Matchmaking Strategies for Maximizing Player Engagement in Video Games

Mingliu Chen

Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027,
mingliu.chen@columbia.edu

Adam N. Elmachtoub

Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research & Data Science Institute, Columbia University, New York,
NY 10027, adam@ieor.columbia.edu

Xiao Lei

Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027,
xl2625@columbia.edu

Managing player engagement is an important problem in the video game industry, as many games generate revenue via subscription models and microtransactions. We consider a class of online video games whereby players are repeatedly matched by the game to compete against one another. Players have different skill levels which affect the outcomes of matches, and the win-loss record influence their willingness to remain engaged. The goal is to maximize the overall player engagement over time by optimizing the dynamic matchmaking strategy. We propose a general but tractable framework to solve this problem, which can be formulated as an infinite linear program. We then focus on a stylized model where there are two skill levels and players churn only when they experience a losing streak. The optimal policy always matches as many low-skilled players who are not at risk of churning to high-skilled players who are one loss away from churning. In some scenarios when there are too many low-skilled players, high-skilled players are also matched to low-skilled players that are at risk of churning.

Regarding the power of the optimal policy, we compare it to the industry status quo that matches players with the same skill level together (skill-based matchmaking). We prove the benefit of optimizing the matchmaking system grows linearly with the number of skill levels. We then use our framework to analyze two common but controversial interventions to increase engagement: adding AI bots and a pay-to-win system. We show that optimal matchmaking may reduce the number of bots needed significantly without loss of engagement. The pay-to-win system can influence player engagement positively when the majority of players are low-skilled. Surprisingly, even non-paying low-skilled players may be better off in some scenarios. Finally, we conduct a case study with real data from an online chess platform. We show the optimal policy can improve engagement by 4-6% or reducing the percentage of bot players by 15% in comparison to skill-based matchmaking.

Key words: matchmaking; video games; user retention; customer lifetime value

1.   Introduction

As of 2020, the global revenue of the gaming industry surged about 20% compared to 2019, and was estimated at $180 billion dollars (Witkowski 2020). One large sector in the video game industry is online competitive games, where players play against one another in matches (one-on-one or in teams). In 2020, online competitive games *PUBG: Mobile* and *Honors of Kings* earned $2.6 and $2.5 billion dollars revenue respectively, which were the most among all mobile games (Verma 2020). Both games (and many others) adopt the idea of games-as-a-service (GaaS) and provide the game content on a "continuing revenue model". These games are usually free-to-play, and the revenue comes from in-game advertisements, microtransactions for virtual items, and subscriptions for seasonal premium passes (sometimes referred to as "battle passes", which offers premium content for subscribers). Managing player engagement is crucial for such free-to-play games, because the total revenue is directly tied to the amount of active players. In the gaming industry, daily active users (DAU) or concurrent users (CCU) are used as key performance indicators, and a high DAU/CCU indicates good product performance in general.

Player engagement can be affected by many factors, such as game content, game mechanics, and user interfaces. Apart from these features, which are determined before the game's release, an important factor that influences engagement in competitive video games is how the players are matched together. The matchmaking system determines with whom a player plays against in each match, which directly affects the outcome of the current match and indirectly influences the future engagement behavior of the players. Chen et al. (2017b) and Huang et al. (2019) both documented that the outcomes of the matches, either receiving wins/losses or scores, have significant impact on engagement. Industry practitioners have also recognized the potential of matchmaking as a tool to improve engagement.[1] The status quo is called *skill-based matchmaking* (SBMM), which simply matches by trying to find an opponent with the closest skill level (Park 2021) and ignores the outcomes of previous matches. Since data is easily available, video game companies have begun exploration on how to leverage matchmaking system to improve player engagement (thereby increasing revenue). For example, Electronics Arts have filed a patent for an engagement-oriented matchmaking system, which largely follows Chen et al. (2017b).[2] Although they recognize the dynamic nature of the problem, their patent is based on a static one-shot model. *In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of dynamic matchmaking in video games and explore the value of optimal matchmaking on long-term player engagement.*

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[1] Josh Menke, a former lead engagement designer for the popular game *Halo 5*, said that "Matchmaking guarantees gameplay experience as intended, and prevents disengagement when possible". (`https://www.gdcvault.com/play/1026588/Matchmaking-for-Engagement-Lessons-from`)

[2] `https://www.pcgamesn.com/ea-matchmaking-microtransactions-eomm-engagement-patent`

In addition to selecting matching partners, video game companies also influence the matchmaking system through other ways. One controversial way is to add AI-powered bots into the matchmaking pool. Different from traditional bots for tutorials or training, AI-powered bots imitate real human players in competitive games and players are not notified when they are matched with a bot. Many competitive games are suspected to have a high bot ratio (Gelbart 2021), although only a few games such as *Fortnite* publicly confirmed the existence of bots in human matches.[3] Such practices are actually double-edged swords. On one hand, the outcome of a match with bots can be easily controlled, because bots can either make intentional mistakes at clutch times, or outperform human players significantly as needed (especially in games that require quick reactions). Thus, AI-powered bots may influence player engagement positively by manipulating the match outcomes properly. On the other hand, bots can be clumsy or predictable at times and often recognized by human players after repetitive encounters. Players are not happy when they intend to compete with other human players but find out that they are frequently in a match with bots. Players who have made in-game purchases and want to use (and parade) them on other players instead of bots can be particularly upset about this.

Another controversial practice is to introduce a *pay-to-win system* (PTW). For competitive games, PTW allows players to improve their competence by paying real currency. For example, the popular competitive game *Dota 2* offers a subscription service called "Dota Plus". At the start of each match, ten players pick their characters one by one, and then paying players receive analytical suggestions on which character to pick based on the existing picks of others and winrate data from recent weeks. Moreover, during the match, paying players receive data-driven suggestions on items to buy and skills to learn, as well as information that is not available to regular players. Such information may not be necessary for professional players, but it provides substantial help to most amateur players. While PTW provides direct revenue, it is not hard to imagine that PTW may also influence player engagement of both payers and non-payers, which influences the overall revenue associated with engagement. The interplay between PTW and the matchmaking system also matters, because the existence of PTW may change the optimal matchmaking policy. The benefits of PTW have not been previously studied when taking player engagement and matchmaking policies into account. In practice, the value of either AI-powered bots or PTW is hard to evaluate through field experiments since the impact is confounded with the matchmaking policies. We provide a theoretical analysis to analyze the value of such strategies in the context of matchmaking.

