Acit, Chandigarh vs M/S International Fresh Farm Products ... on 27 July, 2017

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DIVISION BENCH, CHANDIGARH

BEFORE MS. DIVA SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND MS. ANNAPURNA GUPTA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER

ITA No.311/Chd/2015 (Assessment Year : 2010-11)

M/s International Fresh Farm
Products(India) Ltd.,
#3, Sector 5, Chandigarh.

PAN: AAACI5038D

Circle 1(1), Chandigarh.

Vs.

ITA No.703/Chd/2015 (Assessment Year : 2012-13)

M/s International Fresh Farm
Products(India) Ltd.,
#3, Sector 5, Chandigarh.

PAN: AAACI5038D

Vs. The A.C.I.T., Circle 1(1),

 ${\it Chandigarh.}$

The A.C.I.T.,

And

ITA No.754/Chd/2015
(Assessment Year : 2012-13)

The A.C.I.T., Circle 1(1), Chandigarh. Vs. M/s International Fresh Farm

Products(India) Ltd.,
#3, Sector 5, Chandigarh.

PAN: AAACI5038D (Respondent)

(Appellant)

Appellant by : Shri Parikshit Aggarwal Respondent by : Smt.Chandra Kant, Sr.DR Date of hearing : 12.07.2017 Date of Pronouncement : 27.07.2017

ORDER

PER ANNAPURNA GUPTA, A.M. :

TheaboveappealspertaintothesameassesseewiththeappealinITANo.31 1/Chd/2015havingbeenfiled by theassessee against the orderpassed by the Ld. CIT(Appeals), Chandigarh dated 4.10.2013 for assessment year 2010-11whiletheappeals filed in ITANo.703/Chd/2015 and in ITANo.754/Chd/2015 are cross appeals filed by theassessee and Revenue against theorder of Ld. CIT(Appeals)-I, Chandigarh dated 3.6.2015 relating to assessment year 2012-13.

2. It was commongroundbetweenboththepartiesthattheis sueinvolvedintheappeals wasidentical. Therefore they were heard together and are being disposed off by way of this commonorder. For thesakeofconvenienceweshallbedealing with the assessee's appealinITANo.311/Chd/2015.

ITANo.311/Chd/2015(Assessee's Appeal):

3. Ground No.1 r ai s e d by the assessee reads as under:

"That the Learned CIT(A) has erred in upholding disallowance of deduction U/s 80IB(11) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. That the action of the learned CIT(A) is de-void of any merits as non- claim of deduction in earlier years due to ignorance cannot be aground for sustaining the disallowance of deduction. The appellant company satisfies all the conditions for claim of deduction U/s 80IB(11) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It is prayed that the deduction be allowed .

4. The assessee in the afores aidgroundhaschallengedtheactionoftheLd. CIT(Appeals) in upholdingthedenialofdeductionclaimedu/s8oIB(11)oftheIncomeTaxAct,1961(inshort'theAct').

5. Brief f acts r el ev a nt to the i ssu e aret hat the assessee had claimed deduction a mounting to Rs. 27, 66, 031/-u/s8 oIB(11) of the Act which allows deduction of profits deri ve dfrom the business of setting up and operating a cold chain facility for a gricultural produce. Before the Assessing Officer the assesseedem on stra tedthatit was running a cold chain facility for storage and transportation of agricult ur al produce. The Assessing Officer after examining the agreemententered into by the assessee with M/s Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. for cold storage mana gement, disallo wed the claim of deduction statingth at the assessee was not d oing any cold chain business directly but was only providing services to M/s PepsicoIndia Holding (P) Ltd. and earning income from contract and rent. The Assessing Officer further stated that thoughtheassessee hadenteredi ntothesaidagreementwith M/s Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd.intheyear 2005 and had been providing services to its incethenith adnever claimed th esaiddeductioninearliery ears. The Assessing Officer, therefore, heldtha ttheassesseewasnotentitled to deductionu/s8oIB(11) of the Act sinceit di dnotfulfillconditionslaiddowntherein. The deduction, the refore, claim ed of Rs. 27, 66, 031/-wasaddedbacktotheincomeoftheassessee.

6. The matter was carried in appealbefore the Ld. CIT(Appeals) who upheld the order of the Assessing Officer. The relevant findings of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) at paras 2.3 to 2.3 .5 are as under:

2.3 I have considered the facts of the case and the submission of the Ld. Counsel. The appellant had claimed deduction u/s 80IB of Rs. 27,66,031/-, whereas as per the

audit report in form No. 10CCB, the allowable deduction is only Rs, 10,77,611/- and so the claim of deduction of the appellant is not as per the audit report (claim is higher by Rs.16,88,420/-).

2.3.1 The appellant company had claimed before the Assessing Officer that it was eligible for deduction u/s 8oIB(11), since it was running cold chain facility and satisfied the conditions laid down for the said deduction. However, before me the appellant has argued that the Assessing Officer has disallowed the claim of deduction 8oIB (11A)of the Act, but this argument of the appellant is not correct, since the Assessing Officer has actually disallowed the claim u/s

80.IB(11), claimed by the appellant. Thus, there was misrepresentation either before the Assessing Officer or the undersigned in the appellate proceedings.

2.3.2 It is also seen that the appellant had not claimed deduction u/s 80IB in any of the earlier years and has claimed the same for the first time during the year under consideration.

Relevant provision relating to this issue is sub-section (11) of section 80IB, which is reproduced below for the sake of ready reference:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iii) of sub-section (2) and sub-sections (3), (4) and (5), the amount of deduction in a case of industrial undertaking deriving profit from the business of setting up and operating a cold chain facility for agricultural produce, shall be hundred per cent, of the profits and gains derived from such industrial undertaking for five assessment years beginning with the initial assessment year and thereafter, twenty-five per cent, (or thirty per cent, where the assesses is a company) of the profits and gains derived from the operation of such facility in a manner that the total period of deduction does not exceed ten consecutive assessment years (or twelve consecutive assessment years where the assesses is a co-operative society) and subject to fulfilment of the condition that it begins to operate such facility on or after the 1st day of April, 1999 but before the 1st day of April 2004."

