

Eksamensprojekt

Kursistnavn: XXXXXX XXXXX

Kursistnummer: XXXXXX

Fag	Niveau	Vejleder
Samfundsfag	B	XXXXXX XXXXX
Historie	B	XXXXXX XXXXX

I henhold til Eksamensbekendtgørelsens § 20, stk. 5

”Jeg bekræfter herved med min underskrift, at opgavebesvarelsen er udarbejdet af mig. Jeg har ikke anvendt tidligere bedømt arbejde uden henvisning hertil, og opgavebesvarelsen er udfærdiget uden anvendelse af uretmæssig hjælp og uden brug af hjælpemidler, der ikke har været tilladt under prøven”

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19-Nov-2018

Dato

Underskrift kursist

Opgaven afleveres via mail til ep@kvuc.dk senest den 20. november 2018 kl. 08:00.

Opgaven må kun afleveres ÈN GANG

Emne

FN's fredsbevaring under folkemordet i Rwanda samt FN's svagheder ved konflikter

Indledning

Folkedrabet i Rwanda var resultatet af en social og politisk kamp om magt og ressourcer. Grobunden blev lagt allerede i tiden under de belgiske koloniherrer. Op til folkedrabet blev myter og fjendebilleder reproduceret, og propaganda brugt til at sprede frygt og mistro. FN-soldaterne i Rwanda var slet ikke udrustet til at håndtere et folkedrab.

Problemformulering

- **Hvilken rolle spillede FN for fredsbevaring under folkedrabet i Rwanda?**

Underspørgsmål

1. **Hvad er realisme og idealisme og hvordan hænger det sammen med FN's opbygning? Hvad skete der i Rwanda i 1994?**
2. **Hvordan klarede FN sig i forhold til deres formål om fredsbevaring i Rwanda?**
3. **Hvorfor står FN ofte magtesløse overfor konflikter?**

Empiri, metode og teori

Materialet er 2 officielle dokumenter fra USA og FN i Rwanda, skrevet før og samtidigt med folkemordet så man kan få et indblik i beslutningstagningen indefra, under folkemordet. Som metode har jeg derfor brugt historiefagets kildekritik til at fortolke folkemordets historiske virkelighed. I forbindelse med samfundsfag beskriver jeg først teorier om IP. Teorierne er relevante fordi de beskriver hvorfor det kan tage tid at blive enige om fredsbevarende operationer. Fordelene ved metoderne er at man kan gå i dybden og undersøge hvad der skete igennem officielle kilder, men de er selvfølgelig for få til at kunne drage den mest fyldestgørende konklusion. Desuden ville kvantitativt data og kvalitative undersøgelser også give et dybere indblik i FN's arbejde i Rwanda.

Hvad er realisme og idealisme og hvordan hænger det sammen med FN's opbygning? Hvad skete der i Rwanda i 1994?

To tilgange til folkeret og international politik

- **Idealisme**

Værdibaseret, menneskeheden er universelt fællesskab, samarbejde, international retsorden

- **Folkeforbundet**; opgive ret til at erklære krig, sikre fred og løse lokale konflikter, begrænsning af westfalsk princip (stateres suverænitet, ikke indblanding i andres anliggender) Medlemslande bakkede ikke op om systemet de havde besluttet. **(Jacobsen, 2008)**

- **Realisme**

Fokus på magt- og interesseanalyser, politik og ret baseret på aftaler, stater kæmper for egeninteresser og afgiver ikke magt, westfalsk system **(Jacobsen, 2008)**

- **FN**; westfalsk, fastholdelse af stormagter vha. særprivilegier (veto ret) i sikkerhedsrådet

- **Folkedrab i Rwanda**

1994 maj-juli ca. 800.000 tutsier og moderate hutuer dræbt af ekstremistiske hutuer og medløbere **(Studier, 2018)**. FN tropperne havde mandat VI og ikke VII som gjorde at de ikke kunne gøre meget aktivt.

