


AMT F2016 Final

Complete as much of each question as possible. The exam will be graded on a curve. Good Luck!

1. **Choice Theory (10)** The consumption space of an agent is \mathbb{R}_+^2 . For each property below, on separate figures, show graphically an example of TWO preference relations; one that **satisfies** the property and one that does **NOT** satisfy the property. Clearly indicate indifference curves (if there are any), direction of increasing preferences, points of intersection, etc.
 - (a) monotonicity
 - (b) transitivity
 - (c) continuity
 - (d) convexity
 - (e) quasi-linear
 - (f) local non-satiation
2. **Choice Theory (10)** Let $X = \{\text{apple, orange, banana, 250g lingonberries}\}$ be the set of all fruits.
 - (a) I have the following procedure when faced with each possible subset of available fruits:
 - if the store has $\{\text{apple, orange, banana}\}$, then I choose apple,
 - if the store has $\{\text{orange, banana, 250g lingonberries}\}$, then I choose orange,
 - if faced with each other possible set of fruits, then I choose apple.Does my procedure satisfy WARP? Give an example if not.
 - (b) State the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Irrelevant Deletions Don't Matter) property. Give a real-life example of when it is violated.
3. **Consumer Theory (10)** Let p and p' be two lists of prices, and w be a wealth level. A policy maker wants to know how the welfare of Jane changes if prices change from one to the other. Formally describe and discuss two different ways to measure changes in her welfare *in terms of her expenditure*. (Hint: let $u = v(p, w)$, $u' = v(p', w)$, and recall $e(p, u) = w$).
4. **Risk Aversion (10)** Let $u(x) = \sqrt{x}$ be an agent's Bernoulli utility function for money, and w be his/her wealth. Consider the lottery that pays 10 euros with probability p , and 120 euros with probability $1 - p$. For the following two questions, you do not need to compute an exact number, just write conditions that x and y must satisfy.
 - (a) The individual owns the lottery. What is the minimum amount of money x that the agent is willing to *sell* the lottery for?
 - (b) The individual does not own the lottery. What is the maximum amount of money y that the agent is willing to *buy* the lottery for?
5. **Expected Utility (10)** Consider the lotteries below. Suppose an agent has preferences $L_2 \succ L_1$ and $L_3 \succ L_4$. Show that this is incompatible with Expected Utility preferences. Show that the preferences violate Independence. In light of this, do you think Expected Utility is reasonable to use in modelling decision under uncertainty?
 - $L_1 = 0.25[3, 000] \oplus 0.75[0]$, & $L_2 = 0.2[4, 000] \oplus 0.8[0]$
 - $L_3 = 1[3, 000]$, & $L_4 = 0.8[4, 000] \oplus 0.2[0]$
6. **Classical Exchange Problem (30)** Consider the 2-agent 2-commodity case. Agent 1 has Leontief preferences, and Agent 2 has linear preferences; they are depicted below. The dot (the same point on each picture) represents the endowment profile.



- (a) (2) In the Edgeworth Box, select a point that is NOT Pareto-efficient and graphically show that another point dominates it.
- (b) (3) Identify the entire Pareto-efficient set of allocations.
- (c) (2) **Endowment Lower Bound** Identify the set of points that is preferred by each agent to his/her own endowment.
- (d) (2) You design a **rule** that recommends for each possible profile of preferences and endowments an allocation. For each economy, your rule selects from the Pareto-efficient and endowment lower bound set. For the above economy, select a point z in the Pareto-efficient and endowment lower bound set (that you have calculated); suppose your rule recommends z for this economy. However, **you don't know** each agent's preference until they tell you; so they have to report their preferences first. Suppose that the Agent 2 (with Leontief preference) always tells the truth, but Agent 1 (linear guy) does not. Construct a lie (a different linear preference) that Agent 1 may tell that would make him better off. (Hint: it will depend on z).
- (e) (5) Let $X = \mathbb{R}_+^2$ be each agent's consumption space, N be a set of agents, R their profile of preferences, e their profile of endowments, and p a list of prices. Formally state the definition of a Walrasian Equilibrium.
- (f) (2) What are some implicit assumptions of Walrasian Equilibrium?
- (g) (5) By Walras' Law, each agent consumes on his/her budget line (and not underneath). Suppose prices p are such that the budget line (which goes through the endowment point) is "flatter" than Agent 2's indifference curve through the same point. Graphically show that...
- Agent 1's optimal bundle given p and e^2 lies at a "kink".
 - Agent 2's optimal bundle given p and e^1 lies on the boundary of the Edgeworth Box.
 - Can this price vector (and the resulting allocation) be a Walrasian Equilibrium? Why/why not?
 - Argue that at a Walrasian Equilibrium, the budget line must have the same slope as Agent 2's indifference curves.
- (h) (3) State the First and Second Welfare Theorems.
- (i) (3) An allocation is **envy-free** if no agent prefers another agent's assignment to his/her own. Let e be the endowment profile where the total amount is equally divided between each agent. Using the definition of budget sets, show that each Walrasian Equilibrium for this economy is envy-free.
- (j) (3) Consider an economy with 3 agents and 2 commodities; the endowment profile is $e_1 = (5, 8)$, $e_2 = (4, 4)$, and $e_3 = (12, 4)$. Each agent has monotonic preferences. Is the allocation $((10, 4), (4, 7), (7, 5))$ envy-free? ...in the Core for this economy? If it is not in the Core, then identify a blocking coalition.
- (k) (Bonus 2) As a description of a real-world economy, what aspect do you think Walrasian Equilibrium fails to capture?