In this work, we propose a novel infinite-horizon dynamic program where the goal is to maximize the cumulative active players, which is our metric for engagement. In each period, the game decides

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[3] https://www.epicgames.com/fortnite/en-US/news/matchmaking-bots-controls-and-the-combine-update

who to match with one another. We assume that players can have heterogeneous skill levels, and their state depends on the win-loss outcomes of the most recent past matches. To derive sharp characterizations and managerial insights, we focus on a stylized baseline model with two skill levels and players churn (quit) only when they experience a losing streak. Below we provide a summary of our contributions and findings.

(1) We fully characterize the optimal dynamic policy under the baseline model. The optimal policy always matches as many low-skilled players who are not at risk of churning to high-skilled players who are one loss away from churning, in order to keep the latter in the system and increase the overall engagement. In some scenarios when there are too many low-skilled players, high-skilled players can also be matched to low-skilled players that are at risk of churning.

(2) We then discuss the value of optimal matchmaking over the traditional skill-based matchmaking (SBMM). We find that under the baseline model, the value of optimal matchmaking can be up to 1.5 times of SBMM, and this ratio is tight. However, when we extend the baseline model to multiple skill levels, the advantage of the optimal policy over skill-based matchmaking grows linearly with the number of skill levels.

(3) Next, we investigate the value of optimizing the matchmaking system in presence of AI-powered bots. We show that a platform using SBMM with a relatively small bot ratio can potentially not use bots at all if they transition to an optimal matchmaking policy. On the other hand, when the bot usage is high (implying the bots have evolved to a very sophisticated state), then the gap between the optimal and SBMM policies vanishes.

(4) We then consider the interplay between PTW strategies and the matchmaking system. We find that contrary to the conventional wisdom that PTW is simply to increase revenue, it can also be an effective lever to change the distribution of player states and increase engagement. Surprisingly, even the non-paying low-skilled players may be better off in some scenarios. The potential positive externality on player engagement may transform the public perception of PTW strategies.

(5) Finally, we conduct a case study with data from Lichess (a large online chess platform) to validate our findings. After fitting a player behavior model within our framework, we show that the optimal policy may improve engagement by 4-6% over SBMM. Also, the optimal policy may reduce the bot ratio by 15% while maintaining the same level of engagement as SBMM when the bot ratio is less than 30%.

1.1.   Literature Review

Our work contributes to the emerging literature on operations management in video games. Closest to our work, Chen et al. (2017b) and Huang et al. (2019) also investigate the problem of maximizing

player engagement in video games through matchmaking. Chen et al. (2017b) proposes a model that estimates the churn risk of every pair of possible matches through logistic regression, and myopically minimize the churn risk in the next round. Their numerical study considers one-period problems, and shows 0.7% improvement over SBMM in one period. On the other hand, Huang et al. (2019) estimates user engagement with a hidden Markov model and propose a heuristic algorithm that assigns a selected player to one of the pre-specified candidate matches (assuming all the other players are fixed). In contrast, our paper investigates how to optimally solve the dynamic matchmaking problem through a fluid model, taking both the myopic reward as well as the long-term player engagement into account. We also explicitly solve for the optimal policy in special cases, and provide insights on how the policy looks. Our new framework also enables us to analytically investigate the value of optimal dynamic matchmaking, AI-powered bots, as well as a pay-to-win system.

Aside from matchmaking, several papers in this field consider the monetization of video games. For example, Sheng et al. (2020) considers the problem of incentivizing ad-clicking actions in freemium games. Chen et al. (2020) considers how to optimally price and design 'loot boxes', which is a popular randomized selling scheme for virtual items in video games. Mai and Hu (2021) considers the introduction and pricing of premium content in freemium games. Jiao et al. (2021) considers whether the seller should disclose an opponent's skill level when selling PTW items. Our paper also investigates PTW, but is different in several ways: first, we assume that PTW is a subscription service, which is not dependent on specific matches. Second, instead of player's utility for a single match, we focus on the player's lifetime engagement. Finally, our model enables us to check the joint value of PTW with the optimal matchmaking policy. Apart from monetization, there are increasing interests in the design of video games. Hanguir et al. (2021) recently considers an interesting problem on how to design the loadouts in the game to maximize the diversity of the strategies. Li et al. (2021) considers how to maximize player utility by sequencing game elements in a level.

Our work also connects to the growing literature on managing user engagement and user lifetime value dynamically in a service system. In such systems, the revenue is usually proportional to the amount of cumulative active users, and users' subscription behavior is based on the service history up to date. Aflaki and Popescu (2014) considers how to maximize user engagement by dynamically adjusting the service quality. Kanoria et al. (2018) considers how a fund manager should switch between risk mode and safe mode to maximize customer lifetime value. Bernstein et al. (2020) and Caro and Martínez-de Albéniz (2020) considers how a content provider (e.g., video streaming services) could maximize the subscription revenue by dynamically changing their content. Our work contributes to this field by considering how to manage user retention with dynamic matchmaking

in video games. While the decision variable in most of the above papers is a single variable (service quality or service mode), the decision in our paper is multi-dimensional (matchmaking flows), which brings fundamentally new technical challenges and insights.

More broadly, our work relates to dynamic decision making when players have memory of the decision history. Research in this field have considered dynamic pricing with reference effects (Popescu and Wu 2007, Hu et al. 2016, Chen et al. 2017a), dynamic capacity allocation with customer memory effects (Adelman and Mersereau 2013), network revenue management with repeated customer interactions (Calmon et al. 2020), improving matching rates in dating markets (Ríos et al. 2020), and dynamic personalized pricing with service quality variability (DeCroix et al. 2021). When customer preferences are not fully specified, Bastani et al. (2018) and Cao et al. (2019) consider how to learn customer preferences on the fly in the context of product recommendation or promotion, with the risk that customers may leave the system permanently upon consecutive bad decisions. In our work, user churn decision depends on the outcomes of the most recent previous matches.

Finally, our work contributes to the broad literature of dynamic matching. Here we only review papers where agents may only stay in the system for certain periods before leaving. Ashlagi et al. (2019) provides an approximation algorithm for a setting where customers will stay a fixed number of periods before leaving. Aouad and Saritaç (2020) propose approximate algorithms for dynamic matching over edge-weighted graphs, where the arrival and abandonment of agents are stochastic. Hu and Zhou (2020) considers dynamic matching over a bipartite graph, with finite types of nodes on both sides. Unmatched supply and demand may incur waiting or holding costs, and will be partially carried over to the next period. Our paper considers dynamic matching with finite types of players in a fluid model (see, e.g., Azevedo and Leshno 2016) and their churn risk evolves dynamically based on outcomes of past matches.

2. Model and Preliminaries

We now present our model of a matchmaking system for a 1-versus-1 competitive video game. In Section 2.1, we describe the player behavior, and then introduce the engagement maximization problem in Section 2.2.

