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Muslim Separatism in United Provinces

Social Context and Political Strategy before Partition

Paul R Brass

How can the special role of the Muslims of the United Provinces in the origins and development of Muslim separatism in India and the intensity of Hindu-Muslim conflict in the province be explained?

It has been widely accepted that the Muslims were a backward people compared to the Hindus during British rule, that their leaders perceived their backwardness as a community and took measures to rectify it, which ultimately led them to separate solutions in politics.

Available data on levels of social mobilisation and differential rates of change between Hindus and Muslims in the United Provinces during 1859-1931 does show that there was unevenness of development between the two communities — but it was the Muslims who were the more advanced community and the Hindus the less advanced.

Muslims in the UP in the nineteenth century constituted a cultural and administrative urban elite whose language dominated in the courts and primary schools of the province. The rates of change among Muslims in several respects, including urbanisation, literacy and government employment, continued to keep ahead of rates of change among Hindus till 1931.

The Muslims of the UP took the leading role in Muslim separatism because they were a privileged minority and their leaders were determined to maintain their privileges.

But though rates of change were slower among Hindus, the sheer numerical superiority of the Hindus ensured that no matter how slowly they mobilised, they would ultimately displace Muslims from their privileged positions in public life.

Hindu-Muslim relations became embittered because of Muslim fears of displacement by the rising Hindu majority and because of Hindu resentment at the tenacity with which the Muslim elites struggled to maintain their privileges against Hindu interests.

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I

Introduction

IT is well known that Muslim separatism,¹ the Muslim League, and the Pakistan movement developed roots first in the Muslim minority provinces of north India, from where they later spread to the Muslim majority provinces of Punjab, Bengal, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province. Among the Muslim minority provinces, the role of the United Provinces was especially important.² It was in this great northern province that the Aligarh movement was begun, that the Muslim League was organised, and that the League began the reorganisation after 1937 which led to Pakistan. In the United Province, the Hindi-Urdu controversy was more prolonged and intense than elsewhere. Although Punjab and Bengal suffered more from

communal violence ultimately than did the United Provinces, communal riots were frequent and recurring in the UP also, especially during the 1920s and 1930s. Yet, in the UP, Muslims have always been a relatively small and scattered minority. How can the special role of the UP Muslims in the origins and development of Muslim separatism in India and the intensity of Hindu-Muslim conflict in the province be explained?

DIFFERENTIAL RATES OF CHANGE

A complete answer to this question would require more space than an article and would involve a thorough analysis of the political history of the UP in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Conventional explanations of the causes of Muslim separatism would have to be applied to

the special environment of the UP. One would have to answer such questions as whether the linguistic-cultural gap between Hindus and Muslims was greater here than in other provinces, whether there were special features in the social and economic relations between Hindus and Muslims which differed from other provinces, whether British imperial policies divided the two communities more effectively in UP than elsewhere, and whether there were peculiar patterns of political competition during the Independence movement which embittered the political relations between Hindus and Muslims. This article constitutes only a beginning in dealing with these questions. It will focus on differential rates of socio-economic change between Hindus and Muslims in nineteenth and twentieth centu-

ry UP and on the socio-economic status and political strategy of the Muslim community and its political leadership.

Ultimately, since nationalism is pre-eminently a political phenomenon, the key answers to the question of the special role of UP in Muslim separatist nationalism are likely to be found in the kinds of political choices made by Hindu and Muslim political leaders and by British policy makers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and in the patterns of political competition of the period. The importance of politics and political policies in the development of Muslim separatism in UP should be clear from what is already known. Clearly, without separate electorates, the small and scattered Muslim minority in the north could not have played such a leading role. It is hardly surprising then to recall the special role of the UP Muslim leaders associated with the Ali-garh movement in formulating the original demand for separate electorates.³ It would appear that the minority status of the Muslims of the north itself gave impetus to Muslim separatist demands. Minority politics again became decisive in UP Hindu-Muslim relations in 1937 when, separate electorates notwithstanding, UP Muslims in the Muslim League were unable to win power either through elections or through negotiations in the provincial government of UP and decided to re-organise, mobilise the Muslim electorate, and change the terms of political competition by raising the Pakistan demand.

In fact, at all important political turning-points during the Independence movement, on issues affecting Hindu-Muslim relations, the Muslim political leaders of UP never wavered in their determination to use politics to offset their minority status and to demand separate electorates and weightage in representation, sometimes to the detriment of the interests of the Muslim majorities in the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab. Thus, any analysis of the special role of UP Muslims will have to begin with an appreciation of the importance of the very fact that the Muslims were in a minority in UP.

Historically, national conflict between majority and minority peoples has tended to be most intense when the development or "social mobilisation"⁴ of the two peoples has been uneven.⁵ There have been two kinds of situations of this sort — one in which the more advanced people constitutes a majority, frequently a ruling majority, and the minority is a "backward" minority. Obvious examples of this kind are blacks in the United States and Catholics in

Northern Ireland. The second kind of situation exists when the minority is more advanced, may even be a ruling group, and the majority is the backward group. Examples of this sort of national conflict have been Swedes and Finns in Finland, Germans and Czechs in Bohemia, whites and blacks in South Africa, and Tamils and Sinhalese in Ceylon. A situation conducive to national conflict arises when the social mobilisation of the less advanced group begins to move more rapidly than its rate of assimilation to the language and culture of the more advanced group.⁶ Whether or not national conflict develops, however, and the intensity of such conflict depend upon the kinds of political decisions made by the ruling authorities and by competing political leaders. The most intense conflict is likely to arise when the more advanced group attempts to maintain its advantages by political means,⁷ as most of the above examples testify. When the advanced group is a minority, the attempt to maintain a privileged position for itself may lead to severe repression of the majority if the minority is a ruling group (as in South Africa) or to separatist political solutions if it is merely a privileged minority (such as the Germans in the Sudetenland).

Where do Hindu-Muslim relations in nineteenth and twentieth century UP fit in this scheme? The overwhelmingly predominant view of Hindu-Muslim relations in nineteenth and twentieth century India is that the Muslims were backward compared to the Hindus, who early moved rapidly ahead of the Muslims in the race for Western education and government employment. Muslim separatism from this point of view arose out of the Muslim perception of their backwardness, their attempts to rectify it, and the opposition from the dominant Hindu majority to Muslim efforts to overcome their backwardness. In fact, Wilfred Cantwell Smith has defined Muslim "communalism" (separatism in our terminology) in these terms as "the nationalist ideology adopted by the emergent and precarious Muslim middle class in its struggle against domination within India by the much more developed Hindu middle class".⁸ The hypothesis which would then seem to flow from this as an explanation for the special role of the UP Muslims is that the combination of Muslim backwardness with a minority position produced a more intense separatist identification among UP Muslims when "the emergent and precarious Muslim middle class" arose in the region.

Two historians who have looked more closely at the regional pattern of relations between Hindus and Muslims in UP, however, have argued to the contrary that the Muslims of UP in the nineteenth century held a dominant position⁹ and were attempting to maintain an "elite tradition" of pre-eminence in the region up through the 1930s.¹⁰ Moreover, an examination of census and other documents on the differential position of Hindus and Muslims in nineteenth century UP (then the Northwestern Provinces and Oudh) and on the rates of change in social mobilisation and assimilation within the two communities does not support the hypothesis of Muslim backwardness in UP. Rather, it appears that the relations between Muslims and Hindus in the UP in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries fall into the second of the two types of situations noted above. The Muslims of UP were more advanced than the Hindus, constituting in some respects a nearly dominant administrative and cultural elite, whereas the Hindus were the backward community, struggling to assert themselves, their language and culture against the privileged positions occupied by Muslims and Muslim culture in the life of the region. Hindu-Muslim conflict acquired its intensity and Muslim separatism its strength in UP because Muslim political leaders consistently and persistently struggled to maintain Muslim privileges. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the first part of this argument, namely, the relative advantage of the Muslims compared to the Hindus in the province; to outline the strategy followed by Muslim minority elites to preserve their privileges up to 1936; and to suggest that it was the failure of this strategy after 1936 which led UP Muslim leaders to support the Pakistan demand.

II

Hindus and Muslims in the United Provinces, 1859-1931: Social Mobilisation and Communications

The notion of Muslim backwardness in India goes back to the publication of W W Hunter's "The Indian Musalmans" in 1871. In this little book, which was based primarily on Hunter's analysis of the condition of the Bengal Muslims under British rule, Hunter argued in phrases which have echoed and re-echoed for a century that the Muslims were shunning Western education, that they were being eliminated from government employment, that prominent Muslim

families and Muslim traders had been economically ruined and replaced by Hindu landlords and traders, and that, in a nutshell, the Muslims of Bengal at least constituted "a race ruined under British rule."¹¹ The arguments of W W Hunter, generalised for the whole of India,¹² soon became integrated, with embellishments, into the minds of Muslim elites who used them to appeal to British policy-makers and later to the Muslim masses to separate Muslim from Hindu interests. These arguments were used in the famous memorial of the National Muhammadan Association presented to Ripon in 1882 to demonstrate "the depressed and desperate condition of the Muhammadans" in India and their need for state patronage to restore the balance between them and the Hindus.¹³ They were used by Syed

Ahmad Khan to urge Muslims to concentrate on adopting modern education because, if they did not do so, "they will not only remain a backward community but will sink lower and lower".¹⁴ They were still being used as late as 1937 by Muhammad Ali Jinnah in a Muslim League presidential address in which he remarked that "Mussalmans all over India are numerically in a minority and weak, educationally backward, and economically nowhere".¹⁵

It will be demonstrated below that the arguments and assumptions of Muslim backwardness do not apply to the UP where the objective situation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was exactly the opposite of that described above in most respects. The Muslims in UP from 1859 up through 1931 at least were not significantly be-

hind the Hindus and in many important respects were more advantaged than the Hindus in urbanisation, literacy, English education, social communications and employment, especially government employment.

