexico has ratified ICCPR and CEDAW in March 1981.\

There is more to it. Trade union rights were suppressed, when *maquiladora* workers struggled to establish free trade unions, independent of the government-backed Confederation of Mexican Workers (CMW). For example, in 1989, workers at the Ford plant in Hermosillo organised a hunger strike in support of their demand for democratic elections to the CMW. In response, Ford began to dismiss workers and blacklist those involved in the action, but protests continued. Of a total of 3,800 workers, Ford dismissed 3,050 before the organisers called off the action.

Let us look at another example of the activities of Royal Dutch Shell Oil in the Ogoni region of Nigeria. Human Rights Watch (a NGO) reports (in 1995) that at the end of October 1990, Shell requested police assistance at a peaceful demonstration against the continued destruction of tribal lands as a direct result of oil operations. Due to beatings, teargas attacks and indiscriminate shootings 80 people died. On another occasion, one of Shells’ contractors, Willbros, bulldozed crops in preparation for construction work. When local people protested, Willbros called in government troops who opened fire to disperse the demonstrators. Willbros defended its right

to proceed with the construction, on the grounds that all the necessary formal procedures were adhered to, although the popular Movement for the Protection of the Ogoni People was not invited to take part in the negotiations that sanctioned the contract.

Although Shell has claimed that its contact with Nigerian Security Forces was minimal, a government official admitted to Human Rights Watch that regular contact with Lt. Col. Paul Okuntimo, the Director of Rivers State Security, was made. According to one company official, Okuntimo was a “savage soldier”, known for his brutality, who saw his role as making “the area safe for” the oil companies.

It is instructive to note that these incidents of violation of human rights led to a stormy meeting of the shareholders in 1997, which called for greater openness and social responsibility. Shell has recently announced its intention to publish an annual audit of social accountability. It remains to be seen whether this approach to taking human rights seriously proves beneficial.

Another example concerns the sports goods industry. Indian companies produce many sports goods such as baseballs, footballs, cricket equipment, volleyballs and boxing gloves. Although no official data exist, one NGO (i.e. Christian Aid) estimates that of the 300,000 workers engaged in the industry, some 25,000 to 30,000 are children, either working with their families or in small stitching centres. Some children, aged between 10 and 11 years, work five to six hours a day for as little as Rs.10 or even less than that per football. In addition, tanneries supplying leather to the industry’s main exporters employ children, exposing them to hazardous chemicals. Children and teenage apprentices working in factories or small workshops are routinely paid fraction of the adult minimum wage. Besides poor pay, some adult workers are denied union rights, sick pay and access to provident funds and insurance schemes. It is a common practice to deny continuous appointments to workers so as to deprive them of these rights. Despite the constitutional and statutory ban on employing children in hazardous industries, child labour in leather tanning, carpet industry, bangle-manufacturing units, matches and crackers factories continue till this day.

TNCs also have the potential to do great damage by destroying the livelihoods of people through environmental practices that lay forests bare, deplete fishing stocks, dump hazardous materials and pollute rivers and lakes that were once a source of water and fish. The example of commercial prawn farming reveals the extent of damaging effects of trade on civil and political rights. Many underdeveloped countries have encouraged commercial prawn farming ventures without regard for social and environmental consequences. The World Bank and IMF have supported such ventures to help improve the debt-ridden Third World countries’ balance of payments by increasing exports. Commercial prawn farming has the added advantage that it brings high returns on low levels of investment and technology. This is particularly attractive to private investors who wish to make huge profits in the shortest time, as there is a great demand of prawns in Western countries. Moreover, prawn farming is an important source of foreign exchange for underdeveloped Asian and Latin American states.

The farming method involves the construction of saline ponds, ranging in size from a half hectare to five hectares. The optimum conditions for prawn cultivation are maintained in a number of ways: continuously pumping water, and adding chemicals to control acidity and alkalinity, fertilisers for growth, antibiotics to control disease and other chemicals to combat parasites. The timescale from stocking the ponds with seedling prawns to harvest is usually four months, allowing companies to take three crops a year. In fact, one crop is often sufficient to cover investment costs.

Many governments consider such ventures as contributing to their economic growth and development. Therefore, they often give government land to prawn producers. This practice leads to many human rights violations. The sites of prawn farming represent a valuable resource for local communities providing them the only available access to pasture fuel-wood and other necessities to sustain life. In some cases prawn farming has taken over land previously used for producing locally marketed foods. Moreover, it affects the local fishing communities. Also, the construction of ponds can obstruct the natural flow of water and cause flooding in villages, soil erosion and the salination of soil. Producers often pump wastewater containing cocktail additives (used for prawn production) onto adjacent lands, which pollute the soil. Although many of these practices are illegal, governments generally ignore the violations of laws in their enthusiasm for promoting prawn farming. The result is that people are forced from the land that provides subsistence and their traditional way of life disintegrates, violating economic and cultural rights that are protected under international law of human rights.

25.6 RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

The international community has become concerned over violations of the rights of indigenous peoples in recent years, after many years of neglect. The United Nations has drafted a declaration on the subject in 1994. The decade 1994-2003 has been declared the UN Decade for Indigenous Peoples. There is also a 1989 ILO Convention on their rights.

Oil, uranium, minerals and timber are found throughout the world on indigenous lands, and TNCs have been permitted to encroach on them in the name of economic development. Indigenous lands in many parts of the world have been trespassed upon in pursuit of traditional medicines, which are then brought onto international pharmaceutical markets.

There are many cases concerning the violations of the rights of the indigenous people. We are discussing here only two cases. (In the preceding section we have already discussed the example of Shell Oil in Nigeria's Ogoni region, which violated the rights of tribals). First, in 1985 a complaint against Brazil was brought to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by the Yanomami Indians of Brazil alleging that many of their rights have been violated due to the activities of independent prospectors and companies engaged in exploiting the mineral and timber resources of the Amazon regions inhabited by them. It was alleged that the so-called economic development has resulted in serious violations of their right to health, clean environment, the right to life and the cultural rights. The Inter-American Commission found that the incursions, which included the construction of a highway through Yanomami lands, caused disruption of the social life of the Yanomami and introduced a number of diseases, which decimated the population. The Commission also found that, in licensing and permitting these activities, Brazil violated the right to life and the right to protection of health provided in the American Declaration of the Rights of Man.

A second example concerns the controversy surrounding the proposed construction of a new port by P & O, the developers, in Dahanu in the state of Maharashtra, which placed it conspicuously at the centre of all trade issues. Dahanu is the home of India's few remaining tribal peoples, the Warlis. The proposed port is reportedly eight times the size of Liverpool and will not only bring much needed jobs to the area and regenerate the economy but will also relieve the congestion at Bombay port.

An unpublished report commissioned by P & O, however, concludes, "the port will destroy the Warlis way of life. Moreover, 70 per cent of the Warlis were opposed to the port, with only

11 per cent in favour. Contrary to the government of Maharashtra's claim that the port will bring lasting economic benefits, the report concludes that there is little evidence of this. Indeed, the sustainable use of natural resources has created a flourishing economy, which is self-sufficient and rooted in the natural wealth of the region. If P & O is allowed to go ahead with the construction, the local economy will be destroyed and it will have extensive impact on human rights.

25.7 TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is one of the pillars of the Uruguay Round agreement, and also one of the most contentious. It tightens intellectual property rights for the creator. It introduces an enforceable global standard by linking intellectual property rights with trade, making them binding and enforceable through the WTO mechanism.

TRIPS agreement fails to protect adequately the rights to health, and the rights of indigenous people among others. Its provisions restrain many public policies that promote wider access to health care. National laws of many developing countries have intentionally excluded pharmaceuticals from product patent protection (allowing only process patents) to promote local manufacturing capacity for generic drugs and to make drugs available at lower prices. The move from process to product patents introduced under the TRIPS agreement dramatically reduces the possibilities for local companies to produce cheaper versions of important life saving drug, such as those for cancer and HIV/AIDS. Local production of anti-AIDS drugs flucanazole in India had kept the prices reasonable (costing \$55 for 100 tablets) whereas its prices in the other developed and the same under the developed countries ranges between \$ 700 - \$ 1000.

Traditional knowledge and resource rights of indigenous people have been greatly affected under the TRIPS agreement. Traditionally life forms, plants and animals-were

exempted from patents. But now it is going to change. TRIPS agreement requires all WTO member countries to permit patents on microorganisms and microbiological and non-biological processes. So "bioprospecting" has mushroomed-with scientists "reinventing" and patenting products and processes using traditional knowledge that communities have held for centuries. Patents have been awarded for using the healing properties of turmeric, for the pesticide properties of the neem tree and other plant properties-all part of traditional knowledge. In a number of such cases the patents were challenged and reversed.

The TRIPS agreement mostly benefits technologically advanced countries. It is estimated that industrialised states hold 97 per cent of all patents, and TNCs 90 per cent of all technology and product patents. Developing countries have little to gain from the stronger patent protection from the TRIPS agreement because they have little research and development capacity.

The TRIPS agreement also appears to be incompatible with human rights law and environmental agreements. The International Bill of Rights recognises the human right to share in scientific progress. It may be recalled that India had invented zero but we have not patented its use, rather the entire world is benefited by its use. The Convention on Biodiversity requires states to protect and promote the rights of communities, farmers and indigenous people in their use of biological resources and knowledge systems. It also requires equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the commercial use of communities' biological resources and local knowledge.

There is need to build human rights safeguards into the TRIPS agreement. The African Group of WTO Members has proposed a review of the agreement, particularly for provisions to protect indigenous knowledge. And India has suggested amendment to promote transfer of environmentally sound technology.

25.8 MARGINALISATION OF POOR COUNTRIES

It is true that global economic integration is creating opportunities for people around the world, but it is also leading to widening the gaps between the poorest and richest countries. Many of the poorest countries are marginalised from the growing opportunities of expanding international trade, investment and in the use of new technologies.

The UNDP's Human Development Report 2000, which focuses on human rights, provides arresting evidence of how the pursuit of free trade and the systematic violation of human rights go hand in hand besides marginalising poor countries from the bounty of world economy. Let us look at the statistics provided in the report. World exports of goods and services expanded rapidly between 1990 and 1998, from \$ 4.7 trillion to \$ 7.5 trillion. And 25 countries had export growth averaging more than 10 per cent a year (including Bangladesh, Mexico, Mozambique, Turkey and Vietnam), but exports declined in Cameroon, Jamaica and Ukraine. In 1998 least developed countries, with 10 per cent of the world population, accounted for only 0.4 per cent of global exports, down from 0.6 per cent in 1980 and 0.5 per cent in 1990. Sub-Saharan Africa's share declined to 1.4 per cent, down from 2.3 per cent in 1980 and 1.6 per cent in 1990. Although average tariffs are higher in developing than in developed countries, many poor nations still face tariff peaks and tariff escalation in such key sectors as agriculture, footwear and leather goods.

The marginalisation of poor can further be discerned from the data on foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI flows have boomed, reaching more than \$ 600 billion in 1998. But these flows are highly concentrated, with just 20 countries receiving 83 per cent of the \$177 billion going to developing and transition economies, mainly China, Brazil, Mexico and Singapore. The 48 least developing countries attracted less than \$ 3 billion in 1998, a mere 0.4 per cent of the total.

Of course, not everybody is suffering in the global economy. In 1998, the UNDP said the assets of the world's 358 billionaires exceeded the combined annual incomes of countries with 45 per cent of the world's population. In 1999, we learn that the sales of the world's top six firms, at \$ 716 billion, exceed the combined GDP of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The UNDP's report for 2000 disclosed that the super rich get richer. The combined wealth of the top 200 billionaires hit \$ 1,135 billion in 1999, up from \$ 1,042 billion in 1998. This is in comparison with the combined incomes of \$ 146 billion for the 582 million people in all the least developed countries.

25.9 REGULATING INTERNATIONAL TRADE: NEED TO EVOLVE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR TNCS

In the preceding pages we have seen how TNCs are conducting their business and often pursue their interests of profit making, often disregarding and violating internationally agreed norms of human rights. Unless an internationally accepted "code of conduct" for TNC operations is evolved and enforced through the United Nations or some multilateral forum, it is extremely difficult to make them socially responsible. Such a code may promote human rights accountability

and social auditing of TNCs. While the industrialised countries of the North where TNCs have their base have laid down rules and regulations and parametres within which TNCs and private entrepreneurs could operate, they never supported for such rules and regulations at the international level.

Due to demands from the developing countries of South, supported by the communist states, the United Nations attempted to do its part of monitoring the activities of TNCs and preventing their misuse of power. For several years the United Nations also tried to evolve a binding code of conduct for TNCs, which never came to fruition due to blocking action by the capital exporting states whose primary concern was to protect the freedom of “their” corporations to make profits. After more than two decades of negotiations and drafting of the code, the attempt was abandoned in the late 1980s. The United Nations department concerned with TNCs was abolished under the US pressure in January 1992.

In 1996 the WTO did adopt a declaration, sponsored by the USA, pledging members to respect labour rights. The declaration was non-binding and vague. But some observers were fearful that just as the WTO had struck down some US decisions-based on its environmental regulations-as restraints on free trade, so the WTO might prove equally hostile to human rights regulations.

It is intriguing that instead of laying down a code of conduct for TNCs, the industrialised states, as represented in OECD (the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), are preparing drafts for Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). In February 1997, a 147-page negotiating text was leaked and is now available on Public citizen’s Trade watch web page of the Internet. Although the process to get agreement on the MAI is currently stalled, the OECD continues to argue that its acceptance would make a significant contribution towards completing the global programme of deregulation. In fact, the first draft of the MAI was completed in secret. According to critics, if accepted, the MAI would constitute a significant step towards creating a “constitution of a single global economy” or a “bill of rights and freedoms for TNCs”. This constitution would further restrict state powers to formulate independent policy and curtail the rights of people to enjoy the benefits of their natural resources. The practice of imposing human rights-related investment conditions, such as employing local labour, providing education and training and making a contribution to the local economy, would be outlawed under the MAI. Moreover, MAI draft bans any restriction on “repatriation of profits” and the movement of capital. It also bans “performance requirement” and prohibits governments (of developing countries) from treating foreign investors differently from domestic investors and authorises TNCs to sue national government for failure to meet the MAI’s terms. In short, critics argue that the MAI represents a major step in the attempt to promote free trade that serves the interests of international investors and corporations, without regard for the rights of workers, communities and the environment.

However, it is encouraging to note that a number of corporations have adopted corporate codes of conduct dealing with labour and human rights. The most frequently cited example of company guidelines in this regard are the *Levi Strauss and Co. Business Partner Terms of Engagement and Guidelines for Country Selection*, which are directed to the company’s contractors and suppliers. They cover, *inter alia*, occupational safety and health, freedom of association, wages and benefits, working time, child labour, forced labour and non-discriminatory hiring practices. Also, the OECD has adopted a non-binding code, but it generated little influence.

The Reebok Corporation, the New York Skirt, is making similar efforts and Sports wear Association, the National Association of Blouse Manufacturers Inc., the Industrial Association of Juvenile Apparel Manufacturers and the Timberland Corporation. These efforts, if they

become sufficiently widespread, will have a positive effect on social situations, but they frequently lack effective monitoring systems and need to be more widely adopted and enforced.

Thus, voluntary codes of corporate conduct have proliferated—but they tend to be weak on two fronts. First, they rarely refer to internationally agreed human rights standards. For example, most apparel industry codes refer to national standards rather than the higher ILO standards. Second they lack mechanisms for implementation and external monitoring and audit.

25.10 SUMMARY

As the international trade is growing phenomenally in contemporary world and the TNCs share of it is strengthening day by day, the state of many internationally recognised human rights is getting diluted. This unit reveals that many human rights are violated in the cause of trade. With the study of many examples of TNCs' accountability of human rights in the unit we learn that people who stand in the way of trade-related business “routinely” lose the right to self-determination and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development (ICESCR, Article 1:1). In some cases, local resistance to trade-related development projects lead to the isolation of the right to life, liberty and the security of persons (UDHR, Article 3). The right to form and join trade unions for the promotion and protection of economic and social interests (UDHR, Article 23:4; ICESCR, Article 8), is also a target for oppressive measures. The right to subsistence is violated when people are excluded from their traditional means of feeding, clothing and housing themselves (ICESCR, Article 11). The special protection afforded to women under CEDAW seems to attract little respect when there is a need for low-paid obedient workers engaged in the production of export goods. Also, the right to enjoy and share scientific progress (UDHR, Article 27:2 and ICESCR, Article 15:6) is greatly restricted with the coming into force of TRIPS agreement.

The trade related practices also lead to violations of the rights of indigenous people besides causing significant damages to environment and natural habitat. Moreover, the pursuit of free trade is benefiting rich countries more and the gap between rich and poor nations is growing further. This is leading to the marginalisation of poor nations. Unless the TNCs are made to follow internationally recognised code of conduct, in which human rights dimensions can be built, human rights of people cannot remain secure as the contemporary trade practices at international level reveal.

25.11 EXERCISES

1. What do you understand by the term “International Bill of Rights”? List the rights catalogued in it.
2. “Some of the TNCs have larger revenues than some nations.” Discuss the
3. TNCs’ economic power in the light of this statement.
4. Give examples of violations of women’s rights by certain TNCs.
5. In what way are the environmental rights violated by TNC practices?
6. In which sector is child labour exploited in India by some TNCs?
7. Briefly discuss the violation of the rights of indigenous people by TNCs.
8. Do you think TNCs should be governed by a Code of Conduct?

UNIT 26 CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER

Structure

- 26.1 Introduction
 - 26.2 Emergence of USA as a World Power
 - 26.2.1 Birth of USA as a Superpower
 - 26.2.2 End of the Cold War
 - 26.3 Only Superpower of a Unipolar World
 - 26.3.1 Current Status
 - 26.4 America in the View of Others
 - 26.4.1 Post-Cold War Challenges
 - 26.5 Summary
 - 26.6 Exercises
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26.1 INTRODUCTION

The United States of America is relatively a new civilisation on earth, but it is an old and resilient democracy. The size of the country, its natural resources, advantageous geographical location and the nature of its economy made this country one of the handful of major powers of the world from its very birth as an independent country in 1776. But the focus of the early settlers of the US was on westward continental expansion for decades. As if to announce the world that the United States was a power to be reckoned with, president James Monroe had declared a doctrine named after him as Monroe Doctrine way back in 1823. The doctrine actually was a warning to the then European colonial powers to refrain from meddling in the Western Hemisphere-a region regarded by successive American administrations as the US sphere of influence. The US did not have the teeth to literally implement such a doctrine. And the next major preoccupation of the US political leadership was eradication of slavery, which plunged the country into a devastating Civil War in the 1860s. The number of people killed during the American Civil War was significantly more than all casualties the country suffered in all the wars except the prolonged Vietnam War.

26.2 EMERGENCE AS A WORLD POWER

The industrialisation of the American economy after the Civil War, growth of a powerful US navy in the 1880s and the American victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898 turned the country into a major world power at the turn of the 19th Century. The war against Spain was well calculated and aimed at launching the US as a world power. No wonder that the US Congress declared war against Spain on the ground of ending Spanish colonial rule over Cuba. But the first shots were fired in this war in distant Manila Bay of the Philippines. The idea was to wrest control of the Philippines from Spain and establish American colonial rule. The United States colonised the Philippines after a domestic debate on “imperialism” and became a member of the exclusive club of colonial powers of the time.

26.2.1 Birth of a Super Power

However, not until the Second World War was the United States able to play a leading role in world affairs. The US foreign involvement until then was marked by periodic isolation and occasional activism. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who steered the US through the perilous Second World War, was himself a strategic planner and thinker. As the war was still wreaking havoc around the globe, Roosevelt confident that his country would come out victorious, had ordered his officials to undertake studies on strategic requirements of the US in the post-war period. He was indeed correct and from the ashes of the world war, the US took birth as a superpower of the world.

As almost all the European powers, such as Britain, France, Germany and Italy, had suffered heavy losses in the war, the relative strength of the United States was considerably higher than any country in the entire world. The Soviet Union also had considerable strength in conventional military capability and it also came to be known as a super power. But the US had nuclear monopoly for about four years after the Second World War. The gross domestic product of the US, moreover, was almost half of the total global product. The moment was indeed more unipolar than it has ever been.

The world soon witnessed a Cold War between the two super powers. The United States sought to uphold free market capitalism and perceived an ideological threat from Soviet Communism. The United States, moreover, desired to spread its influence around the world and the Soviet Union posed a challenge to Washington's policies. Washington adopted a declaratory Truman Doctrine promising military aid to those countries, which were fighting Soviet-backed totalitarian/authoritarian forces. Another doctrine "containment of communism", formulated by the Truman administration, became the bedrock of the US national security policy throughout the Cold War in subsequent years. The first theatre of the Cold War was Europe. The East European countries fell under the Soviet sphere of influence and the US took military and economic measures to shield Western Europe from any kind of Soviet penetration. On the basis of the containment objective, the United States under its leadership established a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with West European countries to protect the region from any Soviet military invasion. The 'Marshall Plan' was announced to finance economic recovery of Western Europe. It was an economic measure aimed at maintaining social and economic stability in the Western Europe to ward off probable Communist influence.

While the US was fully committed to defend Western Europe and did not give as much priority to other regions of the world, it had to fight Cold War in Asia by committing American troops. Cold War spilled over to the Asian region with the emergence of Communist China in 1949. It was the result of Chinese civil war, where the US had diplomatically and politically backed the non-Communist Nationalist forces. But months after the Communist victory in China, war broke out in the Korean Peninsula between the Communist North Korea and the non-Communist South Korea. The US sent troops under the UN flag and fought the Korean War on behalf of South Korea, but it ended with no clear victory for any side. By the time the Korean War ended, the Communist challenge in Indo-china became prominent. The US initially got involved politically and diplomatically, but subsequently it had to fight a prolonged war against the Communist forces of North Vietnam to protect South Vietnam. The US lost this war and after the withdrawal of the American troops the whole of Indo-china became Communist.

The most spectacular defeat of the American power in its fight against Communist forces was in Cuba. Cuba, after a successful communist revolution, turned 'red' in 1959 and is still a communist state. The victory of leftist forces in Cuba, Indo-china, Eastern Europe and many

other places clearly indicated that the United States was not able to sustain the unipolar moment it enjoyed during the first few years after Second World War. Its military capabilities and huge wealth did not bring unfailing success to the United States during the Cold War. In other words, the power and influence of the United States were circumscribed in a bipolar international system, where the rival superpower-the former Soviet Union-successfully competed with the US in containing the spread of American pattern of free market capitalism.

26.2.2 End of the Cold War

In fact, the US was perceived as a declining power in the 1970s, particularly after it failed to fight communism in Indo-china, which became a communist dominated region in 1975. The loss of American presence in Iran after the successful Islamic Revolution in that country in 1979 and the rise of the leftist Sandinista forces to power in Nicaragua in the same year further strengthened images of a declining American power. The tide, however, turned when the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 sparked off a second round of intense Cold War. In a way, the US got an opportunity to pay back in the same coin what they had suffered during the prolonged involvement in Indo-china. The US, during the administration of a super cold-warrior-Ronald Reagan-turned Pakistan into a frontline state, brought together several *mujahideen* groups in Afghanistan, and encouraged them to fight back the Soviet troops. The monetary and material help were funneled through Pakistan to these groups. In a span of about ten years of involvement, the Soviet Union was no longer in a position to sustain itself let alone continue the military occupation of Afghanistan. As the involvement in Afghanistan became costlier with passing time, in the second half of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was on a path of economic and political reforms under the dynamic leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* represented restructuring and openness. Moscow also abandoned the Cold War policies and sought *détente* with the West. By 1989, the Soviet Union had withdrawn its forces from Afghanistan and momentous changes in East European countries led to the collapse of Euro-communism. The Soviet Union lost all its control over the East European countries. In 1990-91, Moscow had no option but to cooperate with Washington to deal with the Gulf Crisis. The crisis sparked off by Iraqi president Saddam Hussain's decision to occupy neighbouring Kuwait culminated in a war of liberation. Contrary to Soviet policies of Cold War years, there was unprecedented cooperation between the two super powers in ending the Gulf Crisis. The policy of *détente*, however, was not adequate to deal with the internal political crisis in the Soviet Union. By December 1991, the Soviet Union was unable to sustain itself as a cohesive independent nation and cracked up into fifteen different independent republics. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Cold War also ended. The bipolar international order gave way to a unipolar world dominated by the US

26.3 ONLY SUPERPOWER OF A UNIPOLAR WORLD

The contemporary global political system is described by some as a unipolar world. International Relations analysts and commentators do not agree on the exact nature and characteristics of this unipolarity. But one thing is indisputable; the current unipolarity has replaced the bipolar global system of Cold War years. In this sense, the collapse of one pole represented by the former Soviet Union leaves the United States-the other pole-as the sole super power of the world.

Systemic descriptions apart, what is the current position of the United States in world politics? Is it the most powerful country in the world? Or, is it a declining power? Most of the American people perceive their country as the most important and the most powerful country in the world.

Majority of the American people are not in favour of isolationism and would like their government to play an active role in world affairs. After the Soviet collapse, American people appear to be feeling more secure than before, due to the disappearance of the threat of a nuclear war. Overall, it appears that the US has been a “self-satisfied super power” in the post-Cold War era.

But some analysts, like Hubert P. Van Tuyll, argue that the United States today is a declining power and “it would do well to emulate the British example of survival.” Timothy Garton Ash, on the other hand, writes: “America today has too much power for anyone’s good, including its own. It has that matchless soft power in all our heads. In economic power its only rival is the European Union. In military power it has no rival. Its military expenditure is greater than that of the next eight largest military powers combined. Not since Rome has a single power enjoyed such superiority—but the Roman colossus only bestrode one part of the world. Stripped of its anti-American overtones, the French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine’s term “hyperpower” is apt.” There are others, such as Joseph Nye, Jr. who considers the US as a “predominant power” rather than a “dominant power.”

American scholars and seasoned diplomats, who see a danger in interpreting the US power as a “dominant” one, warn that this planet cannot be ruled by any single political centre, irrespective of its military power. William Pfaff opines that the “American bid for hegemony would eventually fail, because howsoever benevolent, it is seen by others as a threat. A European foreign minister once said that all his colleagues regarded their most serious foreign policy problem was that of dealing with the US.”

But those, who believe in the “hyperpower” theory, support the idea of maintaining the *status quo*. And the US goal, they argue, should be preventing the rise of a rival centre of power. “The central aim of American foreign policy has traditionally been to dominate the Western hemisphere while not permitting another great power to dominate Europe or Northeast Asia. The United States has not wanted a peer competitor. In the wake of the Cold War, US policymakers remain fully committed to this goal.” In 1992, a Pentagon report concluded that the US “strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.”

This group of Americans would support the following policy:

- 1 If the American security interests are challenged, Washington should use diplomacy when it can, but force if it must.
- 1 The US must remain engaged to address the new dangers, challenges as well as opportunities. There would be no security for the country in a policy of isolationism and the country would not prosper in a policy of protectionism.
- 1 The US must send military troops to defend its vital national interests and values, if these are at stake.
- 1 When important, but not vital interests are involved, appropriate cost-benefit analysis should be made.
- 1 Defence capability should be maintained to address regional contingencies and the US overseas military presence should continue to enhance American security.

26.3.1 Current Status of the US

Whatever may be the characterisation of the US position in the world today, there is no dispute

that the US is the only super power in the contemporary world politics. It is the number one military and economic power in the entire globe. Its military strength is not only reflected in its huge defence expenditure but also its leadership in various frontiers of military technology and R & D facilities. While the US demonstrated its spectacular military power in the 1991 Gulf War, it was quick to learn from that war that its “overwhelming dependence” on transoceanic power projection strategy and its confidence of getting access to base facilities overseas were presumptuous. Robert Chandler and John R. Backschies have argued, that the US military strategy would not work efficiently in a world where state-sponsored terrorism was increasing. As the US military was getting ready to meet the new challenges, terrorism struck the US on 11 September 2001. Soon the US was able to demonstrate its military capability once again by bombing the Taliban training camps in Afghanistan. The recent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and its predominance in the field of information technology have elevated the US position in the global military power structure to a point, where no rival is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. The overall social stability in the American society is the product of its national wealth, domestic economic policy and a democratic political structure. This in turn has enabled the US to play a substantial leadership role in the global political and economic affairs.

The US retains military edge over most of its economic rivals and competitors and economic edge over its potential military rivals. While there is a perception that significant things cannot be achieved without the active participation of the US whatever Washington says and does has an impact around the world. And what it does not say and does not do also has repercussion around the globe. As Stephen Waltz writes: “The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a position of unprecedented preponderance. America’s economy is 40 per cent larger than that of its nearest rival, and its defense spending equals that of the next six countries combined. Four of these six countries are close US allies, so America’s advantage is even larger than these figures suggest. The United States leads the world in higher education, scientific research, and advanced technology (especially information technologies), which will make it hard for other states to catch up quickly. This extraordinary position of power will endure well into this Century. President William J. Clinton was the first post-Cold War American president. He presided at the helm of affairs for eight full years at a time when the US came to occupy the position in the world as the sole superpower.” According to Waltz, Clinton followed a foreign policy that was neither “isolationism” nor “expensive internationalism” and many American people actually believe that Clinton’s foreign policy performance was “outstanding”.

Its power, wealth and position have enabled the US to play an important role in world affairs. The US is active in most of the current events in international affairs, such as combating terrorism, checking proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting spread of small arms and illegal drugs trafficking, dealing with environmental degradation, conflict resolution and host of other activities through its participation in international organisations. Moreover, majority of the countries-big, medium and small-are seeking to maintain cordial ties with the United States. Of course, both the fear of the US and the hope of some benefits are guiding the behaviour of those seeking to bandwagon with the US on various international issues. To quote Robert E. Hunter: “The dawn of the 21st Century finds the United States deeply involved in the outside world, more so than ever before in its history, and, in terms of the reach of its global engagement, more so than any other country. It has diplomatic relations with about 180 sovereign states; its military forces are deployed, in large or small, throughout the world; its role in the global economy is unmatched and is made manifest, in some degree, in virtually every other country; and it belongs to a host of international institutions. Other nations look to the United States for leadership, for help in providing for their security and prosperity, for diplomacy in preventing war and making peace, and for wisdom in shaping the work of international bodies that cover a wide range of human activities”.

26.4 AMERICA IN THE VIEW OF THE WORLD

How do other countries view the US international role today? It appears that the perception of the US in many parts of the world is guided by the fear of American power and the suspicion that critical opposition to the US policies could invite retaliation.

First of all, there is widespread discomfort even among the traditional US allies in Europe about the American unilateralism. It is clearly reflected in the US position on the international criminal court, the new Bush administration's approach to the Kyoto Protocol on environment, the determination to go ahead with a missile defence system programme despite widespread opposition, and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate.

Secondly, several members of the European Union, which are also America's NATO allies, do not endorse the US policies towards countries, such as Iran and Iraq. The recent US military action to overthrow the Saddam Hussain regime in Baghdad has generated open criticism in Europe and elsewhere.

Thirdly, both US allies and other neutral countries have found it difficult to agree to the US characterisation of some countries as "rogue states", "countries of concern" and most recently "axis of evil." As the Bush administration seeks to target such regimes, several American analysts also feel that the US government incorrectly elevates these countries to the rank of those who threaten American security interests. The whole idea of the National Missile Defence (NMD), however, is being promoted on the basis of the speculation that countries, such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea pose a missile threat to the United States. Not many American policy makers today dismiss the possible emergence of a "less predictable, rogue missile danger" and believe that NMD could maintain US "freedom of action even "in the face of a coercive missile threat from otherwise second-rate regional powers." It is more of scenario building and seeking justifications for something rather than discovering real threats.

Fourthly, the US foreign policy behaviour has induced the European countries to view management of relations with the US as one of the most important foreign policy challenges. The growing rift between the transatlantic partners on several issues related to trade, investment and business, and the high-handed approach of the US towards such issues has intensified such European perceptions.

Fifthly, the erstwhile adversaries and rivals of the US, such as Russia and China are seeking closer cooperation with that country. Simultaneously, they are striving to evolve a multi-polar international structure as an answer to the perceived American unilateralism in world affairs. The proposed Russia-China-India triangle is a desire to establish a mechanism to manage American unilateralism in international relations.

Sixthly, a large number of smaller countries, particularly in the Islamic world are feeling pressurised by the US since the Bush administration launched the so-called global war against terrorism. With the solitary exception of Iraq's Saddam Hussain government, almost all the Islamic countries condemned the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon buildings on 11 September 2001. But after the US bombing of Afghanistan targetting Taliban, cracks have developed in the Washington-led international coalition against terrorism. Several Islamic countries are unable to endorse the methods and approaches of the Bush Administration in the on-going war against terror. The most glaring case of awesome discontent over the US approach is regarding the whole question of "regime change" in Baghdad. While larger popular opposition

to the US policies reverberates in the growing anti-Americanism in Islamic countries, the governments in those countries appear to be having little option but to bend to the US pressure.

Last but not the least, several countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America feel that the US being the richest country in the world, does not do much for the poverty-stricken masses around the world. There is resentment among a large number of people that the US spends more in defence and security areas than in poverty alleviation, where 2.8 billion people out of total global population of about 6 billion live on less than \$2 a day and 1.2 billion on less than \$1 a day.

26.4.1 Post-Cold War Challenges

American analysts have observed that no great rival power to the US is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. Can the European Union (EU) emerge as a rival centre of power? Europe as an economic equal to the US is possible. Given the continent's diplomatic and military experience, the EU can also play a substantial role in international affairs. But, as Ash points out, "the gulf between its military capacity and that of the United States grows ever wider." Robert Leiber argues that the transatlantic ties remain solid despite numerous differences and that the pervasive "internal bickering" among the EU members cannot create a fracture in the alliance. Mearsheimer is more candid in his assessment. He writes: "Without the American pacifier, Europe is not guaranteed to remain peaceful. Indeed, intense security competition among the great powers would likely ensue because, upon American withdrawal, Europe would go from benign bipolarity to unbalanced multipolarity, the most dangerous kind of power structure. The United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany would have to build up their own military forces and provide for their own security. In effect, they would all become great powers, making Europe multipolar and raising the ever-present possibility that they might fight among themselves. And Germany would probably become a potential hegemon and thus the main source of worry."

Can Russia pose a challenge to the US in the near future? Russia actually remains the only country in the world, which has the "over-kill" nuclear capacity and thus theoretically can threaten the physical existence of the United States. But it no longer poses a systemic challenge to the US predominance in the world, as it did during the Cold War. Its economy is too weak to enable it to play the role of a major pole in the global power structure. Russian economy is unlikely to grow to a point where it can emerge as a rival centre of power to the US. During the larger part of the Cold War, the former Soviet economy was almost half of the US economy. After the end of the Cold War, Russia did not inherit all the sources of wealth of the former USSR. Moreover, the US has provided billions of dollars of assistance to Russia and the two countries are seeking to develop cooperative relations. Since 1992, Washington has provided more than \$10.8 billion in grant assistance to Russia, "funding a variety of programmes in four key areas: security programmes, humanitarian assistance, economic reform, and democratic reform." The American assistance is provided for a variety of programmes including nuclear reactor safety, public health, and customs reform. Russia has also been the recipient of more than \$9 billion in commercial financing and insurance from the US Government.

While Russia has a long list of complaints against the US policies, such as NATO expansion, bombing of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya and Somalia in recent years abrogation of the ABM treaty, intervention in the Caspian politics, it has grudgingly witnessed the US military presence in the Central Asian Republics, it still does not want to follow a confrontational policy. Russia has willy-nilly accepted the engagement policy of the US by joining the NATO-Russia Foundation Act and Partnership for Peace Initiative. On a wide range of security issues, which include nuclear threat reduction, arms control, peacekeeping, combating terrorism and others,

Washington and Moscow are cooperative partners. Russia runs a trade surplus with the US and feels elated about the US support to its membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. Washington is also in favour of Russia's entry into the World Trade Organisation. More than fifty thousand Russian people have visited the US either on various government-sponsored programmes or as tourists. It is thus unlikely that Russia is going to pose a security challenge to the US in the foreseeable future.

Can China pose a security threat to the United States? A great debate is on since the end of the Cold War in the US about the growing Chinese power. One section of the American strategic analysts argues that China could emerge powerful enough to be a rival of the US. Highly positive predictions of the Chinese economic growth and Beijing's drive towards military modernisation have generated apprehensions in the US that China, instead of becoming a cooperative partner, could pose a challenge to the US presence in Asia. The US-China differences over the issues, such as Taiwan, Tibet, trade and human rights are cited as the areas where Washington and Beijing would clash. It is also pointed out that a powerful China would like to throw its strategic weight around in its neighbourhood and this could complicate Washington's cooperative ties with friendly Asian countries. Some analysts go to the extent of forecasting the emergence of a new kind of Cold War between the US and China in Asia.

Another group highlights the positive aspects of emerging ties between the US and China. The economic ties between the two countries have touched new heights in recent years. Political differences between Washington and Beijing have not affected the growing business, trade, and investment ties between the two countries.

American companies have invested in a wide range of manufacturing sectors, hotel projects, restaurant chains, and petrochemicals in China and "have entered agreements establishing more than 20,000 equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in China. More than 100 US-based multinationals have projects in China, some with multiple investments." Moreover, the United States has substantial economic and social ties with Hong Kong. The US investment in Hong Kong is to the tune of about \$16 billion and there are 1,100 US firms and 50,000 American residents in Hong Kong. China ran a trade surplus of about \$100 billion in the year 2001 and the trade relations between the two countries are likely to grow in the future, especially after the US Congress de-linked the Human Rights issue from the trade issue and approved the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) bill.

But even otherwise, China will not be in a position to challenge the American primacy in the world and the predominant US presence in the Asia-pacific region. First of all, the economic achievements of China in absolute terms will always be compromised by its huge demographic burden. Secondly, the US will retain its hold and remains the frontrunner in the advanced technology sectors for the foreseeable future and China in any case is unlikely to be a great competitor. Thirdly, China is currently no match to the US military capabilities; nor is it likely to be a challenger to the US military preponderance.

The US is unlikely to see the rise of a rival superpower in the foreseeable future. The American primacy will continue deep into the 21st Century. But the country certainly has to face new and emerging challenges. Such challenges may require building of "revolving coalitions" with various permutations and combinations of countries. In other words, the days of pure and undiluted unilateralism are transitory and the US perhaps has learnt quickly to adjust to the new realities, especially in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks.

26.5 SUMMARY

The US emerged as a world power on the eve of the 20th Century after winning a war against Spain in 1898. The end of Second World War saw the birth of the USA as a super power. It had nuclear monopoly and a massive economy for a few years and ruled a unipolar world until the Soviet Union emerged as a rival super power. The Cold War between the two super powers led to a decline in American power with the spread of communism into some countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The American decline stopped and the Soviet decline began with the onset of second Cold War with Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviet decline culminated in the disintegration of the Soviet Union, emergence of fifteen different independent republics and end of the Cold War. The collapse of a pole in the bipolar international system led to the emergence of a unipolar world with the US remaining as the sole superpower. The US faces many challenges in the post-Cold War era, but it is unlikely that a rival superpower will emerge in the foreseeable future.

26.6 EXERCISES

1. How did the US seek to contain communism in Europe?
2. Describe how the US failed to contain the spread of communism during the Cold War.
3. Why do some analysts consider the US as a hyperpower?
4. What is the current status of the US in world hierarchy of power?
5. How do the American allies/friends view America?
6. Which countries have the potential to challenge the United States today?
7. Do you think a rival superpower can emerge in the foreseeable future?

UNIT 27 CHINA AS AN EMERGING POWER

Structure

- 27.1 Introduction
 - 27.2 Emergence of People's Republic of China
 - 27.3 Post-Cold War World and Uni-polarity
 - 27.3.1 China's Military Capability
 - 27.3.2 PLA Modernisation
 - 27.3.3 PLA Structure
 - 27.4 China's Economic Strength
 - 27.5 Stability of China
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-

27.1 INTRODUCTION

About China, Napoleon had once said: “It is a sleeping giant, let it sleep for if it wakes it would shake the world”. Whether Napoleon’s prophecy has come out to be true or not is a matter of perception but one thing is certainly true that today China’s presence is felt the world over. Political observers and analysts have been discussing and debating on the role of China in international politics and the status it has among the comity of nations. China has the largest population in the world, approximately 1.5 billion people, according to the latest official census. It has the fourth largest territory-Canada, the United States and Russia being the only other countries bigger in size. It has the biggest land army in the world. Today, its GNP per capita is second largest and it has maintained a growth rate of about 8 per cent for the last many years. However, to assess correctly China’s potential of becoming a super power or even a great power capable of threatening the only super power in today’s world viz. the United States of America, it is necessary to understand a whole gamut of features and factors about China which would be done in this Unit

27.2 EMERGENCE OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

China is one of the oldest civilisations on this earth. For several centuries it remained isolated from the rest of the world as it was self-sufficient in every respect. The Chinese political system until the year 1911 was dominated by an emperor, who according to the Chinese ruled with the “mandate of heaven”. In other words, the emperor was divine, he was son of God. They, therefore, conducted their international relations in a way which seemed very unusual and strange to Westerners. All those who established any kind of relations with them had to pay “tribute” to the emperor. Foreigners were considered barbarians as the Chinese considered themselves superior to outsiders. However, traders, monks, scholars and curious travellers had visited China and many have spent years there. Nonetheless, China remained an enigma to many foreigners. It was only after Western colonialism began to spread its tentacles that China was forced to become a part of the international system. After the Opium War of 1840 when the British, using what is called ‘gunboat diplomacy’, got the Chinese to open their ports for

trade, China had to sign a series of ‘unequal treaties’ with almost all imperialist powers. These treaties subjugated China to all European powers and later to Japan too. China remained politically independent in the sense that no power took away the political sovereignty of China but economically it was plundered by all-Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan-in different ways. An overwhelming part of China’s resources were under the control of the various imperialist powers. This was a matter of grave concern for all patriotic Chinese as this amounted to humiliation for the entire nation which was always a proud civilisation.

In the 20th Century, China witnessed far-reaching changes and experienced a massive transition. First, the monarchy and with it the emperor-system, came to an end in 1911. After that a cultural renewal movement emerged which brought into existence a communist party. Led by Mao Zedong, a peasant revolution with the support of a peasant army, brought liberation to China in 1949. The communists finally defeated their compatriots namely the Nationalists, as they were known. The latter fled to the island of Taiwan and established the government of the Republic of China (henceforth ROC). The communists who had the mainland under their control called it the People’s Republic of China (henceforth the PRC).

Post-liberation China is chronologically divided into two periods i.e. the Mao period (from 1949 to 1977) and the Reform period (1978 onwards). However, since its birth the PRC has been an important player in the post-Second World War era. Although up until 1971, the PRC government was not accepted as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the position was held by the ROC government. Diplomatic recognition by the United States came only in 1978. That same year the Chinese began to reform their system in the most dramatic and totally unexpected ways. In less than three decades China has emerged as a big power in many respects. After the United States and Russia, it is undoubtedly the next powerful country. However, to grasp the extent of China’s power it is imperative for us to analyse some factors. What is it that makes a nation a big power? Is it its military capabilities, its economic strength or its political stability? In fact, it is all these factors in combination which bestows a big power status to any country.

27.3 POST-COLD WAR WORLD AND UNI-POLARITY

As is known to all during the period of the Cold War i.e. from the end of Second World War to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international scenario was dominated by the two super powers viz. the United States and the Soviet Union. Most countries of the world were part of any one of the two blocs. (The Non-aligned countries claimed to belong to no bloc). As long as the PRC had cordial relations with the Soviet Union i.e. until the early 1960s, it said that it was part of the Socialist Bloc led by the Soviet Union. In the latter period when its relations with the Soviet state soured, the PRC claimed that it was part of the Third World which meant the nations of Asia (minus Japan), Africa and Latin America.

The end of the Cold War created a totally new scenario in the arena of international relations. The United States is the only super power unchallenged by any. Along with the process of globalisation that is going on in full strength a completely different world order is emerging and China is making a valiant effort to have an effective presence in it. From all its policy statements it is clear that China is opposed to a uni-polar world and supports multi-polarity because it is opposed to all forms of hegemony. In that sense the PRC poses a challenge to the only super power-the United States. As Karmel has observed: “A more confident but still authoritarian China-a state that suppresses pluralism, brazenly markets its weapons to pariah states and aggressively pursues export-led growth strategies is even looked upon by some as a threat to

the United States". What we would try to see here is that can China be a potential threat to the United States in the foreseeable future.

27.3.1 China's Military Capability

It is beyond doubt that China's dramatically expanded military might and economic development make the states of Asia and beyond feel threatened. While it is true that a lot of information on the Chinese military is not available to the outside world but many studies have been done on the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) by a number of scholars. In the following passages we would take up a brief discussion of the PLA to understand and analyse its role in giving China the status of a big power.

Origins of the PLA

The PLA was formed in the year 1927 when the communists organised the poor peasants in the remote areas of Southern China. Zhu De and Mao Zedong were the main organisers and in its early years it was called first the Eighth Route Army and then the New Fourth Army. The name PLA was given to it after the Japanese attacked China in 1937. In its early years most of its recruits were poor peasants. The PLA fought the Japanese as well as the Chinese Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. There are many instances of bravery and courage that the PLA displayed to bring liberation to China. However, the peasant army used guerrilla tactics to fight the enemy. Known as People's War, all military doctrine as well as strategy and tactics fell under it. For Chinese communists the term 'people' implied those who supported the CPC which includes workers, peasants and progressive sections of the middle classes. It had, therefore, a moral connotation-an army that fights for the *people* and not a *state*.

The People' War doctrine remained an important component of Chinese communist ideology even in the post-liberation period as long as Mao Zedong was alive. The Chinese claimed that even in case of a nuclear war they could defeat the enemy using People's War strategy. This was reinforced by the fact that Chinese did not undertake any massive military modernisation programme due to the limited resources the state has at its disposal. Apart from People's War, the other principle that was accepted during the struggle for liberation was that of "Party commands the gun", which effectively means civilian control over the military. Having given so much clout to the military in its struggle to liberate China, the CPC has always been wary of losing its control over the army. There have been instances in post-liberation China when the army has been called to intervene in, what many would call a political dispute. To maintain its supremacy over the PLA, the CPC has a Central Military Commission (CMC, earlier it was called the Military Affairs Commission) and it is chaired by the most powerful civilian leader. (At present Jiang Zemin is its Chairman). In 1997, the Chinese National People's Congress (China's parliament) passed the National Defence Law in which this Maoist principle of the Party controlling the gun has been stipulated.

27.3.2 PLA Modernisation

China has the biggest land army in the world. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies the total number of troops is 2,840,000 of which the army has 2,090,000 soldiers and the airforce, navy and strategic missile force have 470,000, 280,000 and 125,000 respectively. In addition the Reserves comprise of 1,200,000 men and the People's Armed Police (a paramilitary body) have 800,000.

During the Mao period i.e. up to 1976 with the People's War doctrine upheld, a large army was

perceived as an asset. After Mao's death when the CPC decided to modernise its military as part of the Four Modernisations policy (which later on was called the Reforms under Deng Xiaoping) an oversized PLA is clearly a liability. This is so because a state needs lots of resources to maintain so many soldiers as rations, uniforms, housing, healthcare, children's education, entertainment etc. has to be provided. Moreover, regular training and exercises are also necessary to keep the army's morale high. For a nation that has taken up a very ambitious reforms programme a huge army is an expensive proposition. Troop reduction has therefore become an important issue for the Chinese at present. It has been officially announced that the number of troops would be reduced gradually and brought down to 2.5 million.

Since Reforms were initiated under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, changes have occurred in the military doctrine. Deng Xiaoping talked about and then theorised the concept of "People's War under Modern Conditions" which gave the ideological justification for modernising the PLA. Deng realised that without professionalising the army and modernising the weaponry, China's goal of becoming a developed country would be unachievable. People's War under modern conditions meant that in the event of a war guerrilla tactics would be first used against the enemy which would be drawn into Chinese territory and later it would be attacked with modern weaponry. Trapped inside Chinese territory it would not get an escape route and this would make it either surrender or perish. This theory, however, did have a flaw. Once into Chinese territory the enemy may destroy very important economic installations (factories, oil refineries, air ports, bridges etc.) which would put the economic development programme in jeopardy. After the Gulf War (1991), this concept was not much publicised mainly because this war was fought decisively by the air force with no role for the army. In other words, it was clear to the military planners of China that in this day and age superior technology matters. This not only led to more stress on the technological advancement of the PLA but also brought about new thinking encapsulated in the doctrine of "Modern Warfare under Hi-tech Conditions".

27.3.3 PLA Structure

The PLA land forces are divided into seven military regions namely Beijing, Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu. No one knows how many soldiers are there in each of these regions. It is, however, interesting to note that China's ground forces are not at all towards any national border or potential battlefield. The army is intended more for maintaining internal order engage in construction and relief activities and perform mainly domestic functions. It is estimated that as many as one million troops are stationed in Xinjiang (Sinkiang) province which has seen terrorist activities grow in the last few years. However, according to another source 80,000 soldiers are stationed in the coastal Fujian province, probably to be engaged in a cross-strait military conflict, should it occur. Here it needs to be mentioned that gaining control over the province of Taiwan has been the most crucial of China's policies.

China's navy is divided into East, South and North China Sea fleets. Since the Reforms which led to a policy of Open Door, China's coastal areas have prospered far more than the interior. This has led to a new emphasis on the navy. However, this emphasis is also due to the perception of the importance of the sea as a strategic resource and battleground. As Deng Xiaoping had stated: "Navies in the present era create great power, strong mobility, and the capacity for worldwide intervention. In modern warfare, more than before navies are of substantial significance; their technological foundation, their position and use are increasingly prominent and important." The Chinese navy can be broken down by function into five categories: warship, submarine, marine, naval aviation and coastal defence force. Coastal defence forces are believed to have 29,000 soldiers, the marine corp of around 5,000 and the naval air force approximately 25,000. In late 1985, the Naval Military Academic Research Institute was established to coordinate

and provide research and analysis for the formulation of naval strategy, operations and tactics. Modernisation of the navy has been undertaken rather seriously in the last two decades but military analysts feel that it continues to face some crippling weaknesses. It has, for instance, too many old ships which need to be replaced by new ones with advanced technology. It is said that the bulk of China's naval ships are aging and in the process of going out of use. Key equipment and ordnance for naval modernisation also appear to be beyond China's reach both technologically and financially. The country has expressed its ambition to have blue water navy but most analysts feel that China is decades away from it. As far as naval ordnance is concerned, China remains well behind the United States, Russia and Japan.

The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) could not grow in the pre-reform period as the People's war doctrine was extremely inhibiting. The air force is a capital-intensive branch of the armed forces which in order to be effective relies almost entirely on modern logistics, high technology, advanced and consistent training, and developed command and control systems. The present leaders of China do agree that the air force is the most important branch in a modernised defence establishment. Like the navy, the Chinese air force is third largest in the world in terms of the size of its inventory. It may have more than 6,000 planes. Most of these planes, however, may be operational. The apparently huge size of China's outdated air force suggests that the emphasis is still on quantity rather than quality. Of course efforts are on to improve quality as is indicated by new purchases and development programmes and formation of elite air force units. However, China is struggling to develop these elite units that require to be trained to employ the newest hardware it is acquiring. The figures regarding how much China spends on its air force are not available but it is believed that the air force comprises an increasing per centage of China's overall defence spending.

In addition to the army, navy and air force, the fourth branch of China's defence system is its missile force or Second Artillery. It is well known that maintenance of a missile force requires the services of a very well trained group of scientists and technicians. China exploded its first atom bomb in 1964, and in 1967, its first hydrogen bomb was tested. Since then it has conducted several nuclear tests. Between 1956 and 1981, China developed its first generation of ballistic missiles. China's strategic doctrine on the development of missiles and nuclear bombs appears shrewd and realistic in comparison with its doctrines on the air force and navy. The development of a powerful nuclear missile is a very effective way to maintain a massive deterrent against super power attack. Throughout the reform period the military strategists of China have emphasised the importance of missiles in modern warfare.

Despite possessing laser guns, brilliant bombs, stealth fighter planes and nearly silent submarines, China has many technical, economic and political obstacles in implementing a new strategy. As one author has remarked: "Even if China develops the technical and economic capacity to promote military modernisation more quickly, leaders are afraid that a shift away from the rank and file and toward these high-tech goods might cause the Party to lose control over the gun." In other words, an oversized army and a not completely modernised navy and air force prevent the Chinese from posing a major threat to bigger powers like the United States and Russia.

27.4 CHINA'S ECONOMIC STRENGTH

As is well-accepted, sheer military prowess does not make a nation a major power. A nation's economic resilience is also an extremely important criterion to judge how important a role it can play in international affairs. The United States is the super power of this era because of a combination of its military power, economic strength and domestic political stability. The former Soviet Union

did have enormous military prowess but could not maintain its economic strength, and politically, it is clear in retrospect, it was a very fragile nation-state. Hence when we assess the power of a state we must take into account the all-round capabilities and not just one criterion.

In the year 2001, China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at US\$ 1.1 trillion and the average growth rate registered in the past twenty years has been 9 per cent. India's current GDP is around US \$ 450 billion i.e. less than half of China's. China's foreign exchange reserves exceeded US \$ 216 billion in 2001. Since its membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Chinese government is using it as a trigger to implement far-reaching and radical reforms to globalise the economy. It is expected that by the year 2020, China's economy could be worth US \$10 trillion. In the last thirty years, China has sustained investment rates of over 35 per cent of GDP. In contrast, India's rate of investment peaked at 26 per cent in 1996 and has since declined to about 22 per cent in 2001. China sustains high rate of investment by high rates of domestic savings of around 40 per cent. In the 1980s, its population policy of 'one-child family' has decreased the dependency ratio and raised the savings rate substantially. High savings have been invested in infra-structure and education to create the supporting environment for mass scale production.

Huge investments in infrastructure have created a national power grid with ample generating capacity, a national telecom system with the largest mobile network in the world and a national aviation system. In the last twelve years China has built over 19,000 kilometres of expressways and adds 3000 kilometres each year. India is still below the 1000 km mark in expressways. Urbanisation is taking place in China at a rapid pace as the belief is that "economic development is basically about moving people from villages to cities". Urban productivity is four times of rural productivity. China is building around ten huge new cities that will house over ten million people each.

Human capital formation is also one area China is working on. In the last twenty years there has been tremendous progress. College enrolment in the 1980s was about 1.5 per cent of the total population. At present the enrolment ratio is 11 per cent which means that it has gone up by more than five times in about a decade. Nine-year education is universal. In most villages there is at least one nine-year secondary school. At the high school level i.e. the twelve year school the numbers enrolled are about seventy per cent of those leaving secondary school. Rural families are still reluctant to send their children to high school. About 11 per cent of high school graduates go in for tertiary (or college) education. This is remarkable in contrast with China's past and that of most other developing countries but if we compare it with that of the US and Europe, it is 50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. China, therefore, is way behind. The share of public education expenditure in the GDP has been declining in the last twenty years. Families have mainly borne the burden of their child's education.

Compared with India, most of the figures for China are impressive but in comparison with many other Asian states China still has a long way to go. Even after twenty years of rapid economic growth China is still considered a poor country. Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia have given their people a higher living standard than China has to its people. Moreover rapid growth has, on the one hand, enlivened the stagnant economy of the 1960s and 1970s but on the other, has led to a host of problems which China is grappling with. From one of the most egalitarian societies in the world it has become the most unequal in its distribution of income, wealth and opportunity. The disparities between the wealthy and the poor have increased massively. Apart from this there are various other problems that have resulted as a consequence of the reforms that began in the late 1970s. These issues if not properly addressed may lead to major crises in Chinese society. This indicates that there are question marks on the prospective social stability

of China. No nation can achieve a major power status unless it has domestic peace and stability. This brings us to the next criterion to judge China's big power status viz. political and social stability.

27.5 STABILITY OF CHINA

This is a question that is being frequently asked by many scholars observing the growth of China. Being a big country China can perhaps absorb and neutralise many crises before it goes beyond control. Nonetheless, many important issues have arisen in the last two decades which need to be addressed in such a way that China is able to sustain economic growth without any major dislocation to its social system. The primary objective of the reforms undertaken since 1978 is to strengthen China's international position while retaining the authority of the Party. The results of the reforms include: glaring regional imbalances, noticeable sectoral imbalance, insurmountable ecological and environmental problems, exacerbated rural-urban divide, adverse impact on minorities, women, the elderly, the disabled and so on. Reforms may have brought more wealth to Chinese society but its distribution has not been balanced. Three important sections of Chinese society viz. workers, peasants and intellectuals have been affected by the reforms in a variety of ways. In the following section we discuss these.

Reform of the State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) has been a crucial part of reforms in the urban sector on the workers. This is having a noticeable negative impact. During the pre-reform (Maoist period), the SOE workers were a rather privileged group with guaranteed employment, social security, pension benefits etc., and received cradle-to-grave services from their work units. The SOE reforms have worker-retrenchment at its core. In the last decade more than 14 million workers have been laid off. Veteran permanent workers and retirees find their employment security, welfare benefits etc. in jeopardy. The working class is facing drastic dislocation. The total number of destitute workers nation-wide is estimated at 20 million. The newly emerging private sector and multi-national corporations together are in no position to absorb all workers who have lost their jobs. As a result resistance-both passive and active-has become visible and in the last few years many cases of violent workers' protests have been reported. Strikes as well as other methods of agitation have been followed to get the state to hear their voices. However, superior organisational force of the state has been able to forestall any major outbreak of violence. How long the state would be able to do so is a question many ask.

Reforms have led to rural discontent in several parts of China where peasants have expressed their anger often violently. Among the reasons for peasant unrest are high taxes, lowering of grain prices, losing land for industrialisation, pollution due to new factories, cultural and social conflicts (for example, the state supports cremation of the dead but the custom is burial), corruption of officials and their abusive behaviour with peasants. Peasant protests have taken a variety of forms: petitions, demonstrations, violent fights between peasants and Party cadres, riots, damaging state property, road blocks, holding officials captive, killing of cadres or police. Waves of peasant unrest occur in certain villages of different provinces and subside after some time. These are mostly spontaneous, short-lived and not well organised. More often than not the target of these protests is not the state or the central government but the local officials and local government. All forms of violence are swiftly curbed and sometimes proper corrective measures are taken to pacify the peasants. For some period of time the regime may succeed in containing the unrest in the countryside but a real threat to it may appear in the event of rural protest movements linking up with their urban counterparts.

The creation of a market economy and opening to the outside world gave intellectuals and the

students of China, for the first time in the PRC, alternatives to government employment, either in the professions, non-state enterprises, foreign-joint ventures, or their own businesses, providing a degree of economic independence which gives them some protection from political retaliation. Equally significant is the fact that intellectuals can remain totally distant from political participation if they so desire. The party-state tolerates and even encourages an apolitical culture so that intellectuals stay away from politics. Towards the end of the Century one witnessed different intellectual currents in China. Highly placed academics called for more political reforms. Many demanded civil and political rights along with economic rights. They believe that economic reforms cannot be sustained without political reforms and the only way to deal with rising unemployment, widening income gaps, pollution and corruption is to develop democracy. A group which tried to form a political party to challenge the Communist Party of China was quickly repressed with all its leaders arrested.

The Chinese regime does not face any major or imminent threat from any of these groups-workers, peasants, and intellectuals-in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, there is an apprehension that an alliance between the three or even two of these may be potent enough to challenge the regime leading to chaos and instability. There is some evidence of underground alliances between workers' groups and disgruntled intellectuals and if they consolidate and come out in the open and a movement resembling that of Solidarity in the Poland of the 1980s, emerges on the scene then it certainly does not augur well for the Chinese regime. In such an eventuality China's international image would also be negatively affected and if it has any big power ambitions that too would receive a setback. However, a positive scenario can also emerge. Genuine political reforms may take place which could create viable political institutions, lead to the rule of law, give China an independent judiciary, a free press and autonomous unions. Without a major upheaval if China becomes more open and democratic, its path to becoming a great power would be less difficult to tread.

27.6 SUMMARY

The debate regarding China's great power status has had a variety of interpretations. According to some scholars, China is a struggling developing country with high ambitions. To others, China is a rising or an emerging power which may, in the future, be powerful enough to threaten the United States, the way the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. But we all know retrospectively that the Soviet Union was internally a weak nation-state or else it would not have crumbled so easily. The fate of the Soviet Union also teaches us that a mere military might is not a sufficient condition for big power status; it may be a necessary condition, if at all. Japan is considered an economic super power and plays an important role in world affairs but does not have a standing army.

China has always opposed the hegemony of super powers. It has never expressed the desire of becoming a super power or even a big power. China has, therefore, supported a multi-polar world which will not be dominated by one super power. In this multi-polar world it wants to see itself as playing a crucial role.

China has resented the fact that other nations, mainly in the Asian region, talk of a "China threat" either directly or in a veiled form. This is being done to maintain unipolarity and prevent China from initiating the process of creating a multi-polar world and more importantly to prevent China from becoming a developed country, the Chinese believe. China has played a key role in the formation of the 'Shanghai Five' and signed with the four countries, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikstan, a treaty in 1996 which it called "the first multi-lateral treaty... to build confidence in the Asia-Pacific region." It is believed that China's main aim in having close

cooperation with the Central Asian countries is to have access to the energy supplies which China needs for its economic development programme.

With Russia, China has developed what is called a ‘strategic partnership’ in the last few years. This is of vital importance to the PRC as it permits the PRC to security concerns to its east and south and provides access to weapons which it can neither produce itself nor purchase elsewhere. Most importantly it complicates the American attempts to isolate China on matters such as arms control, the inviolability of national sovereignty and Taiwan. The Chinese have often stated and worked towards expanding this ‘strategic partnership’ to a ‘strategic triangle’ in which along with Russia, India too would be a member. Some discussions at various levels have been going on towards this direction but India’s enthusiasm for this has not been much. This ‘triangle’ would be very clearly some kind of a counter to the United States which has become the sole super power. Such attempts by the Chinese clearly indicate the PRC’s sense of insecurity and self-perception that in the near future it cannot take on the United States.

Yet one more factor that is indicative of China’s weakness *vis-a-vis* the US is the Taiwan issue. Taiwan is a province which was part of China since time immemorial. In 1949 when mainland China was liberated, the Jiang Kai-shek regime with American support settled there and since then the Communist Chinese have been claiming the island as part of their territory. Ideologically, the liberation of China is not complete without Taiwan. In the last fifty years tension has developed a few times on the Taiwan Straits but has not led to war. Unification with Taiwan has been a pronounced objective of the PRC government as evident from all their documents, resolutions, statements, policy papers etc. China has said that it would prefer a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Taiwan issue but it does not rule out the possibility of using force. This statement is seen by observers as public posturing as China knows any attempt to forcibly take over Taiwan may have frightening consequences not just for China but the entire region or may be even the whole world. China will not achieve big power status till it is able to get the Taiwan dispute resolved in its favour.

At present China is completely involved in developing its economy. The underlying belief is that once it achieves a certain level of development, its military might would increase and political stability would be consolidated. At that point, it would be in a position to be considered a super power, although by then, the US, Russia and other nations may also become more powerful. Also, we cannot ignore the point made above that speedy economic growth may lead to political instability. China often behaves in such a way that others see a ‘China threat’. However, these are signs of weakness and insecurity. Once China becomes politically and economically resilient, it would cease to make others feel threatened.

27.7 EXERCISES

1. Explain the structure of the PLA of China.
2. Describe China’s economic strength.
3. What is China’s position in the post-Cold War unipolar world?
4. What is your assessment of China emerging as a super power in the future?

UNIT 28 EMERGENCE OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

Structure

- 28.1 Introduction
- 28.2 State Formation in Central Asia
 - 28.2.1 Formation of Central Asia National-Territorial Identities
- 28.3 Sub-National Identities
 - 28.3.1 National Minorities
- 28.4 Post-Soviet State Formation in Central Asia
 - 28.4.1 The New Constitutions
- 28.5 Language Issues
- 28.6 Religion and State
- 28.7 Economic Performance and Social Stability
- 28.8 Summary
- 28.9 Exercises
- 28.10 Glossary

28.1 INTRODUCTION

Before its disintegration in 1991, the Soviet Union consisted of 15 Union Republics. Of these, five were in Central Asia. These Republics-Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan-began the process of state formation soon after the former Soviet Union ceased to exist. They adopted their constitutions and commenced on a journey of independent nation-states. In the present unit we will discuss various aspects of the formation of the new Central Asian States. With their emergence as independent entities, the Central Asians had to develop their languages and state structure. You will read in this unit, how different Central Asian Republics are in trying to evolve their individual personality, without compromising their place in the international community.

28.2 STATE FORMATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

28.2.1 Formation of Central Asian National-Territorial Identities

Central Asia constitutes five former Soviet republics-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. A distinct national identity among the indigenous ethnic groups of Central Asia was formed during the Soviet period, when these nationalities acquired territorial and political status.

The Soviet state was organised as a federation of republics formed on the basis of national-territorial identity. Between 1924-1936, the present five Central Asian republics finally came into existence by redrawing the boundaries of the former kingdoms (also known as *Khanates*) of

Bukhara and Khiva and the directly ruled former Tsarist (emperor of Russia was called Tsar) colonial territory of Turkmenistan. Territorial delimitation consolidated group identity by giving ethnic groups control over their territories, whereas earlier they were divided among different political units, which had prevented the growth of a national identity.

The transformation of Central Asia from an agrarian region to an industrial one was undertaken with a great deal of urgency despite the region lacking infrastructure and skilled cadres. The Soviet policy of industrialisation went hand in hand with a policy of creating native skilled cadres. Creation of literary languages (written scripts in some cases) and standardisation of national languages, developing infrastructures like educational institutions, media, publishing organisations, reading materials, films and theatres etc. in titular languages consolidated nationhood.

In short, economic modernisation, mass education, strengthening the structure and function of indigenous languages, a defined territory along with the growth of literacy in the titular language and expansion of indigenous administrative cadre, strengthened the national identities in Central Asia.

The migration of Russian and other European population during the peak of industrialisation, notwithstanding, titular culture and tradition prevailed strongly especially in the countryside where most of the Central Asians lived. The knowledge of the mother-tongue was very high and the share of Central Asians in the population of the republics of the region was continuously increasing. All the indicators suggest that the demographic, cultural and linguistic identities were constantly consolidating in favour of the titular nationalities. Though Russian language served as the *lingua franca*, it was not the “official language” of the USSR. In Central Asia, the majority of the population and virtually all of the rural population, routinely speak the vernacular language and know Russian poorly, if at all.

The republics also became more heterogeneous during the modernisation process due to migration of nationalities from other regions of the then Soviet Union. These demographic changes had strong impact in republics like Kazakhstan where Kazakhs became a minority in their republic, constituting less than 40 per cent of the population. The Russians had nearly as much share of the population in the republic. In all the Central Asian republics there were substantial national minorities. These included many non-Slavic groups (Slavs included Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians) as well. While on the one hand the indigenous nationality was being consolidated culturally, politically and demographically, the republics were also acquiring multi-ethnic character like never before. In some cases this was leading to group conflicts as the economy showed signs of stagnation and competition with resources becoming scarce. With centre’s control loosening in the later Soviet years, chauvinistic tendencies in the republics increased.

Despite positive trends in consolidation of indigenous nationhood in Central Asia as well as manifestations of nationalism during the last years of the Soviet Union, the process of nation-building was still incomplete in Central Asia. As a result, while ethnic reassertion goes on one hand, there have also been trends towards fragmentation, like the rise of clan identity, regional and other sub-national identities.

28.3 SUB-NATIONAL IDENTITIES

In situation of insecurity such as those created by the collapse of Soviet Union, people depend on whatever form of solidarity that is available culturally or politically. However, since regional and clan networks have been a tacit constant of politics in various forms in all the Central Asian states even during Soviet times, not surprisingly there is a speedier revitalisation of these

traditional institutions. Such divisions in the case of Tajikistan led to a five-year long civil war and created formidable obstacles in building a coherent nation-state.

Though Soviet modernisation policies including secular education served to undermine traditional institutions like clans and tribes, these survived in many informal ways. The clan identity and its functions in Central Asia are not uniform. While in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan it is more related to extended family ties, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan “clan” affiliations relate more to territorial/regional communities.

Recognising the existence and importance of such identities, the ruling elite have tried to make clan/territorial identity as invisible as possible. The experience of Tajikistan may not have been lost on the Central Asian leadership. They seek to overcome these traditional loyalties in order to create modern nation-states. The momentum of the nation-building process is also likely to weaken these traditional institutions.

The existence and re-assertion of sub-national or group identities in the open, however, should not lead one to believe that these identities would overtake the larger national identity that were so assiduously cultivated over the past 70 years and have also acquired an emotional force that provides its own legitimization. The sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union disrupted the process of national consolidation under the supervision of a multi-ethnic Soviet state. Sometimes previously dormant divisions come out into the open, which the new states have to grapple with, though tribal, regional and other sub-national discords so far have been rather subtle and have not resulted in violent conflicts, barring in Tajikistan. National identity continues to be the dominant factor in the politics of group mobilisation and even state and its institutions to some extent have been harnessed to this end. The fears and anxieties arising among the national minorities in each republic have stemmed from the nationality assertion of the titular Central Asian nationalities, notwithstanding the heterogeneity, diversities and divisions etc.

28.3.1 National Minorities since Independence

Despite the progress made during the Soviet years in terms of upward mobility, most indigenous Central Asians still lived in rural areas (more than 70 per cent) and worked in agriculture at the time of Soviet disintegration. In the urban areas they were predominantly in light and food industries and in the service sector. Skilled workers in industries were mostly from Russian or other European groups. Although the proportion of the Slavic population is not very high in Central Asia as a whole, industrial employment level among Russians was about three times higher than that among the indigenous population. In Kazakhstan, the non-Kazakhs constituted about 57 per cent of the population, and in the industry their share was 75.8 per cent of all industrial workers.

The impact of the national movements for independence that gained momentum elsewhere in the USSR in the late 1980s was less visible in Central Asia. Yet there were some violent outbursts that took the form of inter-ethnic riots. In all the republics of the region, difficult economic situation put ethnic minorities under pressure and there were very violent group clashes. The psychological atmosphere of uncertainty and the adoption of new language laws prompted a large number of Russians and other European population to leave Central Asia in the wake of ethnic riots in different Central Asian states.

Between 1992 and 1996, Central Asia accounted for 59 per cent of all net migrations to Russia from former Soviet republics, of which 25 per cent was from Uzbekistan. Of all the migrants from Central Asia to Russia between 1989 and 1996, ethnic Russians constituted 70 per cent

and most of the remainder was Tatars, Ukrainians, Belarussians and Jews. The net population transfer of ethnic Russians from Central Asia to Russia during the same period was equal to over 14 per cent (1.3 million people) of those ethnic Russians who were permanent residents in the region in 1989.

The changing social context in the newly independent states of Central Asia may also have fuelled emigration. More generally, as indigenous groups succeeded in gaining a privileged status in their homelands, the non-indigenous groups felt increasingly discriminated against. Symbolic of the new cultural policy was the adoption of the new language laws by the Central Asian republics in 1989-90 that elevated the titular language to the status of official language. Many Russians perceived the new language laws as the future basis for job discrimination. Among Russians, including those who were born and brought up in Central Asia, knowledge of the titular language is limited to a few. The new language laws of various Central Asian states did not provide for necessary measures to help Russians master the titular languages. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan decreed that the knowledge of the official language is obligatory for persons occupying certain posts. Deadlines for language requirement for posts in the state apparatus, in administrative, economic and cultural positions was initially 1996 in Turkmenistan, 1997 in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and 1999 in Kyrgyzstan. There was nothing said in the laws about the creation of necessary conditions and legal guarantees for the study and development of Russian language.

The phase of nationalist euphoria being over, there is a sober realisation about the possible impact of emigration of Slavs on the economy and society of the newly independent states of Central Asia. Political leaders of these states both in government and opposition have expressed concern that the loss of professional and skilled personnel was already having a damaging effect. They have been urging the Slavs and other European population to stay.

Russians represented the higher skilled and professional category in Central Asia. At the time of independence, though their share was less than 8 per cent in Tajikistan and slightly over that in Uzbekistan, they represented 21 per cent of the specialists with higher or specialised education in Tajikistan and 17 per cent of those in Uzbekistan. The loss of this skilled population naturally worries the leadership of Central Asian states.

Since the impact of the Russian emigration can be quite detrimental to the economies of the newly independent states of Central Asia, it is difficult to visualise any language-based discrimination, at least in the short run. Essentially Russian remains the language of inter-ethnic communication. As it is, the laws would take some time to come into real force and their strictest implementation in the near future is doubtful. Most state laws provide for the continued use of Russian language. Turkmen law even talks of national-Russian bilingualism. Tajik law proclaims, “[T]he Russian language as the language of inter-ethnic communication functions freely in the territory of Tajikistan”. It has also committed to maintain the linguistic rights of the non-Tajik population, most notably the Uzbeks. In Uzbekistan, under a resolution passed by the parliament, the deadline for a complete switch of the Uzbek alphabet from Cyrillic (Slavic script) to Latin script was pushed back by five years to 2005.

All around chaos and civil war, the rise of religious fundamentalism and the worsening inter-ethnic relations, as has been stated earlier, have so far been major reasons for the exodus. An important factor in Russian emigration could have been the industrial recession in Central Asia that followed the collapse of the USSR. Insufficient deliveries of energy resources and raw materials from Russia together with the absence of orders, from Moscow, Union enterprises whose workforce was made up mainly of Russians, closed down. A large proportion of Russians

worked in the defence industry and many were rendered jobless with the break up of the USSR. In short, ethno-cultural concerns combined with industrial recession resulted in mass exodus of Russians from Central Asia.

The Central Asian states cannot be termed as very discriminatory against the Russians. The language laws, which could form the basis of certain degree of alienation, are flexible enough to take care of the immediate concerns of the Russian-speaking population. Islamic fundamentalism, which has been one major source of worry, has not spread as feared in the beginning. This situation has helped in slowing down emigration of the Russian and other Slavic population from Central Asia in recent years.

While the economic and social stability will help in slowing down Russian emigration, the presence of Russians would in turn help build social and economic stability. The treatment of Russians will also determine the type of relationship Central Asian states would have with the Russian federation in future, a relationship that is so important both from economic and security points of view.

Even during the early days of independence when ethno-national sentiments were at a feverish pitch, Central Asians in general were in favour of building secular states and keeping the multi-ethnic character of their societies in tact. The changing position of Russians and the critical nature of their participation in economic reconstruction have seen some changes in policy as regards the status of Russian language, and, in some cases, the granting of dual citizenship rights to the Russians.

The story of the post-Soviet Central Asia is not about disharmony and conflicts alone. Positive trends have also been observed that point towards better inter-ethnic relations in the region. Ethnic minorities having roots in Central Asia are going to stay and the societies will continue to remain multi-ethnic. The leadership in Central Asia has taken this into cognisance and is seeking to create suitable environment for the integration of national minorities in the state-building process. State-builders have lately made efforts to focus more on preserving and promoting the multi-ethnic character of society and state through more inclusive policies.

28.4 POST-SOVIET STATE FORMATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

In the post-Soviet period, the republics of Central Asia are faced with the onerous task of preserving a collective of nations that are competing to share the benefits and resources. The competition is not only between larger ethnic collectives alone, but also between sub-national identities that have complicated the state-building efforts and which is also one of the main reasons for homogenising tendencies that are so conspicuous in the nation-building efforts.

To impart a sense of common destiny to their members, nation-builders make use of ethnic symbols related to customs, traditional names, heroes, myths, state iconography etc. The ruling elite in Central Asia accord great meaning to the ideology of unity of the indigenous nationality and have created official symbols that draw on the culture of the particular nationality. The replacement of Russian and Soviet names by indigenous ones has resulted in the renaming of a multitude of regions, cities, streets, squares and collective farms. All the states of Central Asia have indulged in tacit and not so tacit nationalising measures to ensure the cultural and political resurgence of their nations. These include new language laws, new national holidays related to traditional festivals, new flags with traditional symbols, glorification of national heroes of the past etc.

The Central Asian republics, in many ways, have been quite diverse. The existence of multiple identities-ethnic, sub-ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional etc.-have necessitated a very complex state-building endeavour in the post-Soviet period. While independence created some momentum to create a model of nation-state based on the dominant national identity, (soon) the heterogeneity of the society impinged upon the process to make it more integrative rather than exclusive.

Though some of the early policies in the post-Soviet Central Asia raised apprehensions among national minorities, very soon, however, the momentum of nationalising weakened and the states are keen to maintain their multi-ethnic identity. The importance of maintaining friendly relations among themselves and with other former Soviet republics has not been lost on the Central Asian leadership. Each major titular ethnic group is a minority in some other state and any competitive nationalism would only create secessionist, divisive and irredentist sentiments that would weaken stability of the new states.

28.4.1 The New Constitutions

The relatively weaker numerical strength of the titular group and the existence of strong sub-national identities confronted nation-builders in states like Kazakhstan. At the time of independence Kazakhs and Russians were nearly equal in number in Kazakhstan (39.5 per cent compared to 37.7 per cent). The demographic situation was even more unfavourable to the Kazakhs given the concentration of Russians in the north and east of the country, where they constituted 61.7 per cent and 64.2 per cent of the population respectively. Even in the then capital Almaty, situated in the south, Russians constituted 56 per cent of the population.

The initial impulse under these circumstances was to create a state in which non-indigenous population would only enjoy certain basic citizenship rights. There was a fear in Kazakhstan that Kazakhs would lose significance in their historical homeland if the existing situation were allowed to continue even after independence. Kazakh language was elevated to the status of ‘state language’, arousing fears among the non-Kazakhs that they would be discriminated in jobs on the basis of language. It could also be used as an instrument to keep the Russians out of the top positions. The law of Kazakhstan requires a fluent knowledge of the Kazakh language for all the constitutional functionaries. It must, however, also be mentioned that the leadership was reluctant even then to adopt an exclusive nationalist position. Thus the 1993 constitution, despite language requirement, did not preserve the highest office of the president to ethnic Kazakhs alone. In Turkmenistan, however, the Turkmen origin of the head of the state is a constitutional requirement.

Various steps that were taken initially created the impression that the Central Asian republics are well on their way to create nation-states based on the dominant indigenous identity alone. There were also policies aimed at strengthening the numerical strength of the indigenous nationality.

The Kazakh state was under mounting pressure to adopt the nation-state model. The constitution declared Kazakhstan as the homeland of the Kazakh people first and foremost. Despite widespread resentment among the Slavs against the 1992 Declaration on Language, Kazakh was made the state language. The other issue of Russian grievance has been that of dual citizenship (to be citizens of Russia and Kazakhstan at the same time), which was accorded only to Kazakhs, who migrated from outside.

In Kyrgyzstan, though the present constitution adopted in 1993 describes the state as “a sovereign, unitary, democratic republic built upon the basis of a legal, secular state” and describes the people of Kyrgyzstan “as the carriers of sovereignty” (Art.1) and even allows citizens of all

nationalities to compete for the highest post of president, there are requirements like knowledge of the Kyrgyz language and 15-year residency in the republic to limit eligibility to such a high post. The preamble of Uzbekistan's constitution adopted in December 1992 states that the people of Uzbekistan "are guided by historical experience in developing Uzbek statehood". On the contrary, the constitution of Tajikistan, adopted in November 1994, displays less national exclusiveness. The preamble states, "We, the people of Tajikistan, as an inseparable part of the world community, seeing ourselves as responsible and duty bound to past, present and future generations, wishing to ensure the sovereignty, development and perfection of our state, recognising the rights and freedoms of the individual as sacred, affirming the equality of rights and friendship of all nationalities and peoples (of Tajikistan), seeking to build a just society, adopt and declare a valid constitution". The constitution not only recognises Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication, but also grants all nationalities and groups residing in the republic to freely use their mother tongue (Art.2). It explicitly separates religion from the state and its affairs. Organisations promoting racism, nationalism, social and religious enmity and hatred are prohibited (Art.8). Nevertheless, even the constitution of Tajikistan makes knowledge of the state language and 10-year residency requirement mandatory for the post of the head of state, i.e., president of the republic.

The role of the state in promoting ever increasing numerical superiority for the dominant indigenous nationality has been significant. Incentives have been offered in states like Kazakhstan to encourage immigration of the diaspora living outside the republic. Other forms of legal support include dual citizenship for Kazakh immigrants and denial of the same to Russians. Kazakhs from outside are automatically recognised as refugees and have preferential status with regard to returning and finding a home and a job, free college admission and housing, and free to travel within the territory of the republic. In other cases like Tajikistan, the state frontier was made porous to welcome co-ethnics from Afghanistan. In each Central Asian case the share of the indigenous population has grown.

Various states have made language knowledge a requirement to occupy the highest position in the state. Art. 55 of the Turkmenistan's constitution even goes a step further and states clearly that the president must be a citizen 'from amongst the Turkmen'. Kyrgyzstan's constitution, though does not reserve the Presidency for the ethnic Kyrgyz alone, however stipulates that the president must 'have a command of the state language'. Uzbekistan's constitution (Art. 90) similarly stipulates that the president must 'have a fluent command of the state language', and according to the constitution of Kazakhstan, the president and the chairman of both houses of parliament must be fluent in the state language.

Fearing alienation of the Russian minority from the polity and the economy, states have taken various steps to prevent emigration of Slavs. Both the 1993 constitution and the 1995 constitution of Kazakhstan guarantee equal rights for all citizens, regardless of race, nationality, language or religion. The new constitution (1995) grants automatic citizenship to all who desire it, with no language or residence requirement whatsoever. The constitution (Art.5) expressly forbids the establishment of any social organisation that seeks to forcibly change the constitutional order, undermine state security, violate territorial integrity, or promote 'social, racial, national, religious, class, or tribal discord'. This has been further supplemented by an absolute ban on any propaganda or campaign directed towards the above aims. Efforts have also been made to protect the linguistic identity of the Russian minority.

28.5 LANGUAGE ISSUE

All the states of Central Asia adopted language laws in 1989-90 that not only elevated their

titular languages to the status of state language but also restricted the use of non-titular languages. However, despite language reforms, the real situation has not been as unfavourable to national minorities as projected. There have been changes in most of the original language laws and important languages like Russian still play an important role in Central Asia. Among many Central Asians the grounding in the mother tongue is strong. They have no real reasons to worry about the future of their own language. Its further expansion in certain spheres is related to the problems in creating more educational infrastructure in the titular language, especially when the economy is not doing well. Therefore, it is difficult to visualise the language issue to be a major factor in pitting ethnic communities against each other. In fact, the time limit for switching over to complete titular language-use has been relaxed in all the states.

The initial target date for implementation of Kyrgyz language-use in all administrative and educational institutions was 1994. However, the problems related to switching over have been such that the implementation of this provision of the language law was suspended in 1993. These problems include need to encourage Russians to stay in the republic; pragmatic need of a language that has already served for decades as a language of interethnic communication and present inadequacy of the Kyrgyz language in the fields of science and technology. A presidential decree in 1994, ‘On Regulating the Migratory Processes in the Kyrgyz Republic’, allowed Russian to be used in those institutions and areas where Slavs formed a majority and in scientific fields where Russian is the normal language in use. The Constitutional Court in early 1996 approved in principle a change to Art.5 (2) of the Constitution and allowed the use of Russian as an official language.

In the case of Kazakhstan, especially, Russian language has been accorded a respectable status. While the 1993 constitution accorded Russian the status of ‘language of inter-ethnic communication’, the 1995 constitution conferred “official” status upon it as well (though not that of “state language”). The dual-language policy has so far ensured a balance and the space for the Russian-language has remained substantial. Though in November 1996 the lower house of the Kazakhstan parliament passed a draft revision of the language law fixing the time frame in which non-Kazakhs (by 1996) and the Kazakhs (by 2001) would learn Kazakh, the final version of the law adopted by both houses of parliament in July 1997 set 1 January 2006 as the deadline for learning of the Kazakh language by all citizens. In line with the Constitution, the new language law states that ‘Russian is used on a par with the Kazakh language in state organisations and organs of local self-government’.

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have not offered any protected status to Russian language. However, not only has the deadline for using the state language in the workplace has been extended, but substantial use of the Russian language still continues in the national media.

In Tajikistan a government resolution was adopted on 21 October 1997, the part-2 of which focusses on special arrangements aimed at maintaining and harmonising the development of all non-Tajik languages, including course offering of those languages at educational institutions, TV and Radio broadcasts etc.

Switching entirely to the use of titular languages in all spheres will take long since it requires a variety of organisational and material infrastructure to make a complete shift. Qualified teachers in the language, adequate schools, equipment and books, creating modernised terminology and translating scientific and technical literature on an advanced and wide scale are required before all citizens could be expected to use the titular language. The states of the region are not in a position to create the necessary infrastructure in the near future. Russian is still used

in business, science and the professions and any drastic step would lead to disruption in the work of state and economic organisations.

28.6 RELIGION AND STATE

Islam remained always in different ways a strong element of Central Asian identity. Be it as a part of everyday life like marriage, circumcision and burial (also called “everyday Islam”), or the authority structure within the family that is influenced by religion, or as a spiritual aspect of life, or as part of ethno-cultural values that differentiated Central Asians from the Slavs, Islam survived despite its separation from the state and weakening of its institutions (*Shariat*, the *Qazi* courts, *Adat*, *Maktab*s etc.) during the Soviet times.

Rituals, symbolism and cultural practices related to Islam have made a strong come back in Central Asia. Rapid growth in the number of mosques and attendance in them, increase in the importance of local shrines and mausoleums and demand for mullahs are symbolic of Islamic revivalism in Central Asia.

In all the Central Asian states, free elections brought to power secular and former communist leadership with popular mandate. The ruling elite in Central Asia realised both the strength and dangers of revivalism and accordingly were unwilling to move beyond a point to either project a religious identity of the new states or allow religious institution and religious leaders to acquire greater authority among the population that can undermine the authority of the political leadership.

One of the factors that contribute to insecurity of the Slavic and other European population is the growing role of Islam in public life and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. Though Islamic revival to a certain extent was expected, growth of political Islam has scared the minorities. Nevertheless, the region has yet to acquire a politically salient Islamic identity. While revival relates to a certain cultural heritage and greater participation in religious rituals, greater autonomy to religious institutions and their leaders, the greatest danger perceived is the use of religion as a unifying identity against the Russian-speaking groups. Even the political leadership, that was willing in the initial years following independence to utilise religious symbols to reinforce its own legitimacy, is today suspicious of religious activism. All the states have taken steps to prevent Islamic political organisations from playing any role in the political life of the country.

28.7 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL STABILITY

Transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one has so far been both complex and painful. The consequent policy and institutional reforms-independent banking and financial systems; introduction of new national currencies; reorientation of economic incentive structures and approaches to economic management-have been wide ranging, costly and resulted in significant dislocation as well as fall in output, income and employment. In the first five years following independence, the economies of Central Asia experienced severe recession, though the subsequent years have witnessed some stabilisation and recovery.

The social sector, however, remains in bad shape and can create social and political unrest until urgent steps are taken. Unemployment, both official and disguised, is at a high level. The fall in employment and real wage, combined with declining spending in social sector and the removal of subsidies brought down real wages, increased unemployment and under-employment that affected the general living standard of the masses.

The states of Central Asia cannot ignore the implications that economic stagnation and crises have on social stability. Though the focus of nation-builders has been to consolidate indigenous nationhood, increasing social and economic disparity pose a greater challenge to the state-building process. A small group enjoys power, while the rest of the population cutting across ethnic groups belongs to the category that has been deprived since independence. Asymmetric distribution of power and resources might give rise to parochialism (based on clan, tribal and ethnic extremism) unless attended to seriously.

In situations of prolonged crises, the divisions within society come to the surface and further complicate the situation. Radicalising ethnic or religious identity could further drag the states down the path of chaos and instability. The formal constitutional guarantees apart, the need to ensure ethnic harmony and social stability has prompted the state leadership in Central Asia to play an active role in making the state-building project inclusive rather than exclusive. The forces of religious and national extremism have been discouraged and in some cases even repressed by the state. The emigration of Russians and other national minorities have gone down substantially and so have inter-ethnic tensions.

28.8 SUMMARY

The Central Asian republics in their present shape came into existence under the Soviets during the 1920s and 1930s, when their boundaries were redrawn to carve out five republics from the former Turkmenistan and the kingdoms of Khiva and Bukhara. The development of national languages and cultural infrastructures strengthened the identities of the titular groups. Simultaneously, due to industrialisation, substantial migration from other regions of the USSR into Central Asia created strong multi-ethnic societies. At the time of the Soviet disintegration the process of consolidation of nationhood was still incomplete and all the indigenous nationalities still had not overcome the existence of clan, regional or tribal affinities. In fact, in the post-Soviet period such divisions accentuated.

The assertion of national identity in recent years has scared minorities in Central Asia, especially the Slavs who have migrated in large numbers. The adoption of new language laws, industrial recession, rise of religious fundamentalism etc. have alienated national minorities in each Central Asian state. Some of these minorities like Russians for example constitute a highly skilled workforce and their departure from Central Asia would have a damaging effect on the economy.

Worried about the emigration of the skilled national minorities and the rise of radical Islam, the leadership of Central Asia has taken steps to create harmonious conditions for integrating different nationalities in the process of state formation in the post-Soviet period. After the initial nation-building zeal, which constituted creating new national symbols, reviving traditional festivals, heroes and myths, the new states are taking steps to make the state inclusive. Religion has been kept separate from the state and religious groups are kept away from the political life. As a result, Russian language has been accorded better position than was given initially and the Russians have been in some states, allowed dual citizenship. The Constitutions have taken care to accommodate national minorities and are less discriminatory. Except in Turkmenistan, even the highest office of president is not restricted to citizens of the titular nationality alone.

The states of Central Asia are faced with difficult economic conditions since the disintegration of the USSR. The social sector remains in bad shape, unemployment has increased manifold and the real income of the population has fallen. This is a challenge that the states need to overcome. Otherwise, divisive forces would grow.

28.9 EXERCISES

1. Briefly discuss the consolidation of the Central Asian national-territorial identities during the Soviet period.
2. What is the condition of national minorities in Central Asia since the disintegration of the USSR?
3. How are the states of Central Asia strengthening indigenous identities?
4. Briefly discuss the steps to ensure harmonious inter-ethnic relations and state stability in Central Asia.

UNIT 29 ETHNIC RESURGENCE AND ‘IDENTITY’ WARS

Structure

- 29.1 Introduction
- 29.2 What is Ethnicity
- 29.3 Modernisation and Ethnic Upsurge and Conflict
- 29.4 Irrational Boundaries: Challenges to State System
- 29.5 Interventionist Role of the Modern State and Loss of Traditional Autonomy
 - 29.5.1 Homogenisation and Assimilationist Approach of the Modern State
 - 29.5.2 External Environment
- 29.6 Identity Wars/Conflicts
 - 29.6.1 Causes of Identity Wars
- 29.7 Summary
- 29.8. Exercises

29.1 INTRODUCTION

The recorded human history is the history of struggle for power and resources. For purposes of waging this struggle, prerequisites like group formations and establishment of political set-up became an integral part. The bases of political order kept changing, keeping in view place and time. Force, fraud, superstition, inheritance, divine right, conquest etc., provided the bases. The breakdown of the hereditary monarchical system created the crisis of legitimacy whereby race, colour, tribe, caste, religion and finally ideology provided the *raison d'être* for collective political existence and its legitimacy. Democratic as well as authoritarian systems were alike in their efforts for mobilising people behind the regime on some common basis and this constituted the crucial factor in terms of stability and the legitimacy of the system.

In the post-imperial and post-colonial phase, ideology of nationalism was articulated to legitimise the pre-eminence of the state as against competing loyalties. Most of the modern wars had been the result of the evolution of one kind of political organisation, the empire, into another form, the nation-state. This process had gone on for well over 300 years and it has not run its full course. But during this phase of the evolution of the nation-state, the emphasis was on territorial nation-state in preference to ethno-nationalism. The ideology of “territorial nationalism” was articulated to integrate ethnically diverse people. In this process, the post-imperialist and post-colonial territorial boundaries were the focus of legitimisation. However, the ideology of nationalism failed to integrate ethnically diverse people and legitimacy of the territorial nation-state came to be increasingly questioned. Instead, the concept of ethnically homogeneous nation-state gained wider acceptance and lies at the root of intra-national and international conflicts today.

29.2 WHAT IS ETHNICITY?

The word ethnic has been derived from the Latin word ‘ethniko’ which means common identity.

Ethnicity is a sense of common identity consisting of the subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people in order to differentiate themselves from other groups. It is a fluid concept-contextual, situational and relational. It is the expression or assertion of cultures, voices and nationalities. It is concerned with the idea of distinctiveness. The term may be defined as an awareness of a common identity among the people/members of a particular social group. According to Anthony D. Smith, ethnicity is based on the following criteria-a distinct group name in order to be recognised as a distinct community by both group members and outsiders; a shared belief by group members in the myth of common ancestry and descent; the presence of historical memories among group members (as interpreted and diffused over generations, often verbally); a distinctive shared culture; association with a specific territory or ‘homeland’; and a sense of common solidarity; and common religion, if there, can be cementing force.

29.2.1 Decline of Ideology of Nationalism and Ethnic Resurgence

The decline of the ideology of territorial nationalism, wherein diverse people were integrated through a common ideology, created a sort of vacuity wherein ethnicity is fast emerging as the most solid basis for political formation and its sustenance. Race, colour, caste, religion etc. no doubt differentiate and bind people together in separate socio-political formations but these seem to have lost to ethnicity because the former unites human beings superficially, to a limited extent and for specific purposes, the ethnicity binds them several-fold over, with characteristic entirety and wholeness.

29.2.2 Nature and Dimensions of Ethnic Resurgence

The upsurge in ethno-nationalism in recent decades the world over, producing conflict and violence within the states and across the borders, is a fact which mankind can ignore at the cost of its own peril. The existing international system is composed of 190 odd territorial “sovereign states” and about 20 non-sovereign political entities, whereas there are 862 major and more than three thousand minor ethnic groups. There is hardly any ethnic group-major or minor-which is immune to some level of irredentism in its relations with other ethnic groups or the state which to they belong. Of the 190 odd “territorial sovereign states,” only 15 are ethnically homogeneous. Of these half are involved in ethnic conflict across the border involving co-ethnic spill-over into the neighbouring state/s. According to analysts, less than 4 per cent of the world’s population lives in states whose boundaries correspond to the ethnic boundaries. Conversely speaking, more than 96 per cent of the world’s population living in political conditions which do not conform to their natural choice or self-determination; as such are haunted by irredentism at various levels and in various forms and manifestations. Significantly, no particular classification of state has proven immune to this phenomenon. Afflicted countries are old (the United Kingdom) as well as new (Bangladesh), large (Indonesia), as well as small (Fiji), rich (Canada) as well as poor (Pakistan), authoritarian (Sudan), as well as democratic (Belgium), Marxist-Leninist (China), as well as militantly anti-Marxist (Turkey), predominantly Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India), and Judaic (Israel).

The magnitude of the problem can be gauged from the fact that since the end of the Second World War till date, many people lost their lives in intra-state and inter-state conflicts and violence and more than 75 per cent of them in ethnic conflict and violence. Of the ongoing major conflicts in the world, over 75 per cent are on ethnic lines. Ethnic conflict and violence, thus, is not only the most serious but also the most complex problem confronting mankind. Ethnicity is at the centre of politics-national as well as international-and is a potent source of challenge to the cohesion of states and of international tension. Ethnic diversity has affected the life in many ways. According to one expert: “Ethnic conflict strains the bonds that sustain civility and

is often at the root of violence that results in looting, death, homelessness, and the flight of large numbers of people.”

29.3 MODERNISATION AND ETHNIC UPSURGE AND CONFLICT

The problems of ethnic upsurge, conflict and violence on an unprecedented scale in so short a period since the Second World War is, perhaps, partly due to the accelerated process of modernisation which mankind has undergone since then. The ethnic violence is only an expression of disapproval and is an armed recourse to change the state of things as desirable from the point of view of the perpetrator of violence. It is some deep-rooted *malaise* which creates conditions of ethnic upsurge and conflict. It is imperative to understand the *malaise* in its depth only so as to grasp its manifestations properly.

In the operational sense, modernisation means the attainment of relatively higher levels of the variables, such as education, per capita income, urbanisation, political participation, industrial employment and media participation. As the process of modernisation unfolds itself it creates conditions of ethnic social mobilisation-both territorial as well as non-territorial. However, this contention is in direct opposition to sociological theories of modernisation and the Marxist theories. There was a kind of consensus amongst the sociological theorists of modernisation and the Marxists that ethnic competition belongs to the pre-modern era; in so far as it persists, it is an irrational form of behaviour or a form of false consciousness.

The political theorists of nation-building also view ethnic ties as transitory in nature and argued that forces of modernisation and social mobilisation would lead to assimilation of distinct identities in the process of nation-building. Even liberal thinking in political science hinges upon the argument that as mankind moved from a primitive, tribal stage of social organisation to a complex industrial and post-industrial structure, the primordial ties of religion, language, ethnicity and race would gradually but inexorably lose their hold and disappear. Scholars like Anthony D. Smith gave a different line of reasoning that the modern scientific state will lead to frequent ethnic revivals. The modern means of audio-visual mass media and communications have created parochial political consciousness on ethnic lines which is far ahead of forces of trade, commerce and industry. Modernisation and social mobilisation have not led to a transfer to primary allegiance from the ethnic group to the state. Can we go beyond this to posit an inverse correlation between modernisation and the level of ethnic dissonance within multi-ethnic states ? The available evidence about the pattern of ethnic dissonance in the world, at various levels of modernisation, is indicative of the fact that material increases in social communication and mobilisation tend to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict. According to Walter S. Jones, the available empirical evidence has borne out that “ethnic consciousness is definitely in the ascendancy as a political force, and that state borders, as presently delimited, is being increasingly challenged by this trend. And what is of greater significance, multi-ethnic states at all levels of modernity have been afflicted. Particularly instructive in this regard is the large proportion of states within the technologically and economically advanced region of Western Europe that have recently been troubled by ethnic conflict”.

The agents of modernisation forge ahead mechanically by multiplication, whereas human thinking and the primordial loyalties change, if at all they do, at a snail’s pace. In terms of technological and material growth and development, in a short span of less than half a century since the Second World War, mankind has achieved many a times more than it could achieve during the entire period of human existence prior to the War. However, on the socio-political and psychological

levels there is hardly any evidence of any change or transformation. Paul-Henry Spaak thus observed the dichotomy created by the technological achievements and socio-political backwardness: “Truly, our imagination is not in step with our era.”

This dichotomy in terms of material achievements and relative socio-political primordialism produces and reinforces fundamentalist forces hinging on primordial ties. The religious fundamentalism, ethnic revivalism and consequent terrorism are the outcome of this disequilibrium of what we have and what we are. Modernisation produces alienation which the ethnic groups are ill-prepared to withstand. The challenge of modernisation to socio-cultural and political ties, values, orientations, institutions and hierarchical social order is often viewed or perceived by the elite of these groups as threats to identity.

Social mobilisation and technological revolution in transport and communications rather than mitigating socio-cultural peculiarities, creating a hybrid culture and a composite society, have generated increased particularist cultural awareness and identity consciousness. The technological revolution in communication permits previously isolated ethnic groups to become more visible, and in certain cases interact across national boundaries. Moreover, the intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic communications play a major role in the creation of ethnic consciousness. Modernisation creates identity consciousness in an ethnic group which the ethnic elite mobilise for political purposes against the states. Simultaneously, within the ethnic groups, the forces of modernisation create convulsions whereby the traditional elite find its authority increasingly challenged by new socio-economic forces which are thrown up by the process of modernisation. In this intra-ethnic competition for dominance, the traditional forces are pitted against the new ones. Consequently, the competition or rivalry for leadership within the group leads to “one-up-manship”. Threat perception being the guiding principle, the existing and the added ethnic grievances are articulated normally around extremist demands, new strategies for their realisation are forged and invariably, in most of the cases, separatist movements are launched.

Modernisation and social mobilisation reinforce group identity on ethnic lines and produce awareness for differentiation from other ethnic groups. The process of modernisation has also produced political and economic competition on an unprecedented scale. This competition is not only essentially the product of conditions of scarcity but also of plenty which the modernisation has created. The ethnic differentiations lead to intensification of competition among groups, making the ascriptive basis of ethnicity a functional and effective vehicle for advancing group interests. The intensive and extensive competition created by modernisation generate social frustration and ire leading to social conflict and violence.

In short, modernisation sharpens differentiations, articulates identity consciousness, produces intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic competition and degenerates into violent conflicts.

29.4 IRRATIONAL BOUNDARIES: CHALLENGE TO STATE SYSTEM

The problem of irrationality of political boundaries is at the root of many ethnic conflicts whereby ethnic groups divided between two or more states strive for either ethnic unity or independence from the parent state or both. Here the difference between politicisation of ethnicity should be distinguished from ethnic nationalism, though the former may lead to the latter where a historical claim to a particular territory can be established. By the same logic all ethnic movements do not aspire for complete independence or statehood. Mobilisation of groups on ethnic lines is done to secure a better deal within the system whereas territorial ethnicity

seeks a position of partial or complete dominance in the territory concerned.

The present ethnic phenomenon is due to the nature of state boundaries all over the world. The state boundaries defy any rational or logical basis of delimitation and delineation. These are the products of the arbitrary policies of the imperialists and colonialists as well as various patterns of migration. The colonialists either inherited these irrational boundaries or followed the imperialistic approach to drawing boundary lines as dividing lines and in the process divided ethnic groups, tribes and even the clans. At times these ethnic groups fell prey to two or more competing colonialists or imperialists which divided them depending upon their power and/or convenience. Ethnic ties or geopolitical factors were completely ignored. The division of Kurds amongst Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Armenia and Syria, and Baluchs between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pashtuns between Afghanistan and Pakistan are cases in point.

During the colonial period these divided ethnic groups constituting a minority in the colonial set-up were handy to the colonialists against the dominant group. Generally, the colonial authorities ensured a better deal for these minority groups in recruitment to services and military and pampered them for their usefulness against national liberation movements of the predominant ethnic group in the colony concerned.

The imperialists as well as colonialists allowed and in some cases facilitated the tribal socio-cultural autonomy to flourish so long as it did not interfere with their authority. The traditional economic and socio-cultural ties and interaction across the border with their ethnic kins continued unchecked or unrestricted. The lack of participative political set up and dormant political consciousness did not create problems for the colonialists. The primordial socio-economic and political structures of the ethnic communities remained intact during the colonial period. In the absence of modern means of transportation and prevailing economic backwardness, the ethnic consciousness for identity remained dormant and primordial in its manifestation and did not pose a challenge to colonial sovereignty. Nevertheless, the demise of imperialism and colonialism ensured by national liberation movements created a consciousness for self-rule or self-determination which eventually percolated down to ethnic communities in the post-colonial states.

Unlike in the past when human factors were rarely taken into account for drawing the boundaries of empires or colonial possessions, in the modern age the human consciousness of a sense of identity cannot be ignored in any territorial distribution. In their zeal for nation-building the Western-educated ruling elite in the post-colonial states charted a course of national assimilation which has boomeranged in the sense that it created a host of sub-national or ethnic uprisings all over the developing world. After the First World War, US president Woodrow Wilson's principles wherein he asserted that "people and provinces are not to be bartered away" and that the right to national self-determination was an inalienable right of the people living in a particular area, the contemporary statesmen and media chided and scorned him for his idealistic enunciations, has facilitated this phenomenon.

29.5 INTERVENTIONIST ROLE OF THE MODERN STATE AND LOSS OF TRADITIONAL AUTONOMY

The penetrative role of the modern state has come to be increasingly resented and even opposed by tribal, ethnic and religious communities. They perceived this tendency as centralisation of power by the state and articulated this perception as a threat to their separate identity. This is not to suggest that the imperial or colonial periods were marked by the complete absence of central penetration and/or control.

Firstly, during the imperial or colonial periods, as and when the state attempted to regulate or harmonise ethnic affairs it was not due to the extension of the sphere of state activity but due to some political compulsions of a particular regime, whereas by contrast the interventionist nature of the modern state makes it imperative to impart socio-economic justice. Secondly, in the past, whenever and wherever the state pursued penetrative policies the affected ethnic group or community resisted the penetration which often led to bloodshed and genocide perpetrated by the state. Permanent and complete submission of the resisting ethnic group remained a surreal reality, use of excessive amount of violence, notwithstanding. Russification drives of Russian Czars in Central Asia and Muslim and Mughal rulers' atrocities against Hindus and Sikhs in India are historical realities substantiating the above position. The opposition to state penetration invariably remained smouldering beneath the façade of normalcy, periodically resurging. Irredentism remained festering for generations, waiting for the opportune moment to strike back.

29.5.1 Homogenisation and Assimilationist Approach of the Modern State

The cumulative impact of the interventionist or penetrative activities of the modern state and its assimilationist policies in the garb of nation-building produced ethnic opposition to the modern state strengthened the hardliners within the regimes which pursued assimilationist policies more vigorously and at times resorted to armed crackdown which further reinforced the position of hawks within the ethnic community. The challenge to ethnic identity and autonomy mounted and became so colossal that the sub-national communities are now compelled by the situation to act as if they were states in an international environment. Elite relations among the ethnic groups partake of diplomacy. While interacting among themselves and even with the state on the political plank, the ethnic leaders reflect local autonomy, which, in the words of an expert is "analogous to the relations among small states in a multipolar international system....They therefore form alliances that might remind the diplomatic historian of Renaissance Italy, and they deal with one another on the basis of sovereign equality".

In its relations to or dealings with the parent state, the ethnic groups' behaviour typified or is analogous to a small state towards the major state in the international system. These groups refer to the parent state in 'us-they' dichotomous terms. In their references to the parent state the relationship is at times reminiscent of colonial relationship. The ethnic communities accuse the parent state of injustice, discrimination and exploitation. The suitable data are marshalled to substantiate the charges. Demands-social, cultural, linguistic, religious, economic, territorial and political-are raised and inability or failure of the state, which is often the case, leads to further charges of exploitation, discrimination, suppression and even genocide.

Ethnic people are mobilised against the state and movements are launched, provincial boundaries are challenged and demands are vociferously raised for unification with the ethnic kins living in other provinces or states. Other ethnic migration to its areas is resented, opposed and at times attacked. Protectionism in terms of property ownership rights, jobs and land ownership is sought, for the ethnic community to the total exclusion of "outsiders". The reactions of the state-whether these be the restoration of law and order or checkmating the growing drift-are decried as if these were of the occupation force. The state is accused of violation of human rights, barbarity and even genocide. Rules of international behaviour are sought to be invoked in ethnic group *vs* state conflict. International bodies dealing particularly with minorities, human rights' protection and other humanitarian agencies are approached against violations by the state. Forces inimical to the state in the international set up are contacted for support. Efforts are made through ethnic migrants abroad to internationalise the issue to evoke sympathy. Significantly,

these actions and activities of the ethnic groups are increasingly gaining legitimacy. This trend has brought about a qualitative change in the territorial state-dominated international system. If this trend remains unchecked, i.e. ethnic homogeneity becomes the *raison d'être* of state system, the world is likely to be composed of more than three thousand ethnically homogeneous mini-states. The disintegration of Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and USSR on ethnic lines are strong pointers to the emerging international political order.

In their zeal for nation-building, the regimes in the Third World pursue policies which generate homogenising pressures, which cause resentment and are viewed with suspicion by the ethnic protagonists. The ruling elite in the Third World is not to be blamed entirely for these homogenising pressures. The modern state by itself is caught up in this vicious circle of cross-cutting interaction and inter-dependence. The inter-dependent global system has created a kind of global political and economic inter-dependence and integration. The state sub-system as part of this global system becomes a catalyst for the percolation of these integrative processes downward in its ethnic sub-systems.

The ethnic aspirations and the consequent uprisings have not properly been managed by the post-colonial states. The tendency among these newly independent states is informed of a threat perception in the context of ethnic minorities and their aspirations to the unity and territorial integrity and even to the independence of the state. Such a perception has paid rich dividends to the ruling elite of reinforcing its eroding legitimacy. No serious effort has been made to accommodate or manage the ethnic aspirations. Instead rulers in the Third World countries followed assimilationist policies and often resorted to military solutions of the ethnic imbroglio. Consequently, the festering irredentism of the ethnic groups assumed the form of violent conflict and terrorism with demands ranging from autonomy to complete independence.

Another aspect of this problem, which has too often been ignored, relates to the intra-ethnic power struggle which paradoxically is linked to ethnic *vs* state conflict. The deprivation of power within the state leads to frustration and anger among the minority ethnic groups. The failure of the traditional leadership of the ethnic group to secure a satisfactory solution over a time leads to loss of patience and anger in the ethnic community. Consequently, the younger generation within the ethnic community, which is relatively more educated and imbued with political consciousness and is not dogmatically loyal to the traditional leadership, instead seeks to challenge and if possible to change it. In this intra-ethnic group struggle for supremacy the new leadership raises extreme demands and advocates violent means to achieve the same. This fascinates the increasingly frustrated rank and file and ignites their imagination of a future set-up. The repressive machinery of the state, in the process of countering it, inadvertently offers justification of the extreme demands raised and the means adopted for their realisation. In the process the new leadership emerges as the dominant force in the ethnic movement within the state.

29.5.2 External Involvement

The conditions of domestic ethnic conflict tend to involve outside parties overtly or covertly, imparting it international dimensions. These essentially intra-national problems assume international character because ethnic considerations have increasingly influenced the decision-making in foreign policy through the ages but in modern times ethnicity has emerged as the major plank on which foreign policies are planned, shaped and executed. In the event of an ethnic group divided between two or more states, the nature of ethnic linkages across the border depends upon a host of ethnic considerations. If an ethnic group is predominant in the state A and a peripheral minority in state B, A is tempted to keep B as an imbecile entity. B as a weak entity by supporting openly or clandestinely the agitated ethnic group and the union of the ethnic

minority, if effected, will strengthen the position of the predominant ethnic group in the state A domestically and *vis-à-vis* state B externally. For example, Pushtoons constitute 13.14 per cent of the population in Pakistan, while they are the predominant ethnic group constituting around 50 per cent of population (including the refugees in Pakistan) in neighbouring Afghanistan. Afghanistan's sympathy and support for Pushtoons' uprisings in Pakistan stems from the fact that this provides them a soft border with Pakistan, a relatively powerful neighbour. As and when conditions warrant the unity of Pushtoons across the Durand Line would reinforce and further consolidate the position of Pushtoons within Afghanistan's political set up. However, in the absence of any ethnic ties with the ethnic group in conflict in a neighbouring state the nature of external involvement will depend upon the nature of the bilateral relations between the affected state and the neighbouring state, their relative power position and a host of other considerations.

In the event of an ethnic group divided between two or more states and constituting majority in none of them (as in the case of Kurds) the tendency on the part of other states is to support the ethnic group against the beleaguered state or the beleaguered state against the ethnic group or a position of neutrality depending upon the nature of their bilateral relations, their relative power position and convenience. Iran and the Soviet Union have supported the Kurds and the Iraq government alternately. Significantly, in 1988, Iraq dropped poisonous gas on the Kurdish town of Halabja causing death to thousands of defenceless civilians and Iraq's president Saddam Hussain justified it. This act of genocide using internationally banned poisonous gas did not raise any flutter anywhere. Perhaps, the USSR, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria where the Kurds constitute a minority-are in a discreet alliance, for, at times, they have also resorted to suppression of restive Kurd populations in their respective states.

Without active external support-both moral and material-the ethnic discontent remains latent and may not assume actual conflict proportions. The discontented ethnic minority without an active external support may take to constitutional means of struggle. However, the spurt in ethnic conflict all over the world in recent years owes its existence and sustenance to external involvement and support. The use of a large number of small and medium weapons by the ethnic groups, the meeting of huge recurring financial requirements for sustenance, and mass-media exposure to their point of view cannot be explained except with reference to the involvement of external powers.

In modern politics, ethnic calculations have become a major input in foreign policy planning. This is not to suggest that this was not in earlier periods of history but the nature and intensity of ethnic considerations in foreign policy-making, particularly in the Third World countries, have assumed new proportions. It is not essentially the conditions of ethnic conflict which influence the foreign policy formulations. The very existence of ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic state is a permanent influencing factor in foreign policy formulation of not only concerned state but also the neighbouring states as well. For example, the Soviet foreign policy towards Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey was never oblivious of ethnic linkages between Soviet Central Asian ethnic groups spilling across the border into these states.

In view of the traditional instruments of foreign policy having been rendered redundant or prohibitive, ethnic issues have emerged as the new instruments of foreign policy. Providing support-overt or covert-to ethnic groups in another state or to the state against the ethnic group, or a status of neutrality in ethnic *vs* state conflict are manifestations of involvement in the ethnic conflict. In an ethnic conflict situation the group-not essentially in a numerical majority in the state-having privileged access to state power will formulate its foreign policy to quarantine the ethnic conflict from any outside involvement. However, the ethnic group having no access to

state power may evolve the strategy to establish international contacts to gain support. It is these efforts of the rival parties “to evoke and/or regulate outside involvement” which lead to the internationalisation of domestic ethnic issues.

Viewed against this background the ethnic phenomena cannot be wished away on assimilationist and Marxist presumptions. It has come to stay as global phenomena confronting the existing national and international systems. Forces of modernisation, rather than mitigating ethnic ties have exacerbated them. The intensity and propensity of all round competition, which is the end-product of modernisation and socio-cultural and political consciousness as its natural corollary, have proved catalytic in organising human beings on ethnic lines. Marxian observation that “workers have no fatherland” means that destitution and misery of the 19th Century European industrial worker would create economic consciousness rather than a parochial one. But the post-industrial society and electronic mass-media, revolution in transport and communication have reinforced parochial consciousness. Of course, the consciousness and competition created ethnic identities in preference to racial, linguistic, religious or ideological identities. The reason being that ethnicity binds human beings together with several overlapping bonds which are more natural, spontaneous and enduring, whereas the other identities are based on one or two variables which are relatively based on expediency and are transient in nature. Ethnic ties are based on a lifetime’s training as member of an ethnic group and which have shaped his moral and mental disposition.

Modernisation facilitated the advent of modern welfare state thereby eroding the internal autonomy of ethnic, religious and tribal groups and led to authoritative centralisation. It is against this interventionist role of the modern state that ethnic groups offered organised and sometimes even violent resistance and opposition. While the developed countries managed the ethnic resistance or opposition through resilience and /or accommodation, the newly independent post-colonial Third World states failed to grasp the reality and rise to the occasion. Instead these states viewed this ethnic resistance and opposition as a threat to unity and territorial integrity of the territorial nation-state, thereupon these states adopted assimilationist policies for nation-building and even did not hesitate to military solutions. The confrontation between the state and the ethnic group enforced the legitimacy of the ruling elite *vis-à-vis* the predominant ethnic group and the ethnic elite *vis-à-vis* the besieged ethnic community or sub-national group.

Irrational boundaries and innumerable mutual disputes between the Third World states facilitated the external links and support to the sub-national groups, and/or to the parent state, thus internationalising the otherwise internal conflict. Deprived of the often used instruments of foreign policy, the states have resorted to warfare through other means, i.e. support to ethnic groups against the state or to the state against the sub-national group. Consequently, ethnic considerations have assumed a major role in foreign policy pursuits. The whole national as well as international set up is confronted with ethnic resurgence of an unprecedented magnitude. The nature, dimensions and magnitude of ethnic claims, ethnic uprisings and ethnic conflicts are clear pointers to the emerging pattern that the existing nation-states and the international set up composed of nation-states as units is in the melting pot. What will emerge out of it will largely depend upon the sagacity and statesmanship of the leadership-both the ethnic as well as of the nation-states.

29.6 IDENTITY WARS/CONFLICTS

No doubt, the problem of identity related conflicts have been haunting the mankind since times immemorial but in contemporary era these have become more pervasive and most violent.

According to one reckoning of the ongoing conflicts the world over more than 75 per cent are related to identity. The dynamics and dimensions of these identity wars are so serious that they pose a threat to the fabric of social cohesion and territorial unity and integrity of most of the modern nation-states. Death toll in these identity conflicts is astounding and millions of people have become refugees. Most of these identity related conflicts are based on threat to ethnic identity.

Identity can be defined as an abiding sense of selfhood, the core of which makes life predictable to an individual. To have no ability to anticipate events is essentially to experience terror. Identity is conceived of as more than a psychological sense of self; it encompasses a sense that one is safe in the world physically, psychologically, socially and even spiritually. Events which threaten to invalidate the core sense of identity will elicit defensive responses aimed at avoiding psychic and/or physical annihilation. Identity is postulated to operate in this way not only in relation to interpersonal conflict but also in conflict between groups.

As is evident, identification is an inherent and unconscious behavioural imperative in all individuals. Individuals actively seek to identify in order to achieve psychological security, and they actively seek to maintain, protect and bolster identity in order to maintain and enhance this psychological security, which is a *sine qua non* of personality, stability and emotional well-being.

29.6.1 Causes of Identity Wars

Any one or the combination of two or more than two of the following factors leads to identity wars.

1. Fear of loss of Identity:

This is primarily due to the arbitrary national territorial formation and the minority ethnic groups in the new political formation where they fear the loss of their ethnic identity. Nagas, Mizos, Assamese in India and Baluch and Pushtoons in Pakistan have had uprisings leading to armed conflict when the new state tried to achieve integration in the national context. Ethnic groups around the world fear the loss of separate and distinct identity in the given political order.

2. Fear of Assimilation:

Minority ethnic groups fear assimilation on the part of the majority. Hence they try to maintain artificial territorial boundary based on their ethnicity. Sikh demand for *Punjabi Suba* and Sikh homeland in India and demand for *Sindhu desh* in Pakistan aim at protecting their identity through territorial demarcation of boundary between “us” and “they” i.e. the dominant majority. A kind of territorial enclave is the objective where its distinct identity could be preserved.

3. Fear of Marginalisation:

This is mainly as a result of domination of an outside group over indigenous people. An out group is one which is not native to the area/region in question but became part of it either due to voluntary immigration or state-sponsored colonisation. In such a scenario, it has often been observed that initially the migratory process was unassisted and did not involve any calculated strategy of dislodging the indigenous group from power and position. Colonisation, on the contrary, was a political programme with strong ethnic considerations aiming at neutralisation of the position of the indigenous people and reducing it to a minority in its own territory as in the case of *Maoris* in New Zealand, *Aborigines* in Australia and *Red Indians* in North and South

America. This is done through an ethnic oriented state-sponsored policy of demographic engineering.

4. Sense of Relative Deprivation and Discrimination:

Minority ethnic groups generally remain deprived and discriminated as a result of denial of minority rights and gross under-representation in national life and governmental institutions. Under representations of minorities in armed forces, civil services, police administration, judicial and legislative departments is widespread. This leads to discrimination as in the case of Tamils in Sri Lanka, Hindus in Bangladesh, Mohajirs and Baluch in Pakistan.

3. Sense of Powerlessness:

Hegemonic majoritarianism pursued by the ruling elite creates a sense of powerlessness among the minorities which in turn leads to minoritarianism. This majoritarianism and minoritarianism feed on each other. Significantly this majoritarian-minoritarian syndrome is more prevalent in democratic polities where the exclusive usurpation of power by the majority community is sought to be justified in the democratic logic. This majoritarianism can be of two categories. One, in which a national majority is pitted against a regional majority which is otherwise a national minority. Secondly, the regional majority is up against the national majority. Sikhs and Kashmiris in India, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Pushtoons, Sindhi and Baluch in Pakistan are the classic examples of this majority-minority syndrome.

The increase in number and intensity of ethnic conflicts or identity wars in recent times is a clear indicator of the state of affairs in the foreseeable future. According to one reckoning there were 37 major armed conflicts in the world in 1991 out of which 25 were internal conflicts most of which were on ethnic lines as identity wars. turned secessionism. Through the power they seek to gain, they argue that their distinct identity can be preserved or promoted.

29.7 SUMMARY

This unit focuses on the question of ethnic identity and reasons for the resurgence of ethnic conflict. Ethnicity comes from the Latin word ‘ethniko’ meaning common identity and refers to an awareness of common identity among the members of a particular social group in terms of a distinctive shared culture, common ancestry and historical memories, association with a specific territory, a sense of common solidarity and common religion. It had been argued earlier that ethnic ties are transitory in nature and that along with modernisation and social mobilisation, distinct identities would be assimilated into the nation. Instead, there has been an upsurge in ethno-nationalism in recent decades producing conflict and violence within the states and across the borders. Of the ongoing major conflicts in the world, over 75 per cent are on ethnic lines. The available evidence about the pattern of ethnic dissonance in the world, at various levels of modernisation, is indicative of the fact that material increases in social communication and mobilisation tend to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict. These conflicts are to an extent the products of the arbitrary policies of the colonialists who followed an irrational logic in drawing boundaries which divided ethnic groups, tribes and clans. The primordial socio-economic and political structures of the ethnic communities remained intact during the colonial period in the absence of modern means of transportation and prevailing economic backwardness. Thus the penetrative role of the modern state has come to be increasingly resented and even opposed by tribal, ethnic and religious communities and they are gaining legitimacy.

The ethnic aspirations and the consequent uprisings have not properly been managed by the post-colonial states. Third World countries followed assimilationist policies and often resorted to military solutions. Deprivation of power within the state leads to frustration and anger among the minority ethnic groups. Apart from that, fear of the loss of identity, fear of assimilation, fear of marginalisation, sense of deprivation, sense of powerlessness are all factors which can lead to an identity war. They also tend to involve outside parties overtly or covertly, imparting it international dimensions. Without active external support the ethnic discontent may not assume actual conflictual proportions. In fact, ethnic calculations have become a major input in foreign policy planning. Ethnic groups in conflict seek autonomy through which they feel their distinct identity can be preserved.

29.8 EXERCISES

1. What do you understand by the term ‘ethnicity’? Do you think it is becoming an important issue in recent years?
2. Give reasons for the rise in ethnic violence in a relatively short span of time after the Second World War.
3. In what way was intervention by colonial states different from that of modern states?
4. Why has the ethnic problem assumed international dimensions?
5. Explain the concept of identity. Why do identity wars take place?

UNIT 30 ABORIGINAL/INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS

Structure

- 30.1 Introduction
- 30.2 Who Are the Indigenous People?
- 30.3 Advent of Indigenous Movements
- 30.4 Spread of Indigenous Movements
 - 30.4.1 Conditions for the Spread
 - 30.4.2 Canada
 - 30.4.3 Australia
 - 30.4.4 Latin America
 - 30.4.5 USA
- 30.5 Major Issues of Indigenous Movements
- 30.6 Government Responses
- 30.7 Summary
- 30.8 Exercises

30.1 INTRODUCTION

Indigenous people had never been regarded as international subjects. They were either relegated to reserved territories in the states or confined to inhospitable regions and doomed to extinction by the repressive policies adopted by the state. But now there is new international thinking, which appreciates their unique way of life. The rise of indigenous peoples as prominent actors not only in the national but also the international arena cannot be ignored. They can no longer be treated as passive objects of historical change but as dynamic subjects of history as they are now actively involved in shaping their own destiny. With states adopting policies such as multiculturalism in order to appease and cater to the demands of its ethnically diverse population, it is becoming increasingly evident that the demands and the aspirations of the ‘indigenous’ peoples are different from that of ethnic groups. Thus ‘indigenous ethnicity’ has emerged as a concept which is different from ‘ethnicity’. Acknowledging the ascending role and influence of the indigenous peoples in global politics the United Nations had the year 1993 declared as the International Year for the World’s Indigenous Peoples by and the decade from 1995 to 2004 as the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples. It is observed, that while each people has its own history, its culture, and each has had its unique struggle and its successes or failures, indigenous peoples from various parts of the world have all come together to create and evolve a common consciousness. In fact, organisations led by the indigenous peoples have at times been criticised for making use of international fora including the United Nations to promote and champion their common cause while damaging the reputation of the countries to which they geographically belong. As a consequence of government policies ranging from exploitation, annihilation or assimilation either by design or oversight in the past, to grudging recognition at present, the world is now admitting that the indigenous peoples have in the past been placed at the mercy of the ruling classes.

30.2 WHO ARE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES?

For the purposes of this discussion, the term “indigenous peoples” applies to the descendants of the original inhabitants of a given area or region-a region forcibly occupied by foreigners who subsequently replaced the mechanisms of governance and curtailed the development of the indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, indigenous peoples still manifest cultural and social characteristics and practices distinct from the national varieties, which surround them. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 107 first introduced the term “indigenous” wherein the “tribal and semi-tribal populations were considered as a broad social category and indigenous populations as a sub-category of the former who are descendants of the original populations of the countries which were taken over by colonisers”. ILO Convention 169, adopted in June 1989 de-linking the concept of “tribe” from the “indigenous” included a reference to self-identification as a fundamental criterion in determining who the indigenous peoples are. It laid down that national governments should allow indigenous peoples to participate in the decision-making that affects them, set their own development priorities and give back the lands they traditionally occupied. Internationally, the word “Indigenous” has been used by the United Nations system as well as by the peoples themselves. To be “indigenous” or a “people” confers a psychological strength over being merely deemed as a minority population. That the ruling elite recognises this is illustrated in the debates of both the ILO and the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations on the use of the words such as “peoples” or “population”. While the ILO decided to use both terms, the Working Group uses the term “population”. The debate suggests that the reason to use “population” rather than “peoples” is possibly to deny the basis for a claim to self-determination and territorial independence within nation-states in which they are located.

Both the terms “indigenous” and “native” are subjects of much debate. While “native” has a colonial connotation for many, the capitalised “Native” is an acceptable label in North America, indicating perhaps that they are a nation. In fact, the term “First Nations” is often used as an alternative designation in Canada and the United States of America. The internationally acceptable term “indigenous” is preferred. The names by which indigenous peoples are called are also changing according to their preferred names. The Lapps of Europe are now known as *Saami*, the Eskimos of Canada as *Inuit* and the Bushmen of Africa as *San*.

It must be emphasised that indigenous peoples are distinct from one another, and that these distinctions are not dependent upon national boundaries. In Europe, the following may be considered as indigenous populations: the Celtic peoples of the British Isles, Brittany in France and Galicia in Spain; the *Basque* peoples of France, Portugal and Spain; The *Saami* people of Greenland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the former Soviet Union. In Asia, there are various tribal or hill peoples in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and China and the *Ainu* people in Japan. In addition there are numerous indigenous groups in Siberia, some of whom are considered as part of the *Inuit* peoples also present in Alaska, Canada and Western Greenland. In Africa, the Berbers and the *San* may be considered as indigenous peoples. Most Asian and African states deny that there are any indigenous peoples within their territories. The ILO subjected Bangladesh to considerable pressure in the UN before it would address the issue of the Chittagong Hill People. In India, the tribal peoples or Scheduled Tribes are considered as the core of the ‘indigenous group’. In Oceania there are indigenous groups in the Philippines, Indonesia, Borneo and Papua New Guinea. Generally, these peoples live in the forests. The Native Hawaiians also fit within Oceania. In Australia are the Aboriginal peoples and in New Zealand are the *Maori* peoples. The displacement of indigenous peoples is usually the result of an invasion of their territory by an ethnically and culturally different group, which then attempts to convert the native population

to the conquerors' cultural norms and suppresses the indigenous peoples culture, identity and history. Usually, the colonising country believes its culture is materially and spiritually superior to that of the indigenous group. In most cases, the invader is able to establish sufficient control over the territory and society to force the indigenous population to deal with the imposed legal system in attempting to redress the injustice inherent in the process of conquest. Needless to say, the indigenous people lose most legal rights until the dominant society accepts its responsibility to make amends. An example of this acceptance process is the creation and operation of the *Waitangi* tribunal in New Zealand, which deals with land title cases between the *Maori* and the European settlers. In the *Waitangi* tribunal, the *Maori* have the majority vote.

30.3 ADVENT OF INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS

It was around 1900 that the first ethno-political initiatives were taken by the indigenous peoples. These were mostly in the form of appeals, petitions and requests to the imperial authorities of various colonial powers. It is commonly known that the Indians of North America were crushed by armed forces during the second half of the 19th Century. Even though the conflict in Northern Europe was not so overt, we find many examples of oppression of the *Saami*, e.g. when their religious-Læstadian movement around 1850 was suppressed with the help of the State Church and the Courts. By the end of the 19th Century, at the highpoint of imperialism, the policy regarding indigenous peoples was increasingly characterised by a heavy-handed assimilation, legitimised by Social Darwinism and racist ideology-and supplemented for example in Norway, with nationalistic ideology. In the face of such policies many indigenous peoples were obliged, initially at least, to limit their opposition to indirect and purely symbolic activities. The League of Nations founded in 1919 was an international organisation in which one could have expected indigenous issues to surface. To begin with, US president Woodrow Wilson himself had taken as his political war-cry, the right of nations to 'self-determination' at the end of the First World War. And secondly, the protection of the rights of minorities was one of the most important spheres of activity during the period when the League was effectively functional.

Chief Deskaheh, a *Cayuga* indigenous person from the 'Six Nations' reserve in the Western Hemisphere (Canada) stepped up demand for full self-government and recognition of the *Iroquois* peoples as a sovereign nation. Around 1920 issues came to a head with both legal battles and violent confrontation. The *Iroquois* sought independence from Canada's legal system. Deskaheh visited England and when that failed, went to Washington to meet the *chargé d'affaires* of Netherlands recalling peace and friendship treaties concluded between Europe and the *Iroquois* in the 18th Century. The General Secretary of the League of Nations then took up the matter in 1923. The British and the Canadian members in the League of Nations Council meeting declared that the Six Nations had no right to claim a separate state as they continued to be "British subjects residing in Canada".

The creation of the United Nations in 1945 offered a ray of hope with its active role in the decolonisation process. Increasing demands from ethnic groups calling for action on the new anti-racist ideals of human rights could no longer be ignored. This had special force in countries like Canada and New Zealand, which during the war had raised special contingents from amongst their indigenous peoples. These in effect opened the way for the question of the indigenous peoples to be raised as a separate issue within the UN around 1970. Also, one experienced in the post-war years a global industrial and technological penetration in the peripheral areas, which stretched from the tropical rain forests to the Arctic region. Initially the development was accelerated by the need to help the most exposed ethnic groups on humanitarian and welfare grounds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO), an organ of the League of

Nations, had initiated this work as early as the 1920s and in 1957, the ILO adopted Resolution 107, which gave protection to the tribal and indigenous peoples all over the world.

As popular organisations, such as the total abstinence and Free Church movements, developed during the second half of the 19th Century, indigenous peoples too began to voice their opposition in more innovative forms. An important pre-condition here was that the indigenous peoples were, to some extent at least, being integrated into the wider society, to the extent that certain groups came into existence that had an insight in, and could appeal to, the common values of citizenship. It is somewhat of a paradox that recruitment to the new leadership was bound, for the most part, to take place amongst those who were most integrated into society as a whole as a result of their having gone through mission schools and teacher education colleges.

30.4 SPREAD OF INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS

30.4.1 Conditions for the Spread of Indigenous Movements

The most important reasons for the spread of indigenous movements were related to the kind of developments at the international level. Firstly, the struggle against Nazism had been waged under the banner of anti-racism and human rights. It was, therefore, most difficult to overlook demands which were to come from ethnic groups that earlier had been regarded as uncivilised and on the way to extinction.

Secondly, the wave of de-colonisation in the Third World aroused sympathy for those ethnic groups that had been subject to internal colonisation. Internationally de-colonisation was carried further by the UN when, in 1960, a resolution laid down the principle that all peoples had the right to self-determination and should therefore, be free to determine their own social and cultural development. A corresponding but more limited principle was accorded to minorities in 1966 through the conventions on human rights. These in effect opened the way for the question of the indigenous peoples to be raised as a separate issue within the UN around 1970.

Thirdly, industrial and technological development was accelerated by the need to help the most exposed ethnic groups on humanitarian and welfare grounds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO), a part of the League of Nations, had begun this work as early as the 1920s. This work came to a conclusion when, in 1957, the ILO adopted Resolution 107 which gave protection to tribal and indigenous peoples. The goal was an organised assimilation, whilst at the same time, in line with conventional colonial law, recognising customary rights and, to some extent, the need to protect material living conditions. The contribution of the indigenous peoples in the making of these decisions was, at that time, conspicuous by its absence. Nevertheless the Resolution was a boost for groups, which in many cases were exposed to actual genocide.

Roughly speaking, then, this was the context indigenous peoples throughout the world had to accommodate to. As it turned out the internal ethno-political situation and their position within the nation state led them over to an international involvement. The First Nations' peoples of North America and the *Saami* of Northern Europe, had both different internal histories and a different relationship to their respective nation states. What they had in common was that they were both active in building up the international network of indigenous peoples in the course of the 1970s and in bringing the indigenous people into the international arena. It was, at the outset, by no means axiomatic that the ethno-political movement within these groups should take an international turn since, as is the case with most indigenous peoples, they are concerned with local issues that can be dealt with inside the boundaries of the nation state. It appears surprising,

therefore, that the organisational development of these indigenous peoples should be so alike. Whatever had happened, occurred in two phases. The first, which proved abortive, occupied the first three decades of the 20th Century and the second that of establishment and growth, occurred after the Second World War, though it did not gather momentum until 1970. The setting up of associations amongst the Indians of the USA showed a clear continuity and existed as a common ethno-political movement. Parallel bodies were late in coming amongst the 'First Nations' in Canada, but when the process began around 1970 it developed rapidly. The *Saami* of Scandinavia were somewhere in between, with developments occurring at different times in the various states. While there were just a handful of indigenous movements dotting the Latin American region in the 1960s, they gained strength in the 1970s and by 1990s indigenous organisations had mushroomed ranging from local and regional organisations to national level federative organisations having alliances with well-developed international lobbies.

30.4.2 Canada

The organisational development amongst the Canadian Indians prior to 1970 was very uneven but singularly more uniform after that date. A new pan-Indian initiative was launched in 1960 when, for the most part, educated urban Indians and *Métis* set up the *National Indian Council* (NIC). Its main aim was to promote Indian culture and advance political agreement. The organisation had, therefore, to fight against major internal divisions right from the outset. It had further problems with fund raising and achieved little influence since the authorities did not see it as being in any way representative of Indians generally. The government's *White Paper* of 1969 according to which all Canadians should be treated equally, became the catalyst that would unite the various indigenous groups around the policy proposed by the NIC.

The Status-Indians' regional bodies came together in a federal structure and at a meeting in 1969 the nature of the organisation, the *National Indian Brotherhood* (NIB) was decided upon. The NIB was totally opposed to the *White Paper* and its idea of a just society with equal opportunities, as it would simply result in denial of rights, which were specifically 'indigenous'. The government, forced to retreat, now stood without a policy for its indigenous peoples. Then president of the NIB George Manuel took this opportunity to initiate building up an international network of indigenous peoples. The NIB has consciously exploited whatever authority the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) had. For example, already at its second general assembly in 1977, a resolution was adopted which was more than anything else grounded in the Canadian political process. The requirement was a pan Indian movement rather than a number of local organisations, which could put forth its demands clearly to the government. This was achieved with the NIB changing its name to the current *Assembly of First Nations*.

30.4.3 Australia

The 1920s and 1930s saw growing political pressure, both domestic and international, on the Australian government in relation to the condition of Aborigines especially in the Northern Territory. Though there were attempts to improve welfare provisions for the indigenous peoples in the Parliament, they were never sustained. A decisive change occurred in the mid-1960s when Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory began to press for indigenous rights in a new way. For example, the Aboriginal community from *Yirrkala* in Arnhem Land pursued a claim to obtain ownership of their land and at Wave Hill cattle station. Despite the continuing concerns of the *Yirrkala* people, the government proceeded with the project as planned. When this failed they took a more radical step in 1971 demanding that their traditional ownership of the land should be recognised by the Australian law. The proclamation of a beach umbrella and a number of tents in the premises of the Parliament House in Canberra as the Aboriginal

Embassy, on Australia Day 1972, in protest of the refusal to recognise indigenous land rights is seen as a symbol of a united and national aboriginal movement.

30.4.4 Latin America

Indigenous movements in Latin America have emerged in the last two to three decades, as has been the case in other parts of the world. In the 1960s, there were only a handful of indigenous movements in the region. The first-ever-indigenous movement was in the early 1960s in Ecuador. The *Shuar* Federation was formed to defend land from encroachment by settlers and promote the interests of the various dispersed *Shuar* communities in the Amazonian Eastern Ecuador. More organisations came up in the 1970s in other Latin American countries, recognising the interests of their own community as important rather than clubbing them with the interests of the larger peasant community. These organisations were not only local and regional, but they also turned national and even international in their reach. Some regional organisations that emerged at that time were the Indigenous Association of the Peruvian jungle (AIDESPA), the Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca Valley (CRIC) in Colombia and the Indigenous Confederation of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB). Among the examples of nation-wide organisations, mention can be made of the Ecuadorian Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities (CNAIE) and the National Union of Indians (UNI) of Brazil.

30.4.5 USA

The first pan-Indian organisation with a more permanent character was the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) founded in 1944. The organisation prioritised the improvement of conditions in the health and educational sectors, lobbying on legislative issues, and media campaigns to bring attention to the indigenous culture and history. Starting with 50 tribal representatives in 1944 the number grew to 154 in 1978, whilst, by that time there were also about 3,000 individual members.

In 1960 a group of young, well-educated Indians set up the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) during a conference of researchers on the Indian questions. It was critical of middle class Indians in the NCAI who were seen as being far too companionable with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the colonial office. The organisation encouraged the growth of 'Native studies' courses in various universities and also managed to get the media interested in their cause. The organisation resolved in 1973 to support the work being carried out to form a worldwide organisation of indigenous peoples. In 1975 the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) was established at a conference in Port Alberni. Urbanised Indians took the initiative in setting up a pan-American organisation. Thus the American Indian Movement (AIM) emerged. This organisation too was quick to make an impact in the media as a result of carrying out various militant actions, the most talked about being the violent confrontation at Wounded Knee in 1973. Both before and after this incident, the organisation demanded that the authorities stand by the treaties. In 1972 the organisation arranged a demonstration across the whole country and in order to exert greater pressure on the authorities, the organisation set up the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) in 1974 as its diplomatic vehicle. In 1977, this was the first one of the indigenous organisations, which was recognised by the UN as a non-governmental organisation. It has been said that the IITC was an organ of indigenous peoples that did most within the UN system. The strength of the IITC lay in the fact that it was one hundred per cent American and did not need, therefore, to have regard for the wishes and strategies of indigenous peoples in other nation states. The pan-Indian organisations through the public debate and attention they aroused influenced both the form and rhetoric of the discussion on indigenous peoples, which sprang up in international circles.

30.5 MAJOR ISSUES OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

The main issue and the demand of the indigenous peoples is that of **Self-determination**. This has a political connotation and is most problematic. It should be recognised that this topic strikes at the legitimacy of the settler regimes and will be resisted. But self-determination need not be understood in terms of political independence from the nation state. Governments have taken cognizance of this demand and there have been instances where a formal structure has been provided for the indigenous peoples whereby they have the freedom to govern themselves. One such recent example is that of the Canadian government establishing *Nunavut*. The arrangement between Greenland and Denmark may also be an indicator that opinion is changing on this issue.

Another such issue is that of **territory**. Land means much more to the indigenous peoples than what is simply implied by the word. **Compensation** for the theft of land and property by the settler societies is a bone of contention. The reactions to the *Waitangi* Tribunal in New Zealand, and to the *Mabo* Decision in Australia indicate the problems in meeting competing equities.

Related questions have been raised in regard to **intellectual property rights** for medicines developed from plants and traditional medical practices of indigenous peoples. The general scenario is that a researcher learns of a traditional medicine and investigates its use and effectiveness. The researcher then refines the drug and a patent is issued to the researcher or his company. In most cases no compensation is given to the tribe, which had preserved and actually discovered the medicine. A proposal to reform the process to ensure compensation to the indigenous people involved was recently discussed and rejected by the World Intellectual Property Organisation. This issue will not go away. Also related to the above is control over the **exploitation of natural resources** located on the traditional lands of indigenous peoples. At present these resources are usually claimed by the settler society, which gets any fees or profits from exploitation without regard to the needs or desires of the indigenous peoples.

Preservation of cultural traditions and languages is a high priority for many indigenous peoples who are usually a minority in the settler society. Most such majority societies have been extremely reluctant to allow the use of indigenous languages in formal governmental activities, though examples can be taken of indigenous languages being accepted as official for the use of indigenous peoples.

30.6 GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

Governmental measures and responses to indigenous movements seem to have passed through various phases. The first was the abortive phase when any indigenous efforts at protests were severely suppressed and no cognizance was taken of the existence of these peoples. The second can be called the establishment and expansionist phase when indigenous movements came to life mostly in the 1970s. Thus in spite of various government policies that argued that indigenous peoples were a part of the past and not of the present, the indigenous peoples made a comeback. Examples of this kind of a governmental policy are the claim by Newfoundland in 1949 when it joined Canada that Newfoundland had no ‘natives’ or the Canadian prime minister’s idea of a ‘just society’ and the *White Paper* of 1969. Today, having gained credibility, the indigenous peoples are demanding ancestral rights. The attitude of the various governments too has been changing with time, keeping in line with the progress of the indigenous movements.

One of the major initiatives that various governments have made is to give constitutional recognition to the rights of the indigenous peoples. Recently, some Latin American countries

have promulgated new constitutions or introduced amendments to the existing constitutions, which reflect the ruling elite's change in attitude towards these peoples. Brazil has a full chapter on the 'Indians' in its new constitution of 1988, while Mexico has introduced reforms. Other countries like Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, Paraguay and Panama too have introduced constitutional reforms or a new constitution in which the rights and the identity of these people have been recognised. Elsewhere, for instance in Canada, through Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982, the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognised and affirmed." Section 35 also provides that the "aboriginal peoples of Canada" include the Indian, *Inuit* and *Métis* peoples, and that the recent land claims agreements of the indigenous peoples are to be recognised as "treaties". Not only that but the recognition of *Nunavut* in 1993 has also been a giant step for the government. Similarly, in Australia, the *Mabo* Decision of 1992 was a major breakthrough. It did away with the concept of *Terra Nullius* wherein empty, unsettled or unpopulated land could be claimed by any one who would settle and develop it. The Native Title Act of December 1993 provided the legal framework for the High Court's decision recognising the principle of Native Title. The Constitutional recognition in Australia to embed these rights and proposals are on the anvil.

While the governments have undertaken major steps, these are not considered as adequate. To quite an extent, these initiatives have been the result of an intense international pressure and awareness. So, the indigenous issue has become an international one over the years. In recent years, global awareness has increased. The establishment of the Working Group on Indigenous Population (WGIP)-created in 1982, is an evidence of that. The WGIP is the principal UN group concerned with indigenous people's rights. They call for a comprehensive study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations. In accordance with the Economic and Social Council's resolution, Jose R. Martinez Cobo was appointed as Special Rapporteur to make such a study. It resulted in a report ***The Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations***, with 22 chapters. The main project of the WGIP has been the drafting of a Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights.

The vehement rejection of the any of the earlier government policies has only stressed the resurgence of the indigenous movements which are now active at the international level.

30.7 SUMMARY

The term "indigenous peoples" applies to the descendants of the original inhabitants of a given area or region-a region forcibly occupied, by foreigners who subsequently replaced their means of governance and curtailed their democratic development. Nevertheless, indigenous peoples still manifest cultural and social characteristics and practices distinct from the national varieties, which surround them.

It was around 1900 that the first ethno-political initiatives were taken by the indigenous peoples. The League of Nations formed in 1919 was an international organisation in which one could have expected to raise indigenous issues. Chief Deskaheh, a *Cayuga* from the Six Nations reserve stepped up the demand for full self-government and recognition of the Iroquois as a sovereign nation. The General Secretary of the League of Nations then took up the matter in 1923. The creation of the United Nations in 1945 offered a ray of hope with the United Nations' active role in the decolonisation process. In 1957, the ILO Adopted Resolution 107 which gave protection to tribal and indigenous peoples. The contribution of the indigenous peoples in the making of these decisions was, at the time, conspicuous by its absence. While there were just a handful of indigenous movements in the 1960s, they gained strength in the 1970s and by 1990s

indigenous organisations had mushroomed ranging from local and regional organisations to national level federative organisations having alliances with well-developed international lobbies. This kind of a lobbying took place in most countries, taking up the major issues concerning indigenous peoples like that of self-determination, territorial rights, intellectual property rights, preservation of cultural traditions and languages. While major steps have been undertaken by the various governments like the formation of *Nunavat* in Canada or the *Mabo* decision in Australia, towards the well being of the indigenous governments, it has not been enough. To quite an extent, these steps have been the result of intense international awareness and pressure. So, indigenous movements, making their presence felt nationally as well as internationally are will be instrumental in their fight for their rights.

30.8 EXERCISES

- 1) How would you define ‘Indigenous Peoples’?
- 2) Identify three of the indigenous populations from any of the regions in the world. Why do you call them ‘indigenous’?
- 3) How did indigenous movements gain international attention in the initial stages?
- 4) Briefly explain how indigenous movements have spread in various parts of the world.
- 5) Explain what the indigenous peoples are demanding in their fight for rights. How have governments in various countries responded to these demands?

UNIT 31 DISPLACEMENT OF POPULATION: INTRA-STATE AND INTERSTATE

Structure

- 31.1 Introduction
 - 31.2 Inter-state Displacement
 - 31.2.1 Non-Refoulement and other Refugee Rights
 - 31.2.2 New Refugee Situations
 - 31.2.3 Refugee Protection: The Current Scenario
 - 31.3 Intra- state Displacement
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 - 31.3.3 Limitations of Protection to Intra-State Displacements
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31.1 INTRODUCTION

The key concepts that we need to define here are displacement, state, inter-state and intra-state. The term displacement can be defined as the dislocation of peoples from a place/environment to another one forcibly. In other words, it is ‘forced migration’. Displacement involves more than just a change of physical environment. It also deals with factors such as coping mechanisms and power relations in the new setting. Displacement is a phenomenon that can recur in people’s lives. Therefore, it can be regarded as a process as well.

Here we need to introduce the term migration and differentiate between displacement (forced migration) and migration. It is a result of a conscious decision on the part of the person who migrates. Therefore, it is a voluntary movement of peoples from one physical environment to a newer one, for economic, social or cultural reasons. Migration may or may not be disruptive for the individual or community.

The term State refers to the nation-state with the features of population, territory, government and sovereignty. For example, India, Tanzania and the United Kingdom are nation-states.

Inter-state displacement refers to forced migration of peoples across national boundaries. In international law those displaced across national borders or subjects of inter-state displacement are defined as refugees-Sri Lankan refugees in Europe or the Vietnamese “boat people” in the USA are examples of inter-state dislocation.

Intra-state displacement deals with displacement within the national borders of a state. Forced migrants as a result of displacement within the national borders of a state are categorised as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Those forcibly displaced due to developmental activities such as construction of roads, railway tracks and dams, for instance, fall under the category of intra-state displacement.

Having differentiated between the terms inter-state and intra-state displacements, i.e. refugees and IDPs, respectively, we shall study the two categories of forced migrants in greater detail.

31.2 INTER-STATE DISPLACEMENT

In everyday speech a refugee is someone who has been compelled to abandon his home or place of habitual residence. Millions of those uprooted or homeless have had to look for safety to escape, intolerance, persecution, political violence, armed conflict or violation of human rights in general. A refugee is a victim of events, for which, at least as an individual he is not responsible.

Until the 20th Century no universal standards existed for the protection of people. Most of the states towards which refugees headed, barred entry to them. Out of this experience the concept of refugees entered international law. The refugee's uncertain legal status made them a political problem. Their physical and economic conditions caused human concern. Until the end of First World War, no coordinated efforts were made to assist and protect refugees. It was only with the inception of the League of Nations at the end of the First World War that a beginning was made in assisting refugees in a coordinated manner. Refugee protection came to be regarded as an international problem that required international co-operation.

In 1921, Fridtjof Nansen (1921-1930), the Norwegian polar explorer was appointed by the League of Nations, as the High Commissioner for Russian refugees. Nansen's good work was carried forward by the American High Commissioner, James McDonald (1933-1935). McDonald fought immigration restrictions across the globe to resettle Jewish refugees that fled Nazi persecution during Hitler's regime. In a short span of two years he settled 80,000 refugees in Palestine and elsewhere. Later, the mandate of the High Commissioner was extended to Armenian, Syrian, Kurdish, Turkish and German refugees. However, these were ad hoc arrangements to deal with specific refugee groups.