2.1. Player Behavior

We assume that each player has a skill level that describes their relative competence in the game. There are K ordered skill levels, where level 1 is the lowest level and level K is the highest. For each match, exactly one of the two players will be the winner, and the outcome of a game is either a win or a loss (no draw). The outcome of a match is a Bernoulli random variable depending on the skill levels of the two players. Let p_{kj} be the winrate of a level k player versus a level j player,

implying that $p_{kj} = 1 - p_{jk}$. Players of the same skill level are equally likely to win, i.e., $p_{kk} = 0.5$. A player with a higher skill level than their opponent has strictly larger than 0.5 probability of winning, i.e., $p_{kj} > 0.5$ if $k > j$. We assume that a player's skill level is fixed over their lifespan in the matching system. In practice, most players are casual players, and it is reasonable to assume that they cannot significantly improve their relative competence once they are familiar with the game. In Huang et al. (2019), players' skill level is an evolving metric that monotonically increases as the players play more. In our setting, skill levels reflect *relative* competence, and is more stable because others are also getting more familiar with the game.

In practice, many factors may influence the players' engagement behavior. The outcome of past matches has been shown to have significant impact on player engagement. For example, Chen et al. (2017b) documented that players' churn risk varies significantly with the outcomes of the last three matches. We assume that a player's *engagement* state is determined by the win-loss record of the last m matches, and transitions according to a Markov chain when the player plays a new match. We use q to denote the 'churn state', i.e., a player quitting the game permanently. Let $\mathcal{G}$ be the set of all possible states of a player, which has cardinality at most $2^m + 1$ (history of wins/losses and the churn state). We shall assume that the probability of churning after $m+1$ consecutive losses is strictly positive. This assumption clearly holds in practice, but is essential for ensuring finiteness of our objective (see Section 2.3).

A player is fully characterized by their skill level k and engagement state $g \in \mathcal{G}$; we shall refer to this pair as a *demographic* of players. Let $P_{win}^k, P_{lose}^k \in [0,1]^{|\mathcal{G}| \times |\mathcal{G}|}$ be the transition matrix of a level k player's engagement state, given that they win/lose the next match. Hence, if they are matched with a level j player, their aggregate transition matrix is given by $M_{kj} = p_{kj} P_{win}^k + (1 - p_{kj}) P_{lose}^k$. For the ease of notation, we also define $\bar{\mathcal{G}}$ to be the set of all the active states except the churn state q and $\bar{M}_{kj}$ be the reduced aggregate transition matrix without the churn state. We define an active player as one who has not churned and is thus in one of the states in $\bar{\mathcal{G}}$. Below we use a simple example to illustrate these concepts.

EXAMPLE 1. Suppose that there are two skill levels of players, either high or low (denoted by level 2 and 1, respectively). They quit with probability 0.2 if they experience two consecutive losses, and with probability 0.5 if they experience three consecutive losses. This implies that $m = 2$, as only two previous matches plus the current match outcome affects the transition state. We further assume that a high-skilled player wins against a low-skill player with probability $p_{21} = 0.8$. Hence, for each skill level, there are 4 engagement states in $\mathcal{G}$: the player may experience 0, 1 or 2 consecutive losses, or reach state q. We use 20, 21, 22, 2q and 10, 11, 12, 1q to denote the states of high- and low-skilled players, respectively. For $k = 1, 2$, the transition matrix P_{win}^k and P_{lose}^k is given by

$$P_{win}^k = \begin{array}{c} k0 \\ k1 \\ k2 \\ kq \end{array} \begin{pmatrix} k0 & k1 & k2 & kq \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad P_{lose}^k = \begin{array}{c} k0 \\ k1 \\ k2 \\ kq \end{array} \begin{pmatrix} k0 & k1 & k2 & kq \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.8 & 0.2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

The aggregate transition matrix is given by

$$M_{kk} = \begin{array}{c} k0 \\ k1 \\ k2 \\ kq \end{array} \begin{pmatrix} k0 & k1 & k2 & kq \\ 0.5 & 0.5 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.5 & 0 & 0.4 & 0.1 \\ 0.5 & 0 & 0.25 & 0.25 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad M_{21} = \begin{array}{c} k0 \\ k1 \\ k2 \\ kq \end{array} \begin{pmatrix} k0 & k1 & k2 & kq \\ 0.8 & 0.2 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.8 & 0 & 0.16 & 0.04 \\ 0.8 & 0 & 0.2 & 0.2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad M_{12} = \begin{array}{c} k0 \\ k1 \\ k2 \\ kq \end{array} \begin{pmatrix} k0 & k1 & k2 & kq \\ 0.2 & 0.8 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.2 & 0 & 0.64 & 0.16 \\ 0.2 & 0 & 0.4 & 0.4 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

and the reduced transition matrix $\bar{M}_{kj}$ is defined as

$$\bar{M}_{kk} = \begin{array}{c} k0 \\ k1 \\ k2 \end{array} \begin{pmatrix} k0 & k1 & k2 \\ 0.5 & 0.5 & 0 \\ 0.5 & 0 & 0.4 \\ 0.5 & 0 & 0.25 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \bar{M}_{21} = \begin{array}{c} k0 \\ k1 \\ k2 \end{array} \begin{pmatrix} k0 & k1 & k2 \\ 0.8 & 0.2 & 0 \\ 0.8 & 0 & 0.16 \\ 0.8 & 0 & 0.2 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \bar{M}_{12} = \begin{array}{c} k0 \\ k1 \\ k2 \end{array} \begin{pmatrix} k0 & k1 & k2 \\ 0.2 & 0.8 & 0 \\ 0.2 & 0 & 0.64 \\ 0.2 & 0 & 0.4 \end{pmatrix}.$$

$\square$

2.2.   Firm's Dynamic Optimization Problem

Now we describe the problem from the perspective of the firm/matchmaker. In practice, players request matches randomly, and the matchmaker reviews the matchmaking pool periodically and formulates matches based on specific constraints. For simplicity, we assume that for each time period, all the active players (i.e., players with engagement state that is not the churn state) request a match, and each player is assigned to an opponent by the matchmaker. The outcomes of all matches are then revealed at the same time, and players update their engagement states upon completion of their matches. Then the next time period starts and all players that have not churned request a match and so on. In Appendix B we show that partial participation and random time length of a match can be naturally incorporated into our framework.

