



The Cradle of Asymmetric Cryptography

Secure Communications Over Insecure Channels

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
Motivation

Some Historical Background


Ralph Merkle developed **Merkle's puzzles** in **1974** for a university project. The idea was rejected by his professor. At this time, asymmetric cryptography concepts were not known to the public.

- Symmetric crypto requires key exchange
 → additional secure channel needed to transmit key
- This new method allows communication partners to transmit a key over *insecure channels*
- Assumption: Attacker can read everything sent on this channel
- Advantages of this method:
- Solution to key distribution problem
- Easier key exchange in network with multiple communication partners


Puzzle Creation



Key Exchange using Puzzles



Security of Merkle's Puzzles



What Does This Mean for Security?

Even if a large n is chosen, attacker only has to put in $O(n^2)$ effort, which makes brute-force attacks feasible.

Example

For n = 10000, the attacker has to calculate 5000 puzzles on average. If it takes about 1 minute to solve a puzzle, the attacker will have found the key in about 3.5 days.

Disadvantages

- For exchanging a key, communication partners have to transmit a large amount of data
- The larger the *n*, the larger the amount of effort communication partners have to expend
- \rightarrow A moderate amount of security requires a very large n.

Merkle's Method Compared to Current Asymmetric Schemes

State of the Art Asymmetric Encryption Schemes

Current asymmetric encryption schemes are based on problems which are considered to be **mathematically hard** to solve.

→ Computing these problems is *infeasible* for large values.

Asymmetric Encryption Schemes are mainly based on:

- Discrete Logarithm Problem
- Integer Factorization Problem.

Lessons Learned

Influence of Merkle's Puzzles

The rejected idea of a student became one of the first *public-key protocols* known to the public.

- Merkle's idea inspired the Diffie-Hellmann key exchange, which is still widely used today.
- The original idea does not offer a sufficient level of security, however, the idea could serve as a base for other protocols.

References:

R. C. Merkle. Secure communications over insecure channels. Communications of the ACM, 21(4):294–299, 1978
C. Paar & J. Pelzl (2010): Understanding Cryptography, Springer http://www.merkle.com/1974/