2.3.3 Thus, the deduction is 100% of the profits and gains derived from eligible industrial undertaking for first five years beginning with the initial assessment year and thereafter 30% of the profits and gains derived from such industrial undertaking. The point is why such a claim was not made by the appellant during the earlier years. When questioned, the representative of the appellant stated that the claim was not made in the earlier years because the appellant was not aware of the law in this regard. To me, it appears that the claim was not made in the earlier years because the appellant was too well aware of the law and was conscious of the fact that it was not entitled to benefit of this provision. Even for the year under appeal, for which the appellant obviously, took a chance, it has not held a consistent stand.

2.3.4 It is also observed that the appellant has provided services to M/s Pepsico and earning income from contract and rent. The appellant has not segregated the amount eligible for deduction u/s 8oIB out of the Receipts from Pepsico, but this observation/ finding is not much relevant, since it has been held that the appellant is not eligible for deduction u/s 8oIB of the Act.

2.3.5 In view of the above, it is held that the appellant is not eligible for deduction u/s 80IB of the Act and the finding of the Assessing Officer in this regard is upheld, though on different grounds. Ground of appeal No.1 is dismissed."

7. Aggrieved by thesame, theassesseehas come up in appeal before us. During the course of hearing before us, the Ld. counselfor assesseemaded etailed arguments against the disallow ancesomade. The Ld. counselfor assesseep ointed out that theassessee was running a cold chain facility and assessmentyear 2004-05 was the first year of commencing operations. The Ld. counselfor assesseep ointed out that theimpugned assessmentyear, i.e. 2010-11, was the 7th year since ith adcommenced operations and it was in this year that the assessee had for the first time claimed deduction u/s80IB(11) of the Act. There after the Ld. counselfor assessee pointed out that the primary reason for denying deduction u/s80IB(11) of the Act. The Cd. CIT(Appeals) itemer ged that the primary reason for denying deduction u/s80IB(11) of the Act we retwo fold;

a) sincethe afore said de ductionhad not be enclaime dinthe e ar liery ear;

b) sinceith admerelyrented outpremisestoM/s Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. for storage of agriculturalproduce and the revenue earned was rental income which was taxableunder the head'income from houseproperty' and notbusinessincome.

8. ThereaftertheLd.counselforassesseestated that it was amply demonstrated both to the Assessing OfficerandtheLd.CIT(Appeals) that theassessee had no tmerely lease doutit premises of coldstorage to M/s Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd.forstoring its agricultural produce but had also rendered services and taken all responsibility for the properstorage of the goods and that it was a consolidated agreement for providing coldstorage facility to M/s Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd.. The Ld. counselfor assessee at this juncture drewour attention to the copy of the agreement entered into with M/s Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. which was reproduced in the assessment or derals oat pages 4 to 8. The same is reproduced here underals of or reference:

COLD STORE MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT This agreement is made at this 15th day of May, 2005 BETWEEN PepsiCo India Holdings Pvt Ltd, (FritoLay Division), a company incorporated under the Companies Act 1953 and having its registered office at 3B, DLF Corporate Park, Ciutab Enclave- Hi, Gurgaon, Haryana and head office at 4m Floor, Tower A, Global' Business Park, Gurgaon Haryana, and factory at Village Channo hereinafter referred to as PIH (which expression shall unless the context'"

otherwise 'repugnant to the context or meaning there of be deemed to include Its successors in business and assigns) of the ONE PART AND M/S international Fresh Farm Products (India) Limited a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and having, its registered office at House, no 3," Sector 5, Chandigarh, hereinafter referred to IFF (which expression shall unless the context otherwise repugnant to the context or meaning there of be deemed to include its successors in business and assigns). On the Other PART.

WHEREAS

- 1) PIH Is engaged in the distribution of snack food products (hereinafter called "PIH Products") manufactured by Peps! Foods Private Limited for PIH at its factory located at Channo (hereinafter called PFL Factory").
- 2) IFF approached PIH and offered Its services for management of cold store for storage of potatoes owned and owned and stored by PIH (hereinafter "PIH Products") at the cold store owned and managed by IFF and located at Village Channo (hereinafter "IFF Cold Store").
- 3) PIH has decided to entrust alt functions relating to cold store management to IFF AND WHEREAS PIH and IFF have agreed to the terms and conditions set out in this agreement as under;

NOW THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSETH AS UNDER

- 1. Responsibilities of IFF PIH hereby agrees to entrust and allow IFF and IFF, In turn, agrees to undertake for and on behalf and for the benefit of PIH the following functions in respect of the PIH Products from time to time:
 - a) Receipt of PIH goods at IFF Cold Store.
 - b) Storage and Preservation of PIH goods as per the terms of this agreement.
 - c) Transportation of PIH goods from IFF Cold Store to PIH Factory located at Village Channo.
 - d) Conduct Physical Verification of PIH goods.
- 1. Warehousing
- a) IFF shall store the PIH Products received by it in IFF Cold Store
- b) IFF shall receive the PIH Products from the PIH as per instructions received from PIH from time to time and issue a Goods Receipt for the same.