Hvordan klarede FN sig i forhold til deres formål om fredsbevaring i Rwanda?

- Kilde 1

Kontekst:

1900 – Belgisk kolonimagt og katolsk kirke skaber elite af tutsier, brugt til at regere og undertrykke befolkningsflertallet, hutuerne.

1950'erne - Rwanda på vej mod uafhængighed. Kolonimagten vurderede, at tutsierne regnes for en trussel på grund af kommunistiske tendenser og støttede derfor hutuerne. (Bjørnlund, 2018)

1990 - Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (tutsier), invaderer Rwanda fra Uganda

1993 - Præsident Habyarimana underskriver magtdelingsaftale med tutsierne. Tegn på afslutning af borgerkrig – FN tropper

Kildetype: Officiel FN Fax. **Afsender:** Dallaire, UNAMIR, Kigali **Modtager:** FN's afdeling for fredsbevarende operationer. **Nedskrevet:** 11. 01. 1994 samtidig, førstehåndskilde

Indhold: Jean-Pierre, lokale kilde informerer at hutu-militsen planlægger at udrydde tutsi-befolkning og at myrde belgiske FN-soldater for at skræmme UNAMIR ud af landet (**Brun, 1997**)
"Deputies were to be assassinated upon entry or exit from Parliament [...] a number of them [Belgian troops] were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda. [...] Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis." (**Dallaire, 1994**)

Formål: Informant beder om tilflugtssted og beskyttelse til sin familie for at fortsætte med at levere informationer om våbenlagre og om at et folkemord er på vej.

New York svarer benægtende uden at konsultere Sikkerhedsrådet. De havde ikke VII mandat.

Tendens: Officielt dokument, Rwandisk og FN synspunkt

Troværdighed: Høj, information skete som forudset, dokument findes mange steder, samtidig

Kilden belyser: FN advaret 3 måneder inden folkedrabet, men greb ikke ind, mistro over for kilden

- Kilde 2

Kontekst: 7. april 1994 - 10 belgiske FN-soldater dræbt. Belgien trak resten af deres soldater ud.

Ca. 6 måneder før blev 18 amerikanske FN soldater dræbt i Somalia, USA vil ikke risikere flere tab.

6. maj – flystyrt med Rwandas præsident og start på massedrab. (**Bøgh, 2013**)

Pressen og offentligheden er begyndt at spørge om det der sker i Rwanda er folkemord.

Kildetype: Handlings memorandum/notat

Afsender: Amerikanske embedsmænd; George E. Moose og John Shattuck, Douglas J. Bennet, Conrad K. Harper

Modtager: Amerikansk udenrigsminister Christopher Warren

Nedskrevet: 21-05-1994, samtidigt

Indhold: En diskussion hvorvidt der sker et folkemord i Rwanda, og om USA skal sige de er enige med FN dokumenter som skildrer at der sker folkemordshandlinger i Rwanda

"L believes that there is a strong basis to conclude that some of the killings and other listed acts carried out against Tutsis have been committed with the intent of destroying the Tutsi ethnic group in whole or in part." – FN's definition på Folkemord

"A USG statement that acts of genocide have occurred would not have any particular legal consequences." (**Moose, Shattuck, Bennet, & Harper, 1994**)

Formål: Sende svar til statssekretæren, så USA kan formulere offentligt og i FN at der sker folkemordshandlinger i Rwanda

Tendens: Officielt dokument, USA's stormagts synspunkt

Troværdighed: Høj, de siger det de skriver, dokument findes mange steder, samtidig

Kilden belyser: USA har information om folkemordshandlinger i Rwanda, men sendte ikke styrker

Hvorfor står FN ofte magtesløse overfor konflikter? Hvordan kan man ændre det?