The years 1950-1951, marked a turning point in refugee protection. It was during this period that a formal structure of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was set up for the protection and assistance of refugees.

In 1951, the UNHCR adopted the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (herein after referred to as the 1951 Convention). The 1951 Convention formulated the definition of a refugee specifically in the context of post-war Europe. It also spelt out standards for their protection by the international community.

The term refugee is applied to any person who as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951, and owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Article 1, 1951 Convention).

Therefore, a refugee as defined by the 1951 Convention was any person who

- 1 was a victim of events in Europe occurring before 1 January 1951
- 1 was outside the country of his origin (home country of which he is a national)

- 1 could not go back to his home country of origin due to a **well founded fear of persecution**
- 1 persecution was justified on the following five grounds race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a social group.

The countries to which refugees flee and seek protection are called ‘countries of asylum’. Asylum can be defined as the protection which a state grants on its territory or in some other place under the control of its organ to a person who comes to seek it.

The 1951 Convention does not provide for the right to asylum. What exists is only the right to seek asylum. It must be pointed out that any country that commits itself to the cause of refugees, implicitly, undertakes the burden of hosting them and overseeing their welfare. Obviously, the nation-states were not willing to assume too many legal obligations arising out of the 1951 Convention. They were not prepared to recognise obligations arising out of an unconditional right to asylum. Therefore, this right is not mentioned in the Convention. However, the 1951 Convention does contain a very significant provision spelt out in Article 33. It deals with prohibition of expulsion or return (refoulement) from the country of asylum. In addition to non-refoulement, the 1951 Convention grants certain other rights to refugees.

31.2.1 Non-Refoulement and Other Refugee Rights

The term non-refoulement derives from the French *refouler*. It means to drive back or repel. Under the principle of non-refoulement (Article 33), it is obligatory for States party to the 1951 Convention, not to return people by force, from countries of asylum to situations where their life and or freedom may be under threat. In practice, States have sent back refugees on grounds that they are a threat to their national security, ‘public order’ or that the refugee status of the individual asylum seeker is questionable or illegal.

In addition to the right to non-refoulement, the 1951 Convention grants refugees the rights of employment, housing, education, social security, documentation and freedom of movement.

The definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention, though general and of universal application, was narrow. It was limited to events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951. In the wake of new events, additional refugees were generated across the world. The existing definitions due to the above mentioned reasons were unable to include the new categories of forced migrants. At this juncture, it was felt that a wider definition was needed to include the newer situations that emerged worldwide. Therefore, the 1951 Convention definition was amended by the 1967 Protocol to the Convention. It removed both the time and the geographical limitations. Henceforth, the 1951 Convention definition covered refugees generated after 1 January 1951 and outside of Europe, as well.

Situations arose on the African continent and other parts of the world, where people were forced to leave their countries of origin not because of a fear of persecution, but because of war at home and the general violence that accompanied the decolonisation process. The 1951 Convention worked well with the individual asylum seekers but now refugees arrived in large numbers. In such circumstances neither was it feasible to check if the motive for seeking the refugee status was due to a ‘well founded fear of persecution’ or due to other factors such as famine, natural disaster, decolonisation or a combination of these. An expanded definition was needed to deal with the newer situations emerging across the world.

31.2.2 New Refugee Situations

Africa

To deal with this emerging reality, in Africa, the 1969 OAU (Organisation of African Unity) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (hereafter referred to as the 1969 OAU Convention) was adopted. This definition accepted the definition offered by the 1951 Convention but also added other categories of persons such as, those escaping violence in general, natural disasters such as famine, floods or drought and members of liberation movements fighting against colonial domination. It would have been difficult for the UNHCR to include freedom fighters because its activities are to be strictly non-political.

Instead of an individual status determination of refugees, the 1969 OAU Convention adopted a group approach. The fact that those concerned were without the protection of their own government was a reason enough to grant them a legal refugee status. The scope of protection offered by the 1969 OAU Convention is much wider than that of the 1951 Convention. A wider definition of the term was found more suitable to deal with refugee situations in Latin America as well.

Latin America

Later, in 1984, following the refugee crisis in Central America, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees was adopted in cooperation with the UNHCR, in Cartagena, Colombia. Like the 1969 OAU Convention's definition, this too defines refugee in a broader manner. Though the Declaration is not legally binding on States, its broader definition is applied to deal with refugee situations in Central and Latin America.

Asia

In the Asian context, the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee's (AALCC) 1966 Principles Concerning the Treatment of Refugees or the Bangkok Principle deal with refugee protection in the region. It specifically incorporates the principles of non-refoulement or non-rejection at the frontiers. However, these principles are not binding and have not had the impact similar to other regional Conventions in Africa and Latin America.

Though the region has witnessed the largest forced population movements in contemporary history, none of the South Asian countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) are signatories to the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol.

There is no comprehensive legal document at the regional level, which provides a framework for refugee protection in the region. Neither are the South Asian States signatories to the international instruments on refugee protection. Refugee protection is dealt with as a part of bilateral relations between the refugee sending and receiving countries in the region. However, in the 1990s, there has been an increased concern about refugee protection at the national and the regional level. A formal legal framework for refugee protection could eliminate discriminatory and inconsistent treatment of refugees arising out of human rights violation in the South Asian region.

By 31 December 1999, 131 states had acceded to both the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Either one or both of the above mentioned instruments have been ratified by 138 States.

Violence of human beings against human beings due to a violation of basic human rights is the main cause of refugee outflows in the world today. This may take the form of persecution of persons because of their race, religion, membership of a social group or political opinion, oppressive regimes and armed conflicts or civil wars. The reasons for refugee outflows can be broadly divided into man-made and natural causes.

We can get an insight into the causes by way of examples that are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

Some illustrations of refugee outflows due to man-made causes

Africa

- 1 *Apartheid* in South Africa is an example of an oppressive regime. *Apartheid* was the policy of separate development of races, introduced by the Afrikaner Nationalist Party in 1948. It discriminated against people on account of their skin colour and closed all avenues of protest against it. The victims of *apartheid* had to flee into neighbouring countries or elsewhere to seek asylum.
- 1 During the 1960s and 1970s violent anti-colonial independence movements against their colonial masters in Africa, led to forced migration across the continent. Of these the most violent were liberation struggles in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Together they accounted for 56 per cent of Africa's refugees at that time!

Europe

- 1 In September 1935, following the Nuremberg laws during Hitler's regime in Germany, the Jews were deprived of citizenship and the right to vote. Their persecution during the Nazi regime led to an outflow of Jewish refugee population from Germany.
- 1 More recently, ethnic tensions in former Yugoslavia have been the major cause of refugee movements in Europe. The deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing to create ethnically homogeneous areas caused refugee outflows from Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, South Caucasus and Kosovo.

Asia

- 1 The partition of the Indian sub-continent led to the formation of India and Pakistan, in 1947, resulted in a two-way refugee movement. About 14 million people were displaced at the time, as Muslims in India fled to Pakistan and the Hindu population fled to India. The two-way forced migration across the border continued in the years that followed, though on a much smaller scale.
- 1 Following the French colonial retreat from Indo-china, communist governments came to power in 1975 in the newly created countries of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. What followed was an exodus of three million people over the next two decades, fleeing repressive communist regimes. By 1978, there were 62,000 Vietnamese refugees, popularly known as the "boat people" arriving by sea on the shores of South East Asia.
- 1 Ethnic conflict for over two decades between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Liberation

Tigers of Tamil *Eelam* (LTTE) forces has displaced over a million peoples and caused large numbers to seek refuge in India and elsewhere.

Natural Causes

Nature's fury too has caused refugee situations across the globe. Calamities such as droughts, floods, famines etc. can be categorised as natural causes of refugee exodus. Refugee movements arising out of natural disasters are termed as environmental refugees. At times drought or environmental degradation can combine with civil wars, further aggravating the plight of refugees. The effects of a natural calamity can be compounded by inadequate economic policies of governments that are unconcerned about the safety and protection of their nationals.

The following are some illustrations from Africa, the worst hit by a natural cause or a combination of natural and man-made reasons.

- 1 In the Senegal River basin due to drought and water shortage, disputes over irrigable land have led to thousands of Senegalese and Mauritanians cross their borders.
- 1 In Angola, decades of civil war and drought have damaged an economy rich in oil, diamonds, iron ore and agricultural potential.
- 1 In the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti) refugee movements are fostered by a combination of armed conflicts, external interventions and natural calamities.

The above-mentioned refugee situations are alleviated by the material assistance and relief provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

On behalf of the international community, the UNHCR is the nodal agency for dealing with refugees. It helps the countries of asylum and provides adequate assistance and protection to refugees. It sees that the asylum seekers are treated in accordance with internationally recognised protection standards. It also works towards durable solutions to bring an end to refugee status, viewed as temporary by the countries of asylum. The following section deals with the three durable or permanent solutions.

The durable solutions attempt to seek an alternative to being a refugee. The UNHCR acts as the coordinator. It is anticipated that refugees will eventually be voluntarily repatriated, assimilated in the country of asylum or resettled in a third country, in that order of preference. To achieve these durable solutions political will and capacity are necessary.

The three durable solutions are considered below.

Voluntary Repatriation

Voluntary Repatriation means the return of refugees to their countries of origin based on their own free will. It involves four actors. They are;

- 1 Country of origin or the country which generates/sends refugees
- 1 Country of asylum or the country where the refugees have sought protection.
- 1 UNHCR as the co-coordinating agency
- 1 Refugees as the ultimate deciding factor.

For refugees to be repatriated or voluntarily sent back home, certain conditions have to be met with. They include:

- 1 The elimination of the causes of forced migration
- 1 A clearly worded amnesty guaranteeing the safety of those returning from exile
- 1 Creation of conditions back home where the life and freedom of those returning would be safe and secure and
- 1 Proper resettlement facilities on return.

Voluntary repatriation is the most preferred option because it alleviates the burden of the country of asylum and brings an end to refugee status as well.

Local integration in the host country

At times, when voluntary repatriation to their countries of origin is not possible, the UNHCR favours the integration of refugees into their host countries. The 1951 Convention requests member states to assimilate and naturalise the refugees. It urges the countries of asylum to grant citizenship to the refugees wherever possible.

Resettlement in a Third Country

This third option involves the shifting or resettlement of a refugee neither in their countries of origin or asylum but in a third country. This is the least preferred and most expensive option, resorted to, at times, for compelling humanitarian reasons. The resettlement of Vietnamese “boat people” in United States of America is an illustration of resettlement.

The traditional countries of asylum prefer to check refugee outflows at source by intervening in conflict situations and providing relief and assistance within the home countries itself. There is a global hesitancy in offering asylum due to the factors mentioned below.

31.2.3 Refugee Protection: The Current Scenario

Today the complexity, magnitude and categories of migratory flows have increased. At the same time there has been a shrinking of refugee protection at the regional and international level.

Economic limitation of host countries, donor fatigue or a decline in international burden sharing (assuming the responsibility of hosting refugees) of supply of food and relief material, increased unemployment rates have made refugees a burden on the host states in the developed world. They fear that an open door policy on refugees would encourage more asylum seekers to come in. Therefore, the 1990s saw a narrower interpretation of the 1951 Convention’s definition of refugees or fewer people were recognised as genuine refugees and granted refugee status.

The Third World countries are emulating the lack of collectivised or global burden sharing in terms of refugee protection and assistance by the developed world. They cite far greater economic and resource constraints, high unemployment rates as some of the significant reasons for a decline in their commitment to refugee protection. There is a need to revitalise burden sharing at the regional and international level so that the human rights of refugees can be protected.

The plight of those people, who have been forced to abandon their habitual place of residence, but could not cross their national borders, or of the internally displaced (IDPs) is even worse.

31.3 INTRA-STATE DISPLACEMENT

To recollect, a refugee is a person who crosses an international border while an intra-state displacement (IDP) is one who is forcibly displaced, but within the territorial boundaries of his state and therefore within its domestic jurisdiction. In other words, intra-State displacements are those who seek safety not in other states but within their national borders and of their own governments.

The IDP's were subjects of focus in the 1990s due to two reasons; first because of the magnitude of the problem and second due to their vulnerability.

In the world of today there are an estimated 25 million persons displaced within the national borders, a five-fold increase since the 1970s! Today IDPs outnumber refugees by nearly 2:1 with an astonishing 13.5 million on the African continent! Sudan, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), currently host IDP population in millions. Uganda, Nigeria, Burundi and Somalia have IDPs around half a million or more.

They are vulnerable because a large number of IDPs remain without the effective protection or assistance of their national governments. At times, governments that are legally accountable for their own citizens well being and protection are often unable or unwilling to act on their behalf. Besides, mass displacement of population can also pose serious threats to the security and stability of an entire region and thereby destabilise it.

Scholars are of the opinion that just because IDPs have been unable to cross the national borders, they should not be denied assistance and protection. If the IDPs also called *internal refugees* were to cross the national borders, they would qualify as refugees.

There are no specific international legal instruments in international law to protect the IDPs, like the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, nor a mandated institution such as the UNHCR for refugees. As a result, the response of the international community, too, has been inconsistent. In the 1990s it was felt that there was a need to define who an IDP is and the principles applicable to them.

Francis M. Deng, the Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Intra-State Displacements presented a set of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, for the purpose of giving them protection and assistance. According to Deng the term Intra-State Displacements applies to any people or a group of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or place of habitual residence *in particular* as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violation of human rights or natural and man made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border. (The use of the term '*in particular*' means that the list of causes of displacement is not exhaustive.

The two crucial elements of internal displacement therefore are i. Coerced or involuntary movement, and ii. Remaining within one's national borders. One must note that displacement or forced migration should not be confused with people who migrate voluntarily from one place to another for economic betterment, social or cultural reasons.

31.3.1 Causes of internal displacement

The factors that cause refugees and internal displacement are the same: the violation of human rights resulting in fear, persecution and human suffering. Repressive regimes, ethnic conflicts, external destabilisation campaigns and interventions are causes of internal displacement as well.

Violation of human rights can take place on various grounds, for instance, the persecution of a particular ethnic group by the state. The group members may be citizens in theory but regarded as ‘aliens’ in practice. Usually the persecuted group may have a different language, religion, culture or ethnicity and may be subject to discrimination and abuse by the majority. Alienation based on the above mentioned identities are the main cause of forced migration across the globe.

Francis Deng and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan point out that differences based on the above mentioned grounds, by themselves, are not the cause of conflict. They create divisive and conflictual situations when these differences translate into opportunities for power sharing and distribution of scarce resources and opportunities. The dominant group tries to impose its identity by exploiting resentment and prejudices to gain or retain hold on power. For example, when drought and famine ravaged Ethiopia in the mid 1980s, the government forcibly relocated hundreds of thousands of Tigrayan people it considered as political opponents, under the pretext of responding to a natural disaster.

Armed conflict or civil wars or situations of general violence generate refugees and Intra-State Displacements simultaneously. At times civilians are targeted as a result of their affiliation with the opposing or anti-government forces.

Some illustrations

Africa

In Sudan, government troops have been responsible for the aerial bombing of civilian targets, as a way of clearing areas of oil production and the construction of oil pipelines causing them to be internally displaced.

In Angola, the battle between the government and rebel forces has been blamed for the forced and repeated displacement of civilian populations. Can you imagine Angola the second largest oil producing country in sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria and the fourth largest diamond producer after Russia has 1.3 million Intra-State Displacements and 25 per cent of its families living below the poverty line, i.e. on US 60 cents per day! Such situations are illustrations of a lack of political will rather than capacity on the part of the national governments.

Angola, Sudan, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have more than 10 million IDPs, trapped inside their national borders, i.e. 75 per cent of them on the African continent. However, IDPs are not confined to Africa alone. Colombia, Indonesia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Burma and India are some of the other countries that have Intra-State Displacements.

Europe

Armed struggle between the Turkish government forces and the Kurdish armed groups, the largest ethnic minority in Turkey (26 per cent of the total population of 12 million people). Their

struggle for self-determination to manifest their ethnic identity and rights, denied by the Turkish government, has led to the internal displacement of thousands of ethnic Kurdish people over the past two decades.

Asia

Displacement in Asia includes the conflict between India and Pakistan for the disputed Kashmir region. As a result of the conflict between the government and the Muslim separatists in Kashmir, there are over 350,000 million internally displaced Hindu *Pandits* who have fled the Muslim dominated Kashmir Valley following killings of their Hindu community members by Muslim separatist groups such as the *Hizbul Mujahiddin*. They live in dismal conditions in the Hindu dominated Jammu region, New Delhi and other parts of the country to which they have migrated.

Forced assimilation policies and land issues have been the cause of displacement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of East Bangladesh. 128,000 families or 500,000 individuals of indigenous Buddhist clans were displaced by deliberately resettling landless Muslim Bengalis from the overcrowded delta region. This is a case of persecution of ethnic and religious minorities by the government.

Human or man-made disasters such as large scale development projects like the Three Gorges Dam in China and the Narmada Sagar Project in India have led to the forcible displacement of one million people, each. Those without adequate resettlement compensation could qualify as people requiring attention under the definition of IDPs. India does not have a national policy for resettlement and rehabilitation. Natural disasters and planned forced eviction have created more than 21.3 million IDPs in India. Out of this 16.4 million have been displaced due to large dams and 2.55 million as a result of minor irrigation projects. Most of these projects are located in forests and other tribal habitats and have displaced over 40 per cent of the tribal peoples though they constitute only 8 per cent of the population.

In addition to man-made causes, natural disasters such as droughts, earthquakes and floods too cause internal displacement. In India, we are familiar with large scale dislocations due to floods in eastern India and the recent earthquakes in the States of Gujarat and Maharashtra. For displacements as a result of natural disasters, governments cannot be held accountable. However they are responsible for providing relief and rehabilitation to the victims of displacement to avoid situations of internal displacement.

IDPs invariably are a result of either of the above-mentioned factors or a complex combination of these. Those unable to cross over the national border to escape violence due to the above mentioned reasons are doubly disadvantaged. They are without the protection of their own government as well as binding international instrument like the 1951 Convention that define and protect refugees. Some IDP situations come to an end with the return of those displaced while others drag on for years.

Internal displacement is viewed as a temporary phenomenon that will get over once the factors that caused displacement have disappeared. It is assumed that the IDPs will return or resettle in their original place of residence and thereby the problem will come to an end. However, the causes of displacement do not always come to an end, for example land submerged due to the construction of large scale development projects can never be recovered. At times civil wars go on for decades and so do situations of internal displacement leading to adverse consequences.

Displacements heavily outweigh return movements with some exceptions such as return

movements in the Philippines, Sri Lanka in 2001 and Macedonia and Afghanistan in 2002. Since the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001, large numbers of Intra-State Displacements have been able to return even though many had to resettle outside their home areas due to the conflict. Following an agreement between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil *Eelam* (LTTE) and the newly elected government in December 2001, after 19 years of conflict to engage in peace negotiations, the lifting of travel restrictions for the Tamils allowed for a limited return by early 2002.

31.3.2 Consequences of Displacement

On return after a long gap, the returnees' traditional social structures such as the family, community and the power structures within it break down. Casualties in war lead to an increase in the number of women and child headed households. Women and children are the worst sufferers of conflict situations due to the loss of their partners/parents. They are left to fend for themselves in violent settings without the warm and secure environment of a home and the resources and support structure of a family.

Women headed households have limited earnings and therefore lack of food and medical amenities may lead to malnutrition and illness. They miss out on the regular schooling, socialisation into their mother tongue and cultural traditions. The disruptive social environment can affect a child's normal growth process. In other words, displacement can be a traumatic experience during the growing up process.

In addition to the above, women and girl child may be exposed to the risk of sexual abuse. Besides, cultural factors may translate into the women/girl child having less access to health, education, nutrition, and education facilities. During displacement, women and children may be subject to torture, rape, sexual assault, abductions and forced recruitment by government or rebel forces. In conflict zones such as Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Sudan for example in Africa, and Colombia, Burma, Iraq and Afghanistan for instance, one comes across the disturbing phenomenon of child soldiers.

Besides the concentration of the displaced in a new environment may be a strain on the common property resources of the region. The new habitat may not be able to support its old residents as well as new arrivals, thereby wreaking havoc on the environment; polluting streams, forestlands and ground water resources. Returnees may find their land and homes occupied by other hostile groups/ ethnicities. Neglected agricultural land becomes uncultivable and buildings may have crumbled down.

Urban centres may face overcrowding. It may lead to stressing the city's infrastructure in terms of water, housing, health care and sanitation facilities. Given the prohibitive cost of land in urban areas, most of the displaced can only settle on the outskirts with little or no amenities, leading to the growth of slums.

Displacement may lead to a loss of skills of traditional craftsmen. They may be forced to eke out a livelihood by acquiring newer skills. For example, the fisher folk displaced by the Narmada Sagar Project in India, may earn a living by pulling human carts or rickshaws in Jabalpur.

Since the IDPs are equally or more vulnerable than the refugees, why are they not protected by the international community? The answer is that the IDPs are not victims of government persecution. When governments assume responsibility and lack material resources to help the IDPs, the international agencies can help. The problem arises when the government itself is the

persecutor or the violator of the human rights of individuals. They can deny access to international agencies that want to help or protect the IDPs on grounds of violation of state sovereignty. In such situations state sovereignty assumes priority over humanitarian assistance

31.3.3 Limitations of Protection to the Intra-State Displacements

Unlike the UNHCR there is no specific international organisation that has the authority to intervene on behalf of millions of IDPs. To deal with this situation the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement spelt out certain guidelines. According to these principles, the primary responsibility for the protection and assistance of IDP rests with their national governments. However, government response, at times, despite good intentions may be constrained in terms of funding and expertise on the part of the local actors. This results in protection standards that are well below those prescribed by the Guiding Principles on IDPs.

On other occasions IDPs may be discriminated against as a result of their ethnic or religious identity. In situations of prolonged civil wars a large part of the government resources are channeled to war efforts, instead of assistance to IDP's.

In Asia, regional organisations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) do not deal with the problem of refugees or IDPs. Adherence to the concept of state sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs has taken priority over human rights of forced migrants. Humanitarian assistance to IDPs comes through civil society organisations like the NGOs.

Therefore, IDPs are a distinct category at risk that requires urgent international attention, more so, when their own governments are the persecutors. IDPs may also need assistance when governments are willing but are unable to do so because of the above mentioned reasons. Unfortunately, humanitarian assistance remains intricately linked with politics. Lack of political will, leadership and co-ordination on the part of the international humanitarian community are the other major weaknesses.

Then there is the problem of assessing the magnitude of internal displacement. The problem also arises because IDPs may not be as easily identifiable and accessible as the refugees. Refugees flee to safer havens across national borders are therefore easily identifiable and therefore accessible to international agencies. IDPs, on the other hand, may remain undetected because they continue to stay in conflict zones, without access to the outside world. At times, they may move to the rural or urban areas and mingle in with the population there and therefore become invisible. Governments may not recognise minorities, political opponents and insurgents or simply deny the existence of the problem.

The IDPs have evoked international concern due to the forced nature of their movement, subjection to human rights abuses following their displacement and lack of protection within their own countries. In the 1990s the international community has assumed responsibility for the IDPs as well, though humanitarian assistance to them is limited due to reasons of national sovereignty.

At the request of the United Nations Secretary General and the General Assembly, the UNHCR has assumed the overall responsibility for the protection and assistance of the IDPs. They are categorised as *peoples of concern* requiring urgent attention. In situations of armed conflict it may assist civilians gain safe passage, evacuate civilians from conflict zones and mediate between returning displaced persons and local residents. The UNHCR guidelines for the protection and assistance to refugee women and against sexual violence are also applicable to the internally displaced girls and women as well.

Additionally, arrays of the UN agencies that provide assistance to IDPs are:

- 1 The International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC) which undertakes activities such as evacuating civilians from situations of danger, securing release of detainees, creating protected areas and making arrangements for cease fires. The ICRC has the clearest mandate when the IDPs are civilian victims of armed conflict.
- 1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) too help women and children and provide assistance with food, medical supplies and promote development.
- 1 In addition NGOs such as Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) or Doctors Without Borders and the World Council of Churches (WCC) too help the internally displaced. They report about their conditions, violations of their human rights and assist in protection activities and monitor the return of IDPs.

31.4 SUMMARY

Displacement is always a coerced or involuntary movement. When displacement takes place within the national State boundaries it is termed as internal displacement. On the other hand, when people cross an international border or are displaced outside of the State, they are called refugees.

In the 1990s, there has been an increase in the number of IDPs and a decline in the number of refugees, as compared to the earlier period. The reasons for this trend are increased border controls, limited opportunities to cross international borders, decline in the tradition of hospitality and the institution of asylum.

Those unable to cross over the national border to escape violence are doubly disadvantaged. They are without the protection of their own governments as well as binding international instruments like the 1951 Convention that defines and protects refugees. The lack of global burden sharing at the regional and international level has serious implications for the human rights of refugees and IDPs the world over.

However, increasing concern over the plight of IDPs by the international community and the relief and protection offered by the UHNCR and an array of UN organisations has brought relief to millions in distress.

31.5 EXERCISES

1. What do you understand by the terms intra- state and inter state displacement?
2. What are the alternatives to refugeeism?
3. What are the differences between refugees and IDPs?
4. Who is responsible for protecting and assisting IDPs?

UNIT 32 TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS: CULTURAL AND CIVILISATIONAL

Structure

- 32.1 Introduction
- 32.2 Meaning of Transnational Movements
- 32.3 Non-State Actors and International Culture
 - 32.3.1 Information and International Culture
- 32.4 Religious Movements
 - 32.4.1 *Dawat-i-Islami*
 - 32.4.2 Different Types of International Activities
- 32.5 Transnational Communities and Civilisational Movements
 - 32.5.1 Diasporas
- 32.6 Culture and Transnational Movements
 - 32.6.1 International Journalism
 - 32.6.2 International Sports Events
 - 32.6.3 Broadcasting - Role of T.V. and Radio
 - 32.6.4 Tourism
- 32.7 Summary
- 32.8 Exercises

32.1 INTRODUCTION

You have read that nation-state has been, and still is, the most important actor in/of political action. In the earlier units when the concepts such as power, national interest, foreign policy, arms control, balance of power and international organisation were discussed, the emphasis, explicitly or implicitly, was on the nation-state. However, in the last about three decades of the 20th Century, the predominance of nation-state was challenged. There has been growing activity of several new non-state actors who, in turn, have contributed to transnational movements. Today, people-to-people relationships have become as important as government-to-government relationships.

In this unit an attempt will be made to highlight the transnational movements that involve such diverse fields as sports and tourism, or religious and ethnic groups, or the cultural invasion of Western style fast food creating the so-called *Mcworld*. Ethnic groups and religious fundamentalism pose challenge to traditional role of the nation-state.

The migration of large numbers of people has created a situation of what is called '*diaspora*'. Indian community, whether in the United States, or the UK or elsewhere, carries its cultural values and civilisational traditions while trying to integrate themselves in the new countries of their adoption. These migrant communities, from several countries, may face the problem of rootlessness for some time, but soon they begin to spread their values in the host countries, and

even contribute to the political lives of these countries. These transnational movements, or transnational politics have both positive and negative aspects.

32.2 MEANING OF TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

You have seen that for a very long time nation-states were the only actors in international politics. They still are primary actors of politics that is called, because of relations among nation-states, as international. But with the increasing role of several non-state actors, and advent of globalisation, borders of the states have become blurred. Today, there are (besides the nation-state) several inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) as also even larger number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who determine the nature of politics among nations. Besides, as stated above, people-to-people contact has become as important as government-to-government relationship. The entire field of literature on various types of non-governmental and inter-governmental activity has been named as transnational politics. The basis of such a politics is found in several movements-cultural and civilisational-that involve people-to-people cooperation. These may be described as the transnational movements.

Writing about globalisation during the 1990s, John Cavanagh compares it to a typical movement which he describes as “remarkable”. He wrote: “One of the movements that I find most interesting and in some ways most similar to what has been built around the world... was the remarkable transnational movement, which was rooted here in the US and England and in different parts of the world and Africa, to fight the Atlantic slave trade between about the 1780s and the early 1800s.” Thus, resistance to, and fight against, slave trade could be an example of transnational movement for it covered several countries across the world.

The concept of transnationalism was elaborated by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. in *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, in 1972. The book emphasised the role of non-state actors such as religious and ethnic groups as well as multinational corporations and terrorist groups. They argued that well over 50 per cent of all international activity involves interactions among non-state actors and nation-states. The authors’ logical conclusion was: “An analysis of international relations on the basis of traditional model that does not include non-state actors seriously distorts reality, for it neglects a considerable and increasing amount of important transnational activity”. To this conclusion, it must be added that people-to-people contacts have further strengthened transnational activity and movements.

Thus, the transnational movements are based on the politics that includes interaction between traditional nation-state and a whole lot of sub-state, or non-state, actors. John Burton refers to the activities of actors such as political parties, ethnic groups, multinational corporations and cultural formations, which at times elude the control of their governments. These cannot be ignored. Burton and his colleagues argued that an exponential growth of technology, especially in the fields of communication, transportation and weaponry, has led to a situation that they prefer to describe as the ‘cobweb model of international relations’. Such a model would include the activities of not only nation-states and giant multinational corporations, but also of ethnic groups and movements such as Irish Republican Army of Ulster (Northern Ireland); Turkish Cypriot Community in Cyprus; Biafrans in Nigeria; Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey; and Basques in Spain. The cobweb model would also include individuals and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) having a powerful transnational impact.

Transnational movements are not only limited to cultural and civilisational groups, but they also include, as mentioned above, numerous other non-state actors. Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf opine that

the “idea that the state has full and exclusive control over its destiny is increasingly questionable. Borders are porous, and states are vulnerable both to external pressures and to challenges from people *within* their boundaries.”

Mathew Evangelista argues, in his book *Unarmed Forces*, that transnational movements played important role in ending the Cold War. He says, “... transnational movements of past half century were able to influence the policies and decisions of a rigid totalitarian USSR and a bureaucratised US foreign policy establishment.”

The role of international terrorism and of the non-governmental organisations have been explained and analysed elsewhere in this book. In this Unit of your course, we will examine the contribution to the transnational politics made by religious movements, ethno-national groups, transnational culture and diaspora reflecting civilisational movements.

32.3 NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL CULTURE

It has been mentioned above that non-state actors have become important activists in transnational movements (see the following Unit 33). These actors are numerous, increasingly active, and self-assertive. Besides multinational corporations and terrorist groups, these actors include ethnic minorities within states seeking independence (such as Tamils in Sri Lanka and *Basques* in Spain) as well as internationally active ethnic groups in two or more countries (for example Kurds who are active in Iran, Iraq and Turkey), who challenge the authority of state and promote transnational movements. They also include religious institutions such as Orthodox Christian Church, and more aggressive and militant groups like several Islamic organisations, such as *Al Qaeda*. It has been observed that the diversity among these groups is striking, even though all are dedicated primarily to their own parochial interests rather than those of any particular country. Riddel-Dixon had this to say about non-state actors: “The term “non-state entity” covers an enormously broad range of groups. On the most basic level, non-state entities are associations of individuals and/or groups that are not established by agreements among states”. This broad definition includes such disparate entities as transnational corporations and the business associations they establish to promote their interests, professional associations, ethnic groups, major religious organisations, terrorist groups, and social movements. The role of non-state actors in blurring the borders of nation-states is significant. These actors create movements which operate in several countries, often using extra-constitutional and even violent means.

32.3.1 Information and International Culture

Global telecommunications are profoundly changing the way of information and culture function in international relations. Information is a vital tool of national governments in their interactions with each other. Yet technology is at the same time undermining and disempowering these governments and shifting power to non-state actors and individuals. These newly empowered individuals and groups have begun to create new transnational networks worldwide, bypassing states.

The power of information technology has fully revolutionised the lives of people the world over. Today, sitting at home you can dial any number on your telephone and speak to a friend, relative or business connection in any part of the globe. “Just a hundred years ago, the idea of instant global connection was incomprehensible,” wrote Goldstein and added, “[i]t would have seemed unthinkable that anyone could push a dozen buttons on a handheld instrument (cordless phone)

and be able to talk with any of billions of people anywhere in the economically developed areas of the world (and many of the poorer areas)." Not only this, equally fascinating, but very common now, is the role of television which has created a new transnational culture in music, dance and field of soap opera. To quote Goldstein again: "Equally ridiculous was the idea that you could look at a box no bigger than a suitcase and see in it moving pictures of things happening at that moment in distant lands." Today this is a reality. Just 150 years ago, none of the modern means of information was available. One could simply write down a letter and send it often by a horse or a sailing ship.

The media over which information travels-telephones, television, films, e-mail etc.-shape the way ideas take form and spread from one place to another. Radio and, increasingly television, reaches even the poorest areas in the Third World countries. And now websites and e-mail, besides mobile telephones, have provided unbelievable connectivity in all parts of the world. This in turn has led to numerous transnational movements. TV is particularly powerful. The combination of pictures and sounds, affects viewers emotionally and intellectually. Viewers can experience distant events more fully. For example, the live coverage of terrorist attack on World Trade Centre in New York and Pentagon building in Washington D.C. by hijacked planes on 11 September 2001 made every viewer the world over feel part of the happenings in the United States. Similarly, the havoc played by the earthquake in parts of Gujarat, earlier, had shook the humankind and made the assistance available for relief in a short period of time. While TV enabled people to see the horror, jet aircrafts enabled the assistance to reach the victims in the shortest possible time.

It is not only the people who benefit from the power of information, but also that governments also use information as a tool of power. Governments spend large amounts of money collecting information about both inside and outside the boundaries of their states. Information collected by states, non-state actors and individuals enables closer interaction between them, making for transnational politics. Governments during Cold War period often held back information from the opposite camp. But, today media is so powerful that it has become major player in world politics. The media/information culture is a vital transnational movement. The effort to run a modern economy without computers, international telephone lines, websites and e-mail technologies would contribute to economic stagnation. As more and more communication channels carry more information to more places, governments become just another player in a crowded field. The information revolution has considerably increased the international interdependence, "making actions in one state reverberate in other states more strongly than in the past." At the same time, by empowering non-state transnational actors, information technology is undermining the centrality of states themselves in world politics.

Joshua S. Goldstein argues that the increase in the power of transnational actors has put into action *two contradictory forces*. One has empowered the sub-state actors, like ethnic groups, leading to disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and proliferation of internal strife since the end of the Cold War. As sub-state actors gain power, they demand their own national rights of autonomy and sovereignty. The second force, however, is the forging of transnational communities and supranational identities. Here regionalism (European Union or ASEAN) or globalism asserts itself as an internationalised culture resting on communication links among peoples in different states. This second force (forging transnational communities) challenges the emphasis on national borders, and makes for transnational culture.

32.4 RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Normally religion is based on the faith of an individual or a group of people. Expectation from

the believers is that (a) they will not force others to follow their faith, but allow every person to be free in matters of religion; and (b) the religion will not be mixed with politics, and that the state and religion will be kept independent of each other. But, these expectations are often belied. In theory, religion would appear to be a natural worldwide force, for peace and harmony. Yet, in the name of religion millions have died. The crusades between 11th and 14th centuries, left millions of Christians and Muslims dead; and the religious conflicts during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) between Christian Catholics and Protestants took the lives of nearly one-fourth of all Europeans. The partition of British India in 1947, on the basis of "two-nations" theory, played havoc with communal frenzy leaving lakhs of people-Hindus and Sikhs-killed, wounded, maimed or raped on both sides of the borders. Wholesale migration of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan created unprecedented human crisis. In West Asia, ongoing conflict between Arab Muslims and Israeli Jews has been responsible for massacre of innocent people; in erstwhile Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims were subjected to "ethnic cleansing" by the neighbouring Serbs; and the terrorist violence in Jammu & Kashmir has forced lakhs of *Pandits* to leave their homes and become refugees within India, while both Hindus and Muslims are being killed in the name of *jihad* sponsored from across the borders.

A large number of nearly 6 billion people of the world have strong religious convictions. At the abstract level, a religion is a system of thought shared by a group of people which gives its members an object of devotion and a code of behaviour. Every religion preaches noble ideals of peace and brotherhood, yet in practice faith many a times leads to movements of hatred and violence. A system of belief provides followers of a religion with their main source of identity; and this identification often leads to misplaced perception that the values of their own religion are superior to other belief systems. Thus, while Hinduism adopts idol worship as a mode of concentration and non-violence as a value, there are others who react sharply against idol worship, that they do not mind animal sacrifice so that meat may be consumed, as food by those believers.

With the conviction that a particular religion is superior, most believers feel that their faith should be universal, and that it should be adopted by everyone throughout the world. To confirm their belief in the superiority of their religion, its followers actively try to convert non-believers to their faith, and engaging themselves in crusades to win followers of other religions to their beliefs. This is usually done through persuasion, through missionary activities to win over hearts and minds of "infidels and non-believers". But, at times conversion has been carried out by bribery or by sword, tarnishing the image of reputed religions. Forceful conversion often leads to clashes that even turn violent. This is against the essentials of religious beliefs.

It is important to note that religions do have high ideals of their doctrines, yet activities of some people in those religions are often against the high ideals. The religious principles are sometimes abused by the "over enthusiasts" or fundamentalists. But, not all religions are abused, all the time. Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf, for example, wrote: "Consider the Hindu ideology of tolerance of different religions, which teaches that there are many paths to truth, and accepts pluralism among diverse populations. Similarly, Buddhism preaches pacifism, as did early Christianity, which prohibited Christians from serving in the armies of the Roman Empire." There may be occasional aberrations, which take the shape of extreme militant religious movements. These movements bring bad name to the religion. The problems arise when religions dabble in politics.

The militant religious movements have certain characteristics. These are: (i) such movements that tend to view existing government as corrupt and illegitimate because it is secular; (ii) they condemn domestic ills of the society, and try to substitute themselves for the government; (iii) they try to bring all government policies and activities in the hands of believers; (iv) they

consider themselves as universal, which means militant religious movements do not recognise international boundaries for propagation of their faith; (v) they are exclusionists, and all non-believers are treated as second-class citizens; and (vi) they, being militants, tend to use coercion to their objectives.

At times religious movements may be compelled to adopt tough stance. For example, as Mushirul Hassan wrote in *The Hindu*, 29 January 2003: “Muslim politics have a transnational dimension, as is illustrated by the responses to Israel’s unjust occupation of Palestine...” Once the alleged injustice is corrected, one can expect the religious transnational movements to give up militancy.

32.4.1 Dawat-i-Islami

One of the latest religious movements, *Dawat-i-Islami* was founded in 1981, and it seeks to promote Muslim brotherhood across the world. The *Dawat-i-Islami*, meaning invitation to Islam, was launched by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri. Founded in Pakistan, catapulted by Sunnis, the Dawat invites the faithfuls to follow the *sunnah*, the prophetic way. Its aim is to promote and deepen the love for the Prophet and the early community of Muslims in Medina. In an article titled *Da’wat-i-Islami: An Aspiring Transnational Movement*, Mujeeb Ahmed, a Pakistani scholar, wrote: “The movement stands for the revival and resurgence of Islam through preaching. Its main characteristic is to preach what is righteous and what is forbidden.” The members of the *Dawat-i-Islami* keen to follow the *Sunnah*, always wear white clothes, a green turban, and a miswak (a wooden stick used in place of a toothbrush) in their pockets. The movement promotes universal brotherhood among the Muslims all over the world. In that sense it is an aspiring transnational movement. The Dawat requires each of its members to become a *murid* (pupil) of Maulana Qadiri. Its critics, however, are not happy with, what they consider, over emphasis on wearing the green turban.

32.4.2 Different Types of International Activities

Many experts believe that militant religious movements tend to stimulate five types of international activities. First, is *irredentism*, which means an attempt by a dominant religion or ethnic group to reclaim territory once possessed by it, but later lost to another region or group. Force is often rationalised for this purpose. Second, *secession* or *separatist revolts* are attempts by a religious, or ethnic, minority to breakaway from an internationally recognised state. Here also force may be used. When these revolts succeed, states disintegrate into two or more political units-as happened when Pakistan was created by dividing British India, or chechens’ ongoing attempt to secede from Russia. Third, activity involves militant religion’s attempt to *migrate*, which means departure of religious minorities to escape persecution when Jews were forced to flee from Germany and Austria, it was result of persecution by Nazis. There minority was not militant. Fourth, activity (though *not* a result of militancy) may lead to the creation of *diasporas*, or communities which live abroad in host countries, but maintain sentimental, economic and even political ties with their homeland (see below a separate section on diaspora). Lastly, militancy breeds *terrorism*.

32.5 TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES AND CIVILISATIONAL MOVEMENTS

Different parts of the world have been witnessing ethno-national movements. Although the state certainly remains the most powerful actor in world affairs, nationality is a potent cultural factor

influencing how states perform. Many people pledge their loyalty, not so much to the state, but to their *ethno-national groups*. Members of these groups share a common civilisation, language, cultural tradition and ties of kinship. According to E.K. Francis, “cultural affinities manifest in shared linguistic, racial, or other markers... enable one community to distinguish itself from others.” The emphasis on ethnic groups reduces the relevance of the state. Most of the states are multinational. In 1994, of the world’s nearly 190 nation-states, 120 countries had politically significant minorities. Thus, the ethnic groups are vital to the understanding of the contemporary international relations.

Karen Fog Olwig argued that “it is not possible to reduce migrants’ socio-cultural construction of places of belonging to nation-state”. Transnational migrants, depending on their trajectories and the social, economic and the political context of these trajectories, identify with family networks, with a family home and not necessarily express their feeling of belonging by joining to the activities with the country of origin.” She objects to limiting the universe of the transnational socio-cultural dimensions to formally and informally organised ethnic associations. She urges us to look at the transnational from the point of the people and develop a framework, which will capture the personal dimensions of this process. Migrations of people with different cultural and civilisational backgrounds creates transnationalism, for they link the culture of the countries of their origin with the culture of the country that they choose to adopt and settle down.

One feature of ethno-national movements is very clear. Most of them transcend existing borders of the states, for most of these groups have their presence in two or more countries like for example, Tamils in India, Sri Lanka and Singapore, just as the Jews as an ethnic group are not limited to Israel. They constitute important force in several countries including the United States. The transnational cultures and civilisations do not recognise any international borders. There is a view that the future will be darkened by violent clashes between various civilisations, or ethnic cultures. Each such clash would be as disturbing as East-West ideological clashes of the Cold War. According to Huntington (1993), the future international conflicts “will not be primarily ideological or economic”, but rather cultural between “nations and groups of different civilisations.” According to Samuel Huntington, who popularised the phrase “clash of civilisations”, there are seven or eight major civilisations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African.

The present day international system is said to be the product of one particular civilisation-Western civilisation, centred in Europe. North American culture was largely influenced by the European civilisation. The Chinese and Indian civilisations are much older, but they suffered at the hands of Western imperialists. The Egyptian civilisation is another ancient civilisation. In the contemporary world civilisational movements have been largely influenced by migrants from one part of the world to another, yet civilisational movements have not really threatened the nation-state.

32.5.1 Diasporas

The term diaspora has become popular in recent days. With the advent of jet age of fast travel across the world, large amount of migrations have taken place, mainly (but not necessarily) from Third World countries to the Western industrialised nations. Defining diasporas, Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf say: “The emigrants create *diasporas*, or communities which live abroad in host countries but maintain sentimental, economic and political ties with their homelands.” The term diaspora includes people having their origin in one country but living in other countries while retaining some kind of link with their home country. They keep their civilisation alive even in

the host countries. This term may not apply to third or fourth generations, but certainly those who are still attached with their civilisation and cultural values constitute a distinct group.

For nearly two centuries people were going from India to foreign lands. Very few of them went till mid-20th Century of their own choice to seek job opportunities. Most of them were taken by imperial masters as plantation workers to places like Sri Lanka, Fiji, Mauritius, Maldives, etc. Some went in order to set up business in other British colonies like Kenya, South Africa or Nigeria. But, with the availability of greater opportunities in developed countries, and fast means of air travel, large number of people began moving out of India to UK, Canada, the United States and Germany. Smaller number of people went to other countries also. Since the 1970s, the migration assumed alarming proportions, causing brain drain at home, and stress and strained relations in some cases in the host countries also.

The United States is itself known as a country of migrants. Beginning with the British, who established 13 colonies in the 17th and 18th centuries, many other Europeans also settled down in the United States. The term *diaspora* is not used for those who migrated centuries ago, but for those who are first or second generation migrants. Even then one may hear of not only Indian-Americans, but also of Polish-Americans or Spanish-Americans and so on.

The large number of migrants often organise themselves as separate groups and act as pressure groups in the host countries. Even when they acquire citizenship of the host country, they seldom forget their roots, their original customs and traditions. This helps unite them as a civilisational and cultural movement. The first ever *Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas* organised in India in January 2003 was a unique gathering of people of Indian origin from nearly 110 countries. The migrants fall in two categories-those who have permanently settled down in the host country and have become its nationals are known as People of Indian Origin (PIO); and there are others who retain their Indian passport but are working in foreign lands, and they are called non-resident Indians (NRI). Together they constitute Indian diaspora. There are similar diasporas of other countries also.

For the sake of proper understanding let us make a study of Indian diaspora as the basis of transnational movement. Indian diaspora is about 20 million strong and spread across 110 countries. Bulk of them are in English-speaking countries. There are also large numbers of PIOs and NRIs in the Gulf region. To look at some of the figures, Indian diaspora in the United Kingdom in 2003 was as strong as 12 lakhs (12,00,000 people); USA had 16,78,765 people; Canada 8,51,000; and there were 2,17,000 in the Netherlands. In the Gulf and West Asia, Saudi Arabia accounted for 15 lakhs, Kuwait 2,95,000, UAE 9,50,000 and Qatar 1,31,000 Indians. Elsewhere, Australia is new home of 1,90,000 Indians; South Africa has 10 lakhs; Malaysia 16,65,000, Singapore 3,07,000; Kenya over one lakh, Mauritius 7,15,756 and Fiji has 3,36,829. There are many more spread out all over the world.

Some major points deserve special mention:

1. While many younger people born and brought up in host countries get absorbed in the local culture, most of the first and second generation migrants retain their links with the country of their origin (for example India). Most Indians in countries like the UK, USA, Canada and Australia continue with their religious beliefs, eating habits and traditions.
2. Most of the members of diaspora still prefer to marry in India and carry Indian culture with them.
3. In countries like UK and US, etc. Indians, whether in professions like medicine, architecture or

information technology, or in business, contribute a great deal to the polity of their newly adopted countries. Many of them raise funds and contribute for elections of one party or the other. In the UK Swaraj Paul, an industrialist was made a peer and is a member of House of Lords. There are at least two more peers, and about half a dozen persons of Indian origin are elected members of House of Commons. There has been an Indian minister in the UK, premier of British Columbia in Canada; prime minister of Fiji (Mahendra Singh Chaudhory); there is an Indian Senator in one of the US States; and the leadership of Mauritius has its roots in India.

4. Indian places of worship, temples, *gurudwaras* and mosques are set up and maintained with respect and reverence wherever the diaspora has its presence.
5. Indian diaspora has popularised Indian cuisine in foreign lands. One finds numerous Indian restaurants in London, New York, New Jersey, Amsterdam and even in Paris. British people have become fond of Indian curry and bar-be-cue.
6. Thus, a transnational cultural and civilisational movement is carried on by the diaspora. It acts as a major link between the homeland and the host country. In the first ever gathering of PIOs and NRIs in New Delhi in 2003, prime minister Vajpayee remarked: “The benchmark for success, which the *pravasi* community has set, are a challenge for us in India. They make us examine why the Indian is so much more innovative, productive and successful abroad than in his own country...” He added: “We do not want your riches, we want the richness of your experience.” Maintaining that India was an important player, foreign minister Yashwant Sinha appealed “to all community leaders within the Indian diaspora to try and do their utmost to organise themselves under a single umbrella so that their collective voice can be effectively heard.” Giving a new meaning to transnationalism, a Fijian minister Shiu Raj called for appreciation of all cultures, “for there is only one race, which is human race... once you do not respect one race there will be problems.” Justice Ahmed Ibrahim of Zimbabwe supported the Fijian leader, and said, “Look at each other, you will see that we are the same people.”

It is this spirit that is behind the success of transnational movements.

32.6 CULTURE AND TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

In the age of newer means of telecommunication, a new global culture is emerging despite the great divisions remaining in cultures and perspective. Goldstein argues that in “the global village, distance and borders matter less and less. Across dozens of countries, people are tuned in to the same news, the same music, the same sports events.” This development is likely to create transnational cultural integration that might lead to emergence of supranational identities, including a global identity. If citizens in European Union can begin to think as “Europeans”, transnationalism may enable people of UN member-countries to think as human beings and residents of planet earth.

However, there is a negative side also. Global culture may turn into “cultural imperialism” dominated by the only surviving Super Power, the United States. The US cultural influence is as strong as its military influence. English is fast becoming the world language and the US president may try to dominate the politics as well as culture of the world. Already the US films and TV shows dominate the world markets. The CNN news channel tries to shape the thinking of millions of viewers the world over.

The concept of ‘*McWorld*’ is an example of transnational food movement. Today, McDonald outlets can be found all over the major cities in the world selling its burgers, thus slowly changing

the habits of Chinese and Indians, besides others. The Chinese noodles and fried rice have gone into background as the junk food is taking over. Similarly, Indian *puris*, *curries* and *dosas* may soon be dominated by the burgers and *pizzas*. The global culture reflected by “Mac Attack” opened a wave of globalisation. When the closed society of China opened up to cultural imperialism, Chinese leaders seemed unsure for years about whether McDonald’s brought to China Western-style prosperity or spiritual pollution. Perhaps there was a bit of both.

We may briefly mention several areas that are helping in the cultural transnational movements.

32.6.1 International Journalism

Joshua S. Goldstein opined in late 1990s that although “a global culture is still only nascent and the most powerful identity is still at the national level, people have begun to participate in specific communities that bridge national boundaries.” For example, international journalists are members of such a community. Journalists work with colleagues from various countries and travel together from country to country, creating a transnational brotherhood. Together they collect news and express views. “Though a journalist’s identity as a journalist rarely takes precedence over his or her national identity, the existence of the transnational community of journalists create a new form of international interdependence.” Like the journalists, the scientists from different countries often work together in communities spanning national borders. When, for example, Pakistani scientists and technologists worked together with their Chinese counterparts to develop nuclear weapons, they were working as scientists, not as Pakistanis or Chinese. Similarly, if an Indian satellite is launched with the assistance of one country or the other, a new community of scientists is evolved. When the late Kalpana Chawla took to space research, she was a member of community of space scientists more than an Indian or Indian-American.

32.6.2 International Sports Events

International sports competitions constitute one of the broadest-based international communities. Millions of cricket fans, for example, watch the test matches or one-dayers. The same is true of the Olympic Games, held every four years, and the regular soccer competitions. It is true that often these competitions stir up animosities between over enthusiasts as when Pakistani team loses to India, there may be hooliganism not only in the playgrounds, but also the over enthusiasts even break their TV sets. Or, British soccer “hooligans rampage through another European country after their team loses a game.” These events show nationalism in extreme form, as a winning cricket team’s supporters sing and dance all round with their flag raised high. Yet, sports do create transnational brotherhood.

But, by and large, sports competitions have positive impact. This is how Goldstein sums up the situation: “Some people see sports as a force for peace. Sports events bring people from different countries together in shared activities. Citizens of different states share their admiration of sports stars, who become international celebrities.” In Israel one of the most successful programmes for bridging the gap between Jewish and Arab children is a soccer camp in which star players of both communities participate together as coaches. In an interesting development, the Chinese-American *rapprochement* of 1971 was so delicate that political cooperation was impossible until the way had first been paved by the US table tennis team that made the first official US visit to China. Sports are indeed a big uniting and cementing transnational force.

32.6.3 Broadcasting: Role of TV and Radio

Electronic media is a vital player in transnational cultural movements. It is not only the news

read out on major network like the CNN, BBC and Star that create world public opinion, but films shown on TV, sopa operas, sitcoms and Chat-shows go a long way in propagating Western culture particularly in the Third World countries. On its part, media in India is engaged in showing its own TV serials, sitcoms and Indian films. Some of them are based on India's own values, but many are adaptations of Western shows. This creates an international entertainment, having both positive and negative transnational impacts. Some of the large Third World countries like Brazil and India having their local contexts in TV programmes influence their diaspora and help consolidate their cultural and civilisational values. Many of the TV shows have their hidden political subtexts.

Advertising is an important source of revenue of commercial TV channels. This is aggressively done by the multinational corporations to win over the local markets and change the habits of peoples of the host countries. At times, this aggressive advertising may have negative and even frustrating impact. One such situation was demonstrated in 1991 when Albania's communist system was crumbling along with its economy. Albanians, who had been watching Italian TV channels, had exaggerated view of Italian prosperity. One commercial on Italian TV had shown cats being given their food in silver platters. Poor Albanians took overloaded ferries to go to Italy to share its prosperity. However, they were sent back home by Italian authorities.

The attack on Iraq in 1991, by the US-led coalition, illustrates how electronic media enables viewers all over the world to watch on TV. Not only that attack on Baghdad was directly telecast by the American channel CNN, but also when the bombing of Baghdad began, president Saddam Hussein reportedly sat in his bunker watching the war unfold on CNN. The CNN signal that he was receiving on his TV set originated from a nearby hotel room in Baghdad, travelled through an overland phone connection to Jordan, then went to CNN headquarters in Atlanta (US), where it was telecast via satellite back to Baghdad. So Saddam Hussein got information about bombing on Baghdad, in his bunker in Baghdad, by way of Atlanta, at the same time that it reached millions of viewers around the world, including the leadership in the United States.

32.6.4 Tourism

Tourism is another major factor in transnational activity. International tourists cross borders of nations 500 million times in a year. This includes people going for official work, business or to meet friends and relatives, but majority of them are holiday makers. People who travel to another country develop deeper understanding and appreciation of its people. People-to-people contact promotes friendship and reduces the chances of conflict and war. For example, an American citizen who visits Japan is more likely to favour US-Japanese trade, or Indians who visit the US or UK find an atmosphere of friendship that sitting at home is impossible to believe. Even when Pakistani nationals visit India, they are surprised to find total goodwill, and not the animosity that they may have expected, because of their media's false propaganda. The transnational understanding is further promoted by exchange of students who go to another country to study. The exchange of tourists promotes world peace, just as visits of leaders of government and official create better understanding between different nations. As mentioned earlier, the rapid means of travel and interconnectivity through telephones, e-mail, etc. has blurred the borders of nation-state and promoted transnational cultural cooperation, even though nationalism still occupies vital position in the lives of people.

The transnational connections forged through these various activities, according to Joshua Goldstein, "... deepen the international interdependence that links the well being of one state to that of other states. This may promote peace, because a person who knows more about a foreign country and has developed empathy for its culture is likely to act as a brake on political conflict with that country and an accelerator of positive cooperation with it."

32.7 SUMMARY

Transnational movements have changed the nature of international relations. For a long time nation-states were the only actors whose mutual relations constituted the core of international relations. Lately, however, several developments have taken place that have compromised with the absolute role of the nation-states. Interdependence of states, rapid means of transport, revolution in information technology, and the emergence of several non-state actors have blurred the borders of the states. People-to-people contacts have grown manifold, making it possible for regular contacts between various communities and civilisations.

It is in this background that transnational movements have been taking place. Transnational movements are based on the politics that include interaction between traditional nation-state and a whole lot of non-state actors. These actors include religious organisations, ethnic groups, multinational corporations and international terrorist outfits. Today, “[b]orders are porous, and states are vulnerable both to external pressures and to challenge from people within their boundaries.”

Information travels fast. It has impact on transnational politics. Religious movements often become militants, and they challenge the state as well as people of other faiths. There are groups like *Al Qaeda* which are committed to propagation of their faith and adopt terrorist weapons to destroy those whom they consider as their enemies. Militant religious activities may take the form of irredentism, or secessionism, or encourage migration of persecuted communities, or unite people of one nationality in foreign lands called the diasporas, or lastly it may take the form of terrorism.

Transnational movements have such inputs as journalism, sports competitions, electronic media and tourism. Advertising may also bring various cultural societies on a common platform. Transnational connections deepen interdependence, and normally promote peace because cultural and civilisational people-to-people contacts act as a brake on political conflict, and accelerator of positive cooperation.

32.8 EXERCISES

1. What do you understand by transnational movements? What, according to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, is the concept of transnational movements?
2. How has media influenced international culture?
3. Sum up the features of religious transnational movements. What are the different types of militant religious movements?
4. Explain what are ethno-national groups.
5. What is the impact of Western civilisation on transnational movement?
6. What is diaspora, and how does it promote transnational movements?
7. Describe the significance of journalism and tourism in transnational cultural movements.

UNIT 33 ROLE OF NGOS

Structure

- 33.1 Introduction
- 33.2 Background to the Rise of INGOs
 - 33.2.1 First World War and International Organisations
 - 33.2.2 Post-Second World War and International Organisations
- 33.3 Definition and Classification of International Organisations
 - 33.3.1 Regions, IGOs and INGOs
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 - 33.4.1 IGOs and INGOs
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- 33.6 NGOs, State and Civil Society
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33.1 INTRODUCTION

More often than not, NGOs today are associated with development and developmental work. The proliferation of developmental NGOs from the 1970s onwards indicates their importance in promoting developmental programmes and influencing governmental policies. However, it is important to note that NGOs are not always necessarily involved in such activities alone and that the NGOs as voluntary organisations at the national level and as international organisations have a history. The growth of international organisations since the First World War is a manifestation of regularising of international relations with their formal and material existence separate from, though

for the most part dependent on, states and groups within states. The areas of concern for these organisations range from peace and security to human rights and development.

In this unit, we discuss the background to the rise of international organisations, their classification and role. Then we focus on NGOs as developmental organisations and their importance in a globalising world. This would enable us to assess their impact on state and state policies.

33.2 BACKGROUND TO THE RISE OF INGOS

Relations between nation-states are not always necessarily between governments or between state officials alone. As groups of individuals in different states relate to each other in various ways, the belief has grown that the term ‘international’ should not be used synonymously with ‘inter-governmental’ or ‘inter-state’ or relations between the official representatives of sovereign states alone. It should include activities between individuals and groups in one state and individuals and groups in another state as well as intergovernmental relations. Transnational relations are those that do not involve activities between governments only. Trans-governmental relations are those that involve connections between one branch of government in one state (for example defence ministry) and a branch of government in another country (its defence ministry) and which do not go through the normal foreign policy making channels. International relations today cover all these relationships-inter-governmental, trans-national and trans-governmental.

International organisations are those which formalise relations whether between governments, groups or individuals. International institutions are forms of organisations that express, as Maurice Duverger states, “the collective forms or basic structures of social organisations as established by law or by human tradition”. An international organisation represents a form of institution which refers to a formal system of rules and objectives a “rationalised administrative instrument and has a formal technical and material organisation: constitutions, local chapters, physical equipments, machines, emblems-an administrative hierarchy, and so forth”. The terms ‘organisation’ and ‘institution’ are used interchangeably by many writers. However, an institution, in Duverger definition, has a wider use that encompasses the notion of a system of relationships that may not manifest themselves in formal organisations of bricks and mortar and an international staff etc. An institutional framework adds ‘stability, durability and cohesiveness’ to individual relationships which might otherwise be ‘sporadic, ephemeral, and unstable’. At an international level, relations may be organised by the practice of diplomatic method or adherence to the tenets of international law or by regular trading, thus giving ‘stability, durability and cohesiveness’ to such relations. Today there is a variety of international organisations ranging from organisations such as the World Council of Churches, International Labour Organisation, World Trade Organisation and Amnesty International etc. A brief history of international organisations may begin with the League of Nations.

33.2.1 First World War and International Organisations

The First World War generated awareness among the European powers of the problems of state’s coexistence and the recognition of the need for peaceful means to regulate relationships. The changed political situation post-1815, European expansion and economic and social developments provided a fertile ground for the rise of international organisations in Europe. The creation of a relatively stable system of sovereign state in Europe was necessary for the rise of international organisations. The peace of Westphalia ending the thirty years war in 1648, the treaty of Utrecht (1713) laid the basis for the sovereign state system in Europe, a system later extended to the rest of the world. This system established states as geographically defined entities with their own forms of government and the right to conduct relations on the basis of sovereign equality. The continuous growth of contact between European states and their recognition of the need for creation of institutional devices and systematic method for regulating relations with each other, the gradual integration of the rest of the world-through wars, colonisation, imperialism-into the European state system, created conditions necessary for truly international organisations. Thus, the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 gathered together the representatives of the victorious powers willing to write a peace treaty and many national interest groups,

international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) committed to the cause of public health, the rights of workers, the cause of peace or the laws of war etc. However, the gathering at Versailles in 1919 was primarily an inter-governmental meeting of heads of State and government, foreign ministers and their advisors and concerned mostly with the question of international peace and security. Economic and social questions were secondary. The peace conference established two leading organisations-The League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation. It must be noted that prior to the Versailles peace conference, the Vienna Congress of 1814-15 codified the rules of diplomacy thereby, standardising and codifying the rules of diplomatic practice and pronouncing on other problems in the international system such as slavery. The Hague Conferences (1899, 1907) attended by non-European states produced some modest achievements and also pointed the way for the institutional development of organised international relations such as-Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes that were later to inspire the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice. The wide membership of the two conferences was a precursor of the League of Nation's Assembly. Yet, it was "more a demonstration that the European state system, with European-based law, had been extended to include outsiders". However, the Hague Conferences indicated the limits reached in the institutionalisation of international relations by the end of the 19th Century mainly due to the primacy of the needs of individual governments and ruthless advancement of state interest overriding collective interests and action.

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 following the First World War prompted individuals, groups and governments to search for the establishment of a functioning international system and organising post-war international relations. The League of Nations was the outcome of these efforts and had, as its aim, the promotion of international co-operation and peace and security.

The 19th Century was also a period of growth in international cooperation in the field of economic and social issues. The spread of democratic ideas and institutions, the belief that all human beings were equal, fostered the notion of participation of all states in international organisations for ensuring peace and progress. The French and the American Revolutions that promoted the idea of the modern democratic state also made the state more responsive to the needs of a wider section of the population. Despite the notions of 'limited government' or 'night watchman government', European governments were increasingly intervening in the economies of their countries and were becoming more involved in the welfare of their citizens-thus giving rise to the welfare state which was to be reflected in their international relationships.

This internationalisation of economic life and commerce was reflected in the activities of the public international unions or international agencies bringing together the representatives of states to manage various aspects of public life such as travel, communications, commerce or welfare. For example, the opening up of the international waterways to all traders by the Congress of Vienna was followed by the international commission for the Elbe (1821), for the Rhine (1831) and the European Danube Commission. In 1868, the International Telegraphic Bureau (later named International Telegraphic Union, ITU) and the General Postal Union (later Universal Postal Union) in 1874 were established. In the later half of the 19th Century, one witnesses the rise of private international associations, INGOS, for promoting and organising humanitarian, religious, economic, educational, scientific and political causes. International gatherings were organised such as the World Anti-Slavery Convention of 1840. These associations became permanent organisations with secretariats, boards and assemblies. The International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) grew faster than the inter-governmental organisations (IGOs).

The international public and private associations were not always independent of each other and usually had a symbiotic relationship due to the need for governmental activity and cooperation across frontiers. The International Committee of the Red Cross, a private international union, promoted the intergovernmental Geneva conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949. A private union-the International Association of Legal Protection of Labour led to the establishment of International Labour Organisation in 1919. Despite the distinction between private and public associations, a number of organisations had mixed memberships with representatives of government bodies sitting together with individual members.

The events following the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the rise of Nazism, and fascism in Germany and Italy and the isolationism of the US, put to test the League of Nations and international organisation that were created to further international cooperation. Even if the whole League system collapsed, it became a stepping stone towards the more enduring United Nations Organisation.

33.2.2. Post-Second War and International Organisations

The causes for the failure of the League of Nations and the rise of the UN system and its structures need not detain us here. What is important is that the war time experience, the emergence of a bipolar world and the threat of atomic weapons created conditions for the rise of a plethora of international organisations-for the promotion of peace and security, for prevention of war and for disarmament and arms control, for the protection of human rights etc, for restructuring of international economic order and for commonly agreed upon rules of trade and commerce. For the establishment of an international monetary system, the Bretton Woods system was given shape. The United Nations Organisation was established with its specialised institutions covering a whole range of issues from peace and security to environment and ecology. A variety of international organisations with limited membership came into existence (e.g., Organisation of African Unity or the Arab League). Some are defined geographically and ideologically such as NATO or Warsaw Pact. A wide range of inter-governmental organisations reflecting various concerns such as fisheries, health etc., also came into existence. The IMF, IBRD, GATT, IDA, IFC-provided the organised basis of the post-war liberal/ market economic system. Regional identities developed and consolidated themselves in the form of European Community, Caribbean Community, Nordic Council etc.

With the tremendous growth in communication and transport, contacts between peoples, groups and governments increased rapidly resulting in the growth of the number of inter-governmental, technical, economic and social organisations and the spread of organisations between individuals and non-governmental groups. This rise of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) resulting from the growth of global interactions has been one of the noticeable developments in international relations since the Second World War. The importance of these organisations is acknowledged by the UN Charter in its Article 71 that authorises the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to make suitable agreements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters within its competence. INGOs, by nature, are concerned with economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural questions and we witness their growth in other areas as well. They have a symbiotic relationship with the UN's specialised agencies. For example, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has relationship with the trade unions and employee organisations, while scientific and specialist associations have consultative status with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and UNESCO. Organisations such as Friends of the Earth, the International Union for consideration of Nature and Natural Resources and the World Wild Life Fund have since acted as shadows to UNESCO and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The growth of INGOs clearly

indicates their importance in international life. They are a potential power in the mobilisation of social forces as approved from the agents of government.

The post-Second World War has seen the gradual growth of international economic integration creating a global economy by the 1990s. Non-governmental activity across frontiers has been a part of these processes of internationalisation and globalisation of world economy. The multinational or transnational corporations/firms have played a key role in this process as INGOs through transfer of capital investments and technology to different parts of the world-more particularly from the developed to the developing countries, thus contributing to the internationalising of economic factors and creating a global market economy. The Cold War divide in the post-Second World War period, the rise of the decolonised countries as the Third World gave rise to debates over neo-colonialism and the hegemonic control of the industrialised countries on the world economy. Thus the North-South divide was reflected in the demand for a New International Economic Order and coming together of the group of 77 (G-77)-Third World states that attended the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Regional organisations for purposes of economic and political cooperation came into existence from out of this group, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

33.3 DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

International organisations are often discussed synonymously with international institutions. In the formal and legal sense, the two terms can be used interchangeably. Clive Archer defines international organisations as ‘a formal continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership’. International organisations as ‘organisations’ represent the apex of a pyramid of multilateral diplomacy. ‘International Organisation is a process: international organisations are the representative aspects of the phase of that process that has been reached at a given time,’ as John Bayles and N.J. Rengger argue. Here, the singular form is used to describe the pattern of multilateral negotiations and the plural form to represent the creation of the organisations and the powers invested in them. Paul Reuter considers an international organisation as a group normally, but not exclusively of states “which can permanently express a juristic will distinct from that of its individual members”.

33.3.1 Regimes, IGOs and INGOs

The irreducible essential characteristics of international organisations are: membership from two or more sovereign states though membership need not be limited to states or official state representatives (such as for non-governmental organisations); the aim of pursuing common interests; formal structures of a continuous nature. Institutions such as a conference, assembly, a permanent secretariat, an executive body are also associated with international organisations. Transnational corporations or multinational business corporations are also international organisations with investments and investors drawn from different countries. Can they qualify as international organisations? *The Year Book of International Organisations* and the Morozov proviso exclude those organisations established with the purpose of making profits for members which rules out international business corporations, cartels and transnational or multinational enterprises.

There are also international ‘regimes’ which refer to a more comprehensive idea. Governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations by creating and accepting procedures,

rules or institutions for certain kinds of activity. These are international regimes which are governing arrangements for a particular service or issue in the international system. It will include both formal and informal agreements, normative and legal elements, and will represent a degree of organisation. The operation of the International Monetary System during 1944-71 is an example. During this period the International Monetary Fund (IMF) created in 1944, along with the World Bank (originally known as International Bank for Development and Reconstruction) exercised substantial authority in regulating the financial stability of the Western states. These two operated as elements of a more comprehensive regime such as the acceptance of fixed exchange rates, fixed gold price and dollar-gold convertibility etc. However, the regime underwent massive changes in 1971 with the abandonment of fixed gold price and exchange rates.

The first distinction between the kinds of international organisations is those which are inter-state or inter-governmental and those whose membership is non-governmental. A third category is those with mixed membership.

The Resolution 288 (x) of 27 February 1950 of the UN Economic and Social Council suggests a distinction between inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs sometimes shortened to NGOs). Formally, an NGO is a permanent institution created by three or more states to serve some mutual purpose. An INGO is one created by private citizens, or groups drawn from three or more countries. According to the Resolution of Economic and Social Council: "Every international organisation which is not created by means of intergovernmental agreements shall be considered a non-governmental international organisation".

A distinction is also made sometimes between inter-governmental organisations and inter-state organisations. Some organisations such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPU) accept members which are not sovereign states but which have governments. A distinction is made between organisations based on a treaty between states and one between governments. An inter-state treaty includes all the institutions of the state whereas an inter-governmental organisation is established purely by the administrative branch of government. However, this distinction made by lawyer Jenres is not always accepted, as any inter-state agreement has to be made by an agreement for those states and it matters little whether his or her nomenclature is that of head of state or head of government.

33.3.2 Transnational Organisations

International organisations often contain members that are not states or governmental representatives but are drawn from groups, associations, organisations or individuals from within the state. Thus, there are non-governmental actors on the international stage and their activities give rise to transnational interactions. These interactions are defined by Keohane and Nye as covering "the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an international organisation". When a formal and continuous structure is formed in order to pursue the common interests of the participants and one which is not an agent of government or an international organisation, then a Transnational Organisation (TNO) comes into existence. In contrast to an inter-governmental organisation, a TNO must have a non-state actor as at least one of its members.

Three kinds of TNOs are identified. The genuine INGO is an organisation with only non-governmental members or representatives of like minded groups from more than two countries (e.g., the World Council of Churches or the Salvation Army). The hybrid INGO has some governmental and some non-governmental representation. If such a hybrid organisation has

been established by a treaty or convention between governments, it should be counted as an IGO. The International Labour Organisation which has made unions, management (non-governmental) representatives as well as governmental representatives is an example of such an organisation.

Trans-governmental organisations are those where relations between governmental actors are not controlled by the central foreign policy organisations. A broader definition of governmental actors includes anyone engaged in the governmental process of a country-legislative judiciary, the executive or local governments. Although such contracts, relations may be informal and not institutionalised, there are some which exist—the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Interpol etc.

The fourth category of TNOs is Business International Non-Governmental Organisations (BINGOs) or Multinational Enterprises or Corporations (MNCs). However, it is argued that these MNCs are not really international or multinational as their management is not recruited internationally nor is their decision-making. The Group of Eminent Persons of the UN argued that ‘transnational’ conveyed better the notion that these firms operate from their home bases across national borders without any form of state control. A distinction is made between ‘transnational corporations’ that operate from their home base across national boundaries and the term ‘multinational corporations’ established by agreement between a number of countries and operating in accordance with prescribed agreements. The MNC comes closer to the definition of an international organisation. However, the UN and *The Yearbook of International Organisation* exclude profit making organisations from the definitions and description of international organisations.

The non-inclusion of MNCs should not deny their role in international relations and commonalities with international organisations. The role of corporations in manipulating, influencing economic policies of developing countries, and even intervening politically and militarily needs to be underscored.

33.4 INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOS)

International organisations are also classified on the basis of membership as regional with limited membership (e.g., BENELUX) and universal with membership drawn from practically all the sovereign states such as the United Nations. The aims and objectives of international organisations can range from general and extensive to the specific and particular. Joseph Nye uses a three-fold division: military security, political organisations and economic organisations. A major classification of international organisations is that of governmental and non-governmental organisations (IGOs and NGOs). There are IGOs with no non-governmental representation and NGOs with no governmental representation. There are INGOs such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union which have special links to governments. There are IGOs which have non-governmental representation in their institutions such as the European Community and the ILO.

As mentioned earlier, the INGOs perform a whole range of functions and can be partly influential, especially in fields such as political campaigns, development awareness, and disaster relief and environmental issues. NGOs can function only when governments allow them to function. This is to say, governments have the power to refuse permission to NGOs to operate in their state. Hence NGOs are seen as vulnerable and dependent for their operations and success upon permissive political conditions. For example, Amnesty International, a human

rights organisation based in London, is only able to operate publicly, in a limited number of countries. As human rights are a sensitive area, governments do not like to be accused of violating human rights. The reports of Amnesty International on violations of human rights during the emergency period in India were condemned by the government of India as prejudiced and as interference in internal matters. However, these reports were revealing of the excesses of state power and violence.

33.4.1 IGOs & INGOs

The INGOs are frequently perceived by the general public to succeed exactly when they do successfully confront governmental power and challenge other opinions, for example the role of Greenpeace in ‘save the whale’ campaign and the dumping of toxic chemicals at sea. In the environmental area, Greenpeace exists to mobilise public opinion, to publicise gross incidents of pollution, species extinction and corporate and governmental malpractice. The INGOs appear as more popular and more active than the functionally relevant IGO (inter-governmental organisations). In the field of disaster relief, famine relief, population control, the environmental consciousness raising, for instance, Greenpeace, International Planned Parenthood Federation, OXFAM are better known to the general public than the appropriate UN organisations such as UNEP (UN Environmental Programme), the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the UN Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO). UNEP exists as a research organisation and as a negotiating forum while Greenpeace mobilises public opinion and exposes violations of environmental protection codes by corporates and governments.

The INGOs have a different style of functioning when compared to inter-governmental organisations. The target of operations of INGOs is limited. Most INGOs work in one particular area; have a staffing policy based upon volunteers and idealists. This is to their advantage and makes INGOs more popular and efficient than their counterpart intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). The latter often suffer from bureaucratisation, overlapping competencies, a sectoral attitude to development and budgeting, and a recruitment and personnel policy constrained by considerations of ‘equitable geographical representation’, as well as poor standards. The style of functioning of INGOs is also more media friendly and innovative such as protests before diplomatic missions, employ role stars to promote Amazonian folklore etc. The IGOs where representatives of governments negotiate over issues, the ideological and political biases of governments inevitably play a role, often hampering collective decision making. Thus the INGOs have the distinct advantage of being autonomous and functioning within the parametres set up by them. Nonetheless, the importance of IGOs cannot be denied as they do play a significant role as legitimate representatives of governments. The UNEP has played a crucial role in providing the forum in which the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocols on ozone-depleting substances were negotiated.

33.4.2 NGOs and Voluntary Social Action

A brief survey of voluntary social action in India indicates its Gandhian inspiration as a struggle against the hegemony of macro-organisations such as political parties and trade unions which often suffered from bureaucratic leadership that discouraged real participation of the people. In the 1960s a number of youth went into the rural areas to work with the poor on issues such as literacy, irrigation, health issues, minimum wages, land and housing rights etc. While many had political roots ranging from *Lohiaite* to the Marxist feminists, the move was away from existing political parties and processes. A non-party political process for structural changes in socio-economic and political change was being articulated. Movements of the late 19th and early 20th Century were basically social movements, rooted in religion, either through Christian

missionaries or Hindu reformists. They were mainly welfare and charitable works and rooted in religion and a few individuals did good works. During the freedom movement, voluntary efforts were mostly directed towards achieving independence. The communists and socialists too were subsumed in different ways in the freedom movement. Post-independence period until the 1960s was a period of lull and issues of structural change were subsumed in the euphoria of building a new India through industrial revolution. However, the economic and political crisis of the 1960s and 1970s led to the realisation that essential conditions of poverty and inequality cannot change unless the socio-economic structure is transformed. Thus the 1960s and 1970s saw the proliferation of various movements—Gandhian, *Lohiaite*, People's War Group (PWG), Liberation Theology etc., all working towards a structural change. Most of these dissent movements had leftist leanings except for the rightwing *Swatantra Party*, and the *Rashtriya Swayam-sevak Sangh* (RSS). Their efforts were based on secular, rationalist initiatives, with capture of state power by the people, for the people as the driving force. In the post-1970s, several local people's movements raised their voices against state oppression and the exclusion of *dalits* and tribals (e.g., the *Chipko Andolan* and the *Chattisgarh Mukti Morcha*). The long suppressed *dalits* and tribals mobilised in complex ways—the Jharkhand movement, *Bhoomi Sena*, *Dalit Panthers* etc. Most of these movements as non-party political processes were promising initially but soon got bogged down by local issues. The movement for Total Revolution led by Jayaprakash Narayan finally toppled Indira Gandhi and brought in the first non-Congress government at the end of the Emergency in 1977. The assertion of subaltern identities led to new social movements—*dalit*, tribal, and women—that articulated their demands in a language that was critical of both liberal and Marxist ideologies and political parties. While some significant movements like the *Chipko Andolan*, the *Narmada Bachao Andolan* and the National Fishermen's Forum continue to agitate, the demand for structural change of the social movements is yet to materialise.

33.5 NGOS AS A SECTOR

The non-party political processes of the late 1960s and 1970s centred around radicalised youth, student groups, especially from Christian organisations in southern and Western India. Influenced by liberation theology that emanated in Latin America, these Christian groups along with student unions, NSS etc. formed themselves into Action Groups, known as Community Action Groups or Social Action Groups. These could no longer operate as earlier institutions like missions, trade unions and mass organisations. They also needed a legal identity to enable them to receive funds. The chosen forum of institution was the Society or Association formed under the Societies Registration Act. These were legally identified with the earlier welfare and charity institutions, which were called NGOs or non-governmental organisations. Some of these organisations such as VISTAS in Maharashtra and Association for the Rural Poor in Tamil Nadu, took up '*conscientisation*' (the method of raising political consciousness of the oppressed, developed by Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educationist) programmes. The *Naxalite* movement in Andhra Pradesh formulated the concept of '*Sangham*' adopted by some NGOs like the CROSS in Hyderabad.

While there is no universal definition and form of NGO, traditionally the term referred to social welfare organisations, including the Lions Club or Rotary. Later, the term included Action Groups which needed a formal structure to administer their funds and therefore registered under the Societies Registration Act or Public Trust Act. This enabled them to receive funds from various donor agencies-national and international. As considerable amounts poured into these groups in the 1980s, the government promulgated the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act. From the mid-1980s, the government also started using these organisations to implement developmental

programmes, first through CAPART and then through various social welfare ministries. The term NGO became increasingly associated with organisations ‘contracting development programmes’. Small groups grew in size, finances, and visibility. The result is the emergence of an NGO sector today.

33.5.1 NGOs as Developmental Agencies

In most of Third World countries, and India, in particular, non-governmental organisations are now playing an important role in the developmental processes. The globalisation of economies of the world within the neo-liberal framework has ushered in an era of global markets and the creation of an organisation-World Trade Organisation (WTO)-that is to regulate, set up new rules of global trade and commerce. The new critical approach to development has shifted focus from structure (state) to actors (civil society). The top-down approach has been displaced by bottom-up community participatory approach. Micro-local actors and projects that were to ‘empower’ people i.e. facilitate people’s own developmental efforts is now the order of the day. The NGOs have become the mediators in these efforts. The state is now seen as an ‘enabling state’, that is to say, a state that would facilitate ‘marketising’ of the economy and the state itself would withdraw or play a limited role in the economy. NGOs are now an important part of the civil society and legitimate negotiators on behalf of the people. The World Bank reports on development acknowledge NGOs as part of the civil society and often negotiate with them on the implementation of various important programmes.

The new economic policies heralded in the early 1990s in India acknowledge the role of NGOs in implementing developmental programmes. A plethora of NGOs operate in Andhra Pradesh in various fields-for removal of urban poverty, slum improvement, for providing livelihood for women etc. The state itself has formed an NGO funded by the World Bank-the Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty etc.

With the processes of globalisation since 1990s, the NGOs are seen as important actors in the implementation of structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and IMF. Privatisation policies and the withdrawal of the state from important sectors of the economy have made the state dependent on the NGOs for implementing developmental programmes. NGOs have become professional, managerial bodies with structures and organisations that do not concern themselves with power, politics, and state but with ‘delivery systems’ for structural adjustment. NGOs have also been accused of lack of accountability and transparency. As receivers of funds from outside, often their accountability is to the donor agencies. Very large NGOs are not accountable to either government bureaucracy or peoples representatives. The National Dairy Development Board is an example. The centralising trend initiated by large NGOs is exhibited not just in large scale dairying that is penetrating rural areas in more and more regions but also in the even more larger terrains of forestry, dry land farming, wasteland development and other new avenues of colonising the vast hinterland of village India and tribal hinterland. To this end, a Society for Promotion of Wastelands Development (SPWD) was formed in 1982, with the collaboration of Ford Foundation and the Central government. Thus government NGOs or GO-NGOs became tools for a new delivery system. Another example of such NGOs with inspiration from donor agency is the World Bank funded Watershed Development, and Joint Forest Management Programmes (JFM). Today there is a criticism that the JFM has degenerated into a form of labour sub-contracting of the work of the Forest Department to the members of the *Vana Samrakshana Samithis* (VSS). Today, most ‘North’ donor agencies have shifted their focus to lobbying and advocacy as the most civil forms of delivering social justice and equity and calling the shots-child labour, Northern Environmental Concerns, AID & Human Rights, Democratisation and Governance.

NGOs today are a fact of the developmental, socio-political scene. The initial euphoria of the 1960s when they were radical enough to challenge the corrupt and authoritarian state has slowly waned. Today a number of NGOs are implementing government projects when governments and state are fast losing their autonomy. Andhra Pradesh is an example *par excellence* where the World Bank inspired programmes are contracted by the government which in turn sub-contracts to the NGOs. The Livelihoods Programme supported by the British DFID for urban poverty alleviation and the programme for rural poverty elimination under the Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP) supported by the World Bank are interpretations of government, international financiers, and NGO collaboration.

33.5.2 NGOs and Social Movements

The diversity of activities of NGOs makes their classification somewhat complex. NGOs cannot be discussed without mentioning other non-party political processes as these are part of the same continuum with interplay, interrelationships and contradictions. A first distinction that is made is between charitable and other organisations from the point of view of their activities and historical perspective. While it is not difficult to distinguish NGOs from political institutions, it is with mass-based and popular issue based initiatives, with loose institutional forums that problems, perspectives, roles and process emerge. The most important distinction is made between NGOs and people's movements. NGOs are institutional in nature receiving funds from donor agencies from outside and governed by long term perspectives. People's movements are perceived as organised struggles by affected communities with a focus on immediately perceived needs and threats and a more personal involvement of the leadership.

One of the key developments that took place in the 1970s was the emergence of Civil Liberties groups. The emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi government and state repression have given rise to human rights groups-some with radical Marxist perspectives and some within the liberal framework. These groups became meeting ground for interaction between NGOs and individuals who otherwise had serious differences on perspectives. For example : Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC), Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Peoples Union for Democratic Rights etc. As Human Rights became an important issue, today a number of NGOs have a human rights desk which take up issues of violations even if in a limited framework, or collaborate, support human rights organisations which are more peoples movements than NGOs.

People's movements have also evolved into NGOs which play a crucial role at the macro-level in projecting the rights of the marginalised communities. An example is the fishermen's movement. The efforts of the movement were aimed at protecting the rights of traditional fish workers of Kerala threatened by the introduction of mechanised craft and turning the self employed men into wage labourers. The movement developed a large support base, and was able to engage within a struggle against international interests that were pressurising India to open its massive resources to the detriment of both the traditional fishing communities and the mechanised industry. The movement spread to various fishermen's belts throughout the country and the National Fishermen's Forum was formed. The Forum is one of the first success stories of unionisation in the unorganised sector.

A number of NGOs have emerged out of people's movements centred on *dalits*, tribals and women. It was in 1972 that a radical group in Maharashtra constituted the *dalit panthers*, modelled after the black groups in the US. The emphasis was on cultural assertion and self-respect with a central role to protect *dalit* literature. Today an NGO-DAPPU in Andhra Pradesh is an umbrella organisation of several *dalit* groups. The National Campaign for *Dalit*

Human Rights (NCDHR), *Dalit* Women's charter of rights and demands, and various other *dalit* organisations have renewed the debate on caste.

Another social movement of the 1960s and 1970s that has implications for political processes and more particularly for developmental issues is the women's movement. Gender today is an important analytical category for political and developmental processes. NGOs are deeply involved in women's issues and development thanks mainly to a strong women's movement and the emphasis on such programmes by donor agencies. The shift in discourses from 'women in development' to 'Gender and Development' to women, environment and development has contributed to the critique of enlightenment ideology and development concepts based on Western standards and rallies. While strongly opposing destructive development projects, as well as the new economic policies (neo-liberal policies and globalisation) many women's groups have been working with other movements on alternatives based on principles of democracy, social justice, peace and environmental sustainability. Today, practically all NGOs have a Gender desk or gender aspects included in their project work.

In India, peace issues have not been predominant in the development agenda of NGOs. The Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND) was formed in 1984. The Balliopal Movement against Missile Test firing range, the Anti-Kalga Nuclear Plant Movement came into confrontation with the military industrial complex. The increasing communal hatred has also led movements against communalism and fundamentalism. Communalism combat, a publication that counters communal hatred has also led movements against communalism and fundamentalism. Post-Pokhran is witnessing a new anti-nuclear and peace movement.

An area where non-governmental initiatives have played an important role is peace and security. For instance, transfrontier collaboration in the anti-slavery campaign began among the Quakers in the 18th Century; cross-national peace movements have flowered periodically since the middle of the 19th Century. Today institutional frameworks for cross-border contact are phenomenal in number. According to a conservative count, these were close to IGOs, over 17,000 INGOs in the 1980s, including cross-border associations in the professions, international foundations of political parties, transnational academic bodies, press groups, to international foundations and other service organisations etc. A significant feature of post-Cold War international relations in several parts of the world has been the emergence of dialogues, training, research and exchange programmes which focus on issues ranging from economic cooperation and social issues to political security matters. For example, in South Asia while cooperation in the areas of both economic and security relations is moving at a comparatively slower pace, NGOs and social activists are using the concept "Track Three" which refers to activities that focus on contemporary policy issues which explicitly function apart from or beyond government (e.g., the Pakistan-India Forum for Peace and Democracy).

33.5.3 Classification of NGOs

NGO activities can be classified into a number of broad domains :

- a) relief and charity
- b) development
- c) mobilisation and organisation
- d) politics
- e) political education.

The organisational classification is :

- a) Development and charity groups
- b) Action-groups involved primarily in the processes of conscientisation and mobilisation of the oppressed without any stated political perspective or some time even anti-political.
- c) Political groups with political perspectives and goals.
- d) Pre-party political formations with the purpose of graduating to political parties.
- e) Support groups carrying out specialised tasks of bringing out journals, documentation and resource centres, lawyers forums etc.

This classification is not an exhaustive one as there can be other variables or mixed groups. The sources of inspiration for voluntary organisations have been Gandhian, Socialist and Marxist or neo-Marxist. While the Gandhian inspiration built on the experience of the freedom struggle is directed to help the rural masses to achieve their economic and social freedom, the socialist school inspired by Ram Manohar Lohia and Jayaprakash Narayan has also been historically active and suspicious of the state and Nehruvian model of development.

The Marxist and neo-Marxist perspective inspired left parties to set-up voluntary organisations with some ideological frameworks. The relations between the NGOs and political parties are not uniform. Some of the Marxists view NGOs as agents of imperialists. In Maharashtra, the *Kashta-Kari Sanghatana*, with a strong rural base among tribals of *Dahanu*, north of Bombay, was targeted by the CPM cadre who felt threatened by the inroads made by the *Sanghatana* into the left constituency. Similarly in North Andhra Pradesh, another organisation SAMATHA was targeted by the PWG and the organisers of the NGO had to stop their work, first in East Godavari and then in Visakhapatnam district. This happened just after the organisation had won a resounding victory for the local tribal communities in their struggle against the collusion of the government with an industry to set-up a commercial complex against the wishes of the local community, flouting the existing laws.

33.6 NGOS, STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

NGOs and government share similar concerns of poverty alleviation. However, the scale of NGOs is much smaller but more focused and with an explicit concern with participation. While some NGOs tackle the symptoms of poverty-low educational levels, ill-health etc., others concentrate on enhancing the asset position and income earning potential of the poor through land improvement schemes, credit and skills training. Nevertheless there are NGOs who attempt to politicise poor people thereby challenging directly many of the social and economic structures established by the State. Since 1980s, new kind of NGOs providing support services to other NGOs in the form of training, evaluation and documentation have emerged and are usually funded by core grants from foreign donors and from payments for staff training from individual NGOs.

There are NGOs which receive funds from the government and there are those that receive funds from foreign donors. India's Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-90) provided for an active involvement of NGOs in the planning process with a massive increase in the volume of government funds (i.e. to Rs.1,500 million per year or US \$ 170 million). Most of these funds were for NGOs to work in government programmes such as afforestation, primary health care, education,

rural housing etc. NGO relations with government are not always cordial. For those NGOs receiving funds from abroad, the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA, 1976) regulates the receipt of funds and all such organisations have to register with the Home Ministry and submit audited accounts. Approximately 90 per cent of NGOs funding in India comes from foreign sources, mainly from International NGOs. In India with a tradition of self-government the suspicions with which foreign funded NGOs are regarded are not always ill founded as a number of these, flush with funds, appear to have the best of both-of being social workers with 'fat salaries and sometimes comfortable bank balances'.

The legitimacy of these organisations dependent on foreign funds to develop villages is questionable to many and suspect as agencies of imperialism to some. Barring a few success stories such as the *Chipko* movement or the campaign against the Forest Bill, voluntary organisations failed to build up any effective national campaigns on issues such as Bhopal disaster. In the Western world, the NGOs and voluntary agencies are regarded as social welfare organisations and play a complimentary role. They are recognised for their organisational and managerial efficiency. However, in the Third World countries such as India, their role is somewhat different due to the very nature of post-coloniality of the state and society. The question is not one of efficient implementation of policies but one of structural transformation-local and non-local-of changing the political power relations of state and society and changing the relations with the external. This hinges on the crucial question of development of capitalism in the periphery.

The failure of developmental models and the crisis of economies in the 1970s were attributed to the failure of state and governance. States were seen as too weak to transform the civil society or as obstructive to economic development. The idea of good governance in the neo-liberal economic model is associated with the withdrawal of state from particularistic intervention in the economy and a freeing of civil society through greater reliance on NGOs, better training of civil service, decentralisation to remove obstacles to development, preferential access of the wealthier (and therefore educated) sections of society to decision making process etc. NGOs posit themselves as better equipped institutions to remove obstacles to development or take on developmental activities as is increasingly evident. They differ from the state non-market economy by the fact that they can choose more freely their staff, can impose commitment beyond formal execution of assigned tasks and have to justify themselves in order to ensure the flow of external resources. With the result, their performance is continuously evaluated. From the point of view of political economy, NGOs can influence criteria for funds. As developmental discourse includes 'culture' as an important variable, NGOs have successfully incorporated the language of 'culture' identities' and the discourse of 'civil' society.

While these efforts might have the impact of democratising the civil society and thereby perhaps the State, the very agenda of aid of the donor agencies is one of creating an environment conducive to neo-liberal reforms. The inevitable contradictions of such reforms aimed at 'good governance', rolling back the state have had the most undesirable results for most Third World countries. While NGOs may be critical of the policies of the IMF/WB, their ability to reverse these is doubtful. The reform policies and the presence of foreign funded organisations in the South have critical implications for state and society.

The NGOs generally avoid confrontation with the state despite their radical discourse. This may be for very obvious reasons of losing permission from the Home Ministry for funds (FCRA). The methods and style of functioning of the NGOs often render them suspect in the eyes of the local people. The 'target groups' over whom/with whom they do project work cover small sections, nor is the project work political enough. By negotiating with the government and by providing welfare measures through its funds, the NGOs often depoliticise issues and blunt the

edge of people's struggles. The 'professionalism' of NGOs seems to fit well with the "managerial discourse" of the World Bank and the IMF; managerial efficiency and professionalism are preferable to political activism. As the NGOs provide employment to substantial numbers of the middle class, rural and urban, they do help without being an answer to the problem of unemployment. The shift in the recent years from the centre to the local/region in the Indian federal polity has given rise to a localism boom. The reason, atleast partly, it is argued, lies in the rise of NGOs.

33.6.1 Future Perspectives

The new social movements of the 1960s and the 1970s have given rise to the discourse of civil society. The hitherto marginalised sections—the tribals, *dalits*, women raised questions with regard to the state and exercise of state power that in turn gave rise to new articulations of nations and nation-states. The NGOs by lending support and funding them have institutionalised some of these movements; at the same time they had the impact of depoliticising them. The shift from class struggles, people's movements to groups, project work, net working etc, has blunted the edge of these struggles. However, it would be wrong to say that all NGOs are alike. There are NGOs which are sensitive to the local needs and cultures and do not impose themselves on the people. Several individuals sympathetic to peoples struggles (for example the *dalit* and women's movements) support them. It is important to recognise the kind of social changes that are now being witnessed and NGOs contribute to this change. However, the globalisation processes, the dominance of the market forces indicate that the global agendas are set by the TNC, IMF and World Bank creating a culture of capital and shaping consumer citizens the world over. Would the NGOs contribute to this process or counter it by taking ideological positions? What would be the nature of social transformations the world over, and what kind of a state, economy and civil society would they create? A question that pertains to the 'histoire de longue duree'-Long term history.

33.7 SUMMARY

Contemporary world witnesses the rise of a plethora of international organisations involving the cooperation of both states/governments and non-governmental units/actors. These organisations perform various kinds of functions, dealing with a variety of issues. Their classification is based on their membership and structures. International non-governmental organisations are those organisations in which governments and states are not members. Yet, they operate within and across national boundaries and are subject to the restrictions of national governments. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as voluntary organisations have grown in number operating in a variety of areas. From the 1960s, we witness the rise of new social movements which have played an important role in activising the civil society. NGOs have contributed to institutionalising these movements and as development agencies, they have contributed to the rise of an NGO sector. Classification of NGOs and their functions is a complex one. Any assessment of NGOs must be based on this transparency as receivers of funds from outside, as deliverers of goods and their contribution to the assertion of rights of marginalised sections of the society. Despite the increasing assertiveness of NGOs role, they cannot be a substitute to states and governments. Globalisation does not abolish states but the boundaries of state power may be reworked.

33.8 EXERCISES

1. Explain the rise of NGOs and their relevance and role in International Relations.

2. Discuss the international organisations in the post-Second World War era and their impact.
3. Write a note on Transnational organisations.
4. Explain the nature and functions of IGOs & INGOs in social development.
5. Explain the changing role of NGOs on governmental policies. Cite instances.

UNIT 34 THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Structure

- 34.1 Introduction
 - 34.2 Diplomacy as Injustice
 - 34.3 Scholarship of Injustice
 - 34.4 Globalisation, Human Security and Justice
 - 34.5 Summary
 - 34.6 Exercises
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34.1 INTRODUCTION

Justice as a concept in International Relations is age-old and encompasses all spheres of state activity. It is of considerable relevance to resolve many critical problems in International Relations. Yet it may be noted at the very outset that, both at the diplomatic plane and within its mainstream scholarship, there is considerable insensitivity to the concern for justice in International Relations. Historically, the guiding principles of international regimes have been stability, predictability and order, but generally at the cost of justice. Today, despite increasing globalisation and its many implications for human security, this inadequacy persists. The present study would address the problems that confront the issue of justice in International Relations by examining and analysing instances of injustice both at the diplomatic level and within its mainstream scholarship, and the reasons for its abiding continuity. It would review the causes of the disjunction in the behaviour of states as actors within the national and international arena analysing issues of diplomatic injustice and partisan scholarship in the present era of globalisation and their symbiotic link in breeding global inequality and insensitivity towards issues of human security. Overall, various dimensions of the issues of structural inequality of states, injustice, mainstream partisan scholarship and the manipulation of International Relations as a policy science insulated from the universal humanist heritage, within its contrived construction of a one-dimensional history in the service of the dominant and the powerful, would be investigated.

34.2 DIPLOMACY AS INJUSTICE

Injustice in International Relations has been persistent since the origins of relations between states. Empirically, it appears that states that generally abide by such elementary principles of justice like equality before law in their domestic politics tend to be less scrupulous about such principles in their international conduct. The example of the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of PoWs is a good case in this context. While the humanitarian laws codified in it manifested some concern for justice, they seem to have been inspired more by the pragmatism of its signatories to avoid reciprocal retribution, than the concern for universal justice *per se*. Besides, many of the same signatories showed no particular concern for justice in their demand for punishing reparations after the Second World War from the peoples of defeated states who had themselves been victims of their regimes' *revanchist* proclivities. The "war crimes" trial at Nuremberg and Tokyo are examples of "victors' justice" rather than universal justice, as Radhabinod Pal, the Indian judge stated in his dissenting judgement at Tokyo. More recently,

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait even after the Cold War had ended, the United Nations' sponsored "police action" against Iraq, or even the bombing of civilian targets in Afghanistan, are examples of scant respect for the principles of justice. The United Nations' collective action in Iraq may have conformed to International Law within the Charter provisions, and the victory may have made general Schwarzkopf, its Commander in Chief, a hero in his country, when he should at least have been tried for "war crimes" in the interests of justice for the sufferings that he brought on the innocent Iraqi peoples. Besides, the UN sanctions imposed against defeated Iraq aggravated the peoples' sufferings without receiving much attention either within International diplomacy or its scholarly discourse. These are only random examples of insensitivity to the concern for justice in recent International Relations.

Besides, conceptual innovations and theoretical insights by the scholars of International Relations are also largely conceived within its historically rooted "statist fetishism," and *clichés* of 'legitimacy', 'balance of power', 'collective security' and more strikingly 'balance of terror' to ensure order and enforcement of law rather than justice that would spontaneously motivate observance of law. This becomes counter-productive in the absence of any sovereign authority in International Relations to enforce law.

An overview of International Relations in a historical perspective indicates scant respect for justice in an abiding sense. The period of colonisation, the Cold War, and the present phase of globalisation are all replete with instances of injustice. Even democratic states with established traditions of justice as the guiding principles of domestic governance have shown little concern for justice at the international plane.

During the colonial era, for example, while almost all of Africa and Asia, still remained enslaved under colonial rule, US president Abraham Lincoln expressed his disapproval of slavery only within the United States; he lampooned the incongruity of "a nation consisting of half slaves and half free" citizens involved in the Civil War. European democracies in that era also limited their concern for "liberty, equality and fraternity," and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, as also the ideals of the *Magna Carta* within their respective nation-states. For example, Britain in this era waged the "opium war" against China in support of the East India Company's right to smuggle opium. In India, it amputated fingers of silk weavers of Bengal to promote British textiles. The "massacre" of peaceful protesters at Jalianwalabagh (Amritsar) is a more telling example of injustice. Even some post-colonial states after their national liberation, flying the flag of a global struggle for freedom and justice, as "nation-states" have swiftly conformed to the prevalent dismal standards of international justice, if not worse in some cases. Through the Cold War, most of the states within the global system, irrespective of their record of justice at home, generally conformed to the two Super Powers' poor standards of international conduct, as role models. "The reluctance of democracies to extend their models of governance to inter-state relations", as David Held argues, had led to the striking paradox within the global system in which "the increase in the number of democratic states has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in democracies among states."

Overall, the running theme through all these incidents, together with the theoretical trends of the post-Cold War era that suggest the "end of history"; and the ahistorical predictions about a possible new "clash of civilisations", seem to suggest renewed attempts to enforce universal order and stability within one's own rules of the game by the dominant global power at the expense of universal justice. Krauthammer's endorsement of this conception is indeed revealing. According to him: "We are in for "abnormal times.... Our best hope of safety in such times, as in difficult times past, is in the American strength and will-the strength and will to lead a unipolar world-unashamedly laying down the rules of the world order and being prepared to enforce them."

Such prioritisation of justice between the realm of national and international politics is operationally hazardous. This became obvious with the unpredicted collapse of the post-war global system despite its obsessive concern for stability and order. Scholarship and diplomacy of contemporary International Relations seems incapable of learning from its failure to provide stability to the Cold War global system, or ensure its orderly transition. Besides, the concern for human rights as justice, despite its widespread legitimacy, still remains an instrument of international diplomacy as in the Cold War era, than for the emancipation of humanity to universal freedom and dignity. Such abiding insensitivity to the concern for universal justice constitutes the original fault-line of International Relations, both at the diplomatic plane and its scholarship.

The abiding continuity of this disjunction in the concern for justice between the sphere of the domestic and international needs to be explored. If, empirically, this disjunction is more pronounced in the case of non-democracies-as seems to be the prevalent assumption-then the case for encouraging democracies within states, as actors within the global system assumes some importance to promote justice in International Relations. But this assumption appears to be empirically flawed, as we would argue. Yet this new orthodoxy of the international funding agencies of development (IMF and IBRD) is being pursued with the same zeal with which “Third World modernisation” was pursued by the Western powers during the Cold War through the “military and bureaucracy as its main vehicle.”

Even among the available options, democracy remains the least unjust form of government; the importance of the democracy-variable as an instrument of international justice remains questionable. To explore this point further, we assume for the sake of argument that wars are the most extreme manifestation of unjust international conduct.

Empirically, we find that most of the major wars across the world through the colonial era were among the European democracies, or initiated by them in their colonies in Asia and Africa. The significant exception was the Second World War plotted by Nazi Germany and the militarist Japan. Since then, however, in the Cold War era, most wars shifted from their predominantly European location to the Third World-various studies indicate-that the largest number of actual wars involved the United States either directly or by proxy. Above all, not all these wars by democracies were inspired by the principles of universal justice, as for example, the “colossal mistake” of the Vietnam War by the United States. Two equally distinguished democracies-England and France-initiated wars, jointly against Egypt, and separately against Argentina, Iceland, Indo-china and Central Africa.

As for preparations for war, like stockpiling of armaments, arms supply to civil wars across the world, involvement in “low intensity” insurgency operations, subversion of popular regimes, or illegal intelligence operations and “proxy wars”, as examples of unjust international conduct, the record of the “free world” through the Cold War period most convincingly undermines the assumption of democracy within the state as a critical variable in the context of our present concern for justice in International Relations. Even within the Third World, the record of the few democratic states does not lend much support of any great importance to the democracy-variable for our purpose.

The assumption that it is difficult for open democratic systems to secretly prepare for wars is also only partially true. For example, democratic US during “the McCarthy era” in the early 1950s devised constitutional and extra-constitutional arrangements to insulate the privileged status of “national security” from the transparency of democratic scrutiny, to launch the Cold War. Besides, apart from nuclear weapons, informed democratic discourse on most strategic armaments, including missiles, chemical and bacteriological weapons, still remains inadequate

because of being shrouded in secrecy on grounds of national security. On this score the record of the more established democracies is not very different from the non-democracies. Thus for example, the US policy of global “military alignment” as an instrument of the Cold War, along with “security checks” on American citizens, was announced by president Harry Truman’s executive decree (NSC -68), and the war in Vietnam that involved 500,000 citizens as troops, was never declared by the US Senate, the only constitutionally empowered authority. Similarly, the Anglo-French War against Egypt in 1956, or Britain’s military nuclearisation, was never discussed in the Cabinet, much less in the public arena. Such significant examples of dealing with ‘national security’ by democratic states undermine any possibility for *a priori* assumption of democracy as a critical variable in the concern for justice in the sovereign states’ international conduct.

On the basis of our assumption that wars are the most extreme form of unjust international conduct, the historical record of democracies does not qualify this least unjust form of governance-howsoever desirable otherwise-as self-sufficient instruments for promoting justice in International Relations. At any rate, absence of war may be a necessary, but never sufficient, condition for peace, and much less for justice. Peace like justice has a more positive connotation, in terms of liberating human consciousness from the use or threat of force, as prime minister Attlee said at the San Francisco Conference in 1947.

Given the weak empirical base of democracy as such, to explain the abiding disjunction between the sovereign states’ concern for justice at the domestic and international plane, the need to analyse International Relations at the systemic level for possible clues needs to be pursued. As of now, this has been inadequately done at the scholarly plane.

34.3 SCHOLARSHIP OF INJUSTICE

The disjunction in the concern for justice between the sovereign states’ behaviour at the national and international plane, is not only reflected in the mainstream scholarly discourse, but by implication, it is even endorsed as part of Realism. As a reflection of reality to a certain extent it may be historically valid, but to the extent that the real is not always the rational, much less just, this sterile version of empiricism of mainstream scholarship in International Relations, with inadequate normative concern, has only helped in widening this disjunction. It has augmented the amorality of the global system across the board and in the field of its scholarship.

As a policy science, to the extent its prescriptive formulations have conformed to such realism, International Relations has been an amoral instrument in the pursuit of power and, as an ally of the powerful, it has reinforced, dominance of the amoral and thus of injustice within the international plane in general, and in some cases at the national plane under the pretext of ‘national security.’ This is how “Realism” in International Relations, both in scholarship and diplomacy, originating as instruments to promote the “national interests” of the post-Second War era’s dominant economic and military Super Power, with nuclear monopoly, have been the flip side of injustice within the global system through the Cold War. This was predictable from the origins of the post-war global system, which simultaneously spawned the Realist hegemony at the intellectual plane and the Cold War within International Relations. Since then, the symbiotic relationship between International Relations, and its mainstream scholarship, has remained a vicious circle at the cost of justice in diplomacy, and the concerns of this policy science.

In fact, the emergence of International Relations as an autonomous field of scholarship in the United States, from its earlier moorings in diplomatic history, within the social base of the world’s dominant military and economic Super Power, has been quite fateful for its future, both

at the diplomatic and scholarly plane. The spatial and temporal context of its origin shaped its priorities, hierarchy of concerns, and its future trajectory from its inception. It is yet to liberate itself from the constraints of its origin. The same context shaped its scholarly identity as a policy science, de-linked from the social and human sciences, as well as International Law, and its domination by military strategic studies. This historical legacy still constrains its scholarship.

From such origins, at the service of the policies of the “power elite” of the world’s dominant military and economic power, having the least in common with the rest of the world, International Relations has become an attractive career option by virtue of its professional rewards. But its intellectual inadequacies as a policy science, within the imponderables of its universe of discourse, have not improved its scientific legitimacy.

The operational hazards of the Realist paradigm, in particular, its persistence with ahistorical predictions based on sterile empiricism, its inadequate sensitivity to normative concerns, and its prioritisation of stability and order at the cost of justice to begin with, were full of uncertainties. Such inadequacies are now part of universal common sense, as derived from the social and human sciences with established intellectual legitimacy. The unpredicted collapse of the Cold War global system built on the Realist paradigm again forcefully substantiated this universal common sense. Yet mainstream International Relations remains insensitive to learn from these lessons, and continues to be obsessed with such Realism.

Particularly striking in this context is the insularity of this scholarship from the intellectual resources of the social and human sciences. In Western political theory Plato’s concept of Justice and Aristotle’s analysis of Democracy, still remain classics that have historically inspired the upsurge of the liberal and democratic theories of the State, thus helping the democratic transformation of the European autocracies. The landmarks in the social history of the Western civilisation, the Reformation, Renaissance, the English, French and Russian Revolutions, as well as the American War of Independence, were all inspired by the idea of justice. Similarly John Locke’s “possessive individualism,” the Benthamite “felicific calculus,” Mill’s utilitarian version of the “greatest good of the greatest number,” Rousseau’s “General Will,” Voltaire and Montesquieu’s “Republican Agenda,” de Tocqueville and Jefferson’s ideas of democracy, Kant’s treatises on “perpetual peace,” and Hegel’s idea of the “civil society” have inspired economists, sociologists and moral philosophers towards the blueprint for a just social order. The same concern for justice has been the mainspring of artistic and literary creativity across the world. Even in more recent times, the political scientist John Rawls’ theory of justice and the economic philosopher Amartya Sen’s idea of “entitlement” are rooted in the historical concern for justice derived in most academic disciplines from the philosophical traditions of the Western Enlightenment. They may have as much relevance within International Relations as they have proved to be in the democratisation process of sovereign states in the Western civilisation. Yet, Western scholarships on International relations refuse to draw from this vast reservoir of intellectual resources to promote justice.

Beyond this Western tradition, even in the Oriental civilisations, intellectual discourses on politics and statecraft, within the religious texts, literary epics and philosophical treatises have all been marked by the concern for justice. The Chinese revolution, for example, was also influenced by the Confucian ideas of justice along with that of Marx and Mao. The Indian literary epics, like the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, howsoever fictional in their empirical base, powerfully portray the triumph of justice as a rational order in statecraft and war; they still remain alive within contemporary India’s intellectual and political discourse to underscore the anomie of its modernity. The Gandhian vision of India’s post-colonial state-to some extent reflected within its constitutional goals-was aimed to replicate the fictional *ramrajya*, howsoever utopian, in

modern India. The colonial liberation movements in Asia and Africa, and the “Liberation Theology” of Latin America, have also been inspired by the ideals of universal freedom and justice. Not that justice has always triumphed, but has nevertheless remained a universal ideal of social transformation and political mobilisation for human emancipation.

Even at the popular plane, folk heroes of fiction and reality have been idolised for their struggle against injustice across the cultural and civilisational divide of humanity. From the fictional Spartacus leading the slave revolt in Roman times to the equally mythical Robin Hood in medieval England; Galileo and Garibaldi in Italy; Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King in America; Gandhi in India and Nelson Mandela in Africa, within their diverse temporal and spatial contexts, constitute a part of the universal human heritage of the struggle for justice, just as the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, Statue of Liberty and the Tien Men Square are its universal metaphors. Yet, Western Realism in post-war International Relations opted for the “struggle for power” as the basis of “politics among nations”. Its policy implications of “global military containment” of a diabolical ideological adversary, “in defence of national interest,” are as much the classic tracts of their spatial and temporal context during the origin of the Cold War, as the ‘end of history’ after it. Similarly, the Military and the Bureaucracy as the “vehicles of modernisation” for “political order” in the Third World, was the specific compulsion of US foreign policy in its search for allies in the Cold War, as the search for a new “clash of civilisations” after it. They have historically represented the national interests of the dominant and the powerful, which have appropriated the universal in their own terms.

As a policy science, International Relations has thus remained insulated from the universal humanist heritage, within its contrived construction of a one-dimensional history in the service of the dominant and the powerful. Its mainstream professionals have selectively opted for intellectual support from a narrow view of Machiavelli’s concept of the “Fox and the Lion” in statecraft, and his separation of politics from ethics delinked from the historical context; from the obscure Clausewitz’s cynical concept of war as “diplomacy by other means,” in the era of nuclear weapons. Others have opted for the amoral Nietzsche’s version of the “Superman” as a role model for the Super Power inspired by the Bismarckian diplomacy of “blood and iron” and Metternich’s alliance system. With such a selectively amoral intellectual base, Realism spawned the Cold War global system with inadequate concern for justice. From the same Western intellectual tradition, international relations could as well have drawn on Emmanuel Kant who systematically argued that the greatest evils which affect civilised nations are brought about by war, and not so much by actual wars in the past or the present as by “never ending and indeed continually increasing preparations for war.” Also, that citizen’s rights can prevail if the rule of law is sustained in all states as well as in International Relations; and that democracy within any political community is only possible when unimpeded by threats from other communities or from networks inter-community (international relations). This could have provided another version of reality for the Realist theory to draw upon in the interest of justice.

Meanwhile, selective manipulation of history as Realism continues to remain the critical instrument in the transformation of the post-war era’s dominant economic and military power to the post-Cold War era’s hegemonic power, now encompassing the cultural domain. The intellectual hegemony of Realism within the global system and its mainstream scholarship has reinforced the history of its own construction, as a self-fulfilling prophecy. For its Super Power patron, it has reproduced a magnified “looking glass image” of itself, which has been rewarding for its national interest, as also for its professional academics as protagonists of Realism across the world. But this has been at the cost of justice within the global system and its consequent instability, and the weak scientific credentials of International Relations as a field of scholarship.

The primacy of the Realist version of “national security” has marginalised the UN-system built on the principles of collective security and universal justice as the basis for a durable and rational order. Its social, economic and humanitarian agencies have been particularly under siege by the global power structure. Its main economic instruments of post-War global reconstruction—the World Bank and the IMF—were from their inception delinked from the hazards of the democratic principles of the UN-system, as originally envisaged, and brought firmly within the control of the United States’ Administration. The UN-system survived through the Cold War by generally conforming to the global power hierarchy, at the cost of its ideals of universal justice. After the end of the Cold War, there have been new pressures, against this institution to reform itself to conform to the new reality of a unipolar world. Meanwhile, the World Bank and the IMF have emerged as the dominant actors shaping the form, content, and rules of the game within the post-Cold War process of globalisation. The operational hegemony of “national security” over collective security in the Cold War system, and the new mystique of the “global market” appear to be flip sides of the continuity of dominance, through the appropriation of the universal by the powerful. The “interdependence” of the military alliances of the Cold War, and the global “interdependence” promoted by the new trading blocs across the world, appears to some as comparable. Such perceptions impede universal justice in the new era, in the absence of any move towards democratising the global system.

Overall, the global system emerging from the Cold War has also remained structurally unjust as the colonial system preceding it. Whether assessed on the Gandhian principles of justice, based on the “needs of the poorest among the poor;” or, John Rawls’ principle of “justice as fairness,” based on the “greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” and not devised within “a veil of ignorance”; or even Amartya Sen’s concept of “entitlement”—as justice; the global system has been unjust for the majority of humanity, consisting of the poor and the disadvantaged. Historically, this majority drawn from the post-colonial Afro-Asian states, as “Third World,” found itself integrated at the periphery of the global system which, for the first time, became universal, but with unequal options for the individuals, groups and states constituting the system. After the Cold War, the global system, with new distortions emerging from its unplanned collapse remains a historical liability in the context of our concern for justice. The recurrent disjunction in the concern for justice in the sovereign states’ behaviour at the national and international level may be better explained by the endemic injustices historically inherited within the global system. Emanuel Kant may be more relevant to explain and provide the recipe for its reform, than the Realists who perpetuate it to thrive of it.

As an instrument of injustice, rather than a catalyst of human emancipation like other sciences, the moral legitimacy of International Relations has remained compromised. Its conceptual, methodological and theoretical resources, empirically rooted in the historical experience of a temporally, spatially, numerically and culturally limited segment of humanity, largely in Europe, appears inadequate to deal with the complexities of a global system that is now universal and more globalised. Its structural inadequacies have been reinforced through the Cold War. Its empiricist obsession has made scholarship in International Relations particularly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformations around “colossal mistakes” and *raison d'etat*. Theories and concepts, rooted in such distortions, constitute its intellectual and moral liabilities.

Consequently, “the scientific credentials of International Relations as a field of scholarship remains somewhat overstated.” Fred Halliday, with greater analytical rigour, perhaps overstates it: “Academic study of International Relations is a sub-field of news commentary...the world of International affairs is a carnival of the bluff and philistine.”

34.4 GLOBALISATION, HUMAN SECURITY AND JUSTICE

The breathing space conjuncturally created for normative concerns within International Relations by the sudden collapse of the Cold War global system is refreshing, in the context of its historical record. While such an opportunity cannot be allowed to lapse by default, it may be prudent to be cautious against the temptation to be over-ambitious. For, many options for universal justice, either in the Kantian, Gandhian or Rawlsian sense, remain historically non-viable in the foreseeable future. It may be more realistic to direct our concern towards optimising such incremental potentials for justice within the global system as long as the new milieu lasts.

We know from universal history, beyond mainstream International Relations that the process of globalisation did not begin with the end of the Cold War; nor did International Relations begin with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) between the European Powers. Each phase of the long historical process of globalisation has left its trail of social, economic, political and humanitarian complexities in an interwoven web across the world. They have varied contemporary relevance in the different regions, and have been documented in the many traditional disciplines with established intellectual legitimacy, like History, Economics, Anthropology, Sociology and Political Science. These are established disciplines with conceptual, theoretical and methodological resources, unlike the limited scientific resources of International Relations.

From such sources, it is evident that the process of globalisation through military conquests, religious proselytisation and maritime trade had considerable historical relevance centuries later at the time of the transformation of the European nation-state as secular democracies in relatively more recent times. Similarly, globalisation of Buddhism in Asia as well as of Islam and Christianity across the world; of mercantile capitalism leading to the Spanish and Portuguese immigration to South America and Europeans in North America; or, the Soviet system of globalisation in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Central Asia during the Cold War; and the Japanese globalisation in Asia have differing relevance in these diverse regions' complexities after the Cold War. There has also been globalisation of the African slave trade, indentured Indian labour and mercenary soldiers of British colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. More recently, globalisation of the criminal under-world, hand-in-glove with the military-civilian oligarchies of the Cold War, and transnational banks like the liquidated Pakistan-owned BCCI involved in drug traffic and money-laundering have played their specific globalising roles in crime and terrorism. These are among the historical legacies of the process of globalisation, with varied relevance to contemporary problems in the different regions of the world, and the security concerns of individuals, groups and communities as citizens of diverse sovereign states. The different components of this historical process have been analysed by social and economic historians and portrayed in literary classics and visual arts, as expressions of the reality.

Admittedly, globalisation ushered in by the Cold War has been significantly different from all its predecessors, in terms of its scale, pace and momentum. This is because of the unequalled levels of economic, military and technological power at its behest. But while the Cold War had territorially limited the process of globalisation broadly within two global ideological divides-just as it was restricted within their different colonial systems in the preceding era-the collapse of the socialist system has universalised the global capitalist market. The disadvantaged groups perceive this market as an extension of the global power structure with one hegemonic power, as envisaged by the US "power elite" at the outset of the Cold War. Consequently, there is absence of any global consensus around the neo-liberal ideological offensive towards economic globalisation through "structural adjustment" of the national economies. There exists thus scepticism and hostility against globalisation as a continuation of the dominance of the powerful in a new

garb across the world. Resultantly the present phase of globalisation raises doubts about the durability of the normative concerns spawned by it.

With the sovereign state still relevant in International Relations, the post-Cold War power hierarchy remains as skewed in favour of the dominant few as in the earlier system. This is also particularly true in the Third World with its unequal regional, sectoral and individual beneficiaries of the Cold War developmental model. The consequent global market and its subsidiary regional trading blocs, generally reflect their respective power hierarchy. The World Bank and the IMF, the apex global funding regime, monitoring the globalisation process of the national economies to the world market, reflect the same power structure; their chief executives are still nominated by the US president, approved by the US Senate, on behalf of the world capitalist market. The fund-strapped UN-system of collective security across the world has been under pressure to reform itself to conform to the same hierarchy by the United States as the hegemonic power, its richest member, largest contributor and biggest defaulter.

Within this empirical reality, the new ideology of globalisation seeking to legitimise the hegemony of the world market over state sovereignty, and its extension to the national markets, is unlikely to have strikingly different consequences for justice and human security within the global system than its predecessor. On the contrary, in the changed context, economic rationality appears to be the updated version of new Realism. The economic rationality of the unequal capitalist market is unlikely to create a different version of “inter-dependence,” or social justice than the “national security” of the Cold War era. The new rationality, insulated from any special concern for universal justice, is more likely to reinforce at the global level, the experience of early capitalist development within the European national economies, in the absence of any sovereign global authority as a substitute for the state. The disjunction in the concern for justice at the national and international plane may even increase within this new version of globalisation as some trends after the terrorist strike on the New York Twin Towers already indicate.

A way out of this depressing scenario may be to draw upon the historical resources of traditional scholarship to promote justice in International Relations. Historically, mainstream Western social and human sciences, drawing upon its moral and intellectual resources, laid the foundations for Liberal Democracy, the welfare state, as well as the Socialist state in their concern for justice within the ongoing process of globalisation. The relevance of this historical experience to International Relations, in the context of our concern for justice within the present global system, still remains largely unexplored. Incidentally, while the empirical base of Realism in “national security” was rooted in the European experience, the neo-realist mystique of market justice is almost singularly rooted in the unique American experience. Consequently as a universal principle, realism of national security and the neo-realism of market justice, appear to be flip sides of the recurrent reality within International Relations of the universal being appropriated by the powerful, at the cost of justice. This appropriation has manifested itself also at the level of concepts with built-in policy priorities and consequent hierarchies.

For example, the universalisation of the Post-Second World War as the historical “post-war” era was a conceptual trivialisation of the concerns of the vast majority of the “post-colonial” era’s humanity, with an abiding impact on the priorities of the global system and its hierarchy. For, the concept structurally prioritised between the historically asymmetrical concerns of post-war reconstruction in Europe and Japan and the post-colonial agenda of nation building. The agenda involving the social, economic, political, institutional and humanitarian transformation constituted their critical security concerns, rather than the Realist version of “national security” directed against an identified external threat. This Realist version as mainstream International Relations spawned the “Third World,” to which the European Cold War was extended, as in the case of

the two earlier “world wars”. The historical asymmetry in the priorities of post-war reconstruction, and post-colonial nation-building, was operationally manifested when the Cold War global system enabled relative security, economic prosperity, and political stability in North America, Europe and Japan at the cost of wars, threats of war, political instability and domestic repression in the Third World was accompanied by such economic growth as possible through foreign aid to regimes of military and civilian oligarchies. This was not conducive to justice within the global system.

The end of the Cold War is yet to manifest itself through any significant dent in the entrenched *ancien régimes* of the Cold War within the “Third World,” or within many countries of the former “Second World” despite their regime changes through some form of “elections.” This may explain the continuity of wars, its threats and preparations, ethnic divisiveness, religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, social violence, crime, drugs, and threat of famine in these regions, coexisting with economic prosperity and political stability within the states, which have been the apparent victors of the Cold War. That explains the abiding attraction of migration from the disadvantaged to the affluent parts of the global system causing new complexities. Consequently, the end of this history cannot be a cause for universal celebration, nor inspire universal confidence about the concern for justice within the new global order. For, the process of globalisation of the Cold War era, built on the historically inherited disparities of the earlier phase, has reinforced its structural asymmetry with new distortions. The new globalisation through economic liberalisation and cultural homogenisation has spawned fresh complexities, at the cost of justice and human security within the global system.

The transnational corporations as instruments of the new globalisation process have created networks of global interdependence within hierarchies of national sovereignties. Global transnationals still fly their national flags, with the State as its ally. General Motors, Enron, IBM, Rolls Royce, Siemens, Sony and Toyota, for example, are still their respective national ‘flagships,’ and as diplomatic instruments have assumed greater legitimacy in the new era of globalisation. Such corporate power, controlling technology, management, capital, and consumer preferences, have an unequal leverage on many weaker states with raw materials and labour as their only bargaining instruments while competing with others for corporate favours. Obviously, this unequal leverage cannot be the basis for global inter-dependence. On the contrary, they have spawned hierarchies of state sovereignties within the post-Cold War global order as before. Overall, the consequences of unequal options, within the global market with free trade, cannot be conducive to universal equality, much less justice.

Within the new dispensation of the Intellectual Property Rights Convention, some oriental traditional medicines, like *neem* and *turmeric* have already been appropriated by Western patents, despite Indian protests. In return, Western consumer preferences, American culture and taste have flooded the world market undermining many ancient lifestyles among the younger generations across the world. Within this process of globalisation through free trade, the global cultural attractions of the West are more a product of its technology and communication, than necessarily its aesthetic content or moral concerns. It has accentuated the ‘generation-gap’ in many non-Western societies. By profitably communicating Western consumer preferences as the main metaphor of a superior life-style, the new globalisation process has accentuated the global hierarchy of sovereignty while making the transnational more attractive, and hence more difficult to bargain with. The conflict between tradition and modernity, continuing through the colonial era, and accentuated by the Cold War process of globalisation, has sharpened within the “Third World” by the appeal of the populist versions of Western modernity profiled through its powerful communication and technology. Religious fanaticism, ethnic divisiveness and regional tensions,

stoked as instruments of the Cold War, have found new symbols to survive, with a different impact on the various regions of the global system.

But the most critical adverse impact of this process of globalisation is in the sphere of human resources, encompassing technology, management, education, health and creative arts. Sieved through increasingly harsh and selective immigration policies of the rich states, despite their commitment to “free trade,” the best talents in most spheres of creativity after acquiring their skills in the subsidised educational institutions have been attracted to the promised utopia, in exchange for the mediocre talents of transnational executives from the West. Apart from the substantial capital transfer on this account, that replicates the colonial global division of labour, its long-term impact on the global intellectual hierarchy cannot exactly be conducive to universal justice.

Despite such an impact of the historical process of globalisation, the end of the Cold War has spawned concerns around democracy, human rights, gender equality and environment within the mainstream of International Relations both at the operational and scholarly plane. Some of these of concerns have also led to global networks of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with motivated and skilled cadres.

While these manifestations of the new globalisation process needs encouragement, there is a need for caution against over optimism. Yet, the globalisation of such concerns has opened new options for justice in International Relations, particularly within such sovereign states where democratic politics has been inadequate either to reflect these concerns within their political discourse or operationalise them in public policies. For example, gender justice, human rights, child labour, deforestation, drug trafficking, in many traditional societies and underdeveloped economies now have global constituencies to combat against local insensitivities, corrupt governments and powerful local vested interests. This is also valid for the democratisation process of the “Third” and “Second” world encouraged by the coordinated policies of the donor agencies in the Western world. But the potentials of democratic transformation of entrenched oligarchies exclusively through external inspiration are limited. Besides, the structurally inequitable global system controlled by the rich and the powerful, despite their protestations of democracy, is not exactly conducive to the democratic transformation of its periphery.

These historical liabilities of the Cold War global system are not easily adaptable to democratic transformation, less so, within a global system that recurrently manifests the disjunction in the concern for justice at the domestic and international plane. That is the sense in which democratisation of the post-war global system, and its peripheral states, are dialectically linked, to promote universal human security as justice in International Relations.

34.5 SUMMARY

Within this framework, and the new opportunity within International Relations, it may be possible to build a global consensus, ideally through the network of NGOs, around such normative principles and institutions which have considerable legitimacy, despite their operational inadequacies. This is to ensure that the consensus-building process around principles of justice in its initial phases directed to a path of least resistance.

Concurrently three such areas immediately come to mind:

- a) Democratisation of the UN-system as the “Centre for Harmonising the Actions for Humanity,” as envisaged in its Preamble, particularly its social, economic and humanitarian institutions of universal justice.

- b) Ensuring the enforcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both through the United Nations as well as through NGOs.
- c) Ensuring regional development and external funding based on the index of human development at the national level as the operational version of “entitlement” as justice and with the NGOs monitoring it.

Along with these broad rubrics, gender justice and environmental protection need special emphasis because of their universal legitimacy, despite regional operational inadequacies in specific regions.

But to be an effective catalyst at the operational plane, scholarship of International Relations needs to take a critical look at the state of the discipline and its resource base. To be able to undermine the “statist fetishism” of its operation, scholarship of International Relations must insulate itself from the endemic hazards of this source of information and data. The state and the mainstream media even within the “free world,” as exclusive sources of official information, have proved to be particularly vulnerable to disinformations around *raison d'etat* as during the McCarthy era in the United States. Consequently, social and human sciences around related issues could be explored as the alternate resource base of the scholarship of International Relations for circumventing the insensitivity of sovereign states to justice in their respective International Relations. NGOs could be an additional source of empirical data for International Relations.

Equally important is the field of creative and visual arts as a source of empirical reality within International Relations, as it has already become in the field of social and human sciences. For example, Picasso's *Guernica* as an evidence of Nazi atrocities, or Chaplin's films as the social reality of economic depression; or the Hiroshima War memorial of the nuclear explosion despite being unquantified, are no less convincing evidence of the empirical reality than the official archives. Similarly, Satyajit Ray, Mrinal Sen, Adoor Gopalakrishnan or the Neo-realist films are no less convincing evidence of the Indian social reality than the quantified official data of governments. It requires creative imagination to incorporate them within the scholarship of International Relations. But as sources of justice they have as much potential as the quantified official records. For justice in International Relations beyond Realism, the resources of the human and social sciences, along with the creative arts, could be explored to advantage till such time as its own scholarship liberates itself from its present roots in facilitating dominance of the powerful, to being a catalyst of universal human emancipation

34.6 EXERCISES

1. Write a short note on diplomacy as injustice.
2. Why do you think injustice in diplomacy recurs?
3. What are the historical liabilities of scholarship in International Relations?
4. What has been the impact of Realism on International Relations?
5. Discuss the main trends in the historical process of Globalisation.
6. In what sense is the post-Cold War process of globalisation different from the earlier phase?

UNIT 35 HUMAN SECURITY

Structure

- 35.1 Introduction
- 35.2 Meanings and Dimensions of Human Security
- 35.3 Nation States and Human Security
 - 35.3.1 Sovereignty
- 35.4 Human Security in the International System
 - 35.4.1 International Arena
 - 35.4.2 Human Security Agenda
- 35.5 Achievements and Prospects for Human Security
 - 35.5.1 Accomplishments
 - 35.5.2 Prospects
- 35.6 Summary
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35.1 INTRODUCTION

Understandably, the principles of human security have always been embedded in the relations among modern sovereign nation states. However, it is only with the end of the Cold War that sufficient attention has been accorded both to the concept and the diplomacy of human security.

What is human security?

Human security is a perspective to look at international relations not from the viewpoint of nation states but from the perspective of the security of the individual. In simple words, human security means safety of people from both violent and non-violent threats. Once it is deemed imperative to frame issues of international affairs in terms of their impact and implications for human security, then policy planners or scholars doing so are looking at issues from the perspective of human security. That is, one must ask whether an action by a country or by the international community as a whole is enhancing or undermining the safety of the people.

35.2 MEANINGS AND DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY

It is a new template to understand and analyse the transformative changes taking place in the international system in the aftermath of the Cold War. Better described, human security is a shift in the angle of vision to identify and meet the challenges and threats to international peace and security. Threats to the safety of individual and security of communities today are such that they also directly threaten international peace and security.

The post-Cold War international system is beset with greater instability and lesser predictability. Threats to international peace and security today are more diffuse and multidimensional. Nature of threats and sources of threats have changed. The challenges and dangers in today's world

threaten more and directly, the safety and wellbeing of individuals and communities. Some old threats and conflicts, which the overarching rivalry between the two superpowers had kept under covers during the Cold War, have resurfaced with greater intensity. These are ethnic, racial and tribal animosities which, in the post-Cold War World, have taken the form of intra-state conflicts and civil wars. Not separated from the above, rather making them deadlier, are some new types and sources of violence and conflict such as those emanating from terrorism, religious fundamentalism, narco-trafficking and money laundering activities. Besides, one also witnesses an intensity in these conflicts, reflected in 'ethnic cleansings', 'hate campaigns' and nationalist xenophobia, etc. It hardly needs to be stressed that many of such conflicts threaten not only the safety of human beings but also the security of the states.

Significantly, such conflicts of today are more often intra- than inter-state. Then there are other features too of such conflicts. Such as, they affect the civilian populations more than the armed combatants. Of the total 86 armed conflicts recorded in 1997, as many as 84 were intra-state. Eight out of ten casualties in recent conflicts have been civilians. More people have died in local-often intra-state-conflicts than in wars between states. Also, more casualties have been on the account of the use of small weapons that are easily available, and have remained beyond all discussions on disarmament. Today, about 500 million small weapons, which have an unusual longevity of life, are in use. Or, some such weapons are cheap and available in abundance, for instance the anti-personnel landmines, which are used by the terrorists, insurgents and all kinds of groups. Worst, these 'wars' are often being fought with 'child soldiers'. In intra-state conflicts during the 1990s, the world has remained a mute spectator to the use of children as armed combatants and as suicide bombers. Another notable aspect of today's conflicts is that while they may be local in nature, they have wider regional and international dimensions. International networks dealing in illicit trades in arms, narcotics, and money laundering are in some complex ways linked to these seemingly local conflicts. Even the support of diasporic communities has been enlisted to carry out campaigns of 'ethnic cleansing', terrorist violence, arms procurement and money transfers.

A second source challenging the safety of human beings is the current unbridled process of economic globalisation. Globalisation has both positive and negative aspects. What is being witnessed today is perhaps more of the negative aspects of globalisation. Particularly the developing economies are getting adversely affected. As national economies integrate with the global market forces, traditional productive structures are getting destroyed and distorted, causing deprivation and displacement of large populations. Patterns of investment and mega-development projects, such as hydro-electrical projects, and economic policies of 'export promotion' are directly responsible for the degradation and destruction of environment. Large populations, particularly the indigenous communities in many countries, have lost their livelihood and, were forced to migrate elsewhere including across national borders. Large volume of speculative capital now operates through the international financial system. The new international banking practices allow the speculative capital rapid mobility across national borders and financial barriers. The pressing needs for foreign investment and the liberalisation of financial markets in most of the developing countries have facilitated the movements of speculative capital in and out of the national economies almost at will. Consequently, national stock markets soar one day only to bottom out the next day. Countries such as Mexico in 1994, Indonesia and other countries of South East Asia in 1997 and Brazil in 1998 have experienced the onslaught of the speculative capital which shook their economies to its foundation and has rendered the notions of national sovereignty and national control infructuous. Admittedly, the financial crises of this type have a 'contagion' effect for the health of the regional and international economies.

Human security is an attempt to respond to the new global realities. It takes the individual as

the nexus of its concerns, as the true lens through which to view politics, economy, environment and the society. It is an effort to construct a global society where the safety of individual is the priority, and where global, regional and bilateral institutions are built and equipped to enhance human security.

35.3 NATION STATES AND HUMAN SECURITY

State security and human security are mutually supportive. However, given the nature and sources of threats to international peace and security, the question of individual freedom and safety cannot any more be dealt with in the statist framework. Truth is that states alone cannot meet the challenges faced by the international system.

Moreover, there are instances, when the states themselves have been a source of threat to the safety of the individual or the security of an ethnic group. Contemporary states may have armed themselves to be impregnably secure but have rendered their citizens insecure. Governments themselves adopt policies prejudicial to various ethnic groups; aid and abet campaigns of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and pursue majoritarian agendas, sponsor terrorism across national borders to subserve their strategic interests, or are under the influence of some millenarian ideas which threaten regional and international peace and security. Human security is not opposed to the security of the state; it stands for building a democratic state that values its own people and protects all its ethnic and racial groups.

Besides, during the 1990s, there have been instances of ‘failed states’; instances where state authority just collapsed for whatever reasons, necessitating international responses in the form of ‘humanitarian interventions’. ‘Failed states’ pose a threat to the sub-regional and regional stability in more than one way—ability to carry out international obligations, exodus of displaced populations, etc.

35.3.1 Sovereignty

The agenda of human security does not limit or circumscribe the sovereignty of state. Certainly, it stands for retooling the state in terms of its various capacities. Building a democratic state that values its own people and protects its minorities is a central strategy for promoting human security.

Principles of human security are not new; what, however, is important is the renewed focus on these principles in the context of an evolving international order. Principles advancing human security in the contemporary international relations are more than a century old. Their evolution had begun in the 19th Century itself, which is reflected in the creation of several international humanitarian organisations, importantly the International Committee of Red Cross. The process had since continued getting institutional expressions in various international agreements and conventions; for instance, those codifying laws of war, in the universalist principles that are enshrined in the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and the recently-established Statute of International Criminal Court. Therefore, principles of human security were always present in the modern international system, which has, as its basis, the notion of sovereign states. These trends explain the emergence of what is now described as the ‘humanitarian international law’.

From the perspective of the theories of international relations, an important aspect is that the postulate of human security is calling for a reexamination of the philosophical and legal bases of state sovereignty and, thereby, of the international system. Liberalism, upon which modern

international system is based, has been concerned primarily with state—its external sovereignty and ‘domestic jurisdiction’. It is however undeniable that the superior ethical goal of liberalism has always been individual freedom. Individual liberty had to be realised within the nation state but, admittedly, it did not mean that the international system could not deal with it. It has dealt with it in the past like, for instance, through the UN Charter. The point therefore is whether the system of sovereign states can reform itself towards the goal of promoting and protecting individual freedom in view of the intensified threats to safety of the individual and security of the state. Today, freedom and safety of the individual is no more possible within the statist framework, and the liberal theories of international relations admit this. Admittedly, states are not so sovereign, nor so immutable.

Besides, states are not any more the only member-entities of the international system. The decade of the 1990s saw the emergence of an international civil society. International non-governmental organisations championing various causes ranging from human rights, collective rights of the indigenous communities, gender equality to population and environmental problems are shaping international public opinion, policy making processes, and development of alternative policies. Governments have also come to rely upon the INGOs for the delivery and disbursement, for instance aid programmes. Even international organisations including the UN have sponsored a number of conferences involving the participation of the NGOs.

Human security does not seek to displace the sovereignty and much less the security of the state. Undeniably, however, in the changed context of contemporary international relations, both state sovereignty and its role need a redefinition and a reconstitution. Human security is not a substitute for the security of the state. Rather, human security is ideally within and through the state. States remain the basic units of the international system. They alone have the authority and coercive power to regulate, enforce and distribute. The classical issues of politics—who governs and on what terms—are as relevant to cyber space as to the real world. In fact, states, today are even more essential to enforce the human security agenda that requires large resources; and entails international efforts to deal with the ‘rogue’ states and groups. States command not only vast array of instruments and resources, but also they alone command the allegiance of the citizens. In short, the continuity of norms, persistence of institutions, and strategic resources and options available to the wielders of state power to shape or distort the patterns of global interdependence all make states central to any change in the international system.

What human security entails is not the displacement of state but refurbishing its various capacities along the principles of democracy and pluralism. Besides, it is also realised that states alone cannot meet the kind of the threats facing the world today, even if some of the events are taking place within the national borders of a country.

35.4 HUMAN SECURITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

35.4.1 International System

Human security agenda is premised on the concept of interdependence of states, which has deepened further in the wake of the processes of economic globalisation, technological and information revolution, and the emergence of an international civil society. Importantly, interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or actors in different countries. When there are reciprocal—though not necessarily symmetrical—costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence. While political and security

interdependence has increased, economic interdependence has deepened even further among the globalising economies. However, noteworthy is the technological interdependence in the way it has transformed international relations. The so-called Information Revolution has opened the international arena to loosely structured networks of organisations, even individuals, and vastly increased the number of channels of contacts between societies. These non-governmental organisations and networks are particularly effective in penetrating states without regard to borders on specific issues such as those related to human rights, and by working through domestic constituencies are able to draw the attention of national governments towards these issues.

Related to the above is the growth of an ‘internationalised conscience’ in support of the security of individual and the collectivities. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. The UN Charter and other international conventions are only reaffirming the global faith in the freedom and security of the individual. As the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan has stated that the UN Charter itself was issued in the name of people and not states. “When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.”

An axiom that comes out of these changes is that international relations are and can no more be confined to the closed-door diplomacy conducted by the state elite. There are many other international actors who are also impinging on international relations. States have shown their inability to resolve all intra- and inter-state conflicts by themselves. The rise of an international civil society means that non-governmental actors are also involved in various ways in the international system; and in its own distinct ways, the international civil society is pressing for, what is being described as, the democratisation of international system.

35.4.2 Human Security Agenda

It needs to be stressed that human security is not a theory. It is *praxis*. Generalisations are emerging from dealing with concrete situations. Basically, it entails a norm-setting and a practical problem-solving agenda that is very large and transformative of the existing international system.

Human security agenda is a very long continuum: from prevention of armed conflicts and, should that fail, ‘humanitarian intervention’ to stop the human suffering, to alleviation of the effects of armed violence on populations and rebuilding of the structures of governance once the conflict is over. It means developing new norms and tools and, wherever they exist, facilitating their implementation. The major task is to convince other states to accept and practise human security agenda; which, no gainsaying, has until now remained a difficult and an uneven process.

What it suggests is a very wide range of actions and a number of instruments. A problem at hand is that precisely this makes human security agenda vast and even somewhat unwieldy. Admittedly, challenges to human security cannot be met just through conventional measures, such as observance of human rights or provision of developmental assistance. In other words, human security is not simply some humanitarian programme. What human security agenda underscores is the need to address the root causes of insecurity and to help ensure future safety of people. It entails building new state capacities. In real terms, it could mean reorganising the financial, administrative, and political capacity of the state with outside help and guidance. State capacity building could mean economic reforms and trade agreements, democratisation including revamping of government institutions such as judiciary, independent electoral commissions, etc.

In other words, human security agenda may bring in far-reaching changes in the economic and political structures and institutions of a state. This may be true more of such states that have lost their capacities due to civil wars, political repression and financial crises, or ‘failed’ states where government’s capacity and machinery may have just collapsed.

35.5 ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR HUMAN SECURITY

35.5.1 Accomplishments

A string of achievements in the second half of the 1990s have shaped the human security agenda. The success of the so-called ‘Ottawa Process’ led to the conclusion in 1997 of international convention banning the production, stockpiling, sale, and use of anti-personnel landmines. This followed the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Two other initiatives, the so-called ‘micro-conventions’, which seek international ban on the use of children as combatants in civil wars and the other banning the production, sale and use of small weapons are under debate and consideration of the international community. The proposal for a UN convention against transnational organised crimes dealing with trafficking in arms and human beings is also under consideration.

Pursuit of human security agenda has engendered an unconventional political process, use of new kinds of diplomatic tools, and the participation of the actors of international civil society in the conduct of international relations. To illustrate the above, a brief description is given below of the political-diplomatic process, unconventional tools of diplomacy and the participation of non-state actors that had led to the signing of the treaty banning the landmines.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction—commonly understood as Ottawa treaty—was signed by 122 countries on 3-4 December 1997. The states adhering to the treaty must never under any circumstance use, develop, produce, stockpile or transfer anti-personnel landmines or help anyone else to do it. They must destroy the existing stockpiles or those already planted within a fixed timeframe. Many more countries have since signed and ratified the treaty.

Ottawa treaty is the first direct attempt to eliminate the scourge that kills or maims one person every 20 minutes. This ‘weapon of mass murder in slow motion’ has killed more persons, mostly civilians, than a weapon of mass destruction. It was at the initiative of Canada, under its foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, and a core group of pro-ban states and a coalition of international non-governmental organisations that the issue was first raised in the international arena. It was pointed out that the existing international laws do not adequately deal with the problem: only few states had accepted the existing laws and the use of only certain types of mines were prohibited and that too in conflicts between states. Besides, the use of mines in civil wars was rampant, and it endangered even more the safety of civilians. Many NGOs had been calling for ban on the production and use of landmines, pointing out that an estimated 119 million mines are spread over about 71 countries, and the problem is essentially a humanitarian problem.

Many organisations including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) and Medico International (MI) had for many years been campaigning for the ban. In 1992, these and other NGOs had launched an International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) at a conference held in London. The ability of the NGOs

to launch the ICBL was related to the emergence of a new global international conscience in the aftermath of Cold War. Many national level campaigns also emerged in the countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia particularly where landmines problem was very serious such as in Cambodia. Pro-ban states also approached the UN for the formulation of new rules that could be comprehensive in dealing with the problem.

Frustrated by the slow pace and effectiveness of the UN process, the 50 pro-ban states and the NGO community finally decided to meet in Ottawa, Canada in October 1996. The conference was attended by ICRC and several international organisations and UN agencies too. This is described as the ‘Ottawa Process’, which culminated in the final treaty signing in December 1997. Among the key actors which played a significant role during the process were Canada which spearheaded the campaign, Austria which prepared the draft treaty, Belgium and Norway which held several conferences in the intervening period, besides the NGOs who had launched several regional initiatives to enlarge the pro-ban coalitions.

Few aspects of the entire ‘Ottawa Process’ are significant. First, the pro-ban countries and their NGO allies took the matter out of the UN conference on disarmament and presented it as an issue related to human survival and therefore a matter of human rights. They presented the issue as not simply one of banning a weapon but one related to the safety of human beings importantly the civilians. Secondly, it was a new kind of diplomacy that relied on the participation of the international civil society. The community of the NGOs proved very useful and effective in building an international public opinion and also, some NGOs could lobby effectively with their governments in support of the ‘Ottawa Process’. Thirdly, the pro-ban states were all medium or small countries and included both the rich and the poor and the developed and the developing countries. Thus, Ottawa treaty became an instance where an international agreement was arrived at without the support—in fact in the face of opposition—of the great powers including the US.

Since 1997, the number of countries who have signed the treaty has gone up. Many countries however cite security and other reasons for not acceding to the Ottawa treaty. For instance, India in principle stands for banning the use of landmines but in a phased manner. Its use should only be allowed for long-term defence of borders, peripheries and peripheries of states. The main difficulty however is that landmines are used indiscriminately by the terrorist, insurgent and other groups. Besides, such groups also use booby traps and other improvised explosive devices. Foremost, therefore, is the need to ban the use of landmines in armed conflicts which are not of an international character. Equally urgent is the task before the international community to drastically reduce the easy availability and transfer of landmines, which leads to their indiscriminate use by such armed groups.

35.5.2 Prospects

One would hardly disagree with the diagnosis of the threats and challenges to human security. The prescriptions of human security are however found to be highly flawed and impracticable. First, the way human security agenda is conceived, it does not devalue state but certainly seeks to circumscribe its role at a time when many developing countries are undergoing wrenching experiences of economic restructuring including serious financial difficulties, or facing challenges of ethnic resurgence and terrorism. Many of the developing countries therefore perceive threats (directly) to their territorial integrity and nation-building process. While agreeing with the ideals of human security, foremost for these countries is the need to preserve their national unity and territorial integrity without which no human security could be possible.

Secondly, it is agreed that international relations have undergone transformative changes with the end of the Cold War but such changes are certainly not so deep as to supplant or drastically reduce the role of the state. All said and done, the international system remains based on the notion of sovereign and equal nation-states. Lastly, no denying the fact that international values and morals have always been part of the international system, but it is only one of the dimensions of international system. Relations among sovereign states otherwise remain based on the acknowledgement of certain formal rules and customs of sovereignty and inviolability of states. Human security agenda is not only interfering in the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of sovereign states but also going beyond that. It prescribes ‘humanitarian intervention’ as the measure of last resort, which is unacceptable to many developing countries which have had experiences of long colonial rule and Western domination. Therefore, one also comes across the view that human security agenda masks the hegemonic ambitions of the great powers because so far it is mostly the developing countries that have faced the humanitarian crises.

35.6 SUMMARY

The concept of human security has received sufficient attention only after the end of the Cold War. It means safety of the people or communities from both violent and non-violent threats and should be seen from the perspective of the security of the individual rather than that of nation-states. It is an effort to create a global society where safety of the individual is the priority and institutions are built to enhance human security.

This does not mean that state security and human security are mutually exclusive. Nor does human security limit sovereignty of state. It only means that safety of the individual cannot be dealt within a statist framework as states alone cannot meet the challenges of the international system. The concept of human security is premised on the interdependence of states which is deepening further in the wake of the process of globalisation and emergence of civil society.

Human security suggests a wide range of actions and a number of instruments. It is not simply a humanitarian programme-it underscores the need to address the root cause of insecurity and entails building new state capacities.

The pursuit of the human security agenda has been an unconventional political process with the use of new kinds of diplomatic tools and participation of international civil society in the conduct of international relations.

While agreeing with the ideals of human security, there are certain problems in its practical implementation. The prescriptions and the way it is conceived is somewhat impracticable especially for developing countries who perceive threats directly to their territorial integrity and the nation-building process. Also, relations among nation states are still based on certain formal rules and customs of sovereignty and inviolability of states. The prescription of humanitarian intervention as a last resort by human security is unacceptable to many developing countries.

35.7 EXERCISES

1. What do you understand by the term “human security”?
2. Does the ‘human security’ agenda undermine the concept of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ and state sovereignty?

3. What kind of international system is envisioned by the human security agenda? How can the present international system be reformed?
4. What are the major accomplishments of the human security agenda so far? Does it involve new diplomatic tools?
5. What are the future prospects of the human security agenda?

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MPS-002

**Indira Gandhi National Open University
School of Social Sciences**

International Relations: Theory and Problems

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2

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August, 2003

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ISBN-

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Further information on the Indira Gandhi National Open University courses may be obtained from the university's office at Maidan Garhi, New Delhi-110 068.

Printed and published on behalf of the Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi, by Professor Kapil Kumar, Director, School of Social Sciences.

