

Disobedience as a Mechanism of Change

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Introduction

- **Disobedience** has been used historically as a form of resistance and call for change in unfair regimes.
- Among the factors that motivate widespread disobedience are:
 - **The iron law of oligarchy** - The tendency of rulers to change norms to their own benefit.
 - **Principled violation of policy** - Selective common-sense non-application of a sanction.

- Can these notions be applied to **norm-governed MAS**?
- Can disobedience be a form of **social learning**, enabling the construction of adaptive systems?
- How can those concepts enable **rule- or ruler-change** of corruptive systems?

Base Premises and Operationalisation


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- **Transformation Premises**
 - P6 - Prescribed ruler destitution

- **Rulers** - Resource Allocation Policy
- **Police** - Check if appropriation = allocation
- **People** - Appropriation of resource

Disobedience levels



- **Rulers** - U - Corruption of allocation policy
- **Police** - P_{cheat} - Decision of compliance as reaction of system's feedback (sanction, pardon, not caught)
- **People** - P_{forg} - Probability of pardon as function of perceived unfairness ($P_{Forg}=f(gini)$)

Conclusion

- The Principled Policy Violation (PVP) is a pertinent and advantageous mechanism in the development of norm-governed open systems;
- PVP enable solutions that are:
 - a. Cost effective;
 - b. Tolerant and resilient to accidents;
 - c. Adaptable to different scenarios and behaviour
 - d. Used as a tool of justice perception and policy justification
- Future steps:
 - Explore *externalities* associated to PVP (e.g. social capital, resentment, shame)
 - Investigate adaptable behaviour
 - PVP as mechanism of social change/revolution in unfair environments

- National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), Brazil;
- Diverse collaborators.



Thank you!