In practice, a popular competitive game usually has millions of concurrent online players. Motivated by this, we follow the literature of fluid matching (see, e.g., Azevedo and Leshno 2016) and assume that players are infinitely divisible. Let s_{kg}^t be the amount of players at time t in the demographic with skill level k and engagement state g. The population of level k active players in period t is given by the vector $\mathbf{s}_k^t \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{G}|}$, and we use $\mathbf{s}^t = [\mathbf{s}_1^t, \dots, \mathbf{s}_K^t]$ to denote the system state. Let $f_{kg,jg'}^t \geq 0$ be the amount of level k players in state g that are matched to a level j opponent in state g' in time t. Note that it is possible to use flow variables that only consider one of $f_{kg,jg'}^t$ and $f_{jg',kg}^t$. However, the current formulation allows easier presentation of the evolution of demographics' sizes over time. A feasible match given $\mathbf{s}^t$ is a set of matching flows $f_{kg,jg'}^t$ that satisfies:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{K} \sum_{g' \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}} f_{kg,jg'}^{t} = s_{kg}^{t}, \; k=1,\ldots,K, \forall g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}},$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^{K} \sum_{g' \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}} f_{jg',kg}^{t} = s_{kg}^{t}, \; k=1,\ldots,K, \forall g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}, \tag{FB}$$

$$f_{kg,jg'}^{t} = f_{jg',kg}^{t}, \; j=1,\ldots,K, k=1,\ldots,K, \forall g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}, g' \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}$$

$$f_{kg,jg'}^{t} \geq 0, \; j=1,\ldots,K, k=1,\ldots,K, \forall g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}, g' \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}$$

Namely, (FB) are *flow balance* constraints that makes sure every active player is matched. The first equation makes sure that every level k player in state g is matched with some opponents, and the second equation ensures that the total amount of matches against level k players in state g equals to the amount of such players. The third equation makes sure that for every pair of demographics, a match results in an equal effect on supply and demand.

Next, we depict the evolution of the system. Using $\mathbf{f}_{kj}^{t} = \{f_{kg,jg'}^{t}\} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{\bar{\mathcal{G}} \times \bar{\mathcal{G}}}$ to denote the flow matrix between level k and j, the *evolution of demographics* is given by

$$\mathbf{s}_{k}^{t+1} = \sum_{j=1,\ldots,K} \left(\mathbf{f}_{kj}^{t}\mathbf{1}\right)^{\top} \bar{M}_{kj} \; k=1,\ldots,K, \tag{ED}$$

where $\mathbf{1}$ is a $|\bar{\mathcal{G}}| \times 1$ unit vector. Note that in (ED), $\mathbf{f}_{kj}^{t}\mathbf{1}$ is the vector describing how many level k players are matched to level j players for all states in $\bar{\mathcal{G}}$, and recall that $\bar{M}_{kj}$ is the state transition matrix for level k players matched to level j players. The engagement at period t is given by $\sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}} s_{kg}^{t}$, the total amount of active players. The firm's objective is to maximize engagement, which we measure by the cumulative amount of active players across all periods, $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}} s_{kg}^{t}$, where $\gamma \in (0,1]$ is the discount factor. The engagement maximization problem can be formulated as a Markov decision process, where the states are $\mathbf{s}^{t}$, the amount of active players in each demographic. Let V^{π} be the value function of a feasible policy π. The value-to-go function is given by

$$V^{\pi}(\mathbf{s}^{t}) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}} s_{kg}^{t+1} + \gamma V^{\pi}(\mathbf{s}^{t+1}) \tag{1}$$

$$\text{subject to (FB), (ED).}$$

Our goal is to find the optimal policy with a value function $V^{*}(\cdot)$, such that $V^{*}(\mathbf{s}^{t}) \geq V^{\pi}(\mathbf{s}^{t})$ for any feasible policy π. Note that the system dynamics are all linear, so when the initial size of each demographic is given, maximizing the engagement is equivalent to the following infinite linear program:

$$V^*(\mathbf{s}^0) = \max \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \gamma^{t-1} \sum_k \sum_{g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}} s_{kg}^t \qquad (2)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{j=1}^{K} \sum_{g' \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}} f_{kg,jg'}^t = s_{kg}^t, \; \forall k, \forall g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}, t = 0, 1, \ldots$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^{K} \sum_{g' \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}} f_{jg',kg}^t = s_{kg}^t, \; \forall k, \forall g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}, t = 0, 1, \ldots$$

$$f_{kg,jg'}^t = f_{jg',kg}^t, \; j = 1, \ldots, K, k = 1, \ldots, K, \forall g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}, g' \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}, t = 0, 1, \ldots$$

$$f_{kg,jg'}^t \geq 0, \; j = 1, \ldots, K, k = 1, \ldots, K, \forall g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}, g' \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}, t = 0, 1, \ldots$$

$$\mathbf{s}_k^{t+1} = \sum_j \left(\mathbf{f}_{kj}^t \mathbf{1} \right)^\top \bar{M}_{kj}, \; \forall k, t = 0, 1, \ldots$$

The LP formulation makes it flexible for industry practitioners to add various practical considerations into this framework. We discuss assumptions that can be relaxed in Appendix B.

2.3. SBMM and Preliminary Results

As mentioned in Section 1, the status quo in industry is SBMM, the skill-based matchmaking policy. Hence, it is important to characterize its performance, and we will use SBMM as a benchmark in our following analysis. In our setting, SBMM refers to any policy that let players in the same skill level match with each other. Note that SBMM is always feasible by letting players in the same state match with each other, i.e., $f_{kg,kg}^t = s_{kg}^t$. Let $V^{\text{SBMM}}(\cdot)$ be the value function of the SBMM. We first characterize the value of SBMM in Proposition 1. Because a time period in our model is short and the life cycle of a game is at most a few months or years, it is reasonable to set the discount factor to $\gamma = 1$ (as in Huang et al. (2019)). Interestingly, we show that when $\gamma = 1$ the value of SBMM is still finite due to our mild assumption that players have a positive probability of churning when they are dealt $m + 1$ consecutive losses.

PROPOSITION 1 **(Value of Skill-based Policy)**. *For any $\gamma \in (0, 1]$ and any initial state of demographics $\mathbf{s}^0$, the value function of SBMM is*

$$V^{SBMM}(\mathbf{s}^0) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \mathbf{v}_k^\top \mathbf{s}_k^0,$$

where $\mathbf{v}_k$ is given by

$$\mathbf{v}_k = \gamma^{-1} \left(\left(I - \gamma \bar{M}_{kk} \right)^{-1} - I \right) \mathbf{1}.$$

All proofs are provided in Appendix A. Under SBMM, a level k player starts from an active state g and transitions to the next engagement state according to the Markov chain M_{kk}. Note that each unit of players generates one unit of engagement in each period. Thus, the total engagement

a unit of player can generate, which we refer to as their shadow price, is then the average number of periods they stay active and is described by $\mathbf{v}_k$. Note that the shadow price is finite even when $\gamma = 1$. The skill-based policy provides an important benchmark, and is trivially the only (and optimal) policy when there is only one skill level.

