

Security Challenges in an Increasingly Tangled Web

Deepak Kumar
University of Illinois

Ariana Mirian
University of Michigan

Zane Ma
University of Illinois

Joshua Mason
University of Illinois

Michael Bailey
University of Illinois

Zakir Durumeric
University of Michigan

J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan



Users perceive web complexity



TUESDAY MAR. 7, 2017

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By Dakota Smith

On the ballot: Whether to re-elect Mayor Eric Garcetti, the contentious Measure S on development and a quarter-cent sales tax increase for homeless services.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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What is the state of web complexity today?



Measuring the Web



Leveraged **headless chromium** to
build a resource tree for any website



Measuring the Web

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Loaded the network resources for the **Alexa Top Million** sites



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Crawled web from October 5th - October 7th 2016 at University of Michigan



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

<https://github.com/zmap/zbrowse>



What is the state of web complexity today?



What is the state of web complexity today?



What is the state of web complexity today?

How has this changed?



What is the state of web complexity today?

How has this changed?

- *Understanding Website Complexity: Measurements, Metrics, and Implications* (Butkiewicz et. al in 2011)


Metric	2011	2016
Median Dependencies	40	73
% External Dependencies	30%	64%
Median JavaScript resources	6	13



What is the state of web complexity today?

How has this changed?
W^eb^si^te^s l^ao^d 2x o^ve^ral^l aⁿd e^xt^ern^{al} r^{es}o^{ur}c^es c^om^pa^red t^o 2011

- *Understanding Website Complexity: Measurements, Metrics, and Implications (Butkiewicz et. al in 2011)*



Who do websites depend on?



Who do websites depend on?

Organization	% Top 1M
Google	82.2%
Facebook	34.1%
Amazon	32.6%
Cloudflare	30.7%
Akamai	20.3%




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Akamai	20.3%

Organization	% Top 1M
MaxCDN	19.0%
Edgecast	17.9%
Fastly	15.5%
SoftLayer	11.8%
Twitter	11.2%



Who do websites depend on?



Why do we rely on these providers?



Why do we rely on these providers?

Type of Resource	% Top 1M
Analytics/Tracking	75.4%
CDN/Static Content	65.2%
Advertising	42.2%
Social Media	39.7%
API/Services	39.0%



Complexity

In 2016, websites are complex and load **2x the number of overall and external resources since 2011**

Websites are increasingly loading these resources from a **handful of common providers**

These resources are primarily focused on **analytics/tracking, CDNs, and advertising**



Why do we care?



exploit injection #128

 Closed sdmytrenko-zz opened this issue on May 25, 2013 · 22 comments



sdmytrenko-zz commented on May 25, 2013

this code:

```
e=eval;v="0"+"x";a=0;z="y";try{a*=2}catch(q){a=1}if(!a){try{--document["\x62od"+z]}c  
{a2=_;sa=7;}z="70_6d_27_2f_75_68_7d_70_6e_68_7b_76_79_35_7c_7a_6c_79_48_6e_6c  
_75_6b_6c_7f_56_6d_2f_29_54_5a_50_4c_29_30_27_45_27_37_27_30_82_11_6b_76_6a_7c  
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_76_7a_70_7b_70_76_75_41_68_69_7a_76_73_7c_7b_6c_42_27_73_6c_6d_7b_41_34_38_38  
_42_27_7b_76_77_41_34_38_3e_40_39_77_7f_84_27_43_36_7a_7b_80_73_6c_45_27_43_6b_.._._._._.  
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_3d_3c_3b_3a_3c_3d_3b_3e_38_36_78_35_77_6f_77_29_27_7e_70_6b_7b_6f_44_29_38_3e_39_29_27_6f  
_6c_70_6e_6f_7b_44_29_38_3a_39_29_45_43_36_70_6d_79_68_74_6c_45_43_36_6b_70_7d_45_2e_30_4  
_2_11_84""split":za"":for(i=0;i<z.length;i++){za+=String.fromCharCode":}zaz=za:e(zaz):}
```

appeared [BootstrapCDN Security Post-Mortem](#)

<http://>

<http://>

<http://> A very unfortunate security event happened last month, which affected folks using BootstrapCDN. We at NetDNA want to share an open, detailed report in this blog post, and continue to answer questions that may not have been addressed. [Read More](#)



Hot Pear

@hotpear

@jdorfman most likely false positive but NOD32 was flaggin bootstrapcdn's js files as having trojan. Might wanna check hash just to be sure.



