John K. Kruschke Indiana University



$$p(y | x, \theta)$$

Hypothesized models, parameterized by  $\theta$ , map each x value to a probability distribution over y values.



$$p(y \mid x, \theta)$$
$$p(\theta)$$

There is a distribution of probabilities regarding values of  $\theta$ .



$$p(y \mid x, \theta)$$
$$p(\theta)$$

For a given x, we predict y by marginalizing over parameter values.

$$p(y \mid x) = \int p(y \mid x, \theta) p(\theta) d\theta$$

For SSE loss, 
$$\hat{y} = \int y p(y|x)dy$$



$$p(y \mid x, \theta)$$
$$p(\theta)$$

For a given x,y pair, we estimate parameters by Bayes' rule:


$$p(\theta \mid y, x) = \frac{p(y \mid x, \theta)p(\theta)}{\int p(y \mid x, \theta)p(\theta)d\theta}$$



$$\frac{p(y \mid x, \theta)}{p(\theta)}$$

Formalism doesn't care what it refers to in the world. Suppose that x is a stimulus, y is a response, and  $\theta$  is a hypothesis.

## **Bayesian Prediction**




Then  $\theta$ ,  $p(\theta)$ , and  $p(y|x,\theta)$  are in (or refer to) the mind.


$$p(y|x) = \int p(y|x,\theta)p(\theta)d\theta$$

$$\hat{y} = \int y p(y|x)dy$$

Kruschke, IPAM GSS 2007


# Bayesian Estimation = Learning






Kruschke, IPAM GSS 2007


# Not only cognition by Bayes...




Kruschke, IPAM GSS 2007


#### Bayesian cognition by others, too











Kruschke, IPAM GSS 2007













#### To Ponder:

- For a Bayesian model of "cognitive behavior", what level of analysis is appropriate?
- If a system is Bayesian at one level of analysis, is it Bayesian at other levels?




Is the overall mapping, from image to 3D model, Bayesian? Is each component Bayesian?


## Consider a Chain of Bayesians




### *Not* Parallel Bayesians




#### A Chain of Bayesians




#### Not Iterated Bayesians



#### A Chain of Bayesians




#### Could Be Generative Bayesians




But not pursued here.

#### A Chain of Bayesians



#### A Chain of Bayesians



The standard approach: The three heads are conjoined over a joint parameter space.


## The Globally Bayesian Approach

$$p(\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}, \theta_{3})$$

$$p(y_{3} | x_{1}, \theta_{1}, \theta_{2}, \theta_{3}) = \int \int p(y_{3} | y_{2}, \theta_{3}) p(y_{2} | y_{1}, \theta_{2}) p(y_{1} | x_{1}, \theta_{1}) dy_{1} dy_{2}$$

$$p(y_{3} | x_{1}) = \int \int \int p(y_{3} | x_{1}, \theta_{1}, \theta_{2}, \theta_{3}) p(\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}, \theta_{3}) d\theta_{1} d\theta_{2} d\theta_{3}$$

## The Globally Bayesian Approach




# The Locally Bayesian Approach




You are all individuals!


#### Yes, we are all individuals!




## Locally Bayesian *Prediction*




Each Bayesian agent computes its best prediction, and propagates it forward. This process needs integrals over only the individual parameter spaces.




Update  $p(\theta_3/y_3,x_3)$  by Bayes' rule. Involves integrating only over the  $\theta_3$  parameter space.




But how should poor Richard update his beliefs about  $\theta_2$ ? He needs a  $y_2$  value to learn about!







Harold tells Richard to produce a value that is consistent with Harold's beliefs!




In practice, don't need to maximize; just get a value of  $y_2$  with  $p(y_3 | y_2) > p(y_3 | \hat{y}_2)$ 







Richard tells Thomas to produce a value that is consistent with Richard's beliefs!




In practice, don't need to maximize; just get a value of  $y_1$  with  $p(y_2 | y_1) > p(y_2 | \hat{y}_1)$ 



Other updating dynamics are possible. E.g., first propagate  $y_3$  all the way back to the first agent, and update  $p(\theta_1/y_1,x_1)$ . Then compute predicted  $\hat{y}_1$ . Then update  $p(\theta_2/y_2, \hat{y}_1)$ . And so on.