Urbanisation

Table 1 gives the distribution of the population of UP from 1881 to 1961 by religion for urban and rural areas and shows the percentage of Hindus and Muslims living in towns from 1881 to 1951. It is possible, from these figures, both to compare the relative proportions of Hindus and Muslims living in the cities and towns of the province and to show the difference in the degree and rate of urbanisation among Hindus and Muslims over a considerable period.¹⁶ The Table demonstrates that the Muslim

TABLE 1 : URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS IN UTTAR PRADESH BY RELIGION, 1881-1961(a)

(In Percentages)

1	Total Population		Urban Population		Rural Population		Living in Towns		
	Hindu(c) 2	Muslim 3	Hindu(c) 4	Muslim 5	Hindu(c) 6	Muslim 7	Total(a) 8	Hindu(c) 9	Muslim 10
1961	84.67	14.63	68.05	29.16	87.12	12.48	12.85	NA	NA
1951			(68.1)	(28.6)					
	85.05	14.28	66.02	31.30	88.05	11.60	13.64	10.5	29.9
1941			(59.1)	(38.1)					
1931	83.67	15.43	59.49	38.06	86.52	12.20	12.4	9.0	30.6
			(57.9)	(39.3)					
	84.36	14.98	59.52	38.23	87.65	11.88	11.2	7.7	29.0
1921			(59.8)	(37.5)					
	84.92	14.46	59.41	37.41	87.45	11.74	10.6	7.4	27.4
1911			(58.4)	(38.5)					
	85.05	14.38			NA	NA	10.2	7.2(d)	26.9(d)
1901			(64.2)	(33.9)					
	85.20	14.38			NA	NA	11.1	NA	NA
1891									
	85.86	13.82	64.27	33.85	NA	NA	11.4	8.46	28.34
1881									
	85.97	13.74	64.5	34.6	88.2	11.1	11.7	7.25	25.02

(a) It must be stressed that the relative proportions of urban and rural population in different census years are not strictly comparable. The following caveat from the "Census of India, 1951", Vol II, Pt 1-A, p 162 should be kept in mind in reading the table: "It is to be remembered that the number of towns [has] varied from census to census and due to administrative changes the villages of one census were regarded as towns and even certain towns of a particular census which had lost their urban characteristics were regarded as villages at the other subsequent censuses." Such changes would naturally also affect the relative proportions of Hindus and Muslims in urban and rural areas. Moreover, the changes have sometimes been considerable, for example, between 1951 and 1961 when the number of census towns was reduced from 486 to 244. (The numbers of census towns for other census years were as follows: 1941 456; 1931, 450; 1921, 446; 1911, 435; 1901, 453; 1891, 484; 1881, 288.) Consequently, the table can be used to show the relative urban-rural balance for the population as a whole and by religion at each census for a variable number of census towns, but it can suggest only approximately the general and relative rates of urbanisation over time.

Other factors than census redefinition have also sometimes affected the results in an arbitrary or capricious manner, as in 1911 when at the time of census enumeration, bubonic plague was raging in many towns of the province and many urban residents had been evacuated temporarily to rural areas.

Wherever possible, figures in each column have been taken from retrospective tables in census volumes for later years, in which adjustments have been made to include the former princely states and in other ways make the figures more comparable.

(b) Figures in parentheses in columns 4 and 5 refer to the city population for 30 cities. They were taken from a 1951 retrospective table.

(c) The figures for "Brahmanic Hindus" and "Hindu Aryas", sometimes listed separately in the old census reports, have been combined in this table.

(d) Figures in columns 9 and 10 for 1911 and earlier are for British territory only, excluding the princely states. All other figures include both. The differences were usually slight, but the inclusion of Rampur state increases the Muslim proportions in the total population and in the urban population.

Sources : Compiled from "Census of India Paper No. 1 of 1962", "1961 Census, Final Population Totals", P 235 and "Census of India, 1961", Vol XV, Pt I-C (iii), P 64 and Pt II-C (ii), PP 516-517; 1951, Vol II, Pt I-A, pp 162, 419-422; 1941, Vol V, pp 56, 81; 1931, Vol XVIII, Pt I, pp 154, 526, 1921, Vol XVI, Pt I, pp 39, 64; 1911, Vol XV, Pt I, pp 23, 36; 1901, Vol XVI, Pt I, p 100; 1891, Vol XVI, Pt I, p 191; 1881, "Report on the Census of the N-W P and Oudh and of the Native States of Rampur and Native Garhwal", pp 59-60, 96.

population of UP has been far more urbanised than the Hindu population from 1881 up to the present. As late as 1931, 29 per cent of the Muslim population of UP lived in cities and towns, compared to less than 8 per cent of the Hindu population, and more than 38 per cent of the total urban population of the province was Muslim. Moreover, there were 21 towns in UP in 1931 in which the Muslims comprised more than 50 per cent of the population and another 31 towns, including such important cities as Lucknow and Agra, in which they comprised between a third and a half of the total population.¹⁷

The most striking feature of the figures on urbanisation in UP from the point of view of differential rates of change between the two communities is that, in the period between 1881 and 1931, the proportion of Muslims in the urban population of the province increased from 34.6 per cent in 1881 and 33.85 per cent in 1891 to 38.23 per cent in 1931, while the proportion of Hindus declined in the same period from 64.5 per cent and 64.27 per cent in 1881 and 1891 respectively to 59.52 per cent in 1931.¹⁸ Some of this change seems to reflect a higher rate of urbanisation among Muslims than among Hindus, but most of the Muslim increase probably reflects the greater rate of increase in the Muslim population of the province as a whole, in urban and rural areas alike. It is only after 1931 that the rural-urban population ratio begins to shift in favour of the Hindus until, by 1961 the proportion of Muslims in the urban population of the State is reduced to less than 30 per cent. Nevertheless, the much higher degree of urbanisation among Muslims in UP re-

mains a fact up to the present. In 1951, nearly 1 out of every 3 Muslims in the province lived in a city or town whereas only 1 Hindu in 10 was a town dweller.

The second important feature of the differential rates in Hindu-Muslim urbanisation in UP is the shift in urban-rural population ratios between 1931 and 1951. The most important factors in this shift were clearly the migration of urban Muslims to Pakistan in the post-partition period, and the influx to the UP towns of Hindu refugees from Pakistan, reflected in the very sharp drop in the Muslim proportion of the urban population between 1941 and 1951. However, the increase in the percentage of Hindus living in towns from 7.8 per cent in 1931 to 10.5 per cent in 1951 seems a larger increase than what could have conceivably been produced by immigration from outside the province, suggesting that in the crucial years of Hindu-Muslim political conflict in the 1930s and 1940s, the urban Hindu-Muslim population ratio was beginning to shift against the Muslims. It is doubtful, however, that this shift was sufficiently pronounced in this period to influence Muslim political attitudes, that is, to make Muslims conscious and fearful of increased Hindu movement to cities and towns of the province.

More important for understanding the context in which the Muslim separatist movement flourished are the simple facts that the Muslim urban population of the province was very large relative to the Muslim proportion in the total population and that their urban proportion was increasing until some time in the 1930s. It was in the cities that the Muslim League acquired its initial strength and urban Muslims supported the Muslim

League more heavily than did rural Muslims. Even in the 1936 elections, more than 50 per cent of the urban Muslim vote went to the League, compared to less than 30 per cent of the rural Muslim vote. The League won 9 out of the 13 urban Muslim seats in 1936, but only 20 (out of 27 contested) of the 51 rural Muslim seats. In 1946, more than 71 per cent of the urban Muslim vote was won by League candidates, compared to 62 per cent of the rural Muslim vote.¹⁹

Literacy and English Education

In the early 1870s and again in the early 1880s, the Government of India solicited the views of the provincial governments on the status of Muslim education in the provinces in response to the charges being made at the time that Muslims were not receiving the benefits of modern education to the extent that Hindus were. The governments of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh on both occasions vigorously insisted that the allegations had no substance as far as those provinces were concerned. The figures on the proportions of Muslims at school in 1871-72 provided by the major British provinces at the time showed that, in fact, Muslims were proportionately overrepresented in comparison to Hindus in schools and colleges in both the North-Western Provinces and in Oudh and that Muslims in those provinces were better represented in this respect than in any other province in British India (Table 2). The Muslim advantage was especially pronounced in Oudh where the Director of Public Instruction reported that the percentage of Muslim boys of school-going age in school was 8.1 per cent

