# The Up-Ballot Implications of Uncontested US House Races
## The Case of 2018

Kevin Morris    Peter Miller

Brennan Center for Justice

Southern Political Science Association, 2020

## Overview

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  - and larger for the "represented party" in five of the seven (not Texas and Wisconsin)

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  - Party-based mobilization (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994)

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    - "packing" and "cracking" for advantage
    - Redistricting reduces turnout by disrupting incumbent recall (Winburn and Wagner 2009; Hayes and McKee 2009)

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- We leverage the Bayesian racial probability estimate methodology developed by Imai and Khanna (2016) for states without self-reported race data.

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
# Methodology

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- The matching procedure resulted in strong improvements across all the factors on which we match.

# Regression Results

exp(Estimate)

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
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- What are the overtime effects?
  - Replicate the same methods in 2020 and 2022

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