With Proposition 1, we are able to show that any policy may only induce finite engagement, even when $\gamma = 1$.

LEMMA 1 (**Finiteness of the Value Function**). *For any $\gamma \in (0,1]$, policy π, and initial state of demographics $\mathbf{s}^0$, $V^\pi(\mathbf{s}^0)$ is always finite.*

The proof of Lemma 1 is based on the fact that the value of SBMM is always finite, and any policy may only be finitely better than SBMM. Finally, because (2) is an infinite LP, strong duality is not always guaranteed, although we prove it does hold in our setting.

LEMMA 2 (**Strong Duality**). *For any $\gamma \in (0,1]$, policy π, and initial state of demographics $\mathbf{s}^0$, strong duality and complementary slackness hold for* (2).

Although it is challenging and redundant to write out a dual problem in closed-form for the model presented in this section due to the generality of player behavior, we provide the dual problem of our stylized model, presented in Section 3, in Appendix A.2.

3. A Stylized Baseline Model

In this section, we consider a more stylized model with two types of players, which allows us to characterize the essence of the optimal matching policy explicitly and derive important insights. We first present the model of consideration and the matchmaking problem. Then we present the optimal policy and discuss its insights.

Consider the following model with only two skill levels, either high or low. Players' churn behavior depends only on the outcomes of the last match and the current match (i.e., $m = 1$), and will churn if and only if they experience two consecutive losses (one from the previous match and one from the current match). Further, we assume a high-skilled player beats a low-skilled player with probability one. While the model is highly stylized, it does capture the essence and fundamental tradeoff of the engagement maximization problem. The assumptions of two skill levels as well as the 100% high-versus-low winrate are simplifications of the heterogeneous skill levels. The dependency on the most recent two matches captures the players' bounded memory, which is common in literature to deliver tractable results (e.g., Hu et al. 2016, Cohen-Hillel et al. 2019). In the context of pricing, empirical evidence also suggests that customers may only remember the current and most recent prices (see, e.g., Krishnamurthi et al. (1992) and the numerical part of Hu et al. (2016)). It is also consistent with industry practitioners' opinions that players have very limited memory capacity (Hiwiller

2015, Hodent 2020). The churn behavior assumption based on losing streaks is a simplification of our assumption that players have positive probability to churn after $m+1$ consecutive losses, and implies that people favor a winning outcome over a losing outcome in competitive games. This assumption follows the cognitive evolution theory in psychology that the *intrinsic* motivation to an activity (by the underlying need for competence and self-determination) would increase (decrease) when perceiving oneself as competent (incompetent) (Deci and Ryan 1980). Winning and losing are natural signals of competence and incompetence, and the relative benefit of winning over losing on the intrinsic motivation (measured by subsequent time spent on the game) has been widely supported in the literature (Reeve et al. 1985, Vansteenkiste and Deci 2003). Despite the outcome itself, in practice, game designers also offer various *extrinsic* incentives that are contingent with the match outcomes, such as badges and in-game currencies, which further reinforce players' desires to win (Richter et al. 2015). In Section 5, we numerically show that looking at losing streaks over just a couple matches is sufficient for estimating churn risk and our theoretical insights hold in the case study.

Under this setting, we can classify players into 4 *demographics*: high (level 2) and low-skilled (level 1) players who won the past game, denoted by $2w$ and $1w$, respectively; high and low-skilled players who lost the past game, denoted by class 2ℓ and 1ℓ, respectively. The aggregate transition matrix is given by

$$
\bar{M}_{kk} = \begin{array}{c} \\ kw \\ k\ell \end{array}\begin{array}{c} kw \;\; k\ell \\ \begin{pmatrix} 0.5 & 0.5 \\ 0.5 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \end{array}, \quad
\bar{M}_{21} = \begin{array}{c} \\ kw \\ k\ell \end{array}\begin{array}{c} kw \;\; k\ell \\ \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \end{array}, \quad
\bar{M}_{12} = \begin{array}{c} \\ kw \\ k\ell \end{array}\begin{array}{c} kw \;\; k\ell \\ \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \end{array}.
$$

For convenience, we define $\mathcal{P} := \{1w, 1\ell, 2w, 2\ell\}$. Let $\mathbf{s}^t = (s_{1w}^t, s_{1\ell}^t, s_{2w}^t, s_{2\ell}^t)$ denote the size of the four demographics in period $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$. Furthermore, denote $f_{i,j}^t$ as the amount of players in demographic i that are assigned to match with players in demographic j in period t, where $i, j \in \mathcal{P}$. The flow balance constraints (FB) now become

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}} f_{i,j}^t &= s_i^t, \; \forall i \in \mathcal{P}, \\
\sum_{i \in \mathcal{P}} f_{i,j}^t &= s_j^t, \; \forall j \in \mathcal{P}, \\
f_{i,j}^t &= f_{j,i}^t, \; \forall i \neq j, \, i, j \in \mathcal{P} \\
f_{i,j}^t &\geq 0, \; \forall i \neq j, \, i, j \in \mathcal{P}.
\end{aligned} \tag{FB_S}
$$

In any period $t = 1, 2, \ldots$, the evolution of demographics (ED) now becomes

$$
\begin{aligned}
s_{2w}^{t+1} &= \frac{1}{2}(f_{2w,2w}^t + f_{2w,2\ell}^t + f_{2\ell,2w}^t + f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t) + f_{2w,1w}^t + f_{2w,1\ell}^t + f_{2\ell,1w}^t + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t, \\
s_{2\ell}^{t+1} &= \frac{1}{2}(f_{2w,2w}^t + f_{2w,2\ell}^t), \\
s_{1w}^{t+1} &= \frac{1}{2}(f_{1w,1w}^t + f_{1w,1\ell}^t + f_{1\ell,1w}^t + f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t), \\
s_{1\ell}^{t+1} &= \frac{1}{2}(f_{1w,1w}^t + f_{1w,1\ell}^t) + f_{1w,2w}^t + f_{1w,2\ell}^t.
\end{aligned}
\tag{ED$_S$}
$$

The evolution in (ED$_S$) reflects that high-skilled players always beat low-skilled players and players from the same skill level have equal chances to win a match. Furthermore, since churn is guaranteed after two losses, only players in demographic 2ℓ and 1ℓ may potentially leave the system in the next period.