- **Tungt og bureaukratisk system (Arrouas, 2010)**
- **Væbnet fredsbevaring vil ikke ske i store stater (Jacobsen, 2008)**
- **Westfalsk princip**

Svært for sikkerhedsrådet at beslutte intervention – forskellige prioriteringer, indblanding i suveræne staters anliggender strider imod princip – Især Rusland og Kina (**Jacobsen, 2008**)

+ 5 veto lande – ikke demokratisk

- **USA bidrager til FN's budget med 22 % (Arrouas, 2010)** - påvirke beslutninger
- **Selviske motiver bag intervention** - i stedet for at fremme fred og beskytte befolkning - opretholde strategiske, magtpolitiske interesser (**Jacobsen, 2008**)

- Frankrig maj 1994 foreslår at sende FN soldater.

Frankrig havde forsynet hutu-hæren med våben og træning, ydet dem assistance mod RPF's angreb i 1990. RPF fra engelsksprogede Uganda, trussel mod Frankrigs indflydelsessfære. 5 i Sikkerhedsrådet undlod at stemme. (**Wonsild, 2018**)

Konklusion

FN havde potentialet til at spille en stor rolle for fredsbevaringen under folkemordet i Rwanda. Desværre tog det medlemslandene alt for lang tid om at blive enige om en fredsbevarende strategi, blandt andet fordi landene har forskellige tilgange til internationalt samarbejde, altså idealistisk eller realistisk, samt mistro overfor staters intentioner bag interventioner og de 5 staters udemokratiske veto ret. Kilderne viser at FN allerede var blevet advaret og havde modtaget information om folkemordet, men vælger så vidt muligt at undgå at handle, med pres fra USA, som ville undgå at bruge ordet folkemord. Der mangler stadig svar på hvorfor der ikke blev handlet i tide. Dette er vigtigt at undersøge for at forbedre nuværende og fremtidig fredsarbejde.

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Jacobsen, A. F. (2008). *Menneskerettigheder, demokrati og retssamfund*. København: Gyldendal.

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DATE: 11 JANUARY 1994

HR 47

TO: BARIL\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLANNE UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE-212-963-9852 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT	
ATTN: NGEN BARIL	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2	

1. FORCE COMMANDER PUT IN CONTACT WITH INFORMANT BY VERY VERY IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POLITICIAN. INFORMANT IS A TOP LEVEL TRAINER IN THE CADRE OF INTERHAMWE-ARMED MILITIA OF MRND.
2. HE INFORMED US HE WAS IN CHARGE OF LAST SATURDAYS DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH AIMS WERE TO TARGET DEPUTIES OF OPPOSITION PARTIES COMING TO CEREMONIES AND BELGIAN SOLDIERS. THEY HOPED TO PROVOKE THE RPF BN TO ENGAGE (BEING FIRED UPON) THE DEMONSTRATORS AND PROVOKE A CIVIL WAR. DEPUTIES WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON ENTRY OR EXIT FROM PARLIAMENT. BELGIAN TROOPS WERE TO BE PROVOKED AND IF BELGIANS SOLDIERS RESORTED TO FORCE A NUMBER OF THEM WERE TO BE KILLED AND THUS GUARANTEE BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA.
3. INFORMANT CONFIRMED 48 RGF PARA CDO AND A FEW MEMBERS OF THE GENDARMERIE PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS IN PLAIN CLOTHES. ALSO AT LEAST ONE MINISTER OF THE MRND AND THE SOUS-PREFECT OF KIGALI WERE IN THE DEMONSTRATION. RGF AND INTERHAMWE PROVIDED RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.
4. INFORMANT IS A FORMER SECURITY MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT. HE ALSO STATED HE IS PAID RF150,000 PER MONTH BY THE MRND PARTY TO TRAIN INTERHAMWE. DIRECT LINK IS TO CHIEF OF STAFF RGF AND PRESIDENT OF THE MRND FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT.
5. INTERHAMWE HAS TRAINED 1700 MEN IN RGF MILITARY CAMPS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. THE 1700 ARE SCATTERED IN GROUPS OF 40 THROUGHOUT KIGALI. SINCE UNAMIR DEPLOYED HE HAS TRAINED 300 PERSONNEL IN THREE WEEK TRAINING SESSIONS AT RGF CAMPS. TRAINING

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FOCUS WAS DISCIPLINE, WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, CLOSE COMBAT AND TACTICS.