TABLE 2 : NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIMS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION AND IN THE POPULATION AT SCHOOL IN THE MAJOR PROVINCES OF INDIA, 1871-72

Provinces	Total Population	Muslims	Percentage	At School		
				Total	Muslims	Percentage
Madras	31,281,177	1,872,214	6	123,689	5,531	4.4
Bombay	16,349,206	2,528,344	15.4	190,153	15,684	8.2
Bengal and Assam	60,467,724	19,553,420	32.3	195,086	28,411	14.4
North-Western Provinces	30,781,204	4,188,751	13.5	162,619	28,900	17.8
Oudh	11,220,232	1,111,290	9.9	48,926	12,417	25.3
Punjab	17,611,498	9,102,488	51.6	68,141	23,783	34.9
Total	167,711,041	38,356,507	22.8	789,617	114,816	14.5

Source : Selections from the Records of the Government of India, Home Department, "Correspondence on the Subject of the Education of the Muhammadan Community in British India and Their Employment in the Public Service Generally", Calcutta, Superintendent, Government Printing, India 1886, p 355.

compared to only 3.3 per cent of Hindu boys in school.²⁰ In 1883, the government of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh reported again that, in the combined provinces, Muslims were taking greater advantage of the new educational opportunities than the Hindus. It was reported then that the proportion of Muslim boys in school to the total Muslim population was 2.18 per cent compared to only 1.33 per cent for Hindus.²¹ Thus, by the time of the publication of Hunter's "Indian Musalmans" and before the memorial of the National Muhammadan Association, Muslims in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh were taking greater advantage of the new system of education than the Hindus.

The Muslim educational drive persisted up through 1931, the latest date for which comparative figures for Hindus and Muslims are available. Tables 3, 4, and 5, showing male literacy and male English literacy rates broken up by religion and rural-urban population divisions, demonstrate dramatically the persistent force of educational change among Muslims. Although Muslims were behind the Hindus in general male literacy in 1881 (Table 3),²² they gradually closed the gap until they were ahead of the Hindus by 1911 and significantly ahead by 1931. More important politi-

cally is the fact that male English literacy among Muslims was consistently higher than among Hindus throughout the period 1891 to 1931 and that the gap in their favour increased during this period.

In the urban areas of the province, the situation was somewhat different. Urban Hindus had higher rates of both male literacy and male English literacy in the period between 1901 and 1931. In this respect, it can be said that the urban Muslims were more "backward" than the urban Hindus. However, from another point of view, comparing the proportion of the Muslim urban literate and English-educated population to the proportion of Muslims in the total population of the state, the Muslims were in advance of the Hindus in both respects, at least since 1901 (Table 5). Moreover, in the period between 1901 and 1931, Muslims were closing the gap in the urban areas also with respect to both male literacy and male English literacy.

The figures in Table 5, which show the proportions of Hindus and Muslims to the total literate and English-educated populations in the rural and urban areas of the province, demonstrate most dramatically the more rapid rate of change among Muslims in this period. Among all the literate categories of the

population, Muslims increased their proportion in the population steadily every ten years until, by 1931, Muslims comprised more than 15 per cent of the literate population of the province, nearly 20 per cent of the English-educated population, more than 28 per cent of the urban literate population, and more than 22 per cent of that tiny but politically crucial population segment, the urban English-educated class.

Thus, up to 1931 at least, in education as in urbanisation, Muslims in UP were mobilising more rapidly than the Hindus. From the Muslim political point of view, however, this could be little consolation, for, even with a somewhat slower rate of urbanisation and education, the Hindus continued to comprise a majority in the cities, among the literate, and among the English educated. Both the differences in the rates of change among Hindus and Muslims as well as the impossibility of the Muslims overcoming the numerical preponderance of the Hindus no matter how much faster they changed can be illustrated by comparing the absolute numbers of Hindus and Muslims among the urban English-educated classes in 1901 and 1931. Between 1901 and 1931, Muslims multiplied themselves in this key category more than four times,

TABLE 3 : MALE LITERACY BY RELIGION IN THE UNITED PROVINCES IN PERCENTAGES, 1881-1931 (a)

	1931	1921	1911	1901	1891	1881
Total Population	(9.4) 8.0	(7.4) 6.5	6.1	5.78	5.15	(5.14) 4.5
All Hindus (b)	(8.9)	(7.0) 6.7	5.8	5.61	5.06 (d)	(5.05)(d)
All Muslims	(9.7)	(7.4) 6.5	5.9	5.26	4.52 (d)	(4.41)(d)
Total Urban (c)	(29.6)	(23.6) 21.3	17.9	17.60	N A	N A
Urban Hindu	(32.1)	(24.4) 22.1	19.4	19.76	N A	N A
Urban Muslim	(22.1)	(17.2) 15.4	13.0	10.99	N A	N A

(a) Figures in parentheses are for males aged five and over; other figures are for all males. Urban figures include the princely states. Other figures refer to British territory only.

As with other "Census of India" historical statistics, a caveat must be entered here against interpreting the figures too literally to show changes over the entire time period. The criteria for determining literacy and the categories for classifying literates and illiterates varied from census to census until 1911, when they were fixed. The 1881 and 1891 figures distinguished between those "learning" and the "literate". Some in the "learning" category would have been classed as literate in later census years. The 1901 figures eliminated this distinction, but used a loose criterion for determining literacy.

(b) "Brahmanic" Hindus only.

(c) Urban here refers to the population of the cities. The number of cities included in these tabulations in the respective census years were 1931, 23; 1921, 24; 1911, 24; 1901, 19.

(d) The combined figures for scholars and literates eliminate the imbalance in favour of the Hindus in 1881 and 1891. They are: 5.80 (per cent) learning and literate among Hindus and 5.87 (per cent) learning and literate among Muslims in 1881 and 5.92 (per cent) and 6.06 (per cent) respectively for Hindus and Muslims in 1891.

Sources: Compiled from "Census of India, 1951," Vol II, Pt I-A, pp 385, 390, 393; 1931, Vol XVIII, Pt I, pp 453, 457, 465-467, 475-479, 481-482; 1921, Vol XVI, Pt I, pp 115, 118-123, 127; 1911, Vol XV, Pt I, pp 252, 257, 264-269; 1901, Vol XVI, Pt I, pp 156, 164-170; 1891, Vol XVI, Pt I, 258; 1881, "Report on the Census of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh and of the Native States of Rampur and Native Garhwal", pp 91-92

whereas the Hindus multiplied themselves by slightly less than three times. Whereas, in 1901, Hindus outnumbered Muslims in this category in the ratio 4:1, their advantage in 1931 was considerably less than 3:1. Yet, the the overwhelming political fact of 1931 remained that there were 68,838 Hindus in the class which provided the lawyers, politicians, and government servants, but only 26,375 Muslims. The Muslims were not backward in UP compared to the Hindus, but they could not hope to overcome their minority status in all walks of life no matter how slowly the overwhelmingly larger Hindu majority mobilised itself.

Employment

W W Hunter had tried to show that, in Bengal, the Muslim aristocracy had been economically ruined, that Muslims were practically eliminated from positions of government employment which they had previously dominated, and that Muslim traders and businessmen had also suffered eclipse. The memorial of the National Muhammadan Association generalised Hunter's comments for the whole of India. Although the memorialists themselves were aware that, "in the North-Western Provinces the disproportion between the two races is probably not so great", they nevertheless complained that "the Hindus outnumber the Muhammadans in the Government offices".²³ The comments of the government of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh on the position of Muslims in government employment in the provinces at the time revealed that, in fact, not only

were the Muslims not underrepresented in government offices but they held positions, in the words of the officiating secretary to the government, "out of all proportion to the population figures".²⁴ It was reported then that "out of the 54,130 native officials holding appointments under this Government 35,302 are Hindus and 18,828 Muhammadans, being 65.22 per cent Hindus and 34.78 per cent Muhammadans, as against 86.75 and 13.25 in the general population".²⁵ In the highest-paid and most prestigious positions, such as deputy collectors and tahsildars, Muslims in many years outnumbered Hindus during the period from 1859 to 1882.²⁶ The imbalance in favour of the Muslims in the provinces was so great at this time that the secretary to the Government of India, in summarising the reports of the provinces on this question, remarked:

In the North-Western Provinces and Oudh and in the Punjab the enquiries which have been instituted prove that the allegations of the memorialists as to the exclusion of their community from a fair share of Government patronage do not apply. The figures submitted indicate that in respect of offices in the Subordinate Executive and Judicial services, including all the higher and better paid appointments, the Muhammadans have secured not only a fair proportion, but almost an unduly liberal share of patronage.²⁷

The available figures for later years show that the original advantage of the Muslims in government employment in these provinces was not only maintained, but was increased significantly. In 1886-87, 45.1 per cent or 235 out of

521 positions in the executive and judicial branches of the uncovenanted service in the province were held by Muslims.²⁸ In 1867, 1877, and 1887, Muslims held 32.5, 27.4, and 29.6 per cent respectively of the appointments open to Hindus and Muslims in the salary scale of Rs 75 per month and above in the government of the province.²⁹ Most striking, however, is the fact that, as late as 1911 and 1921, Muslims held 41.94 and 47.67 per cent of government positions (Tables 6 and 7), compared to their proportion of 34.78 per cent in 1882.