- c) IFF shall take all reasonable care for storage of the PIH Products and shall be deemed to be in the position of a bailee in relation to such goods.
- d) Both the parties agree that transaction relating to Receipt & Issue of PIH Products, affecting the stock balances in the inventory system for stocks at IFF Cold Store shall be effected under the control of IFF' and PIH reserves the right to audit such transactions to determine the source of each transaction.
- e) IFF shall be responsible to follow such storage norms as are specified in Annexure-2
- f) The parties hereto agree to the Review and Reporting Schedule contained in the operating protocol contained in Annexure 3.
- g) The ownership of entire stocks at the IFF Cold Store shall remain with PIH at all times.
- 2. Transferfrom IFFColdstore
- a) A IF F s h all keep 2 (Two) no. of trucks of the specific at ion mentioned Annexure 1 of this agreement at all times at the IF F Cold S torefortransport of the P IH Products to the P IH F actory.
- b) BIFF shall be liable for any loss, damage, mis-delivery, non-delivery or shortage of the Products by reason of any acts of omission or commission on their part or by its employees, contractors, agents or sub-agents. IFF shall within two weeks from the date of any demand made by PIH in that behalf without demur and notwithstanding any objection raised by them, and without any right of set-off or counter claim, reimburse PIH the amount of loss incurred by PIH, failing which PIH shall be entitled to recover such amounts from them in any manner it deems fit.
- c) IFF shall, in the performance of its obligations under this agreement, use its best endeavors to promote the interest of PIH and comply with the instructions and directions of PIH issued from time to time.
- d) IFF will be fully responsible for the Products received by it for any shortages/loss/damage in transit between IFF Cold Store and PIH Factory.
- e) IFF shall arrange to procure all required licenses and/or comply with all regulations and laws.
- 3. Relationship It is clearly understood between PIH and IFF that the relationship between PIH and IFF shall be on principal to principal basis and IFF shall not act as an Agent or shall not represent itself as a representative of PIH in any manner to third party. Both parties, shall be responsible towards their respective employees and compliance with statutory laws. IFF agrees to indemnify and keep indemnified PIH against any non-compliance and vice-versa
- 4. Consideration PIH hereby agrees to pay IFF consideration as per Annexure- 4

5. Validity This agreement shall be effective from Feb 15th, 2005 and shall be valid for a period of 3 years, provided that either party may with three months prior notice in writing terminate this agreement in the event of breach of any of the terms of this agreement by the other party.

Provided further that the parties may review the scope of services and pursuant costs after every 12 months, the first review by November 15th, 2005.

- 6. Arbitration If any dispute or differences shall arise between the parties hereto relating to the operations mentioned herein above or any other aspect thereof or if any matter shall arise as to the meaning or construction of any of the provisions of this agreement all such disputes or differences shall be referred to in accordance with Arbitration- & Conciliation Act 1996, and the place of such arbitration shall be in the State of Punjab. This Agreement is made and executed on this the 27th day of January 2006, between M/s international Fresh Farm Products (India) Ltd., a limited company having its registered office at, H No. 3, Sector 5, Chandigarh 160
- o22. Herein after called 'IFFPIL' (which expression shall unless otherwise repugnant to the context or meaning thereof be deemed to include its successors in business and assigns) of the ONE FART AND M/s PepsiCo India Holdings- Private Limited (FritoLay Division), a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and having its registered office at 3B, Corporate Park OLF Qutab Enclave, Phase 111, Gurgaon, Haryana and an office a(13'" Floor. Mohan Dev Building 13 Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi and having its factory at Village Chnnno Distt Bhawanigarh, Punjab herein after called 'PIH1 (which expression shall unless otherwise repugnant to the context or meaning thereof be deemed to include its "successors In business and assigns) of the OTHER PART. WHEREAS
- 1) PIH manufactures, sells and distributes a large range of packaged salted snack food products under the trade marks Lays, Uncle Chipps, Kurkure, Namkeen, Lehar Namkeen, Cheetos etc.. and requires cold storage facilities for the storage of potatoes used in the manufacture of some of these products
- 2) IFFPL has entered into a Cold Store Agreement dated December 1, 2004 with PepsiCo India Holdings Private Limited (FritoLay Division) for lease of its Cold Store located at Village Channo (the "Cold Store").
- 3) IFFPL and PIH have agreed to in make certain improvements to the facilities available In the Cold Store To this end IFFPI shall, at its own cost, install certain additional amenities and fixtures In the Cold Store which PJH has agreed to take on lease on the terms and conditions contained herein.

NOW THEREFORE IN CONSIDERATION OF THE REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES CONTAINED HEREIN THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWS:

1) IFFPIL will build racks in 3 chambers (chamber #1,2 and

- 3) and in half area of chamber #4 of the Cold Store (the "Facilities") as per the agreed design and, handover to PIH for use by February 1, 2006
- 2. PIH shall take the Facilities on lease from IFFPL for rent of Rs.227,000/-(Rupees two lacs twenty seven thousand only) (the "Rent") per month to be paid by PIH to IFFPIL from the date the Facilities are handed over for use to PIH.
- 3) This agreement shall subsist for a period of 5 (five) years form the date of handover of the Facilities to PIH (!.«. February 1,2006) on the terms and conditions contained herein and shall expire on January 31, '20.11 unless terminated earlier in terms hereof.
- 4) The either party may terminate this agreement at any time during the term without assigning any reason by giving to the other 3 months written notice at the address contained herein.
- 5) In the event of-any dispute or difference lathe between the parties regarding the interpretation of this agreement or any other issue parties hereto shall refer the dispute to arbitration per the terms of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Courts in Delhi shall have exclusive jurisdiction.
- 9. The Ld. counsel for a sses ee pointed out the refrom that asper clause-2 of the s a i d a g re e m e n t th e assessee had of f e r e d s e r vi c e s for m a n a g e me n t of cold s t o r a g e for storage of potatoes of M/s Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. (hereinafterref erred to a s'PIH'). Referring to clause-3 of the said agreement the Ld. counsel for a s s e s s e e pointed out t h at all functions relating to c old s t o rage m a n age m e nt had been entrusted to the assessee. There afterthe Ld.counselfor assesseed rewo ur attention to the responsibilities of the assessee in discharging its functi ons and pointed out that it included all activities right from receipt of good s from PIH at the colds to rage to transporting the good staken to PIH on dema n din clu ding storing and preserving them in the interim periodand conducting phy sicalverification of the same. The Ld. counselfor assesseedrewour attentiont othewarehousing clause and pointed out to point No. (c) therein which required the assesseet ot a ke all reason able care of storage of the products and state d that the assessee would be in the position of bailee to such goods. The Ld.c ounselforassesseethereafterdrewourattentiontoclausedealingwithtr ansferfrom assessee's cold storage and pointed out that the said clausereq uired the assesse etoke eptwotrucks atits disposal fortransporting goodst o PI H and that the assessee would beliable in case of anyloss ord amage, misdeliveryornon-deliveryonitspart.
- 10. The Ld.counselfor assesseethereafterstated thatitisevidentfrom the a foresaidagreement that the assessee had not merely letoutits colds to ragefacility to PIH, since theresponsibility of storing the agricultural produce of PIH properly in its facility rested with the assessee and it was the duty of the assesse etoadequately store the agricultural produce sent by PIH to its colds to rage facility. The Ld.counselfor assessees tated that afterreceiving the goods from PI

