

DISCUSSION OF
"FINANCIAL FRAGILITY WITH SAM?"
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BI-SHOF 4th Annual Conference in
Asset Pricing and Financial Econometrics
June 4, 2018

WHAT THEY DO

- Evaluate effects of introducing **Shared Appreciation Mortgages** in a GE model with a financial sector

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- ▶ Key ingredients:
 - ▶ Three types of agents: borrowers, depositors, bankers
 - ▶ Idiosyncratic house-price risk, banker profit risk
 - ▶ Aggregate endowment risk, and housing preference shocks
 - ▶ Limited liability of bankers \Rightarrow government bailouts
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 - ▶ Bankers intermediate between borrowers and savers
- ▶ Model mortgages as nominal perpetuities:
 - ▶ Benchmark: No indexation
 - ▶ Consider various SAM mortgages

OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

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- ▶ What underlies the welfare results?
 - ▶ Indexation makes mortgages more costly
 - ▶ \Rightarrow lower demand for housing
 - ▶ \Rightarrow lower house prices
 - ▶ \Rightarrow lower (deadweight) housing maintenance costs

OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

- ▶ SAM indexed to aggregate house prices:
 - ▶ Reduces risk-sharing across agents
 - ▶ Has minimal effects on mortgage default
 - ▶ Increases bank default risk
 - ▶ Increases aggregate welfare
- ▶ SAM indexed to "local" house prices:
 - ▶ Improves risk-sharing
 - ▶ Significantly reduces mortgage default
 - ▶ Decreases bank default risk
 - ▶ Decreases aggregate welfare

WHAT IS A FINANCIAL RECESSION?

- ▶ Financial recession in the model driven by increase in variance of housing quality shock, ω and negative preference shock for housing ξ and drop in income.
 - ▶ House prices fall $\sim 8\%$
 - ▶ Foreclosure rate $3 - 4\%$
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- ▶ 2007-2010 mortgage "crisis":
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
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- ▶ 2007-2010 mortgage "crisis":
 - ▶ House prices fall 40%
 - ▶ Foreclosure rate 3 – 4%
 - ▶ LTV spikes 50%
- ▶ Is this the right way to think about what drives a crisis?
- ▶ Debt-financed bailout more contractionary than tax financed?

HOUSE PRICES AND QUALITY SHOCKS

- ▶ How much of default is driven by p_t vs ω_{it} ?
- ▶ Would be nice to unpack change in ω vs ξ
- ▶ Is local indexation better targeted or is it insuring a different kind of shock?
 - ▶ ω_{it} is a *permanent shock* to housing stock
 - ▶ p_t is mean reverting value of housing
- ▶ Clearly desirability (and ability) to insure ω shocks different than movements in p_t
- ▶ Is this how we should think about local vs aggregate house prices?


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- Given fixed housing stock, conjecture: rents must fall at least at much as prices in the financial recesssion...
- How should we interpret p_t dynamics with counterfactual ρ_t/p_t dynamics?

ASSET SPACE

- ▶ Housing is the only asset in positive net supply in the model
- ▶ Savers can only save through intermediated mortgages
- ▶ No capital in the economy, no government debt
 - ▶ Does this make savers consumption too sensitive to mortgage debt?
 - ▶ Does it make risk-free rate too sensitive to mortgage debt?
- ▶ How much is risk-sharing limited by the restriction on the asset space?
- ▶ To what extent can households already replicate some features of SAM mortgages through asset markets?

DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

- ▶ Limited heterogeneity in the model
 - ▶ Everyone is a homeowner
 - ▶ Borrowers have perfect consumption insurance against idiosyncratic risk
 - ▶ Foreclosure not really adverse event to household
 - ▶ Foreclosure doesn't depend on LTV

INDEXATION IN PRACTICE

- ▶ Given the availability of house price indices, why haven't we seen these contracts in practice?
- ▶ Authors implicitly assumed there exists a perfectly measured index for local house prices
- ▶ Hartman-Glaser & Hébert (2017) show that if:
 - ▶ Indices of a noisy measure of the risk households would like to hedge
 - ▶ Lenders have private information about the quality of the index
 - ▶ Lenders are risk-averse

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 - ▶ Lenders are risk-aversethen there is an equilibrium where all lenders offer non-contingent contracts.
- ▶ How predictive are local HPI for defaults? Liquidity effects? Idiosyncratic income risk?

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

- ▶ Very nice paper investigating SAM mortgages in GE
- ▶ Thought provoking results on financial fragility when indexing to aggregate house prices
- ▶ Clearly important to study in GE framework
- ▶ Look forward to seeing the next version