The census figures for 1911 and 1921 on employment by religion in UP, which are the latest available comprehensive figures, demonstrate clearly that up to that time, Muslims were either over-represented or proportionately well represented in comparison to the Hindus not only in government employment, but in every major category of employment in both the modern urban sectors of the economy and in elite sectors of the traditional rural economy. In many key categories, Muslims approached equality in numbers with and even surpassed the number of Hindus.

The figures for 1921 and 1911 for occupation by religion in the UP must be treated cautiously and cannot be used without discrimination to show changes in occupational distribution between 1911 and 1921 because of significant alterations in the bases of enumeration in the two censuses and because of the peculiar circumstances under which the census of 1911 was taken.³⁰ Nevertheless, the figures taken together in Tables 6 and 7 do reveal certain consistent and persistent features. Muslims comprised a smaller proportion than Hindus of ordinary cultivators in the province, but were over-represented in both census years among the rent receiving and rent collecting categories of the population. Moreover, the urban rentier class of Muslims in 1911 was larger, in absolute terms, than the Hindu urban rent receivers and rent collectors. In the industrial and commercial life of the province, Muslims were also well represented. There are some very sharp differences between 1911 and 1921 in some of these categories, probably because of the changes in instructions to the census enumerators, but here also there are some consistent features. Muslims were clearly overrepresented (in proportion to their numbers in the total population) in the industrial life of the province both in 1911 and in 1921, in

TABLE 4 : MALE ENGLISH LITERACY BY RELIGION IN THE UNITED PROVINCES IN PERCENTAGES, 1891-1931 (a)

	1931	1921	1911	1901	1891
Total Population	(1.10) .94	(.75) .66	.49	.36	.17
All Hindus (b)	(.84) .47	(.53) .47	.29	.22	.08
All Muslims	(1.48) .81	(.92) .81	.65	.38	.13
Total Urban	(9.59)(c)	N A	N A	3.69	N A
Urban Hindu	(9.66)(d)	N A	N A	3.74	N A
Urban Muslim	(5.94)(d)	N A	N A	1.97	N A
Rural Hindu	(.48)	N O T	A V A I L A B L E		
Rural Muslim	(.78)	N O T	A V A I L A B L E		

(a) Figures in parentheses are for males aged five and over; other figures are for all males. Unless otherwise noted, figures are for British territory only.

(b) "Brahmanic" Hindus only.

(c) Figures are for 23 cities for the entire province, including the princely states.

(d) Figures are for 22 cities in British territory.

Sources: "Census of India, 1931", Vol XVIII, Pt I, pp 463, 465-467, 479; 1921, Vol XVI, Pt I, pp 119, 123; 1901, Vol XVI, Pt I, pp 156, 164-170; 1891, Vol XVI, Pt I, p 261.

TABLE 5 : MALE LITERATE AND ILLITERATE POPULATIONS OF THE UNITED PROVINCES BY RELIGION, 1872 to 1931 (a)

	Literate			Literature in English			Urban Literate			Urban Literate in English			Illiterate		
	Total		Muslim	Total		Muslim	Total		Muslim	Total		Muslim	Total		Muslim
	Hindu	Hindu		Hindu	Hindu		Hindu	Hindu		Hindu	Hindu		Hindu	Hindu	
1931 No	2,043,410	1,631,640	311,569	240,140	153,031	47,740	364,801	230,542	103,589	118,377	68,838	26,375	23,401,596	19,680,691	3,468,884
	79.85		15.25		63.73	19.88		63.20	28.40		58.15	22.28		84.10	14.82
1921 No	1,556,626	1,248,545	221,503	156,900	95,039	27,384	258,949	160,502	68,180	87,498	49,370	16,121	22,231,119	18,882,269	3,166,648
%	80.21		14.23		60.57	17.45		61.98	26.33		56.42	18.42		84.94	14.24
1911 No	1,505,945	1,213,997	205,212	121,529	63,782	20,966	221,018	131,974	52,239	65,304	31,210	11,701	23,135,886	19,735,664	3,261,075
%	80.61		13.63		52.48	17.25		59.71	23.64		47.79	17.92		85.30	14.10
1901 No	1,422,924	1,178,622	181,125	87,641	47,739	12,919	174,285	127,426	35,882	36,504	24,104	6,421	23,194,018	19,847,621	3,258,772
%	82.83		12.73		54.47	14.74		73.11	20.59		66.03	17.59		85.57	14.03
1891 No	1,257,149	1,060,471	146,777	43,364	17,465	4,189	NOT AVAILABLE	17,465	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	22,808,011	19,715,647	3,047,084
	84.36		11.68		40.27	9.66								86.44	13.39
1881 No	1,033,458	879,182	116,763	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE
	85.07		11.30												
1872(b)No	531,608	469,248	59,578	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE	NOT AVAILABLE
	88.27		11.21												

(a) Figures for Hindus exclude Aryas and other small Hindu sects where they were listed separately in the census volumes, which was frequently, but not consistently, the case. Their exclusion does not significantly affect the percentages in the table. Where the combined percentages for Hindus and Muslims in any category fall significantly short of 100, the bulk of the difference is invariably made up by Christians.

(b) North-Western Provinces only.

Sources: "Census of India": 1931, Vol I, Pt II, p 434 and Vol XVIII, Pt II, pp 448-449, 470; 1921, Vol XVI, Pt II, pp 108, 128-132; 1911, Vol XV Pt II, II, pp 106-107 146-150; 1901, Vol XVI, Pt II, pp 82-83, 114-119; 1891, Vol XVI, Pt I-C, p 261 and Pt II, pp 1-13; 1881, "Report on the Census of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, 1881 and of the Native States of Rampur and Native Garhwal", p 92; 1872, "Census of the N-W Provinces, 1872", Vol I, p 30.

the province as a whole and in the cities. They were overrepresented in transport and trade in the province as a whole in both census years and only slightly underrepresented in these categories in the cities. (Some of the sub-categories under trade, however, show major inconsistencies between 1911 and 1921, indicating heavy overrepresentation of Muslims in 1921 and under-representation in 1911.)

In the politically crucial occupations in government service and the liberal professions, Muslim representation was very high in both 1911 and 1921. Mus-

lims were over-represented in the army in both years in the province as a whole; they outnumbered Hindus in both years in urban and rural sectors alike in the police department; and they were overrepresented even in the category of village watchmen both in 1911 and 1921. In the all-important category of public administration, especially in state employment, it has already been noted above that Muslims were heavily overrepresented. Nor was Muslim employment confined to the lower levels of government administration. Figures on the caste of gazetted

officers in UP in 1921 reveal that the Brahmans provided the largest contingent of 1,019 officers, but that Shaikhs (707) and Saiyids (265) came next, followed by the Hindu Jats (259) and Kayasthas (198).³¹ In the professions and liberal arts, which were the classes that provided the urban and district town politicians, Muslims were well represented or heavily overrepresented as lawyers in the province as a whole in 1911 and 1921 and only slightly under-represented in this respect in the 24 cities. Muslim doctors outnumbered Hindus in the cities and were over-

TABLE 6 : OCCUPATION BY RELIGION (FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS) IN THE UNITED PROVINCES, 1921 (a)

Occupation	Total	Hindus (b)		Muslims	
		No	%	No	%
Total Population	46,510,668	39,292,926	84.48	6,724,967	14.28
1 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	35,716,334	33,371,748	93.44	2,144,973	6.01
a Ordinary Cultivators	29,849,821	28,709,783	96.18	999,111	3.35
b Income from Rent of Land	818,437	569,677	69.61	225,734	27.58
c Agents, Managers of Landed Estates, Clerks, Rent Collectors, etc	136,201	111,707	82.02	21,171	15.54
d Other	4,911,875	3,980,581	81.04	898,957	18.30
2 Exploitation of Minerals	8,208	4,230	51.54	3,622	44.13
3 Industry	5,113,564	2,765,144	54.07	2,224,166	43.50
4 Transport	401,870	206,657	51.42	187,261	46.60
5 Trade (a)	2,060,338	1,147,735	55.71	832,339	40.40
a Bank Managers, Money Lenders, Exchange and Insurance Agents, Money Changers, and Brokers and Their Employees	113,960	49,832	43.73	51,690	45.36
b Brokers, Commission Agents, Commercial Travellers, Warehouse Owners and Employees	31,454	14,037	44.63	15,544	49.42
c Trade in Piece Goods	145,706	65,980	45.28	69,671	47.82
d Grain and Pulse Dealers	549,830	319,287	58.07	194,936	35.45
6 Public Force	253,503	127,782	50.41	116,616	46.00
a Army	78,821	41,392	52.51	30,238	38.36
b Police	85,706	41,983	48.98	42,670	49.79
c Village Watchmen	88,493	44,318	50.08	43,394	49.04
7 Public Administration	245,862	142,586	57.99	92,167	37.49
a Service of the State	121,147	57,382	47.37	57,747	47.67
b Municipal and Other Local (not Village) Service	20,252	10,555	52.12	8,752	43.22
8 Professions and Liberal Arts	488,424	374,284	76.63	89,965	18.42
a Lawyers	15,948	10,126	63.49	4,476	28.07
b Medical Practitioners	33,087	16,932	51.17	13,178	39.83
c Instruction	74,608	50,467	67.64	16,763	22.47
d Letters and Arts and Sciences	61,293	29,703	48.46	30,176	49.23

(a) Tables 6 and 7 are not meant to show and should not be used to demonstrate shifts between 1911 and 1921 in occupational categories. Although the categories in 1911 and 1921 are the same, the bases of enumeration changed. In agricultural occupations, the basis of enumeration was entirely different in 1921 from 1911. Moreover, there was a change in 1921 in the basis of enumerating principal and subsidiary occupations, which may have had a considerable impact on the results in some categories of employment, e.g. money-lenders and brokers (5a and 5b) in the table. All 1911 urban statistics must be treated with caution because of the peculiar conditions under which the census was taken (see fn. (a) to table 1).

