Frontex and the Securitization of Migration: A Critical Analysis of Discursive and Processual Acts

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I.   Introduction

> *"Together with the Member States, we ensure safe and well-functioning external*
> *borders providing security." (Frontex, 2024d)*

This is the mission statement of Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The positioning of itself as a key actor in bordering processes of the European Union (EU) and naming security as a central aim, indicates, that Frontex contributes to the discourse that frames migration as a potential threat. The interplay of migration and securitization has been subject to a academic research, raising questions about the methods and implications of treating migration as a security concern.

The following paper will therefore investigate, how Frontex shapes migration as a security issue and analyze different ways of securitization that can be performed. The first chapter will give an overview of existing research and theoretical concepts about the securitization of borders and especially of the EU's external borders. This is used to build a conceptualization that guides the analysis of this paper. The third chapter provides a description of the empirical material that is analyzed and the applied method of computer-assisted document analysis. The following analysis will primarily focus on the qualitative analysis of Frontex' risk analysis reports and determine discursive elements of securitization. In a second section, this will be complemented by a (briefer) investigation of how Frontex shapes migration as a security issue through processual actions.

II.   Literature Review

This chapter will first provide a very brief overview of developments in the EU's external border management in the last 25 years, as well as an introduction to the creation and realm of responsibility of Frontex. This empirical context builds the necessary background information for the analysis of how Frontex shapes migration as a security issue and is in the second section enriched with the theoretical concepts of securitization and racialization that form the center of the analysis.

2.1   Border Policing in the European Union

In the past decades, there has been a notable rise in the securitization of the external borders of the European Union. According to Andreas (2003), there are two main drivers for this development in the late 1990s and early 2000s: An increased ambition to streamline justice systems across member states, coupled with the creation and expansion of the Schengen Area, that enables the free movements of people. A need for stronger protection of external border was perceived as a logical consequence to the decrease or abolition of internal border controls. As a measure to both strengthen cooperation between member states and fortify external border protection, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, was founded in 2004 (Neal, 2009). According to Neal (2009), the founding of Frontex was prepared and legitimized by a specific type of speech used by politicians. This speech claims, that threats to the security of the EU (1) come from the outside and that (2) immigrants from third countries are one of those major threats. This creation of a strong linguistic link between migration from outside the EU and security risks was coupled with a realization, that there was no one single existing institution in the EU, that was solely responsible for border protection. Therefore, in an attempt to further streamline and strengthen cooperation between EU member states, Frontex was founded (Neal, 2009). Since then, the realm of responsibility as well as the funds provided by member states have increased significantly (Sarantaki, 2023). Today, Frontex' main tasks include the publication of risk analysis reports, border control missions, as well as providing training and support to coast and border control guards of the member states and return operations to deport migrants who do not have a legal right to stay in the EU (Frontex, 2024d).

This development has been partially embedded within the Four Pillars of the European Agenda on Migration from 2015. This agenda was drawn out in response to an increase of immigrants and asylum seekers arriving at the EU's external borders, especially from the Middle East. This development is to date still often referred to as a migration "crisis" (Squire, 2020). The agenda's first pillar calls for the reduction of incentives for "irregular" migration. While one of the measures under pillar one is developmental aid in origin

countries, the focus lies on anti-smuggling measures and the return of migrants to their origin countries. According to the author, these logics stand in a long tradition of European policy mechanisms, that build on the false assumption, that return policies function as a deterrent for migration (Squire, 2020). The second pillar focuses on securing external borders, especially those of coastal member states. While international law proclaims a legal duty to provide help to any vessel in distress, member states increasingly disallow disembarkation and criminalize private rescue missions. The third and fourth pillar focus on building common asylum policies and especially new policies on legal migration. While they are less relevant for the analysis at hand, they shed light on the EU's perception of so-called *regular* or *irregular* migration, and in turn, the definition of who poses a security threat and who does not (Squire, 2020). Knowing under which circumstances Frontex was founded builds the starting point for the analysis. It shows, that securitization framings have been a part of Frontex from the very beginning, which is why the analysis in this paper can investigate, how Frontex further upholds, changes or intensifies these framings.

2.2   Securitization and Racialization of Borders

The analysis in this paper will primarily be centered around literature on the securitization of borders and migration, yet be supported by conceptualizations of the interplay of racialization and border security.