H for cold storage theen tire responsibility for maintaining thegoodsinproper condition in its cold storage facility rested with the assessee and PIH thereafter had nothing to dowith the goods and was alsonotinvolved in proper maintenance of the goods in the colds torage facility provided by the assessee. The Ld.counselfor assessees tated that it was evident from the above that the assessee was not merely providing premises to PIH but was providing colds torage facility to PIH and, therefore, the Ld. CIT(Appeals) haderred inholding that the assessee was as a consequence not entitled to deduction u/s8oIB(11) of the Act. The Ld.counselforassessee placed reliance on the following case laws in support of its above contention:

- 1) CITVs.NationalStorageP.Ltd. 66ITR596(1967)(SC)
- 2) CITVs.DistrictCo-operativeFederation 271ITR 22 (2004) (All)
- 3) CITVs. Ambika Sheet Grah (P) Ltd. 8 4 C C H 28 9 (2 0 13) (All)
- 4) I TO V s . Am b i k a S h e e t G r ah (P) L td . 1 1 9 I TD 2 3 5 (2 00 9) (A g r)

11. The Ld.counselforassessee further pointedout that ithadreturnedits in come from coldstorage facility provided as income under the head' profits and gains from business and profession' and the Assessing Officerhad assessed it as such. The Ld.counselforassessee pointedout that the Assessing Officerhad not treated there not alincome earned by it as income under the head' Income from house property'. Therefore also, Ld.Counselfor the assessees tated that, having assessed the income as income under the head' income from business and profession' and not under the head 'income from house property', the Assessing Officerhad not treated the afores aid income from house property', the Assessing Officerhad not treated the afores aid income as merely rentre ceived by the assesse by letting out its property.

12. The Ld.counselforassesseethereaftertookup the secondreason for denying deduction i.e. since the assesseehad not claimeds aid deduction in earliery ears. The Ld.counselforassesseep ointedoutthatithasbeen held by courts in a number of decisions that merely becausededuction has not been claimed in earliery ears, theassesseec ould not bedenied deduction in a subsequenty ear. The Ld.counselforassesseestated thatithasbeen held that claiming deduction from theinitial assessment year it is not a condition which is a pre-requisite for claiming deduction in subsequenty ears. The Ld.counselforassessees

drewourattention to the following decision sin support of its above contentions:

- 1) C I T V s . Ex c e l So ft e c h L t d . 2 1 9 C TR 4 0 5 (2 00 8 (P & H)
- 2) Praveen Soni Vs. CIT 3 3 3 I TR 3 2 4 (2 01 1) (Del)
- 3) CITVs.LaxmiMetalIndustries 2 3 6 I TR 1 3 0 (1999) (All)
- 4) CITVs. Sunder Forging I TANo. 242 of 2012 (P&H)

13. Thus the Ld. counselfor assessee argued that denial of deduction u/s8 oIB(11) was against the facts and circumstances of the case and in contravention of the law in this regard.

14. Per contra, the Ld. DR relied upon the orders of the Assessing Officerand Ld. CIT(Appeals). The Ld. DR further pointed out that the Assessing Officer had not investigate dwhether the assesse had commenced operations before 1.4.2004 which is an essential condition for claiming deduction u/s80IB(11) of the Actand, therefore, requested that them atterberes to red backtothe Assessing Officertoestablish this fact.

15. To this, the Ld. counselfor as sessee countered by saying that the date of c ommencementofoperationbytheassesseewasclearlypointedoutintheA u dit Report of the Chartered Account ant certifying the assesse 's claim of deduct ionu/s80IB(11)oftheAct, as 27.3.2004. The same was filed before the Asses sing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings when he was exam ining the said claim of the assessee and merely because the Assessing Office rhadnot mentioned soin his order about this aspect it would not mean that hehasnotappliedhismindtoit and arrived at a conclusion that the assessee had commencedoperations before the prescribed date. The Ld. counselfor as s esseefurtherpointedoutthatbyaccedingtotherequestoftheLd.DRitwou ld am ount to reviewing theorder of the Assessing Officer, the power forwhich layonly with the CIT and furtherpointed out that it would tantamount to giving s ec o n d innings to the Assessing Officerontheimpugnedissue. The Ld. DRc ountered by saying that since this was the most basic condition to be fulfilled by the assessee for claiming deduction u/s 8 o IB(11) of the Actwhich app are ntly th e Asses sing Officer had not look edin to, the matters hould be sent back to the Assessing O f fi c er with the directions to investigate the same.