Consistent with our original model in Section 2, the matchmaker is interested in maximizing players' engagement by designing matching flows satisfying both (FB) and (ED) constraints. We shall focus on the case where there is no discount factor, i.e., $\gamma = 1$. Thus, given the initial demographics $\mathbf{s}^0 = (s_{1w}^0, s_{1\ell}^0, s_{2w}^0, s_{2\ell}^0)$, we define the matchmaker's problem as

$$
V^*(\mathbf{s}^0) = \max_{\{f_{i,j}^t\}_{t=0}^\infty, \{s_i^t\}_{t=1}^\infty} \sum_{t=1}^\infty \sum_{i \in \mathcal{P}} s_i^t
\tag{P}
$$
$$
\text{s.t. (FB$_S$) and (ED$_S$)} \ \forall t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, \ \text{and} \ i, j \in \mathcal{P},
$$

which is an infinite dimensional linear program. Although the objective is an infinite sum, we note that Lemma 1 guarantees the finiteness of (P).

Although we have already stripped the matching model to its simplest form, it still possesses intricate dynamics. While traditional literature on Markov decision processes usually considers steady-state solutions, our problem (P) cannot have a steady-state solution since the total engagement is finite. We thus consider a generalization of steady-state referred to as *decaying steady-state*. A policy admits a decaying steady state $\mathbf{s}^t$, if there exists some $c \in (0, 1]$ such that under the given policy, we have $\mathbf{s}^{t+1} = c\mathbf{s}^t$. Unfortunately, Lemma 3 shows that no matching policy, besides SBMM, results in its demographics reaching a decaying steady state.

LEMMA 3 (**No Steady State Exists**). *Consider a fixed time period t.*

(i) SBMM can induce a non-zero decaying steady-state, but only for $c = (1 + \sqrt{5})/4$ and $\mathbf{s}^t$ a positive multiple of the vector $((1 + \sqrt{5})/2, 1, (1 + \sqrt{5})/2, 1)$.

(ii) For any matching policy that involves matching flows between high-skilled and low-skilled players, there is no non-zero decaying steady-state for any $c \in (0, 1]$.

As we show next, SBMM is actually sub-optimal as long as there are positive amounts of players in both levels. On the other hand, searching and conducting analysis for steady states is doomed

to fail. Hence, even under this simplest setting, finding the optimal matching policy is highly non-trivial and needs to take the dynamics of player demographics across time into consideration.

Before presenting the optimal matching policy that maximizes the matchmaker's problem in (2), we first consider a one-period matching which provides insights on the structure of the optimal matching flows. Suppose the matchmaker only needs to design the optimal matching flows for the initial period. That is, we can modify the matchmaker's problem in (2) to

$$\max_{f_{i,j}^0} \sum_i s_i^1, \qquad \text{s.t. (FB}_\text{S}) \text{ and (ED}_\text{S}) \text{ when } t = 0. \tag{P$_1$}$$

In other words, by designing the matching flows in the initial period $t = 0$, the matchmaker wants to retain as many players in the next period $t = 1$ as possible. Lemma 4 summarizes the optimal matching flows in the one-period matching problem (P$_1$).

LEMMA 4 **(Myopic Policy)**. *Consider the one-period matching problem in* (P$_1$) *with demographics state* $\mathbf{s}^t = (s_{1w}^t, s_{1\ell}^t, s_{2w}^t, s_{2\ell}^t)$. *The optimal matching policy maximizes flow between demographics* 2ℓ *and* $1w$. *The rest of the players can be matched arbitrarily as long as* $2w$ *and* 1ℓ *are not matched to each other.*

Lemma 4 states that the *myopic* decision that maximizes player engagement is to maximize the matching flow between demographics 2ℓ and $1w$. In other words, the matchmaker saves as many high-skilled players who are about to leave the system, as possible, using low-skilled players, who are not at risk of churning. Other players can simply be matched with same-level opponents or any other ways as long as $2w$ and 1ℓ are not matched. The intuition behind the optimal matching policy in this one-period setting is fairly intuitive. It preserves as many high-skilled players as possible without sacrificing low-skilled players at all.

The above intuition may not hold true anymore if we consider the infinite-horizon matchmaking problem, because of the trade-off between short-term and long-term reward. Compared to SBMM, the myopic policy increases the number of players in demographic 1ℓ, leading to higher churn rate in the subsequent period, and thus decreases the possible $2\ell - 1w$ matching in the future. It turns out, however, the optimal matchmaking policy in the infinite-horizon problem (P) resembles the one in Lemma 4. In the optimal matchmaking policy, the matchmaker still maximizes the flow between 2ℓ and $1w$ demographics in order to maximize the overall player engagement, despite the forward-looking nature of the problem. However, the matchmaker also needs to balance the populations in each demographic at the same time, which is not a concern in the one-period matching problem (P$_1$). We present the formal result in the next proposition.

PROPOSITION 2 (**Optimal Matchmaking Policy**). *The optimal matching policy is summarized in Table 1 with respect to different demographics. The optimal policy always maximizes matching flows between demographics 2ℓ and $1w$. The rest of the players are matched via SBMM in most scenarios (third row in Table 1), except when there are less high-skilled players compared to low-skilled players and too many 1ℓ players (first and second rows in Table 1). In this case, the matchmaker also matches players in demographic 2ℓ with players in 1ℓ.*

Table 1   **Optimal Matchmaking Policy,** $K_1 := \frac{18}{5}s_{2w}^t + \frac{9}{5}s_{2\ell}^t + \frac{3}{5}s_{1w}^t, K_2 := \frac{18}{5}s_{2w}^t + \frac{23}{5}s_{2\ell}^t - \frac{11}{5}s_{1w}^t$

States of demographics	Optimal matching policy
$s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t + s_{1w}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2w}^t < s_{1\ell}^t$, and $s_{1\ell}^t > K_2$	$f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{1w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t = f_{1\ell,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t$, and $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t - f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t$
$s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t + s_{1w}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2w}^t < s_{1\ell}^t$, and $K_1 < s_{1\ell}^t \leq K_2$	$f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{1w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t = \frac{9}{7}s_{2w}^t + \frac{23}{14}s_{2\ell}^t - \frac{11}{14}s_{1w}^t - \frac{5}{14}s_{1\ell}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t = f_{1\ell,2\ell}^t = \frac{5}{14}s_{1\ell}^t - \frac{9}{7}s_{2w}^t - \frac{9}{14}s_{2\ell}^t - \frac{3}{14}s_{1w}^t$, and $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t - f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t$
Otherwise	$f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t - \min\{s_{2\ell}^t, s_{1w}^t\}$, $f_{1w,1w}^t = s_{1w}^t - \min\{s_{2\ell}^t, s_{1w}^t\}$, $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t$, and $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = \min\{s_{2\ell}^t, s_{1w}^t\}$

Table 1 summarizes the detailed matching flows by separating the four-dimensional state space into three regions. The first two regions represent special cases when there are more high-skilled players than low-skilled players in the system. The last region reflects that a myopic policy similar to the one in Lemma 4 can be extended to a dynamic setting and remains optimal. In our proof, we split the four-dimensional state space into 7 scenarios (presented in Appendix A.2), and shows the transition between scenarios under the proposed policy. Then we rely on strong duality and complementary slackness in Lemma 2 to prove optimality.