Ole Wæver, as one of the main representatives of the so-called Copenhagen School of security studies, claims, that security in itself is just a concept, yet not a real measurable phenomenon. What actually exists is the securitization of issues through speech acts: Naming security and security issues is an act performed by politicians to legitimize "a special right to use whatever means necessary" (Wæver, 1993). Therefore, when investigating how security issues come to be, researchers should look into the discursive elements that are used to construct and prioritize specific issues as security issues (Léonard, 2010). Newer concepts point out, however, that securitization is not always merely done though speech acts. As Didier Bigo (2002 as cited by Léonard, 2010) has pointed out in the context of the securitization of migration, these speech acts by politicians

are often accompanied by administrative processes, risk evaluations and other actions to increase the sense of a security threat. Together, these to theoretical concepts pose a useful guidance for the analysis at hand, and indicate, that while speech acts often lay the groundwork, other processual actions should not be neglected.

While Wæver and Bigo provide important theoretical concepts, other scholars add to these with more empirical research about the securitization of borders and especially those of the EU. Sarantaki (2023) identifies an increasing securitization at the EU's external borders based on significant increases in Frontex' number of staff, amount of budget as well as number and extent of tasks and deeds. However, as Walters (2006) points out, this materialistic development is not the only change in how borders are securitized. Drawing on Michel Foucault's conceptualization of discipline, he remarks, how borders have shifted from being scenes of military disciplinary actions to a space of controlling and policing the mobility of actors. Similarly to the founding logics of Frontex, this mobility is framed as a security threat. Migrants are seen as what Walters (2006) calls a "dividual" – a fragmented and incomplete person, that needs not be trained or reformed but merely kept out. This logic is used to create a population of unwanted "others" that should be feared as they pose a security risk. The author concludes, that through this logic, borders are increasingly used to create social division.

Huysmans & Squire (2016) provide further insights into the specific language, that is used to legitimize different securitization measures. They differentiate between humanitarian approaches, that focus on the protection of migrants on the one hand and strategic approaches, that see migration as a risk to a state's security on the other. The basis of the latter is the understanding, that security is a condition, that states (can) aspire to reach. According to the authors, the language to describe migration is a powerful tool to shape people's perception of it and to legitimize border management measures. As a result, migration is often perceived as a bigger threat, than it actually poses (Huysmans & Squire, 2016).

A broader lens on bordering practices focusses on the interplay of securitization and racialization. While Moffette & Walters (2018) argue that race and processes of racialization are not yet taken into account to a satisfying extend in migration and security research, Isakjee et al. (2020) provide one perspective on how race plays a significant role at the EU's external borders. By placing present-day case studies in a theoretical framework of Liberalism, they claim, that violence at borders is often legitimized through "racial othering". Examples from Calais or the Croatian-Bosnian Border showcase the various forms of violence migrants have to face: from physical abuse, to the destruction of living sites to racist narratives. This violence is often especially directed towards Muslim migrants (Isakjee et al., 2020).

The selected literature is useful for the analysis at hand, as it points out key elements of securitization, that can be both linguistic as well as processual. One limitation to the use of the selected literature is, that it assumes access to a broad range of material on both speech acts as well as processual actions. This is often not the case in the context of migration: While speech acts can be analyzed on publications and press releases, Frontex is often criticized for a lack of transparency in their work (e.g., Sunderland, 2024).

III.   Conceptual Lens

One suitable conceptualization for securitization, that encompasses the linguistic elements of securitization named in the previous chapter, is presented by Wæver (2000, p. 251, as cited in Neal, 2009):

> *"Security is the speech act where a securitizing actor designates a threat to a specified referent object and declares an existential threat implying a right to use extraordinary means to fence it off."*

The chosen speech acts for this analysis are Frontex' risk analysis reports (RAR). Frontex as the European Coast and Border Guard Agency is a key actor in bordering practices of the EU. Meanwhile, the risk analysis reports are one of their main tasks and give insight in both language as well as processes. They are therefore deemed a suitable source for this

analysis. The language used in the RAR will be investigated in the first part of the analysis. As the "securitizing actor" has been chosen to be Frontex for this analysis, the focus will be on the "referent object", "existential threat", as well as "extraordinary means". The empirical material will therefore be analyzed for language that fulfills these criteria:

1. Security is a central ambition to be reached.
2. An (existential) threat is defined.
3. This threat is a group of individuals, that are described defined as
4. (racial) "others".
5. This threat calls for the need of (extraordinary) action.

