



1. Motivation




20 popular npm packages with 2 billion weekly downloads compromised in **supply chain attack**.
The Hacker News. (2025, September)


[ASE'25] DEBUN: Detecting **Bundled JavaScript Libraries** on Web using Property-Order Graphs

Seojin Kim*, Sungmin Park*, and Jihyeok Park

- **Next Step - Exploitability**



3. Approach



- **sink APIs and Objects**

CWE-1321	Object.prototype, Object.{defineProperty, defineProperties}
CWE-78	child_process.{exec[Sync], spawn[Sync]}
CWE-94	global.eval, Function (constructor), vm.runInContext
CWE-1333	RegExp.{exec, test}, String.{match, replace}

- **Incorrect PoC Types**

Type 1) A **different sink** within the **same library**

- ex) **jQuery/index.js** line 112, **jQuery/util.js** line 78

Type 2) A **different sink** in a **third-party library**

- ex) **lodash/set.js** line 55


Type 3) Intended result **occurs in PoC** without target sink

- ex) See Case Study

Type 4) No intended result, simple mistake

5. Case Study

Case 1) Intended result **occurs in PoC** without target sink



Case 2) Overly complex PoC generated by LLM

```
const dset = require("dset").dset;
const maliciousObject = {};
const pollutedKey = "a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.p.q.r.s.t.u.v.w.x.y.z";
dset(maliciousObject, pollutedKey, {});
dset(
  maliciousObject.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.p.q.r.s.t.u.v.w.x.y.z.__proto__,
  "exploited",
  true
);
```

2. Background

- **Prior Work - PoC Generation**

- **Manual Dataset**

- SecBench.js (ICSE'23)

- **Static Analysis**

- FAST (SP'23), Explode.js (PLDI'25)

- **Dynamic Analysis**

- NodeMedic (EuroS&P'23), NodeMedic-Fine (NDSS'25)

- **LLM**

- PoCGen (arXiv)

- **Vulnerability Categories**

CWE-1321	Prototype-Pollution	Attacker input manipulates object prototype
CWE-78	Command-Injection	Attacker input executed as OS commands
CWE-94	Code-Injection	Attacker input executed as code
CWE-1333	ReDos	Attacker input cause excessive regex matching

- **PoC example**

const adb = require("adb-driver");
adb.execADBCommand('& touch a');

CVE-2020-7636 PoC (adb-driver) - SecBench.js

child_process_1 **exec(execCmd, option || {})**
() => {}
);

file 'a' created

Simplified Library code of **adb-driver@0.1.8**

- **Problem**

Validation limited to **intended results** at end of the execution

const alfred = require("alfred-workflow-nodejs");
alfred.utils.wfVars.remove(' '; touch a '#,"value");

PoC (alfred-workflow-nodejs) - PoCGen

var Utils = (function() {
wfVars: {
 set: **function(callback){**
 exec(addCommand, callback(_toUndefined));
 }
 remove: **function(callback){**
 exec(getCommand, callback(_toUndefined));
 }
}

no intended result

file 'a' created

Simplified Library code of **alfred-workflow-nodejs@2.0.1**

4. Evaluation

- **Prototype-Pollution Exploits**

	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3	Type 4	Invalid	Total
SecBench.js	0	4	4	3	11	194
Explode.js	18	0	0	0	18	83
PoCGen	14	1	2	2	19	148

- Assume SecBench.js, a manual dataset, as **ground truth**

- **11.29%** of exploits fail to match with their **target sink**

6. Future Work