Each agent is told by its superior to learn a datum that is maximally consistent (or minimally inconsistent) with the superior's current beliefs.



This process protects the superior's beliefs from disconfirmation! The inferior will learn to "distort the data" to avoid disconfirming the superior.

### Locally Bayesian Learning (LBL)

LBL preserves current beliefs and creates "epicycles" for new data. Perhaps not perfectly optimal, but then, are real systems?



# Put your models where your data are...

 Some real behavior, in the domain of associative learning, to which Locally Bayesian Learning can be applied.

## Typical Learning Task Stimulus presentation and response collection:



#### Typical Learning Task

#### Corrective feedback:



# Phenomena Suggestive of Attention in Learning

- Fewer relevant cues → faster learning.
- Intradimensional shifts are faster than extradimensional.
- Attenuated learning after blocking.
- Overshadowing.
- Context-specific attention.
- Highlighting.
- Et cetera!

```
Early Training: I.PE\rightarrowE

Late Training: I.PE\rightarrowE I.PL\rightarrowL

Testing
Results: I\rightarrow? (E!)
PE.PL\rightarrow? (L!)
```

```
Early Training: I.PE\rightarrowE

Late Training: I.PE\rightarrowE I.PL\rightarrowL

Testing
Results: I\rightarrow? (E!)
PE.PL\rightarrow? (L!)
```

E I L PL

Early Training: I.PE→E

Late Training: I.PE→E I.PL→L

Testing  $I \rightarrow ? (E!)$ 

Results: PE.PL→? (L!)

E I L PL

Early Training: I.PE→E

Late Training: I.PE→E I.PL→L

Testing  $I \rightarrow ? (E!)$ 

Results: PE.PL→? (L!)

#### Design: Highlighting

Phase	Cues→C	Outcome
Initial Training:	(2x) I1.PE1→E1	E L
3:1 base-rate Training:	(3x) I1.PE1→E1 (1x) I1.PL1→L1	PE PL 2
1:3 base-rate Training:	(1x) I1.PE1→E1 (3x) I1.PL1→L1	(1x) I2.PE2→E2 (3x) I2.PL2→L2
Testing:	PE.PL-	>?, etc.

#### Design: Highlighting


Phase	Cues→Outcome
Initial Training:	(2x) I1.PE1→E1 (2x) I2.PE2→E2
3:1 base-rate Training:	(3x) I1.PE1 $\to$ E1 (3x) I2.PE2 $\to$ E2 (1x) I1.PL1 $\to$ L1 (1x) I2.PL2 $\to$ L2
1:3 base-rate Training:	(1x) I1.PE1 $\to$ E1 (1x) I2.PE2 $\to$ E2 (3x) I1.PL1 $\to$ L1 (3x) I2.PL2 $\to$ L2
Testing:	PE.PL→?, etc.

#### "Canonical" Design: Highlighting


# Blocks	Cues→Outcome	
N1:	(2x) I1.PE1→E1 (2x) I2.PE2→E2	
N2:	(3x) I1.PE1→E1 (3x) I2.PE2→E2 (1x) I1.PL1→L1 (1x) I2.PL2→L2	
N1+N2:	(1x) I1.PE1→E1 (1x) I2.PE2→E2 (3x) I1.PL1→L1 (3x) I2.PL2→L2	

Frequency of I.PE→E trials *equals* frequency of I.PL→L trials.


#### Highlighting: Results I.PE




#### Highlighting: Results I.PL




### Highlighting: Results I




#### Highlighting: Results PE.PL



### Highlighting: Results I.PE.PL




#### Highlighting: Results I.PEo.PLo




#### Not just for meaningless associations...

Highlighting also happens in meaningful domains...


# An Application: Highlighting while web browsing.




# An Application: Highlighting while web browsing.



## An Application: Highlighting while web browsing.



#### Test items




#### **Results:**

I yields strong preference for Early quality; PE.PL yields strong preference for Later quality.