6. PRINCIPAL AIM OF INTERHAMWE IN THE PAST WAS TO PROTECT KIGALI FROM RPF. SINCE UNAMIR MANDATE HE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO REGISTER ALL TUTSI IN KIGALI. HE SUSPECTS IT IS FOR THEIR EXTERMINATION. EXAMPLE HE GAVE WAS THAT IN 20 MINUTES HIS PERSONNEL COULD KILL UP TO 1000 TUTSIS.

7. INFORMANT STATES HE DISAGREES WITH ANTI-TUTSI EXTERMINATION. HE SUPPORTS OPPOSITION TO RPF BUT CANNOT SUPPORT KILLING OF INNOCENT PERSONS. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE FULL CONTROL OVER ALL ELEMENTS OF HIS OLD PARTY\FACTION.

8. INFORMANT IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE LOCATION OF MAJOR WEAPONS CACHE WITH AT LEAST 135 WEAPONS. HE ALREADY HAS DISTRIBUTED 110 WEAPONS INCLUDING 35 WITH AMMUNITION AND CAN GIVE US DETAILS OF THEIR LOCATION. TYPE OF WEAPONS ARE G3 AND AK47 PROVIDED BY RGF. HE WAS READY TO GO TO THE ARMS CACHE TONIGHT-IF WE GAVE HIM THE FOLLOWING GUARANTEE: HE REQUESTS THAT HE AND HIS FAMILY (HIS WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN) BE PLACED UNDER OUR PROTECTION.

9. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN THE NEXT 36 HOURS WITH A POSSIBLE 8 HR. OF WEDNESDAY AT DAWN (LOCAL). INFORMANT STATES THAT HOSTILITIES MAY COMMENCE AGAIN IF POLITICAL DEADLOCK ENDS. VIOLENCE COULD TAKE PLACE DAY OF THE CEREMONIES OR THE DAY AFTER. THEREFORE WEDNESDAY WILL GIVE GREATEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND ALSO BE MOST TIMELY TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT INPUT TO ON-GOING POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.

10. IT IS RECOMMENDED THE INFORMANT BE GRANTED PROTECTION AND EVACUATED OUT OF RWANDA. THIS HQ DOES NOT HAVE PREVIOUS UN EXPERIENCE IN SUCH MATTERS AND URGENTLY REQUESTS GUIDANCE. NO CONTACT HAS AS YET BEEN MADE TO ANY EMBASSY IN ORDER TO INQUIRE IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROTECT HIM FOR A PERIOD OF TIME BY GRANTING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN THEIR EMBASSY IN KIGALI BEFORE MOVING HIM AND HIS FAMILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

11. FORCE COMMANDER WILL BE MEETING WITH THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON TOMORROW MORNING IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL IS CONSCIOUS OF ALL PARAMETERS OF HIS INVOLVEMENT. FORCE COMMANDER DOES HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON THE SUDDENNESS OF THE CHANGE OF HEART OF THE INFORMANT TO COME CLEAN WITH THIS INFORMATION. RECCE OF ARMED CACHE AND DETAILED PLANNING OF RAID TO GO ON LATE TOMORROW. POSSIBILITY OF A TRAP NOT FULLY EXCLUDED, AS THIS MAY BE A SET-UP AGAINST THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON. FORCE COMMANDER TO INFORM SRSG FIRST THING IN MORNING TO ENSURE HIS SUPPORT.

13. PEUX CE QUE VEUX: ALLONS-Y.

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ACTION MEMORANDUM MAY 20 10:40
S/S MAY 21 P6:05

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DECL:OADR DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Mr. Tarnoff
G - Mr. Wirth
FROM: AF - George E. Moose
DRL - John Shattuck
IO - Douglas J. Bennet
L - Conrad K. Harper

SUBJECT: Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?