16. We have he ard the contentions of both the parties and perused theorders of the authorities below. Theis suebefore uspertains to claim of deductionu/s 80IB(11) of the Act which reads as under:

"(11) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iii) of sub-section (2) and sub-sections (3), (4) and (5), the amount of deduction in a case of industrial undertaking deriving profit from the business of setting up and operating a cold chain facility for agricultural produce, shall be hundred per cent of the profits and gains derived from such industrial undertaking for five assessment years beginning with the initial assessment year and thereafter, twenty-five per cent (or thirty per cent where the assessee is a company) of the profits and gains derived from the operation of such facility in a manner that the total period of deduction does not exceed ten consecutive assessment years (or twelve consecutive assessment years where the assessee is a co-operative society) and subject to fulfilment of the condition that it begins to operate such facility on or after the 1st day of April, 1999 but before the [1st day of April, 2004]."

17. The said section allows deduction of profits derived by industrial undertakings from the business of setting up and operating of cold chain facility for agricult ural produce.

18. In the present case, the fact that the assessee is the owner of a cold storage facility is not denied. The bone of contention or the primary reason for denying the deduction to the assessee by the Revenue is that the profitsearned by the assessee have not been derived from the business of operating the cold chain facility for agricultural produce but in fact are mererental searned from letting out the facility of cold storage.

19. Havingheardthearguments of the Ld.counselfortheasses see and ongoi ngthroughtheagreemententeredintobytheassesseewithPIH,onaccount ofwhichtheentireincome was earned by the assessee, we find that we are in a greementwiththecontentionoftheLd.counselfortheassesseethatithadp rovided cold chain facility to PI Handhad not merely letoutits premises to PIH. As pointed out by the Ld. counselfor the assessethe agreement provided f or the assessee to assume all responsibility pertaining to storing theagricultura l p r o d uc e se n t b y PI H to its cold c ha i n facility. Th e assessee as per th e a g r e e m e n t w a s responsible for maintaining and keeping the good sin proper condition an dwasrequired to renderalls ervices for the same. All functions and respons ibilities vis - a - visthegoods sent for storage by PIH, beginning from receipt ofgoods, theirstorage and preservation, conducting physical verificatio n and transportinggoodsbacktoPIHallrested with the assessee. The assess eewasresponsible for storing the goods with reasonable care and was in the position of a bailee in respect of thosegoods. Theresponsibility of transporting t hegoodsbacktoPIHingoodconditionalsorested with the assessee. The as

sesseewasalsoliableforanyloss, orda magebyreason of any actofomissio norcommission on its part or on the part of its employees. Meaning thereby that the right from the moment the goods were received by the assesseether e sponsibility for their upkeeplay with the assesse tillit was delivered back to PIH. The Revenue has not brought to our notice any clause in the agreeme ntwhichgaverightstoPIHtomanagethegoodsoncedeliveredinthecoldsto rage. PIHhasnotbeenshowntoustohavebeenincontrolofthecoldstoragef a cility, which would have been the case if the premises had been letout to P IH. Infact whatemerges from the agreement is that the cold chain facility wa sintheownership and control of the assessee and it was required to render a lls er vices for storing the agricultural produces enttoit. Whatemerges th ere fore from the various clauses pointed out by the Ld. counsel for the assess ee is that the assessee had definitely not merely letoutits colds to rage pre mises to PIH, but had in fact given colds to rage facility to PIH. Therefore, the reis noiota of doubtin our minds in holding that the assessee was indulgin ginthebusiness of operating cold chain facility and was not merely letting outits cold chain facility to PIH. The case laws relied upon by the Ld. counsel for the assessee in this regard areapt. In the case of Commission er of Incom e Taxvs District Co-operative Federation (2004) 271 ITR 22 (All), the defin ition of cold storage business was borrowed from Words and Phrases, Per manentEditionVolume7Aasunder:

"Cold storage business'---'doing a cold storage business' means carrying on the business of storing commodities in a cool place for hire or reward, and a packing house which used cold storage for preserving its own commodities alone, but did not receive and store for the public or any part thereof, is not 'doing a cold-storage business' within General Tax Act, 26th Dec., 1890, 22, imposing a tax 'on all packing houses doing a cold storage business.' [Stwart vs. Atlanta Beef Co. 18 S.E. 981, 985, 93 Ga. 12, 44, Am. St. Representation 119]."

20. The assessee in the present case has clearly demonstrated that it was carrying on the business of storing commodities in a coolplace for reward and therefore as pertheabove definition can be safely said to be carrying on cold storage business.

21. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CommissionerofIncome TaxvsNational StoragePvt.Ltd.(1967)66ITR596(SC) while dealing with theiss uewhether letting out of vaults for storing films tantamounted to income derived fromexercise of propertyrightsorwasanadventureinthenature of trade, held afterexamining the facts of the case that the subject hired was a complexone since the assessee had constructed specially designed vaults and rendered otherservices to the vaultholders for safekeeping of theitems and for dispatching and receiving theitems. The Hon'bleapex court therefore held that the incomeder ived was not merely from the exercise of proprietary rights but was in the nature of

business in come. Therelevantfindingsareasunder:

"The assessee was carrying on an adventure or concern in the nature of trade. The assessee not only constructed vaults of special design and special doors and electric fittings, but also rendered other services to the vault-holders. It installed fire alarm and was incurring expenditure for the maintenance of fire alarm by paying charges to the municipality. Two railway booking offices were opened in the premises for the despatch and receipt of film parcels. This is a valuable service. It also maintained a regular staff consisting of a secretary, a peon, a watchman and a sweeper, and apart from that it paid for the entire staff of the Indian Motion Picture Distributors' Association an amount of Rs. 800 per month for services rendered to the licensees. These vaults could only be used for the specific purpose of storing of films and other activities connected with the examination, repairs, cleaning, waxing and rewinding of the films. The agreements are licences and not leases. The assessee kept the key of the entrance which permitted access to the vaults in its own exclusive possession. The assessee was thus in occupation of all the premises for the purpose of its own concern, the concern being the hiring out of specially built vaults and providing special services to the licensees. "The subject which is hired out is a complex one" and the return received by the assessee is not the income derived from the exercise of property rights only but is derived from carrying on an adventure or concern in the nature of trade."

