# Disobedience as a Mechanism of Change

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Introduction

## Aim and Scope

The social concept of disobedience can be used as a mechanism for adaptive and exploratory learning in norm-governed multi-agent systems.

# Disobedience in Society

- Disobedience has been used historically as a form of resistance and call for change in unfair regimes.
- Among the factors that motivate widespread disobedience are:
  - The iron law of oligarchy the tendency for a small group to emerge an run complex organisations for its own benefit, rather than the collective interest
  - Principled violation of policy law enforcement relaxation, with selective common-sense non-application of sanctions



Figure 1: Suffragette's in UK

## Disobedience as Learning Mechanism

- Can these notions be applied to norm-governed MAS?
- How to deal with systems with disfunctional norms?
- Can disobedience be a form of collective learning, enabling adaptive systems?



# **Base Premises and**

Operationalisation

## **Premises**

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- · P2 Compliance is an individual decision
- P3 Existence of monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms

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### · Disobedience Premises

- · P4 Fairness decays over time (corruption)
- · P5 Possibility of pardon by law enforcers

### · Transformation Premises

• P6 - Prescribed ruler destitution and new government formation

## Operationalisation








- Resource allocation scenario
- · Players and its roles:
  - · Rulers Resource allocation policy
  - · People Appropration of resource
  - Police Check if apppropriation = allocation

## Disobedience levels



## Learnable variables

Rulers:

 ${f U}$  - Corruption of allocation policy

$$U = f(time)$$

Police:

 $\mathbf{P_{forg}}$  - Probability of sanction pardon as function of perceived fairness


$$P_{forg} = f(\textit{fairness}) ~~ \textit{fairness} \sim \textit{Gini}(\textit{Satisf})$$


People:

 $\mathbf{P_{Cheat}}$  - Decision of compliance as reaction of system's feedback

$$P_{Cheat} = f(fairness_i) \qquad \begin{cases} \uparrow & \text{if sanctioned } \land \text{ unfair} \\ \downarrow & \text{if sanctioned } \land \text{ fair} \\ = & \text{if forgiven} \\ \uparrow & \text{if not caught} \\ \downarrow & \text{if compliant} \end{cases}$$


# Experimental Results





Without pardoning or reformation, People stay at the mercy of rulers, not having another rational choice than to obey, no matter how unfair is the current policy.


## Base Game




### Peace:




# Unjustified Disobedience:




## **Base Game**




## Exploitation:



## Oppresion:




# First Extension - Pardoning




Obedience is conditioned to unfairness level: If fair, agents obey; if unfair, tendency to non-compliance


Police validates justified norms disobedience, pardoning transgressions

# First Extension - Pardoning





### Revolution:






## Second Extension - Reformation - Reformation Cycles






- · Perpetual cycle of power change
- · Alternation of power and higher overall satisfaction.
- · Points out the need for post-revolution reconstruction.


## Second Extension - Reformation - Popular Control






Knowing the Reformation Threshold  $\mathcal{T}$ , unfairness is manipulated so Rulers please People with just enough resources so their disobedience remains in controlled levels.

# Second Extension - Reformation - Pragmatic Revolution





People disobey just enough to guarantee that satisfaction (and resource) is the same for all agents.



#### Final Remarks

- Disobedience as a tool for adaptive learning in norm-governed MAS
  - · Usual systems try to guarantee obedience, but not governance fairness
  - pardoning mechanisms justify disobedience as a revolutionary behaviour for justice restoration
  - Formal reformation mechanisms give power to non-Rulers and enables cycles of change
- · Open questions / Future work:
  - Can subjective terms as fairness, obedience, unjustified, revolution be defined in different ways?
  - What are the effects of limited or subjective knowledge of events? How interpersonal factors such as social influence, trust and misinformation could affect the system?
  - How to escape from simple system reformation and move towards post-revolution reconstruction?

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