(b) "Brahmanic" Hindus only; excludes Aryas.

Sources : "Census of India, 1921", Vol XVI, Pt II, pp 396-407.

TABLE 7 : OCCUPATION BY RELIGION (FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS) IN THE UNITED PROVINCES, 1911 (a)

Occupation	Whole Province						24 Cities					
	Hindus			Muslims			Hindus			Muslims		
	Total	No	%	Total	No	%	Total	No	%	Total	No	%
Total Population	48,014,080	40,705,353	84.78	6,904,731	14.11		2,148,858	1,240,471	57.73	832,619	38.75	
1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	35,267,372	31,633,423	89.70	3,481,886	9.87		247,907	163,743	66.05	79,445	32.05	
a Ordinary Cultivators	28,712,015	25,756,942	89.71	2,846,778	9.91		110,987	80,470	72.50	28,765	25.92	
b Income from Rent of Land	866,419	671,534	77.51	175,797	20.29		53,821	25,230	46.88	27,186	50.51	
c Agents, Managers of Landed Estates	196,722	124,579	63.33	68,736	34.94		19,593	9,193	46.92	9,833	50.19	
d Clerks, Rent Collectors, etc.	5,492,216	5,080,368	92.50	390,575	7.11		63,506	48,850	76.92	13,661	21.51	
2 Exploitation of Minerals	8,808	7,943	90.18	826	9.38		545	456	83.67	82	15.05	
3 Industry	5,834,384	4,021,696	68.93	1,741,716	29.85		670,467	354,479	52.87	304,156	45.36	
4 Transport	449,610	296,919	66.04	138,197	30.74		138,406	79,081	57.14	51,050	36.88	
5 Trade (a)	2,140,395	1,602,422	74.87	464,478	21.70		344,487	214,268	62.20	117,389	34.08	
a Bank Managers, Money Lenders, Exchange and Insurance Agents, Money Changers and Brokers and Their Employees	144,283	120,191	83.30	9,993	6.93		26,214	20,928	79.84	2,801	10.69	
b Brokers, Commission Agents, Commercial Travellers, Warehouse Owners and Employees	29,411	24,925	84.75	3,328	11.32		8,569	6,967	81.30	1,132	13.21	
c Trade in Piece Goods	133,429	95,216	71.36	30,137	22.59		25,091	17,519	69.82	6,195	24.69	
d Grain and Pulse Dealers	686,906	602,925	87.77	60,609	8.82		67,593	54,327	80.37	9,677	14.32	
6 Public Force	336,627	214,780	63.80	92,523	27.49		65,559	25,710	39.22	22,450	34.24	
a Army	61,180	24,757	40.47	14,472	23.65		31,508	7,778	24.69	7,349	23.32	
b Police	85,623	38,279	44.71	43,090	50.33		26,154	11,960	45.73	13,468	51.49	
c Village Watchmen	189,807	151,749	79.95	34,957	18.42		7,891	5,972	75.68	1,629	20.64	
7 Public Administration	269,593	181,363	67.27	78,090	28.97		64,771	29,999	46.32	31,720	48.97	
a Service of the State	123,022	65,224	53.02	51,598	41.94		41,925	21,794	51.98	17,717	42.25	
b Municipal and Other Local (not Village) Service	20,897	11,389	54.50	8,507	40.71		9,037	4,478	49.55	4,241	46.93	
8 Professions and Liberal Arts	534,027	387,293	72.52	123,612	23.15		121,691	74,771	61.44	38,717	31.82	
a Lawyers	16,867	10,115	59.97	5,497	32.59		8,441	4,857	57.54	2,936	34.78	
b Medical Practitioners	30,050	15,246	50.74	12,510	41.63		10,696	4,486	41.94	5,437	50.83	
c Instruction	66,906	37,306	55.76	22,675	33.89		17,937	7,778	43.63	7,653	42.67	
d Letters and Arts and Sciences	96,313	42,638	44.27	51,694	53.67		21,859	7,852	35.92	13,170	60.25	

Sources : "Census of India", 1911, Vol XV, Pt II, pp 550-563. 588-589, 614-615, 640-641, 666-667.

(a) See fn (a) to Table 6.

(b) "Brahmanic" Hindus only; excludes Aryas.

TABLE 8 : HINDI, URDU AND ENGLISH NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS IN UTTAR PRADESH, 1873-1960

Language	Number of Papers								
	1960	1950	1940	1930	1920	1910	1900	1890	1873
Hindi	594	435	367	253	175	86	34	24	9
Urdu	161	140	268	225	151	116	69	68	25
English	88	62	109	84	71	56	34		

Sources : "Court Character and Primary Education in the N-W Provinces and Oudh" Allahabad, Indian Press, 1897 p 78; "Census of India, 1951" Vol II, Pt I-A, p 409; "Census of India, 1931", Vol XVIII Pt I, p 474; and Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, "Annual Report of the Registrar of Newspapers for India 1961", Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1961, Pt I, p 309.

represented in the province as a whole in both years. Muslims were also over-represented in the teaching profession and in other miscellaneous occupations included under letters and arts and sciences.

The proportionate overrepresentation of Muslims in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy of UP in 1911 and 1921 can be illustrated graphically (see Figure). Although the imbalance in 1921 in favour of the Muslims in comparison to 1911 seems almost impossible to believe, it is nevertheless clear


that both in 1911 and in 1921 Muslims were considerably overrepresented (in terms of their proportion to the total population) in both industry and mining and in the service sectors of the economy of the state. In contrast, the proportion of Muslims engaged in agricultural occupations was very small in both 1911 and 1921, much smaller than their proportion even in the rural population of the state. Thus, in employment as in urbanisation and education, it is clear that the Muslims were already more advanced than the

Hindus in the nineteenth century and that they increased their advantage up through 1921. The figures on the employment of Muslims in government service between 1859 and 1921 suggest, in fact, that the Muslims constituted a privileged community, nearly a dominant administrative elite, and that it was the Hindus in this region who were denied a share of government posts in a proportion reflecting their numbers.

Communications

In 1837, Persian was replaced by English and the vernacular languages of the various provinces of British-ruled India as official and court languages. In north India, however, the vernacular language chosen was not Hindi in the Devanagari script, but Urdu in the Persian script. In the Northwestern Provinces and Oudh, Urdu alone was the court language until 1900, when the lieutenant-governor, A P MacDonnell, issued a circular giving Hindi equal status with Urdu in the provinces. Until that time, Urdu was the pre-eminent symbol of the continued dominance of the Muslim elite in the administrative and cultural life of the province.

FIGURE: OCCUPATION BY RELIGION IN THE UNITED PROVINCES, 1911 AND 1921



I: Agriculture and Forestry; II: Industry and Mining; III: Occupations other than Agriculture, Industry and Mining; IV: Unproductive population; x: Other religions.

Note: This figure is meant to be comparable to the one in Karl W Deutsch, "Nationalism and Social Communication", Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1966, p 143, which shows a similar kind of break-up for Czechs and Germans in Bohemia.

The great discrepancy in the occupational distribution in the figure between 1911 and 1921, however, limits its usefulness. All that can be reasonably asserted from the two sets of data is that Muslims were overrepresented in both years in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy in proportion to their percentage in the total population, but the extent of overrepresentation is not clear and the change shown cannot be accepted as accurate.