However, drawing on Bigo, Léonard (2010) expands Wæver's conceptualization to (extraordinary) securitizing practices, whose "exceptional character suggests that the problem they are tackling is also exceptional and cannot be dealt with by 'normal' or 'ordinary' measures" (Léonard, 2010). This broader lens is adopted in this paper, and the second part of the analysis will investigate, how Frontex' actions reinforce and/ or support their linguistic security framing.

IV. Data & Methodology

4.1   Data

Since the size of the data, that qualifies to be included is too big for the scope of this exam, a focus is set on Frontex' risk analysis reports (RAR). They are a suitable choice, as they can be seen as an act in themselves, yet also allow for the analysis of the language that Frontex uses to describe migration at the EU's external borders. Frontex' Public Register of Documents includes 104 English-language documents of category "Risk analysis". Categorizing those by year and region of interest (based on the title of each document) gives a first overview of the data at hand (Figure 1). Most documents are general or "global" RAR. After a peak between 2015 and 2018, that can largely be attributed to a large share of reports about the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnerships, publications have decreased

significantly since then. To further narrow down the analyzed data, this paper will focus on the annual RAR, that have been published since 2010.


Figure 1: Number of Risk Analysis Reports Published Over Time by Region

For an analysis of Frontex' actions and realm of responsibilities, additional literature as well as Frontex' own website will be consulted.

One limitation of this approach is, that it is prone to biased selectivity: If a large share of the analyzed documents stems from the same source, latent framings can be so common across all documents that they can be hard to notice (Bowen, 2009). Therefore, special care has to be applied to critically analyze the used language. Additionally, only easily available open-access material can be used in the scope of this paper. This means for once, that published documents must be read with a grain of salt, as they not only serve their supposed purpose, but can also function to create or maintain a certain image of Frontex. Additionally, it is not known, which information is unknown to the author of this paper. It must therefore be assumed, that the analysis cannot take the full picture into account.

4.2   Methodology

To analyze Frontex' linguistic framings, the main method employed in this paper is computer-assisted document analysis, as proposed by Breiger et al (2018). Following the authors' proposition, low-tech tools for computational text analysis will complement a close manual

reading of the texts. This combination of methods can leverage the benefits of both: Computational methods allow a farther removed perspective on the text at hand and can help finding patterns and identifying key parts of text. However, the emotional and social intelligence of the researcher is necessary to understand relevant linguistic patterns (Breiger et al., 2018). In this paper, computational methods will be applied using Python 3.11 (Python Software Foundation, 2023) to create a methodological funnel (as shown in Figure 2), that highlights relevant elements in the report, that the author can then spend their attention for manual analysis on.

Figure 2: Funnel Methodology

The first funnel step is a word cloud: A word cloud is a simple, visual representation of word frequencies in a text, where more important words are displayed bigger, and irrelevant words are left out or appear very small. Word clouds are a good method to gain a first impression of the text corpus at hand (Kalmukov, 2021). Secondly, the most common bi-grams of a manually selected set of keywords will be inspected. Bi-Grams are pairs of two

co-occurring words[1]. Analyzing the most common bi-grams, which include selected keywords (e.g. "migration"), gives an indication of the most common associations to these key terms (Nair, 2021). Lastly, based on findings from the word cloud and bi-grams, the annual risk analysis reports will be manually analyzed to determine elements of the above defined conceptualization. In the second part of the analysis, the investigation of securitizing measures and processual actions relies on external literature as well as information found on Frontex' website.

V.   Analysis

The word cloud computed based on the 13 annual risk analysis reports yields these results:

Figure 3: Word Cloud for 13 risk analysis reports

Unsurprisingly, the terms "EU", "migrant", "external border" or "member state" are amongst the most common. However, other terms signal the base tone that is used in RAR: "detection", "illegal", "smuggling" or "trafficking" indicate a focus on negative sentiments and forms of migration that are (deemed) illegal. When looking at some of the smaller

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[1] For example, in that sentence the bi-grams are: "Bi-Grams are", "are pairs", "pairs of" "of two", "two co-occurring" and "co-occurring words".

appearing words, one can see different specific countries, but also the terms "irregular migration", "security", "threat", "criminal" or "effective return". While these terms have to be analyzed more closely within the context that they are used in, they encompass the criteria that were laid down for the conceptualization that guides this analysis. These will be further investigated in the following section.