22. In the present case undisputedly the assessee was theowner of the cold storages which again are specially designed structures and be sides being theowner has alsorendered services of cold storage taking all responsibility for the propermainten ance of the goods sent to it for storage. The assessee as per the abovejudgement was thus in occupation of the premises for the purpose of itsown concern being hiring out the specially constructed storage facility and providing services to the licensees. The agreements in the present case we reclearly licenses and not leases.

23. Moreover, we find nomeritinthecontention of the Revenue that since the assessee had not claimed deduction under thesaidsection in earlier years, it was not entitled to claim thesaid deduction in theimpugnedyear. A perusal of the conditions stipulated under the saidsection to be fulfilled by the assesseere veals that nosuch condition has been specifically stipulated in the said section. There is no requirement specified in section stating that the assessee has to necessarily claimded uction from the initial assessmenty earitself, in the absence of which it would not be entitled to claims oin the subsequent years. These ctions of the Acthavetobeinterpreted strictly and literally and nowordsormeaning can be added to what has been stated in the section. This is abasic rule of interpretation of Statute. In the absence of any specific stipulation in the section, we hold that the Ld. CIT (Appeals) haderred in stating that the assessee was notentitled to claim deduction undersection 8 o IB (11) of the Actsince

ithadnotclaimedthesaiddeductionintheearlieryears. The decisions relied upon by the Ld.counselfor the assessee are apt. In the case of CIT vs Excel Softech Ltd.(2 oo8) 219 CTR 405 (P&H) the jurisdictional High Courthas in the context of exemption grantedu/s10Bheldthatintheabsence of any such stipulation in the statute there is nobarinclaiming exemption from any of the assessmentyears from the eligible block of years. There le vant finding sat para 7 of the order are as under:

"In our opinion, the contention raised by the Revenue is liable to be rejected. Sec. 10B of the Act reads as under:

"10B. Special provisions in respect of newly established hundred per cent export-oriented undertakings--(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a deduction of such profits and gains as are derived by a hundred per cent export-oriented undertaking from the export of articles or things or computer software for a period of ten consecutive assessment years beginning with the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the undertaking begins to manufacture or produce articles or things or computer software, as the case may be, shall be allowed from the total income of the assessee."

The aforesaid provision provides that subject to the provisions of this section, a deduction of such profits and gains as are derived by a hundred per cent export-oriented undertaking from the export of articles or things or computer software for a period of ten consecutive assessment years beginning with the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the undertaking begins to manufacture or produce articles or things or computer software, as the case may be, shall be allowed from the total income of the assessee. Sub-s. (2) provides that this section applies to any undertaking which fulfils certain conditions, mentioned in this sub-section itself. The exemption under this section is available for 10 years. The initial year is the year in which the eligible undertaking begins to manufacture or produce articles or things or computer software. It is not disputed that the assessee unit fulfills all the conditions, as mentioned in sub-s. (2). In the present case, the assessee had started the development of computer software in the asst. yr. 1998-99 and was registered with the Software Technology Park w.e.f. 24th March, 2000, therefore, the 10 years period has to be reckoned from the asst. yr. 1998-99. The assessee has claimed exemption for the first time in the asst. yr. 2001-02, which is well within 10 years. Therefore, the unit of the assessee cannot be denied the said exemption on the ground that it is not the newly established undertaking in the assessment year in question. In our view, the words "newly established undertaking" are only to identify the initial year of the period of 10 years for which the assessee is eligible for claim of exemption under s. 10B of the Act. Sec. 10B(1) of the Act does not use the words "newly established undertaking". Only in the heading, the words "newly established hundred per cent export-oriented undertakings" have been mentioned. It is well-settled law that headings or titles prefixed to sections or group of sections can be referred to in construing an Act of the legislation, only when the enacting words are ambiguous, but when the language of the section is clear, then the heading cannot be used to give a different effect to clear words in the section. In our view, there is no ambiguity in s. 10B of the Act, which provides exemption to certain newly established hundred per cent export oriented undertakings, on fulfilling certain conditions, for a period of ten consecutive assessment years. The initial year is the year in which the eligible undertaking begins to manufacture or produce articles or things or computer software. Sec. 10B of the Act does not provide any restriction that in each of the years of claim, the export-oriented undertaking should be newly established. Indeed, relevance of "newly established undertaking" is only to identify the initial year of the period of ten years for which the assessee is eligible for claim of exemption under s. 10B of the Act. Since in the present case, undisputedly, the initial year is the asst. yr. 1998-99, therefore, the assessee was rightly held to be fully eligible for exemption under s. 10B of the Act for the assessment year under consideration i.e., 2001-02, as it was the fourth year, out of ten years beginning with the initial assessment year, in which it began to develop and export the computer software."

24. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Praveen Sonivs CIT (2011) 333 ITR 3 24 in the context of deduction claimedu/s8oIB(3) alsoupheld this view at para 6 of itsorderasunder:

"If the assessee fulfils the requirement of small-scale industrial undertaking (which aspect shall be dealt while answering other question of law), it is not in dispute that the assessee would have qualified for this deduction from the asst. yr. 1998-99. Had the assessee claimed this benefit in that year, he would have been allowed this benefit for 10 consecutive years, i.e., till asst. yr. 2007-08. The assessee, thus, becomes entitled to claim the benefit in the asst. yr. 1998-99. However, merely because of the reason that though the assessee was eligible to claim this benefit, but did not claim in that year would not mean that he would be deprived from claiming this benefit till the asst. yr. 2007-08, which is the period for which his entitlement would accrue. The provisions contained in s. 80-IB of the IT Act nowhere stipulate any condition that such a claim has to be made in the first year failing which there would be forfeiture of such claim in the remaining years. It is not the case of the assessee that he should be allowed to avail this claim for 10 years from the asst. yr. 2004-05. The assessee has realized his mistake in not claiming the benefit from the first asst. yr. 1998-99. At the same time, the assessee foregoes the claim upto the asst. yr. 2003-04 and is making the same only for the remaining period. There is no reason not to give the benefit of this claim to the assessee if the conditions stipulated under s. 80-IB of the IT Act are fulfilled."

25. In view of the above, we hold that the assessee is entitled to deduction undersection 8 oIB (11) of the Act and direct the Assessing Officer to grant the same in accordance with law.

26. We may alsopointoutth at we find nomeritinthe argument of the Ld.D. R.thattheissue of allow ability of claim undersection 8 oIB(11) of the Actberestored backtothe Assessing Officer for the purpose of determining whether the assesse ehad actually commenced it operation before 1.4.2004, which is an essential condition for claiming the said deduction. As pointed out by the Ld. counsel for the assessee, all relevant facts had been placed before the Assessing Officer

during the assessment proceedings and thed ate of commence ment being 27.3.

2004 was very much certified by the Chartered Account ant and mentione dinhis certificate provided in Form No.10 CCB. In such circumstance sitis reasonable to presume that the Assessing Officerhad applied his mind to the said facts and arrived at conclusion that the assessee fulfilled the conditions of commencing theoperation before 1.4.2004. In any case, since this admitted ly was not there as on for denying deduction undersection 80 IB(11) of the Act by the Assessing Officer, we cannot enhances cope of assessment by restoring the said is sue to the Assessing Officer. The contention raised by the Ld. D.R. is, therefore, dismissed.

- 27. In view of the aboveground No.1raised by the assessee is allowed.
- 28. Ground No.2 r ai s e d by the assessee reads as under:
 - "2. That in the facts and circumstances of the case the Ld CIT(A) is not justified in upholding the addition of Rs 410145/- as unexplained cash credits under section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961."
- 29. In the afores aidground, the assessee has challenged the disallow ance of interest undersection 36(1)(iii) of the Act.
- 30. Brieffacts relevant to the issue are that the Assessing Officer made disallowance of interest pertaining to interest free advances made to two parties as under:
 - 1) M / s M e g a F o o d Pa r k L t d . = R s . 1 o , oo , o o o /-
 - 2) M/sZenithFood&
 NutrientsPvt.Ltd.

= R s.

for there a sonthat the businessexpediency of the saidadvanceh adnotbeenestablishedandtheassesseewas found to have diverted in terestbearing funds for the purpose of makingsuchadvances.

- 31. The matter wascarried in appealbefore the Ld. CIT (Appeals) whoupheld the order of the Assessing Officer.
- 32. Before us, the Ld. counsel for the assessee primarily raised only one contentionthat the aforesaid advance had been made out ofowninterest free funds of the assesse e and nointerest bearing funds has been used for the said purpose. Substantiating its contention the Ld. counselfor the assessee drewour attention to th

e b a l an c e s h e e t o f th e a s ses s e e f o r th e i m pu g n e d y e a r p l a c ed a t P a p e r B o o k p a geNos.11topointoutthatitclearlyreflectedthatownfundsoftheassesseei n the form of shareholders funds, being share capital and reserves & surplus, a mou ntedtoRs.15.98crores, which includedRs.2.8croressharecapitalandRs. 13.18 crores reserves and surplus. The Ld. counselforthe assessee further dr e w o ur a t t e n t i o n to Schedule 2 of the balance sheet, b e i n g S ch e d u l e of reserves an d su rplus, to point out therefrom that therevenuereserves of the assesseeinthefo rm of balanceinthe Profit and Loss Account amounted to Rs.1.53 crores. Ther e aftertheLd.counselfortheassessees ta tedthatthe total a dv ances on which i nterest had been disallowed amounted to Rs. 44.75 lacs. The Ld. counsel for the asse ssee, therefore, stated that it was evident that the assessee had enoughown f und stomaketheimpugned advances. The Ld. counself or the assesseethere afters tated thatithad utilized its interest bearing funds clearly for the business p urpose of the assesse e which is evident from the fact that the interest be ari ngfunds, comprising of only securedloans, which includedloanstaken fro m SI DBI and HDFC truck loan. The Ld.counselfortheassessee drew our attention to Schedule-3 of se c u r e d loans for pointing out this fact. The L d. c o u n s e l f o r t h e a s s e s s ee t h e r e a ft er s t a t ed t h a t t h e l oa n f ro m SI D BI w as a t e r m l o a n t a k e n f o r c o ns t ru c t ion ofland and building and was utilized for the saidpurpose. So also HDFC truck loan was for the purpose of fin ancingthepurch as e of truck and had been ut ilizedforthesame. The Ld. counselforthe assesseest ated that the assessee hadonly currentac countinthebankreflected in the Schedule of current as s e t l o a n s a n d advances, S c h ed u l e - 7, a nd o n w h i c h n o i n t e r e st h a d b e en paid and funds from which had been utilized for the purpose of makingthesaidadvances. Th eLd.counselfortheassesseealsopointedout and statedat Barthattheunsec uredloanstakenbytheassesseecarriednointerest. ThustheLd.counselfor the assesseepointed out that it is evident that the interest bearing loans in any case could not and had not been used for the purpose of making the said a dvances and, therefore, also there was nore as on formaking any disallowa nce of interest undersection 36(1)(iii) of the Act. The Ld. counselfortheass esseein support of its contention stated that whereen oughown funds are av ail able thepresumptionist hat thes aid funds have been utilized for the purpose of making the interest free a dvancesandrelieduponthefollowingcaselaws:

