Algorithmic Economics - HW 3

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Let's install the required libraries first

```
In [ ]: ! pip install numpy seaborn pandas
       Requirement already satisfied: numpy in /home/jakub/.pyenv/versions/scient
       ific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (1.26.2)
       Requirement already satisfied: seaborn in /home/jakub/.pyenv/versions/scie
       ntific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (0.13.2)
       Requirement already satisfied: pandas in /home/jakub/.pyenv/versions/scien
       tific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (2.1.3)
       Requirement already satisfied: matplotlib!=3.6.1,>=3.4 in /home/jakub/.pye
       nv/versions/scientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from seaborn) (3.8.2)
       Requirement already satisfied: python-dateutil>=2.8.2 in /home/jakub/.pyen
       v/versions/scientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from pandas) (2.8.2)
       Requirement already satisfied: pytz>=2020.1 in /home/jakub/.pyenv/version
       s/scientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from pandas) (2023.3.post1)
       Requirement already satisfied: tzdata>=2022.1 in /home/jakub/.pyenv/versio
       ns/scientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from pandas) (2023.3)
       Requirement already satisfied: contourpy>=1.0.1 in /home/jakub/.pyenv/vers
       ions/scientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from matplotlib!=3.6.1,>=3.
       4->seaborn) (1.2.0)
       Requirement already satisfied: cycler>=0.10 in /home/jakub/.pyenv/version
       s/scientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from matplotlib!=3.6.1,>=3.4->s
       eaborn) (0.12.1)
       Requirement already satisfied: fonttools>=4.22.0 in /home/jakub/.pyenv/ver
       sions/scientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from matplotlib!=3.6.1,>=3.
       4->seaborn) (4.47.0)
       Requirement already satisfied: kiwisolver>=1.3.1 in /home/jakub/.pyenv/ver
       sions/scientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from matplotlib!=3.6.1,>=3.
       4->seaborn) (1.4.5)
       Requirement already satisfied: packaging>=20.0 in /home/jakub/.pyenv/versi
       ons/scientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from matplotlib!=3.6.1,>=3.4-
       >seaborn) (23.2)
       Requirement already satisfied: pillow>=8 in /home/jakub/.pyenv/versions/sc
       ientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from matplotlib!=3.6.1,>=3.4->seabo
       rn) (10.2.0)
       Requirement already satisfied: pyparsing>=2.3.1 in /home/jakub/.pyenv/vers
       ions/scientific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from matplotlib!=3.6.1,>=3.
       4->seaborn) (3.1.1)
       Requirement already satisfied: six>=1.5 in /home/jakub/.pyenv/versions/sci
       entific/lib/python3.11/site-packages (from python-dateutil>=2.8.2->pandas)
       (1.16.0)
       [notice] A new release of pip is available: 23.3.1 -> 24.0
```

We define the player and battlefield representation:

[notice] To update, run: pip install --upgrade pip

```
In [ ]: from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import List
import numpy as np
```

```
# battlefield can just be a list of ints

@dataclass
class Player:
    num_resources: int
    strategy: np.ndarray
```

The best response functions, which although similar are not exactly symmetrical because of how draws are handled.

```
In [ ]: # this is equivalent to finding k'th (k = num resources) largest element
        def bestPureResponseAtt(att player, def player, battlefields):
            num resources = att player.num resources
            def strat = def player.strategy
            utils = (1.0-def strat) * battlefields
            util idxs = np.argpartition(utils, -num resources)
            res = np.zeros like(def strat)
            res[util idxs[-num resources:]] = 1.0
            return res
        # this is equivalent to finding k'th (k = num resources) largest element
        def bestPureResponseDef(att player, def player, battlefields):
            num resources = def player.num resources
            att strat = att player.strategy
            utils = att strat * battlefields
            util idxs = np.argpartition(utils, -num resources)
            res = np.zeros like(att strat)
            res[util idxs[-num resources:]] = 1.0
            return res
```

We also have to implement a calculation of ϵ , this is bounded from the bottom by the difference in paysoff between the players when reacting with any of their best responses against the opponent's mixed strategy.

Let *S* be the set of pure strategies available to a given player, then:

todo

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```
In [ ]: def getEpsilon(
    att_player, def_player, battlefields, best_resp_att=None, best_resp_d
):
    att_strat = att_player.strategy
    def_strat = def_player.strategy
    if best_resp_att is None:
        best_resp_att = bestPureResponseAtt(att_player, def_player, battl
    if best_resp_def is None:
        best_resp_def = bestPureResponseDef(att_player, def_player, battl
    pay_att = np.sum(best_resp_att * battlefields * (1 - def_strat))
    pay_def = np.sum((1 - best_resp_def) * battlefields * att_strat)

    return abs(pay_att - pay_def)
```

We are now able to implement ficticious play.