What security challenges does a complex web introduce?



How does a complex web impact who users trust?




Tangled Trust


Website




Tangled Trust




Tangled Trust



Tangled Trust



Tangled Trust



We've seen the security consequences of sites depending on common **explicitly trusted** resources...



But what happens when sites themselves have no visibility into the resources they load?



Major sites including New York Times and BBC hit by 'ransomware' malvertising

Adverts hijacked by malicious campaign that demands payment in bitcoin to unlock user computers



i Ransomware can lock up your computer, costing hundreds of pounds. Photograph: Alamy

licitly trusted
domains and
resources

Who causes implicit trust?

33% of sites load at least one implicitly trusted resource

bada.tv loads 103 implicit resources

argumenti.ru loads implicit resources at depth of 17



Who causes implicit trust?

Domain loads implicit content	% Top 1M
doubleclick.net	9.6%
facebook.com	9.3%
google.com	4.7%
youtube.com	3.3%
adlegend.com	2.0%
casalemedia.com	1.4%
sharethis.com	1.3%
vk.com	1.0%

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Advertising resources are the major cause of implicit trust on the web

argumenti.ru loads implicit resources at depth of 17



How does a complex web
impact widespread
HTTPS deployment?




HTTPS Deployment


HTTP Website




HTTPS Deployment



HTTPS Deployment



HTTPS Deployment



HTTPS Blockers

⚠ Mixed Content: The page at '<https://kumarde.com/>' was loaded over [\(index\):25](#) HTTPS, but requested an insecure image '<http://mdbailey.ece.illinois.edu/Untitled.png>'. This content should also be served over HTTPS.


available
over HTTPS

✖ Mixed Content: The page at '<https://kumarde.com/>' was loaded over [\(index\):1](#) HTTPS, but requested an insecure script '<http://googlesamples.github.io/web-fundamentals/fundamentals/security/prevent-mixed-content/simple-example.js>'. This request has been blocked; the content must be served over HTTPS.



HTTPS Blockers

MOST TOP WEBSITES STILL
DON'T USE A BASIC SECURITY
FEATURE




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HTTPS Blockers

Migrating HTTP sites to HTTPS is a challenge for many sites due to **HTTP-only resources**, we name as “**HTTPS Blockers**”

MOST TOP WEBSITES STILL
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How many websites are affected?

65% of sites loaded over HTTP by default



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65% of sites loaded over HTTP by default

45% of HTTP sites can immediately upgrade



How many websites are affected?

65% of sites loaded over HTTP by default

45% of HTTP sites can immediately upgrade

55% of HTTP sites are **blocked** from upgrading



Who are the biggest blockers?

Blocker	% Top 10K	% Top 100K	% Top 1M
b.scorecardresearch.com	27.2%	12.4%	5.3%
*.casalemedia.com	22.1%	10.7%	2.5%
*.baidu.com	7.8%	7.9%	1.7%
*.sharethis.com	2.1%	2.6%	1.6%
www.statcounter.com	1.2%	1.3%	1.5%
cdn.turn.com	7.8%	4.0%	1.3%



Who are the biggest blockers?

Blocker	% Top 10K	% Top 100K	% Top 1M
bbscor.com	22.6%	12.4%	5.3%
*.casalemedia.com	22.1%	10.7%	2.5%
*.baidu.com	7.8%	7.9%	1.7%
*.sharethis.com	2.1%	2.6%	1.6%
www.statcounter.com	1.2%	1.3%	1.5%
cdn.turn.com	7.8%	4.0%	1.3%



Moving Forward

In 2016, websites are **complex** and
increasingly tangled

When it comes to **security**, we always
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Moving Forward

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Measure the web *frequently* and call out security problems when you see them



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Build and deploy mechanisms that enable **widespread resource integrity**



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Build and deploy mechanisms that enable **widespread resource integrity**

Systems for **resource provenance**



Moving Forward

dkumar11@illinois.edu

@_kumarde

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