Laser typeset by : HD Computer Craft, EA1/75, Main Market Inderpuri, New Delhi-110012.

Ph: 25811437; 31081117

Printed at :

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INTRODUCTION

In the **Book II** on *International Relations: Theory and Problems*, the primary focus of the Units 18 to 35 is to help gain not only some insights into some of the issues that are largely the legacies of the Cold War era but also identify some of the other new problem areas that need critical consideration in the study of current international relations. Keeping these in view, the units in **Book II** are sequentially structured in a manner that in the preliminary part attention is drawn to such of those unresolved problems that the world had to grapple for long. In the remaining part, an attempt is made to identify and examine the new problem areas that are treated as part of the study of IR.

Against that schema, Units 18 to 20-will discuss the different problems that nation-states faced during most of the 20th Century such as the right to self-determination, interventions/invasions perpetrated by one nation-state on the other as also the nuclear arms production and proliferation among nation-states. In discussing these problems, effort is also made to highlight what multilateral mechanisms have been evolved by the comity of nations-be it within the framework of the United Nations Charter or through other multilateral fora-to meet the challenges they pose to the nation-states and also how effective (or not) these initiatives have been in minimising the rigours of these problems. More precisely put, the question that these units seek to answer is whether the end of the Cold War has at all made any difference to the nation-states in tackling these problems-largely the legacies of the past-more effectively or not. Added to an analysis of these problems is a discussion on the issue of terrorism, which unarguably has assumed global magnitude in the post-Cold War era. Such that, Unit 21 purports to analyse at some length the antecedents of international terrorism and sketch the anatomy of terrorism with some case studies of identified non-state terrorist organisations and their recent activities which apparently flout the hitherto acknowledged norms of behaviour in the international system.

The subsequent four units-Unit 22 to Unit 25-deal with themes, which may be characterised as problems that belong to the realm of international political economy. Needless to state that recent revolutions in science and technology have added a new dimension to the study of IR which most analysts argue call for critical attention and scrutiny not only for an understanding of the dynamics of international relations but also for evolving appropriate policy mechanisms. It is for these considerations, Unit 22 offers a historical background to the evolution of science and technology and its impact on international relations over the past Century. Given that the disparate levels in the development of science and technology among nation-states have further widened the gap between the “have” and “have not” nation-states, Unit 23 offers some insights on the inequality among nation-states triggered largely by recent innovations in science and technology and their diffusion across the world. It needs hardly any elaboration that the currently witnessed economic globalisation is a direct fall-out of the recent technological revolution in information and biological sectors. In what ways these revolutions in technology have impacted on the political-economic structures of nation-states and how these structures affect the sovereignty of nation-states and with what consequences for the sovereign nations are dealt at some length in Unit 24. In the evolving global economic order, it is apparent that human rights have assumed a significant dimension seeking a redefinition which goes beyond the basic political rights as was understood in the past. The current phase in international trade, it is argued, impinges on such basic human economic rights. How iniquitous are the norms of the currently observed international trade practices among nation-states and how they have led to an exacerbation of violations of basic human rights are discussed in Unit 24.

If the end of the Cold War is an important benchmark in the history of international relations, its aftermath ushered in a world order palpably different from the previous world system. If the

Cold War international system was largely characterised by a ‘bipolar’ power politics, it has since yielded place to what some analysts describe as the ‘unipolar’ moment. For, in the post-Cold War era the United States has emerged as the only pre-eminent or, what some describe as the ‘hyper’ power. What are the implications of the emergence of the United States as the only global power not only for that country but also for the rest of the world is discussed in Unit 26. Yet the post-Cold War, as some perceive, in its wake has also led to a multi-polar international system with the emergence of China as an economic power house. What ramifications would China’s emergence have for the future course of international politics such as, for example, whether the world would once again lapse into a bipolar adversarial power politics of the Cold War era or not and other related issues are discussed in Unit 27. That apart, concomitant with the end of the Cold War the collapse of the Soviet Union has inserted a new political geography just as the two preceding ‘hot’ World Wars had done in the first half of the 20th Century-in the sense, the political map of Euro-Asia has once again been redrawn with the emergence of what are called the Central Asian countries which in the past were the constituent parts of the now extinct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Admittedly, the emerging political map of this part of the world is latent with a variety of uncertainties both from within and outside. What are these uncertainties and how they are likely to influence these countries in respect of their role in the future course of international events are selectively discussed in Unit 28.

Thus far having dealt at length with a variety of problems which are either the direct or the indirect consequences of an international order largely determined by the super powers’ Cold War politics through most of the second half of the last Century, the remaining units in the **Book II** are devoted to examining some of the major problems that have suddenly surfaced with considerable stridency in the recent decades. It is not as though that these problems were non-existent in the past. Rather they were largely neglected and, therefore, were not widely recognised as important in the study of IR. These relate to the human beings in respect of their ethnic identity in all its dimensions and their displacement within and outside the nation-state ambit and the ways in which they affect contemporary global politics. In the past such identity crises based on cultural, religious racial and civilisational differences were largely dealt at within the confines of nation-states. Consequent upon the displacement of human population in large numbers across national boundaries, triggered by a number of factors-political, economic and technological-ethnic identities based on a variety of differentiations have become a source of serious conflict between nation-states and within nation-states. These in turn are impacting adversely on the already crisis-ridden course of world politics. It is for these considerations, an attempt is made in the subsequent-Unit 29 to Unit 32-to offer some insights on the aforementioned problem areas.

Whereas Unit 29 offers a critical analysis of the resurgence of ethnic identity and the conflicts arising out of such identity crises in the different regions, Unit 30 provides a descriptive analysis of yet another dimension of ethnicity viz. indigenous ethnicity of the aboriginal peoples (also known as natives/*adivasis/tribals*) located in select countries of the world. While these aboriginal peoples are reasserting their primordial rights based on their ‘indigenous’ cultural identity within the nation-states in which they are residing, they are also engaged on the basis of a global campaigning and movement to articulate their aspirations. Unit 31 offers an analysis of the displaced people both from within and outside the nation-states on account of a variety of factors. Legally identified as refugees/stateless people, what circumstances have led to their present status and what international efforts are made to meet with the lot of these people are examined in the unit. Transnational movements of population caused by economic globalisation have made inroads into what has traditionally been understood as ‘national’ identity. In what ways these diasporic communities have changed the nature and course of international relations are discussed in Unit 32.

The concluding three units are devoted to delineate the status of international relations contemporaneously witnessed and what future trajectory it is likely to traverse on the basis of the currently prevalent ideas and institutions. There is no gainsaying that the course of international relations has shifted from one based on inter-state relations to a dynamics of relations based on both state and non-state actors. The civil society on the basis of a variety of non-state actors, commonly known as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), is increasingly becoming vociferous-some times circumscribing the role performance of the nation-state and in some instances even substituting the nation-state-in meeting the challenges of different segments of population across the world. What impact are the NGOs making on the course of international relations is analysed in Unit 33. The following Unit 34 enumerates analytically the built-in injustice in the present state of international relations and offers some pointers to remedying it both in respect of practice and study of IR. The final Unit 35 underlines the need to reframe the present international relations based as it is on the narrowly conceived nation-state security system to encompass the more basic human security system, an idea that is emphasised by both practitioners and scholars of IR for the betterment the global society. Its implementation at the policy level however is fraught with a number of difficulties. What these difficulties are and to what extent the concept of human security has been given concrete shape by the policy makers are highlighted in the concluding unit.

In an effort to help facilitate a quick grasp of the different themes and sub-themes discussed, the book has the following additional features:

- 1 A synoptic structure of the unit identifying the themes/sub-themes, an introduction highlighting the broad contours of the theme and a summary at the end of each Unit offering a brief description of the major conclusions;
- 1 At the end of each Unit a number of study questions are listed that can be used for discussion as well as themes for essays; and
- 1 At the end of the book a list of scholarly works on the themes discussed are listed under the title “Suggested Readings”.

The book thus enables students/learners to gain useful insights in the discipline of IR rather than cursorily study current international events/affairs. The basic and overarching objective of the print material is to enable the students/learners to graduate from the basics of the discipline to a higher level of critical analysis of the issues involved in the study and research of international relations.

UNIT 25 HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Structure

- 25.1 Introduction
- 25.2 Internationalisation of Human Rights
- 25.3 The Growth of World Trade: An Overview
- 25.4 The Role of World Trade Organisation
- 25.5 Transnational Corporation's Accountability of Human Rights
- 25.6 Rights of Indigenous People
- 25.7 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
- 25.8 Marginalisation of Poor Countries
- 25.9 Regulating International Trade: Code of Conduct for TNCs
- 25.10 Summary
- 25.11 Exercises

25.1 INTRODUCTION

Contemporary International Relations has been witnessing two significant developments. One, since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 a huge corpus of human rights law has been evolved under its aegis. As a result, the term 'human rights' has become a "catch word" in contemporary discourses. In fact, human rights can be said to have become, as the former Secretary General of the U.N., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, said in his opening statement to the World Conference on Human Rights (14-25 June 1993) in Vienna, Austria, "the common language of humanity and the ultimate norm of all politics". Second, we are witnessing the globalisation of the world economy. There has been a rapid transformation of the world economy: the reduction of national barriers to trade and investment, the expansion of telecommunications and information systems, the introduction of e-commerce, the increasing role of multinational enterprises, global inter-firm networking arrangements and alliances, regional economic integration and the development of a single unified world market. Under such a milieu, there has been a consistent and faster growth of international trade which has been institutionalised and regulated with the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, which had, for long, controlled economies and markets, has contributed further to this process of globalisation of the world economy and trade.

Many scholars and nations assert and believe that the participation of developing/poor countries in international trade will contribute greatly to their economic prosperity and industrial growth and this will consequently help in raising the standard of life of their people. Further, it is assumed that this prosperity might ultimately improve human conditions and the prospects of human rights of everyone. Contrary to such assertions and beliefs of the protagonists of free trade, human rights are at great risk as international trade primarily works on the principle of profit making rather than promoting and respecting them. Professor Upendra Baxi critically

remarks that the paradigm of human rights of all human beings is steadily, but surely, subverted by trade-related practices. The main focus of this unit is to explain how human rights of the people, specially the workers, are violated by profit making Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and industrialised states that are under their tremendous influence.

25.2 INTERNATIONALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

One of the greatest, in fact, revolutionary, developments in the annals of human history is that for the first time in international relations a comprehensive list of “human rights” has been recognised which every individual, irrespective of his/her origin, religion, race, colour, sex, nationality, etc. can claim as a member of human society. Since 1948 the United Nations has adopted nearly 100 human rights instruments (such as declarations, conventions, covenants, protocols, and resolutions) on various facets of human rights, covering the entire gamut of human relationship. However, it must be noted that the most important among all these instruments are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966, which together form the parts of the International Bill of Rights. This Bill, the first ever adopted in the history of the world, has brought the matter of promoting human rights on the agenda of international relations.

Let us briefly discuss the rights that are mentioned in the International Bill. The UDHR, which was Magna Carta of mankind, proclaims civil-political and economic, social and cultural rights. The two Covenants of 1966 further elaborate these two sets of rights mentioned in the UDHR. The Covenants are legally binding on ratifying states unlike the provisions of the UDHR. It may be noted that the right to property included in UDHR (Art.17) is missing in the two Covenants.

The ICCPR sets out the following rights (under Articles 6-27): right to life; freedom from torture and inhuman treatment; freedom from slavery and forced labour; the right to liberty and security; the right of detained persons to be treated with humanity; freedom from imprisonment for debt; freedom of movement and of choice of residence; freedom of aliens from arbitrary expulsion; the right to a fair trial; protection against retroactivity of the criminal law; the right to recognition as a person before law; the right to privacy; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; prohibition of propaganda for war and of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred; the right of peaceful assembly; freedom of association; the right to marry and found a family; the rights of the child; political rights; equality before the law and rights of minorities. Thus, this is an exhaustive list, and there are more rights in ICCPR than in the UDHR or the European Convention on Human Rights.

Similarly, the ICESCR also provides a detailed list of rights (under Articles 6-15) to be protected by State Parties. These include: the right to work; the right to just and favourable conditions of work including fair wages, equal pay for equal work and holidays with pay; the right to form and join trade unions, including the right to strike; the right to social security; protection of the family, including special assistance for mothers and children; the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing and the continuous improvement of living conditions; the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the right to education, primary education being compulsory and free for all, and secondary and higher education generally accessible to all and the right to participate in cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.

Thus, these two Covenants provide the most basic human rights. Besides these two UN instruments, there are two other sets of human rights norms which conflict with international

trade practices. They are rights of the workers and the environmental rights. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has adopted around 150 Conventions, dealing with, among others, conditions of work, remuneration, child and forced labour, the provision of holidays and social security, prevention of discrimination in employment and trade union rights. There are some 200 multilateral environmental agreements in existence today containing some form of trade measures.

25.3 THE GROWTH OF WORLD TRADE: AN OVERVIEW

Let us briefly look at the phenomenal growth of world trade in contemporary world. During the last five decades the world exports have increased ten fold, even after adjusting for inflation, consistently growing faster than world Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Foreign investment has risen more rapidly; sales by TNCs exceed world exports by a growing margin, and transactions among TNCs are a rapidly expanding segment of world trade. Foreign exchange flows have soared to more than \$1.5 trillion daily, up from \$15 billion in 1973. According to 1996 annual report of the WTO, there was a strong growth in both merchandise and service trade in 1995. The value of total cross-border trade in goods and services exceeded \$6,000 billion for the first time. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, disclosed in his millennium address to the UN that the market for e-commerce was \$2.6 billion in 1996; it is expected to grow to \$300 billion by year 2002. Another study had estimated that the growth of world trade would exceed \$8 trillion annually by the year 2000.

25.4 THE ROLE OF WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION

The WTO was established on 1 January 1995 replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is the result of many rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. The Marrakesh agreement was negotiated as a climax of the Uruguay round of trade negotiations under the umbrella of GATT. The last round of negotiations was concluded on 15 December 1993 and the participating governments signed the Final Act, which included over 22,000 pages, at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 April 1994. The “Marrakesh Declaration” affirmed that the new trade law would “strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment, employment and income growth throughout the world.” The Marrakesh agreement was the most comprehensive trade deal in world history, covering everything from paper clips to jet aircraft. The bulk of the document symbolised its breadth.

The WTO has a much broader scope in terms of the commercial activity and trade policies to which it applies. GATT applied only to trade in merchandise goods; the WTO covers trade in goods, services and “trade in ideas” or intellectual property (innovations, inventions etc.). The functions of the WTO include: (i) monitoring the implementation of multilateral trade agreements, which together make up the WTO; (ii) acting as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations; (iii) seeking to resolve trade disputes among trading partners. (The findings of its arbitration panels are binding); (iv) overseeing national trade policies; and (v) co-operating with other international institutions involved in global economic policy making.

The principles governing international trade system outlined in the WTO Agreements are worth noting. There are four significant principles: (i) Trade should be conducted without discrimination among members and between imported and domestically produced merchandise. (ii) The WTO agreements seek to ensure that conditions of investment and trade are more predictable by making it difficult for member governments to change the rules of the game at will. The key to predictable trading conditions is often the transparency of domestic laws, regulations and practices. WTO agreements contain transparency provisions, which require disclosure of these

rules at the national level or at the multilateral level through formal notifications to the WTO. (iii) The WTO promotes open and fair competition in international trade. It is not the “free trade” institution as it permits tariffs and limited forms of protection. (iv) The WTO agreements encourage development and economic reform. Many of the underdeveloped countries have been following the policies of economic reforms or liberalisation during the last one decade.

25.5 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS' ACCOUNTABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

It has long been recognised that the TNCs that operate across national boundaries have enormous impact on the modern world. If we compare the revenues of the twenty-five largest MNCs with revenues of states, we learn that only six states—USA (\$ 1,248 billion), Germany (\$ 690 billion), Japan (\$ 595 billion), UK (\$ 389 billion), Italy (\$ 339 billion) and France (\$ 221 billion)—have revenues larger than the nine largest MNCs Mitsubishi (\$ 184 billion), Mitsui (\$ 182 billion), Sumitomo (\$ 168 billion), Marubeni—(\$ 161 billion), Ford Motor (\$ 137 billion), Toyota Motor (\$ 111 billion) and Exxon (\$ 110 billion). Because of their enormous economic power, TNCs are often beyond the effective control of national governments, including those, which are within their own jurisdictions. Moreover, TNCs normally have considerable influence in national political systems, especially through pro-business political parties and personalities. This makes regulation of business difficult to achieve.

Today there are more than 38,500 transnational parent companies with their more than 250,000 foreign affiliates. These TNCs and their foreign affiliates produced 25 per cent of global output in 1998, and the top 100 (ranked by foreign assets) had sales totaling \$ 4 trillion. Between 1980 and 1992 the annual sales of TNCs doubled (\$ 2.4 to \$ 5.5 trillion), and the annual sales of many are now greater than the GDP of some states. For example, in 1997, General Motor's worldwide sales (\$ 168 billion) exceeded the combined GDP of Indonesia and Pakistan. (Indonesia: \$115 billion; Pakistan: \$ 45 billion). Again, the combined revenue of two US-based business corporates - General Motors (\$ 168 billion) and Ford Motors (\$ 147 billion) is nearly equal to India's GDP (\$ 324 billion).

The primary objective and concern of TNCs is profit making. In order to make profits TNCs often move their capital and production units to those places where they attract cheap labour. There is a global competition to attract TNC investment both among developing and developed countries. In the hope of attracting TNC investment, nations bid against each other to offer the lowest levels of environmental, labour and human rights regulation. This competitiveness is directly contributing towards fewer social benefits, lower salaries of workers and violation of many social, political and trade union rights. One may find many horror stories of unprincipled TNCs making handsome profits at the expense of clearly exploited employees. Various TNCs, from United Fruit to Coca-Cola, actively opposed progressive governments and laws designed to advance labour rights and other human rights. In fact, United Fruit in Guatemala (1954) and ITT in Chile (1973) actively cooperated with the US government in helping to overthrow politicians (Arbenz in Guatemala and Allende in Chile) who were champions especially of labour rights for their nationals.

What follows here and in the next two sections is a selection of examples where contemporary trade practices lead to human rights violations. Both the TNCs and the elite of national governments demonstrate their intolerance to any alternative world-view expressed by individuals and groups in defence of their economic, social, civil and political rights. When alternatives are expressed, they routinely engage in violating human rights. The statement of former president

of Ecuador, Abdala Bacaram, is case in point: he had asserted that “if oil workers seek to halt the production of basic and strategic services such as oil, I will personally witness the police and the armed forces giving them a thrashing to make them return to work.” Though this statement is perhaps more blunt than most, the attitude of many corporations and governments is similar. Following select examples testify this.

Mexico’s *maquiladora* sector provides a further example. The *maquiladora* produces \$29 billion in export earnings and offers employment for more than 500,000 people from the poorest, least experienced and least educated groups in society. Human rights violations are reported in many parts of the sector, particularly in relation to attempts by workers to establish free trade unions. Where possible, the corporations operating in the *maquiladora* prefer to employ women, because they are more committed to the job and are less informed about their rights, less radical than men, more tolerant of substandard working conditions and less likely to engage in politics or trade union activism.

Moreover, women employees have faced discrimination during pregnancy. Applicants for jobs are routinely subjected to pregnancy tests before being hired. In some cases employees questioned women about their sexual activities, when they last menstruated and whether they used contraceptives. If women do become pregnant, managers attempt to create such conditions, which may compel them to resign. Managers use several methods intended to intimidate, including picking on every conceivable error in the quality of work, no matter how insignificant it is; they provide substandard machines so that their poor performance will not attract bonus payment; refuse to allow time off to attend the doctor, and transfer them to heavier, more physically demanding work usually not suitable for pregnant women. Since women are desperate to keep jobs, they tolerate discriminatory treatment.

Although Mexican labour law forbids such discrimination, the government frequently tolerates such practices. It is regrettable that neither the corporations nor the government seem interested in responding to internationally recognised prohibitions on pregnancy-based discrimination. Under Article 26 of the ICCPR, all people are entitled to equal treatment before the law regardless of sex. Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) condemns all forms of discrimination against women, particularly in the field of employment (Article 11:1). Discriminatory pregnancy-based practices are also a violation of the right to privacy (ICCPR Article 17, UDHR Article 12) and the right to decide freely the number and spacing of children (CEDAW Article 16:1). It may be recalled that Mexico has ratified ICCPR and CEDAW in March 1981.\

There is more to it. Trade union rights were suppressed, when *maquiladora* workers struggled to establish free trade unions, independent of the government-backed Confederation of Mexican Workers (CMW). For example, in 1989, workers at the Ford plant in Hermosillo organised a hunger strike in support of their demand for democratic elections to the CMW. In response, Ford began to dismiss workers and blacklist those involved in the action, but protests continued. Of a total of 3,800 workers, Ford dismissed 3,050 before the organisers called off the action.

Let us look at another example of the activities of Royal Dutch Shell Oil in the Ogoni region of Nigeria. Human Rights Watch (a NGO) reports (in 1995) that at the end of October 1990, Shell requested police assistance at a peaceful demonstration against the continued destruction of tribal lands as a direct result of oil operations. Due to beatings, teargas attacks and indiscriminate shootings 80 people died. On another occasion, one of Shells’ contractors, Willbros, bulldozed crops in preparation for construction work. When local people protested, Willbros called in government troops who opened fire to disperse the demonstrators. Willbros defended its right

to proceed with the construction, on the grounds that all the necessary formal procedures were adhered to, although the popular Movement for the Protection of the Ogoni People was not invited to take part in the negotiations that sanctioned the contract.

Although Shell has claimed that its contact with Nigerian Security Forces was minimal, a government official admitted to Human Rights Watch that regular contact with Lt. Col. Paul Okuntimo, the Director of Rivers State Security, was made. According to one company official, Okuntimo was a “savage soldier”, known for his brutality, who saw his role as making “the area safe for” the oil companies.

It is instructive to note that these incidents of violation of human rights led to a stormy meeting of the shareholders in 1997, which called for greater openness and social responsibility. Shell has recently announced its intention to publish an annual audit of social accountability. It remains to be seen whether this approach to taking human rights seriously proves beneficial.

Another example concerns the sports goods industry. Indian companies produce many sports goods such as baseballs, footballs, cricket equipment, volleyballs and boxing gloves. Although no official data exist, one NGO (i.e. Christian Aid) estimates that of the 300,000 workers engaged in the industry, some 25,000 to 30,000 are children, either working with their families or in small stitching centres. Some children, aged between 10 and 11 years, work five to six hours a day for as little as Rs.10 or even less than that per football. In addition, tanneries supplying leather to the industry’s main exporters employ children, exposing them to hazardous chemicals. Children and teenage apprentices working in factories or small workshops are routinely paid fraction of the adult minimum wage. Besides poor pay, some adult workers are denied union rights, sick pay and access to provident funds and insurance schemes. It is a common practice to deny continuous appointments to workers so as to deprive them of these rights. Despite the constitutional and statutory ban on employing children in hazardous industries, child labour in leather tanning, carpet industry, bangle-manufacturing units, matches and crackers factories continue till this day.

TNCs also have the potential to do great damage by destroying the livelihoods of people through environmental practices that lay forests bare, deplete fishing stocks, dump hazardous materials and pollute rivers and lakes that were once a source of water and fish. The example of commercial prawn farming reveals the extent of damaging effects of trade on civil and political rights. Many underdeveloped countries have encouraged commercial prawn farming ventures without regard for social and environmental consequences. The World Bank and IMF have supported such ventures to help improve the debt-ridden Third World countries’ balance of payments by increasing exports. Commercial prawn farming has the added advantage that it brings high returns on low levels of investment and technology. This is particularly attractive to private investors who wish to make huge profits in the shortest time, as there is a great demand of prawns in Western countries. Moreover, prawn farming is an important source of foreign exchange for underdeveloped Asian and Latin American states.

The farming method involves the construction of saline ponds, ranging in size from a half hectare to five hectares. The optimum conditions for prawn cultivation are maintained in a number of ways: continuously pumping water, and adding chemicals to control acidity and alkalinity, fertilisers for growth, antibiotics to control disease and other chemicals to combat parasites. The timescale from stocking the ponds with seedling prawns to harvest is usually four months, allowing companies to take three crops a year. In fact, one crop is often sufficient to cover investment costs.

Many governments consider such ventures as contributing to their economic growth and development. Therefore, they often give government land to prawn producers. This practice leads to many human rights violations. The sites of prawn farming represent a valuable resource for local communities providing them the only available access to pasture fuel-wood and other necessities to sustain life. In some cases prawn farming has taken over land previously used for producing locally marketed foods. Moreover, it affects the local fishing communities. Also, the construction of ponds can obstruct the natural flow of water and cause flooding in villages, soil erosion and the salination of soil. Producers often pump wastewater containing cocktail additives (used for prawn production) onto adjacent lands, which pollute the soil. Although many of these practices are illegal, governments generally ignore the violations of laws in their enthusiasm for promoting prawn farming. The result is that people are forced from the land that provides subsistence and their traditional way of life disintegrates, violating economic and cultural rights that are protected under international law of human rights.

25.6 RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

The international community has become concerned over violations of the rights of indigenous peoples in recent years, after many years of neglect. The United Nations has drafted a declaration on the subject in 1994. The decade 1994-2003 has been declared the UN Decade for Indigenous Peoples. There is also a 1989 ILO Convention on their rights.

Oil, uranium, minerals and timber are found throughout the world on indigenous lands, and TNCs have been permitted to encroach on them in the name of economic development. Indigenous lands in many parts of the world have been trespassed upon in pursuit of traditional medicines, which are then brought onto international pharmaceutical markets.

There are many cases concerning the violations of the rights of the indigenous people. We are discussing here only two cases. (In the preceding section we have already discussed the example of Shell Oil in Nigeria's Ogoni region, which violated the rights of tribals). First, in 1985 a complaint against Brazil was brought to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by the Yanomami Indians of Brazil alleging that many of their rights have been violated due to the activities of independent prospectors and companies engaged in exploiting the mineral and timber resources of the Amazon regions inhabited by them. It was alleged that the so-called economic development has resulted in serious violations of their right to health, clean environment, the right to life and the cultural rights. The Inter-American Commission found that the incursions, which included the construction of a highway through Yanomami lands, caused disruption of the social life of the Yanomami and introduced a number of diseases, which decimated the population. The Commission also found that, in licensing and permitting these activities, Brazil violated the right to life and the right to protection of health provided in the American Declaration of the Rights of Man.

A second example concerns the controversy surrounding the proposed construction of a new port by P & O, the developers, in Dahanu in the state of Maharashtra, which placed it conspicuously at the centre of all trade issues. Dahanu is the home of India's few remaining tribal peoples, the Warlis. The proposed port is reportedly eight times the size of Liverpool and will not only bring much needed jobs to the area and regenerate the economy but will also relieve the congestion at Bombay port.

An unpublished report commissioned by P & O, however, concludes, "the port will destroy the Warlis way of life. Moreover, 70 per cent of the Warlis were opposed to the port, with only

11 per cent in favour. Contrary to the government of Maharashtra's claim that the port will bring lasting economic benefits, the report concludes that there is little evidence of this. Indeed, the sustainable use of natural resources has created a flourishing economy, which is self-sufficient and rooted in the natural wealth of the region. If P & O is allowed to go ahead with the construction, the local economy will be destroyed and it will have extensive impact on human rights.

25.7 TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is one of the pillars of the Uruguay Round agreement, and also one of the most contentious. It tightens intellectual property rights for the creator. It introduces an enforceable global standard by linking intellectual property rights with trade, making them binding and enforceable through the WTO mechanism.

TRIPS agreement fails to protect adequately the rights to health, and the rights of indigenous people among others. Its provisions restrain many public policies that promote wider access to health care. National laws of many developing countries have intentionally excluded pharmaceuticals from product patent protection (allowing only process patents) to promote local manufacturing capacity for generic drugs and to make drugs available at lower prices. The move from process to product patents introduced under the TRIPS agreement dramatically reduces the possibilities for local companies to produce cheaper versions of important life saving drug, such as those for cancer and HIV/AIDS. Local production of anti-AIDS drugs flucanazole in India had kept the prices reasonable (costing \$55 for 100 tablets) whereas its prices in the other developed and the same under the developed countries ranges between \$ 700 - \$ 1000.

Traditional knowledge and resource rights of indigenous people have been greatly affected under the TRIPS agreement. Traditionally life forms, plants and animals-were

exempted from patents. But now it is going to change. TRIPS agreement requires all WTO member countries to permit patents on microorganisms and microbiological and non-biological processes. So "bioprospecting" has mushroomed-with scientists "reinventing" and patenting products and processes using traditional knowledge that communities have held for centuries. Patents have been awarded for using the healing properties of turmeric, for the pesticide properties of the neem tree and other plant properties-all part of traditional knowledge. In a number of such cases the patents were challenged and reversed.

The TRIPS agreement mostly benefits technologically advanced countries. It is estimated that industrialised states hold 97 per cent of all patents, and TNCs 90 per cent of all technology and product patents. Developing countries have little to gain from the stronger patent protection from the TRIPS agreement because they have little research and development capacity.

The TRIPS agreement also appears to be incompatible with human rights law and environmental agreements. The International Bill of Rights recognises the human right to share in scientific progress. It may be recalled that India had invented zero but we have not patented its use, rather the entire world is benefited by its use. The Convention on Biodiversity requires states to protect and promote the rights of communities, farmers and indigenous people in their use of biological resources and knowledge systems. It also requires equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the commercial use of communities' biological resources and local knowledge.

There is need to build human rights safeguards into the TRIPS agreement. The African Group of WTO Members has proposed a review of the agreement, particularly for provisions to protect indigenous knowledge. And India has suggested amendment to promote transfer of environmentally sound technology.

25.8 MARGINALISATION OF POOR COUNTRIES

It is true that global economic integration is creating opportunities for people around the world, but it is also leading to widening the gaps between the poorest and richest countries. Many of the poorest countries are marginalised from the growing opportunities of expanding international trade, investment and in the use of new technologies.

The UNDP's Human Development Report 2000, which focuses on human rights, provides arresting evidence of how the pursuit of free trade and the systematic violation of human rights go hand in hand besides marginalising poor countries from the bounty of world economy. Let us look at the statistics provided in the report. World exports of goods and services expanded rapidly between 1990 and 1998, from \$ 4.7 trillion to \$ 7.5 trillion. And 25 countries had export growth averaging more than 10 per cent a year (including Bangladesh, Mexico, Mozambique, Turkey and Vietnam), but exports declined in Cameroon, Jamaica and Ukraine. In 1998 least developed countries, with 10 per cent of the world population, accounted for only 0.4 per cent of global exports, down from 0.6 per cent in 1980 and 0.5 per cent in 1990. Sub-Saharan Africa's share declined to 1.4 per cent, down from 2.3 per cent in 1980 and 1.6 per cent in 1990. Although average tariffs are higher in developing than in developed countries, many poor nations still face tariff peaks and tariff escalation in such key sectors as agriculture, footwear and leather goods.

The marginalisation of poor can further be discerned from the data on foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI flows have boomed, reaching more than \$ 600 billion in 1998. But these flows are highly concentrated, with just 20 countries receiving 83 per cent of the \$177 billion going to developing and transition economies, mainly China, Brazil, Mexico and Singapore. The 48 least developing countries attracted less than \$ 3 billion in 1998, a mere 0.4 per cent of the total.

Of course, not everybody is suffering in the global economy. In 1998, the UNDP said the assets of the world's 358 billionaires exceeded the combined annual incomes of countries with 45 per cent of the world's population. In 1999, we learn that the sales of the world's top six firms, at \$ 716 billion, exceed the combined GDP of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The UNDP's report for 2000 disclosed that the super rich get richer. The combined wealth of the top 200 billionaires hit \$ 1,135 billion in 1999, up from \$ 1,042 billion in 1998. This is in comparison with the combined incomes of \$ 146 billion for the 582 million people in all the least developed countries.

25.9 REGULATING INTERNATIONAL TRADE: NEED TO EVOLVE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR TNCS

In the preceding pages we have seen how TNCs are conducting their business and often pursue their interests of profit making, often disregarding and violating internationally agreed norms of human rights. Unless an internationally accepted "code of conduct" for TNC operations is evolved and enforced through the United Nations or some multilateral forum, it is extremely difficult to make them socially responsible. Such a code may promote human rights accountability

and social auditing of TNCs. While the industrialised countries of the North where TNCs have their base have laid down rules and regulations and parametres within which TNCs and private entrepreneurs could operate, they never supported for such rules and regulations at the international level.

Due to demands from the developing countries of South, supported by the communist states, the United Nations attempted to do its part of monitoring the activities of TNCs and preventing their misuse of power. For several years the United Nations also tried to evolve a binding code of conduct for TNCs, which never came to fruition due to blocking action by the capital exporting states whose primary concern was to protect the freedom of “their” corporations to make profits. After more than two decades of negotiations and drafting of the code, the attempt was abandoned in the late 1980s. The United Nations department concerned with TNCs was abolished under the US pressure in January 1992.

In 1996 the WTO did adopt a declaration, sponsored by the USA, pledging members to respect labour rights. The declaration was non-binding and vague. But some observers were fearful that just as the WTO had struck down some US decisions-based on its environmental regulations-as restraints on free trade, so the WTO might prove equally hostile to human rights regulations.

It is intriguing that instead of laying down a code of conduct for TNCs, the industrialised states, as represented in OECD (the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), are preparing drafts for Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). In February 1997, a 147-page negotiating text was leaked and is now available on Public citizen’s Trade watch web page of the Internet. Although the process to get agreement on the MAI is currently stalled, the OECD continues to argue that its acceptance would make a significant contribution towards completing the global programme of deregulation. In fact, the first draft of the MAI was completed in secret. According to critics, if accepted, the MAI would constitute a significant step towards creating a “constitution of a single global economy” or a “bill of rights and freedoms for TNCs”. This constitution would further restrict state powers to formulate independent policy and curtail the rights of people to enjoy the benefits of their natural resources. The practice of imposing human rights-related investment conditions, such as employing local labour, providing education and training and making a contribution to the local economy, would be outlawed under the MAI. Moreover, MAI draft bans any restriction on “repatriation of profits” and the movement of capital. It also bans “performance requirement” and prohibits governments (of developing countries) from treating foreign investors differently from domestic investors and authorises TNCs to sue national government for failure to meet the MAI’s terms. In short, critics argue that the MAI represents a major step in the attempt to promote free trade that serves the interests of international investors and corporations, without regard for the rights of workers, communities and the environment.

However, it is encouraging to note that a number of corporations have adopted corporate codes of conduct dealing with labour and human rights. The most frequently cited example of company guidelines in this regard are the *Levi Strauss and Co. Business Partner Terms of Engagement and Guidelines for Country Selection*, which are directed to the company’s contractors and suppliers. They cover, *inter alia*, occupational safety and health, freedom of association, wages and benefits, working time, child labour, forced labour and non-discriminatory hiring practices. Also, the OECD has adopted a non-binding code, but it generated little influence.

The Reebok Corporation, the New York Skirt, is making similar efforts and Sports wear Association, the National Association of Blouse Manufacturers Inc., the Industrial Association of Juvenile Apparel Manufacturers and the Timberland Corporation. These efforts, if they

become sufficiently widespread, will have a positive effect on social situations, but they frequently lack effective monitoring systems and need to be more widely adopted and enforced.

Thus, voluntary codes of corporate conduct have proliferated-but they tend to be weak on two fronts. First, they rarely refer to internationally agreed human rights standards. For example, most apparel industry codes refer to national standards rather than the higher ILO standards. Second they lack mechanisms for implementation and external monitoring and audit.

25.10 SUMMARY

As the international trade is growing phenomenally in contemporary world and the TNCs share of it is strengthening day by day, the state of many internationally recognised human rights is getting diluted. This unit reveals that many human rights are violated in the cause of trade. With the study of many examples of TNCs' accountability of human rights in the unit we learn that people who stand in the way of trade-related business "routinely" lose the right to self-determination and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development (ICESCR, Article 1:1). In some cases, local resistance to trade-related development projects lead to the isolation of the right to life, liberty and the security of persons (UDHR, Article 3). The right to form and join trade unions for the promotion and protection of economic and social interests (UDHR, Article 23:4; ICESCR, Article 8), is also a target for oppressive measures. The right to subsistence is violated when people are excluded from their traditional means of feeding, clothing and housing themselves (ICESCR, Article 11). The special protection afforded to women under CEDAW seems to attract little respect when there is a need for low-paid obedient workers engaged in the production of export goods. Also, the right to enjoy and share scientific progress (UDHR, Article 27:2 and ICESCR, Article 15:6) is greatly restricted with the coming into force of TRIPS agreement.

The trade related practices also lead to violations of the rights of indigenous people besides causing significant damages to environment and natural habitat. Moreover, the pursuit of free trade is benefiting rich countries more and the gap between rich and poor nations is growing further. This is leading to the marginalisation of poor nations. Unless the TNCs are made to follow internationally recognised code of conduct, in which human rights dimensions can be built, human rights of people cannot remain secure as the contemporary trade practices at international level reveal.

25.11 EXERCISES

1. What do you understand by the term "International Bill of Rights"? List the rights catalogued in it.
2. "Some of the TNCs have larger revenues than some nations." Discuss the
3. TNCs' economic power in the light of this statement.
4. Give examples of violations of women's rights by certain TNCs.
5. In what way are the environmental rights violated by TNC practices?
6. In which sector is child labour exploited in India by some TNCs?
7. Briefly discuss the violation of the rights of indigenous people by TNCs.
8. Do you think TNCs should be governed by a Code of Conduct?

UNIT 26 CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER

Structure

- 26.1 Introduction
 - 26.2 Emergence of USA as a World Power
 - 26.2.1 Birth of USA as a Superpower
 - 26.2.2 End of the Cold War
 - 26.3 Only Superpower of a Unipolar World
 - 26.3.1 Current Status
 - 26.4 America in the View of Others
 - 26.4.1 Post-Cold War Challenges
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26.1 INTRODUCTION

The United States of America is relatively a new civilisation on earth, but it is an old and resilient democracy. The size of the country, its natural resources, advantageous geographical location and the nature of its economy made this country one of the handful of major powers of the world from its very birth as an independent country in 1776. But the focus of the early settlers of the US was on westward continental expansion for decades. As if to announce the world that the United States was a power to be reckoned with, president James Monroe had declared a doctrine named after him as Monroe Doctrine way back in 1823. The doctrine actually was a warning to the then European colonial powers to refrain from meddling in the Western Hemisphere-a region regarded by successive American administrations as the US sphere of influence. The US did not have the teeth to literally implement such a doctrine. And the next major preoccupation of the US political leadership was eradication of slavery, which plunged the country into a devastating Civil War in the 1860s. The number of people killed during the American Civil War was significantly more than all casualties the country suffered in all the wars except the prolonged Vietnam War.

26.2 EMERGENCE AS A WORLD POWER

The industrialisation of the American economy after the Civil War, growth of a powerful US navy in the 1880s and the American victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898 turned the country into a major world power at the turn of the 19th Century. The war against Spain was well calculated and aimed at launching the US as a world power. No wonder that the US Congress declared war against Spain on the ground of ending Spanish colonial rule over Cuba. But the first shots were fired in this war in distant Manila Bay of the Philippines. The idea was to wrest control of the Philippines from Spain and establish American colonial rule. The United States colonised the Philippines after a domestic debate on “imperialism” and became a member of the exclusive club of colonial powers of the time.

26.2.1 Birth of a Super Power

However, not until the Second World War was the United States able to play a leading role in world affairs. The US foreign involvement until then was marked by periodic isolation and occasional activism. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who steered the US through the perilous Second World War, was himself a strategic planner and thinker. As the war was still wreaking havoc around the globe, Roosevelt confident that his country would come out victorious, had ordered his officials to undertake studies on strategic requirements of the US in the post-war period. He was indeed correct and from the ashes of the world war, the US took birth as a superpower of the world.

As almost all the European powers, such as Britain, France, Germany and Italy, had suffered heavy losses in the war, the relative strength of the United States was considerably higher than any country in the entire world. The Soviet Union also had considerable strength in conventional military capability and it also came to be known as a super power. But the US had nuclear monopoly for about four years after the Second World War. The gross domestic product of the US, moreover, was almost half of the total global product. The moment was indeed more unipolar than it has ever been.

The world soon witnessed a Cold War between the two super powers. The United States sought to uphold free market capitalism and perceived an ideological threat from Soviet Communism. The United States, moreover, desired to spread its influence around the world and the Soviet Union posed a challenge to Washington's policies. Washington adopted a declaratory Truman Doctrine promising military aid to those countries, which were fighting Soviet-backed totalitarian/authoritarian forces. Another doctrine "containment of communism", formulated by the Truman administration, became the bedrock of the US national security policy throughout the Cold War in subsequent years. The first theatre of the Cold War was Europe. The East European countries fell under the Soviet sphere of influence and the US took military and economic measures to shield Western Europe from any kind of Soviet penetration. On the basis of the containment objective, the United States under its leadership established a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with West European countries to protect the region from any Soviet military invasion. The 'Marshall Plan' was announced to finance economic recovery of Western Europe. It was an economic measure aimed at maintaining social and economic stability in the Western Europe to ward off probable Communist influence.

While the US was fully committed to defend Western Europe and did not give as much priority to other regions of the world, it had to fight Cold War in Asia by committing American troops. Cold War spilled over to the Asian region with the emergence of Communist China in 1949. It was the result of Chinese civil war, where the US had diplomatically and politically backed the non-Communist Nationalist forces. But months after the Communist victory in China, war broke out in the Korean Peninsula between the Communist North Korea and the non-Communist South Korea. The US sent troops under the UN flag and fought the Korean War on behalf of South Korea, but it ended with no clear victory for any side. By the time the Korean War ended, the Communist challenge in Indo-china became prominent. The US initially got involved politically and diplomatically, but subsequently it had to fight a prolonged war against the Communist forces of North Vietnam to protect South Vietnam. The US lost this war and after the withdrawal of the American troops the whole of Indo-china became Communist.

The most spectacular defeat of the American power in its fight against Communist forces was in Cuba. Cuba, after a successful communist revolution, turned 'red' in 1959 and is still a communist state. The victory of leftist forces in Cuba, Indo-china, Eastern Europe and many

other places clearly indicated that the United States was not able to sustain the unipolar moment it enjoyed during the first few years after Second World War. Its military capabilities and huge wealth did not bring unfailing success to the United States during the Cold War. In other words, the power and influence of the United States were circumscribed in a bipolar international system, where the rival superpower-the former Soviet Union-successfully competed with the US in containing the spread of American pattern of free market capitalism.

26.2.2 End of the Cold War

In fact, the US was perceived as a declining power in the 1970s, particularly after it failed to fight communism in Indo-china, which became a communist dominated region in 1975. The loss of American presence in Iran after the successful Islamic Revolution in that country in 1979 and the rise of the leftist Sandinista forces to power in Nicaragua in the same year further strengthened images of a declining American power. The table, however, turned when the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 sparked off a second round of intense Cold War. In a way, the US got an opportunity to pay back in the same coin what they had suffered during the prolonged involvement in Indo-china. The US, during the administration of a super cold-warrior-Ronald Reagan-turned Pakistan into a frontline state, brought together several *mujahideen* groups in Afghanistan, and encouraged them to fight back the Soviet troops. The monitory and material help were funneled through Pakistan to these groups. In a span of about ten years of involvement, the Soviet Union was no longer in a position to sustain itself let alone continue the military occupation of Afghanistan. As the involvement in Afghanistan became costlier with passing time, in the second half of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was on a path of economic and political reforms under the dynamic leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* represented restructuring and openness. Moscow also abandoned the Cold War policies and sought *détente* with the West. By 1989, the Soviet Union had withdrawn its forces from Afghanistan and momentous changes in East European countries led to the collapse of Euro-communism. The Soviet Union lost all its control over the East European countries. In 1990-91, Moscow had no option but to cooperate with Washington to deal with the Gulf Crisis. The crisis sparked off by Iraqi president Saddam Hussain's decision to occupy neighbouring Kuwait culminated in a war of liberation. Contrary to Soviet policies of Cold War years, there was unprecedented cooperation between the two super powers in ending the Gulf Crisis. The policy of *détente*, however, was not adequate to deal with the internal political crisis in the Soviet Union. By December 1991, the Soviet Union was unable to sustain itself as a cohesive independent nation and cracked up into fifteen different independent republics. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Cold War also ended. The bipolar international order gave way to a unipolar world dominated by the US

26.3 ONLY SUPERPOWER OF A UNIPOLAR WORLD

The contemporary global political system is described by some as a unipolar world. International Relations analysts and commentators do not agree on the exact nature and characteristics of this unipolarity. But one thing is indisputable; the current unipolarity has replaced the bipolar global system of Cold War years. In this sense, the collapse of one pole represented by the former Soviet Union leaves the United States-the other pole-as the sole super power of the world.

Systemic descriptions apart, what is the current position of the United States in world politics? Is it the most powerful country in the world? Or, is it a declining power? Most of the American people perceive their country as the most important and the most powerful country in the world.

Majority of the American people are not in favour of isolationism and would like their government to play an active role in world affairs. After the Soviet collapse, American people appear to be feeling more secure than before, due to the disappearance of the threat of a nuclear war. Overall, it appears that the US has been a “self-satisfied super power” in the post-Cold War era.

But some analysts, like Hubert P. Van Tuyll, argue that the United States today is a declining power and “it would do well to emulate the British example of survival.” Timothy Garton Ash, on the other hand, writes: “America today has too much power for anyone’s good, including its own. It has that matchless soft power in all our heads. In economic power its only rival is the European Union. In military power it has no rival. Its military expenditure is greater than that of the next eight largest military powers combined. Not since Rome has a single power enjoyed such superiority—but the Roman colossus only bestrode one part of the world. Stripped of its anti-American overtones, the French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine’s term “hyperpower” is apt.” There are others, such as Joseph Nye, Jr. who considers the US as a “predominant power” rather than a “dominant power.”

American scholars and seasoned diplomats, who see a danger in interpreting the US power as a “dominant” one, warn that this planet cannot be ruled by any single political centre, irrespective of its military power. William Pfaff opines that the “American bid for hegemony would eventually fail, because however benevolent, it is seen by others as a threat. A European foreign minister once said that all his colleagues regarded their most serious foreign policy problem was that of dealing with the US.”

But those, who believe in the “hyperpower” theory, support the idea of maintaining the *status quo*. And the US goal, they argue, should be preventing the rise of a rival centre of power. “The central aim of American foreign policy has traditionally been to dominate the Western hemisphere while not permitting another great power to dominate Europe or Northeast Asia. The United States has not wanted a peer competitor. In the wake of the Cold War, US policymakers remain fully committed to this goal.” In 1992, a Pentagon report concluded that the US “strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.”

This group of Americans would support the following policy:

- 1 If the American security interests are challenged, Washington should use diplomacy when it can, but force if it must.
- 1 The US must remain engaged to address the new dangers, challenges as well as opportunities. There would be no security for the country in a policy of isolationism and the country would not prosper in a policy of protectionism.
- 1 The US must send military troops to defend its vital national interests and values, if these are at stake.
- 1 When important, but not vital interests are involved, appropriate cost-benefit analysis should be made.
- 1 Defence capability should be maintained to address regional contingencies and the US overseas military presence should continue to enhance American security.

26.3.1 Current Status of the US

Whatever may be the characterisation of the US position in the world today, there is no dispute

that the US is the only super power in the contemporary world politics. It is the number one military and economic power in the entire globe. Its military strength is not only reflected in its huge defence expenditure but also its leadership in various frontiers of military technology and R & D facilities. While the US demonstrated its spectacular military power in the 1991 Gulf War, it was quick to learn from that war that its “overwhelming dependence” on transoceanic power projection strategy and its confidence of getting access to base facilities overseas were presumptuous. Robert Chandler and John R. Backschies have argued, that the US military strategy would not work efficiently in a world where state-sponsored terrorism was increasing. As the US military was getting ready to meet the new challenges, terrorism struck the US on 11 September 2001. Soon the US was able to demonstrate its military capability once again by bombing the Taliban training camps in Afghanistan. The recent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and its predominance in the field of information technology have elevated the US position in the global military power structure to a point, where no rival is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. The overall social stability in the American society is the product of its national wealth, domestic economic policy and a democratic political structure. This in turn has enabled the US to play a substantial leadership role in the global political and economic affairs.

The US retains military edge over most of its economic rivals and competitors and economic edge over its potential military rivals. While there is a perception that significant things cannot be achieved without the active participation of the US whatever Washington says and does has an impact around the world. And what it does not say and does not do also has repercussion around the globe. As Stephen Waltz writes: “The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a position of unprecedented preponderance. America’s economy is 40 per cent larger than that of its nearest rival, and its defense spending equals that of the next six countries combined. Four of these six countries are close US allies, so America’s advantage is even larger than these figures suggest. The United States leads the world in higher education, scientific research, and advanced technology (especially information technologies), which will make it hard for other states to catch up quickly. This extraordinary position of power will endure well into this Century. President William J. Clinton was the first post-Cold War American president. He presided at the helm of affairs for eight full years at a time when the US came to occupy the position in the world as the sole superpower.” According to Waltz, Clinton followed a foreign policy that was neither “isolationism” nor “expensive internationalism” and many American people actually believe that Clinton’s foreign policy performance was “outstanding”.

Its power, wealth and position have enabled the US to play an important role in world affairs. The US is active in most of the current events in international affairs, such as combating terrorism, checking proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting spread of small arms and illegal drugs trafficking, dealing with environmental degradation, conflict resolution and host of other activities through its participation in international organisations. Moreover, majority of the countries-big, medium and small-are seeking to maintain cordial ties with the United States. Of course, both the fear of the US and the hope of some benefits are guiding the behaviour of those seeking to bandwagon with the US on various international issues. To quote Robert E. Hunter: “The dawn of the 21th Century finds the United States deeply involved in the outside world, more so than ever before in its history, and, in terms of the reach of its global engagement, more so than any other country. It has diplomatic relations with about 180 sovereign states; its military forces are deployed, in large or small, throughout the world; its role in the global economy is unmatched and is made manifest, in some degree, in virtually every other country; and it belongs to a host of international institutions. Other nations look to the United States for leadership, for help in providing for their security and prosperity, for diplomacy in preventing war and making peace, and for wisdom in shaping the work of international bodies that cover a wide range of human activities”.

26.4 AMERICA IN THE VIEW OF THE WORLD

How do other countries view the US international role today? It appears that the perception of the US in many parts of the world is guided by the fear of American power and the suspicion that critical opposition to the US policies could invite retaliation.

First of all, there is widespread discomfort even among the traditional US allies in Europe about the American unilateralism. It is clearly reflected in the US position on the international criminal court, the new Bush administration's approach to the Kyoto Protocol on environment, the determination to go ahead with a missile defence system programme despite widespread opposition, and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate.

Secondly, several members of the European Union, which are also America's NATO allies, do not endorse the US policies towards countries, such as Iran and Iraq. The recent US military action to overthrow the Saddam Hussain regime in Baghdad has generated open criticism in Europe and elsewhere.

Thirdly, both US allies and other neutral countries have found it difficult to agree to the US characterisation of some countries as "rogue states", "countries of concern" and most recently "axis of evil." As the Bush administration seeks to target such regimes, several American analysts also feel that the US government incorrectly elevates these countries to the rank of those who threaten American security interests. The whole idea of the National Missile Defence (NMD), however, is being promoted on the basis of the speculation that countries, such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea pose a missile threat to the United States. Not many American policy makers today dismiss the possible emergence of a "less predictable, rogue missile danger" and believe that NMD could maintain US "freedom of action even "in the face of a coercive missile threat from otherwise second-rate regional powers." It is more of scenario building and seeking justifications for something rather than discovering real threats.

Fourthly, the US foreign policy behaviour has induced the European countries to view management of relations with the US as one of the most important foreign policy challenges. The growing rift between the transatlantic partners on several issues related to trade, investment and business, and the high-handed approach of the US towards such issues has intensified such European perceptions.

Fifthly, the erstwhile adversaries and rivals of the US, such as Russia and China are seeking closer cooperation with that country. Simultaneously, they are striving to evolve a multi-polar international structure as an answer to the perceived American unilateralism in world affairs. The proposed Russia-China-India triangle is a desire to establish a mechanism to manage American unilateralism in international relations.

Sixthly, a large number of smaller countries, particularly in the Islamic world are feeling pressurised by the US since the Bush administration launched the so-called global war against terrorism. With the solitary exception of Iraq's Saddam Hussain government, almost all the Islamic countries condemned the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon buildings on 11 September 2001. But after the US bombing of Afghanistan targetting Taliban, cracks have developed in the Washington-led international coalition against terrorism. Several Islamic countries are unable to endorse the methods and approaches of the Bush Administration in the on-going war against terror. The most glaring case of awesome discontent over the US approach is regarding the whole question of "regime change" in Baghdad. While larger popular opposition

to the US policies reverberates in the growing anti-Americanism in Islamic countries, the governments in those countries appear to be having little option but to bend to the US pressure.

Last but not the least, several countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America feel that the US being the richest country in the world, does not do much for the poverty-stricken masses around the world. There is resentment among a large number of people that the US spends more in defence and security areas than in poverty alleviation, where 2.8 billion people out of total global population of about 6 billion live on less than \$2 a day and 1.2 billion on less than \$1 a day.

26.4.1 Post-Cold War Challenges

American analysts have observed that no great rival power to the US is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. Can the European Union (EU) emerge as a rival centre of power? Europe as an economic equal to the US is possible. Given the continent's diplomatic and military experience, the EU can also play a substantial role in international affairs. But, as Ash points out, "the gulf between its military capacity and that of the United States grows ever wider." Robert Leiber argues that the transatlantic ties remain solid despite numerous differences and that the pervasive "internal bickering" among the EU members cannot create a fracture in the alliance. Mearsheimer is more candid in his assessment. He writes: "Without the American pacifier, Europe is not guaranteed to remain peaceful. Indeed, intense security competition among the great powers would likely ensue because, upon American withdrawal, Europe would go from benign bipolarity to unbalanced multipolarity, the most dangerous kind of power structure. The United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany would have to build up their own military forces and provide for their own security. In effect, they would all become great powers, making Europe multipolar and raising the ever-present possibility that they might fight among themselves. And Germany would probably become a potential hegemon and thus the main source of worry."

Can Russia pose a challenge to the US in the near future? Russia actually remains the only country in the world, which has the "over-kill" nuclear capacity and thus theoretically can threaten the physical existence of the United States. But it no longer poses a systemic challenge to the US predominance in the world, as it did during the Cold War. Its economy is too weak to enable it to play the role of a major pole in the global power structure. Russian economy is unlikely to grow to a point where it can emerge as a rival centre of power to the US. During the larger part of the Cold War, the former Soviet economy was almost half of the US economy. After the end of the Cold War, Russia did not inherit all the sources of wealth of the former USSR. Moreover, the US has provided billions of dollars of assistance to Russia and the two countries are seeking to develop cooperative relations. Since 1992, Washington has provided more than \$10.8 billion in grant assistance to Russia, "funding a variety of programmes in four key areas: security programmes, humanitarian assistance, economic reform, and democratic reform." The American assistance is provided for a variety of programmes including nuclear reactor safety, public health, and customs reform. Russia has also been the recipient of more than \$9 billion in commercial financing and insurance from the US Government.

While Russia has a long list of complaints against the US policies, such as NATO expansion, bombing of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya and Somalia in recent years abrogation of the ABM treaty, intervention in the Caspian politics, it has grudgingly witnessed the US military presence in the Central Asian Republics, it still does not want to follow a confrontational policy. Russia has willy-nilly accepted the engagement policy of the US by joining the NATO-Russia Foundation Act and Partnership for Peace Initiative. On a wide range of security issues, which include nuclear threat reduction, arms control, peacekeeping, combating terrorism and others,

Washington and Moscow are cooperative partners. Russia runs a trade surplus with the US and feels elated about the US support to its membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. Washington is also in favour of Russia's entry into the World Trade Organisation. More than fifty thousand Russian people have visited the US either on various government-sponsored programmes or as tourists. It is thus unlikely that Russia is going to pose a security challenge to the US in the foreseeable future.

Can China pose a security threat to the United States? A great debate is on since the end of the Cold War in the US about the growing Chinese power. One section of the American strategic analysts argues that China could emerge powerful enough to be a rival of the US. Highly positive predictions of the Chinese economic growth and Beijing's drive towards military modernisation have generated apprehensions in the US that China, instead of becoming a cooperative partner, could pose a challenge to the US presence in Asia. The US-China differences over the issues, such as Taiwan, Tibet, trade and human rights are cited as the areas where Washington and Beijing would clash. It is also pointed out that a powerful China would like to throw its strategic weight around in its neighbourhood and this could complicate Washington's cooperative ties with friendly Asian countries. Some analysts go to the extent of forecasting the emergence of a new kind of Cold War between the US and China in Asia.

Another group highlights the positive aspects of emerging ties between the US and China. The economic ties between the two countries have touched new heights in recent years. Political differences between Washington and Beijing have not affected the growing business, trade, and investment ties between the two countries.

American companies have invested in a wide range of manufacturing sectors, hotel projects, restaurant chains, and petrochemicals in China and "have entered agreements establishing more than 20,000 equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in China. More than 100 US-based multinationals have projects in China, some with multiple investments." Moreover, the United States has substantial economic and social ties with Hong Kong. The US investment in Hong Kong is to the tune of about \$16 billion and there are 1,100 US firms and 50,000 American residents in Hong Kong. China ran a trade surplus of about \$100 billion in the year 2001 and the trade relations between the two countries are likely to grow in the future, especially after the US Congress de-linked the Human Rights issue from the trade issue and approved the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) bill.

But even otherwise, China will not be in a position to challenge the American primacy in the world and the predominant US presence in the Asia-pacific region. First of all, the economic achievements of China in absolute terms will always be compromised by its huge demographic burden. Secondly, the US will retain its hold and remains the frontrunner in the advanced technology sectors for the foreseeable future and China in any case is unlikely to be a great competitor. Thirdly, China is currently no match to the US military capabilities; nor is it likely to be a challenger to the US military preponderance.

The US is unlikely to see the rise of a rival superpower in the foreseeable future. The American primacy will continue deep into the 21st Century. But the country certainly has to face new and emerging challenges. Such challenges may require building of "revolving coalitions" with various permutations and combinations of countries. In other words, the days of pure and undiluted unilateralism are transitory and the US perhaps has learnt quickly to adjust to the new realities, especially in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks.

26.5 SUMMARY

The US emerged as a world power on the eve of the 20th Century after winning a war against Spain in 1898. The end of Second World War saw the birth of the USA as a super power. It had nuclear monopoly and a massive economy for a few years and ruled a unipolar world until the Soviet Union emerged as a rival super power. The Cold War between the two super powers led to a decline in American power with the spread of communism into some countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The American decline stopped and the Soviet decline began with the onset of second Cold War with Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviet decline culminated in the disintegration of the Soviet Union, emergence of fifteen different independent republics and end of the Cold War. The collapse of a pole in the bipolar international system led to the emergence of a unipolar world with the US remaining as the sole superpower. The US faces many challenges in the post-Cold War era, but it is unlikely that a rival superpower will emerge in the foreseeable future.

26.6 EXERCISES

1. How did the US seek to contain communism in Europe?
2. Describe how the US failed to contain the spread of communism during the Cold War.
3. Why do some analysts consider the US as a hyperpower?
4. What is the current status of the US in world hierarchy of power?
5. How do the American allies/friends view America?
6. Which countries have the potential to challenge the United States today?
7. Do you think a rival superpower can emerge in the foreseeable future?

UNIT 27 CHINA AS AN EMERGING POWER

Structure

- 27.1 Introduction
 - 27.2 Emergence of People's Republic of China
 - 27.3 Post-Cold War World and Uni-polarity
 - 27.3.1 China's Military Capability
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 - 27.5 Stability of China
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27.1 INTRODUCTION

About China, Napoleon had once said: “It is a sleeping giant, let it sleep for if it wakes it would shake the world”. Whether Napoleon’s prophecy has come out to be true or not is a matter of perception but one thing is certainly true that today China’s presence is felt the world over. Political observers and analysts have been discussing and debating on the role of China in international politics and the status it has among the comity of nations. China has the largest population in the world, approximately 1.5 billion people, according to the latest official census. It has the fourth largest territory-Canada, the United States and Russia being the only other countries bigger in size. It has the biggest land army in the world. Today, its GNP per capita is second largest and it has maintained a growth rate of about 8 per cent for the last many years. However, to assess correctly China’s potential of becoming a super power or even a great power capable of threatening the only super power in today’s world viz. the United States of America, it is necessary to understand a whole gamut of features and factors about China which would be done in this Unit

27.2 EMERGENCE OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

China is one of the oldest civilisations on this earth. For several centuries it remained isolated from the rest of the world as it was self-sufficient in every respect. The Chinese political system until the year 1911 was dominated by an emperor, who according to the Chinese ruled with the “mandate of heaven”. In other words, the emperor was divine, he was son of God. They, therefore, conducted their international relations in a way which seemed very unusual and strange to Westerners. All those who established any kind of relations with them had to pay “tribute” to the emperor. Foreigners were considered barbarians as the Chinese considered themselves superior to outsiders. However, traders, monks, scholars and curious travellers had visited China and many have spent years there. Nonetheless, China remained an enigma to many foreigners. It was only after Western colonialism began to spread its tentacles that China was forced to become a part of the international system. After the Opium War of 1840 when the British, using what is called ‘gunboat diplomacy’, got the Chinese to open their ports for

trade, China had to sign a series of ‘unequal treaties’ with almost all imperialist powers. These treaties subjugated China to all European powers and later to Japan too. China remained politically independent in the sense that no power took away the political sovereignty of China but economically it was plundered by all-Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan-in different ways. An overwhelming part of China’s resources were under the control of the various imperialist powers. This was a matter of grave concern for all patriotic Chinese as this amounted to humiliation for the entire nation which was always a proud civilisation.

In the 20th Century, China witnessed far-reaching changes and experienced a massive transition. First, the monarchy and with it the emperor-system, came to an end in 1911. After that a cultural renewal movement emerged which brought into existence a communist party. Led by Mao Zedong, a peasant revolution with the support of a peasant army, brought liberation to China in 1949. The communists finally defeated their compatriots namely the Nationalists, as they were known. The latter fled to the island of Taiwan and established the government of the Republic of China (henceforth ROC). The communists who had the mainland under their control called it the People’s Republic of China (henceforth the PRC).

Post-liberation China is chronologically divided into two periods i.e. the Mao period (from 1949 to 1977) and the Reform period (1978 onwards). However, since its birth the PRC has been an important player in the post-Second World War era. Although up until 1971, the PRC government was not accepted as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the position was held by the ROC government. Diplomatic recognition by the United States came only in 1978. That same year the Chinese began to reform their system in the most dramatic and totally unexpected ways. In less than three decades China has emerged as a big power in many respects. After the United States and Russia, it is undoubtedly the next powerful country. However, to grasp the extent of China’s power it is imperative for us to analyse some factors. What is it that makes a nation a big power? Is it its military capabilities, its economic strength or its political stability? In fact, it is all these factors in combination which bestows a big power status to any country.

27.3 POST-COLD WAR WORLD AND UNI-POLARITY

As is known to all during the period of the Cold War i.e. from the end of Second World War to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international scenario was dominated by the two super powers viz. the United States and the Soviet Union. Most countries of the world were part of any one of the two blocs. (The Non-aligned countries claimed to belong to no bloc). As long as the PRC had cordial relations with the Soviet Union i.e. until the early 1960s, it said that it was part of the Socialist Bloc led by the Soviet Union. In the latter period when its relations with the Soviet state soured, the PRC claimed that it was part of the Third World which meant the nations of Asia (minus Japan), Africa and Latin America.

The end of the Cold War created a totally new scenario in the arena of international relations. The United States is the only super power unchallenged by any. Along with the process of globalisation that is going on in full strength a completely different world order is emerging and China is making a valiant effort to have an effective presence in it. From all its policy statements it is clear that China is opposed to a uni-polar world and supports multi-polarity because it is opposed to all forms of hegemony. In that sense the PRC poses a challenge to the only super power-the United States. As Karmel has observed: “A more confident but still authoritarian China-a state that suppresses pluralism, brazenly markets its weapons to pariah states and aggressively pursues export-led growth strategies is even looked upon by some as a threat to

the United States". What we would try to see here is that can China be a potential threat to the United States in the foreseeable future.

27.3.1 China's Military Capability

It is beyond doubt that China's dramatically expanded military might and economic development make the states of Asia and beyond feel threatened. While it is true that a lot of information on the Chinese military is not available to the outside world but many studies have been done on the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) by a number of scholars. In the following passages we would take up a brief discussion of the PLA to understand and analyse its role in giving China the status of a big power.

Origins of the PLA

The PLA was formed in the year 1927 when the communists organised the poor peasants in the remote areas of Southern China. Zhu De and Mao Zedong were the main organisers and in its early years it was called first the Eighth Route Army and then the New Fourth Army. The name PLA was given to it after the Japanese attacked China in 1937. In its early years most of its recruits were poor peasants. The PLA fought the Japanese as well as the Chinese Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. There are many instances of bravery and courage that the PLA displayed to bring liberation to China. However, the peasant army used guerrilla tactics to fight the enemy. Known as People's War, all military doctrine as well as strategy and tactics fell under it. For Chinese communists the term 'people' implied those who supported the CPC which includes workers, peasants and progressive sections of the middle classes. It had, therefore, a moral connotation-an army that fights for the *people* and not a *state*.

The People' War doctrine remained an important component of Chinese communist ideology even in the post-liberation period as long as Mao Zedong was alive. The Chinese claimed that even in case of a nuclear war they could defeat the enemy using People's War strategy. This was reinforced by the fact that Chinese did not undertake any massive military modernisation programme due to the limited resources the state has at its disposal. Apart from People's War, the other principle that was accepted during the struggle for liberation was that of "Party commands the gun", which effectively means civilian control over the military. Having given so much clout to the military in its struggle to liberate China, the CPC has always been wary of losing its control over the army. There have been instances in post-liberation China when the army has been called to intervene in, what many would call a political dispute. To maintain its supremacy over the PLA, the CPC has a Central Military Commission (CMC, earlier it was called the Military Affairs Commission) and it is chaired by the most powerful civilian leader. (At present Jiang Zemin is its Chairman). In 1997, the Chinese National People's Congress (China's parliament) passed the National Defence Law in which this Maoist principle of the Party controlling the gun has been stipulated.

27.3.2 PLA Modernisation

China has the biggest land army in the world. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies the total number of troops is 2,840,000 of which the army has 2,090,000 soldiers and the airforce, navy and strategic missile force have 470,000, 280,000 and 125,000 respectively. In addition the Reserves comprise of 1,200,000 men and the People's Armed Police (a paramilitary body) have 800,000.

During the Mao period i.e. up to 1976 with the People's War doctrine upheld, a large army was

perceived as an asset. After Mao's death when the CPC decided to modernise its military as part of the Four Modernisations policy (which later on was called the Reforms under Deng Xiaoping) an oversized PLA is clearly a liability. This is so because a state needs lots of resources to maintain so many soldiers as rations, uniforms, housing, healthcare, children's education, entertainment etc. has to be provided. Moreover, regular training and exercises are also necessary to keep the army's morale high. For a nation that has taken up a very ambitious reforms programme a huge army is an expensive proposition. Troop reduction has therefore become an important issue for the Chinese at present. It has been officially announced that the number of troops would be reduced gradually and brought down to 2.5 million.

Since Reforms were initiated under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, changes have occurred in the military doctrine. Deng Xiaoping talked about and then theorised the concept of "People's War under Modern Conditions" which gave the ideological justification for modernising the PLA. Deng realised that without professionalising the army and modernising the weaponry, China's goal of becoming a developed country would be unachievable. People's War under modern conditions meant that in the event of a war guerrilla tactics would be first used against the enemy which would be drawn into Chinese territory and later it would be attacked with modern weaponry. Trapped inside Chinese territory it would not get an escape route and this would make it either surrender or perish. This theory, however, did have a flaw. Once into Chinese territory the enemy may destroy very important economic installations (factories, oil refineries, air ports, bridges etc.) which would put the economic development programme in jeopardy. After the Gulf War (1991), this concept was not much publicised mainly because this war was fought decisively by the air force with no role for the army. In other words, it was clear to the military planners of China that in this day and age superior technology matters. This not only led to more stress on the technological advancement of the PLA but also brought about new thinking encapsulated in the doctrine of "Modern Warfare under Hi-tech Conditions".

27.3.3 PLA Structure

The PLA land forces are divided into seven military regions namely Beijing, Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu. No one knows how many soldiers are there in each of these regions. It is, however, interesting to note that China's ground forces are not at all towards any national border or potential battlefield. The army is intended more for maintaining internal order engage in construction and relief activities and perform mainly domestic functions. It is estimated that as many as one million troops are stationed in Xinjiang (Sinkiang) province which has seen terrorist activities grow in the last few years. However, according to another source 80,000 soldiers are stationed in the coastal Fujian province, probably to be engaged in a cross-strait military conflict, should it occur. Here it needs to be mentioned that gaining control over the province of Taiwan has been the most crucial of China's policies.

China's navy is divided into East, South and North China Sea fleets. Since the Reforms which led to a policy of Open Door, China's coastal areas have prospered far more than the interior. This has led to a new emphasis on the navy. However, this emphasis is also due to the perception of the importance of the sea as a strategic resource and battleground. As Deng Xiaoping had stated: "Navies in the present era create great power, strong mobility, and the capacity for worldwide intervention. In modern warfare, more than before navies are of substantial significance; their technological foundation, their position and use are increasingly prominent and important." The Chinese navy can be broken down by function into five categories: warship, submarine, marine, naval aviation and coastal defence force. Coastal defence forces are believed to have 29,000 soldiers, the marine corp of around 5,000 and the naval air force approximately 25,000. In late 1985, the Naval Military Academic Research Institute was established to coordinate

and provide research and analysis for the formulation of naval strategy, operations and tactics. Modernisation of the navy has been undertaken rather seriously in the last two decades but military analysts feel that it continues to face some crippling weaknesses. It has, for instance, too many old ships which need to be replaced by new ones with advanced technology. It is said that the bulk of China's naval ships are aging and in the process of going out of use. Key equipment and ordnance for naval modernisation also appear to be beyond China's reach both technologically and financially. The country has expressed its ambition to have blue water navy but most analysts feel that China is decades away from it. As far as naval ordnance is concerned, China remains well behind the United States, Russia and Japan.

The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) could not grow in the pre-reform period as the People's war doctrine was extremely inhibiting. The air force is a capital-intensive branch of the armed forces which in order to be effective relies almost entirely on modern logistics, high technology, advanced and consistent training, and developed command and control systems. The present leaders of China do agree that the air force is the most important branch in a modernised defence establishment. Like the navy, the Chinese air force is third largest in the world in terms of the size of its inventory. It may have more than 6,000 planes. Most of these planes, however, may be operational. The apparently huge size of China's outdated air force suggests that the emphasis is still on quantity rather than quality. Of course efforts are on to improve quality as is indicated by new purchases and development programmes and formation of elite air force units. However, China is struggling to develop these elite units that require to be trained to employ the newest hardware it is acquiring. The figures regarding how much China spends on its air force are not available but it is believed that the air force comprises an increasing per centage of China's overall defence spending.

In addition to the army, navy and air force, the fourth branch of China's defence system is its missile force or Second Artillery. It is well known that maintenance of a missile force requires the services of a very well trained group of scientists and technicians. China exploded its first atom bomb in 1964, and in 1967, its first hydrogen bomb was tested. Since then it has conducted several nuclear tests. Between 1956 and 1981, China developed its first generation of ballistic missiles. China's strategic doctrine on the development of missiles and nuclear bombs appears shrewd and realistic in comparison with its doctrines on the air force and navy. The development of a powerful nuclear missile is a very effective way to maintain a massive deterrent against super power attack. Throughout the reform period the military strategists of China have emphasised the importance of missiles in modern warfare.

Despite possessing laser guns, brilliant bombs, stealth fighter planes and nearly silent submarines, China has many technical, economic and political obstacles in implementing a new strategy. As one author has remarked: "Even if China develops the technical and economic capacity to promote military modernisation more quickly, leaders are afraid that a shift away from the rank and file and toward these high-tech goods might cause the Party to lose control over the gun." In other words, an oversized army and a not completely modernised navy and air force prevent the Chinese from posing a major threat to bigger powers like the United States and Russia.

27.4 CHINA'S ECONOMIC STRENGTH

As is well-accepted, sheer military prowess does not make a nation a major power. A nation's economic resilience is also an extremely important criterion to judge how important a role it can play in international affairs. The United States is the super power of this era because of a combination of its military power, economic strength and domestic political stability. The former Soviet Union

did have enormous military prowess but could not maintain its economic strength, and politically, it is clear in retrospect, it was a very fragile nation-state. Hence when we assess the power of a state we must take into account the all-round capabilities and not just one criterion.

In the year 2001, China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at US\$ 1.1 trillion and the average growth rate registered in the past twenty years has been 9 per cent. India's current GDP is around US \$ 450 billion i.e. less than half of China's. China's foreign exchange reserves exceeded US \$ 216 billion in 2001. Since its membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Chinese government is using it as a trigger to implement far-reaching and radical reforms to globalise the economy. It is expected that by the year 2020, China's economy could be worth US \$10 trillion. In the last thirty years, China has sustained investment rates of over 35 per cent of GDP. In contrast, India's rate of investment peaked at 26 per cent in 1996 and has since declined to about 22 per cent in 2001. China sustains high rate of investment by high rates of domestic savings of around 40 per cent. In the 1980s, its population policy of 'one-child family' has decreased the dependency ratio and raised the savings rate substantially. High savings have been invested in infra-structure and education to create the supporting environment for mass scale production.

Huge investments in infrastructure have created a national power grid with ample generating capacity, a national telecom system with the largest mobile network in the world and a national aviation system. In the last twelve years China has built over 19,000 kilometres of expressways and adds 3000 kilometres each year. India is still below the 1000 km mark in expressways. Urbanisation is taking place in China at a rapid pace as the belief is that "economic development is basically about moving people from villages to cities". Urban productivity is four times of rural productivity. China is building around ten huge new cities that will house over ten million people each.

Human capital formation is also one area China is working on. In the last twenty years there has been tremendous progress. College enrolment in the 1980s was about 1.5 per cent of the total population. At present the enrolment ratio is 11 per cent which means that it has gone up by more than five times in about a decade. Nine-year education is universal. In most villages there is at least one nine-year secondary school. At the high school level i.e. the twelve year school the numbers enrolled are about seventy per cent of those leaving secondary school. Rural families are still reluctant to send their children to high school. About 11 per cent of high school graduates go in for tertiary (or college) education. This is remarkable in contrast with China's past and that of most other developing countries but if we compare it with that of the US and Europe, it is 50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. China, therefore, is way behind. The share of public education expenditure in the GDP has been declining in the last twenty years. Families have mainly borne the burden of their child's education.

Compared with India, most of the figures for China are impressive but in comparison with many other Asian states China still has a long way to go. Even after twenty years of rapid economic growth China is still considered a poor country. Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia have given their people a higher living standard than China has to its people. Moreover rapid growth has, on the one hand, enlivened the stagnant economy of the 1960s and 1970s but on the other, has led to a host of problems which China is grappling with. From one of the most egalitarian societies in the world it has become the most unequal in its distribution of income, wealth and opportunity. The disparities between the wealthy and the poor have increased massively. Apart from this there are various other problems that have resulted as a consequence of the reforms that began in the late 1970s. These issues if not properly addressed may lead to major crises in Chinese society. This indicates that there are question marks on the prospective social stability

of China. No nation can achieve a major power status unless it has domestic peace and stability. This brings us to the next criterion to judge China's big power status viz. political and social stability.

27.5 STABILITY OF CHINA

This is a question that is being frequently asked by many scholars observing the growth of China. Being a big country China can perhaps absorb and neutralise many crises before it goes beyond control. Nonetheless, many important issues have arisen in the last two decades which need to be addressed in such a way that China is able to sustain economic growth without any major dislocation to its social system. The primary objective of the reforms undertaken since 1978 is to strengthen China's international position while retaining the authority of the Party. The results of the reforms include: glaring regional imbalances, noticeable sectoral imbalance, insurmountable ecological and environmental problems, exacerbated rural-urban divide, adverse impact on minorities, women, the elderly, the disabled and so on. Reforms may have brought more wealth to Chinese society but its distribution has not been balanced. Three important sections of Chinese society viz. workers, peasants and intellectuals have been affected by the reforms in a variety of ways. In the following section we discuss these.

Reform of the State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) has been a crucial part of reforms in the urban sector on the workers. This is having a noticeable negative impact. During the pre-reform (Maoist period), the SOE workers were a rather privileged group with guaranteed employment, social security, pension benefits etc., and received cradle-to-grave services from their work units. The SOE reforms have worker-retrenchment at its core. In the last decade more than 14 million workers have been laid off. Veteran permanent workers and retirees find their employment security, welfare benefits etc. in jeopardy. The working class is facing drastic dislocation. The total number of destitute workers nation-wide is estimated at 20 million. The newly emerging private sector and multi-national corporations together are in no position to absorb all workers who have lost their jobs. As a result resistance-both passive and active-has become visible and in the last few years many cases of violent workers' protests have been reported. Strikes as well as other methods of agitation have been followed to get the state to hear their voices. However, superior organisational force of the state has been able to forestall any major outbreak of violence. How long the state would be able to do so is a question many ask.

Reforms have led to rural discontent in several parts of China where peasants have expressed their anger often violently. Among the reasons for peasant unrest are high taxes, lowering of grain prices, losing land for industrialisation, pollution due to new factories, cultural and social conflicts (for example, the state supports cremation of the dead but the custom is burial), corruption of officials and their abusive behaviour with peasants. Peasant protests have taken a variety of forms: petitions, demonstrations, violent fights between peasants and Party cadres, riots, damaging state property, road blocks, holding officials captive, killing of cadres or police. Waves of peasant unrest occur in certain villages of different provinces and subside after some time. These are mostly spontaneous, short-lived and not well organised. More often than not the target of these protests is not the state or the central government but the local officials and local government. All forms of violence are swiftly curbed and sometimes proper corrective measures are taken to pacify the peasants. For some period of time the regime may succeed in containing the unrest in the countryside but a real threat to it may appear in the event of rural protest movements linking up with their urban counterparts.

The creation of a market economy and opening to the outside world gave intellectuals and the

students of China, for the first time in the PRC, alternatives to government employment, either in the professions, non-state enterprises, foreign-joint ventures, or their own businesses, providing a degree of economic independence which gives them some protection from political retaliation. Equally significant is the fact that intellectuals can remain totally distant from political participation if they so desire. The party-state tolerates and even encourages an apolitical culture so that intellectuals stay away from politics. Towards the end of the Century one witnessed different intellectual currents in China. Highly placed academics called for more political reforms. Many demanded civil and political rights along with economic rights. They believe that economic reforms cannot be sustained without political reforms and the only way to deal with rising unemployment, widening income gaps, pollution and corruption is to develop democracy. A group which tried to form a political party to challenge the Communist Party of China was quickly repressed with all its leaders arrested.

The Chinese regime does not face any major or imminent threat from any of these groups-workers, peasants, and intellectuals-in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, there is an apprehension that an alliance between the three or even two of these may be potent enough to challenge the regime leading to chaos and instability. There is some evidence of underground alliances between workers' groups and disgruntled intellectuals and if they consolidate and come out in the open and a movement resembling that of Solidarity in the Poland of the 1980s, emerges on the scene then it certainly does not augur well for the Chinese regime. In such an eventuality China's international image would also be negatively affected and if it has any big power ambitions that too would receive a setback. However, a positive scenario can also emerge. Genuine political reforms may take place which could create viable political institutions, lead to the rule of law, give China an independent judiciary, a free press and autonomous unions. Without a major upheaval if China becomes more open and democratic, its path to becoming a great power would be less difficult to tread.

27.6 SUMMARY

The debate regarding China's great power status has had a variety of interpretations. According to some scholars, China is a struggling developing country with high ambitions. To others, China is a rising or an emerging power which may, in the future, be powerful enough to threaten the United States, the way the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. But we all know retrospectively that the Soviet Union was internally a weak nation-state or else it would not have crumbled so easily. The fate of the Soviet Union also teaches us that a mere military might is not a sufficient condition for big power status; it may be a necessary condition, if at all. Japan is considered an economic super power and plays an important role in world affairs but does not have a standing army.

China has always opposed the hegemony of super powers. It has never expressed the desire of becoming a super power or even a big power. China has, therefore, supported a multi-polar world which will not be dominated by one super power. In this multi-polar world it wants to see itself as playing a crucial role.

China has resented the fact that other nations, mainly in the Asian region, talk of a "China threat" either directly or in a veiled form. This is being done to maintain unipolarity and prevent China from initiating the process of creating a multi-polar world and more importantly to prevent China from becoming a developed country, the Chinese believe. China has played a key role in the formation of the 'Shanghai Five' and signed with the four countries, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikstan, a treaty in 1996 which it called "the first multi-lateral treaty... to build confidence in the Asia-Pacific region." It is believed that China's main aim in having close

cooperation with the Central Asian countries is to have access to the energy supplies which China needs for its economic development programme.

With Russia, China has developed what is called a ‘strategic partnership’ in the last few years. This is of vital importance to the PRC as it permits the PRC to security concerns to its east and south and provides access to weapons which it can neither produce itself nor purchase elsewhere. Most importantly it complicates the American attempts to isolate China on matters such as arms control, the inviolability of national sovereignty and Taiwan. The Chinese have often stated and worked towards expanding this ‘strategic partnership’ to a ‘strategic triangle’ in which along with Russia, India too would be a member. Some discussions at various levels have been going on towards this direction but India’s enthusiasm for this has not been much. This ‘triangle’ would be very clearly some kind of a counter to the United States which has become the sole super power. Such attempts by the Chinese clearly indicate the PRC’s sense of insecurity and self-perception that in the near future it cannot take on the United States.

Yet one more factor that is indicative of China’s weakness *vis-a-vis* the US is the Taiwan issue. Taiwan is a province which was part of China since time immemorial. In 1949 when mainland China was liberated, the Jiang Kai-shek regime with American support settled there and since then the Communist Chinese have been claiming the island as part of their territory. Ideologically, the liberation of China is not complete without Taiwan. In the last fifty years tension has developed a few times on the Taiwan Straits but has not led to war. Unification with Taiwan has been a pronounced objective of the PRC government as evident from all their documents, resolutions, statements, policy papers etc. China has said that it would prefer a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Taiwan issue but it does not rule out the possibility of using force. This statement is seen by observers as public posturing as China knows any attempt to forcibly take over Taiwan may have frightening consequences not just for China but the entire region or may be even the whole world. China will not achieve big power status till it is able to get the Taiwan dispute resolved in its favour.

At present China is completely involved in developing its economy. The underlying belief is that once it achieves a certain level of development, its military might would increase and political stability would be consolidated. At that point, it would be in a position to be considered a super power, although by then, the US, Russia and other nations may also become more powerful. Also, we cannot ignore the point made above that speedy economic growth may lead to political instability. China often behaves in such a way that others see a ‘China threat’. However, these are signs of weakness and insecurity. Once China becomes politically and economically resilient, it would cease to make others feel threatened.

27.7 EXERCISES

1. Explain the structure of the PLA of China.
2. Describe China’s economic strength.
3. What is China’s position in the post-Cold War unipolar world?
4. What is your assessment of China emerging as a super power in the future?

UNIT 28 EMERGENCE OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

Structure

- 28.1 Introduction
- 28.2 State Formation in Central Asia
 - 28.2.1 Formation of Central Asia National-Territorial Identities
- 28.3 Sub-National Identities
 - 28.3.1 National Minorities
- 28.4 Post-Soviet State Formation in Central Asia
 - 28.4.1 The New Constitutions
- 28.5 Language Issues
- 28.6 Religion and State
- 28.7 Economic Performance and Social Stability
- 28.8 Summary
- 28.9 Exercises
- 28.10 Glossary

28.1 INTRODUCTION

Before its disintegration in 1991, the Soviet Union consisted of 15 Union Republics. Of these, five were in Central Asia. These Republics-Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan-began the process of state formation soon after the former Soviet Union ceased to exist. They adopted their constitutions and commenced on a journey of independent nation-states. In the present unit we will discuss various aspects of the formation of the new Central Asian States. With their emergence as independent entities, the Central Asians had to develop their languages and state structure. You will read in this unit, how different Central Asian Republics are in trying to evolve their individual personality, without compromising their place in the international community.

28.2 STATE FORMATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

28.2.1 Formation of Central Asian National-Territorial Identities

Central Asia constitutes five former Soviet republics-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. A distinct national identity among the indigenous ethnic groups of Central Asia was formed during the Soviet period, when these nationalities acquired territorial and political status.

The Soviet state was organised as a federation of republics formed on the basis of national-territorial identity. Between 1924-1936, the present five Central Asian republics finally came into existence by redrawing the boundaries of the former kingdoms (also known as *Khanates*) of

Bukhara and Khiva and the directly ruled former Tsarist (emperor of Russia was called Tsar) colonial territory of Turkmenistan. Territorial delimitation consolidated group identity by giving ethnic groups control over their territories, whereas earlier they were divided among different political units, which had prevented the growth of a national identity.

The transformation of Central Asia from an agrarian region to an industrial one was undertaken with a great deal of urgency despite the region lacking infrastructure and skilled cadres. The Soviet policy of industrialisation went hand in hand with a policy of creating native skilled cadres. Creation of literary languages (written scripts in some cases) and standardisation of national languages, developing infrastructures like educational institutions, media, publishing organisations, reading materials, films and theatres etc. in titular languages consolidated nationhood.

In short, economic modernisation, mass education, strengthening the structure and function of indigenous languages, a defined territory along with the growth of literacy in the titular language and expansion of indigenous administrative cadre, strengthened the national identities in Central Asia.

The migration of Russian and other European population during the peak of industrialisation, notwithstanding, titular culture and tradition prevailed strongly especially in the countryside where most of the Central Asians lived. The knowledge of the mother-tongue was very high and the share of Central Asians in the population of the republics of the region was continuously increasing. All the indicators suggest that the demographic, cultural and linguistic identities were constantly consolidating in favour of the titular nationalities. Though Russian language served as the *lingua franca*, it was not the “official language” of the USSR. In Central Asia, the majority of the population and virtually all of the rural population, routinely speak the vernacular language and know Russian poorly, if at all.

The republics also became more heterogeneous during the modernisation process due to migration of nationalities from other regions of the then Soviet Union. These demographic changes had strong impact in republics like Kazakhstan where Kazakhs became a minority in their republic, constituting less than 40 per cent of the population. The Russians had nearly as much share of the population in the republic. In all the Central Asian republics there were substantial national minorities. These included many non-Slavic groups (Slavs included Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians) as well. While on the one hand the indigenous nationality was being consolidated culturally, politically and demographically, the republics were also acquiring multi-ethnic character like never before. In some cases this was leading to group conflicts as the economy showed signs of stagnation and competition with resources becoming scarce. With centre’s control loosening in the later Soviet years, chauvinistic tendencies in the republics increased.

Despite positive trends in consolidation of indigenous nationhood in Central Asia as well as manifestations of nationalism during the last years of the Soviet Union, the process of nation-building was still incomplete in Central Asia. As a result, while ethnic reassertion goes on one hand, there have also been trends towards fragmentation, like the rise of clan identity, regional and other sub-national identities.

28.3 SUB-NATIONAL IDENTITIES

In situation of insecurity such as those created by the collapse of Soviet Union, people depend on whatever form of solidarity that is available culturally or politically. However, since regional and clan networks have been a tacit constant of politics in various forms in all the Central Asian states even during Soviet times, not surprisingly there is a speedier revitalisation of these

traditional institutions. Such divisions in the case of Tajikistan led to a five-year long civil war and created formidable obstacles in building a coherent nation-state.

Though Soviet modernisation policies including secular education served to undermine traditional institutions like clans and tribes, these survived in many informal ways. The clan identity and its functions in Central Asia are not uniform. While in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan it is more related to extended family ties, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan “clan” affiliations relate more to territorial/regional communities.

Recognising the existence and importance of such identities, the ruling elite have tried to make clan/territorial identity as invisible as possible. The experience of Tajikistan may not have been lost on the Central Asian leadership. They seek to overcome these traditional loyalties in order to create modern nation-states. The momentum of the nation-building process is also likely to weaken these traditional institutions.

The existence and re-assertion of sub-national or group identities in the open, however, should not lead one to believe that these identities would overtake the larger national identity that were so assiduously cultivated over the past 70 years and have also acquired an emotional force that provides its own legitimization. The sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union disrupted the process of national consolidation under the supervision of a multi-ethnic Soviet state. Sometimes previously dormant divisions come out into the open, which the new states have to grapple with, though tribal, regional and other sub-national discords so far have been rather subtle and have not resulted in violent conflicts, barring in Tajikistan. National identity continues to be the dominant factor in the politics of group mobilisation and even state and its institutions to some extent have been harnessed to this end. The fears and anxieties arising among the national minorities in each republic have stemmed from the nationality assertion of the titular Central Asian nationalities, notwithstanding the heterogeneity, diversities and divisions etc.

28.3.1 National Minorities since Independence

Despite the progress made during the Soviet years in terms of upward mobility, most indigenous Central Asians still lived in rural areas (more than 70 per cent) and worked in agriculture at the time of Soviet disintegration. In the urban areas they were predominantly in light and food industries and in the service sector. Skilled workers in industries were mostly from Russian or other European groups. Although the proportion of the Slavic population is not very high in Central Asia as a whole, industrial employment level among Russians was about three times higher than that among the indigenous population. In Kazakhstan, the non-Kazakhs constituted about 57 per cent of the population, and in the industry their share was 75.8 per cent of all industrial workers.

The impact of the national movements for independence that gained momentum elsewhere in the USSR in the late 1980s was less visible in Central Asia. Yet there were some violent outbursts that took the form of inter-ethnic riots. In all the republics of the region, difficult economic situation put ethnic minorities under pressure and there were very violent group clashes. The psychological atmosphere of uncertainty and the adoption of new language laws prompted a large number of Russians and other European population to leave Central Asia in the wake of ethnic riots in different Central Asian states.

Between 1992 and 1996, Central Asia accounted for 59 per cent of all net migrations to Russia from former Soviet republics, of which 25 per cent was from Uzbekistan. Of all the migrants from Central Asia to Russia between 1989 and 1996, ethnic Russians constituted 70 per cent

and most of the remainder was Tatars, Ukrainians, Belarussians and Jews. The net population transfer of ethnic Russians from Central Asia to Russia during the same period was equal to over 14 per cent (1.3 million people) of those ethnic Russians who were permanent residents in the region in 1989.

The changing social context in the newly independent states of Central Asia may also have fuelled emigration. More generally, as indigenous groups succeeded in gaining a privileged status in their homelands, the non-indigenous groups felt increasingly discriminated against. Symbolic of the new cultural policy was the adoption of the new language laws by the Central Asian republics in 1989-90 that elevated the titular language to the status of official language. Many Russians perceived the new language laws as the future basis for job discrimination. Among Russians, including those who were born and brought up in Central Asia, knowledge of the titular language is limited to a few. The new language laws of various Central Asian states did not provide for necessary measures to help Russians master the titular languages. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan decreed that the knowledge of the official language is obligatory for persons occupying certain posts. Deadlines for language requirement for posts in the state apparatus, in administrative, economic and cultural positions was initially 1996 in Turkmenistan, 1997 in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and 1999 in Kyrgyzstan. There was nothing said in the laws about the creation of necessary conditions and legal guarantees for the study and development of Russian language.

The phase of nationalist euphoria being over, there is a sober realisation about the possible impact of emigration of Slavs on the economy and society of the newly independent states of Central Asia. Political leaders of these states both in government and opposition have expressed concern that the loss of professional and skilled personnel was already having a damaging effect. They have been urging the Slavs and other European population to stay.

Russians represented the higher skilled and professional category in Central Asia. At the time of independence, though their share was less than 8 per cent in Tajikistan and slightly over that in Uzbekistan, they represented 21 per cent of the specialists with higher or specialised education in Tajikistan and 17 per cent of those in Uzbekistan. The loss of this skilled population naturally worries the leadership of Central Asian states.

Since the impact of the Russian emigration can be quite detrimental to the economies of the newly independent states of Central Asia, it is difficult to visualise any language-based discrimination, at least in the short run. Essentially Russian remains the language of inter-ethnic communication. As it is, the laws would take some time to come into real force and their strictest implementation in the near future is doubtful. Most state laws provide for the continued use of Russian language. Turkmen law even talks of national-Russian bilingualism. Tajik law proclaims, “[T]he Russian language as the language of inter-ethnic communication functions freely in the territory of Tajikistan”. It has also committed to maintain the linguistic rights of the non-Tajik population, most notably the Uzbeks. In Uzbekistan, under a resolution passed by the parliament, the deadline for a complete switch of the Uzbek alphabet from Cyrillic (Slavic script) to Latin script was pushed back by five years to 2005.

All around chaos and civil war, the rise of religious fundamentalism and the worsening inter-ethnic relations, as has been stated earlier, have so far been major reasons for the exodus. An important factor in Russian emigration could have been the industrial recession in Central Asia that followed the collapse of the USSR. Insufficient deliveries of energy resources and raw materials from Russia together with the absence of orders, from Moscow, Union enterprises whose workforce was made up mainly of Russians, closed down. A large proportion of Russians

worked in the defence industry and many were rendered jobless with the break up of the USSR. In short, ethno-cultural concerns combined with industrial recession resulted in mass exodus of Russians from Central Asia.

The Central Asian states cannot be termed as very discriminatory against the Russians. The language laws, which could form the basis of certain degree of alienation, are flexible enough to take care of the immediate concerns of the Russian-speaking population. Islamic fundamentalism, which has been one major source of worry, has not spread as feared in the beginning. This situation has helped in slowing down emigration of the Russian and other Slavic population from Central Asia in recent years.

While the economic and social stability will help in slowing down Russian emigration, the presence of Russians would in turn help build social and economic stability. The treatment of Russians will also determine the type of relationship Central Asian states would have with the Russian federation in future, a relationship that is so important both from economic and security points of view.

Even during the early days of independence when ethno-national sentiments were at a feverish pitch, Central Asians in general were in favour of building secular states and keeping the multi-ethnic character of their societies in tact. The changing position of Russians and the critical nature of their participation in economic reconstruction have seen some changes in policy as regards the status of Russian language, and, in some cases, the granting of dual citizenship rights to the Russians.

The story of the post-Soviet Central Asia is not about disharmony and conflicts alone. Positive trends have also been observed that point towards better inter-ethnic relations in the region. Ethnic minorities having roots in Central Asia are going to stay and the societies will continue to remain multi-ethnic. The leadership in Central Asia has taken this into cognisance and is seeking to create suitable environment for the integration of national minorities in the state-building process. State-builders have lately made efforts to focus more on preserving and promoting the multi-ethnic character of society and state through more inclusive policies.

28.4 POST-SOVIET STATE FORMATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

In the post-Soviet period, the republics of Central Asia are faced with the onerous task of preserving a collective of nations that are competing to share the benefits and resources. The competition is not only between larger ethnic collectives alone, but also between sub-national identities that have complicated the state-building efforts and which is also one of the main reasons for homogenising tendencies that are so conspicuous in the nation-building efforts.

To impart a sense of common destiny to their members, nation-builders make use of ethnic symbols related to customs, traditional names, heroes, myths, state iconography etc. The ruling elite in Central Asia accord great meaning to the ideology of unity of the indigenous nationality and have created official symbols that draw on the culture of the particular nationality. The replacement of Russian and Soviet names by indigenous ones has resulted in the renaming of a multitude of regions, cities, streets, squares and collective farms. All the states of Central Asia have indulged in tacit and not so tacit nationalising measures to ensure the cultural and political resurgence of their nations. These include new language laws, new national holidays related to traditional festivals, new flags with traditional symbols, glorification of national heroes of the past etc.

The Central Asian republics, in many ways, have been quite diverse. The existence of multiple identities-ethnic, sub-ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional etc.-have necessitated a very complex state-building endeavour in the post-Soviet period. While independence created some momentum to create a model of nation-state based on the dominant national identity, (soon) the heterogeneity of the society impinged upon the process to make it more integrative rather than exclusive.

Though some of the early policies in the post-Soviet Central Asia raised apprehensions among national minorities, very soon, however, the momentum of nationalising weakened and the states are keen to maintain their multi-ethnic identity. The importance of maintaining friendly relations among themselves and with other former Soviet republics has not been lost on the Central Asian leadership. Each major titular ethnic group is a minority in some other state and any competitive nationalism would only create secessionist, divisive and irredentist sentiments that would weaken stability of the new states.

28.4.1 The New Constitutions

The relatively weaker numerical strength of the titular group and the existence of strong sub-national identities confronted nation-builders in states like Kazakhstan. At the time of independence Kazakhs and Russians were nearly equal in number in Kazakhstan (39.5 per cent compared to 37.7 per cent). The demographic situation was even more unfavourable to the Kazakhs given the concentration of Russians in the north and east of the country, where they constituted 61.7 per cent and 64.2 per cent of the population respectively. Even in the then capital Almaty, situated in the south, Russians constituted 56 per cent of the population.

The initial impulse under these circumstances was to create a state in which non-indigenous population would only enjoy certain basic citizenship rights. There was a fear in Kazakhstan that Kazakhs would lose significance in their historical homeland if the existing situation were allowed to continue even after independence. Kazakh language was elevated to the status of ‘state language’, arousing fears among the non-Kazakhs that they would be discriminated in jobs on the basis of language. It could also be used as an instrument to keep the Russians out of the top positions. The law of Kazakhstan requires a fluent knowledge of the Kazakh language for all the constitutional functionaries. It must, however, also be mentioned that the leadership was reluctant even then to adopt an exclusive nationalist position. Thus the 1993 constitution, despite language requirement, did not preserve the highest office of the president to ethnic Kazakhs alone. In Turkmenistan, however, the Turkmen origin of the head of the state is a constitutional requirement.

Various steps that were taken initially created the impression that the Central Asian republics are well on their way to create nation-states based on the dominant indigenous identity alone. There were also policies aimed at strengthening the numerical strength of the indigenous nationality.

The Kazakh state was under mounting pressure to adopt the nation-state model. The constitution declared Kazakhstan as the homeland of the Kazakh people first and foremost. Despite widespread resentment among the Slavs against the 1992 Declaration on Language, Kazakh was made the state language. The other issue of Russian grievance has been that of dual citizenship (to be citizens of Russia and Kazakhstan at the same time), which was accorded only to Kazakhs, who migrated from outside.

In Kyrgyzstan, though the present constitution adopted in 1993 describes the state as “a sovereign, unitary, democratic republic built upon the basis of a legal, secular state” and describes the people of Kyrgyzstan “as the carriers of sovereignty” (Art.1) and even allows citizens of all

nationalities to compete for the highest post of president, there are requirements like knowledge of the Kyrgyz language and 15-year residency in the republic to limit eligibility to such a high post. The preamble of Uzbekistan's constitution adopted in December 1992 states that the people of Uzbekistan "are guided by historical experience in developing Uzbek statehood". On the contrary, the constitution of Tajikistan, adopted in November 1994, displays less national exclusiveness. The preamble states, "We, the people of Tajikistan, as an inseparable part of the world community, seeing ourselves as responsible and duty bound to past, present and future generations, wishing to ensure the sovereignty, development and perfection of our state, recognising the rights and freedoms of the individual as sacred, affirming the equality of rights and friendship of all nationalities and peoples (of Tajikistan), seeking to build a just society, adopt and declare a valid constitution". The constitution not only recognises Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication, but also grants all nationalities and groups residing in the republic to freely use their mother tongue (Art.2). It explicitly separates religion from the state and its affairs. Organisations promoting racism, nationalism, social and religious enmity and hatred are prohibited (Art.8). Nevertheless, even the constitution of Tajikistan makes knowledge of the state language and 10-year residency requirement mandatory for the post of the head of state, i.e., president of the republic.

The role of the state in promoting ever increasing numerical superiority for the dominant indigenous nationality has been significant. Incentives have been offered in states like Kazakhstan to encourage immigration of the diaspora living outside the republic. Other forms of legal support include dual citizenship for Kazakh immigrants and denial of the same to Russians. Kazakhs from outside are automatically recognised as refugees and have preferential status with regard to returning and finding a home and a job, free college admission and housing, and free to travel within the territory of the republic. In other cases like Tajikistan, the state frontier was made porous to welcome co-ethnics from Afghanistan. In each Central Asian case the share of the indigenous population has grown.

Various states have made language knowledge a requirement to occupy the highest position in the state. Art. 55 of the Turkmenistan's constitution even goes a step further and states clearly that the president must be a citizen 'from amongst the Turkmen'. Kyrgyzstan's constitution, though does not reserve the Presidency for the ethnic Kyrgyz alone, however stipulates that the president must 'have a command of the state language'. Uzbekistan's constitution (Art. 90) similarly stipulates that the president must 'have a fluent command of the state language', and according to the constitution of Kazakhstan, the president and the chairman of both houses of parliament must be fluent in the state language.

Fearing alienation of the Russian minority from the polity and the economy, states have taken various steps to prevent emigration of Slavs. Both the 1993 constitution and the 1995 constitution of Kazakhstan guarantee equal rights for all citizens, regardless of race, nationality, language or religion. The new constitution (1995) grants automatic citizenship to all who desire it, with no language or residence requirement whatsoever. The constitution (Art.5) expressly forbids the establishment of any social organisation that seeks to forcibly change the constitutional order, undermine state security, violate territorial integrity, or promote 'social, racial, national, religious, class, or tribal discord'. This has been further supplemented by an absolute ban on any propaganda or campaign directed towards the above aims. Efforts have also been made to protect the linguistic identity of the Russian minority.

28.5 LANGUAGE ISSUE

All the states of Central Asia adopted language laws in 1989-90 that not only elevated their

titular languages to the status of state language but also restricted the use of non-titular languages. However, despite language reforms, the real situation has not been as unfavourable to national minorities as projected. There have been changes in most of the original language laws and important languages like Russian still play an important role in Central Asia. Among many Central Asians the grounding in the mother tongue is strong. They have no real reasons to worry about the future of their own language. Its further expansion in certain spheres is related to the problems in creating more educational infrastructure in the titular language, especially when the economy is not doing well. Therefore, it is difficult to visualise the language issue to be a major factor in pitting ethnic communities against each other. In fact, the time limit for switching over to complete titular language-use has been relaxed in all the states.

The initial target date for implementation of Kyrgyz language-use in all administrative and educational institutions was 1994. However, the problems related to switching over have been such that the implementation of this provision of the language law was suspended in 1993. These problems include need to encourage Russians to stay in the republic; pragmatic need of a language that has already served for decades as a language of interethnic communication and present inadequacy of the Kyrgyz language in the fields of science and technology. A presidential decree in 1994, ‘On Regulating the Migratory Processes in the Kyrgyz Republic’, allowed Russian to be used in those institutions and areas where Slavs formed a majority and in scientific fields where Russian is the normal language in use. The Constitutional Court in early 1996 approved in principle a change to Art.5 (2) of the Constitution and allowed the use of Russian as an official language.

In the case of Kazakhstan, especially, Russian language has been accorded a respectable status. While the 1993 constitution accorded Russian the status of ‘language of inter-ethnic communication’, the 1995 constitution conferred “official” status upon it as well (though not that of “state language”). The dual-language policy has so far ensured a balance and the space for the Russian-language has remained substantial. Though in November 1996 the lower house of the Kazakhstan parliament passed a draft revision of the language law fixing the time frame in which non-Kazakhs (by 1996) and the Kazakhs (by 2001) would learn Kazakh, the final version of the law adopted by both houses of parliament in July 1997 set 1 January 2006 as the deadline for learning of the Kazakh language by all citizens. In line with the Constitution, the new language law states that ‘Russian is used on a par with the Kazakh language in state organisations and organs of local self-government’.

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have not offered any protected status to Russian language. However, not only has the deadline for using the state language in the workplace has been extended, but substantial use of the Russian language still continues in the national media.

In Tajikistan a government resolution was adopted on 21 October 1997, the part-2 of which focusses on special arrangements aimed at maintaining and harmonising the development of all non-Tajik languages, including course offering of those languages at educational institutions, TV and Radio broadcasts etc.

Switching entirely to the use of titular languages in all spheres will take long since it requires a variety of organisational and material infrastructure to make a complete shift. Qualified teachers in the language, adequate schools, equipment and books, creating modernised terminology and translating scientific and technical literature on an advanced and wide scale are required before all citizens could be expected to use the titular language. The states of the region are not in a position to create the necessary infrastructure in the near future. Russian is still used

in business, science and the professions and any drastic step would lead to disruption in the work of state and economic organisations.

28.6 RELIGION AND STATE

Islam remained always in different ways a strong element of Central Asian identity. Be it as a part of everyday life like marriage, circumcision and burial (also called “everyday Islam”), or the authority structure within the family that is influenced by religion, or as a spiritual aspect of life, or as part of ethno-cultural values that differentiated Central Asians from the Slavs, Islam survived despite its separation from the state and weakening of its institutions (*Shariat*, the *Qazi* courts, *Adat*, *Maktab*s etc.) during the Soviet times.

Rituals, symbolism and cultural practices related to Islam have made a strong come back in Central Asia. Rapid growth in the number of mosques and attendance in them, increase in the importance of local shrines and mausoleums and demand for mullahs are symbolic of Islamic revivalism in Central Asia.

In all the Central Asian states, free elections brought to power secular and former communist leadership with popular mandate. The ruling elite in Central Asia realised both the strength and dangers of revivalism and accordingly were unwilling to move beyond a point to either project a religious identity of the new states or allow religious institution and religious leaders to acquire greater authority among the population that can undermine the authority of the political leadership.

One of the factors that contribute to insecurity of the Slavic and other European population is the growing role of Islam in public life and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. Though Islamic revival to a certain extent was expected, growth of political Islam has scared the minorities. Nevertheless, the region has yet to acquire a politically salient Islamic identity. While revival relates to a certain cultural heritage and greater participation in religious rituals, greater autonomy to religious institutions and their leaders, the greatest danger perceived is the use of religion as a unifying identity against the Russian-speaking groups. Even the political leadership, that was willing in the initial years following independence to utilise religious symbols to reinforce its own legitimacy, is today suspicious of religious activism. All the states have taken steps to prevent Islamic political organisations from playing any role in the political life of the country.

28.7 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL STABILITY

Transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one has so far been both complex and painful. The consequent policy and institutional reforms-independent banking and financial systems; introduction of new national currencies; reorientation of economic incentive structures and approaches to economic management-have been wide ranging, costly and resulted in significant dislocation as well as fall in output, income and employment. In the first five years following independence, the economies of Central Asia experienced severe recession, though the subsequent years have witnessed some stabilisation and recovery.

The social sector, however, remains in bad shape and can create social and political unrest until urgent steps are taken. Unemployment, both official and disguised, is at a high level. The fall in employment and real wage, combined with declining spending in social sector and the removal of subsidies brought down real wages, increased unemployment and under-employment that affected the general living standard of the masses.

The states of Central Asia cannot ignore the implications that economic stagnation and crises have on social stability. Though the focus of nation-builders has been to consolidate indigenous nationhood, increasing social and economic disparity pose a greater challenge to the state-building process. A small group enjoys power, while the rest of the population cutting across ethnic groups belongs to the category that has been deprived since independence. Asymmetric distribution of power and resources might give rise to parochialism (based on clan, tribal and ethnic extremism) unless attended to seriously.

In situations of prolonged crises, the divisions within society come to the surface and further complicate the situation. Radicalising ethnic or religious identity could further drag the states down the path of chaos and instability. The formal constitutional guarantees apart, the need to ensure ethnic harmony and social stability has prompted the state leadership in Central Asia to play an active role in making the state-building project inclusive rather than exclusive. The forces of religious and national extremism have been discouraged and in some cases even repressed by the state. The emigration of Russians and other national minorities have gone down substantially and so have inter-ethnic tensions.

28.8 SUMMARY

The Central Asian republics in their present shape came into existence under the Soviets during the 1920s and 1930s, when their boundaries were redrawn to carve out five republics from the former Turkmenistan and the kingdoms of Khiva and Bukhara. The development of national languages and cultural infrastructures strengthened the identities of the titular groups. Simultaneously, due to industrialisation, substantial migration from other regions of the USSR into Central Asia created strong multi-ethnic societies. At the time of the Soviet disintegration the process of consolidation of nationhood was still incomplete and all the indigenous nationalities still had not overcome the existence of clan, regional or tribal affinities. In fact, in the post-Soviet period such divisions accentuated.

The assertion of national identity in recent years has scared minorities in Central Asia, especially the Slavs who have migrated in large numbers. The adoption of new language laws, industrial recession, rise of religious fundamentalism etc. have alienated national minorities in each Central Asian state. Some of these minorities like Russians for example constitute a highly skilled workforce and their departure from Central Asia would have a damaging effect on the economy.

Worried about the emigration of the skilled national minorities and the rise of radical Islam, the leadership of Central Asia has taken steps to create harmonious conditions for integrating different nationalities in the process of state formation in the post-Soviet period. After the initial nation-building zeal, which constituted creating new national symbols, reviving traditional festivals, heroes and myths, the new states are taking steps to make the state inclusive. Religion has been kept separate from the state and religious groups are kept away from the political life. As a result, Russian language has been accorded better position than was given initially and the Russians have been in some states, allowed dual citizenship. The Constitutions have taken care to accommodate national minorities and are less discriminatory. Except in Turkmenistan, even the highest office of president is not restricted to citizens of the titular nationality alone.

The states of Central Asia are faced with difficult economic conditions since the disintegration of the USSR. The social sector remains in bad shape, unemployment has increased manifold and the real income of the population has fallen. This is a challenge that the states need to overcome. Otherwise, divisive forces would grow.

UNIT 29 ETHNIC RESURGENCE AND ‘IDENTITY’ WARS

Structure

- 29.1 Introduction
- 29.2 What is Ethnicity
- 29.3 Modernisation and Ethnic Upsurge and Conflict
- 29.4 Irrational Boundaries: Challenges to State System
- 29.5 Interventionist Role of the Modern State and Loss of Traditional Autonomy
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29.1 INTRODUCTION

The recorded human history is the history of struggle for power and resources. For purposes of waging this struggle, prerequisites like group formations and establishment of political set-up became an integral part. The bases of political order kept changing, keeping in view place and time. Force, fraud, superstition, inheritance, divine right, conquest etc., provided the bases. The breakdown of the hereditary monarchical system created the crisis of legitimacy whereby race, colour, tribe, caste, religion and finally ideology provided the *raison d'être* for collective political existence and its legitimacy. Democratic as well as authoritarian systems were alike in their efforts for mobilising people behind the regime on some common basis and this constituted the crucial factor in terms of stability and the legitimacy of the system.

In the post-imperial and post-colonial phase, ideology of nationalism was articulated to legitimise the pre-eminence of the state as against competing loyalties. Most of the modern wars had been the result of the evolution of one kind of political organisation, the empire, into another form, the nation-state. This process had gone on for well over 300 years and it has not run its full course. But during this phase of the evolution of the nation-state, the emphasis was on territorial nation-state in preference to ethno-nationalism. The ideology of “territorial nationalism” was articulated to integrate ethnically diverse people. In this process, the post-imperialist and post-colonial territorial boundaries were the focus of legitimisation. However, the ideology of nationalism failed to integrate ethnically diverse people and legitimacy of the territorial nation-state came to be increasingly questioned. Instead, the concept of ethnically homogeneous nation-state gained wider acceptance and lies at the root of intra-national and international conflicts today.

29.2 WHAT IS ETHNICITY?

The word ethnic has been derived from the Latin word ‘ethniko’ which means common identity.

Ethnicity is a sense of common identity consisting of the subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people in order to differentiate themselves from other groups. It is a fluid concept-contextual, situational and relational. It is the expression or assertion of cultures, voices and nationalities. It is concerned with the idea of distinctiveness. The term may be defined as an awareness of a common identity among the people/members of a particular social group. According to Anthony D. Smith, ethnicity is based on the following criteria-a distinct group name in order to be recognised as a distinct community by both group members and outsiders; a shared belief by group members in the myth of common ancestry and descent; the presence of historical memories among group members (as interpreted and diffused over generations, often verbally); a distinctive shared culture; association with a specific territory or ‘homeland’; and a sense of common solidarity; and common religion, if there, can be cementing force.

29.2.1 Decline of Ideology of Nationalism and Ethnic Resurgence

The decline of the ideology of territorial nationalism, wherein diverse people were integrated through a common ideology, created a sort of vacuity wherein ethnicity is fast emerging as the most solid basis for political formation and its sustenance. Race, colour, caste, religion etc. no doubt differentiate and bind people together in separate socio-political formations but these seem to have lost to ethnicity because the former unites human beings superficially, to a limited extent and for specific purposes, the ethnicity binds them several-fold over, with characteristic entirety and wholeness.

29.2.2 Nature and Dimensions of Ethnic Resurgence

The upsurge in ethno-nationalism in recent decades the world over, producing conflict and violence within the states and across the borders, is a fact which mankind can ignore at the cost of its own peril. The existing international system is composed of 190 odd territorial “sovereign states” and about 20 non-sovereign political entities, whereas there are 862 major and more than three thousand minor ethnic groups. There is hardly any ethnic group-major or minor-which is immune to some level of irredentism in its relations with other ethnic groups or the state which to they belong. Of the 190 odd “territorial sovereign states,” only 15 are ethnically homogeneous. Of these half are involved in ethnic conflict across the border involving co-ethnic spill-over into the neighbouring state/s. According to analysts, less than 4 per cent of the world’s population lives in states whose boundaries correspond to the ethnic boundaries. Conversely speaking, more than 96 per cent of the world’s population living in political conditions which do not conform to their natural choice or self-determination; as such are haunted by irredentism at various levels and in various forms and manifestations. Significantly, no particular classification of state has proven immune to this phenomenon. Afflicted countries are old (the United Kingdom) as well as new (Bangladesh), large (Indonesia), as well as small (Fiji), rich (Canada) as well as poor (Pakistan), authoritarian (Sudan), as well as democratic (Belgium), Marxist-Leninist (China), as well as militantly anti-Marxist (Turkey), predominantly Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India), and Judaic (Israel).

The magnitude of the problem can be gauged from the fact that since the end of the Second World War till date, many people lost their lives in intra-state and inter-state conflicts and violence and more than 75 per cent of them in ethnic conflict and violence. Of the ongoing major conflicts in the world, over 75 per cent are on ethnic lines. Ethnic conflict and violence, thus, is not only the most serious but also the most complex problem confronting mankind. Ethnicity is at the centre of politics-national as well as international-and is a potent source of challenge to the cohesion of states and of international tension. Ethnic diversity has affected the life in many ways. According to one expert: “Ethnic conflict strains the bonds that sustain civility and

is often at the root of violence that results in looting, death, homelessness, and the flight of large numbers of people.”

29.3 MODERNISATION AND ETHNIC UPSURGE AND CONFLICT

The problems of ethnic upsurge, conflict and violence on an unprecedented scale in so short a period since the Second World War is, perhaps, partly due to the accelerated process of modernisation which mankind has undergone since then. The ethnic violence is only an expression of disapproval and is an armed recourse to change the state of things as desirable from the point of view of the perpetrator of violence. It is some deep-rooted *malaise* which creates conditions of ethnic upsurge and conflict. It is imperative to understand the *malaise* in its depth only so as to grasp its manifestations properly.

In the operational sense, modernisation means the attainment of relatively higher levels of the variables, such as education, per capita income, urbanisation, political participation, industrial employment and media participation. As the process of modernisation unfolds itself it creates conditions of ethnic social mobilisation-both territorial as well as non-territorial. However, this contention is in direct opposition to sociological theories of modernisation and the Marxist theories. There was a kind of consensus amongst the sociological theorists of modernisation and the Marxists that ethnic competition belongs to the pre-modern era; in so far as it persists, it is an irrational form of behaviour or a form of false consciousness.

The political theorists of nation-building also view ethnic ties as transitory in nature and argued that forces of modernisation and social mobilisation would lead to assimilation of distinct identities in the process of nation-building. Even liberal thinking in political science hinges upon the argument that as mankind moved from a primitive, tribal stage of social organisation to a complex industrial and post-industrial structure, the primordial ties of religion, language, ethnicity and race would gradually but inexorably lose their hold and disappear. Scholars like Anthony D. Smith gave a different line of reasoning that the modern scientific state will lead to frequent ethnic revivals. The modern means of audio-visual mass media and communications have created parochial political consciousness on ethnic lines which is far ahead of forces of trade, commerce and industry. Modernisation and social mobilisation have not led to a transfer to primary allegiance from the ethnic group to the state. Can we go beyond this to posit an inverse correlation between modernisation and the level of ethnic dissonance within multi-ethnic states ? The available evidence about the pattern of ethnic dissonance in the world, at various levels of modernisation, is indicative of the fact that material increases in social communication and mobilisation tend to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict. According to Walter S. Jones, the available empirical evidence has borne out that “ethnic consciousness is definitely in the ascendancy as a political force, and that state borders, as presently delimited, is being increasingly challenged by this trend. And what is of greater significance, multi-ethnic states at all levels of modernity have been afflicted. Particularly instructive in this regard is the large proportion of states within the technologically and economically advanced region of Western Europe that have recently been troubled by ethnic conflict”.

The agents of modernisation forge ahead mechanically by multiplication, whereas human thinking and the primordial loyalties change, if at all they do, at a snail’s pace. In terms of technological and material growth and development, in a short span of less than half a century since the Second World War, mankind has achieved many a times more than it could achieve during the entire period of human existence prior to the War. However, on the socio-political and psychological

levels there is hardly any evidence of any change or transformation. Paul-Henry Spaak thus observed the dichotomy created by the technological achievements and socio-political backwardness: “Truly, our imagination is not in step with our era.”

This dichotomy in terms of material achievements and relative socio-political primordialism produces and reinforces fundamentalist forces hinging on primordial ties. The religious fundamentalism, ethnic revivalism and consequent terrorism are the outcome of this disequilibrium of what we have and what we are. Modernisation produces alienation which the ethnic groups are ill-prepared to withstand. The challenge of modernisation to socio-cultural and political ties, values, orientations, institutions and hierarchical social order is often viewed or perceived by the elite of these groups as threats to identity.

Social mobilisation and technological revolution in transport and communications rather than mitigating socio-cultural peculiarities, creating a hybrid culture and a composite society, have generated increased particularist cultural awareness and identity consciousness. The technological revolution in communication permits previously isolated ethnic groups to become more visible, and in certain cases interact across national boundaries. Moreover, the intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic communications play a major role in the creation of ethnic consciousness. Modernisation creates identity consciousness in an ethnic group which the ethnic elite mobilise for political purposes against the states. Simultaneously, within the ethnic groups, the forces of modernisation create convulsions whereby the traditional elite find its authority increasingly challenged by new socio-economic forces which are thrown up by the process of modernisation. In this intra-ethnic competition for dominance, the traditional forces are pitted against the new ones. Consequently, the competition or rivalry for leadership within the group leads to “one-up-manship”. Threat perception being the guiding principle, the existing and the added ethnic grievances are articulated normally around extremist demands, new strategies for their realisation are forged and invariably, in most of the cases, separatist movements are launched.

Modernisation and social mobilisation reinforce group identity on ethnic lines and produce awareness for differentiation from other ethnic groups. The process of modernisation has also produced political and economic competition on an unprecedented scale. This competition is not only essentially the product of conditions of scarcity but also of plenty which the modernisation has created. The ethnic differentiations lead to intensification of competition among groups, making the ascriptive basis of ethnicity a functional and effective vehicle for advancing group interests. The intensive and extensive competition created by modernisation generate social frustration and ire leading to social conflict and violence.

In short, modernisation sharpens differentiations, articulates identity consciousness, produces intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic competition and degenerates into violent conflicts.

29.4 IRRATIONAL BOUNDARIES: CHALLENGE TO STATE SYSTEM

The problem of irrationality of political boundaries is at the root of many ethnic conflicts whereby ethnic groups divided between two or more states strive for either ethnic unity or independence from the parent state or both. Here the difference between politicisation of ethnicity should be distinguished from ethnic nationalism, though the former may lead to the latter where a historical claim to a particular territory can be established. By the same logic all ethnic movements do not aspire for complete independence or statehood. Mobilisation of groups on ethnic lines is done to secure a better deal within the system whereas territorial ethnicity

seeks a position of partial or complete dominance in the territory concerned.

The present ethnic phenomenon is due to the nature of state boundaries all over the world. The state boundaries defy any rational or logical basis of delimitation and delineation. These are the products of the arbitrary policies of the imperialists and colonialists as well as various patterns of migration. The colonialists either inherited these irrational boundaries or followed the imperialistic approach to drawing boundary lines as dividing lines and in the process divided ethnic groups, tribes and even the clans. At times these ethnic groups fell prey to two or more competing colonialists or imperialists which divided them depending upon their power and/or convenience. Ethnic ties or geopolitical factors were completely ignored. The division of Kurds amongst Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Armenia and Syria, and Baluchs between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pashtuns between Afghanistan and Pakistan are cases in point.

During the colonial period these divided ethnic groups constituting a minority in the colonial set-up were handy to the colonialists against the dominant group. Generally, the colonial authorities ensured a better deal for these minority groups in recruitment to services and military and pampered them for their usefulness against national liberation movements of the predominant ethnic group in the colony concerned.

The imperialists as well as colonialists allowed and in some cases facilitated the tribal socio-cultural autonomy to flourish so long as it did not interfere with their authority. The traditional economic and socio-cultural ties and interaction across the border with their ethnic kins continued unchecked or unrestricted. The lack of participative political set up and dormant political consciousness did not create problems for the colonialists. The primordial socio-economic and political structures of the ethnic communities remained intact during the colonial period. In the absence of modern means of transportation and prevailing economic backwardness, the ethnic consciousness for identity remained dormant and primordial in its manifestation and did not pose a challenge to colonial sovereignty. Nevertheless, the demise of imperialism and colonialism ensured by national liberation movements created a consciousness for self-rule or self-determination which eventually percolated down to ethnic communities in the post-colonial states.

Unlike in the past when human factors were rarely taken into account for drawing the boundaries of empires or colonial possessions, in the modern age the human consciousness of a sense of identity cannot be ignored in any territorial distribution. In their zeal for nation-building the Western-educated ruling elite in the post-colonial states charted a course of national assimilation which has boomeranged in the sense that it created a host of sub-national or ethnic uprisings all over the developing world. After the First World War, US president Woodrow Wilson's principles wherein he asserted that "people and provinces are not to be bartered away" and that the right to national self-determination was an inalienable right of the people living in a particular area, the contemporary statesmen and media chided and scorned him for his idealistic enunciations, has facilitated this phenomenon.

29.5 INTERVENTIONIST ROLE OF THE MODERN STATE AND LOSS OF TRADITIONAL AUTONOMY

The penetrative role of the modern state has come to be increasingly resented and even opposed by tribal, ethnic and religious communities. They perceived this tendency as centralisation of power by the state and articulated this perception as a threat to their separate identity. This is not to suggest that the imperial or colonial periods were marked by the complete absence of central penetration and/or control.

Firstly, during the imperial or colonial periods, as and when the state attempted to regulate or harmonise ethnic affairs it was not due to the extension of the sphere of state activity but due to some political compulsions of a particular regime, whereas by contrast the interventionist nature of the modern state makes it imperative to impart socio-economic justice. Secondly, in the past, whenever and wherever the state pursued penetrative policies the affected ethnic group or community resisted the penetration which often led to bloodshed and genocide perpetrated by the state. Permanent and complete submission of the resisting ethnic group remained a surreal reality, use of excessive amount of violence, notwithstanding. Russification drives of Russian Czars in Central Asia and Muslim and Mughal rulers' atrocities against Hindus and Sikhs in India are historical realities substantiating the above position. The opposition to state penetration invariably remained smouldering beneath the façade of normalcy, periodically resurging. Irredentism remained festering for generations, waiting for the opportune moment to strike back.

29.5.1 Homogenisation and Assimilationist Approach of the Modern State

The cumulative impact of the interventionist or penetrative activities of the modern state and its assimilationist policies in the garb of nation-building produced ethnic opposition to the modern state strengthened the hardliners within the regimes which pursued assimilationist policies more vigorously and at times resorted to armed crackdown which further reinforced the position of hawks within the ethnic community. The challenge to ethnic identity and autonomy mounted and became so colossal that the sub-national communities are now compelled by the situation to act as if they were states in an international environment. Elite relations among the ethnic groups partake of diplomacy. While interacting among themselves and even with the state on the political plank, the ethnic leaders reflect local autonomy, which, in the words of an expert is "analogous to the relations among small states in a multipolar international system....They therefore form alliances that might remind the diplomatic historian of Renaissance Italy, and they deal with one another on the basis of sovereign equality".

In its relations to or dealings with the parent state, the ethnic groups' behaviour typified or is analogous to a small state towards the major state in the international system. These groups refer to the parent state in 'us-they' dichotomous terms. In their references to the parent state the relationship is at times reminiscent of colonial relationship. The ethnic communities accuse the parent state of injustice, discrimination and exploitation. The suitable data are marshalled to substantiate the charges. Demands-social, cultural, linguistic, religious, economic, territorial and political-are raised and inability or failure of the state, which is often the case, leads to further charges of exploitation, discrimination, suppression and even genocide.

Ethnic people are mobilised against the state and movements are launched, provincial boundaries are challenged and demands are vociferously raised for unification with the ethnic kins living in other provinces or states. Other ethnic migration to its areas is resented, opposed and at times attacked. Protectionism in terms of property ownership rights, jobs and land ownership is sought, for the ethnic community to the total exclusion of "outsiders". The reactions of the state-whether these be the restoration of law and order or checkmating the growing drift-are decried as if these were of the occupation force. The state is accused of violation of human rights, barbarity and even genocide. Rules of international behaviour are sought to be invoked in ethnic group *vs* state conflict. International bodies dealing particularly with minorities, human rights' protection and other humanitarian agencies are approached against violations by the state. Forces inimical to the state in the international set up are contacted for support. Efforts are made through ethnic migrants abroad to internationalise the issue to evoke sympathy. Significantly,

these actions and activities of the ethnic groups are increasingly gaining legitimacy. This trend has brought about a qualitative change in the territorial state-dominated international system. If this trend remains unchecked, i.e. ethnic homogeneity becomes the *raison d'être* of state system, the world is likely to be composed of more than three thousand ethnically homogeneous mini-states. The disintegration of Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and USSR on ethnic lines are strong pointers to the emerging international political order.

In their zeal for nation-building, the regimes in the Third World pursue policies which generate homogenising pressures, which cause resentment and are viewed with suspicion by the ethnic protagonists. The ruling elite in the Third World is not to be blamed entirely for these homogenising pressures. The modern state by itself is caught up in this vicious circle of cross-cutting interaction and inter-dependence. The inter-dependent global system has created a kind of global political and economic inter-dependence and integration. The state sub-system as part of this global system becomes a catalyst for the percolation of these integrative processes downward in its ethnic sub-systems.

The ethnic aspirations and the consequent uprisings have not properly been managed by the post-colonial states. The tendency among these newly independent states is informed of a threat perception in the context of ethnic minorities and their aspirations to the unity and territorial integrity and even to the independence of the state. Such a perception has paid rich dividends to the ruling elite of reinforcing its eroding legitimacy. No serious effort has been made to accommodate or manage the ethnic aspirations. Instead rulers in the Third World countries followed assimilationist policies and often resorted to military solutions of the ethnic imbroglio. Consequently, the festering irredentism of the ethnic groups assumed the form of violent conflict and terrorism with demands ranging from autonomy to complete independence.

Another aspect of this problem, which has too often been ignored, relates to the intra-ethnic power struggle which paradoxically is linked to ethnic *vs* state conflict. The deprivation of power within the state leads to frustration and anger among the minority ethnic groups. The failure of the traditional leadership of the ethnic group to secure a satisfactory solution over a time leads to loss of patience and anger in the ethnic community. Consequently, the younger generation within the ethnic community, which is relatively more educated and imbued with political consciousness and is not dogmatically loyal to the traditional leadership, instead seeks to challenge and if possible to change it. In this intra-ethnic group struggle for supremacy the new leadership raises extreme demands and advocates violent means to achieve the same. This fascinates the increasingly frustrated rank and file and ignites their imagination of a future set-up. The repressive machinery of the state, in the process of countering it, inadvertently offers justification of the extreme demands raised and the means adopted for their realisation. In the process the new leadership emerges as the dominant force in the ethnic movement within the state.

29.5.2 External Involvement

The conditions of domestic ethnic conflict tend to involve outside parties overtly or covertly, imparting it international dimensions. These essentially intra-national problems assume international character because ethnic considerations have increasingly influenced the decision-making in foreign policy through the ages but in modern times ethnicity has emerged as the major plank on which foreign policies are planned, shaped and executed. In the event of an ethnic group divided between two or more states, the nature of ethnic linkages across the border depends upon a host of ethnic considerations. If an ethnic group is predominant in the state A and a peripheral minority in state B, A is tempted to keep B as an imbecile entity. B as a weak entity by supporting openly or clandestinely the agitated ethnic group and the union of the ethnic

minority, if effected, will strengthen the position of the predominant ethnic group in the state A domestically and *vis-à-vis* state B externally. For example, Pushtoons constitute 13.14 per cent of the population in Pakistan, while they are the predominant ethnic group constituting around 50 per cent of population (including the refugees in Pakistan) in neighbouring Afghanistan. Afghanistan's sympathy and support for Pushtoons' uprisings in Pakistan stems from the fact that this provides them a soft border with Pakistan, a relatively powerful neighbour. As and when conditions warrant the unity of Pushtoons across the Durand Line would reinforce and further consolidate the position of Pushtoons within Afghanistan's political set up. However, in the absence of any ethnic ties with the ethnic group in conflict in a neighbouring state the nature of external involvement will depend upon the nature of the bilateral relations between the affected state and the neighbouring state, their relative power position and a host of other considerations.

In the event of an ethnic group divided between two or more states and constituting majority in none of them (as in the case of Kurds) the tendency on the part of other states is to support the ethnic group against the beleaguered state or the beleaguered state against the ethnic group or a position of neutrality depending upon the nature of their bilateral relations, their relative power position and convenience. Iran and the Soviet Union have supported the Kurds and the Iraq government alternately. Significantly, in 1988, Iraq dropped poisonous gas on the Kurdish town of Halabja causing death to thousands of defenceless civilians and Iraq's president Saddam Hussain justified it. This act of genocide using internationally banned poisonous gas did not raise any flutter anywhere. Perhaps, the USSR, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria where the Kurds constitute a minority-are in a discreet alliance, for, at times, they have also resorted to suppression of restive Kurd populations in their respective states.

Without active external support-both moral and material-the ethnic discontent remains latent and may not assume actual conflict proportions. The discontented ethnic minority without an active external support may take to constitutional means of struggle. However, the spurt in ethnic conflict all over the world in recent years owes its existence and sustenance to external involvement and support. The use of a large number of small and medium weapons by the ethnic groups, the meeting of huge recurring financial requirements for sustenance, and mass-media exposure to their point of view cannot be explained except with reference to the involvement of external powers.

In modern politics, ethnic calculations have become a major input in foreign policy planning. This is not to suggest that this was not in earlier periods of history but the nature and intensity of ethnic considerations in foreign policy-making, particularly in the Third World countries, have assumed new proportions. It is not essentially the conditions of ethnic conflict which influence the foreign policy formulations. The very existence of ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic state is a permanent influencing factor in foreign policy formulation of not only concerned state but also the neighbouring states as well. For example, the Soviet foreign policy towards Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey was never oblivious of ethnic linkages between Soviet Central Asian ethnic groups spilling across the border into these states.

In view of the traditional instruments of foreign policy having been rendered redundant or prohibitive, ethnic issues have emerged as the new instruments of foreign policy. Providing support-overt or covert-to ethnic groups in another state or to the state against the ethnic group, or a status of neutrality in ethnic *vs* state conflict are manifestations of involvement in the ethnic conflict. In an ethnic conflict situation the group-not essentially in a numerical majority in the state-having privileged access to state power will formulate its foreign policy to quarantine the ethnic conflict from any outside involvement. However, the ethnic group having no access to

state power may evolve the strategy to establish international contacts to gain support. It is these efforts of the rival parties “to evoke and/or regulate outside involvement” which lead to the internationalisation of domestic ethnic issues.

Viewed against this background the ethnic phenomena cannot be wished away on assimilationist and Marxist presumptions. It has come to stay as global phenomena confronting the existing national and international systems. Forces of modernisation, rather than mitigating ethnic ties have exacerbated them. The intensity and propensity of all round competition, which is the end-product of modernisation and socio-cultural and political consciousness as its natural corollary, have proved catalytic in organising human beings on ethnic lines. Marxian observation that “workers have no fatherland” means that destitution and misery of the 19 th Century European industrial worker would create economic consciousness rather than a parochial one. But the post-industrial society and electronic mass-media, revolution in transport and communication have reinforced parochial consciousness. Of course, the consciousness and competition created ethnic identities in preference to racial, linguistic, religious or ideological identities. The reason being that ethnicity binds human beings together with several overlapping bonds which are more natural, spontaneous and enduring, whereas the other identities are based on one or two variables which are relatively based on expediency and are transient in nature. Ethnic ties are based on a lifetime’s training as member of an ethnic group and which have shaped his moral and mental disposition.

Modernisation facilitated the advent of modern welfare state thereby eroding the internal autonomy of ethnic, religious and tribal groups and led to authoritative centralisation. It is against this interventionist role of the modern state that ethnic groups offered organised and sometimes even violent resistance and opposition. While the developed countries managed the ethnic resistance or opposition through resilience and /or accommodation, the newly independent post-colonial Third World states failed to grasp the reality and rise to the occasion. Instead these states viewed this ethnic resistance and opposition as a threat to unity and territorial integrity of the territorial nation-state, thereupon these states adopted assimilationist policies for nation-building and even did not hesitate to military solutions. The confrontation between the state and the ethnic group enforced the legitimacy of the ruling elite *vis-à-vis* the predominant ethnic group and the ethnic elite *vis-à-vis* the besieged ethnic community or sub-national group.

Irrational boundaries and innumerable mutual disputes between the Third World states facilitated the external links and support to the sub-national groups, and/or to the parent state, thus internationalising the otherwise internal conflict. Deprived of the often used instruments of foreign policy, the states have resorted to warfare through other means, i.e. support to ethnic groups against the state or to the state against the sub-national group. Consequently, ethnic considerations have assumed a major role in foreign policy pursuits. The whole national as well as international set up is confronted with ethnic resurgence of an unprecedented magnitude. The nature, dimensions and magnitude of ethnic claims, ethnic uprisings and ethnic conflicts are clear pointers to the emerging pattern that the existing nation-states and the international set up composed of nation-states as units is in the melting pot. What will emerge out of it will largely depend upon the sagacity and statesmanship of the leadership-both the ethnic as well as of the nation-states.

29.6 IDENTITY WARS/CONFLICTS

No doubt, the problem of identity related conflicts have been haunting the mankind since times immemorial but in contemporary era these have become more pervasive and most violent.

According to one reckoning of the ongoing conflicts the world over more than 75 per cent are related to identity. The dynamics and dimensions of these identity wars are so serious that they pose a threat to the fabric of social cohesion and territorial unity and integrity of most of the modern nation-states. Death toll in these identity conflicts is astounding and millions of people have become refugees. Most of these identity related conflicts are based on threat to ethnic identity.

Identity can be defined as an abiding sense of selfhood, the core of which makes life predictable to an individual. To have no ability to anticipate events is essentially to experience terror. Identity is conceived of as more than a psychological sense of self; it encompasses a sense that one is safe in the world physically, psychologically, socially and even spiritually. Events which threaten to invalidate the core sense of identity will elicit defensive responses aimed at avoiding psychic and/or physical annihilation. Identity is postulated to operate in this way not only in relation to interpersonal conflict but also in conflict between groups.

As is evident, identification is an inherent and unconscious behavioural imperative in all individuals. Individuals actively seek to identify in order to achieve psychological security, and they actively seek to maintain, protect and bolster identity in order to maintain and enhance this psychological security, which is a *sine qua non* of personality, stability and emotional well-being.

29.6.1 Causes of Identity Wars

Any one or the combination of two or more than two of the following factors leads to identity wars.

1. Fear of loss of Identity:

This is primarily due to the arbitrary national territorial formation and the minority ethnic groups in the new political formation where they fear the loss of their ethnic identity. Nagas, Mizos, Assamese in India and Baluch and Pushtoons in Pakistan have had uprisings leading to armed conflict when the new state tried to achieve integration in the national context. Ethnic groups around the world fear the loss of separate and distinct identity in the given political order.

2. Fear of Assimilation:

Minority ethnic groups fear assimilation on the part of the majority. Hence they try to maintain artificial territorial boundary based on their ethnicity. Sikh demand for *Punjabi Suba* and Sikh homeland in India and demand for *Sindhu desh* in Pakistan aim at protecting their identity through territorial demarcation of boundary between “us” and “they” i.e. the dominant majority. A kind of territorial enclave is the objective where its distinct identity could be preserved.

3. Fear of Marginalisation:

This is mainly as a result of domination of an outside group over indigenous people. An out group is one which is not native to the area/region in question but became part of it either due to voluntary immigration or state-sponsored colonisation. In such a scenario, it has often been observed that initially the migratory process was unassisted and did not involve any calculated strategy of dislodging the indigenous group from power and position. Colonisation, on the contrary, was a political programme with strong ethnic considerations aiming at neutralisation of the position of the indigenous people and reducing it to a minority in its own territory as in the case of *Maoris* in New Zealand, *Aborigines* in Australia and *Red Indians* in North and South

America. This is done through an ethnic oriented state-sponsored policy of demographic engineering.

4. Sense of Relative Deprivation and Discrimination:

Minority ethnic groups generally remain deprived and discriminated as a result of denial of minority rights and gross under-representation in national life and governmental institutions. Under representations of minorities in armed forces, civil services, police administration, judicial and legislative departments is widespread. This leads to discrimination as in the case of Tamils in Sri Lanka, Hindus in Bangladesh, Mohajirs and Baluch in Pakistan.

3. Sense of Powerlessness:

Hegemonic majoritarianism pursued by the ruling elite creates a sense of powerlessness among the minorities which in turn leads to minoritarianism. This majoritarianism and minoritarianism feed on each other. Significantly this majoritarian-minoritarian syndrome is more prevalent in democratic polities where the exclusive usurpation of power by the majority community is sought to be justified in the democratic logic. This majoritarianism can be of two categories. One, in which a national majority is pitted against a regional majority which is otherwise a national minority. Secondly, the regional majority is up against the national majority. Sikhs and Kashmiris in India, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Pushtoons, Sindhi and Baluch in Pakistan are the classic examples of this majority-minority syndrome.

The increase in number and intensity of ethnic conflicts or identity wars in recent times is a clear indicator of the state of affairs in the foreseeable future. According to one reckoning there were 37 major armed conflicts in the world in 1991 out of which 25 were internal conflicts most of which were on ethnic lines as identity wars. turned secessionism. Through the power they seek to gain, they argue that their distinct identity can be preserved or promoted.

29.7 SUMMARY

This unit focuses on the question of ethnic identity and reasons for the resurgence of ethnic conflict. Ethnicity comes from the Latin word ‘ethniko’ meaning common identity and refers to an awareness of common identity among the members of a particular social group in terms of a distinctive shared culture, common ancestry and historical memories, association with a specific territory, a sense of common solidarity and common religion. It had been argued earlier that ethnic ties are transitory in nature and that along with modernisation and social mobilisation, distinct identities would be assimilated into the nation. Instead, there has been an upsurge in ethno-nationalism in recent decades producing conflict and violence within the states and across the borders. Of the ongoing major conflicts in the world, over 75 per cent are on ethnic lines. The available evidence about the pattern of ethnic dissonance in the world, at various levels of modernisation, is indicative of the fact that material increases in social communication and mobilisation tend to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict. These conflicts are to an extent the products of the arbitrary policies of the colonialists who followed an irrational logic in drawing boundaries which divided ethnic groups, tribes and clans. The primordial socio-economic and political structures of the ethnic communities remained intact during the colonial period in the absence of modern means of transportation and prevailing economic backwardness. Thus the penetrative role of the modern state has come to be increasingly resented and even opposed by tribal, ethnic and religious communities and they are gaining legitimacy.

The ethnic aspirations and the consequent uprisings have not properly been managed by the post-colonial states. Third World countries followed assimilationist policies and often resorted to military solutions. Deprivation of power within the state leads to frustration and anger among the minority ethnic groups. Apart from that, fear of the loss of identity, fear of assimilation, fear of marginalisation, sense of deprivation, sense of powerlessness are all factors which can lead to an identity war. They also tend to involve outside parties overtly or covertly, imparting it international dimensions. Without active external support the ethnic discontent may not assume actual conflictual proportions. In fact, ethnic calculations have become a major input in foreign policy planning. Ethnic groups in conflict seek autonomy through which they feel their distinct identity can be preserved.

29.8 EXERCISES

1. What do you understand by the term ‘ethnicity’? Do you think it is becoming an important issue in recent years?
2. Give reasons for the rise in ethnic violence in a relatively short span of time after the Second World War.
3. In what way was intervention by colonial states different from that of modern states?
4. Why has the ethnic problem assumed international dimensions?
5. Explain the concept of identity. Why do identity wars take place?

UNIT 30 ABORIGINAL/INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS

Structure

- 30.1 Introduction
- 30.2 Who Are the Indigenous People?
- 30.3 Advent of Indigenous Movements
- 30.4 Spread of Indigenous Movements
 - 30.4.1 Conditions for the Spread
 - 30.4.2 Canada
 - 30.4.3 Australia
 - 30.4.4 Latin America
 - 30.4.5 USA
- 30.5 Major Issues of Indigenous Movements
- 30.6 Government Responses
- 30.7 Summary
- 30.8 Exercises

30.1 INTRODUCTION

Indigenous people had never been regarded as international subjects. They were either relegated to reserved territories in the states or confined to inhospitable regions and doomed to extinction by the repressive policies adopted by the state. But now there is new international thinking, which appreciates their unique way of life. The rise of indigenous peoples as prominent actors not only in the national but also the international arena cannot be ignored. They can no longer be treated as passive objects of historical change but as dynamic subjects of history as they are now actively involved in shaping their own destiny. With states adopting policies such as multiculturalism in order to appease and cater to the demands of its ethnically diverse population, it is becoming increasingly evident that the demands and the aspirations of the ‘indigenous’ peoples are different from that of ethnic groups. Thus ‘indigenous ethnicity’ has emerged as a concept which is different from ‘ethnicity’. Acknowledging the ascending role and influence of the indigenous peoples in global politics the United Nations had the year 1993 declared as the International Year for the World’s Indigenous Peoples by and the decade from 1995 to 2004 as the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples. It is observed, that while each people has its own history, its culture, and each has had its unique struggle and its successes or failures, indigenous peoples from various parts of the world have all come together to create and evolve a common consciousness. In fact, organisations led by the indigenous peoples have at times been criticised for making use of international fora including the United Nations to promote and champion their common cause while damaging the reputation of the countries to which they geographically belong. As a consequence of government policies ranging from exploitation, annihilation or assimilation either by design or oversight in the past, to grudging recognition at present, the world is now admitting that the indigenous peoples have in the past been placed at the mercy of the ruling classes.

30.2 WHO ARE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES?

For the purposes of this discussion, the term “indigenous peoples” applies to the descendants of the original inhabitants of a given area or region-a region forcibly occupied by foreigners who subsequently replaced the mechanisms of governance and curtailed the development of the indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, indigenous peoples still manifest cultural and social characteristics and practices distinct from the national varieties, which surround them. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 107 first introduced the term “indigenous” wherein the “tribal and semi-tribal populations were considered as a broad social category and indigenous populations as a sub-category of the former who are descendants of the original populations of the countries which were taken over by colonisers”. ILO Convention 169, adopted in June 1989 de-linking the concept of “tribe” from the “indigenous” included a reference to self-identification as a fundamental criterion in determining who the indigenous peoples are. It laid down that national governments should allow indigenous peoples to participate in the decision-making that affects them, set their own development priorities and give back the lands they traditionally occupied. Internationally, the word “Indigenous” has been used by the United Nations system as well as by the peoples themselves. To be “indigenous” or a “people” confers a psychological strength over being merely deemed as a minority population. That the ruling elite recognises this is illustrated in the debates of both the ILO and the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations on the use of the words such as “peoples” or “population”. While the ILO decided to use both terms, the Working Group uses the term “population”. The debate suggests that the reason to use “population” rather than “peoples” is possibly to deny the basis for a claim to self-determination and territorial independence within nation-states in which they are located.

Both the terms “indigenous” and “native” are subjects of much debate. While “native” has a colonial connotation for many, the capitalised “Native” is an acceptable label in North America, indicating perhaps that they are a nation. In fact, the term “First Nations” is often used as an alternative designation in Canada and the United States of America. The internationally acceptable term “indigenous” is preferred. The names by which indigenous peoples are called are also changing according to their preferred names. The Lapps of Europe are now known as *Saami*, the Eskimos of Canada as *Inuit* and the Bushmen of Africa as *San*.

It must be emphasised that indigenous peoples are distinct from one another, and that these distinctions are not dependent upon national boundaries. In Europe, the following may be considered as indigenous populations: the Celtic peoples of the British Isles, Brittany in France and Galicia in Spain; the *Basque* peoples of France, Portugal and Spain; The *Saami* people of Greenland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the former Soviet Union. In Asia, there are various tribal or hill peoples in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and China and the *Ainu* people in Japan. In addition there are numerous indigenous groups in Siberia, some of whom are considered as part of the *Inuit* peoples also present in Alaska, Canada and Western Greenland. In Africa, the Berbers and the *San* may be considered as indigenous peoples. Most Asian and African states deny that there are any indigenous peoples within their territories. The ILO subjected Bangladesh to considerable pressure in the UN before it would address the issue of the Chittagong Hill People. In India, the tribal peoples or Scheduled Tribes are considered as the core of the ‘indigenous group’. In Oceania there are indigenous groups in the Philippines, Indonesia, Borneo and Papua New Guinea. Generally, these peoples live in the forests. The Native Hawaiians also fit within Oceania. In Australia are the Aboriginal peoples and in New Zealand are the *Maori* peoples. The displacement of indigenous peoples is usually the result of an invasion of their territory by an ethnically and culturally different group, which then attempts to convert the native population

to the conquerors' cultural norms and suppresses the indigenous peoples culture, identity and history. Usually, the colonising country believes its culture is materially and spiritually superior to that of the indigenous group. In most cases, the invader is able to establish sufficient control over the territory and society to force the indigenous population to deal with the imposed legal system in attempting to redress the injustice inherent in the process of conquest. Needless to say, the indigenous people lose most legal rights until the dominant society accepts its responsibility to make amends. An example of this acceptance process is the creation and operation of the *Waitangi* tribunal in New Zealand, which deals with land title cases between the *Maori* and the European settlers. In the *Waitangi* tribunal, the *Maori* have the majority vote.

30.3 ADVENT OF INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS

It was around 1900 that the first ethno-political initiatives were taken by the indigenous peoples. These were mostly in the form of appeals, petitions and requests to the imperial authorities of various colonial powers. It is commonly known that the Indians of North America were crushed by armed forces during the second half of the 19th Century. Even though the conflict in Northern Europe was not so overt, we find many examples of oppression of the *Saami*, e.g. when their religious-Læstadian movement around 1850 was suppressed with the help of the State Church and the Courts. By the end of the 19th Century, at the highpoint of imperialism, the policy regarding indigenous peoples was increasingly characterised by a heavy-handed assimilation, legitimised by Social Darwinism and racist ideology-and supplemented for example in Norway, with nationalistic ideology. In the face of such policies many indigenous peoples were obliged, initially at least, to limit their opposition to indirect and purely symbolic activities. The League of Nations founded in 1919 was an international organisation in which one could have expected indigenous issues to surface. To begin with, US president Woodrow Wilson himself had taken as his political war-cry, the right of nations to 'self-determination' at the end of the First World War. And secondly, the protection of the rights of minorities was one of the most important spheres of activity during the period when the League was effectively functional.