```
In [ ]: def ficticiousPlay( # todo intial conditions player
```

```
battlefields, num res att, num res def, epsilon=0.001, max iters=1 00
):
   assert num res att > 0 and num res att < len(battlefields)</pre>
   assert num res def > 0 and num res def < len(battlefields)</pre>
   assert num res att < num res def</pre>
   #battlefields = np.array(battlefields, dtype=np.double)
   num battlefields = battlefields.shape[0]
   att play = Player(num res att, np.array([num res att/num battlefields
   def play = Player(num res def, np.array([num res def/num battlefields
    epsilons = []
    for t in range(1, max iters + 1):
        resp att = bestPureResponseAtt(att play, def play, battlefields)
        resp def = bestPureResponseDef(att play, def play, battlefields)
        err = getEpsilon(att play, def play, battlefields, resp att, resp
        epsilons.append(err)
        if err <= epsilon:</pre>
            break
        for i, (cur, new) in enumerate(zip(att play.strategy, resp att)):
            att play.strategy[i] = (cur * (t - 1) + new) / t
        for i, (cur, new) in enumerate(zip(def play.strategy, resp def)):
            def play.strategy[i] = (cur * (t - 1) + new) / t
    return att play.strategy, def play.strategy, np.array(epsilons) # len
```

Let's generate some nice variety for the input analysis, we will consider games with 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 battlefields for each we will check situations where the attacker and defender have a $low(< \sim 15\%)$, medium ($\sim 40-60\%$) or high number($> \sim 85\%$) or resources in comparison to the number of battlefields

```
In [ ]: import random as r
        import pandas as pd
        import math
        r.seed(42)
        input ranges = ["low", "mid", "high"]
        field sizes = [10 * i for i in range(1, 6)]
        range divisors = [(field \ sizes[-1], 1 / 0.15), (1 / 0.4, 1 / 0.6), (1 / 0.4)]
        num samples = 100
        input params = []
        column names = ["field size", "tokens att", "tokens def", "range att", "r
        for field size in field sizes:
            for att range in range(len(input ranges)):
                 for def range in range(att range, len(input ranges)):
                     for _ in range(num samples):
                         min att = math.ceil(field size / range divisors[att range
                         min att = min(field size - 2, min att)
                         max att = math.floor(field size / range divisors[att rang
                         \max att = \max(\min att + 1, \max att)
                         max att = min(max att, field size - 1)
                         assert min att < max att</pre>
                         tokens att = r.randrange(min att, max att)
                         min def = math.ceil(field size / range divisors[def range
                         min def = max(tokens att + 1, min def)
                         max def = math.floor(field size / range divisors[att rang
                         \max def = \max(\min def + 1, \max def)
                         tokens def = r.randrange(min def, max def)
                         assert tokens att < tokens def</pre>
```

```
assert tokens def < field size</pre>
                input params.append(
                        field size,
                        tokens att,
                        tokens def,
                        input ranges[att range],
                        input ranges[def range],
                    )
battlefields arr = np.random.randint(
   2,
   6,
    size=(
        len(field sizes)* len(input ranges) * (len(input ranges) + 1) //
        field sizes[-1]
    ),
).astype(np.double)
assert(battlefields arr.shape[0] == len(input params))
# make sure each battlefield value occurs at least once
battlefields arr[...,0] = 2.0
battlefields arr[...,1] = 3.0
battlefields arr[...,2] = 4.0
battlefields arr[...,3] = 5.0
```

And let's simulate everythign for later analysis

```
In []: max_iters = 10_000
#epsilons = np.zeros((len(input_params), max_iters), dtype=np.double)
epsilons = []
attack_strats = []
defend_strats = []
for i, (fs, ta, td, ra, rd) in enumerate(input_params):
    if i % 100 == 0:
        print(f"done {i}, starting or continuing sizes {fs}", flush=True)
    attack_strat, defend_strat, epsilon = ficticiousPlay(battlefields_arr
    attack_strats.append(attack_strat)
    defend_strats.append(defend_strat)
    epsilons.append(epsilon)
```

done 0, starting or continuing sizes 10

