50.020 Security Lecture 8: Operating System Security II

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## Introduction

# **Operating System Security**

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#### Last Lecture, we discussed:

■ How buffer overflow attacks work



#### This Lecture:

- Buffer overflow attacks (continue)
  - Countermeasures of buffer overflow attacks
    - secure coding (avoid insecure functions, etc.)
    - Canaries



- Non-executable (NX) bit
- ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization)
- Variants of buffer overflow attacks
  - Jump into existing function (e.g. doSensitiveStuff())
  - Jump into injected code by attacker
  - Jump into LibC (to bypass NX bit countermeasure)
  - Jump into PLT (Procedural Linkage Table) (to bypass ASLR countermeasure)
- More about malware



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
## Countermeasures of buffer overflow attacks

## **Canaries**


- Ca birds were used in mines to detect gas
- Here, they are used to detect overflow attacks
- Canaries are random values saved just below RBP
- Before returning, the OS will check if the canary 🛺 live"
  - Canary can be random values (saved outside the frame)
  - Alternative: *Terminator* canary with \0 values, hard to overwrite
- GCC uses canaries by default! (ProPolice)
- Visual studio supports canaries as well



## Canaries Figure



## Canaries Figure



## **NX** Bit

- The NX (non-executable) bit is a technology used in CPUs to **segregate** areas of memory for use by either storage of processor **instructions** (code) or for storage of data.
- An operating system with support for the NX bit may mark certain areas of memory as non-executable. The processor will then refuse to execute any code residing in these areas of memory.
- For example, making stack—on-executable to prevent stack-based buffer overflow attacks.
- However, Return-to-LibC invariant has been proposed to defeat NX bit technology (Refer to Return-to-LibC slides later)

## **ASLR**

- Buffer overflows require a tacker to know where each part of the program is located in memory.
- Without ASLR, libraries, stack, heap are mapped to constant addresses
- Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is an exploit mitigation technique that randomizes the location where system executables are loaded into memory (including stack address, heap address, shared library address)
- In particular when shared library address is randomized, return-to-LibC wont work since attacker needs to know LibC base address.
- Sometimes has to be enabled manually in the operating system.

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#### Variants of buffer overflow attacks

## Variants of buffer overflow attacks

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- Jump into existing function (e.g. doSensitiveStuff())
- Jump into injected code by attacker
- Jump into LibC (to defeat countermeasure of NX-bit)
- Jump into PLT (Procedural Linkage Table)

We are going to focus (a bit) on the last two invariants.

## Return-to-LibC attacks

- Since 2004, most OS have pages in stack either writeable OR executable...
  - NX bit, first supported by AMD64 architecture
  - So code injection does only work if NX is disabled for some reason!
- So, what can the attacker do to attack?
- NX-bit prevents jumping into injected code on stack.

## Return-to-LibC attacks

- Return-to-LibC attacks return address points to LibC (standard C library) functions <sup>1</sup>. LibC is a library of standard functions that can be used by all C programs (and sometimes by programs in other languages)
- Addresses have to be guessed based on similar setup
- Popular functions<sup>2</sup> to jump into: system(), unlink(),...
- But you have to set up the stack for that function+ arguments in registers!

<sup>1</sup>https://linux.die.net/man/7/libc

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>https:

## Return-To-PLT

- Procedural Linkage Table (PLT)
  - Used to direct executable's calls to LibC to dynamic address.
- Exploiting PLT to defeat ASLR on LibC address.
- Instead of jumping into dynamic LibC address, we jump into static PLT
- More info on:
- F
- https://sploitfun.wordpress.com/2015/05/08/
  bypassing-aslr-part-i/

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#### Malware

# Types of Malware

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The following are popular terms for malware

- Virus
- Worm
- Adware
- Trojans
- Rootkits / Remote Access Tools
- Ransomware

What are the differences?

# Spreading classification

- Spreading by replicating code into executables
  - Viruses (uncommon nowadays)
- Spreading by autored exploit over the network
  - Worms (niche cases)
- Downloaded by the user/ browser
  - Adware (as part of free applications)
  - Trojans (hiding payload code as part of application)



# **Payloads**

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The payload is performing the malicious actions on victim machine

- Ad injector
- Keylogger, screengrabber, etc (Spyware)
- Rootkit
- Botclient
- Ransomware

# Malware (in 2013)

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#### **Top Malware Categories**

This figure displays the top malware categories. Trojans are the most common malware, followed by adware. Source: Sourcefire (ClamAV and FireAMP solutions)



## Malware for Windows (in 2013)

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
#### Top Windows Malware Families

This figure shows the top malware families for Windows. The largest, Trojan.Onlinegames, mainly comprises password stealers. Source: Sourceire (ClamAV solution)



## Attack Vectors 2016

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Source: Kaspersky, all rights reserved

## What will attacker's code do?

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Lets assume the attacker was able to run code

- This code will run in context of executing user
- E.g. ShellShock: code run as www-data (apache user)
  - Attacker can read and write to website
  - E.g. inject javascript into website to spread malware
- Attacker can also read user's files, and many system files
  - Depending on OS/ access control setup
  - If attacker's code can connect through firewall, data can be exfiltrated
- Attacker can also try to escalate his rights
  - http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4618/
- Once attacker has root rights, he can do anything

## Example: Locky

- Malware that was spread via pdf and MS office files
- After infection, connects to Command & Control server
  - Obtains public key of new unique RSA-2048 key pair
  - Then, all accessible documents are encrypted with AES-128
  - Original versions deleted
  - After all files are encrypted, a 0.5 Bitcoin ransom is charged
  - After paying ransom, personalized removal tool is provided

## Example: WannaCry

- Ransomware from May 2017
- Leveraged EternalBlue vulnerability (by NSA)
- Infected hospitals and train information systems



## Zero-Day Exploits

- Strong attackers might also have access to unknown exploits
- Those exploits will not be listed in CVE database, and no fixes exist
- Such zero-day exploits are quite valueable
  - They are sold for money on the Internet
- Attackers will try to use them stealthily
  - Being caught/ detected after the attack might reveal the zero-day

## How to recover from compromise

- What should you do after you detect compromise?
- Once infected, it is likely that the attacker has full control
- From that point on, no on-board tools can be trusted any more
  - Rootkits are made to resist detection
- Depending on how paranoid your are
  - Run a virus scanner from a live USB key
  - Backup your data. Check for viruses.
  - Completely reinstall.
- If we are talking about work systems
  - Do forensic analysis of system(s)
  - Set up from scratch and get data from known good backups

## Conclusion

- This week (OS Security I, II):
  - A focus on buffer overflow attacks:
    - How buffer overflow attacks work
    - Countermeasures of buffer overflow attacks
    - Variants of buffer overflow attacks
  - Some general things on attack and malware
- Next Lecture:
  - OS Security III: Common OS defense mechanisms.