Chief Deskaheh, a *Cayuga* indigenous person from the 'Six Nations' reserve in the Western Hemisphere (Canada) stepped up demand for full self-government and recognition of the *Iroquois* peoples as a sovereign nation. Around 1920 issues came to a head with both legal battles and violent confrontation. The *Iroquois* sought independence from Canada's legal system. Deskaheh visited England and when that failed, went to Washington to meet the *chargé d'affaires* of Netherlands recalling peace and friendship treaties concluded between Europe and the *Iroquois* in the 18th Century. The General Secretary of the League of Nations then took up the matter in 1923. The British and the Canadian members in the League of Nations Council meeting declared that the Six Nations had no right to claim a separate state as they continued to be "British subjects residing in Canada".

The creation of the United Nations in 1945 offered a ray of hope with its active role in the decolonisation process. Increasing demands from ethnic groups calling for action on the new anti-racist ideals of human rights could no longer be ignored. This had special force in countries like Canada and New Zealand, which during the war had raised special contingents from amongst their indigenous peoples. These in effect opened the way for the question of the indigenous peoples to be raised as a separate issue within the UN around 1970. Also, one experienced in the post-war years a global industrial and technological penetration in the peripheral areas, which stretched from the tropical rain forests to the Arctic region. Initially the development was accelerated by the need to help the most exposed ethnic groups on humanitarian and welfare grounds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO), an organ of the League of

Nations, had initiated this work as early as the 1920s and in 1957, the ILO adopted Resolution 107, which gave protection to the tribal and indigenous peoples all over the world.

As popular organisations, such as the total abstinence and Free Church movements, developed during the second half of the 19th Century, indigenous peoples too began to voice their opposition in more innovative forms. An important pre-condition here was that the indigenous peoples were, to some extent at least, being integrated into the wider society, to the extent that certain groups came into existence that had an insight in, and could appeal to, the common values of citizenship. It is somewhat of a paradox that recruitment to the new leadership was bound, for the most part, to take place amongst those who were most integrated into society as a whole as a result of their having gone through mission schools and teacher education colleges.

30.4 SPREAD OF INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS

30.4.1 Conditions for the Spread of Indigenous Movements

The most important reasons for the spread of indigenous movements were related to the kind of developments at the international level. Firstly, the struggle against Nazism had been waged under the banner of anti-racism and human rights. It was, therefore, most difficult to overlook demands which were to come from ethnic groups that earlier had been regarded as uncivilised and on the way to extinction.

Secondly, the wave of de-colonisation in the Third World aroused sympathy for those ethnic groups that had been subject to internal colonisation. Internationally de-colonisation was carried further by the UN when, in 1960, a resolution laid down the principle that all peoples had the right to self-determination and should therefore, be free to determine their own social and cultural development. A corresponding but more limited principle was accorded to minorities in 1966 through the conventions on human rights. These in effect opened the way for the question of the indigenous peoples to be raised as a separate issue within the UN around 1970.

Thirdly, industrial and technological development was accelerated by the need to help the most exposed ethnic groups on humanitarian and welfare grounds. The International Labour Organisation (ILO), a part of the League of Nations, had begun this work as early as the 1920s. This work came to a conclusion when, in 1957, the ILO adopted Resolution 107 which gave protection to tribal and indigenous peoples. The goal was an organised assimilation, whilst at the same time, in line with conventional colonial law, recognising customary rights and, to some extent, the need to protect material living conditions. The contribution of the indigenous peoples in the making of these decisions was, at that time, conspicuous by its absence. Nevertheless the Resolution was a boost for groups, which in many cases were exposed to actual genocide.

Roughly speaking, then, this was the context indigenous peoples throughout the world had to accommodate to. As it turned out the internal ethno-political situation and their position within the nation state led them over to an international involvement. The First Nations' peoples of North America and the *Saami* of Northern Europe, had both different internal histories and a different relationship to their respective nation states. What they had in common was that they were both active in building up the international network of indigenous peoples in the course of the 1970s and in bringing the indigenous people into the international arena. It was, at the outset, by no means axiomatic that the ethno-political movement within these groups should take an international turn since, as is the case with most indigenous peoples, they are concerned with local issues that can be dealt with inside the boundaries of the nation state. It appears surprising,

therefore, that the organisational development of these indigenous peoples should be so alike. Whatever had happened, occurred in two phases. The first, which proved abortive, occupied the first three decades of the 20th Century and the second that of establishment and growth, occurred after the Second World War, though it did not gather momentum until 1970. The setting up of associations amongst the Indians of the USA showed a clear continuity and existed as a common ethno-political movement. Parallel bodies were late in coming amongst the 'First Nations' in Canada, but when the process began around 1970 it developed rapidly. The *Saami* of Scandinavia were somewhere in between, with developments occurring at different times in the various states. While there were just a handful of indigenous movements dotting the Latin American region in the 1960s, they gained strength in the 1970s and by 1990s indigenous organisations had mushroomed ranging from local and regional organisations to national level federative organisations having alliances with well-developed international lobbies.

30.4.2 Canada

The organisational development amongst the Canadian Indians prior to 1970 was very uneven but singularly more uniform after that date. A new pan-Indian initiative was launched in 1960 when, for the most part, educated urban Indians and *Métis* set up the *National Indian Council* (NIC). Its main aim was to promote Indian culture and advance political agreement. The organisation had, therefore, to fight against major internal divisions right from the outset. It had further problems with fund raising and achieved little influence since the authorities did not see it as being in any way representative of Indians generally. The government's *White Paper* of 1969 according to which all Canadians should be treated equally, became the catalyst that would unite the various indigenous groups around the policy proposed by the NIC.

The Status-Indians' regional bodies came together in a federal structure and at a meeting in 1969 the nature of the organisation, the *National Indian Brotherhood* (NIB) was decided upon. The NIB was totally opposed to the *White Paper* and its idea of a just society with equal opportunities, as it would simply result in denial of rights, which were specifically 'indigenous'. The government, forced to retreat, now stood without a policy for its indigenous peoples. Then president of the NIB George Manuel took this opportunity to initiate building up an international network of indigenous peoples. The NIB has consciously exploited whatever authority the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) had. For example, already at its second general assembly in 1977, a resolution was adopted which was more than anything else grounded in the Canadian political process. The requirement was a pan Indian movement rather than a number of local organisations, which could put forth its demands clearly to the government. This was achieved with the NIB changing its name to the current *Assembly of First Nations*.

30.4.3 Australia

The 1920s and 1930s saw growing political pressure, both domestic and international, on the Australian government in relation to the condition of Aborigines especially in the Northern Territory. Though there were attempts to improve welfare provisions for the indigenous peoples in the Parliament, they were never sustained. A decisive change occurred in the mid-1960s when Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory began to press for indigenous rights in a new way. For example, the Aboriginal community from *Yirrkala* in Arnhem Land pursued a claim to obtain ownership of their land and at Wave Hill cattle station. Despite the continuing concerns of the *Yirrkala* people, the government proceeded with the project as planned. When this failed they took a more radical step in 1971 demanding that their traditional ownership of the land should be recognised by the Australian law. The proclamation of a beach umbrella and a number of tents in the premises of the Parliament House in Canberra as the Aboriginal

Embassy, on Australia Day 1972, in protest of the refusal to recognise indigenous land rights is seen as a symbol of a united and national aboriginal movement.

30.4.4 Latin America

Indigenous movements in Latin America have emerged in the last two to three decades, as has been the case in other parts of the world. In the 1960s, there were only a handful of indigenous movements in the region. The first-ever-indigenous movement was in the early 1960s in Ecuador. The *Shuar* Federation was formed to defend land from encroachment by settlers and promote the interests of the various dispersed *Shuar* communities in the Amazonian Eastern Ecuador. More organisations came up in the 1970s in other Latin American countries, recognising the interests of their own community as important rather than clubbing them with the interests of the larger peasant community. These organisations were not only local and regional, but they also turned national and even international in their reach. Some regional organisations that emerged at that time were the Indigenous Association of the Peruvian jungle (AIDESP), the Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca Valley (CRIC) in Colombia and the Indigenous Confederation of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB). Among the examples of nation-wide organisations, mention can be made of the Ecuadorian Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities (CNAIE) and the National Union of Indians (UNI) of Brazil.

30.4.5 USA

The first pan-Indian organisation with a more permanent character was the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) founded in 1944. The organisation prioritised the improvement of conditions in the health and educational sectors, lobbying on legislative issues, and media campaigns to bring attention to the indigenous culture and history. Starting with 50 tribal representatives in 1944 the number grew to 154 in 1978, whilst, by that time there were also about 3,000 individual members.

In 1960 a group of young, well-educated Indians set up the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) during a conference of researchers on the Indian questions. It was critical of middle class Indians in the NCAI who were seen as being far too companionable with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the colonial office. The organisation encouraged the growth of 'Native studies' courses in various universities and also managed to get the media interested in their cause. The organisation resolved in 1973 to support the work being carried out to form a worldwide organisation of indigenous peoples. In 1975 the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) was established at a conference in Port Alberni. Urbanised Indians took the initiative in setting up a pan-American organisation. Thus the American Indian Movement (AIM) emerged. This organisation too was quick to make an impact in the media as a result of carrying out various militant actions, the most talked about being the violent confrontation at Wounded Knee in 1973. Both before and after this incident, the organisation demanded that the authorities stand by the treaties. In 1972 the organisation arranged a demonstration across the whole country and in order to exert greater pressure on the authorities, the organisation set up the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) in 1974 as its diplomatic vehicle. In 1977, this was the first one of the indigenous organisations, which was recognised by the UN as a non-governmental organisation. It has been said that the IITC was an organ of indigenous peoples that did most within the UN system. The strength of the IITC lay in the fact that it was one hundred per cent American and did not need, therefore, to have regard for the wishes and strategies of indigenous peoples in other nation states. The pan-Indian organisations through the public debate and attention they aroused influenced both the form and rhetoric of the discussion on indigenous peoples, which sprang up in international circles.

30.5 MAJOR ISSUES OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

The main issue and the demand of the indigenous peoples is that of **Self-determination**. This has a political connotation and is most problematic. It should be recognised that this topic strikes at the legitimacy of the settler regimes and will be resisted. But self-determination need not be understood in terms of political independence from the nation state. Governments have taken cognizance of this demand and there have been instances where a formal structure has been provided for the indigenous peoples whereby they have the freedom to govern themselves. One such recent example is that of the Canadian government establishing *Nunavut*. The arrangement between Greenland and Denmark may also be an indicator that opinion is changing on this issue.

Another such issue is that of **territory**. Land means much more to the indigenous peoples than what is simply implied by the word. **Compensation** for the theft of land and property by the settler societies is a bone of contention. The reactions to the *Waitangi* Tribunal in New Zealand, and to the *Mabo* Decision in Australia indicate the problems in meeting competing equities.

Related questions have been raised in regard to **intellectual property rights** for medicines developed from plants and traditional medical practices of indigenous peoples. The general scenario is that a researcher learns of a traditional medicine and investigates its use and effectiveness. The researcher then refines the drug and a patent is issued to the researcher or his company. In most cases no compensation is given to the tribe, which had preserved and actually discovered the medicine. A proposal to reform the process to ensure compensation to the indigenous people involved was recently discussed and rejected by the World Intellectual Property Organisation. This issue will not go away. Also related to the above is control over the **exploitation of natural resources** located on the traditional lands of indigenous peoples. At present these resources are usually claimed by the settler society, which gets any fees or profits from exploitation without regard to the needs or desires of the indigenous peoples.

Preservation of cultural traditions and languages is a high priority for many indigenous peoples who are usually a minority in the settler society. Most such majority societies have been extremely reluctant to allow the use of indigenous languages in formal governmental activities, though examples can be taken of indigenous languages being accepted as official for the use of indigenous peoples.

30.6 GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

Governmental measures and responses to indigenous movements seem to have passed through various phases. The first was the abortive phase when any indigenous efforts at protests were severely suppressed and no cognizance was taken of the existence of these peoples. The second can be called the establishment and expansionist phase when indigenous movements came to life mostly in the 1970s. Thus in spite of various government policies that argued that indigenous peoples were a part of the past and not of the present, the indigenous peoples made a comeback. Examples of this kind of a governmental policy are the claim by Newfoundland in 1949 when it joined Canada that Newfoundland had no ‘natives’ or the Canadian prime minister’s idea of a ‘just society’ and the *White Paper* of 1969. Today, having gained credibility, the indigenous peoples are demanding ancestral rights. The attitude of the various governments too has been changing with time, keeping in line with the progress of the indigenous movements.

One of the major initiatives that various governments have made is to give constitutional recognition to the rights of the indigenous peoples. Recently, some Latin American countries

have promulgated new constitutions or introduced amendments to the existing constitutions, which reflect the ruling elite's change in attitude towards these peoples. Brazil has a full chapter on the 'Indians' in its new constitution of 1988, while Mexico has introduced reforms. Other countries like Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, Paraguay and Panama too have introduced constitutional reforms or a new constitution in which the rights and the identity of these people have been recognised. Elsewhere, for instance in Canada, through Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982, the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognised and affirmed." Section 35 also provides that the "aboriginal peoples of Canada" include the Indian, *Inuit* and *Métis* peoples, and that the recent land claims agreements of the indigenous peoples are to be recognised as "treaties". Not only that but the recognition of *Nunavut* in 1993 has also been a giant step for the government. Similarly, in Australia, the *Mabo* Decision of 1992 was a major breakthrough. It did away with the concept of *Terra Nullius* wherein empty, unsettled or unpopulated land could be claimed by any one who would settle and develop it. The Native Title Act of December 1993 provided the legal framework for the High Court's decision recognising the principle of Native Title. The Constitutional recognition in Australia to embed these rights and proposals are on the anvil.

While the governments have undertaken major steps, these are not considered as adequate. To quite an extent, these initiatives have been the result of an intense international pressure and awareness. So, the indigenous issue has become an international one over the years. In recent years, global awareness has increased. The establishment of the Working Group on Indigenous Population (WGIP)-created in 1982, is an evidence of that. The WGIP is the principal UN group concerned with indigenous people's rights. They call for a comprehensive study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations. In accordance with the Economic and Social Council's resolution, Jose R. Martinez Cobo was appointed as Special Rapporteur to make such a study. It resulted in a report ***The Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations***, with 22 chapters. The main project of the WGIP has been the drafting of a Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights.

The vehement rejection of the any of the earlier government policies has only stressed the resurgence of the indigenous movements which are now active at the international level.

30.7 SUMMARY

The term "indigenous peoples" applies to the descendants of the original inhabitants of a given area or region-a region forcibly occupied, by foreigners who subsequently replaced their means of governance and curtailed their democratic development. Nevertheless, indigenous peoples still manifest cultural and social characteristics and practices distinct from the national varieties, which surround them.

It was around 1900 that the first ethno-political initiatives were taken by the indigenous peoples. The League of Nations formed in 1919 was an international organisation in which one could have expected to raise indigenous issues. Chief Deskaheh, a *Cayuga* from the Six Nations reserve stepped up the demand for full self-government and recognition of the Iroquois as a sovereign nation. The General Secretary of the League of Nations then took up the matter in 1923. The creation of the United Nations in 1945 offered a ray of hope with the United Nations' active role in the decolonisation process. In 1957, the ILO Adopted Resolution 107 which gave protection to tribal and indigenous peoples. The contribution of the indigenous peoples in the making of these decisions was, at the time, conspicuous by its absence. While there were just a handful of indigenous movements in the 1960s, they gained strength in the 1970s and by 1990s

indigenous organisations had mushroomed ranging from local and regional organisations to national level federative organisations having alliances with well-developed international lobbies. This kind of a lobbying took place in most countries, taking up the major issues concerning indigenous peoples like that of self-determination, territorial rights, intellectual property rights, preservation of cultural traditions and languages. While major steps have been undertaken by the various governments like the formation of *Nunavut* in Canada or the *Mabo* decision in Australia, towards the well being of the indigenous governments, it has not been enough. To quite an extent, these steps have been the result of intense international awareness and pressure. So, indigenous movements, making their presence felt nationally as well as internationally are will be instrumental in their fight for their rights.

30.8 EXERCISES

- 1) How would you define 'Indigenous Peoples'?
- 2) Identify three of the indigenous populations from any of the regions in the world. Why do you call them 'indigenous'?
- 3) How did indigenous movements gain international attention in the initial stages?
- 4) Briefly explain how indigenous movements have spread in various parts of the world.
- 5) Explain what the indigenous peoples are demanding in their fight for rights. How have governments in various countries responded to these demands?

UNIT 31 DISPLACEMENT OF POPULATION: INTRA-STATE AND INTERSTATE

Structure

- 31.1 Introduction
 - 31.2 Inter-state Displacement
 - 31.2.1 Non-Refoulement and other Refugee Rights
 - 31.2.2 New Refugee Situations
 - 31.2.3 Refugee Protection: The Current Scenario
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31.1 INTRODUCTION

The key concepts that we need to define here are displacement, state, inter-state and intra-state. The term displacement can be defined as the dislocation of peoples from a place/environment to another one forcibly. In other words, it is ‘forced migration’. Displacement involves more than just a change of physical environment. It also deals with factors such as coping mechanisms and power relations in the new setting. Displacement is a phenomenon that can recur in people’s lives. Therefore, it can be regarded as a process as well.

Here we need to introduce the term migration and differentiate between displacement (forced migration) and migration. It is a result of a conscious decision on the part of the person who migrates. Therefore, it is a voluntary movement of peoples from one physical environment to a newer one, for economic, social or cultural reasons. Migration may or may not be disruptive for the individual or community.

The term State refers to the nation-state with the features of population, territory, government and sovereignty. For example, India, Tanzania and the United Kingdom are nation-states.

Inter-state displacement refers to forced migration of peoples across national boundaries. In international law those displaced across national borders or subjects of inter-state displacement are defined as refugees-Sri Lankan refugees in Europe or the Vietnamese “boat people” in the USA are examples of inter-state dislocation.

Intra-state displacement deals with displacement within the national borders of a state. Forced migrants as a result of displacement within the national borders of a state are categorised as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Those forcibly displaced due to developmental activities such as construction of roads, railway tracks and dams, for instance, fall under the category of intra-state displacement.

Having differentiated between the terms inter-state and intra-state displacements, i.e. refugees and IDPs, respectively, we shall study the two categories of forced migrants in greater detail.

31.2 INTER-STATE DISPLACEMENT

In everyday speech a refugee is someone who has been compelled to abandon his home or place of habitual residence. Millions of those uprooted or homeless have had to look for safety to escape, intolerance, persecution, political violence, armed conflict or violation of human rights in general. A refugee is a victim of events, for which, at least as an individual he is not responsible.

Until the 20th Century no universal standards existed for the protection of people. Most of the states towards which refugees headed, barred entry to them. Out of this experience the concept of refugees entered international law. The refugee's uncertain legal status made them a political problem. Their physical and economic conditions caused human concern. Until the end of First World War, no coordinated efforts were made to assist and protect refugees. It was only with the inception of the League of Nations at the end of the First World War that a beginning was made in assisting refugees in a coordinated manner. Refugee protection came to be regarded as an international problem that required international co-operation.

In 1921, Fridtjof Nansen (1921-1930), the Norwegian polar explorer was appointed by the League of Nations, as the High Commissioner for Russian refugees. Nansen's good work was carried forward by the American High Commissioner, James McDonald (1933-1935). McDonald fought immigration restrictions across the globe to resettle Jewish refugees that fled Nazi persecution during Hitler's regime. In a short span of two years he settled 80,000 refugees in Palestine and elsewhere. Later, the mandate of the High Commissioner was extended to Armenian, Syrian, Kurdish, Turkish and German refugees. However, these were ad hoc arrangements to deal with specific refugee groups.

The years 1950-1951, marked a turning point in refugee protection. It was during this period that a formal structure of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was set up for the protection and assistance of refugees.

In 1951, the UNHCR adopted the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (herein after referred to as the 1951 Convention). The 1951 Convention formulated the definition of a refugee specifically in the context of post-war Europe. It also spelt out standards for their protection by the international community.

The term refugee is applied to any person who as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951, and owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Article 1, 1951 Convention).

Therefore, a refugee as defined by the 1951 Convention was any person who

- 1 was a victim of events in Europe occurring before 1 January 1951
- 1 was outside the country of his origin (home country of which he is a national)

- 1 could not go back to his home country of origin due to a **well founded fear of persecution**
- 1 persecution was justified on the following five grounds race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a social group.

The countries to which refugees flee and seek protection are called ‘countries of asylum’. Asylum can be defined as the protection which a state grants on its territory or in some other place under the control of its organ to a person who comes to seek it.

The 1951 Convention does not provide for the right to asylum. What exists is only the right to seek asylum. It must be pointed out that any country that commits itself to the cause of refugees, implicitly, undertakes the burden of hosting them and overseeing their welfare. Obviously, the nation-states were not willing to assume too many legal obligations arising out of the 1951 Convention. They were not prepared to recognise obligations arising out of an unconditional right to asylum. Therefore, this right is not mentioned in the Convention. However, the 1951 Convention does contain a very significant provision spelt out in Article 33. It deals with prohibition of expulsion or return (refoulement) from the country of asylum. In addition to non-refoulement, the 1951 Convention grants certain other rights to refugees.

31.2.1 Non-Refoulement and Other Refugee Rights

The term non-refoulement derives from the French *refouler*. It means to drive back or repel. Under the principle of non-refoulement (Article 33), it is obligatory for States party to the 1951 Convention, not to return people by force, from countries of asylum to situations where their life and or freedom may be under threat. In practice, States have sent back refugees on grounds that they are a threat to their national security, ‘public order’ or that the refugee status of the individual asylum seeker is questionable or illegal.

In addition to the right to non-refoulement, the 1951 Convention grants refugees the rights of employment, housing, education, social security, documentation and freedom of movement.

The definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention, though general and of universal application, was narrow. It was limited to events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951. In the wake of new events, additional refugees were generated across the world. The existing definitions due to the above mentioned reasons were unable to include the new categories of forced migrants. At this juncture, it was felt that a wider definition was needed to include the newer situations that emerged worldwide. Therefore, the 1951 Convention definition was amended by the 1967 Protocol to the Convention. It removed both the time and the geographical limitations. Henceforth, the 1951 Convention definition covered refugees generated after 1 January 1951 and outside of Europe, as well.

Situations arose on the African continent and other parts of the world, where people were forced to leave their countries of origin not because of a fear of persecution, but because of war at home and the general violence that accompanied the decolonisation process. The 1951 Convention worked well with the individual asylum seekers but now refugees arrived in large numbers. In such circumstances neither was it feasible to check if the motive for seeking the refugee status was due to a ‘well founded fear of persecution’ or due to other factors such as famine, natural disaster, decolonisation or a combination of these. An expanded definition was needed to deal with the newer situations emerging across the world.

31.2.2 New Refugee Situations

Africa

To deal with this emerging reality, in Africa, the 1969 OAU (Organisation of African Unity) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (hereafter referred to as the 1969 OAU Convention) was adopted. This definition accepted the definition offered by the 1951 Convention but also added other categories of persons such as, those escaping violence in general, natural disasters such as famine, floods or drought and members of liberation movements fighting against colonial domination. It would have been difficult for the UNHCR to include freedom fighters because its activities are to be strictly non-political.

Instead of an individual status determination of refugees, the 1969 OAU Convention adopted a group approach. The fact that those concerned were without the protection of their own government was a reason enough to grant them a legal refugee status. The scope of protection offered by the 1969 OAU Convention is much wider than that of the 1951 Convention. A wider definition of the term was found more suitable to deal with refugee situations in Latin America as well.

Latin America

Later, in 1984, following the refugee crisis in Central America, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees was adopted in cooperation with the UNHCR, in Cartagena, Colombia. Like the 1969 OAU Convention's definition, this too defines refugee in a broader manner. Though the Declaration is not legally binding on States, its broader definition is applied to deal with refugee situations in Central and Latin America.

Asia

In the Asian context, the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee's (AALCC) 1966 Principles Concerning the Treatment of Refugees or the Bangkok Principle deal with refugee protection in the region. It specifically incorporates the principles of non-refoulement or non-rejection at the frontiers. However, these principles are not binding and have not had the impact similar to other regional Conventions in Africa and Latin America.

Though the region has witnessed the largest forced population movements in contemporary history, none of the South Asian countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) are signatories to the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol.

There is no comprehensive legal document at the regional level, which provides a framework for refugee protection in the region. Neither are the South Asian States signatories to the international instruments on refugee protection. Refugee protection is dealt with as a part of bilateral relations between the refugee sending and receiving countries in the region. However, in the 1990s, there has been an increased concern about refugee protection at the national and the regional level. A formal legal framework for refugee protection could eliminate discriminatory and inconsistent treatment of refugees arising out of human rights violation in the South Asian region.

By 31 December 1999, 131 states had acceded to both the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Either one or both of the above mentioned instruments have been ratified by 138 States.

Violence of human beings against human beings due to a violation of basic human rights is the main cause of refugee outflows in the world today. This may take the form of persecution of persons because of their race, religion, membership of a social group or political opinion, oppressive regimes and armed conflicts or civil wars. The reasons for refugee outflows can be broadly divided into man-made and natural causes.

We can get an insight into the causes by way of examples that are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

Some illustrations of refugee outflows due to man-made causes

Africa

- 1 *Apartheid* in South Africa is an example of an oppressive regime. *Apartheid* was the policy of separate development of races, introduced by the Afrikaner Nationalist Party in 1948. It discriminated against people on account of their skin colour and closed all avenues of protest against it. The victims of *apartheid* had to flee into neighbouring countries or elsewhere to seek asylum.
- 1 During the 1960s and 1970s violent anti-colonial independence movements against their colonial masters in Africa, led to forced migration across the continent. Of these the most violent were liberation struggles in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Together they accounted for 56 per cent of Africa's refugees at that time!

Europe

- 1 In September 1935, following the Nuremberg laws during Hitler's regime in Germany, the Jews were deprived of citizenship and the right to vote. Their persecution during the Nazi regime led to an outflow of Jewish refugee population from Germany.
- 1 More recently, ethnic tensions in former Yugoslavia have been the major cause of refugee movements in Europe. The deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing to create ethnically homogeneous areas caused refugee outflows from Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, South Caucasus and Kosovo.

Asia

- 1 The partition of the Indian sub-continent led to the formation of India and Pakistan, in 1947, resulted in a two-way refugee movement. About 14 million people were displaced at the time, as Muslims in India fled to Pakistan and the Hindu population fled to India. The two-way forced migration across the border continued in the years that followed, though on a much smaller scale.
- 1 Following the French colonial retreat from Indo-china, communist governments came to power in 1975 in the newly created countries of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. What followed was an exodus of three million people over the next two decades, fleeing repressive communist regimes. By 1978, there were 62,000 Vietnamese refugees, popularly known as the "boat people" arriving by sea on the shores of South East Asia.
- 1 Ethnic conflict for over two decades between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Liberation

Tigers of Tamil *Eelam* (LTTE) forces has displaced over a million peoples and caused large numbers to seek refuge in India and elsewhere.

Natural Causes

Nature's fury too has caused refugee situations across the globe. Calamities such as droughts, floods, famines etc. can be categorised as natural causes of refugee exodus. Refugee movements arising out of natural disasters are termed as environmental refugees. At times drought or environmental degradation can combine with civil wars, further aggravating the plight of refugees. The effects of a natural calamity can be compounded by inadequate economic policies of governments that are unconcerned about the safety and protection of their nationals.

The following are some illustrations from Africa, the worst hit by a natural cause or a combination of natural and man-made reasons.

- 1 In the Senegal River basin due to drought and water shortage, disputes over irrigable land have led to thousands of Senegalese and Mauritanians cross their borders.
- 1 In Angola, decades of civil war and drought have damaged an economy rich in oil, diamonds, iron ore and agricultural potential.
- 1 In the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti) refugee movements are fostered by a combination of armed conflicts, external interventions and natural calamities.

The above-mentioned refugee situations are alleviated by the material assistance and relief provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

On behalf of the international community, the UNHCR is the nodal agency for dealing with refugees. It helps the countries of asylum and provides adequate assistance and protection to refugees. It sees that the asylum seekers are treated in accordance with internationally recognised protection standards. It also works towards durable solutions to bring an end to refugee status, viewed as temporary by the countries of asylum. The following section deals with the three durable or permanent solutions.

The durable solutions attempt to seek an alternative to being a refugee. The UNHCR acts as the coordinator. It is anticipated that refugees will eventually be voluntarily repatriated, assimilated in the country of asylum or resettled in a third country, in that order of preference. To achieve these durable solutions political will and capacity are necessary.

The three durable solutions are considered below.

Voluntary Repatriation

Voluntary Repatriation means the return of refugees to their countries of origin based on their own free will. It involves four actors. They are;

- 1 Country of origin or the country which generates/sends refugees
- 1 Country of asylum or the country where the refugees have sought protection.
- 1 UNHCR as the co-coordinating agency
- 1 Refugees as the ultimate deciding factor.

For refugees to be repatriated or voluntarily sent back home, certain conditions have to be met with. They include:

- 1 The elimination of the causes of forced migration
- 1 A clearly worded amnesty guaranteeing the safety of those returning from exile
- 1 Creation of conditions back home where the life and freedom of those returning would be safe and secure and
- 1 Proper resettlement facilities on return.

Voluntary repatriation is the most preferred option because it alleviates the burden of the country of asylum and brings an end to refugee status as well.

Local integration in the host country

At times, when voluntary repatriation to their countries of origin is not possible, the UNHCR favours the integration of refugees into their host countries. The 1951 Convention requests member states to assimilate and naturalise the refugees. It urges the countries of asylum to grant citizenship to the refugees wherever possible.

Resettlement in a Third Country

This third option involves the shifting or resettlement of a refugee neither in their countries of origin or asylum but in a third country. This is the least preferred and most expensive option, resorted to, at times, for compelling humanitarian reasons. The resettlement of Vietnamese “boat people” in United States of America is an illustration of resettlement.

The traditional countries of asylum prefer to check refugee outflows at source by intervening in conflict situations and providing relief and assistance within the home countries itself. There is a global hesitancy in offering asylum due to the factors mentioned below.

31.2.3 Refugee Protection: The Current Scenario

Today the complexity, magnitude and categories of migratory flows have increased. At the same time there has been a shrinking of refugee protection at the regional and international level.

Economic limitation of host countries, donor fatigue or a decline in international burden sharing (assuming the responsibility of hosting refugees) of supply of food and relief material, increased unemployment rates have made refugees a burden on the host states in the developed world. They fear that an open door policy on refugees would encourage more asylum seekers to come in. Therefore, the 1990s saw a narrower interpretation of the 1951 Convention’s definition of refugees or fewer people were recognised as genuine refugees and granted refugee status.

The Third World countries are emulating the lack of collectivised or global burden sharing in terms of refugee protection and assistance by the developed world. They cite far greater economic and resource constraints, high unemployment rates as some of the significant reasons for a decline in their commitment to refugee protection. There is a need to revitalise burden sharing at the regional and international level so that the human rights of refugees can be protected.

The plight of those people, who have been forced to abandon their habitual place of residence, but could not cross their national borders, or of the internally displaced (IDPs) is even worse.

31.3 INTRA-STATE DISPLACEMENT

To recollect, a refugee is a person who crosses an international border while an intra-state displacement (IDP) is one who is forcibly displaced, but within the territorial boundaries of his state and therefore within its domestic jurisdiction. In other words, intra-State displacements are those who seek safety not in other states but within their national borders and of their own governments.

The IDP's were subjects of focus in the 1990s due to two reasons; first because of the magnitude of the problem and second due to their vulnerability.

In the world of today there are an estimated 25 million persons displaced within the national borders, a five-fold increase since the 1970s! Today IDPs outnumber refugees by nearly 2:1 with an astonishing 13.5 million on the African continent! Sudan, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), currently host IDP population in millions. Uganda, Nigeria, Burundi and Somalia have IDPs around half a million or more.

They are vulnerable because a large number of IDPs remain without the effective protection or assistance of their national governments. At times, governments that are legally accountable for their own citizens well being and protection are often unable or unwilling to act on their behalf. Besides, mass displacement of population can also pose serious threats to the security and stability of an entire region and thereby destabilise it.

Scholars are of the opinion that just because IDPs have been unable to cross the national borders, they should not be denied assistance and protection. If the IDPs also called *internal refugees* were to cross the national borders, they would qualify as refugees.

There are no specific international legal instruments in international law to protect the IDPs, like the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, nor a mandated institution such as the UNHCR for refugees. As a result, the response of the international community, too, has been inconsistent. In the 1990s it was felt that there was a need to define who an IDP is and the principles applicable to them.

Francis M. Deng, the Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Intra-State Displacements presented a set of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, for the purpose of giving them protection and assistance. According to Deng the term Intra-State Displacements applies to any people or a group of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or place of habitual residence *in particular* as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violation of human rights or natural and man made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border. (The use of the term '*in particular*' means that the list of causes of displacement is not exhaustive.

The two crucial elements of internal displacement therefore are i. Coerced or involuntary movement, and ii. Remaining within one's national borders. One must note that displacement or forced migration should not be confused with people who migrate voluntarily from one place to another for economic betterment, social or cultural reasons.

31.3.1 Causes of internal displacement

The factors that cause refugees and internal displacement are the same: the violation of human rights resulting in fear, persecution and human suffering. Repressive regimes, ethnic conflicts, external destabilisation campaigns and interventions are causes of internal displacement as well.

Violation of human rights can take place on various grounds, for instance, the persecution of a particular ethnic group by the state. The group members may be citizens in theory but regarded as ‘aliens’ in practice. Usually the persecuted group may have a different language, religion, culture or ethnicity and may be subject to discrimination and abuse by the majority. Alienation based on the above mentioned identities are the main cause of forced migration across the globe.

Francis Deng and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan point out that differences based on the above mentioned grounds, by themselves, are not the cause of conflict. They create divisive and conflictual situations when these differences translate into opportunities for power sharing and distribution of scarce resources and opportunities. The dominant group tries to impose its identity by exploiting resentment and prejudices to gain or retain hold on power. For example, when drought and famine ravaged Ethiopia in the mid 1980s, the government forcibly relocated hundreds of thousands of Tigrayan people it considered as political opponents, under the pretext of responding to a natural disaster.

Armed conflict or civil wars or situations of general violence generate refugees and Intra-State Displacements simultaneously. At times civilians are targeted as a result of their affiliation with the opposing or anti-government forces.

Some illustrations

Africa

In Sudan, government troops have been responsible for the aerial bombing of civilian targets, as a way of clearing areas of oil production and the construction of oil pipelines causing them to be internally displaced.

In Angola, the battle between the government and rebel forces has been blamed for the forced and repeated displacement of civilian populations. Can you imagine Angola the second largest oil producing country in sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria and the fourth largest diamond producer after Russia has 1.3 million Intra-State Displacements and 25 per cent of its families living below the poverty line, i.e. on US 60 cents per day! Such situations are illustrations of a lack of political will rather than capacity on the part of the national governments.

Angola, Sudan, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have more than 10 million IDPs, trapped inside their national borders, i.e. 75 per cent of them on the African continent. However, IDPs are not confined to Africa alone. Colombia, Indonesia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Burma and India are some of the other countries that have Intra-State Displacements.

Europe

Armed struggle between the Turkish government forces and the Kurdish armed groups, the largest ethnic minority in Turkey (26 per cent of the total population of 12 million people). Their

struggle for self-determination to manifest their ethnic identity and rights, denied by the Turkish government, has led to the internal displacement of thousands of ethnic Kurdish people over the past two decades.

Asia

Displacement in Asia includes the conflict between India and Pakistan for the disputed Kashmir, region. As a result of the conflict between the government and the Muslim separatists in Kashmir, there are over 350,000 million internally displaced Hindu *Pandits* who have fled the Muslim dominated Kashmir Valley following killings of their Hindu community members by Muslim separatist groups such as the *Hizbul Mujahiddin*. They live in dismal conditions in the Hindu dominated Jammu region, New Delhi and other parts of the country to which they have migrated.

Forced assimilation policies and land issues have been the cause of displacement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of East Bangladesh. 128,000 families or 500,000 individuals of indigenous Buddhist clans were displaced by deliberately resettling landless Muslim Bengalis from the overcrowded delta region. This is a case of persecution of ethnic and religious minorities by the government.

Human or man-made disasters such as large scale development projects like the Three Gorges Dam in China and the Narmada Sagar Project in India have led to the forcible displacement of one million people, each. Those without adequate resettlement compensation could qualify as people requiring attention under the definition of IDPs. India does not have a national policy for resettlement and rehabilitation. Natural disasters and planned forced eviction have created more than 21.3 million IDPs in India. Out of this 16.4 million have been displaced due to large dams and 2.55 million as a result of minor irrigation projects. Most of these projects are located in forests and other tribal habitats and have displaced over 40 per cent of the tribal peoples though they constitute only 8 per cent of the population.

In addition to man-made causes, natural disasters such as droughts, earthquakes and floods too cause internal displacement. In India, we are familiar with large scale dislocations due to floods in eastern India and the recent earthquakes in the States of Gujarat and Maharashtra. For displacements as a result of natural disasters, governments cannot be held accountable. However they are responsible for providing relief and rehabilitation to the victims of displacement to avoid situations of internal displacement.

IDPs invariably are a result of either of the above-mentioned factors or a complex combination of these. Those unable to cross over the national border to escape violence due to the above mentioned reasons are doubly disadvantaged. They are without the protection of their own government as well as binding international instrument like the 1951 Convention that define and protect refugees. Some IDP situations come to an end with the return of those displaced while others drag on for years.

Internal displacement is viewed as a temporary phenomenon that will get over once the factors that caused displacement have disappeared. It is assumed that the IDPs will return or resettle in their original place of residence and thereby the problem will come to an end. However, the causes of displacement do not always come to an end, for example land submerged due to the construction of large scale development projects can never be recovered. At times civil wars go on for decades and so do situations of internal displacement leading to adverse consequences.

Displacements heavily outweigh return movements with some exceptions such as return

movements in the Philippines, Sri Lanka in 2001 and Macedonia and Afghanistan in 2002. Since the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001, large numbers of Intra-State Displacements have been able to return even though many had to resettle outside their home areas due to the conflict. Following an agreement between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil *Eelam* (LTTE) and the newly elected government in December 2001, after 19 years of conflict to engage in peace negotiations, the lifting of travel restrictions for the Tamils allowed for a limited return by early 2002.

31.3.2 Consequences of Displacement

On return after a long gap, the returnees' traditional social structures such as the family, community and the power structures within it break down. Casualties in war lead to an increase in the number of women and child headed households. Women and children are the worst sufferers of conflict situations due to the loss of their partners/parents. They are left to fend for themselves in violent settings without the warm and secure environment of a home and the resources and support structure of a family.

Women headed households have limited earnings and therefore lack of food and medical amenities may lead to malnutrition and illness. They miss out on the regular schooling, socialisation into their mother tongue and cultural traditions. The disruptive social environment can affect a child's normal growth process. In other words, displacement can be a traumatic experience during the growing up process.

In addition to the above, women and girl child may be exposed to the risk of sexual abuse. Besides, cultural factors may translate into the women/girl child having less access to health, education, nutrition, and education facilities. During displacement, women and children may be subject to torture, rape, sexual assault, abductions and forced recruitment by government or rebel forces. In conflict zones such as Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Sudan for example in Africa, and Colombia, Burma, Iraq and Afghanistan for instance, one comes across the disturbing phenomenon of child soldiers.

Besides the concentration of the displaced in a new environment may be a strain on the common property resources of the region. The new habitat may not be able to support its old residents as well as new arrivals, thereby wreaking havoc on the environment; polluting streams, forestlands and ground water resources. Returnees may find their land and homes occupied by other hostile groups/ ethnicities. Neglected agricultural land becomes uncultivable and buildings may have crumbled down.

Urban centres may face overcrowding. It may lead to stressing the city's infrastructure in terms of water, housing, health care and sanitation facilities. Given the prohibitive cost of land in urban areas, most of the displaced can only settle on the outskirts with little or no amenities, leading to the growth of slums.

Displacement may lead to a loss of skills of traditional craftsmen. They may be forced to eke out a livelihood by acquiring newer skills. For example, the fisher folk displaced by the Narmada Sagar Project in India, may earn a living by pulling human carts or rickshaws in Jabalpur.

Since the IDPs are equally or more vulnerable than the refugees, why are they not protected by the international community? The answer is that the IDPs are not victims of government persecution. When governments assume responsibility and lack material resources to help the IDPs, the international agencies can help. The problem arises when the government itself is the

persecutor or the violator of the human rights of individuals. They can deny access to international agencies that want to help or protect the IDPs on grounds of violation of state sovereignty. In such situations state sovereignty assumes priority over humanitarian assistance

31.3.3 Limitations of Protection to the Intra-State Displacements

Unlike the UNHCR there is no specific international organisation that has the authority to intervene on behalf of millions of IDPs. To deal with this situation the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement spelt out certain guidelines. According to these principles, the primary responsibility for the protection and assistance of IDP rests with their national governments. However, government response, at times, despite good intentions may be constrained in terms of funding and expertise on the part of the local actors. This results in protection standards that are well below those prescribed by the Guiding Principles on IDPs.

On other occasions IDPs may be discriminated against as a result of their ethnic or religious identity. In situations of prolonged civil wars a large part of the government resources are channeled to war efforts, instead of assistance to IDP's.

In Asia, regional organisations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) do not deal with the problem of refugees or IDPs. Adherence to the concept of state sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs has taken priority over human rights of forced migrants. Humanitarian assistance to IDPs comes through civil society organisations like the NGOs.

Therefore, IDPs are a distinct category at risk that requires urgent international attention, more so, when their own governments are the persecutors. IDPs may also need assistance when governments are willing but are unable to do so because of the above mentioned reasons. Unfortunately, humanitarian assistance remains intricately linked with politics. Lack of political will, leadership and co-ordination on the part of the international humanitarian community are the other major weaknesses.

Then there is the problem of assessing the magnitude of internal displacement. The problem also arises because IDPs may not be as easily identifiable and accessible as the refugees. Refugees flee to safer havens across national borders are therefore easily identifiable and therefore accessible to international agencies. IDPs, on the other hand, may remain undetected because they continue to stay in conflict zones, without access to the outside world. At times, they may move to the rural or urban areas and mingle in with the population there and therefore become invisible. Governments may not recognise minorities, political opponents and insurgents or simply deny the existence of the problem.

The IDPs have evoked international concern due to the forced nature of their movement, subjection to human rights abuses following their displacement and lack of protection within their own countries. In the 1990s the international community has assumed responsibility for the IDPs as well, though humanitarian assistance to them is limited due to reasons of national sovereignty.

At the request of the United Nations Secretary General and the General Assembly, the UNHCR has assumed the overall responsibility for the protection and assistance of the IDPs. They are categorised as *peoples of concern* requiring urgent attention. In situations of armed conflict it may assist civilians gain safe passage, evacuate civilians from conflict zones and mediate between returning displaced persons and local residents. The UNHCR guidelines for the protection and assistance to refugee women and against sexual violence are also applicable to the internally displaced girls and women as well.

Additionally, arrays of the UN agencies that provide assistance to IDPs are:

- 1 The International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC) which undertakes activities such as evacuating civilians from situations of danger, securing release of detainees, creating protected areas and making arrangements for cease fires. The ICRC has the clearest mandate when the IDPs are civilian victims of armed conflict.
- 1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) too help women and children and provide assistance with food, medical supplies and promote development.
- 1 In addition NGOs such as Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) or Doctors Without Borders and the World Council of Churches (WCC) too help the internally displaced. They report about their conditions, violations of their human rights and assist in protection activities and monitor the return of IDPs.

31.4 SUMMARY

Displacement is always a coerced or involuntary movement. When displacement takes place within the national State boundaries it is termed as internal displacement. On the other hand, when people cross an international border or are displaced outside of the State, they are called refugees.

In the 1990s, there has been an increase in the number of IDPs and a decline in the number of refugees, as compared to the earlier period. The reasons for this trend are increased border controls, limited opportunities to cross international borders, decline in the tradition of hospitality and the institution of asylum.

Those unable to cross over the national border to escape violence are doubly disadvantaged. They are without the protection of their own governments as well as binding international instruments like the 1951 Convention that defines and protects refugees. The lack of global burden sharing at the regional and international level has serious implications for the human rights of refugees and IDPs the world over.

However, increasing concern over the plight of IDPs by the international community and the relief and protection offered by the UHNCR and an array of UN organisations has brought relief to millions in distress.

31.5 EXERCISES

1. What do you understand by the terms intra- state and inter state displacement?
2. What are the alternatives to refugeeism?
3. What are the differences between refugees and IDPs?
4. Who is responsible for protecting and assisting IDPs?

UNIT 32 TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS: CULTURAL AND CIVILISATIONAL

Structure

- 32.1 Introduction
- 32.2 Meaning of Transnational Movements
- 32.3 Non-State Actors and International Culture
 - 32.3.1 Information and International Culture
- 32.4 Religious Movements
 - 32.4.1 *Dawat-i-Islami*
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- 32.5 Transnational Communities and Civilisational Movements
 - 32.5.1 Diasporas
- 32.6 Culture and Transnational Movements
 - 32.6.1 International Journalism
 - 32.6.2 International Sports Events
 - 32.6.3 Broadcasting - Role of T.V. and Radio
 - 32.6.4 Tourism
- 32.7 Summary
- 32.8 Exercises

32.1 INTRODUCTION

You have read that nation-state has been, and still is, the most important actor in/of political action. In the earlier units when the concepts such as power, national interest, foreign policy, arms control, balance of power and international organisation were discussed, the emphasis, explicitly or implicitly, was on the nation-state. However, in the last about three decades of the 20th Century, the predominance of nation-state was challenged. There has been growing activity of several new non-state actors who, in turn, have contributed to transnational movements. Today, people-to-people relationships have become as important as government-to-government relationships.

In this unit an attempt will be made to highlight the transnational movements that involve such diverse fields as sports and tourism, or religious and ethnic groups, or the cultural invasion of Western style fast food creating the so-called *Mcworld*. Ethnic groups and religious fundamentalism pose challenge to traditional role of the nation-state.

The migration of large numbers of people has created a situation of what is called '*diaspora*'. Indian community, whether in the United States, or the UK or elsewhere, carries its cultural values and civilisational traditions while trying to integrate themselves in the new countries of their adoption. These migrant communities, from several countries, may face the problem of rootlessness for some time, but soon they begin to spread their values in the host countries, and

even contribute to the political lives of these countries. These transnational movements, or transnational politics have both positive and negative aspects.

32.2 MEANING OF TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

You have seen that for a very long time nation-states were the only actors in international politics. They still are primary actors of politics that is called, because of relations among nation-states, as international. But with the increasing role of several non-state actors, and advent of globalisation, borders of the states have become blurred. Today, there are (besides the nation-state) several inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) as also even larger number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who determine the nature of politics among nations. Besides, as stated above, people-to-people contact has become as important as government-to-government relationship. The entire field of literature on various types of non-governmental and inter-governmental activity has been named as transnational politics. The basis of such a politics is found in several movements-cultural and civilisational-that involve people-to-people cooperation. These may be described as the transnational movements.

Writing about globalisation during the 1990s, John Cavanagh compares it to a typical movement which he describes as “remarkable”. He wrote: “One of the movements that I find most interesting and in some ways most similar to what has been built around the world... was the remarkable transnational movement, which was rooted here in the US and England and in different parts of the world and Africa, to fight the Atlantic slave trade between about the 1780s and the early 1800s.” Thus, resistance to, and fight against, slave trade could be an example of transnational movement for it covered several countries across the world.

The concept of transnationalism was elaborated by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. in *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, in 1972. The book emphasised the role of non-state actors such as religious and ethnic groups as well as multinational corporations and terrorist groups. They argued that well over 50 per cent of all international activity involves interactions among non-state actors and nation-states. The authors’ logical conclusion was: “An analysis of international relations on the basis of traditional model that does not include non-state actors seriously distorts reality, for it neglects a considerable and increasing amount of important transnational activity”. To this conclusion, it must be added that people-to-people contacts have further strengthened transnational activity and movements.

Thus, the transnational movements are based on the politics that includes interaction between traditional nation-state and a whole lot of sub-state, or non-state, actors. John Burton refers to the activities of actors such as political parties, ethnic groups, multinational corporations and cultural formations, which at times elude the control of their governments. These cannot be ignored. Burton and his colleagues argued that an exponential growth of technology, especially in the fields of communication, transportation and weaponry, has led to a situation that they prefer to describe as the ‘cobweb model of international relations’. Such a model would include the activities of not only nation-states and giant multinational corporations, but also of ethnic groups and movements such as Irish Republican Army of Ulster (Northern Ireland); Turkish Cypriot Community in Cyprus; Biafrans in Nigeria; Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey; and Basques in Spain. The cobweb model would also include individuals and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) having a powerful transnational impact.

Transnational movements are not only limited to cultural and civilisational groups, but they also include, as mentioned above, numerous other non-state actors. Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf opine that

the “idea that the state has full and exclusive control over its destiny is increasingly questionable. Borders are porous, and states are vulnerable both to external pressures and to challenges from people *within* their boundaries.”

Mathew Evangelista argues, in his book *Unarmed Forces*, that transnational movements played important role in ending the Cold War. He says, “... transnational movements of past half century were able to influence the policies and decisions of a rigid totalitarian USSR and a bureaucratised US foreign policy establishment.”

The role of international terrorism and of the non-governmental organisations have been explained and analysed elsewhere in this book. In this Unit of your course, we will examine the contribution to the transnational politics made by religious movements, ethno-national groups, transnational culture and diaspora reflecting civilisational movements.

32.3 NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL CULTURE

It has been mentioned above that non-state actors have become important activists in transnational movements (see the following Unit 33). These actors are numerous, increasingly active, and self-assertive. Besides multinational corporations and terrorist groups, these actors include ethnic minorities within states seeking independence (such as Tamils in Sri Lanka and *Basques* in Spain) as well as internationally active ethnic groups in two or more countries (for example Kurds who are active in Iran, Iraq and Turkey), who challenge the authority of state and promote transnational movements. They also include religious institutions such as Orthodox Christian Church, and more aggressive and militant groups like several Islamic organisations, such as *Al Qaeda*. It has been observed that the diversity among these groups is striking, even though all are dedicated primarily to their own parochial interests rather than those of any particular country. Riddel-Dixon had this to say about non-state actors: “The term “non-state entity” covers an enormously broad range of groups. On the most basic level, non-state entities are associations of individuals and/or groups that are not established by agreements among states”. This broad definition includes such disparate entities as transnational corporations and the business associations they establish to promote their interests, professional associations, ethnic groups, major religious organisations, terrorist groups, and social movements. The role of non-state actors in blurring the borders of nation-states is significant. These actors create movements which operate in several countries, often using extra-constitutional and even violent means.

32.3.1 Information and International Culture

Global telecommunications are profoundly changing the way of information and culture function in international relations. Information is a vital tool of national governments in their interactions with each other. Yet technology is at the same time undermining and disempowering these governments and shifting power to non-state actors and individuals. These newly empowered individuals and groups have begun to create new transnational networks worldwide, bypassing states.

The power of information technology has fully revolutionised the lives of people the world over. Today, sitting at home you can dial any number on your telephone and speak to a friend, relative or business connection in any part of the globe. “Just a hundred years ago, the idea of instant global connection was incomprehensible,” wrote Goldstein and added, “[i]t would have seemed unthinkable that anyone could push a dozen buttons on a handheld instrument (cordless phone)

and be able to talk with any of billions of people anywhere in the economically developed areas of the world (and many of the poorer areas)." Not only this, equally fascinating, but very common now, is the role of television which has created a new transnational culture in music, dance and field of soap opera. To quote Goldstein again: "Equally ridiculous was the idea that you could look at a box no bigger than a suitcase and see in it moving pictures of things happening at that moment in distant lands." Today this is a reality. Just 150 years ago, none of the modern means of information was available. One could simply write down a letter and send it often by a horse or a sailing ship.

The media over which information travels-telephones, television, films, e-mail etc.-shape the way ideas take form and spread from one place to another. Radio and, increasingly television, reaches even the poorest areas in the Third World countries. And now websites and e-mail, besides mobile telephones, have provided unbelievable connectivity in all parts of the world. This in turn has led to numerous transnational movements. TV is particularly powerful. The combination of pictures and sounds, affects viewers emotionally and intellectually. Viewers can experience distant events more fully. For example, the live coverage of terrorist attack on World Trade Centre in New York and Pentagon building in Washington D.C. by hijacked planes on 11 September 2001 made every viewer the world over feel part of the happenings in the United States. Similarly, the havoc played by the earthquake in parts of Gujarat, earlier, had shook the humankind and made the assistance available for relief in a short period of time. While TV enabled people to see the horror, jet aircrafts enabled the assistance to reach the victims in the shortest possible time.

It is not only the people who benefit from the power of information, but also that governments also use information as a tool of power. Governments spend large amounts of money collecting information about both inside and outside the boundaries of their states. Information collected by states, non-state actors and individuals enables closer interaction between them, making for transnational politics. Governments during Cold War period often held back information from the opposite camp. But, today media is so powerful that it has become major player in world politics. The media/information culture is a vital transnational movement. The effort to run a modern economy without computers, international telephone lines, websites and e-mail technologies would contribute to economic stagnation. As more and more communication channels carry more information to more places, governments become just another player in a crowded field. The information revolution has considerably increased the international interdependence, "making actions in one state reverberate in other states more strongly than in the past." At the same time, by empowering non-state transnational actors, information technology is undermining the centrality of states themselves in world politics.

Joshua S. Goldstein argues that the increase in the power of transnational actors has put into action *two contradictory forces*. One has empowered the sub-state actors, like ethnic groups, leading to disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and proliferation of internal strife since the end of the Cold War. As sub-state actors gain power, they demand their own national rights of autonomy and sovereignty. The second force, however, is the forging of transnational communities and supranational identities. Here regionalism (European Union or ASEAN) or globalism asserts itself as an internationalised culture resting on communication links among peoples in different states. This second force (forging transnational communities) challenges the emphasis on national borders, and makes for transnational culture.

32.4 RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Normally religion is based on the faith of an individual or a group of people. Expectation from

the believers is that (a) they will not force others to follow their faith, but allow every person to be free in matters of religion; and (b) the religion will not be mixed with politics, and that the state and religion will be kept independent of each other. But, these expectations are often belied. In theory, religion would appear to be a natural worldwide force, for peace and harmony. Yet, in the name of religion millions have died. The crusades between 11th and 14th centuries, left millions of Christians and Muslims dead; and the religious conflicts during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) between Christian Catholics and Protestants took the lives of nearly one-fourth of all Europeans. The partition of British India in 1947, on the basis of “two-nations” theory, played havoc with communal frenzy leaving lakhs of people-Hindus and Sikhs-killed, wounded, maimed or raped on both sides of the borders. Wholesale migration of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan created unprecedented human crisis. In West Asia, ongoing conflict between Arab Muslims and Israeli Jews has been responsible for massacre of innocent people; in erstwhile Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims were subjected to “ethnic cleansing” by the neighbouring Serbs; and the terrorist violence in Jammu & Kashmir has forced lakhs of *Pandits* to leave their homes and become refugees within India, while both Hindus and Muslims are being killed in the name of *jihad* sponsored from across the borders.

A large number of nearly 6 billion people of the world have strong religious convictions. At the abstract level, a religion is a system of thought shared by a group of people which gives its members an object of devotion and a code of behaviour. Every religion preaches noble ideals of peace and brotherhood, yet in practice faith many a times leads to movements of hatred and violence. A system of belief provides followers of a religion with their main source of identity; and this identification often leads to misplaced perception that the values of their own religion are superior to other belief systems. Thus, while Hinduism adopts idol worship as a mode of concentration and non-violence as a value, there are others who react sharply against idol worship, that they do not mind animal sacrifice so that meat may be consumed, as food by those believers.

With the conviction that a particular religion is superior, most believers feel that their faith should be universal, and that it should be adopted by everyone throughout the world. To confirm their belief in the superiority of their religion, its followers actively try to convert non-believers to their faith, and engaging themselves in crusades to win followers of other religions to their beliefs. This is usually done through persuasion, through missionary activities to win over hearts and minds of “infidels and non-believers”. But, at times conversion has been carried out by bribery or by sword, tarnishing the image of reputed religions. Forceful conversion often leads to clashes that even turn violent. This is against the essentials of religious beliefs.

It is important to note that religions do have high ideals of their doctrines, yet activities of some people in those religions are often against the high ideals. The religious principles are sometimes abused by the “over enthusiasts” or fundamentalists. But, not all religions are abused, all the time. Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf, for example, wrote: “Consider the Hindu ideology of tolerance of different religions, which teaches that there are many paths to truth, and accepts pluralism among diverse populations. Similarly, Buddhism preaches pacifism, as did early Christianity, which prohibited Christians from serving in the armies of the Roman Empire.” There may be occasional aberrations, which take the shape of extreme militant religious movements. These movements bring bad name to the religion. The problems arise when religions dabble in politics.

The militant religious movements have certain characteristics. These are: (i) such movements that tend to view existing government as corrupt and illegitimate because it is secular; (ii) they condemn domestic ills of the society, and try to substitute themselves for the government; (iii) they try to bring all government policies and activities in the hands of believers; (iv) they

consider themselves as universal, which means militant religious movements do not recognise international boundaries for propagation of their faith; (v) they are exclusionists, and all non-believers are treated as second-class citizens; and (vi) they, being militants, tend to use coercion to their objectives.

At times religious movements may be compelled to adopt tough stance. For example, as Mushirul Hassan wrote in *The Hindu*, 29 January 2003: “Muslim politics have a transnational dimension, as is illustrated by the responses to Israel’s unjust occupation of Palestine...” Once the alleged injustice is corrected, one can expect the religious transnational movements to give up militancy.

32.4.1 *Dawat-i-Islami*

One of the latest religious movements, *Dawat-i-Islami* was founded in 1981, and it seeks to promote Muslim brotherhood across the world. The *Dawat-i-Islami*, meaning invitation to Islam, was launched by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri. Founded in Pakistan, catapulted by Sunnis, the Dawat invites the faithfuls to follow the *sunnah*, the prophetic way. Its aim is to promote and deepen the love for the Prophet and the early community of Muslims in Medina. In an article titled *Da’wat-i-Islami: An Aspiring Transnational Movement*, Mujeeb Ahmed, a Pakistani scholar, wrote: “The movement stands for the revival and resurgence of Islam through preaching. Its main characteristic is to preach what is righteous and what is forbidden.” The members of the *Dawat-i-Islami* keen to follow the *Sunnah*, always wear white clothes, a green turban, and a miswak (a wooden stick used in place of a toothbrush) in their pockets. The movement promotes universal brotherhood among the Muslims all over the world. In that sense it is an aspiring transnational movement. The Dawat requires each of its members to become a *murid* (pupil) of Maulana Qadiri. Its critics, however, are not happy with, what they consider, over emphasis on wearing the green turban.

32.4.2 Different Types of International Activities

Many experts believe that militant religious movements tend to stimulate five types of international activities. First, is *irredentism*, which means an attempt by a dominant religion or ethnic group to reclaim territory once possessed by it, but later lost to another region or group. Force is often rationalised for this purpose. Second, *secession* or *separatist revolts* are attempts by a religious, or ethnic, minority to breakaway from an internationally recognised state. Here also force may be used. When these revolts succeed, states disintegrate into two or more political units-as happened when Pakistan was created by dividing British India, or chechens’ ongoing attempt to secede from Russia. Third, activity involves militant religion’s attempt to *migrate*, which means departure of religious minorities to escape persecution when Jews were forced to flee from Germany and Austria, it was result of persecution by Nazis. There minority was not militant. Fourth, activity (though *not* a result of militancy) may lead to the creation of *diasporas*, or communities which live abroad in host countries, but maintain sentimental, economic and even political ties with their homeland (see below a separate section on diaspora). Lastly, militancy breeds *terrorism*.

32.5 TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES AND CIVILISATIONAL MOVEMENTS

Different parts of the world have been witnessing ethno-national movements. Although the state certainly remains the most powerful actor in world affairs, nationality is a potent cultural factor

influencing how states perform. Many people pledge their loyalty, not so much to the state, but to their *ethno-national groups*. Members of these groups share a common civilisation, language, cultural tradition and ties of kinship. According to E.K. Francis, “cultural affinities manifest in shared linguistic, racial, or other markers... enable one community to distinguish itself from others.” The emphasis on ethnic groups reduces the relevance of the state. Most of the states are multinational. In 1994, of the world’s nearly 190 nation-states, 120 countries had politically significant minorities. Thus, the ethnic groups are vital to the understanding of the contemporary international relations.

Karen Fog Olwig argued that “it is not possible to reduce migrants’ socio-cultural construction of places of belonging to nation-state”. Transnational migrants, depending on their trajectories and the social, economic and the political context of these trajectories, identify with family networks, with a family home and not necessarily express their feeling of belonging by joining to the activities with the country of origin.” She objects to limiting the universe of the transnational socio-cultural dimensions to formally and informally organised ethnic associations. She urges us to look at the transnational from the point of the people and develop a framework, which will capture the personal dimensions of this process. Migrations of people with different cultural and civilisational backgrounds creates transnationalism, for they link the culture of the countries of their origin with the culture of the country that they choose to adopt and settle down.

One feature of ethno-national movements is very clear. Most of them transcend existing borders of the states, for most of these groups have their presence in two or more countries like for example, Tamils in India, Sri Lanka and Singapore, just as the Jews as an ethnic group are not limited to Israel. They constitute important force in several countries including the United States. The transnational cultures and civilisations do not recognise any international borders. There is a view that the future will be darkened by violent clashes between various civilisations, or ethnic cultures. Each such clash would be as disturbing as East-West ideological clashes of the Cold War. According to Huntington (1993), the future international conflicts “will not be primarily ideological or economic”, but rather cultural between “nations and groups of different civilisations.” According to Samuel Huntington, who popularised the phrase “clash of civilisations”, there are seven or eight major civilisations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African.

The present day international system is said to be the product of one particular civilisation-Western civilisation, centred in Europe. North American culture was largely influenced by the European civilisation. The Chinese and Indian civilisations are much older, but they suffered at the hands of Western imperialists. The Egyptian civilisation is another ancient civilisation. In the contemporary world civilisational movements have been largely influenced by migrants from one part of the world to another, yet civilisational movements have not really threatened the nation-state.

32.5.1 Diasporas

The term diaspora has become popular in recent days. With the advent of jet age of fast travel across the world, large amount of migrations have taken place, mainly (but not necessarily) from Third World countries to the Western industrialised nations. Defining diasporas, Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf say: “The emigrants create *diasporas*, or communities which live abroad in host countries but maintain sentimental, economic and political ties with their homelands.” The term diaspora includes people having their origin in one country but living in other countries while retaining some kind of link with their home country. They keep their civilisation alive even in

the host countries. This term may not apply to third or fourth generations, but certainly those who are still attached with their civilisation and cultural values constitute a distinct group.

For nearly two centuries people were going from India to foreign lands. Very few of them went till mid-20th Century of their own choice to seek job opportunities. Most of them were taken by imperial masters as plantation workers to places like Sri Lanka, Fiji, Mauritius, Maldives, etc. Some went in order to set up business in other British colonies like Kenya, South Africa or Nigeria. But, with the availability of greater opportunities in developed countries, and fast means of air travel, large number of people began moving out of India to UK, Canada, the United States and Germany. Smaller number of people went to other countries also. Since the 1970s, the migration assumed alarming proportions, causing brain drain at home, and stress and strained relations in some cases in the host countries also.

The United States is itself known as a country of migrants. Beginning with the British, who established 13 colonies in the 17th and 18th centuries, many other Europeans also settled down in the United States. The term *diaspora* is not used for those who migrated centuries ago, but for those who are first or second generation migrants. Even then one may hear of not only Indian-Americans, but also of Polish-Americans or Spanish-Americans and so on.

The large number of migrants often organise themselves as separate groups and act as pressure groups in the host countries. Even when they acquire citizenship of the host country, they seldom forget their roots, their original customs and traditions. This helps unite them as a civilisational and cultural movement. The first ever *Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas* organised in India in January 2003 was a unique gathering of people of Indian origin from nearly 110 countries. The migrants fall in two categories-those who have permanently settled down in the host country and have become its nationals are known as People of Indian Origin (PIO); and there are others who retain their Indian passport but are working in foreign lands, and they are called non-resident Indians (NRI). Together they constitute Indian diaspora. There are similar diasporas of other countries also.

For the sake of proper understanding let us make a study of Indian diaspora as the basis of transnational movement. Indian diaspora is about 20 million strong and spread across 110 countries. Bulk of them are in English-speaking countries. There are also large numbers of PIOs and NRIs in the Gulf region. To look at some of the figures, Indian diaspora in the United Kingdom in 2003 was as strong as 12 lakhs (12,00,000 people); USA had 16,78,765 people; Canada 8,51,000; and there were 2,17,000 in the Netherlands. In the Gulf and West Asia, Saudi Arabia accounted for 15 lakhs, Kuwait 2,95,000, UAE 9,50,000 and Qatar 1,31,000 Indians. Elsewhere, Australia is new home of 1,90,000 Indians; South Africa has 10 lakhs; Malaysia 16,65,000, Singapore 3,07,000; Kenya over one lakh, Mauritius 7,15,756 and Fiji has 3,36,829. There are many more spread out all over the world.

Some major points deserve special mention:

1. While many younger people born and brought up in host countries get absorbed in the local culture, most of the first and second generation migrants retain their links with the country of their origin (for example India). Most Indians in countries like the UK, USA, Canada and Australia continue with their religious beliefs, eating habits and traditions.
2. Most of the members of diaspora still prefer to marry in India and carry Indian culture with them.
3. In countries like UK and US, etc. Indians, whether in professions like medicine, architecture or

information technology, or in business, contribute a great deal to the polity of their newly adopted countries. Many of them raise funds and contribute for elections of one party or the other. In the UK Swaraj Paul, an industrialist was made a peer and is a member of House of Lords. There are at least two more peers, and about half a dozen persons of Indian origin are elected members of House of Commons. There has been an Indian minister in the UK, premier of British Columbia in Canada; prime minister of Fiji (Mahendra Singh Chaudhory); there is an Indian Senator in one of the US States; and the leadership of Mauritius has its roots in India.

4. Indian places of worship, temples, *gurudwaras* and mosques are set up and maintained with respect and reverence wherever the diaspora has its presence.
5. Indian diaspora has popularised Indian cuisine in foreign lands. One finds numerous Indian restaurants in London, New York, New Jersey, Amsterdam and even in Paris. British people have become fond of Indian curry and bar-be-cue.
6. Thus, a transnational cultural and civilisational movement is carried on by the diaspora. It acts as a major link between the homeland and the host country. In the first ever gathering of PIOs and NRIs in New Delhi in 2003, prime minister Vajpayee remarked: “The benchmark for success, which the *pravasi* community has set, are a challenge for us in India. They make us examine why the Indian is so much more innovative, productive and successful abroad than in his own country...” He added: “We do not want your riches, we want the richness of your experience.” Maintaining that India was an important player, foreign minister Yashwant Sinha appealed “to all community leaders within the Indian diaspora to try and do their utmost to organise themselves under a single umbrella so that their collective voice can be effectively heard.” Giving a new meaning to transnationalism, a Fijian minister Shiu Raj called for appreciation of all cultures, “for there is only one race, which is human race... once you do not respect one race there will be problems.” Justice Ahmed Ibrahim of Zimbabwe supported the Fijian leader, and said, “Look at each other, you will see that we are the same people.”

It is this spirit that is behind the success of transnational movements.

32.6 CULTURE AND TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

In the age of newer means of telecommunication, a new global culture is emerging despite the great divisions remaining in cultures and perspective. Goldstein argues that in “the global village, distance and borders matter less and less. Across dozens of countries, people are tuned in to the same news, the same music, the same sports events.” This development is likely to create transnational cultural integration that might lead to emergence of supranational identities, including a global identity. If citizens in European Union can begin to think as “Europeans”, transnationalism may enable people of UN member-countries to think as human beings and residents of planet earth.

However, there is a negative side also. Global culture may turn into “cultural imperialism” dominated by the only surviving Super Power, the United States. The US cultural influence is as strong as its military influence. English is fast becoming the world language and the US president may try to dominate the politics as well as culture of the world. Already the US films and TV shows dominate the world markets. The CNN news channel tries to shape the thinking of millions of viewers the world over.

The concept of ‘*McWorld*’ is an example of transnational food movement. Today, McDonald outlets can be found all over the major cities in the world selling its burgers, thus slowly changing

the habits of Chinese and Indians, besides others. The Chinese noodles and fried rice have gone into background as the junk food is taking over. Similarly, Indian *puris*, *curries* and *dosas* may soon be dominated by the burgers and *pizzas*. The global culture reflected by “Mac Attack” opened a wave of globalisation. When the closed society of China opened up to cultural imperialism, Chinese leaders seemed unsure for years about whether McDonald’s brought to China Western-style prosperity or spiritual pollution. Perhaps there was a bit of both.

We may briefly mention several areas that are helping in the cultural transnational movements.

32.6.1 International Journalism

Joshua S. Goldstein opined in late 1990s that although “a global culture is still only nascent and the most powerful identity is still at the national level, people have begun to participate in specific communities that bridge national boundaries.” For example, international journalists are members of such a community. Journalists work with colleagues from various countries and travel together from country to country, creating a transnational brotherhood. Together they collect news and express views. “Though a journalist’s identity as a journalist rarely takes precedence over his or her national identity, the existence of the transnational community of journalists create a new form of international interdependence.” Like the journalists, the scientists from different countries often work together in communities spanning national borders. When, for example, Pakistani scientists and technologists worked together with their Chinese counterparts to develop nuclear weapons, they were working as scientists, not as Pakistanis or Chinese. Similarly, if an Indian satellite is launched with the assistance of one country or the other, a new community of scientists is evolved. When the late Kalpana Chawla took to space research, she was a member of community of space scientists more than an Indian or Indian-American.

32.6.2 International Sports Events

International sports competitions constitute one of the broadest-based international communities. Millions of cricket fans, for example, watch the test matches or one-dayers. The same is true of the Olympic Games, held every four years, and the regular soccer competitions. It is true that often these competitions stir up animosities between over enthusiasts as when Pakistani team loses to India, there may be hooliganism not only in the playgrounds, but also the over enthusiasts even break their TV sets. Or, British soccer “hooligans rampage through another European country after their team loses a game.” These events show nationalism in extreme form, as a winning cricket team’s supporters sing and dance all round with their flag raised high. Yet, sports do create transnational brotherhood.

But, by and large, sports competitions have positive impact. This is how Goldstein sums up the situation: “Some people see sports as a force for peace. Sports events bring people from different countries together in shared activities. Citizens of different states share their admiration of sports stars, who become international celebrities.” In Israel one of the most successful programmes for bridging the gap between Jewish and Arab children is a soccer camp in which star players of both communities participate together as coaches. In an interesting development, the Chinese-American *rapprochement* of 1971 was so delicate that political cooperation was impossible until the way had first been paved by the US table tennis team that made the first official US visit to China. Sports are indeed a big uniting and cementing transnational force.

32.6.3 Broadcasting: Role of TV and Radio

Electronic media is a vital player in transnational cultural movements. It is not only the news

read out on major network like the CNN, BBC and Star that create world public opinion, but films shown on TV, sopa operas, sitcoms and Chat-shows go a long way in propagating Western culture particularly in the Third World countries. On its part, media in India is engaged in showing its own TV serials, sitcoms and Indian films. Some of them are based on India's own values, but many are adaptations of Western shows. This creates an international entertainment, having both positive and negative transnational impacts. Some of the large Third World countries like Brazil and India having their local contexts in TV programmes influence their diaspora and help consolidate their cultural and civilisational values. Many of the TV shows have their hidden political subtexts.

Advertising is an important source of revenue of commercial TV channels. This is aggressively done by the multinational corporations to win over the local markets and change the habits of peoples of the host countries. At times, this aggressive advertising may have negative and even frustrating impact. One such situation was demonstrated in 1991 when Albania's communist system was crumbling along with its economy. Albanians, who had been watching Italian TV channels, had exaggerated view of Italian prosperity. One commercial on Italian TV had shown cats being given their food in silver platters. Poor Albanians took overloaded ferries to go to Italy to share its prosperity. However, they were sent back home by Italian authorities.

The attack on Iraq in 1991, by the US-led coalition, illustrates how electronic media enables viewers all over the world to watch on TV. Not only that attack on Baghdad was directly telecast by the American channel CNN, but also when the bombing of Baghdad began, president Saddam Hussein reportedly sat in his bunker watching the war unfold on CNN. The CNN signal that he was receiving on his TV set originated from a nearby hotel room in Baghdad, travelled through an overland phone connection to Jordan, then went to CNN headquarters in Atlanta (US), where it was telecast via satellite back to Baghdad. So Saddam Hussein got information about bombing on Baghdad, in his bunker in Baghdad, by way of Atlanta, at the same time that it reached millions of viewers around the world, including the leadership in the United States.

32.6.4 Tourism

Tourism is another major factor in transnational activity. International tourists cross borders of nations 500 million times in a year. This includes people going for official work, business or to meet friends and relatives, but majority of them are holiday makers. People who travel to another country develop deeper understanding and appreciation of its people. People-to-people contact promotes friendship and reduces the chances of conflict and war. For example, an American citizen who visits Japan is more likely to favour US-Japanese trade, or Indians who visit the US or UK find an atmosphere of friendship that sitting at home is impossible to believe. Even when Pakistani nationals visit India, they are surprised to find total goodwill, and not the animosity that they may have expected, because of their media's false propaganda. The transnational understanding is further promoted by exchange of students who go to another country to study. The exchange of tourists promotes world peace, just as visits of leaders of government and official create better understanding between different nations. As mentioned earlier, the rapid means of travel and interconnectivity through telephones, e-mail, etc. has blurred the borders of nation-state and promoted transnational cultural cooperation, even though nationalism still occupies vital position in the lives of people.

The transnational connections forged through these various activities, according to Joshua Goldstein, "... deepen the international interdependence that links the well being of one state to that of other states. This may promote peace, because a person who knows more about a foreign country and has developed empathy for its culture is likely to act as a brake on political conflict with that country and an accelerator of positive cooperation with it."

32.7 SUMMARY

Transnational movements have changed the nature of international relations. For a long time nation-states were the only actors whose mutual relations constituted the core of international relations. Lately, however, several developments have taken place that have compromised with the absolute role of the nation-states. Interdependence of states, rapid means of transport, revolution in information technology, and the emergence of several non-state actors have blurred the borders of the states. People-to-people contacts have grown manifold, making it possible for regular contacts between various communities and civilisations.

It is in this background that transnational movements have been taking place. Transnational movements are based on the politics that include interaction between traditional nation-state and a whole lot of non-state actors. These actors include religious organisations, ethnic groups, multinational corporations and international terrorist outfits. Today, “[b]orders are porous, and states are vulnerable both to external pressures and to challenge from people within their boundaries.”

Information travels fast. It has impact on transnational politics. Religious movements often become militants, and they challenge the state as well as people of other faiths. There are groups like *Al Qaeda* which are committed to propagation of their faith and adopt terrorist weapons to destroy those whom they consider as their enemies. Militant religious activities may take the form of irredentism, or secessionism, or encourage migration of persecuted communities, or unite people of one nationality in foreign lands called the diasporas, or lastly it may take the form of terrorism.

Transnational movements have such inputs as journalism, sports competitions, electronic media and tourism. Advertising may also bring various cultural societies on a common platform. Transnational connections deepen interdependence, and normally promote peace because cultural and civilisational people-to-people contacts act as a brake on political conflict, and accelerator of positive cooperation.

32.8 EXERCISES

1. What do you understand by transnational movements? What, according to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, is the concept of transnational movements?
2. How has media influenced international culture?
3. Sum up the features of religious transnational movements. What are the different types of militant religious movements?
4. Explain what are ethno-national groups.
5. What is the impact of Western civilisation on transnational movement?
6. What is diaspora, and how does it promote transnational movements?
7. Describe the significance of journalism and tourism in transnational cultural movements.

UNIT 33 ROLE OF NGOS

Structure

- 33.1 Introduction
- 33.2 Background to the Rise of INGOs
 - 33.2.1 First World War and International Organisations
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- 33.3 Definition and Classification of International Organisations
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 - 33.4.1 IGOs and INGOs
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33.1 INTRODUCTION

More often than not, NGOs today are associated with development and developmental work. The proliferation of developmental NGOs from the 1970s onwards indicates their importance in promoting developmental programmes and influencing governmental policies. However, it is important to note that NGOs are not always necessarily involved in such activities alone and that the NGOs as voluntary organisations at the national level and as international organisations have a history. The growth of international organisations since the First World War is a manifestation of regularising of international relations with their formal and material existence separate from, though

for the most part dependent on, states and groups within states. The areas of concern for these organisations range from peace and security to human rights and development.

In this unit, we discuss the background to the rise of international organisations, their classification and role. Then we focus on NGOs as developmental organisations and their importance in a globalising world. This would enable us to assess their impact on state and state policies.

33.2 BACKGROUND TO THE RISE OF INGOS

Relations between nation-states are not always necessarily between governments or between state officials alone. As groups of individuals in different states relate to each other in various ways, the belief has grown that the term ‘international’ should not be used synonymously with ‘inter-governmental’ or ‘inter-state’ or relations between the official representatives of sovereign states alone. It should include activities between individuals and groups in one state and individuals and groups in another state as well as intergovernmental relations. Transnational relations are those that do not involve activities between governments only. Trans-governmental relations are those that involve connections between one branch of government in one state (for example defence ministry) and a branch of government in another country (its defence ministry) and which do not go through the normal foreign policy making channels. International relations today cover all these relationships-inter-governmental, trans-national and trans-governmental.

International organisations are those which formalise relations whether between governments, groups or individuals. International institutions are forms of organisations that express, as Maurice Duverger states, “the collective forms or basic structures of social organisations as established by law or by human tradition”. An international organisation represents a form of institution which refers to a formal system of rules and objectives a “rationalised administrative instrument and has a formal technical and material organisation: constitutions, local chapters, physical equipments, machines, emblems-an administrative hierarchy, and so forth”. The terms ‘organisation’ and ‘institution’ are used interchangeably by many writers. However, an institution, in Duverger definition, has a wider use that encompasses the notion of a system of relationships that may not manifest themselves in formal organisations of bricks and mortar and an international staff etc. An institutional framework adds ‘stability, durability and cohesiveness’ to individual relationships which might otherwise be ‘sporadic, ephemeral, and unstable’. At an international level, relations may be organised by the practice of diplomatic method or adherence to the tenets of international law or by regular trading, thus giving ‘stability, durability and cohesiveness’ to such relations. Today there is a variety of international organisations ranging from organisations such as the World Council of Churches, International Labour Organisation, World Trade Organisation and Amnesty International etc. A brief history of international organisations may begin with the League of Nations.

33.2.1 First World War and International Organisations

The First World War generated awareness among the European powers of the problems of state’s coexistence and the recognition of the need for peaceful means to regulate relationships. The changed political situation post-1815, European expansion and economic and social developments provided a fertile ground for the rise of international organisations in Europe. The creation of a relatively stable system of sovereign state in Europe was necessary for the rise of international organisations. The peace of Westphalia ending the thirty years war in 1648, the treaty of Utrecht (1713) laid the basis for the sovereign state system in Europe, a system later extended to the rest of the world. This system established states as geographically defined entities with their own forms of government and the right to conduct relations on the basis of sovereign equality. The continuous growth of contact between European states and their recognition of the need for creation of institutional devices and systematic method for regulating relations with each other, the gradual integration of the rest of the world-through wars, colonisation, imperialism-into the European state system, created conditions necessary for truly international organisations. Thus, the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 gathered together the representatives of the victorious powers willing to write a peace treaty and many national interest groups,

international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) committed to the cause of public health, the rights of workers, the cause of peace or the laws of war etc. However, the gathering at Versailles in 1919 was primarily an inter-governmental meeting of heads of State and government, foreign ministers and their advisors and concerned mostly with the question of international peace and security. Economic and social questions were secondary. The peace conference established two leading organisations-The League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation. It must be noted that prior to the Versailles peace conference, the Vienna Congress of 1814-15 codified the rules of diplomacy thereby, standardising and codifying the rules of diplomatic practice and pronouncing on other problems in the international system such as slavery. The Hague Conferences (1899, 1907) attended by non-European states produced some modest achievements and also pointed the way for the institutional development of organised international relations such as-Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes that were later to inspire the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice. The wide membership of the two conferences was a precursor of the League of Nation's Assembly. Yet, it was "more a demonstration that the European state system, with European-based law, had been extended to include outsiders". However, the Hague Conferences indicated the limits reached in the institutionalisation of international relations by the end of the 19th Century mainly due to the primacy of the needs of individual governments and ruthless advancement of state interest overriding collective interests and action.

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 following the First World War prompted individuals, groups and governments to search for the establishment of a functioning international system and organising post-war international relations. The League of Nations was the outcome of these efforts and had, as its aim, the promotion of international co-operation and peace and security.

The 19th Century was also a period of growth in international cooperation in the field of economic and social issues. The spread of democratic ideas and institutions, the belief that all human beings were equal, fostered the notion of participation of all states in international organisations for ensuring peace and progress. The French and the American Revolutions that promoted the idea of the modern democratic state also made the state more responsive to the needs of a wider section of the population. Despite the notions of 'limited government' or 'night watchman government', European governments were increasingly intervening in the economies of their countries and were becoming more involved in the welfare of their citizens-thus giving rise to the welfare state which was to be reflected in their international relationships.

This internationalisation of economic life and commerce was reflected in the activities of the public international unions or international agencies bringing together the representatives of states to manage various aspects of public life such as travel, communications, commerce or welfare. For example, the opening up of the international waterways to all traders by the Congress of Vienna was followed by the international commission for the Elbe (1821), for the Rhine (1831) and the European Danube Commission. In 1868, the International Telegraphic Bureau (later named International Telegraphic Union, ITU) and the General Postal Union (later Universal Postal Union) in 1874 were established. In the later half of the 19th Century, one witnesses the rise of private international associations, INGOS, for promoting and organising humanitarian, religious, economic, educational, scientific and political causes. International gatherings were organised such as the World Anti-Slavery Convention of 1840. These associations became permanent organisations with secretariats, boards and assemblies. The International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) grew faster than the inter-governmental organisations (IGOs).

The international public and private associations were not always independent of each other and usually had a symbiotic relationship due to the need for governmental activity and cooperation across frontiers. The International Committee of the Red Cross, a private international union, promoted the intergovernmental Geneva conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949. A private union-the International Association of Legal Protection of Labour led to the establishment of International Labour Organisation in 1919. Despite the distinction between private and public associations, a number of organisations had mixed memberships with representatives of government bodies sitting together with individual members.

The events following the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the rise of Nazism, and fascism in Germany and Italy and the isolationism of the US, put to test the League of Nations and international organisation that were created to further international cooperation. Even if the whole League system collapsed, it became a stepping stone towards the more enduring United Nations Organisation.

33.2.2. Post-Second War and International Organisations

The causes for the failure of the League of Nations and the rise of the UN system and its structures need not detain us here. What is important is that the war time experience, the emergence of a bipolar world and the threat of atomic weapons created conditions for the rise of a plethora of international organisations-for the promotion of peace and security, for prevention of war and for disarmament and arms control, for the protection of human rights etc, for restructuring of international economic order and for commonly agreed upon rules of trade and commerce. For the establishment of an international monetary system, the Bretton Woods system was given shape. The United Nations Organisation was established with its specialised institutions covering a whole range of issues from peace and security to environment and ecology. A variety of international organisations with limited membership came into existence (e.g., Organisation of African Unity or the Arab League). Some are defined geographically and ideologically such as NATO or Warsaw Pact. A wide range of inter-governmental organisations reflecting various concerns such as fisheries, health etc., also came into existence. The IMF, IBRD, GATT, IDA, IFC-provided the organised basis of the post-war liberal/ market economic system. Regional identities developed and consolidated themselves in the form of European Community, Caribbean Community, Nordic Council etc.

With the tremendous growth in communication and transport, contacts between peoples, groups and governments increased rapidly resulting in the growth of the number of inter-governmental, technical, economic and social organisations and the spread of organisations between individuals and non-governmental groups. This rise of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) resulting from the growth of global interactions has been one of the noticeable developments in international relations since the Second World War. The importance of these organisations is acknowledged by the UN Charter in its Article 71 that authorises the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to make suitable agreements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters within its competence. INGOs, by nature, are concerned with economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural questions and we witness their growth in other areas as well. They have a symbiotic relationship with the UN's specialised agencies. For example, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has relationship with the trade unions and employee organisations, while scientific and specialist associations have consultative status with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and UNESCO. Organisations such as Friends of the Earth, the International Union for consideration of Nature and Natural Resources and the World Wild Life Fund have since acted as shadows to UNESCO and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The growth of INGOs clearly

indicates their importance in international life. They are a potential power in the mobilisation of social forces as approved from the agents of government.

The post-Second World War has seen the gradual growth of international economic integration creating a global economy by the 1990s. Non-governmental activity across frontiers has been a part of these processes of internationalisation and globalisation of world economy. The multinational or transnational corporations/firms have played a key role in this process as INGOs through transfer of capital investments and technology to different parts of the world-more particularly from the developed to the developing countries, thus contributing to the internationalising of economic factors and creating a global market economy. The Cold War divide in the post-Second World War period, the rise of the decolonised countries as the Third World gave rise to debates over neo-colonialism and the hegemonic control of the industrialised countries on the world economy. Thus the North-South divide was reflected in the demand for a New International Economic Order and coming together of the group of 77 (G-77)-Third World states that attended the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Regional organisations for purposes of economic and political cooperation came into existence from out of this group, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

33.3 DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

International organisations are often discussed synonymously with international institutions. In the formal and legal sense, the two terms can be used interchangeably. Clive Archar defines international organisations as ‘a formal continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership’. International organisations as ‘organisations’ represent the apex of a pyramid of multilateral diplomacy. “International Organisation is a process: international organisations are the representative aspects of the phase of that process that has been reached at a given time,” as John Bayles and N.J. Rengger argue. Here, the singular form is used to describe the pattern of multilateral negotiations and the plural form to represent the creation of the organisations and the powers invested in them. Paul Reuter considers an international organisation as a group normally, but not exclusively of states “which can permanently express a juristic will distinct from that of its individual members”.

33.3.1 Regimes, IGOs and INGOs

The irreducible essential characteristics of international organisations are: membership from two or more sovereign states though membership need not be limited to states or official state representatives (such as for non-governmental organisations); the aim of pursuing common interests; formal structures of a continuous nature. Institutions such as a conference, assembly, a permanent secretariat, an executive body are also associated with international organisations. Transnational corporations or multinational business corporations are also international organisations with investments and investors drawn from different countries. Can they qualify as international organisations? *The Year Book of International Organisations* and the Morozov proviso exclude those organisations established with the purpose of making profits for members which rules out international business corporations, cartels and transnational or multinational enterprises.

There are also international ‘regimes’ which refer to a more comprehensive idea. Governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations by creating and accepting procedures,

rules or institutions for certain kinds of activity. These are international regimes which are governing arrangements for a particular service or issue in the international system. It will include both formal and informal agreements, normative and legal elements, and will represent a degree of organisation. The operation of the International Monetary System during 1944-71 is an example. During this period the International Monetary Fund (IMF) created in 1944, along with the World Bank (originally known as International Bank for Development and Reconstruction) exercised substantial authority in regulating the financial stability of the Western states. These two operated as elements of a more comprehensive regime such as the acceptance of fixed exchange rates, fixed gold price and dollar-gold convertibility etc. However, the regime underwent massive changes in 1971 with the abandonment of fixed gold price and exchange rates.

The first distinction between the kinds of international organisations is those which are inter-state or inter-governmental and those whose membership is non-governmental. A third category is those with mixed membership.

The Resolution 288 (x) of 27 February 1950 of the UN Economic and Social Council suggests a distinction between inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs sometimes shortened to NGOs). Formally, an NGO is a permanent institution created by three or more states to serve some mutual purpose. An INGO is one created by private citizens, or groups drawn from three or more countries. According to the Resolution of Economic and Social Council: "Every international organisation which is not created by means of intergovernmental agreements shall be considered a non-governmental international organisation".

A distinction is also made sometimes between inter-governmental organisations and inter-state organisations. Some organisations such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPU) accept members which are not sovereign states but which have governments. A distinction is made between organisations based on a treaty between states and one between governments. An inter-state treaty includes all the institutions of the state whereas an inter-governmental organisation is established purely by the administrative branch of government. However, this distinction made by lawyer Jenres is not always accepted, as any inter-state agreement has to be made by an agreement for those states and it matters little whether his or her nomenclature is that of head of state or head of government.

33.3.2 Transnational Organisations

International organisations often contain members that are not states or governmental representatives but are drawn from groups, associations, organisations or individuals from within the state. Thus, there are non-governmental actors on the international stage and their activities give rise to transnational interactions. These interactions are defined by Keohane and Nye as covering "the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an international organisation". When a formal and continuous structure is formed in order to pursue the common interests of the participants and one which is not an agent of government or an international organisation, then a Transnational Organisation (TNO) comes into existence. In contrast to an inter-governmental organisation, a TNO must have a non-state actor as at least one of its members.

Three kinds of TNOs are identified. The genuine INGO is an organisation with only non-governmental members or representatives of like minded groups from more than two countries (e.g., the World Council of Churches or the Salvation Army). The hybrid INGO has some governmental and some non-governmental representation. If such a hybrid organisation has

been established by a treaty or convention between governments, it should be counted as an IGO. The International Labour Organisation which has made unions, management (non-governmental) representatives as well as governmental representatives is an example of such an organisation.

Trans-governmental organisations are those where relations between governmental actors are not controlled by the central foreign policy organisations. A broader definition of governmental actors includes anyone engaged in the governmental process of a country-legislative judiciary, the executive or local governments. Although such contracts, relations may be informal and not institutionalised, there are some which exist-the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Interpol etc.

The fourth category of TNOs is Business International Non-Governmental Organisations (BINGOs) or Multinational Enterprises or Corporations (MNCs). However, it is argued that these MNCs are not really international or multinational as their management is not recruited internationally nor is their decision-making. The Group of Eminent Persons of the UN argued that ‘transnational’ conveyed better the notion that these firms operate from their home bases across national borders without any form of state control. A distinction is made between ‘transnational corporations’ that operate from their home base across national boundaries and the term ‘multinational corporations established by agreement between a number of countries and operating in accordance with prescribed agreements. The MNC comes closer to the definition of an international organisation. However, the UN and *The Yearbook of International Organisation* exclude profit making organisations from the definitions and description of international organisations.

The non-inclusion of MNCs should not deny their role in international relations and commonalities with international organisations. The role of corporations in manipulating, influencing economic policies of developing countries, and even intervening politically and militarily needs to be underscored.

33.4 INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOS)

International organisations are also classified on the basis of membership as regional with limited membership (e.g., BENELUX) and universal with membership drawn from practically all the sovereign states such as the United Nations. The aims and objectives of international organisations can range from general and extensive to the specific and particular. Joseph Nye uses a three-fold division: military security, political organisations and economic organisations. A major classification of international organisations is that of governmental and non-governmental organisations (IGOs and NGOs). There are IGOs with no non-governmental representation and NGOs with no governmental representation. There are INGOs such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union which have special links to governments. There are IGOs which have non-governmental representation in their institutions such as the European Community and the ILO.

As mentioned earlier, the INGOs perform a whole range of functions and can be partly influential, especially in fields such as political campaigns, development awareness, and disaster relief and environmental issues. NGOs can function only when governments allow them to function. This is to say, governments have the power to refuse permission to NGOs to operate in their state. Hence NGOs are seen as vulnerable and dependent for their operations and success upon permissive political conditions. For example, Amnesty International, a human

rights organisation based in London, is only able to operate publicly, in a limited number of countries. As human rights are a sensitive area, governments do not like to be accused of violating human rights. The reports of Amnesty International on violations of human rights during the emergency period in India were condemned by the government of India as prejudiced and as interference in internal matters. However, these reports were revealing of the excesses of state power and violence.

33.4.1 IGOs & INGOs

The INGOs are frequently perceived by the general public to succeed exactly when they do successfully confront governmental power and challenge other opinions, for example the role of Greenpeace in ‘save the whale’ campaign and the dumping of toxic chemicals at sea. In the environmental area, Greenpeace exists to mobilise public opinion, to publicise gross incidents of pollution, species extinction and corporate and governmental malpractice. The INGOs appear as more popular and more active than the functionally relevant IGO (inter-governmental organisations). In the field of disaster relief, famine relief, population control, the environmental consciousness raising, for instance, Greenpeace, International Planned Parenthood Federation, OXFAM are better known to the general public than the appropriate UN organisations such as UNEP (UN Environmental Programme), the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the UN Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO). UNEP exists as a research organisation and as a negotiating forum while Greenpeace mobilises public opinion and exposes violations of environmental protection codes by corporates and governments.

The INGOs have a different style of functioning when compared to inter-governmental organisations. The target of operations of INGOs is limited. Most INGOs work in one particular area; have a staffing policy based upon volunteers and idealists. This is to their advantage and makes INGOs more popular and efficient than their counterpart intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). The latter often suffer from bureaucratisation, overlapping competencies, a sectoral attitude to development and budgeting, and a recruitment and personnel policy constrained by considerations of ‘equitable geographical representation’, as well as poor standards. The style of functioning of INGOs is also more media friendly and innovative such as protests before diplomatic missions, employ role stars to promote Amazonian folklore etc. The IGOs where representatives of governments negotiate over issues, the ideological and political biases of governments inevitably play a role, often hampering collective decision making. Thus the INGOs have the distinct advantage of being autonomous and functioning within the parametres set up by them. Nonetheless, the importance of IGOs cannot be denied as they do play a significant role as legitimate representatives of governments. The UNEP has played a crucial role in providing the forum in which the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocols on ozone-depleting substances were negotiated.

33.4.2 NGOs and Voluntary Social Action

A brief survey of voluntary social action in India indicates its Gandhian inspiration as a struggle against the hegemony of macro-organisations such as political parties and trade unions which often suffered from bureaucratic leadership that discouraged real participation of the people. In the 1960s a number of youth went into the rural areas to work with the poor on issues such as literacy, irrigation, health issues, minimum wages, land and housing rights etc. While many had political roots ranging from *Lohiaite* to the Marxist feminists, the move was away from existing political parties and processes. A non-party political process for structural changes in socio-economic and political change was being articulated. Movements of the late 19th and early 20th Century were basically social movements, rooted in religion, either through Christian

missionaries or Hindu reformists. They were mainly welfare and charitable works and rooted in religion and a few individuals did good works. During the freedom movement, voluntary efforts were mostly directed towards achieving independence. The communists and socialists too were subsumed in different ways in the freedom movement. Post-independence period until the 1960s was a period of lull and issues of structural change were subsumed in the euphoria of building a new India through industrial revolution. However, the economic and political crisis of the 1960s and 1970s led to the realisation that essential conditions of poverty and inequality cannot change unless the socio-economic structure is transformed. Thus the 1960s and 1970s saw the proliferation of various movements—Gandhian, *Lohiaite*, People's War Group (PWG), Liberation Theology etc., all working towards a structural change. Most of these dissent movements had leftist leanings except for the rightwing *Swatantra* Party, and the *Rashtriya Swayam-sevak Sangh* (RSS). Their efforts were based on secular, rationalist initiatives, with capture of state power by the people, for the people as the driving force. In the post-1970s, several local people's movements raised their voices against state oppression and the exclusion of *dalits* and tribals (e.g., the *Chipko Andolan* and the Chhattisgarh *Mukti Morcha*). The long suppressed *dalits* and tribals mobilised in complex ways—the Jharkhand movement, *Bhoomi Sena*, *Dalit Panthers* etc. Most of these movements as non-party political processes were promising initially but soon got bogged down by local issues. The movement for Total Revolution led by Jayaprakash Narayan finally toppled Indira Gandhi and brought in the first non-Congress government at the end of the Emergency in 1977. The assertion of subaltern identities led to new social movements—*dalit*, tribal, and women—that articulated their demands in a language that was critical of both liberal and Marxist ideologies and political parties. While some significant movements like the *Chipko Andolan*, the Narmada *Bachao Andolan* and the National Fishermen's Forum continue to agitate, the demand for structural change of the social movements is yet to materialise.

33.5 NGOS AS A SECTOR

The non-party political processes of the late 1960s and 1970s centred around radicalised youth, student groups, especially from Christian organisations in southern and Western India. Influenced by liberation theology that emanated in Latin America, these Christian groups along with student unions, NSS etc. formed themselves into Action Groups, known as Community Action Groups or Social Action Groups. These could no longer operate as earlier institutions like missions, trade unions and mass organisations. They also needed a legal identity to enable them to receive funds. The chosen forum of institution was the Society or Association formed under the Societies Registration Act. These were legally identified with the earlier welfare and charity institutions, which were called NGOs or non-governmental organisations. Some of these organisations such as VISTAS in Maharashtra and Association for the Rural Poor in Tamil Nadu, took up '*conscientisation*' (the method of raising political consciousness of the oppressed, developed by Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educationist) programmes. The *Naxalite* movement in Andhra Pradesh formulated the concept of '*Sangham*' adopted by some NGOs like the CROSS in Hyderabad.

While there is no universal definition and form of NGO, traditionally the term referred to social welfare organisations, including the Lions Club or Rotary. Later, the term included Action Groups which needed a formal structure to administer their funds and therefore registered under the Societies Registration Act or Public Trust Act. This enabled them to receive funds from various donor agencies-national and international. As considerable amounts poured into these groups in the 1980s, the government promulgated the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act. From the mid-1980s, the government also started using these organisations to implement developmental

programmes, first through CAPART and then through various social welfare ministries. The term NGO became increasingly associated with organisations ‘contracting development programmes’. Small groups grew in size, finances, and visibility. The result is the emergence of an NGO sector today.

33.5.1 NGOs as Developmental Agencies

In most of Third World countries, and India, in particular, non-governmental organisations are now playing an important role in the developmental processes. The globalisation of economies of the world within the neo-liberal framework has ushered in an era of global markets and the creation of an organisation-World Trade Organisation (WTO)-that is to regulate, set up new rules of global trade and commerce. The new critical approach to development has shifted focus from structure (state) to actors (civil society). The top-down approach has been displaced by bottom-up community participatory approach. Micro-local actors and projects that were to ‘empower’ people i.e. facilitate people’s own developmental efforts is now the order of the day. The NGOs have become the mediators in these efforts. The state is now seen as an ‘enabling state’, that is to say, a state that would facilitate ‘marketising’ of the economy and the state itself would withdraw or play a limited role in the economy. NGOs are now an important part of the civil society and legitimate negotiators on behalf of the people. The World Bank reports on development acknowledge NGOs as part of the civil society and often negotiate with them on the implementation of various important programmes.

The new economic policies heralded in the early 1990s in India acknowledge the role of NGOs in implementing developmental programmes. A plethora of NGOs operate in Andhra Pradesh in various fields-for removal of urban poverty, slum improvement, for providing livelihood for women etc. The state itself has formed an NGO funded by the World Bank-the Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty etc.

With the processes of globalisation since 1990s, the NGOs are seen as important actors in the implementation of structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and IMF. Privatisation policies and the withdrawal of the state from important sectors of the economy have made the state dependent on the NGOs for implementing developmental programmes. NGOs have become professional, managerial bodies with structures and organisations that do not concern themselves with power, politics, and state but with ‘delivery systems’ for structural adjustment. NGOs have also been accused of lack of accountability and transparency. As receivers of funds from outside, often their accountability is to the donor agencies. Very large NGOs are not accountable to either government bureaucracy or peoples representatives. The National Dairy Development Board is an example. The centralising trend initiated by large NGOs is exhibited not just in large scale dairying that is penetrating rural areas in more and more regions but also in the even more larger terrains of forestry, dry land farming, wasteland development and other new avenues of colonising the vast hinterland of village India and tribal hinterland. To this end, a Society for Promotion of Wastelands Development (SPWD) was formed in 1982, with the collaboration of Ford Foundation and the Central government. Thus government NGOs or GO-NGOs became tools for a new delivery system. Another example of such NGOs with inspiration from donor agency is the World Bank funded Watershed Development, and Joint Forest Management Programmes (JFM). Today there is a criticism that the JFM has degenerated into a form of labour sub-contracting of the work of the Forest Department to the members of the *Vana Samrakshana Samithis* (VSS). Today, most ‘North’ donor agencies have shifted their focus to lobbying and advocacy as the most civil forms of delivering social justice and equity and calling the shots-child labour, Northern Environmental Concerns, AID & Human Rights, Democratisation and Governance.

NGOs today are a fact of the developmental, socio-political scene. The initial euphoria of the 1960s when they were radical enough to challenge the corrupt and authoritarian state has slowly waned. Today a number of NGOs are implementing government projects when governments and state are fast losing their autonomy. Andhra Pradesh is an example *par excellence* where the World Bank inspired programmes are contracted by the government which in turn sub-contracts to the NGOs. The Livelihoods Programme supported by the British DFID for urban poverty alleviation and the programme for rural poverty elimination under the Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP) supported by the World Bank are interpretations of government, international financiers, and NGO collaboration.

33.5.2 NGOs and Social Movements

The diversity of activities of NGOs makes their classification somewhat complex. NGOs cannot be discussed without mentioning other non-party political processes as these are part of the same continuum with interplay, interrelationships and contradictions. A first distinction that is made is between charitable and other organisations from the point of view of their activities and historical perspective. While it is not difficult to distinguish NGOs from political institutions, it is with mass-based and popular issue based initiatives, with loose institutional forums that problems, perspectives, roles and process emerge. The most important distinction is made between NGOs and people's movements. NGOs are institutional in nature receiving funds from donor agencies from outside and governed by long term perspectives. People's movements are perceived as organised struggles by affected communities with a focus on immediately perceived needs and threats and a more personal involvement of the leadership.

One of the key developments that took place in the 1970s was the emergence of Civil Liberties groups. The emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi government and state repression have given rise to human rights groups-some with radical Marxist perspectives and some within the liberal framework. These groups became meeting ground for interaction between NGOs and individuals who otherwise had serious differences on perspectives. For example : Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC), Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Peoples Union for Democratic Rights etc. As Human Rights became an important issue, today a number of NGOs have a human rights desk which take up issues of violations even if in a limited framework, or collaborate, support human rights organisations which are more peoples movements than NGOs.

People's movements have also evolved into NGOs which play a crucial role at the macro-level in projecting the rights of the marginalised communities. An example is the fishermen's movement. The efforts of the movement were aimed at protecting the rights of traditional fish workers of Kerala threatened by the introduction of mechanised craft and turning the self employed men into wage labourers. The movement developed a large support base, and was able to engage within a struggle against international interests that were pressurising India to open its massive resources to the detriment of both the traditional fishing communities and the mechanised industry. The movement spread to various fishermen's belts throughout the country and the National Fishermen's Forum was formed. The Forum is one of the first success stories of unionisation in the unorganised sector.

A number of NGOs have emerged out of people's movements centred on *dalits*, tribals and women. It was in 1972 that a radical group in Maharashtra constituted the *dalit panthers*, modelled after the black groups in the US. The emphasis was on cultural assertion and self-respect with a central role to protect *dalit* literature. Today an NGO-DAPPU in Andhra Pradesh is an umbrella organisation of several *dalit* groups. The National Campaign for *Dalit*

Human Rights (NCDHR), *Dalit* Women's charter of rights and demands, and various other *dalit* organisations have renewed the debate on caste.

Another social movement of the 1960s and 1970s that has implications for political processes and more particularly for developmental issues is the women's movement. Gender today is an important analytical category for political and developmental processes. NGOs are deeply involved in women's issues and development thanks mainly to a strong women's movement and the emphasis on such programmes by donor agencies. The shift in discourses from 'women in development' to 'Gender and Development' to women, environment and development has contributed to the critique of enlightenment ideology and development concepts based on Western standards and rallies. While strongly opposing destructive development projects, as well as the new economic policies (neo-liberal policies and globalisation) many women's groups have been working with other movements on alternatives based on principles of democracy, social justice, peace and environmental sustainability. Today, practically all NGOs have a Gender desk or gender aspects included in their project work.

In India, peace issues have not been predominant in the development agenda of NGOs. The Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND) was formed in 1984. The Balliopal Movement against Missile Test firing range, the Anti-Kalga Nuclear Plant Movement came into confrontation with the military industrial complex. The increasing communal hatred has also led movements against communalism and fundamentalism. Communalism combat, a publication that counters communal hatred has also led movements against communalism and fundamentalism. Post-Pokhran is witnessing a new anti-nuclear and peace movement.

An area where non-governmental initiatives have played an important role is peace and security. For instance, transfrontier collaboration in the anti-slavery campaign began among the Quakers in the 18th Century; cross-national peace movements have flowered periodically since the middle of the 19th Century. Today institutional frameworks for cross-border contact are phenomenal in number. According to a conservative count, these were close to IGOs, over 17,000 INGOs in the 1980s, including cross-border associations in the professions, international foundations of political parties, transnational academic bodies, press groups, to international foundations and other service organisations etc. A significant feature of post-Cold War international relations in several parts of the world has been the emergence of dialogues, training, research and exchange programmes which focus on issues ranging from economic cooperation and social issues to political security matters. For example, in South Asia while cooperation in the areas of both economic and security relations is moving at a comparatively slower pace, NGOs and social activists are using the concept "Track Three" which refers to activities that focus on contemporary policy issues which explicitly function apart from or beyond government (e.g., the Pakistan-India Forum for Peace and Democracy).

33.5.3 Classification of NGOs

NGO activities can be classified into a number of broad domains :

- a) relief and charity
- b) development
- c) mobilisation and organisation
- d) politics
- e) political education.

The organisational classification is :

- a) Development and charity groups
- b) Action-groups involved primarily in the processes of conscientisation and mobilisation of the oppressed without any stated political perspective or some time even anti-political.
- c) Political groups with political perspectives and goals.
- d) Pre-party political formations with the purpose of graduating to political parties.
- e) Support groups carrying out specialised tasks of bringing out journals, documentation and resource centres, lawyers forums etc.

This classification is not an exhaustive one as there can be other variables or mixed groups. The sources of inspiration for voluntary organisations have been Gandhian, Socialist and Marxist or neo-Marxist. While the Gandhian inspiration built on the experience of the freedom struggle is directed to help the rural masses to achieve their economic and social freedom, the socialist school inspired by Ram Manohar Lohia and Jayaprakash Narayan has also been historically active and suspicious of the state and Nehruvian model of development.

The Marxist and neo-Marxist perspective inspired left parties to set-up voluntary organisations with some ideological frameworks. The relations between the NGOs and political parties are not uniform. Some of the Marxists view NGOs as agents of imperialists. In Maharashtra, the *Kashta-Kari Sanghatana*, with a strong rural base among tribals of *Dahanu*, north of Bombay, was targeted by the CPM cadre who felt threatened by the inroads made by the *Sanghatana* into the left constituency. Similarly in North Andhra Pradesh, another organisation SAMATHA was targeted by the PWG and the organisers of the NGO had to stop their work, first in East Godavari and then in Visakhapatnam district. This happened just after the organisation had won a resounding victory for the local tribal communities in their struggle against the collusion of the government with an industry to set-up a commercial complex against the wishes of the local community, flouting the existing laws.

33.6 NGOS, STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

NGOs and government share similar concerns of poverty alleviation. However, the scale of NGOs is much smaller but more focused and with an explicit concern with participation. While some NGOs tackle the symptoms of poverty-low educational levels, ill-health etc., others concentrate on enhancing the asset position and income earning potential of the poor through land improvement schemes, credit and skills training. Nevertheless there are NGOs who attempt to politicise poor people thereby challenging directly many of the social and economic structures established by the State. Since 1980s, new kind of NGOs providing support services to other NGOs in the form of training, evaluation and documentation have emerged and are usually funded by core grants from foreign donors and from payments for staff training from individual NGOs.

There are NGOs which receive funds from the government and there are those that receive funds from foreign donors. India's Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-90) provided for an active involvement of NGOs in the planning process with a massive increase in the volume of government funds (i.e. to Rs.1,500 million per year or US \$ 170 million). Most of these funds were for NGOs to work in government programmes such as afforestation, primary health care, education,

rural housing etc. NGO relations with government are not always cordial. For those NGOs receiving funds from abroad, the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA, 1976) regulates the receipt of funds and all such organisations have to register with the Home Ministry and submit audited accounts. Approximately 90 per cent of NGOs funding in India comes from foreign sources, mainly from International NGOs. In India with a tradition of self-government the suspicions with which foreign funded NGOs are regarded are not always ill founded as a number of these, flush with funds, appear to have the best of both-of being social workers with ‘fat salaries and sometimes comfortable bank balances’.

The legitimacy of these organisations dependent on foreign funds to develop villages is questionable to many and suspect as agencies of imperialism to some. Barring a few success stories such as the *Chipko* movement or the campaign against the Forest Bill, voluntary organisations failed to build up any effective national campaigns on issues such as Bhopal disaster. In the Western world, the NGOs and voluntary agencies are regarded as social welfare organisations and play a complimentary role. They are recognised for their organisational and managerial efficiency. However, in the Third World countries such as India, their role is somewhat different due to the very nature of post-coloniality of the state and society. The question is not one of efficient implementation of policies but one of structural transformation-local and non-local-of changing the political power relations of state and society and changing the relations with the external. This hinges on the crucial question of development of capitalism in the periphery.

The failure of developmental models and the crisis of economies in the 1970s were attributed to the failure of state and governance. States were seen as too weak to transform the civil society or as obstructive to economic development. The idea of good governance in the neo-liberal economic model is associated with the withdrawal of state from particularistic intervention in the economy and a freeing of civil society through greater reliance on NGOs, better training of civil service, decentralisation to remove obstacles to development, preferential access of the wealthier (and therefore educated) sections of society to decision making process etc. NGOs posit themselves as better equipped institutions to remove obstacles to development or take on developmental activities as is increasingly evident. They differ from the state non-market economy by the fact that they can choose more freely their staff, can impose commitment beyond formal execution of assigned tasks and have to justify themselves in order to ensure the flow of external resources. With the result, their performance is continuously evaluated. From the point of view of political economy, NGOs can influence criteria for funds. As developmental discourse includes ‘culture’ as an important variable, NGOs have successfully incorporated the language of ‘culture’ identities’ and the discourse of ‘civil’ society.

While these efforts might have the impact of democratising the civil society and thereby perhaps the State, the very agenda of aid of the donor agencies is one of creating an environment conducive to neo-liberal reforms. The inevitable contradictions of such reforms aimed at ‘good governance’, rolling back the state have had the most undesirable results for most Third World countries. While NGOs may be critical of the policies of the IMF/WB, their ability to reverse these is doubtful. The reform policies and the presence of foreign funded organisations in the South have critical implications for state and society.

The NGOs generally avoid confrontation with the state despite their radical discourse. This may be for very obvious reasons of losing permission from the Home Ministry for funds (FCRA). The methods and style of functioning of the NGOs often render them suspect in the eyes of the local people. The ‘target groups’ over whom/with whom they do project work cover small sections, nor is the project work political enough. By negotiating with the government and by providing welfare measures through its funds, the NGOs often depoliticise issues and blunt the

edge of people's struggles. The 'professionalism' of NGOs seems to fit well with the "managerial discourse" of the World Bank and the IMF; managerial efficiency and professionalism are preferable to political activism. As the NGOs provide employment to substantial numbers of the middle class, rural and urban, they do help without being an answer to the problem of unemployment. The shift in the recent years from the centre to the local/region in the Indian federal polity has given rise to a localism boom. The reason, atleast partly, it is argued, lies in the rise of NGOs.

33.6.1 Future Perspectives

The new social movements of the 1960s and the 1970s have given rise to the discourse of civil society. The hitherto marginalised sections—the tribals, *dalits*, women raised questions with regard to the state and exercise of state power that in turn gave rise to new articulations of nations and nation-states. The NGOs by lending support and funding them have institutionalised some of these movements; at the same time they had the impact of depoliticising them. The shift from class struggles, people's movements to groups, project work, net working etc, has blunted the edge of these struggles. However, it would be wrong to say that all NGOs are alike. There are NGOs which are sensitive to the local needs and cultures and do not impose themselves on the people. Several individuals sympathetic to peoples struggles (for example the *dalit* and women's movements) support them. It is important to recognise the kind of social changes that are now being witnessed and NGOs contribute to this change. However, the globalisation processes, the dominance of the market forces indicate that the global agendas are set by the TNC, IMF and World Bank creating a culture of capital and shaping consumer citizens the world over. Would the NGOs contribute to this process or counter it by taking ideological positions? What would be the nature of social transformations the world over, and what kind of a state, economy and civil society would they create? A question that pertains to the 'histoire de longue duree'-Long term history.

33.7 SUMMARY

Contemporary world witnesses the rise of a plethora of international organisations involving the cooperation of both states/governments and non-governmental units/actors. These organisations perform various kinds of functions, dealing with a variety of issues. Their classification is based on their membership and structures. International non-governmental organisations are those organisations in which governments and states are not members. Yet, they operate within and across national boundaries and are subject to the restrictions of national governments. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as voluntary organisations have grown in number operating in a variety of areas. From the 1960s, we witness the rise of new social movements which have played an important role in activising the civil society. NGOs have contributed to institutionalising these movements and as development agencies, they have contributed to the rise of an NGO sector. Classification of NGOs and their functions is a complex one. Any assessment of NGOs must be based on this transparency as receivers of funds from outside, as deliverers of goods and their contribution to the assertion of rights of marginalised sections of the society. Despite the increasing assertiveness of NGOs role, they cannot be a substitute to states and governments. Globalisation does not abolish states but the boundaries of state power may be reworked.

33.8 EXERCISES

1. Explain the rise of NGOs and their relevance and role in International Relations.

2. Discuss the international organisations in the post-Second World War era and their impact.
3. Write a note on Transnational organisations.
4. Explain the nature and functions of IGOs & INGOs in social development.
5. Explain the changing role of NGOs on governmental policies. Cite instances.

UNIT 34 THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Structure

- 34.1 Introduction
 - 34.2 Diplomacy as Injustice
 - 34.3 Scholarship of Injustice
 - 34.4 Globalisation, Human Security and Justice
 - 34.5 Summary
 - 34.6 Exercises
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34.1 INTRODUCTION

Justice as a concept in International Relations is age-old and encompasses all spheres of state activity. It is of considerable relevance to resolve many critical problems in International Relations. Yet it may be noted at the very outset that, both at the diplomatic plane and within its mainstream scholarship, there is considerable insensitivity to the concern for justice in International Relations. Historically, the guiding principles of international regimes have been stability, predictability and order, but generally at the cost of justice. Today, despite increasing globalisation and its many implications for human security, this inadequacy persists. The present study would address the problems that confront the issue of justice in International Relations by examining and analysing instances of injustice both at the diplomatic level and within its mainstream scholarship, and the reasons for its abiding continuity. It would review the causes of the disjunction in the behaviour of states as actors within the national and international arena analysing issues of diplomatic injustice and partisan scholarship in the present era of globalisation and their symbiotic link in breeding global inequality and insensitivity towards issues of human security. Overall, various dimensions of the issues of structural inequality of states, injustice, mainstream partisan scholarship and the manipulation of International Relations as a policy science insulated from the universal humanist heritage, within its contrived construction of a one-dimensional history in the service of the dominant and the powerful, would be investigated.

34.2 DIPLOMACY AS INJUSTICE

Injustice in International Relations has been persistent since the origins of relations between states. Empirically, it appears that states that generally abide by such elementary principles of justice like equality before law in their domestic politics tend to be less scrupulous about such principles in their international conduct. The example of the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of PoWs is a good case in this context. While the humanitarian laws codified in it manifested some concern for justice, they seem to have been inspired more by the pragmatism of its signatories to avoid reciprocal retribution, than the concern for universal justice *per se*. Besides, many of the same signatories showed no particular concern for justice in their demand for punishing reparations after the Second World War from the peoples of defeated states who had themselves been victims of their regimes' *revanchist* proclivities. The "war crimes" trial at Nuremberg and Tokyo are examples of "victors' justice" rather than universal justice, as Radhabinod Pal, the Indian judge stated in his dissenting judgement at Tokyo. More recently,

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait even after the Cold War had ended, the United Nations' sponsored "police action" against Iraq, or even the bombing of civilian targets in Afghanistan, are examples of scant respect for the principles of justice. The United Nations' collective action in Iraq may have conformed to International Law within the Charter provisions, and the victory may have made general Schwarzkopf, its Commander in Chief, a hero in his country, when he should at least have been tried for "war crimes" in the interests of justice for the sufferings that he brought on the innocent Iraqi peoples. Besides, the UN sanctions imposed against defeated Iraq aggravated the peoples' sufferings without receiving much attention either within International diplomacy or its scholarly discourse. These are only random examples of insensitivity to the concern for justice in recent International Relations.

Besides, conceptual innovations and theoretical insights by the scholars of International Relations are also largely conceived within its historically rooted "statist fetishism," and *clichés* of 'legitimacy', 'balance of power', 'collective security' and more strikingly 'balance of terror' to ensure order and enforcement of law rather than justice that would spontaneously motivate observance of law. This becomes counter-productive in the absence of any sovereign authority in International Relations to enforce law.

An overview of International Relations in a historical perspective indicates scant respect for justice in an abiding sense. The period of colonisation, the Cold War, and the present phase of globalisation are all replete with instances of injustice. Even democratic states with established traditions of justice as the guiding principles of domestic governance have shown little concern for justice at the international plane.

During the colonial era, for example, while almost all of Africa and Asia, still remained enslaved under colonial rule, US president Abraham Lincoln expressed his disapproval of slavery only within the United States; he lampooned the incongruity of "a nation consisting of half slaves and half free" citizens involved in the Civil War. European democracies in that era also limited their concern for "liberty, equality and fraternity," and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, as also the ideals of the *Magna Carta* within their respective nation-states. For example, Britain in this era waged the "opium war" against China in support of the East India Company's right to smuggle opium. In India, it amputated fingers of silk weavers of Bengal to promote British textiles. The "massacre" of peaceful protesters at Jalianwalabagh (Amritsar) is a more telling example of injustice. Even some post-colonial states after their national liberation, flying the flag of a global struggle for freedom and justice, as "nation-states" have swiftly conformed to the prevalent dismal standards of international justice, if not worse in some cases. Through the Cold War, most of the states within the global system, irrespective of their record of justice at home, generally conformed to the two Super Powers' poor standards of international conduct, as role models. "The reluctance of democracies to extend their models of governance to inter-state relations", as David Held argues, had led to the striking paradox within the global system in which "the increase in the number of democratic states has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in democracies among states."

Overall, the running theme through all these incidents, together with the theoretical trends of the post-Cold War era that suggest the "end of history"; and the ahistorical predictions about a possible new "clash of civilisations", seem to suggest renewed attempts to enforce universal order and stability within one's own rules of the game by the dominant global power at the expense of universal justice. Krauthammer's endorsement of this conception is indeed revealing. According to him: "We are in for "abnormal times.... Our best hope of safety in such times, as in difficult times past, is in the American strength and will-the strength and will to lead a unipolar world-unashamedly laying down the rules of the world order and being prepared to enforce them."

Such prioritisation of justice between the realm of national and international politics is operationally hazardous. This became obvious with the unpredicted collapse of the post-war global system despite its obsessive concern for stability and order. Scholarship and diplomacy of contemporary International Relations seems incapable of learning from its failure to provide stability to the Cold War global system, or ensure its orderly transition. Besides, the concern for human rights as justice, despite its widespread legitimacy, still remains an instrument of international diplomacy as in the Cold War era, than for the emancipation of humanity to universal freedom and dignity. Such abiding insensitivity to the concern for universal justice constitutes the original fault-line of International Relations, both at the diplomatic plane and its scholarship.

The abiding continuity of this disjunction in the concern for justice between the sphere of the domestic and international needs to be explored. If, empirically, this disjunction is more pronounced in the case of non-democracies-as seems to be the prevalent assumption-then the case for encouraging democracies within states, as actors within the global system assumes some importance to promote justice in International Relations. But this assumption appears to be empirically flawed, as we would argue. Yet this new orthodoxy of the international funding agencies of development (IMF and IBRD) is being pursued with the same zeal with which “Third World modernisation” was pursued by the Western powers during the Cold War through the “military and bureaucracy as its main vehicle.”

Even among the available options, democracy remains the least unjust form of government; the importance of the democracy-variable as an instrument of international justice remains questionable. To explore this point further, we assume for the sake of argument that wars are the most extreme manifestation of unjust international conduct.

Empirically, we find that most of the major wars across the world through the colonial era were among the European democracies, or initiated by them in their colonies in Asia and Africa. The significant exception was the Second World War plotted by Nazi Germany and the militarist Japan. Since then, however, in the Cold War era, most wars shifted from their predominantly European location to the Third World-various studies indicate-that the largest number of actual wars involved the United States either directly or by proxy. Above all, not all these wars by democracies were inspired by the principles of universal justice, as for example, the “colossal mistake” of the Vietnam War by the United States. Two equally distinguished democracies-England and France-initiated wars, jointly against Egypt, and separately against Argentina, Iceland, Indo-china and Central Africa.

As for preparations for war, like stockpiling of armaments, arms supply to civil wars across the world, involvement in “low intensity” insurgency operations, subversion of popular regimes, or illegal intelligence operations and “proxy wars”, as examples of unjust international conduct, the record of the “free world” through the Cold War period most convincingly undermines the assumption of democracy within the state as a critical variable in the context of our present concern for justice in International Relations. Even within the Third World, the record of the few democratic states does not lend much support of any great importance to the democracy-variable for our purpose.

The assumption that it is difficult for open democratic systems to secretly prepare for wars is also only partially true. For example, democratic US during “the McCarthy era” in the early 1950s devised constitutional and extra-constitutional arrangements to insulate the privileged status of “national security” from the transparency of democratic scrutiny, to launch the Cold War. Besides, apart from nuclear weapons, informed democratic discourse on most strategic armaments, including missiles, chemical and bacteriological weapons, still remains inadequate

because of being shrouded in secrecy on grounds of national security. On this score the record of the more established democracies is not very different from the non-democracies. Thus for example, the US policy of global “military alignment” as an instrument of the Cold War, along with “security checks” on American citizens, was announced by president Harry Truman’s executive decree (NSC -68), and the war in Vietnam that involved 500,000 citizens as troops, was never declared by the US Senate, the only constitutionally empowered authority. Similarly, the Anglo-French War against Egypt in 1956, or Britain’s military nuclearisation, was never discussed in the Cabinet, much less in the public arena. Such significant examples of dealing with ‘national security’ by democratic states undermine any possibility for *a priori* assumption of democracy as a critical variable in the concern for justice in the sovereign states’ international conduct.

On the basis of our assumption that wars are the most extreme form of unjust international conduct, the historical record of democracies does not qualify this least unjust form of governance-howsoever desirable otherwise-as self-sufficient instruments for promoting justice in International Relations. At any rate, absence of war may be a necessary, but never sufficient, condition for peace, and much less for justice. Peace like justice has a more positive connotation, in terms of liberating human consciousness from the use or threat of force, as prime minister Attlee said at the San Francisco Conference in 1947.

Given the weak empirical base of democracy as such, to explain the abiding disjunction between the sovereign states’ concern for justice at the domestic and international plane, the need to analyse International Relations at the systemic level for possible clues needs to be pursued. As of now, this has been inadequately done at the scholarly plane.

34.3 SCHOLARSHIP OF INJUSTICE

The disjunction in the concern for justice between the sovereign states’ behaviour at the national and international plane, is not only reflected in the mainstream scholarly discourse, but by implication, it is even endorsed as part of Realism. As a reflection of reality to a certain extent it may be historically valid, but to the extent that the real is not always the rational, much less just, this sterile version of empiricism of mainstream scholarship in International Relations, with inadequate normative concern, has only helped in widening this disjunction. It has augmented the amorality of the global system across the board and in the field of its scholarship.

As a policy science, to the extent its prescriptive formulations have conformed to such realism, International Relations has been an amoral instrument in the pursuit of power and, as an ally of the powerful, it has reinforced, dominance of the amoral and thus of injustice within the international plane in general, and in some cases at the national plane under the pretext of ‘national security.’ This is how “Realism” in International Relations, both in scholarship and diplomacy, originating as instruments to promote the “national interests” of the post-Second War era’s dominant economic and military Super Power, with nuclear monopoly, have been the flip side of injustice within the global system through the Cold War. This was predictable from the origins of the post-war global system, which simultaneously spawned the Realist hegemony at the intellectual plane and the Cold War within International Relations. Since then, the symbiotic relationship between International Relations, and its mainstream scholarship, has remained a vicious circle at the cost of justice in diplomacy, and the concerns of this policy science.

In fact, the emergence of International Relations as an autonomous field of scholarship in the United States, from its earlier moorings in diplomatic history, within the social base of the world’s dominant military and economic Super Power, has been quite fateful for its future, both

at the diplomatic and scholarly plane. The spatial and temporal context of its origin shaped its priorities, hierarchy of concerns, and its future trajectory from its inception. It is yet to liberate itself from the constraints of its origin. The same context shaped its scholarly identity as a policy science, de-linked from the social and human sciences, as well as International Law, and its domination by military strategic studies. This historical legacy still constrains its scholarship.

From such origins, at the service of the policies of the “power elite” of the world’s dominant military and economic power, having the least in common with the rest of the world, International Relations has become an attractive career option by virtue of its professional rewards. But its intellectual inadequacies as a policy science, within the imponderables of its universe of discourse, have not improved its scientific legitimacy.

The operational hazards of the Realist paradigm, in particular, its persistence with ahistorical predictions based on sterile empiricism, its inadequate sensitivity to normative concerns, and its prioritisation of stability and order at the cost of justice to begin with, were full of uncertainties. Such inadequacies are now part of universal common sense, as derived from the social and human sciences with established intellectual legitimacy. The unpredicted collapse of the Cold War global system built on the Realist paradigm again forcefully substantiated this universal common sense. Yet mainstream International Relations remains insensitive to learn from these lessons, and continues to be obsessed with such Realism.

Particularly striking in this context is the insularity of this scholarship from the intellectual resources of the social and human sciences. In Western political theory Plato’s concept of Justice and Aristotle’s analysis of Democracy, still remain classics that have historically inspired the upsurge of the liberal and democratic theories of the State, thus helping the democratic transformation of the European autocracies. The landmarks in the social history of the Western civilisation, the Reformation, Renaissance, the English, French and Russian Revolutions, as well as the American War of Independence, were all inspired by the idea of justice. Similarly John Locke’s “possessive individualism,” the Benthamite “felicific calculus,” Mill’s utilitarian version of the “greatest good of the greatest number,” Rousseau’s “General Will,” Voltaire and Montesquieu’s “Republican Agenda,” de Tocqueville and Jefferson’s ideas of democracy, Kant’s treatises on “perpetual peace,” and Hegel’s idea of the “civil society” have inspired economists, sociologists and moral philosophers towards the blueprint for a just social order. The same concern for justice has been the mainspring of artistic and literary creativity across the world. Even in more recent times, the political scientist John Rawls’ theory of justice and the economic philosopher Amartya Sen’s idea of “entitlement” are rooted in the historical concern for justice derived in most academic disciplines from the philosophical traditions of the Western Enlightenment. They may have as much relevance within International Relations as they have proved to be in the democratisation process of sovereign states in the Western civilisation. Yet, Western scholarships on International relations refuse to draw from this vast reservoir of intellectual resources to promote justice.

Beyond this Western tradition, even in the Oriental civilisations, intellectual discourses on politics and statecraft, within the religious texts, literary epics and philosophical treatises have all been marked by the concern for justice. The Chinese revolution, for example, was also influenced by the Confucian ideas of justice along with that of Marx and Mao. The Indian literary epics, like the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, howsoever fictional in their empirical base, powerfully portray the triumph of justice as a rational order in statecraft and war; they still remain alive within contemporary India’s intellectual and political discourse to underscore the anomie of its modernity. The Gandhian vision of India’s post-colonial state-to some extent reflected within its constitutional goals-was aimed to replicate the fictional *ramrajya*, howsoever utopian, in

modern India. The colonial liberation movements in Asia and Africa, and the “Liberation Theology” of Latin America, have also been inspired by the ideals of universal freedom and justice. Not that justice has always triumphed, but has nevertheless remained a universal ideal of social transformation and political mobilisation for human emancipation.

Even at the popular plane, folk heroes of fiction and reality have been idolised for their struggle against injustice across the cultural and civilisational divide of humanity. From the fictional Spartacus leading the slave revolt in Roman times to the equally mythical Robin Hood in medieval England; Galileo and Garibaldi in Italy; Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King in America; Gandhi in India and Nelson Mandela in Africa, within their diverse temporal and spatial contexts, constitute a part of the universal human heritage of the struggle for justice, just as the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, Statue of Liberty and the Tien Men Square are its universal metaphors. Yet, Western Realism in post-war International Relations opted for the “struggle for power” as the basis of “politics among nations”. Its policy implications of “global military containment” of a diabolical ideological adversary, “in defence of national interest,” are as much the classic tracts of their spatial and temporal context during the origin of the Cold War, as the ‘end of history’ after it. Similarly, the Military and the Bureaucracy as the “vehicles of modernisation” for “political order” in the Third World, was the specific compulsion of US foreign policy in its search for allies in the Cold War, as the search for a new “clash of civilisations” after it. They have historically represented the national interests of the dominant and the powerful, which have appropriated the universal in their own terms.

As a policy science, International Relations has thus remained insulated from the universal humanist heritage, within its contrived construction of a one-dimensional history in the service of the dominant and the powerful. Its mainstream professionals have selectively opted for intellectual support from a narrow view of Machiavelli’s concept of the “Fox and the Lion” in statecraft, and his separation of politics from ethics delinked from the historical context; from the obscure Clausewitz’s cynical concept of war as “diplomacy by other means,” in the era of nuclear weapons. Others have opted for the amoral Nietzsche’s version of the “Superman” as a role model for the Super Power inspired by the Bismarckian diplomacy of “blood and iron” and Metternich’s alliance system. With such a selectively amoral intellectual base, Realism spawned the Cold War global system with inadequate concern for justice. From the same Western intellectual tradition, international relations could as well have drawn on Emmanuel Kant who systematically argued that the greatest evils which affect civilised nations are brought about by war, and not so much by actual wars in the past or the present as by “never ending and indeed continually increasing preparations for war.” Also, that citizen’s rights can prevail if the rule of law is sustained in all states as well as in International Relations; and that democracy within any political community is only possible when unimpeded by threats from other communities or from networks inter-community (international relations). This could have provided another version of reality for the Realist theory to draw upon in the interest of justice.

Meanwhile, selective manipulation of history as Realism continues to remain the critical instrument in the transformation of the post-war era’s dominant economic and military power to the post-Cold War era’s hegemonic power, now encompassing the cultural domain. The intellectual hegemony of Realism within the global system and its mainstream scholarship has reinforced the history of its own construction, as a self-fulfilling prophecy. For its Super Power patron, it has reproduced a magnified “looking glass image” of itself, which has been rewarding for its national interest, as also for its professional academics as protagonists of Realism across the world. But this has been at the cost of justice within the global system and its consequent instability, and the weak scientific credentials of International Relations as a field of scholarship.

The primacy of the Realist version of “national security” has marginalised the UN-system built on the principles of collective security and universal justice as the basis for a durable and rational order. Its social, economic and humanitarian agencies have been particularly under siege by the global power structure. Its main economic instruments of post-War global reconstruction—the World Bank and the IMF—were from their inception delinked from the hazards of the democratic principles of the UN-system, as originally envisaged, and brought firmly within the control of the United States’ Administration. The UN-system survived through the Cold War by generally conforming to the global power hierarchy, at the cost of its ideals of universal justice. After the end of the Cold War, there have been new pressures, against this institution to reform itself to conform to the new reality of a unipolar world. Meanwhile, the World Bank and the IMF have emerged as the dominant actors shaping the form, content, and rules of the game within the post-Cold War process of globalisation. The operational hegemony of “national security” over collective security in the Cold War system, and the new mystique of the “global market” appear to be flip sides of the continuity of dominance, through the appropriation of the universal by the powerful. The “interdependence” of the military alliances of the Cold War, and the global “interdependence” promoted by the new trading blocs across the world, appears to some as comparable. Such perceptions impede universal justice in the new era, in the absence of any move towards democratising the global system.

Overall, the global system emerging from the Cold War has also remained structurally unjust as the colonial system preceding it. Whether assessed on the Gandhian principles of justice, based on the “needs of the poorest among the poor;” or, John Rawls’ principle of “justice as fairness,” based on the “greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” and not devised within “a veil of ignorance”; or even Amartya Sen’s concept of “entitlement”—as justice; the global system has been unjust for the majority of humanity, consisting of the poor and the disadvantaged. Historically, this majority drawn from the post-colonial Afro-Asian states, as “Third World,” found itself integrated at the periphery of the global system which, for the first time, became universal, but with unequal options for the individuals, groups and states constituting the system. After the Cold War, the global system, with new distortions emerging from its unplanned collapse remains a historical liability in the context of our concern for justice. The recurrent disjunction in the concern for justice in the sovereign states’ behaviour at the national and international level may be better explained by the endemic injustices historically inherited within the global system. Emanuel Kant may be more relevant to explain and provide the recipe for its reform, than the Realists who perpetuate it to thrive of it.

As an instrument of injustice, rather than a catalyst of human emancipation like other sciences, the moral legitimacy of International Relations has remained compromised. Its conceptual, methodological and theoretical resources, empirically rooted in the historical experience of a temporally, spatially, numerically and culturally limited segment of humanity, largely in Europe, appears inadequate to deal with the complexities of a global system that is now universal and more globalised. Its structural inadequacies have been reinforced through the Cold War. Its empiricist obsession has made scholarship in International Relations particularly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformations around “colossal mistakes” and *raison d'etat*. Theories and concepts, rooted in such distortions, constitute its intellectual and moral liabilities.

Consequently, “the scientific credentials of International Relations as a field of scholarship remains somewhat overstated.” Fred Halliday, with greater analytical rigour, perhaps overstates it: “Academic study of International Relations is a sub-field of news commentary...the world of International affairs is a carnival of the bluff and philistine.”

34.4 GLOBALISATION, HUMAN SECURITY AND JUSTICE

The breathing space conjuncturally created for normative concerns within International Relations by the sudden collapse of the Cold War global system is refreshing, in the context of its historical record. While such an opportunity cannot be allowed to lapse by default, it may be prudent to be cautious against the temptation to be over-ambitious. For, many options for universal justice, either in the Kantian, Gandhian or Rawlsian sense, remain historically non-viable in the foreseeable future. It may be more realistic to direct our concern towards optimising such incremental potentials for justice within the global system as long as the new milieu lasts.

We know from universal history, beyond mainstream International Relations that the process of globalisation did not begin with the end of the Cold War; nor did International Relations begin with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) between the European Powers. Each phase of the long historical process of globalisation has left its trail of social, economic, political and humanitarian complexities in an interwoven web across the world. They have varied contemporary relevance in the different regions, and have been documented in the many traditional disciplines with established intellectual legitimacy, like History, Economics, Anthropology, Sociology and Political Science. These are established disciplines with conceptual, theoretical and methodological resources, unlike the limited scientific resources of International Relations.

From such sources, it is evident that the process of globalisation through military conquests, religious proselytisation and maritime trade had considerable historical relevance centuries later at the time of the transformation of the European nation-state as secular democracies in relatively more recent times. Similarly, globalisation of Buddhism in Asia as well as of Islam and Christianity across the world; of mercantile capitalism leading to the Spanish and Portuguese immigration to South America and Europeans in North America; or, the Soviet system of globalisation in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Central Asia during the Cold War; and the Japanese globalisation in Asia have differing relevance in these diverse regions' complexities after the Cold War. There has also been globalisation of the African slave trade, indentured Indian labour and mercenary soldiers of British colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. More recently, globalisation of the criminal under-world, hand-in-glove with the military-civilian oligarchies of the Cold War, and transnational banks like the liquidated Pakistan-owned BCCI involved in drug traffic and money-laundering have played their specific globalising roles in crime and terrorism. These are among the historical legacies of the process of globalisation, with varied relevance to contemporary problems in the different regions of the world, and the security concerns of individuals, groups and communities as citizens of diverse sovereign states. The different components of this historical process have been analysed by social and economic historians and portrayed in literary classics and visual arts, as expressions of the reality.

Admittedly, globalisation ushered in by the Cold War has been significantly different from all its predecessors, in terms of its scale, pace and momentum. This is because of the unequalled levels of economic, military and technological power at its behest. But while the Cold War had territorially limited the process of globalisation broadly within two global ideological divides-just as it was restricted within their different colonial systems in the preceding era-the collapse of the socialist system has universalised the global capitalist market. The disadvantaged groups perceive this market as an extension of the global power structure with one hegemonic power, as envisaged by the US "power elite" at the outset of the Cold War. Consequently, there is absence of any global consensus around the neo-liberal ideological offensive towards economic globalisation through "structural adjustment" of the national economies. There exists thus scepticism and hostility against globalisation as a continuation of the dominance of the powerful in a new

garb across the world. Resultantly the present phase of globalisation raises doubts about the durability of the normative concerns spawned by it.

With the sovereign state still relevant in International Relations, the post-Cold War power hierarchy remains as skewed in favour of the dominant few as in the earlier system. This is also particularly true in the Third World with its unequal regional, sectoral and individual beneficiaries of the Cold War developmental model. The consequent global market and its subsidiary regional trading blocs, generally reflect their respective power hierarchy. The World Bank and the IMF, the apex global funding regime, monitoring the globalisation process of the national economies to the world market, reflect the same power structure; their chief executives are still nominated by the US president, approved by the US Senate, on behalf of the world capitalist market. The fund-strapped UN-system of collective security across the world has been under pressure to reform itself to conform to the same hierarchy by the United States as the hegemonic power, its richest member, largest contributor and biggest defaulter.

Within this empirical reality, the new ideology of globalisation seeking to legitimise the hegemony of the world market over state sovereignty, and its extension to the national markets, is unlikely to have strikingly different consequences for justice and human security within the global system than its predecessor. On the contrary, in the changed context, economic rationality appears to be the updated version of new Realism. The economic rationality of the unequal capitalist market is unlikely to create a different version of “inter-dependence,” or social justice than the “national security” of the Cold War era. The new rationality, insulated from any special concern for universal justice, is more likely to reinforce at the global level, the experience of early capitalist development within the European national economies, in the absence of any sovereign global authority as a substitute for the state. The disjunction in the concern for justice at the national and international plane may even increase within this new version of globalisation as some trends after the terrorist strike on the New York Twin Towers already indicate.

A way out of this depressing scenario may be to draw upon the historical resources of traditional scholarship to promote justice in International Relations. Historically, mainstream Western social and human sciences, drawing upon its moral and intellectual resources, laid the foundations for Liberal Democracy, the welfare state, as well as the Socialist state in their concern for justice within the ongoing process of globalisation. The relevance of this historical experience to International Relations, in the context of our concern for justice within the present global system, still remains largely unexplored. Incidentally, while the empirical base of Realism in “national security” was rooted in the European experience, the neo-realist mystique of market justice is almost singularly rooted in the unique American experience. Consequently as a universal principle, realism of national security and the neo-realism of market justice, appear to be flip sides of the recurrent reality within International Relations of the universal being appropriated by the powerful, at the cost of justice. This appropriation has manifested itself also at the level of concepts with built-in policy priorities and consequent hierarchies.

For example, the universalisation of the Post-Second World War as the historical “post-war” era was a conceptual trivialisation of the concerns of the vast majority of the “post-colonial” era’s humanity, with an abiding impact on the priorities of the global system and its hierarchy. For, the concept structurally prioritised between the historically asymmetrical concerns of post-war reconstruction in Europe and Japan and the post-colonial agenda of nation building. The agenda involving the social, economic, political, institutional and humanitarian transformation constituted their critical security concerns, rather than the Realist version of “national security” directed against an identified external threat. This Realist version as mainstream International Relations spawned the “Third World,” to which the European Cold War was extended, as in the case of

the two earlier “world wars”. The historical asymmetry in the priorities of post-war reconstruction, and post-colonial nation-building, was operationally manifested when the Cold War global system enabled relative security, economic prosperity, and political stability in North America, Europe and Japan at the cost of wars, threats of war, political instability and domestic repression in the Third World was accompanied by such economic growth as possible through foreign aid to regimes of military and civilian oligarchies. This was not conducive to justice within the global system.

The end of the Cold War is yet to manifest itself through any significant dent in the entrenched *ancien régimes* of the Cold War within the “Third World,” or within many countries of the former “Second World” despite their regime changes through some form of “elections.” This may explain the continuity of wars, its threats and preparations, ethnic divisiveness, religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, social violence, crime, drugs, and threat of famine in these regions, coexisting with economic prosperity and political stability within the states, which have been the apparent victors of the Cold War. That explains the abiding attraction of migration from the disadvantaged to the affluent parts of the global system causing new complexities. Consequently, the end of this history cannot be a cause for universal celebration, nor inspire universal confidence about the concern for justice within the new global order. For, the process of globalisation of the Cold War era, built on the historically inherited disparities of the earlier phase, has reinforced its structural asymmetry with new distortions. The new globalisation through economic liberalisation and cultural homogenisation has spawned fresh complexities, at the cost of justice and human security within the global system.

The transnational corporations as instruments of the new globalisation process have created networks of global interdependence within hierarchies of national sovereignties. Global transnationals still fly their national flags, with the State as its ally. General Motors, Enron, IBM, Rolls Royce, Siemens, Sony and Toyota, for example, are still their respective national ‘flagships,’ and as diplomatic instruments have assumed greater legitimacy in the new era of globalisation. Such corporate power, controlling technology, management, capital, and consumer preferences, have an unequal leverage on many weaker states with raw materials and labour as their only bargaining instruments while competing with others for corporate favours. Obviously, this unequal leverage cannot be the basis for global inter-dependence. On the contrary, they have spawned hierarchies of state sovereignties within the post-Cold War global order as before. Overall, the consequences of unequal options, within the global market with free trade, cannot be conducive to universal equality, much less justice.

Within the new dispensation of the Intellectual Property Rights Convention, some oriental traditional medicines, like *neem* and *turmeric* have already been appropriated by Western patents, despite Indian protests. In return, Western consumer preferences, American culture and taste have flooded the world market undermining many ancient lifestyles among the younger generations across the world. Within this process of globalisation through free trade, the global cultural attractions of the West are more a product of its technology and communication, than necessarily its aesthetic content or moral concerns. It has accentuated the ‘generation-gap’ in many non-Western societies. By profitably communicating Western consumer preferences as the main metaphor of a superior life-style, the new globalisation process has accentuated the global hierarchy of sovereignty while making the transnational more attractive, and hence more difficult to bargain with. The conflict between tradition and modernity, continuing through the colonial era, and accentuated by the Cold War process of globalisation, has sharpened within the “Third World” by the appeal of the populist versions of Western modernity profiled through its powerful communication and technology. Religious fanaticism, ethnic divisiveness and regional tensions,

stoked as instruments of the Cold War, have found new symbols to survive, with a different impact on the various regions of the global system.

But the most critical adverse impact of this process of globalisation is in the sphere of human resources, encompassing technology, management, education, health and creative arts. Sieved through increasingly harsh and selective immigration policies of the rich states, despite their commitment to “free trade,” the best talents in most spheres of creativity after acquiring their skills in the subsidised educational institutions have been attracted to the promised utopia, in exchange for the mediocre talents of transnational executives from the West. Apart from the substantial capital transfer on this account, that replicates the colonial global division of labour, its long-term impact on the global intellectual hierarchy cannot exactly be conducive to universal justice.

Despite such an impact of the historical process of globalisation, the end of the Cold War has spawned concerns around democracy, human rights, gender equality and environment within the mainstream of International Relations both at the operational and scholarly plane. Some of these of concerns have also led to global networks of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with motivated and skilled cadres.

While these manifestations of the new globalisation process needs encouragement, there is a need for caution against over optimism. Yet, the globalisation of such concerns has opened new options for justice in International Relations, particularly within such sovereign states where democratic politics has been inadequate either to reflect these concerns within their political discourse or operationalise them in public policies. For example, gender justice, human rights, child labour, deforestation, drug trafficking, in many traditional societies and underdeveloped economies now have global constituencies to combat against local insensitivities, corrupt governments and powerful local vested interests. This is also valid for the democratisation process of the “Third” and “Second” world encouraged by the coordinated policies of the donor agencies in the Western world. But the potentials of democratic transformation of entrenched oligarchies exclusively through external inspiration are limited. Besides, the structurally inequitable global system controlled by the rich and the powerful, despite their protestations of democracy, is not exactly conducive to the democratic transformation of its periphery.

These historical liabilities of the Cold War global system are not easily adaptable to democratic transformation, less so, within a global system that recurrently manifests the disjunction in the concern for justice at the domestic and international plane. That is the sense in which democratisation of the post-war global system, and its peripheral states, are dialectically linked, to promote universal human security as justice in International Relations.

34.5 SUMMARY

Within this framework, and the new opportunity within International Relations, it may be possible to build a global consensus, ideally through the network of NGOs, around such normative principles and institutions which have considerable legitimacy, despite their operational inadequacies. This is to ensure that the consensus-building process around principles of justice in its initial phases directed to a path of least resistance.

Concurrently three such areas immediately come to mind:

- a) Democratisation of the UN-system as the “Centre for Harmonising the Actions for Humanity,” as envisaged in its Preamble, particularly its social, economic and humanitarian institutions of universal justice.

- b) Ensuring the enforcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both through the United Nations as well as through NGOs.
- c) Ensuring regional development and external funding based on the index of human development at the national level as the operational version of “entitlement” as justice and with the NGOs monitoring it.

Along with these broad rubrics, gender justice and environmental protection need special emphasis because of their universal legitimacy, despite regional operational inadequacies in specific regions.

But to be an effective catalyst at the operational plane, scholarship of International Relations needs to take a critical look at the state of the discipline and its resource base. To be able to undermine the “statist fetishism” of its operation, scholarship of International Relations must insulate itself from the endemic hazards of this source of information and data. The state and the mainstream media even within the “free world,” as exclusive sources of official information, have proved to be particularly vulnerable to disinformations around *raison d'etat* as during the McCarthy era in the United States. Consequently, social and human sciences around related issues could be explored as the alternate resource base of the scholarship of International Relations for circumventing the insensitivity of sovereign states to justice in their respective International Relations. NGOs could be an additional source of empirical data for International Relations.

Equally important is the field of creative and visual arts as a source of empirical reality within International Relations, as it has already become in the field of social and human sciences. For example, Picasso's *Guernica* as an evidence of Nazi atrocities, or Chaplin's films as the social reality of economic depression; or the Hiroshima War memorial of the nuclear explosion despite being unquantified, are no less convincing evidence of the empirical reality than the official archives. Similarly, Satyajit Ray, Mrinal Sen, Adoor Gopalakrishnan or the Neo-realist films are no less convincing evidence of the Indian social reality than the quantified official data of governments. It requires creative imagination to incorporate them within the scholarship of International Relations. But as sources of justice they have as much potential as the quantified official records. For justice in International Relations beyond Realism, the resources of the human and social sciences, along with the creative arts, could be explored to advantage till such time as its own scholarship liberates itself from its present roots in facilitating dominance of the powerful, to being a catalyst of universal human emancipation

34.6 EXERCISES

1. Write a short note on diplomacy as injustice.
2. Why do you think injustice in diplomacy recurs?
3. What are the historical liabilities of scholarship in International Relations?
4. What has been the impact of Realism on International Relations?
5. Discuss the main trends in the historical process of Globalisation.
6. In what sense is the post-Cold War process of globalisation different from the earlier phase?

UNIT 35 HUMAN SECURITY

Structure

- 35.1 Introduction
 - 35.2 Meanings and Dimensions of Human Security
 - 35.3 Nation States and Human Security
 - 35.3.1 Sovereignty
 - 35.4 Human Security in the International System
 - 35.4.1 International Arena
 - 35.4.2 Human Security Agenda
 - 35.5 Achievements and Prospects for Human Security
 - 35.5.1 Accomplishments
 - 35.5.2 Prospects
 - 35.6 Summary
 - 35.7 Exercises
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35.1 INTRODUCTION

Understandably, the principles of human security have always been embedded in the relations among modern sovereign nation states. However, it is only with the end of the Cold War that sufficient attention has been accorded both to the concept and the diplomacy of human security.