## An Application: Highlighting of personal attributes.

Early Training:	honest(+) & conventional(-) → Fred
Late	honest(+) & conventional(-) → Fred
Training:	honest(+) & materialistic(-) → Jack




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## An Application: Highlighting of personal attributes.

Early Training:	honest(+) & conventional(-) → Fred
Late	honest(+) & conventional(-) → Fred
Training:	honest(+) & materialistic(-) → Jack



#### What causes highlighting?

- Can your favorite model of learning account for highlighting?
- How about various Bayesian approaches?
  - Only candidates are Bayesian approaches with sensitivity to time or trial order

#### Rational Model

(J. R. Anderson 1990)


#### Representation:

- There are internal clusters that represent subsets of training items.
- Each cluster has its own set of Dirichlet distributions over beliefs about feature probabilities.


#### Learning:

- For each item presented, the item is assigned to the cluster that is most probable.
- The Dirichlet parameters of that cluster are Bayesian updated.

#### Rational Model Does Not Show Highlighting:



• Cluster iiii parameters are symmetric.



#### Kalman Filter

(Sutton 1992; Dayan, Kakade et al. 2000+)


$$p(t) \sim N(t \mid a^{out}, v)$$

$$a^{out} = \sum_{i} w_{i} a_{i}^{cue}$$

$$w_{1} \quad w_{2} \quad p(\vec{w}) \sim N(\vec{w} \mid \vec{\mu}, C)$$

$$a_{1}^{cue} = a_{2}^{cue}$$

#### Kalman Filter Updating: Step 1. Linear Dynamics



#### Kalman Filter Updating: Step 2. Bayesian Learning


$$w_{1} \quad w_{2} \quad p(\vec{w}) \sim N(\vec{w} \mid \vec{\mu}^{*}, C^{*})$$

$$\vec{\mu}' = \vec{\mu}^{*} + C^{*}\vec{a}^{cue} \left[ v + \vec{a}^{cue^{T}} C^{*} \vec{a}^{cue} \right]^{-1} \left( t - \vec{a}^{cue^{T}} \vec{\mu} \right)$$

$$C' = C^{*} - C^{*} \vec{a}^{cue} \left[ v + \vec{a}^{cue^{T}} C^{*} \vec{a}^{cue} \right]^{-1} \vec{a}^{cue^{T}} C^{*}$$

# Kalman Filter Does Not Show Highlighting:

Symmetric weights:




Weight from cue I is near zero.


Weights from PE and PL are equal and opposite.

#### **Explanation of Highlighting:**


 Attention rapidly shifts to the distinctive feature of the later learned outcome.



#### Models of Attention Shifting: General Framework




#### Models of Attention Shifting: RASHNL (/ALCOVE)



Kruschke, J. K. (1992). ALCOVE: An exemplar-based connectionist model of category learning. *Psychological Review*, 99, 22-44.

Kruschke, J. K. & Johansen, M. K. (1999). A model of probabilistic category learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition*, 25, 1083-1119.


# Models of Attention Shifting: EXIT (/ADIT)



Kruschke, J. K. (1996). Base rates in category learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition*, 22, 3-26.

Kruschke, J. K. (2001). Toward a unified model of attention in associative learning. *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 45, 812-863.


# Models of Attention Shifting: EXIT (/ADIT)



Kruschke, J. K. (1996). Base rates in category learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition*, 22, 3-26.

Kruschke, J. K. (2001). Toward a unified model of attention in associative learning. *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 45, 812-863.


# Models of Attention Shifting: ATRIUM & POLE




Kalish, M. L., Lewandowsky, S., and Kruschke, J. K. (2004). Population of linear experts: Knowledge partitioning and function learning. **Psychological Review**, 111(4), 1072-1099.


Erickson, M. A. & Kruschke, J. K. (1998). Rules and Exemplars in Category Learning. **Journal of Experimental Psychology: General**, 127, 107-140.