- 1) HeroCyclesPvt.LtdvsCIT,Ludhiana
 3 7 9 I TR 3 4 7 (SC)
- 2) Bright Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs CIT, Jalandha 381 I TR 107 (P & H)

33. The Ld. D. R., on the other hand, relied upon the order of the Ld. CIT (Appeals).

34. We have heard the contentions of both the parties. We find meritinthe contention of the Ld.counselfortheassesseethatwhere thenexus between interest be aring funds and interest freeadvances is ruled out and where the assessee has demonstrated theavailability of enoughown funds for the purpose of making theinterest freeadvances, nodisallowance undersection 36(1)(iii) of the Act could be made. The Ld.counselfortheassessee has rightly relied uponcaselaws as cited before us. But at the same time, we find that all facts and figures leading to the said conclusion have now for the first time been pointed out to us. Since the said figures need to be verified we restore the issue back to the file of the Assessing Officerto verify the contention of the assessee that no interest be a ring fund shave been used for the purpose of making the said advances. The Assessing Officer is there after directed to decide the issue in a ccord ance with law. Need less to say that he assessee be granted due opport unity of hearing by the AO.

This ground of appeal of the assessee is the reforeal lowed for statistical purposes.

35. The appeal of the assessee is allowed for statisticalpurposes.

ITANo.703/Chd/2015(Assessee's Appeal):

36. The assessee in this appeal has raised following grounds of appeal:

- "1. That on the facts, circumstances of the case and in law, the Worthy C1T(A), through his order dated 03.06.2015, has erred in passing that order in contravention of the provisions of Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
- 2. That on law, facts and circumstances of the case, Worthy CIT (A) has erred in confirming the disallowance of deduction claimed by the appellant u/s 80-IB(11) of the Act amounting to Rs.1,21,36,078/- by erroneously holding that the appellant is not eligible for said deduction as the same was not claimed in prior years since the "initial assessment year". Both the lower authorities have grossly erred in holding that non-claim of eligible deduction u/s 80IB from the initial assessment year would be fatal to said claim in subsequent years.
- 3. That on law, facts and circumstances of the case, Worthy CIT (A), vide para 2.3.4 of his order for AY 2010-11, has erred in confirming the disallowance of deduction claimed by the appellant u/s 80-IB(11) of the Act amounting to Rs.1,21,36,078/-, wherein without making any decision on adverse inference drawn by the Ld. AO and seriously objected to by the appellant, he confirmed the disallowance since the issue had been decided against the appellant on other objections vide para 2.3.3 of his order for AY 2010-11. The Worthy CIT(A) has erred in not passing the order in regard to this issue and therefore the same deserves to be set-aside.

- 4. That on facts, circumstances and legal position of the case, the Worthy CIT(A) has erred in confirming the action of Ld. AO. in making addition of Rs.6,00,000/- u/s 36(l)(iii) of the Act on estimated, arbitrary, presumptive and prejudiced basis without assigning any logical reasons and has erroneously disallowed the proportionate interest on advance given for business purpose to M/s Temptation Foods as interest free advance. Both the lower authorities have erred in appreciating the facts of the case and law applicable thereon.
- 5. That the appellant craves leave for any addition, deletion or amendment in the grounds of appeal on or before the disposal of the same."
- 37. It is relevant to observe here that it was submitted by both the parties that the facts and circumstances of this appeal are similar to the facts and circumstances in ITA No.311/Chd/2015. The findings given in ITA No.311/Chd/2015 shall therefore apply mutatis mutandis to this appeal also. This appeal of the assessee is also allowed for statistical purposes. I T A N o . 7 54 / C h d/ 2 o 1 5 (R e ve n u e 's A p p e a l) :
- 38. Theonlygroundraisedbythe RevenueinthepresentappealpertainstodeletionofadditionofRs. 2,41,360/-madeu/s14AoftheIncomeTaxAct,1961.

It is stated that in the present appeal the taxeffect is less than the prescribe d limit provided by the recent CBDT Circular.

- 39. According to Circular No. 21/2015 dated 10.12.2015, the CBDT in supercession of earlier in structionsh as directed that department's appeals before ITATsh all not be file dincases where thetaxeffect does not exceed the monetary limit of Rs.10lacs. Thetax will not include any interest thereon. It is further clarified that if in the case of an assessee, disputed is suesarise in more than one assessment year, appealcan befiled in respect of such assessment year or years in which the taxeffect in respect of disputed is suesexceeds the monetary limits ospecified. This instruction will apply retrospectively to pending appeals and appeals to be filed hence for th before the Tribunal. The pending appeals below the specified tax limit may be with drawn/not pressed.
- 40. Admittedly, in the departmentalappeal, thetax effect is less than Rs.10 lacs, therefore, departmentalappealis not maintain able. The learned CIT (Appeals) decided theis sueindepartmentalappealonfacts and the case of the revenue would not fall in the exceptions provided in the above circular.
- 41. In view of the above, learned D.R.stated that since departmentalappeal is filed against the CBDT instructions, therefore, he would not be pressing departmentalappeal. Therefore, theabove departmentalappealis dismissed beingnot pressed.

42. The appealof the Revenueis dismissed.

43. In theresult, boththeappeals of theassessee are allowed for statisticalpurposes and the appeal of the Revenueisdismissed.

Orderpronouncedintheopencourt.

Sd/-

(DIVA SINGH) (ANNAPURNA GUPTA)

JUDICIAL MEMBER

Dated: 27 t h July, 2017

Rati

Copy to:

The Appellant
 The Respondent
 The CIT(A)
 The CIT
 The DR

Assistant Registrar, ITAT, Chandigarh