Between 1867 and 1900, Hindus of the province agitated through pamphlets and deputations to government for the replacement of Urdu in Persian script with Hindi in the Devnagari script as the official court language.³² It is in this period in UP that political conflict between Hindus and Muslims began, for the leading Muslims of the province organized themselves into political associations to oppose the Hindu demand. Syed Ahmad Khan's Muhammadan Educational Conference, founded in 1886, took up the defence of Urdu in its meetings.³³ Syed Ahmad himself is said to have despaired of the prospects for Hindu-Muslim unity because of this controversy.³⁴ After the issuance of the MacDonnell circular in 1900, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Syed Ahmad's successor in the Aligarh movement, organised an Urdu Defence Association to oppose the admission of Hindi to equal status with Urdu as a court and official language of the province.³⁵ It is a measure of elite Muslim feelings on this subject that, as late as 1928, a committee of leading Muslim politicians, landlords and lawyers, in a representation to the Simon Commission, demanded the abrogation of the 1900 order and the reinstatement of Urdu as the sole official and court language of UP!³⁶

Studies of the origins of nationalism in India have emphasised the importance of English education as a unifying element in the spread of communications which made possible nationalist organization.³⁷ But the trends which were of greater importance in the long run and which have not been given the attention due to them by historians of nationalism were those taking place in vernacular education in the provinces. English education was providing a medium of communication and a precondition for all-India nationalist organisation for that tiny elite which dominated all-India politics in the period between 1885 and 1920, but the more important issue in the UP in this period was not the spread of English education but whether Hindi or Urdu would be the predominant medium of primary education.

The two issues of court language and medium of primary education were closely connected in the late nineteenth century, for as long as Urdu was the sole official (vernacular) language in use in the province, Hindu children whose parents wished their sons to have access to government positions would be compelled to have them educated in Urdu medium

schools. Many Hindus did study Urdu in preference to Hindi in the period when Urdu was the official court language. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya's pamphlet, "Court Character and Primary Education in the N-W Provinces and Oudh", published in 1897, cited government figures to show that, in the government schools in the North-western Provinces between 1860-61 and 1873-74, the proportion of Urdu-learners was far in excess of the proportion of Muslims in the schools at the time.³⁸ In 1873-74, 16.2 per cent of the boys in the middle and lower vernacular schools of the provinces were Muslim, but nearly 35 per cent of the boys in government schools of all kinds were studying Urdu.³⁹ In Oudh, the situation was even more favourable to Urdu and the Muslims. In 1872, the secretary to the chief commissioner of Oudh revealed that "although the Hindu so largely outnumbered the Mahomedan population of the province, the course of instruction is practically a course of Urdu-Persian, rather than a course of Hindi-Sanskrit; and is thus ... more suited for Mahomedan than for Hindu scholars". The secretary reported at the time that, in the government schools, 22,074 students were learning Urdu, Persian, or Arabic whereas only 4,959 students were taking up Hindi or Sanskrit.⁴⁰ The most recent figures which distinguished between Hindi-and Urdu-learners in the provinces before the change in court language are for 1896, and they show that there were 50,316 boys studying Urdu and 100,404 studying Hindi in the vernacular elementary schools in the combined North-western Provinces and Oudh.⁴¹

Moreover, the trend in the middle and late nineteenth century was toward increasing displacement of Hindi by Urdu in the schools. In 1860-61, there were 11,490 boys studying Urdu or Persian in primary schools in the North-western Provinces compared to 69,134 studying Hindi. By 1873-74, the number of Urdu- and Persian-learners had multiplied by more than four times to 48,229, whereas the number of Hindi-learners had increased by less than a third to 85,820.⁴² In the middle vernacular examinations, figures for the period 1873-74 to 1895-96 show that, during this time, Urdu displaced Hindi as the dominant language for this purpose. Whereas only 434 candidates took this examination in Urdu in 1873-74 and 1,315 students took it in Hindi, by 1895-96, the proportions were reversed, with 2,814 candidates taking the exa-

mination in Urdu compared to only 785 taking it in Hindi.⁴³

In effect, large numbers of Hindus, primarily because of the continued official importance given to Urdu in the provinces, were being assimilated to the cultural language and script of the Muslims in the late nineteenth century. It was this process of assimilation to which the leaders of the Hindi movement were opposed in the late nineteenth century and which Muslims of the Aligarh school wanted to continue. However, even though the Northwestern Provinces were the most educationally backward of the British Indian provinces during this period and relatively small proportions of Hindus were entering the government schools, the size of the Hindu majority was too overwhelming to be wholly assimilated to Urdu. Although Hindus who went up to the middle and secondary examinations opted for Urdu for the sake of employment, Hindus learning Hindi were still more than twice the number of Urdu-learners at the primary stages in 1896. In this situation, where the social mobilisation of the Hindus (however slow it was at this time) was proceeding faster than the process of assimilation to the Urdu language and Indo-Persian culture, lay the basic condition for Hindu-Muslim conflict in the late nineteenth century.

Although figures are not available to demonstrate it, it can be presumed that the process of assimilation to Urdu was reversed by the government order of 1900. However, it was not until much later that Hindi overtook Urdu as the predominant vernacular language of public communications in the UP. Data on the number of Hindi and Urdu papers between 1873 and 1964 (Table 8) demonstrate the earlier predominance of Urdu as the elite vernacular language of the province and reveal that it was not until 1920 that the number of Hindi papers in UP exceeded the number of Urdu papers. Until 1930, the number of both the Hindi and Urdu papers continued to increase, but the rate of increase in the number of Hindi papers in UP was less than that of the Urdu papers. As in other aspects of the process of social mobilisation of the two communities, the problem of the Muslims was not so much their backwardness but that no matter how fast they ran, the Hindus either ran faster or, even when they walked, nearly always outnumbered the Muslims in the end.

Taken together, the available data on vernacular education and newspaper publication suggest that it was not the Muslims but both Hindi and the Hindus who were backward compared to Urdu and the Muslims and Hindus who were struggling for self-assertion and for their linguistic expression in the public life of the northern provinces against the dominance of Urdu and the educated Muslim elite. Moreover, in their resistance to the claims of Hindi, as in their later demands for weightage in political representation and for separate electorates, the Muslim elites of UP made it clear from the beginning that they intended to fight to maintain their privileges.

III

The Political Strategy of a Privileged Elite

Although the Muslim community was more advanced in most respects than the Hindu in nineteenth and twentieth century UP, its political leadership was more narrow. Congress nationalism (which reflected Hindu aspirations) in UP was a bourgeois movement, led by the middle class professionals in the cities and towns and the petty zamindars and bigger peasants in the countryside, supported financially by the textile and sugar millowners and the big cloth traders.⁴⁴ Muslim separatism in UP had a quite different class basis, reflecting the differences both in the socio-economic conditions of the Muslims and their religious organisation.

The Muslim community in UP was not primarily a peasant community and Muslim separatism, therefore, did not have the peasant base which Congress nationalism had. The leaders of the nineteenth century Muslim educational and political movements in UP were largely Muslim aristocrats and government servants. All the prominent leaders and financial backers of the Aligarh movement belonged to these groups.⁴⁵ The Muslim League, itself an offshoot of the Aligarh movement, was dominated by Muslim landlords from the beginning.⁴⁶ In its later stages, leadership positions in the Muslim League were divided between the Muslim aristocracy and the upper middle class professionals,⁴⁷ especially the big lawyers such as Chaudhury Khaliquzzaman. For a time, the *ulama* also supported the League. The membership of the UP contingent of the Central Parliamentary Board of the Muslim League in 1936

reflected this triple alliance of elites—the aristocrats and landlords (Nawab Ismail Khan, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, the Rajas of Mahmudabad and Salempur), the lawyer-politician (Khaliquzzaman), and the *ulama* (Maulanas Shaukat Ali and Hassan Ahmad).⁴⁸ The major difference between the leadership of the Muslim separatist and Congress nationalist movements, however, was in the greater role in the former of aristocrats and upper class professionals. It was this combination of big landlords and big lawyer-politicians which led the Muslim League to victory in UP after 1937, despite the defection of most of the *ulama* to the Congress.⁴⁹

It is no doubt true, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith has pointed out, that the Muslim League in the end succeeded in winning the support of “the bulk of the middle classes”, as well as the lower middle classes, in UP as elsewhere.⁵⁰ However, Muslim separatism in UP was, in origin, the ideology of an upper class and upper middle class elite attempting to preserve its privileged position in society through political means.⁵¹ The leadership of the movement remained in the hands of the landlords and the lawyer-politicians until the end. The ideology of the movement, not so much anti-secular as anti-democratic, reflected its class leadership. Its consistent political purpose was to prevent the introduction into India of a representative system based on Western democratic principles of territorial representation and one man-one vote in which the Muslims as a community and the Muslim elites as a class would be an ineffective minority. In the pursuit of this purpose, the Muslim political leaders of UP and the other minority provinces adopted a notably consistent political strategy, which they succeeded in imposing on the rest of the country, sometimes to the detriment of the interests of the majority provinces’ Muslims.