What is human security?

Human security is a perspective to look at international relations not from the viewpoint of nation states but from the perspective of the security of the individual. In simple words, human security means safety of people from both violent and non-violent threats. Once it is deemed imperative to frame issues of international affairs in terms of their impact and implications for human security, then policy planners or scholars doing so are looking at issues from the perspective of human security. That is, one must ask whether an action by a country or by the international community as a whole is enhancing or undermining the safety of the people.

35.2 MEANINGS AND DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY

It is a new template to understand and analyse the transformative changes taking place in the international system in the aftermath of the Cold War. Better described, human security is a shift in the angle of vision to identify and meet the challenges and threats to international peace and security. Threats to the safety of individual and security of communities today are such that they also directly threaten international peace and security.

The post-Cold War international system is beset with greater instability and lesser predictability. Threats to international peace and security today are more diffuse and multidimensional. Nature of threats and sources of threats have changed. The challenges and dangers in today's world

threaten more and directly, the safety and wellbeing of individuals and communities. Some old threats and conflicts, which the overarching rivalry between the two superpowers had kept under covers during the Cold War, have resurfaced with greater intensity. These are ethnic, racial and tribal animosities which, in the post-Cold War World, have taken the form of intra-state conflicts and civil wars. Not separated from the above, rather making them deadlier, are some new types and sources of violence and conflict such as those emanating from terrorism, religious fundamentalism, narco-trafficking and money laundering activities. Besides, one also witnesses an intensity in these conflicts, reflected in ‘ethnic cleansings’, ‘hate campaigns’ and nationalist xenophobia, etc. It hardly needs to be stressed that many of such conflicts threaten not only the safety of human beings but also the security of the states.

Significantly, such conflicts of today are more often intra- than inter-state. Then there are other features too of such conflicts. Such as, they affect the civilian populations more than the armed combatants. Of the total 86 armed conflicts recorded in 1997, as many as 84 were intra-state. Eight out of ten casualties in recent conflicts have been civilians. More people have died in local-often intra-state-conflicts than in wars between states. Also, more casualties have been on the account of the use of small weapons that are easily available, and have remained beyond all discussions on disarmament. Today, about 500 million small weapons, which have an unusual longevity of life, are in use. Or, some such weapons are cheap and available in abundance, for instance the anti-personnel landmines, which are used by the terrorists, insurgents and all kinds of groups. Worst, these ‘wars’ are often being fought with ‘child soldiers’. In intra-state conflicts during the 1990s, the world has remained a mute spectator to the use of children as armed combatants and as suicide bombers. Another notable aspect of today’s conflicts is that while they may be local in nature, they have wider regional and international dimensions. International networks dealing in illicit trades in arms, narcotics, and money laundering are in some complex ways linked to these seemingly local conflicts. Even the support of diasporic communities has been enlisted to carry out campaigns of ‘ethnic cleansing’, terrorist violence, arms procurement and money transfers.

A second source challenging the safety of human beings is the current unbridled process of economic globalisation. Globalisation has both positive and negative aspects. What is being witnessed today is perhaps more of the negative aspects of globalisation. Particularly the developing economies are getting adversely affected. As national economies integrate with the global market forces, traditional productive structures are getting destroyed and distorted, causing deprivation and displacement of large populations. Patterns of investment and mega-development projects, such as hydro-electrical projects, and economic policies of ‘export promotion’ are directly responsible for the degradation and destruction of environment. Large populations, particularly the indigenous communities in many countries, have lost their livelihood and, were forced to migrate elsewhere including across national borders. Large volume of speculative capital now operates through the international financial system. The new international banking practices allow the speculative capital rapid mobility across national borders and financial barriers. The pressing needs for foreign investment and the liberalisation of financial markets in most of the developing countries have facilitated the movements of speculative capital in and out of the national economies almost at will. Consequently, national stock markets soar one day only to bottom out the next day. Countries such as Mexico in 1994, Indonesia and other countries of South East Asia in 1997 and Brazil in 1998 have experienced the onslaught of the speculative capital which shook their economies to its foundation and has rendered the notions of national sovereignty and national control infructuous. Admittedly, the financial crises of this type have a ‘contagion’ effect for the health of the regional and international economies.

Human security is an attempt to respond to the new global realities. It takes the individual as

the nexus of its concerns, as the true lens through which to view politics, economy, environment and the society. It is an effort to construct a global society where the safety of individual is the priority, and where global, regional and bilateral institutions are built and equipped to enhance human security.

35.3 NATION STATES AND HUMAN SECURITY

State security and human security are mutually supportive. However, given the nature and sources of threats to international peace and security, the question of individual freedom and safety cannot any more be dealt with in the statist framework. Truth is that states alone cannot meet the challenges faced by the international system.

Moreover, there are instances, when the states themselves have been a source of threat to the safety of the individual or the security of an ethnic group. Contemporary states may have armed themselves to be impregnably secure but have rendered their citizens insecure. Governments themselves adopt policies prejudicial to various ethnic groups; aid and abet campaigns of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and pursue majoritarian agendas, sponsor terrorism across national borders to subserve their strategic interests, or are under the influence of some millenarian ideas which threaten regional and international peace and security. Human security is not opposed to the security of the state; it stands for building a democratic state that values its own people and protects all its ethnic and racial groups.

Besides, during the 1990s, there have been instances of ‘failed states’; instances where state authority just collapsed for whatever reasons, necessitating international responses in the form of ‘humanitarian interventions’. ‘Failed states’ pose a threat to the sub-regional and regional stability in more than one way—ability to carry out international obligations, exodus of displaced populations, etc.

35.3.1 Sovereignty

The agenda of human security does not limit or circumscribe the sovereignty of state. Certainly, it stands for retooling the state in terms of its various capacities. Building a democratic state that values its own people and protects its minorities is a central strategy for promoting human security.

Principles of human security are not new; what, however, is important is the renewed focus on these principles in the context of an evolving international order. Principles advancing human security in the contemporary international relations are more than a century old. Their evolution had begun in the 19th Century itself, which is reflected in the creation of several international humanitarian organisations, importantly the International Committee of Red Cross. The process had since continued getting institutional expressions in various international agreements and conventions; for instance, those codifying laws of war, in the universalist principles that are enshrined in the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and the recently-established Statute of International Criminal Court. Therefore, principles of human security were always present in the modern international system, which has, as its basis, the notion of sovereign states. These trends explain the emergence of what is now described as the ‘humanitarian international law’.

From the perspective of the theories of international relations, an important aspect is that the postulate of human security is calling for a reexamination of the philosophical and legal bases of state sovereignty and, thereby, of the international system. Liberalism, upon which modern

international system is based, has been concerned primarily with state—its external sovereignty and ‘domestic jurisdiction’. It is however undeniable that the superior ethical goal of liberalism has always been individual freedom. Individual liberty had to be realised within the nation state but, admittedly, it did not mean that the international system could not deal with it. It has dealt with it in the past like, for instance, through the UN Charter. The point therefore is whether the system of sovereign states can reform itself towards the goal of promoting and protecting individual freedom in view of the intensified threats to safety of the individual and security of the state. Today, freedom and safety of the individual is no more possible within the statist framework, and the liberal theories of international relations admit this. Admittedly, states are not so sovereign, nor so immutable.

Besides, states are not any more the only member-entities of the international system. The decade of the 1990s saw the emergence of an international civil society. International non-governmental organisations championing various causes ranging from human rights, collective rights of the indigenous communities, gender equality to population and environmental problems are shaping international public opinion, policy making processes, and development of alternative policies. Governments have also come to rely upon the INGOs for the delivery and disbursement, for instance aid programmes. Even international organisations including the UN have sponsored a number of conferences involving the participation of the NGOs.

Human security does not seek to displace the sovereignty and much less the security of the state. Undeniably, however, in the changed context of contemporary international relations, both state sovereignty and its role need a redefinition and a reconstitution. Human security is not a substitute for the security of the state. Rather, human security is ideally within and through the state. States remain the basic units of the international system. They alone have the authority and coercive power to regulate, enforce and distribute. The classical issues of politics—who governs and on what terms—are as relevant to cyber space as to the real world. In fact, states, today are even more essential to enforce the human security agenda that requires large resources; and entails international efforts to deal with the ‘rogue’ states and groups. States command not only vast array of instruments and resources, but also they alone command the allegiance of the citizens. In short, the continuity of norms, persistence of institutions, and strategic resources and options available to the wielders of state power to shape or distort the patterns of global interdependence all make states central to any change in the international system.

What human security entails is not the displacement of state but refurbishing its various capacities along the principles of democracy and pluralism. Besides, it is also realised that states alone cannot meet the kind of the threats facing the world today, even if some of the events are taking place within the national borders of a country.

35.4 HUMAN SECURITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

35.4.1 International System

Human security agenda is premised on the concept of interdependence of states, which has deepened further in the wake of the processes of economic globalisation, technological and information revolution, and the emergence of an international civil society. Importantly, interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or actors in different countries. When there are reciprocal—though not necessarily symmetrical—costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence. While political and security

interdependence has increased, economic interdependence has deepened even further among the globalising economies. However, noteworthy is the technological interdependence in the way it has transformed international relations. The so-called Information Revolution has opened the international arena to loosely structured networks of organisations, even individuals, and vastly increased the number of channels of contacts between societies. These non-governmental organisations and networks are particularly effective in penetrating states without regard to borders on specific issues such as those related to human rights, and by working through domestic constituencies are able to draw the attention of national governments towards these issues.

Related to the above is the growth of an ‘internationalised conscience’ in support of the security of individual and the collectivities. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. The UN Charter and other international conventions are only reaffirming the global faith in the freedom and security of the individual. As the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan has stated that the UN Charter itself was issued in the name of people and not states. “When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.”

An axiom that comes out of these changes is that international relations are and can no more be confined to the closed-door diplomacy conducted by the state elite. There are many other international actors who are also impinging on international relations. States have shown their inability to resolve all intra- and inter-state conflicts by themselves. The rise of an international civil society means that non-governmental actors are also involved in various ways in the international system; and in its own distinct ways, the international civil society is pressing for, what is being described as, the democratisation of international system.

35.4.2 Human Security Agenda

It needs to be stressed that human security is not a theory. It is *praxis*. Generalisations are emerging from dealing with concrete situations. Basically, it entails a norm-setting and a practical problem-solving agenda that is very large and transformative of the existing international system.

Human security agenda is a very long continuum: from prevention of armed conflicts and, should that fail, ‘humanitarian intervention’ to stop the human suffering, to alleviation of the effects of armed violence on populations and rebuilding of the structures of governance once the conflict is over. It means developing new norms and tools and, wherever they exist, facilitating their implementation. The major task is to convince other states to accept and practise human security agenda; which, no gainsaying, has until now remained a difficult and an uneven process.

What it suggests is a very wide range of actions and a number of instruments. A problem at hand is that precisely this makes human security agenda vast and even somewhat unwieldy. Admittedly, challenges to human security cannot be met just through conventional measures, such as observance of human rights or provision of developmental assistance. In other words, human security is not simply some humanitarian programme. What human security agenda underscores is the need to address the root causes of insecurity and to help ensure future safety of people. It entails building new state capacities. In real terms, it could mean reorganising the financial, administrative, and political capacity of the state with outside help and guidance. State capacity building could mean economic reforms and trade agreements, democratisation including revamping of government institutions such as judiciary, independent electoral commissions, etc.

In other words, human security agenda may bring in far-reaching changes in the economic and political structures and institutions of a state. This may be true more of such states that have lost their capacities due to civil wars, political repression and financial crises, or ‘failed’ states where government’s capacity and machinery may have just collapsed.

35.5 ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR HUMAN SECURITY

35.5.1 Accomplishments

A string of achievements in the second half of the 1990s have shaped the human security agenda. The success of the so-called ‘Ottawa Process’ led to the conclusion in 1997 of international convention banning the production, stockpiling, sale, and use of anti-personnel landmines. This followed the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Two other initiatives, the so-called ‘micro-conventions’, which seek international ban on the use of children as combatants in civil wars and the other banning the production, sale and use of small weapons are under debate and consideration of the international community. The proposal for a UN convention against transnational organised crimes dealing with trafficking in arms and human beings is also under consideration.

Pursuit of human security agenda has engendered an unconventional political process, use of new kinds of diplomatic tools, and the participation of the actors of international civil society in the conduct of international relations. To illustrate the above, a brief description is given below of the political-diplomatic process, unconventional tools of diplomacy and the participation of non-state actors that had led to the signing of the treaty banning the landmines.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction—commonly understood as Ottawa treaty—was signed by 122 countries on 3-4 December 1997. The states adhering to the treaty must never under any circumstance use, develop, produce, stockpile or transfer anti-personnel landmines or help anyone else to do it. They must destroy the existing stockpiles or those already planted within a fixed timeframe. Many more countries have since signed and ratified the treaty.

Ottawa treaty is the first direct attempt to eliminate the scourge that kills or maims one person every 20 minutes. This ‘weapon of mass murder in slow motion’ has killed more persons, mostly civilians, than a weapon of mass destruction. It was at the initiative of Canada, under its foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, and a core group of pro-ban states and a coalition of international non-governmental organisations that the issue was first raised in the international arena. It was pointed out that the existing international laws do not adequately deal with the problem: only few states had accepted the existing laws and the use of only certain types of mines were prohibited and that too in conflicts between states. Besides, the use of mines in civil wars was rampant, and it endangered even more the safety of civilians. Many NGOs had been calling for ban on the production and use of landmines, pointing out that an estimated 119 million mines are spread over about 71 countries, and the problem is essentially a humanitarian problem.

Many organisations including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) and Medico International (MI) had for many years been campaigning for the ban. In 1992, these and other NGOs had launched an International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) at a conference held in London. The ability of the NGOs

to launch the ICBL was related to the emergence of a new global international conscience in the aftermath of Cold War. Many national level campaigns also emerged in the countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia particularly where landmines problem was very serious such as in Cambodia. Pro-ban states also approached the UN for the formulation of new rules that could be comprehensive in dealing with the problem.

Frustrated by the slow pace and effectiveness of the UN process, the 50 pro-ban states and the NGO community finally decided to meet in Ottawa, Canada in October 1996. The conference was attended by ICRC and several international organisations and UN agencies too. This is described as the ‘Ottawa Process’, which culminated in the final treaty signing in December 1997. Among the key actors which played a significant role during the process were Canada which spearheaded the campaign, Austria which prepared the draft treaty, Belgium and Norway which held several conferences in the intervening period, besides the NGOs who had launched several regional initiatives to enlarge the pro-ban coalitions.

Few aspects of the entire ‘Ottawa Process’ are significant. First, the pro-ban countries and their NGO allies took the matter out of the UN conference on disarmament and presented it as an issue related to human survival and therefore a matter of human rights. They presented the issue as not simply one of banning a weapon but one related to the safety of human beings importantly the civilians. Secondly, it was a new kind of diplomacy that relied on the participation of the international civil society. The community of the NGOs proved very useful and effective in building an international public opinion and also, some NGOs could lobby effectively with their governments in support of the ‘Ottawa Process’. Thirdly, the pro-ban states were all medium or small countries and included both the rich and the poor and the developed and the developing countries. Thus, Ottawa treaty became an instance where an international agreement was arrived at without the support—in fact in the face of opposition—of the great powers including the US.

Since 1997, the number of countries who have signed the treaty has gone up. Many countries however cite security and other reasons for not acceding to the Ottawa treaty. For instance, India in principle stands for banning the use of landmines but in a phased manner. Its use should only be allowed for long-term defence of borders, perimetres and peripheries of states. The main difficulty however is that landmines are used indiscriminately by the terrorist, insurgent and other groups. Besides, such groups also use booby traps and other improvised explosive devices. Foremost, therefore, is the need to ban the use of landmines in armed conflicts which are not of an international character. Equally urgent is the task before the international community to drastically reduce the easy availability and transfer of landmines, which leads to their indiscriminate use by such armed groups.

35.5.2 Prospects

One would hardly disagree with the diagnosis of the threats and challenges to human security. The prescriptions of human security are however found to be highly flawed and impracticable. First, the way human security agenda is conceived, it does not devalue state but certainly seeks to circumscribe its role at a time when many developing countries are undergoing wrenching experiences of economic restructuring including serious financial difficulties, or facing challenges of ethnic resurgence and terrorism. Many of the developing countries therefore perceive threats (directly) to their territorial integrity and nation-building process. While agreeing with the ideals of human security, foremost for these countries is the need to preserve their national unity and territorial integrity without which no human security could be possible.

Secondly, it is agreed that international relations have undergone transformative changes with the end of the Cold War but such changes are certainly not so deep as to supplant or drastically reduce the role of the state. All said and done, the international system remains based on the notion of sovereign and equal nation-states. Lastly, no denying the fact that international values and morals have always been part of the international system, but it is only one of the dimensions of international system. Relations among sovereign states otherwise remain based on the acknowledgement of certain formal rules and customs of sovereignty and inviolability of states. Human security agenda is not only interfering in the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of sovereign states but also going beyond that. It prescribes ‘humanitarian intervention’ as the measure of last resort, which is unacceptable to many developing countries which have had experiences of long colonial rule and Western domination. Therefore, one also comes across the view that human security agenda masks the hegemonic ambitions of the great powers because so far it is mostly the developing countries that have faced the humanitarian crises.

35.6 SUMMARY

The concept of human security has received sufficient attention only after the end of the Cold War. It means safety of the people or communities from both violent and non-violent threats and should be seen from the perspective of the security of the individual rather than that of nation-states. It is an effort to create a global society where safety of the individual is the priority and institutions are built to enhance human security.

This does not mean that state security and human security are mutually exclusive. Nor does human security limit sovereignty of state. It only means that safety of the individual cannot be dealt within a statist framework as states alone cannot meet the challenges of the international system. The concept of human security is premised on the interdependence of states which is deepening further in the wake of the process of globalisation and emergence of civil society.

Human security suggests a wide range of actions and a number of instruments. It is not simply a humanitarian programme-it underscores the need to address the root cause of insecurity and entails building new state capacities.

The pursuit of the human security agenda has been an unconventional political process with the use of new kinds of diplomatic tools and participation of international civil society in the conduct of international relations.

While agreeing with the ideals of human security, there are certain problems in its practical implementation. The prescriptions and the way it is conceived is somewhat impracticable especially for developing countries who perceive threats directly to their territorial integrity and the nation-building process. Also, relations among nation states are still based on certain formal rules and customs of sovereignty and inviolability of states. The prescription of humanitarian intervention as a last resort by human security is unacceptable to many developing countries.

35.7 EXERCISES

1. What do you understand by the term “human security”?
2. Does the ‘human security’ agenda undermine the concept of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ and state sovereignty?

3. What kind of international system is envisioned by the human security agenda? How can the present international system be reformed?
4. What are the major accomplishments of the human security agenda so far? Does it involve new diplomatic tools?
5. What are the future prospects of the human security agenda?

UNIT 16 MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Structure

- 16.1 Introduction
 - 16.2 Major International Problems and the Role of International Institutions and Instruments
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16.1 INTRODUCTION

The pattern of international relations that was conspicuous in the Cold War days has faded into oblivion. There has been a complete transformation of world scenario and a new pattern of international relations is emerging. It has in its womb some positive as well as negative developments giving rise to both hopes and fears. This pattern has its bearings both on the developed as well as on the developing nations. These changes have also profoundly affected the role of international institutions which play a key role in the execution of various international instruments through which different dimensions of international relations are managed.

Prominent among all these international institutions or to put it otherwise at the apex of all these international institutions is the role of the United Nations in managing the international relations. In the last fifty years especially during the last ten years, the involvement of United Nations has increased sharply in almost every aspect of international relations—from peacekeeping and human rights to the environment, from women's and children's rights to air safety, from disarmament issues, economic and social concerns, further codification of international law to the refugees. In the very recent years, the world body has changed and refocused its orientations and concerns.

The UN has greatly contributed to the reshaping of the world through its role in the process of decolonisation, and promotion of international cooperation for economic, social and humanitarian progress. The non-political organs and specialised agencies of the UN, especially, the UNHCR, UNESCO, UNDP, WHO, UNICEF etc. have registered great successes in their own spheres of international activity. Deadly diseases like smallpox and plague have virtually been eradicated saving thousands of lives. The UN has fed hundreds of thousands of refugees and saved them from starving to death. It has been able to respond in many ways to the growing needs and aspirations of the world community and help lay the foundations of a world order in which fundamental human rights and the worth of the human persons are recognised. Indeed, one of the greatest achievements of the UN has been the codification of a remarkable body of human rights laws which it has initiated and which have been adopted by its member states. Credit is also due to the UN for its success in managing other problematic areas. The UN has facilitated conflict resolution and peaceful transition to independence and normalcy in a number

of countries such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa. We shall have a detailed discussion on most of these major problem areas of international relations in the subsequent paragraphs

At the same time, it is hardly possible to overlook the failures of the UN particularly in the political field. The utter failure of the UN in maintaining even a semblance of peace in the former Yugoslavia is a serious and indelible blot on its image; and has greatly undermined its credibility. To the victims of the Bosnian conflict, irrespective of race, the UN has become a cruel joke, a dirty word. Events in Rwanda provide yet another particularly depressing example of the UN's shortsightedness. When the genocidal killing in that country began in April 1994, the UN Security Council responded by reducing the peacekeeping force already deployed there to symbolic presence. By July, estimates of the number of people killed had risen to half million. About two million more fled into neighbouring Zaire as helpless refugees

The UN's debacle in Somalia is well known. Experience has shown that except in Kuwait in 1991, the UN has been unable to take effective measures to enforce peace. But it is to be remembered that Kuwait was basically a US action in the name of the UN, as was the Korean action in 1950-51. And the same US is presently just ignoring the UN absolutely by not adhering to its resolution and instructions and has gone on war in full scale against Iraq in the company of its friend and another permanent member of the UN Security Council namely the Great Britain. It has considerably undermined the UN system and is likely to have serious repercussions on its existence.

It is generally believed that the UN's peacekeeping has played a highly constructive role in maintaining international peace and security, a major thrust area in the management of international relations, as is evidenced by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988. But it is difficult to subscribe to this assessment especially after its failure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Rwanda. The UN's conflict resolution and peacekeeping functions were earlier hamstrung by the bipolar politics of the Cold War and after the end of the Cold War there was a spurt in demand for UN peace missions from Cambodia to Haiti and from Mozambique to Tajikistan. But the recent debacles have underscored the need for strengthening the machinery for safeguarding peace. A detailed discussion on UN peacekeeping functions will be undertaken in subsequent paragraphs.

The euphoria and optimism that marked the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s about the world body's perceived capacity to come to terms with a wider variety of conflict situations have evaporated sooner than expected. Earlier UN's failure could be blamed on Cold War. Today the UN has only itself to blame for allowing the only super power to usurp and sideline its role. It has now become clear that the UN is having great difficulty in coming to grips with new peace and security problems of the post-Cold War world. With the ending of the Cold War, countless conflicts, frictions and disputes have erupted in the form of civil, ethnic and religious wars. Is UN well equipped to face or manage such international problems? We shall deal with this question in subsequent paragraphs.

One of the major responsibilities placed on the UN by its Charter is to consider "the principles concerning disarmament and regulation of armaments". But it is frightening to realise that we live in a world which today continues to waste nearly \$ 1000 billion every year on mass killing machines whereas the UN's annual budget is less than \$ 2 billion a year. Over the years the world has made tremendous advances in developing and perfecting a war system but has failed to develop a peace system. Global military spending since the creation of the UN has added

up to a cumulative \$ 30-35 billion. The military sector absorbs substantial resources that could help reduce potential for violent conflict if instead they were invested in human security—health, education, housing, poverty eradication and environmental sustainability. If the governments pursued the building of a peace system with the same seriousness as they build military might, in all likelihood many violent conflicts could be avoided. A comparatively small investment, perhaps some \$ **20-30** billion per year, could make a tremendous difference in the global war and peace balance. This in fact is an overdue investment. Not making it will condemn humanity to bear the costs of the war system an infinitum. This is a task to which the UN should devote its primary attention with utmost urgency.

16.2 MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS

The UN and its family of agencies are engaged in managing a vast array of international problems that touch every aspect of people's lives around the world. Right from noticing problems of general nature like caring for child survival, environmental protection, health and medical search, alleviation of poverty and economic development, agricultural development and fisheries, education, family planning, emergency and disaster relief, air and sea travel to problems of serious nature of maintaining peace and security, resolving endless regional conflict

16.2.1 Managing International Problems of Peace and Security

By deploying more than 35 peacekeeping forces and observer missions, the United Nations has been able to restore calm which has allowed the negotiating process to go forward while saving millions of people from becoming casualties of conflicts. There are presently 16 peacekeeping forces in operation.

Some of the various instruments in the form of treaties, conventions, resolutions, declaration etc. that helped in resolving the problem of peace and security are mentioned below:

- the 1965 Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states and the protection of their independence and sovereignty;
- the **1970** declaration on the strengthening of international security; the **1980** declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the charter of the United Nations;
- the **1974** definition of aggression;
- the **1977** declaration on the deepening and consolidation of international détente;
- the 1981 declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of states;
- the 1981 declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe;
- the 1982 Manila declaration on the peaceful settlement of international disputes; the 1987 declaration on the enhancement of the effectiveness of the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations;

- the 1978 declaration on the preparation of societies for life in peace;
- the 1984 declaration on the right of peoples to peace;
- the 1988 declaration on the prevention and removal of disputes and situations which may threaten international peace and security;
- in 1980 the Assembly approved the establishment of the University for Peace, located in San Jose, Costa Rica;
- the Assembly has designated the opening day of its regular annual session – the third Tuesday in September each year - as the International day of Peace. The year 1986 was proclaimed the International Year of Peace.

Paramount in the minds of the drafters of the UN Charter was the establishment of a system for the maintenance of peace and security that would be more effective than the League of Nations system had been. In contrast to the decentralised League of Nations system, the drafters of the Charter sought to concentrate the decision making power in the Security Council by mentioning that concurrence of the five permanent members was required for any decision by the Council under Chapter VII of the charter. This was also evident in the various articles (art. 39 to 51) of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus those chiefly responsible for the drafting of the UN Charter came to favour a system that tried to harness responsibility to power, laid emphasis on the availability to the UN of adequate forces and facilities for keeping the peace, encouraged states to settle their disputes by developing the processes of conflict resolution by peaceful means of their own choice, accorded to the organs responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security a wide range of choice to achieve their desired ends. It was in continuation with this line of thinking that the United Nations further concretised the system of collective security and disarmament and evolved the concept of peacekeeping, veto and sanctions.

UN peacekeeping operations have evolved over the years as a pragmatic response to all conflicts, whether regional or international. In the UN context peacekeeping has been defined as the use of multinational forces, under UN command to help contain and resolve conflicts between hostile states and sometimes between antagonistic forces within a single state. There are two broad types of Missions and Peacekeeping operations: Military Observance Missions and Peacekeeping forces. Observer Missions are composed of unarmed officers and range in strength from a few dozen to several hundred observers. Peacekeeping forces are composed of military units; usually light infantry battalions and their strength have ranged from 1250 to 20000 troops. These troops are armed with light infantry weapons. The concept of peacekeeping is not specifically described in the UN Charter. It goes beyond purely diplomatic means for the peaceful settlement of disputes described in Chapter VI but falls short of the military or other enforcement provisions of Chapter VII. Till date there have been twenty peacekeeping operations. Of these ten used peacekeeping forces and the other ten were military observer missions. The Security Council has generally refrained from spelling out the provisions of the UN charter on which its decisions are usually based, but it did so in the establishment of the UNTSO—UN Truce Supervision Organisation and the UNMOGIP—UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, the two oldest peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping has over the years evolved as a flexible, internationally acceptable way of controlling conflicts, and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. As the tensions of Cold War receded, the international community turned increasingly to UN peacekeeping helping

resolve the various regional and international crisis and conflict situations. United Nations peacekeeping activities have increased and broadened dramatically in recent years. In the span of only five years, the organisation has launched more operations than in the previous forty years. In 1988 and 1989 alone there were five new operations. In September 1988, the Nobel Committee awarded the peace prize to the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations. The growth, however, is not only in quantity, but also in quality, for peacekeeping operations are taking on new tasks that often go far beyond traditional activities and which today include: (a) safeguarding humanitarian relief operations (b) supporting electoral assistance (c) assisting in mine clearance (d) monitoring human rights (e) providing police support (f) enforcing embargoes (g) restoring democracy (h) disarming warring parties (i) administrative management (j) responding to refugees' needs and (k) providing services for victims. In addition to peacekeeping there is also Peace-making, which means negotiations. It seeks to bring hostile parties to an agreement and uses the peaceful means outlined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. (ii) Peace-building, which is essential in the aftermath of a conflict. It means support for structures which solidify peace and build trust and cooperation among former enemies.

16.2.2 Managing the Problem of Global Disarmament

Disarmament is an important aspect in preserving world peace and security. The havoc caused by the two world wars convinced people that if humanity was to be saved from complete destruction, something ought to be done to reduce or limit certain or all types of armaments. Usually the term disarmament is used for reduction or elimination of armaments. The essence of the approach is to restrict the means of disarmament and includes everything which has to do with the limitation, reduction, abolition or control of certain or all armaments through the voluntary agreement of two or more nations. Thus, the strategy of disarmament is the exact reverse of the collective security system and the regional security alliances. Instead of trying to scare countries away from war by confronting them with a formidable deterrent force, disarmament seeks to establish conditions that will assure a nation that others are neither intending to attack it nor are capable of doing so, at least in the immediate future. The strategy is to reduce rather than to build up a confrontation of armed forces the institutional machinery set up by the UN to deal with disarmament issues, especially in the way it has developed since 1978, is complicated. Actually, it is only the UN General Assembly which deals with all aspects of this subject (The Security Council has never systematically dealt with disarmament issues, which is understandable in view of the use of veto.) The Department of Disarmament Affairs in the United Nations Secretariat, headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, assists the operative bodies. There is also a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. In addition to these advisory bodies, which have a global membership, there is the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which, as the name suggests, is a worldwide institution specifically concerned with disarmament questions but has a limited number of members. Though it is an independent body, the Conference on Disarmament is closely linked with the United Nations.

Some of the various instruments in the form of important international arms control agreements dealing particularly with the threat of nuclear weapons are listed below:

- the 1959 Antarctic Treaty;
- the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, called the Partial Test-Ban Treaty because it does not ban underground tests;
- the 1967 Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies (outer space treaty)

- the 1967 treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America
- the 1968 treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (non-proliferation treaty)
- the 1971 treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea bed and the ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof (sea-bed treaty)
- the 1972 convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction;
- the 1979 convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques;
- the 1979 agreement governing the activities of states on the moon and other celestial bodies (moon agreement);
- the 1981 convention on prohibition of restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons;
- the 1985 south pacific nuclear free zone treaty.

The General Assembly in 1969 proclaimed the 1970s as a **Disarmament** Decade. The first session on **disarmament** held at United Nations Headquarters from 23 May to 1 July 1978, was the largest, most representative meeting of nations ever convened to consider the question of disarmament. That first special session on disarmament evoked an unusual **universal** response. It was the 1978 special session that **made disarmament** the dominant topic in the UN, to some extent superseding that of a New International **Economic** Order which had dominated the preceding phase. As a result, the General assembly established a new **Disarmament Commission** as a deliberative body, composed of all UN members. In 1979, the Assembly declared the 1980s as the second **Disarmament** Decade. The second special session on **disarmament** was held at **UN headquarters** from 7 June to 10 July 1982.

Within the framework of the world **disarmament campaign**, the General Assembly has established three regional centres, **funded** by voluntary contributions, to provide regional activities under the **campaign**. They are: the Regional Centre for Peace and **Disarmament** in Africa located in Togo; the Regional Centre for **Peace, Disarmament** and Development in Latin America and Caribbean, located in Peru; and the Regional Centre for Peace and **Disarmament** in Asia, located in Nepal.

While assessing the multilateral **disarmament** process due note is to be taken of flaws in the UN system. Clearly, the United Nations and its associated institutions are not able to get directly involved in bringing about **disarmament** in the sense of destroying or reducing weapons. Nonetheless, it is but obvious that any **multilateral disarmament** policy of the foreseeable future will have to be governed by the conditions prevailing within the UN system, notwithstanding all the criticism and **difficulties**. Global **disarmament** diplomacy within the UN is essential for the safer and more stable world order. The global dialogue on security is indispensable; the **institutions that** have been created for that dialogue are valuable and deserve every support.

The United Nations has **developed seven** major instruments over the last **more than** fifty years to **maintain** international peace and security. These are:

- Preventive diplomacy and Peace-making

- Peace-Keeping
- Peace-Building
- Sanctions
- Peace-Enforcement
- The Collective Security Mechanism
- Disarmament

Despite its best attempts the United Nations evidently depends upon the measure of support it receives from the Great Powers in resolving international disputes. It has not been, nor will it ever be, in a position to force **an** unacceptable solution on a great power, or for that matter any solution against its wishes. It can therefore be said that the UN's record both in resolving disputes by agreement and in helping them become dormant, has been by no means unimpressive, Many disputes are referred to the UN simply because at a particular point of time there is no other way in which they are resolved. The mere taking of a dispute before the UN organs provides **an opportunity** for explaining all possible means for resolving it.

16.2.3 Managing the Problem of Economic and Social Development

The word 'economic' in the UN Charter was to be interpreted to include trade, finance, communications, transport, economic reconstruction, and international access to raw materials, and capital goods. The political struggle between the rich North and the poor South group of nations for the establishment of a more egalitarian world economic order plays a much more dominant role in the UN today than it did in the 1940s and 1950s. North-South politics in and outside the UN possess certain distinctive features which make it different from other political struggles in the world body. Firstly, it is not a power struggle between any two nations but definitely a bloc struggle between two major economic groups. Secondly, it is not associated with strategic issues like the problems of peace and war nor is it in the real sense a contest for supremacy between the two ideological viewpoints. It is rather a difference of economic interests represented by two broad economic groups of nations—the rich North and the poor South. Finally, it involves not cajoling and canvassing to win support among nations but one of confrontation and heated discussions, bargaining and negotiations between large organised groups.

Starting from the Algiers summit of Non-aligned Movement to subsequent summit meetings including a special session of the General Assembly which was convened at the behest of NAM, various attempts have been made to draw the attention of all nations towards these economic problems of southern nations. In the above-mentioned special session of the General Assembly a document and declaration was adopted for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). To reduce this existing enormous inequity between the North and the South is the main task assigned to NIEO and despite its best efforts for so many years NIEO also has not achieved any success.

16.2.4 Regional Commissions of ECOSOC

ECOSOC set up five regional commissions between 1947 and 1974: the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ESCAP), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA), and the Economic Commission for South Asia (ECSA). The main objectives of these regional

commissions have been to provide research and planning facilities that stimulate a spirit of self-help, while tackling regional problems through increasing regional integration. These are seriously engaged in increasing the pace of development in their respective region.

16.2.5 The UN and Global Conferences for Economic and Social Development

The UN is also constantly engaged in arranging from time to time global conferences to discuss prominent economic issues. Some of the main conferences summoned so far are as under:

- United Nations Conference on Desertification (Nairobi, 1977);
- United Nations Water Conference (Mar del Plata, 1977);
- United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among developing countries (Buenos Aires, 1978);
- United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (Vienna, 1979)
- World Conference on Agrarian Reforms and Rural Development (Rome, 1979)
- World Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women : Equality, Development and Peace (Copenhagen, 1980)
- United Nations Conference on New and Renewable sources of Energy (Nairobi, 1981)
- United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (Paris, 1982);
- World Assembly on Ageing (Vienna, 1982)
- International Conference on Population (Mexico City, 1984);
- World Conference to Review and Appraise the achievements of the United Nations decade for Women (Nairobi, 1985);
- United Nations Conference for the promotion of International Cooperation in the peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy (Geneva, 1987);
- International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (Vienna, 1987);
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Belgrade, 1983; Geneva, 1987);
- International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (New York, 1987);
- UN Social Summit (Copenhagen, 1995)

16.2.6 Role of World Bank and International Monetary Fund

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—the Bretton Woods twin institutions are managing the monetary and financial affairs of different countries of the world. The World Bank is supposed to be a lender of conunerciallp raised capital for development projects. Given

its essential structuring as a bank, borrowing (except for international development assistance) on the commercial market, there was never any possibility of it complying with the principles, processes and intended coordinating role of the UN. Even if it ceased to be subject to the influence of one or two industrial powers, it is difficult to see how it could ever fit into the non commercial, one country one vote, and shoe-string finance system of the UN. Only occasionally, do the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) manage to consult each other. To come to grips with the question of its future place in the system, UN delegations need to subject the Bank to as searching an evaluation as its controlling governments do the UN system's developmental activities. The Bank has, of course, done useful work, but the realities certainly do not match the mystique.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), far more than the World Bank, was supposed to intervene equitably in the economic policies of countries. It was supposed to be the multilateral instrument of coherent macro-economic policies designed to achieve the economic and social goals as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, the majority of the countries find the IMF's role essentially primitive. The 'donor' governments insist that macro-policies regarding world money should be discussed at the IMF alone and not at the UN notwithstanding the provision of article 58 of the UN. The Fund itself is so governed that although the developing countries constitute 74 per cent of its membership, they constitute barely 34 per cent of its voting strength. These are not the propitious conditions considering the provisions of the UN Charter.

Fortunately, pressures for reform of the IMF and the World Bank policies, for fair treatment of both surplus and deficit countries, are now increasingly being heard. It is also hoped that realisation of the dangerous consequences of a lack of macro-economic strategies for the world as a whole will also generate pressure for a genuine international trade organisation directed by the UN to secure equitable trading opportunities for all nations.

It is a common characteristic of public institutions that when they are not used, they gradually lose the capacity to be used. This syndrome is one major cause of the current impotence of the UN in relation to global economic problems. The UN has been steadily losing its ability to exercise intellectual leadership in the great economic and social issues of the world. Today there is obviously a need for a mechanism that can periodically assess the UN's achievements and shortcomings in the field of socio-economic development. It must be of a manageable size, yet at the same time be regionally representative.

16.3 OTHER GLOBAL CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

We have already discussed above the major areas of concern where international bodies have framed various instruments and with the help of those instruments these international institutions are trying to manage international relations. We shall discuss below some other latest pertinent concerns in the management of which different international institutions are deeply engrossed.

a) Protecting environment

The UN has played a vital role in fashioning a global programme designed to protect the environment. The Earth Summit, the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, resulted in treaties on bio-diversity and climate change, and all countries adopted 'Agenda 21'—a blueprint to promote sustainable development or the concept of economic growth while protecting natural resources.

b) Providing humanitarian aid to victims of conflict

More than 30 million refugees fleeing war, famine or persecution have received aid from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since 1951 in a continuing effort coordinated by the United Nations that often involves other agencies. There are more than 19 million refugees, primarily, women and children, who are receiving food, shelter, medical aid, and education and repatriation assistance.

c) Aiding Palestinian refugees

Since 1950, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has sustained four generations of Palestinians with free schooling, essential health care, relief assistance and key social services virtually without interruption. There are 2.9 million refugees in the Middle East served by UNRWA.

d) Alleviating chronic hunger and rural poverty in developing countries

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has developed a system providing credit, often in very small amounts, for the poorest and most marginalised group that has benefited over 230 million people in nearly 100 developing countries.

e) Focussing on African development

For the UN, Africa continues to be the highest priority. In 1986, the UN convened a special session to drum up international support for African economic recovery and development. The United Nations has also instituted a task force to ensure that commitments made by the international community are honoured and challenges met. The Africa Project Development Facility (APDF) has helped entrepreneurs in 25 countries to find financing for new enterprises. The Facility has completed 130 projects which represents investments of 233 million and the creation of 13,000 new jobs. It is expected that these new enterprises will either earn or save some \$ 131 million in foreign exchange annually.

f) Promoting Women's rights

A long term objective of the United Nations has been to improve the lives of women and to empower women to have greater control over their lives. Several conferences during the UN sponsored International Women's Decade set an agenda for the advancement of women and women's rights for the rest of the century. The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) have supported programme and projects to improve the quality of life for women in over 100 countries. They include credit and training, access to new food-production technologies and marketing opportunities and other means of promoting women's work

g) Pressing for universal immunisation

Polio, tetanus, measles, whooping cough, diphtheria and tuberculosis still kill more than eight million children each year. In 1974, only 5 per cent of children in developing countries were immunised against these diseases. Today, as a result of these efforts of UNICEF and WHO, there is an 80 per cent immunisation rate, saving the lives of more than 3 million children each year.

h) Promoting investment in developing countries

The United Nations, through the efforts of the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) has served as a "match maker" for North-South, South-South and East-West investment, promoting entrepreneurship and self-reliance, industrial cooperation and technology transfer, and cost-effective, ecologically sensitive industry.

i) Reducing the effects of natural disaster

The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) has spared millions of people from the calamitous effects of both natural and man-made disasters. Its early warning system, which utilises thousands of surface monitors as well as satellites, has provided information for dispersal of oil spills and has predicted long term droughts. The system has allowed for the efficient distribution of food aid to drought regions, such as Southern Africa in 1992.

j) Protecting the ozone layer

The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) have been instrumental in highlighting the damage caused to the earth's ozone layer. As a result of a treaty, known as the Montreal Protocol, there has been a global effort to reduce chemical emissions of substances that have caused the depletion of the ozone layer. The effort will spare millions of people from the increased risk of contracting cancer due to additional exposure to ultraviolet radiation.

k) Curbing global warming

Through the Global Environment Facility (GEF), countries have contributed substantial resources to curb conditions that cause global warming. Increasing emissions from burning fossil fuels and changes in land use patterns have led to a build up of gases in the atmosphere, which experts believe can lead to warming of the Earth's temperature.

l) Cleaning up pollution

UNEP led a major effort to clean up the Mediterranean Sea. It encouraged adversaries such as Syria and Israel, Turkey and Greece to work together to clean up beaches. As a result more than 50 per cent of the previously polluted beaches are now usable.

m) Fighting drug abuse

The UN International Drugs Control Programme (UNDCP) has worked to reduce the demand for illicit drugs, suppress drug trafficking, and has helped farmers to reduce their economic reliance on narcotic crops by shifting farm production towards other dependable sources of income.

n) Improving global trade relations

The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has worked to obtain special trade preferences for developing countries to export their products to developed countries. It has also negotiated international commodities agreements to ensure fair prices for developing countries. And through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which has now been supplanted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations has supported trade liberalisation that will increase economic development opportunities in developing countries.

o) Introducing improved agricultural techniques and reducing costs

Assistance from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) has resulted in improved crop yields. Asian rice farmers have saved \$12 million on pesticides and their governments, over \$150 million a year on pesticide subsidies.

p) Promoting stability and order in the world's oceans

Through three international conferences, the third lasting more than nine years, the UN has spearheaded an international effort to promote a comprehensive global agreement for the protection, preservation and peaceful development of the oceans. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into force in 1994, lays down rules for the determination of national maritime jurisdiction, navigation on the high seas, rights and duties of coastal and other states, obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment, cooperation in the conduct of marine scientific research and preservation of living resources.

q) Protecting intellectual property

The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) provides protection for new inventions and maintains a register of nearly 3 billion national trademarks. Through treaties, it also protects the works of artists, composers and authors worldwide. WIPO's work makes it easier and less costly for individuals and enterprises to enforce their property rights. It also broadens the opportunity to distribute new ideas and products without relinquishing control over the property rights.

r) Improving global communications

The Universal Postal Union (UPU) has maintained and regulated international mail delivery. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has coordinated use of the radio spectrum, promoted cooperation in assigning positions for stationary satellites, and established international standards of communications, thereby ensuring the unfettered flow of information around the globe.

s) Generating worldwide commitment in support of the needs of children

Through UNICEF's efforts, the Convention on the Rights of Children became international law in 1990 and has been adopted in 166 countries by the end September 1994; following the 1990 World Summit for Children convened by UNICEF, more than 150 governments have committed themselves to over 20 specific measurable goals to radically improve children's lives by the year 2000.

16.4 SUMMARY

During the last more than fifty years extensive international cooperation in solving economic, socio-cultural and humanitarian problems, which formed the core of international relations as they existed among different nations of the world, has taken place. Countries have joined hands within multilateral institutions to improve human condition in a way never before attempted. These multilateral institutions produced numerous instruments to organise and regulate their working. Guided by those instruments these institutions plunged themselves headlong and participated in major programmes in support of the economic development and worked together within the United Nations to assist millions of the most helpless and vulnerable of the world's

people—refugees, victims of natural disasters, women ;and children where the need has been greatest In the area of International Law, which comprises of the international instruments and guide the working of different international institutions, more has been done by way of codification in recent decades than in all previous history. On human rights, universal standards have been elaborated, and covenants, which enjoy broad support, have come into force. This can be seen as a major step forward, if we consider that never before have states acknowledged the legitimacy of international concern in this area. The awareness of the global problems and of interests common to all humanity has become widespread. On matters of major global concern such as safeguarding the natural environment and dealing with demographic trends, commonly agreed programmes have been developed on a multilateral basis. In many other areas; study consultation and planning have taken place within the multilateral institutions.

Despite these substantial achievements, there is also evidence of a decline in confidence in multilateralism and disillusionment with the UN approach to solving world's problems. This can be attributed to a combination of factors. The emergence of more than a hundred new independent countries has made multilateralism more complicated and, with the change in majorities, more subject to controversy. Disagreement among members of the UN Security Council had prejudiced the system of collective security provided in the Charter. Today, the way the United States has used or rather misused or when unable to bring to it to its own terms just ignored it, putting the entire UN system to anarchy, and that too using the entire UN system for the fulfillment of its selfish motives or to show to the world as to who wield the power, has also led to a great amount of pessimism both within the UN system and without. The requirements of an equitable global economy have not yet be met in full. The gap between the countries of the North and the countries of the South seems to be growing wider day by day. Discords over trading arrangements and treaties like NPT seem to be dominating the international arena today. Moreover the possibility of a renewal of a Cold War this time between the various trading blocs does not seem to be a far reality. There are problems to be recognised and, to the extent possible, to be overcome. They must not, however, obscure the value of the UN as it should be clearly understood that international problems cannot be dealt with any more by unilateral means.

The great human goals of peace, justice and prosperity are now understood to require ever widening cooperative effort for their achievement. A new array of problems of undeniable global dimensions that are beyond the ability of any single country or group of states to solve may arise. Moreover, the enormity of the tasks undertaken, have forced the international institutions and the world community to acquire a new realism—awareness that they have embarked upon a long path towards progress which would be marked by both successes and failures.

Now there is deeper understanding of where the sources of trouble lie in the world. There is an increasing awareness that security involves far more than questions of land weapons. Moreover, there is also a realisation that the lack of economic, social and political development is the underlying cause of conflict. In only redefining and bringing to fulfillment a renewed vision of development, can we begin to get at the roots of conflict? In the process can be built, enduring foundations for a secure, just and creative era for all humanity. This is the primary mission of the international institutions in the 21st Century. These institutions have helped restrain conflict from escalating to global proportions. The UN peacekeeping forces have prevented renewed resort to armed force where war has been halted.

Today, the realisation is dawning that for human beings around the world, in every land and of every background, the myriad of international institutions under the aegis's of United Nations

is more than **an** instrument of peace: justice and cooperative development among nations. **And** it is this faith in international institutions that **should** keep our tomorrow brighter and hopeful.

16.5 EXERCISES

- 1) What are the major failures of the UN in political field?
- 2) Discuss the highly constructive role of the UN peacekeeping operation.
- 3) Explain major instruments that helped in the resolution of problems of peace and security.
- 4) Discuss the efforts for managing the problem of global disarmament.
- 5) Analyse the role of the World Bank and IMF in the management of global economy.

UNIT 17 INDIA IN THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER

Structure

- 17.1 Introduction
- 17.2 The Concept of World Order
- 17.3 The Old Order and its Characteristics
 - 17.3.1 Cold War
 - 17.3.2 The Third World
- 17.4 Break-up of the Old World Order
- 17.5 The New World Order
 - 17.5.1 Salient Features of the New World Order: The Hegemon
 - 17.5.2 Unilateralism
 - 17.5.3 Discriminatory Regimes
 - 17.5.4 Marginalisation of the UN
 - 17.5.5 Intensifying of Dependency Relations
- 17.6 Implications for India
- 17.7 Summary
- 17.8 Exercises

17.1 INTRODUCTION

After studying the units in Block 3 and 4, you must already be familiar with the changes in international relations that have come about in the last quarter of the 20th Century. Besides the dominance of the G-7 nations, and the US in particular, the rise of the new middle powers like China, South Africa and India, both economically and politically/militarily, has been an important factor in the new situation. The end of the Cold War has given a new dimension to the problem of security. It has also accelerated the process of globalisation and economic integration of the world. Formation of regional groupings of nations like European Community, ASEAN, NAFTA is but one response of the nations to the issues that these changes have raised. However, in considering these details a student of International Relations is likely to get lost and may overlook the larger picture. In other words, he may miss the wood for the trees! Therefore, it is intended to put these changes in the perspective of World Order. Seeing the total picture of international relations would make understanding the particular issues easier. It would also help to clarify or at least help speculate on, the causal factors behind some of the important phenomena in international relations. It will be endeavour of this Unit to draw for you an outline of this picture in the form of World Order.

A developing nation, in particular India, has limited options while facing this larger picture of international order. It has to steer itself through the pulls and pressures brought to bear upon it by other powers, especially the Great Powers, as best as it can in order to achieve its goals: national security, political independence and economic strength. It has to make best possible use of a given situation over which it has little control. It may, while exercising its options, influence to a limited extent the features of the World Order. This would be the case especially if it is successful in mobilising other developing nations in support of its stand on important issues—economic or political. This Unit will seek to define the options available to India and the possible strategies that it can adopt.

Before doing that we will try to discuss the concept of World Order and the structural aspects it involves. Against that background we will try to outline the features of the World Order that characterised the post-Second World War international relations for more than four decades—what we call here the Old World Order (OWO). After a cursory discussion of the factors that brought about a radical change in this, we will try to identify the features of the New World Order (NWO)—its structure and limits. And then, we will turn to the position of India in particular, and the developing nations in general, in this Order. At the end, we will speculate on the possibilities of changes in the New World Order and the forces that could be instrumental in bringing about these changes.

17.2. THE 'CONCEPT OF WORLD ORDER

The term 'order' may be interpreted as an arrangement of things, as against dis-order. It could also mean a particular way of distribution of goods or values among the units—people or nations—such that a pattern or structure emerges. In the context of international relations, the value distributed could be power. The pattern that emerges could be egalitarian where consensual cooperation could be a feature governing relations. It could be hegemonic where domination may be the governing feature or in an oligopolistic structure exploitation may characterise international relations. Or, it could even be a variant of these. These patterns, for their survival and successful operation, would prescribe rules or conditions that are logical. All this assumes that there exists close and frequent interaction between nations on different planes. If nations are isolated, as they were in primitive, ancient or pre-modern times the question of pattern would not arise. To put it simply: such a pattern of relations among nations could be called World Order. The terms *Pax Britannica*, Concert of Europe in some ways reflect this concept. As a result of a rise or decline in the power of nations these patterns may change. The Order is not permanent. Thus, at the end of the Gulf War 1990-91, George Bush Sr., then president of the US, suggested that such a change had occurred and a new order was emerging.

In ancient India, Kautilya put forward the *Mandala* theory, which, to some extent, captures this concept. In this, he conceptualised, on geo-political basis, relations of alliance (*Mitra*), hostility (*Ari*), neutrality (*Udaseena*) between groups of twelve states. In his scheme of things each state was an actual or potential enemy, ally or neutral depending on its geo-political location in relation to the nation-on-the-march (*Vijigishu*) charting its foreign policy. A neighbouring state would be a potential enemy and the enemy's enemy would then be one's friend and so on. However, Kautilya's aim was not so much to theorise about world order as to guide the expansionist state in framing its policy for dominating the *Mandala* of states. Its ultimate aim was to become a *Chakravarti* – an emperor.

Morton Kaplan, in his book, *System and Process in International Politics* postulated six types of hypothetical models based on distribution of power: 1. The Unit Veto System; 2. Balance of Power System; 3. Loose Bi-polar System; 4. Tight Bi-polar System; 5. Universal System; and 6. Hierarchical System. These systems can be arranged as a continuum on the scale of integration from Unit-Veto to hierarchical system. From these he deduced rules for their structure, survival or remaining in equilibrium. Frequent violation of these rules would herald a change in the system. To put it briefly, in a Unit-veto system, each nation would be totally free to accept or reject an obligation and no rule would be valid without its acceptance. In a Balance of Power System, two or more states form alliances to prevent the emergence of a hegemon or a dominant power. In a Bi-polar System, essentially, the nations form two opposing groups or alliances Depending upon the discipline and solidarity within these groups. it would be termed tight or loose Bi-polar Systems. In a Hierarchical System, one nation is pre-dominant

like a Colossus stalking the earth. Universal System is an idealised version of a world government ruling with the aid of international law. These: of course, are ideal types and do not necessarily correspond with ground realities. However, it helps us in understanding the concept and operation of international system. One could describe the post-Second World War situation as a bi-polar one—its nature (solidarity) varying over time, moving from tight to a loose bi-polar system.

37.3 THE OLD WORLD ORDER AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS

The end of the Second World War saw the nations in the world clearly divided into two groups, based on ideology. The capitalist nations or free market economies (including the liberal democratic nations)—US, Western European nations, Australia, New Zealand, and their allies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—were at one end of the pole. To protect themselves from possible aggression—direct or indirect—of the communist nations, they formed defensive alliances. NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS were some of these. In addition to these, the US entered into bilateral security pacts with various nations. In opposition to these, and at the other end of the pole, were the communist nations: The Soviet Union, Peoples' Republic of China and the East European states which were overrun by the Soviet armies in the last phase of the war. They too formed military alliances. The Warsaw Pact between the Soviet Union and the East European nations and the security treaty between Soviet Union and China were the chief examples of these. The leaders of both these blocs were armed with nuclear and conventional weapons and, therefore, balanced each other. Political, economic, communication and cultural ties paralleled the security links between nations within these blocks.

17.3.1 Cold War

What ensued has been aptly described as a Cold War. The communist nations severed their relations with their rivals to such an extent that what Winston Churchill described as an Iron Curtain separated them. The rivalry between the two blocs was intense. Threats, propaganda, ideological diatribes and acts short of war characterised the relations between the nations of the two groups. Fear and suspicion pervaded the atmosphere. Its result was arms race and trade boycott. There was minimum tolerance for dissidence within the bloc. War was prevented only by deterrence or fear of reprisals. The situation was one of *pence at the centre and conflict on the periphery*. That is, while a direct armed conflict between the two blocs was avoided by a kind of negative consensus, each tried to test the preparedness of the other by provoking minor conflicts. Berlin blockade of 1949, Greek-Yugoslav conflict of the early 1940s, Korean War of the 1950s and the Iranian Crisis were examples of such brinkmanship. They were, however, not allowed to grow into larger conflagrations.

17.3.2 The Third World

This picture was complicated by the emergence of the Third World. (It is an ambiguous term, which negatively denotes countries, which are neither communist nor have developed a capitalist economy. More generally, it refers to the former colonies.) A host of the countries in Asia and Africa, at the end of the war, freed themselves from the shackles of colonial rule and emerged as independent 'new nations'. While some of these entered into formal or informal ties with the US bloc (like Malaysia, Ceylon, Pakistan, Philippines) and a few (e.g. Cuba) established military or economic ties with the Soviet Bloc, a majority of these nations preferred to remain non-committed or 'non-aligned'. These nations favoured peaceful co-existence, disarmament (especially nuclear), a *détente*, and toning down of ideological rhetoric. Though a formal bloc

was not organised, and the non-aligned remained more as a movement, there was sufficient coordination among these nations, both within and outside the UN, so as to forge a common agenda for the non-aligned. Anti-imperialism, de-colonisation, economic development, disarmament and multi-lateral (UN) diplomacy were some of the chief themes on this agenda. What is important from the point of view of our subject is that this altered the nature of the World Order somewhat. The existence of a large number of non-aligned nations tended to slacken the bonds holding the nations in each of these two blocs. On the one hand, it tended to shift the focus of the rivalry from the bloc members to this neutral space. Thus, progressively, in the 1960s locations of the conflicts were in the Third World rather than the territories of the members of the blocs (example, Indochina, Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, etc.). This helped reduce the rigour of bloc discipline and turn it into a Loose Bi-polar system. Dissidence on the part of Romania, Albania, China, France helped accomplish this change. Secondly, though unorganised, the non-aligned group of nations could tilt the balance between the two blocs one-way or the other politically, if not militarily.

These new nations whose domestic politics bristled with contradictions—racial, religious, class and ethnic—provided an opportunity for the Cold War rivalry to spill over into this space. Thus on the one hand, Soviet Union and China provided military, political and economic support to one faction; predictably, the Western bloc championed the cause of the other. The existence of the communist parties in some of these nations was a great advantage to the Soviet Union in this struggle (for example, in Malaysia: Indonesia and Philippines). That the former imperial powers, which ruled these colonies, were members of the Western Bloc (Britain, Portugal, Netherlands Belgium, France), was also a factor in its favour. What this meant was that many of these new nations became scenes of proxy wars. Congo, Angola, Namibia, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Yemen are prime examples of these.

To a degree this made world politics predictable and simple. Thus, if the Soviet Union supported one party to a regional or even a domestic conflict (say, India on Kashmir or a Lumumba in Congo) then almost automatically the Western Bloc would come to the help of the other party (Pakistan or Kasavubu in the above examples) and vice-versa. Though this exacerbated the conflict, it also offered scope for preventive diplomacy to insulate the conflict from Great Power rivalry. Thus, the Suez Crisis (1956), the Lebanese conflict (1958), or the Congolese conflict (1960) were sought to be isolated from Great Power politics in seeking their solutions. In some rare instances (e.g. the Indo-Pak conflict 1965) the negative consensus between the super-powers allowed one to assume a mediatory role to pacify the conflict.

Secondly, the bi-polar rivalry allowed the Third World nations to carve out political space for themselves. Leaders of the bloc competed in wooing the Third World nations offering them military/economic aid and laying a premium on the opinions of their leaders. Thus, nations like India, Egypt, or Indonesia used this to their advantage by seeking and obtaining aid from both the Soviet and the US bloc of nations.

The ideological divide between the two blocs offered to the Third World nations, practically, a choice between two models of economic development: centrally planned economy (socialism) or free market economy (capitalism). Some Third World nations (India, Pakistan, Egypt) made a cocktail of the two in the form of mixed economy to suit their conditions. This also meant easy availability of preferential trade or aid/technology options. Many such deals were struck by Third World nations in the 1960s and 1970s.

Finally, the Loose Bi-polar System allowed some political space to the UN. The organisation, which, in the early 1950s, was a gladiatorial arena for the two blocs for trading charges or

scoring points showed tendencies to, in the words of its dynamic UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, become a "constitutional system of international cooperation" rather than remaining as a mere "institutional system of international co-existence". In the 1960s and 1970s, the UN took a number of initiatives like peacekeeping operations, preventive diplomatic missions, technical task forces, UNCTAD, etc. to help small nations shield themselves from the Cold War and stand on their own. In fact, Hammarskjold felt that the UN was primarily 'their' organisation, for the Third World nations, especially the non-aligned. They took full advantage of this in using the UN to pressurise the developed nations in the First and the Second Worlds on questions like de-colonisation and development that were important from their point of view. (See Unit 18 on Right to Self-Determination).

17.4 BREAK-UP OF THE OLD WORLD ORDER

As seen earlier, the World Order was already moving from a Tight Bi-polar to a Loose Bi-polar one in the decades of 1960s and 1970s. However, dramatic changes in the Soviet bloc in the later part of the 1980s brought about a radical change in the world scenario. The Soviet Union collapsed and its bloc disintegrated. Not only did the units of the Soviet federation like Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgisistan, Ukraine, Bylo-Rus become independent nations but members of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe—Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East Germany severed their connections with the bloc and, in fact, many of them have now become members of the NATO! Moreover, Russia itself has conceded the inefficiency of a centrally planned economy and has embraced principles of liberal democracy and free market economy.

It may not be appropriate here to analyse in depth the factors responsible for this event. We will only take a cursory look at some of the factors involved and move on with our discussion. The chief factors responsible for the turn back were undoubtedly the inefficiencies involved in the centrally planned economies and the exploitation of the state by the party bureaucrats. The economy could not keep pace with growing competition in a globalised world. The policies of 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika' merely helped bring out in the open these deficiencies.

In fact, the hold of the ideology in keeping the flock of the communist nations together had already considerably weakened in the 1960s with China, Albania and Romania charting their separate paths. This had further affected the loyalty of communist parties' worldwide to the Soviet Union. The rise of Euro-communism was a case in point.

National identities in East-European communist nations had also caused cracks in the monolith. This was especially true of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This must have had its repercussions within the Soviet federation too. What gave a mortal blow to the Soviet edifice was its misadventure in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. Its army got mired in the guerrilla war and had to bent an ignominious retreat. The break up of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of its bloc was a cumulative effect of all these factors.

17.5 THE NEW WORLD ORDER

What emerged from the debris of the Old World Order is the New World Order hinted by president George Bush Sr. In many ways, the Gulf War (against Iraq) was a marking point in the change. Though Iraq was a recipient of economic and military aid of the Soviet Union and almost an ally, the war was waged by the US with little resistance or protection from Russia. US supremacy was unchallenged.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc implies the emergence of a unipolar world order. The last decade of the 20th Century witnessed the hegemony of the US in military and economic spheres, in trade and technology. Western European nations, Japan, China, India, etc. were left on the margins of this new power structure. Let us try to get together some of the features of this New World Order.

17.5.1 Salient Features of the New World Order: The Hegemon

A salient feature of the New World Order is the nature of the dominance of the hegemon—the US. Strategically, it is the only nation which has worldwide interests and ‘presence’. With 725 military installations outside its territory, of which 17 are fully-fledged bases, US has 1.4 millions active servicemen of whom 250,000 are deployed overseas. It is a necessary actor in all crisis situations, either as a participant, a mediator or a instigator—direct or indirect. The role of the US in the Irish Good Friday Agreements 1998, the Dayton Agreement and Kosovo crisis in Yugoslavia, the East Timor crisis in Indonesia 1999, de-escalation of the Kargil crisis 2000 and the subsequent Indo-Pak crisis, the North Korean crisis 1993-94 and 2002 are some of the prominent examples. In fact, it is the only power maintaining a military presence in all parts of the world. Figures of its defence spending would make this dominance more clear. US defence spending constitutes 36 per cent of world defence spending. US military budget exceeds that of the next 14 biggest defence spenders *combined*. The following table will give you an idea of the disparity in defence spending between US and some other countries:

Defence Spending as per cent of hegemon (hegemon = 100)

Year	US	Britain	Russia	Japan	Germany	China
1950	100	16	107	na	na	na
1985	100	10	109	5	8	10
1996	100	13	26	17	14	13
2000	100	11	20	15	10	14

Source: *Economist* June 29, 2002

To put it in concrete terms, in 2000 US defence spending was \$300bn while that of NATO-Europe was 160 bn and of Russia \$60 bn. The US also accounts for 40 per cent defence production worldwide.


This is paralleled by the US dominance in the economic realm. The US has the status of the largest economy of the world—home to the largest number of the MNCs.


Economic Dominance: GDP as per cent of the Hegemon (hegemon = 100)

Year	US	Britain	Russia	Japan	Germany	China
1950	100	24	35	11	15	na
1985	100	17	39	38	21	46
1997	100	15	9	38	22	53
2000	100	15	13	35	21	52

Source: *Economist* June 29, 2002

Measurements of Power





US: 40.6 per cent

Its share in the world trade is the largest (US accounts for 15.4 per cent of world exports compared to European Union's share of 18.4 per cent). and it, more often than not, occupies the position of largest trading partner for most of the nations. It is also important to note that for most of the technological innovations in sciences, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, information technology, etc. the US is the starting point. It dominates world financial bodies like the World Bank, the IMF or the WTO.

17.5.2 Unilateralism

This dominance inevitably culminates in unilateralism and discriminatory regimes. It is but natural for the hegemon to rank its interests first and to think that what is good for the US is good for the world too. Many of the actions of the US in this new role illustrate this point. The US opted out of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which was an essential ingredient of the structure of nuclear deterrence and launched a programme of nuclear missile defence. Despite a worldwide consensus, it rejected the Kyoto Protocol 1997 on environmental protection. The Protocol sought to lay down a timetable for regulating CFC gases emissions to prevent global warming. It not only refused to accept the instrument setting up the International Criminal Court but sought and obtained from the UN an immunity to its peace-keepers from prosecutions for war crimes. The US Senate rejected to ratify in 1999 the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The US also has pulled out of the Verification Protocol for Biological Weapons Convention. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, New York, it declared a war on terror and attacked Afghanistan to root out the Taliban regime there, UN being merely a witness to the happenings. Subsequent to the war, it has detained thousands of prisoners of war in disregard of Geneva Conventions. In 2002 it brought pressure to bear upon the UN Security Council to pass resolution 1441 warning Iraq to destroy weapons of mass destruction or face 'serious consequences'.

In the economic sphere, it imposed 'safeguard tariffs' on steel (March 2002) to protect its steel industry and violated the spirit of the Uruguay Protocol by dispensing a huge subsidy (about \$82 bn over 10 years) to its farmers. The US persists with its Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974 empowering its president to impose temporary trade barriers to protect US interests. The disagreements between domestic trade laws and the WTO have been a great impediment for nations trading with the US. Such unilateralism on the part of the hegemon is a chief characteristic of the New World Order.

17.5.3 Discriminatory Regimes

Being the hub of the capitalist world, the US is the prime mover behind many of the discriminatory regimes in the economic field. Its chief instruments for these are the IMF, World Bank and the WTO. Through the IMF, the Third World nations are 'persuaded' to adopt policies of structural adjustment favouring liberalisation, privatisation and free trade. This was clearly evident during the Southeast Asian nations economic crisis of 1997-98 when IMF relief was made conditional on the adoption of such policies. It was also a feature of the negotiations preceding the adoption of the Uruguay Protocol. The US has sought to consolidate its position in the world trade by establishing NAFTA, and free trade agreements with Latin American, Southern African and South-east Asian Nations. Though these regimes stand by free trade, actually, by linking trade with conditionalities like child labour, pollution norms and subsidies pre-eminence of the interests of the G7 nations (and US) is insured. The Uruguay Protocol by opening the field for investment, intellectual property rights and services insures the predominance of the capitalist concerns in the Third World.

17.5.4 Marginalisation of the UN

Another feature of the New World Order is the marginalisation of the UN. In the Old World Order the UN performed three important functions in international politics:

First, as defined by the Charter, it was 'Centre for Harmonisation of Relations' among nations. That is, it was one of the places where negotiations between nations took place—on the sidelines or through the fora of the UN bodies. These exchanges, especially, involving small powers, were fruitful in coordinating their stand and evolving a common approach on questions dealing with the developed nations. Many of the initiatives—e.g. the one on the study of the MNCs, or development—were the result of such collaboration.

Secondly, UN fora were used by the Third World nations to pressurise the Great Powers to modify their policies. Thus, the resolutions passed on de-colonisation or racial equality was quite successful in moulding world public opinion. Not all such attempts were equally successful. Its resolutions urging the great powers to take steps towards nuclear disarmament were given scant respect. But the attempts were significant. Thirdly, the UN was an institution to legitimise international behaviour, for example, in the field of human rights, and the use of force in international relations. In particular, its attempts at preventive diplomacy like Observation Groups and Peacekeeping Forces opened a new area for conflict resolutions.

In the New World Order, this role of the UN seems to be shrinking, if not getting obliterated. The UN now is, more and more, becoming an instrument of US foreign policy. The US has often threatened to withhold its contributions unless the UN followed its advice in administrative matters. And as in the early years of the UN (in the 1950s), the Security Council has been used to back up the steps already taken by the US (e.g. in Iraq).

17.5.5 Intensifying of Dependency Relations

Lastly, a feature of the New World Order, especially in the economic fields, is the intensifying of the dependency of the Third World nations in relation to the G7 nations in general, and the US in particular. The absence of the countervailing bloc (the Soviet Union) has meant that these nations have little room for manoeuvre. The volume of aid to Third World nations has dwindled to a trickle. Policies of free trade, and opening of their economies for investment and services has forced them to enter un-equal competition and has resulted in supremacy of the MNCs and

capitalist conglomerates. Thus, any weakening of the US or the Western economies has quite an adverse effect on the livelihood of the peoples of the Third World causing recession, unemployment and debt traps for these nations.

The question all this raises is, can the hegemony of the US be termed absolute, or are there any relieving features to this dark picture?

The US has a legacy of liberalism, individual freedoms and democracy. Even accepting that in international relations national interest rather than ideology is the deciding factor, the fact remains that the government needs to justify its actions within the framework of liberalism. Very often US self interest is benign when it favours free trade, free movement of men and money or democracy and rule of law. It has a constitution, which sets limits to absolute power of any one institution within the country. Though painfully slow, on many occasions, liberal values have triumphed—witness the end of McCarthyism or the anti-Vietnam war campaign. Further, the US being a land of immigrants, it offers scope for lobbies and groups championing causes not only in domestic politics but also in foreign policy matters. The Jews, the Irish and the Hispanics have made their presence felt in this area.

A more important factor is the variety of interests competing with each other in the US. It would be an over-simplification to argue that US policies are under the thumb of one or even one class of interests. Thus for example, the oil interests check the Jewish interest group. This open competition among interests makes for checks and balances which acts as a moderating influence on its hegemonic ambitions.

In a way its allies outside parallel these competing interests within the nation. Even if the Soviet Union is no more, the rise of the European Union, and Japan as second largest economies and a fast growing China means that the US does not have a total free way. It cannot always take its West-European allies for granted and has to rely on persuasion rather than coercion to make them fall in line. If European Union continues on its integrationist course and China on its reformist one they could soon prove counterweights to US hegemony. The uni-polar system could give way to a multi-polar one. Again, the US influence has limits when it affects the vital interests of even small powers. Thus, it has not proved effective in shaping the policies of parties to the Israel-Palestine or the Kashmir conflicts.

17.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Let us look at the implications for India of this New World Order. Against that background, we will see the options available to India in this new situation for safeguarding its interests.

First, the absence of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War makes the policy of non-alignment to that extent irrelevant. It can now only mean non-attachment to the remaining bloc—militarily and economically—not that in the changed circumstances, the US would be overly eager to have such entanglements. Thus, non-alignment remains only a slogan, a shell without substance. Secondly, the changed situation implies that there is so much less room for manoeuvre. Russia is in no position to offer economic aid and its political support on questions of India's national interest can only be symbolic—except where its use of the veto power in the UN is involved. India has to make space for itself based on its economic and military strength rather than its diplomatic initiatives. In fact, this attenuated role for India was already evident in the negotiating round preceding the signing of the GATT accords or the Kyoto Protocols. Adjusting to the new situation, India in the late 1990s has sought US attention, if not intervention, in its bilateral conflicts with Pakistan. Internally too, India has distanced itself from its earlier socialistic

policies and is downplaying the role of the state in industry and business. With the increasing irrelevance of the non-aligned, India is hard put to maintain its leadership role among the developing countries (Third World nations).

Three options appear to be available for India in this scenario:

- 1) India can choose to become a client state of the US: It can opt to follow the Western economic model of development increasing consumerism and following an elitist model of society based on inequalities. In such a model the role of the state in industry and business is minimal with greater scope for private enterprise. Internationally this would imply following a path of dependent development, that is, seeking foreign investment, and providing goods and services needed by the Western Nations. Politically, it may support, or at least acquiesce in, US policies of dominance, especially in central and East Asia. It could mean abandoning its long-standing position on nuclear arms and embarking on a policy of collaboration in military matters. Since 1990, India seems to be leaning towards this soft option.
- 2) A hard option for India would be to consistently follow a path of self-reliance. This could mean abandonment of the ambition of increasing its military and economic strength in order to support its claim to be a world power. Then it can stick to its high moral ground of nuclear disarmament and peaceful co-existence. This would entail organising its society on the basis of decentralisation of power, ethnic pluralism and an egalitarian approach to development. In such a model, the economy will have to respond to the needs of the masses rather than those of the elites. .
- 3) These two are extreme positions. Of course, India can combine elements of these two options picking and choosing paths to suit its peculiar circumstances. For example, it may offer stiff resistance to the pressures brought to bear upon it where its vital interests are involved (e.g. Kashmir, security from a nuclear threat, terrorism, etc.). It can try to build a support base for itself among the Third World Nations who face problems similar to that of India in matters of trade, environment issues, security concerns like terrorism etc. Lastly, it can try to influence the hegemon 'from inside' (through NRIs, MNCs, interest groups) as well as 'from outside' (in cooperation with other nations).

17.7 SUMMARY

No World Order is permanent. International politics is in a constant flux. Therefore, it is conceivable that the New World order could undergo change. The factors that helped its rise, and that have ensured its maintenance, change. According to an analyst, these causes of change can be grouped into four categories: changes in power relationships, in technology, in attitudes and values, and changes within major actors.

Thus, a change in the distribution of power, e.g. military or economic, could drastically affect the World Order. As remarked earlier in this Unit, if European Union emerges as an integrated unit with a strong leadership, or if China/India reforms its economy and polity then it could pose a major challenge to the hegemony of the US, especially if its world-view differs from that of the US. The hegemonic unipolar World Order, then, could be replaced by a tri-polar, if not a multi-polar, World Order,

Nuclear technology was the principal force that brought about a change in the world system after Second World War. However, comparable changes are occurring in the fields of

communications and biotechnology. The ways in which these technological changes could affect International Relations are yet to unravel. Already, new information technology is effecting changes in world economic activity, which only a few decades back would have been inconceivable.

Technological changes and their effects are sharp and dramatic to view. Changes in norms of behaviour or values are slow to perceive, almost imperceptible. Yet, they can bring about long lasting changes. For example, aversion to violence and war could result from catastrophic decisions to use weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical or biological. Trade, travel and television are important instruments in bringing about attitudinal changes.

We saw that changes that occurred in the domestic sphere of the Soviet Union had far-reaching international repercussions. These were totally unimaginable in the 1970s or even the early 1980s. A similar implosion within, say, China or the south Asian sub-continent could change the whole political geography. A more realistic and immediate factor is the turmoil within the Islamic world. Iran, Palestine, and Pakistan are its flesh-points. These would be subject matter for other units.

17.8 EXERCISES

- 1) Explain the concept and salient features of the old world order.
- 2) Write a brief note on the various characteristics of the New World Order
- 3) Write a note on the implications of the New World Order for the developing countries like India.
- 4) Write an essay on the increasing dependency relations in the New World Order

UNIT 18 RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Structure

- 18.1 Introduction
- 18.2 Self-determination and Nationalism
- 18.3 External Self-determination and Decolonisation
 - 18.3.1 UN and Self-determination
 - 18.3.2 De-colonisation in Asia and Africa
 - 18.3.3 Racial Equality and Self-determination
- 18.4 Self-determination and non-colonial Societies
 - 18.4.1 Self-determination as Applied to Parts of Colonial Empires/States
 - 18.4.2 Self-determination and Multi-ethnic Societies: Internal Self-determination
- 18.5 Summary
- 18.6 Exercises

18.1 INTRODUCTION

In some of the earlier units in Book I, you have studied the important characteristics of the Third World countries now addressed as ‘developing countries’. A major part of the Third World was once a part of the colonial empires of Western European countries—chiefly Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Netherlands. Nationalist movements in these colonies, in the 20th Century, successfully made use of the slogan of the self-determination to win freedom from their European masters. But much before that, in Europe, diverse peoples, parts of old empires—the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian—claimed the right of self-determination to set up independent nations.

In this unit, in the first part, we will review briefly this historical application of the concept. In the latter part, we will analyse the difficulties and contradictions involved in interpreting this concept and the way in which international community and the UN have tackled this problem in its application to colonial and non-colonial societies. On the basis of this discussion, we will try to evaluate the utility of the concept, especially against the background of changing international relations.

18.2 SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONALISM

The *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* interprets self-determination to mean: “all people of one nationality are entitled to dwell together in order to govern themselves in a state of their own.”. Therefore, it is clear that this concept is anchored in that of nationalism. Nationalism implies a subjective feeling on the part of a community of its separate identity and an urge or aspiration to be self-governing or independent. The identity could be based on language, religion, race or a shared historical experience, which help in forging common emotional bonds amongst the people. The basis may be imaginary but the bonds are real. Hence, Anderson calls a nation an “imagined community”. In the late 19th and early 20th Century, these aspirations on the part

of a number of communities in Central Europe created a great deal of unrest and weakened the fabric of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires. This factor was, at least partly, responsible for the outbreak of the First World War. The promise of self-determination after the conclusion of the war and the Fourteen Points of US president Woodrow Wilson were addressed to this problem. At the end of the War, the Allied statesmen realised that the problem was more complicated than what the principle suggested. Even though as a result of the application of this principle a number of communities attained nationhood-Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia-it did not solve the problem. The division of Central and Eastern Europe into independent nation states still left a substantial number of people within the boundaries of these new nations who had deeper emotional, racial or linguistic ties with the neighbouring nation states. Thus, for example, Germans in Czechoslovakia, Russians in the Baltic States all resented their fate being linked with, what for them was, an alien rule. To alleviate, if not to solve this situation, a convention on the rights of ethnic minorities in these states had to be agreed upon while drafting the Covenant of the League of Nations. The fact of the matter is that, short of mass transfer of population, which today would be called 'ethnic cleansing', no clear division of people could be effected which would satisfy all sections of people. This problem has continued to haunt the statesmen right up to the 21st Century. The recent opting out of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia, from Yugoslavia and the split of Czechoslovakia would testify to this. As far as Europe is concerned, this is not the end of the story. The question of Chechnya, Basque, Cyprus, Northern Ireland still remain unresolved-and many of the potential ones remain under the surface. You will read more on this later in this unit.

18.3 EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND DE-COLONISATION

In spite of the promise implied in the Fourteen Points of president Wilson, after the First World War, the Principle of Self-determination was not applied to the peoples within the colonial empires-the British, French, Dutch and Portuguese-in Asia and Africa. The Covenant of the League of the Nations only said, members agreed to "undertake to secure just treatment of native inhabitants under their control" (Art 23.b). In fact, parts of the defeated empires in Asia and Africa were distributed among the Allies to be governed as 'Mandates' under the League of Nations system. The denial of right of Self-determination came as a deep disappointment to the colonial people. In fact, many of their leaders considered it a betrayal for, they had offered full-fledged cooperation to their colonial masters during the War on the premise that on its successful conclusion they would be rewarded with substantial, if not full-fledged, self-government. Therefore, in India in particular, it led to mass movements and non-cooperation with the rulers. This continued even during the Second World War.

During the Second World War, much before the formation of the UN, the Principle of Self-determination found an oblique reference in the Atlantic Charter issued by British prime minister Winston Churchill and US president Franklin D. Roosevelt, which laid down the objectives of the Allies. This was felt necessary to win the sympathy and cooperation of the people in the colonies. It said, the US and UK "respect the right of the people to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." (Later Churchill clarified that he had in mind the people attacked by the Nazis). The ambiguity in the declaration reflected the resistance to the concept offered by the Western European imperialists, chief of them being Britain and France.

18.3.1 UN and Self-determination

At the time of the drafting of the UN Charter, the founding fathers were obviously more concerned with peace and security, sanctity of the territorial integrity of the nations rather than the question of Self-determination. These concerns precede the mention of the Self-determination in the Charter. The latter finds mention only at two places in the Charter. One of the purposes of the UN mentioned is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and Self-determination of peoples”. (Art 1.2) It also finds mention as a principle on which the promotion of social and economic conditions and rights of people should be based. (Art. 55) It is now agreed that the term ‘people’ here refers to the people who were subjected to colonial domination of the salt-water variety. In a broader context the Charter makes provisions in Chapters XII, XIII and XI for Trusteeship Council and Non-self governing Territories. The mandates under the League of Nations along with territories/colonies of the enemy nations were included as Trusts in the charge of Administering Authorities, supervised by the Trusteeship Council. Its aim was to promote political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants and their progressive development towards self-government and independence. The Trusteeship Council had powers to receive petitions from inhabitants, reports of the Administering Authority, of conducting investigations and reporting to the General Assembly. Of the ten trust territories in 1950, all but two had become free by 1970.

Chapter XI of the Charter was a declaration on colonies, euphemistically called Non-self governing Territories. Under this, the member nations who had responsibilities for the colonies (except Portugal) committed to “accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost...the wellbeing of the inhabitants” and to develop self-government and free political institutions and provide information on economic, social and educational conditions to the UN. The UN listed 74 such territories in 1946. A regime to monitor the progress towards the goal of self-government was devised by the UN in the form of a committee on self-governing territories. The imperial power in Europe, in particular France, and Portugal followed a strategy of treating their outlying colonies (Algeria and Goa for example) as integral parts of their nations. They settled their nationals in those territories who along with the natives had representation in their legislatures. Thus technically the natives were not ‘subjects’ but were ‘free’ nationals of the metropolitan states. Any attempt by the UN to consider the question of these territories was opposed on the ground that it contravened Art 2(7) of the Charter.

18.3.2 De-colonisation in Asia and Africa

The omission in the Charter regarding Self-determination to the colonies was redressed to a certain extent when issues relating to freedom of colonies came up for consideration before the organs of the UN, especially the General Assembly. It is significant to note that out of the 3 founding members of the UN, 27 had some experience of colonialism. Therefore, it is not surprising that right from its inception the General Assembly of the UN took a stand favouring de-colonisation. The repeated resolutions of the General Assembly, passed with over-whelming majorities, lent an air of legitimacy to the principle of de-colonisation and by implication that of Self-determination. Resolution 1514 of the General Assembly passed in 1960 is a case in point. It was passed without dissent. It said: “All Peoples have the right to Self-determination, by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” It further appointed a special committee to examine the implementation of Resolution 1514. This pressure in the General Assembly was maintained in the 1960s and 1970s. The Non-aligned nations both inside and outside the UN continued their support to the process of de-colonisation. Thus the Bandung Conference of the Non-aligned

declared "its full support for the principle of Self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the Charter of the UN" and its resolutions. Thanks to the political support of the non-aligned, military and economic support to the insurgents extended by the Soviet Union and the grudging sympathy of the United States, most of the African colonies attained their independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus the membership of the UN increased from 50 in the first years of its existence to 170 at the end of the Cold War.

18.3.3 Racial Equality and Self-determination

If Trusteeship system and de-colonisation (freedom of non-self governing territories) were two elements of the UN activity in the area of Self-determination, the third element concerning this concept has to do with racial equality in South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Though South Africa was independent and was, in fact, a member nation of the UN, its policy of *Apartheid* meant that a white racial minority ruled it and the vast majority of the coloured people did not participate in the government. India was the first to raise this question in the UN. This was sought to be countered on the grounds of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the UN charter, which precluded UN interference in the internal affairs of a country. Notwithstanding these objections, the question was discussed and more than 60 resolutions condemning the policy passed, year after year in the UN General Assembly between 1946 and 1960. As early as 1962, the General Assembly passed a resolution recommending that its members break diplomatic relations and communications with South Africa and boycott its exports. Not satisfied with the Security Council imposing arms embargo against South Africa in 1965, the General Assembly urged the Security Council to use its powers under Chapter VII and impose sanctions against the country. Outside the UN, the Commonwealth of Nations took up the issue in the 1980s and organised a boycott of South Africa. Under the pressure of world public opinion, the UN Security Council took cognizance of the matter and imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions. Within the country, the African National Congress increased its level of resistance. Buckling under the combined pressure the white regime had to capitulate and accept democracy based on one-man-one-vote principle.

The situation in Rhodesia was similar to South Africa. The British colony of Rhodesia and Nyasa was dissolved in 1963 and Southern Rhodesia was made a self-governing colony. Its Constitution of 1961 provided for a weighted voting system which, in effect, resulted in a white minority government. The UN General Assembly in 1962 called for its suspension. The UN and the Commonwealth of Nations held Britain responsible for its transition to independence. Therefore, when the minority government of Ian Smith issued a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), it was not recognised by the international community. The UN Security Council imposed mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII and an oil embargo in 1968. All this finally led to its independence under the name of Zimbabwe and a democratically elected government. In both these cases racial discrimination was rejected and the right of the citizen to equal membership of nationhood was reiterated.

These cases were not directly related to the principle of Self-determination in the sense of assertion of national identity. However, the fact that a majority of the people was not considered a part of the identity and had to wage a relentless struggle to have a share in it, has relevance to the principle. The case of Southern Rhodesia makes this more explicit.

18.4 SELF-DETERMINATION AND NON-COLONIAL SOCIETIES

Freedom to the colonies does not mark the end of the role of the principle of Self-determination.

It remained relevant though somewhat problematic, in two types of cases to which we will turn now in this section. One of the questions this raises is, what should be the unit to which it would be appropriate to apply the principle? And, what is more, should a neighbouring state/nation, of which it once was a part, have any justifiable claims in the matter?

18.4.1 Self-determination as Applied to Parts of Colonial Empires/ States

India's former defence minister, V. K. Krishna Menon once said that 'colonialism is permanent aggression.' Therefore, when in the early 1960s India too resorted to military action to free Goa from Portuguese rule and annexed it, this was claimed as an unfinished business of decolonisation. Goa, then, was under Portuguese rule. The UN did not endorse India's action but nor did it uphold Portugal's claims to the territory. Similar were the claims of Indonesia to West Irian. Indonesia initially rejected a call for holding a plebiscite there on the grounds of its historical claims to the area. An agreement with the concerned parties was patched up and the territory was handed over to Indonesia in 1962. The UN later, through its presence there, confirmed that this had the approval of the local people.

There are many cases, more complex than these, a few of them a legacy of colonialism. The attitude of the international community in general, and the UN in particular, to these can at best be described as ambivalent. During the empire-building days, Britain had conquered Falkland Islands off the coast of Argentina. Though the British colonies of British Guyana and the islands of West Indies were granted freedom, Falkland continued to be a colony. The Island's meagre population was of mixed origin. Compared to the autocratic regimes of Argentina, it possibly preferred its administrative links with Britain thousands of miles away. When Argentina tried to force the issue in the 1980s and forcibly tried to capture the island, war with Britain ensued. Argentina was defeated and the situation has continued as it was since then. Should Falkland be considered a part of Argentina despite the wishes of the local people? The UN could not give a clear answer in 1982.

Another is the case of the Rock of Gibraltar. The Rock is geographically a part of Spain but was conquered by Britain in 1730. Spain claims it as a part of its nation. However, its population of a few thousand prefers the British rule. Recently, in November 2002 in an unofficial referendum 99 per cent of them rejected the claims of Spanish sovereignty.

The other similar cases need to be mentioned in this context. Before the 20th Century, Ireland was a part of Britain. While the Irish are of Catholic religion, a majority of people of Northern Ireland are Protestant-most of them of British descent settled there. After a prolonged struggle by the Irish for independence in the 19th Century, Home Rule followed by independence was granted to Ireland in the early 20th Century. However, the northern part of the island, because of its Protestant majority, was retained and, continued to be a part of the United Kingdom. For a long time Ireland laid claims to this part because of its historical, geographical and cultural links to the island. The Protestant majority of the northern part contested this. The Catholic minority of the northern part organised Irish Republican Army and waged a militant struggle for its union with the Republic of Ireland. Its political arm is Sinn Fein. The British refused to concede any role to the UN in the matter. A compromise of sorts was arrived at in 1998 called Good Friday Agreement. The Agreement gives autonomy to Northern Ireland, a share in the political power to the Catholic minority and its representative Sinn Fein. It also makes a connection between the North and the South of Ireland but the question of the union with Ireland is put on hold.

In East Asia, the island of Taiwan (Formosa) was part of the Republic of China before the

Second World War. After the 1949 Communist Revolution, the Nationalist Party took refuge in the island. Protected by the US navy, the island has remained separate from the mainland and was governed by the Nationalist party. Its democratically elected government seems to cherish this separation. Because of the liberal values, economic prosperity and higher standard of living that it brings with it, its population possibly wishes to maintain this separation. As against this, the People's Republic of China (on the mainland) claims Taiwan as an inseparable part of its nation. At present the government of Taiwan is recognised and has diplomatic relations with 30 nations.

The questions that these cases raise are, should Self-determination have reference only to the wishes of the inhabitants of a particular area or should its historical, geographical and cultural links to the neighbouring country be also considered relevant? This becomes all the more important when this has a colonial legacy. For, on many occasions the colonial rulers for strategic or economic reasons had an interest in keeping the part separate, or foster its distinctiveness. Would it be justifiable to correct the historical wrong irrespective of the wishes of the people of the area? And should this be considered a part of the wider process of decolonisation?

18.4.2 Self-determination and Multi-Ethnic Societies: Internal Self-determination

The concept of Self-determination, however, is not confined to colonies or to colonialism. It has contemporary relevance too. As in Europe, to which a reference was made in Section 18.2 of this unit, there are many states today, which include within them substantial sections of people who aspire to have an independent national status. Thus, according to a study, in the post-Cold War period, there have been more than 50 armed state formation conflicts, some beginning before the end of the Cold War. Many of these were in Europe. Thirteen of these have reached some kind of settlement. Some of these have found expression in the UN. Again, the response of the international community and the UN has been inconsistent. Let us turn our attention to some of these cases and analyse the factors involved in the application of the principle of Self-determination.

Broadly the cases fall into two categories: a) Break up of (or failed) states; and b) former colonies or failed cases of nation building.

- a) We noted in Section 18.2 of this unit that the term nation-hood, and the factors that go into determining one, are highly ambiguous and varying. It being a subjective feeling, nation-hood like any other form of loyalty, is a matter of degree. Thus, some nations may be closely knit while some others may be prone to disintegrative forces. Where the factors of dissonance (race, language, religion, history, economic conditions etc.) in relation to the national identity have geographical bases i.e. if they are concentrated in a geographical area, then it becomes a potential case for a claim to 'national Self-determination'. If we consider this with the fact that most nations are heterogeneous, we would realise the importance of the phenomenon. According to a study of 132 of the contemporary states, in 31 states (i.e. 23.5 per cent) the largest ethnic group was only 50 to 74 per cent of the population. In 39 cases (i.e. 29.5 per cent) the largest group failed to account for even half of the population. Therefore, it is no wonder that fissiparous tendencies are widespread.

We also noted that 'national consciousness' is mainly a *subjective* feeling. This means that a regionally concentrated religious/linguistic/ethnic minority may *perceive* that it is being discriminated against. Such a perception and the resulting alienation can result in a call for national Self-

determination. What is more, the feeling of identity may vary in intensity and time. It may also depend on the context. To illustrate the point, the ethnically divergent population of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo always had greater affinity to Albania. But it was only the repressive policy of Slobodan Milosovic and the imminent break up of the federation that brought out the discontent into the open. The open hostility of the neighbouring nations and the NATO to the Serbian regime gave it greater encouragement to use militant means to achieve its aims.

Thus, the fissiparous forces may remain latent, under the surface and could become active given the right opportunity. In Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union/Yugoslavia not only led to the complete independence of its federating states but also led to militant struggles within some of these states by ethnic identities for independence. Prominent among these are Chechnya in Russia and Kosovo in Yugoslavia.

The militant struggle of the Basque province in Spain is also worth mentioning in this context. The following table would give some idea of the on-going struggles and the ones, which have met with success in Europe.

Table 18.1

Country	Status	Result
UK-Northern Ireland	1998 Good Friday Agreement	Autonomy
Spain-Basque Province	Continuing	—
Czech-Slovakia	1991 forming of two independent nations	Independence
Yugoslavia-Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia	1994 Dayton Agreements	Independence
Yugoslavia-Kosovo	Continuing	Autonomy or Independence
Russia-Chechnya	Continuing	
Cyprus	Negotiations under UN auspices continuing	<i>de facto</i> partition at present

In all the above cases where some settlement was reached in the form of independence or autonomy, international community/UN had intervened in forms ranging from mediation (UK-Northern Ireland, by US) to the use of peace keeping forces (Bosnia- Herzegovina by NATO) or the use of force (Kosovo by NATO).

18.4.2 Self-determination and Multi-Ethnic Societies: Internal Self-determination

Most of the colonies and their boundaries were accidents of history, determined by the timing, and the process of their acquisition by the imperial powers. Therefore, apart from the legacy of the colonial rule, there was hardly anything common to mark their people. In most cases, their population was diverse in terms of religion/language or ethnicity. After Independence, when the uniting factor of anti-colonialism had worn off, there was hardly a bond strong enough to keep the people together. On the contrary, competition for economic resources, education, and

employment-what Myron Weiner calls “Politics of Scarcity”-brought in the open the dividing lines in the society. Where the new nation had adopted democratic form of government, party politics found the primordial loyalties of language, religion, etc. as convenient bases to build their organisations. These further sharpened the edges of the dividing lines. Where these lines coincided, especially with regional boundaries, the call for autonomy was natural. The response of the dominant group in the country was not always sympathetic. In fact such calls were looked upon with suspicions as evidence of treason. The groups were dubbed unpatriotic forgetting that the *State* had yet to emerge as a *nation*. Repression following turning the struggle militant. The accusations of treason became a self-fulfilling prophecy. If a struggle for freedom from colonial rule is called ‘external Self-determination’ then the struggle for separation may be called ‘internal Self-determination’. As this concept is related to nationalism or nation building, its application to cases in Europe was noted in the previous part. While it is not possible to describe its application to all the Third World-former colonies-here, as illustration only two cases are taken up briefly for discussion. However, Table 18.2 will give an idea of the importance of the problem in the Third World.

Table 18.2

Nation	Area Seeking autonomy/ independence	Status
Indonesia	Aceh	Low key struggle
Philippines	Mindanao	Militant struggle
Sri Lanka	Tamil North	Militant struggle/ negotiations
Iran-Iraq-Turkey	Kurds	Militant struggle in Turkey suspended de facto separation in Iraq
Nigeria	Biafra	Autonomy
Myanmar	Kachin-Karen Tribal belt	Low key militant struggle
China	Tibet	Peaceful struggle
India	North-eastern tribal	Low key insurgency
Ethiopia	Eritrea	Independence
Indonesia	East Timor	Independence

(The above list is not exhaustive. It excludes cases where an area is disputed between two nations)

As remarked earlier, in many of these areas, struggles at different levels are continuing. Some are movements for autonomy or for political identity, which, if not satisfied, may transform themselves into demands for Self-determination. Two cases will illustrate this point:

- a) **Emergence of Bangladesh:** Based on the fears of Hindu domination, provinces of British India with Muslim majority opted in 1947 to form a separate state, Pakistan. Its two parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan (East Bengal) were not contiguous. They also were divided by factors of language, culture and economy. After independence, within a brief period, the country passed under the rule of a coalition of military and bureaucracy. Though the East

Pakistan had half the population of the country, it was grossly under-represented in both of these, more so in the military. Therefore, after the 1965 Indo-Pak War, East Pakistan pressed for greater autonomy. The Awami League under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman carried on a peaceful mass movement for the purpose. In the elections in 1970, his party swept the polls and secured a majority in the National Assembly. However, the West Pakistani political and military elite did not allow it to assume power and unleashed a reign of terror and repression in East Pakistan. The struggle turned into a military conflict when Awami League organised its military wing, the Mukti Bahini and sought India's help. In the ensuing Indo-Pak war, Pakistan was defeated and East Pakistan decided to become independent as Bangladesh in 1971. It was remarkable that, though the struggle had unofficial sympathy of international community, it could get material help only from India. After its defeat, Pakistan accepted the separation and Bangladesh was accorded recognition by the international community and the UN.

- b) **Sri Lanka and the LTTE:** Sri Lanka, then known as Ceylon, was granted independence by the British along with India and Pakistan. The population of the country was predominantly Buddhist and Sinhalese speaking (Buddhist 63 per cent, Hindus 23 per cent, Christians 9 per cent and Muslims 7 per cent). Its significant minority of Hindus and Muslims (all Tamil speaking) settled in the northern and eastern parts of the Island. To quote Marshall Singer, a student of Ceylonese politics, "the ethnic groups that inhabit Ceylon have never shared a common identity-except as subjects of the British Empire. In all of Ceylon's history no Ceylonese nation has existed, except perhaps during the period of agitation for the political independence of the "State" of Ceylon....One that foreign enemy was gone. There was nothing to bind the diverse groups living on the island." In 1965, when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party under SWRD Bandaranaik came to power it followed a policy of declaring Buddhism as the state religion and Sinhalese, the official language.

This was interpreted as discrimination against the Tamil speaking Hindu minority. Both the mainstream ruling parties-UNP and SLFP, thwarted their successive demands for autonomy to the Northern and Eastern provinces, their union and for a federation. When the movement by the Tamils in the North was sought to be suppressed, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) took to insurgency. It now sought independence for the Tamil provinces for the North and the East. An agreement in 1987 resulted through the mediation of the then Indian prime minister. It involved an Indian peacekeeping force and negotiations for autonomy. However, this failed to bring peace or accord and the bloodletting continued. Finally, through the mediation of Norway, a ceasefire was agreed to in 2001-02 to be followed by negotiations.

In many of the areas listed in the table 18.2 and the above two cases different levels of struggle-some militant, some peaceful-had occurred. These movements for political autonomy or the political identity, if not satisfied, may transform themselves into demands for self-determination. In fact, this has already happened in some. Thus, East Timor, which was part of Indonesia, Bangladesh, a part of Pakistan, and Eritrea of Ethiopia, have gained their independence in the last few decades.

18.5 SUMMARY

The discussion of the concept of the right to Self-determination brings out certain features in the context of international relations and raises certain questions:

1. It is obvious that the concept, along with that of nationalism played a significant role in the

process of de-colonisation. In the later part of the 20th Century, holding on to empires had become un-economical. Possibly, the realisation that the economic benefits could be reaped through other means-like unequal trade, industrial and military domination, the use of ideas and world media-could have been at the back of this realisation. But the role of the liberal ideas of democracy and equality, education and the process of self-realisation worldwide (both among the colonisers and the colonials) should not be underestimated. Ideas and ideologies have no boundaries and wield their influence in many ways. It was these forces, which expressed themselves through the UN and through movements such as the Non-aligned and the African National Congress.

A second factor that helped to accelerate this process of de-colonisation and Self-determination was the helping hand lent by the Soviet Union. The threat of the spread of communism among the dependent people forced the Western powers and the United States to support/accept the rise of new nations in Asia and Africa.

2. The concept of Self-determination makes no provision for identifying the bases for defining the territorial limits. This has resulted in conflicts between claims and counter-claims. The question as to what should be the unit for the application of the principle of Self-determination remains unanswered. If small territorial limits are accepted for recognition of a national identity it may lead to economically non-viable states, which then become objects of economic exploitation and strategic manipulation for the Great Powers. While doing this one also has to weigh in the claims of the wider societies based on historical, strategic and economic factors. They cannot be ruled out as totally irrelevant. The application of the principle in the context of de-colonisation is called ‘external Self-determination’.
3. It is the application of the principle of Self-determination within multi-cultural societies that is most complex. This, we called internal Self-determination. State boundaries do not coincide with the limits of national self-consciousness. It is evident that in such societies, where there persists a self-perceived feeling of being discriminated against, of being exploited, a sense of alienation sets in. It provides a fertile ground for the spread of identity-based movements. Language, religion, race, culture, or any other factor then can become a rallying point for such an identity. What is more, identities may vary in intensity over time and the context. Just as a relatively innocuous identity today may grow into a full-fledged nationalist movement demanding its right of Self-determination in the future, such a movement may also dissipate over a period of time if met with timely recognition and steps to assuage the feelings of hurt.

Thus, mechanisms like granting autonomy, conceding demands relating to identity symbols often can satisfy the legitimate aspirations. The way the UK has dealt with the Scotch/Welsh identity demands should hold a lesson in this context. Another mechanism, fruitfully utilised is organising a federation, which to a large extent fulfils the demands of identity. Canada (in the case of Quebec) and India (in the cases of Jharkhand and North-eastern States like Mizoram, Nagaland) have taken this path to counter demands for Self-determination. Sri Lanka and Cyprus may follow the same route.

The movement for Self-determination may get a fillip and is vitally affected by its international context. Thus many movements have culminated in the forming of independent nations because of the military, material and political support from within the international community. Bangladesh, East Timor, Eritrea, Bosnia-Herzegovina became successful cases of Self-determination thanks to the support mobilised through international relations. As against this, the demands of Tamils in Sri Lanka, Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, Chechnya in Russia, Biafra in Nigeria were either cold-shouldered or opposed by forces in international politics. In fact, if closely examined, one can

see that the international community has always been reluctant to support a secessionist movement. It seems to attach greater importance to territorial integrity than to Self-determination. This was evident in the cases of Biafra, Cyprus and even Bangladesh. Even the UN General Assembly's resolution 1514 said that while 'alien subjugation, domination and exploitation' was against the Charter and the principle of Self-determination, 'any attempt aimed at partial or total disruption of national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN' (Para 6). This is especially so if the state is 'possessed of a government representing the whole people without distinction as to race, creed and colour'. Thus, Self-determination must ensure 'to all people...internal Self-determination, namely the fundamental constitutional liberties'.

Therefore, Self-determination is the cumulative result of factors like the intensity of the national aspirations of the people, the response it meets with from the country against which the claims are laid, and the attitude of the international community. One of these alone would be inadequate to bring about a permanent change.

18.6 EXERCISES

1. Explain the concept of self-determination and distinguish its elements.
2. Examine the problems involved in practicing self-determination in Europe in the 20th Century.
3. Discuss various issues of decolonisation.
4. Evaluate the role of UN to the concept of self-determination and its application.
5. Critically examine the concept of self-determination in its application to multi-ethnic societies

UNIT 19 INTERVENTION/INVASION

Structure

- 19.1 Introduction
 - 19.2 Concept of Intervention
 - 19.2.1 Origin of Concept of Intervention
 - 19.3 Types of Intervention
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19.1 INTRODUCTION

Intervention is a word used to describe an event, (something that happens in international relations). The event might take a form as significant as the entry of one state into a violent conflict within another state or as apparently insignificant as an ill-chosen remark made by a statesman about the affairs of a foreign state.

The fact that the same word is used to describe such diverse phenomena turns the focus of attention from intervention as an event to intervention as a concept, in order to decide what it is that is common to each case. This is the task of definition and three general observations about it arise from these statements:

In the first place, because intervention is a word used to describe events in the real world, and not a purely abstract concept, freedom to stipulate an arbitrary definition is limited. Second, because intervention is a term used to describe such a broad range of activities in international relations, it is unlikely that any definition can capture the whole of reality. And in the third place, disagreement about the concept of intervention, about the sorts of activity that are to be called intervention and what it is that makes them similar, casts doubt upon any idea that painstaking research could uncover the essential meaning of intervention.

19.2 CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION

When one country interferes by force in the internal affairs of another country, the act is called intervention. An example of intervention was the demand by the US government in April 1898 that Spain withdraw its troops from the island of Cuba, which was then in rebellion against Spanish rule.

Nearly all-powerful nations have at some time or other, intervened in the affairs of weaker neighbours. According to some international lawyers, a country has the right to intervene in the

affairs of another whenever it sees a threat to its own peace and safety or to the property or persons of its citizens. Today, it is generally believed that intervention should take place only under the authority of an appropriate international organisation, such as the United Nations.

Intervention in international law means the dictatorial interference by a state in the internal affairs of another state, or in relations between two other states. It is formally forbidden by a number of treaties, especially among American republics, and has been described as illegal in essence and justified, if at all, only by its success.

Not all intervention has been selfish, predatory, maleficent or unsought. Not all has involved a disproportionate exercise of strength by the great power, although the disproportionate strength was usually in the background. Much of it has been reactive.

Intervention, mediation and interposition

Intervention is distinguished from mediation or the offering of advice by a state after a request by other states, and from representations or protests that concern the demanding state's own interests or rights. It is also distinguished from interposition, or forcible action by one state in the territory of another to protect its nationals, and from defensive action against military action or aggression. It may take the form of another military or diplomatic action but diplomatic intervention implies resort to force if the demands are not complied with.

19.2.1 Origin of the Concept of Intervention

As a technical term the word "intervention" is of comparatively modern origin, but the idea comprised in it may be traced back to E. de Vattel, the Swiss jurist, whose *Droit des gens* was first published in 1758. He laid down the general rule of state independence that every state has the right to govern itself as it thinks fit, adding the corollary that no foreign power has a right to interfere with a state apart from friendly help unless it is asked to do so or unless prompted by special reasons. The notion that states were independent was recognised in theory, but in the European practice of that age little attention was paid to it by the more powerful states when it did not suit their purpose.

The writers on international law who succeeded Vattel forged and welded the materials scattered throughout his book into a more compact form, but it was some time before "interference" was insulated as a substantive branch of international law and longer still before it acquired "intervention" as a technical name. This hardened as a distinctive term during a period extending roughly from 1817 to 1830. The reason for its swift evolution during this period is paradoxical. The gross infractions of state interference were so numerous that jurists were forced to give the topic of intervention, whether justifiable or otherwise, an increasing amount of attention. Within the brief span of the twelve years between 1820 and 1832 the Holy Alliance exploited its principles of interference in Naples and Spain; Greece and Belgium became independent states by the intervention of foreign states and the French and Austrian interventions balanced one another in Italy.

19.3 TYPES OF INTERVENTIONS

There are three distinct varieties of intervention. The commonest type, the type which has been discussed in the above historical sketch, is **internal intervention** or interference by one state between disputant sections of the community in another state, the matter of dispute being usually but not invariably some constitutional change. Internal intervention, when it occurs, is directed

against abnormal conditions resulting from internal strife, and as a general rule, the expectant treatment of non-intervention has come to be preferred to the surgery of intervention.

A second type of intervention so called consists of **punitive measures** adopted by one state against another to enforce the observance of treaty engagements or the redress of illegal wrongs. Such interventions occurred with considerable frequency throughout the 19th Century, as for example, the blockade by France in 1838 of the coast of Argentina on the ground of the alleged ill treatment of French subjects by the local government; the warlike expedition sent jointly by England, France and Spain in 1861 to compel Mexico to repay their debt; the English embargo on Greek shipping in 1850 as a means of redressing the wrongs suffered by Don Pacifico and other British subjects; the naval expeditions dispatched against Korea in 1866 by France and the United States to punish in the one case, the murder of a French apostolic vicar and in the other, the destruction of an American vessel and the massacre of its crew.

A third type of intervention, usually referred to as **external intervention**, consists of interference by one state in the relations usually the hostile relations of other states without the consent of the latter. The great majority of such interventions have had as their aim the promotion or settlement of a war between the states interfered with. External intervention usually involves participation by the intervener in a war, and the modern international law does not profess to classify the causes of war as just or unjust. But since the institution of League of Nations (formed in 1919), this doctrine has been seriously modified. Article II of the Covenant of the League declared that any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any members of the League or not, is a matter of concern to the whole League, which shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. Not only are elaborate provisions made in other articles for the settlement of disputes between member states but also certain topics are expressly specified as generally suitable for arbitration.

Since all the three forms of intervention involve force or the threat of force, the question is raised as to the difference between intervention and war. This is found to lie not in the acts of the parties but in the intention of one of them. The intervening state in spite of the hostile character of its conduct and of its recognition as such by the state affected usually regards pacific relations as uninterrupted. The claim of the intervener may be reluctantly acquiesced, in which case the intervention is non-belligerent; or it may be taken up as a gauge of war, and then it becomes belligerent.

As to the distinction between intervention and war, W.E. Hall wrote:

[R]egarded from the point of view of the state intruded upon, it (intervention) must always remain an act, which, if not consented to, is an act of war. But from the point of view of the intervening power it is...a measure of prevention or of police, undertaken sometimes for the express purpose of avoiding war...it may be a pacific measure, which becomes war in the intention of authors only when resistance is offered...Hence although intervention often ends in war, and is sometimes really war from the commencement, it may be conveniently considered abstractedly from the pacific or belligerent character which is assumed in different cases.

Further, intervention, as a type of activity can be seen as **military intervention** or **economic intervention**. Military intervention might be one such type, taking place when troops are dispatched to keep order or to support a revolution in a foreign state, or when military aid is given to a government whose internal position is insecure or which is in conflict with a neighbouring state. It has been argued that the very presence or display of armed force, such as the location of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, has an effect on the politics of the littoral

states tantamount to intervention in their affairs.

Economic intervention might constitute another type of intervention, occurring when strings are attached by the great powers to aid given to the small or when an economically developed state denies a contract to an underdeveloped primary-producing state.

Various sorts of political intervention might be said to take place when hostile propaganda is disseminated abroad, when moral support is lent to a revolutionary struggle within another state, when recognition is refused to an established government, or when a member state of the Commonwealth insists on discussing the internal affairs of another member at a prime ministers' conference.

19.3.1 The Purpose of Intervention

The purpose of intervention is the end toward which it is directed, the thing that it is designed to achieve. The balance of power, the interests of humanity, and the maintenance of ideological solidarity are but three of the ends which states have pursued by intervention, and it might be argued that the compilation of a catalogue of purposes of intervention is of little value in defining intervention, because it would tend to become a general account of states' motives for action in foreign policy. If intervention takes place for the purpose of forcing a delinquent state to submit to the recognised rules of international law or to punish a breach of the law or to neutralise the illegal intervention of another, then it has been argued that it is a lawful activity.

Whenever an intervention can be said to take place by right, it never constitutes a violation of external independence or territorial supremacy. But this definition of intervention refers to "dictatorial interference" in the internal or external affairs of a state, and dictatorial interference clearly implies a violation of external independence or territorial supremacy. This is the core of the confusion between the use of the word intervention as a description of an event in international relations and its use as a normative expression by international lawyers. If intervention by right is held not to violate the independence of the target state, a violation which features in most definitions as the thing, which above all differentiates intervention from other phenomena, then it is to be understood that intervention by right is not intervention. However difficult it may prove, there can be no objection in attempting to distinguish lawful from unlawful intervention, but excluding "lawful intervention" from the class of events called intervention does not advance the attempt.

19.3.2 The Motive of Intervention

The motive of intervention is political rather than legal. The US has, in pursuance of policies related to the Monroe Doctrine intervened in Caribbean republics-in Cuba to establish the independence of that state, and in others to maintain order and international obligations. It has been party to treaties that permitted intervention in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and the Panama, although these treaties were subsequently terminated in accordance with the "good neighbour" policy. Since Second World War, the US has intervened in Greece, Lebanon, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam to "contain communism", although other grounds such as protection of national or collective self defence were also asserted.

Also, the Soviet Union had entered Hungary and Czechoslovakia to maintain communist control, and Great Britain and France have intervened in Egypt in 1956 to prevent nationalisation of the Suez Canal.

The great powers have frequently intervened, sometimes collectively, to prevent a state from becoming so powerful as to disturb the balance of power. A system of international relations based on equilibrium of power can hardly avoid occasional intervention of this kind. Intervention to stop gross inhumanities against minorities or dependent peoples has also occurred, and has been considered justifiable if the purpose was genuinely humanitarian. Often such interventions have veiled political objectives.

The League of Nations Covenant declared that “the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations,” and the UN Charter gives the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

Action authorised in pursuance of these provisions, as by the UN in Korea and Congo, has, sometimes been called “collective intervention”, and is undoubtedly legal if in pursuance of the authority given to the organisation by its members.

The prevention of situations that will induce states to intervene in the affairs of others is the major problem of international law and international organisation and can hardly be solved without, in some degree, subjecting the sovereignty of states to a world order. Nations continue to be reluctant, however, to surrender their sovereignty in this manner.

19.4 NATURE AND FREQUENCY OF FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS

The legal notion of sovereignty notwithstanding, governments frequently intervene in the domestic affairs of other states. But as intervention contradicts the international legal norm, officials usually take the position that only other (unfriendly) governments engage in interventions, whereas they themselves do not practice intervention. Moreover, to the extent that they admit their own intervention, they tend to justify their action as resulting from an “invitation” or a “request” by a friendly government under duress, or as being a regrettable reaction against a hostile government’s prior intervention. You should note, however, that intervention is not restricted to interference in the domestic affairs of another country. As already mentioned, we are using the term intervention to refer to any involvement by a government in a conflict situation that does not concern it in a direct or major way.

Intervention can take the form of covert activities. For example, in the early 1970s, the US government provided funds to friendly conservative politicians in Chile in order to prevent the election of Marxist president Salvador Allende, and it conducted secret bombings of Cambodia during the Indo-china War. Intervention can also take the overt form of massive and direct military assistance to a friendly regime in trouble, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the US participation in the Vietnam War during 1965-1973, and the Chinese entry into the Korean War in 1950. Between these two extremes, there is a great deal of variation in the secrecy, scale, and direct involvement of the intervener. For example, although in 1961 the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supplied and organised a group of Cuban exiles in their attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro’s communist government, the US military forces did not engage in direct combat when the invasion was launched. Moreover, although never officially acknowledged, the US government’s role in this attempt to overthrow another government (known as the Bay of Pigs episode, named after the place where the invasion forces landed) was an “open secret.” Until the Watergate era, the CIA’s other covert activities, such as its plots to assassinate Fidel Castro, of foreign intervention were less well known.

Among the 106 civil wars that were identified by Small and Singer for the period 1816-1980,

21 involved substantial foreign military intervention. That is, about 20 per cent of the civil wars became internationalised. More than one country intervened in some of these wars (e.g., the Russian Revolution and the Spanish Civil War). There were altogether 33 cases of substantial foreign military intervention in civil wars.

The following table shows the most active interventionists in other people's civil wars. The United States and the United Kingdom head the list with six interventions each. The five interventions undertaken by France place it a close third. The record of intervention showed in this table, however, is understated for two reasons. First, only substantial military interventions were counted. The coding rules used by Small and Singer define "substantial" as meaning that the intervening state must commit at least 1,000 troops or suffer 100 battle deaths. As a result, small-scale interventions are not included in this table. Second, there were many situations that did not qualify according to the definition of civil war used by Small and Singer, but that nonetheless experienced foreign intervention. The Bay of Pigs episode mentioned earlier is such an example. Similarly, Soviet military forces did intervene in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, most recently, Afghanistan, even though the internal turmoil of these countries did not qualify as civil war.

Military Intervention in Others' Civil Wars, 1816-1980

The Intervener	Number of Interventions	Countries Experiencing Civil War
United States	6	USSR/Russia, Lebanon, Vietnam, Laos, Dominican Republic, Cambodia
United Kingdom	6	Portugal, Spain, Argentina, China, USSR/Russia, Greece
France	5	Spain, Argentina, Morocco, USSR/Russia
Portugal	2	Spain
North Vietnam	2	Laos, Cambodia
Japan	2	USSR/Russia, China
Syria	2	Jordan, Lebanon
Belgium	1	Zaire
Cuba	1	Angola
Egypt	1	Yemen Arab Republic
Finland	1	USSR/Russia
Germany	1	Spain
Italy	1	Spain
Russia	1	Iran
South Vietnam	1	Cambodia

Source: Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills, California:Sage, 1982). *16-1980* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1982).

19.5 INTERVENTION SINCE SECOND WORLD WAR

Korean War

Although two different political governments had emerged in Korea by 1947, the fact that they were still only provisional governments gave the Korean people hope for a possible unification. Up until this time, nationalists from both the North and the South continued their efforts to negotiate a unification treaty; however, irreconcilable differences between the US and the Soviet Union prevented any such goal. Eventually, the US concluded that the chasm that existed between the US and the Soviet Union in establishing a unified Korea was insurmountable and so they pressured the United Nations to allow for a general election in Korea. Suspicious of foul play by the US, the Soviets refused to allow the election to be held in North Korea.

Nevertheless, the US advocated that voting should still be carried out in the south in order to establish some sort of legitimate government, and so in May 1948, South Korea held its first general elections. Thereafter, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established and was promptly recognised by the United Nations as the legitimate government of Korea. Up until and through these elections there were heavy protests by Korean leftists who feared that this election would kill all chances for unification. During the same time the north followed with similar actions by holding its own elections. When the votes were tabulated, Kim Il Sung was declared president of the new Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPKR), which was immediately recognised, by the Soviet Union and other communist countries as the legitimate government of North Korea. By winter of 1948 the worst fears of Korean Nationalists were confirmed as Korea became permanently divided at the 38th parallel.

In May 1948, a communist government was formed in North Korea, and Soviet Union instantly recognised it. Other East European countries followed suit. The two Koreas were involved in mounting conflict with each other while the US and USSR forces moved out of the two Koreas. With deteriorating relations in the wake of Cold War, Korea became an additional point of conflict.

On 25 June 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea. The matter was immediately reported by the US to the Security Council. A UN unified command was set up, under the commandership of General MacArthur of US. The UN forces, hence, (most of them US troops) freed South Korea, but did not stop on the dividing line, the 38th parallel. They began pushing the North Koreans inside their territory and reached almost till the Chinese border. This certainly was not the spirit of the UN Security Council resolutions. An armistice was signed only in July 1953. The Korean War came to an end, leaving behind an intensified Cold War, heightened anti-Communist propaganda by the US and increased mutual hate and distrust.

Suez Crisis

The Egyptian decision to nationalise the Suez Canal in July 1956 led to a serious crisis involving the use of force by Israel, Britain and France. The invasion was universally condemned but the Soviet Union got the opportunity to threaten rocket attack on Anglo-French forces. America retaliated by counter threat. The United Nations compelled the British, French and Israelis to terminate their military action. The threatened rocket attack did not take place. Britain and France suffered humiliation. By their threatened intervention, the Soviets gained a sizeable propaganda victory in the Arab world.

In the mid and late 1950s, however, Cold War moved into new arenas. As position in Europe

and East Asia stabilised, the great powers increasingly turned their attention to the Third World, the newly independent states of the West Asia, South East Asia and Africa which were struggling to develop viable economies and to establish national identities. Soviet-American competition in the Third World produced the first of many explosive confrontations in the Suez Crisis of 1956, when the US withdrew an offer to assist Egypt in constructing a gigantic dam on the river Nile; the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalised the Suez Canal. Dependent on the Mediterranean lifeline, Britain, France and Israel subsequently launched military action against Egypt. The Soviet Union backed Nasser, and Khrushchev even threatened to use nuclear weapons against the Western allies. Fearful that the Soviet Union might exploit the crisis to extend its influence in the West Asia, the Eisenhower administration forced Britain and France to withdraw. The crisis ended, but it only added to intensify the Cold War rivalry. The Russians expanded their assistance to Nasser and sought to gain influence in the other West Asian nations. The US enunciated the Eisenhower Doctrine, which offered aid to any West Asian nation threatened by Communism.

Cuban Missile Crisis

The island of Cuba in the Caribbean is located at a distance of 90 miles from the US state of Florida. In 1898, United States freed Cuba from Spain. The United States acquired the right to intervene through the incorporation of Platt Amendment in the Constitution. In 1952, Batista, who had served as president of Cuba from 1940 to 1944, returned to power and established his dictatorship in Cuba that lasted till 1959, when Fidel Castro managed to capture power. In 1961 he formally declared himself as a Marxist. On the assumption of power, Castro tried to concentrate all the powers in his own hands and tried to establish a dictatorship. Castro also tried to free the Cuban economy from American dependence and decided to ally with a new paymaster - USSR. Thus he converted Cuba virtually into a satellite of Soviet Union. Cuba further proceeded with the nationalisation of American property. The US reacted by stopping purchase of Cuban sugar and even severed diplomatic relations with Cuba. In the meanwhile a large number of anti-Castro Cubans moved to the US. Their strength increased so much so as to be able to form a Cuban army in exile.

In April 1961, president Kennedy permitted the Cuban exiles to invade the island in the hope that the Cubans would rise and support the liberating forces against Castro. However, the invasion was a complete disaster. The failure of the mission (popularly known as Bay of Pigs) greatly enraged the American public opinion. In the meanwhile Soviet prime minister Khrushchev announced his decision to set up a Soviet base in Cuba with Soviet missiles, which posed a serious threat to the security of the United States. In fact, since mid-1961, Soviet Union had been supplying armaments including missiles to Cuba. As the installation of these missiles in Cuba put the United States in direct firing range from Cuba, US claimed that it posed a serious threat to its security. Though Khrushchev assured US that these missiles were installed only to strengthen Cuban defence and were not meant for any offensive use, this did not satisfy the US. In the meantime in October 1962, Soviet Union dispatched yet another vessel allegedly carrying long range missiles. However, before this could actually reach Cuba, US announced the blockade of Cuba. Although Soviet Union denounced the blockade, the Soviet missiles carriers moved up to the "quarantine" line and stopped there. Moscow finally ordered these ships to return home, thereby diffusing a situation, which could have converted into a nuclear war. Soviet Union subsequently, dismantled the missile bases in Cuba.

Vietnam War

The Vietnam War proved to be a disastrous adventure of the American foreign policy. The

Geneva Agreement of 1954 confirmed the exit of French from the whole of Indo-China. It also created two Vietnams, but they never lived in peace. The elections that were to be held in the two parts in 1956 were never held. Instead the war began which lasted almost twenty years and finally led to the creation of one unified Vietnam under the communist rule. While North Vietnam was helped by the Soviet Union, it was mainly the American intervention that made the Vietnam War different from other wars between the two neighbours.

Both China and Soviet Union were interested in bringing the conflict to an end and prevailed upon North Vietnam to accept the Geneva Agreement. As South Vietnam did not respond favourably to the Geneva Agreement, a war broke out between North and South which lasted for almost 20 years and proved to be the most destructive war in the post Second World War period.

The foreign policy-makers of the United States made several miscalculations and became responsible for a prolonged war in which large numbers of casualties were suffered by both the Americans and the Vietnamese. Eisenhower's decision to provide American military and economic assistance to Ngo Dinh Diem's regime was not in conformity with the US policy of free elections to decide the contentious issues. When Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, Vietnam was already America's costliest commitment.

By 1963, America got more deeply involved in South Vietnam. In 1964 the first bombing raid was made over North Vietnam, which soon became a regular feature for the Vietnam War. By the close of 1972, the futility of continued war with Vietnam was realised. This led to the Paris Agreement in January 1973, whereby a cease-fire was established, which did not last very long. In 1974-75 the North Vietnamese launched an offensive against South Vietnam. The then regime of South Vietnam collapsed and the city of Saigon was captured by the communist troops on 30 April 1975. This marked the end of Vietnam War and the whole Vietnam came under communist control.

Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia

Yugoslav secession in 1948, and the uprising in Poland and Hungary in 1956 had caused upheaval in the communist system. The USSR could not afford to allow Czechoslovakia to follow Yugoslav example. Josip Broz Tito was still alive and popular, and in Rumania, Ceausescu was making uncomfortable gestures. The prospects of Czechoslovakia, under Dubcek sliding out of the Soviet Bloc were disturbing. By June 1968, Soviet prime minister Kosygin had visited Czechoslovakia, and Dubcek and other reformist leaders had visited Moscow. When Warsaw Pact forces began manoeuvres in Czechoslovakia, the situation became very tense. The French and Italian Communist parties tried to mediate. West Germany got so alarmed that it withdrew its troops from the Czechoslovak border to belie the rumours that Germans were instigating the popular reformists.

During mid-1968, Soviet Union alleged that a *cache* of American arms had been found in Czechoslovakia. This allegation was sought to introduce Cold War politics in an essentially internal crisis of the Communists. Soon the Soviet troops began to move out of Czechoslovakia, but suddenly Soviet intervention took place on 20 August 1968, when the Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian troops marched into Czechoslovakia.

It was considered as a violation of the Czech sovereignty and in October 1968, Czechoslovaks were asked to sign a treaty permitting Soviet troops to be stationed in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was a mild intervention. From a Soviet point of view, it was a "regrettable" necessity.

Afghan Crisis

Tension was developing between the East and the West after the Helsinki Summit in 1975. The areas of tension were outside Europe. However, the Cold War returned with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The West described Soviet action as an invasion of Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a monarchy till Mohammed Daud deposed King Zahir Shah in 1973. Daud abolished monarchy and himself became the president of the new Republic. Daud decided to seek weapons from the Soviet Union to restore balance of power in the region. Earlier, Daud had been supported by People's Democratic Party, which soon split into two factions: one led by Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and known as the *Khalq*, and the other led by Babrak Karmal, called *Parcham*.

Having consolidated his position, Daud played off East against the West and sought help from the Shah of Iran. He persecuted both the factions of People's Democratic Party, and in 1977 put some of their leaders in jail. Meanwhile, both the factions had penetrated into the army and had even made a sort of truce with each other. The tables were turned and Mohammed Daud was ousted in 1978. Hafizullah Amin took over as Afghan president in September 1979. Meanwhile, in Iran, Shah had been deposed and Ayatollah Khomeini's volunteers had seized the US Embassy and taken many Americans as hostages. The USSR felt that America might organise a *coup* in Iran. In anticipation that Amin would join hands with America, Soviet Union decided to get rid of him and tighten its grip on Afghanistan. The Soviet forces entered Afghanistan towards the end of 1979. Amin was arrested and executed. Babrak Karmal came back from the Soviet Union and was named the president. This action was described and justified by the Soviet Union as a "painful intervention" to keep the "US imperialists" away from the country.

Gulf War

The first major international crisis after the Cold War occurred in West Asia during 1990-1991. The attack by Iraq on neighbouring oil-rich Kuwait, conquest and annexation of Kuwait into Iraq as its nineteenth province marked the first phase of the crisis. When all efforts to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait failed, and peaceful solution appeared to be impossible, the 28-nation coalition, led by the United States and authorised by the UN Security Council, waged a war on Iraq and liberated Kuwait. This was the second phase of what is called Gulf War II. The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 may be described as Gulf War I. The prolonged war had been generally indecisive, though Iraq claimed eventual advantage. As Iran had already come under the Islamic regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, America had generally supported Iraq in that war, without being actually involved in it. It is the Gulf War of 1990-91, which threatened the international peace with injected Arab-Israel conflict input and an attempt to give it an ideological colour.

19.6 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The concept of humanitarian intervention is not new—it has long been part of the inventory of European power politics. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention remained an integral part of the European powers' conduct of foreign policy from until the First World War. The theory implies that whenever its very government violates the "human rights" of the population of a given state, another state or group of states has the right to intervene in the name of the so-called "international community", thus temporarily substituting their own sovereignty for that of the state against which the intervention is directed.

More recently, in a space of just a few months, from March to September 1999, the global

community witnessed major interventions in defence of human rights and self-determination in Kosovo and East Timor. Although carried out by different coalitions of forces and acting under different mandates, these two interventions signalled that it could well be an increased emphasis on humanitarian intervention by the international community at the seeming expense of the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in a country's domestic affairs. Such interventions have sought to compel a change in behaviour regarding the widespread abuses of human rights (Kurds and Kosovars).

Intervention and Non-intervention

Intervention having been discussed, non-intervention might be said to be the circumstance in which intervention does not occur. But beyond the accident of non-intervention, a state might be said to follow a policy of non-intervention when it chooses not to intervene in a situation where intervention also is a possible policy. Publicists have expounded theories of non-intervention, which assert the desirability of states refraining from intervention from the point of view of the achievement of peace between states, or of providing for the best interests of a particular state. An international law asserts non-intervention as a principle, a rule which states are obliged to adhere to in their relation with each other.

The function of the principles of intervention in international relations might be said, then, to be one of protecting the principle of state sovereignty. In the first place, states might feel obliged to obey rules out of a sense of moral duty. Second, they might adhere to rules through a calculation that it is in their interests to do so, and third, they might be forced into obedience to rules. An account of the promise of each of these factors as inducements to rule-determined behaviour by states will emerge from the study of the practice of states with regard to the principle of non-intervention.

19.7 SUMMARY

Intervention has been and probably still is inevitable as one means of standardising the civilisation upon which the international law is now based. From the point of view of maintaining peace, there is something to be said for the suppression of internal discords in another state when it is a common knowledge that no revolution can break out in a European state without the likelihood of the balance of power between other states being upset. In many instances this is, at best, an excuse and not a justification, but it does show clearly that a policy of isolation, if it signifies absolute indifference to what occurs in other states, is neither advisable nor practicable. If any change in the trend of ideas about intervention is perceptible, it is this. In future, intervention is more likely to be undertaken collectively, and the threat in it will more probably be one of economic outlawry—which is one of the sanctions of the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Charter of the United Nations—rather than one of actual war.

Under international law, intervention may be legally justified (1) if the intervening state has been granted such a right by treaty; (2) if a state violates an agreement for joint policy determination by acting unilaterally; (3) if intervention is necessary to protect a state's citizens; (4) if it is necessary for self defence; or (5) if a state violates international law. The UN Charter also justifies intervention when it involves a collective action by the international community against a state that threatens or breaks the peace or commits an act of aggression. Nonetheless, politically, much less ideologically motivated, interventions are most likely to occur when a great power's hegemonic role is threatened within its sphere of influence. Interventions by small Third World states in the territory of their own neighbours, however, also are likely to become a frequent occurrence.

19.8 EXERCISES

1. What is meant by intervention?
2. Trace the origin and development of the concept of intervention.
3. Identify three distinct varieties of intervention.
4. What is the purpose of intervention?
5. What are the motives behind any kind of intervention?
6. Give examples of intervention in the post-Second World War period.
7. What do you understand by humanitarian intervention?
8. Explain the difference between Intervention and Non-intervention.

UNIT 20 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Structure

- 20.1 Introduction
- 20.2 Evolution of Non-proliferation Policy
 - 20.2.1 US Monopoly
 - 20.2.2 Atoms for Peace
 - 20.2.3 Safeguards
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20.1 INTRODUCTION

The spread of nuclear weapons has been considered a grave threat to the security of the world at large. The debate is not so much about the use of nuclear technology, for the uses of nuclear technology in the development process of any nation has been well accepted. The debate is on the peaceful vs. the military uses of this technology. This debate has complicated over the years as this technology has been acknowledged as being ‘dual use’ technology and as such it would be difficult to differentiate from the end use for which the technology is pursued. Yet, the debate on the proliferation of nuclear weapons has dominated the writings on international security. The central concerns have been the horizontal and not vertical proliferation of these weapons.

Policies of nuclear proliferation present interplay of two sets of issues: one is the technical and political set of issues and the other relates to the capability and intent of the countries concerned. The technical element in non-proliferation seeks to either deny the critical technical assets to a country that seeks to embark on a nuclear programme or to make these assets available under a safeguard system. This places restraint on the possible use of nuclear technology for

weapons production and ensures that the technology that is transferred or acquired remains for civilian (or confines to) use only. The political component of the system operates at two levels: one that seeks to create an international pressure on the countries to desist from going nuclear and two, provide various incentives and disincentives to countries in the form of economic and other ways to dissuade them from going nuclear. The political component adds on to the technical component in providing a ‘political’ rationale for not going nuclear.

The capability of a state to go nuclear is dependent on the technical component. The development of nuclear technology and infrastructure that is capable of producing a nuclear weapon is a technical dimension of the problem of proliferation. A nuclear capable state may be technically ripe for nuclear proliferation, but it would be the political intention of exercising the choice to go in for a nuclear weapon that would determine nuclear proliferation. In fact, with the spread of nuclear technology and availability of nuclear material, the decision on whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons would be a political one.

The incentives to produce a nuclear weapon may be listed as follows:

- a) Increased international status: This is a psychological aspect of perceiving to have crossed the ‘threshold’ and become a ‘great power’.
- b) Domestic political requirements or political pressures: These pressures may be visible in both democratic and authoritarian systems of government.
- c) Increased strategic autonomy.
- d) A strategic hedge against military and political uncertainty, especially about the reliability of allies.
- e) Possession of a weapon of last resort.
- f) Bargain or leverage over the developed nations.

The disincentives that may discourage nations from going in for nuclear weapons include:

- a) Resource diversion to nuclear programme may lead to a loss of opportunity to pursue other pressing economic and social priorities.
- b) Adverse national and international public opinion that would reflect on the ‘status’ of the nation.
- c) Disruption of established or conventional security guarantees provided by some of the great powers.
- d) Infeasibility of developing the required technology and consequently the corresponding nuclear strategy.
- e) Fear of an adverse international reaction that would have an impact on the trade and other relations of the country.

Nuclear weapons programmes usually require a long lead time for countries that have no nuclear infrastructure. Any nation seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons must develop an appropriate source of fissile material. This is a major technical barrier. The core of a nuclear

bomb is made up of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Fifteen to twenty-five kilograms of highly enriched uranium or five to eight kilograms of plutonium are generally considered the necessary minimum for the core of a multi-kiloton atomic bomb.

A nation seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons must have a source of this fissile material. There are three main approaches that nations take to overcome this barrier: One is by developing nuclear facilities dedicated for the purpose of weapons development. The second is the development of a civilian nuclear programme that is free of safeguards and the subsequent acquisition of sensitive technologies for the development of a nuclear bomb. In case of safeguarded facilities the option may be of diversion of material from civilian facilities. The third option is theft of the raw material or the weapon itself.

20.2 EVOLUTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

Nuclear non-proliferation policy has emerged through four main stages:

- i) The post-war phase that was characterised by secrecy and efforts to retain monopolistic control on part of the United States as the sole nuclear weapons power in the world.
- ii) The ‘liberal’ policy ushered in by president Eisenhower through the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme announced in the United Nations in 1953.
- iii) The policy of controls through safeguards came to be sponsored by the nuclear weapon powers to contain the spread of nuclear weapons across the world. This came to be enshrined in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and subsequent efforts like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996.
- iv) The reactive phase on part of the nuclear weapon powers in the post Indian nuclear test of 1974 and subsequent testing by India and Pakistan in 1998. This phase saw the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Club and such other legislation like the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (1978) of the United States. It also saw the debate shift from technical to political discourse on the utility of nuclear weapons and the impositions of various sanctions against the new nuclear weapon states.

20.2.1 US Monopoly

The main aim of the Anglo-Saxon partners during the Second World War was to win the race to build a nuclear weapon before Nazi Germany. The Soviet Union had been kept out of this nuclear cooperation. The United States, Canada and Britain signed the Quebec agreement in 1943 under which they decided not to communicate any information to third parties without mutual consent. Following the detonation of the first atomic bomb in Hiroshima, they adopted a comprehensive non-proliferation policy towards the rest of the world. There was an agreement not to disclose the practical applications of atomic energy before effective, enforceable safeguards against misuse could be put in place.

The first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission received two reports that sought to link the development of commercial nuclear policy and nuclear weapons. The Baruch Plan (1946) proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority (IADA) to regulate and control all aspects of the development and use of atomic energy. The proposed IADA was to have complete regulatory authority over all nuclear activities that were potentially dangerous to world security and was to have statutory power to control, license and

inspect all other nuclear facilities. The second was the Acheson-Lilienthal Report (1946) that too realised that the current American monopoly over nuclear weapons technology would end sooner or later and that it would be necessary to install mechanisms to control the spread of this technology and the weapons that may follow. It recognised that nations with commercial nuclear technological capability may eventually launch into weapons production and hence proposed the creation of a strong international authority to regulate the commercial development of nuclear energy.

The failure to get either of the proposals adopted led the United States to enact the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public law 585). Under this law the American government obtained title to all nuclear facilities in which fissionable nuclear materials could be manufactured and became the sole proprietor of all fissionable material. The Act classified as secret all information relating to the utilisation of fissionable material for generation of commercial nuclear power and prohibited any sharing of data with other countries. The Canadians and the British viewed this new American policy with suspicion. The British, who had to shift their nuclear research programme to the United States during the Second World War, were upset over the American decision of prohibiting nuclear cooperation with other countries. The British embarked on their own general purpose nuclear programme that eventually came to focus on weapons programme due to political and security consideration. The Canadians who had eschewed the weapons programme did decide to cash in on their technological expertise and the raw material resources that they possessed.

The Soviet Union entered the nuclear field with its first explosion in 1949. The British exploded their first bomb in 1952. The French distrust of the professed American and British commitment to provide it with a security umbrella, defeat in Vietnam and the feeling of economic vulnerability in the post-Suez crisis eventually led them to go in for a nuclear programme that had both, commercial and security considerations. The French entered the nuclear club in 1960. The Chinese entry in 1964 brought in an entirely new dimension to the debate on proliferation, that of a poor Third World country gaining a new status.

The interest in nuclear technology that nations around the world showed in the 1960s came to be based on these two considerations: national security and commercial uses of nuclear technology. This, then, was to become the key issue of anti-proliferation strategy: nuclear powers simply concentrated on denying nuclear technology to non-nuclear powers rather than finding out the ‘motivations’ behind a nation’s interest in acquiring the technology. The efforts by nuclear states to promote institutional mechanisms to limit the spread of nuclear weapons were perceived by the non-nuclear states as self serving attempts to protect the political and/or economic interests of the nuclear powers.

20.2.2 Atoms for Peace

The gradual lessening of international tensions following the death of Stalin and the realisation on the part of the Americans of an end of their nuclear monopoly led to changes in American policy. In 1953 president Eisenhower enunciated his ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme before the United Nations. Under this proposal the United States, Soviet Union and other countries were to contribute fissile material to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which would be responsible for storage and security of this material. The IAEA would then be responsible for providing electrical energy to the world at large. The US Atomic Energy Act was amended to allow for the implementation of this new liberal policy. It took a little time for the political rhetoric to get translated into concrete policy. By 1955 the programme got under way. That year the Argonne Laboratory opened its School of Nuclear Science and Engineering staffed by a

group of scientists from twenty different countries; extensive declassification of papers was undertaken; the first United nations Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held in Geneva and the US had negotiated agreements with at least twenty seven nations for nuclear cooperation.

20.2.3 Safeguards

The impetus of the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme did not last long. The IAEA came to be established in 1957. The Agency’s role in inspection and verification was the key to the idea of ‘safeguards’ system. The IAEA’s function is to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure that assistance provided is not used to further any military purpose. The IAEA safeguards system was based on four main elements: (i) review of the design of nuclear facilities; (ii) specification of a system of records and accounts; (iii) specification of a system of reports and (iv) inspection of safeguarded facilities to verify compliance with the agreements. The IAEA safeguard system is not concerned with the physical protection of nuclear material, or with organisation to anticipate and prevent attempts at diversion to recover stolen or diverted material.

The logic of safeguards that formed the essential thrust of the nuclear policy was the essential ingredient of the problem of control over proliferation. The first level of control comes through detection of diversion of nuclear material from civilian facilities to military use. This is done through series of agreements between the supplier countries and the end users of the nuclear material defining what constitutes ‘peaceful uses’. The second level is that of a response to the detection of diversion of nuclear material. Institution of sanctions and recourse to political measures to bring pressure on the country are some of the means to tackle the problem. The third level is laying down restrictions on the supply of nuclear and related material. Supplier agreements are made to ensure that material is not supplied to countries suspect of a weapons programme.

The evolution of international safeguards went through two distinct phases. The first was the pre NPT phase wherein the focus had been on individual countries. The second was ushered in by the NPT that made safeguards a universal norm.

20.2.4 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

The entry of China into the nuclear club transformed the debate on nuclear issues from an East-West Cold War issue that was to be considered mainly by the developed world into a global concern. The earlier focus had mostly been on weapons systems, strategic parity and corresponding geostrategic considerations. Now the focus shifted to the problem of diversion of material from peaceful uses to weapons use. While this concern was expressed in the context of the discussions on the NPT, it was only after the 1974 Indian test that such a direct linkage came to be acknowledged as a reality. The acute concern for control over proliferation and possible safeguards finally led to the creation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The chief motivation of its sponsors, the USA, Great Britain and USSR, was to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The treaty divides the signatories into two categories: those who possess the nuclear bomb (those who possessed it prior to 1 January 1967) and those who did not. It commits the non-weapon states to inspection of their holdings of nuclear materials. The NPT commits them to negotiate safeguard agreements with the IAEA. These safeguards, however, are not binding on the weapon states. In exchange of the commitment by the non-weapon states to refrain from

producing or acquiring nuclear weapons the weapon states agreed to the following: (i) not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear weapon devices and not to assist non-weapon states to acquire such weapons or devices; (ii) to seek discontinuance of all (underground) nuclear tests as a corollary to the 1953 Partial Test Ban Treaty; (iii) to refrain from the threat or the use of force in compliance of the UN Charter; (iv) to develop research production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and help the developing countries in this regard; (v) to make available to all states the potential benefits from and peaceful uses of nuclear explosions; and (vi) pursue negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and move towards nuclear disarmament.

The NPT became the first step to the construction of an effective international regime designed to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There had been a consensus on the part of the Americans and the Soviets that unfettered proliferation of nuclear weapons would destabilise the international order. This view had not been shared by France and China, who were suspicious of the US-Soviet control over the nuclear weapons. Both the countries did not sign the NPT at the time of its creation.

The non-nuclear weapon states were also critical of the treaty. They perceived this to be a discriminatory treaty. Their main points of criticism were: (i) The asymmetric nature of the treaty provisions that imposed safeguards only on the non-weapons states; (ii) the preservation of commercial interests of the weapon states by providing them the right to explore peaceful uses programme; (iii) the vagueness of the commitments on part of the weapon states; and (iv) the failure to address legitimate security concerns of the non-weapon states.

Until the signing of the NPT the debate about safeguards had been structured within technological parametres and frameworks. The unbalanced nature of the Treaty obligations under the NPT and the universality of its approach resulted in the shift of the debate from the technical to the political arena. Unlike the earlier era, the NPT system of safeguards came to be perceived as an infringement on the political sovereignty of the State. Eventually it was the Indian test of 1974 that refocused international attention to the linkage between peaceful uses and weapons production.

The NPT had provided for periodic review conferences. In 1995 the conference decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely.

20.2.5 Suppliers Group

In 1970, shortly after NPT came into force, a number of countries had entered into consultations about procedures and standards to be applied to the export of nuclear fuel and materials. This group chaired by Claude Zangger, were members of the NPT or were suppliers of nuclear materials. Following the Indian test, several countries informed the IAEA of their intention to enforce the IAEA safeguards on their nuclear exports. This memorandum included a ‘trigger list’ of materials and items and was to become the first major agreement on the supply list of nuclear materials. Two major issues were discussed: Under what conditions, technology and equipment for enrichment and reprocessing be transferred to non-weapon states; and whether transfers are made to states unwilling to submit to full scope IAEA safeguards.

The Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines of the so called London Club, that eventually emerged included the following: One, nuclear export recipients pledge not to use the transferred material for nuclear explosives of any kind. Two, transfer of sensitive nuclear technology was to come under this safeguards system. However, such a transfer could take place with extreme restraint in

case the facilities were using only low enriched uranium.

In due course, the entire concept of suppliers group came to have a new meaning with the restrictions being placed on transfer of dual use technologies under several regimes instituted for that purpose. In 1987 seven missile technology exporters agreed to establish identical export guidelines to cover the sale of nuclear capable ballistic missiles. This agreement is known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It aims at limiting the risks of nuclear proliferation by controlling the transfer of technology which could contribute to nuclear weapons delivery. In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group in a meeting at Warsaw adopted the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear Related Dual Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology.

The Third World in general has been critical of the restrictive measures placed by these guidelines. They have argued that after having accepted the NPT they should have access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses. The Weapon states however point out that even under the NPT system the transfer of technology is not unrestricted and as such would have to be placed under safeguards. These restraints appear to have slowed down the pace of nuclear related developments in the Third World and have also put a restraint on the missile programmes of some of the countries.

20.3 NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSIONS

The question of nuclear weapons explosions has been on the international agenda ever since the 1954 Indian proposal that called for a stand still on testing. This has been one of the means of implementing the non-proliferation agenda. The main treaties that have been concluded in the context of nuclear explosions are:

1. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty
2. The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
3. The 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
4. The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty is a multilateral treaty which prohibits any nuclear explosion (including those intended for non-military purposes) in the atmosphere, outer space or under water or in any environment if the explosion would cause radioactive debris in any country. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty is a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in which the parties undertook to prohibit, prevent and not carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty was also a US-USSR bilateral agreement that sought to regulate the explosions which could be conducted outside the nuclear weapons test sites and which may therefore be considered as for peaceful purposes. Both the latter two treaties were, in a sense, additions to the Partial Test Ban Treaty that sought to cover the loopholes of the first.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was looked at as the most important means to tackle both, horizontal and vertical proliferation. It was claimed that, by banning all explosions, the CTBT would have (a) constrained the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; (b) end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; (c) contributed to the process of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and (d) strengthened international peace and security.

The negotiations on the CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament got bogged down on two contentious issues—that of the scope of the treaty and the verification arrangements. The issue of scope came into discussion because while the CTBT sought to outlaw all nuclear testing (including Peaceful Nuclear tests), some kind of weapon designing could continue, based on sub-critical tests and laboratory simulation. The problems raised in this context related to the defining of the concept ‘comprehensive’. The continuation of laboratory level testing provided an opportunity to the weapon powers to retain their weapons stockpile and also ensure that it is in workable condition by testing them in the laboratory. The differences over verification focused on the agency that was to monitor the implementation. The concern expressed was that if it were a national agency it would constitute an intrusion on the sovereignty of a country, besides the attendant biases of the country. After an indefinite extension given to the NPT in 1995, India linked the signing of the CTBT with a time bound global disarmament programme. Indian view was that the NPT had failed to tackle the question of global nuclear disarmament and the CTBT with its implicit limitations on its scope also did not proceed in the direction of the goal of disarmament. India maintained that the five nuclear weapon powers agree on a timetable for total removal of nuclear weapons as a precondition to its acceptance. The Conference on Disarmament concluded without taking any decision and then the CTBT proposal was placed in the United Nations General Assembly as a Resolution. This was eventually passed in 1996 as a UN resolution.

The acrimonious debates that took place on the CTBT illustrate the dilemma about nuclear proliferation. The key issue was the fear that the nuclear weapons powers sought to maintain a status quo on the number of nuclear weapon states. They were seen as states that sought to deny the non-weapon states their legitimate aspirations that were linked either to their security concerns or their efforts at exploring nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This position was especially articulated by the threshold states like India. The eventual nuclear testing by India and Pakistan in 1998 and their entry into the nuclear club (though it has not been formally recognised by the original weapon states) was an assertion of this position. The discussions have begun on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) as the possible next step to non-proliferation. The reactions on the part of the non-weapon states are likely to be as sharp as those in case of the CTBT.

20.4 NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION

An important dimension of the discussion on nuclear proliferation is the understanding of the perception and policies of the nuclear weapon powers, especially the US and the USSR. What have been their nuclear strategies? What have they done to reduce the nuclear tensions amongst themselves? Answers to these questions will provide an insight into the approaches that they take towards the countries that aspire to become weapon powers and are seen as a threat to world peace by the established nuclear weapon powers. Nuclear doctrines define the role of nuclear weapons in both deterring and waging nuclear war. These doctrines have evolved with changes in technology and have been affected by the changing political and security environment. It is therefore necessary to look at the key doctrines and the important agreements that came to be made in the context of these doctrines.

20.4.1 Nuclear Doctrines

The United States believed that the vague threats of the use of nuclear weapons forced North Korea and China to the negotiation table in the Korean War. The policy of deterrence evolved in the 1950s was a security doctrine of the United States. The US declared the intention to

retaliate instantly by means and places of its own choosing. It articulated the policy as nuclear deterrence by threat of ‘massive’ retaliation in 1954. Deterrence is the core of nuclear strategy. Deterrence is often conceptualised as a function of capability and will. Its key function is to keep peace and prevent war. In fact, it has been argued that the key function of the military establishment in the nuclear age is not to win wars but to avert them. Credible deterrence is possible only when the contending parties have a retaliatory (second strike) capability. The American policy evolved since the 1950s keeping in mind the Soviet threat. Soviet nuclear doctrine had also argued along the lines of developing a deterrent capability.

20.4.2 The ABM Treaty

In 1969 the US and USSR initiated bilateral negotiations on possible restrictions on their strategic nuclear arsenals. One agreement concluded in the first phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) was the treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). The ABM Treaty (1972) prohibits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems for the defence of the territories of the United States or the Soviet Union. The treaty had provided for two specific areas where ABM systems can be deployed in the country, eventually, this was reduced to one area. The treaty prohibits the development, testing and deployment of mobile ABM systems and components, including those that are sea based, air based, land based or space based. Although the ABM Treaty had constrained the countries on ABM deployment, they continued their missile defence technology programmes. The Soviets tried to get around the treaty by constructing radar for ballistic missile detection and tracking in Siberia under the guise of space tracking. The US launched an ABM programme called the Strategic Defence Initiative in 1983 to provide a shield to protect the US from possible Soviet attacks.