According to Proposition 2, the optimal matching policy always maximizes the flows between demographic 2ℓ and $1w$. Thus, just like the one-period example, matching players from different skill levels is beneficial. On one hand, the platform should always "save" as many high-skilled players (2ℓ, who are about to leave the platform) as possible by matching them with low-skilled players ($1w$, without losing streaks). When matched with low-skilled players, high-skilled players (2ℓ) can enjoy a free win to break the losing streak and participate in future matchings. On the other hand, since low-skilled players can potentially prevent high-skilled players from leaving when they are matched, low-skilled players are very valuable to the matchmaker so they should not be completely exhausted. Note that low-skilled players used to "save" high-skilled players are those from $1w$, so they may potentially recover from the losing streak in the next period. In most cases, the matchmaker does not match remaining players in 2ℓ to players in 1ℓ since players from the latter leave the matching process afterwards, resulting in no immediate improvements and losing

the potential for them to come back to demographic $1w$. One exception is when there are not enough low-skilled players in $1w$ but too many players in 1ℓ compared to the size of 2ℓ (the first two rows in Table 1). Under these scenarios, after exhausting players in $1w$, the matchmaker also matches low-skilled players in 1ℓ to high-skilled players in 2ℓ. Here, the matchmaker is essentially adjusting the overall player distribution among the demographics. Although they have the potential to increase other players' engagement, low-skilled players are only valuable if there are enough high-skilled players that need to be saved. The adjustment preserves high-skilled players in the process who may need to be saved by low-skilled players in the future.

Another way to gain insights on the effect of player distribution on the optimal policy is to look at the shadow price of each demographic, which can be loosely interpreted as how valuable a demographic is to the matchmaker. In general, the shadow prices for players who are not on losing streaks are higher than those that just lost a game. On the other hand, the shadow prices with respect to the skills ($2w$ versus $1w$) depend on the relative population of high and low players. Interestingly, when there are many more high-skilled players compared to low-skilled players, the shadow prices of low-skilled players are always bounded. However, as the ratio between the number of high- and low-skilled players goes to 0, the shadow prices for high-skilled players increases since high-skilled players can survive "forever" if injected to the system. This also explains why the matchmaker is willing to sacrifice players in 1ℓ to save high-skilled players in this case. We leave the detailed descriptions on shadow prices in the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.2.

Finally, we analyze the performance of the optimal matchmaking policy with the SBMM benchmark in Proposition 3 below.

PROPOSITION 3 (**Engagement Improvement**). *(a) In a single period, the myopic policy from Lemma 4 garners at most 4/3 engagement as SBMM. (b) In the infinite-horizon setting, we have that the optimal policy from Proposition 2 garners at most 3/2 engagement as SBMM. In other words,*

$$\frac{V^*(\mathbf{s}^t)}{V^{SBMM}(\mathbf{s}^t)} \leq \frac{3}{2}, \tag{3}$$

for any $\mathbf{s}^t \geq 0$. Furthermore, the upper bound is achieved for some $s_{2\ell}^t = s_{1w}^t > 0$ and $s_{2w}^t = s_{1\ell}^t = 0$.

Proposition 3 first states that the the value of the myopic policy over SBMM is at most 4/3 in a single period. While Chen et al. (2017b) conjectured that the power of myopic matchmaking grows exponentially as the time horizon increases, we resolve this in the negative: over the whole time horizon, the benefit of optimal policy over SBMM is at most 50%. As discussed in Section 3, the optimal matching policy utilizes matches between 2ℓ and $1w$ players to improve engagement. Thus, as we can see from the second statement in Proposition 3, the upper bound of the performance

ratio is attained when the initial demographics only have equal amount of 2ℓ and $1w$ players. In this scenario, the matchmaker improves the most compared to SBMM by using low-skilled players who are not in danger of churning to save high-skilled players who are about to churn.

4. Multiple Skill Levels, AI-powered Bots, and Pay-to-win System

In this section, we use the baseline model introduced in Section 3 to discuss several extensions of our model. In particular, we compare the performance of the optimal policy to SBMM in Section 4.1 when there are multiple skill levels. Moreover, we discuss the insights of having AI-powered bots in Section 4.2 and implementing pay-to-win strategies in Section 4.3.

4.1. Multiple Skill Levels

Based on the discussion in Section 3, we know that low-skilled players are valuable for maximizing total player engagement due to the fact that they can be used to extend the lifespan of high-skilled players. Thus, it is natural to conjecture that the power of optimal matchmaking shall increases further if there are more than two skill levels in the matchmaking system. That is, when a relatively high-skilled player is about to leave, the matchmaker can match them with a relatively low-skilled player to prevent them from churning. The other player may then be saved by a player from an even lower skill level in the future, which improves the overall engagement among players. To formalize this intuition, we extend the baseline model to multiple skill levels.

Consider the baseline model introduced in Section 3, but with $K > 2$ skill levels. For $1 \le k \le K$, let s_{kw}^t and $s_{k\ell}^t$ denote the amount of level k players at time t who just won and lost their last match, respectively. We assume that higher-skilled players always defeat lower-skilled players, i.e., for any $1 \le j < k \le K$ we have that $p_{jk} = 0$.

With $K > 2$ skill levels and for all $t = 1, 2, \ldots$, the state of demographics evolves according to the following dynamics:

$$
\begin{aligned}
s_{kw}^{t+1} &= \frac{1}{2}(f_{kw,kw}^t + f_{kw,k\ell}^t + f_{k\ell,kw}^t + f_{k\ell,k\ell}^t) + \sum_{j<k}(f_{kw,jw}^t + f_{kw,j\ell}^t + f_{k\ell,jw}^t + f_{k\ell,j\ell}^t), \\
s_{k\ell}^{t+1} &= \frac{1}{2}(f_{kw,kw}^t + f_{kw,k\ell}^t) + \sum_{j>k}(f_{kw,jw} + f_{kw,j\ell}).
\end{aligned}
\tag{ED$_\text{K}$}
$$