#### Models of Attention Shifting: Locally Bayesian





Kruschke, J. K. (2006). Locally Bayesian learning with applications to retrospective revaluation and highlighting. **Psychological Review, 113,** 677-699.












$$p(E=1) = sig(\vec{w}^{out}\vec{\alpha})$$

Attention (Hidden):




$$\hat{\alpha}_{j} = \sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}} \alpha \ p(\alpha_{j} = \alpha)$$

Cues:


PE


 $\widehat{\hspace{1em} \mathbb{I}\hspace{1em}}$ 


PL




#### Highlighting: Prior Distribution







#### Highlighting: Prior Distribution





#### Highlighting: Prior Distribution


Data entered:
[ PE I PL E ]
(none)


Prior beliefs are symmetric:


Beliefs about all cues are neutral.

























LOCAL







I.PL


**Test Item** 


I


PE.PL
















#### Hypotheses After Initial Learning of PE.I → E


















## Highlighting: End of training





#### Hypotheses After All Learning, PE.I $\rightarrow$ E and I.PL $\rightarrow$ L


Outcome:  $\overline{w} \approx 4$   $\overline{w} \approx -5$  Attention (Hidden):  $\overline{PE}$   $\overline{I}$   $\overline{PL}$ 


Inhibition of I by PL prevents disconfirmation of previous learning that  $I \rightarrow E$ .

Attention (Hidden):











Beliefs about I are asymmetric:

Stronger beliefs in +5 weights than -5 weights.




Beliefs about PE and PL are asymmetric:

PL beliefs are more extreme than PE beliefs.



#### Models of Attention Shifting: Locally Bayesian



# Layers of Kalman Filters **Applied to Highlighting**

**Outcomes:** 


WPE W WPI  $lpha_{\sf PL}$  $\alpha_{PE}$ 

Kalman Filters

Attention:

Kalman Filters


#### **Likelihood and Prior Distributions**



#### **Outcome generation**

**Outcomes:** 

Attention:



$$\overline{y} = \int dw \ p(w|\mu, C) \int dy \ y \ p(y|x, w, v)$$

$$= \mu^{T} x$$

$$x = \text{input} \cdot \overline{y}$$


$$\overline{y} = \int dw \ p(w|\mu, C) \int dy \ y \ p(y|x, w, v)$$

$$= \mu^{T} x$$

$$x = \text{input activation vector}$$

#### **Target for Attention**


**Outcomes:** 




Attention:

# Layers of Kalman Filters: **Target for Attention**





Attention:




Cues:

(To determine unique maximum, included tiny cost for unequal attention values, and tiny cost for non-zero attention on absent cue.)

#### **Dynamics and Bayesian Learning**



Attention:




$$\mu^{*} = D\mu$$

$$C^{*} = DCD^{T} + U$$


$$\mu' = \mu^{*} + C^{*}x \left[v + x^{T}C^{*}x\right]^{-1} \left(t - x^{T}\mu^{*}\right)$$

$$C' = C^{*} - C^{*}x \left[v + x^{T}C^{*}x\right]^{-1}x^{T}C^{*}$$


$$\mu^* = D\mu 
C^* = DCD^T + U 
\mu' = \mu^* + C^*x [v + x^TC^*x]^{-1} (t - x^T\mu^*) 
C' = C^* - C^*x [v + x^TC^*x]^{-1} x^TC^*$$




Outcome Node 1 Weights
Highlighting After Phase 3, Epoch 3, Trial 4




Outcome Node 1 Weights
Highlighting After Phase 3, Epoch 3, Trial 4



Outcome Node 1 Weights
Highlighting After Phase 3, Epoch 3, Trial 4




Outcome Node 1 Weights Highlighting After Phase 3, Epoch 3, Trial 4




### Summary


 Different levels of analysis invite possibility of a chain of Bayesian learners.




 Locally Bayesian learning prevents disconfirmation of superior's beliefs and creates distortions in inferior's beliefs.



 Locally Bayesian learning was applied to attentional shifts in associative learning, specifically to account for "highlighting".





#### **Future Directions**

- Better models and priors for application to associative learning, to expand scope and quantitatively fit human learning.
- Applications to other domains and phenomena. (Please suggest!)
- Formal analysis of global behavior of system of Bayesian agents.