The conceptualization can be divided into two parts: (1) The definition of a security threat and the population that seemingly causes this threat (aka the referent object and existential threat in the words of Wæver (2000, p. 251, as cited in Neal, 2009)) and the (2) extraordinary measures that are legitimized through the detection of this threat. A sub-section will be dedicated to each of these two parts.

5.1   Referent Object and Existential Threat

After having determined the general sentiment of the RAR by inspecting the word cloud, bi-grams give a better impression of common associations to key terms. These key terms were selected by the author based on their domain knowledge and aim of this paper. Namely, they are:

- migrant
- migration
- illegal
- security
- threat

The most common bi-grams for each of these key terms are presented in Table 1. Since the bi-grams for migrant and migration were very similar, they are combined in one row.

Key Term	Bi-Grams
migrant/migration	irregular migrant/ migration migrant smuggling illegal migrant/ migration migrant/ migration flow migration policy migration pressure migration management

	migration route
	migration crisis
border	external border
	land border
	border management
	border control
	air border
	sea border
	border guard
illegal	illegal bordercrossing
	illegal stay
	illegal border
	illegal migration
	illegal stayer
	detect illegal
security	internal security
	border security
	security threat
	security issue
	freedom security
threat	hybrid threat
	security threat
	terrorist threat
	future threat

Table 1: Most common bi-grams including selected key terms

The most common bi-grams of migrant/ migration are almost exclusively negative. There is a clear focus on forms of irregularized migration as well as smuggling and trafficking. Additionally, the association to pressures, flows or crisis indicates, that migration is perceived as a threat or something resembling a dangerous and unpredictable natural force. As Haas et al. (2019) point out, this is a misguiding framing, as European countries are far from the most affected destination countries. It is therefore not acknowledged that (international) migration is a normal and common phenomenon, whose scale has rarely changed with time on a global level (Haas et al., 2019). A closer look at the context, that these terms are used in in the RAR confirms this angle. In the Annual Risk Analysis Report 2012 it reads:

> *"According to the [Common Integrated Risk Analysis M]odel, a 'threat' is a force or pressure acting upon the external borders that is characterised by both its magnitude and likelihood"* (Frontex, 2012)

and

> *"There were major and extensive developments in irregular migration pressure at*
> *the external border of the EU in 2011"* (Frontex, 2012)

While these are only two examples from one year, similar phrasing can be found in all RAR reports over time. They serve as initial indicators, that Frontex frames "illegal" migration as an threat with growing opacity to the EU and its member states. While there are countless examples of "illegal/irregular migrants/migration", one that sticks out is mentioned in the Strategic Risk Analysis Report of 2022:

> *"Certain third countries use illegal migration as a tool to blackmail the EU and/ or*
> *specific Member States."* (Frontex, 2022)

Here, the concept of illegal migration is mentioned as something, that the EU can be "blackmailed" with. The quote reveals several underlying understandings: (1) migration is illegalized and framed as something bad and threating to the EU and its member states. (2) Not only the migrants themselves, but also third countries are portrayed as antagonists who exert pressure on the EU by criminal means. (3) The fact that the EU is perceived to be *blackmailed* insinuates, that migration is unwanted and forced upon the EU and that in a just world, the EU would not have to deal with the burden and threat of migration. Lastly, (4) migrants become mere unpersonified objects, that are just used as a means to an end. This resembles the conceptualization of the "dividual" as brought forth by Walters (2006).

In line with this negative framing of migration, it is unsurprising that "migration policies" and "border/ migration management" are also amongst the most common bi-grams: By describing migration as a threat or something that is illegal, it seems only natural that it needs to be controlled and managed. In its Risk Analysis Report of 2015, Frontex names very concretely, that:

> *"Given the threats visible at the external borders of the EU, it is evident that border*
> *management has an important security component."*(Frontex, 2015a)

And in the Strategic Risk Analysis Report five years later, they state:

"Put simply, European integrated border management must take account of EU policies, global megatrends and future threats to assess how they will affect the functioning of EU's external border as well as impacting internal security." (Frontex, 2020)

Border management is therefore seen as a logical and vital response to the perceived threat, that the EU faces. It is therefore of interest to further inspect, how that threat is defined. The bi-grams indicate, that one of these perceived threats is terrorism, which is confirmed in several risk analysis reports:

"In the medium term, the impact of migration, cross-border crime and terrorism will continue to require effective border management as a key tool for the mitigation of security threats in the EU." (Frontex, 2021)

"Border guards are also the first filter at the external borders when it comes to the detection of potential terrorist threats." (Frontex, 2019)

