

envoycon

NORTH AMERICA

# Making Envoy Resilient to Sudden Increases in Load



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*Staff Software Engineer*  
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
*Software Engineer*  
*Google*

## Agenda

- What is DoS attack
- HTTP2 Rapid Reset attack
- Effects on Envoy
- Mitigations
- Overload manager and the system

# What is DoS Attack



Requests per second by Metropolitan Area




Source: <https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/google-cloud-mitigated-largest-ddos-attack-peaking-above-398-million-rps>


- Multiple types of Denial of Service(DoS)
  - Protocol level
  - Application level
  - High Q/RPS
  - low-and-slow
- One High RPS example:
  - HTTP/2 Rapid Reset reached up to 400M RPS globally.

# Internals of HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Vulnerability



- 
1. Quickly create a lot of requests.
  2. Immediately delete them through `RST_STREAM`
  3. Repeat step 1
  4. `MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAM` will not work here
    - a. Account open and half close stream status

# Impact of CPU Exhaustion of Response Latency




- 200ms of response latency from a single Rapid Reset connection for a single worker thread Envoy.
- Latency impact is almost linear with the number of rapid reset connections.


✓nighthawk\_latency\_99\_microseconds ✓nighthawk\_latency\_95\_microseconds ✓nighthawk\_latency\_90\_microseconds ✓nighthawk\_latency\_50\_m

# From Bad to Worse

- Response latency of sidecar services is also impacted.



# From Bad to Worse



- Requests to sidecar services start to time out.
- Some side-car services are configured fail-open



- Improve fairness of sharing CPU across client connections.
  - **http.max\_requests\_per\_io\_cycle**
    - - limit number of requests processed from single TCP segment.
- Specific to Rapid Reset - detection of abusive connections that frequently reset new requests.
  - **overload.premature\_reset\_total\_stream\_count**
  - **overload.premature\_reset\_min\_stream\_lifetime\_seconds**

## Future Improvements


- CPU accounting per connection
  - Allow Overload Manager to throttle or close costly connections.
- Dynamically scaling worker count in response to load spikes.

Check that external authorization **does not fail open**.

# Highlight the Role of Overload Manger


- A large scale system can be scaled **Horizontally** and **Vertically**
  - It could take **O(Mins)** to scale horizontally.
  - We need to make sure our system healthy to scale, especially at beginning.
    - Load report, DoS feedback, etc.
  - The time when overload manger will take effect in **O(ms/s)**

Priority	Action	Time
1	Autoscaling of Envoys	O(mins)
2	Overload Manager Actions Load Shedding	O(ms/s)



# Sudden traffic spike can make LBs OOM

- Sudden increase of traffic can make CPU saturated
- And then it can continue to lead Out-of-Memory - **crashes!**
  - Event queue length increases due to saturated CPU
    - Delay overload manager actions
  - Small requests can amplify the memory effect in our LBs as well!
    - Cost is low for clients
    - Usually Envoy needs more work to process requests
      - Buffer / External RPC / Large Response



Amplified

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


## We're sorry...


... but your computer or network may be sending automated queries. To protect our users, we can't process your request right now.

See [Google Help](#) for more information.


# “Traditional” Overload Manager Actions




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


# “Proactive” Overload Manager Thread Model





# Proactive load shed points



# Load shed points in Envoy

1. tcp\_listener\_accept
2. http\_connection\_manager\_decode\_headers
3. http1\_server\_abort\_dispatch
4. http2\_server\_go\_away\_on\_dispatch
5. hcm\_ondata\_creating\_codec
6. Http\_downstream\_filter\_check
  - a. Http decoder filters
  - b. Router

More info can be found here

[https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/configuration/operations/overload\\_manager/overload\\_manager#overload-manager](https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/configuration/operations/overload_manager/overload_manager#overload-manager)

@kbaicho, @boteng

# Examples to config overload manager


```
1. refresh_interval:
2.     seconds: 0
3.     nanos: 250000000
```

```
1. resource_monitors:
2.     - name: "envoy.resource_monitors.container_memory"
3.       typed_config:
4.         "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.resource_monitors.container_memory
```

```
1. loadshed_points {
2.     name: "envoy.loadshed_points.tcp_listener_accept"
3.     triggers {
4.         name: "resource_monitors.container_memory"
5.         scaled {
6.             scaling_threshold: 0.8
7.             saturation_threshold: 0.9
8.         }
9.     }
10. }
```

- Consider configuring *envoy.load\_shed\_points.tcp\_listener\_accept*
- Make sure GOAWAY can be triggered for HTTP/2 and HTTP/3
  - We'd like to see a good portion of GOAWAY for a better connection load balancing between LB containers rather than most of them are 503 local reply
    - *http2\_server\_go\_away\_on\_dispatch*
    - *http\_connection\_manager\_decode\_headers*
- Consider dropping load around side streams
  - *http\_downstream\_filter\_check*

- Set a default value for *max\_requests\_per\_io\_cycle*
  - Mainly for HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 Multiplex Streams
  - To fairly use CPU cycles
  - Limit to **15 - 50** via Load test
- Set a value to *max\_connections\_to\_accept\_per\_socket\_event*
  - Envoy listener will by default accept many new connections as possible
  - It can be up to **15K** or more in a single I/O event
    - Envoy can run out of memory before the overload manager has a chance to react.
  - Increasing frequency of resource monitor polling is not sufficient with more cost.
  - Recommend **50 - 1000** with ignorable impact on the tail latency via Load test!
    - Metrics: [connections\\_accepted\\_per\\_socket\\_event](#)



- Examine the buffer size configuration
  - `tls_inspector` buffer size
    - - default 64KB -> reduce the amount of memory `tls_inspector` pre-allocates
  - Flow control as always
    - Listener limits
    - Cluster limits
    - H/2 Stream limits
  - Examine the customized buffer usage in your data-plane

- [How it works: The novel HTTP/2 'Rapid Reset' DDoS attack](#)
- Envoy Rapid Reset [CVE-2023-44487](#)
- [Google mitigated the largest DDoS attack to date, peaking above 398 million rps](#)
- [Envoy Overload Manager Doc](#)
- [Lightning Talk: Protecting Envoy: Overload Manager](#) by @kbaichoo

Thank you all for making Envoy more resilient

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Thank you & QA