20.4.3 SALT Agreement

The first SALT agreement on limiting offensive strategic arms was signed and came into force at the Moscow Summit of 1972 that finalised the ABM treaty. This agreement set limits on the number of strategic ballistic launchers of the US and USSR for a period of five years pending a comprehensive agreement. After the completion of five years the two countries agreed to continue to observe the provisions of the Interim Agreement of 1972 and also specified some more specific limitations on ICBMs and SLBMs. In subsequent negotiations the US and USSR adopted a new framework that permitted a long-term agreement on limits below the overall ceiling decided earlier. They set short term goals for more contentious issues and agreed to more far reaching goals to be achieved in the next phase of SALT agreements. This arrangement was to become the structure of the SALT II agreement signed in 1979. SALT II was not ratified due to the deterioration of the international situation following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

20.4.4 INF Treaty

The SALT agreements limited only the long range ground and sea based ballistic missiles. Both, the US and USSR continued to develop and deploy intermediate and shorter range missiles. By early 1980s the two countries initiated negotiations on this area. The main issue raised in the course of negotiations on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) concerned the types of delivery vehicles to be covered by the limitations, the geographic coverage of such limitations, the involvement of third countries and the stringency of verification measures. The INF treaty came to be signed in 1987 covering the intermediate range missiles and shorter-range missiles. This was applicable to all the American and Soviet missiles in Europe and Asia, but excluded

British and French armaments. The INF eliminated only a small fraction of nuclear delivery vehicles, yet the treaty is significant as it successfully eliminated an entire category of missile systems.

20.4.5 START Agreements

In 1991, after almost a decade of negotiations the US and USSR concluded a treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, subsequently called the START I Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) The treaty provides deep cuts into the arsenals of the two powers but unlike the INF does not provide for the elimination of any specific category of weapons systems. This treaty was followed by the START II agreement in 1993. It has been maintained that these agreements further reduce the risk of nuclear war because of the political impact of the dramatic cuts in the nuclear inventory of the superpowers. At one level it represents a cessation of a nuclear arms race between the US and Russia yet at another it retains nuclear forces with both that far exceed the levels which are deemed sufficient by advocates of a minimum nuclear deterrence.

Two points need to be made about the approaches of the US and the USSR about their position on nuclear arms limitation:

1. The central concerns that prompted the two countries to undertake series of negotiations on limiting and reducing their nuclear arsenals was the fear of a nuclear war that would be detrimental to the world at large. The core of these concerns was structured within the conceptual framework of deterrence that was the underlining principle of security for both the countries. These countries had thus built their security policies around centrality of nuclear weapons and would therefore have no incentive to move towards nuclear disarmament.
2. From a Third World perspective, therefore, the nuclear weapon states took a status quoist position on the world order based on capability of a nation state determined by its nuclear status. If the Third World countries wanted a space in the decision making apparatus of the world, they realised that they would have to get that space through a demonstration of a nuclear power capability.

20.5 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

20.5.1 Denuclearised Zones

The idea of establishing nuclear weapon free zones in populated areas of the world, as opposed to areas like the Antarctic, was conceived with a view to extend the purview of nuclear non-proliferation and ensure that new states do not go in for nuclear weapons. The motive was to remove the regional security pressures for the countries to opt for nuclear weapons. The NPT had encouraged the creation of such zones. These zones had another asset-they not only prevented the countries of the region from going nuclear, they also proscribed the entry of weapons in the area. While the former was met with a fair amount of success, it was always difficult to implement the latter objective.

Some of the prominent arrangements include the following:

- i) Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) covering the Latin American region.

- ii) Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) covering the South Pacific region
- iii) Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula (1992). South Korea had been a member of the NPT since 1975, while the North Koreans joined the NPT in 1985. In 1992 the two Koreas signed this agreement with an aim to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. However after North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 1993 this agreement has come into jeopardy.

20.5.2 India and Pakistan

The debates during the CTBT negotiations had identified India, Pakistan and Israel (the P- 3) as threshold powers that had the capability to produce a nuclear bomb. Some of the other countries of concern included Iraq and North Korea. South Africa, a country long identified as a capable power had joined the NPT just prior to the transition to a non-*apartheid* route, hence was taken off the list of countries to be concerned about. Following the Gulf War of 1991, the question of Iraq's compliance with the NPT has become a matter of grave concern for the nuclear powers. The efforts made to send a team of IAEA inspectors to verify the Iraqi compliance has met with resistance and the issue has now become a major international controversy. North Korea has also been put under severe pressure by the United States to ensure that it does not proceed with its nuclear weapons and missile development programmes. There is very little public debate on the Israeli position about nuclear weapons. Of these countries, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998 and declared themselves as nuclear weapon powers thus raising the debate on nuclear proliferation to a very different level.

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan had generated a great deal of debate on the rationale and implications of these actions taken by both the governments. Much of the debate focused on the security considerations of this action, the regional threat dimensions, internal political compulsions and the problem of proliferation. At one level these tests constitute a symbolism of the Third World defiance that seeks to challenge the post-Cold War order in international relations; at another they present a challenge to the policies of international nuclear non-proliferation.

Over the years the issue of nuclear and related technologies like space and electronics had come to symbolise the core of the developed world's *status quoist* agenda. The NPT regime with its multifarious dimensions like the Nuclear Suppliers group, MTCT, FMCT, etc. had sought to place the P-5 (Nuclear Powers) in a monopolistic managerial framework. The problem was compounded by the restraints placed on 'dual use' technologies. The key threats to national security as articulated by the technologically advanced countries of the developing world came to focus on these restraints of the G-7 regime. The first symbolic defiance of this restraint came in the form of the 1974 nuclear test at Pokhran. The 1974 test had a limited agenda. It presented its revisionist defiance in terms of technological competence of a Third World country. The international situation of the 1970s did not merit a demonstration of weapons capability. The labeling of the test as peaceful and the creation of resultant ambiguity in nuclear policy satisfied the technological and political requirements of an anti-*status quoist* approach.

The May 1998 tests represent this defiant independence at an age where the nuclear regime had become more stringent over the years. The indefinite extension of the NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for dual use technologies and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, represented the new era of global management. Given the thrust of the global agenda on the nuclear and related issues, the Third World defiance of this new order was bound to manifest in the area of nuclear technologies. The Iraqi and Korean efforts represent one kind of defiance. Their efforts were 'managed' and

a crisis (or threat) to the world order as perceived by the Developed World was averted. The Israeli method of quietly building a nuclear capability under the American umbrella represents another approach. The Indian demonstration of its independence came as a follow up to the earlier efforts of 1974.

The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 thus came to represent a demonstration of capabilities- technological and political. Technological capabilities were in the context of the denial of access to advanced technologies that India experienced over the years. The political capability represents the demonstration of political will of the elite to take on the G-7 regime. It is this reassertion of the ability to take independent decisions in face of anticipated sanctions that makes the nuclear test a symbol of a resurgent Third World. It is at that level that both, the Indian and Pakistani tests, demonstrate a commonality of approaches.

The problem of nuclear proliferation, it needs to be reiterated, did not start with the Indian test of 1974. It arose with the first atomic bomb dropped over Japan in 1945. The problem became complicated when the US monopoly of nuclear technology ended in the years that followed. The shifts in US policies and that of the other weapon states since have been aimed at keeping the number of nuclear weapon states within limits. In the 1960s the acuteness of this problem was recognised when an underdeveloped Third World country, China, entered the exclusive club of nuclear powers. The year 1968 therefore marks the first institutional step in the fight for exclusivity. The NPT regime created in 1968 has continued to retain its hold through the new Century. It has refused to acknowledge the two new states India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states under the ambit of the NPT definition.

20.6 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TODAY

The international nuclear non-proliferation regime has been subjected to severe stresses over the past decade. The Indian and Pakistani tests have been identified as major setbacks to the efforts at non-proliferation. Many had believed that the norm of nuclear non-proliferation had become almost universally accepted. No state had openly joined the nuclear club in several decades. The membership of the NPT had grown and it had now become a permanent agreement. The South Asian states had not been considered as ‘rogue’ states by the international community. One was a flourishing democracy, the other an old ally of the United States. These countries not only declared themselves nuclear, but also they asserted their aim of integrating these weapons into their military doctrines. This open nuclearisation was complicated by the situation in Iraq and North Korea.

If avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons is an objective of the weapon states, they have failed to implement their share of the responsibility. If at the end of the Cold War both the US and Russia had undertaken to reduce their own nuclear arsenal with vigour and a sense of purpose, this may have conveyed a more positive message for non-proliferation. Further, both Washington and Moscow need to devalue the nuclear weapons by downgrading their role in their own security policies. Until 2000 the Russians had embraced nuclear weapons in their military doctrine to compensate for the seriously weakened states of its conventional forces. The US continues to expand the rationale of its nuclear posture. NATO’s strategic concept asserts that the alliance views nuclear weapons as necessary for the indefinite future. From a non-proliferation point of view these claims are problematic.

The nuclear weapon states would have to consider the uses of security guarantees as a means for non-proliferation. It has been argued that the United States may have to take up the issue of such guarantees more seriously. Several of the proliferation trouble spots like Iraq, North

UNIT 11 EMERGING POWERS

Structure

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11.1 INTRODUCTION

Countries such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan and South Africa are; in some very significant ways, emerging powers in the international system of the post-Cold War era. Notably, these are all middle powers—defined and understood in various ways. Middle powers, as emerging powers in the post-Cold War period, are assuming new roles and using innovative diplomatic techniques in some very distinctive ways. At the same time, no doubt, these countries are facing numerous new challenges too.

The term 'emerging power' is quite subjective and even misleading. Middle power, no doubt a somewhat ambiguous and vague a term, nevertheless is used more objectively, and yields useful insights into the foreign policy priorities, diplomatic styles and position of such countries in the evolving international order. Therefore, it is from the middle power perspective that the emerging powers, listed in this Unit, have been discussed.

11.2 MIDDLE POWERS AS EMERGING POWERS: SOME DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

Middle power as a category suffers from normative defects. It is, therefore, difficult to define the term neatly. Since the concept is somewhat loose and problematic, scholars have used different criteria to define middle powers and have come up with different lists of countries that meet their respective criteria.

Adding to the problem is the fact that all middle powers do not behave in the same fashion. They have different resources, styles and contexts of their foreign policies. Besides, over a Period, countries may gain or lose their status and role as middle powers in the international system. Therefore, one should not put too much emphasis on the generic pattern of middle power behaviour.

Nonetheless, the framework remains useful in understanding the foreign policy priorities and behaviour of countries, which perceive themselves as middle powers and are so perceived by others also. The continued relevance of the framework can be gauged from the fact that the framework has withstood the transformative changes witnessed in the international system from the end of the Second World War to the end of Cold War and after.

11.3 MAJOR APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING MIDDLE POWERS

The subject of International Relations has for long dealt with the category of countries that are described as middle powers. Scholars and practitioners of diplomacy have defined middle powers generally in structural terms highlighting aspects of aggregate state power, location in the hierarchy of states, or idealist, normative influences in their foreign policies.

11.3.1 Importance of Position

It is most common to define a middle power by its *position* in the international hierarchy. In this view, middle powers are said to be those occupying the 'middle' point in a range of bigness and smallness—usually measured by reference to such quantifiable attributes as area, population, size, complexity and strength of the economy, military capability, and other comparable factors. In this first approach, middle powers are sometimes equated with medium or intermediate powers. However, such an approach has its own problems. Particularly, how to work out quantifiable measures of power? Nevertheless, such an approach clearly satisfies the need to differentiate between those states, which are not great powers but are not minor powers either.

11.3.2 Place of Geography

Others, by contrast, have suggested that middle powers are derived from a state's *geography*. A middle power, it is asserted, is a state physically located 'in the middle' between the system's great powers. The geographical approach has at least two variants. One suggests that a state, which is powerful within its geographical region, might usefully be thought of as a middle power. In this view, middle powers are actually regional powers. Another variant, common in the bipolar/Cold War period, suggested that middle powers are those, which occupy some kind of a 'middle' position, ideologically, between the polarised great powers. They generally included neutral and Non-aligned states—India, Sweden and Yugoslavia—in this category.

The criteria of *size* and *geography* have also been used to describe countries, which are regional powers. Regional powers are predominant in their respective sub-regions/regions but may not necessarily be middle powers. Being predominant, they are able to influence the course of events in their regions and, therefore, exhibit many middle power attributes. But one should not take all regional powers to be middle power.

11.3.3 Normative Approach

A third approach, and it is more widely accepted, is the *normative* view of middle powers. In this view, middle powers are seen as potentially wiser or more virtuous than states positioned either 'above' them (the great powers) or 'below' them (the minor powers). They are thought to be 'good international citizens'; especially middle powers such as Australia and Canada, which claim that their foreign policies are inspired and infused with 'liberal internationalism'.

In the *normative* view, middle powers are thought to be trustworthy because they can exert diplomatic influence without the likelihood of recourse to force. They also have a good past

record of conduct and contribution to the working of the international system, and thereby, they would also have earned some rights and credibility, including in the perception of the great powers. Because of this, countries located 'in the middle' are portrayed as taking their responsibilities in the creation and maintenance of global order seriously.

Such a view that ascribes certain norms to middle powers however has its own difficulties:

- i) Such middle powers may take high moral ground but their actual conduct does not always stand close scrutiny. Contrast, for example, Australian and Canadian rhetoric on Kuwait's sovereignty in the Gulf conflict of 1991 with their silence on Indonesia's invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975. They may have the 'arrogance of no power' and end up taking very rigid stands, which certainly is not the essence of inter-state relations.
- ii) A second difficulty with the *normative* approach is that it tends to exclude a wide variety of states, which might reasonably claim membership in the rank of the middle powers according to other criteria. Their proclaimed idealism and virtuosity alone cannot be the normative basis of middle power category.
- iii) One also notices that such like-minded 'good international citizens' are all developed northern states of middle size—Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden—rather than a broader range of states that might include such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Nigeria or Poland.

11.4 BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH

It is argued, therefore, that the essence of middle power diplomatic activity is captured best by emphasising, not by what this group of countries should be doing but what type of diplomatic behaviour they do, or could, display in common. This fourth approach, the *behavioural*, pays more attention to particular behaviours associated with middle powers. According to this approach, middle powers strongly pursue multilateral solutions to international problems. They embrace compromise and work to build consensual positions in international disputes. They uphold values of 'good international citizenship' to guide their diplomacy. Importantly, and above all, their behaviour is guided by a belief in their technical and entrepreneurial ability to fulfil such roles. The noted Canadian diplomat and scholar, W. H. Holmes has described it as the 'functional' resources for effective performance of middle power roles.

11.4.1 General Attributes of Middle Power Behaviour

To recapitulate the discussion, it is clear that there is not one scientific definition of middle power. Also, all middle powers do not always behave in the same fashion. It also needs to become clear that middle power behaviour has been far from static in nature. As the international system has changed, we have seen dramatic modifications in the behaviour of these states. One cannot also ascribe any permanence to middle powers: countries do gain and lose middle power characteristics.

Yet, there remains something notable about their foreign policies and their conduct in the international system. Let us therefore examine, who are the middle powers? How do they behave and why they behave in the way they behave?

- 1) Middle powers are not great powers, not because they do not have the military capabilities or the economic strength of the great powers. In reality, in terms of size, military capability or economic development level, a middle power may not be different from a great power.

But they are not small powers either. Countries perceive themselves as middle powers and position **themselves** in the international system so as to view it differently, rather independently. This they do, so as to mark their presence in international affairs; and, importantly, not to leave the international system to the vagaries of the great powers.

- 2) Middle powers are **multilateralists**. At its core, the concept of middle power diplomacy signifies a certain type and a certain content of foreign policy based on an attachment to multilateral institutions and a collaborative world order. A middle power does not view itself to be effective if working alone. Working through multilateral institutions or in a small group of states: **middle powers** are capable of systemic impact. The **term** evokes caution, **equivocalness**, and issue-specific activism, even leadership. It calls for an agile and flexible **form** of statecraft on top of a **firm** sense of international **commitment**. Middle powers have, so to say, their 'own ways of doing things'; their strength lies in pursuing **accommodation**, **consensus** and **voluntarism**. They are multilateralists and 'good international **citizens**', though not necessarily always. Only in a norms-based multilateral international system, middle powers **can** play their due roles and check the arbitrary and unilateral **tendencies** of the great powers. In some very important ways, middle powers thus challenge the notion that power alone is or could be the basis of international relations.
- 3) Middle powers are 'functional' powers. The principle of 'functionalism' means that middle powers have comparative advantage in certain specific areas. They have requisite resources and skills in select areas, where they can make a difference in the functioning of the **international system**. **Admittedly**, these resources and specialised skills are not **uniform** to all the middle powers; nor do they remain constant. These resources and skills could be, for instance, in the area of international peacekeeping, mediation, dc.

In other words, by **working** upon their comparative advantage, middle powers contribute in their own distinct ways, what even great powers cannot, to the international system. The 'functional' middle powers are able to check the unilateral tendencies and coercive behaviour, generally associated with the foreign policy of big powers. Their middle range capabilities allow them to pursue, what today is called, 'niche diplomacy'. They are good in international coalition building because they carry a certain weight and credibility in the international system. Since they are unlikely to subordinate their coalition partners to their own ends, they make acceptable leaders. They pursue 'niche **diplomacy**' because they have the credibility with the weak and the powerful alike. Even great powers on occasions rely on middle powers for their credibility and mediatory skills.

Theoretically, even small powers could have issue-specific comparative advantage; but middle powers are capable of holding on to their own in the international system dominated by great powers. Besides, they are able to marshal necessary sources to back up their **commitments**. Middle powers do not suffer capability-commitment gap, which small powers generally do. In short, middle powers are invariably committed to broadening and maximising, what is called, the 'Grotian perspective' in international politics—promoting rule of law, dialogue and consensus building, etc.

11.4.2 Concluding Observations on Middle Powers

Based on the above: scholars have pointed out other roles which are common in varying degrees to all middle powers: roles of regional/sub-regional leadership, functional leadership, role as **system stabilisers**, negative roles as 'first followers' and 'fence sitters', and roles as 'good international **citizens**'. Other scholars have also differentiated middle powers in terms of their ability to keep distance from major power conflicts; a degree of autonomy in their foreign

policies from major powers; support for international status quo and stability; and a commitment to gradual reform of the international system.

In sum, one may say that 'middlepowermanship'—to use an expression coined by W. H. Holmes—is a set of behaviour. Better described, it is a *process* that is always responding to the emerging exigencies. In that way, middle powers have been there in all ages and in all kinds of international system. The concept of middle power, no gainsaying, remains somewhat elusive. W. H. Holmes has suggested that the term should remain ambiguous, somewhat 'mystical', and for right reasons. The ambiguity enables middle powers to suitably modify their roles, and advance their perceived political objectives and diplomatic style in the international system.

One needs also to accept that middle powers behave in all sorts of ways. Roles associated with them are performed by all sorts of states—super powers, great powers, upper middle powers and lower middle powers: regional and sub-regional powers, and small powers—and, no matter, in whatever other manner international hierarchy is described. Nonetheless, what is obvious is that middle powers cannot do some of the things that the great powers can do; in the same way they do certain things that smaller powers cannot.

It is said that 'middlepowermanship' is a role always in search of an actor; and scores of states have in different periods and circumstances scripted the role differently for themselves. In the end, middle powers may not have the strength of a giant, they have the skills of a dancer; and they will continue to perform those roles whatever be the shape of the international system.

11.5 MIDDLE POWERS IN THE ERA OF COLD WAR

In the immediate post-1945 era, most middle powers were very much in support of the international order, which was established and underwritten by American hegemony. Most middle powers were aligned rather than non-aligned with US and depended on US security umbrella. They were active members of various alliances such as NATO. Of all the countries under discussion here, only China and India had responded differently. India's Non-aligned policy seriously questioned the great power domination and politics of bloc formation.

Aligned or non-aligned, middle powers invariably stood by the UN system. A strengthened UN system could alone ensure compliance with international norms, reduce the over-bearing presence of great powers; and promote norms of cooperation, consensus and negotiations. In other words, all these countries, true to their middle power vocation, were multilateralists. Only through a strong UN system, they could make a difference in the functioning of the international system. The foreign policy of India was also directed at, in cooperation with Non-aligned and other developing countries, strengthening the UN system. Among these countries, only the mainland China looked at its own position differently. In the first place, it was kept out of UN, being represented by Taiwan for long. Besides, it was always determined to emerge, and be recognised, as a great power. An element of defiance was always part of its foreign policy as the Western alliance sought its isolation.

The tight bipolarity and the Cold War conflict had a constraining effect on middle power diplomacy. With the international agenda dominated by geopolitical-security issues, middle powers had little room for maneuverability. Those which were alliance partners such as Australia and Canada were often the 'first followers' of US; others like Japan, restrained by its treaty obligations, showed reluctance to lead independently. Non-aligned countries such as India alone showed independence. Non-alignment was however so much rhetoric; at best, it tried to build an international opinion against the bloc politics. Be that as it may, for the most part, middle

powers were making efforts only to ease the global tensions; and, through peacekeeping and arms control etc., tried to avert the possibility of the outbreak of another world war.

In quite a number of instances, the role adopted by middle powers encompassed mediatory activity between antagonistic Cold War blocs. In particular, countries such as India, under Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, and Sweden frequently engaged in this type of inter-bloc diplomatic activity. Aligned middle powers such Canada and Australia had more often tended to focus more on intra-bloc relations. They were defusing tensions between bloc members; for instance Canada defused the crisis that had developed between US on one hand and Britain and France on the other during the Suez crisis of 1956. Canada and Australia had also urged restraint to the alliance leader during the Korean and Vietnam wars; and resisted US tendency towards isolationism. A considerable amount of attention was paid by most of the middle powers to mediation and conflict resolution with respect to regional 'brushfires'. Here, they were often involved in peacekeeping roles in various parts of the world.

This is not to suggest that middle powers had only limited role and left no impact on the international system. Particularly aligned middle powers on occasions did prevail upon US and indeed were 'able to lead the elephant'. Cases of this nature however remained more atypical and were restricted to instances in which the US itself was basically willing to be reined in. What came out more glowingly is the role of these countries in defusing regional crisis and participate in UN peacekeeping activities. Non-aligned middle powers also had an impact in strengthening the functioning of the UN General Assembly and away from the great power-dominated Security Council. These were feeble but laudable attempts in democratising the functioning of the world body.

11.6 'RELOCATION' OF THE IDEA OF MIDDLE POWER AND EMERGING POWERS

Scholars and specialists of international relations nearly concur that especially in periods of major transitions and flux in the international system, middle powers' activism becomes more pronounced. They are able to utilise their resources and skills in reshaping and reordering the international system away from great power domination and towards a somewhat 'democratised' order. They are able to bring in more of their values of coalition- and consensus building and rule of law. This has been said, for example, of the period immediately after 1945. It has also been true of the détente years of the early and the mid-1970s; and it is being reiterated for the period in the aftermath of Cold War.

Some far-reaching political and economic changes are taking place in the present international system. In the changing international system, the idea of middle power can be 'relocated' to more usefully capture the importance and the role of emerging powers under discussion here.

- 1) The very definition of leadership is in flux. As against a more structurally determined definition that prevailed after 1945, economic globalisation and interdependence have now put a premium on the technical and entrepreneurial definition of leadership. In place of power structures as the basis of leadership (rather hegemony), there is recognition of the 'role of agents' in the explanations of the world politics.
- 2) Especially when analysing question of international cooperation in an era of uncertainty, there is recognition of the role that less powerful states may play in the process of cooperation building. Wherever the principle of power is being challenged by the necessity and reality of interdependence, middle powers have new windows of opportunity opened to them in the international system.

- 3) In the evolving world order, the number of actors—both state and non-state—has also increased. Significantly, these actors are both international systemic and domestic, who are capable of exercising non-structural leadership.
- 4) The number of issue areas where non-structural leadership is forthcoming and is, in fact, required, has also grown. Changes and challenges in the international economic and political order are such that they are not amenable to the unrestrained influence of great powers. It is being said that 'games of skills' are replacing 'tests of will'. What it all means is that while structural leadership by the great powers remains the most important source of initiative, other categories of leadership can also be significant in catalysing the processes of reform and change, especially those requiring considerable cooperation and collaboration.
- 5) Such roles may be better performed by appropriately qualified middle powers in ways different from the past pattern. At the core of such assertion is the changing nature of the international agenda. The salience of new issues of environment, economic cooperation in fact does not lend itself to structural leadership easily. In other words, the structural power as the basis of domination-subordination has declined and is being replaced by qualities of leadership that attract followers on some sound bases of principles.

The assumption of an emerging multi-polar world, it is granted, is very ambiguous. One can assume that US will continue to have a central role but the influence of other centres of structural powers viz. EU and Japan will also grow. Along with these centres of structural power, there would also be non-structural powers and actors—be they middle powers or non-state entities. They will also be a source of leadership—a leadership that is based on persuasion and not force.

Since the nature of both leadership and followership is changing, a theoretical reconsideration of middle power behaviour is in order. In other words, in the changed international circumstances of today, the idea of middle power is in need of 'relocation'. There is a hiatus in the structural leadership, and this gap is being filled by the middle powers. And this is what precisely is making them emerging powers. Besides, developed economies of US and, more so, of EU countries and Japan themselves are facing increasing exposure to the vagaries of economic globalisation, demonstrating thereby the degree to which interdependence has deepened in the international system. The middle powers feel even more acutely the impact of this increased interdependence. In other words, there are both opportunities and constraints for middle powers to suitably modify and enhance their roles.

The fact that the idea of middle power is getting 'relocated' is evident since the 1980s. Adapting to new circumstances, middle powers have become increasingly quick and flexible in responding not only to some new conditions and circumstances but in taking different forms of initiatives in policy terms. While growing interdependence has thrown up more challenges and exposed these states to greater vulnerabilities, it has also provided new windows of opportunity (perhaps, more windows of necessity). It seems clear that middle powers have greater freedom of action thrust upon them in terms of their diplomacy. Numerous middle powers are now looking for ways to assert themselves, tending to adopt forms of creative action when confronted with the altered circumstances or demands. Deepening of interdependence apart, two other factors have worked to reinforce the ability and willingness of middle powers to adopt a more activist, initiative-oriented approach in the international arena. First is the change in the global agenda from 'high' policy issues of military-security to the 'second' and 'third' agendas of economic cooperation and social/ environmental issues. The shift in the international agenda has altered perceptions and definitions of 'national interest' and 'national security'. A second factor impelling middle power activism is the accentuated intermeshing of domestic politics with foreign policy.

With 'second' and 'third' agenda issues increasingly in command, internal societal forces are more involved in 'domestic' issues having international ramifications; and in those 'international' issues which have a spill-over into national arena. For middle powers, foreign policy therefore has become a 'two-level game'. A classic case of this type is the protectionist policies on textiles practised by a number of industrialised middle powers including Australia and Canada; or the question of protecting agricultural sector in India from WTO rules. In sum, middle power behaviour in the 1990s has become not only more segmented but also more multifaceted. Now, middle power leadership on issues of 'second' and 'third' agendas is not and cannot be based on the classical notion of power. Nor can it be based on great economic capability of the sort, for instance, possessed by Japan. Rather, middle power leadership and initiative-taking will have to be based on non-structural forms of power; and on the influence associated with the imaginative and energetic use of their diplomatic skills. Middle powers are engaged as never before in complex political and economic activities for building new regional and international strategic communities, encompassing aspects of both economic cooperation and political security.

11.6.1 Categorisation of Middle Power Activities

To schematise the emergent pattern of middle powers, noted scholars—Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal—have attempted mapping out categories of action. A middle power approach to diplomacy emphasises entrepreneurial flair and technical competence in the pursuit of diplomatic activities. Not only this diplomacy is devoted to building consensus and cooperation on issue specific agendas, it is invariably differentiated and has an important temporal element as well. Consequently, an itemised pattern of middle power behaviour—changing over time—can be set out as:

- 1) **Catalyst:** Entrepreneurial middle powers may act as catalyst with respect to a diplomatic effort, providing the intellectual and political energy to trigger an initiative and, in that sense, take the lead in gathering followers around it.
- 2) **Facilitator:** In the early and middle stages, the focus may be on agenda setting. The actor/s would be a facilitator/s for some form of associational, collaborative, and coalitional activity. Coalition building on issue-specific questions is a central technique of middle power leadership, which otherwise do not have the structural power of the great. Coalitions are a means of leveraging power. This kind of task entails planning, convening and hosting of formative meetings, setting priorities and drawing up rhetorical declarations and manifesto.
- 3) **Manager:** A third stage would be that of a manager with a heavy emphasis on institution building. In its broadest sense, institution building includes not only the creation of formal organisations and regimes but also the development of conventions and norms. Central to institution building is a work programme that establishes a division of labour, the development of monitoring activity, and possibly the establishment of a secretariat or bureaucracy. This managerial stage also requires the development of confidence building measures and facilities for dispute resolution in which trust and credibility are built up. Confidence building also seeks to alleviate misunderstandings and misperceptions through liaison efforts, shuttle diplomacy, and the use of alternative formal and informal fora, the creation of transparency, and other means to push a given process forward. In addition, this activity can be complemented by a push to demonstrate the relevance or importance of the initiative by operationalising some of the more practical—and depoliticised—proposals and programmes.

These three main roles depend on collection of data, which often requires technical skills: which the middle powers, possess in good deal. Such technical skills are no doubt possessed

more by the great powers but they are invariably occupied with larger agendas than do middle powers for whom one international issue looms so large that they devote larger proportion of their time, energy and resources to it. This is precisely what is meant by 'niche diplomacy'.

By way of caution, one should not overestimate the magnitude of this form of initiatives in international relations. The influence of middle powers varies issue by issue, by institutional arena, and by the openness and receptivity to initiatives from other sources.

In the end, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the international relations still remain based largely on structural power: and the influence of middle powers in agenda setting and policy coordination remains constrained by structural factors.

11.6.2 Observations on Some of the Emerging Powers

As has been noted earlier, most of middle powers under discussion here are being described as emerging powers for their ability to raise a variety of issues, form and lead coalitions of the like-minded countries around specific issues, and work towards the reform of the international system along democratic and equitable lines. In many different ways, middle powers are engaged in all kinds of agendas. Middle power framework is said to be a 'made-in-Canada' framework. The liberal internationalist middle power Canada has had its comparative advantage in areas such as international peacekeeping, mediation and 'quiet diplomacy'. In recent years, it has successfully employed its coalition-building and other skills in areas such as the international treaty banning the anti-personnel landmines and the establishment of the International Criminal Court.

Another self-perceived liberal internationalist middle power is Australia. Given the medium size of its economy and military capabilities, this middle power has, since the 1970s, developed and deployed a multilateralist approach so as to remain actively engaged in building consensus on matters of political-security and economic cooperation in the highly complex Asia Pacific region. Australia's initiative in the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and its policy of 'engagement with Asia' in the 1990s are the foremost examples of a middle power seeking to build a strategic community in the region. Australia and Canada, the two major resource export-dependent economies, have also been instrumental in the creation of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries. The Cairns Group consists of both developed and developing economies that are adversely affected by the agricultural policies of protectionism and subsidies followed by EU, and US and is therefore working for a non-discriminatory trading system in agriculture.

Middle powers are not necessarily regional powers. But when they are, as for instance is the case with Brazil, India, and South Africa: they exercise considerable influence over their respective sub-regions. Of all the Latin American countries, national capabilities make Brazil a middle power. It is one of the emerging markets of the 1990s, in the same way as it was labeled a newly industrialising country (NICs) or an advanced industrialising country (ADC) middle power in the 1970s. Its preoccupation with economic development process has enabled it to behave more as a regional power that is keen to engage the neighbouring countries in economic cooperation through, for example, the South Cone Common Market (Mercosur), while holding on to a moderate consensual political position. At the international level too, it has opted for a foreign policy of 'interested neutralism' while seeking to promote its economic and trade interests.

A developing middle power, India has had its skills proved and tested in its leadership of the Non-aligned Movement in the 1950s and the 1960s. It is a multilateralist middle power with

comparative advantage in peacekeeping and **mediatory diplomacy**. It has a complex strategic scenario in South Asia and beyond, which **made** it take the time-tested route of **becoming** a nuclear power to ensure its own security. In the 1990s, the country has been engaged in a series of complex strategic dialogues practically with all the major and emerging powers. Its diplomacy is sophisticated and its credibility in the international system makes it a natural coalition leader of like-minded countries on specific issues. The size, its economic riches, and **geo-strategic** location make South Africa a middle power. However, its ability to lead issue-specific coalitional patterns in the African continent is strongly dependent on its ability to become a multi-racial and a multi-cultural democratic society.

Japan's political role never corresponded to its economic might during the Cold War era. Although Japan as the world's largest creditor and aid giver had tremendous economic power, there have been only few signs that Tokyo is prepared to exercise agenda-based leadership. Its priorities have primarily been of avoiding risks and dangers. In contrast to the activism displayed by more skilful middle powers, its diplomatic **approach** remained exceedingly cautious and reactive in nature. Far from taking the lead on specific issues, it tended to hold back and let other actors do the running. International expectations and **the** decline in its economic strength in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1998 are now making it accept greater **responsibilities** for international peace and security. **Some** of the skills that have been utilised by other emerging powers are only now being learnt by Japan. As **compared** to others, China never **perceived** itself nor, interestingly, it was perceived by the Western world as a middle power. In the Western perception, it always had the potential of a great power. An emerging economic powerhouse, it is argued that China, once it is **fully** developed, is capable of exercising political influence on a much larger Asia Pacific region and would reorder Asia Pacific region in a very different way.

11.7 SUMMARY

Conventional approaches of size and position, geography and norms have limitations in understanding the foreign policy conduct of middle powers, which are the emerging powers in **contemporary** international relations.

Middle powers do not necessarily behave in the same fashion. However, one finds that they are invariably always multilateralist. They have comparative advantage in certain areas where using their expertise and skills they can and do make a difference in the **functioning** of the international system.

Their preferences for politics of consensus, coalition building, peacekeeping and their distinctive specialisations in mediatory diplomacy enable **them** to impact the international system in some major ways. By their presence in the **international** system, they question the principle of power being the basis of international relations. By their activism, they make the system remain based on international legal and moral norms.

Cold War **had** a constraining effect on **middle** powers. In the post-Cold War period and in the era of **economic globalisation**, most **middle** powers are being described as emerging powers. The very concept of **middle** power has undergone **modification**, rather relocation' as structural changes in the international system and rise of new agenda items is allowing middle powers to not only assume new roles but also pursue them in very different and innovative **manners**. They are filling up the leadership void, and also providing a leadership that is technical and entrepreneurial and **not** based on power. Their activism is deepening the conditions of **interdependence** in the emerging multipolar and 'democratising' world order.

11.8 EXERCISES

- 1) Briefly describe the main approaches for understanding the middle powers.
- 2) Identify the principal behavioural aspects of middle power diplomacy.
- 3) Explain 'good international citizenship' and multilateralism.

UNIT 12 REGIONAL GROUPINGS

Structure

- 12.1 Introduction
- 12.2 Historical Background
- 12.3 Theory
 - 12.3.1 Functionalism and Neo-functionalism
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12.1 INTRODUCTION

What is regionalism? In simple terms, it may be defined as the formation of inter-state groupings. Traditionally, regional organisations were divided into two broad categories, one involving regional economic integration such as the European Common Market (ECM) and the other politically evolved regional security organisations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). With the onset of the process of globalisation, regionalism too has gained further momentum in the past decade or so. The end of Cold War and with it the erosion of the Cold War alliance systems seem to have given a boost to the political salience of regionalism. What is more the recent resurgence in regionalism is not only diverse but also global in nature. It spans across the traditional divide of developed and developing countries encompassing a variety of objectives—political: economic and security—all at the same time.

12.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Very few regional groupings existed before the Second World War. The great international upheavals of the 1930s and 1940s followed by demolition of the European imperial order and the decolonisation of most parts of the world led to a surge towards regional groupings. The first reference to regionalism was made: in the preliminary draft of the United Nations Charters underlining the role of regional bodies for dealing with peace and security of the world.

In the early years of the Cold War, the collective security mechanism of the UN system was not very effective because many of the selective regional security arrangements—such as the

NATO, Warsaw Pact, South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), Australia-New Zealand-United States security arrangement (ANZUS) and the Organisation of American States (OAS)—had sub-served the interests of one or the other Super Powers. Around the same time, a number of loosely-knit regional economic groups such as the ECM and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) cluttered the world map. Alongside, the decolonised countries of Africa and Asia (and eventually the countries of Latin America) evolved themselves into groups both inside and outside the United Nations—the Group of 77 (C-77) and the group of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) countries in an attempt to bargain collectively with the industrially advanced countries. These mushrooming of regional structures and organisations yielded place to a number of sub-regional groupings within and laterally across the continents. Such of these regional organisations include importantly the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN in 1967), Andean Common Market (ANCOM in 1972), Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM in 1973), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS in 1975), South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC in 1985), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC in 1981), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC in 1985).

The efficacy of many of these regional organisations was largely limited either because of the rigours of the super power Cold War or because the countries that integrated regionally could not for long sustain the process. Lack of political consensus together with the economic disparity between countries largely led the dissolution or modification of the existing regional arrangements.

Notwithstanding the setbacks that regional organisations had experienced in the past, in recent years, as has been mentioned earlier, regionalism and effort towards structuring regional organisations have come to the fore. There are those who attribute the resurgence of regionalism as a direct consequence of the end of the Cold War as much as there are those who see this trend as the penultimate phase towards globalisation describing regional organisations as building blocks for ushering in an integrated global order.

12.3 THEORIES OF REGIONALISM

Scholarly discourses suggest a number of theories on regionalism. Let us briefly acquaint ourselves with some of the more important theoretical approaches to regionalism such as 1. Functionalism and Neo-functionalism; 2. Kealist; 3. Liberal inter-governmentalist; 4. Constructivist; and 5. Multi-level governance.

12.3.1 Functionalism and Neo-functionalism

The Functionalism theory is factored on two components—i) the power of society based on the role of interest groups, professional associations, producer groups and labour unions and cultural and scientific organisations which push for regional integration by providing a supporting societal base and ii) the supra-national institutions which provide political organisation and capacity to mobilise interests and access to policymaking influence. Together, the Functionalists argue, they contribute to regionalism.

Neo-functionalism consists of three components—i) Background conditions; ii) Process conditions; and iii) Conditions that encourage/discourage task expansion.

- i) Background conditions: Regional integration would occur first among countries with a certain domestic environment. It would occur in liberal democratic countries with capitalist economies, differentiated social structures and pluralistic interest group structures. Here, ethnic rivalries and class conflicts would be less intense and would gain from expansion of capitalism to the regional level.

- ii) Process conditions: Regional integration would occur in countries with dense networks of economic exchange, trade, labour migrations, tourism and free flows of productive factors.
- iii) Conditions that encourage/discourage task expansion: These conditions are those that are a spill-over with linkages among different sectors serving as transmission belts of integration e.g., increased regional trade may mean increased coordination of monetary/fiscal policy.

12.3.2 Realism

The theory of Realism underscores that the preferences of states (including preferences for integration) are determined by their position in the international distribution of power. So, it is not the nature of societal groups and attributes of states and similarities among countries that matter. On the other hand, what matters is the placement of the states in the international distribution of power. Yet, when states join a regional union, they do commit to cooperation with stable membership over a long period of time. Accordingly, the Realists claim that in the bi-polar power distribution during the Cold War what encouraged deep integration within Europe to evolve the European Economic Community (EEC) was that the constituent member states were also members of NATO.

12.3.3 Liberal Inter-governmentalism

Whereas the theory of Neo-functionalism is premised on transnational society and supranational institutions, the proponents of Liberal inter-governmentalism place the nation-states at the centre of analysis. To them the force of economic and social interest groups is funnelled through the domestic political process. Interest aggregation, intergovernmental bargaining and enforcement of decisions are crucial. Leaders of countries must then take societal interests (as well as their own) into the international negotiating forum and bargain to achieve favourable results that are acceptable to their foreign counterparts and domestic constituencies. As opposed to the Neo-functionalism approaches, the introduction of states representing both their own institutional interests as well as the interests of their constituents, as emphasised by the liberal-intergovernmentalism, provides a more accurate picture of regional integration than one exclusively based on social forces and supranational entrepreneurs.

12.3.4 Constructivism

Limited largely to Western Europe, the theory of Constructivism is based more on the role of ideas, norms and identities as opposed to material factors in the integration process. Human thought, ideas and agency are seen as crucial to the explanation of the international order. The Constructivists argue that norms are simply constraints and they become constitutive of agents. Constructivism in a sense provides a bridge between ideational, material and institutional realms. It allows a better understanding of 'how' and 'why' the process of integration takes place and thereby provides a point of convergence with rational choice analysis.

A major drawback of the Constructivist approach is that unlike the afore-mentioned theories such as realism and inter-governmentalism, it has not yet reached a stage of shared theoretical principles or common research strategies.

12.3.5 Multi-level Governance

On the basis of the process of regional integration of Europe having now attained the status of European Union (EU), the focus is shifting from considering EU as a system of multi-level governance. This shift gains relevance as EU makes the transition from a decentralised system

of states to a vertically **and** horizontally integrated system. The main idea of multi-level governance is that neither the EU **nor the member states** enjoy a monopoly of power **and** decision-making. The member states interact with one another and with private actors as part of a complex system of multi-level governance. **Here one** has to take into account levels above and below the state. In contrast to a state-centric model in which influences are **funnelled** through the state, here interest groups **may** outflank the state. Thus a multi-level governance approach expands the range of relevant actors, interconnects the political arenas and economic actors and has multi-levels of decision-making mechanisms.

12.4 ECONOMIC GROUPINGS

Speaking of regional economic groupings or units, attention is usually focussed on the **formation** of preferential trading arrangements between groups of countries **within** a geographic region known as 'trading blocs'. Economic regionalism in principle also extends from goods and market integration or common markets between neighbours, policy integration like economic and monetary unions to complete economic and political union. An economic regional grouping would have a set of preferential policies **aimed** at encouragement of the **exchange** of goods and /or factors of production between **members** of the group.

Global economic changes have accentuated the raised level of regional awareness. For many countries, economic marginalisation **represents** a greater threat than does the sense of security **marginalisation** that accompanied the **end** of the bipolar world system. In a sense, it was the economic **marginalisation** that acted as a catalyst to the European nation-states to **evolve** the European **Community** (EC). The deepening of economic integration in Europe in turn impacted favourably on the regional economic integration process elsewhere as **can** be seen in groupings like Arab Maghreb Union, Andean Group (AG), South-cone American **Common Market** (Mercosur) and ASEAN. All these regional groups committed the **member countries** at least on paper towards the creation of a **common** market within a certain time frame. Again, it was the fear of exclusion that led the countries in Latin America to organise themselves into regional **common markets**.

Economic regionalism also made a comeback with the **beginning** of negotiations on a Free Trade Area between USA and Canada and the passing of the Single European Act in 1986. It then **moved** to developing countries in Latin America and Africa. This was soon followed by widening of the European Community and the creation of the European Economic Area (EEA) with EFTA and the extension of the Canada-USA FTA to Mexico to create the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Finally, after a long time, Asia Pacific **economic** regionalism began to emerge. The major economic groupings currently **functional** in the world are the following: North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in North America; Mercosur in Latin America; European Community (EU) in Europe; and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Asia Pacific.

12.4.1 NAFTA

In January 1994, Canada, the United States and Mexico launched the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and formed the world's largest free trade area. Designed to foster increased trade and investment among the partners, the NAFTA envisages an **ambitious** schedule for tariff elimination and reduction of non-tariff barriers, as well as **comprehensive** provisions on the conduct of business in the **free** trade area. These include disciplines on the regulation

of investment, services, intellectual property, competition and the temporary entry of business persons. As of 1 January 1998 virtually all Canada-US trade became tariff-free. Some tariffs remain in place for certain products in Canada's supply-managed sectors (e.g. dairy and poultry), as well as sugar, dairy, peanuts and cotton in the United States.

Since the NAFTA entered into force, the Canadian economy has grown by an annual average of 3.8 per cent, keeping Canada in the lead among the 6-7 countries. This healthy growth has translated into the creation of close to 2.1 million jobs, representing an increase of 16 per cent over pre-NAFTA employment levels. Since the establishment of the NAFTA on 1 January 1994, total trade and investment between Canada, Mexico and the United States have steadily increased each year. Canada's merchandise trade with the United States reached US\$ 588.7 billion in 2000. Two-way merchandise trade between Canada and Mexico has doubled since 1994 and reached US\$ 14.1 billion in 2000. In terms of Canada's total merchandise exports, 86.6 per cent go to the NAFTA partners.

The NAFTA provides for virtually all tariffs to be eliminated on trade in originating goods between Canada and Mexico by 1 January 2003. A third round of "accelerated" tariff reductions was implemented in January 2001. Mexican tariffs were eliminated on certain pharmaceuticals, chemicals and batteries, representing close to US\$ 207 million in bilateral trade. As of January 2001, Mexican tariffs on Canadian products range between 0 and 4 per cent, with a few higher tariffs remaining on certain agricultural products subject to tariff-rate quotas (mainly corn, barley and dry edible beans) and on dairy and poultry products.

Under the NAFTA, Canadian producers are better able to realise their full potential by operating in a larger, more integrated and efficient North American economy. Canadian manufacturers are able to access tariff free, highest-quality intermediate goods from across North America in the production of final goods for export. Consumers benefit from this heightened competition and integrated marketplace with better prices, greater choice of products and higher-quality goods and services.

Improved access to NAFTA markets, together with the existence of clear rules on trade and investment, has increased Canada's attractiveness to foreign and domestic investors. Total foreign direct investment into Canada reached US\$ 292 billion in 2000, more than 64 per cent of which comes from NAFTA partners. Foreign direct investment into Canada from the United States increased to US\$ 186 billion in 2000, while investment from Mexico reached US\$ 132 million. Canadian direct investment in the NAFTA countries has also increased, reaching US\$ 154 billion into the United States in 2000, a 127 per cent increase over the 1993 level, and US\$ 3.2 billion into Mexico, more than six times the pre-NAFTA level.

12.4.2 EU

The European Union (EU) is a unique, treaty-based institutional framework that defines and manages economic and political cooperation among its fifteen European member countries. The Union is the latest stage in a process of integration begun in the 1950s by six countries—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—whose leaders signed the original treaties establishing various forms of European integration. These treaties gave life to the novel concept that, by creating communities of shared sovereignty in matters of coal and steel production, trade, and nuclear energy, another war in Europe would be unthinkable. While common EU policies have evolved in a number of other sectors since then, the fundamental goal of the Union remains the same: to create an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.

Economic integration was launched in the wake of Second World War, as a devastated Western Europe sought to rebuild its economy. On 9 May 1950, French foreign minister Robert Schuman announced a plan, conceived by French businessman-turned-advisor, Jean Monnet that called pooling European coal and steel production under a common authority. The Schuman Declaration was regarded as the first step toward achieving a united Europe—an ideal that in the past had been pursued only by force. Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands accepted the French proposal and signed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty in Paris on April 1951. The Six set up the ECSC High Authority, to which member governments transferred portions of their sovereign powers. Coal and steel trade among the Six increased by 129 per cent over the next five years.

Encouraged by the success, the Six pursued integration in the military and political fields. When these efforts were derailed, European leaders decided to continue the unification of Europe on the economic front alone. A historic meeting in Messina, Italy, in June 1955, launched the negotiation of two treaties to establish:

- A European Economic Community (EEC) to merge separate national markets into a single market that would ensure the free movement of goods, people, capital, and services with a wide range of common economic policies; and
- A European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or EURATOM) to further the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Membership to the Union was open to any European country with a stable democratic government, a good human rights record, a properly functioning market economy, and sound macroeconomic policies. Membership seeking countries must also have the capacity to fulfill and implement existing EU laws and policies (known as the *acquis communautaire*). Four enlargements have already taken place: Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the original six European Community members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands) in 1973. Greece joined in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. Austria, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the European Union on January 1, 1995. Norway had also negotiated and signed an accession treaty in 1994, but Norwegian voters narrowly rejected membership in a referendum. The European Union is currently preparing for a fifth enlargement to more than twenty-five member states.

12.4.3 ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five founder member countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. The ASEAN region today has a population of about 500 million, a total area of 4.5 million square kilometers with a combined gross domestic product of US\$737 billion, and a total trade of US\$ 720 billion.

The ASEAN Declaration states that the aims and purposes of the Association are: (i) to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations, and (ii) to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The highest decision-making organ of ASEAN is the Meeting of the ASEAN Heads of State and Government held each year. The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting also held on an annual basis

deliberates on a number sectors such as agriculture and forestry, economics, energy, environment, finance, information, investment, labour, law, regional haze, rural development and poverty alleviation, science and technology, social welfare, transnational crime, transportation, tourism, youth, the AIA Council and, the AFTA Council. Supporting these ministerial bodies are 29 committees of senior officials and 122 technical working groups. To support the conduct of ASEAN's external relations, ASEAN has established committees composed of heads of diplomatic missions in the following capitals: Brussels, London, Paris, Washington D.C., Tokyo, Canberra, Ottawa, Wellington, Geneva, Seoul, New Delhi, New York, Beijing, Moscow, and Islamabad. ASEAN has several specialised bodies and arrangements promoting inter-governmental cooperation in various fields such as importantly higher/university education; business management; energy, commerce and industry. Furthermore, there are 53 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which have formal affiliations with ASEAN.

When ASEAN was established, trade among the Member Countries was insignificant. Estimates between 1967 and the early 1970s showed that the share of intra-ASEAN trade from the total trade of the Member Countries was between 12 and 15 per cent. Thus, some of the earliest economic cooperation schemes of ASEAN were aimed at addressing this situation. One of these was the preferential trading arrangement (PTA) of 1977, which accorded tariff preferences for trade among ASEAN economies. Ten years later, an Enhanced PTA Programme was adopted at the Third ASEAN Summit in Manila further increasing intra-ASEAN trade.

The Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation was adopted at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992, which included the launching of a scheme toward an ASEAN Free Trade Area or AFTA. The strategic objective of AFTA is to increase the ASEAN region's competitive advantage as a single production unit. The elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers among the member countries is expected to promote greater economic efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness. The Fifth ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok in 1995 adopted the Agenda for Greater Economic Integration, which included the acceleration of the timetable for the realisation of AFTA from the original 15-year timeframe to 10 years.

In addition to trade and investment liberalisation, regional economic integration is being pursued through the development of Trans-ASEAN transportation network consisting of major interstate highway and railway networks: principal ports and sea lanes for maritime traffic, inland waterway transport, and major civil aviation links. ASEAN is promoting the interoperability and interconnectivity of the national telecommunications equipment and services. Building of Trans-ASEAN energy networks, which consist of the ASEAN Power Grid and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Projects are also being developed.

ASEAN cooperation has resulted in greater regional integration. Within three years from the launching of AFTA, exports among ASEAN countries grew from US\$ 43.26 billion in 1993 to almost US\$ 80 billion in 1996, an average yearly growth rate of 28.3 per cent. In the process, the share of intra-regional trade from ASEAN's total trade rose from 20 per cent to almost 25 per cent. Tourists from ASEAN countries themselves have been representing an increasingly important share of tourism in the region. In 1996, of the 28.6 million tourist arrivals in ASEAN, 11.2 million or almost 40 per cent, came from within ASEAN itself. Today, ASEAN economic cooperation covers the following areas: trade, investment, industry, services, finance, agriculture, forestry, energy, transportation and communication, intellectual property, small and medium enterprises, and tourism.

12.4.4 APEC

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), founded by a dozen countries in 1989, has become a forum of twenty-one countries that addresses economic issues in the Asia-Pacific region. This

diverse group includes the US, Canada, China, Taiwan (officially Chinese Taipei), Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, South Korea, Papua New Guinea, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Russia, and Vietnam.

Together, the APEC countries account for over 50 per cent of the world's merchandise trade, half the global GNP, and two-fifths of the world population. Operating from a modest secretariat in Singapore, APEC sponsors regular meetings and annual summits of senior government officials and heads of state. APEC operates by consensus rather than through binding agreements and the type of legalism evident in the North American Free Trade Agreement. In this process of "concerted unilateralism," APEC members define broad regional goals but leave the specific aspects of implementation to each nation.

APEC consists of three occasionally overlapping processes. The first is economic and technical cooperation promoting economic and human resource development, or "Eco-Tech." Second is trade and investment liberalisation, an agenda that emerged at its 1993 meeting when US president Clinton invited the 18 APEC leaders to Blake Island, Washington, for the first-ever APEC Economic Leaders Meeting. The Bogor Declaration, adopted in 1994, proclaimed the elimination of all trade and investment barriers by 2010 for APEC's wealthiest countries and by 2020 for its poorest ones. Subsequent meetings led to a refinement of these goals in terms of Individual and Collective Action Plans that were to provide the actual liberalisation commitments.

At the 1997 Vancouver meeting, APEC leaders agreed to negotiate specific, mandatory trade liberalisation targets in nine sectors on a fast-track basis covering \$1.5 trillion in trade (known as Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation). Those sectors included: chemicals, fisheries, forestry, energy goods and services, environmental goods and services, gems and jewellery, medical equipment, toys, and a telecommunications mutual recognition agreement. While the last was approved in June 1998, Japan's opposition to liberalisation in fisheries and forestry effectively torpedoed the broader initiative.

At the 1998 Kuala Lumpur Meeting, leaders agreed to bring the proposals to the World Trade Organisation's next round of negotiations in 2000, largely as a face-saving initiative. The third—and weakest—process is the sustainable development agenda, which also emerged within APEC in 1993. To date, this process has been characterised by a flurry of small-scale, capacity-building projects and little else beyond statements of principles and a meeting on marine resources earlier this year.

The weakness of the sustainable development agenda has five major causes: poor leadership by the wealthier countries, most prominently the United States; popular opposition to APEC's free trade agenda; the failure to connect the trade, investment, and environmental tracks; the weakness of pro-sustainable development forces within negotiating governments (most of which are dominated by commercial interests); and the inability of pro-sustainable development forces from civil society to penetrate the national and regional processes of policy formulation.

The challenge of working with diverse economies and varying perspectives on trade and investment regulation gives APEC a certain informality and lack of cohesiveness. Although the APEC forum has declared its support for free trade, many members oppose mandatory implementation schedules for comprehensive tariff and quota reduction. Indeed, some countries—principally Malaysia and Japan—have insisted that the liberalisation goals be non-binding and have opposed the US demand that all economic sectors be opened to foreign trade and investment. Countries that oppose the US in its drive to convert APEC into another free trade area would

prefer that APEC remain a consultative organisation that facilitates technical cooperation on economic matters.

12.4.5 SAARC

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established on 8 December 1985 when the government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka formally adopted its Charter providing for the promotion of economic and social progress, cultural development within the South Asia region and also for friendship and cooperation with other developing countries. The basic principles as envisaged in SAARC are sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and mutual benefit. All decisions within this regional setting are to be taken on the basis of consensus. Till date 11 summit meetings of the heads have taken place—Dhaka (1985), Bangalore (1986), Kathmandu (1987), Islamabad (1988), Male (1990), Colombo (1991), Dhaka (1993), New Delhi (1995), Male (1997), Colombo (1998) and Kathmandu (2002).

SAARC functions on the basis of the following formal institutions:

- i) The Council of Ministers, responsible for formulating policies and deciding on new areas of cooperation.
- ii) Standing Committee comprising foreign secretaries of member states with the task of monitoring and coordination. The Programming Committee consisting of senior officials scrutinising the secretarial budget. assists the Standing committee.
- iii) The Technical Committee formulate specialised programmes in their respective fields under the SAARC Integrated Programme of Action (SIPA). SIPA is the core of SAARC's work programme reflected in the technical committee. The seven technical committees under the SIPA cover are—a) agricultural and rural development; b) communications and transport; c) social development; d) environment, meteorology and forestry; e) science and technology; f) human resources development; and g) energy.
- iv) Specialised Ministerial Meetings which focus on specific areas of concern like international economic issues, children, women's issues, environment, poverty alleviation, youth, disabled, housing, agriculture, trade, tourism and culture.

SAARC has identified certain areas on which collective positions could be projected and promoted in international forums. According to its Charter, acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region, promotion of active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields and strengthening of cooperation among the member states in international fora on matters of common interest are some of its main objectives.

While social issues are one of the main areas of cooperation focussing on issues of child development, health, and women, SAARC's accent is on economic cooperation and growth among developing countries. With this in view, SAARC initiated since 1991 several measures such as an extensive study on Trade Manufactures and Services (TMS); setting up the Committee on Economic Cooperation (CEC) to oversee implementation of measures and policies to enhance trade and economic relations between member states; the adoption of the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) signed on 11 April 1993 which came into force on 7 December 1995—leading to trade negotiations, deepening tariff concessions and steps towards evolving the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) to further liberalise trade within the region.

These apart, SAARC has initiated a few unprecedented initiatives to devise common strategies in the international fora such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), for ensuring a non-discriminatory world trade regime. Also SAARC members have renewed their commitment to encourage participation of private sector and to organise trade-fairs to promote intra-SAARC trade and organised tourism.

Notwithstanding these positive developments, the SAARC is riddled with problems, which are somewhat typical to this regional setting. For one, the long-drawn political-diplomatic wrangle between India and Pakistan over an array of issues has slowed the pace of the SAARC integration process. Furthermore, the disparate levels, of the region's economies also has considerably affected priorities of these countries in the global trade regime.

12.5 POLITICAL/SECURITY GROUPINGS

The kind of changes taking place in the economic sphere is reflected in the political arena as well. Political liberalisation and the concurrent 'democratisation' process that has swept the countries have also helped produce an environment hospitable to interdependence at the regional and global level. The *Mercosur* agreement for instance, was negotiated in the wake of the return of civilian governments to power in both Argentina (1983) and Brazil (1985). Similarly in Chile, in the post-Pinochet dictatorial regime, Chile under Aylwin and Frei moved closer to the APEC process and became an associate of Mercosur.

This question of how democracy has helped bring countries together should be considered along with the fact that political groupings are mostly security alliances to protect against potential threats. Some of the more prominent alliances have been discussed below.

12.5.1 NATO

Following the end of the Second World War, Western Europe had to find a solution to future European security particularly in the face of a powerful and ideologically different Soviet Union. Germany, which had caused two European wars, also had to be held in check. In April 1949, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US signed the North Atlantic Treaty. This created the main security organisation for Western Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Greece and Turkey joined in 1952. West Germany joined NATO in 1955 and Spain in 1982. In the 1990s, France rejoined NATO (although it has remained outside some of NATO's command structures) after leaving in the 1960s. In 1999, NATO began its first wave of enlargement when it accepted the membership of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, and Western Europe moving towards closer economic integration, NATO launched the Strategic Concept in 1991 to redefine its approach to European security. The organisation has assisted in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme since 1994 to build confidence and co-operation between itself, countries of the former Soviet Union and the neutral countries of Finland, Ireland and Sweden. NATO conducts regular meetings with Russia, originally through the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council (PJC). In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) replaced the PJC in May 2002. It is hoped that the NRC will improve dialogue between NATO and Russia.

Regular discussions with countries in the Mediterranean area commenced in 1994. In 2000, NATO introduced regular meetings with the Ukraine and has discussions with the Balkan states

through the South-East Europe Initiative (SEEL), which works in conjunction with the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

In 1999, NATO launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to reflect the changing security environment and to develop the military capabilities of member states. Central to this has been Western Europe's attempts since the 1990s to create its own European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). This has initially been through the Western European Union (WEU), European Operational Rapid Force (EUROFOR) and the Eurocorps and now the EU's developing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 2003, the EU will officially create its own Rapid Reaction Force, which will undertake peacekeeping operations. The Force will work in close co-operation with NATO. ESDI has also resulted in the development of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The CJTF will be a multi-national military force and command, composed of Western European and non-NATO European states. It is proposed that the CJTF will be available for deployment by 2004.

In 1994-95, NATO launched its first offensive operations in its entire history as its aircraft bombed targets during the Bosnian war. In 1995, NATO launched its first major ground mission, Operation Joint Endeavour, as 60,000 peace enforcement troops deployed to Bosnia as the Implementation Force (IFOR). NATO still maintains this operation as the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) to ensure that Bosnia adheres to the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995. In April 1999, NATO launched Operation *Allied* Force against Yugoslavia in retaliation for the country's activities against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In August 2001, 3,500 NATO troops also deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) for 30 days to undertake Operation Essential Harvest, tasked with disarming ethnic Albanian guerrillas. 700 NATO troops remain in FYROM as Operation *Amber Fox* to oversee implementation of reforms enhancing the rights of ethnic Albanians in the country.

Some of the ten states have been undertaking NATO's Military Assistance Programme (MAP) since 1999, which will make their armed forces more compatible with NATO's forces. However, not all the countries will be granted membership immediately. Only the Baltic states and Slovenia are well advanced with MAP and are also candidates for the EU accession in 2004. Lithuania, for example, has streamlined its armed forces, will introduce a battalion-sized unit for NATO operations by 2002 and a rapid reaction brigade by 2006. Bulgaria and Romania hope that they will be rewarded with NATO membership for allowing the US to use their airspace and bases for Operation *Enduring Freedom* from October 2001. Greece and Turkey also want the two countries to join to enhance security in the Balkan region. Following the events of 11 September and the general new security environment, NATO is planning to restructure its military capabilities. Key to the restructuring plan will be the creation of further rapid reaction forces, such as the CJTF.

12.5.2 ASEAN

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia: signed at the first ASEAN Summit on 24 February 1976, declared that in their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties should be guided by the following fundamental principles: 1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; 2. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or Coercion; 3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 4. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 5. Effective cooperation among themselves.

The TAC stated that ASEAN political and security dialogue and cooperation should aim to promote regional peace and stability by enhancing regional resilience. Regional resilience shall be achieved by cooperating in all fields based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation, and solidarity, which shall constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia.

Some of the major political accords of ASEAN are as follows: ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, 8 August 1967; Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, Kuala Lumpur, 27 November 1971; Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, 24 February 1976; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, 24 February 1976; ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, 22 July 1992; Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Bangkok, 15 December 1997; and ASEAN Vision 2020, Kuala Lumpur, 15 December 1997.

In 1992, the ASEAN Heads of State and Government declared that ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region. Two years later, the ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF was established. The ARF aims to promote confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in the region. The present participants in the ARF include: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. Through political dialogue and confidence-building, no tension has escalated into armed confrontation among ASEAN members since its establishment more than three decades ago.

12.5.3 OSCE

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organisation in the world with 55 participating states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative: comprehensive in dealing with a wide range of security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, democratisation, election monitoring and economic and environmental security; co-operative in the sense that all OSCE participating States have equal status, and decisions are based on consensus.

The OSCE is engaged in standard setting in fields including military security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian concerns. In addition, the OSCE undertakes a variety of preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict within and among the participating States.

The OSCE has its main office in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the Permanent Council are held. In addition, specialised seminars and meetings are convened in various locations and periodic consultations among Senior Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government are held. The principles guiding relations between participating states are as follows: sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-operation among states; and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The OSCE had its origin in the early 1950s when the Soviet Union first proposed the creation of an all-European security conference. In the mid-1960s the Warsaw Pact renewed calls for such a conference. In May 1969, the Government of Finland sent a memorandum to all European countries, the United States and Canada, offering Helsinki as a conference venue. Beginning in November 1972, representatives from the original 35 nations met for nearly three years to work out the arrangements and the framework for the conference, concluding their work in July 1975.

On 1 August 1975, the leaders of the original 35 participating States gathered in Helsinki and signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Also known as the Helsinki Accords, the Final Act is not a treaty, but rather a politically binding agreement consisting of three main sections informally known as "baskets," adopted on the basis of consensus. This comprehensive Act contains a broad range of measures designed to enhance security and cooperation in the region extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Since 1975, the number of countries signing the Helsinki Accords has expanded to 55, reflecting changes such as the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Institutionalisation of the Conference in the early 1990s led to its transformation to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, effective January 1995.

12.5.4 ARF

The ASEAN Regional Forum was established in 1994. It draws together 23 countries which are involved in the security of the Asia Pacific region. It comprises the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam); the 10 ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia and the United States), the one ASEAN observer (PNG); as well as the DPRK and Mongolia.

The ARF is premised on the idea drawn from the ASEAN experience i.e an incremental process of dialogue can produce qualitative improvements in political relationships. It provides a setting in which members can discuss current regional security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security in the region. Issues discussed at recent ARF meetings include the security, political and human rights situations in the Korean Peninsula, East Timor, Indonesia, and Burma; instability in the Pacific; nuclear testing in South Asia; WMD and missile issues; and transnational crime—including piracy, people smuggling and illicit trade in small arms. Members are encouraged to provide voluntary briefings on issues like defence policy and spending, as a means of enhancing transparency and building confidence.

The ARF is characterised by minimal institutionalisation, and consensus decision making. It is premised on a gradual three-stage process of evolution—developing from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy and, in the long term, conflict resolution. Much of the ARF's activity to date has been centred on confidence-buildin activities, including on subjects such as peacekeeping, piracy, conventional arms, and disaster relief. It has also done some work on security aspects of transnational crime. The ARF is beginning very slowly to move beyond confidence-building, to explore possibilities for preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy tools agreed by ARF members to date include an enhanced role for the ARF Chair in coordinating its positions so as to strengthen the Forum's ability to respond to situations affecting the security of ARF members during the period between Ministerial meetings. Another mechanism is a register of ARF experts which: when operational, will provide a pool of expertise on regional security issues that may be drawn upon by the ARF Chair or individual ARF members.

12.6 SUMMARY

Regionalism and regional organisations can contribute positively to ensuring order and stability in a particular region. There are five ways in which this can be done.

Firstly, the responsibility for the regional order has shifted onto the states of a given region in contrast to years of European colonialism or Cold War. This facilitates regional organisations to work towards promoting peace and security and bear the costs of collective action be it economic (agreeing to redistributive mechanisms) or military (effective alliances).

Secondly, regional organisations act as providers of international legitimacy. This is important in the context of international peace and security. Traditional role of regional bodies have expanded to include peacemaking as well as nation-building/reconstruction. Therefore, regional organisations act as collective security systems to tackle sources of conflict and promote reassurance rather than deterrence or containment. In the economic field too, there is a move towards elaboration of international regimes, intellectual property rights, environmental protection and industrial policy.

Thirdly, it facilitates to negotiate effective agreements because of the built-in consensus and common interest regionally existing than is possible at a global level.

Fourthly, increasing regional economic integration restrains outbreak of conflict and increase incentives for managing it first by increasing material costs of armed conflict and second, by providing framework within which new collective identities and new forms of institutionalised cooperation can emerge. Deep integration and emergence of new security communities are likely to occur where geographical proximity and regional interdependence, shared history and common cultural traditions are present.

Finally, regionalism may represent a way of mitigating ethnic, nationalist, or communal conflict. Regionalism provides one way in which responses to demands for self determination can be broadened and in which minorities and stateless groups can find a secure place and a measure of representation within a larger political community.

But at the same time it needs to be kept in mind that regionalism, whatever form it may have taken can offer no miracle cure for the problems faced by countries today. Though regionalism does offer some promise, it is no panacea. More so, in the post-Cold War years, the difficulties encountered by regional organisations in dealing with certain crises puts a question mark on the efficacy and the effectiveness of these organisations.

12.7 EXERCISES

- 1) Do you think that there has been a revival of interest in regionalism in recent years? If so, why?
- 2) What accounted for regionalism in the Cold War years?
- 3) What are the different theoretical approaches to regionalism?
- 4) Give reasons for the formation of regional economic groupings in recent years.
- 5) Briefly sketch the evolution of European economic integration since the end of the Second World War.
- 6) Are the objectives of ASEAN very different from that of NAFTA?
- 7) Explain briefly reasons for the formation of political/security groupings by citing any one example.

UNIT 13 GLOBALISATION

Structure

- 13.1 Introduction
 - 13.2 Towards Definition of Globalisation
 - 13.3 Core Characteristics of Globalisation
 - 13.4 Perceptions of the Protagonists
 - 13.5 Perceptions of the Critics
 - 13.5.1 Compromise of National Economic Interest
 - 13.5.2 Curtailment of National Sovereignty
 - 13.5.3 Erosion of National Identity
 - 13.6 International Relations Theory (IR) and Globalisation
 - 13.7 Towards Formulation of IR Theory on "Globalised" State
 - 13.8 Summary
 - 13.9 Exercises
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13.1 INTRODUCTION

The prime objective of this unit is to understand the term “globalisation” both in respect of its content and significance in order that it serves as a basis to apply it or appreciate it in the study of International Relations. For, after all, most current discourse on International Relations not only quite frequently use the term “globalisation” but some even point to the futility of studying contemporary international relations without reference to the ramifications of the phenomenon of “globalisation”. It is said that the term “globalisation” was first used in French literature on International Relations dating back to the early 1950s. (The French term for globalisation is *mondialisation*). However, the usage of the term in International Relations literature has come about in **very** recent years especially in the wake of the so-called revolution in information and communication technology. Although the term “globalisation” is widely used yet there appears to be no agreement in terms of what this phenomenon represents. In that sense, it is as popular in current usage as it is contested in respect of what it signifies.

13.2 TOWARDS DEFINITION OF GLOBALISATION

Before outlining the ways in which globalisation has been described, what constitutes the character of globalisation needs to be identified. Definitions of the term globalisation are aplenty reflecting a seemingly interminable set of variations on the theme.

Some writers have given the broadest possible scope to the term. To them, globalisation is a “multi-faceted” phenomenon “impacting” on social, economic and political spheres of human experience. Others are of the view that globalisation is “a set” of phenomena that accompany one another with no aspect being more important or significant than others. According to them, numerous factors distinguish the globalisation process of today. These distinctions include more rapid communications, market liberalisation and global integration of the production of goods and services.

In other accounts, some writers distinguish one characteristic of globalisation as giving rise to others. In other words, they restrict the overall reference of the term “globalisation”. Such

descriptions usually extend beyond communications technology to other areas such as economics and politics. Yet, they locate the root or the foundation of globalisation in the advance of global communication networks. For they argue that the communications revolution has made it possible for ideas, information and cultural values to transcend seamlessly beyond nation-state boundaries. In the process, these changes have triggered new political and social dynamics across the world.

There are others who emphasise solely the economic characteristic of the process of globalisation. To them, globalisation refers not to a fully "interconnected world market" but simply to the increasing "interconnections of markets" of different countries largely on account of the liberalisation of trade, capital investment and diffusion of services across the world. Contesting this approach of characterising globalisation as synonymous with "free-market capitalism", others argue that globalisation is two-dimensional—one, it serves as powerful vehicle that raises economic growth, spreads technology and contributes to better living standards in countries of both the developed and developing world; and two, it "assaults" the sovereign authority of the nation-state, "erodes" local culture and tradition and even "threatens" economic and social stability.

13.3 CORE CHARACTERISTICS OF GLOBALISATION

Admittedly, these different definitions reflect the variations in the range of phenomena encompassing the term "globalisation". Based on these variations in the characterisation of globalisation, it is possible to identify at least five distinct features of the term:

- 1) It is most usefully employed as a descriptive rather than a prescriptive term. It does not designate some desirable or undesirable end to be accepted or avoided. It merely reflects a set of social, political, economic and technological forces that have recently become distinctly pronounced.
- 2) The term in its usage is perhaps relatively new whereas the phenomenon/phenomena that it designates could by no means be treated as new. The past has also experienced the phenomena that the term "globalisation" entails.
- 3) The institutions that have emerged as a consequence of the globalisation process extend beyond the power and authority of nation-states. So much so, in the "globalising" international affairs, nation-states are no longer exclusive actors as in the past but besides there are other actors too which, among others, include non-government organisations (NGOs), environmental movements, transnational corporations, ethnic nationalities and multi-statal regional organisations.
- 4) In the "globalising" world, the role performance of the new actors encompasses a relatively large field because of the growing number of economic, political and communication networks. To that extent, these networks have made nation-state boundaries porous and permeable to the movement of people, goods, services, ideas and information.
- 5) The globalisation process has not only made international relations more expansive but also intensive because there are not only greater number of actors and networks influencing one another, but more importantly, the impact each one makes on the other is qualitatively greater than in the past. Global media networks, the products of transnational corporations and the large migration of people from one part of the world to the other have greatly influenced the social and cultural moorings of people across the world.

Of the afore-stated features of globalisation, the first and the second identify the process that demands a response. The third feature underlines that in a “globalising” international order, the nation-states share the world stage with other actors and, as a consequence international relations are becoming less nation-state-centric. The fourth and the fifth features point to the unsustainable character of the traditional distinction between domestic and international affairs.

13.4 PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROTAGONISTS

The differing perceptions as to what constitutes the inherent features of globalisation, has generated an intense debate as to the benefits and deficits that have arisen out the process of globalisation. These benefits and deficits that have direct bearing on the future direction of international relations admittedly merit mention.

The proposition that globalisation has narrowed down the distinction and the dividing line between the two spheres viz. the international and national, constituting the basis and rationale for the discipline of International Relations, is welcomed by some and rejected by others. Those who welcome globalisation argue that it, in turn, would promote and pave the way for world peace, human security and economic well-being. Whereas there are those who reject these claims and argue that the globalisation constitutes the principal threat to democracy: human freedom and identity.

Generally speaking, protagonists of globalisation claim that what is in the making is a “cosmopolitan democratic community” at the global level under an emerging new *inter-relational* pattern. Yet, even among them, there are some disagreements. For, some among them advocate globalisation without any reservation on grounds that many of the problems attributed to globalisation actually occur more as a result of not having fully accepted and embraced the increasingly “global” character of the world. To them, since its inception the nation-state as an institution has failed to deliver or guarantee world peace, human rights and well-being. Being so, transgressions against human rights, dignity and poverty are most effectively addressed through international institutions. To empower these institutions with necessary authority and power calls for a “world government” that may rely on national governments to administer policies but at the same time would hold authority over the states.

In support of their claims: they cite the futility of attempting to address problems such as resource management and environmental degradation by the nation-states and contrast them with the facility with which international or, rather the global institutions have dealt with these issues.

By contrast, there is a variation in the positive approach that accords only qualified support to globalisation. While it welcomes some of the developments that accompany globalisation, it rejects others. In other words: it makes a distinction between the desirable and undesirable outcome of globalisation. However, even in this line of advocacy there is no generally accepted set of features of globalisation that is desirable and which is not. On the one hand, industry and business organisations that embrace the opening of markets as increasing consumer choice and lowering of commodity prices, may also express reservations at the multilateral treaties subjecting their activities to international environmental standards. On the other hand, labour organisations that demand the recognition and adoption of international conventions on human rights as progressing social justice may deplore the global market's ability to take advantage of poor labour conditions.

There is yet another aspect that is of concern to those who advocate qualified support to globalisation. They are of the view that the process of globalisation should stop short of

uprooting the very foundations of the institution of nation-state. To them the nation-state is important in maintaining national interests. While underlining the importance of the nation-state, however, they argue that it should function in unison with other nation-states in addressing problems that occur on a global scale. Also, they believe that globalisation will result in the emergence of a *global* civil society, consisting of nation-states and NGOs that is held together by a framework of norms supported by international conventions and treaties.

13.5 PERCEPTIONS OF THE CRITICS

The protagonists as a whole, including those who advocate the process with some reservations claim that globalisation has unfolded new benefits and possibilities to national communities through the opening of markets and also by exerting the much-needed pressure upon nation-states to promote human security and well-being. Against them are those who voice their deep concern over the phenomenon of globalisation. In their view globalisation consists of a set of dangerous and potentially uncontrollable forces that dis-empower communities by disabling the nation-state's inherent power and authority to order its domestic economic and political arrangements as well as protect its established national identities. In effect, they are of the view that globalisation brings about the exactly the opposite of what the protagonists envisage. They identify three major areas of concern, which in their view threaten international relations: 1. Compromise of national economic interest; 2. Curtailment of nation-state sovereignty; and 3. Erosion of national identity.

13.5.1 Compromise of National Economic Interest

The present globalisation largely the consequence of the revolution in information and communication technology has made it possible for capital to move across national borders vesting the transnational corporations with the power to establish operations with multinational bases and also giving them the ability to transfer activities and resources across nation-state boundaries on a large scale. Such that the resulting economic globalisation has not only accentuated interdependence between domestic economies but also a greater degree of dependence of these economies on investment from transnational corporations. Economic interdependence does not merely entail increases in the volume of international exchanges between states. It involves the raising of capital in one or more countries to support production in others. Also, it involves the spreading of production of commodities across any number of countries.

The ease with which capital moves across national boundaries is as much a positive benefit as it is not. For, it opens the possibility that the benefits of investment will be lost if capital is withdrawn from one domestic economy to another, a more lucrative or promising economy. The resulting loss distorts the economy including causing loss of revenue to the national government. Under these circumstances, the national governments are encouraged to discard tariffs and implement economic regimes the objective of which would be to attract capital and investment—a situation that is called the 'race for the bottom'. The consequences are increasing unequal distribution of wealth between and within national communities.

Placed in such a bind, the nation-states are less able to represent and protect the economic interests of the national community. Besides, as national revenue declines so does the power of the nation-state to provide for the welfare in respect of education/skills and health for its citizenry. To that extent, efforts at human resource development suffer further.

13.5.2 Curtailment of National Sovereignty

Concerns about globalisation's threat to nation-state sovereignty relates to the increasing pressure on national governments to implement international treaties and conventions that satisfies the

international community. This increasingly subjects the national governments to demands and standards set out in multilateral treaties on a variety of issues. Also, the national governments are subjected to scrutiny by international institutions.

In traditional understanding of international relations, focusing upon treaties reinforced the centrality of the nation-states and national interests in international relations. Treaties were made between nation-states for their mutual benefit. They sought to secure peace between states rather than provide grounds for international scrutiny of nation-state's domestic arrangements. In the nation-state-centric world, treaties were means of protecting sovereignty. However, in recent years international treaties have proliferated impinging on the domestic jurisdiction of nation-states. Besides regulating the diplomatic relations, these treaties impose domestic political, economic and environmental obligations upon nation-states.

This changing character of international treaties, conventions and agreements is claimed to have been instrumental in the disruption of the distinction between domestic and international affairs. Upon such claims, it is argued that national communities suffer a democratic deficit. Claims of a democratic deficit charge the treaties with disrupting the chain of responsibility between democratically elected governments and their national communities by introducing powerful international communities of finance and diplomacy to which the national governments are also responsible. Yet, many international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to which national governments become obligated, are not, strictly speaking, democratic institutions as they are elected by or representative of national communities.

13.5.3 Erosion of National Identity

Two ways in which globalisation is claimed to generate pressures on national identity are the increased mobility of populations across the world and advances in the global communication networks. With movements of populations stimulated by an increase in the gap between the high living standards enjoyed in the countries of the 'North' (i.e industrially and technologically more advanced countries of the West) and the low standards of living in the countries of the 'South' (i.e the less developed countries elsewhere), the countries of 'North' are said to be faced with the problems of national identity as evidenced by the resurgence of xenophobia and racist violence. As a result, these countries that once possessed clear standards and accepted cultural practices and beliefs are now forced to accommodate ever-increasing numbers of people with diverse cultural beliefs and practices. Emerging wider civil societies in these countries are disrupted as individuals form associations that are closed to those who do not share common cultural identities.

Electronic revolution in communication technology also contributes to the erosion of cultural identity through a process of what is called the homogenisation. Such homogenisation cuts both ways in the sense its impact is adversely felt in the countries of the 'North' as well as in the South. So much so, critics from both sides voice concern over the impact of globalisation.

13.6 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND GLOBALISATION

Any attempt to survey the massive literature on the phenomenon of globalisation suggests that there is no simple or agreed definition of what constitutes the phenomenon nor any consensus about how far the process has advanced, and in which areas. About all that can be said is that

it represents a major site of contestation. The contestation over it covers a whole range—its definitions and meanings, its historical novelty; its benefits and deficits; the extent to which it reveals a single coherent logic or multiple dissonant tendencies; and above all its impact on the efficacy and viability of the nation-state. Admittedly, it is difficult to reduce the multi-faceted phenomenon to a functional and analytical concept in the study of international relations. Yet, some order needs to be imposed to make intelligible the connections between globalisation and International Relations (IR) theory.

As a preliminary towards this task, what is required is to recognise that underlying the many specific areas of debate so far considered, globalisation is contested along some more general fault-lines. By their very nature, these fault-lines have a marked bearing on issues that traditionally have been debated throughout in IR theory.

One of these relates to whether the phenomenon of globalisation is to be distinguished merely as an idea or it represents a cognitive material factor. In other words, whether globalisation is triggered by material forces such as technology, communications and economic systems and is identifiable and quantifiable in that realm alone. Or, is it identified on the basis of the human understanding of these material changes. Some are of the view that such a differentiation is not possible. If that be so, i.e that globalisation impinges both on the material and cognitive forces, then any theoretical account of it must incorporate both aspects. Based on such an approach, the Constructivist School of IR suggests that neither of these aspects can be discounted in the analysis of globalisation and international relations.

Another concern while discussing the phenomenon of globalisation in respect of IR theory is the relationship between the economic and political spheres. That is, whether the two are causally related i.e either of them follow the other or *vice versa*. Because some are the view that the ongoing economic globalisation in its wake has unleashed political transformation whereas others view that political system should and does change preceding the economic process. A third view is that both are related oppositionally in so far as politics is thought to serve as a check to the potential economic globalisation. These characterisations are very relevant while relating globalisation to the IR theory. However, since both the protagonists and the critics of globalisation do little more than interpret the phenomenon within their preferred perception without arriving at a consensus, it makes any attempt to develop an integrated approach to studying the relationship between globalisation and the IR theory difficult.

Besides, there are other general issues regarding globalisation that makes it less useful in respect of IR theory. For, there are profound divergences of opinion even among the protagonists of globalisation about its relevance to the key developments within international relations itself. This is evident, for instance, in the competing understandings of its relationship to the end of super power Cold War. While some are of the view that globalisation is the consequence of the end of the Cold War, others view that it is the advent of globalisation that has caused the end of the Cold War. Such causal connections are appealing and even plausible because in one sense it is the termination of the Cold War that allowed the globalising forces to penetrate the hitherto closed societies. But at the same time, it is possible to reverse the proposition and argue that it was the penetration of the globalising forces that hastened and eroded the basis of Cold War.

To resolve the dilemma, some theorists take the view that globalisation is both the cause and effect of the Cold War. It is a cause to the extent that it has led to the abridgement of the role of the nation-state in the post-Cold War international order. It is an effect to the extent that it was the demise of the Cold War that paved the way for the rapid pace of globalisation. In their

view, globalisation was taking place simultaneously at the level of the nation-state and of the international system. So they argue that if the focus on the latter tends to emphasise post-Cold War discontinuity, the focus on the former underlines its continuity. Since both are realities of the post-Cold War, globalisation in their line argument, accommodates both continuity and change provided that its location in both the nation-state and the international system is borne in mind.

13.7 TOWARDS FORMULATION OF IR THEORY ON “GLOBALISED” STATE

In the current phase of globalisation largely catalysed by information technology with the emergence of a powerful global economy, the ability of the nation-state to manage a separate national economy independent of the global economy is no doubt seriously impaired. But this is not anything new. For, constraint on the autonomous functioning of the nation-state has always been the case as the Structuralist School contends. Also, it has been the constant refrain of the Marxists and *Dependencia* Schools of IR theory that in the case of the developing countries, placed as they are in the periphery of the global capitalist order, exercising state sovereignty has always remained a problem for them.

If that was the case, what then is the *raison d'être* for formulating a new theory of IR to encapsulate this new phenomenon called globalisation? It is here one has to differentiate the impact of globalisation from the effects of interdependence. For, the consequences of globalisation are recognizably different from those resulting from interdependence. Whereas the interdependent world system impinged solely upon the autonomy element of sovereignty, globalisation on the other hand, additionally unsettles the core element of sovereignty, namely the formal “authority”. In this connection, some argue that not only is globalisation distinct from interdependence, it represents a much more fundamental assault on the traditional barricades of sovereignty. It entails a shift in both the domestic and international manifestation of sovereignty. Also, it produces a new realignment between its constituent elements such as authority and autonomy.

This is evident admittedly from the challenge that globalisation poses to the concept and content of sovereignty. Not only globalisation has impacted adversely on the territoriality element of sovereignty, but also more vitally it has impaired the "identity" and "authority" elements of sovereignty. These unsettling effects of globalisation have led to a new situation in which decisions and outcomes do not correspond to the choice of the sovereign states and also are not contained within the territorial confines of the state. National boundaries have become truly porous. The identity element of sovereignty is also compromised with the emergence of civil society thanks to which absolute authority reposed in the state has now become diluted.

Also, in its wake, the process of globalisation has given rise to new networks of authority such as importantly, the international regimes quite vocal and visible in the realm of global security in all its dimensions. Here, mention may be made of such of the recently conceived and crafted international regimes on issues relating to vital human security such as human rights, environmental protection and so on. The emergence of new norms encapsulated in these international regimes, it is argued, need be neither a constraint nor a signal of the decline of sovereignty. Rather, they represent an evolution of what sovereignty signifies. It may therefore be postulated that in terms of globalisation, sovereignty is undergoing a process of readjustment reflecting thereby the different terms of engagement between its external and internal dimensions.

Just as in the past, when sovereignty's formal and substantive elements repositioned themselves: in the present contest too it is being reconstituted as part of its engagement with globalisation.

In its reconstitution some shifts are apparent in its substantive elements too. If in the past, the "control/capacity" aspects tended to become variables and "authority" remained a constant, now in the currently globalising state, both have become variables. Thus as some analysts argue, sovereignty might be undergoing transformation rather than being undermined or becoming redundant.

What then are the indications of such transformation? They are to be found mainly in the new identities, and in the less territorialised and sometimes totally deterritorialised circumstances whereas, for much of its historical development, the nation-state forged a close link between its territoriality and its primary functions—economic, political and security—that link has become now more tenuous. Perhaps, in the future, it may be no longer necessary to the effective performance of these functions. Instead, the state through its exercise of sovereignty in the post-Cold War era is legitimised less by its relationship with a given piece of territory and more by its ability to ensure the political rights of its citizens.

As sovereign, the nation-state therefore seeks to remake and refashion itself in response to the conflict in domestic and international spheres by discarding some of its traditional capacities. While abdicating, it is also at the same time and by the same token acquiring new capacities. While it delegates some functions to the international and transnational bodies, yet it arrogates for itself, some authority to monitor the effective functioning of these bodies and regimes. In turn, such shifts in the delegation and arrogation of state capacities are likely to transform the content of the formal doctrine of sovereignty in the current phase of globalisation. By formulating a framework along the lines delineated, it may be possible to develop a theory of IR that could integrate into its fold the phenomenon of globalisation for analysis and understanding.

13.8 SUMMARY

Most current discourse in the discipline of International Relations frequently use the term "globalisation", and some even point to the futility of studying contemporary international relations without reference to the ramifications of the phenomenon of "globalisation".

Definitions of the term globalisation are aplenty. They reflect a seemingly interminable set of variations on the theme—ranging from defining it as a "multi-faceted" phenomenon "impacting" on social, economic and political spheres of human experience to emphasising the phenomenon solely by its manifest economic characteristics.

These differing perceptions as to what constitutes the core elements of globalisation, have generated an intense debate as to the benefits and deficits that have arisen out of globalisation. The proposition that globalisation has narrowed down the dividing line between the two spheres viz. the international and national, which distinction is what constitutes the basis and rationale for the discipline of International Relations, is welcomed by some and rejected by others. Those who welcome globalisation argue that it would promote world peace, human security and economic well-being. Whereas there are those who reject these claims and argue that the globalisation constitutes the principal threat to democracy, human freedom and identity.

Again, there are those who welcome some of the developments that accompany globalisation and reject others making a distinction between the desirable and undesirable outcome of globalisation. To them the nation-state is important in maintaining national interests. While underlining the importance of the nation-state, however, they argue that it should function in unison with other nation-states in addressing problems that occur on a global scale. Also, they believe that globalisation will result in the emergence of a *global civil society*, consisting of

nation-states and NGOs that is held together by a framework of norms supported by international conventions and treaties.

Notwithstanding these contestations regarding the meaning and dimensions of globalisation, for applying it as a concept for analysis in IR some order needs to be evolved. That would make intelligible the connection between globalisation and International Relations (IR) theory. To do so, not only calls for a redefinition of state sovereignty but also on that basis a reformulation of an analytical framework for the study of globalisation in international relations.

13.9 EXERCISES

- 1) On the basis of your study examine critically the various definitions of the term “globalisation”
- 2) What in your assessment are the salient characteristics of the current phase of globalisation?
- 3) Critically examine the contrasting perceptions of the protagonists and the critics of globalisation.
- 4) Can the phenomenon of globalisation be analysed on the basis of the traditional theories of IR?

UNIT 14 INTERNATIONAL INEQUITIES

Structure

- 14.1 Introduction
- 14.2 Issues Impinging on International Inequities
 - 14.2.1 Increasing Gap between the Developed and the Under-developed Nations
 - 14.2.2 Increased Global Interdependence
 - 14.2.3 Neo-Colonial Control of Developed Countries over the Developing Countries
 - 14.2.4 Excessive Exploitation of World Income and Resources by the Developed Countries
 - 14.2.5 Role of Multinational Corporations as Instruments of Control of the Developed over the Developing Countries
 - 14.2.6 Control of the Developed Countries over the Policies of the Developing Countries
 - 14.2.7 The Failure of the Bretton Woods
 - 14.2.8 The Inadequacy of New GATT and WTO
 - 14.2.9 Economic Problems Compounded by Developments in Eastern Europe and Republics of the Erstwhile USSR
- 14.3 Processes of Divergence Leading to Conflict
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 - 14.3.2 Process of Institutional Changes
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 - 14.3.5 Mnacc of Multinational Corporations as the Biggest Cause of Divergence
 - 14.3.6 Resentment of Commodity Producers
 - 14.3.7 Divergence of Approach on Total Revision of the Brctton Woods System
- 14.4 Processes of Convergence Prompting Cooperation
 - 14.4.1 Establishment of a New International Economic Order
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- 14.5 Summary
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14.1 INTRODUCTION

The widespread economic international inequities and the big technological gap that exists between the rich and the poor—the developed and the developing countries—have virtually divided the world into two parts: The Rich or the North, and the Poor or the South. The rich countries are technologically developed and economically well off. By virtue of this, they are in a position to maintain and even strengthen their hold not only over international economic system but also over the economies and policies of the poor countries. The poor countries, which are industrially, technologically and economically under-developed, continue to live under the neo-colonial dependence upon the rich. In the past, they were the victims of imperialism and colonialism, and even after becoming sovereign independent states, they continue to suffer from poverty and under-development as the legacies of the past history and face continued exploitation at the hands of the rich countries. The latter through several devices like foreign aid, multi-national corporations, control over international economic institutions and protectionist trade and economic policies, are virtually forcing the under-developed countries to live with

their sufferings. The under-developed countries have however, now come openly and strongly against the continued neo-colonial control of the rich countries and are currently engaged in a struggle to secure their due rights in international relations. This situation has given rise to the problem of relations between developed and under-developed countries. In this post Cold War era, politics of international economic relations has come to be the most major centre of interest. One of its crucial dimensions happens to be the problem of relations between developed and under-developed countries which can be better described as international inequities among nations of the world.

14.2 ISSUES IMPINGING ON INTERNATIONAL INEQUITIES

The issues which are crucial in widening the gap between the developed and under-developed countries or are catalyst in increasing the international inequities can be analysed under the following heads:

14.2.1 Increasing Gap between the Developed and the Under-developed Nations

A very wide gap exists between the people of the developed countries and the people of the developing or under-developed countries. The former with less than 30 per cent of the world's population control more than 70 per cent of world's wealth and income while the latter with more than 70 per cent of the population live with less than 30 per cent of the resources and income. The per capita income of two-dozen industrialised countries is between \$ 3000 to \$ 6000 whereas that of hundred or more under-developed countries is about \$100.

The gap that exists between the developed and under-developed is further increasing at an alarming rate. The developed and rich nations are becoming richer and the under-developed and the poor nations are becoming poorer particularly after 1970. By virtue of being technologically advanced and industrially developed the rich are strengthening their control over International trade. UNCTAD and GATT have failed to prevent the continuously increasing gap between the rich and the poor. The record of UNCTAD clearly shows that the efforts of the developing countries to attain self-sustained growth have not received adequate support. The pattern of international trade still favours the developed countries. Despite bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, the gap between the developed and the developing countries is growing. The energy crisis, the falling exports, the stiff competition in world markets, the monopolistic role of the MNCs, the inadequacy of the **Bretton Woods system** in contemporary times, the inadequate and limited economic and technological aid to the developing countries etc. have combined to make the poor live with poverty. A combination of the persistent monetary crisis, exacerbated by inflationary trends and balance of payment problems, continued deterioration in the terms of trade and aid, prevalent drought conditions and above all the recent energy crisis have brought to the fore the array of grave economic and social problems for the Third World. The stark realities of economic conditions and social problems for the Third World are too grim to be ignored. The gap between the per capita incomes of the rich nations and the poor nations is widening. The transfer of resources to the developing countries is continually declining while their external debt has increased by six times. The increase in the oil import bill of the developing countries has further limited their economic conditions. Thus, the ever widening gap between the developed countries and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is a stark reality of contemporary international relations. The latest report of UN Human Development Report records that out of a total population of 6.6 billion, 4.4 billion people live in the developing countries. The 3/5 part of the population living in developing countries is such as does not enjoy

good sanitary and health facilities and a third of the population even does not have pure drinking water facilities. The world consumes goods worth \$24 billion and out of this the share of the developing nations is just minimum.

14.2.2 Increased Global Interdependence

Despite the big gap between the economies of the developed and under-developed countries, the global interdependence has increased. Both the developed countries and the under-developed countries today find themselves in a stage of increased interdependence. The developed countries find themselves dependent upon the underdeveloped countries for selling their goods and for purchasing raw materials. The under-developed countries continue to depend upon the developed countries for securing economic and technological aid and selling their commodities besides securing access to advanced technology. However, due to the big gap that exists between the economic conditions of the developed and under-developed countries, the global inter-dependence continues to be exploited by the rich for strengthening their economic conditions. Backed by three powerful weapons—technological, political and military power—the developed countries have maintained successfully their control and superior role over international trade even in contemporary era of global interdependence. This has been a source of great disadvantage for the developing countries. The concept of interdependence excited the prospects of increased and active participation of the developing countries in international decision-making. However, much to their disappointment, they, today, find themselves playing a secondary role in this era of neo-colonialism.

14.2.3 Neo-Colonial Control of Developed Countries over the Developing Countries

Despite the fact of global interdependence and the sovereign equal status of all the members of international community, the developing states continue to live under neo-colonialism. The dawn of independence and the resulting sovereign status had made them free politically and theoretically. Economically and in actual practice they continue to be dependent upon the developed countries. They find themselves dependent upon the developed states for securing foreign aid and help. Their present position is the result of the exploitation that they suffered during the past several centuries of their existence under the yoke of Western imperialism-colonialism. The developed countries of today could develop only because of their ability and success in exploiting the wealth and resources of their colonies which have now become sovereign independent states and are given the tag of developing countries. Even after the end of their imperial system, the developed countries have been maintaining a neo-colonial economic-political control over the economies and policies of the developing countries.

The neo-colonial control of the developed countries over the developing countries continues to be a stark reality of contemporary international relations. Through several subtle devices like foreign aid, military, alliances, partnerships, interventions, multinational corporations, international economic institutions, protectionist trade etc., the developed countries are maintaining a big and intensive control over the economies and policies of the developing countries. The developing countries are trying hard to get rid of neo-colonialism but their continued dependence upon the developed countries for import of goods and know-how, is keeping their efforts limited and less successful. The relations between developed countries and under-developed countries can be also described as the efforts of the former to sustain and strengthen their neo-colonialistic control over the economies and policies of the developing countries and efforts of the latter to secure freedom from neo-colonialism.

14.2.4 Excessive Exploitation of World Income and Resources by the Developed Countries

Another fact of the relations between developed and under-developed countries is the continued disproportionately large exploitation and utilisation of world resources and income by the former. Under multifarious disguises, the stronger and rich countries are successfully maintaining the appropriation of world resources to the detriment of the poor and weak countries. Being technologically and industrially advanced and economically affluent, the developed countries continue to have virtual control of the raw material markets and what practically amounts to a monopoly over manufactured products and capital equipment, they have been able to proceed at will in fixing the prices of the raw material that they take from the developing countries. Consequently, they are in a position to drain the resources of the Third World through several means to their own advantage. The developed countries, particularly the USA have been trying to control the economic policies of developing countries indirectly through IMF, World Bank and other international financial institutions. They have been trying to meet their own economic problems by exploiting resources potential and economic policies of the Third World countries. The control over international economic institutions and world economy further strengthens the hold of the developed countries and the minority finds it easy and expedient to determine at will the allocation of world resources in tune with their desired objectives.

14.2.5 Role of Multinational Corporations as Instruments of Control of the Developed over the Developing Countries

The developed countries have been exercising a big control over the economies and thereby over the policies of the developing countries through a large network of multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs are owned by the capitalists of the developed countries and they function as the extra-governmental arms for extending their control over the markets, economies and policies of the developing countries. A large number of industries in the developing countries are directly owned and controlled by MNCs. There are about 800 giant multinational corporations of seven countries—the USA, the UK, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada—which are controlling more than 50 per cent of the world production. These corporations virtually control the natural resources and raw materials that are found in abundance in the under-developed countries. By virtue of their monopoly over technological know-how and international patents, the MNCs make huge profits through their industries and centers in these countries. Even a country like India, which is definitely more developed than other developing countries, continues to suffer virtual economic exploitation at the hands of several MNCs.

The MNCs have created and are still creating several barriers aimed at checking the 'access to markets' and 'access to advanced technology' efforts of the developing countries. These corporations have the ability to check the rate of economic growth and development and to mould economic and industrial development in under-developed countries in a way as is deemed ideal to the interests of the MNCs. The barrier to entry created by the MNCs can hardly be countered by the developing countries through any negotiations. The developing countries are most vulnerable. Their exports, be it manufactured commodities or primary products, are under the dominant influence of the operation of transnational corporations. It is naturally expected that nearly 80 to 90 per cent of primary products of interest to developing countries are marketed by MNCs. Nearly 40 per cent of world trade is intra-firm trade. Developing countries are always faced with an uphill task of exporting their products and receiving reasonable renumeration for these. Through MNCs, the developed countries have penetrated deeply into the economic systems of the under-developed countries. One of the major issues of the world is to find means for eliminating the highly exploitative role of the MNCs in international economic relations.

14.2.6 Control of the Developed Countries over the Policies of the Developing Countries

Through their superior economic, political and military power, the developed countries are in a position to maintain a large amount of control, both direct and indirect, over the policies of the developing countries. The developed countries can engineer armament race among the new states and divert their economies from developmental to defence oriented programmes. They are in a position to influence the behaviour and policies of the new states. They can cause, at will, any damage to the economic stability of any developing country by fixing at will the exchange rate, by pursuing protectionism in trade, and by using their hold over the international economic institutions and the MNCs. They can and they usually do, resort to interventions in the domestic affairs and politics of the developing states for maintaining or securing a particularly desired favourable situation in international relations. By the use of their superior communication technology and other means of political and psychological warfare, the developed countries are in a position to exercise a desired influence and control over the public opinion and policies of the developing countries.

14.2.7 The Failure of the Bretton Woods

The under-developed countries have now fully realised the inherent weaknesses and absolutely partial and harmful nature and working of the existing international economic system. The recurrent monetary crises which have come to characterise the prevailing international economic system, the failure of GATT and UNCTAD, the difficulties in the way of securing and using 'special drawing rights', the increasing large payments of deficits and increased external indebtedness of the under-developed countries, reflects fully the failure of the Bretton Woods and the existing international trade system. In fact, in almost every way the existing international system is proving to be a big failure for the countries to secure the desired goal of 'development'. The Third World, therefore, demands a restructuring of international economic system in such a way as shall ensure fair and just distribution of world income, resources and trade among all the countries. This demand has got christened as the New International Economic Order and it stands for a new economic system capable of securing the development—economic, technological and industrial—of the under-developed side by side with the developed.

14.2.8 The inadequacy of New GATT and WTO

The inadequacies of the new GATT and WTO agreements have been further source of strain on the relations between the developed and the developing countries. Now sonic the developed countries have been trying to introduce a 'social clause', which is designed to act as a check upon the already limited export potentials of the Third World countries. In the name of prohibiting child labour, the developed countries are trying to keep limited the chances of exporting such items as carpets. The developing countries are against the incorporation of the social clause. They want to abide by the Uruguay Round in letter and spirit. The WTO Seattle meeting in December 1999 clearly reflected big differences between the developing and developed countries over some of the features of the WTO and over some of the proposed changes in it.

14.2.9 Economic Problems Compounded by Developments in Eastern Europe and Republics of Erstwhile USSR

The developments in Eastern European countries and their economic needs as well as the economic needs of Russia and other republics of erstwhile USSR have tended to create more problems for the Third World countries. The disappearance of socialist bloc has made the

developing countries more dependent upon the Western developed countries. The possibility of diversion of Western foreign aid to the former socialist states has been a source of concern for the developing countries. The chances for exploiting the economic dependency of the Third World countries by the developed countries have increased in the contemporary era of international relations.

14.3 PROCESSES OF DIVERGENCE LEADING TO CONFLICT

The following processes of divergence have frequently led to growing conflict between the developed and developing countries

14.3.1 Restructuring World Economic Relations

The first major area of conflict requiring urgent attention relates to the restructuring of the world economic relations on a just and reasonable basis. The existing international economic relations are characterised by the developing countries as 'anachronistic and irrelevant'. Realising the non-viable nature of the existing economic order, the developing countries advocate a New Economic Order based on equality, interdependence, mutual benefit and support for the rights of all nations to work for securing progress, development and a chance for a fair share in world wealth and income. So long as this demand of the developing countries is not accepted by the developed world—and this is pending with the developed nations since 1974—the element of discord shall persist.

14.3.2 Process of Institutional Changes

In the jargon of contemporary international relations until and unless the following two institutional changes which are deemed very essential by under-developed countries for safeguarding their rights and securing their needs, there can not be any harmony between the developed and under-developed countries of the world. First relates to the restructuring of the existing rules and regulations governing the international economic relations and second relates to the formation of new institutions and systems of cooperation among nations. Presently the rules governing international economic and trade relations as well as the international institutions responsible for realising and enforcing these rules and regulations are such as favour the interests and needs of the developed countries. The World Bank, the IMF, the conventions governing 'Intellectual Property' (patents, copyrights etc.) and other economic institutions stand dominated by the developed countries. GATT is more conducive to the interests of the rich and developed countries. Thus so long as these institutions and rules are not restructured with a view to make these useful for all without any bias or discrimination, there is no chance of conflict between the developed and the under-developed vanishing away.

14.3.3 Process of Ending the Concept of Protectionism in International Economy and Trade

The demand of the under-developed countries is for eliminating the existing system of protectionist trade and policies which is designed by the developed countries to safeguard their interests in international economy and trade. By this system, the developed countries are in a position to impose discriminatory limits on exports to other countries and to make the world trade highly competitive, to the direct and big disadvantage of the developing countries.

Discriminatory limits on exports and imports, even against GATT rules, are frequently made and pressed into use by the developed countries. The past record of international trade bears testimony to this charge. Australia, Canada, France, the UK, the USA and Sweden have imposed new quotas and so called 'orderly marketing arrangement' on the developing countries' exports of footwear. A new protocol of the Multi-fibre Arrangement, covering the period through 1990 permitted the imposition of more severe restrictions on clothing and textile. Under it, the ECM reduced 1978 quotas for three countries beneath the actual 1976 levels and severely limited the growth of quotas of other countries, including many that are only beginning to export these exports. Analysing the bad effects of such protectionist policies and trade, on the economies and international trade of the developing countries, former president of the World Bank, Robert MacNamara, in one of his speeches observed: "The net effect of all these restrictive measures will be to limit the growth of developing countries." Such protectionist trade and policies have been a source of a big strain and loss for the developing countries. Their import bills have boomed while their exports have tended to be stagnant. The need is to end protectionism in trade and economy to avoid conflict between the developed and developing countries of the world.

14.3.4 Conflict Owing to Non-transfer of Capital Resources and Technology

Another reason of conflict between the developed and the under-developed countries of the world stems from the non-transfer of capital resources and technology by the rich nations of the North. These transfers can take place either through private investment or economic aid channeled through official agencies both bilateral and multilateral. Cancellation of outstanding debts of the Third World countries and the grant of 0.7 per cent of their GNP as developmental aid to the developing countries can solve the capital needs of the entire Third World.

Technology plays a key role in economic development. The inability of the developing countries to register a higher economic growth rate and development is largely due to the low-level of technology that is at their disposal. The recourse to advanced technology is vitally necessary for increased and efficient productivity. Its contribution, along with other factors of production, is always substantial for all round development. For securing advanced technology, the developing countries find themselves dependent upon the developed countries. The latter, through international patents and protective policies and measures have a virtual monopoly over advanced technological know-how and expertise. They are not prepared to transfer it to the developing countries without getting favourable commitments and several desired trade and economic agreements. Often their terms are not reasonable from the developing countries point of view. It is this inequity that the Third World countries want to remove.

14.3.5 Menace of Multinational Corporations as the Biggest Cause of Divergence

Presently, several multinational corporations (MNCs) are playing a big role in the spheres of international economy, trade technology and industrial production. They are controlling almost all the international patents in respect of advanced technological know-how. These are the instruments of the developed countries for maintaining their control over international economy and trade as well as for directing and controlling the economies and policies of the Third World countries. The developing countries are often forced by the developed countries to import the required technology through the expansion of cooperation with the MNCs which are held to be the most important channel for the transfer of capital technology and managerial expertise.

However, this exercise involves high costs and heavy burdens for the developing countries. MNCs charge very high fees for the supply of advanced technology. With poor economic resources and poverty writ large, the developing countries find it very difficult to purchase the technology from the MNCs. The fear of MNCs' interference with their domestic markets, economics, social and cultural values and decision making further prevents them to deal with MNCs. The role of MNCs in international economy has been negative and damaging as it has been a source of maintaining and increasing the gap between developed and developing countries. These have always acted as instruments of neo-colonialism of the rich over the poor countries. These have often played a dirty role in securing the overthrow of elected governments in many developing countries. Indeed the developing countries want to end this menace of MNCs.

14.3.6 Resentment of Commodity Producers

In this era of global interdependence, the commodity producers—mostly the developing countries—are playing almost as important a role as is being played by the industrialised and advanced countries. However, the developed countries give only marginal importance to the commodity producers. The lack of rules for safeguarding their interests make the developing countries live at the mercy of the developed countries. The dependence of the developing countries for the export of their commodities, the cut-throat unchecked open competition in international markets and protectionism in trade policies of the developed countries, together combine to make the lot of the Third World very poor and unfruitful. The developing countries want an international code of rules for protecting their trade interests. Not concluding international agreements to raise and stabilise the prices of raw material products exported by developing countries has always been a major bone of contention creating considerable hostility between the developed and developing countries.

14.3.7 Divergence of Approach on Total Revision of the Bretton Woods System

The existing system unduly favours the rich *vis-à-vis* the poor. In the presence of big economic and industrial gap between the developed and the developing countries, GATT and UNCTAD have failed to produce the desired effect and change in international economic and trade system. The Third World countries demand a definite fixed share in all international exports and tariff preferences in their favour as part of a new economic order. They argue that greater export sales facilitated by tariff preferences for developing countries and not to shameful non-tariff barriers in some more developed countries would have a number of beneficial effects. With greater foreign exchange earnings, the developing countries would import the large volume of capital goods and raw materials necessary to sustain more rapid growth of output, income and employment and thereby move towards development. The need is to end the existing terms of international economic relations and trade which are unfavorable to the Third World countries. Like GATT and UNCTAD, the Bretton Woods system has also outlived its existence. Bretton Woods has failed to create new truly global economic institutions for coordinating international economic relations. It has tended to favour the rich to the disadvantage of the poor. GATT has not been fully successful in securing greater trade liberalisation. IMF has nearly failed to meet the developmental loan requirements of the Third World. International institutions have come to be dominated by the rich and advanced countries. Likewise Bretton Woods has also failed to be adequately responsive to the needs of the developing countries. The need, therefore, is to replace it by a new economic system which is replete with a new set of priorities, principles, procedures and definite rules for governing contemporary international economic relations favouring the developmental needs of the developing countries.

14.4 PROCESSES OF CONVERGENCE PROMPTING COOPERATION

Various processes are working to bring convergence between the developed and under-developed countries of the world so that international economic relations can be established on just and fair bases. Prominent among these processes are the demand for establishment of a New International Economic Order, changing the outlook of international institutions like IMF, World Bank, etc., using the platform of Non-Aligned Movement, encouraging South-South Cooperation, effectively utilising the forum of 6+15 and giving more say to under-developed countries in institutions such as WTO. Needless to mention that all these institutions are attempting to bring the wide gulf of international inequities and disparities among the developed and developing countries to a manageable proportion so that a healthy international environment can be established. Here we shall discuss the role of these institutions in promoting cooperation and reducing international inequities.

14.4.1 Establishment of a New International Economic Order

A New International Economic Order (NIEO) is the only alternative that can go a long way in securing an equitable partnership between the rich and the poor nations. The issue of securing NIEO can be legitimately described as the most vital issue of contemporary international relations. The decolonialisation movement dominated the first two decades after the Second World War and these witnessed the rise of a number of sovereign independent states in Asia and Africa. These new states being motivated by a strong desire for development and full participation in international relations, started working for securing their due rights and roles in international relations. However, the abject poverty, scarcity of resources and under-development that characterised their people made it difficult for them to secure the desired objectives. Their dependence upon the developed and rich countries particularly for their economic needs forced them to live with the domination of the international system by the rich and powerful states. The rich countries came up with several instruments like foreign aid, Multinational Corporations, IMF, SDR, etc. which were apparently designed to help the poor countries but which were in reality the instruments for perpetuating their neo-colonialist control over their former colonies. The new states found themselves dependent upon the rich for meeting even their primary needs. Their dependence was exploited by the developed countries for influencing their economies and policies. The international economic system was and continues to be exploited by the rich states to their own advantage and the net result came in the form of a big gap between the rich and the poor. Inequalities and imbalances in international economy and trade that came to be developed as a result of the protectionist and neo-colonial policies of the developed nations, created a situation in which the poor under-developed countries found themselves being squeezed into being economic dependencies and satellites of the developed countries. The international economic system became more partial and exploitative.

The energy crisis of 1970s and several other harmful developments, made the under-developed countries totally dissatisfied with the prevailing system. They started making efforts towards the securing of their rights *vis-à-vis* the developed states. The existence of several international movements like NAM, Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement, Third World Unity and consolidation drive etc., provided them with the opportunity to share their problems and thoughts. The net result came in the form of the demand for restructuring of the international economic system—the creation of a new international economic order, with a view to make it equitable and just and to end the existing system which was partial in favouring the interest of the developed countries and which was giving little help to the Third World countries towards the securing

of their goals of development. The **demand** for NIEO has, however, till today failed to carry much conviction with the developed countries. They are in no mood to accept the demand as its acceptance is bound to end their existing superior position and role in international relations. **Their** opposition to the demand has **come** in the form of consolidation of their collective power as well as in the form of attempts to **delay** or evade the conduct of global negotiations over the issue. The **commitment** and determination of the Third World countries to secure NIEO against the **attempts** of the developed countries to torpedo the demand have together made the issue of NIEO a burning issue of contemporary international relations. The end of Cold War and the changes which came in the form of liquidation of socialist bloc, disintegration of the Soviet Union and the increased popularity of the **principles** of economic liberalism have together produced an environment in which the issue of NIEO has now emerged as the most vital issue of **contemporary** international relations and the day is not far off when the developed world will have to pay due heed to this demand by accepting the New International Economic Order which naturally will lead to extended mutual cooperation between the developed and developing countries.

14.4.2 South-South Cooperation

Another attempt on the part of developing countries to consolidate themselves in a move to **fight** unitedly the international inequities perpetrated on them by the developed **nations** of the North is their sincere attempts to promote the South-South cooperation. Since early 1980s' these countries **have** been trying to promote economic cooperation for development. The objective has come to acquire a popular characterisation as South-South cooperation in international relations. Since the New Delhi **meet** of 1982 (in New Delhi the **number** of member countries was **77** which has now gone up to 125) several attempts have been made towards the promotion of South-South cooperation. Various attempts at promotion of South-South cooperation can be discussed as under:

South-South Meet at New Delhi, 1982

The conference concluded with **unanimous** acceptance of the importance of cooperation for collective self-reliance and **with** a renewed call for efforts to reach an agreement on the launching of North-South global economic negotiations.

South- South Cooperation GSTP July 1985

The idea of Global System of Trade Preference (GSTP) was mooted first in 1982 and took shape at the two UNCTAD meetings in **1984** which did the spadework. This idea was **mooted** for securing increased trade cooperation and relations among the developing nations.

June 1987 NAM Foreign Ministers Conference on South-South Cooperation

The Pyongyang Conference, the first conference of Non-aligned foreign ministers on **South-South** cooperation was held on 12 and 13 June 1987 at Pyongyang. It gave a call to give new **impetus** to cooperation among the non-aligned and other developing countries and adopt a new **approach** to make such cooperation more dynamic.

Meeting of South-South Commission

The second meeting of South-South **Commission** for betterment of Third World countries was held at Kuala Lumpur in March, 1989. It discussed the continued neo-colonial control of the North over the economies and policies of the South, the protectionist policies adopted by the

industrialised countries against the import of processed and unprocessed commodities from the Third World countries, the steep fall in their population, growth ratio and the resultant slow down in the growth of the inelastic demand for essential commodities. the persistent fall in the commodity prices over the past few years and the steady development of a rapid global movement towards an international service and information economy. The Commission also discussed the changes in Eastern Europe containing the possibility of diversion of foreign aid from developed to the East European states. All these changes have made it imperative to usher in an era of South-South cooperation for the sheer survival of the Third World countries. Since the North is not agreeing in favour of NIEO, the South has only one alternative and that is development through South-South cooperation.

Meetings of G-15

With a view to encourage and lead the drive for South-South cooperation, various meetings of the group of 15 Third World countries popularly known as G-15 were held in different countries of the Third World. In June 1990, it was held at Kuala Lumpur, at Caracas (Venezuela) in November 1991, at Dakar (Senegal) in November 1992, at New Delhi in March 1995, in November 1995, at Buenos Aires (Argentina), at Harare in 1996, at Cairo in July 1998 and at Jamaica in 1999. In 1999, it completed 10 years of its existence. However, its efforts to have a big influence remained limited both in respect of the relations with developed countries as well as in the sphere of South-South cooperation. Another point worth mentioning here is that the G-15 was designed to act as an 'Action Group' for the South and was in no way in competition with the Group of 77 and Non-Aligned Movement. It was described as a catalyst intended to invigorate action towards increased and more matured South-South cooperation.

14.4.3 Role of World Trade Organisation (WTO)

WTO was founded in January, 1995, as a successor to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT), and is based in Geneva. While GATT focussed primarily on trade in goods, the WTO covers cross-border trade in services and ideas and the movement of personnel. The underlying principle of the WTO is to create an international environment that enables the free flow of goods, services and ideas. The four main WTO guidelines are trade without discrimination, predictable and growing market access, promoting fair competition and encouraging development and economic reform. The WTO has full-time representative from the member countries. The WTO functions on the basis of one member one vote which is not weighted by the countries' position in global trade. WTO members contribute to the administrative costs of the organisation in proportion to share in global trade. It has a full time Secretary-General with a tenure of four years who is assisted by four deputies. All GATT members qualified automatically for membership to the new body. The WTO countries together account for over 90 per cent of the global trade. The highest WTO authority is the Ministerial Conference which meets every two years. The day-to-day working falls on to a number of subsidiary bodies, principally the General Council, which also convenes as the Dispute Settlement Body and as the Trade Policy Review Body. The General Council delegates responsibility to three other major bodies—the Council for Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, and Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. The main concerns and agreements of the WTO relate to Market Access, Reduction of Tariff Levels, General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS), Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Trade related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Procedure Oriented Councils, Procedure-oriented Councils, Countervailing Measures, Anti-Dumping and Regional Trading Arrangements.

The WTO stands designed to benefit the developing countries: yet it has reflected several disturbing trends. The major developed countries have abundant resources at their disposal and

their objectives are also very clear. They want to use the framework of the WTO to expand the space for their manufacturers, traders, service providers, investors and high technology monopolies. It is therefore imperative for the developing countries not to ignore this oncoming well organised and massive thrust thereby exposing themselves to the risk of being total losers in this one-sided game. They should gear themselves up, individually and in groups, and reverse the adverse trends that are being set in motion.

14.5 SUMMARY

The above discussion reveals abundantly that there exists gross international inequities between the developed and developing countries. There are a number of issues on which there are divergences between these two extreme categories of nations and yet through various international bodies and processes there is an attempt to bridge this wide gulf.

The developed countries are maintaining, particularly in the sphere of economic and trade relations, a rigid big exploitative control over the developing countries. The grim international economic situation: the energy crisis, the continued unproductive and harmful armament race, the failure of the GATT and UNCTAD, the lack of success towards a North-South understanding over the issue of NIEO, the failure of the United Nations to act out its role successfully, etc., have all combined to create a grim international situation in which the developing countries find themselves at the receiving end because of their poverty and dependence upon the developed countries.

The under-developed countries on the other hand have been hoping to get a good response from the developed countries for securing their economic development. They want in specific (i) a restructuring of the existing economic order; (ii) total recasting of the Bretton Woods system; (iii) an increased and definite share in the world trade; (iv) writing-off the old debts; (v) grant of international developmental aid; (vi) transfer of advanced technology by the developed countries; (vii) increased help for the development of agriculture and industry; and (viii) a due share in international decision-making. For achieving this, the Third World countries want a comprehensive North-South dialogue. They have to accelerate their efforts for promoting South-South cooperation for mutual development. But the success in this direction has been limited. The hope for a global North-South dialogue has also faded into background in the post-Cold War era of international relations. The issue of NIEO has come to be a big controversial issue, rather the biggest issue in the relations between the developed and under-developed countries. What is needed is a strong determination on the part of the developing countries to secure their due rights and share in the contemporary international system after eliminating the domination of the system by the developed nations.

14.6 EXERCISES

- 1) Critically examine issues which are responsible for bringing in international inequities.
- 2) Describe the various processes of divergence and convergence responsible for increasing and reducing international inequities.
- 3) Critically evaluate the role of IMF and the World Bank in meeting the problems of inequities in the under-developed countries.
- 4) Explain the basic objectives and the organisational structure of the WTO.
- 5) What are the prospects for South-South cooperation in the contemporary economic order?

UNIT 15 ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Structure

- 15.1 Introduction
- 15.2 Trade
 - 15.2.1 Why does International Trade Take Place?
- 15.3 Factor Movements: Capital
 - 15.3.1 What Causes the Movements of Capital?
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15.1 INTRODUCTION

Since historical times, commercial transactions between countries were part of the national life. Especially trade was at the centre of these transactions. The historical records show that many Asian and European countries were exchanging goods between them and trade was flourishing particularly since the mid-16th Century. Even trade between many Asian countries was doing well, especially between India and Indonesia, and between Southeast Asian and East Asian countries such as Malaysia, Burma (now, Myanmar), Indonesia, Southern African countries, Caribbean Islands, West Pacific Islands. Similarly, there were monetary transactions between countries amounting to financial investments. The British had invested in many commercial projects in Southeast Asia. Similarly, the European countries had invested in African countries. Hence international economic relation is not a new phenomenon beginning in the 20th Century. Only change one can notice is that the industrial revolution of the 19th Century and information and communication revolution of the 20th Century have altered the parameters of this relationships taking it to a new high.

Because of increasing cross-border economic transactions the world today is increasingly becoming interdependent where developed countries too understand the significance of developing and LDCs in their progress. Their economic interactions are not out of compulsion or necessity but for securing each other's mutual interests. Even the international political relations and diplomacy between countries depend upon their mutual economic relations. More intense and regular are the economic relations, less possibility of friction of war. This has been well demonstrated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its establishment in 1967. For over the past thirty-five years since the ASEAN came into existence, all ten Southeast Asian countries are free from war-threat from each other. This miracle could happen through intense trade, movements of capital and labour, and financial assistance between them. Thus in the following discussion we highlight the basic principles of international economic relations by analysing the factors involved in it.

15.2 TRADE

Trade continues to be the foremost factor in international **economic** relations. Trade consists of two elements: i) merchandise trade and ii) trade in services. The principal components of merchandise trade are exports and imports of manufactured goods, agriculture products and mining products. The trade in manufactures (of world trade) accounts for almost 75 per cent of international trade and remaining 25 per cent is in primary products. Among the primary goods, trade in food products is the largest (9.3 per cent) followed by trade in fuels (7.6 per cent); trade in raw materials, ores and metals accounts for 5.7 per cent. In the manufacturing category, machinery and transport equipment accounts for 39 per cent of world trade. Automotive products are a major subcategory, absorbing 9.6 per cent of world trade. Other important categories of manufactures include trade in chemicals (9.3 per cent) and in textiles, clothing and miscellaneous consumer goods (15.6 per cent). The notable characteristic of current world trade is that trade in manufactures continues to be significant while trade in primary products continues to be sluggish.

Along with merchandise trade, trade in services is also an important component of the international trade. Services generally include the following items: wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage, communication, financial services, insurance, real estate, business services, personal services, community services, social services, and government services. International trade in services broadly consists of commercial services, investment income, and government services, with the first two categories accounting for the bulk of services. Discussions of trade in "services" generally refer to trade in commercial services. Since the beginning of the 1980s the exports of commercial services is surpassing merchandise exports, mainly because of advancement in information and communication technology, rise in tourism and internationalisation of production activities. However, the nature of trade in "services" is such that it is extremely difficult to obtain accurate estimates of the value of ("services") transactions. Because there is no agreed definition of what constitutes a traded service: and the way in which these transactions are measured are less precise than is the case for merchandise trade. Estimates are obtained by examining foreign exchange records and/or through surveys of establishments. Since many service transactions are not observable (hence, they are sometimes referred to as the "invisible" in international trade), the usual customs records or data are not available for valuing these transactions.'

15.2.1 Why does International Trade Take Place?

International trade plays an important role in the economic development of any country, and it is considered as an "engine of growth". Rather its importance has increased manifold in recent times with the advent of wave of liberalisation since the beginning of 1980s. Here we would give brief explanation of the basis of trade by drawing upon approaches of trade theories.

Mercantilism

During the 17th and 18th centuries the economic doctrine of mercantilism prevailed, largely in the Europe and the West. The doctrine of mercantilism was highly nationalistic and viewed the well being of the nation to be of prime importance. It favoured the regulation and planning of economic activity as an efficient means of fostering the goals of the nation, and it generally viewed foreign trade with suspicion.

The most important way in which a country could grow rich, according to the doctrine of mercantilism, was by acquiring precious metals, especially gold. Single individuals, however,

were not to be trusted: they might also like gold, but perhaps **they** liked other things even more. Left to themselves, they might exchange gold for cloth or sugar, or indulge in whatever private pleasures they preferred, to the detriment of the stock of precious metals stored in the nation. To prevent such undertakings, the **nation** had to control foreign trade. Exports were viewed favourably as long as they brought in goods, solid gold, but imports were viewed with apprehension, as depriving the country of its true source of richness—precious metals. Therefore, trade **had** to be regulated, controlled and restricted, with no specific virtue being seen in having a large **volume** of trade.

It was against this background that the English classical **economics** was developed, for mercantilism was the credo that Adam **Smith** and David Ricardo rebelled against; English classical economics was an offspring of liberalism and the **Enlightenment**—of a general philosophy that stressed the importance of the individual and viewed the nation as **nothing** more than the **sum** of its inhabitants. For **Smith** and Ricardo, the **supreme** subjects of economics are the consumers. The enjoyment of consumer was viewed with favour.

The Theory of Absolute Advantage of Trade: Adam Smith

Adam Smith saw clearly that a countrn could gain by trading. For instance, the tailor does not make his own shoes; he exchanges a suit for shoes. Thereby both the **shoemaker** and the tailor gain. In the **same** manner, Smith argued, a whole country can gain by trading with other countries.

Adam **Smith** cited an example, if it takes 10 labour units to manufacture 1 unit of good X in country A but 20 labour units in country B, **and** if it takes 20 units of labour to manufacture 1 unit of good Y in country A but only 10 labour units in country B, **then** both countries can gain by trading.

If the two countries exchanged the 2 goods at a ratio of 1 to 1, so that 1 unit of good X is exchanged for 1 unit of good Y, country A could get 1 unit of good Y by sacrificing only 10 units of labour, whereas it would have to give up 20 units of labour if it produced **the** good itself. Likewise country B would have to sacrifice only 10 units of Labour to get 1 unit of good X, whereas it would have to give up 20 **units** of labour if it produced itself. In nutshell, both countries could have more of both goods, **with** a given effort, by trading.

The Theory of Comparative Advantage: David Ricardo

David Ricardo did not object to **Smith**'s analysis. It is obvious that if one country has an absolute advantage over the other country in one line of production and the other country has an absolute advantage over the first country in a second line of production, both countries can gain by trading. A great deal of trade, perhaps most trade, is governed by such differences.

But what if one country is more productive than another country in all lines of production? If country A can produce all goods with less labour cost **than** country B, does it still benefit the countries to trade? Ricardo's answer was **yes**. So long as country B is not equally less productive in all lines of production, it sill pays **both** countries to trade. This **Ricardo's argument formulated** the foundation for favourable opinion for international trade. Ricardo's argument is still considered important and **remains** as the basis **when** two countries go for trade.

Ricardo used England and Portugal as **examples** in his demonstration, the two goods they produced being wine and cloth. He assumed that Portugal was more **efficient** in making both

cloth and wine. The Table 1 shows how Ricardo summed up the cost conditions in the two countries.

Table 1 : Cost Comparisons

	Labour cost of Production (in hours)	
	1 unit of wine	1 unit of cloth
Portugal	80	90
England	120	100

According to this model, Portugal has an absolute advantage in the production of wine as well as in the production of cloth, because the labour cost of production for each unit of the two commodities is less in Portugal than in England.

To demonstrate that trade between England and Portugal will, even in this situation, lead to gains for both countries, it is useful to introduce the concept of opportunity cost. The opportunity cost for a good X is the amount of other goods which have to be given up in order to produce one (additional) unit of X. Table 2 gives the opportunity costs for producing wine and cloth in Portugal and England. These costs have been constructed on the basis of the information given in Table 1.

Table 2 : Opportunity Costs

	Opportunity costs for	
	1 unit of wine	1 unit of cloth
Portugal	$80/90 = 8/9$	$90/80 = 9/8$
England	$120/100 = 12/10$	$100/120 = 10/12$

A country has a comparative advantage in producing a good if the opportunity cost for producing the good is lower at home than in the other country. Table 2 shows that Portugal has the lower opportunity cost of the two countries in producing wine, while England has the lower opportunity cost in producing cloth. Thus Portugal has a comparative advantage in the production of wine and England has a comparative advantage in the production of cloth.

What does it mean by 'comparative advantage'? In order to see about comparative advantage there must be at least two countries and two goods. We compare the opportunity costs of the production of each good in both countries. As long as the two countries' opportunity costs for one good differ, one country has a comparative advantage in the production of the other good. As long as this is the case, both countries will gain from trade, regardless of the fact that one of the countries might have an absolute disadvantage in both lines of production.

Comparative Advantages and Gains from Trade

Let us assume that Portugal and England do not trade but produce and consume in isolation. The prices of cloth and wine in the two countries are then determined by their respective cost of production.

If in England it takes 120 hours of labour to make 1 unit of wine, while it takes only 100 hours to make 1 unit of cloth, obviously wine must then be more expensive per unit than cloth—I unit of wine will cost $120/100$, or 1.2, unit of cloth.

If in Portugal it takes 80 hours of labour to make 1 unit of wine and 90 hours to make 1 unit of cloth, cloth will be more expensive than wine—1 unit of wine will cost $80/90$, or 0.89, units of cloth.

Let us now open the possibility of trade. If England could import 1 unit of wine at price less than 1.2 units of cloth: she would gain by doing so. If Portugal could import more than 0.89 units of cloth for 1 unit of wine, she, too, would gain. Therefore, if the international price of 1 unit of wine is somewhere between 1.2 and 0.89 units of cloth, both countries will gain by trading.

Let us assume further that in the international markets 1 unit of wine exchanges for 1 unit of cloth. It is then advantageous for England to export cloth and import wine, because in the absence of trade England would have to give up 120 hours of labour for every unit of wine she wants. By trading she can, instead, with 100 hours of efforts, produce 1 unit of cloth and then exchange this unit of cloth for 1 unit of wine. Under autarky i.e., a country producing and consuming in isolation, it would have to give up 120 hours of labour for every unit of wine she wanted, whereas with trade she only needs to give up 100 hours. With each 20 hours left over she can produce more cloth and enjoy a higher level of consumption—or the workers can rest, and trade will make possible more leisure with a given amount of consumption.

Portugal will also gain from trading. In isolation she would have given up 90 hours of labour to get 1 unit of cloth. Now she can make 1 unit of wine with the effect of 80 hours of labour and exchange this unit of wine for 1 unit of cloth in the international market. Every 10 hours of labour freed by this process can then be used for either increased production or increased leisure.

Thus trade offers each country the possibility of specialising in the line of its comparative advantage and then exchange these products for those in which she has a comparative disadvantage. Both countries can reallocate their factors of production to the line where their comparative advantage lies and then export this product and import the other product. In nutshell, with a given amount of resources each country can consume more by trading than in isolation.

After the theory of comparative advantage economists modeled many new theories but Ricardo's theory remained a landmark and the new theories mostly attempted to redefine the Ricardo's theory in changed situations. As the development advanced in many countries during the 20th Century, the role of factors of production altered in new situations and parameter to measure their significance also changed. Nevertheless, the basis of international trade continued to be the comparative advantage.

15.3 FACTOR MOVEMENTS: CAPITAL

Along with trade the two factors, capital and labour, have assumed equal importance as powerful agents of international economic relations since 1950s. Rather financial capital flows across the national borders have been increasing following the wave of globalisation in 1980s. The international labour mobility too has risen because of the rise of MNCs, TNCs and opening of new job opportunities with the growth of information and communication technology (ICT)

sector. Here we would touch upon the aforesaid issues in detail and would demonstrate their relevance to the trade.

Movements of capital through FDI and MNCs

The earlier trade theorists of the 18th and 19th centuries considered mobility of capital and labour only within the boundaries of a nation and ruled out their mobility between the nations. However, this assumption in the current period has undergone a change as large-scale capital and labour mobility **has** been taking place and changing the pattern of economic development in a significant way.

One needs to distinguish between two types of international movements of capital: one is foreign direct investment (FDI) and another is foreign portfolio investment. FDI refers to a movement of capital that involves ownership and control. In case of FDI the investor retains control over the invested capital and FDI and management go together. For instance, when Japanese citizens purchase common stock in a Malaysian **firm**, they become owners and have an element of control because common stockholders **have** voting rights. For classification purposes, this type of purchase is recorded as **FDI** if the stock involves more than 10 per cent of the outstanding **common** stock of the Malaysian **firm**. If a Japanese company purchases more than 50 per cent of the shares outstanding, it has a controlling interest and the "Malaysian" **firm** becomes a foreign subsidiary. The building of a plant in India by a Japanese company is also FDI, because obviously there is ownership and control of the new facility—a branch **plant**—by the Japanese company. FDI is usually discussed in the context of the multinational corporation (MNC), sometimes referred to as the multinational enterprises (MNE), the transnational corporation (TNC), or the transnational enterprises (TNE). All these **terms** refer to the same phenomenon—production is taking place in plants located in two or more countries but under the supervision and general direction of the headquarters located in one country.

Foreign portfolio investment does not involve ownership or control but the flow of "financial capital" rather the "real capital". In case of portfolio investment the investor does not retain control over the invested capital—only he lends his capital in order to get a return on it but he has no control over the use of that capital. Examples of foreign portfolios investment are the **deposits** of funds in an Indian **bank** by a Japanese company or the purchase of a bond (a certificate of indebtedness) of an Indian **company** or the Indian government by a citizen or company based in Japan. These flows of financial capital have their immediate impact on balances of payments or **exchange** rates rather than on production or income generation.

15.3.1 What Causes the Movements of Capital?

There is considerable mobility of capital across country borders in the world economy today. One can view the movements of **capital** between countries as **fundamentally** no different from movements between regions of a country (or between industries), because the capital is moved in response to the expectation of a higher rate of return in the new location than it earned in the old location. Economic agents seek to maximise their well-being. They seek higher rate of return on capital over time. We give in the following lines some reasons for capital movements.

i) Growing Market for Products

Firms invest abroad in response to large and rapidly growing markets for their products. For instance, **many** firms from US, Japan, South Korea and Germany are investing in India and China mainly to seek advantage of rapidly growing markets of these two countries.

ii) **Changing Tastes and Wants**

The manufacturing and services production in developed countries is catering increasingly to high-income tastes and wants, the firms of these countries invest overseas if the recipient country has a high per capita income. However, per capita income must be kept distinct from total income (**GDP**) ; for example, **firms** in developed countries are keen to move into China because of its sheer market size and despite its relatively low per capita income.

iii) **Access to Raw Material**

The foreign **firms** invest in other countries to secure access to mineral or raw material deposits located there and then process and sell them in more finished **form**. For instance, a substantial share of US direct investment overseas (especially in developing countries) is in the petroleum industry.

iv) **Getting behind the Tariff Wall**

Tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the host country also can induce an inflow of **FDI**. If trade restrictions make it difficult for the foreign firm to **sell** in the host country market, then an alternative strategy for the **firm** is to "get behind the tariff wall" and produce within the host country itself.

v) **Low Relative Wages**

A foreign firm may consider investment in a host country if there are low relative wages in the host country. The existence of low wages because of relative labour abundance in the recipient country such as India, China, Vietnam, Indonesia is an attraction when the production process is **labour-intensive**. Many times the production process gets broken up in such a manner that capital intensive or **technology-intensive** production of components takes place **within** developed countries while labour-intensive assembly operations take **place** in developing countries.

vi) **To Protect Market Share**

Sometimes firms invest abroad for defensive purposes to protest market share. For instance, **firm X**, finds it essential to begin production in the foreign **market** location in order to preserve its competitive position because its competitors are establishing plants in the foreign market currently served by X's exports or because **firms** in the host country are producing in large volume and competing with X's goods.

vii) **For Risk Diversification**

Firms often invest abroad as a **means** of risk diversification. By doing so they can avoid recession prevailing in some part of the world. If a recession or **downturn** occurs in one **market** or industry, it will be beneficial for a firm not to depend upon one market.

viii) **Firm-Specific Attributes**

Foreign firms may find **investment** in a host country to be profitable because of some **firm-specific** knowledge or assets that enable the foreign **firm** to **outperform** the host country's domestic firms. Superior management skills or an important patent might be involved. An opportunity to generate a profit by exploiting such advantages in a new setting **entices** the foreign **firm** to make the investment.

15.3.2 Major Instruments of Portfolio Investment

There is a large variety of instruments through which portfolio flows are channelled. The principal instruments are venture capital funds, county funds, America depository receipts (ADRs) and global depository receipts (GDRs), convertible bonds and bonds with equity warrants. Countries may prefer to channel portfolio inflows through specific instruments in order to protect their markets from externally induced turbulence.

i) Venture Capital funds

The rational for venture capital is an **imbalance** created by an inadequate supply of capital on appropriate terms **from** existing financial institutions on the one hand, and a significant demand for funding for new or high risk ventures with prospects for high growth and profitability on the other. Venture capital financing **provides** early-stage financing, as well as financing for the expansion of established companies. Venture capitalists provide equity-type financing with a view towards participating in the high returns achieved by successful new ventures with high growth potential, particularly in the form of capital gains. Venture capital investing involves the participation of a venture capital institution in the investee company. Since the early 1980s, many specialised venture capital institutions have been formed in developing and the LDCs.

ii) International Equity Investment Funds

Investment funds can be managed or unmanaged. Managed funds actively trade their portfolio of securities, the composition of which will change over time. Unmanaged funds invest in a fixed portfolio of securities which does not change over the life of the fund. Among the various portfolio **investment** instruments, managed international investment funds have become the most popular vehicle for portfolio investment in the emerging markets. Investment funds can also be divided into closed-end and open-end funds (commonly referred to as mutual funds or unit investment trusts). Closed-end funds are distinguished from open-end funds in that they issue a fixed number of shares at the time of their initial public offering.

iii) American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Global Depository Receipts (GDRs)

An ADR is generally created by the deposit of the securities of a non-United States company with a custodian bank in the country of incorporation of the issuing company. The custodian bank informs the depository in the US that the ADRs can be issued. ADRs are US dollar denominated and are traded in the same way, as are the securities of the US companies. The **ADRs** holder is entitled to the **same** rights and advantages as owners of the underlying securities in the home country. Several variations on ADRs have developed over time to meet more specialised demands in different markets. One such variation is the GDR which are identical in structure to an ADR, the **only** difference being that they can be traded in more than one currency and within as well as outside the US

iv) Convertible Bonds and Bonds with Equity Warrants

A convertible bond is a bond which gives its holder the right to exchange the bond for a specified number of the issuing company's shares at any time up to and indicating the maturity date of the bond. Many convertible bonds include a call option which gives the issuing company the right to call the bond for redemption before the bonds maturity date. Once the company exercises the call, the bond holder is usually allowed approximately thirty days in which to either convert the bond into shares or surrender the bond and receive in return the call price in cash. The issuer will usually be obliged to pay a premium above the bond's par value in the event that they exercise the call.

An equity warrant is a security which gives the holder the right to buy (in return for cash) a specified number of shares directly from the issuing company at a specified fixed price for a given period of time, which is known as exercise period. The warrant can usually, but not always, be detached from the bond and sold as a separate security. This is not the case with convertible bonds. They also sometimes issue warrants as separate securities.

15.4 LINKAGES BETWEEN FDI AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT

As mentioned earlier portfolio investment is distinguished from FDI by the degree of management control that foreign investors exercise in a venture (or a **firm**): portfolio investors usually provide only financial capital by purchasing shares of a **company** without any involvement in the company's management. Portfolio investment has a shorter investment horizon than FDI, sometimes just a few weeks or months, although this **horizon** can extend to ten years or more. The type of investor is also different: while FDI investors are **firms** engaged in the production of goods and services, portfolio investors are more often either financial institutions, institutional investors (**FIIs**), or individuals, and are interested only in the financial **returns** of their investments. However, in practice, these distributions are often less than clear-cut and are subject to a number of following qualifications.

The ownership threshold commonly used to distinguish FDI and portfolio **investment** is somewhat arbitrary. An investment is normally counted as **FDI** when it involves an equity capital stake of 10 per cent or more of the ordinary shares in an incorporated enterprise, or its equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise. This is held to indicate a lasting interest in, or a degree of control over, the management of the enterprise. An equity stake of less than 10 per cent is categorised as portfolio investment.

However, minority-share purchase can, in some circumstances, involve direct **management** participation, and in some cases lasting **management** control can take place with a less than 10 per cent equity stake. In the case of Japan, for instance, Japanese companies sometimes hold less than 10 per cent of the shares of **foreign** supplies of raw materials, but still have representation on the **foreign** company's board of directors and maintain a long term business relationship with these companies.

The role of venture capital investors is also less clear-cut. They provide equity capital for unquoted companies (on stock market) often at the start-up stage, and are often very closely involved in managing them, either directly or indirectly, by providing advisory services. Although their overriding motive is to achieve a **capital gain**, venture capital **investors** often wait several years before selling their equity stakes.

Flows of portfolio investment normally take place through transactions involving shares of **companies** quoted in **stock markets**, although some portfolio flows also take place in unquoted companies (for e.g., in the case of **venture capital funds**). The contribution of portfolio investment to the financing of **domestic** enterprises can be significant. It is most direct when the investment is made in the market for primary issues, in the local stock **market**, or in **international market** through **international equity offerings** or issues of depository receipts. Share purchases in the local secondary **market** contribute indirectly to the financing of local **firms**. Portfolio investors are mostly attracted in the first place by "blue-chip" companies in **emerging markets** because they seek opportunities to take advantage of "price anomalies" by investing in companies that appear to be undervalued on the basis of, for e.g., the **price-earnings ratio**. However, these need

not necessarily, always be blue-chip companies, they can be companies with high growth potential.

Flows of portfolio investment are linked to the development of stock markets in recipient countries. Many venture-capital funds investments in unquoted companies are made **with** the expectation of reaping capital gains subsequent to the listing of such companies on the stock market once they become **mature**. With regard to mergers and acquisitions (**M&Qs**), there is a close relationship between **FDI** and portfolio investment. In many cases, cross border **M&Qs** are considered as **FDI** transactions because they confer a lasting and significant management interest in the merged or acquired company. However, it is possible for such transactions to take place with a minority equity interest, in which case the transaction would be recorded as a portfolio flow.

15.5 FACTOR MOVEMENTS: LABOUR

Along with capital, the mobility of labour too has increased since the mid-1950s. Such mobility is playing important role in designing the economic relationship **between** two countries. For instance, a large number of ethnic Chinese migrated and settled in the Southeast Asia are playing influential role in economic activities of the Southeast Asian nations and are seen as a link between China and South East Asia. The settled ethnic Chinese forms a strong network to conduct economic transactions **between** China and Southeast Asia and most of the **FDI** inflows into China comes from Chinese Diaspora. In the following lines, we analyse the issues involved in labour mobility and its implications.

Causes of Labour Movements

Technically, the desire to migrate on the part of an individual (labour) depends on the expected costs **and** benefits of the move. Expected income difference between the old and new location; cost-of-living differences between the two locations, and other non-pecuniary net benefits in the new location such as health facilities, educational opportunities, or greater political or religious freedom figure into the decision to migrate. Even within this more general framework, expected wage or income differences are an important factor. For instance, large number of unskilled **and** skilled labour from India migrated to various countries of West Asia to earn higher wages. Similarly large number of Indian knowledge—labour such as doctors, engineers, management professionals, software experts, scientists and teachers migrated to the US and other developed countries since the early 1970s to earn comparatively higher wages as well as avail better work environment.

What is 'Brain Drain' ?

The movement of skilled labour, especially **between** developing and the industrialised countries, is a relatively recent phenomenon. However, an increasing number of highly educated people (physicians, research scientists, technocrats, university teachers, and other skilled professionals) **from** developing countries to the US, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand is more often referred to as the "brain drain." Higher salaries, lower taxes, greater professional and personal freedom found in these countries explain such migration.

The developing countries, because of brain drain, are in a quandary. The migration of skilled labour often represents a **substantial** static and **dynamic** cost to them. Developing countries often resort to restrict the out-migration of skilled labour. Until recently, for example, restrictions

of this kind were **common** in Eastern Europe. However, the loss in personal **freedom** associated with labour movement restriction makes such restrictions unappealing. Restriction of personal **freedom** also lead to lower production and a loss of professional leadership and entrepreneurship, which is important to these countries **as** they undergo **economic reforms**.

15.6 MONETARY AND CREDIT FACTOR

Closely related to the capital and labour **movements** is the issue of the "external financial assistance" or popularly **known** as "foreign aid". The aid factor in recent period has taken a back-seat in international **economic** relations with the rise of FDI and portfolio investment. Now the concern has shifted to interdependence of developed and developing and LDCs rather than dependence of developing and LDCs on the developed countries. The relationship between these countries is **now** based on principle of mutual benefit. The developed countries too need developing and LDCs for expanding their production and marketing base. The liberalisation and globalisation have opened up the markets. Many developing and LDCs are **now** following the policy of export-led growth. The policy of import-substitution is **becoming** past-day phenomenon. This changed situation is more suitable to the FDI and portfolio investment to play significant role than foreign aid and therefore there is less stress on the latter.

15.6.1 What is Foreign Aid?

Foreign aid or **external financial assistance** refers to only that part of the capital inflow, which is not based on **normal market** incentives but is made on concessionary **terms**. Thus, grants of freely convertible currency constitute aid in the full sense. Foreign loans contain only an element of aid. The difference between aid **and** loan can be identified on the basis of three factors, i.e. grace **and** maturity period, **as** well as interest rate. Normally in case of aid these factors are lower when compared with loan. However, in case of both, aid and loan, private foreign investment and short-term capital movements are **excluded**.

The need for **foreign aid** arises when **domestic capital formation** falls short of developmental-programme requirement. The developing and LDCs during the 1950s to 1970s were caught in a typical situation: mass poverty; unemployment, surplus labour in agriculture, high birth rate, famine and hunger, low agricultural productivity and inadequate industrialisation. Coupled with these problems the financial market and banking network was extremely insufficient to attract either FDI or portfolio investment. To overcome shortfall in **domestic capital formation** developing and LDCs approached the developed countries for assistance. They also approached the international **and** multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, US Aid Organisation, etc. for help. Recognising their concerns the developed and the aforesaid **organisations** too came forward and provided the **help**. Their financial assistance was either in the form of aid or loans. The borrowed resources were mainly meant for three purposes, firstly to supplement national income by making available (**the borrowed**) foreign exchange to be deployed in developmental programmes; secondly for importation of strategic capital goods or foreign materials to be used to expand production base by utilising domestic raw materials that would otherwise remain unused; and thirdly to remove a balance of payments bottleneck which was almost the usual feature of the developing and LDCs.

15.6.2 Types of Foreign Aid

The foreign aid often invokes one question: whether the aid is tied or untied? The tying of aid *inter alia* determines the cost of foreign aid. The aid may be tied by sources or end-use (via specification of commodities or projects). There are various methods by which aid can be tied

to the source but two methods namely, formal restrictions and indirect restrictions are more in practice. In case of formal restrictions, the recipient country has to spend the aid funds for importing goods and services only from the designated source(s). The US resorts to this method while allowing foreign assistance to developing countries. While in case of direct restrictions, three methods can be applied. First, the aid-flow becomes the part of an overall trade arrangement. Secondly, the aid-flow can be coupled with the provisions under which the aid is to be spent on donor countries goods and services and the donor country would make the reciprocal purchases from the recipient country on a preferential basis. Thirdly, the donor can finance only those commodities and/or projects of the recipient country where the donor country has the decided advantage in tendering or supplying the specified items.

Aid can be project tied or non-project tied. When aid is given for a particular project, then it is called a project aid. If it is not for a specified commodity or project, it becomes a non-project aid. Project and non-project aid have their own merits and demerits. The greatest merit of the non-project aid is that the recipient country is free to utilise aid according to its priority programmes and as such it works as a stimulant in the overall process of economic growth. In case of project-tied aid the recipient country has no option but to utilise it on the programme for which it is sanctioned. From the point of developmental goal of the (recipient) developing country, aid should be untied and country's overall development programmes (instead of individual projects) should be the basis for allocating and controlling aid.

The tying of aid gives more benefits to the donor than recipient country. The tying of aid to purchases in the donor country is implicitly a form of protection, and it readily degenerates into a means of trade-promotion by the donor country (of its trade) instead of being a means of accelerating the development of the recipient country. That causes adverse effects to recipient country. The real value of aid is reduced to the extent that import prices from the donor country are above competitive world market prices. This may be of less concern when the recipient country receives aid in the form of a grant; but in the case of a loan, the extra cost of tying (represented by the difference between the purchasing power of untied aid and tied aid) may have a substantial effect in reducing the element of subsidy or the "grant component" in the loan.

The practice of aid tying is also undesirable because it distorts the recipient country's allocation of investment resources. When procurement (of machinery and material) is limited to the aid-supplying country, the recipient's development programme tends to become biased towards those projects that have a high component of the special import content allowed for under the conditions of tied aid. Aid tied to purchases in the donor country can also limit the choice of technology used in investment projects and may thereby cause the recipient country to adopt by necessity a technology that is less appropriate for its factor endowment that would be suitable if it could import freely.

15.7 SUMMARY

Trade, capital and labour movements and foreign aid constitute significant factors in international economic relations. Their importance, however, assume different degrees with the change in location, time and purpose. Traditionally trade continues to be one of the important factors. The basis of trade remains the theory of comparative cost advantage. Ricardo's principle essentially relies on free market economy where trade can bring benefit to both the trading partners. The differences in comparative cost of production and their relative opportunity cost determine the level of trade between two partners.