These are only two of many examples, where terrorism is named as a central threat to the EU's security. While it is hardly arguable that terrorism poses a threat, it is interesting that migration and terrorism are tightly linked to one another in the RAR. The first quote names them together in one enumeration, as though migration was equally criminal and dangerous as terrorism. The second quote is one example of how that definition of a threat is directly used to legitimize the need for border guards. However, this urgent need for action, which lays out the basis legitimization for the existence of Frontex, is further expanded in other places:

"However, the effectiveness of border management will continue to depend on whole-of-sector and whole-of-government approaches where needed, as border and coast guards are just one part of a sustainable response to cross-border security threats." (Frontex, 2021)

"Frontex monitors Europe's borders 24 hours a day, seven days a week, helping the EU face challenges and threats at its borders, including threats related to cross-border crime and prevention of terrorism." (Frontex, 2019)

In sum, it has been shown, that migration is clearly framed as an illegal action, that poses an existential threat to the EU and its member states and that goes hand in hand with terrorist acts. This is used as a base legitimization for the existence and actions of Frontex as a "border management" agency. And while it is not explicitly spelled out that security is a state that Frontex aims to achieve, it is a clear underlying assumption of all RAR. Therefore, many of the elements laid out in the conceptualization that guides this analysis have been determined.

While othering is an obvious part of the framing of migrants, elements of racialization, however, could not be found through the computational methods that were applied in this analysis. A closer look at the profiles of different migrants in the Risk Analysis Report for 2016, shows, that especially migrants from Libya, Syria and Iraq are named in line with jihadism and islamist extremists. Later on, the report dedicates a whole section on describing violent behavior performed my migrants against each other and against border guards. More specifically it is described that

> *"many migrants do not stop when requested to do so by border guards, they do not obey orders of border authorities and are not afraid to engage in physical contact while crossing the border."* (Frontex, 2016)

While migrants are portrayed as violent groups that disregard rules and put border officials at risk and are brought in relation to extremist and violent forms or Islamism, there are no clear signs of racialization framings in these RAR. It must be noted however, that the RAR are a form of public communication by Frontex. Therefore, it is unsurprising that racial elements are less prevalent or obvious than they are reported to be in Frontex' actions at the external borders by humanitarian organizations (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2021; Isakjee et al., 2020).

5.2   Extraordinary Means

While the main focus of the analysis is on securitizing speech acts used within the risk analysis reports, the following section will provide a brief investigation how these framings support or are supported by selected securitizing processes.

5.2.1. RAR as a Securitizing Measure

That Frontex' risk analysis reports are not only suitable for linguistic analysis but pose a securitizing act is no new finding as but been showed by several scholars. The risk analysis reports are one of Frontex' key tasks and were valued equally important as border checks by European legislations (Horii, 2016). As Léonard (2010) points out, the creation of the reports is, according to Frontex, based on "intelligence-driven" measures – a term that is traditionally used in the context of threats to national security. The use of the term "intelligence" in this context, instead of more neutral terms such as data for information therefore underpins the securitizing effect. Additionally, the accumulation of big data sets for the purpose of providing real-time security assessments as well as early warning systems is, according to Léonard (2010), one example of how practices meant to deal with acknowledged security issues are applied to the context of migration. Horii (2016) too, stresses the extraordinary extent of data collection and coordination that underpins it. Therefore, the RAR can both linguistically as well as processually be identified as a securitizing tool.

5.2.2. Return Operations

In cooperation with EU member states, Frontex organizes so-called return operations to deport "[n]on-EU nationals who have exhausted their legal right to stay in the territory of Member States" to their origin countries (Frontex, 2024b). While this in itself is not an unusual procedure, Léonard (2010) points out, that they are extraordinary through the scope of coordination "aiming to expel certain groups" they are built on. Additionally, Frontex is regularly reported to be involved in illegal push-backs, where migrants arriving on sea are picked-up or deterred towards non-EU countries, before they even reach an EU member state. In consequence, they are denied both aid as a vessel in distress as well as the opportunity to claim asylum in the EU (see e.g., Amnesty International Deutschland e.V., 2021; Kolar, 2022; von der Burchard, 2021). These actions are not only illegal, but they also support the framing identified in the RAR, that the EU has a right to be free of the burden of migration and non-EU migrants. In addition, they are one example of how migrants are seen

as what Walters (2006) calls "dividuals": Instead of welcoming migrants and supporting their integration, the aim is to merely keep them out of EU territory. Both return operations and push-backs can therefore be seen as a securitizing act, as they are employed to remove (or prevent from arriving) a perceived threat from EU territory.