```
KeyboardInterrupt
                                                 Traceback (most recent call las
       t)
       Cell In[9], line 9
             7 if i % 100 == 0:
                   print(f"done {i}, starting or continuing sizes {fs}", flush=Tr
       ue)
       ----> 9 attack strat, defend strat, epsilon = ficticiousPlay(battlefields
       arr[i, :fs], ta, td, max iters=max iters, epsilon=0.0)
            10 attack strats.append(attack strat)
            11 defend strats.append(defend strat)
       Cell In[6], line 21, in ficticiousPlay(battlefields, num res att, num res
       def, epsilon, max iters)
            19
                  for i, (cur, new) in enumerate(zip(att play.strategy, resp at
       t)):
            20
                       att play.strategy[i] = (cur * (t - 1) + new) / t
       ---> 21
                   for i, (cur, new) in enumerate(zip(def play.strategy, resp de
       f)):
                       def play.strategy[i] = (cur * (t - 1) + new) / t
            22
            24 return att play.strategy, def play.strategy, np.array(epsilons)
       KeyboardInterrupt:
In [ ]: epsilons stacked = np.stack(epsilons)
        attack strats padded = []
        for strat in attack strats:
            attack strats padded.append(np.pad(strat, (0, field sizes[-1] - strat
        attack strats stacked = np.stack(attack strats padded)
        defend strats padded = []
        for strat in defend strats:
            defend_strats_padded.append(np.pad(strat, (0, field_sizes[-1] - strat
        defend strats stacked = np.stack(defend strats padded)
In [ ]: | np.save('epsilons', epsilons stacked)
        np.save('attack strats', attack strats stacked)
        np.save('defend strats', defend strats stacked)
In [ ]: import pickle
        with open("input_params.pkl", 'wb') as f:
            pickle.dump(input params, f)
In [ ]: import seaborn as sns
        import pandas as pd
        column names = ["epsilon", "timestep", "field size", "tokens att", "token
        df = pd.DataFrame([(epsilons stacked[i,j] , j, fs, ta, td, ra, rd) for i,
        print(df)
```

```
epsilon timestep field_size tokens_att tokens_def range_att
\
0
        1.500000
                           0
                                       10
                                                     1
                                                                   2
                                                                            low
                                                                   2
1
        0.600000
                                                     1
                                                                            low
                         100
                                       10
2
        0.440000
                                                     1
                                                                   2
                                                                            low
                         200
                                       10
3
        0.336667
                                                                   2
                         300
                                       10
                                                     1
                                                                            low
4
                                                     1
                                                                   2
        0.305000
                         400
                                       10
                                                                           low
                         . . .
                                                    . . .
                                                                            . . .
299995 0.029579
                        9500
                                       50
                                                    46
                                                                 47
                                                                          high
299996
        0.029271
                        9600
                                       50
                                                    46
                                                                 47
                                                                          high
299997
        0.028969
                        9700
                                                    46
                                                                 47
                                       50
                                                                          high
299998 0.028673
                        9800
                                       50
                                                    46
                                                                  47
                                                                          high
299999 0.028384
                        9900
                                       50
                                                    46
                                                                  47
                                                                          high
       range def
0
              low
1
              low
2
              low
3
              low
4
              low
              . . .
. . .
299995
             high
299996
             high
299997
             high
299998
             high
299999
             high
```


[300000 rows x 7 columns]

As we can observe have a decay of $t^{1/f(field_size)}$

```
In [ ]: sns.set_theme(style="darkgrid")


# Plot the responses for different events and regions
sns.lineplot(x="timestep", y="epsilon", hue="field_size", data=df, palett

Out[ ]: <Axes: xlabel='timestep', ylabel='epsilon'>
```



```
In []: import time
import numpy as np
runtimes = []
for f_size in range(10,200,10):
    field = np.random.randint(2,6,f_size)
    start = time.time()
    ficticiousPlay(battlefields_arr[i, :fs], ta, td, max_iters=max_iters,
    end = time.time()
    runtimes.append((f_size, end-start))
```

question 2.2



question 2.3

The analysis of the achieved approximation of value of epsilon with respect to different starting strategies doesn't draw any interesting conclusions. There were 7 starting strategies checked:

- 1. no starting strategy (normal Fictitious Play)
- 2. uniform distributions over probabilities of which battlefield players assign a resource to
- 3. attackers starts with pure strategy picking bA least valueable battlefields, while defender bD most valueable
- 4. both players start with pure strategy picking bA or bD most valueable battlefields
- 5. defender starts with pure strategy picking bD least valueable battlefields, while attacker splits half of resources to each least and most valueable ones
- 6. attacker picks least valueable battlefield with probability 1 and distributes the rest uniformly over the rest of battlefields, defender does the same but picks most valueable battlefield
- 7. both players pick least valueable battlefield with probability 1 and distribute the rest uniformly over the rest of battlefields

First tests were done with 100000 rounds limit on random battlefields of size between 30 and 40 and there seemed to be no specific rule whatsoever. All approximations (in a scope of one test) with respect to starting strategy were better or worse comparing to no strategy depending on the test. There seemed to be a rule that "no strategy" strategy ended up with the worst approximation when difference of resources given to both players was over n / 2, but again, not for all tests.

The next approach was approximating epsilon for "no strategy" within 100000 rounds and checking how many rounds other starting strategies require to reach it. This time the number of

checked battlefields was 10 and 45. The only tendency we could observe is that for mid and high tests, which operate on number of resources from range (n/3, 2n/3) and (2n/3, n) respectively, the number of required rounds was lower – sometimes by just few hundred, but in extreme case it was by 22000.