

Thus, the Director's decision based solely on this normative force was not an unlawful submission contrary to the rule of law. However, it was suggested that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (incorporated in schedule 1 to the Human Rights 1998) (the ECHR), if

Baroness Hale of Richmond's *\*obiter dicta\** allows further insight. She emphasised that although the Director had discretion to consider risk to life and national security, it was *"common ground"* this did not include personal threats. She contended that *"'National security'... 'was not an issue here. Public safety was'."* and that *"'a distinction between the personal and the 'public interest'..."* must imply importance to the public as a whole. Connected with the above exploration of the ECHR one can see public safety, and the right to life of British citizens, being held opposite to the rule of law invested in the Director.

Taken further the case may essentially indicate a contention between protection of the rule of law secured in a public official and *bona fide* decisions leading to potential military action. \*\*Here, the judiciary, and the Director, do not, and should not have\*\* \*\*\*locus standi\*\*\* \*\*as can be interpreted in the\*\* \*\*\*Ratio Decidendi\*\*\*. This powers lays with the executive derogated from the royal prerogative. Thus, anything less than a politics of legal reasoning would have been absurd, with the inference of the prevalence of the ECHR more so, regardless of the implications for the rule of law.

**\*\*Ergo\*\***

1. Look closer
2. Find the Ratio Decidendi
3. Find the £\$€¥
4. Invest