5.2.3. Rapid Border Interventions and Standing Corps

Frontex offers *rapid border interventions* (RABIT), that can be requested by member states, that see themselves under "urgent and exceptional pressure at its external border" (Frontex, 2024a). Frontex can then send the necessary support in the form of e.g. operational staff or border guards from the so-called Rapid Pool, that in turn is equipped by the member states, with short notice (Frontex, 2024a). On Frontex' website, there are only two accounts of a member state (in both cases Greece) requesting a RABIT (Frontex, 2010, 2015b). In spite of this rarity, the Rapid Pool continues to exist and be trained, which supports the framing, that migration can pose an exceptional and sudden risk to EU member states at any point (Léonard, 2010). This perception however is deemed incorrect by Squire (2020), who argues, that increased migratory movements, such as Europe experienced in 2015, are far from unforeseeable. This leads to conclude, that RABIT are upheld more for the purpose of supporting a general framing of a security threat posed by migration than out of actual necessity.

Today, the Rapid Pool is included in Frontex' newest addition to their realm of tasks and units: the standing corps. While Frontex has previously been manned by delegates from the member states or trained and supported their coast guards, it now has its own unit. The standing corps is supposed to support member states in border checks and registrations, handle illegal actions at the border and support return operations. Standing Corps officers are allowed to carry firearms (Frontex, 2024c). This signals a further militarization of border control at the EU's external borders. The standing corps can be identified as extraordinary not only due to the novelty of its concept, but also its scope: While starting out with the already remarkable number of 5.000 employees in 2021, Frontex plans to double that number by 2027 (European Parliament, 2019). Similarly to RABIT, these employment plans

support Frontex' claim, that an increase in border officers is crucial, and that they need to be available at all times to handle the risks posed by arriving migrants. And even though Frontex claims to train the standing corps officers to "fully [comply] with the applicable EU law and ethical standards" (Frontex, 2024c), they too have been reported to be involved in illegal pushbacks (e.g., Bewarder et al., 2024; Kohler, 2024).

VI.   Conclusion

Circling back to the conceptualization laid out in chapter III, this analysis showed, that the (annual) risk analysis reports published by Frontex are based on the underlying (yet not explicit) assumption, that (1) the security of EU member states and the Schengen Area is a central aim to be upheld. (2) Migration or (3) migrants from non-EU states, that arrive at the EU's external borders are widely described to be an existential threat to this security. Instead of efforts to welcome and integrate them, Frontex goes to lengths to enforce partially illegal actions to merely keep them away from EU territory. Due to the nature of the publications, there could only be found indications of racialization practices, for more evidence of this, on-site practices of Frontex have to be examined. Lastly, the linguistic securitization framings are used to (5) legitimize and stress the need for different kinds of border management. The second part of the analysis then showed how Frontex not only uses language, but also processual acts to support this securitizing framing. From today's point of view, it cannot be determined, whether the use of securitizing language came first to pave the way for corresponding actions, or if the imposed actions led and lead to an increase in securitizing language. Most likely, language and actions influence each other in what Huysmans (2006, as cited in Neal, 2009) calls "a circular logic of defining and modulating hostile factors for the purpose of countering them politically and administratively". It can therefore be concluded, that Frontex, as the EU's official border and coast guard agency and therefore very central actor in bordering processes, concentrates all its discursive and processual actions towards shaping migration as a security issue.

VII.   Limitations and Outlook

One limitation to the analysis at hand is that only a small part of the suitable material could be analyzed. However, the use of computational methods proved itself useful in creating a funnel nor narrowing down relevant parts of speech for manual analysis. Therefore, a further investigation into the possibilities of utilizing more advanced computational methods to allow for the analysis of a bigger set of documents seems fruitful. On the other hand, it must be noted, that even through sophisticated computational methods, important subtle framings, that are only recognizable to humans, can be missed. For following research, it is furthermore interesting to investigate the interplay of securitizing actions by Frontex on the one hand and the EU and its member states on the other: As Frontex depends on EU funding, they must uphold this securitization to legitimize their existence. But in turn member states must also support securitization processes in order to see a need for Frontex as a border and coast guard agency. A slightly different angle could investigate the tension between the EU's bordering practices (including Frontex) and its image of a normative power that advocates for human rights and solidarity.

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