To seek higher returns of free trade and expand the basis of production beyond national boundaries movements of capital and labour are also burgeoning. Initially the capital moved from developed to developing countries to take advantage of abundant raw material and cheap labour. In the process developing countries were benefited with the absorption of new and advanced technology. Flow of capital helped developing countries to erect network of security market, i.e. stock exchange. This prompted the flow of portfolio investment from individuals and investment firms of developed to developing countries. Besides, there is an increased labour movement across the countries. The rise in labour movements is basically more from developing to developed countries to earn higher returns. The spurt in education and training of information and communication technology (ICT) in the developing countries helps skilled-labour to migrate to developed countries.

Foreign aid dominated the international economic relations (until the emergence of FDI and portfolio investment) for some of the developing and most of the LDCs. To those economies where trade expansion had limited scope because of small size of their economy, such as Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal, external economic assistance is *sine qua non* in their development programmes. For instance, India's assistance to these three economies is quite substantial and especially the Bhutanese Five-Year Plans for the past fifty years are entirely dependent on the Indian assistance.

15.8 EXERCISES

- 1) What is the basis of the theory of absolute advantage of trade?
- 2) What is comparative cost advantage?
- 3) What is the difference between foreign direct investment and portfolio investment?
- 4) What are the causes of movements of capital?
- 5) What is the significance of foreign aid in developmental process?
- 6) Why is the untied aid preferable to a tied aid?

UNIT 6 FEMINIST APPROACHES

Structure

- 6.1 Introduction
 - 6.2 How Do Feminists Define Power?
 - 6.3 Feminist View of the State
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 - 6.5 The Relevance of Feminist Critiques in Third World Societies
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6.1 INTRODUCTION

Feminism is the advocacy of the rights of women. It explains that women have been disadvantaged compared to men and are subordinated to men because of a system of patriarchy. Patriarchy is a system of social structures and practices through which men dominate and exploit women. This implies two things. One that it is not biological characteristics but social systems that are at the root of gender inequality. And second that not every individual man is necessarily in a position of domination, nor is every woman in a position of subordination. The Feminist movement involves struggles for political and legal rights and equal opportunities for women.

Patriarchy is a system of social and power relations where men dominate and control women. It is present in different institutions and structures from family to state to international relations. Patriarchy varies according to different social systems and cultures. Patriarchy determines relations between men and women, between individuals, social groups, communities and social formations. Patriarchy has existed at different periods of times from pre-history, ancient societies, feudalism, and capitalism and is part of the globalisation process. At each stage it has had its specific characteristic and intersects with all prevailing concepts like nationalism, militarism and religion. Patriarchy is a pervasive ideology but one that has been challenged and contested.

Feminism incorporates many strands from the liberal, radical, socialist, and post-modernist feminists. However, a commonality in their judgement exists that gender inequalities continue to exist and that in gender roles the "private" and "natural" role assigned to women serves to make their work and labour invisible. This not only perpetuates unequal relations but also distorts the understanding of the most pressing problems of the world. Feminists emphasise the process of democracy as integral for gaining rights. Most feminists challenge the doctrine of essentialism that casts women with a fixed identity, i.e. women as essentially peaceful and men as aggressors. Such projections are used in ultra-nationalist projects and dangerous political agendas. Feminists have critiqued the state, concept of power and theories of International Relations (IR) and national security doctrines. Feminism is linked with movements for women's rights and gender equality.

6.2 HOW DO FEMINISTS DEFINE POWER?

Feminist scholars show that power relations are organised on the basis of gender. In fact the concept of power is given masculine traits. Power is constructed as possessing force and the ability to influence others. Those without power, especially during conflict are termed as "impotent" or "wimpy" and their weakness is associated with femininity. For example in South Asia, men who oppose military action are asked to wear bangles. Men are naturally associated with leadership and women are accepted as leaders if they accept masculine notions of power.

The unequal struggle for power through history, where men established control led to the subordination of women because of their reproductive role. Political theory and International Relations give a central role to man and place women as secondary actors within state systems. Through history, the very concept of the male is linked to the notion of power. Feminists challenged this notion in order to overcome it. This is not to imply that all men think in patriarchal stereotypes, but only that concepts and institutions reflect historically and culturally conditioned ideas about knowing the world and that masculinity had become a base for these institutions. A socially constructed masculine experience is shown to be a universal experience and imposed on women and society as a whole. This preserves male privilege and reinforces social practices in the private and public spheres. Feminists have shown up how the male experience is not the only human experience and to present only this is an exclusionary view of human relations and of international relations.

6.3 FEMINIST VIEW OF THE STATE

Feminists argue that traditional theories of the state are either descriptive i.e. deal only with characteristics like sovereignty, territory, power, or deal primarily with their role as instruments of coercion or social cohesion. States according to feminists are patriarchal in structure and support: patriarchy. For feminists states are extensions of society. Thus the feudal state, the capitalist state, the socialist state all have features of obvious as well as covert or hidden patriarchy.

Although patriarchal practice preceded state formation, states became structured because patriarchal and class systems got institutionalised. Gender and class relations were backed by the power of the state and this hierarchy was reproduced and ensured by a complex of legitimising ideologies. Women lost their right to property and came to be treated as property. The individual household unit rendered women vulnerable to and dependent on fathers/brothers/husbands. This weakened their access to countervailing power and support from larger kinship networks. Inheritance, sexuality and reproduction were regulated by the state. For instance, adultery by women became a crime against the state and was publicly punishable. Women's role in the domestic/household sphere was regulated by the state. Women's role was confined to private spheres and men to public spheres. For example, women had to wear a veil and were subjected to harassment. States gave legitimacy to this practice because of the concept that women were to be "protected". For this protection they had to give up their autonomy. Men are the "natural" citizens of their state, but women have had to fight for their rights. Thus women got the right to vote only after long struggles by the women's movements.

The state ensured the organisation of power relations on a gender basis. The state has formalised gender power relations by retaining male domination at the level of top personnel within states. Gender differentiation is evident in the presence of the disproportionate number of men in the

coercive structures of the state like the army or police and women most visible in the service sectors i.e. teachers, health workers and clerical support. In fact, women were supposedly "protected" from the so-called "tough professions" in order to exclude them and to prevent them from equal rights. Men were born eligible for better jobs and higher pay while women managed to wrest these privileges only after struggles and debates and were given these rights only when society was haunted by the spectre of social anarchy and breakdown of family values. Writers like Spike Peterson and Zilla Eisenstein have shown how the state mystified its patriarchal base by the construction and manipulation of the ideology that sees the distinction between public and private life. Feminist writers like Sylvia Walby systematically deconstruct the state to show its patriarchal character and point to women's labour and reproduction as objects of control by the state.

Even though the state has some amount of autonomy and is not a monolith, it is structured in a patriarchal way. Its actions are more often in men's interests than women's. It is because of the long history of patriarchy and exploitation and its legitimization by the state and its structures that the patriarchal state system is so acceptable and appears apolitical and natural. The state also reflects dominant ethnic communities and class biases.

The state has changed with time. These changes are often in response to pressures from social movements like the women's movement. Sometimes changes come from the democratisation process and electoral pressures. For example, pressure from the women's movements for equal inheritance rights or for reservation of seats in parliament for women. Changes can also come from international pressure, for example, pressure from international organisations on states to sign the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Though changes have been made to improve the status of women through laws and various schemes, women still face patriarchal structures of state and society. Whether in terms of employment, dual burden, violence culture, etc. women continue to be discriminated against. Patriarchy has been challenged and altered but it exists. The tasks of the feminist movement thus remain.

6.3.1 Feminist Analysis of Nationalism

Feminist scholars have shown the relation between women and the nation as a further explanation of women and the state. The state as the structure for control and administration of a territory and the nation as a construct that binds people on the basis of ethnicity and other factors incorporate gender. The concept of citizenship historically has formed the link between nation and state. Feminist writers like Yuval-Davis, Anthias, Jnyawardane and Cynthia Enloe show the links between gender and ethnic/national identity. They show that women are involved in ethnic and national processes through various ways. Women's role as reproducers for the nation and members of ethnic groups is given much emphasis by most nations. This is evident from the debates on population and growth of different ethnic and majority or minority communities.

During wars and conflicts women's role as reproducers of the nation gets emphasised. Women get linked to boundaries of ethnic/national groups. The concept of "us" versus "them" or the "other" as an enemy is often borne by women in this capacity. Women are important for the nation and nationalism as transmitters of national culture and for socialising children as citizens. Women have symbolic value for nations as signifiers of ethnic/national differences. Women wear cultural symbols on their bodies. They are marked out by their dress, type of ornaments etc. (For example, bindi, mangal sutra, etc.) During conflicts they are thus vulnerable to attack or "protection". Women are also participants in national, economic, political and military struggles. Women have been equal participants in national tasks when called upon and uphold the ideologies and needs of the nation like men. This aspect, however, is often less emphasised

than their role as **ethnic/national** markers. In this tradition, women are keepers of national culture, family tradition and indigenous religion. These values impose constraints and sanctions against women taking on new public roles.

Nationalism and nationalist movements have had contradictory effects on women. For example, in both India and Pakistan women played an active role in the struggle for independence from colonial rule. In both these countries issues of reform for women, or property rights for women were not on the agenda of nationalism. While nationalism played its role in history, it homogenised people in a fixed hierarchy. Differences of class, gender, multiple identities (ethnic, religious) were covered up and demands from these groups were perceived as contributing towards disintegration of internal unity, territorial integrity or any other attribute of sovereignty.

Nationalism focuses on identity and manages to paper over pluralities that in fact differentiate people within the same state on the basis of gender, ethnicity, class, caste or region. Nationalism seeks to construct a dominant nationality and in doing so covers up exploitative and unjust social relations. Nationalism **creates myths** that legitimise the state system in which **violence** is used as the ultimate arbiter of social conflicts. While **internal** differences are masked, the assumption of external differences is magnified and enhanced to create a bigger than life enemy image. Militarism is legitimised since force is seen as necessary for solving conflicts, defending boundaries, constructing sovereignties and **legitimising** the maintenance of the state system in which violence is the ultimate arbiter of social conflicts.

Historically, nationalism has promoted the image of male domination and leadership. The distinctions between nationalism and militarism are deliberately blurred. Literature and **analysis** of war associates men with combat, violence and **activity**, and women with peace, nurturing, and passivity. These images are **explained** by references to biological, social and historical explanation. National chauvinism exaggerates images and ideas of nationalism in a way that nationalism becomes distorted and loses its progressive contents. Doctrines of national chauvinism construct an "other" as an enemy. They **conflate** manhood, combat and militarism, and glorify violence as a "natural" expression of masculine and nation-state identity. The image of the "heroic" male warriors is extended to the behavior of states. Success of a state, like that of a **man** is measured in terms of power, honours, valour, self-reliance, and aspects linked primarily to the "male ego".

The language of nationalism is gendered. Terms like "love of country" (where the country becomes co-terminus with "mother") **are transformed** into images where women serve as the repository of group identity. The nation is often depicted as the body of women about to be violated by foreigners. National identity is equated with ideas of specific race, gender, and religion. When women are equated as mothers of the nation they signify national difference. Since women embody these values **that** incidents of rape during conflict occur. Rape is seen as a political act by which the aggressor attacks the honor and identity of the "other"—the enemy. This act is also **seen** as breaking the continuity of the social order that women are meant to uphold. By raping women **the honour of the community/nation that she belongs to** is dishonoured and collectively punished.

Feminist scholars argue that when women become symbolic figures for national identity they get fixed in a social and political hierarchy, that appears to idealise women and "honour" them, but in reality binds them by fixing them in a permanently lower place in the social and political hierarchy. For example, the Rajput women in medieval India, would symbolically hand over the sword to the male of the house, but had to commit *sati* on their death, and were debarred from all property rights.

Nationalism can be progressive at certain times of history, for instance, during anti-colonial struggles but nationalism based on single identity/religious politics is a retrogressive nationalism that destroys the real traditions of countries and peoples. Gender plays a role in the construction of national identity and situates women in a hierarchical order that is seen as essential for the nation. Women are not excluded from the concept of the nation in the way other groups may be, due to their race, religion or colour, but they are given a specific place that complements the men.

6.3.2 Feminism and Human Rights

The women's movement has struggled for long to get women's rights recognised as human rights. While human rights violations can take place on any individual, women are subject to human rights violations in a gendered way. For instance, rape is a method of torture, or punishment for errant women. It was after much pressure from the women's movement that the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was proposed by the United Nations in December 1979. This convention addressed the systematic discrimination against half of the world's population. Many states have still to sign this convention. Rape has been recognised as a war crime only in the year 2000. While the CEDAW and the recognition of women's rights are important steps, in many cases these remain normative instrumentality. There is great need to create a body like the international criminal court where violations of such instruments can be adjudicated.

6.3.3 Feminist Critique of Realism

Even when the modern state accommodated gender issues, International Relations continued to primarily deal with the patriarchal aspects of the state. Gender remained outside the sphere of concern because of the intellectual tradition of theories of Realism and the preoccupation of the state with national security. International Relations theorists did not relate to the demands from the women's movement or with change that was to effect social and political systems.

Realists argue that states are the primary providers of security and an individual secures her/his security by virtue of membership to the national community. The image of the state as a "protector" is widely and powerfully used in Realism. The protector is attributed with "masculine" characteristics and the "protected" with the feminine. The security of the individual is inextricable from that of the state because the state protects and preserves the social order and protects individuals from invasion by foreigners and from injuries to one another.

Feminist writers like Rosemary Grant argue that Realist theory endorses patriarchy because for Realists, patriarchy is necessary for maintaining social order and the state. It is for this reason that women are excluded from many prevailing definitions of political actor. International Relations theory privileges man and excludes women because it is man who is identified with the state and the state is the basis of patriarchal relations in Realist discourse. Feminists critique the Realist argument that accepts the premise that the citizen is identified with the male, and women are the "other", the outsider.

Realist doctrines are directly inherited from the conception of the state where the central figure and main actor is the "sovereign man" or the "hero-warrior". This sovereign man is the symbol of power in political theory, specially constructed by Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Later political theorists accepted and reinforced this argument. The Realist thinkers accepted the man of rational choice as their actor in common with neo-classical economic theory. Hans Morgenthau, a foundational thinker of Realism, like Hobbes, states that the "nature of man" is the starting

point for theorising on International Relations. It is natural for man to dominate and all associations are based on this. The social hierarchy where man is superior is necessary for the survival of states that are the main actors in the international political system. The concepts chosen by the Realists make the exclusion of women in the international political order a virtue.

6.4 FEMINISM, WAR AND PEACE

Wars are seen as the activity of men and women are positioned as secondary during war. Note for instance, the opening sentence of the UNESCO Charter that states since wars are made in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that peace should be made. This assumes that those who make war are the ones who make the peace and the nation. Since wars are seen as "nation-building" exercises, it is men who appear to be most involved in this task. They then are the more privileged of the two genders in the national enterprise.

Feminists see war as a gendering activity. War marks the gender of all members of society whether they are or not combatants. Men and women suffer war but as unequal they suffer unequally under the same oppressive system. Feminists see war not just as the impact on women approach, but as a system where the gender stereotypes are re-enforced and gender relations restructured. During wars women's identities get coded in a system of nationalist and gender politics (like mothers of the nation) and their status and rights get linked to their nation. Women have participated in wars in different ways. Women are concerned with war and militarisation for a number of reasons. First, because women and children are victims of policies that they did not plan or execute. It is men who participate in and define public life, and take decisions about war and militarisation. Even today, there are less than ten per cent of women in most parliaments. In many countries, especially in the Third World, there are no women at all in the higher decision making bodies of the executive like the cabinet.

War impacts men and women differently. Military training and military casualties in conventional wars have been men. Women too constitute direct casualties of war. Wars increasingly are carried out in civilian areas and current statistics show that more than 75 per cent of the casualties are non-combatants that include large number of women and children. Modern weaponry is designed to hurt largest possible numbers and is indiscriminate in causing hurt and death.

Wartime sexual violence against women has occurred in almost all wars through history. It is used as an instrument of coercion against the enemy in war, inter-community conflict as well as during ethnic and sectarian conflicts. The relationship between conflicts and the violation of women's bodies has been repeatedly established in all wars and conflicts. This phenomenon was widespread whether it was the partition of India in 1947, or when the fleeing Pakistani army raped 200,000 Bengali women in Bangladesh in 1971 or, more recently during ethnic conflicts that marked the emergence of the breakaway republics of former Yugoslavia. The belief that mass rape is part of genocide, humiliation and destruction of the "enemy" flows from the patriarchal understanding that a woman's body is not owned by her but is symbolic as territory or property belonging to the enemy, which must be violated. The psychological torture and trauma associated with rape and pregnancy caused by an enemy is incomparable to other forms of torture.

Women are victims of war and conflict in a variety of other ways. The loss of family members, which includes husbands, brothers and children has long-term psychological effects on women. The record of women as caretakers of family members who are war casualties is legendary and women alone endure this form of prolonged and unique suffering. Their loss is not purely an

emotional loss and in most instances also an economic loss and decline of social legitimacy. In many societies where women continue to be second-class citizens or where women farm the bulk of the illiterate and unemployed, the loss of male family members in a conflict is irreparable for women. In this case they lose the main earning member and many economic and social rights that accrue from their income. For, women destitution follows quickly on the heels of a war. Yet their role in the war effort, "to give their sons/ men to the nation" remains a gendered role.

It has been documented by international organisations like the UNCR that seventy to eighty per cent of the world's refugees are women and children. Women are often the sole caretakers of children; they support the extended family, play a central economic role, and nurture traumatised children and families and restore a semblance of normalcy. Famines, food scarcity, destruction of infrastructure and basic facilities, like water pipelines, roads, bridges, buildings, hospitals, farmlands, have an impact on the entire social structure and community. Studies have shown that in conditions of food scarcity, women are likely to decrease their own food intake. In South Asia during peace but in conditions of poverty it is the girl child who would be deprived of basic needs and education.

The impact of war on the destruction of the natural environment has a devastating consequence for women. Given their role as food providers and caretakers, the responsibility of finding alternative sources of food and water and rebuilding the environment falls on women and increases their burden disproportionately. In countries like El Salvador and Vietnam where eighty per cent of the vegetation was devastated by war, studies showed that it was peasant women who bore the burden of finding wood for fuel and growing food. The impact of the Gulf War and the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq has badly affected women and children who become the hapless victims of international politics and state policies. Feminist discourse places emphasis on human connectedness, dialogue and cooperation in contrast to domination and violent confrontation. So feminists in IR do not argue for women's equal rights to be part of the military or for the right to dominate. But they want the right to speak for peace and be in positions where they can put this point of view.

6.4.1 Feminism and the Security Debate

Since it is men who have fought, resolved and chronicled wars, international security became the preserve of men. Feminists ask that security of states be viewed with the perspective of the social relations that support the role of the state. National security has been an almost exclusively male domain. Feminists have challenged the view of the military as a defender of a pre-given "national interest" and see security as partial and not unilinear. Security of the state does not automatically bestow security to its members, especially those outside its priorities and boundaries. Strategies must encompass non-militarist methods of negotiations.

Feminists want a change in the theory of Realism and argue for broadening the very concept of security, to decrease the military aspects and to valorise the democratic aspect instead. Real security should be less state-centric and rather more society-centered for more equitable economic needs and geared to social justice, political liberty and egalitarian democratisation. This broadening of the concept of security, beyond the assumptions of Realism based security must take place. On the question of security the relation between state and non-state actors has to be better understood and social justice must take precedence over inter-state conflict resolution.

For real peace, what is required is not the "management" of a conflict by national security personnel working within a national security paradigm, but instead to widen security perspectives

to keep peace with processes of **democratisation** and **empowerment**. The politics of people's **movements** and acceptance of feminist ideas are part of such wider processes. Despite their halts and defeats, these influenced and altered domestic and international politics with the turn of the century.

6.5 THE RELEVANCE OF FEMINIST CRITIQUES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES

Is feminism relevant in non-Western states and societies or is it part of a Western tradition? Since women have been oppressed in all societies and through history, feminism provides a powerful tool to analyse this in order to change it. Patriarchy and forms of oppression do have their cultural and historical specificities, but the basic power relationship remain the same. The feminist critique of the state, power and international politics is relevant for women who would like to change their status world over.

International relations by nature are inter-connected and foreign policy is based among other things on responses of other states. Realism is widely practised by all states. The international political system is hegemonic and has hierarchies of power that bind states together. States tend to use similar strategic concepts. For instance, if the leading power of the world is militarist in its approach, other states also use militarism rather than negotiation to deal with their enemies. Post-colonial states like those in South Asia are vulnerable to the international political system and thus tend to follow the traditional discourse of international relations. Even those that did not accept the doctrine of Realism in the earlier decades after independence like India were ultimately pressurised into adopting Realism and national security doctrines that conply with militarism. Security advisors emphasise the continuous necessity for India to modernise its defence forces, to develop a strategic doctrine.

Patriotic discourse in all of South Asia refers to the nation as the "mother" and the symbol of mother/woman has been used interchangeably with the nation. Women have been signifiers of identity and identity politics is marked on the bodies of women who are victims of rape and abuse during conflicts. The task for South Asian feminists and gender-sensitive scholars is one that will build on feminist discourse and weave into it the social and political specificities of the South Asian experience into it. The feminist critique helps deconstruct the security policy of the state and shows its impact on larger social issues.

For feminists, peace is when women can control their autonomy and peace is not restricted to a public peace. For women, peace is an absence of domestic, social and public violence. Security for women, is security outside and within the home.

6.6 SUMMARY

Feminism is the advocacy of the rights of women. It explains that women have been disadvantaged compared to men and are subordinated to men because of a system of patriarchy. Feminists analyse state security, power, and nationalism to show that the traditional approach focuses almost entirely on state power, military strategies and is thus state-centred. They submit that this approach is patriarchal and has biases against women and hides their role. They see war and nationalism as being gendered processes. Feminists advocate a feminist approach to state security and international relations as one that will show the gender biases and correct these biases.

6.7 EXERCISES

- 1) How do feminists define power?
- 2) How do feminists analyse the stale?
- 3) How do feminists perceive nationalism?
- 4) Do feminists have a special interest in human rights? And why?
- 5) What is the feminist critique of Realism?
- 6) Why do feminists see war as a gendered process?
- 7) What is the feminist vision of security?
- 8) Is feminism relevant to Third World or India?

UNIT 7 ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACHES

Structure

- 7.1 Introduction
 - 7.2 Environmental Approaches
 - 7.3 Three Myths of Development Policy
 - 7.4 Environment-Development Debate
 - 7.4.1 Paradox of Sustainable Development
 - 7.5 The North-South Divide
 - 7.6 Globalisation and Sustainability
 - 7.7 Summary
 - 7.8 Exercises
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7.1 INTRODUCTION

This Unit deals with sustainable development in the context of environmental approaches of international relations. Traditional study of international relations was limited to relations between states, role of the government and armed forces, and questions of war and peace. In the post-Second World War period a number of non-state actors became active in the relations among nations. Besides other actors, these included terrorist organisations and multinational corporations (MNCs). Later still, it was realised that the role of civil society could not any more be ignored in the study of international relations. In turn, civil society was related to development particularly sustainable development, which, according to Brundtland Commission, means "development...that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs." Thus, it is not only development of the present and checking environmental degradation is important; equally important is to end the "north-south" divide. Even though the world is said to have now become a "global village", yet the North continues to be a voracious consumer and the South continues to be in want and misery because they still have to surrender their resources to the rich nations of the North.

In this Unit, you will read about certain myths about development, as also the linkage between environmental protection and development. You will appreciate that sustainable development policies stand on three pillars, namely, the carrying capacity of land, water, air and forests which are basic resources to sustain life in our planet; development should observe intra-governmental equity and justice; and that present generation must not extract out of the stock of resources belonging to the future generations. A number of efforts have been made in recent decades, including the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 2002, and attended by 192 countries to reach a difficult consensus on the implementation of policies for sustainable development.

7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACHES

"Environment" does not observe boundaries. Air, water, forests and land are contiguous and are inherently structured and designed to join and bring people together and their nations closer. Ironically indeed, this has never been so due to the high value of these resources, which are naturally available to mankind and also due to the difficulties and dilemmas in the system of dividing, demarcating and measuring the distribution of their use and misuse by various nations.

Ironically "nature" that existed to create relationships of interdependence even amongst the antagonists has now become a hot bed of international politics. The emerging statistics of resource scarcity and the widening income gap between the developed and the developing nations is once again threatening the world with a disaster more devastating than the Second World War. It is this realisation that G-7 [now G8 with the addition of Russia] has diverted attention from the proliferation of strategic weapons and balancing the MAD capabilities to conservation, acquisition and control of the resources of the world such as forests, land, agriculture, water and technology. It is a perplexing situation for the study of international relations because now the deliberations feature not the government or the military prowess but the people who control resources at the grass-roots level. Thus in present times the study of international relations is forced to come down to the grass-root Level where communities, people's organisations, voluntary agencies, farmers groups, forest dwellers, labour unions and tribals are asserting themselves and struggling to clean the clogged channels of the centralised state structures.

The environmental contingencies are defying both the meteorological forecasts as well as the indigenous wisdom. The last century was the warmest century in the past 600 years and fourteen of the warmest years since 1860s occurred between 1980 and 1998. Some of the worst environmental calamities like floods, droughts, cyclones and earthquakes occurred during the last decade. Most of the low-lying areas in the world are getting inundated and the number of ecological refugees has been growing at an unmanageable pace. The worldwide scarcity of resources has led to "water wars" over and above the already prevailing wars over forest ownership and usufruct rights. The shrinking environmental space has mobilised men and money across national boundaries in a manner never seen before. Environment has become a political problem of the highest order. Under these circumstances the concept of military security appeared outdated and irrelevant since the new environmental insecurities threatened not one country but all the inhabitants of this "spaceship earth" irrespective of their being rich or poor, man or woman, white or black. "Global warming", "greenhouse effect" and "el-nino" is the new terminology, which baffles the decision makers and perplexes the technology studies. That the world is serious about these unanticipated developments is manifested in the path breaking study made by Brundtland Commission that was soon followed by another study of an international group headed by Helmut Schmidt, former Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. It published a report, which offered a vision for dealing with the change. It is a vision in which security is achieved by tackling the roots of violence: poverty, environmental degradation, injustice and inequity. Nowhere has this new vision about international politics been so dramatised, emotionalised and exorcised as in the field of the use of environmental resources. The threatening revelations about resource scarcities, pollution hazards and technology dumping has brought together people of all nations, faiths and occupations together in a United campaign to rise above boundary disputes and work concertedly for the betterment of human life and sustainable material advancement. Global trade and trans-national companies are seen as dominant factors in pushing their trade agendas into national policies. The journey from Rio (1992) to Seattle (1999) has demonstrated the rising discontent and rebelliousness amongst citizens of both the developed and the developing countries against the official insolence towards environmental demands in their trade policies. Environmental problems are problems of development and of international cooperation. They are also very much part of a broader "system" and cannot be taken in isolation. However, environmental issues are right now the political problems of the highest order since they have grown in complexity and often lack the unified political constituency to lobby for them. The degree of degradation, depletion and degeneration of environmental resources are different in different countries and so the scale of priority to these varying problems also differs. A new *Environmental Outlook to 2020* issued by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) sets out "practical

policy options" and analyses the potential economic and environmental consequences of the OECD's 29 member countries. With the Rio+10 Johannesburg Conference on Sustainable development [World Summit on Sustainable Development] trying for a political gel on environmental issues, both the developed and the developing countries emerge as assertive participants to obtain support for their policy agendas. It is well accepted and un-debated that the continuance of the existing wasteful developmental paths is suicidal and the whole enterprise of "catching up" with the West is nothing more than a debt-trap for the developing countries in which the multinational financial institutions enjoy the golden harvest. The earth's resources are limited and the superpower of today will not be the one with the bomb but the one intellectually controlling the alternatives to the existing paradigm of development. Ian Johnson the World Bank's vice-president of the environmentally and socially sustainable development, acknowledged the problem and remarked that "the next generation of wars almost certainly will be fought over natural resources because they will become the binding constraint on development."

International relations have always been a study of military and diplomatic relations for the control of strategic interests related to the balance of power. "People" as a factor has neither been the concern or its study. Governments had always superseded the arena of civil society and had also dictated international decisions upon their citizens. It is for the first time beginning from the Rio Summit of 1992 and growing into a full fledged movement at the Seattle Summit [1999] and finally threatening the very existence of the state structures at the Genoa Summit [2001] that we witness the new force of civil society in belligerence with international institutions created for the purpose of resource use. Global environmental politics is all about the tremendous gap that has prevailed and is consistently maintained by the rich nations of the North by controlling and extracting the resources from the poor nations of the South. This is exacerbated by the fact that while the North controls the technology and science, the South nurtures its rich biodiversity and other natural resources.

This new direction of international relations questions the intrinsically destructive nature of human economy. The whole preoccupation of world leaders from controlling and eliminating threats to the development of wealth by a few powerful states had given rise to destructive technology and exploitative institutions. As Brian Milani explains that this old concept of wealth is understood as money and things (weapons in strategic sense) or quantitative wealth which destroys more than it creates but the new concept is wealth as regeneration—qualitative wealth—the (inner) development of people, the (social) development of community, and restoration of all living systems. International politics today may be called a politics of designing green economics. Thus the efforts towards designing and regeneration have incited the whole debate on "sustainability". Environmental approaches are not directed simply to mitigate environmental destruction but to put upside down the ideology which prevents community controls over resources and usurp decision making power from the citizens. The aim of these new approaches is complete development and holistic advancement that Herman Daly distinguishes from "growth". These new environmental approaches to world politics have created new relationships of people to their economy, of culture to law and of productive forces to natural resources. The new social activism which is progressing from the Rio summit to the Seattle, Copenhagen and the recent New Delhi Summit on Climate Change is a force to reckon with in the direction of transforming the world from the destructive, negative and quantitative push to development to a more regenerative, positive and qualitative development.

7.3 THREE MYTHS OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Development in the post-Second World War was structured for rapid monetary growth or catching up with the developmental paradigm of the dominant West. The race towards economic

efficiency and monetary aggrandisement led US president Harry S. Truman to declare that the nations of the South being poor in these two aspects are underdeveloped and therefore they need to develop in accordance with the parameters set by the developed countries. These parameters were internalised in the Official Development Assistance [ODA] being distributed to the poor nations. This catching up with the West to overcome the reputation of an "underdeveloped state", nations of the Third World started adopting policies, which were based upon quantitative growth oriented industrialisation. The technology and institutions, which directed policies towards accumulation of capital, were largely destructive to nature. The forces of production generated more "illiti" to use Ruskin's term than "wealth". Land was degraded, rivers polluted and the atmosphere laden with CfC (Chloro-fluoro carbons). Nations of the Third World went deep into public debt and the economic recovery programmes introduced by the developed nations diverted attention of policy planners from regenerative qualitative development to dependent programmes. The human potential of the poor nations was distorted and degenerated while the imported systems of the West were thought to be the only answer to the crisis of underdevelopment and poverty. The free market economy introduced after the collapse of the command economy in USSR has given unlimited freedom for capital transactions and multinational enterprises. As Parkin states: "What this freedom means is that banks can earn a pot of gold in Third World." This "catching up" development has converted the process of development into a mechanistic system, which has destroyed the earth's atmosphere, oceans, forests, ground water and soil.

The global economic production has gone up several times since the Second World War. World food output had increased at a record pace and the global output of goods and services reached \$ 3 trillion in 1980. Yet this did not signify that people were better off and it had no relation to the nation's development and progress. In the last two decades the world spent more than US\$17 trillion [at 1988 prices and exchange rates] on military activity. Global military expenditure averaged US \$850 billion per year or US\$ 2.33 billion per day, US\$ 97 million an hour or US \$ 1.6 million a minute. In 1990 the global military expenditure reached US\$ 1000 billion. Even in the late 1980s when the détente was becoming a reality and global military spending in the developed countries showed a slight decline, it was offset by the sharp rise in the developing countries. Another dangerous development that has taken place along with this growth orientation is that 50 per cent of all arms imports into developing countries have been financed by the export credits and this amounts to 30 per cent of all debt inflow to developing countries. The military concerns have also consumed a large amount of developmental resources such as the employment of 3 million scientists and engineers and of 60 to 80 million people worldwide. Large areas of land, forests and water bodies are blocked for use of testing weapons, training military and posting army or their equipments. About 6 per cent of total world oil consumption is for military purposes, which is half the total oil, consumed by developing countries. The focus of all wars has been to destroy the life support system of the enemy state. Use of bombs, chemical and biological weapons have destroyed their forests, crops, water bodies and wetlands. Manufacture of destructive weapons and the development of hazardous technology has damaged life of this planet beyond repair. Millions of land and sea mines, unexploded bombs and hazardous gases in the air have endangered innocent people, livestock and wildlife but also made large tracts of land and water unfit for human and animal consumption.

The conventional paradigm of international relations did not have the study of development indicators such as the growth of medical research like biotechnology and genetic engineering with the warfare techniques. Present day environmental warfare has been developing pathogenic microorganisms for destructive purposes, which has given an entirely new meaning to the studies on security. In present times no nation can insulate itself from the global effect of hostilities. Thus the conventional approaches which depended upon the use of strategies such

as "balance of power", "deterrence", "peaceful coexistence", "collective security" and "common security" have now become broad based in which the military concerns are just a part of the wider fields of political, economic, social, environmental and humanitarian aspects.

This new approach to international politics countered and challenged the three prevailing myths of development policies. The myths are:

- Economic growth indicates nation's progress.
- Free markets prevent the spread of poverty.
- Wealth could be created through debt.

The First Human Development Report of the UNDP in 1990 attacks the first myth in the approach to human development. It gave a more comprehensive yardstick to assess progress of nations rather than just judging through economic progress or GNP. The military might or the deterrent capability is not an indicator of a nation's might as most such nations which have been on the top on the basis of their military prowess have sunk in their ratings when the other indicators of progress such as overall human development manifested in the provisions of health facilities, employment, housing, gender sensitivity, environmental protection, infrastructure and overall socio-economic opportunities were taken into consideration. USA, Canada, Germany and many others showed a sharp decline in their developmental rank when other human developmental indicators were taken into consideration.

Thus the approach to international relations is no more oriented towards semi-analysis of few factors through cost-benefit considerations and strategic defence ability. The approach is now a holistic analysis, which involves ecological management, political farsightedness, social sensitivity and people's participation. International relations has to work in accordance with the global ecological cycles and not the global market and its profit orientation.

The second myth that the free markets prevent the spread of poverty is rooted into a lack of understanding about the cause for poverty. When market barriers are dismantled there is a free flow of foreign direct investment [FDI] into countries. This replaces the official development assistance: [ODA] that had constituted the foreign aid from developed countries to the less developed countries [LDC]. The replacement of ODA by FDI is an indication that the LDC would be getting aid only on fulfillment of the conditions set by the transnational companies [TNC] which provide the FDI. Relatively ODA is more benign than FDI because it comes from the government of a country but FDI investment is pure business. To attract HH countries bypass their regulatory conditions or deregulate or de-reserve some precious and traditionally conserved areas for business like mining, dam building, setting up oil refinery or land for industries. It has also been found that FDI requirements may also get laws and regulations of a land amended or changed for the benefit of some companies close to the government of the land. Thus FDI, which aspires for liberalised trade, may also centralise decision making to a larger extent. Strict environmental regulations in the West are bringing most of those companies into poorer countries, which need FDI to survive. Governments of these LDCs compromise their environmental concerns for this race for FDI. The Green economists lament, as Parkin states that "millions of people are not part of this freedom: those who can barely eke out an existence at the starvation level because their countries are burdened by interest and loan repayments or those who are in order to survive are forced to destroy their natural environment."

The third myth that the wealth could be created through debt is countered by an analysis of the most highly indebted countries. Presently 80 per cent of poor in Latin America, 50 per cent of poor in Asia and Africa live on marginal lands characterised by low productivity and high

susceptibility to environmental degradation such as arid and low fertility lands. While in 1977 there were just 57 million people living in areas affected by desertification, by 1984 their number increased by 135 million. The total external debt of developing countries has multiplied thirteen fold in the last two decades from \$ 100 billion in 1970 to around \$ 650 billion in 1980 and to around \$1,350 billion in 1990. According to World Bank just 20 countries headed by Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, India and Egypt hold 57 per cent of debt. Human Development Report 1992 reveals that the decision by the G-7 to forgive debt of poorest of the most indebted countries led to the cancellation of only \$6 billion of the total \$64 billion debt and in doing so the concern for the really distressed sub-Saharan Africa was left far behind. Debt servicing in global economics allows the donor agency to bypass the environmental limitations of the poor country and ill-treat them as high-risk borrowers. To pay back the debts they step up production of primary commodities that were already in oversupply and the prices fall even lower in the international market. Between 1989-1991 when the weighted index of the group of 33 primary commodities declined by half from 105 to 57, the export commodity prices of the Third World fell by 20 per cent [HDR 1992:18]. The case of Uganda is an eye opener, which suffered a loss of 122m. on exports from tea and coffee. In India the impact of the aid has been the burgeoning interest and principal repayments that led to a massive 76 per cent increase in the net outflow of just the cash-wealth from India. Thus in 1993 while the aid receipts fell by 20 per cent from \$73911 to \$588m, interest and amortisation payments rose substantially from \$470m. to \$540m. as compared to the \$457m and \$511m. in the previous years. Peter Brady reveals that between 1980 to 1990 over \$600 billion or six times the Marshall Plan, was transferred from poorer nations to the richer ones in the form of interests from loans. The net transfer of resources from South to North is \$ 50 billion per year. If the plants and germ plasm, cheap cassava and soya beans, fish and forest products that the South donates to the North due to low commodity price in the international market [as the environmental value of the product is not internalised in its price by the poor country] are added, the reverse flow of resources is much bigger. The 1991 Human Development Report observes that global markets make developing countries lose economic opportunities worth around \$ 500 billion annually, which is ten times that they receive in foreign aid. Vandana Shiva remarks: "The Third World poverty is generated through the very processes that generate affluence in the North". The whole economic orthodoxy of export oriented growth strategies on one hand strengthens the grip of the TNCs over poor nations and allow the big banks in the West to reap the harvest on the loans, while on the other hand, marginalise both subsistence rural and tribal people by the ghastly but legitimised exploitation of their ecological wealth.

7.4 ENVIRONMENT-DEVELOPMENT DEBATE

The preceding section explains that economic problems cause and aggravate environmental despoliation. Nations in debt destroy their environment to survive. However this debate has its origin in the boom conditions of USA when industrial growth peaked in the decade of 1950s and the early 1960s. This industrialisation posed a severe threat to the land and water, Bakes and ponds, fish and forest life. Rachael Carson's *Silent Springs* reveals the threat inherent in the excessive use of insecticides and pesticides, and the environmental hazards to Grand Canyon, Redwood Forests and Lake Eire. Suddenly USA was faced with the new threats to development by the very means that it had applied for development. The Club of Rome prepared a report in 1964 called "*Limits to Growth*" [1972] which sent warning signals to the ambitious industrialists and development planners. It brought the speedily progressing growth to a halt at a point of introspection of the strategies they employed and the means they pursued. The debate between environment and development was couched into an antagonism between the two. It was believed that either one could have a rising per capita income manifested in the increased

GNP or one could enjoy a good environment. The two cannot coexist. This belief was however proved wrong in the subsequent turn of information and knowledge.

The paradigm shift in this debate started in the early 1970s. The severe oil crisis marked the beginning of the end of the developmental paradigm of the West. A panel of experts convened by the Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Founex, Switzerland in 1971 brought out the developmental dilemma of the developing countries which were pursuing the "catching up with the West" growth policies. It reported: "The kind of environmental problems that are of importance in developing countries are those that can be overcome by the process of development itself." The next Conference at Stockholm in 1972 was the first international initiative to devise an action plan for cooperation on human environment. On the recommendation of 114 signatories to the conference the United Nations General Assembly created United Nations Environment Programme as a nodal agency for environmental cooperation and coordination. Soon after in 1974 the Cocoyoc [Mexico] Symposium on Patterns of Resource Use was organised by UNDP and UNEP. It explained the problem of growth and economic development, which were believed to destroy environment. It explained that "the problem today is not primarily one of absolute physical shortage but of economic and social maldistribution and misuse." Thus it was becoming increasingly clear that environment and economic activity could go together provided the framework for economic development is reframed and redesigned and reinvented. There need not be panic and contempt against the environmentalists since economic growth with concern for environment would be lasting and therefore reliable. It is this kind of growth which later came to be referred to as "sustainable growth". This style of economic development did not come alone but brought with it a new vocabulary such as "eco-development", "environmentally sound and sustainable development", "development without destruction", "alternative patterns of growth and sustainable development". All these terms signify that economic development and technology has to face the new challenge of environment.

Since then several conferences, which were taking place in the social and economic spheres such as population, housing, rehabilitation, social development and food sought to bring in this new phenomenon of "sustainable development." The International Development Strategy for the Third UN Development Decade in 1980 focussed upon these other issues, which were dependent upon the use of environment and its resources. It writes, "health, nutrition and general well being depend upon the integrity and productivity of environment and resources". The following conferences can be described as the conferences, which broadened up the concept of ecology and environment:

- World Food Conference, Rome, 1974
- World Climate Conference, Geneva 1979
- Alternative Lifestyles and Development Options, UNEP, Nairobi, 1980.
- World Commission on Environment and Development [WCED] Our *Common Future*, 1987.
- UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 1992
- World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, June 1993
- International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, September 1994.
- World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, March 1995.
- Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 1995
- Habitat II, Second UN Conference on Human Settlements, Istanbul, June 1996.
- World Food Summit, Rome 1996

- World Trade Organisation Conference , Seattle 1999-2000.
- World Trade Organisation Conference, Genoa 2001
- Finance for Development Conference 2002

Therefore environment linked up with every social and economic issue in global politics. The latest issue, which has posed the greatest threat to environment, is that of Biotechnology and Genomic research. The rich nations may use the germ plasm of plants and animals to transform plant species and animal breeds respectively. The intellectual property rights [IPR] may help them steal the rich biodiversity resources from the south to convert it into finished products and then seek copyrights on them.

7.4.1 Paradox of Sustainable Development

In the decade of 1970s environment became a wholesome word providing a framework for public policy across the world. The prevailing paradigm of growth, which had been morally supported by economists such as Ricardo and Adam Smith, had come into question. It may have made nations rich and some nations so rich that they were able to control the world politics but this accumulation of wealth by few of them was possible only by overusing resources, which did not belong to them. This is not to use the Marxian analogy that they belonged to the proletariat but to bring to focus the wisdom of ecology, which prescribes deadlines for the exhaustion, and use of resources, which are available in nature. All resources of the world are exhaustible and they cannot be overused, misused and destroyed by short sighted and iniquitous policies of governments. That the resources of the world belong to all and human beings are trustees of this natural wealth is the fundamental idea behind the new paradigm of growth. Harrison has brought out the use of environment as:

- A bank of resources
- A site for the physical presence of organism
- A sink of wastes

Thus the new approach to global politics demands a redesigning of policies in the light of these three areas of concern and also coordinates policies being formulated in all these three different areas. The idea that underlies the new approach is that of unity of environmental issues and convergence of all resource use policies. No one state can claim to or can be allowed to extract resources out of nature, which could be detrimental to other states. Thus deforestation, over-fishing or over-killing of animals, the pollution of rivers through the discharge of effluents, oil spills in oceans, releasing hazardous gas substances or micro organism in air are all international issues and thus would need international regulations. This whole framework of action came to be called "sustainable development".

"Sustainable development" is a difficult word to define since it has many definitions. The most comprehensive definition comes from the Brundtland Commission named after its President Ms. Gro Harlem Brundtland former prime minister of Norway who headed the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. Presently the term sustainable development has around forty reported definitions but the most reliable one still remains to be the one given in the Brundtland Commission. It says that "sustainable development...that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs". The same year *The Environment Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond* further elaborated the same definition by stating that sustainable development is the basis for "prudent management of available global resources and environmental capacities and the rehabilitation of the environment previously subjected to degradation and misuse...Although it is important to tackle immediate environmental

problems, anticipatory and preventive policies are the most effective and economical in achieving environmentally sound development." This concept of sustainable development became the greatest critique of development policies, as the rapid industrialisation, which focussed only upon the improvement of living standards of present generation, was not sustainable. As Tolba explains: "economic systems should be managed to maintain and improve the environmental resource base so that future generations would be able to live equally well or better." It integrates environmental management with economic and social policies and this was exactly what was brought out at the Stockholm Conference in 1972. Former prime minister Indira Gandhi who pointed out in the Conference that "poverty was the greatest polluter" indicated that a poor nation cannot afford to follow environmental controls imposed through environmental regulations. The whole business of environmental management would need an environmentally sound and sustainable development (ESSD) techniques, which in turn would need financial assistance to poor nations.

Sustainable development has established that the GNP is not the right method of assessing a country's progress. In the decade of 1980s and 1990s attempts were made to adjust national income accounts to register both the direct costs inflicted by environmental degradation and the "depreciation" of natural resources capital to allow for losses in future production potential. It means that the national income accounts do not mention the value of the resource, which it had extracted out of the stock belonging to the future generation. Thus the declining resources for the future generation would affect the living standard of the future generations. This exposes the high living standards being maintained by the rich nations or even developing countries which is due to their drawing out of what belongs to those who are yet to inhabit the earth. If one deducts the value of the resources extracted out of the future stock the GNP falls drastically. When Japan tried to adjust its national income accounts to environmental degradation, its GNP was found to be growing by 5.8 per cent and not 8.3 per cent as was earlier believed. In Indonesia it turned out to be only 4 per cent instead of 7.1 per cent per year. Thus the Brundtland Report called "*Our Common Future*" had been right in remarking that incomplete accounting occurs especially in the case of resources that are not capitalised in enterprise or national accounts: air, water and soil.

Another paradox of sustainable development is the measurement and cost of damage caused by environmental degradation in a country. The economic cost of pollution damage in developed countries varies between 3 and 5 per cent of GNP and the cost of pollution abatement and control has been estimated to be at 0.8 per cent to 1.5 per cent of annual GDP. In developing countries the cost of pollution control and ESSD efforts would cost much lower. It is well established now that the returns of these adjustments would be around \$26 billion per year for USA alone. For developing countries it varies from country to country but the gain has been estimated to be substantial.

To sum up, sustainable development policies stand on three pillars:

- Development should observe the carrying capacity of land, water, air and forests, which are the four basic resources to sustain life over the planet. If they are used beyond their ability to regenerate, replenish and recharge then they are lost for ever.
- Development should observe intra-generational equity and Justice. According to this, development should benefit all classes and sections of people in the society. If they benefit only a few dominant classes who matter in the electoral success then the resource wastefulness by that class would destroy the share of the other classes also.

- Development should observe inter-generational equity **and** justice. This would **mean** that the present generation does **not have** the right to extract out of the stock of resources belonging to the **next** generation. This would **bring** in poverty due to resource degradation inherited by the **next** generation.

7.5 THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE

The Brundtland Commission exposed the global **consumption** patterns: which has also been elaborately described in the Second Citizen's Report prepared by the Centre for Science and Environment, an environmental NGO in Delhi. The global environmental crisis is supposedly a direct outcome of the unjust consumption pattern practised and sustained by G 8 States.

Even though the world has now become a Global Village as the Canadian scholar McLuhan had tenned it yet the northern side of the globe is a voracious consumer but the southern side is constantly in want and misery because they loose out their resources to the rich nations of the North. The 23 per cent of the world population living in industrial countries is earning 85 per cent of world income and consuming most of its resources. The energy **consumption** measured per capita is 280 in USA followed by 165 in Germany, 110 in Japan, 30 in Latin America and 21 in Asia but it dips to 12 in Africa and in some African countries it is as low as just one. One US citizen consumes energy equal to 160 Tanzanians or 900 Nepalese. It is this **affluence**, which has resulted into a high production of CFC gases from the developed countries with USA topping the list 28 per cent in contrast to 8 per cent produced by whole of the Third World. This consumption pattern has also denied \$500 billion worth of market opportunities annually to the developing countries. Lant Pritchett of the World Bank reveals in a study that in 1870 the world's richest countries USA and Britain had incomes, which was nine times that of the poorest country. In 1990 it galloped to 45 times more than the poorest country. Pritchett also calculated the incomes of the 17 richest countries in 1870, which was 2.4 times that of all other countries. In 1990 the gap was increased by 4.5 times. This study concludes that the gap is widening and this is the major cause for the sharpening battle between the developed and the developing countries and the rise of the civil society movement. This has been manifested in the Seattle and the Genoa WTO Summits when the civil society groups emerged in large numbers to prevent the G 7 countries from taking unjust and unsustainable decisions. The Seattle Summit was a total turnaround to the practised market economy within the WTO.

During the Rio Summit the divisions between the North and the South were quite pronounced in cast of the biodiversity Convention. The richest 70per cent biodiversity was concentrated in the identified 12 "mega-diversity" countries. (Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Zaire, Madagascar, China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia). The developed countries wanted the developing countries to take action for the preservation and conservation of their biodiversity resources. However, the cost of the most basic biodiversity protection programmes were in the range of \$ 10 to \$14 billion per annum whereas the technological benefits derived from the genetic resources would go into the pockets of the Western TNCs. Therefore, the ticklish problems of "Biotechnology", "Patents", "Role of TNCs" and the much debated "Intellectual Property Rights" added further complications to the acceptance of the Biodiversity Convention. Despite all odds and strong opposition by its greatest trading partner USA, Canada was the first industrialised nation to ratify the Convention On Biological Diversity (CBD). Its three main objectives are indicative of some long-term collaboration plans between the two nations:

- i) Conservation of Biological Diversity
- ii) Sustainable use of Biological Resources
- iii. Fair and equitable sharing of benefits resulting from the use of genetic resources.

Besides Biodiversity, "Climate Change" is another area of international muscle flexing. The socio-economic consequences of climate change especially the impact of climate change upon the agriculture-based economies of developing countries will have serious global fallout. It says that in 1992 Canada consumed approximately 34,000 Btu of energy to produce an industrial output of 1985-dollar value, compared to 26,000 Btu in the United States and 18,000 Btu on average in the G-7. The industry lobby especially of the oil companies lobbied through Global Climate Coalition and the Climate Council another industry group, which accompanied the US delegation to the UNEP meetings. UK had not been directly affected by this pollution since the wind carried away the pollution towards the Arctic and Europe. Europe and the Alliance of the Small Island States were directly threatened from pollution and ocean rise, which would submerge their homelands. Thus the JUSCANZ group (Japan, US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) wanted to weaken the language of the climate change initiative by diverting the debate to the one on 'sources' and "sinks".

7.6 GLOBALISATION AND SUSTAINABILITY

From 26 August to 4 September 2002, 192 countries at the World Summit on Sustainable Development [WSSD] reached a difficult consensus on the implementation plans for sustainable policies.

- *Tackling biodiversity loss by agreeing on the target to halt the alarming rate of loss by 2010.*
- *Halving the figure of 2.4 billion people who do not have access to basic sanitation facilities by 2015.*
- *Protecting the world's fishing stocks by restoring most of the world's major fisheries to sustainable levels by 2015.*
- *Committing to a clause to "continue to enhance the mutual supportiveness of trade"*

It was well agreed that environmental degradation would continue to worsen unless world leaders come with a coherent poverty reduction strategy. It was thus clear that finance was the prime requirement for sustainable development. During the Workshop on Global Environmental Negotiations the industrialised nations were made clear on the point that the Agenda 21 was non-negotiable and therefore aid for development should be forthcoming from these developed countries.

However this remains only on paper as the global politics is ridden by the same old rules of the game. It is manifested in the way USA has been dominating the decision making by other countries in signing the Climate Change Convention or the Kyoto Protocol. India heads the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change when it won the seat by replacing the US contestant. Therefore, the recently organised "Eight Conference of Parties" [COP-8] to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] held in India, the abidance to the Kyoto Protocol was the prime requirement but it ended up into strained commitments from the developed as well as the developing countries. USA and the JUSCANZ group prevented the recourse to alternatives by going into bilateral swaps to economy of many developing countries like Thailand, Belize, El Salvador, India and China. USA was able to negotiate on technology issues with Australia and Canada thus preventing strong action on Kyoto Protocol from these two potentially strong states. The protocol comes into force only if 55 countries representing 55 per cent of GGEs ratify. The World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg has echoed the concerns for the shortcomings of climate change initiatives.

The Seattle Conference has sufficiently demonstrated the unification and convergence of the civil society groups across national and ideological boundaries to question the domination of the G-8 countries over environmental policies of the world. The UN Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the Earth Summit) was the outcome of an intensive two years preparation of 35,000 people, 106 heads of state or government and 9000 journalists. This Summit gave an unprecedented access to public interest groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the business groups represented through the TNC representatives. The unbalanced production and consumption levels prevailing in the world and the decreasing official development assistance (ODA) was pointed out as the villain of environmental sustainability. This was followed up at the 64th meeting of the Development Committee at Ottawa on November 18th, 2001 under the Chairmanship of Yashvant Sinha, minister of finance of India. The central concern of the Conference deliberations was the assessment of Poverty Reduction Strategies. This was further discussed at the Finance for Development (FfD) Conference in April 2002 at Washington. The Conference emphasised the enhancing the ODA flows and harmonisation of the government agencies with private sector and the civil society so that poverty eradication exercises could be improved upon. Canadian government also worked in consultation with the civil society groups of Canada for the Tenth Session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD10) in May 2002, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in August 2002.

The Tenth Session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD10) in May 2002, and the recently concluded World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) provide an opportunity for reassessment. The themes, which have been picked up for action, are:

- a) Stewardship and conservation;
- b) Innovation and Partnership;
- c) Sustainable Communities
- d) Health and the Environment;
- e) International Governance.

7.7 SUMMARY

The biggest challenge and the most dramatic upsurge has been the movement to democratic pluralism. The movement from an essentially bipolar world dominated and displayed by two super powers and military forces to microspores of civil society groups creating multitude of opportunities as well as uncertainties. The two development decades of the United Nations had believed in institutional solutions to developmental problems and this was fairly expressed in the call for the New International Economic Order. But the 21st Century brought in a more individualistic and inward looking market oriented development, which was paradoxical to the liberalism and open circuit approach emerging in the technology of communication. While the first development decade concentrated decisions with the transnational companies, the second development decade gave a boost to the rise of grassroots movements and civil society resurgence.

It is fairly understandable that the path of sustainable development is ridden with the immense gap that exists between the North and the South states. Global negotiations and international agreements have remained unfulfilled and disappointing. The increased conflicts between trade and environment are only making the task more complicated. It is important that nations apply logic and understanding with a long-term perspective and initiate concrete action towards sustainable development.

7.8 EXERCISES

- 1) What is sustainable development?
- 2) Explain the prevailing myths of development policy.
- 3) Analyse the environment-development debate.
- 4) Discuss the north-south divide in the context of global environmental crisis.

UNIT 8 WORLD VIEWS FROM ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA

Structure

- 8.1** Introduction
 - 8.2** Perspectives
 - 8.3** The Humanists
 - 8.3.1** Tagore: The Humanist Poet
 - 8.4** Nationalist and Trans-Nationalists
 - 8.4.1** Pan Asianism
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 - 8.4.6** Latin America
 - 8.5** The Non-aligned Theory and Practice
 - 8.6** Summary
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-

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Most of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America had been under colonial rule of one European Power or the other. After decolonisation, most of them adopted the policy of non-alignment. But, some did join either the American Bloc or the Soviet Bloc in the Cold War contest. The countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America came to be known as the Third World countries. But, all the non-aligned or the Third World countries did not have identical views on all international issues. In the present Unit, you will have an overview of the thinking of prominent leaders of Third World, including Gandhi, Tagore, Soekarno, Chou, Nasser and Nkrumah etc. You will also read in this Unit how the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America viewed the world from their common and distinct points of view.

8.2 PERSPECTIVES

The study of International Relations reflects mainly the preoccupation of great or powerful nations with their individual national interests, national security and very frequently their power ambitions. Being colonies and subservient to Western powers, the non-Europeans were generally treated as objects rather subjects of IR. As a result it was seldom that they were considered to have a voice in world affairs. Surprisingly, the end of Second World War did not improve matters. The Cold War and its subsequent intensification between two militarised camps headed by Moscow and Washington pushed issues concerning the newly emergent states of Asia, Africa and the Caribbean into messy oblivion. The choice for them was to join as camp followers one or the other power-bloc, and thus perpetuate their subservient status as in the past.

But the pattern of world affairs had changed. Along with independence, the non-Europeans had gained a new voice—the voice of independent and sovereign nations. Though weak and unable to meet the immediate needs of independence, some of these new nations were nevertheless

able to keep away from rival grouping; of the Cold War. In time this attitude, variously called neutral, or non-conformist or non-aligned provided a rallying point to a number of ex-colonies to raise a collective voice in world affairs. But collective did not mean unanimous. Those who joined the non-aligned group—which also acquired in time the status of a movement—did so in the light of their individual interests and purposes. Together they called for a total restructuring of the world system. Others were less ambitious and desired reforms only in a few select cases, which gave rise to severe economic and social disparities in the community of independent nations. Curiously, there were also many nations that nominally joined the non-alignment camp but continued to sub-serve the dictates of powerful nations in accordance to the shifting sands of the Cold War.

Yet, the voices of post-colonial nations marked the emergence of a new phase in world history. It is true that these voices were mutually contradictory, but this surely was not unintelligible. For, each new nation represented a combination of historical, cultural and racial heritage in the course of history. In the case of some, the attainment of national independence did not signify attainment of national consciousness. Quite a few clung to their exclusive religious, communal or community norms. There were others who having successfully gained their political goal became ambitious to re-shape the world on a new set of goals and principles. Over time all this gave rise to great confusion.

This notwithstanding, we can hear common refrains in the voice of non-aligned leaders. First, they aspire for a change in the conduct of world affairs by strong or big powers. Second, they condemn imperialism in all forms including racial, colonial and military domination. To the extent they could exert pressure in shaping world opinion within and outside the UN, they did succeed in securing complete elimination of colonialism in Asia and Africa. Thirdly, they gave new emphasis to the enduring values of world peace, co-existence among small and big nations, and also alternative versions of economic and political organisations of civil society. It is to be admitted though that these noble values have so far evaded the reach of all nations and governments.

The problem is how do we go about arranging those different refrains as they flowed from different lands and ages. The best we thought could be to arrange them in accordance with the several stages of the evolution of colonial societies from the colonial to independent nationhood. Accordingly we present the following scheme:

- 1) The humanists
- 2) The nationalist and beyond
- 3) The trans-nationalist formations
- 4) The non-aligned, and
- 5) Radicals and non-conformists

8.3 THE HUMANISTS

In this section we shall briefly deal with the essential teachings of Tagore and Gandhi. This is so not because both were Indians but because their teachings and lives have made an abiding impact on human mind far beyond the shores of India. Tagore and Gandhi became legends in their own lifetime—Tagore as a man of ideas and Gandhi a man of action. Being contemporaries, they held each other in high respect (Gandhi called the poet his “*Gurudev*” and the latter conferred upon Gandhi the title of “Mahatma” or great soul). Yet, they differed in great many respects.

Gandhi's field was politics. He imparted courage to Indians to defy imperial rule of Great Britain. But he demanded that his followers must absolutely abandon violence. And he himself never violated this path of non-violence. In 1920, Gandhi launched his non-violent *Satyagraha* and such was the response that people in thousands joined him and filled the jails. Gandhi, wrote Jawaharlal Nehru in his *Aurohiogrphy*, released Indians from the fear of British jails: "We all shouted freedom from housetops."

Gandhi's basic faith rested as we have stated on *ahimsa* or non-violence. He researched and proved by his undeviating resistance to British that non-violence was a more potent force than violence to meet oppression and injustice. He kept steadfast to his belief that the practice of *ahimsa* could melt the heart of absolute criminals. Hence: at one point he even went out to personally appeal to Hitler to abandon annexed aggression against other nations and adopt means of peaceful persuasion to achieve his goals.

The second feature was Gandhi's stress on simplicity of village life. This simplicity, in his opinion, reflected the essential goodness and honesty of poor men. He asserted that all that poor Indians wanted was freedom from fear and want. For this what they needed was spiritual force and no external aid. Nature, he said, had enough to meet man's needs though not enough to satisfy his greed. For this he himself began a life of extreme abstinence and self-penance. This accounted for his image of a saintly man.

Third, though a deeply religious man (he declared himself as being a "*sanatanist*" Hindu). Gandhi argued that *dharma* (religion) and politics should not be treated in isolation. On the contrary, spiritual law did not work in a field of its own—"it expresses itself through the ordinary activities of life. It thus affects the economic, the social and political fields."

Why did Gandhi stress so much on spiritual force? Mainly and perhaps because he could see that only the striving towards self-denial could give courage to his countrymen to defy foreign rule. He condemned the British for having sapped and corrupted the inner strength of India's starving millions. Hence his demand that the British must quit India and leave its inhabitants their own fate. In some ways, he was pointing out that the destiny of each community was autonomous and thus could not be imitated or learnt from outsiders.

Finally, Gandhi's translation of these convictions into political action inspired the entire colonial world. It encouraged them to try to put an end to colonial and racial bondage—primarily by peaceful means. On the other hand, it indicated a new way of achieving peace among nations and peoples through application of non-violence. Gandhi's impact on Africans and Negro leaders in America was immediate and stunning. In time, noted an Egyptian writer, "Non-violence became a world political force. (It opened) a new dialogue which "was armed with atomic bombs, but only with the new moral and political code, the effectiveness of which was demonstrated by Gandhi."

Gandhi, therefore, showed how weaker nations of the world could play a constructive role by "refusing to be entangled in military alliances. His was, to put it in the words of a noted African scholar, "in part a moral judgement on those who sought security in such alliances."

8.3.1 Tagore: The Humanist Poet

As a poet Tagore received universal recognition in India and abroad. He travelled extensively and lectured in great many places to spread his message of the confluence of diverse religions, cultures and beliefs that bind mankind. He decried narrow mindedness in any walk of life. He

maintained that tolerance of other cultures was the essence of human development—a characteristic trait that made India great. Above all he insisted on breaking the walls of narrow prejudice and superstition. 'Where the clear stream of reason thus runs one of his famous poems, does not get lost in the dreary sand of dead habits, my Father let my country awake."

Tagore's stance on many important issues of his time created great controversies. He did not welcome, for instance, Gandhi's call to burn imported foreign-made goods. Nor did he show enthusiasm in nationalist campaign of preventing school-going children from attending their classes. "This," he had quipped, "could be the best way to produce a nation of illiterates."

Similarly, Tagore refused to define his philosophy according to any known category of Hindu scriptures. This approach certainly contradicted Gandhi's self-definition of being a "*sanatanist*" Hindu. Further, he distanced himself from Gandhi's idea that India's lot could be improved on the basis of village self-sufficiency or teachings of ancient Hindu scriptures. Did these differences also reflect a difference of views between the two on concepts on modernity and tradition?

Well it might, but Tagore's mind mainly dwelt on issues concerning the future of entire mankind. He stood for uninterrupted flow of technology and ideas among nations. He stood on the side of world peace and brotherhood. Hence, he unequivocally condemned Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and Japan's aggression against unarmed people of China.

But Tagore's most enduring contribution to the theory of IR was his direct repudiation of the concept of nationalism. Tracing the causes of the Great War (1914-19) he arrived at the conclusion that nations and nationalism as had grown in Europe were primarily responsible for the outbreak of war. Nationalism, he defined, was "the self-destructive tendency of the European nation-state—a mechanical organisation of peoples in pursuit of material aggrandisement and hence necessarily aggressive and imperialist in character".

This description, it should be noted, was far from Lenin's economic interpretation of imperialist wars. Yet, it is worthwhile to note that Tagore's humanism and Lenin's philosophy came to the single conclusion that war was inevitable in an era of nation states!

To sum up, the world outlook of Tagore and Gandhi thus reflected their unchangeable faith in the goodness of man. Both started from the premise that "man's world was a moral one"—and, therefore, superior to material or national ambition. Admittedly, the spheres of their activities greatly differed, but there was vital link between the two. Writes Asish Nandy: "They saw themselves as belonging to a civilization that refused to view politics only as a secularised arena of human initiative. Certainly in both there was not only a built-in critique of nationalism but also that of the social and cultural realities of the nation".

The question, however, remains what could be the current relevance of Gandhi and Tagore in the study of world affairs? One answer is clear: their stand that the fundamental unity of human society as against conflict and violence rejects wholesale the axioms on which International Relations studies are conducted and elaborated. Their high ideals, one can argue, are impractical and unattainable. This may appear to be true, but has the argument in favour of power-coiltest and military strength succeeded any better a more humane society?

Gandhi's life and teaching had a profound impact on the liberation struggle of peoples against racist and colonial rule. Second, his unflinching stress on moral means of achieving political goals provided a new dignity to the lowly and downtrodden. Finally, it could be maintained that it was Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence that prepared the ground for independent India's foreign policy.

And what about Tagore? His idea of a conflict-free world society was not altogether a flight of poetical fancy. The silent suffering of the poor and the young gave him the courage to refuse entry to God's own messengers.

Finally, Tagore's condemnation of nationalism may gain greater importance in coming years. His version of internationalism may not converge with post-Cold War theories of globalisation—a mischievous phrase that hides the face of global misery and inequalities. It may only point out, as Nandy puts it: "Perhaps the time has to take stock of the costs of nation-state system and the nationalism that sustains it. Such stock-taking may not alter the past but it may lead towards a redefinition of the concepts and functions of the state, at least in this part of the globe..."

8.4 NATIONALISTS AND TRANS-NATIONALISTS

It is not easy to explain nationalism of Afro-Asians. To most nationalist parties or groups it meant expulsion of foreign rulers and attainment of independence. In essence, this was more or less a negative aim. And this perhaps prevented the enunciation of nationalism in the Afro-Asian world. There was, in addition the over-riding need to keep all elements in a colonial society under a single banner called "Freedom". The idea that all things could be set aright once the outsiders left was universal. Gandhi, wrote Jawaharlal Nehru, remained "delightfully vague" when asked about the meaning of *Swaraj*. So also did Kwame Nkrumah, chief of the leading nationalist party of the West African colony of the Gold Coast (later called Ghana) when he called for the establishment of a political kingdom. The rest, he assured, would simply follow. The faith in the coming of a millennium of wealth and plenty was what galvanised the masses in the colonies.

This, we must stress, is a total repudiation of the familiar concept of nationalism as defined and developed in the West. The basic constructs of Western nationalism included faith in a nation state—an entity that United peoples on the basis of common culture, language and political institutions. The aim of such a state was to be strong, functioning as a power in competition or collaboration with other nation states.

The worldview of post-colonial states was framed, in contrast to the West, in the background of their common experience as subjects of Western power, known as Imperialism. Their immediate needs irrespective of their size/strength were to attend to the basic needs of their people and correct the inequalities caused by the erstwhile imperialist politics. This they knew could not be attained within the confines of single nation-states. Africa and even in Latin America therefore we see attempts on the part of their new leaders to build regional organisations within the context of which nation-states could or should be constructed. This is what we call Trans-national expression of nationalism in the non-European world.

In the remaining part of this section, we shall attempt a description of the regional organisations under the following headings:

- 1) Pan-Asian organisations
- 2) Pan-Africanism
- 3) Pan-Arab and Islamic formations
- 4) Latin American unity

8.4.1 Pan Asianism

It is interesting but paradoxical that the first impulse for Pan-Asian solidarity came from two very opposite ends. One was Japan, which scored an unexpected military victory over a Czarist

Russian army in 1905. This was hailed throughout Asia as a historic triumph of the East over the West.

Commented a historian: "After the Russo-Japanese War, the Oriental question was the problem of Asia's revolt against its European masters." But Japan's victory made it militarily **ambitious**. It started to model its policies on European lines. It embarked on a course of conquering China's northern territories. In 1931, its troops marched into Manchuria. This aroused Asian indignation. Japan's close neighbours became afraid while many nationalist parties condemned it without reservation. In India, the leading Congress Party viewed with "horror the imperialist aggression of Japan in China attended with wanton cruelty and bombing of the civilian population."

The Indian approach to Pan-Asianism was quite different. Being the central pin of Great Britain's world **empire**, it had over the years come to fraternise with the suffering of peoples in other colonies. At the same time, it had pledged support—moral and material—to freedom struggles elsewhere. The end of the War witnessed far-reaching transformation in Asia. The idea of "Asia for Asians" had taken deeper roots. The defeat of Japan in 1945 had released Asian nationalists from their overwhelming fear of Japanese ambitions. At the same time developments in China, Indo-China and South-east Asia alerted them about the possibility of a re-entry of Western powers into their respective colonies. This was a dreadful prospect they were determined to resist and defeat.

This was the post-war situation in Asia when India's Provisional Government under Nehru convened the Asian Relations conference in New Delhi in March-April 1947. Nehru sketched out the purpose of this conference in his inaugural address: "Far too long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with. We do not intend to be the playthings of others."

A second meeting—again in New Delhi—was convened in March 1949. This meeting devoted **much** time in debating the situation in Indonesia. But it also prepared the ground for forming an Afro-Asian group within the framework of the United Nations. Pan-Asianism was certainly giving birth to a much greater movement, Afro-Asianism. (See next sub-unit).

8.4.2 Africans

Unlike the Asians, the Africans visualised their world as based on racial solidarity. As a movement Pan-Africanism sprang up from two different sources. One was Negro agitation in America. Another was the breakaway African church movement in central, southern and Western Africa. In the first case, the sentiment for black solidarity was first aired at the Pan-African Congress held in London in 1900. At this Congress, W.E.B. Du Bois, a prolific writer and university teacher, announced that the biggest question of the 20th Century "will be the colour line"—a statement that became a prophecy during the years of struggle against *apartheid* (or institutional racism) in South Africa.

Though interrupted from time to time, Du Bois' indefatigable energy built up Pan-Africanism on a scale as vast and **formidable** as the Communist International. Between 1900 and 1945, his band of followers met in different places, but outside Africa. In the last Congress held in Manchester in 1945, Du Bois was able to establish contact with a new generation of militant African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya); and George Padmore (a member of the Communist International) and Hastings Banda (Nyasaland). Buoyed by their

enthusiasm and help, Du Bois pressed for "Africa's autonomy and independence"—albeit as far as possible "in this One World of groups and peoples to rule themselves subject to inevitable world unity and federation." The Manchester meeting thus acted as a catalyst to accelerate the process of decolonisation in Black Africa.

Du Bois, however, had to meet with a contender. This was Marcus Garvey (1887-1940), a colourful Jamaican with unerring instinct for rabble rousing among the Negroes of Harlem, New York. Garvey disdained the idea of integration among men of different races. Instead, he called for a "back to Africa" movement, which had an immediate impact on his audience. He conferred titles and honours on his followers, started a shipping company to transport Negroes from America to the black continent.

8.4.3 The Muslim World

The idea of a unified body of believers (*Umma*) has always been present in the Islamic world. In the 19th Century, several Islamic thinkers, such as Djamal-edin-Afghani, Abduh and Rachid Rida, stressed the importance of the unity of Islam. But such unity could hardly be obtained. Nevertheless, the idea recurred from time to time.

A further complication arose at the end of the First World War and, especially, after the fall of Caliphate. The Turkish Revolution of 1923-24 frustrated attempts on the part of *Mullahs* to restore the vanished glory of the Caliphate. Instead, Mustafa Kemal Pasha's (1922-38) new Republic defined the principles of state to be *republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism and revolution*. These principles helped the formulation of new system of public education, emancipation of women, scrapping of religious courts and their replacement by "modern scientific civil codes".

Mustafa also took personal interest in devising a Roman script for the Turkish language, agricultural innovation, rapid industrialisation and introduction of democracy. The sweep of his reforms was indeed breathtaking. What is more the Revolution lasted and gave new Turkey a breath of solidity that Lenin's Bolshevik revolution in Russia failed to achieve. Yet, Kemal Pasha's men failed to impact the Muslim world. For all intents and purposes, they progressively moved towards the West. Why was it so? Was it because of geographical proximity or because the rest of the Islamic community rejected the Turkish path? Or, it is quite likely that in the view of Arab Muslims, the Turkish revolution appeared both anti-Islamic and pro-West. More importantly, to the new generation of Arab nationalists neither the restoration of Caliphate nor the model of Westernisation as embraced by Turkey was acceptable. The question thus remains still unresolved.

8.4.4 The Arab World

Whatever be the answer, the Ottoman Empire had robbed the Arab world of a truly theocratic and political center. This caused the beginning of a phase of uncertainty among the former constituents of the old empire. In addition three major developments complicated Arab search for unity. First was the attempt by Western powers to re-establish their individual spheres of influence in the West Asia. Second, the discovery of vast oil deposits turned the arid lands into strategically one of the world's most sensitive locations. An immediate result of this discovery was also direct involvement of American Oil corporations with Arab rulers. The third major factor was creation of the State of Israel in the midst of what had always been the traditional inhabitation of Arab Muslims. By 1948, military confrontation between Israel and Arabs had become the single largest issue to tear West Asia apart.

In a sense the creation of Israel helped cement Arab unity. But uneven flow of oil income introduced rivalry and division among the Arab countries. These two contradictory factors brought to the fore two new actors viz., Arab League and Egypt. The League was founded in March 1945. As a regional organisation, it succeeded in bringing most Arab nations under a single umbrella. It also imparted a sharper edge to the anti-imperialist militancy of the Arabs. In the long run, however, the Arab League failed to achieve Arab unity as a counter-point to Israeli threat.

8.4.5 Masser's Three Circles

Pan-Arab-ism for Nasser was a geopolitical concept. He conceived this idea after his daring action to nationalise the Suez Canal in 1956. This provoked a joint Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in league with Israel. But under American pressure the invading army withdrew leaving Egypt a free field to lead the Arab world. Nasser became a world celebrity. His prestige soared higher when in February 1958, he proclaimed the formation of a United Arab Republic by Egypt's union with Syria and Yemen. "This was seen by Arab nationalists as the first step towards the creation of a great United Arab state."

By the end of 1950s Nasser had become the most charismatic figure of the Arab world. He had established intimate relations with emergent nationalist leaders of Black Africa. Many of these leaders and their followers converged in Cairo until the Egyptian capital came to be known as an African Mecca. It was at this point that Nasser wrote his famous Philosophy of the Revolution: *Testament* that sets out to present his views on the future of Africa and Asia.

As a professional soldier, Nasser stressed Egypt's importance in geo-political terms. He could see that Egypt stood as a link between three strategic regions—Arab, Africa and the Muslim World. He outlined these as three circles "in which we shall try to concentrate all our energies." First, the Arab world—"as a compact whole" whose history and interests "are intimately linked with ours." Second, the African circle where a dreadful struggle was being waged between white and black races. Finally, the Islamic circles of which the centre was Mecca. If pilgrimage to Mecca could be converted into a political force it could bring together the leaders of the Islamic states, the intellectuals, the Ulemas, the writers, the merchants, the captains of industry, as well as the young people in order to study the major principles of a policy, common to all Muslim nations.

The basic unity of the three worlds, which he outlined, had definitely inspired Arabs and Africans. But events were moving against Nasser's grand design. Egypt's defeat in the Sinai War (1967) ruined his prestige when Israel became more aggressive in its policies. In Africa, new states emerged and its new leaders started talking about continental unity with the formation of Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Islam, indeed, was fast becoming a source of instability in the world. Explains Samuel P. Huntington in his *The Clash of Civilizations*, that Islam "lacks a dominant center. States aspiring to be leaders of Islam, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and potentially Indonesia, compete for influence in the Muslim world. No one of them is in a strong position to mediate conflicts within Islam, and no one of them is able to act authoritatively on behalf of Islam in dealing with conflicts between Muslim and non-Muslim groups."

8.4.6 Latin America

Unlike Asia or Africa, the Latin Americans are not indigenous to South American nations. No more than a quarter of the inhabitants claim descent from Europeans ancestors. Almost half of

the population is Creole i.e mixed races, constitute more or less a landowning middle class. The bottom layers and the poorest are composed of former Negro races and a handful minority are the indigenous peoples or "Indians", perhaps the first inhabitants of the vast continent. A wide gulf between the wealth and privileged minority and pitifully poverty-stricken masses further complicates this division on ethnic lines. The Latin revolution of the early 19th Century did not introduce any substantial change in this unjust order. In fact the position of Blacks and Indians became much worse.

In brief, history took a reverse step in Latin America. This reversal plunged the continent in endless social, political and military turmoil. There were as many coups and violent disorders as were decadent dictators. This situation of permanent conflict was fertile for foreign intervention. In fact to prevent rival European powers from acting in collusion with Latin aficionados, the United States directly intervened in the southern hemisphere to set aright its economy, and domestic and external relations. In sum, Latin America became a semi-colony of its great northern neighbour.

Nevertheless, the Latin American revolution produced great men of vision. Foremost among them was of course Simon Bolivar (1783-1826): celebrated as liberator of the great continent. Bolivar had in mind the vision of a republican federation embracing all Units of the Iberian Empire. Although nothing much came out of this vision, it must be conceded that like the Asians and Africans, the Latin Americans too had at one point entertained the hope of building continental unity.

Next to Bolivar, one of his contemporaries, Miranda (1750-1816), a Venezuelan by birth, had plans to establish a new Inca empire with support from North America and Europe. Following him, San Martin (1778-1856), who liberated Peru from Spanish occupation called for a unified monarchical system in Spanish-speaking Americans. In short, the leaders of independence movement—from Bolivar to San Martin—expressed with clarity "their concept of a United Latin America presenting a common front to those outside." In this phase, North America was automatically viewed as a powerful friend and protector of its southern neighbours.

But the issues of Latin American unity and American hegemony were becoming more complex by the end of the century. The Monroe doctrine (1823) that proclaimed that the "American continent was no territory for future European colonisation" now became transformed into what US president Theodore Roosevelt announced to be US intention to act as an "international police force" for the Latin continent. Pan-Americanism itself gave rise to a profound sense of ambivalence "wising from conflict between the concept of belonging to a hemisphere and the unity of Latinos".

This brief survey of the rise of nationalism and regional movements presents several angles for investigation. One is of course the fact that in Asia, Africa, Latin America and West Asia (in brief, the entire colonial world) national and Trans-national consciousness reinforced one another almost from the start. This does not mean that the other worlds did not develop Trans-national sentiments or loyalties. Quite the contrary, we have in Europe the rise of powerful movements such as Pan-Germanic, Pan-Slavic and Pan-Jewish movements. Most such movements, however, went hand in hand to strengthen the nation-state in their individual spheres. This was not so in the former cases. The concept of nation state, in their case, was to mature and climax in the formation of Trans-national organisations based on cultural, religious or racial affinities. Political liberation of a single territory from the sway of colonialism was, therefore, only a halfway house—as Ghana's independent constitution proclaimed that it would surrender its individual sovereignty soon as the entire Africa achieved freedom from racial/colonial domination.

We have seen that despite their century old search for unity Muslims and Arabs failed to establish a solid foundation for unity building. From time to time they came close to forging a common anti-imperialist or anti-Western front but the forging itself escaped their grasp.

In Asia, on the other hand, common experience under colonial rule and reference to Asian unity failed to make progress beyond holding a few Asian Conferences. Different faiths, different cultures and ideologies came in the way of building an all-Asia organisation. Besides, the relations between the two huge countries—China and India—worsened. By faith and tradition China preferred to maintain its purity from external contamination. Also it is possible that in the background of its imperial tradition of being the Middle Kingdom, China set its goal to compete with two great powers—Russia and America. This shaped the primary focus of its foreign policy to play a global than regional role.

Unlike the Asians, the Africans did make remarkable progress towards continental unity. In 1963, the independent African states met in Addis Ababa and shedding individual reservation signed a charter to found the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Though not effective nor an able tool to cement unity, the Organisation did demonstrate a strong consensus in favour of keeping new African states free from inter-state and international disputes. The call "Africa and Africans" became the rallying theme during the time of decolonisation.

But surface unity did not hide real difficulties. First, the prevalence of different cultural influences intervened to keep independent Africans apart. Strong economic and military ties between Paris and Francophone Africans gave rise to grave misgivings among Africans in other parts. Illustrating their case president Nkrumah condemned the French-speaking states as "neo-colonialist". His ambition on the other hand to head a movement for continental unity generated fear and suspicion among the latter. Another complicating factor was continuous excursion of Islamic Maghreb States into the affairs of black Africa.

The Latin Americans furrowed a different path. By origin, the *latifundia* elite was Europeans. They hated the natives—either freed slaves or Indians. Western Europe continued to be their source of inspiration, but the dominant influence, as noted earlier, remained North America. It took a long time for them to perceive the great changes that had swept across the world. When they did, they swayed between extreme conservatism and neo-radicalism. But we have space enough to dwell on these developments in the remaining section.

8.5 NON-ALIGNED THEORY AND PRACTICE

From local, national and regional, we now enter the phase of Third World internationalism. This phase did not immediately follow what we have described as Trans-nationalism in the previous section. Two events, however, stand out. One was the high profile meeting of Afro-Asian states in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955. 29 states attended the meeting. The leading performers at this meeting were Chou En-lai (China), Nehru (India), Soekarno (Indonesia) and John Kotelawala of Sri Lanka. Strictly speaking this was China's first appearance in a world stage and Chou En-lai won affection and love from nearly everyone present in the meeting. His magnetic charm overshadowed even Nehru's personality. But in his speech and manner Chou made it clear that in his country's relations with Asia and Africa, he did not want anyone to act as an intermediary. Nevertheless, wrote S.P. Varma: "With its emphasis on the right of self-determination of all colonial peoples and the right of equality between all races, economic equality, with an emphasis on re-structuring the existing international economic order, cultural equality and multi-nationalism through strong support for the UN system—which later became

the basis of non-alignment—Bandung was the first step in the direction of challenging the international system, based as it was on the domination of the world by Western alliance led by the United States."

Conceptually at least, the world faced a greater danger to its own existence from nuclear competition between two great powers—America and the USSR—than from suppression of colonies by the old imperialist powers. The holistic view of the need for world peace was, therefore, more Realistic than anti-colonialism. At least Nehru thought so. The latent friction between Afro-Asian regionalism and the movement for world peace became fully evident at the non-aligned summit at Belgrade held in 1961.

This was the conference that marked the appearance of non-alignment as an international movement. In fact, Jawaharlal Nehru openly deprecated the very idea that non-alignment as a policy could ever become a movement, let alone intervene in world politics as a third force. But others were more ambitious. They called for a worldwide movement against all manifestation of colonialism, imperialism and racism. A confrontation between the two approaches took place in the plenary meeting of the conference itself. Nehru categorically stated that the real source of world tension and strife was not imperialism but the deepening of ideological conflict between the two Super Powers. He chose to address the meeting in this way: "De-Colonisation? It is over! Nothing is more important than to prevent war between East and West! What is the emancipation of a few people when the whole of mankind is threatened with annihilation?"

The intensification of the nuclear race as also manufacture of long distance weapons did lend force to Nehru's argument. But Soekarno as spokesman of the rival group flatly rejected this view. He argued that the majority of mankind was affected not so much by the ideological conflict as by problems of poverty, disease, illiteracy and colonial bondage. His observation received full backing from the leaders of Ghana, Guinea, Iraq and Mali. Three years later, at Cairo, Soekarno sharpened his views and declared that Moscow and Washington could live very well at peace with each other and did not need anybody's support.

Nehru's concept of non-alignment thus anticipated an intermediary role between two competing blocs. For a while this indeed had a Realistic base. But a year later, the complexion of great power relations changed. First, the Cuban crisis of late 1962 brought realisation as well as urgency to both Moscow and Washington that unless they reached an agreement that unless they mutually agreed to qualify the nuclear race they both were in great danger of mutual self-annihilation. This realisation prompted them to sign important agreements such as nuclear test ban treaty, installation of a hot line between Washington and Moscow, SALT 1, and the general reduction of tensions between the two super powers. The phase thus came to be known as the phase of *détente*.

This phase definitely brought about several changes also in the non-align movement. Soekarno's statement that Russia and America did not need an intermediary for peace between the two proved indeed to be true. Nehru's attempt to raise regional movements to the sphere of international movement for peace as a consequence met with certain reverses. The old call for de-colonisation, anti-racism and anti-imperialism thus returned to the fore, of non-alignment agenda.

To some extent this trend isolated India from the Third World movements. This was very eloquently demonstrated when after the border conflict between India and China, very few of Afro-Asians made any move to support India. Did this in reverse also give a boost to China's diplomatic offensive in Afro-Asia? Perhaps it did: for in early 1964, Chinese prime minister

Chou En-lai undertook his high-profile tour of Africa. His famous statement that Africa was ripe for revolution—though he did explain it—made some African states bold enough to berate Western powers as much it caused worry to others. Soon after, Beijing signed agreement with the government of Tanzania to construct a rail-line between Tanzanian port of Dar-Es-Salaam to Zambia's copper-rich northern province.

But China probably did not make India its primary target of attack. It was at first out to contest what it considered to be the Super Power intention to dominate world affairs. Later of course, it became an out and out campaign to oust Soviet influence from the Third World. It was in this connection that India's pro-Soviet stance played a role to contain China's influence in Afro-Asian affairs. Events favoured it: in southern Africa, especially Angola and Mozambique, China's misreading of grass roots situation deprived much of its influence in Africa. In contrast, India gained ground by cultivating closer relations with mainstream nationalist groups in Southern Africa. Over the years, while India's stand on such major issues such as Cuba and Afghanistan, earned Soviet gratitude, it equally alienated the USA. In sum, India regained its leading role in the non-aligned movement. But in more than one respect, NAM—as the movement itself came to be called—adopted the Afro-Asian agenda of anti-imperialism. In this the intensification of armed struggle in Portugal's African colonies, Namibia and also South Africa lent an extra-edge to the original agenda. But the composition of NAM had vastly changed. Similarly, Yugoslavia did not want the USSR to be formally connected with NAM. Its opinion counted; because in addition to being a new member, Yugoslavia under president Tito had become the nucleus of the non-aligned movement. Among other new entrants, were Cyprus and Cuba—the island state that had broken US hold to inaugurate a new phase of revolutionary movement in the Americas. In sum, NAM had become a truly tri-continental movement.

The Non-aligned could not be described either as a group of states that had refused to join alliances or as a group that was distinguished by non-involvement in Cold War disputes. All that remained was a refusal to take membership of multilateral, Cold War military alliances. In other respects some of the Non-Aligned were fully committed to the East and some to the West. This means, as Willetts wrote: "The cooperation of the Non-Aligned as a diplomatic and ideological group will not be significantly affected by the course of relations between the Super Powers or the conflict between capitalism and communism."

But the changing relations between the Super Powers did affect different groups of Third World nations differently. This in turn, as we shall see below, affected the Non-aligned movement very profoundly. Let us review these changes in brief.

The Period between 1961-1991

From 1963 onwards relations between Moscow and Washington became increasingly conciliatory. Talks between the two on nuclear test, long and medium range missiles and disarmament became a ritual feature. But disturbing developments were taking place in the Third World. The armed struggle in southern Africa intensified. Liberation leaders in Southern Africa called not only for an end of colonial/racial domination but also for the creation of a new order based on equal social, economic and political opportunities. "Our struggle," wrote Amilcar Cabral, one of the most memorable and brilliant leaders in Portuguese-held Africa, "is for the building of our countries ... a life of happiness, a life in which every man will have the respect of all men, where discipline will not be imposed upon us, where everyone will have work, where wages are fair, where one will have the right to what man has made, what he has created for the welfare of men. This is what our struggle is about. If we do not achieve this, we will have failed in our duty, the objective of our struggle..."

The fall of Portuguese Empire in Africa had long time consequences for Africa and the world. To begin with, the success of a prolonged-anlied revolt had a direct bearing on Portugal's political life. It was the first and perhaps the last case when—reversing Karl Marx's prediction that by liberating themselves, European working classes will also liberate **the colonial people**—a revolution in the colonies liberated the Portuguese people from a wretchedly tenacious, regressive Fascist rule. Symbolically this was thus Africa's gift to Europe.

In addition, developments in Portuguese Africa facilitated faster change in the rest of Southern Africa. The first among the racist citadels to fall was Ian Smith's illegal regime in Rhodesia. Seeing no alternative to worldwide pressure and intensified guerilla warfare within, it finally accepted defeat in 1980. This paved the way for the installation of a duly elected majority government headed by Robert Mugabe, leader of the country's leading nationalist party.

Reaction to these developments elsewhere was somewhat complex. In 1976 South African troops crossed Namibian borders and penetrated deep into the Angolan territory in a bid to check the advance of MPLA forces southwards. Backing the latter were Cuban soldiers well trained in the use of Russian made guns and helicopters. This turned the Angolan war into a cockpit of Super Power conflict. The normalisation process in the relations between Moscow and Washington was not given up, but the two seemed to have bisected world politics into two different spheres—Super Powers and Europe on the one hand, and Third World on the other hand. Moscow considered backward African and Asian states to be one of its special concerns, whereas Washington contested every inch of Russian advance into these areas. Naturally, this brought back some tensions of the Cold War.

One is not sure what made the Cubans militarily so active first in Angola and later in the war between Somalia and Ethiopia. Havana denied that it was acting under Moscow's instruction. This charge may not have been valid. But its policy might have been the product of an ideological debate that had flared up among members of NAM. Around the middle of the 1970s, some radical leaders were pressing for an open pro-Soviet and anti-Western role for NAM. Chief among these were Fidel Castro (Cuba), Kwame Nkrumah (of Ghana, then living in exile in Guinea), Auguste Neto of Angola, and perhaps Sekou Toure of Guinea. They represented in some sense, the line of radicals.

Perhaps these leaders represented a long line of radical thought as enunciated by their predecessors such as Ben Bella (Algeria), Soekarno (Indonesia) and Che Guevara (South American revolutionary). But their pro-Soviet leanings had become more pronounced. Writing in October issue of *Labour Monthly* (1968), for instance, Nkrumah commented: "The world struggle, and the cause of world tension, has to be seen not in the old political context of the Cold War, that is of nation states and power blocs, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary peoples. If we are to achieve Revolutionary Socialism, then we must avoid any suggestion that will imply that there is any separation between the Socialist world and a Third World".

Some years later, Fidel Castro pressed forward similar views albeit in militant, Marxist terminology: "Any attempt to pit the non-aligned countries against the socialist countries is profoundly counter-revolutionary and benefits only imperialist interests. Inventing a false country can have only one aim, to evade the real enemy."

Castro's real target, however, was China, which had by this time identified USSR as the primary imperialist power, a renegade and outright enemy of the Third World. At the 31st session of the UN General Assembly (5 October 1976) China's Foreign Minister, Chia Kuan-hua said as much. "At present, the Soviet Union and the United States, the two super powers

constituting the first world, are the biggest international oppressors and exploiters of our time and they are sources of a New World War". Further, he said: "The Fifth Conference of the Heads of States or Governments of Non-aligned countries withstood outside pressure and maintained the position of opposing imperialism, and particularly super-power hegemonism. The people of Asia, Africa and Latin America have come to see more and more clearly the true colour of social-imperialism.

Together the passages cited above indicate that the triangular Cold War involving China, the Soviet Union and the USA had started to seriously affect the lion-aligned movement. It was not that Cuba had become any less non-aligned than others, but in the ongoing war between Beijing and Moscow, it did not hesitate to fully side with the latter. Some African members, however, were keen to exploit the situation. They became alternately pro-China or pro-Soviet. In some cases as the liberation movements of southern Africa, some factions openly sided with Beijing in order to gain added weight in relation to the pro-Moscow groups. This lent peculiarly intriguing dimensions to the liberation struggle as a whole. In Angola, these groups continued a fratricidal warfare long after Portugal abandoned the colony.

Another issue that should interest scholars is whether non-alignment was a policy that was applicable in relation only to competition between two super-powers? Or, was it also relevant to other situations such as Sino-Soviet dispute! In relation even to super-power rivalry, the old stance of keeping free of both camps had been seriously violated. Egypt's foreign policy, for instance, literally took a U-turn from Moscow to Washington after its military defeat in the Sinai-war (June 1967). India, on the other hand, did not hide its loudly proclaimed pro-Soviet leanings. The last notable instance noted by many, was when despite muted murmuring, New Delhi did not openly protest Soviet military action in Afghanistan.

At times one is tempted to agree with Libyan president M. Gadaffi's observation, which he made years before the Afghan crisis: "Actually, in the true sense of the world, non-alignment has been defeated, both by our own violation and by the greater forces which compel us." He added: "It is sufficient to say that the countries who were the founders of the non-alignment movement, unfortunately, through pressure, have adopted obligations which we can neither accept nor approve. They even maintain an alliance with the great powers."

Despite these questionings, the Non-aligned group did not break up. Why?

One reason could be that ideological affiliation of one member or another with super power blocs did not matter much so long as they preferred to stick with it. A formal treaty or agreement with any of the power blocs of course were not ignored, but sort of a formal affiliation any member or group of non-aligned could conduct foreign relations without any serious consequence. Perhaps this flexibility helped the non-aligned camp to survive. But there were other serious factors. One was that belonging to NAM played what can be called an "Independence Plus Factor". Its members could go to war against another non-aligned nation without facing any retribution from the group as a whole. And this kind of intra-NAM warfare increased alarmingly since 1970 onward. To count a few, India- Pakistan War (1970-1), Iran-Iraq War (1980-8), Tanzania- Uganda War (1979-80), War in the Horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-8), invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (1990), and a large number border skirmishes in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Internal squabbles and the inability to restrain the disputing parties had thus seriously impaired NAM's prestige. Its own contribution to stabilising peace—one of its cardinal aims—had thus become less than nominal. At the same time both the super powers had taken advantage of this

disarray among the non-aligned to push their individual agenda into the Third World. In such a situation, NAM survived but became less and less effective,

Perhaps the relaxation of the Cold War also helped. Some of the Latin American states that had avoided any tract with NAM now applied for membership. To reflect this trend, the first foreign ministers meeting of non-aligned countries was held in Georgetown, Guyana, (August 1972). From this time onward we see a marked shift from political to economic matters. As Julius Nyerere pointed out on the eve of Lusaka Conference (1970): "It is poverty which constitutes our greatest danger and to a greater or lesser extent we are all poor." At Lusaka, the non-aligned nations made a declaration that "poverty of developing nations and their economic dependence on those in affluent circumstances (constituted) a structural weakness in the present economic order."

With this came the larger impact of the Latin American theories of economic under-development and dependency. This helped to correct the NAM perspective on world economic system, though it remains unclear if the Latin wisdom made any positive impact on distorted economies of poorer countries. Nevertheless, several important advances were made. In early 1974, the energy crisis arising from the decision of oil producing and exporting countries (**OPEC**) demonstrated that unified action on the part of developing states on matters concerning market prices of raw materials could persuade the rich nations to relax their rigid stance on economic matters. In April-May 1974, a special session of UN General Assembly adopted two major documents. The first one was a declaration of the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO) which stated *inter alia* that the establishment of NIEO "based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all states (can) make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and developing countries." Second, a programme of action to give concrete shape to the great principles set out in the declaration. From this followed several North-South negotiations.

Perhaps, the power hierarchy even within the Third World had changed. The relatively industrialised and big-sized states such as India, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa have certainly advanced economies which can only prosper if they distance themselves more and more from their poorer neighbours and enter bilateral agreements with the industrialised West. The profound changes that have come about in international relations at the end of Cold War calls for a radical review of the themes of Third World solidarity either in the political or economic sphere.

8.6 SUMMARY

In this Unit, you have read about non-aligned leaders' emphasis on the enduring values of world peace, co-existence, and alternative versions of economic and political organisations of civil society. You have read about the views of Gandhi and Tagore, the two legends in their own lifetime. While Gandhi emphasised on *ahimsa* and *satyagraha*, Tagore advocated tolerance of other cultures and opposed Gandhi's call for boycott of foreign-made goods. You have also read about the worldview of nationalists and pan-nationalists. These include the ideas of Pan-Asianism, the Africans, the Muslim world, the Arab World (which indeed includes the Arab Muslims), and of Latin America. This Unit has also dealt with the Three Circles of president Nasser. These were the Arab World, the African Circle and the Islamic Circle of which Mecca was the centre. The theory and practice of non-alignment is discussed in the last section. Nehru, Nasser and Tito pioneered the non-aligned movement, besides others. It is explained how different member-nations of NAM, in course of time, gave up strict non-alignment and tilted either towards the United States or the former Soviet Union.

8.7 EXERCISES

- 1) Describe the worldview of nationalists and pan-nationalists following decolonisation.
- 2) Highlight the major differences in the views of Mahatma Gandhi and Poet Tagore.
- 3) Why was Tagore described as a "humanist poet"?
- 4) Describe Nasser's Three Circles.
- 5) Discuss the progress made by the Latin Americans and Africans for continental unity.

UNIT 9 END OF COLD WAR

Structure

- 9.1 Introduction
- 9.2 What was *the* Cold War?
 - 9.2.1 Meaning and Nature of **Cold War**
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- 9.6 Peaceful End of the Cold War
 - 9.6.1 Indications for the Future
- 9.7 Summary
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9.1 INTRODUCTION

When the Second World War ended in 1945 with the victory of Allies, it was expected that the scourge of the war would be overcome by a new atmosphere of peace and cooperation. Unfortunately, that did not happen. Italy had been defeated in 1944 before the second front was opened against Germany. Hitler, finding his defeat imminent, committed suicide in April 1945, and just after a week Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allies, and four main victors occupied it by temporarily dividing it into four military zones. As peace treaty eluded the victors, the United States dropped two atom bombs on a defiant and yet undefeated Japan in August 1945. The humiliated Japanese surrendered soon afterwards, and the Second World War came to an end. But, the conclusion of war did not usher in an era of cooperation and friendship. It turned the erstwhile allies into foes. However, the hostility between two major victors, the United States and the then Soviet Union, was of unique nature. The two Super Powers did not fight war with their armed forces. They fought it diplomatically, and tried for one-upmanship. There was acute tension, which came to be known as the Cold War.

This state of tension lasted for over four decades. At times, the two power blocs, led by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, came close to a third (nuclear) war, but avoided it. At other times, their relations improved to a point where normalcy appeared imminent. This phase was termed as *détente*.

Just as cooperation sometimes leads to conflicts, the opposite is equally true. The Cold War sustained itself till late 1980s, but finally gave way to US-USSR peace and cooperation. Efforts

made by different leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union for reduction of tension finally bore fruits when on the last day of 1989 the US president George Bush Sr. and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev declared the formal end of the Cold War.

In this unit, you will read very briefly about the meaning and origin of the Cold War, for one cannot understand the end of an event without knowing about its origin. You will also have a brief idea of *détente*, before analysing the developments leading to the end of Cold War.

9.2 WHAT WAS THE COLD WAR

The Cold War was an unarmed peacetime conflict. It was a war in which armed forces did not engage themselves in battles, guns were not fired, the tanks did not roll and the bombs were not dropped. The Second World War had begun in 1939 with the German attack on Poland and consequent declaration of war by the British Empire, its Dominions and France against Germany. Hitler's Germany was joined by Italy and Japan. Together these three powers were known as the Axis Powers. The opponents, called Allies led by the UK and France were joined in June 1941 by the Soviet Union (after German attack on it), and the United States in December 1941 following Japanese bombardment at Pearl Harbor. As the war drew to a close the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two Super Powers as their combined might had defeated the enemy. The other victors lost much of their military and economic capabilities. It hastened decolonisation, and yet many East European countries were brought into communist fold. They were led by the USSR, and known as the Eastern or Communist Bloc. Several Western capitalist countries came under the American wings and were called Western or American Bloc. The emergent international system featured distribution of powers between many European and non-European sovereign States. "In addition", wrote Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf in *World Politics*, "the advent of nuclear weapons radically changed the role that threats of warfare would play henceforth in world politics. Out of these circumstances grew the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for hegemonic leadership."

9.2.1 Meaning and Nature of Cold War

The term Cold War was first used for hostile attitude adopted by the United States and its friends on one side, and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other, soon after the Second World War. Unlike traditional wars, this was a diplomatic conflict, without the use of armed forces. The two sides maintained normal diplomatic relations, yet behaved like enemies. Walter Lippmann, in 1947, used the term "diplomatic war". The Cold War was defined by Flemming as "a war that is fought not in the battle field, but in the minds of men; one tries to control the minds of others." John Foster Dulles, US secretary of state in early 1950s, a leading critic of the USSR, had said that, "The Cold War was a moral crusade for moral values—for good against bad; right against wrong; religion against atheism." Giving a moral dimension to the Cold War. Dulles thus described the Soviet Union as bad, wrong and atheist. Louis Malle in his book *The Cold War As History* described the Cold War as a situation of high tension between two power blocs, it was more dangerous than an armed conflict; the parties to the Cold War tried to complicate the issues rather than attempt to resolve them; and all disputes and conflicts were used as pawns in the Cold War. Unlike a normal war, it was fought in the diplomatic channels and the United Nations forum. According to Grieves, the Cold War was "a form of conflict taking place below the level of hot war in a thermonuclear age."

The nature of Cold War underwent constant changes during over four decades of its duration. However, Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf mentioned three primary characteristics of the Cold War. These were:

- The periods of intense conflict alternated with periods of relative **cooperation**; and reciprocal, action-reaction exchanges were also evident.
- Both actors (US and USSR) were willing to disregard their respective professed ideologies whenever their perceived national interests rationalised such inconsistencies, for example, each backed allies with political **systems** antithetical to its own when the necessities of power politics seemed to **justify** doing so.
- Throughout the Cold War contest: both rivals consistently **made** avoidance of all-out war their highest priority. Through a gradual learning process involving push and shove, restraint and reward, **tough** bargaining and calm negotiation, the Super Powers created a security system, or rules for the peaceful management of **their** disputes.

Thus, Cold War was a state of peacetime unarmed **warfare**. Both the Super Powers had constructed their blocs, mostly on ideological basis. There indeed were several unattached or non-aligned countries, but Cold War was essentially fought between two power blocs. Each side used ideological weapons against the other. The two Super Powers tried to weaken the other block, to generate defections, and to strengthen their own position. Both gave liberal economic aid **and** established military bases in **the** territories of smaller allies. Propaganda, espionage, military intervention, military alliances, regional organisations and supply of **armaments** were some of the tools used to promote the bloc interests. Such actions aggravated the **Cold War**. The Super Powers and their close allies looked at every issue from their ideological and bloc **viewpoint**. Attempts **were made** to encourage industrial unrest, ethnic conflicts, and feelings of **narrow** nationalism to weaken the opposite bloc. Thus, as Louis Halle said, the Cold War was even worse than a **regular-armed** conflict.

9.2.2 Origin and Evolution of Cold War

In this unit dealing with end of the Cold War, it is neither necessary nor possible to go into details of origin and evolution of the **Cold War**. However, a brief mention **may** be made here to highlight **the major** events.

Nobody could say for certain as to **when** the Cold War began. **Blame** was put on the US by the Soviet Union for having started the conflict by not opening the second front against **Germany** till mid-1944, **leaving** USSR alone to fight the enemy. The West was also suspected of hidden agenda to seek destruction of both Nazi-Fascist dictators and the **Soviet** Union so that the Western countries could alone enjoy the fruits of victory. The Soviet Union felt **strongly** upset at the secret **development** of **atom** bomb by the United States, and its use against Japan **when** the USSR was just about to declare war against it. After the war, the United States created anti-Soviet front through **Truman** Doctrine and Marshall Plan. The Fulton speech of Winston **Churchill** in March 1946 (preceding Truman Doctrine) signalled hate campaign against the Soviet Union. Churchill had condemned the USSR for violation of Yalta Agreement to hold democratic elections in liberated countries, and **for having** erected an "iron curtain" at **the** East-West dividing line. He called for a campaign to protect freedom, Christian civilisation and democracy, **and** to contain **communism**.

The Western countries, on the other hand, **blamed** the USSR for violation of pledge to allow liberated countries to elect governments of their choice and for installing puppet communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The USSR tried to impose its system even in Greece and Turkey. It did not keep the promise to withdraw its troops **from** Iran soon after the end of the war. The USSR had launched a "hate-West" campaign and set up the **Cominform**.

The conflict was basically ideological. A US diplomat posted in its embassy in Moscow, George Kennan had sent his famous "long telegramme" to the State Department in Washington. He had argued: "In summary, we have here (USSR) a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with (the) US there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed: the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet Power is to be secure." Later this communication was published in the US under the signature of "X".

The US policy was guided by the principle of containment of communism, while the USSR was hopeful of destruction of capitalism and imperialism. The Cold War evolved through many areas of conflict, and some of cooperation. The two sides (USSR and US) supported communist North Korea and capitalist South Korea respectively in early 1950s. For some time USSR boycotted the United Nations for getting representation to the People's Republic of China. The West condemned Soviet military intervention in Hungary in 1956. Earlier, the question of German division (West and East) into pro-West and pro-Soviet States had raised the level of conflict. This was complicated when Soviet Union blockaded West Berlin (1948-49), and the US airlifted all supplies to the people of West Berlin. Later, (1961), a wall was erected to divide East and West Berlins.

The meeting between Soviet premier Khrushchev and US president Eisenhower in 1959 had raised the hopes of cooperation, but the US spy plane U-2 was noticed flying in the Soviet airspace in May 1960, and was shot down. This created tension, which reached its peak during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. The Soviet ships carrying nuclear missiles to Cuba had to beat a hasty retreat, as the US navy had blockaded Cuba and a nuclear war had become imminent.

There were many areas of conflict. But, in this unit, it is not possible to give any more details.

9.3 TOWARDS THE END OF COLD WAR

The period between 1945 and 1962 is identified with the Cold War. However, it does not mean that during this period there was a constant rise in the level of tension between the two power blocs. There were also interim periods of easing of tensions. For example, the period 1953-56 showed improved relations between East and West. There were signs of *détente* during the Camp David summit in 1959, but there was a sudden increase in the temperature from 1960 (U-2 incident) to 1962 (the Cuban Crisis). After the Cuban Crisis, the world experienced an extended period of relaxed tension, called *détente*, for about 12-13 years.

Improved relations were evident in several areas after Stalin's death in 1953. In July 1953, a cease-fire was declared in Korea. Next year, peace agreement was concluded for Indo-China at Geneva. In 1955, the Austrian question was resolved, its neutral status was recognised and Soviet Union withdrew troops. The USSR also withdrew from Porkkala in Finland. There were signs of easing of tension between West Germany and the Soviet Union. The German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer was invited to Moscow, and diplomatic relations were established between USSR and West Germany. Next year Japan and USSR also established diplomatic relations. After a gap of ten years, the Four Power Summit was held in 1955 at Geneva. It was attended by US president Eisenhower, Soviet leader Khrushchev and prime minister Bulganin, British prime minister Anthony Eden, and Edger Faure, prime minister of France. Nothing much came out of the Summit, but it demonstrated improved relations between East and West. The Soviet leaders now recognised in principle the existence of two Germanys—Federal Republic of Germany (West); and German Democratic Republic (East). The year 1956 was significant for

international communism. Stalin was denounced by his own successor Khrushchev. This was interpreted by the West as liberalisation of communism.

9.3.1 *Détente*

Détente may be described as a situation of reduced international tension. *Détente* is not normalcy. The term was used for relaxation in East-West conflict. During the period of *détente*, Cold War had not ended, but the level of tension had gone down and there were signs of understanding. The reduced tension, or fall in the temperature, could not be measured. It was an environmental change for the better in East-West conflict. Coral Bell in her book *The Diplomacy of Détente* states that: "détente supposes a conscious and deliberate reduction of tension...". The idea is that reduced tension is an intentionally achieved situation: it is not accidental: it is by choice. She adds: "Cold War assumes a conscious maintenance of tension at relatively high level." Therefore, *détente* was the outcome of conscious efforts for eased relations. Henry Kissinger defined *détente* as "a mode of management of adversary power." Thus, for him *détente* is the outcome of effective and deliberate management of the opponent in the interest of relaxation of tension.

Coral Bell's analysis of *détente* underlines relaxation not only between Soviet Union and the United States, but also between these two Powers and China. She says that if it takes two to make a quarrel, it takes two or three to maintain *détente*. "I propose to look at *détente* as an American diplomatic strategy consciously deployed within a triangular power balance, *vis-à-vis.* both China and the United States." Further, according to Bell, "*détente* with China was a more notable achievement than the *détente* with the United States", because "level of tension with China had been far higher ... than with the United States."

In the context of Cold War, *détente* was used to mean, "to slacken the tension." Brezhnev explained the meaning of *détente* (1977) thus: "Détente means first of all overcoming the Cold War and then a transition to normal, stable relations among states. Détente means willingness to resolve differences and disputes not by force, not by threats and saber rattling, but by peaceful means at the conference table. Détente means a certain trust and the ability to consider each other's legitimate interests." This long quotation from Brezhnev's statement explains very lucidly how *détente* meant a situation of transition from Cold War to normal and stable relations among states. When Kissinger talks of management of adversary power he implies that *détente* is a mode of living with or offsetting the adversary power.

D.K.Simes in his *Détente and Conflict* says that as defence was the primary need of USSR, it used both cooperation and conflict as tools of security. This is the essence of *détente* as practised during the reduced tension phase of the Cold War. Commenting on the international situation in 1976, George Kennan had said: "In this complicated world there could be no international relationship which was one of total antagonism or total identity of interest." President Nixon of the United States (1969-74) has been described as "the author of *détente*". This is more appropriate in connection with US-China relations. It was Nixon who ensured expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from the United Nations and secured representation of the People's Republic of China in the world body. It is he who sought an end to the Vietnam War. Therefore, conscious efforts were made to ease the tension for eventual end of the Cold War.

9.3.2 PTBT and NPT

The Cuban Missile Crisis had convinced world leaders that it had the "potential" of a Third World war. Both the Super Powers were convinced by that time, that a nuclear war would be

fatal for both of them. It was realised that wisdom was a better part of valour. The Cuban Crisis had demonstrated the need for swift contacts between American and Soviet leaders to avoid recurrence of similar crises. A hot line was, therefore, installed to link Washington with Moscow. It would enable direct contact between leaders of two powers when time was of essence.

In the post-1962 period a number of agreements were concluded and several contacts established to ease the tension. One such agreement was the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). It was signed in July 1963 by Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. Negotiations for test ban were carried out since 1955. The Cuban Crisis hastened the agreement. The nuclear tests were causing serious damage to the environment and threat to humankind. The Partial Test Ban Treaty banned all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, on the ground and under water including the high seas. But, it proved impossible to agree on a control system to ban underground testing. Thus, underground testing and nuclear weapons manufacturing continued. But, the three Powers who originally signed the treaty agreed to limit the possession of nuclear weapons to the "bare minimum". France refused to sign the treaty. By 1964 China had exploded its first bomb, and it also refused to sign the treaty. In spite of Partial Test Ban Treaty, France and China continued with their tests in the atmosphere. The continued French nuclear testing in the Pacific region even in 1995 caused grave anxiety.

In 1968, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed by UK, USA, and USSR. It was ratified and enforced in 1970. The nuclear powers promised to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and nuclear technology to countries not having them, and the non-nuclear Powers, in turn, promised not to accept or develop such weapons. France and China did not sign the NPT for many years. It was only in 1992 that China signed the NPT. India has not signed it on the ground that it is discriminatory. It allowed the nuclear powers to retain the weapons, but barred other countries from developing them. India is willing to sign only a non-discriminatory NPT.

9.3.3 Process of Normalisation

The central element in the policy of *détente* was normalisation in Europe. The tension began to ease towards the end of 1960s. The most significant was the problem of two Germanys and of Berlin. The change of West German government in 1969 helped in relaxation of tension. Under the chancellorship of Willy Brandt, West Germany initiated *Ostpolitik*. This German word is used to indicate a 'policy for the East'. Brandt government renewed normal relations with Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. Treaties with USSR and Poland were concluded in 1970. Other agreements were finalised in 1971-72. Both German states recognised each other and were recognised by the Super Powers. To begin with, West Germany tried to extend relations with countries of Eastern Europe. The United States and West Germany by their treaty of August 1970 promised not to use violence to alter the existing boundaries in Europe. This was a major concession by West Germany, which had always maintained that these boundaries were not final.

The four-power agreement on Berlin was concluded in 1971. Neither East nor West abandoned its formal position on Berlin, yet many complicated questions were sought to be regulated. Access to West Berlin from West Germany was approved by providing easier rail, road and water communication, and West Berlin was recognised as a part of Federal Republic. The access of the residents of West Berlin to East Berlin and East Germany was improved. However, the Berlin Wall remained intact as dividing line between two parts of Berlin.

Several East-West summits were held during the period of *détente*. US president Kennedy and the Soviet leader Khrushchev had met only once in Vienna in 1961. Similarly, president

Johnson and prime minister Kosygin met once at Glassboro in 1967. During 1970s summits became annual feature. The biggest success was Nixon's visit to Moscow in 1972, where a number of agreements were signed. One of these agreements was: "The Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." In 1973, the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war was also concluded.

The efforts made by Nixon administration, and particularly the steps taken by secretary of state Kissinger eased the tension between United States and China. Kissinger paid a secret visit to China in 1971. On 26 October 1971, People's Republic of China was allowed representation in the United Nations, and Taiwan was expelled. As Coral Bell says, this part of *détente* was more important because there was much greater conflict between the United States and China than between the Super Powers. In fact US-China *détente* did not normalise relations between the two largest communist countries—China and USSR. After China was allowed representation in the UN, president Nixon himself visited that country in February 1972 and helped in the relaxation of US-China tension. With continued 'Cold War' between China and the USSR, a third pole appeared to be vaguely emerging in the international system.

9.3.4 Helsinki Conference

The Cold War had subsided when on the first day of annual session of UN General Assembly in 1973 both the Germanys were admitted. The famous Helsinki Summit of 35 countries in 1975, and the signing of its Final Act, was regarded, for the time being, as burying the Cold War. Lundestad refers to achievements of the Helsinki Conference as a symbolic culmination of *detente* in Europe. The principal concern of West European countries in 1970s in the field of security was to combine the Western alliance (with USA) with the improved relations with the Soviet Union. Improvement in relations meant a more relaxed mood, more cultural and commercial and personal exchanges, and a reduction in the forces deployed by both sides. The Soviet Union also had similar aims. The USSR proposed a European Security Conference. The West European countries agreed to attend the Conference provided the United States and Canada also participated in it. The Conference met at Helsinki (Finland) between 1972 and 1975. The deliberation lasted in all about 15 months and resulted in the signing of Helsinki Final Act. 35 countries attended this European Conference on Security and Cooperation (ECSC), including 33 European nations, Canada and the United States. Albania was the only European country, which did not attend the Conference. Those who attended were from both the Power Blocs as well as Yugoslavia, the non-aligned.

The apparent aim of the Soviet Union was to secure general endorsement of the post-Second World War frontiers of the European nations, and secondly, to discuss the security issues. The approach of the Western Bloc countries, to begin with, according to Peter Calvocoressi, was "a mixture of boredom and cynicism." But, later they tried to achieve maximum concessions from the USSR. The West and non-aligned insisted that the European frontiers could not be declared final, but the Conference declared that they should not be altered by force. The Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975 by all the 35 countries, contained declarations not legally binding, yet formal and normative. The Final Act contained ten principles. These were: (i) sovereign equality of all nations; (ii) respect of rights of all, implied in national sovereignty; (iii) neither to use nor threaten the use of force; (iv) inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of states; (v) peaceful settlement of international disputes; (vi) non-interference in the internal affairs of each other; (vii) freedom of expression and of faith and worship and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; (viii) equality and people's right of self-determination; (ix) cooperation among states; and (x) observance of responsibilities implied in international law. The Final Act established certain principles for economic and cultural cooperation. The participants promised

to promote basic **human rights** and contacts across the national borders were to be made easier. The critics pointed out that the USSR and East European countries had failed to abide by their promises.

9.3.5 New Cold War

The process of *détente* was at its peak at the time of Helsinki Conference, 1975. But after that it lost its momentum. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union again became so sore that by 1980 it appeared that the Cold War had come back. The new tension came to be described as the New Cold War. It was visible when Soviet armed forces intervened and occupied Afghanistan in December 1979. USSR was willing to accept *status quo* in Europe, but not elsewhere. America's disappointment over new conflicts in Indo-China, Horn of Africa and Afghanistan, gave ammunition to those who had opposed cooperation with the Soviet Union. Conflicts outside Europe now assumed greater significance than before.

Even when *détente* was at its peak Soviet paper *Pravda* wrote: "The Soviet Union will continue to rebuff any aggressive attempts by the forces of imperialism and render extensive help to the patriots of Angola... Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa..." In 1976, Soviet Communist Party chief Brezhnev said in the 27th Party Congress that, "*détente* does not in the slightest way abolish or change the laws of the class struggle. We do not conceal the fact that we see *détente* as a way to create more favourable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction."

The Soviet Union became more active in the export of armaments. Normally, American weapon exports had been much greater than those of the Soviet Union. This trend changed and the two Powers openly competed in arms sale. By early 1980s, the Soviet Union was responsible for a little over 30 per cent of the world's arm exports, whereas US share was slightly less than 30 per cent. By 1977, in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia had changed to a more pro-Soviet policy; Somalia was drifting towards the United States. The Soviet plans for a socialist federation of Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti were turned down. Soviet influence had increased in South Yemen since the British left in 1967. In February 1979 the South invaded North Yemen. Despite substantial assistance given by USSR to South, the latter tried to maintain normal relations with North Yemen also. The United States offered to send supplies and advisers to North. USA cooperated with Saudi Arabia in criticising the Soviet Union. Even radical Arab countries spoke out against the invasion. A cease-fire was declared, but the guerilla combat continued until 1982.

In Indo-China, Soviet Union backed Vietnam whereas the latter's relation with China was strained. Pol Pot regime of Cambodia was being backed by China. But, it was perhaps the most brutal regime that the world had seen since 1945. In January 1979 Vietnam, with Soviet backing, attacked Cambodia and deposed the Pol Pot regime. But, Vietnamese action was certainly a violation of sovereignty of a neighbour. Once again many people in the West spoke of Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Kampuchia). In February 1979 China marched its troops into Vietnam. The war went badly for China and it withdrew its troops after some time. But, it showed serious tension between China, USSR and the West.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had resulted in stationing of over 90,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The Soviet armies stayed on for nearly nine years. It was only in 1988 that Gorbachev realised the futility of continued occupation of an unwilling people. Large numbers of Afghans had, meanwhile, fled to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan where they were trained as guerrillas. Throughout Soviet occupation, and even afterwards, internal fighting became a normal feature and peace kept evading the war-torn country.

When the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan (1989), the power was transferred to the non-communist leadership, which had been fighting for removal of the "Soviet invaders." Dr. Najibullah, the pro-Soviet president, who had replaced Babrak Karmal three years earlier, agreed to transfer the power in accordance with the Geneva Agreement (1988) concluded between various parties interested in ending the Afghan crisis.

The New Cold War was also reflected in not so successful SALT talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both the countries got busy in the development of neutron bomb, and their rivalry in Indian Ocean area threatened the peace of this region. After the arrival of Gorbachev on the scene (1985) with his determination to reform the Soviet society and polity and reduce tension in the world, Cold War began once again moving towards fresh *détente* and finally ended on the eve of Soviet disintegration.

During the New Cold War, the conflict had been virtually in three blocs—the US Bloc, the Soviet Bloc and the Chinese Bloc. Interestingly, a "non-aligned" Pakistan was virtually aligned both with China and the United States. India was already very close to the Soviet Union. The New Cold War was different from the old Cold War in regard to the area of conflict. Europe was the main theatre of the first Cold War; now it was essentially outside Europe that the New Cold War was being witnessed. It was either Afghanistan, or Arab-Israel conflict, or the trouble in the Horn of Africa, or the clash in Indo-China. The New Cold War was thus global in nature. Another area of conflict during the New Cold War was the Indian Ocean. The Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean was threatening the peace in the region. During the New Cold War, as in the Cold War, struggle was witnessed in the United Nations also.

9.4 THE COLD WAR ENDS

The Cold War had begun at a time when the Allies, including the United States and USSR, had successfully defeated the Nazi Germany and her Axis partners. The world had expected lasting friendship among the victors when they split and formed two hostile camps. The Cold War ended (1990) at a time when the conqueror man had come to live with it and it was expected that (despite ups and downs and *détente*) the East-West conflict would become permanent. When the Cold War suddenly ended, the Western Bloc had not expected 'victory' and the Eastern Bloc was still dreaming of self-destruction of capitalism. The end of the Cold War came under "the aegis of two rather improbable collaborators"—Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. The American president had been elected to reaffirm the traditional values of American exceptionalism. He was expected to continue to contain communism, not to defeat it. He represented the "right" in the US society. Gorbachev was determined to reinvigorate what he considered a superior soviet ideology. Reagan and Gorbachev both believed in the ultimate victory of their side. Henry Kissinger compared the two men and concluded that while "Reagan understood the mainsprings of his society, whereas Gorbachev had completely lost touch with his society." But, the trouble erupted when Soviet president Gorbachev could not fulfill his dream of a free and democratic system in the former Soviet Union. He precipitated the demise of the system he represented by demanding reform of which it proved incapable.

9.4.1 Reagan and Gorbachev

At the time when Reagan had begun his administration (1981) American prestige was going down rapidly. Americans had failed in Vietnam and retreated from Angola. The Soviet Union by extraordinary surge of expansion had managed to spread Cuban military forces from Angola to Ethiopia in tandem with thousands of Soviet combat advisers. Afghanistan had been occupied by over 90,000 Soviet troops. The pro-West Iranian government of the Shah Pehlvi had

collapsed and was replaced by radically anti-American Islamic regime, which seized 52 Americans as hostages in the US embassy at Tehran. At that moment of US weakness (which saw defeat of sitting president Carter), communism was all ready to hit hard and it appeared that communist momentum might sweep all before it. But, Gorbachev's reforms misfired and all his good intentions proved futile. The entire Eastern Bloc collapsed like a pack of cards as Soviet Union itself disintegrated in 1991. No world power had ever disintegrated so totally or so rapidly without losing a war.

Henry Kissinger, in his work *Diplomacy*, has described Reagan as a president who hardly had any knowledge of history and that destiny helped him to win the Cold War. The details of foreign policy bored Reagan. "He had absorbed a few basic ideas about the dangers of appeasement, the evils of communism, and the greatness of his own country, but analysis of substantive issues was not his forte." Kissinger pays tribute to his speechwriters. Reagan had a wish to take Gorbachev on a tour of the United States so that he could see how people were happy in a capitalist system. The workers would tell him how wonderful it was to live in America. Reagan believed that it was his duty to see that Gorbachev recognised that communist philosophy was an error.

Meanwhile, Reagan had pledged US support to anti-Communist insurgents who sought to overthrow Soviet-supported governments in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua. In addition, American leaders had been speaking of "win-ability" of nuclear war by a threat of "first use" of nuclear weapons in a conventional war. In 1985, Soviet leader Gorbachev summarised the tense situation (in view of Afghan crisis) by saying: "The situation is very complex, very tense. I would even go so far as to say it is explosive." However, the situation did not explode. Gorbachev decided on his "new thinking" in order to relax the tension. He tried to reconcile the Soviet Union's differences with the capitalist West, in order to check the deterioration of his country's economy. Gorbachev emphasised "the need for a fundamental break with many customary approaches to foreign policy." During his visit to the US in 1987, to sign the INF Treaty, Gorbachev accepted that there were serious differences between two Super Powers, yet, he said: "Wisdom of politics today lies in not using those differences as a pretext for confrontation, enmity and arms race." An aide of Gorbachev, Georgi Arbator told the Americans that, "we are going to do a terrible thing to you—we are going to deprive you of an enemy." Within next two years, the two countries ceased to be enemies, and brought the Cold War to an end.

9.4.2 INF Treaty

Reagan had also dreamt of freeing the world from the fear of nuclear war. He and Gorbachev worked hard, met at summit level four times in four years and finally concluded a treaty to destroy certain types of intermediate level ballistic missiles. At one stage (at Reykjavik: Iceland, 1986) the two leaders agreed to reduce all strategic forces by 50 per cent within five years and to destroy all ballistic missiles within ten years. Reagan had almost accepted the Soviet offer to abolish nuclear weapons altogether. But, what would happen if other nuclear powers did not go along. The Reykjavik deal failed at the last moment because of Gorbachev's insistence that US should give up its star wars project. The US was not willing to accept this condition.

Finally, it was agreed in 1987 to destroy Soviet and American intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles. This paved the way for an understanding between the two Super Powers, which in turn contributed to the end of Cold War.

Mikhail Gorbachev enjoyed unprecedented power and prestige in the Soviet Union. Yet, he was destined to "preside over the demise of the empire built with so much blood and pressure."

When he assumed office in 1985, Gorbachev was the leader of a nuclear Super Power, which was in a state of economic decay. When he lost power in 1991, the Soviet army had thrown its support behind his rival Boris Yeltsin, the Communist Party had been declared illegal and the 'empire', which had been assembled after so much of bloodshed, by every Russian ruler since Peter the Great, had disintegrated. Gorbachev led one of the most significant revolutions of his time. He destroyed the Communist party, which had controlled every aspect of Soviet life. The country disintegrated and Gorbachev was blamed for the debacle of his reforms Glasnost and Perestroika. Despite ultimate debacle, Gorbachev deserves the credit for being willing to face the Soviet Union's dilemma. He knew that it would take a long time for Soviet Union to reach a level of industrialisation that could even remotely be regarded competitive with the capitalist world. So he tried to gain time, and attempted a major reassessment of Soviet foreign policy. He worked hard to reach agreement with America in nuclear missiles, and to end the Cold War and succeeded in both.

The United States was determined since 1947 to contain communism. It, however, did not know that it would be able to defeat communism in the country of its origin. Kissinger pays unique tribute to George Kennan (US diplomat in Moscow in 1947). He says: "The ending of the Cold War...was much as George Kennan had foreseen in 1947." The Soviet system had needed a permanent outside enemy to sustain itself. When the Twenty Seventh Congress of Communist Party led by Gorbachev, changed the policy from co-existence to interdependence, the moral basis for Cold War had ended. Gorbachev had ended domestic repression. So, as Kennan had predicted, the Soviet people who had been reared on discipline and total obedience, turned overnight in the free and democratic environment from one of the strongest to "one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies."

As far as America was concerned Kennan's policy of containment had paid rich dividends, though for over 40 years tension and strife had dominated international relations. If America had not organised resistance, the communist parties in Europe and elsewhere would have easily prevailed. The way the Cold War ended, the Americans took credit for what they called "victory". Americans also claim that the United States had preserved the global equilibrium and, therefore, the peace of the world

In the post-Cold War world there have been, and are, many crises, but no overriding ideological challenge to the United States. Chinese Communist rulers have opted for liberalisation, though in their own style. China is no more an ideological challenge to the United States, the former being People's Republic notwithstanding. There are emerging economic competitors, Germany and Japan; and Russia is still a nuclear power and can pose a challenge to American superiority. Almost every situation in post-Cold War period is a special case. Circumstances helped the United States to prevail in the Cold War. But, it may not be very easy for her to dominate the expected multi-polar world of the 21st Century.

9.4.3 Peace Process in West Asia

Ever since Israel was created in 1948, the Palestinians in particular and Arabs in general adopted hostile attitude towards the Jewish State. The Birth of Israel had uprooted large number of Palestinians who were forced to live as displaced persons out of their homeland. The hostility was so intense that Israel on one side and one or more Arab countries on the other, fought four wars in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, but Israel could not be humbled. In fact every time Israel came to occupy several neighbouring territories namely the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights. Jerusalem, the holy place of Christians, Jews and Muslim was now fully controlled by Israel. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) under the leadership of Yasser Arafat

was recognised by many of Eastern Bloc and Third World countries, including India. The West was fully committed to Israel, which had been in a belligerent mood. In the context of Cold War, Israel was the principal Western outpost in the Middle East, whereas the Soviets and the Arab World supported Palestinians.

The peace process in the West Asian conflict was finally initiated by the United States. An agreement concluded at Camp David in 1978, in the presence of president Carter, opened the doors for normalisation of relations. The agreement signed by the then president of Egypt and prime minister of Israel enabled the two hostile neighbours to work for peace. Earlier, president Anwar Sadaat of Egypt had taken the unusual step of visiting Israel in a bid to put an end to unnecessary hostility. After the Camp David agreement, both in Egypt and Israel several hard-liners began stiff opposition. Anwar Sadaat himself was assassinated by an Egyptian. But, the peace process thus initiated was not halted by his successor president Mubarak. Sinai that had been under Israeli occupation was eventually returned to Egypt.

After decades of hostility both PLO and Israel realised the need of living in peace. Finally, in 1993 Israel and PLO concluded an agreement in a bid to find a lasting solution to the problem. Certain concessions were promised by Israel so that Palestinian self-rule could be established in parts of occupied territory. It may take some more time for normalcy to be established but the peace process that has been initiated points towards a better future for Arab-Israel-PLO relations.

9.4.4 The Fall of Berlin Wall and the Reunification of Germany

One of the first developments of the end of Cold War was reunification of Germany. The wall that was built to separate East Berlin from the West was constructed at the Soviet initiative, but was strongly resented by people living on either side. Families and friends were forcibly separated simply because they were living in two different parts of the city. People from East were not allowed even to visit ailing relatives on the other side. At times, persons trying to go to the other side, without authority, were shot. Economic conditions in the two Germanys were vastly different as also was the politics. FRG or West Germany, had become a highly industrialised prosperous country. It was even in a position to give aid to many Third World countries. East Germany (GDR), on the other hand, though committed to socialism, had not been able to achieve economic prosperity. As soon as US-Soviet relations became normal, strong desire for union of two Germanys was expressed in all quarters. The Berlin Wall was first to be pulled down (1989) with so much enthusiasm that the end of Cold War could be easily noticed. Negotiations were initiated between the two countries—one was a member of NATO, and the other of Warsaw Pact (which has since been abolished). After the fall of Berlin Wall, the next step taken in 1990 was to introduce West German currency in the East also. Finally, the two Germanys were reunited. The chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany was chosen as head of the government of unified country, which adopted market economy and Western type of democratic system. Thus, while the division of Germany in 1940s marked the beginning of bitterness of Cold War, the unification was an outcome symbolic of the end of Cold War.

9.5 GULF WAR AND EAST-WEST COOPERATION

As the East-West Conflict, called the Cold War, ended in December 1989, the international community was faced with a new crisis. On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded the neighbouring tiny, but oil rich, Kuwait. Within hours, Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait as the Emir (ruler) of the small Arab country fled. Kuwait was annexed into Iraq as its nineteenth province. The UN authorised

the US-led military action and liberated Kuwait in February 1991. This Gulf War II (the first being Iran-Iraq war fought earlier for several years) turned out to be an example of East-West cooperation in the post-Cold War world.

In less than six hours of commencement of invasion, America had made its position clear. The White House condemned Iraq's invasion and called for "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces." But, the US had not made up its mind on the nature of action to be taken. The next day president Bush said: "We are not ruling any options in, but we are not ruling any options out." Bush did not say anything about the use of force for the simple reason that he did not know whether he would have to use force.

The UN Security Council debated the issue of Iraqi invasion, and the subsequent annexation of Kuwait. Meanwhile, Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decreed on 8 August 1990 the annexation of Kuwait "in a comprehensive, eternal and inseparable merger." Kuwait was made nineteenth province of Iraq.

From the time Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August, hectic diplomatic and other activities were initiated to pressurise Iraq to vacate Kuwait. Saudi Arabia was among the main critics of Iraq. On 16 August, Iraq took thousands of foreigners—British, French, Americans and Japanese—as hostages; on 21 September 1990 Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) called upon the people to be prepared for "the mother of all battles." By that time Iraq had about 4,30,000 troops in the south and in Kuwait. As the UN decided to impose economic sanctions Iraq threatened to attack Saudi oil fields, unfriendly Arab countries and Israel. The inevitability of UN authorised war against Iraq was evident by mid-November 1990.

As there were no signs of Iraq's compliance with the Security Council resolutions, the United States went about building a coalition of countries who were opposed to Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. While most of the 28 countries contributed to military build-up against Iraq in support of UN resolutions and to use force, if necessary, only six were actively involved in the war against Iraq. These were: the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, France, Egypt and Syria. The war that took place from 17 January to 28 February 1991 was generally a trial of strength between Iraq and the United States. On the other side, Iraq was supported by Jordan, Yemen and the PLO diplomatically, political and economically, but none fought on the side of Iraq.

The Soviet Union, faced with growing troubles at home, had joined the coalition and fully supported the UN resolutions and the US determination to expel Iraq from Kuwait; but refused to participate in a military build-up in the Gulf or join the war against Iraq; and made a high-profile attempt to mediate between the two conflicting sides. The Soviet Union was aware of likely repercussions among the Muslim Republics of USSR in case it actively engaged itself in the hostilities. Besides, it had been giving massive aid to Iraq for two decades, and the Gulf was too closely situated to the then Soviet territory.

For most Arab countries Iraq's action had created a dilemma—how to respond to the destruction of sovereignty of one of the Arab League members by another. To support Iraq would mean undermining the core principle of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. To support the US against Iraq would mean letting down a fellow Arab State. Therefore, most of them either remained neutral or expressed rhetoric sympathy either with Iraq or the coalition. Meanwhile, after all the efforts of the Soviet Union had failed to bring about a diplomatic solution and liberation of Kuwait, it agreed to support Security Council Resolution No. 678 which called upon Iraq to vacate Kuwait by 30 November 1990 failing which use of force could be resorted to (compel it to vacate the aggression).

The US-led 28 nation coalition convened military action against Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait on 17 January 1991 at 2.40 a.m. (Gulf Time). The Gulf War II was fought in two phases. From 17 January to 23 February it was limited to aerial bombardment of strategic targets in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. The aerial action was supported by naval action by the coalition forces. The ground action began on 24 February and by 28 February 1991 Iraq was defeated and Kuwait was liberated. Iraqi president Saddam Hussain, in a desperate move, tried to change the Gulf War into Arab-Israel conflict, but failed totally. For weeks, Scud missile attacks were made on Israel by Iraq. The idea was that when Israel would retaliate, the Arab world would be called upon to fight against the Jewish State. That would make the position of Egypt and Saudi Arabia very difficult. Despite prolonged provocation, Israel did not retaliate. Israel was repeatedly requested by the United States not to get dragged in the war.

Meanwhile, the Soviet president Gorbachev's diplomatic efforts continued unsuccessfully. Saddam Hussain had said that once the ground fighting began Americans would have to swim in their own blood, and that the Vietnam War would be forgotten as picnic. But, within four days of ground action Iraq accepted defeat, Kuwait was liberated and Al Sabah was restored as its Emir. This crisis was the first soon after the formal end of Cold War, but before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This war was a unique example of East-West Cooperation, putting an end to the politics of the Cold War era.

9.6 PEACEFUL END OF THE COLD WAR

The world had become so used to the Cold War politics for nearly forty-five years that when it suddenly ended, the people could hardly believe that the world was now a different place. The end of Cold War had coincided with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, fall of the Berlin Wall, reunification of Germany and establishment of democratic regimes in erstwhile socialist countries. Gorbachev succeeded in concluding the INF Treaty with the United States, and ending the Cold War. He introduced several economic and political reforms in the USSR, but could not take them to their logical conclusion. As the former Communist, Boris Yeltsin got elected as president of Russia, the authority of Soviet president began to be eroded. While several Republics of USSR began demanding secession, and Congress of People's Deputies conceded the demand for multi-party democracy in the USSR, conservative Communists "removed" Gorbachev in August 1991. But, Yeltsin, fearing his own fall, rallied behind detained Gorbachev and the short-lived conservative coup failed. But, "rescued" Gorbachev was unable to hold the country together. It disintegrated in December 1991 into fifteen sovereign countries. Thus, the end of Cold War not only terminated communist regimes in Eastern Europe, but also brought demise to once mighty Super Power, the Soviet Union.

The failed coup of August 1991 against Gorbachev was said to have "put the nail in the coffin of Communist Party control in Moscow." With the retreat of Communism, massive changes swept the post-Cold War world politics. Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf concluded thus: "The abrupt end of the Cold War suggested something quite different from the lesson of two World Wars that great powers rivalries are doomed to end in armed conflict. The Cold War was different; it came to an end peacefully. This suggests that great powers are capable of settling their struggles without bloodshed, and that it is sometimes possible for them to manage their competition and resolve their disputes."

In an article written in 1994, Robert D. Schulzinger wrote about the end of Cold War. He wrote: "Now that the Cold War has ended, the historical postmortems have just begun. The ocean of original documents from US government archives has now been augmented by rivers flowing from previously closed Soviet and Eastern European depositories." According to Gaddie, those

who praise the conduct of American foreign policy believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union validates the actions of US officials and makes the costs of the Cold War worthwhile. But, the critics of US diplomacy claimed that the Cold War might have ended sooner, at less cost, had the United States pursued more creative and less confrontational policies.

There were many in the West who felt that the American Bloc had won the Cold War. Their argument is reflected in the following comment of Matthew Evangelista, in his book *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War*. He wrote: "An important ingredient of the conservative mythology distilled from the 1980s is that Ronald Reagan's "hard line" was the vital element in the collapse of the Soviet empire and the "winning" of the Cold War. Running up a 3-trillion dollar deficit in military spending and creating a specter of "Star Wars" were said to be part of a shrewd strategy designed to force the USSR into bankruptcy in its efforts to compete militarily."

Discussing the end of Cold War, Joshua S. Goldstein concludes that it was very difficult to state categorically as to why the Cold War ended. He wrote: "Scholars do not agree on the important question of why the Cold War ended. One line of argument holds that US military strength under President Reagan forced the Soviet Union into bankruptcy as it tried to keep up in the arms race." Another argument, according to Goldstein, is that the Soviet Union suffered from internal stagnation over a number of decades and ultimately imploded because of weaknesses in its system of governance that had little to do with external pressure. However, these and many other arguments advanced by Western scholars highlight only as to why the Soviet Union fell apart. As students of international relations we should be pleased with the fact that the 45-year old conflict between East and West ended, that too peacefully.

The end of Cold War was peaceful and without mass destruction. How did it happen? There are different interpretations of such a peaceful end of the Cold War. One view was that the policies that US diplomat George Kennan had suggested, while recommending containment of communism in his famous article signed "X", now appeared prophetic. Kennan had anticipated that the non-military containment would "promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up of or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." Many observers believed that this is what precisely happened, though it took more than forty years.

Another view was expressed by the Neo-realists. They emphasised the contribution of nuclear weapons, the essence of military power, rigid bipolarity, and extended deterrence through alliances. In 1991, an advisor to former US president Reagan, Richard Pipes expressed the Neo-realist view in his contention: "Those who argued for nuclear deterrence and serious military capabilities contributed mightily to the position of strength that eventually led the Soviet leadership to choose a less bellicose, less menacing approach to international politics."

Liberals and Neo-liberals mention other reasons for peaceful end of the Cold War. For example, Ted Galen Carpenter observed in 1991: "Many of the demonstrators... who sought to reject communist rule looked at the American system for inspiration. But the source of that inspiration was America's reputation as a heaven for the values of limited government, not Washington's 300 billion dollar a year military budget and its network of global military bases." Yet Georgi Arbator, Director of the Soviet Union's Institute for the USA and Canada Studies, expressed another view. He argued that the Realist theory "that President Reason's 'tough' policy and intensified arms race... persuaded communists to 'give up', is sheer nonsense. On the contrary, this policy made the life for reformers, for all who yearned for democratic changes in their life, much more difficult. The Conservatives and reactionaries were given predominant influence... Reagan made it practically impossible to start reforms after Brezhnev's death...and made things more difficult for Gorbachev to cut military expenditures."

The **fact** that the Cold War ended peacefully **may** not be easy to explain with reference to theories like those of Realists, Neo-realists, Liberals or Neo-liberals. Just as scholars debated the causes of origin of Cold War **for** decades, the reasons for orderly and peaceful end of the Cold War may intrigue the scholars for decades. The world was saved of possible nuclear disaster, and bloc politics gave way to understanding and cooperation. The two top leaders of Super Powers showed courage, wisdom and statesmanship when they decided to reduce intermediate range nuclear weapons, and initiate talks for strategic **arms** reduction. Credit must be given both to the United States and the Soviet Union for realising the **futility** of continued Cold War. While perfect cooperation is never possible among nations, total conflict was undesirable and the idea behind **peaceful** end of the Cold War was to **co-exist** peacefully despite differences in their outlook and approach. **Theorising** may not necessarily explain the reasons for **peaceful** conclusion of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War altered the **nature** of international relations. It held out the promise of **international** peace, but at the **same** time raised the possibility of new kinds of **global** instability. As president George Bush Sr. lamented in 1991: "The collapse of communism has thrown open a **Pandora's** box of **ancient ethnic** hatreds, resentment, even revenge." This was reflected in the eruption of ethnic flare-up in erstwhile Yugoslavia and even the pockets of Russian Federation.

With the end of the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves liberated from a rivalry **that** had extracted enormous resources and reduced their economic strength relative to other ascending great powers, **such as China, Germany** and Japan. In **this** sense, according to Lebow and Stein (1994) both the Super Powers "lost". Both were caught breathless.

9.6.1 indications for the Future

The developments related to the post-Cold War period are not within the scope of this Unit. However, some indications towards possible future may be briefly mentioned **here**. According to Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf "The **peaceful** end of Cold War does not ensure a peaceful future. On the contrary, the insights of long-cycle and realist theories predict pessimistically that prevailing trends in the **diffusion** of economic power will lead to renewed competition, conflict, and perhaps even warfare among the great powers, and that the range of new problems and potential threats will multiply." This prediction is indeed too pessimistic. Nevertheless, nothing can be said with certainty because any **environmental** change can occur at any time. By the early 21st Century not only had Germany and Japan become **economic** giants, but also a small country like South Korea was aggressively **moving ahead** in the direction of becoming an **economic** power.

Besides, India and Pakistan had become nuclear powers with the threat of intentional or accidental use of nuclear bomb by Pakistan looming large. India, with its rapidly **liberalising economy** and growing strength in the field of **information technology**, was surely **moving** towards the status of a major player in **international** relations. Hence, the post-Cold War world need not necessarily be **assumed** to be a guarantee for 50 years peace. To conclude, we may agree with Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf. They argue: "In the long run, Russia could again emerge as a super-power if it overcomes its long-neglected **domestic** problems. Lying in the heartland of Eurasia, a bridge between Europe and the Pacific Rim, with China and India to the South, Russia stands militarily tall..." However, the present Russia, or for that matter **no** other country appears to pose a serious challenge to the American **hegemonic** leadership.

9.7 SUMMARY

In order to properly understand **the** end of the Cold War, it is essential to have some idea about the Cold War—what was the Cold War, how it began and why it began. Therefore, in this Unit, you have read about the **meaning and** origin of the Cold War. It was a "diplomatic war", fought not on the battlefields, but in the minds of men. The armed forces did not participate in the Cold War; only the diplomatic actions maintained high degree of tension between the East and West, which means the Soviet Bloc **and** the American Bloc respectively. Soon after the Second World War, the erstwhile friends and allies turned into the foes. Two power blocs were soon formed led by the two Super Powers. **Both** sides blamed each other for **the** Cold War. Nobody knows the exact date of the commencement of Cold War.

There were periods of acute conflict **and** also periods of relative calm and cooperation. The easing of tension was termed as *détente*. Following the **most** serious crisis of Cuba, efforts were initiated for *détente*, **which** saw the signing of PTBT and NPT. The Final Act of Helsinki, 1975 created hopes of ending the Cold War, but it erupted again around 1979, particularly with the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces.

The hope of terminating the Cold War was again expressed in the efforts made by US presidents Ford, Reagan and finally George Bush on the one side, and Brezhnev **and** president Gorbachev on the other. Numerous factors were responsible for ending the Cold War. Gorbachev's attempts for internal **reforms** in the Soviet Union, as also the efforts of the two sides to curtail their nuclear weapons (INF Treaty of 1987) and to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons, besides other factors, contributed to the end of the Cold War. .

The rapid collapse of communist **regimes** in East European countries **combined** with the demand of several Union Republics of Soviet Union hastened the end of Cold War. Enthusiastic people of the city pulled down the wall that had divided East **and** West Berlin in 1989, and in 1990 the two Germanys were united saying farewell to socialist ideology. All this enabled the two Super Powers to reach out to each other.

The authority of Soviet president was eroded when he agreed to have multiparty **democracy** in the country, **and** when Boris Yeltsin was directly elected as the president of Russia and he challenged the Soviet president. Gorbachev's troubles were multiplied when a conservative **coup** was attempted and later when several Republics declared their independence. But, by that time Cold War had been formally declared to have ended by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev,

Different scholars expressed their different views **and** tried to theorise the peaceful end of the Cold War. Most of them—realists, neo-realists, neo-liberals, argued as to how different factors made for a peaceful **end of the** Cold War, **without** any mass destruction. Peaceful end of the Cold War raised doubts whether there would be lasting peace and a new world order or new power centres would **emerge** and challenge the **hegemonic** position of the United States.

9.8 EXERCISES

- 1) Trace the nature and origin of the Cold War.
- 2) Write a note **on** *détente*.
- 3) Describe briefly the **PTBT** and **NPT**.
- 4) Conunent briefly on the New Cold War.
- 5) Analyse the role of Reagan and Gorbachev in the **termination** of Cold War.
- 6) Write a note **on** INF Treaty?

UNIT 10 POST-COLD WAR ISSUES

Structure

- 10.1 Introduction
 - 10.2 Features of the Post-Cold War World
 - 10.2.1 Uni-polarity
 - 10.2.2 Challenges to Nation-State
 - 10.3 Changing Dimensions of Security
 - 10.4 Initiatives for Peace and Development
 - 10.4.1 Efforts for Peace
 - 10.4.2 Activities in Development
 - 10.5 Restructuring of the UN
 - 10.5.1 Composition of Security Council
 - 10.5.2 Development Bodies
 - 10.6 Summary
 - 10.7 Exercises
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10.1 INTRODUCTION

International politics is dynamic in nature, not static or frozen forever. As you may have noticed while watching television or reading newspapers, developments occur virtually on a day-to-day basis. Many of them are routine, whereas some are regarded as turning points with major consequences. The dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 are among the relevant examples. They become the defining moments for the study of international politics.

One such notable development was the end of the Cold War some 13 years ago, during 1989-90. You have already learnt in the previous Unit the process of the end to the Cold War. The end of the Cold War between the United States and the then Soviet Union marked an end to one era and the beginning of a new era affecting nearly every aspect of international relations. While the long persisting danger of direct military confrontation between the two superpowers has fizzled out with its welcome fall out in many spheres of world affairs, durable peace has remained a distant dream for much of the world. New threats to peace have emerged in a big way not only in the local theatres but also shaking the foundations of the human civilisation itself. The spin-offs from the advances in information and communication technologies have brought fortunes to a few, but reduced the bulk of world's poor countries and peoples to irretrievable destitute. States by themselves are unable to find answers, pointing to the need for enhanced framework for international cooperation. But ironically international organisations like the United Nations are facing the challenges of autonomy, accountability and effectiveness.

10.2 FEATURES OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

10.2.1 Uni-polarity

Some analysts believed that the post-Cold War scene marks the end of bipolarity, and the emergence of the United States as the powerhouse without any parallel or competition. That is to say that the world politics has tended to become uni-polar. The erstwhile enemy, the Soviet

Union is now an ally, a partner of the United States in matters of strategic arms control, security of the North Atlantic region, settlement of regional conflicts. Despite occasional tensions in political and economic policy preferences, Europe is nowhere near acquiring the will and the capability to challenge the United States power. China has achieved impressive economic progress after abandoning the socialist model long before the end of the Cold War, but follows pragmatism because of its limitations in matching the United States power.

The motley group of the Third World countries is in disarray. The Non-Aligned Movement seemed to become rudderless and irrelevant. With the collapse of socialist model in the Soviet Union, capitalist model has acquired nearly universal acceptance as never before. Many countries—Vietnam, Mongolia, India, Tanzania, Algeria and others have embraced free market ideology. Economies were liberalised to attract foreign/Western investment. The role of the International Monetary Fund has become a key instrument of the United States in supervising the adjustment process of these economies.