ISSUES FOR DECISION

Whether (1) to authorize Department officials to state publicly that "acts of genocide have occurred" in Rwanda and (2) to authorize U.S. delegations to international meetings to agree to resolutions and other instruments that refer to "acts of genocide" in Rwanda, state that "genocide has occurred" there or contain other comparable formulations. (A resolution posing this issue is expected at the May 24-25 Special Session of the UN Human Rights Commission).

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Events in Rwanda have led to press and public inquiries about whether genocide has occurred there. In light of the stark facts in Rwanda (see INR's analysis, Tab 1) and L's legal analysis (Tab 2), we believe that Department officials should be authorized to state the Department's conclusion that "acts of genocide have occurred" in Rwanda. This is the same formulation that we use with respect to Bosnia.

A Special Session of the UN Human Rights Commission will meet May 24-25 in Geneva to consider the human rights situation in Rwanda. The U.S. delegation will press for a strong

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resolution condemning the violence and calling for action, including the appointment of a Special Rapporteur. We expect other delegations to seek language in the resolution that condemns events in Rwanda as "genocide." We believe that U.S. delegations to such international meetings should be authorized to agree to resolutions and other instruments that provide that "genocide" or "acts of genocide" have occurred in Rwanda, or contain other formulations that indicate that some, but not necessarily all, of the violence in Rwanda is "genocide" within the meaning of the 1948 Genocide Convention. (In the case of Bosnia, we have shown flexibility in international fora, e.g., the World Conference on Human Rights, where we joined in a consensus statement that genocide is "taking place" in Bosnia).

DISCUSSION

As defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention, the crime of "genocide" occurs when certain acts are committed against members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group with the intent of destroying that group in whole or in part. Among the relevant acts are killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction of the group. In addition, conspiracy, direct and public incitement and attempts to commit genocide, as well as complicity in genocide, are offenses under the Convention.

INR's assessment of relevant activities in Rwanda since the April 6 crash of the airplane carrying the Rwandan President is attached (Tab 1). I believe (Tab 2) that there is a strong basis to conclude that some of the killings and other listed acts carried out against Tutsis have been committed with the intent of destroying the Tutsi ethnic group in whole or in part. Moreover, there is evidence that some persons in Rwanda have incited genocide or have been complicit in genocide, which would also constitute offenses under the Convention.

A USG statement that acts of genocide have occurred would not have any particular legal consequences. Under the Convention, the prosecution of persons charged with genocide is the responsibility of the competent courts in the state where the acts took place or an international penal tribunal (none has yet been established); the U.S. has no criminal jurisdiction over acts of genocide occurring within Rwanda unless they are committed by U.S. citizens or they fall under another criminal provision of U.S. law (such as those relating to acts of terrorism for which there is a basis for U.S. jurisdiction).

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Although lacking in legal consequences, a clear statement that the USG believes that acts of genocide have occurred could increase pressure for USG activism in response to the crisis in Rwanda. We believe, however, that we should send a clear signal that the United States believes that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda. If we do not seize the opportunity presented by fora such as the UNHRC to use the genocide label to condemn events in Rwanda, our credibility will be undermined with human rights groups and the general public, who may question how much evidence we can legitimately require before coming to a policy conclusion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you authorize Department officials to state publicly that "acts of genocide have occurred" in Rwanda (all bureaus support).

Approve ✓ (WC) 5/21/94 Disapprove

That you authorize U.S. delegations to the UN Human Rights Commission and other international fora to agree to resolutions and other instruments that refer to "acts of genocide" in Rwanda, state that "genocide has occurred" there or contain other comparable formulations (all bureaus support).

Approve ✓ (WC) 5/21/94 Disapprove
MC.

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - INR Memorandum
- Tab 2 - Legal Analysis

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