

Simple but longterm card-terminal authorization protocol based on one time passwords - sketch of protocol

Card	Transmission	Terminal
<p>Generates the challenge nonce (NC).</p> <p>Deciphers the response, verifies the challenge AR and responds with AC value. Also sends current State of card. Everything is ciphered with usage of the same KeyStream.</p> <p>Save the new state.</p>	<p>1. $\leftarrow \text{HelloMessage}$</p> <p>2. $NC \rightarrow$</p> <p>3. $\leftarrow \text{KeyStream1} \oplus NR + \text{KeyStream2} \oplus AR$</p> <p>4. $AC \oplus \text{KeyStream3}, \text{State} \oplus \text{KeyStream4} \rightarrow$</p> <p>5. $\leftarrow \text{NewState} \oplus \text{KeyStream5}$</p>	<p>Sends Hello Message and asks card for authentication.</p> <p>Prepare the challenge nonce (NR). Respond on NC nonce with AR value. Cipher both nonce and value with KeyStream.</p> <p>Verify the AC challenge. Verify the state. Send new state.</p>

To detect the attempt of relay attack the terminal is gathering the informations about the delays between each card response (in milliseconds). If the sum of delays is higher than given safe value, the card is revoked on the end of authentication procedure.