Game-Theoretic Models of Information Overload in Social **Networks**

A Presentation for CS886

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1 Introduction

2 Followership model

Background

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- Some surveys claim the average person has five social media accounts and spends 1hr 40 mins on them every day [2].
- Increasing irrelevant updates on social media newsfeeds, or information overload.

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- Asymmetric: requires consent from only one side to maintain tie eg., Twitter.
- Authors mainly look at asymmetric social networks.

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- Makeup of newsfeed becomes very important to user.
- Mix of newsfeed is determined by the activity level of user's friends.
- How much one hears from one particular friend is not in user's control.

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 - Users can be partitioned as producers and consumers of information (80 20 rule).

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- Engagement: Users get frustrated by high update rate of followees and leave the social network.

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 - q_{ij} denotes utility consumer j derives from producer i's updates.
- Producer i updates at a frequency (rate) of r_i.
- Payoff for producer i is r_i times the number of followers he/she has.

References

Borgs, C., Chayes, J., Karrer, B., Meeder, B., Ravi, R., Reagans, R., & Sayedi, A. (2010). Game-theoretic models of information overload in social networks. In Algorithms and Models for the Web-Graph (pp. 146-161). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

