



NOOBSEC


WHAT EVERY DEVELOPER SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT WEB SECURITY




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
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OUTLINE

- I. Why Do We Care?
- II. A Crash Course In:
 - A. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
 - B. Client-State Manipulation
 - C. Cross-Site Request Forgery (XSRF)
 - D. SQL Injection
- III. How to Keep Learning



Do I Really Need To Know This? *Yes.*

- **Anyone can be targeted.** *Really.*
- Small agencies, big clients, not as much manpower and keen to hire juniors out of college/university
- For managers - invest in your dev's education!
- We'll see IRL examples for each attack vector we discuss

CROSS-SITE SCRIPTING (XSS)

Basically code injection

People “inject” malicious scripts into websites that would otherwise be trusted

Usually client-side scripts

WHY IS THIS BAD?

Can lead to session cookies being compromised, which means a user’s session can be hijacked. Or, it can prompt an install-script for some sketchy program. Or, spoof some content.

E.G. from OWASP: “An XSS vulnerability on a pharmaceutical site could allow an attacker to modify dosage information resulting in an overdose”



FILE UPLOAD XSS

A file containing a malicious script is uploaded on a vulnerable site. Anyone who views that file can be affected.

E.g. Some sites that allow you to upload CVs, etc. and don't restrict formats.



EXAMPLE

STORED XSS

Injected script is stored on the server somehow -- in a database, message forum, comment field.

“Victim” is presented the script when it requests information in some way.



EXAMPLE

REFLECTED XSS

Injected script isn't stored on the server. The victim user has to open a link where the malicious script lives.



EXAMPLE

XSS IRL EXAMPLE

Stored XSS in
developer.uber.com

"An attacker can make a series of requests to <https://uber.readme.io/> that will result in permanent defacement/stored XSS of all the documentation pages on <https://developer.uber.com/>"

<https://hackerone.com/reports/131450>

HOW DO WE PREVENT THEM?

ESCAPE & SANITIZE ALL THE THINGS!

PHP: `<input type="text" value="<?php echo esc_attr($someValue);?>" />`

RoR: `<%= h(potentially_unsafe_user_generated_content) %>`

But as of Rails 3, this is handled automatically! Yay!

OWASP is handy:

XSS Cheat Sheet

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_\(Cross_Site_Scripting\)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)

XSS Code Review Guidelines

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Code_Review_Project

ESCAPE ALL THE THINGS



CLIENT-STATE MANIPULATION

DO NOT TRUST THE CLIENT. NOT EVER!

Happens when servers provide state information to a client, and it's passed back as part of an HTTP request from the client.

EXAMPLES:

- Hidden input fields in a form when confirming a purchase
- GET instead of POST requests when submitting forms
- Privilege Escalation

EXAMPLE

```
1 <html>
2 <head>
3   <title>Pizza</title>
4 </head>
5 <body>
6   <form action="submit_order" method="GET">
7     The total cost is $7.60.
8     Are you sure you'd like to order?
9     <input type="hidden" name="price" value="7.60">
10    <input type="submit" name="continue" value="Continue">
11    <input type="submit" name="continue" value="Go Back">
12  </form>
13 </body>
14 </html>
```

HOW DO WE PREVENT IT?

NOT SENDING SENSITIVE INFO BACK TO THE CLIENT.

“SIGNED STATES” SENT BACK TO THE CLIENT.

Don't make hidden data visible.

Don't use GET for sensitive info.

Store a session-id and send *that* to the client rather than the explicit data value; that gets stored in the database where it's used to look up the actual data.

Sign transactions - but make sure to sign *everything*.



CROSS-SITE REQUEST FORGERY (XSRF)

Attacker can use an HTTP request to access user info from another site.

Servers aren't really smart enough to determine whether an action was intentional; it just sees the request and does it.

If a user has been authenticated on one site, and then is the victim of some kind of malicious script on *another* site: danger.



EXAMPLE

XSRF IRL EXAMPLE

Harvest, the time-tracking/invoicing app.

<https://hackerone.com/reports/152569>



malcolmx submitted a report to Harvest.

Hello,

I Found Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) while made new Category

POC :

```
<html>
<body>
  <form action="https://[any_user_site].harvestapp.com/api/v2/expense_categories"
method="POST">
    <input type="hidden" name="name" value="[category_name]" />
    <input type="hidden" name="unit&#95;price" value="" />
    <input type="hidden" name="unit&#95;name" value="" />
    <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
  </form>
</body>
</html>
```

just put user site and the name of the category on this HTML Form and the category will be created to this account.

there is no any token to validate the request here

so the attacker can use this to made a CSRF attack to any victim account

HOW DO WE PREVENT IT?

TOKENS ARE YOUR BFF.

The site requires a special token before it'll actually perform any data-altering operations. The token is submitted with the request, and validated by the "victim" site.

E.g. A bank


Validating origin headers submitted with the request

OWASP has a cheat-sheet for this too:

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site Request Forgery \(CSRF\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF))



SQL INJECTION



AKA. "Command Injection Vulnerabilities"

End-user supplied input is inserted into a query or command to cause the command interpreter to misinterpret it.

EXAMPLE

Sometimes “attackers” can give wonky input just to break a request and hopefully see error messages.

Can submit queries that complete a legit request and *then* start another:

E.g. ... month = 0; DROP TABLE x;

Information leakage

E.g.

```
SELECT * FROM x WHERE userid = 4123 AND order_month = 0 or 1=1  
...AND order_month = 0 AND 1 = 0 UNION SELECT cardholder, number, exp_month,  
exp_year FROM creditcards
```



SQL INJECTION IRL

Insurance product - LocalTapioca

“There exists an SQL Injection vulnerability on the path /cs/Satellite. This path accepts numerous fields, including blobtable, blobcol, blobkey and blobwhere. It is possible to sufficiently manipulate the the blobwhere field in order to trigger a time-based blind SQL Injection attack.”

<https://hackerone.com/reports/164739>

HOW DO WE PREVENT IT?

PREPARED STATEMENTS + BIND VARIABLES

Placeholders guaranteed to be data

Put placeholders where there exists something you should always consider data. E.g. `userid=?`

WHITELISTING

Specifying what input should look like and not allowing input that doesn't match pattern.

STUFF THAT DOESN'T WORK WELL:

Blacklisting doesn't work well. If you're looking for dangerous characters you could inadvertently conflict with functional requirements. (e.g. O'Brien)

Doesn't prevent numeric parameter attacks. Plus, attackers can use JS or encoding to specify characters that are blacklisted

Escaping doesn't guard against numeric params.

Stored procedures can still be used to perform malicious tasks by modifying the structure of the statement



HOW TO KEEP LEARNING

BOOKS

Peter Yaworski's Web
Hacking 101 eBook

The Web Application
Hacker's Handbook

Foundations of
Security: What Every
Programmer Needs
to Know

PODCASTS

OWASP Podcast

The Cyber Wire

Smashing Security

COURSES

Stanford's Advanced
Computer Security
Certificate

Ryerson's Digital
Forensics &
Cryptography
Certificate

Coursera

PRACTICE, PRACTICE, PRACTICE

CTFs are fun, and good for teams!

Lots of websites for practicing:

- <https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/>
- ShellterLabs: <https://shellterlabs.com/en/>
- 22 Hacking Sites, CTFs & Wargames:
<https://wheresmykeyboard.com/2016/07/hacking-sites-ctfs-wargames-practice-hacking-skills/>





THANK YOU!
Questions?