

DISCUSSION OF
“WHO BEARS THE COSTS OF INFLATION”
BY PALLOTT, PAZ-PARDO, SLACALEK, TRISTANI, AND
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6th Annual Research Conference
Banco de España, Madrid
November 23-24, 2023

QUICK SUMMARY OF THE PAPER

- ▶ Global surge of inflation post-COVID, Russian invasion of Ukraine
- ▶ Objective: measure welfare impacts across the distribution
- ▶ Simple framework to quantify different channels
- ▶ Focus on direct, indirect, fiscal policy
- ▶ Nice combination of theory, micro/macro data to tackle big policy question

THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

- ▶ Two-period, two-generation OLG model
- ▶ Period 0 is “short run”, unexpected shock happens:
 - ▶ Aggregate price level moves
 - ▶ Relative prices also move
- ▶ Period 1 is “long run”, basically flex price back in SS but:
 - ▶ Aggregate price level same as in period 0
 - ▶ Relative prices back to pre-shock

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DERIVING WELFARE COSTS

- ▶ Start with household Lagrangean
- ▶ Differentiate with respect to the shock
- ▶ To first order, gives money-metric welfare costs
- ▶ Analyze different components of the budget constraint:
 - ▶ Consumption basket/individual price indices
 - ▶ Wages and taxes/transfers
 - ▶ Short- and long-term bond holdings
 - ▶ Real assets and dividends

DIRECT AND INDIRECT WELFARE COSTS

$$d\mathcal{W}_i^{DIR} = \left(-\frac{d \log \bar{P}_0^\star}{dz_0} - \left[\frac{d \log P_{i0}^\star}{dz_0} - \frac{d \log \bar{P}_0^\star}{dz_0} \right] \right) \times \\ \left(W_{i0} - T_{i0} + B_{iS0} + (1 + Q_{L0}\delta) B_{iL0} + \sum_{k=1}^K D_{k0} a_{ik0} + \sum_{k=1}^K Q_{0k} (a_{i0k} - a_{i1k}) \right)$$

$$d\mathcal{W}_i^{IND} = \frac{d \log W_0}{dz_0} W_0 - \frac{d \log T_{i0}^{AUT}}{dz_0} T_{i0}^{AUT} - \frac{d \log Q_{S0}}{dz_0} Q_{S0} B_{S0} \\ - \frac{d \log Q_{L0}}{dz_0} Q_{L0} (B_{i,L1} - \delta B_{i,L0}) + \sum_{k=1}^K \left[\frac{d \log Q_{k0}}{dz_0} Q_{k0} (a_{i,k0} - a_{i,k1}) \right] \\ + \sum_{k=1}^K \left[\frac{d \log D_{k0}}{dz_0} D_{k0} a_{i,k0} \right]$$

COMMENTS ON THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

- ▶ Why are we doing this? If we could observe prices and expenditures at the HH level at higher frequency, we wouldn't need the additional machinery
- ▶ Model is very partial equilibrium:
 - ▶ Shock is to equilibrium prices
 - ▶ “GE” effects are observed changes to wages, taxes, etc
 - ▶ Distinction between direct/indirect/fiscal is more accounting than counterfactual
- ▶ A cleaner “direct effect” would be increase in price of energy, indirect effects through other prices, etc
- ▶ In general P_0 in equilibrium depends on fiscal policy, wages, etc
- ▶ Why OLG structure? Model and empirics don't line up

NON-LINEARITIES AND NON-HOMOTHETICITIES

- ▶ Is a first-order approach the right one for largest increase in prices in decades?
- ▶ Model very simple, in principle could be solved fully non-linearly
- ▶ Even a second-order approximation picks up additional welfare terms
- ▶ Robust evidence of non-homothetic preferences
- ▶ Non-homotheticity+higher order captures expenditure switching:
 - ▶ Due to income effects
 - ▶ Due to substitution effect
 - ▶ Due to preference shocks

ASSUMPTIONS 1 & 2

- ▶ Assumption 2: inflation is temporary, but prices permanent
- ▶ Assumption 3: shock is neutral in the long-run
- ▶ Would be interesting to explore other scenarios:
 - ▶ How different would welfare effects be under strict price targeting?
 - ▶ If some relative prices move because of preferences, different long-run relative prices
- ▶ In general, there's little discussion of monetary policy and what could (should?) have been done

MEASUREMENT: THE DEVIL'S IN THE DETAILS

- ▶ Ideally: we'd have high frequency data on all components of HH budget constraint
- ▶ Reality: have to use macro data to infer changes
- ▶ Given the data limitations, they're doing a careful job
- ▶ Already find a lot of heterogeneity across households, likely even more
- ▶ Small comment: use REIT regression for house prices, why not use BIS Residential Property Price database?

MEASUREMENT: “MORTGAGES”

- ▶ In the model, mortgages are essentially negative short term bond positions
- ▶ Bond prices taken as average of gov and corp
- ▶ Mortgages typically repaid at par not market price
- ▶ Fixed vs adjustable rate mortgages, model completely ignores any MP response and affect on mortgage payments
- ▶ Given that my guess is mortgages represent the majority of bond holdings for most households, trying to do that more carefully would be important

FINAL THOUGHTS

- ▶ Very nice paper
- ▶ Careful first stab at answering important welfare question
- ▶ Given data limitations, about as good as we can do
- ▶ Would be interesting to explore non-linearities and non-homotheticities
- ▶ Could also comment on monetary as well as fiscal policies