

Url: [/r/Superstonk/comments/nlwqyv/house_of_cards_part_3/](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/nlwqyv/house_of_cards_part_3/)

Prerequisite DD:

1. [Citadel Has No Clothes](https://www.reddit.com/r/GME/comments/m4c0p4/citadel_has_no_clothes/)
2. [The EVERYTHING Short](https://www.reddit.com/r/GME/comments/mgucv2/the_everything_short/)
3. [The House of Cards – Part 1](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/mvk5dv/a_house_of_cards_part_1/)
4. [The House of Cards - Part 2](https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/nlwaxv/house_of_cards_part_2/)

[illegible]

****4.**** ****Slimy...****

The objective isn't to address the issue: it's to keep the issue hidden. Firms that underreport their short interest are gaming the system by taking advantage of how the short interest calculation is done. When the SEC relies on reports that broker-dealers provide, and FINRA takes YEARS to reveal the lies within those reports, the broker-dealer can lie without immediately facing the consequences. It allows these firms to operate in a high-risk environment without exposing just HOW big their risk-appetite is.

<https://preview.redd.it/v9625j8wek171.jpg?width=1115&format=jpg&auto=webp&s=85d43bc351fbda75e347bd33a1a550b67dda970e>

Well Merrill Lynch knocked that one right out of the f*cking park...

<https://preview.redd.it/s3zok5wyek171.jpg?width=1129&format;=jpg&auto;=webp&s;=815e5344912234ceba846dc0d45c8b8b488b82c4>

Merrill made it seem like the required deposit in their customer reserve account was much lower than it truly was. They wouldn't have been able to use that cash if it reduced the amount below the minimum capital requirement, so they found a way to fudge the numbers. In doing so, they managed to prevent a CODE RED while reaping the benefits of a high-risk 'opportunity'. Should Merrill have filed bankruptcy during that time, those customers would have been completely blindsided.

In the case of short selling, the *true* exposure of short interest is unknown... and I'm not just talking about the short sale indicator. When a firm fails to deliver securities that were sold short, there's a pretty good indication that they've exposed themselves to a bit of a problem.. Now imagine a case where the FTDs start piling up and they STILL continue to short sell that same security.. think I'm joking?

Check out the [Royal Bank of Canada](https://files.brokercheck.finra.org/firm/firm_31194.pdf):

<https://preview.redd.it/u6yl6tj2fk171.png?width=812&format;=png&auto;=webp&s;=1e44cc507247db1e28c00a213f90054b9abdaa6a>

Again... I was pretty shocked at that one. However, nothing rang-the-bell quite like this one from [Goldman Sachs](https://files.brokercheck.finra.org/firm/firm_361.pdf):

<https://preview.redd.it/5f408er6fk171.png?width=1031&format;=png&auto;=webp&s;=38b9ad83d2a07360af5b5cd99d834a8771b66c93>

Goldman had 68 occasions in 4 months where they didn't close a failure-to-deliver... In 45 occasions, they CONTINUED to accept customer short sale orders in securities which it had an active failure-to-deliver...

When a firm is really starting to sweat, they pull certain tricks out of their ass to quell the situation. Again, this is nothing but smoke and mirrors because that's all they can really do. Just as Merrill Lynch artificially lowered their customer reserve deposit, other firms make it look like they cover their short positions.

One of the ways they do this is by short selling a SH*T load of shares right before a buy-in... Since we're talking about Goldman Sachs, this seems like a great time to showcase their experience with this..

<https://preview.redd.it/zhf1hr1afk171.png?width=1049&format;=png&auto;=webp&s;=f704c3722ae287480057ce3e01c561a28b77cf4c>

I promise... It really is as dumb as it sounds...

So the perception here is when Goldman's client has a FTD and they find out a buy-in is coming, the required buy-in would obviously be too extreme for the client to handle.. So they begin to buy those shares while simultaneously shorting AT LEAST the same amount they were required to purchase...

Have you ever failed to repay a loan so you went to another bank and got a loan to cover the first one? Well that's exactly what this is... I know what you're probably thinking... "didn't that just kick the can down the road?". The answer is YES: it didn't actually solve anything..

There's still one more citation that Goldman received which truly represents the pinnacle of *no-sh*t's-given.* After I cover this, I don't know how anyone could argue the systematic risks that exist within the securities lending business.. Check it out:

<https://preview.redd.it/0md200bdfk171.png?width=940&format;=png&auto;=webp&s;=cf5e8310fbcbbd73699e3593b2ab5dab418055ab0>

For 5 years, Goldman relied on a team of 10-12 individuals to locate shares to be used by its clients for short selling. This group was known as the "demand team". Naturally, as the number of requests coming in

John was a Professor of Finance at Fordham University when he published “short selling, death spiral convertibles, and the profitability of stock manipulation”. The document is loaded with sh*t that’s incredibly relevant today, especially when it comes to naked short selling. He dives into the exact formula

that short sellers use, which is far beyond what my wrinkled brain can interpret, alone...

..However, when firms are naked shorting a company with the goal of bankrupting them, they leave footprints which are only explained by this event. The proof is in the pudding, so to speak..

<https://preview.redd.it/ax7u0r4wfk171.jpg?width=1072&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=1828755bfe49c47ca178d960f91dfd21d8b0d680>

Any of this sound familiar??

*"The manipulator can not drive the share price close to zero unless he can naked short an extraordinary number of shares... * this form of manipulation would result in... unusually heavy trading volume, and unusually large and persistent fails to deliver at the NSCC".*

Anyone else remember the volume in GME during the run-up in January? The total volume traded between **1/31/2021 and 2/5/2021 was 1,508,793,439** **shares**, or an average daily trade volume of **88,752,555 shares.** On 1/22/2021, the volume reached 197,157,946... that's roughly 3x the number of shares that exist..

if this doesn't sound like unusual volume then I'm not sure what is. Furthermore, the FTD report on GameStop was through the roof during this time:

<https://preview.redd.it/brz98nbzfk171.jpg?width=1625&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=83ae877853acd2ec65fa73f57216f00b708a7eab>

<https://preview.redd.it/zlla3ak0gk171.jpg?width=1038&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=c5d4a1331f8c9d97b5338cc55a37310a95c9559b>

Notice the statement where the manipulator will be relieved of its obligation to cover **IF** the firm's shares are cancelled in bankruptcy? Did you happen to see footnotes 65 & 66 in the first screenshot of his PDF? It references a company that he used for his analysis...

<https://preview.redd.it/zdp3at43gk171.jpg?width=997&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=8508c9d0c869544f0ccd3a15477abfd64d38897c>

Charter Communications had a whopping **241.8% short float in 2005**... **The ONLY way the manipulator could have escaped this was by bankrupting the company and relieving the obligation to repurchase those shares...**

Guess what happened to Charter? They filed for [bankruptcy](<https://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=7189668&page=1>) in 2009...

However, unlike John's example where naked short sellers were driving down the price without opposition, GameStop had extremely high demand from retail investors to counter this activity. As I have discussed with Dr. T and Carl Hagberg, the run-up in volume during January and February was largely conducted by naked short sellers in an attempt to suppress the share price. As I have shown in the example with Goldman Sachs, firms will short sell during a buy-in for the same exact reason. To stabilize the price, you must stabilize supply and demand.

...You know what Charter didn't have?

AN ARMY OF APES TO HODL THE STONK

DIAMOND. F*CKING. HANDS