Muslim political leaders in UP, from the nineteenth century up to the Lahore resolution (the “Pakistan resolution”) of 1940, adopted two broad kinds of measures in UP to preserve the privileged status of the Muslim minority—measures to enhance the effectiveness of the Muslim minority and measures to decrease the effectiveness of the Hindu majority. To justify their demands, which will be noted presently, Muslim politicians in UP used two mutually contradictory arguments. One was that the Muslims were backward in education and in economic condi-

tion compared to the Hindus, who were seen as determined to capitalise on their advantage by establishing their political dominance and “crushing the minority community”.⁵² From this point of view, special political rights for Muslims were needed to defend a weak and impoverished minority from a ruthless and bigoted majority.⁵³ The other argument, which more accurately reflected the objective condition of the Muslim elites and their ideology, was that the Muslims were historically and currently more important and influential in the social and economic life of the province and that rights should be granted to them on this basis rather than according to their numbers:

The Mohammedans form only 14.28 per cent of the population of these Provinces, but it cannot be denied that they have played a glorious part for centuries past in the material, social and cultural progress of these Provinces. A major portion of these Provinces is considered to be the heart of the Muslims of India. They were the rulers and the landed magnates of the country in the last century, and they still hold a prominent place in these Provinces. Their civic rights should be judged more on these considerations than on their numerical strength.⁵⁴

The two arguments were used alternately, depending on their suitability to the purpose at hand, in justifying measures to increase Muslim minority effectiveness and decrease Hindu majority effectiveness. In the first category of measures may be included efforts to promote Muslim solidarity generally through such institutions as the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College and through such symbols as the defense of Urdu. Specific political demands which grew out of this strategy were those for separate electorates (which made possible the effective political organisation of a scattered Muslim minority in UP), for weightage in all forms of representation in politics and administration, and for a veto to political representatives of the Muslim community over legislation affecting the interests of Muslims. The second of these demands certainly, and the first probably, worked against the interests of the Muslims of the majority provinces. The principle of weightage applied to Bengal and Punjab reduced Muslim representation in those provincial legislative councils. Separate electorates also probably increased the representation of the Hindu and Sikh minorities in those provinces beyond what they might have achieved in mixed electorates.

In the second category of measures to decrease Hindu effectiveness were efforts to split the Hindu community into caste Hindus and depressed classes. In UP, the class orientation of the Muslim elites prevented Muslim political leaders from attempting seriously to join forces politically with the middle and lower Hindu castes. Instead, Muslim leaders demanded that caste Hindus should not benefit from the numbers of the depressed Hindu groups in the representative system, but that those groups should either be given separate electorates also or, failing separate electorates, the representation to which the Hindu depressed classes would be entitled by their numbers should be divided equally between caste Hindus and Muslims until such time as the Hindu depressed classes were capable of effectively representing themselves!⁵⁵ The second major tactic adopted by Muslim leaders to decrease Hindu effectiveness was to oppose measures of democratisation. Syed Ahmad Khan warned the Muslims against accepting the western representative system in India, by which they would be reduced to a permanent minority. Muhammad Ali, who saw the Muslim community in the 1920s as "small in numbers, ignorant, and poor", noted that Muslims found it painful to learn that, in a representative system, "wisdom consisted in lung-power multiplied by the millions and political strength lay in the counting of heads".⁵⁶ And, in 1928, Muslim political leaders in UP praised the extension of local self-government powers to the towns where Muslims were concentrated and given weightage, but regretted the extension of similar powers to the district boards where the principle of weightage could not overcome the overwhelming Hindu preponderance in the rural areas. The Muslims argued that "the District Boards Act was precipitate; it conferred power on an ignorant and illiterate peasantry, and this power was, and has been utilised, by members of the majority community for the organisation and consolidation of their party, community, or caste, in the rural areas".⁵⁷ In this way, the Muslim aristocracy who would naturally be opposed to representative democracy by their class interests alone could use an elitist argument to stir in the minds of the Muslim masses a fear of permanent backwardness and a permanent minority status under a representative system inevitably dominated by Hindus.

The explanation offered above for the leading role of the UP Muslims in

the development of Muslim separatism in India seems reasonable until 1940. Until that time, Muslim separatism was a movement for minority privileges within India. UP Muslims took the lead because they were already a privileged minority and were determined to maintain their privileges. Moreover, until 1936, their strategy was eminently successful in UP. Separate electorates were conceded in 1909 with respect to provincial and central legislative bodies. They were extended to municipalities and district boards in UP in 1916 and 1922, respectively.⁵⁸ Under the terms of the Lucknow Pact between the Congress and the Muslim League in 1916, Muslim representation in the UP legislative council was fixed at 30 per cent. The Communal Award of 1932 provided for Muslim representation of 28.9 per cent (66 out of 228 seats) in the UP legislative assembly. The available figures on the political representation of the Muslims in elected local self-governing bodies in UP in the 1920s show that the Muslims were overrepresented in these bodies as well. In 1923, 25.2 per cent and in 1925-26, 33.7 per cent of the elected members of the 48 district boards in UP were Muslims. In March 1928, the UP Government revealed that 66 of out of 240 members of Notified Area Committees (small town governments), or 27.5 per cent and 291 out of 935 members of municipal boards, or 41.8 per cent were Muslims.⁵⁹ Most important, until 1936, the great Muslim zamindars and talukdars, such as the Nawab of Chattari and the Raja of Salempur, among others, were trusted allies and advisers of the British governors in UP and were ministers in the provincial government.⁶⁰

After 1936, however, with the election of a Congress majority in the UP legislative assembly and the installation of a Congress government, the privileged position of the Muslim elites in the province was seriously threatened. Within a few years of this great change in provincial politics, the strategy of Muslim political leaders in the UP Muslim League had changed from demanding minority rights only to demanding in addition a separate sovereign homeland for Muslims in areas where Muslims were in a majority. It is extremely likely that these two changes were closely connected, that the new threat to the Muslim position in UP led UP Muslims to take the lead in the Pakistan demand even before the Muslims of Bengal and Punjab were prepared for it. However, it

would require much more space and a different kind of analysis to explain the appeal of the Pakistan demand in the UP after 1940. All that can be suggested here is that the communal polarisation in UP after 1936 can be better understood if it is recognised that, in that year, Muslim elites in UP suffered their most severe setback since 1900. In 1900, Hindi acquired equality with Urdu; but, in 1936, Hindus came to power in the province for the first time in popular elections with an overwhelming majority, displacing from ministerial positions in the UP Government Muslim landlords and denying power also to the leaders of the Muslim League.

IV

Conclusion

This article began with a question which could not be fully answered here, namely, to explain the leading role of the Muslims of the United Provinces in the development of Muslim separatist consciousness or nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century up to 1940 and the intensity of Hindu-Muslim conflict in the UP during that period. Theories of nationalism and the previous evidence of social conflicts in other regions of the world and in South Asia suggested that an important place to begin in the search for an explanation is in the relative levels of development or "social mobilisation" between Hindus and Muslims in the UP and the differential rates of change between the two groups during the period in which political conflict between the two communities developed. In fact, the predominant explanation for Muslim nationalism in India does stress the differences in levels of development between the two peoples. It has been widely accepted that the Muslims were a backward people compared to the Hindus during British rule, that their leaders perceived their backwardness as a community and took measures to rectify it, which ultimately led them to separatist solutions in politics. The available data on levels of social mobilisation and differential rates of change between Hindus and Muslims in the United Provinces between 1859 and 1931 does show that there was an unevenness of development between the two communities, but that the Muslims in UP at least were the more advanced community and the Hindus the less advanced community.

The record of national conflicts in other parts of the world suggests that the conditions for conflict between a relatively more advanced minority and a socially mobilising majority are created when the rate at which the majority develops (that is, the rate at which its members become educated, move to cities and towns, and seek lucrative employment in the modern sectors of the economy) moves faster than the ability of the minority to assimilate the majority to its dominant language and culture. Muslims in U P in the nineteenth century constituted a cultural and administrative urban elite whose language dominated in the courts and primary schools of the province. Moreover, the rates of change among Muslims in several respects, including urbanisation, literacy, and government employment continued to keep ahead of rates of change among Hindus up through 1931. However, even though rates of change were frequently slower among Hindus in this period, the sheer numerical superiority of the Hindus ensured that no matter how slowly they mobilised, they would ultimately displace or replace Muslims from their privileged positions in public life in the provinces.

A crucial change in the relative balance between the two communities occurred in 1900, when the pressure of Hindu demands forced the government of the Northwestern Provinces and Oudh to admit Hindi to equality with Urdu as an official vernacular court language. Until 1900, large numbers of Hindus were being assimilated to Urdu through the schools and were being required to use Urdu in dealings with government. After 1900, the process of assimilation was stopped. From 1900 onwards, Hindus who became educated and urbanised and who sought government employment were likely to have less in common with similarly-placed Muslims and were likely to use a different style of language and a different script.

The origins of Hindu-Muslim political differences in U P lie in the Hindi-Urdu controversy in the late nineteenth century. It was during this controversy that the entrenched Muslim elites made it clear that they would oppose even the admission of Hindi in Devanagari script to equality with Urdu in Persian script as an official language of the provinces. From the late nineteenth century onwards, Muslim elites followed a consistent political strategy, requesting privileges and making demands which would increase their political effective-

ness as a minority and decrease the effectiveness of the Hindu majority. That strategy was largely successful until 1936, but it contributed to the embitterment of the relations between Hindus and Muslims, which continues up to the present.