Victor in the Cold War has brought to the both admiration and fear. The US became the single remaining super Power pushing the Soviet Union to a subordinate status. To illustrate the preponderance of the United States position, it may be suffice to refer to the arms export scene. Although the value of arms exports nearly halved after the end of the Cold War, the United States has retained its dominant position as the foremost exporter to governments and groups. Its share in the arms export market is approximately two-thirds of the total value of arms exports by major producers including the former Soviet Union and China. The new power realities are nowhere demonstrated more poignantly than in the world body, the United Nations.

In fact; a remarkable feature of the post-Cold War scene is the new focus on the role of the United Nations in the preservation of peace and security. The important security-related organ, the Security Council earlier known for disagreements between the two superpowers, is transformed into an active agent for effective action, thanks to the collaboration among the five permanent members. Vetoes are no longer fashionable or even feasible because no permanent member could really afford a confrontation with the Untied States. With a few modifications, the US-initiated moves were approved. The role of the General Assembly, of the Secretary-General and other bodies too suffered at the hands of the Security Council. The Security Council in particular and the UN general came under the United States shadow.

10.2.2 Challenges to Nation State

Another important feature of the posr-Cold War times is the multiplicity of challenges the nation state has come under. As you may already know, state has been the chief—if not the only—actor on the stage of international politics. Since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) signalling the birth of nation state, statehood has become a strong aspiration of peoples all over the world struggling to establish their collective political identity. In the 20th Century, not only that many territories have gained the status of “nation states” but also existence of a society or system of such states is commonly taken as a given characteristic of the world order. Remarkably, the newly emerged states conferred a secular nationality on all inhabitants, without reference to differences in languages spoken, faiths followed, and ethnic background. In short, more states have become multi-nation states in composition and character. India, the United States, the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and indeed a large number of countries are multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-racial. In a way this was a colonial legacy. Territorial maps drawn by the colonial powers left many ethnic groups separated by international frontiers. And the 20th Century norms of inter-state conduct as enshrined in the United Nations Charter underwrite the principles of sanctity of territoriality of states and equality in their sovereign

status. By and large, the nation state enjoyed the safeguards of these principles until the end of the Cold War. However, state as the organising unit of people has come under unprecedented stress **after** the Cold War ended.

No doubt, the end of the Cold War worked to the advantage of a few states and they emerged territorially better defined. And, this was achieved in a bloodless **fashion**. The two **Germanys** and the two Yemens were unified **peacefully**. This is something to be only welcomed. On the other hand greatly worrying were the disintegration of the Soviet Union (although the geographical size of the Russia Federation as a successor state still remains large) into 14 independent countries in 1991 followed by the beginning of the brutal process of **Yugoslavia's** disintegration **on** ethnic lines. Soon Czechoslovakia followed the trend and was split into two. These developments are far too significant not to have reverberations elsewhere. Eritrea got independence from Ethiopia after a long denial of their "right to self-determination", although problems over border between the two are far from settled. **Bosnia-Herzegovina** (a new state that separated from Yugoslavia in a violent process) faced further strains of disintegration as the Serbs and Croats fought for separation. Groups demanding the right to self-determination raised their head in other countries as well.

In many more countries, the state authority appeared to be seriously challenged by the groups rebelling in civil wars against their **own governments**. Parts of territories were cut off from the administrative, political control of the **governments**. Civil **wars** in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Tajikistan and Zaire put the state on hold. In some cases the dissatisfied groups were fighting amongst themselves adding to lawlessness, if not collapse of state. Somalia in the early 1990s was the best-known example of a "failed state". Sierra Leone was an example in the late 1990s.

At the same time, **the** forces of globalisation touching upon the political, cultural and economic facets of our lives have tended to sideline the authority of state, especially in the developing countries. States in Latin America and East Asia, for example, have been completely swept off by the excesses of globalisation. Indonesia and Argentina are very prominent victims of the sudden **economic** collapse leading to considerable weakening of those states. Many backward states are caught in a bind: they need **external** financial flows, but they are in no position to regulate the **whimsical** flight of capital. The power of the Bretton Woods' institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and transnational corporations has overwhelmed, if not eroded, the authority of governments. Similarly, consumerism—as promoted through the media with global reach—is undercutting the cultural ethos of **many** weak countries. In the **political** field the emergence of the civil society comprising essentially the non-governmental organisations with active interest in human rights, environment, and development fields are also questioning the actions and policies of states with negative implications for their overall authority and standing.

10.3 CHANGING DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

In the post-Cold War era, there has been qualitative shift in the perceptions about threats to security. Traditionally external dimensions of security had preoccupied the attention of states and scholars alike. Security has almost always been associated with military aspects. **States**—both strong and the weak—sought to protect themselves **through** acquisition of weapons or association with military alliances **from** the dangers of aggression, territorial occupation and military intervention from outside. And of course as historical accounts show several armed conflicts occurred in various regions of the world during the period 1945-1990. In South Asia itself, **India** and Pakistan fought wars against each other thrice in 1948, 1965 and 1971. Although

invasions or intrusions across the recognised and well-established geographical lines occurred as in the Gulf (the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Pakistani intrusion in Kargil in 1999, and the border clash between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000), a qualitatively different trend has obtained in the post-Cold War era. More conflicts occurred within countries (dubbed as civil wars or intra-state conflicts) than conflicts between them. Nearly 90 per cent of the conflicts came under that category of civil wars. Afghanistan, Angola, Central African Republic, former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan are some of the countries badly affected by civil wars. That they are civil wars is a misnomer. They are truly uncivil, with reference to the reckless use of small arms (like AK-47s), hand grenades and landmines, which have brought misery to millions of unconnected and innocent men, women and children in the conflict theatres. Ethnic 'cleansing' (in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda), forcible use of children as soldiers, gang rapes of women have become integral to the ugly phenomenon of civil wars. As per estimates, innocent civilian losing life in these conflicts is approximately 95 per cent. In other words, the state-centric security during the Cold War era has now been replaced by the growing concerns about human security.

Besides separatism and ethnic nationalism, there are other problematic aspects related to domestic or internal security. Religious and racial intolerance is gaining destabilising potential in contemporary world affairs. Though religious extremism is commonly identified with Islam, it is not true that fundamentalism is confined to one religion alone. Many of these groups enjoy wide network of patronage transcending national boundaries extending into supply of military hardware and funds. This network is said to include also *mafia* connected with drug trafficking: arms dealing and money laundering. In other words, the internal disorder faced by many countries often has often cross-border linkages.

It is these linkages that made international terrorism the most dangerous aspect threatening security of not just one or the other state, but the system of states as a whole. *Al Qaeda* under the leadership of Osama bin Laden is one of the most feared terrorist organisations in the world today. We all are familiar with the daredevil attacks planned and organised allegedly by Osama bin Laden's followers against the World Trade Centre in New York and other locations in the United States on 11 September 2001. Although terrorism as a menace existed much before 11 September 2001, the incident demonstrated on the television screens how the mightiest power on earth was so easily shaken. In South Asia, India and Sri Lanka have been fighting terrorists for more than a decade. And now terrorism has spread its tentacles to other countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan in South Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia in Southeast Asia, Palestine, Lebanon and Egypt in West Asia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan in Africa, and so forth.

We must take note of one more emerging dimension of security. Apart from military threats to security, non-military threats have attracted more attention in the post-Cold War world. Matters associated with economic and financial stability, energy supplies, global warming and climate change resulting from environment degradation, human rights are now intertwined with security imperatives of states as well as the world community. Take for example the case of small island countries like Nauru, Kiribati that face the danger of submerging in the sea waters, because of the global climate change. Forest fires in Indonesia in the recent years have caused great concern in the neighbourhood. Droughts in Africa are caused by environmental degradation. Because of the economic liberalisation and privatisation in the era of globalisation, economies of most developing countries are slackening. Even a few countries that derived benefits from foreign capital found to their dismay how suddenly could their economies collapse. The case in point is the 1997 developments in Southeast Asia and East Asia. The economies of South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia have turned upside down with the flight of capital from these countries. The economic weakening has had its political fall out. The Suharto regime

had to quit for its failure to manage the economic crisis. Regimes are becoming insecure in Latin America too, because of their **economic** collapse. Only recently we have read about food riots in Argentina that led to collapse of government there. In **Africa** where a large number of least developed countries exist, the problem of indebtedness is acute. It has received no substantial foreign investment and has no scope for exports for generating resources for development. In fact, the economic factors underlie many of the strains the African societies are undergoing.

The climate of economic deprivation and political persecution has fuelled refugee flows to neighbouring and distant countries. There are nearly 20 million identified as refugees or internally displaced people. Countries are unwilling to welcome the asylum seekers because of the fear that they might **impinge** on their national security, while those who are sheltered have no great hope of returning home with honour. This sense of despondency has caused **turmoil** in Africa and elsewhere. In addition, there are those who enter foreign lands illegally engendering hate and suspicion **among** the natives. You may have read about the problem caused in **Assam**, Bengal and Delhi by the presence of illegal migrants from Bangladesh. The United States faces similar problem along its borders with Mexico.

In short, security has become comprehensive in scope encompassing a complex matrix of internal and external dimensions at one level and also military and non-military aspects at another. States are faced with the **compulsion** to work with other states under a more effective framework. Besides they are forced to go beyond the need to shop for military hardware and attend to the political, social and economic development of their inhabitants.

10.4 INITIATIVES FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

You may have noticed how peace and development have become inter-linked to underline the expanding canvas of security. Naturally the world community has been seized of these two problems with the aim to make the post-Cold War world peaceful, just and prosperous through initiatives either at collective or individual levels. We will discuss some of these initiatives towards peace and development in separate sections below.

10.4.1 Efforts for Peace

The post-Cold War era was marked notably by numerous peace initiatives. Some of them addressed the goal of peace in general, while other initiatives attempted to bring peace in specific problem regions.

One of the most widely discussed initiatives in the early 1990s was "An Agenda for Peace" prepared by the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The Security Council which met at the summit level for the first time in January 1992 asked for his recommendations for strengthening the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping: peacemaking and preventive diplomacy to face the post-Cold War issues adequately. To enhance peacekeeping capacity the Agenda insisted on sufficient and dependable advance commitment from member states regarding funds and forces. As a result, governments agreed to make commitments for the UN stand-by peacekeeping force. They agreed to modestly enhance the peacekeeping reserve fund. But in other areas like peace enforcement and preventive deployment, states have been cautious because they feared that contributing more military capability to UN would take away their sovereignty.

Keeping in view of the fact that weapons systems capable of mass destruction are spreading and threatening peace, the post-Cold War years witnessed encouraging efforts in the form of signing of multilateral treaties on disarmament and arms control questions. The first in the

series of such treaties was signed in 1993 (became effective from 1997 after minimum necessary ratifications by governments). It was the Chemical Weapons Convention; it banned development, production, stockpiling, and use of these weapons and also set up a verification mechanism with adequate powers to ensure destruction of the existing stocks. Many believe that the inspection mechanism is relatively efficient enough to be emulated for banning other types of weapons. Then followed other initiatives. In 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted a law on comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, although the initiative lacked consensual support. India, for instance, doubted if the treaty was truly comprehensive in covering all tests and refused to believe that the initiative promoted the goal of nuclear disarmament. India stayed away from the initiative and indeed later went ahead with Pokhran II nuclear weapon tests. The United States having first supported and signed it turned against it after the Senate earlier refused to ratify. In 1997 some governments and non-governmental organisations, concerned about the effects of use of landmines silent killers of thousands of innocent people, jointly made a move that culminated in signing of the convention in Ottawa in 1997 prohibiting use, production and transfer of landmines. The US—the largest producer of landmines—and others like India and Pakistan were uneasy about some provisions of the Convention for separate reasons. In yet another major initiative, the international community finalised at Rome in 1998 a statute for setting up an international criminal court for trying those who are accused of committing crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, and crimes of aggression. The court has become a reality three years later in 2001, although many countries like India and the United States are not party to it. These differences are affecting progress on efforts to agree on conventions related to the problem of small arms and terrorism.

As regards bringing peace to conflict-torn countries, you may recall a few major initiatives during 1990s. The United States mediated the peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine in 1993 as also Dayton accord on the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995. Norway has been widely supported in its ongoing peace initiative on Sri Lanka, involving talks between Tamil Tigers and the Colombo Government. Similar initiatives were undertaken for easing of conflicts in Africa too. On its part, the United Nations has collaborated with regional organisations in facilitating reconciliation process in several cases, starting from the Paris Agreement on Cambodia signed in 1991 to the Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan in 2001. It has to be pointed out that many of these initiatives were not lucky to bring about quick results, while some have failed to fructify. The 1993 West Asia accord is only a ready illustration to show that signing of peace agreements (though no less easy in itself) is easier than implementing the commitments agreed upon.

Allied to the peacemaking activity are the United Nations peacekeeping operations. You may find striking features of UN peacekeeping activities after the Cold War ended when they are contrasted from those launched during the Cold War period. The number of these operations deployed in various conflict zones so far in a span of 12-13 years are three times more than the number pertaining to the four decades long Cold War era. Secondly, many of the 43 post-Cold War peacekeeping operations, sent to restore calm in intrastate conflict situations, undertook a broad range of functions starting from separating fighting factions within a state to disarming of military and the rebel forces, delivery of humanitarian supplies, protection of civilians under threat, repatriation of refugees, conduct of elections, providing interim administration and so forth. They seemed to have performed functions which state should be performing in normal circumstances. The ambitious nature of this role is evident in the setbacks the UN peacekeeping activity received in places like Somalia and Sierra Leone.

10.4.2 Activities in Development

Hopes that the end of the Cold War would bring more resources for economic development did not bear fruit. While the former socialist countries now becoming market friendly competed for

assistance from advanced countries: the industrially advanced countries faced the internal problems like unemployment and economic recession. Moreover, the end of the Cold War era was coincided by the economic globalisation. Globalisation has widened disparities within and between countries. The world community could not afford to ignore this disturbing trend, otherwise putting to peril the peace and stability of the present and future generations.

To promote awareness and facilitate consensus on the desirable action programmes, the UN convened several important conferences at the highest level of government—all addressed different facets of development: The Rio Summit (1992) on environment, the Vienna summit on human rights (1993) which highlighted the right to development, the Cairo meet (1994) on population, the Copenhagen Summit (1995) on social development, the Beijing conference (1995) on women, the Istanbul Summit (1997) on human settlements, and in 2002 the conferences on development finance and sustainable development at Monterrey and Johannesburg respectively. The Millennium Summit of the UN General Assembly in 2000 sought to put people-oriented development goals to be achieved by the year 2015 for halving the number of people with less than 1 dollar a day, primary education for all male and female children, arrest and reversal of the spread of HIV-AIDS and major common epidemics: improvement in the conditions of at least 100 million slum dwellers. Laudable as they are, but progress in their implementation requires huge additional resources in the range of 50-75 billion US dollars a year. However, the reality on ground is that the rich donor countries do not spare funds for development. In fact the quantum of official aid to the poor countries has come down from US\$65 billion in 1990 to US\$53 billion in 2000, although the Monterrey Meet extracted a promise for additional aid to the tune of \$25 billion for the next five years.

There are initiatives on other fronts. Concerned about the growing indebtedness and its impact on the economies of the heavily indebted poor countries, the World Bank and the United Nations have jointly campaigned for a waiver of debts. The United States and other members of the rich countries' club agreed to cancel debts of the poor and heavily indebted countries to the tune of some \$40 billion. Though the response was below the expectations, it demonstrated the potential of persuasion.

Aid and debt-relief have only limited role unless complemented by establishment of a fair and equitable set of rules for trade to the benefit of the disadvantaged majority. Trade is increasingly becoming an essential part of global power play. Establishment of the World Trade Organisation as a follow-up to the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations in the mid-1990s and its functioning since then reinforce the dominance of the major trading powers. Indeed voices of protest are heard not only from the developing countries but also civil society groups based in Europe and North America.

10.5 RESTRUCTURING OF UNITED NATIONS

The issues confronted by the post-Cold War era constitute challenge for the United Nations, too. And the complexity and immensity of those challenges could have been better tackled if structurally the United Nations was better equipped. Hence, no wonder, the question of restructuring the United Nations became a focal issue in the post-Cold War era facing not only the governments, but also the non-official opinion across the world. And major organs of the United Nations—whether handling the security or development issues—could not remain immune from the need for restructuring.

10.5.1 Composition of Security Council

The salience of security issues after the end of the Cold War had put the Security Council in the centre stage of happenings. However, opinion gained strength to assert that an effective role

of the Council in tackling its comprehensive and complex tasks would not be possible without making its composition adequately representative to accommodate suitably the newly emerged global and regional powers. Hence the demand for expansion in both categories of the permanent and non-permanent members.

We should note here that the composition of the Security Council was conceived in rigid terms when the United Nations was founded in 1945. Since then only a minor enlargement of the non-permanent members from 6 to 10 in the mid-1960s was possible. As the membership of the United Nations had increased from 51 to 191 (nearly four times) in 2002, the gap in the ratio between the UN membership and the Security Council's size became unjustifiable. Furthermore: the permanent members of the Security Council come from the Western, industrially advanced countries. The developing countries from Asia (with the sole exception of China), Africa and Latin America do not figure as permanent members.

Therefore, India and many others demanded representation in the category of permanent membership for developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Some countries from these regions—for example, India from Asia, South Africa from Africa, Brazil from Latin America, (in addition to Germany and Japan from the industrialised world)—put forward their claim for a permanent seat. Whereas there is no dispute about the need to expand the membership of the Security Council, there are many issues on which a broad agreement is yet to be achieved.

In the meanwhile, the lack of transparency in the way the Security Council works has come under sharp scrutiny. Almost universally disapproved was the practice of holding closed door consultations where permanent members reach an understanding over an issue followed by a formality of endorsement at the full meeting of the Council without giving ample opportunity for non-members to contribute to the decision-making of the Council. Especially in peacekeeping matters, troop-contributing countries are not fully associated with vital decisions regarding the operation concerned. The criticism has produced some results in the sense that it has been agreed lately that there would be more open, formal meetings giving access to states that are not members of the Security Council to participate in those meetings.

10.5.2 Development Bodies

The bulk of the financial and human resources of the United Nations are dedicated to the economic and social development activities. Over the years it has emerged as an important source of policy advice, technical assistance and humanitarian help without the donor's conditions built into sorts of aid routed bilaterally or through financial institutions like the World Bank. Let us also remember that the United Nations has played a major role in building greater awareness about the conditions among the poor countries and worked for compromises between the industrial countries of North and the underdeveloped South. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), for instance, played a big role in taking up the cause of the developing countries in 1960s and 1970s for equitable and just terms of trade. Of course, the developed countries, especially the United States accuse the United Nations of being politicised and partisan. They started ignoring the UN and preferred other forums like the IMF, the IBRD and now the World Trade Organisation. To justify this shift, they have accused the UN development agencies of inefficiency and wastage of funds and duplication of jobs.

In the post-Cold War era, the rich nations' main thesis is that the UN should take up such tasks that it can do the best, while leaving the rest to other organisations. The Economic and Social Council, the chief apex body for coordinating activities for economic and social development has been reduced with a cap on the number of resolutions to be adopted in each

session. While the developing countries have cooperated with those reforms, they are resisting proposals to disband UNCTAD or merge UN Environment Programme with unrelated wings. Their viewpoint is that reforms should result in strengthening—not in sidelining—of the UN.

Reforms are a delicate issue and no restructuring can be meaningful if they are not based on broad agreement between the developed and the developing countries. Let us hope that an enlightened approach will guide the problem of restructuring for the benefit of coming generations.

10.6 SUMMARY

The post-Cold War era has signalled some notable changes in the world affairs, some welcome and others worrisome to many of us. The emergence of the uni-polar world with United States as the sole superpower may not be good for the healthy resolution of common issues. Likewise, the erosion of the authority of nation states—partly owing to civil wars triggered by internally dissatisfied groups and partly because of the pressures of globalisation—is also an issue of great importance. The issues of security have acquired new dimensions both military and non-military as also external and internal. To address the growing complexity of problems the humanity is faced with, institutions like the United Nations have proved to be of great use, in spite of their structural and performance-related shortfalls. The key for better future lies in further restructuring of the Organisation so that it serves the interests of all, not a few, countries and peoples.

10.7 EXERCISES

- 1) On what basis can you describe the United States the most feared state in the post-Cold War period?
- 2) Cite two main reasons for the erosion of nation-state in contemporary times?
- 3) Why do you think security has become more prominent in the post-Cold War era than before?
- 4) How does terrorism threaten world order?
- 5) Why have some of the disarmament initiatives of the United Nations not succeeded in the post-Cold War years?
- 6) What purpose does the United Nations activities towards development serve?
- 7) Why do you think India should be a permanent member of the expanded Security Council?
- 8) What criticism do the developed countries have against the United Nations activities in development?

UNIT 1 REALIST AND NEO-REALIST APPROACHES

Structure

- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 What is Realism?
 - 1.2.1 One Realism, or Many?
 - 1.2.2 Classical Realism
 - 1.2.3 Contemporary Realism or Neo-realism
- 1.3 Key Concepts in the Realist School
 - 1.3.1 National Interest
 - 1.3.2 National Power
 - 1.3.3 National Security
- 1.4 Some Important Theories in the Realist Approach to International Relations
 - 1.4.1 Theory of Conflict
 - 1.4.2 Theory of Balance of Power
 - 1.4.3 Theory of Deterrence
- 1.5 Summary
- 1.6 Exercises

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Of the major approaches to the study of international relations, Realism has by far proved to be the most influential theory in explaining the nature of world politics. What probably explains its dominance as a school of thought is its ability to provide the most powerful explanation for the state of war, which characterises the regular condition of life in the international system. This, however, does not mean that its basic assumptions have remained unchallenged. As would become clear in the later part of this Unit, the Realist perspective has come under fierce criticism. As you go along this Unit, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Realist approach will become clearer to you.

1.2 WHAT IS REALISM?

Realism, also known as "Political Realism" or "Realpolitik", continues to remain one of the dominant schools of thought within the domain of international relations. Although its genesis can be traced back to Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War (431 BC), and to Sun Tzu's classic work on strategy, *The Art of War*, written at roughly the same time in China, Realism emerged as the dominant international perspective only during the 20th Century. More specifically, it emerged in its modern form largely in reaction to idealism, a more normatively driven approach which held that countries were United in an underlying "harmony of interests"—a view shattered by the outbreak of Second World War. Rather than study the world as it might be, Realists maintained that a science of international politics must study the world, as it was—an insistence that resulted in the Realists' self-acclaimed appellation. In contrast to the "idealists", a term retrospectively coined by the Realists for the inter-war scholars whose major preoccupation was with understanding the cause of war and finding a lasting remedy for its existence, war to the Realists appears as a natural phenomenon given the inherent craving for power in human nature. While idealism emphasises that international relations should be guided by morality, Realism is grounded in an emphasis on power politics and the pursuit of national interests.

But, what do these terms mean? As you go along this Unit, the meanings and implications of such expressions frequently used in the literature on international relations would become clear to you. However, before we get down to explaining these terms we must take note of the fact that from the perspective of the Realist framework, states are recognised as the pre-eminent actors in world politics. What provides weight to such an assumption is the accompanying notion of sovereignty, which enables states to act as independent and autonomous entities both within and outside the nation-state. The rise of nationalism and the emergence of modern nation-states have further consolidated such a belief system by transforming the different states into cohesive political communities, within which all other loyalties and ties remain subordinate to the nation-states. By logical extension, all non-state actors like multinational corporations and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations are relegated to a peripheral status within the international system. Despite the growing recognition of the fact that such non-state entities do significantly influence the outcome of developments in international relations, the Realists are unwilling to budge from their position as far as the pre-eminence of nation-states in the international system is concerned. While conceding that the non-state actors do operate within the political arena, the Realists argue that the states' supremacy remains unchallenged as they do so only with the consent of national political authorities. Nothing, the Realists argue, is above the state.

1.2.1 One Realism or Many?

There is no consensus among theorists of international relations with regard to the taxonomy of Realism. The question as to whether Realism constitutes a single coherent theory or there are different strands within Realism has proved increasingly contentious. Nevertheless, different classificatory schemes are often used to separate one strand of Realism from another. Generally speaking, the Realist school can be divided into two broad categories—classical Realism and contemporary Realism or Neo-realism.

1.2.2 Classical Realism

Classical Realism represents a whole worldview of international politics encompassing several generations of theorists ranging from Thucydides, Machiavelli, and E.H. Carr to Hans J. Morgenthau, the most famous high priest of post-war Realism. The central argument of classical Realism rests on the assumption that international politics is driven by an endless struggle for power, which has its root in human nature. In this framework, justice, law, and society have either no place or are circumscribed. Classical Realism recognises that principles are subordinated to policies and that the ultimate test of the state leader lies in accepting and adapting to the changing power political configurations in world politics.

Classical Realism, as a school of thought, became fashionable more particularly during the inter-war period when a new generation of scholars got actively engaged in explaining new developments in international relations. Classical Realists, a term retrospectively used by later band of Realists, is thus often attributed to those theorists who were actively writing on international relations immediately before and after the Second World War. What distinguishes this genre of scholars from others is their shared belief in an essentially pessimistic view of human nature. Some of the key figures in this tradition of Realist school like Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943), Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), and others believe that the struggle for power is inherent in human nature. In other words, the drive for power and the will to dominate are treated as the fundamental traits of human nature. Following from this, the behaviour of the state as a self-seeking egoist is thus understood to be merely a reflection of the characteristics of the people that comprise the state. It is human nature that explains why

international politics is necessarily power politics. Convinced of the unchanging human nature, classical Realists are highly pessimistic with regard to the possibility of any qualitative transformation of world politics. As a result, they tend to rely much more upon conventional principles of diplomacy and mechanisms—such as balance of power, international morality and world public opinion, and international law—for regulating and restraining the inevitable clashes of interests between states, than on the human nature.

1.2.3 Contemporary Realism or Neo-realism

Contemporary Realism, also called Neo-realism and Structural Realism, is a more recent strand of Realism that developed during the 1980s under the influence of Kenneth Waltz. While Neo-realists continue to acknowledge the central importance of power, they tend to explain events in terms of the structure of the international system rather than the goals and make-up of individual states. The structure of the international system, for the Neo-realists, is a major determinant of state behaviour. It is through an analysis of the different structures of the international system—defined in terms of ordering principles, the functional differentiation of the Units, and distributions of capabilities—that the Neo-realists tend to explain the varying patterns of world politics. This, they believe, cannot be explained simply in terms of the interests and policies of individual countries.

Unlike the classical Realists who trace the causes of war to the innate human nature, the Neo-realists tend to explain international conflict within the framework of the anarchic structure of the international system. This basically means that there is no overarching central authority to enforce rules and norms or protect the interests of the larger global community. In other words, it is not so much the innate human nature as the anarchical system, which nurtures fear, jealousy, suspicion, and insecurity in the international system. The structural Realists insist that conflict can emerge even if the actors have benevolent intent towards each other. This form of Structural Realism is most often associated with Kenneth Waltz's landmark book, *Theory of International Politics* (1979). Waltz's Structural Realism has had a major impact on scholars in international relations. Waltz's popularity as a structural Realist emanates from his ringing assertion that the structure of the international system decisively shapes the behaviour of the states. According to Waltz: anarchy prevents states from entering into co-operative agreements to end the state of war. The condition of anarchy—absence of a “higher power” over and above the sovereign nation-states to ensure peace among them—is often viewed as synonymous to a state of war. By the state of war, structural Realists do not intend to convey the impression that large-scale war is a daily occurrence in international politics: Rather, the possibility that a particular state may resort to force indicates that the outbreak of war is always a likely scenario in an anarchical environment. Put differently, the structure of the international system can drive states to war even if state leaders desire peace. Structural Realists insist that the form of a state, for example a democracy or a totalitarian state, or the personality of the leader is less important in accounting for the phenomena of war than the fact that action takes place within the context of an anarchical realm.

However, Kenneth Waltz's theory of Structural Realism is not the only version of Neo-realism. A second group of contemporary Realists, prominent among whom is Joseph Grieco, have integrated Waltz's ideas with the ideas of more traditional Realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, Stanley Hoffmann, and Robert Gilpin to construct a contemporary or modern Realist profile. Grieco represents a group of Neo-realists or modern Realists who are critical of neo-liberal institutionalists who claim states are mainly interested in absolute gains. Grieco claims that all states are interested in both absolute and relative gains and in the question of how such gains are distributed in the international system. Such Neo-realists, however, identify

two barriers to international cooperation, fear of those who **might** not follow the rules and the relative gains of others.

There is yet **another** version, the **third** version of Neo-realism, which is increasingly becoming popular as security studies. This form of Neo-realism is further divided into two sub-groups—offensive Neo-realism and defensive Neo-realism. While offensive Neo-realists emphasise the importance of relative power, the defensive Neo-realists are often **confused** with neo-liberal institutionalists, a branch of liberalism. which will be taken up in detail in the next Unit. Like traditional Realists, the offensive Neo-realists believe that conflict is inevitable in the international system and leaders must always be wary of expansionary powers. The defensive Neo-realists, on the other hand, recognise the costs of war and argue that it invariably results from irrational forces in a society. Moreover, they argue that it is the presence of the expansionary forces in the **international** system, always willing to use force, which makes it impossible to co-exist in a world without weapons. They do, however, concede that co-operation can take place but is likely to be successful only among the friendly states.

However, all this has evoked strong reactions from a number of scholars. Several critics point out that **contemporary** Realists like Waltz who construct a Realist theory without relying on an assumption about **human nature** tend to assume that states are competitive and egoistic entities. Moreover, in the work of **contemporary** structural Realists, these traits appear to be prior to the interactions of states as though they existed before the game of power politics began. We shall come back to some of the more general criticisms of the Realist approach later on in the Unit. Our more immediate concern here, however, is to identify some of the key concepts frequently used in the Realist approach to the study of international politics.

1.3 KEY CONCEPTS IN THE REALIST APPROACH

We shall be focussing here on some of the key concepts frequently used in the study of international relations, which together form the very core of the Realist school. These are: national interest, national power, and national security. Our use of these concepts so far has been rather loose lacking a systematic treatment without which we cannot possibly capture the minute nuances of their implications in the Realist tradition of international relations theory. However, you might have, perhaps, already noticed that such concepts tend to overlap and are often used interchangeably by the Realist theorists.

1.3.1 National Interest

From the perspective of the Realist framework, the concept of national interest, notwithstanding its **ambiguity**, is considered to be the most important analytic category in explaining and predicting the course of international behaviour. Pursuance of national interest as a foreign policy goal in the Realist perspective is treated as the primary justification for all kinds of state actions. Almost all Realists are **unanimous** on this. However, the real problem arises when one asks conceptual or substantive questions about the national interest. For example: Can there be a universally acceptable definition of national interest? Does national interest keep changing as per time and space? Who decides what constitutes national interest at any given point of time and how is it prioritised? Does national interest always represent the genuine interests of the nationals of a country? Is national interest the sum total of the interests of all the citizens of a country? Or, is national interest, merely an expression of the values of the political elite of a country? And so on.

A review of history does reveal that different statesmen have justified their foreign policies in the name of the national interest. For example, Napoleon argued that he was acting in France's interest when he initiated the Russian campaign and when, later, he mounted a last desperate battle at Waterloo. Similarly, Hitler justified his expansionist policies, including a mindless multi-front war, in the name of Germany's national interest. In each of these and many other instances, we find statesmen justifying their diplomatic strategies in the name of national interest.

Hans Morgenthau has been a systematic and consistent supporter of the premise that diplomatic strategy or foreign policy should be motivated by national interest rather than by ideological considerations. He equates national interest with the pursuit of state power, where power stands for anything that establishes and maintains control by one state over another. He further adds that this power-control relationship can be achieved by coercive as well as cooperative techniques. Morgenthau has been criticised for constructing two abstract and imprecise concepts—power and interest—which he uses as the ends and means of international political action. Morgenthau, however, has remained firmly in support of his position that great abstractions such as power and interest cannot and should not be quantified. Morgenthau believes that political action is not finite, precise, and clearly observable. Therefore, if political concepts are to reflect accurately the hazy reality of politics, they must also be vague and imprecise.

Further, the concept of national interest is intricately intertwined with the question of national survival. As Morgenthau puts it, "the minimum requirement of nation-states is to protect their physical, political and cultural identity against possible encroachments by other nation-states." It is this sole objective of survival, argues Morgenthau, which justifies a whole range of cooperative and conflictive policies such as competitive armaments, balance of power, foreign-aid alliances, subversion, and economic and propaganda "warfare."

However, the Realist understanding of the concept of national interest is not free from problems. It is, as critics argue, defined in a rather loose fashion, with the consequence that pursuance of national interest does at times become a license for the countenance of atrocities on the weaker nations. As a result, national interest, more often than not, is merely assumed rather than rigorously defined. For example, that national interest is a necessary criterion of policy appears too obvious with the result that no one would ever argue that the state ought to act in opposition to its national interest. But then, what constitutes national interest? As a matter of fact, those who rule may not follow policies that would necessarily lead to enhancement of national interest but their own or class interest.

1.3.2 National Power

The concept of power has conceptually proved to be an elusive category lacking unanimity among scholars over its precise meaning. However, from the days of Thucydides to the present, the concept of power has been identified with political action. Morgenthau, for example, defines politics as the struggle for power. In other words, power for Morgenthau, symbolises a relationship between two political actors where actor A has the ability to control the mind and actions of actor B. As he puts it, power is, "man's control over the minds and actions of other men".

The Realists make two important points about the concept of power. First, power is a relational concept in the sense that one does not exercise power in a vacuum, but always in relation to another entity. And second, power is seen as a relative concept. What it means is that in the international system it may not be enough to calculate one's own power capabilities, but also the power of other states. However, the task of accurately assessing the power of states presents

a serious challenge. The challenge gets further aggravated as it is merely calculated in terms of the number of troops, tanks, aircraft, and naval ships that a particular country possesses. Calculation of power in this purely physical sense leads to further build up of physical force with a view to outstripping the power of the perceived enemy country. This is done with the belief that it might enhance the ability of one actor to get other actors do something they would not otherwise do. This one-dimensional view of power, as understood by the Realists, has been criticised on a number of grounds.

Contemporary structural Realists have in recent years sought to bring more conceptual clarity to bear on the meaning of power in the Realist discourse. Kenneth Waltz, for example, tries to overcome the problem by shifting the focus from power to **capabilities**. He suggests that capabilities can be ranked according to their strength in the following areas: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.

However, as critics point out, resource strength need not always lead to military victory. For example, in the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the distribution of resources clearly favoured the Arab coalition and yet the supposedly weaker side annihilated its enemies' forces and seized their territory. The definition of power as capabilities has proved even less successful at explaining the relative economic success of Japan over China. Yet another problem with the Realist treatment of power relates to its exclusive focus upon state power. For Realists, states are the only actors that really "count". As a result, transnational corporations, international organisations, and religious denominations are rarely taken seriously in the Realist framework. Moreover, it is not clear that these non-state actors are autonomous from state power, whether this be Italy in case of the papacy or the US in case of corporations like Microsoft. The extent to which non-state actors bear the imprint of a statist identity is further endorsed by the fact that these actors have to make their way in international system whose rules are made by states.

1.3.3 National Security

From the Realist viewpoint, the concept of national security or national survival is treated as a fundamental value in the foreign policy of all states. Particularly, classical Realists like Machiavelli, Meinecke, and Weber attach top priority to national security or survival. They stress that the task of ensuring national security/survival must be considered as the supreme national interest to which all political leaders must adhere. In other words, national security is viewed as a precondition for attaining all other goals, whether these involve conquest or merely independence. In the words of Henry Kissinger, "a nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk". As also noted by Waltz, "beyond the survival motive, the aim of states may be endlessly varied". All other goals such as economic prosperity belong to the domain of what is called "low politics" and hence are considered of secondary importance. The primary concern of the Realists is unambiguously with "high politics"—the security of the state. Given the obsession of the Realists with the preservation of security, they emphatically recommend the leaders of their state to adopt an ethical code which would help them judge an action according to the outcome rather than in terms of a judgement about whether the individual act is right or wrong.

Despite the near unanimity among Realists on the centrality of the issue of national security, recent developments in the Realist thinking indicate a raging controversy over the question of whether "states are in fact principally security or power maximisers". This controversy, which primarily takes place between the defensive and offensive Realists, has significant implications

for the prospects of international peace and co-operation. Defensive Realists such as Waltz and Grieco argue that it is security which is the principal interest of the states and that they seek to obtain only as much power as it is sufficient to ensure their own survival. According to this view: states are primarily defensive actors and will not seek to gain greater amount of powers if that means jeopardizing their own security. Offensive Realists like Mearsheimer on the other hand, argue that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a hegemonic position in the international system. States, according to this view, always desire more power and are willing, if the opportunity arises, to alter the existing distribution of power even if such an action may jeopardise their own security.

1.4 SOME IMPORTANT THEORIES IN THE REALIST APPROACH

As you might have perhaps already noticed, we have been making oblique reference to some of the important Realist theories like conflict, balance of power and deterrence in the discussion above. We shall now focus more specifically on these to help us develop a better understanding of the Realist approach to the study of international politics.

1.4.1 Theory of Conflict

Conflict constitutes the core of the Realist approach. It is around this (perceived) basic reality of perpetual conflict among the states in the international system that the entire Realist theory is built. If you recall the main argument of the Realists, you would be able to recognise the central importance they attach to human nature, which according to them is essentially conflicting. This inherently conflicting nature of human beings, according to the Realists, leads to a constant struggle for power among them. Following from this, the nature of international system is viewed by the Realists as anarchic and as one that is based on the principle of self-help. In the self-help system, the Realists argue, it would be naive on the part of a state to rely upon others for securing its own security. In other words, the structure of the international system, which is marked by perpetual conflict and perennial condition of uncertainty in the absence of a central authority, has no space for friendship, trust and honour.

Critiquing the idealist belief in internationalism and natural harmony, the Realists posit that in the absence of any higher authority over and above the sovereign state, international politics is conducted in a "state of nature" like situation, and is thus characterised by anarchy, not harmony. Unlike domestic politics, where a hierarchical pattern of authority exists to enforce private agreements and public laws, there is no such arrangement in the international politics where all sovereign states enjoy formal equality against each other. As a result, an anarchic international system in the Realist perspective is viewed as one in which each state is forced to help itself and give priority to its own national interest, defined, most fundamentally, as state survival and territorial defence.

The issue of national interest understood in terms of state survival leads to a constant struggle for power among the states. As is evident from Hans Morgenthau's classic statement in *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, that "statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power." Power is here broadly understood in terms of both material and psychological: military and economic capabilities. The centrality of the notion of power in the Realist perspective is ineluctably linked to the concept of national interest that is defined in terms of maximising power. This explains why Realists put so much of emphasis on the role

of power and views the nature of world politics as inherently conflictual in nature. The Realists argue that since power exists only in a relative sense and that all countries cannot maximise their power or satisfy their national interests at the same time, a constant struggle for power and more power among the states characterises the nature of the world politics.

However, the pursuit of power or constant struggle for power among the states does not mean that the international system is characterised by relentless conflict and unending war. Anarchy not in the Hobbesian sense of "state of nature" in which absence of norms and conventions, rules and laws had created a free for all situation. But, anarchy in a limited sense of the term i.e. the absence of any recognisable supreme authority in the international system over and above the state. In fact, the Realists argue that some semblance of order is maintained within the state system through the creation of a balance of power. This brings us to another important theory of the Realist approach i.e. balance of power.

1.4.2 Theory of Balance of Power

Given the anarchic nature of the international system owing to absence of any higher authority to prevent and counter the use of force, the Realists argue that security can only be realised through self-help. As Waltz notes, "in an anarchic structure, self-help is necessarily the principle of action". However, when a particular state seeks to ensure its own security by acquiring weapons and other means, it invariably fuels the insecurity of other states. The spiral of insecurity thus unleashed is called security dilemma. According to Wheeler and Booth, security dilemma exists "when the military preparations of one state create an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for "defensive" purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage)". This leads to a situation whereby one state's quest for security often becomes another state's source of insecurity. In other words, states find it extremely difficult to trust one another and often suspect the intentions of others. As a result, the military preparations of one state are to be invariably matched by neighbouring states. Ironically, at the end of the day, states often feel no more secure than before they undertook measures to enhance their own security.

It is with a view to escape this security dilemma that the theory of balance of power becomes important. However, the Realists are not unanimous on this. While the Neo-realists view the security dilemma to be a perennial condition of international politics, the classical Realists believe that even in a self-help system, the dilemma can be mitigated. The balance of power thus becomes the principal mechanism by which the security dilemma is mitigated.

But: what is meant by balance of power? Balance of power is all about fashioning a pattern of interaction amongst states that tend to curb aggression and expansionism by rendering them impracticable. This means that while pursuing their national interests and national security, states do enter into alliances which when properly balanced against one another may guarantee prolonged periods of peace and stability. However, given the highly dynamic and volatile nature of international system, it is virtually impossible to predict how long would such peace and stability last. Moreover, each time the balance of power breaks down, it is inevitably followed by a war.

The Neo-realists or structural Realists argue that in a self-help system, the balance of power can emerge even in the absence of a conscious policy to maintain the balance i.e. without pursuing a policy of prudent statecraft. As Waltz argues that balances of power inevitably emerge irrespective of the intentions of any state. In an anarchical system in which states

always seek to perpetuate themselves, alliances will inevitably emerge that seek to check and balance the power against threatening states.

However, all varieties of Realism are united in the belief that the balance of power is not a stable condition. Whether it was the contrived balance of the Concert of Europe in the early 19th Century or the more fortuitous balance of the Cold War, such balances eventually broke down. The **precipitating** factor for the breakdown of such a balance of power could either be a war or peaceful change. However, the **Realists** argue that a new balance of power soon replaces the old one. The continual collapsing of the balance of power in the international system demonstrates that states can only mitigate the worst consequences of the security dilemma but cannot escape it altogether. The Realists attribute the reason for the existence of such conditions to the absence of trust in the international system.

1.4.3 Theory of Deterrence

The theory of deterrence is a new name for balance of power in the modern nuclear age. Also known as "nuclear diplomacy", it came into existence during the period of Cold War diplomacy. The term "Cold War diplomacy" refers to **some** very specific aspects of diplomacy that **emerged** after Second World War. From the late 1940s until the end of the **1980s**, world politics was dominated by the ideological confrontation between the United States and **the** Soviet Union. Each superpower supported by a network of allies sought to **undermine** and "defeat" the other by all means short of a real or a "hot war"—hence the "Cold War" description of this confrontational system. The diplomatic activity associated with the "East-West" confrontation had a single dramatic focus—the absolute necessity of avoiding a global, nuclear conflict that could destroy the international system. It was against this backdrop that nuclear diplomacy or the deterrence theory came to the fore as one of the **most** important types of Cold War diplomacy.

But, what is meant by nuclear diplomacy or deterrence theory'? Nuclear diplomacy refers to the interactions between states that possess nuclear weapons where one or more states threaten to use them to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an action. In other words, the theory of deterrence is based on the assumption that in a nuclear age possession of nuclear weapons by one state or one block of states would deter the enemy state or the enemy camp from **making** first use of the nuclear option in the course of a likely war.

1.5 SUMMARY

In this final section of the Unit, let us try and sum up the main arguments of the Realist approach to **the** study of international politics. As a school of thought, Realism continues to provide one of the most influential **frameworks** to understand the nature of world politics. The Realist approach views nation-states as the principal actors in world politics as they are answerable to no higher political authority in the **international** system. In other words, states are treated as the super-ordinate actors on the world stage. Moreover, conflicts of interests among them in an **anarchical** international system are assumed to be inevitable. The purpose of statecraft, in the Realist framework, is national survival in a hostile environment. No means is considered to be **more important** to secure national **survival than** the acquisition of **power**. And no **principle** is **more important than** self-help—the ultimate dependence of the state on its own resources to promote its interests **and** protect itself. As aptly noted by Charles W. Kegley Jr., "the game of international politics takes place under conditions of permanent anarchy and revolves around the pursuit of power: acquiring it, increasing **it**, protecting it, and using it to bend others to one's will".

1.6 EXERCISES

- 1) Account for the dominance of Realist approach in international relations theory.
- 2) Bring out the underlying assumptions of Realism.
- 3) What distinguishes Neo-realism from Realism?
- 4) Bring out the essence of the key concepts frequently used in the Realist framework. What Purpose do they serve?
- 5) To what extent do you think, is the notion of "national interest" representative of the genuine interests of a nation?
- 6) How "anarchic" is the nature of the international system as seen by the Realists? Is there a way out?
- 7) What is meant by the notion of "security dilemma"? Do the Realists suggest any mechanism to escape or mitigate the security dilemma?

UNIT 2 LIBERAL AND NEO-LIBERAL APPROACHES

Structure

- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Liberal Approach to the Study of International Relations
 - 2.2.1 Underlying Assumptions of the Liberal Approach
- 2.3 Neo-liberal Approach to the Study of International Relations
- 2.4 Concept of World Order
- 2.5 Concept of Globalism
- 2.6 Search for Liberal-institutional Mechanisms
 - * 2.6.1 Core Assumptions of Neo-liberal Institutionalism
 - 2.6.2 Functionalism
 - 2.6.3 Neo-Functionalism
- 2.7 Theory of Communication
- 2.8 Theory of Conflict-resolution
- 2.9 Summary
- 2.10 Exercises

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Liberalism, also known as pluralism, projects a different image of world politics as compared to Realism. However, much like Realism, it too has a rather long tradition. There are many strands of liberalism but some of the common themes that run through the liberal thinking are that human beings are perfectible, that democracy is necessary for that perfectibility to develop, and that ideas do matter. Unlike the Realists, the liberals have enormous belief in human progress and the faculty of reason that each individual is endowed with. Accordingly, liberals reject the Realist notion that war is the natural condition of world politics. They also question the idea that the state is the main actor on the world political stage, although they do not deny that it is important. But they do see multinational corporations, transnational actors such as terrorist groups, and international organisations as central actors in some issue-areas of world politics. In relations between states, liberals stress the possibilities for cooperation, and the key issue becomes devising international settings in which cooperation can be best achieved. The picture of world politics that results from the liberal view thus is of a complex system of bargaining between many different types of actors. Military force is still important but the liberal agenda is not as restricted as is the Realist one. Liberals see national interest in much more than military terms, and stress the importance of economic, environmental, and technological issues.

2.2 LIBERAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Liberal approach to the study of international politics has its roots in the development of liberal political theory in the 17th Century. Closely connected with the emergence of the modern liberal state, the liberal tradition generally takes a *positive* view of human nature. Interestingly, some of the major contributors until the mid-20th Century were not international relations scholars, but political philosophers, political economists, and people generally interested in international affairs. For example, John Locke, widely considered the first liberal thinker of the

17th Century, saw a great potential for human *progress* in modern civil society and capitalist economy, both of which, he believed, could flourish in states that guaranteed individual liberty.

Liberals are generally of the view that the period since the late 17th Century constitutes a historical watershed during which a multifaceted process of modernisation has introduced or enhanced the possibility of a dramatic improvement in the moral character and material well being of humankind. In other words, the liberals argue that the process of modernisation unleashed by the scientific revolution led to improved technologies which in turn made it possible to devise more efficient ways of producing goods and mastering nature. This was reinforced **by** the liberal intellectual revolution, which had great faith in human reason and rationality. Here lies the basis for the liberal belief in progress: the modern liberal state invokes a political and economic system that will bring, in Jeremy Bentham's famous phrase, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number".

2.2.1 Underlying Assumptions of the Liberal Approach

Some of the important underlying assumptions of the liberal approach to the study of international politics can be identified as follows:

- 1) Individuals are the primary international actors: Liberals put the individual at the centre of the universe and all progress is measured in terms of the interests of the individuals as the **two** are perceived as inextricably intertwined. In other words, progress for liberals has always **meant** progress for individuals. John Locke, for example, is accredited with the creation of a constitutional state through a social contract to protect **the** liberties of the individuals. Such a state enables and establishes the rule of law that respects the rights of the citizens to life, liberty and property. This does not mean that states are relegated to marginal status in the liberal perspective. Far from it, **the** Liberals view states as the **most** important collective actors in our present era, but they are seen as pluralistic actors whose interests and policies are **determined** by bargaining among groups and elections.
- 2) States' interests *are dynamic and are both self-regarding and other-regarding*: Liberals are of the **viewpoint** that the interests of the states are not static but dynamic. States' interests keep changing with **time** because individuals' values and the power **relations** **among** interest groups keep evolving over time. Also, most liberals believe that states do not only have certain self-interests to preserve but also regard states' policies as other-regarding to **some** extent since **they** believe that the growth of liberal democracy increases people's concern for other humans. These ideas can be traced back to Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. As far as the specific interests of the states are concerned, liberals accept that state survival **and autonomy** are important, but they are viewed as secondary interests to the primary interests of the individuals. While the liberals are generally optimistic over the long-term role of the states in supporting peace, welfare, and justice, **they** do realise that exploitative interests (including power over **others** as an end in itself) are unlikely ever to disappear.
- 3) Both individual and state *interests* are *shaped* by a wide *variety of* domestic and *international* conditions: Liberals are of the view that the interests of both individuals and states are affected by a host of factors at the **domestic** and international levels. While conceding that eventually such interests are determined by the bargaining power that they possess, the manner in **which** they define their interests are **shaped** by a number of factors both within **the** state and outside the state i.e. the international arena. At the domestic

level, factors like the nature of economic and political systems, patterns of economic interactions, and personal values may play decisive role. At the international level, presence of factors like technological capabilities, patterns of interactions and interdependencies, transnational sociological patterns, knowledge, and international institutions allow states to affect each other in different ways. States—the predominant collective actors—are viewed by the liberals as entities that are embedded in both their own societies and the international system, and their interests and policies are affected by conditions in both arenas. However, there is a significant difference between the Realists and the liberals on the matter of institutions and political hierarchy in the international system. The liberals feel very uncomfortable with the Realists' rather simplistic conception of the international system as anarchical. In sharp contrast to the Realists, liberals are of the view that given the pervasiveness and wide influence of the network of international institutions it would be naive not to integrate it into an overall conception of the international system.

- 4) **Mutual interests can sustain cooperation in the international system:** With the growth of liberal democracies, interdependencies, knowledge, international social ties, and international institutions, the liberals have come to believe that cooperation can be possible among states without resorting to coercive means. Unlike the Realists who believed that existence of a hegemonic (dominant) power is a prerequisite to cooperation, the liberals are of the view that cooperation can be achieved through non-coercive bargaining based on identification of mutual interests. An obvious question that arises here is what makes the liberals so optimistic about the possibility of cooperation? Their optimism about increased cooperation based on mutual interest emanates from a strong belief in the mutuality of interests, which they think will keep growing with increased interdependences and the spread of democratic values. Further, liberals believe that improved knowledge and communication will immensely enhance the ability of the states and other actors to better understand their common interests,

2.3 NEO-LIBERAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

What distinguishes the neo-liberals from the traditional liberal scholars? Do the neo-liberals present a contrasting view of world politics from that of the traditional liberals? What is it that necessitates the prefix neo before liberalism? Are the neo-liberals closer to the Realists and Neo-realists in their orientation than to the traditional liberals? These are some of the questions that we shall try and explore in the following section.

The most important distinguishing feature of the neo-liberals is their declining confidence in human progress. Unlike the traditional liberals, the neo-liberals are far less optimistic about progress and cooperation. This, however, does not mean that they are as pessimistic as the Realists or Neo-realists as seen in the previous Unit. As a category, the term neo-liberal refers to post-war liberal scholars who retained much of the belief of the traditional liberals except perhaps sharing their optimism. In the pre-Second World War period, most liberal writers had a strong belief in the growing, slow but steady, realisation of human freedom. However, in the post-War period, the new generation of scholars became much more reluctant about committing themselves to the liberal notion of progress. This lack of optimism among the new generation of liberals was grounded in a number of considerations. As noted by Zacher and Matthew, "Liberals [neo-liberals] have not wanted to be branded as idealists as were many interwar liberals; the international events of this century (including two world wars and the Cold War) have made them wary about being too optimistic, and, in keeping with the ethos of contemporary social science, many have felt more comfortable about explaining than predicting".

In the academic world, neo-liberal generally refers to neo-liberal institutionalism (one of the strands of liberalism, which we shall discuss in detail later on in this Unit) or what is now called institutional theory. However, in the policy world, Neo-liberalism has a different connotation. In the domain of foreign policy, a neo-liberal approach seeks to promote free trade or open markets and Western democratic values and institutions. Inspired by such an ideology thus most of the Western liberal democracies have rallied around United States in its call for the "enlargement" of the community of democratic and capitalist nation-states. This brand of liberalism (Neo-liberalism) draws its ideological strength from the belief that all financial and political institutions created in the aftermath of the Second World War have stood the test of time, which provides the foundation for contemporary political and economic arrangements. What further adds weight to such a view is the belief that these financial and political institutions were created and are being sustained by policy-makers who embrace neo-liberal or Realist/Neo-realistic assumptions about the world.

However, there are many who question such assumptions of liberalism. As noted by Steven L. Lamy: "In reality, neo-liberal foreign policies tend not to be as wedded to the ideals of democratic peace, free trade, and open borders. National interests take precedence over morality and universal ideals and, much to the dismay of traditional Realists, economic interests are given priority over geopolitical ones".

The post-War liberalisn or Neo-liberalism is broadly divided into four main strands of thinking: institutional liberalism, sociological liberalism, republican liberalism, and interdependence liberalism. It is important to discuss these strands at some length as they hold the key to our understanding of some of the important theories that we are supposed to learn in this Unit. However, we shall confine ourselves to only those aspects of these strands that are of immediate concern to us for the purpose of understanding this Unit.

2.4 CONCEPT OF WORLD ORDER

There is no single homogenous conception of order in world politics. Instead, one comes across competing conceptions of order in international relations theory. However, given our immediate objective and purpose, we shall focus mainly on the liberal conception of order and touch upon the Realist version only to the extent it can help draw a contrasting picture. The crucial difference between the two becomes visible from the different terms that they employ to describe order in international relations. While the Realists prefer the term "international order" to describe the nature of order in international politics, the liberals use "world order" for the same. Does it mean then that the difference between the two is merely semantic and not 'substantive'? The answer is a simple no.

The Realists' conception of **international order** is state-centric which emphasises stability and peace among states. The elements of such an international order are based on the traditional models of order such as the structure of the balance of power, sovereignty, the forms of diplomacy, international law, the role of the great powers, the current forms of collective security, and the codes circumscribing the use of force. Such a conception thus focuses exclusively on the structure of the post-Cold War system, especially upon the number of **Great Power** actors and the distribution of capabilities among them. In other words, it defines order largely in terms of the operative security structure, primarily understood in political-military sense, within the **international system**.

The concept of **world order**, as conceptualised by the liberals on the other hand, is a much wider category in nature and scope. In sharp contrast to the Realists who treat states as the basic

units of order, the liberals take individual human beings as its key units of order and construct order in terms of rights, justice, and prosperity. Unlike the Realists, the liberals assert that order in world politics emerges not from a balance of power but from the **interactions** between many layers of governing arrangements, comprising laws, agreed norms, international regimes, and institutional rules. The liberal conception of world order thus clearly has a widening agenda of order that encompasses, among other things, the relationship between economic and political dimensions, new thinking about security, debates about the consequences of globalisation, the role of human rights, and strategies for human emancipation. Its central claim is that patterns of integration and interdependence have become so deeply embedded in the Cold War period, albeit for strategic and geopolitical reasons, that they now have a self-sustaining momentum that precludes any return to war and autarchy.

An important landmark in the development of the liberal conception of world order was the setting up of an organisation called **World Order Models Project (WOMP)**. Established in 1968, it aimed at promoting the development of alternatives to the inter-state system with a view to eliminating war. For WOMPers (as they have come to be called), the unit of analysis is the individual while the level of analysis is global. Some of the key figures associated with WOMP like Mendlovitz and Falk focussed on the questions of global government that today form the core of much of the work going on under the name of globalisation. In the more recent years, particularly since the mid-1990s, WOMP has become much wider in its focus by concentrating on the world's most vulnerable people and environment.

2.5 CONCEPT OF GLOBALISM

Globalism is best understood when compared to the more familiar concept of globalisation. The technological, economic and cultural processes, which lead to globalisation, are often believed to be objective and impersonal, independent of the preferences, attitudes and actions of those political actors whose interests they deeply affect. Those who benefit from them can accelerate them at the most only marginally. They can be stopped or reversed even more marginally by those who suffer the consequences. Globalism, on the other hand, is a perspective consciously promoted by rationalist, humanist and universalist actors and thinkers of both liberal and socialist political persuasions. At the core of all globalist positions are the following shared assumptions. One, globalists believe the problems which the world faces are global in nature. The urgency, immediacy or intensity of these problems may vary, but they are not restricted to any particular locality, community, state or region, and therefore, if left unattended, all would suffer from their consequences. Problems of environmental degradation, population explosion, nuclear war, terrorism, narcotics and spread of HIV/AIDS are global in this sense. Secondly, all globalists believe that the solutions to these global problems also have to be global in scope. That is so because the resources required for handling these problems are beyond the reach of any nation, region or community. Not only financial and material resources need to be pooled globally, human inputs also have to be coordinated in order to achieve required levels of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Thirdly, all globalists believe that such coordination is possible on a sustained basis only when there is global consensus on the definition of problems as well as prioritization of preferred solutions. Such consensus in turn requires that decision-making processes are transparent and based on democratic equality of participants.

Given these assumptions, it is easy to see the objections, which globalists have against the kind of globalisation presently taking place. They characterise it as "globalisation from above" because it is being shaped by the rich and the powerful states and corporations. They exploit the tremendous concentration of wealth and power in their hands to force unequal integration

on the weak and poor states and communities to further marginalise them. Globalists are not against globalisation as such. But they prefer what they call "globalisation from below" which would truly reflect the philosophy of globalism.

2.6 SEARCH FOR LIBERAL-INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

The search for liberal-institutional mechanisms to help establish peace and ensure prosperity through cooperation goes back to the days of the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson, the chief proponent of the League of Nations, is considered to be the first liberal institutionalist who pointed out the **importance of** institutions in transforming the international relations **from** a "jungle" of chaotic power politics to a "zoo" of regulated and peaceful interaction. Although the League of Nations experiment turned out to be a disaster, later developments in the field of international organisations like the United Nations **and** European Union have rekindled new hope in the philosophy of liberal institutionalism.

Liberal institutionalism or neo-liberal institutionalism, as a school of thought, shot to prominence for providing the most convincing challenge to Realist and Neo-realist thinking. Although **neo-liberal** institutionalism shares many of the assumptions of Neo-realist thinking, there are significant differences between the two over the issue of cooperation in the international system. Liberal institutionalists attack the Neo-realists for focusing exclusively on conflict and competition and thus minimizing the chances for cooperation even in an anarchic international system. The main claim of the liberal institutionalists is that international institutions and regimes help promote cooperation **between** states. **But, what are institutions and regimes?** And, how do they help in securing international cooperation? Institutions, according to Haas, Keohane, and Levy are persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe roles, constrain activity, and shape the expectations of actors. Such institutions may include organisations, bureaucratic agencies, treaties and agreements, and informal practices that states accept as binding. Young, on the other hand, defines regimes, as social institutions that are based on agreed rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures. These govern the interactions of various state and non-state actors in issue areas such as the environment or human rights. Varieties of treaties, trade agreements, scientific **and** trade protocols, market protocols, and the **interests** of producers, consumers, and distributors, for example, govern the global market in coffee. Such regimes and institutions, for the liberal institutionalists, help govern an anarchic and competitive international system and they encourage, and at times require, multilateralism and cooperation as a means of securing national interests. The roots of this version of **Neo-liberalism** can **be seen** in the functional integration scholarship of the 1940s and the 1950s and regional integration studies of the 1960s. These are better known as **Functionalism** and **Neo-Functionalism** schools of thought in **the** literature of international relations theory. However, before we take **these** up separately, it would be useful to look at some of the core assumptions of liberal institutionalism.

2.6.1 Core Assumptions of Neo-liberal Institutionalism

Although **the** neo-liberal institutionalists do concede that states are key actors in international relations, they refuse to buy **the** argument of the Realists who believe that states are the only significant actors. According to the neo-liberal institutionalists, states are **rational** or **instrumental** actors that always **seek** to **maximise** their interests in all issue areas.

Neo-liberal institutionalists further believe that in the present-day competitive environment, states seek to **maximise absolute gains** through cooperation as **rational behaviour** leads **them**

to see value in cooperative behaviour. States are thus less concerned with gains or advantages by other states in cooperative arrangements. However, the neo-liberal institutionalists believe that the biggest obstacle to successful cooperation comes from the fear of *non-compliance* or the possibility of cheating by states. Such fears primarily emanate from the sovereign status enjoyed by the states in the international system leading to a general lack of trust among the states. However, the neo-liberal institutionalists believe that such fears of non-compliance and cheating can be allayed, if not eliminated altogether, through creation of institutions in the international system.

Neo-liberal institutionalists recognise that cooperation may be harder to achieve in areas where leaders perceive they have no mutual interests. For example, cooperation in military or national security areas, where someone's gain is perceived as someone else's loss (a zero sum perspective) may be more difficult to achieve. However, it is believed that states in all likelihood will be willing to shift loyalty and resources to institutions once these are perceived as mutually beneficial and if they provide states with increasing opportunities to secure their international interests.

2.6.2 Functionalism

David Mitrany, the most prominent proponent of the Functionalist school of thought, is accredited with fashioning this alternative view of international politics in response to the security/conflict conception of the Realist and Neo-realist scholars. Mitrany argues that greater interdependence in the form of transnational ties between countries could lead to peace. He is of the view that cooperation should be arranged by technical experts and not by politicians. Some of the other important Functionalists like Joseph Nye, Ernst Haas, J.P. Sewell, Paul Taylor, A.J.R. Groom, John Burton, and Christopher Mitchell have immensely contributed to the Functionalist tradition of international relations theory.

Presented as an operative philosophy that would gradually lead to a peaceful, unified, and cooperative world, Functionalism is widely regarded as the most insightful critique of the Realist framework of international politics. The main concern of the Functionalists is to develop piecemeal non-political cooperative organisations, which will not only help establish peace and secure prosperity but also render the practice of war obsolete eventually. However, this may not be forthcoming as long as the international system continues to be founded on suspicion and anarchy and war is accepted as an established means of settling international disputes. The institution of nation-states is considered to be the biggest obstacle in the path of fostering peace and prosperity. Aware of the fact that governments have vested interests and that nation-states will not be dismantled voluntarily, the Functionalists advocate a gradual approach toward regional or global unity. This, they believe, might eventually help isolate and render obsolete the rigid institutional structures of nation-states. But, how do the Functionalists propose to go about it?

As noted above, the Functionalists' prime concern is with developing piecemeal cooperative organisations at the regional level in non-political areas like economic, technical, scientific, social and cultural sectors where the possibility of forging effective cooperation among the states appears to be highly practical. These apparently non-political sectors are collectively referred to, in the Functionalist literature, as functional sectors where the possibility of opposition or resistance appears minimal. This is based on the assumption that efforts to establish functional organisations at the micro level in non-political sectors such as energy production and distribution, transportation and communication control: health protection and improvement, labour standards

and exchanges etc. are least likely to be met with opposition. There is a greater possibility of successful functioning of such non-political functional organisations as these can be of mutual advantage to the participating states. The possibility of a higher success rate of such functional bodies gets further enhanced by the fact that they do not appear to pose any challenge, at least apparently, to the national sovereignty of the participating states.

One of the most important assumptions of the Functionalist school is based on the concept of what is called "spillover" effect. The concept of spillover is similar to that of "demonstration" effect as used in the discipline of economics. The underlying belief of the spillover concept is that cooperation in one area would open new avenues for similar cooperation in other areas. For example, successful forging of cooperation in the area of coal and steel production would spill over into other functional areas like transportation, pollution control etc. Such a process of cooperation, the Functionalists argue, would eventually lead to political unification of a given region.

The strength of the Functionalist school of thought lies in the fact that they tend to emphasise cooperative aspects of international behaviour and sidestep conflictive aspects. In contrast to the Realists who look at the world in terms of politics of conflict and irrationality, the Functionalists view the world through the prism of cooperation and reason. The Functionalists believe that the accumulation of the process of functional organisations would not only help link people and their interests across national boundaries but would also eventually relegate the nation-states to the "museum of institutional curiosities".

2.6.3 Neo-Functionalism

In contrast to the Functionalist theory, which seeks to create a New World order in which the sovereign states take a back seat, Neo-Functionalism or the integration theory seeks to create new states through the integration of the existing states. This is achieved initially at the regional level eventually culminating, in the long run, in the creation of a single world state. The idea that integration between states is possible if the political process of spillover facilitates it is basically drawn from the experience of European Union. The neo-Functionalists thus prefer to emphasise cooperative decision-making processes and elite attitudes in order to assess the process towards integration.

Ernst Haas is considered to be the chief proponent of this school of thought. Although Haas builds on Mitrany, he rejects the notion that technical matters can be separated from politics. Haas defines integration as "the tendency toward the voluntary creation of larger political units, each of which self-consciously eschews the use of force in the relations between the participating units and groups". Integration, for Haas, has to do with getting self-interested political elite to intensify their cooperation. Put differently, Haas views integration as a process by which the actors concerned begin voluntarily to give up certain powers and evolve new techniques for tackling common problems and resolving mutual conflicts. Joseph Nye carries this theme further when he asserts that regional political organisations "have made modest contributions to the creation of islands of peace in the international system". These studies suggest that the way towards peace and prosperity is to have independent states pool their resources and even surrender some of their sovereignty to create integrated communities to promote economic growth or respond to regional problems. What distinguishes the neo-Functionalists from the Functionalists thus is that they focus primarily on formal institutions in an attempt to determine the extent to which national as opposed to international agencies carry out important functions.

2.7 THEORY OF COMMUNICATION

The communications theory in international relations is considered to be an integral part of what has come to be called **sociological liberalism** strand of thinking. Unlike the Realists who view international relations exclusively in terms of the study of relations between the governments of sovereign states, sociological liberals assert that it is also about **transnational** relations i.e. relations between people, groups, and organisations belonging to different countries. James Rosenau defines **transnationalism** as, "the processes whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations **among** private individuals, groups, and societies that **can** and do have important consequences for the course of events". As is evident from the above definition, the notion of **community** and the process of interdependence are considered to be important elements of international relations. The underlying assumption of the communication theory, which builds on the notion of **transnationalism**, is that as transnational activities increase, people in distant lands get linked and their governments **become** more interdependent. This leads to a situation whereby it **becomes** more difficult and a costly proposition for states to act unilaterally and to avoid cooperation with the neighbours. As a result, states not only become wary of the rising cost of war but also work towards the goal of creating a peaceful international community.

Karl Deutsch is considered to be the **chief** proponent of the **communications** theory, or perhaps more appropriately, **communications** approach in international relations. This approach seeks to measure the extent of communication **and** transactions between societies by watching the flow of international transactions, such as trade, tourists, letters, and **immigration**. The **central** argument of the **communications** approach, as **articulated** by Deutsch, is that a high degree of transnational ties between societies would lead to **peaceful** relations that would **amount** to more than the absence of war. Such transactions, the **argument** goes, will eventually lead to the development of what Deutsch calls **security communities** or integrated socio-political systems. Integration in this context means that a "sense of **community**" has **been** achieved and that people have come to agree that their **conflicts** and **problems** can be resolved "without resort to large-scale physical force". Deutsch identifies two major subcategories of **security communities**—**amalgamated** and **pluralist**. He maintains that both of these are **characterised** by the absence of intra-community wars,

Among the **amalgamated** security communities, Deutsch believes that United States fits the bill since its unified federal structure enables it to exercise central political control over a **continent-sized** region. Pluralist security communities, on the other **hand**, lack such central political authority. However, the various national Units that together constitute a pluralist security community tend to refrain from fighting **one** another and thus do not need to fortify their borders. North American continent and Western Europe, relatively larger areas, are believed to be good examples of pluralist security communities. From the perspective of the communications approach, integration is viewed both as a process **leading** toward political unification and as the end product of that process—**amalgamated** and pluralist security communities.

2.8 THEORY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Liberals are not **unanimous** on how to resolve conflicts in the international system. There are probably as many divergent approaches to address the issue of conflict in the international system, as there are different strands within **liberalism**. However, what is **common** to all the strands is the underlying emphasis on the role of **human reason** and **rationality** in securing

international cooperation, which in turn will help resolve conflicts between various state actors. Moreover, it is this commonality between them, which distinguishes the liberals from the Realists who treat conflict as a permanent feature of world politics. While the Realists believe that recourse to war is a necessary condition for resolving conflicts, liberals stress that conflicts can be resolved by forging international cooperation without actually resorting to coercive means. Unlike the Realists, as noted above, who believe that existence of a hegemonic (dominant) power is a prerequisite to cooperation, the liberals are of the view that cooperation can be achieved through non-coercive bargaining based on identification of mutual interests. Where the liberals differ from each other is how to go about it.

As you might have perhaps already noticed, different strands of liberalism, as discussed above, approach the issue of resolving conflicts differently. We have already seen the views of liberal institutionalists including the Functionalists and neo-Functionalists and the communication theorists in this regard. In the following section, therefore, we shall focus primarily on those strands of liberalism namely, interdependence liberalism and republican liberalism which we have not covered so far and see as to how do they approach the issue of resolving conflicts in the international system. This might also help us identify the points of departure of these liberals from the ones already discussed above.

How do interdependence liberals seek to resolve conflicts? Such liberals are of the view that a high division of labour in the international economy increases interdependence i.e. mutual dependence between states, which discourages and reduces violent conflicts between them. The emergence of "trading states" such as Japan and Germany in the post-War period provides strength to the assumption of the interdependence liberalism. The underlying assumption of this strand of liberalism is that such trading states tend to refrain from the traditional military-political option of high military expenditure and instead prefer to focus on the trading option of an intensified international division of labour that increases interdependence. Such an assumption received a tremendous fillip in the wake of the end of the Cold War with the trading option being hugely preferred even by very large states. Rosecrance is of the view that the end of the Cold War has made the traditional military-political option less urgent and thus less attractive.

The theory of "complex interdependence" formulated in the 1970s by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye took the logic of interdependence to a new height. Distinguishing this version of post-War interdependence from the earlier and simpler kinds of interdependence in which the use of force was always an option in the case of conflicts between states. These theorists argue that the process of modernisation is fast increasing the level and scope of interdependence between states. Under conditions of complex interdependence, transnational actors are increasingly becoming much more important with the consequence that military force has become a less useful instrument of policy. As a result, international relations are increasingly becoming more like domestic politics. As Keohane observes: "Different issues generate different coalitions, both within governments and across them, and involve different degrees of conflicts. Politics does not stop at the water's edge". The interdependence liberals thus argue that in most of these conflicts military force is fast becoming redundant. Other sources of non-military power like "negotiating skills" are increasingly becoming much more important. Keohane and Nye thus argue that under complex interdependence states are getting more preoccupied with the "low politics" of welfare and less concerned with "high politics" of national security, which would eventually pave the way for a world free of all conflicts.

Republican Liberals approach the issue of conflict via democracy. The underlying assumption is that liberal democracies are better equipped to resolve conflicts and less prone to war as these

are based on the foundation of peaceful existence and rule of law. They, therefore, argue that democracies are far more law-abiding than other political systems. This, however, does not mean that liberal democracies never go to war. As a matter of fact, democracies have gone to war as often as non-democracies. But the underlying argument here is that democracies rarely fight each other. Republican liberals are, therefore, generally very optimistic about the role of democracies in establishing long-term world peace. The obvious question that arises here is what makes them so very optimistic about the prospects of long-term world peace. It may be useful to look at the observation of Sorensen in this regard who argues that with the increase in the number of democracies in the world in the recent years, the prospects of a more peaceful world has, if anything, brightened up. In such a world, he further argues, international relations will be characterised by cooperation instead of conflict. Michael Doyle, perhaps, most systematically addresses the question as to why democracies are at peace with one another. He advances three elements to strengthen the claim that democracy leads to peace with other democracies. First, democracies follow democratic norms of peaceful resolution of conflicts. Given the fact that democratic governments are controlled by their citizens who are generally against waging wars with other democracies, democratic governments therefore encourage peaceful international relations. Second, democracies hold common moral values which lead to the formation of what Kant called a "pacific union". Union, not in the sense of a formal peace treaty, but a zone of peace based on the common moral foundations of all democracies. Such commonalities tend to encourage peaceful ways of resolving conflicts both at the domestic and international levels. Thirdly, ever increasing economic cooperation and growing interdependence between democracies strengthen international peace and minimises the chances of conflict. In the pacific union, "the spirit of commerce", a term coined by Kant, will result in mutual and reciprocal gain for those involved in international economic cooperation and exchange eventually rendering the practice of war obsolete.

2.9 SUMMARY

What becomes abundantly clear from the foregoing discussion is the fact that liberals do not speak in one homogenous voice. There are various strands within liberalism, each of which approaches international relations from its own unique vantage point. However, there are certain common underlying themes cutting across different strands that provide a common identity to liberalism as a school of thought in international relations. For example, the underlying emphasis on the role of *human reason* and *rationality* in securing international cooperation is common to all the strands of liberalism. Moreover, it is this commonality between them, which distinguishes the liberals from the Realists who treat conflict as a permanent feature of world politics. While the Realists believe that recourse to war is a necessary condition for resolving conflicts, liberals stress that conflicts can be resolved by forging international cooperation without actually resorting to coercive means. Unlike the Realists who believe that existence of a hegemonic (dominant) power is a prerequisite to cooperation, the liberals are of the view that cooperation can be achieved through non-coercive bargaining based on identification of mutual interests.

2.10 EXERCISES

- 1) Identify the underlying assumptions of liberalism. Also, identify the main differences between the Realists and the liberal frameworks.
- 2) What distinguishes the neo-liberals from the traditional liberal scholars? Do the neo-liberals present a contrasting view of world politics from that of the traditional liberals?

- 3) What do you mean by "order" in international politics? Bring out the Realist and Liberal views on international/world order.
- 4) Is globalisation different from globalism? If so, in what respect?
- 5) Bring out the differences between Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism. In what ways do they strengthen the liberal framework of international relations?
- 6) What is meant by the notion of "security communities"? In what ways can they be realised?
- 7) How do the liberals approach the issue of resolving conflicts in international relations?

UNIT 3 MARXIST AND OTHER RADICAL APPROACHES

Structure

- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Marxist Approach to the Study of International Relations
 - 3.2.1 Core Elements of the Marxist Approach
- 3.3 Theory of Imperialism
- 3.4 Theory of Colonialism
- 3.5 Theory of Neo-colonialism
 - 3.5.1 Nkrumah's Thesis on Neo-colonialism
- 3.6 Theory of Hegemony
- 3.7 Summary
- 3.8 Exercises

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The Marxist approach to the study of international relations contrasts sharply with the conventional paradigms discussed in the earlier Units. What makes the Marxist approach unconventional is its insistence on the need for change. Unlike the Realist and liberal, it is not status-quoits' and stands for radical change of the existing international/world order. In sharp contrast to Realism and liberalism, the Marxist approach envisions a rather uncommon view of international relations. While the former portray world politics in much familiar ways of "struggle for power" and "interdependence" or "complex interdependence", the Marxists seek to go to the roots of world politics by exposing a deeper underlying "hidden" truth. To the Marxists, such a truth lies in the fact that all the familiar events of world politics like wars, treaties, international aid programmes etc. take place within structures which deeply influence these events. What are these structures then? These are the structures of a global capitalist system. Any understanding of world politics, the Marxists thus argue, must be based on a broader understanding of the processes that operate within global capitalism.

3.2 MARXIST APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Theorists of international relations in the West have for long maintained that orthodox Marxist theory contains anything of relevance on international relations. In terms of a theoretical analysis of international relations, they are of the view that Marx himself had little to contribute. Such assertions may not be totally unfounded given Marx's preoccupation with the analysis of the structures of national capitalism, but it would be patently wrong to assume that he never reflected on issues relevant to international relations. Although Marx was primarily concerned with analysing the structures of national capitalism, and particularly the antagonistic relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, an *internationalist* perspective was nevertheless implicit in his work. This was evident in Marx's recognition that class loyalties cut across national divisions, which enabled him to proclaim, at the end of the *Communist Manifesto*, "Workers of the world! Unite!" In other words, whereas liberal and Realist theories hold that power is organised *vertically*, reflecting the division of the world into independent states, Marxism advances a theory of *horizontal* organisation based on international class. However, the implications of viewing capitalism as an *international system* were not fully explored until

Lenin's Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Lenin argued that imperial expansion reflected domestic capitalism's quest to maintain profit levels through the export of surplus capital, and that this, in turn, brought major capitalist powers into conflict with one another: the resulting war (the First World War) being essentially an imperialist war in the sense that it was fought for the control of colonies in Africa, Asia and elsewhere.

Before we get down to discussing the theories of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and hegemony we must be clear in our minds that Marx's ideas have been interpreted and appropriated in a number of different and contradictory ways resulting in a number of competing schools of Marxism. Underlying these different schools are several common elements that can be traced back to Marx's writings.

3.2.1 Core Elements of Marxist Approach

All Marxists agree that the social world must be viewed and analysed as a totality. Consequently, they not only view the academic division of the social world into different areas of enquiry like history, philosophy, economics, political science, sociology, international relations etc. as arbitrary but also unhelpful. They instead insist that understanding one without knowledge of the other is not possible because the social world can only be studied as a whole. The need for adopting an interdisciplinary approach in any meaningful understanding of the world politics was emphasised by Marx himself in his *Capital* I. His suggestion in this context was to start with the simplest of social relations and then proceed to build them up into a more and more complex picture. Thus, for Marxist theorists, the disciplinary boundaries that characterise the contemporary social sciences must be transcended in order to have a proper understanding of the dynamics of world politics.

Another key element of the Marxist approach is the **materialist** conception of history. The central argument here is that it is the economic development of a society, which determines the processes of historical change. What it basically means is that economic development effectively serves as the motor of history. The central dynamic that Marx identifies is tension between the means of **production** (land, labour and capital) and **relations** of production (the way the means of production are arranged in any given society) that together form the economic base of a given society. Developments in the economic base act as a catalyst for the broader transformation of society as a whole. This is because, as Marx argues in his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, "the mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general". Thus, the legal, political, and cultural institutions and practices of a given society reflect and reinforce the pattern of power and control in the economy. It follows logically, therefore, that change in the economic base ultimately leads to change in the "legal and political superstructure".

Marxists attribute a very special status to class in their analysis of society. In contrast to liberals who believe that there is an essential harmony of interests between different social groups, Marxists hold that society is systematically prone to class conflict. Marx, for example, argues in the *Communist Manifesto*, which he co-authored with Engels, "the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggle". In capitalist society, the main axis of conflict is between the bourgeoisie (the capitalist) and the proletariat (the workers).

Having seen some of the essential elements of Marxist approach in this section, we will now turn to the task of examining some of the important theories like imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and hegemony.

3.3 THEORY OF IMPERIALISM

Broadly understood as the policy of extending the power or rule of a state beyond its boundaries, imperialism in its earliest usage served as an ideology that supported military expansion and imperial acquisition by drawing on nationalist and racialist doctrines. It was in this sense that the term was originally used as an invective against the expansionist policy of Napoleon I and a little later against the expansionist policy of Britain. Even though imperialism in its classical form has become a thing of the past, it continues to remain a useful analytic category in explaining various phenomena in contemporary society. It is now more commonly used to describe the system of political domination or economic exploitation that the pursuit of such goals helped to establish. So much so that since the Second World War, the word imperialism has virtually become synonymous with the oppression and exploitation of the weak and impoverished countries by the powerful ones. In the Marxist tradition, imperialism is seen as an economic phenomenon that typically results from the pressure to export capital. Several contemporary Marxists are of the view, as would become evident later on in the Unit that far from being over the phenomenon of imperialism continues to thrive under new forms. For example, Neo-Marxists draw attention to a more subtle form of imperialism termed as neo-colonialism, through which industrialised powers control foreign territory by economic domination while respecting the territory's formal political independence.

However, the frequent use of the two terms—colonialism and imperialism—interchangeably adds to a general confusion over their precise meanings. While "colony" is a people detached from a larger entity and settled in a distant place implying emigration, imperialism derived from the term "imperium" connotes exercise of command or domination of one people by a stronger people without implying emigration. In other words, imperialism describes the relations between a dominant and subservient society without the latter being necessarily reduced to a formal colony.

J. A. Hobson, an English economist, is universally accredited with the task of formulating the scientific concept of imperialism in his seminal work *Imperialism: A Study* in 1902. Hobson's study focused on late-19th Century imperialism, which could be distinguished from previous forms of imperialism in two ways: the existence of several empires in competition with one another, and the predominance of finance capital over mercantile capital. The central argument of Hobson was that the accumulation of capital and saturation of internal markets led to a situation whereby it became urgent to seek outlets for investment abroad. The process of excessive accumulation of capital leading to a search for investment abroad is termed by Hobson as the "economic taproot of imperialism". Hobson believed that excessive accumulation of capital took place primarily because of oversaving which in turn got a fillip from the unequal distribution of wealth. Following from this, Hobson prescribed the need for social reforms. He believed that equitable distribution of wealth in society would increase the purchasing power of the people, which in turn would expand the markets. Expansion of markets thus would not only provide for increased internal capital investments but would also greatly ease the pressure for investment abroad. Several Marxist theorists, however, have expressed strong reservations to Hobson's prognosis.

Different theories of imperialism as articulated by several Marxist theorists like Rudolf Hilferding (1877-1941), Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), and V. I. Lenin (1870-1924) question and challenge the Hobsonian assumption that social reforms can resolve the contradictions created by imperialist expansion. For example, although Hilferding in his *Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase in Capitalist Development* (1910) agreed with Hobson that imperialist competition led inevitably to violence, he vehemently rejected the possibility of expanding internal markets

through wage increases. He was of the view that such an alternative would necessarily reduce profits. Noting the dominant role of finance capital and the concentration of capital under monopoly ownership of an oligarchy, Hilferding concluded that this extreme polarisation of wealth under imperialism presaged the "last stage" of the fight between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Once most of the means of production were concentrated in few hands, the expropriation of the "capitalist oligarchy" would give rise to socialism. Hilferding thus linked the fight against imperialism to the fight for socialism, and the fight for political power to the fight for economic power. The relationship between imperialism and national oppression was acknowledged, but subordinated to a class analysis and the class struggle.

Rosa Luxemburg also viewed imperialism as "the last stage in the historical race of capitalism". Proceeding from a Marxist class analysis, she described the crucial role played by the unequal **exchange** between imperialist (capitalist) and colonised (pre-capitalist) countries in the accumulation of capital. In *The Accumulation of Capital*, she also emphasised the historical role played by militarism in capital accumulation, and pioneered the study of the relationship among political domination, **military** occupation, and external debt. Moreover, in addition to describing how militarism is used to ensure the conditions of accumulation (through the subjection of colonies, as a weapon in the competitive struggle between capitalist **countries**, etc.), Luxemburg argued that militarism "is a pre-eminent means for the realisation of surplus value; it is in itself a **province** of accumulation", which would later form the basis of the "**military-industrial complex**" of the great empires.

Lenin is perhaps the first Marxist to offer a systematic analysis of modern imperialism. In *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin began his discussion of imperialism by asking what he called "the main question": "**whether** it is possible to reform the basis of imperialism, whether to go forward to the accentuation and deepening of the antagonisms which it endangers, or backwards towards allaying these antagonisms". Pessimistic of the possibility of reforming capitalism of its imperialist tendencies, he rejected such notions by insisting that imperialism was the inevitable "highest stage" of capitalism, which could only be defeated by revolution. "**Imperialism**", wrote Lenin, "is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of all territories of the globe has been completed".

Lenin thus distinguished modern imperialism from the old **by** pointing out that the special feature of modern **imperialism** was the export of capital rather than export of ordinary commodities **and/or** a desire for new investments rather than new markets for goods as naively believed by Hobson. As he observed: "Imperialism is the direct continuation of fundamental properties of capitalism in general". He viewed it as a special stage of capitalism that developed by about 1900.

Lenin was highly critical of Kautsky for his **theory** of "ultra imperialism" on the ground that it was nothing more than a **restatement** of Hobson's theory of "**inter-imperialism**". He attacked Kautsky for masking the true nature of **imperialism** by way of insisting that "a union of world imperialism, and not struggle amongst imperialisms", was possible, and that "a phase when war shall cease under capitalism" would come. Contrary to Kautsky's assertion that "the rule of finance capital lessens **the** unevenness and contradictions in world economy", Lenin was of the view that "**in** reality, it *increases* them". Lenin further added: "**Monopolies**, oligarchy, the striving for domination instead of the striving for liberty, **the** exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations **by** an extremely small group of the richest or most powerful nations—all these have given birth to **those** distinctive characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as a parasitic or decaying capitalism".

3.4 THEORY OF COLONIALISM

Derived from Greek, the terms "colonisation" and "colonialism" broadly connote the permanent settlement of a new territory by a group of people who have moved there from their original home: a colony. Although the two terms are frequently used interchangeably, they have distinct meanings. While foreigners frequently use colonisation to refer to the process of permanent settlement of a new territory, colonialism refers to **political** control or rule of the people of a given territory by a foreign state. It is thus possible that **colonisation** may occur without colonialism. However, in the context of the modern world, "colonisation" is also often used to refer to the process of establishing the colonial rule of a state over the inhabitants of other territories, whether or not significant movements of population accompany this from the country of the colonising state to its colonial territory. However, when this does occur, it is distinguished by the term "settler colonies". For example, in the Americas settler Portuguese, Spanish, **French**, English and other Europeans established colonies in the centuries following Columbus's fateful voyage of 1492, while a permanent settler presence was insignificant in the European colonies of Asia. Africa presents examples of both settler colonies—the French in Algeria, Portuguese in **Angola** and Mozambique, British in Kenya and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Dutch and then British in South Africa—and **other** colonies where the European presence was mostly limited to the agents of **political** rule (civil and military officials) and economic activity (merchants, plantation managers, mining engineers), who returned "**home**" on retirement. However, in French colonialism, colonies were thought of as part of **the mother country**, meaning that colonial peoples were granted formal rights of citizenship.

The evolution of imperialism in the 20th Century has assumed two distinct forms--colonialism and neo-colonialism. The latter will be taken up separately in **the** next section of the Unit. However, from the **point** of view of colonialism being a **form** of imperialism, it is broadly understood as the theory or practice of **establishing** control over foreign territory and turning it into a "**colony**". Colonialism is **thus** usually distinguished by settlement and by economic domination. In contrast, neocolonialism is essentially an economic phenomenon based on the export of capital from an advanced country to a less developed one, as seen, for example, in so-called US "**dollar imperialism**" in **Latin America**.

The Marxists are probably the ones to have presented the most systematic treatment of the theory of colonialism by focusing on several general issues. First, they try to link the direct political control of non-capitalist societies with the reproductive requirements of European and American industrial capitalist economies in **the** 19th Century. **Second**, they focus on the political, economic and ideological implications of industrial capitalist entry into non-capitalist societies with a view to understanding the possibility of **development** of socialism in both the industrial capitalist and **colonised** societies. This was necessary as they considered capitalism to be a prerequisite to socialism. And finally, they **analyse** the possible consequences of socialist **developments** in colonial societies for socialist transformation in colonising countries.

In the Marxist tradition, these issues have **been** approached from **within** different theoretical and political perspectives. The most detailed **commentary** by Marx on colonialism appeared in 1853, which he wrote while analysing the **impact** of British colonial rule on India. Marx argued that colonial control was necessary not simply as a means for gaining access to markets and raw materials, but also as a means for excluding rival industrial nations, and in cases where the reproduction of non-capitalist economies was particularly resistant to capitalist penetration. In Capital III, Marx **further** stressed the importance of the colonial state for transforming those non-capitalist modes whose political level was crucial for **their** reproduction.

Luxemburg further developed the role of colonialism in effecting capitalist penetration in non-capitalist economies thereby transforming them in capitalist economies. She posited four capitalist mechanisms for undermining natural economies or non-capitalist modes of production. This, she argued, could be done by introduction of a commodity economy and an internal separation of trade from agriculture, or by a forcible possession of their fertile land, raw materials and labour power. She argued that only colonialism could achieve this undermining successfully which came as a last resort when all other mechanisms like trade, investment and monetisation had failed to restrict the reproduction of the natural economy.

It was with the publication of Hilferding's *Finance Capital* in 1910 that colonialism began to be viewed more specifically as the outcome of developments in a particular phase of industrial capitalist growth. Hilferding associated colonialism with the rise to dominance of finance capital and the resultant increase in the export of capital from industrial capitalist economies in the late 19th Century leading to conflicts between industrial nation states over the annexation and consolidation of colonial areas. Lenin extended this further by arguing that the export of capital to colonised areas would lead to an expansion and deepening of capitalist development. As already seen above, Lenin was highly critical of Kautsky's theory of "ultra-imperialism" and instead focused on inter-imperialist rivalry between nation states by questioning their possibilities for cooperative exploitation of colonised areas. This, coupled with Lenin's belief in Marx's notion of capitalist penetration as progressive, ultimately laid the basis for one strand of the debate on colonialism in the Third International. The views of Kautsky and Bukharin on colonialism formed other strands of the debate. They were of the view that capitalist production, rather than spreading evenly through the colonial economy, would remain confined to sectors operating in the interests of the industrial capitalist economies. However, M. N. Roy, Eugene Varga, and Pronin were the ones who later on best represented Lenin's perspective on colonialism. These debates on the forms of capitalist development through colonialism ultimately laid the basis for the emergence of new theories of underdevelopment and dependency—a subject matter that we shall take up in detail in the next Unit.

3.5 THEORY OF NEO-COLONIALISM

The term neo-colonialism was probably used for the first time by Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, the first black African State to receive independence after being a European colony. It was in the context of the independence of Malaysia five months after Ghana in 1957 that Nkrumah used the term neo-colonialism to ridicule the move by pointing out that nothing had changed in reality except the flag and some other superficialities. Such superficialities were evident from the fact that Malaysia was still a British colony as the British controlled its capitalist economy, that British troops were still stationed in Singapore (then a part of Malaysia), and that the country was still very much oriented towards Britain. This provoked Nkrumah to use the term neo-colonialism as he found the new arrangement to be nothing different but a new variety of colonialism. Later on, Nkrumah elaborated it in a book, *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, whose title emulated Lenin's, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. This, in fact, was no coincidence but a result of Lenin's deep influence on Nkrumah's political thinking.

3.5.1 Nkrumah's Thesis on Neo-colonialism

From the perspective of the newly liberated states of Afro-Asia, Nkrumah has rightly come to be considered the pioneer of the theory of neo-colonialism. He considered neo-colonialism to be the last stage of imperialism. A few excerpts from his work will illustrate the essentials of his theory of neo-colonialism:

The essence of 1x0-colonialism is that the State, which is subject to it, is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside ... The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world ... Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress ... Neocolonialism is based upon the principle of breaking up former large United colonial territories into a number of small nonviable States which are incapable of independent development and must rely upon the former imperial power for defense and even internal security. Their economic and financial systems are linked, as in colonial days, with those of the former colonial ruler ... "Aid", therefore, to a neocolonial State is merely a revolving credit, paid by the neo-colonial master, passing through the neo-colonial State and returning to the neo-colonial master in the form of increased profits. Secondly, it is in the field of "aid" that the rivalry of individual developed States first manifests itself. So long as neo-colonialism persists so long will spheres of interest persist, and this makes multilateral aid—which is in fact, the only effective form of aid—impossible.

In essence, Nkrumah's work has come to be widely accepted as an integral part of a larger enquiry into the understanding of the complex structures of world capitalism.

One would find it difficult to refute the argument that many former colonies are still essentially satellites of the great powers and other rich countries. Perhaps, the most obvious and important manifestation of neo-colonialism is the current pattern of international trade. The great bulk of international trade today both in terms of volume and value is carried on among the industrially developed rich countries of the West. They benefit both from buying and selling and from providing shipping, insurance, banking, and other services necessary to the conduct of international trade. Moreover, the trade between the rich and poor countries is still primarily based on a "colonial economy"; that is, the rich countries sell manufactured goods and semi-finished goods to the poor countries, mostly ex-colonies, in exchange for commodities like foods, fuels, and raw materials. Since the rich countries control much of the commodity production in the poor countries, they tend to hold down their prices, despite characteristic short-term price fluctuations. And since they also control their own factories, they tend to keep the prices of manufactured goods high. Thus, the poor countries are caught in a "squeeze" from which it is very difficult to escape.

3.6 THE THEORY OF HEGEMONY

The term "hegemony" is derived from the Greek word *hegemonia* meaning leader. A widely used term in international relations theory, hegemony is most frequently used to connote the predominant position of the most powerful state in the international system or the dominant state in a particular given region. Viewed from this power-centric Realist perspective, the United Kingdom came to be regarded as the hegemonic power of the 19th Century as the United States is currently considered the hegemon in the post-Cold War era. Following the same logic, India is widely viewed as the current regional hegemon in South Asia. It is not surprising thus that almost all the non-Marxist scholars of different theoretical predilection in the international relations theory use the term hegemony to describe the dominant-dependent structure of relationship between the hegemon and the states that fall under its hegemony.

In the Marxist theory, on the other hand, the term hegemony is used in a very different and specific sense. Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), Italian Marxist and social theorist is widely considered to be the most influential 20th Century Marxist exponent of the theory of hegemony.

For Gramsci, hegemony refers to the ability of a dominant class to exercise power by winning the consent of those it subjugates, as an alternative to the use of coercion. Unlike the traditional Marxists, Gramsci puts emphasis on the non-coercive form of class rule. He believed that while it could be true to speak of coercion or the fear of coercion as the main reason behind the inability of exploited and alienated majority in overthrowing the system that caused them so much hardship in the case of less developed societies like the pre-Revolutionary Russia, the situation was quite different in the case of the more developed countries of the West. Gramsci believed that in case of the developed West, the system was maintained not merely by coercion, but perhaps more importantly through consent. It is in this context that his theory of hegemony becomes crucial in understanding the nature of modern capitalist society. Hegemony is thus typically understood, in the Gramscian sense, as a cultural or ideological process that operates through the spread of bourgeois values and beliefs throughout society.

Consent, according to Gramsci, is produced and reproduced by the hegemony of the ruling class in society. It is this hegemony that allows the bourgeois values—the moral, political, and cultural values of the dominant class—to become widely dispersed throughout society and to be accepted by subordinate classes as their own. In other words, the bourgeois ideology is so deeply internalised by the subordinate and exploited classes that it becomes part of the unquestioned “common sense”. The penetration of such bourgeois values takes place through the institutions of civil society like the media, the education system, churches, voluntary organisations, etc.

Gramsci's contribution to the general body of Marxist thought lies in the fact that he successfully managed to shift the focus of Marxist analysis more towards super structural phenomena as against the traditional obsession of the orthodox Marxists with the economic base. After Gramsci, international relations theorists such as Robert Cox have attempted to “internationalise” his thought by transposing several of his key concepts, most notably hegemony, to the global context. While drawing upon Gramsci's notion of hegemony and transposing it to the international realm, Cox argues that hegemony is perhaps as important for maintaining stability and continuity at the international level as it is at the domestic level. According to Cox, successive dominant powers in the international system have shaped a world order that suits their interests, and have done so not only as a result of their coercive capabilities, but also because they have managed to generate broad consent for that order even among those who are disadvantaged by it. Using the examples of the two hegemons, United Kingdom and the United States, Cox manages to demonstrate that the ruling, hegemonic idea of “free trade” is so widely accepted today in the world that it has almost become part of the “common sense” even though it impacts upon the peripheral states adversely and only the dominant states tend to gain from it. Cox argues that the degree to which a state can produce and reproduce its hegemony in the international system indicates the extent of its power in the system. The success of the United States in gaining near universal acceptance for Neo-liberalism, Cox argues, shows the dominance of the current hegemon in the international system.

3.7 SUMMARY

It becomes evident from the foregoing discussion that Marx himself had little to contribute by way of a theoretical analysis of international relations. Nevertheless: his ideas have been interpreted and appropriated in a number of ways resulting in a number of competing schools of Marxism—an issue that will be explored at greater length in the next Unit. However, underlying these different schools are several common elements that are often traced back to Marx's writings.

What is noteworthy about the Marxist approach to international relations is the fact that despite the collapse of Communist party rule in the former Soviet Union and other East European states, Marx's work has retained its relevance in the contemporary world. Of particular importance is Marx's analysis of capitalism, which has yet to be bettered. The main strength of the Marxist approach to international relations lies in its ability to reveal the hidden workings of global capitalism. These hidden workings are analytically crucial as they provide the context in which international events occur.

3:8 EXERCISES

- 1) Bring out the core elements of Marxist approach to international relations.
- 2) What does Hobson mean by "economic taproot of imperialism"? How have the Marxist scholars reacted to his theory of imperialism?
- 3) How is colonialism different from imperialism? Also highlight the Marxist views on colonialism.
- 4) What do you mean by neo-colonialism? Do you agree with the view that even after the end of colonialism, it continues to operate under the garb of neo-colonialism?
- 5) Do you agree with the view that Nkrumah is the pioneer of the theory of neo-colonialism? Outline his main thesis.
- 6) In what ways, do you think the Marxist theory of hegemony helps in enriching our understanding of the dynamics of international politics?

UNIT 4 NEO-RADICAL APPROACHES

Structure

- 4.1 Introduction
 - 4.2 Theory of Underdevelopment
 - 4.2.1 Origin of the Underdevelopment Theory
 - 4.3 Theory of Centre-Periphery
 - 4.3.1 Andre Gunder Frank on Centre-periphery
 - 4.3.2 Sarnir Amin on Centre-periphery
 - 4.3.3 Immanuel Wallerstein on Centre-periphery
 - 4.4 Theory of *Dependencia*
 - 4.4.1 Key Arguments of the Theory of *Dependencia*
 - 4.5 Summary
 - 4.6 Exercises
-

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The neo-radical approaches in international relations variously known as "development of underdevelopment", "centre-periphery", and "dependency" offer significant insights into an understanding of the nature of capitalist penetration in the Third World—Afro-Asian and Latin American countries. Even though these approaches are primarily concerned with explaining the impact of capitalist penetration into such relatively poorer developing countries of the Third World, they do not represent a single unified body of literature. Rather, each of these represents a distinct way of explaining the cause of "development" or "underdevelopment" in the Third World societies. However, more often than not all these approaches are broadly clubbed together under the rubric of what has come to be called the "dependency framework".

What probably makes these approaches neo-radical in nature is their insistence on maintaining an analytic and methodological equidistance from both the dominant modernisation framework and the classical Marxist perspective in explaining the causes of development or underdevelopment. These approaches, therefore, do not fall neatly within either of the two frameworks i.e. the modernisation and Marxist theories, although in terms of ideological affinity they are clearly closer to Marxism than to the dominant modernisation project. We shall now discuss each of these approaches separately.

4.2 THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The growing dissatisfaction with the failure of the traditional theories of development in resolving the problems of poverty, hunger, health, and the like in the poorer Third World countries led to the beginning of a new search for alternative analytic and explanatory framework. Particularly after the Second World War, it had become quite apparent to certain observers in the Third World countries that diffusion of capital from the advanced to the less developed nations was far from a reality. The intellectual reaction that thus followed led to the emergence of a new radical thinking eventually culminating into what has come to be known as underdevelopment theory. In sharp contrast to the Western-centric development theory that treats underdevelopment as an inherently universal feature of the development process at least in the initial stage and .

hence focuses exclusively on explaining how development takes place, the underdevelopment theory seeks to problematise underdevelopment historically by seeking to theorise its persistence. Explaining underdevelopment thus constitutes the core concern of the underdevelopment theorists.

4.2.1 Origin of Underdevelopment Theory

Broadly speaking, the underdevelopment theory mainly originated from two distinct sources: one, theoretical debates within Marxism, and two, the concrete development experience of Latin America. The issue of the possibility of capitalist development in the non-European countries exactly on the pattern of the West has for long dominated the agenda of classical Marxist debates on capitalist development. From Marx to the Russian Narodniks to Lenin, the issue of the feasibility and progressive role of capitalism continued to remain a constant theme of debate until the end of the 1950s when the classical Marxist view was effectively challenged by a series of influential writings. The classical Marxist position that capitalist development in underdeveloped countries is eminently possible and that capitalism has a progressive role to play in such societies was vehemently rejected by this new genre of writings. The first influential work in this context was Paul Baran's *Political Economy of Growth*. Baron's pessimism over the possibility of capitalist development in the underdeveloped countries can be gauged from his own writings:

[E]conomic development in underdeveloped countries is profoundly inimical to the dominant interests in the advanced capitalist countries. Supplying many raw materials to the industrialised countries, providing their corporations with vast profits and investment outlets, the backward world has always represented the indispensable hinterland of the highly developed capitalist West. Thus the ruling class in the United States (and elsewhere) is bitterly opposed to the industrialisation of the so-called "source countries" and to the emergence of integrated processing economies in the colonial and semi-colonial world.

The second source of the origin of underdevelopment theory relates to the concrete development experience of Latin America and the concomitant writings of Latin American scholars, which resulted from such experiences. Notable among these are scholars like Raul Prebisch, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Osvaldo Sunkel, and Theotonio Dos Santos who challenged the thesis that capitalism nurtures development and indeed outlined a new theory of underdevelopment. This particular version of underdevelopment as fashioned by the above scholars came to be widely known as dependency theory, a theory that we shall examine separately in details later on in the Unit. This was so because these scholars put emphasis on the exploitative structure of the world capitalist economy in which Western economies enjoyed a dominant position vis-a-vis the Latin American economies, which were reduced to the status of mere satellites. Interestingly, the primary interest of the work carried out by the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) under its head Prebisch was primarily, at least in the initial stage, directed towards an understanding of the terms of international trade. It was only at a much later stage that it took the form of a full-fledged theory of centre-periphery, which shed new light on the understanding of underdevelopment in the Third World countries.

4.3 THEORY OF CENTRE-PERIPHERY

By rejecting the classical standard theory of international trade as developed from Adam Smith and Ricardo through Hecksher, Ohlin, and Samuelson, the ECLA School argued that the world economy had been polarised into a centre and a periphery. The main argument of the ECLA

School rested on the assumption that the traditional international division of labour has resulted in excessive concentration of production and wealth at the centre leading to increased **pauperization** of the periphery. This point is illustrated by advancing the argument that while the centre is characterised by a production structure, which is homogenous and diversified, the periphery is **symbolised** by a structure, which is heterogeneous and specialised. The periphery is specialised in the sense that production is confined to a few primary **commodities** and to enclaves, which have little or no **linkages** to the rest of the **economy**. It is heterogeneous on account of its dualism—some structures **characterise** the capitalist system and others perpetuate the features of the previous **pre-capitalist** system. Because of these features, the ECLA School concluded **that** the economy 'of the periphery could not benefit much **from** the international division of labour and international trade. Furthermore, the ECLA managed to demonstrate through concrete evidences of the Latin American economies that low levels of productivity and unfavorable **terms** of trade only add up to sustained unequal development. The merit of the ECLA School lies in the fact that they **look** at both development and underdevelopment as two sides of the same coin. Some of the prescriptions as suggested by the ECLA school to get out of the exploitative **structure** relate to promoting "spontaneous **industrialisation**", "planned **industrialisation**", and the need for a "dynamic elite" which will help the Latin American economies to steer clear the impediments posed by the age-old yoke of imperialist and/or neocolonial control.

Despite such efforts made by the ECLA School to explain the dynamics of development and underdevelopment, it has been criticised as being **reformist** in orientation. The reason why it was dismissed as reformist is that it almost uncritically accepted the proposition that the petty bourgeois intelligentsia and the industrial bourgeoisie in the periphery would play a progressive role by supporting national interests and restricting the influence of foreign interests. **Furthermore**, the ECLA School is also criticised for its inability in explaining the mechanisms of exploitation adequately.

4.3.1 Andre Gunder Frank on Centre-periphery

Drawing upon the work of Baran and ECLA, Andre Gunder **Frank** came to represent the full development of dependency theory and to **epitomise** the left-wing challenge to the progressive thesis of classical Marxism. In his main work, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (1967), and through several other writings, Frank developed his thesis that 'underdevelopment as we know it today, **and economic** development as well, are the simultaneous **and** related products of the development on a world-scale and over a history of more than four centuries, at least, of a single integrated economic system: **capitalism**'. He maintained that capitalism at centre and the **periphery** are **dynamically** related and the **dynamics** produce development at both ends. However, the problem according to Frank is that in **contrast** to the centre, which alone reaps all the **benefits** of development, what **occurs** at the end of the periphery is the **development of underdevelopment**. In other words, the underdevelopment of the periphery or the satellite is a condition of the development of the centre or the metropolis. This is so because capitalism, according to Frank, constantly generates underdevelopment in **satellite/** peripheral countries through the expropriation of surplus by the advanced metropolitan **countries**. Frank thus **visualises** "a whole chain of metropolises and satellites, which runs from **the** world metropolis down to the **hacienda** or rural merchants who are satellites of **the** local commercial metropolitan centre but who, in their turn, have **peasants** as their satellites." Influenced heavily by Paul **Baran's** ideas, Frank **demonstrates** how an inimical relationship **exists** between **economic** development in satellite countries and the dominant interests in advanced capitalist countries. **Thus**, to him, any understanding of undrdevelopment in satellite countries can be explained only by referring to the single **historical** process of capitalist development. To him, a satellite

country experiences the highest growth rate only when its link with the **metropolitan** countries is the weakest. Thus, any explanation of "development of **underdevelopment**" of a specific country can be understood only by locating its position in the hierarchy of the world capitalist **system** as a whole, and secondly, by identifying the **economic** structure of the society under investigation. Given the highly **hierarchised** structure of the **world capitalist economy**, Frank argues that there is **no** way of eliminating **underdevelopment** at the periphery other than **de-linking** from capitalism altogether.

Frank's **theory** of development of underdevelopment has been criticised mainly on two grounds. From a historical point of view: Lacklau raises two fundamental questions: First, is it true that Latin America had a market-oriented capitalist **economy** from the very beginning? The problem is that capital and the capitalist mode of production do not necessarily represent the same thing. In fact, capital may exist in antiquity, but the capitalist mode of production **emerges** only when a free labour **market** can be identified.

Secondly, to what extent were the structural conditions of **capitalism** prevalent in the 16th Century Europe when, according to Frank, the capitalist **domination** started in Latin America? Apart from that, Frank tries to locate the fundamental contradictions of a society in the field of circulation rather than production, with the result that his theory "can go no more than halfway towards an explanation of why development generates underdevelopment". It has also been argued that Frank, perhaps, overemphasises the vertical relationship between metropolitan and satellite countries and thereby ignores the historical ties, which sustain the dependency structure.

4.3.2 Samir Amin on Centre-periphery

Another major contribution to the theory of **underdevelopment** came from the **African** scholar Samir Amin. In his major work *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment* (1974), Amin argued that the **industrialised** countries and the less developed countries are integrated in a manner, which inhibits capitalism from performing its **historical** role of developing the productive forces in the underdeveloped countries. He asserted that from the beginning of the imperialistic period, the less developed countries were no longer capable of attaining "autonomous self-sustaining growth", whatever their level of per capita output might be. One aspect of this state of affairs is that the periphery seeks development in competition with the centre, which dominates it and distorts its structures, rendering them unsuitable for self-sustaining development. This competition leads to a distortion toward export activities, the choice of light industries and low technology, and toward tertiary activities, all of which transfer "multiplier" effects from the periphery to the centre and block economic **growth**.

4.3.3 Immanuel Wallerstein on Centre-periphery

Immanuel Wallerstein, whose monumental studies of the history of capitalism epitomise the world system theory, is widely considered to be its most prominent protagonist. In other words, Wallerstein's world-system theory—a direct development of Lenin's work on imperialism and the Latin American dependency school—is universally acknowledged as yet another very significant contribution to underdevelopment theory. Given the wide historical sweep and the range of issues covered in Wallerstein's work, a number of other writers such as Christopher Chase-Dunn, Frank and Gilts etc. have further developed his work by building on his initial foundational work.

In his major work *The Capitalist World Economy* (1979), Wallerstein traced the major institutions of the world—classes, ethnic and national groups, households, and states—to the development

of the capitalist world system. The modern world-system, for Wallerstein, is an example of a world-economy. According to Wallerstein this system emerged in Europe at around the turn of the 16th Century. It subsequently expanded to bring about the current situation whereby, as Wallerstein believes, there is no corner of the globe, which is not thoroughly "implicated" within it. And all this could become possible because of the "ceaseless accumulation of capital" or in a word, capitalism. Thus the modern world-system, according to Wallerstein, is above all else a "capitalist system", which provides its central dynamic. He argued that the world system is unequal and that this is related to its capitalist character. The inequality resolves into a hierarchy of three kinds of states or regions—the periphery, the semi-periphery, and the core. According to Wallerstein, the three zones of world economy are linked together in an exploitative relationship in which wealth is drained away from the periphery to the centre. As a result, the relative positions of the zones become ever more "deeply entrenched" i.e. the rich get richer whilst the poor become poorer.

4.4 THEORY OF DEPENDENCIA

As a concept, the term "dependency" is widely used in international relations to explain the "dominant-dependent" structure of relations both among and between the nation-states. However, as a school of thought, dependency theory seeks to explain the causes of economic development and underdevelopment. Evolving in Latin America during the 1960s, the dependency theory later found favour in some writings about Africa and Asia. The dependency theory particularly became very influential in Latin America where it exerted considerable influence on government policies in the region.

With contributions from varied scholars like Prebisch, Furtado, Sunkel, Paz, Cordoso, Faletto, Dos Santos, and Marini, Latin America contributed more than any other region to the development of underdevelopment theory, in this case the dependency version. This probably explains why underdevelopment theory is largely associated with Latin America and regarded as Latin America's major contribution to the social sciences.

Apart from Latin America, the dependency theory has had varying degrees of influence in other regions like Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Even though the dependency approach has not been very influential in countries like India, it has nonetheless enjoyed a visible presence. Indian Marxist scholars like Dadabhai Naoroji and M. N. Roy did contribute considerably towards the development of dependency perspective. However, the appeal of the dependency theory in India in terms of its impact on the policy circles is not at all comparable to that of the Latin American countries. The situation in Africa, however, has been far better than that of India. It became quite influential in policy circles in Africa under the influence of the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research (CODESRTA), the umbrella social science organisation of Africa. CODESRIA in due course of time became a key centre for the leaders of the more radical nationalist and liberation movements from Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia—all of whom had their own distinct theories of underdevelopment which emanated from their experiences of exploitative imperialism. The popularity of the dependency perspective in this part of the world can be gauged from the fact that Julius Nyerere, president of Tanzania, personally popularised it so much that it became part of the official ideology in independent Mozambique and Angola.

4.4.1 Key Arguments of the Theory of Dependencia

There is apparently no unified body of thought called dependency theory. Nor is there any consensus among scholars about a theory of dependency. A careful look at the existing literature

on dependency reveals that they move in different directions with both advocates and critics putting forward a multitude of positions. While there are some critics who attack the nationalist inclinations of some advocates of dependency who oppose outside influence, others argue that too much of a focus on external considerations of dependency avoids considerations of the internal class struggle. There are still others who believe that dependency obscures the analysis of imperialism. This is probably so because dependency theory encompasses a large body of literature which incorporates many concepts and methods. However, the distinguishing feature of all dependency writers is that they treat the social and economic development of underdeveloped countries as conditioned by external forces. What this means is that the more powerful advanced capitalist countries of the world dominate the underdeveloped countries in the international capitalist system.

The decade of 1960s and 1970s witnessed growing assertions from the originators of the dependency approach. They stressed that the issue of development in the Third World should be treated as a historically distinctive problem. According to the *dependentistas*, the world economy was divided into two sets of countries—the core comprising of the developed capitalist Western Europe and Northern America, and the periphery constituted by the Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. *Dependentistas* held the view that the Third World countries were increasingly being drawn into the world capitalist system and that their economies were increasingly being transformed into the capitalist mode of production through the continuous penetration of capital from the core countries to the peripheral areas. All this, over the span of the past three to four centuries, they argued, has linked up the peripheral economies with that of the core economies. This brought about a situation whereby, they argued; both dependent capitalism and pre-capitalist formulations existed at the same time in the absence of fullest realisation of the potentials of capitalist development. The *dependentistas* thus asserted that underdevelopment, much like development, is also a historical process, which allowed the core economies to establish and perpetuate the structures of dominance vis-a-vis the peripheral economies. Consequently, the core economies began to develop at the cost of the peripheral ones. The resultant dependence of the periphery upon the core for capital, investments, credit, market, technology and finished products provided leverage to the core countries in world capitalist system. The increased vulnerability of the periphery *vis-à-vis* the core resulted in the perpetuation of exploitation of the peripheral countries at the hands of the core countries. The subordinate position of the peripheral economies thus directly weakened their bargaining capacity in areas of trade which allowed the core countries a free hand in regulating the prices of primary commodities and raw materials resulting in constant fluctuations of the prices and deterioration in terms of trade. All this enabled the core countries to accumulate capital in their parts of the world at the cost of the peripheral economies. This exploitative relationship between the core and the periphery was not only structurally linked but also enabled the core countries to accumulate the surplus from the peripheral economies on a world scale. The loss of access to its surplus thus explains the continued impoverishment and marginality of the peripheral economies in the world capitalist system.

As aptly noted by the Brazilian social scientist, Dos Santos:,

By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of inter-dependence between two or more economies: and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.

The Chilean economist Osvaldo Sunkel further elaborates upon the issue of foreign penetration into the political economies of the Third World and how outside economic and political influences affect local development and reinforce ruling classes at the expense of the marginal classes:

Foreign factors are seen not as external but as intrinsic to the system, with manifold and sometimes hidden or subtle political, financial, economic, technical and cultural effects inside the underdeveloped country. ... Thus the concept of "dependencia" links the post-War evolution of capitalism internationally to the discriminatory nature of the local process of development, as we know it. Access to the means and benefits of development is selective: rather than spreading them, the process tends to ensure a self-reinforcing accumulation of privilege for special groups as well as the continued existence of a marginal class.

It thus becomes quite clear from the above that the surplus is appropriated by and invested in the advanced capitalist countries where it leads to rapid economic development. The *dependentistas* thus argue that the appropriation of the surplus by the developed core both causes and perpetuates inequalities among the peripheral economies of the Third World countries. In explaining the dynamics of exploitation, they go as far back as the colonial period by tracing the roots of historical looting and plundering of the colonies by the "metropolitan" countries. They argue that what was true of the colonial times is also true of the present day persistence of underdevelopment in the Third World. The only difference being that while in the colonial period such extraction/appropriation of the surplus took the form of direct appropriation of products i.e. looting and plundering, in the contemporary times it operates through what is called "repatriation of profits". One of the most distinguishing features of the dependency theory is that unlike the orthodox Marxist theory, it seeks to explain the extraction/appropriation dichotomy as an aspect of the relationship among countries. and not classes.

4.5 SUMMARY

As against the decades of 1960s and 1970s when the dependency theory had indeed become very fashionable in the Third World and did appear as the viable alternative explanatory framework, it has now become common to proclaim that it is more or less dead. Both Western mainstream scholarship and left-wing intellectuals appear to have rejected the tendency of underdevelopment theory to hold the West responsible for the underdevelopment of the Third World. This is justified on the basis of the spectacular economic performance by some of the Third World countries like the Republic of South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan—the so-called **Asian Tigers**, and the other newly industrialising economies. There are other factors as well, which explain the increasing unpopularity of the underdevelopment theory today. Some of the cataclysmic international political developments like the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Westernisation of the former Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the renewed hegemonisation of the market in the wake of a globalising world have all added to the declining influence, if not outright rejection, of the underdevelopment theory. Moreover, the recent spate of economic crisis engulfing some of the Third World countries, especially in Latin America and Africa, has forced them to go for IMF-sponsored neoclassical solutions like structural adjustment programs etc.

Be that as it may, it would be difficult to deny the fact that the dependency framework did make bold efforts to provide an alternative explanation of underdevelopment. Not only did it challenge the conventional wisdom as represented by the modernisation theory and orthodox Marxism, but also sought to show the way forward. Despite its demise as a sound theory, it continues to

remain a valid analytic and explanatory framework as far as understanding underdevelopment in the Third World is concerned. Finally, one can conclude by saying that its demise paradoxically attests its increasing significance.

4.6 EXERCISES

- 1) What is the neo-radical approach to the study of international relations?
- 2) How is underdevelopment different from development? Bring out the essential features of the theory of underdevelopment.
- 3) What do you understand by the centre-periphery model of underdevelopment? What are the views of different scholars on this?
- 4) What made the dependency theory extremely popular in Latin America in the 1970s? Locate the other areas where it has had deep impact on the policy makers by accounting for possible reasons.
- 5) Bring out the key arguments of the dependency approach.
- 6) Why do you think has the revolutionary appeal of the dependency framework declined in the more recent times?

UNIT 5 POST-STRUCTURALIST AND POST-MODERNIST APPROACHES

Structure

- 5.1 Introduction
 - 5.2 Post-structuralist or Post-modernist Approach to International Relations
 - 5.2.1** Underlying Key Themes of Post-modernism
 - 5.3 Interrogating the Nation-State
 - 5.4 Post-colonialism: Culture, Ideology and Hegemony
 - 5.5 Post-colonial Theory in International Relations
 - 5.6 Summary
 - 5.7 Exercises
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5.1 INTRODUCTION

A careful reading of the last four Units should prove very handy in approaching the present one. This Unit seeks to introduce you to some of the more contemporary radical approaches to international relations. It is hoped that after reading this Unit you will have learned something about the empirical state of the world, but even more importantly you will be more aware of the problems involved in theorising about international relations in world politics. As you will recall, the last four Units provided you with overviews of the three dominant theories of international relations (Realism, Liberalism, and Structuralism) and the contemporary debate between the two leading mainstream theories, Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism. The underlying common assumptions of these approaches rest on the premise that international politics operates within a given structure and that "facts" or "truth" about the world could be objectively discerned if scientific method was followed. It is a different thing though that these approaches differ a great deal from each other in respect to what constitutes "truth" and how can it be discovered? It is this underlying emphasis on "objectivity" and "truth" in these approaches that perhaps explains why they have all been labeled as "rationalist" or "positivist" in nature.

However, the above mentioned three approaches have dominated the discipline of International Relations for the last fifty years to such an extent that it has come to define the broad contours of disagreements in international theory mainly among the adherents of these approaches. The ensuing debates, termed as "inter-paradigm debate", have thus significantly dominated the thinking about international relations. It is believed to have silenced all possible controversies and questions that could be asked about the state of theory in international relations. This may, however, be far from true. As pointed out by Steve Smith, "... the inter-paradigm debate by no means covers the range of issues that any contemporary theory of world politics needs to deal with. Instead it ends up being a rather conservative political move because it gives the impression of open-mindedness and intellectual pluralism; whereas, in fact, of the three theories involved in the inter-paradigm debate one, Realism, has tended to be dominant, with its contest with liberalism being the central theme of what debate has existed in international theory". As noted in the first Unit, Realism could emerge as the dominant school primarily because of its ability to project the world in commonsensical terms. Given the dominance of Realism, all attempts at providing alternative conceptions of world politics were either dubbed as normative or value-laden as against Realism, which was considered to be "scientific" and "objective". And yet, most recent debates in international relations take up precisely these two issues of

"objectivity" and "commonsensical projection" of world polities, deeply embedded in Realism. in order to subvert its dominance.

This makes it incumbent upon us to take stock of some of the major developments in the field of international theory in the recent years, the last two decades in particular. One of the major developments in this regard has been the debate between Neo-realist¹¹ and Neo-liberalism or what has come to be called the neo-neo debate or the neo-neo synthesis. However, there is near unanimity among scholars that the neo-neo debate is neither highly contentious nor intellectually very different from each other. Both share "an epistemology as they focus on similar questions and agree on a number of assumptions about man, the state, and the international system". The second major development should be of immediate relevance to us from the point of view of the present Unit. This is relatable to the emergence of a range of new approaches being developed to explain world politics. This could become possible partly because of the changes effected in the nature of the world order by the end of the Cold War. The end of Cold War significantly reduced the credibility of Realism, especially in its Neo-realist guise, which took the stability of the bi-polar system for granted. With the dramatic disappearance of the bipolar system in the wake of the end of the Cold War, the explanatory power of Neo-realism too met the same fate. However, this by no means was the only reason for the emergence of new approaches. Steve Smith outlines three other important reasons: first, the inadequacy of the Realist approach to explain the rise of non-state actors, social movements, radically expanding transactions, and the like. As pointed by him, "new approaches were needed to explain these parts of world politics, even if Realism was still good at dealing with the power politics aspects". Second, there were major developments underway in other academic disciplines, especially in the social sciences generally, but also in the philosophy of science and social science that attacked the underlying methodological (i.e. how to undertake study) assumption of Realism, a position known as positivism; in its place a whole host of alternative ways of thinking about the social sciences were being proposed, and International Relations simply caught the bug. Third, Realism's dominance was called into question by "a resurgence of its historical main competitor, liberalism, in the form of neo-liberal institutionalism, with this debate now comprising the mainstream of the discipline". Meanwhile, whilst those in the mainstream were engaged in this debate, a series of alternative approaches were being worked out as being more relevant to world politics at the turn of the millennium.

Smith's classification of existing theories in international relations into various categories helps us immensely in appreciating the points of departures between the three dominant theories (positivist theories) and some of the more recent theories broadly known as post-positivist or reflectivist theories. According to him, theories can be distinguished according to whether they are explanatory or constitutive and whether they are foundational or anti-foundational. You might, at this stage, find yourself suddenly loaded with these new and somewhat unsettling terms, but these are expressions, all of which have today become an integral part of the ongoing debate in international relations theory, and are pretty much easy to understand. Let us, first of all, try and get familiar with them. To begin with, all explanatory theories are called foundational whereas constitutive theories are said to be anti-foundational. This needs further elaboration. The main distinction between an explanatory theory and constitutive theory is that while the former sees the world as something external to our theories of it, the latter thinks that our theories actually help construct the world. Or, to put it another way, there has been a rather long debate between those who treat the social world and the natural world alike, and those who think that it is our language and concepts that help create that reality. Theorists who think that the natural and the social worlds are the same are known as naturalist theorists.

In the context of International Relations also a line is frequently drawn between explanatory theories and constitutive theories. All the theories discussed in the previous Units like Realism,

liberalism and structuralism are identified as explanatory theories because they share the assumptions of positivism, a theme which we shall come to a little later in this section. In these theories, the **main** objectives of a **theory** are believed to be "to report on a world that is external to our **theories**; to uncover regularities in human behaviour and thereby explain the social world in much **the same way** as a natural scientist might explain the **physical world**".

In **sharp** contrast to the above, most of the approaches that have developed in the last decade or so have come to be called constitutive theories. In other words, all the post-positivist approaches in **international** relations thus **qualify** as constitutive theories. For these theories, theory is not external to the world it seeks to explain. In **fact**, it is theory, the post-positivists assert, which **determines** how one **thinks** about the world. To put **it** another way, for these theorists, it is their theories of the social world, which actually constitute the world.

Having seen the difference between **explanatory** and constitutive theories let me quickly bring it to your notice that all **explanatory** theories, broadly speaking, are believed to be foundational while constitutive theories are anti-foundational. But then, what is meant by foundational and **anti-foundational** theories? The foundational and anti-foundational debate basically refers to the issue of **basis of knowledge claims**, i.e. whether there is any neutral or objective basis for testing or **evaluating** our beliefs about the world. In other words, how do we know that **what we know** is true! While a foundationalist asserts that all truth claims can be judged true or false, an **anti-foundationalist** questions this since there are never neutral grounds for so doing. According to **anti-foundationalists**, each theory will **define** what counts as the facts and so there will be no neutral position available to determine between rival claims. As noted by Smith: "Foundationalists look for what are termed meta-theoretical (or above any particular theory) grounds for choosing between truth claims; anti-foundationalists think that there are no such positions available".

The most important distinction between the traditional approaches that comprised the inter-paradigm debate and the more recent approaches is that unlike the **former**, the new approaches are much less wedded to **foundationalism**. For example, **some** of the post-positivist approaches like post-modernism, feminist theory, and normative theory have come to be identified with **anti-foundationalism**. Whereas the "neo-neo" debate, historical sociology and critical theory are viewed as closer to foundationalism. Interestingly, such distinctions were never really discussed before in the literature of international relations. It was only in the last decade or so that such distinctions have started surfacing in a big way in international theory with a view to "undermining Realism's claim to be delivering the truth".

All this could **become** possible, as noted by Smith, "because of a massively important reversal in the way in which social scientists have **thought** about their ways of constructing knowledge". This brings us back to the discussion on **positivism** that I had referred to early on in this section. Positivism, as a school of thought, **remained** dominant in International Relations till about the late 1980s. It was nearly impossible to think of a social scientist in International Relations who was not influenced by the positivist thinking. However, it has come in for severe attack since then. But, what is positivism anyway? Smith defines positivism "as a view of how to create knowledge that relies on four main **assumptions**: first a belief in the unity of science, i.e. that the same methodologies apply in both the scientific and non-scientific worlds. Second, there is a distinction between facts and values, with facts being neutral between theories. Thirdly, that the social world, like the natural one, has regularities, and that these can be "discovered" by our theories in much the **same way** as a scientist does in looking for the regularities in nature. Finally, that the way to **determine** the truth of statements is by appeal to these natural facts; this is known as **an** empiricist epistemology".

Crucially, recent years have witnessed a rejection of these positivistic assumptions in international theory leading to the coinage of the term "a post-positivist era" by Yosef Lapid. Much of the traditional international relations theory was dominated by positivism until about the 1980s when its salient assumptions came in for severe attack from the newly emerged "post-positivist" approaches. It may thus not be very difficult for us to appreciate the point as to why most of the new approaches tend to move closer towards constitutive and anti-foundational assumptions. According to Smith, the current theoretical situation in international relations is characterised by three main positions: first, rationalist theories that are essentially the latest versions of the Realist and liberal theories dealt with in the previous Units; second, reflectivist theories that are identified as post-positivist; and thirdly social constructivist theories that seek to bridge the gap between the first two sets of theories. We will, however, limit ourselves here only to a discussion of the post-positivist or reflectivist theories. Even among the reflectivist theories, our main concern will be with understanding the emergence of post-structuralist or post-modernist approach in international relations theory. Let me, however, point out at the very outset that several terms are interchangeably and simultaneously used in the literature of international relations to connote what we have just identified as one of the dominant trends in contemporary international theory i.e. reflectivist theory. Some of the most popular of these terms are "radical", "alternative", "post-positivist" and even simply "new".

5.2 POST-STRUCTURALIST OR POST-MODERNIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Post-structuralism or post-modernism has widely come to be recognised as an influential theoretical development throughout all the social sciences in the last two decades or so. Let me point out at the very outset that the two terms are often used interchangeably in the literature of international relations. And, we also use the two terms in the same sense throughout the text. In the context of International Relations, it is said to have made its entry in the mid-1980s. However, it could make its mark only in the last few years. Today, it is perhaps as popular a theoretical approach as any other reflectivist theory. The issue of its popularity will be examined while exploring the meaning of post-modernism in international theory.

The post-modernist approach to international relations is not an easy one to define, even though one comes across a large number of theorists who claim to be post-modernists. As Richard Devetak observes in his extremely useful summary of post-modernism, "part of the problem is defining precisely what post-modernism is". One of the most popular and widely used definitions has been offered by Jean-Francois Lyotard who writes: "Simplifying to the extreme, I define *postmodern* as incredulity towards meta-narratives". But, what is meant by meta-narratives? Metanarrative or Grand theory is believed to possess clear foundations for making knowledge claims, or what in technical terms is called *foundational epistemology*. What Lyotard means by this is that post-modernism is essentially concerned with deconstructing, and distrusting any account of human life that claims to have direct access to "the truth". Put another way, post-modernists are suspicious of any theory or approach based on an assumption that it is possible to uncover "truth". No wonder then, post-modernists are highly suspicious of Marxism and feminism because both assume that it is possible to determine foundations upon which to base moral judgements and truth about the world. Post-modernists are also unhappy with critical theory, since they believe that it too is just another grand theory or meta-narrative.

5.2.1 Underlying Key Themes of Post-modernism

Two most important themes of post-modernism, as discussed by Devetak relate to the power-knowledge relationship, and the textual strategies used by post-modernist international theorists.

The theme of power-knowledge relationship in post-modern scholarship is most deeply influenced by the works of Michel Foucault. This is so because power-knowledge relationship, for Foucault, constitutes a core concern of his work. In contrast to the rationalist theorists, Foucault believes that there is a close relationship between power and knowledge. Unlike the positivists, he does not believe that knowledge is immune from the workings of power. Instead, Foucault's main argument is that power in fact produces knowledge. For him, "all power requires knowledge and all knowledge relies on and reinforces existing power relations". Thus there is no such thing as "truth", existing outside of power. According to post-modernists, truth is not something external to social settings, but is instead part of them. Resultantly, post-modernists are primarily interested in knowing which types of "truths" and knowledge practices support what kinds of power relations.

In the context of international relations, post-modern international theorists have used this insight to examine the "truths" of international relations theory to see how the concepts and knowledge claims that dominate the discipline in fact are highly contingent on specific power relations. Smith uses two recent examples from the works of Cynthia Weber and Jens Bartelson on the concept of sovereignty to illustrate the power-knowledge relationship. As noted by Smith: "In both cases the concept of sovereignty is revealed to be both historically variable, despite the attempts of mainstream scholars to imbue it artificially with a fixed meaning, and is itself caught up in the practice of sovereignty by producing the discourse about it".

Post-modernists' approach to the study of history within the power-knowledge framework is another area within post-modernism that of late has become very popular. Foucault's contribution in this respect has a special position in post-modernist literature. His approach to the study of history has come to be known as "genealogy". The key underlying assumption of genealogy is that there is no such thing as truth, but only "regimes of truth". And, these regimes of truth, for Foucault, reflect the ways in which, through history both power and truth develop together in a *mutually sustaining relationship*. In other words, as Smith observes, "what this means is that statements about the social world are only "true" within specific discourses". Accordingly, post-modernism is concerned with how some discourses and therefore some truths dominate others. It is precisely here that the notion of power comes in. It is for this reason that post-modernists are opposed to any meta-narratives, since they imply that there are conditions for establishing the truth or falsity of knowledge claims independent of any discourse. It is this negation of the role of power in the construction of truth and knowledge claims at the hands of the positivists or rationalists that is so vehemently opposed by post-modernists.

The second important theme of post-modernism, as discussed by Devetak, relates to the use of *textual strategies*. What purpose does it serve? From the point of view of post-modernism, the construction of the social world is equated with that of a text. The insight of Jacques Derrida, an Algerian-born French post-structuralist, in this context throws significant light on the arbitrariness of the construction of the social world. Derrida's central argument is that the world is like a text in the sense that "it cannot simply be grasped, but has to be interpreted". Such interpretations of the world, for Derrida, reflect the concepts and structures of language, what he terms "the textual interplay at work". He proposes two main tools to enable us to see how arbitrary are the seemingly "natural" oppositions of language. These are *deconstruction* and *double reading*.

Smith paraphrases Derrida's views on these two important concepts very lucidly. According to Smith: "Deconstruction is based on the idea that seemingly stable and natural concepts and relations within language are in fact artificial constructs, arranged hierarchically in that in the case of opposites in language one term is always privileged over the other. Therefore,

deconstruction is a way of showing how all theories and discourses rely on artificial stabilities produced by seemingly objective and natural oppositions in language (rich/poor, good/bad, powerful/powerless, right/wrong)". The second important concept used by Derrida is that of double reading. He uses this for "showing how these stabilisations operate by subjecting the text to two readings". While the first reading is "a repetition of the dominant reading to show how it achieves its coherence, the second points to the internal tensions within a text that result from the use of seemingly natural stabilisations". According to Smith: "The aim is not to come to a "correct" or even "one" reading of a text, but instead to show how there is always more than one reading of any text".

Such techniques, of late, have indeed become very popular with international relations theorists. Richard Ashley, for example, has used the technique of double reading for a study of the concept of anarchy. In the first reading, Ashley provides a reading of the "anarchy problematic" as done in the traditional literature. His second reading shows "how the seemingly natural opposition between anarchy and sovereignty that does the work in the first reading is in fact a false opposition". As Smith notes: "By radically disrupting the first reading Ashley shows just how arbitrary is the "truth" of the traditional assumptions made about anarchy and the kind of logic of state action that it requires". Another work following the method of double reading by Rob Walker examines the construction of the tradition of Realism in international theory. He shows rather convincingly that construction of such a tradition could only become possible "by ignoring the major nuances and complexities within the thoughts of the key thinkers of this tradition, such as Machiavelli and Hobbes". David Campbell is yet another international theorist who has recently applied post-modern theory to empirical examples in world politics, such as the construction of US foreign policy, the Gulf War, and the Bosnian conflict.

Finally, any theory that seeks to shake the very foundation of established wisdom is bound to raise eyebrows. And, post-modernist theory is no exception. It has been attacked by the dominant mainstream international theory on grounds of being "too theoretical" and for being "far removed" from the "real" world. The post-modernists, however, respond by asserting that in the social world there is no such thing as the "real" world in the sense of a reality that is not open to interpretations. Let me conclude this section with a quote from Smith who puts up a good defence: "It seems clear to me that post-modernism is in fact taking apart the very concepts and methods of our thinking. It helps us think about the conditions under which we are able to theorise about world politics: and to many, post-modernism is the most appropriate theory for a globalised world".

5.3 INTERROGATING THE NATION-STATE

The origin of the concept of modern "nation-state" can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which brought the Thirty Years War to an end with a formal recognition by the European powers of the sovereign independence of each state. A simultaneous outcome of this development was the emergence of the modern international system in which the nation-state came to be treated as the most important actor. The accompanying notion of sovereignty further consolidated the dominance of nation-states by authorising them to act as independent and autonomous entities both within and outside their territorial jurisdictions. However, the issue of the changing status of the nation-state has been a subject of major debate in the literature of international relations. Before we set out to analyse the changing nature of the status of nation-state, a brief discussion of the meaning of the term would be in order at this stage.

Conceptually, the terms "nation" and "state" are quite distinct from each other in terms of both meaning and scope, and yet the two are often used interchangeably in the literature of international

relations. While **the** nation is a historical concept based on **a** cultural identity shared by a single people, the state is a political **Unit** defined in terms of population, territory, and an **autonomous government**. The state provides a basis for political loyalty in the form of citizenship, whereas the nation promotes an effective relationship through which the individual gains a sense of cultural identity. However, nations and states do not always necessarily have the **same** cultural and territorial boundaries. What probably justifies the **usage** of the term nation-state as a generic category is the underlying assumption that the existence of such an entity over the years may lead to some sort of gradual **fusion** between cultural and political boundaries. Such an assumption also supports the need for prolonged maintenance of political control by a **central authority** over a given territory and its inhabitants.

Andrew Heywood's definition of nation-state is particularly **helpful** in an understanding of the multifaceted **nature** of the concept. Heywood views nation-state as "a form of political organisation, and as a political ideal". In the first case, he views it as an "**autonomous political community**" which is bound together by the overlapping bonds of citizenship and **nationality**. It is **thus** seen as an alternative to multinational **empires** and **city-states**. In the latter case, the nation-state is viewed by him as "**a principle, or ideal type**", which is reflected in Mazzini's goal: "every **nation** a state, only one state for the entire nation". Such a principle clearly acknowledges that no modern state is, or can be, "**culturally homogenous**".

There are two *conflicting perspectives* on the future of the nation-state as a viable political Unit. There are those who argue that nation-state both as a principle and form of political organisation has gained in strength and will continue to remain the most viable political Unit in future as well. While others argue that the days of the nation-state are over or **can** well be seen to be getting over. Let us try and **identify** some of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the competing arguments made by the proponents and detractors on the future of the nation-state.

One of the **arguments** put forward in defence of the nation-state relates to the universal acceptance of **the** nation-state as "the sole legitimate unit of political rule". This, the proponents argue, is evident from the **fact** that the whole world today has **become** a world of nation-states. Such beliefs draw strength from **some** of the recent developments in the world. The principle of nation-state as a viable political **organisation** was recently vindicated by the creation of **new** nation-states in the later part of the 20th Century. As noted by Heywood: "Since 1991: at least 18 **new** states have come into existence (14 of them as a result of the disintegration of the USSR), and all of **them** have claimed to be nation-states". The strength of the nation-state is seen to lie in the fact that "it offers the prospect of **both** cultural cohesion and political unity, thus allowing those who share a **common cultural** or ethnic identity to exercise the **right to independence and self-government**". No wonder then, the forces responsible for creating a world of nation-states are seen as "**natural**" and "**irresistible**". In their views, no other social group can ever **claim to constitute** an alternative political **community**. Implicit in such contention is the argument that even **supranational** bodies such as the European Union **will** never be able to replace the nation-state. **and command** the same kind of popular allegiance as **that** of the nation-state.

The detractors, on the **other hand**, present quite a contrasting picture of the future of the nation-state. According to **them**, the nation-state today is confronted by a **number** of challenges. These challenges are posed by **a combination** of "**internal pressures**" and "**external threats**" which have **together** produced **what** has come to be referred to as a "**crisis of the nation-state**". Internally, various kinds of "**centrifugal forces**" like **demands** for greater autonomy or **self-determination**, and the rise of **ethnic** politics are **casting** serious doubts on the **ability** of the nation-states to deliver. Examples of increasing cases of centrifugal forces galore: the Arab-Israel conflict, the

conflict between the Catholics and the Protestants in Northern Ireland, the Basque separatist movement in Spain, the ethnic conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalas in Sri Lanka, and many more. Such instances of growing ethnic assertion and self-determination the world over, the detractors argue, are evidence of the fact that nation-states are no longer able to provide a meaningful "collective identity" or a sense of "social belonging".

The future of nation-state as a viable political unit has particularly come in for attack from a number of external sources. Growth of supranational bodies like the United Nations and the European Union, the advance of economic and cultural globalisation, and the need to find international solutions to the environment crisis are fast rendering the institution of the nation-state meaningless. For example, with the nuclearisation of the world and advances in the technology of warfare, the ability of the nation-states to provide security is increasingly being doubted. This has led to a situation whereby more and more demands are being raised for policing of the world peace by supranational and international organisations. Moreover, with increasing globalisation of economic life, the character of the markets has undergone radical transformation. In the changed international context, markets have become world markets, transnational corporations control most of the businesses, and capital is moved around the globe in the flick of an eyelid. All this has resulted, the argument goes, in the erosion of the power of nation-states in regulating and controlling their economic destinies. Furthermore, given the obsession of the nation-states with protecting their own strategic and economic interests, their attitude towards environment is characterised by indifference and callousness. This has cost the global environment quite dearly. The case of Chernobyl nuclear accident is often cited as an example in this respect. The rise of *global culture* or *mass culture* is yet another example frequently used to show the weakening of "distinctive" national cultures and traditions around the world. The advent of "information superhighway" in the wake of revolutionary changes in the field of communication, and the dramatic growth of international tourism are seen as important developments, which have weakened the hold of the nation-states around the world.

In the context of international relations, the nation-states have for long been treated as the preeminent actors. However, its preeminence both as the principal actor and the fundamental unit of analysis is intricately linked with the dominance of Realism in IR theory. Since Realist theory privileges the nation-state over all other kinds of actors in international relations, it has been rightly characterised as state-centric and power-centric. By logical extension, all non-state actors, or perhaps, more appropriately, transnational actors like multinational corporations and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations are relegated to a peripheral status within the international system. Roughly speaking, Realism retained a dominant position in the study of international relations during the period 1939-89. Even though its dominance was challenged during the 1970s by pluralism and globalism, it reemerged more vigorously in the 1980s under the guise of Neo-realism. However, some of the tumultuous and unpredictable developments of the late 1980s and 1990s like the collapse of the Socialist block accompanied by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the democratic revolutions that swept the world or the surge of international cooperation, integration and change left both the Realists and Neo-realists in a state of awe and shock. It took them completely by surprise. They could never predict the course and intensity of the change that radically transformed the very face of the world. A theory, which could neither predict nor explain such fundamental events in modern history clearly came to be derided by the critics. All this has led to the rise of a new demand for a "paradigm shift" in the study of international relations. Not that Realism has become redundant, but other non-state-centric theories like liberal pluralism, globalism and neo-idealism have come to the fore of international relations. The recognition that transnational/non-state actors are much more important than the Realist school suggests is fast gaining ground in the post-Cold War world order.

5.4 POST-COLONIALISM: CULTURE, IDEOLOGY AND HEGEMONY

Of late, the term "post-colonial" has become quite fashionable, particularly with the institutionalization of what is called "post-colonial studies" within universities the world over. Originating in the field of literary and cultural studies, the term "postcolonial" is today used extensively in social sciences including international relations. However, much before the term "post-coloniality" gained currency in social sciences literature, the thesis was forcefully propounded by Frantz Fanon, particularly in his two books, *Black Skins, White Masks* (1967) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961).

Given the fact that the term "post-colonialism" has become so "heterogeneous" and "diffuse", Ania Loomba finds it almost "impossible to satisfactorily describe what its study might entail". No wonder, the term "postcolonial" has continued to evoke controversy regarding its precise meaning and application. Post-colonialism, as a field of study, is broadly concerned with new ways of studying colonialism and its *aftermath*. Put differently, the process of decolonisation is as much an intrinsic part of this new area of study as colonialism. Loomba argues the prefix "post" complicates matters because it implies an "aftermath" in two senses—temporal, as in coming after, and ideological, as in supplanting. It is the second implication, which the critics of the term have found contestable: if the inequities of the colonial rule have not been erased, it is perhaps premature to proclaim the *demise* of colonialism. A country may be both postcolonial (in the sense of being formally independent) and neo-colonial (in the sense of remaining economically and/or culturally dependent) at the same time." This point can perhaps be better illustrated with the help of an example from international relations. Even though colonialism in its classic form has become a thing of the past, it is widely acknowledged that the usages of terms like the "First" and "Third" worlds entail unequal colonial relations. As Loomba observes: "The new global order does not depend upon direct rule. However, it does allow the economic, cultural and (to varying degrees) political penetration of some countries by others. This makes it debatable whether once-colonised countries can be seen as properly "post-colonial"".

Critics have often emphasised the need for using the term "post-colonialism" with "caution" and "qualifications", for they believe that American post-coloniality and Indian post-coloniality are qualitatively different. The two cannot be treated in the same way just because United States of America was also "anti-colonial in a limited sense" at some point of time. There is broad agreement in the field of postcolonial studies that both the "metropolis" and the "colony" were not only deeply modified by the colonial process, but were also accordingly "restructured by decolonisation". However, "this does not mean", asserts Loomba, that "both are postcolonial in the same way. Post-colonialism, like patriarchy, is articulated alongside other economic, social, cultural and historical factors, and therefore, in practice, it works quite differently in various parts of the world". Loomba thus defines the term "postcolonial" as "a general process with some shared features across the globe. But if it is uprooted from specific locations, "post-coloniality" cannot be meaningfully investigated, and instead, the term begins to obscure the very relations of domination that it seeks to uncover" What is clear from the above is that "post-colonial" is historically, geographically, and culturally a variable term and, therefore, context must not be lost sight of.

Apart from the above, another problem commonly identified with the term "postcolonial" relates to its usage in a narrow chronological sense. It is invariably viewed as designating a point of rupture or radical break from the past. In this worldview, post-colonialism is reduced

to a mere temporal category in the sense of marking the end of one era i.e. colonialism, and beginning of a new period in its aftermath in which the "decolonised" people would be supposedly free to shape their own destiny. However, from the perspective of cultural studies, the term 'postcolonial' refers to 'a significantly more specific condition'—a condition in which no such rupture really occurred. The underlying argument here is that while colonial exploitation might have ended with the formal withdrawal of colonialism, the story does not end here. For, colonialism did not merely exploit the colonies, it also changed them 'permanently' and 'irretrievably'. The colonial past remains deeply embedded in the present of the postcolonial people and mediates their future. This applies equally to their economies, polities, societies, cultures, and indeed even their psychology.

5.5 POST-COLONIAL THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the context of international relations, the term 'Post-colonial' is generally used in the popular sense of designating a rupture i.e. a radical break from the past. As a result, the two terms "Third World" and "Postcolonial World" are often used interchangeably in the literature of international relations. This is so because most of the Third World countries, with a few exceptions, are former colonies. However, this is not to suggest that the postcolonial theory, as understood in the field of cultural studies, is of no use for international relations. On the contrary, several theorists in international relations increasingly use the term 'postcolonial' to depict the "postcolonial" nature of state, nationalism, society, and culture of once-colonised countries, or newly independent countries, or the Third World countries. In a recent perceptive study, Bhupinder Brar proposes to replace the term "Third World" by an alternative term, "Post-Colonial World". According to him: "The basic problem with the term Third World is that it describes essentially the starting position at which the newly independent countries found themselves. It does not clarify why they continue to be poor and backward". Using the term 'postcolonial' in the specific sense in which it is used in the area of cultural studies, Brar argues that the perspective of post-coloniality can illuminate certain areas in international relations which had earlier been neglected. The extension and application of the "post-coloniality" argument in the field of international relations, he asserts, can be particularly helpful in discerning a new pattern of dependency, which is social, cultural, and psychological as against the narrow economic focus of the world system and core-periphery models. However, he does not prefer one at the cost of the other. As he observes: "Instead of using one to the exclusion of the other, it will be more rewarding if we try to understand the post-war period by combining the economic explanation provided by the "world system" and "core-periphery" analyses and the socio-cultural explanation provided by the theory of post-coloniality". The strength of the postcolonial theory, for him, lies in the fact that it, "focuses on a peculiar relationship which former colonies historically came to develop with their colonial masters. This relationship has been aptly described as that of an 'intimate enemy'. In this relationship, much before the enemy is recognized as enemy, its values, beliefs and norms are internalized by the victim, so that the more the victim opposes the enemy, the more it acts like the enemy itself, producing its mirror images in the name of rebellion". This was nothing but a dependency of non-economic nature of the colonized on the colonizer. The colonized were so overwhelmingly hegemonized by the ideas, beliefs, culture, and ideologies of the colonizers that they often could not see the dividing line. Such dependency can also be found, Brar argues, in the realm of post-colonial politics, which have a direct bearing on the future of economic development of postcolonial societies. The hegemony of western developmental and modernization project so overwhelmingly gripped the "national elite" in the postcolonial societies that they could never come out with all alternative developmental agenda. Despite their insistence on pursuing the principle of self-reliance, they

could never break **the shackles** of Western **mindset**. As a result, they ended up imitating the Western model of development, privileging thereby Western modernity and rationalism.

Brar extends the post-coloniality **argument** to yet another area of international relations. This relates to the obsession of most post-colonial states with the notion of absolute sovereignty. What is being argued here is that while seeking to safeguard their freedom, these states "fail to **recognise** two historical facts". As he puts it: "First, the notion of absolute sovereignty is linked directly to the Western states system which was created by the treaty of Westphalia; prior to this treaty, such **notions** existed neither in the East nor in the West. Second, it is this very **system** based on absolute sovereignty, which **made** pursuit of power appear legitimate, and thereby **legitimised** colonialism. The more the post-colonial states insist today on the "principle" of absolute sovereignty, the more the unequal and hierarchical international system gets perpetuated".

5.6 SUMMARY

Summing up a unit, which deals with a vastly disparate body of literature, can be a particularly tricky business. This Unit, as you must have realised, deals with varied kinds of intellectual movements spanning a fairly long tradition of scholarship in the field of international relations. What distinguishes this tradition from the past, as seen in the preceding Units, is its refusal to be bound by conventional frameworks. and its keenness to device new ways of looking at the world. It may only be fair to conclude by saying that both the post-modernist approach and the post-colonial approach shed **new** light on our understanding of international politics. While post-modernism seeks to look at **international** politics afresh by questioning and rejecting the **dominance** of positivist approaches, the post-colonial approach promises to illuminate hitherto unexplored and neglected areas in the field of international relations.

5.7 EXERCISES

- 1) On what grounds do the post-positivist approaches reject positivism?
- 2) Discuss the underlying **assumptions** of post-positivist or reflectivist theory.
- 3) Outline the key underlying themes of **post-modernism**.
- 4) Do you agree **with** the view that the extension and application of **post-modernist** approach in international relations has opened new avenues of research?
- 5) Discuss the conflicting views **on the** future of nation-states.
- 6) Does post-colonialism offer new insights in understanding international relations?

