

DISCUSSION OF
"LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND THE
COST OF RECESSIONS"
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OVERVIEW

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
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- ▶ Focus on German experience post-Hartz reforms
- ▶ First discuss empirics, then quantitative exercise (won't cover everything, paper 111 pages...)


EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR HARTZ REFORMS: u

Unemployment Rate



Hartung, Jung, and Kuhn (2015)


EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR HARTZ REFORMS: δ , f




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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR HARTZ REFORMS: δ , f

(a) Separation rate




(b) Job finding rate



Hartung, Jung, and Kuhn (2015)

CONSISTENT WITH U.S. EVIDENCE ON UI CUTS



Hagedorn, Manovskii and Mitman (2015)

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 - ▶ UI, b : $c_u = b_{s,l}h$
 - ▶ JSA, x : $f(l, x; S)$
- ▶ Admits decomposition for welfare costs:

$$\Delta(\Omega_0, S_0) = \underbrace{\Delta_y(\Omega_0, S_0)}_{\text{Output}} + \underbrace{\Delta_r(\Omega_0, S_0)}_{\text{Risk}} + \underbrace{\Delta_l(\Omega_0, S_0)}_{\text{Effort}}$$

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- ▶ Introducing DMP-style labor market is a step in the right direction (why not benchmark?)
- ▶ Adding nominal rigidities could add further amplification and propagation (and maintain analytical tractability)

ENDOGENOUS FEEDBACK AND AMPLIFICATION

Negative shock (e.g., productivity)



Job-finding rate falls

Affected by UI/JSA


Affected by UI

Labor Demand ↓

Precautionary savings ↑

Affected by UI

Aggregate Demand falls ↓



FINANCIAL AUTARKY

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
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
- ▶ Lack of self-insurance means welfare costs likely upper bounds
- ▶ Further, self-insurance responds to changes in UI and JSA
- ▶ Differential long-run and short-run effects of changes to policy

ENDOGENOUS RESPONSE OF WEALTH DISTRIBUTION

High UI



Low UI



Krueger, Mitman and Perri (2016)

SUMMARY

- ▶ Nice paper
- ▶ New take on the welfare costs of recessions and how labor market policy affects them
- ▶ Admits a nice decomposition of the welfare costs
- ▶ Would like to see more internal propagation to fully evaluate the effects of UI/JSA