Thus, the answer suggested here to the question of the leading role of U P Muslims in Muslim separatism in India is that U P Muslims took the lead because they were a privileged minority in the nineteenth century in the region and their leaders were determined to maintain their privileges. Until 1940 Muslim separatism in India was a movement for minority privileges within India. U P Muslims took the lead in this movement because they were already a privileged elite and their leaders feared the loss of their privileged status. Hindu-Muslim relations became embittered because of Muslim fears of displacement by the rising Hindu majority and because of Hindu resentment at the tenacity with which the Muslim elites struggled to maintain their privileges against Hindu interests.

Notes

- 1 "Separatism" in this article will be used as a term synonymous with the more common, but less precise, term "communalism". I mean by Muslim separatism in India all movements which attempted to build a separate group consciousness and identity among Muslims.
- 2 See, for example, the comments of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, "India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative", Bombay, Orient Longmans, 1959, pp 160-161; R Coupland, "Indian Politics, 1936-1942", London, Oxford University Press, 1943, pp 110-111; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis", London, Victor Gollancz, 1946, p 256; and Percival Spear, "The Position of the Muslims, Before and After Partition", in Philip Mason (ed), "India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity", London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p 42.
- 3 On this point, see M S Jain, "The Aligarh Movement: Its Origin and Development, 1858-1906", Agra, Sri Ram Mehra, 1965, pp 154-158; Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, "Pathway to Pakistan", Lahore Longmans, 1961, pp 11-12; "A History of the Freedom Movement", Karachi, Pakistan Historical Society, 1961, Vol II, pt II, p 543. Last reference hereafter cited as "Pakistan Freedom Movement".
- 4 "Social mobilisation" is defined by Karl W Deutsch in *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2d ed, Cambridge,

Mass, The M I T Press, 1966, p 126 as the process by which a population becomes available for "mass communication" and it is usually measured by a variety of quantitative indicators. The indicators of social mobilisation which will be used in this article are the proportions of people literate or educated, living in cities and towns, and engaged in lucrative employment in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy.

- 5 The importance of unevenness and discontinuity in the development of conflict between peoples is stressed by Deutsch, esp at p 29, and with specific reference to India by Anil Seal, "The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Late Nineteenth Century", Cambridge University Press, 1968.
- 6 Deutsch, p 130.
- 7 Deutsch, p 2.
- 8 Smith, p 180. Nearly every book written on the subject has used the notion of Muslim backwardness to explain the development of Muslim separatism in India.
- 9 Seal, p 339.
- 10 D A Low, "Introduction", in D A Low (ed), "Soundings in Modern South Asian History", Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968, p 14.
- 11 W W Hunter, "The Indian Muslims", Lahore, Premier Book House, 1964, citation from p 12.
- 12 See also Seal on this point, p 307.
- 13 Selections from the Records of the Government of India, Home Department, "Correspondence on the Subject of the Education of the Muhammadan Community in British India and Their Employment in the Public Service Generally", Calcutta, Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1886, p 237. Hereafter referred to as "Correspondence on the Subject of the Muhammadan Community". I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Conlon, for bringing this volume to my attention.
- 14 Cited in Wm Theodore de Bary *et al*, "Sources of Indian Tradition", New York, Columbia University Press, 1958, p 744.
- 15 Cited in Smith, p 264.
- 16 However, see fn (a) to Table 1.
- 17 Census of India, 1931, Vol XVIII, "United Provinces of Agra and Oudh", Pt I — Report, by A C Turner, Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1933, p 138.
- 18 The increase in the proportion of urban Muslims seems to have been a persistent feature of the period, not simply dependent on the changes in the number of census towns.
- 19 These figures come from an unpublished paper of P D Reeves, "Changing Patterns of Political

- Alignment in the General Elections to the United Provinces' Legislative Assembly, 1937 and 1946".
- 20 "Correspondence on the Subject of Muhammadan Community", p 212.
- 21 *Ibid*, p 287.
- 22 However, it must be stressed that literary figures before 1911 are not comparable with the figures after that date. The 1881 and 1891 censuses distinguished between "scholars", that is, children in school, and "literate", who were enumerated separately. As the previous paragraphs point out, there were proportionately more Muslim than Hindu boys in school in the 1870s in the provinces, which would not be reflected in the literary figures. See fn (d) to Table 3.
- 23 "Correspondence on the Subject of the Muhammadan Community", p 240.
- 24 *Ibid*, p 289.
- 25 *Ibid*, p 286.
- 26 *Ibid*
- 27 *Ibid*, p 389
- 28 Seal, p 118.
- 29 *Ibid*, p 305.
- 30 See fn (a) to Table 1.
- 31 "Census of India, 1921, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh", Vol XVI, Pt II, by E H H Edye, Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, United Provinces, 1923, p 413.
- 32 An extremely valuable contemporary collection of the pamphlets, government orders, and views of British officials and others is contained in a volume attributed in the British Museum Catalogue to Madan Mohan Malaviya, titled "Court Character and Primary Education in the N-W Provinces of Oudh", Allahabad, Indian Press, 1897. Hereafter cited as "Court Character and Primary Education". See also Jyotirindra Das Gupta, "Language Politics and Group Process in India", unpublished Ph D dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1966, pp 91-93.
- 33 Jain, p 77.
- 34 *Ibid*, p 138, fn 4.
- 35 *Ibid*, p 66 and Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, "The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan", Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1963, p 47.
- 36 "Representation of the Muslims of United Provinces (India) to the Indian Statutory Commission (July 1928)", p 182. The representation listed the names of thirty prominent Muslim sponsors headed by Shafaat Ahmad Khan and including members of the UP legislative council, prominent members of district boards and municipalities, representatives of the Aligarh Muslim University, and the president of the UP provincial Muslim League.
- 37 The classic account is Bruce Tiebout McCully, "English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism", Gloucester, Mass, Peter Smith, 1966.
- 38 "Court Character and Primary Education", p 28.
- 39 *Ibid*, app, p 77, where the figures are shown as an extract from a government order of 1874. The population compared, boys in the middle and lower vernacular schools studying Urdu and Muslim boys in government schools of all kinds, are not identical, but the discrepancy between Urdu-learners and Muslims in school is consistent with other information presented in this article.
- 40 Correspondence on the Subject of the Muhammadan Community", p 212.
- 41 "Court Character and Primary Education", p 28, where it is reported that "it has been ascertained that on the 31st March, 1896, 50,316 boys were reading Urdu and 100,404, Hindi, in the vernacular primary schools in these Provinces". How the information was "ascertained" is not stated, but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the figures.
- 42 *Ibid*.
- 43 *Ibid*, p 31.
- 44 Smith, p 217 and Paul R Brass, "Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh", Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp 229ff.
- 45 Faruqi, p 39; Jain, pp 55-59, 65, 74-75; Khaliquzzaman, pp 8, 35, 114; "Pakistan Freedom Movement", II, ii, chs xviii and xxi.
- 46 See, for example, Khaliquzzaman, pp 18, 97, 120, 137, 144-145, 159, 214, 233; Khalid B Sayeed, "The Political System of Pakistan", Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1967, p 13.
- 47 Sayeed, p 55.
- 48 Khaliquzzaman, p 416.
- 49 *Ibid*, chs xvii-xix.
- 50 Smith, pp 257 and 269ff.
- 51 Cf Smith, pp 246-269.
- 52 "Representation of the Muslims of United Provinces", pp 2 and 6.
- 53 *Ibid*, p 58.
- 54 *Ibid*, p 55.
- 55 *Ibid*, p 8: "The depressed classes both touchables and non-touchable who outnumber in these provinces the Hindus proper as well as the Moslems will take [a] long time to come on a par either with the Hindus proper or the Moslems. ...It will be impolitic to let the caste Hindus alone monopolize the advantages that should have gone to the depressed classes had they been in a position to take advantage of the reformed constitution. In fairness to the Moslem, these advantages should be apportioned equally between the caste Hindu and the Moslem."
- 56 Cited in de Bary, p 775.
- 57 "Representation of the Muslims of United Provinces", p 28.
- 58 *Ibid*, p 25.
- 59 Calculated from *Ibid*, apps A,B,C.
- 60 Khaliquzzaman, p 155.

Drop in World Rice Trade

THE volume of world trade in rice fell in 1968 for the third successive year and is likely to drop again in 1969, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation's annual Rice Report. World paddy production in 1968 (excluding China, North Korea and North Viet Nam) touched a new high of 185 million tons, six per cent above the previous year's record, and the 1969 output may be even higher still.

The FAO export price index (1957-59 = 100) declined from the peak of 158 in March 1968 to 140 in December 1968 and in October this year stood at 126. The Rice Report describes the trade as entering a "volatile stage", with export supplies exceeding import requirements, and the promise of increasingly higher yields in several countries through the use of high-yielding varieties.

Growing competition among exporters has been reflected in a considerable rise in subsidies and exports on concessional and special terms. The European Economic Community's Rice Regulation has stimulated production in Italy, whose increased supplies to the Community have displaced some developing countries' exports.

Another significant factor in the changing face of the world's rice trade is that Japan has virtually left the ranks of importers for the immediate future. As per caput incomes increase, the Japanese are turning more and more from rice to higher-protein foods, but bumper rice crops continue to be harvested, giving the country a surplus problem. The Government recently revealed plans to offer \$110 to farmers for every 10 acres of land they take out of rice cultivation next year.