



AuthZEN: the "OIDC" of Authorization

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About Me



Dev Tech, Cloud, IAM, startups, skiing





















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Authentication != Authorization

Authentication

Authorization



Standards:







Developer services:











What can the user do in the context of this app?

Standards: ?

Developer services: ?



Broken Access Control: #1!!



- Bad security¹
- Inconsistency
- Opportunity cost







Authorization is finally having its moment...










Figure 2: Zanzibar architecture. Arrows indicate the direction of data flow.



Intuit AuthZ²



NETFLIX Product Access Service⁵



QCon plus NOVEMBER 01 - 12, 2021 PLUS.QCONFERENCES.COM

(1) https://research.google/pubs/pub48190/

(4) https://medium.com/building-carta/authz-cartas-highly-scalable-permissions-system-782a7f2c840f

(2) https://medium.com/intuit-engineering/authz-intuits-unified-dynamic-authorization-system-bea554d18f91

(5) https://www.infoq.com/presentations/authorization-scalability/

(3) https://medium.com/airbnb-engineering/himeji-a-scalable-centralized-system-for-authorization-at-airbnb-341664924574

Cloud-native authorization changes the game



Cloud-native "Old-school" Coarse-grained, tenant-level Fine-grained: resource-level Principle of WHAT least privilege permissions permissions **Policy-based**: authorization logic Authorization "spaghetti logic" Separation **HOW** embedded in the application extracted out of the application of duties Real-time: permissions evaluated Permissions evaluated at login time, Continuous WHEN enforcement scopes embedded in access token before granting access to resource





Fine-grained access control evolution



Access Control Lists: 1980's-1990's (UNIX, NT CACL)

Role-based Access Control: 1990's-2000's (LDAP, AD)

ACL

RBAC

Does Alice have read access to this file?

Is Bob in the sales-admin role?

Attribute-based Access Control: 2000's-2010's (XACML)

Relationship-based Access Control – 2020 (Zanzibar)

ABAC

ReBAC

Is Mallory in the sales department, is the document in the sales folder, and is it currently working hours in the US? Does Eve have read access to this document if she's in the sales group, the document is in the sales folder, and the sales group is in the "editor" relation on the sales folder?





Policy-based access management



Lift access control logic out of the application and into its own policy-as-code artifact

Policy written in Rego (Open Policy Agent / Topaz)

```
≣ post.rego ×
src > policies > __id > ≡ post.rego
       package peoplefinder.POST.api.users.__id
       default allowed = false
       default visible = true
       default enabled = true
       allowed {
         props = input.user.attributes.properties
 11
         props.department == "Operations"
 12
 13
       allowed {
         dir.is_manager_of(input.user.id, input.resource.id)
 15
 17
       enabled {
         allowed
 21
```

Application code uses middleware to call authz service

```
// use checkAuthz as middleware in the route dispatch path
app.get("/api/users", checkJwt, checkAuthz async (req, res) => {
    const users = await directory.getUsers(req);
    if (users) {
        res.status(200).send(users);
    } else {
        res.status(403).send('something went wrong');
    }
});
```

Store and version policy just like application code

Every policy change is part of a git changelog

Policy can be evolved by security team, decoupled from app

Policy can be built into an immutable image and signed (https://github.com/opcr-io/policy)





Real-time access checks




Done correctly, authorization is a <u>distributed systems problem</u>

Authorize locally

- Authorization is in the critical path of every application request
- Requires 100% availability at milliseconds of latency
- Must be deployed right next to the application / microservice
- Compute decision using cached policy, user, and resource data

Manage centrally

- Control plane manages policies, user directory, resource data
- Decision log collection and aggregation
- High-speed event and data fabric between control plane and edge








Cloud-native authorization: ecosystems, standards & OSS





Policy as data (ReBAC)





ALFA

2014



AuthZEN

2024



Zanzibar

2020

NGAC

2016









Casbin

















The AuthZEN Charter



https://openid.net/wg/authzen/ Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) Initial focus: PEP-PDP API Policy Decision Point (PDP) Follow-on: Event delivery Follow-on: Policy Discovery & Management Policy Information Point (PIP) Policy Administration Point (PAP)





AuthZEN 1.0 PEP-PDP Implementer's Draft (ratified today!)



https://openid.github.io/authzen/

```
"subject": {
  "type": "user",
  "id": "CiRm...2Fs"
},
"action": {
  "name": "can delete todo"
},
"resource": {
  "type": "todo",
  "id": "1"
  "properties": {
    "ownerID": "beth@the-smiths.com"
```



```
{
  "decision": true
}
```






First interop use-case: Todo application



https://authzen-interop.net/docs/scenarios/todo



Todo Application

This document lists the request and response payloads for each of the API requests in the Todo interop scenario.

TIP

This is a copy of the payload document defined by the AuthZEN WG. The definitive document can be found here.

Overview of the scenario

The Todo application manages a shared todo list between a set of users.

There are 5 actions that the Todo application supports, each with a permission associated with it:

Action	Permission
View a user's information	can_read_user
View all Todos	can_read_todos
Create a Todo	can_create_todo
(Un)complete a Todo	can_update_todo
Delete a Todo	can_delete_todo

There are four roles defined:

- viewer able to view the shared todo list (can_read_ their picture) (can_read_user)
- editor viewer + the ability to create new Todos (c. user
- admin editor + the ability to delete any Todos (car
- evil_genius editor + the ability to edit Todos that

There are 5 users defined (based on the "Rick & Morty" cart








Interop architecture & Demo



https://authzen-topaz-proxy.demo.aserto.com







Interoperable implementations as of Nov 2024



Compliant with: 1.1 Preview, 1.0 Implementers Draft, 1.0 Preview





















Compliant with: 1.0 Preview












Enforcement points



Zero-trust means defense-in-depth







What's Next?



Resource Search API: find all the resources that a subject can access Subject Search API: find all the subjects that can access a resource

Work with relying parties (Workday, SFDC, etc) to externalize authorization

Work with API Gateway vendors to wire AuthZEN into their products

Create additional interop scenarios

Add more implementations (especially ReBAC systems)

Pursue policy discovery/management and event delivery into PDP/PIP





Where to find us



Meeting notes & Design docs: https://hackmd.io/@oidf-wg-authzen

AuthZEN mailing list: https://openid.net/wg/authzen

GitHub: https://github.com/openid/authzen

OpenID Slack: #wg-authzen







Questions? Connect with me this week!



- Open Policy Containers: Project Pavilion 17B: Thu 1:30-5pm
- The Policy Engines Showdown: Fri 2pm

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The principles of cloud-native authorization



Fine-grained

Support a consistent model (RBAC, ABAC, ReBAC) that fits the application domain

Policy-based

Extract policy out of the app and into its own repo, and build into a signed image

Real-time

Authorization is a local call, executing over fresh user / resource data

Centrally managed

Policy and directory/resource data are centrally managed

Compliance & forensics

Decision logs are aggregated and stored centrally

Developer-centric

Authorization with a single line of code

Integrates easily

Identity providers, source code repos, artifact registries, logging systems, API gateways

Cloud-native and open

Ecosystem effects of using k8s-native technologies like Open Policy Agent, Topaz, OCI