The evolution of demographics in (ED$_\text{K}$) reflects that a player in skill level k always win a game when matched with another player who has lower skill level, i.e., $j < k$, and only players who just

lost a game are subjected to churn. Similarly, the flow balancing conditions in (FB$_\text{S}$) needs to be modified to the following:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sum_j f_{i,j}^t &= s_i^t, \ \forall i \in \tilde{\mathcal{P}}, \\
\sum_i f_{i,j}^t &= s_j^t, \ \forall j \in \tilde{\mathcal{P}}, \\
f_{i,j}^t &= f_{j,i}^t, \ \forall i \neq j, \ i,j \in \tilde{\mathcal{P}}, \\
f_{i,j}^t &\geq 0, \forall i,j \in \tilde{\mathcal{P}},
\end{aligned}
\tag{FB$_\text{K}$}
$$

where $\tilde{\mathcal{P}} := \{1w, 1\ell, \dots, Kw, K\ell\}$. Therefore, with the initial demographic $\mathbf{s}^0 = (s_{1w}^0, s_{1\ell}^0, \dots, s_{Kw}^0, s_{K\ell}^0)$, we define the matchmaker's problem as

$$
\max_{\{f_{i,j}^t\}_{t=1}^\infty} \ \sum_{t=1}^\infty \sum_{i \in \tilde{\mathcal{P}}} s_i^t
\tag{P$_\text{K}$}
$$
$$
\text{s.t. (FB}_\text{K}) \text{ and (ED}_\text{K}) \ \forall t = 0, 1, \dots, \text{ and } i,j \in \tilde{\mathcal{P}},
$$

which reduces to (P) when $K = 2$. Although the optimal policy can still be evaluated by solving the linear program (P$_\text{K}$), it becomes very difficult to characterize in closed-form as a result of having multiple skill levels. Unlike the optimal policy characterized in Proposition 2 for the baseline model with two skill levels, the optimal policy in this case may induce matching between non-adjacent skill levels. However, we show that in this case, the matchmaker can improve the engagement beyond 50 percent when compared to SBMM, and in fact the potential improvement is linear in K. The next proposition provides the upper and lower bounds on the ratio between the value functions under optimal and skill-based policies.

PROPOSITION 4 (**Engagement Improvements with Multiple Classes**). *Denote* $R_K := \max_{\mathbf{s}^t} \dfrac{V_K^*(\mathbf{s}^t)}{V^{SBMM}(\mathbf{s}^t)}$, *representing the largest ratio between the value function of the optimal policy and the skill-based policy for any starting state of demographics. For $K > 2$, we have*

$$
\frac{3K^2 + 7K + 6}{8K + 8} \leq R_K \leq \frac{4K + 1}{5},
\tag{4}
$$

that is, $R_K = \Theta(K)$.

To get the lower bound, we first show that in some special cases that the optimal policy is a myopic policy, and we provide the closed-form expression of the optimal value function (Lemma EC.2 in Section A.3). We then build the lower bound by computing the ratio when the initial state falls into one of the special cases. To get the upper bound, we utilize the dual problem and the corresponding shadow prices.

The implication of Proposition 4 is significant. Note that the upper and lower bounds grow linearly in K. Thus, while the potential value of optimal matchmaking over SBMM cannot grow

exponentially over the time horizon, it does grow linearly with the number of skill levels. In practice, it is reasonable to have several skill levels in a game, and thus the value of optimal matchmaking can be significant. In the extreme case, when K goes to infinity, SBMM can be arbitrarily bad.

To further illustrate the intuition behind Proposition 4, we start with the baseline model. When there are two skill levels (K and $K-1$), note that the level $K-1$ players can be no worse off than self-matching, because no other players can be used to prevent them from churning. Thus, their population decays exponentially fast over time. By introducing level $K-2$ players, who have a lower skill compared to those in level $K-1$, these players can be used to save level $K-1$ players who would have left previously. Then the level $K-1$ players, saved by level $K-2$ players, can be used to save level K players. As we keep introducing new levels, players from the newly introduced lowest level can be used to save those from the second lowest level, who can further be used to save players from the third lowest level, and so on. Hence, when introducing a new skill level, it improves the engagement for all existing levels, and the marginal benefit is increasing with K.

4.2. AI-powered bots

AI-powered bots are routinely developed by game designers as an attempt to closely mimic human player behavior. Ideally, a matchmaker can use bots whenever a human player is about to churn if they experience one more loss. The bot can be designed in such a way that it is competitive but still loses to the human player, which may result in the human breaking their losing streak and remaining in the system longer. On the other hand, due to the limitations of technology, AI-powered bots can be identified by experienced players. If a human player is frequently matched with bots, they may find out that their opponents are not human and perhaps be discouraged from playing the game. In this section, we provide a framework to analyze the value of adding a percentage of AI-powered bots to the matching pool.

In this section, we focus on the impact on players' engagement when a certain percentage of the demographics are bots. We do not consider when to match players with bots, as this may significantly alter the behavior of the system and the attitude towards bots. To be more specific, we consider a scenario where each active player can be matched to a bot with an independent and fixed probability $\alpha \in [0,1)$ in each period. This setup can be interpreted as bots maintaining a constant percentage in the overall demographics over time. In practice, the value of α depends on the players' ability to detect bots and tolerance towards bots. The more developed the AI technology is, i.e., bots are less detectable, the higher α can be. Consider the baseline model introduced in Section 3. In each period, with probability α, a player is matched with a bot who is designed to lose with probability 1 and give the player a win. With probability $1 - \alpha$, the player is matched with another human player just like in Section 3. Thus, adding bots only slightly changes (FB$_\mathrm{S}$) and (ED$_\mathrm{S}$).

We leave the detailed of the formulation to the Appendix (Eq. ($\mathrm{P_{Bot}}$)) to avoid repetition. With slight abuse of notation, denote $V^{\mathrm{SBMM}}(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$ and $V^*(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$ as the value functions of SBMM and the optimal matchmaking policy when the probability of matching with bots is α, respectively.

The total engagement can be increased by improving the matchmaking policy from SBMM to optimal, but can also be improved by adding bots. To measure the value of an optimal matchmaking policy, we consider the increase in bot ratio needed under SBMM to achieve the same level of engagement as the optimal policy. It is obvious that the optimal policy should use no more bots than SBMM, and we quantify this reduction in the bot ratio. When there is only one skill level, then the optimal policy has to use the same bot ratio as SBMM as policies are the same. Thus, we are interested in the maximum power of the optimal policy. We summarize the maximum power of the optimal policy in the presence of bots in Proposition 5 below.

PROPOSITION 5. *Let α be the fractions of bots in SBMM.*

(a) *For any $\alpha \leq 16.9\%$, there exists some state $\mathbf{s}$ of demographics such that $V^*(\mathbf{s}, 0) = V^{SBMM}(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$, i.e., a state where the optimal policy without bots is as good as SBMM with α fraction of bots. For $\alpha > 16.9\%$, no such state exists.*

(b) *Let $a(\alpha)$ be the bot ratio such that $V^*(\mathbf{s}, a(\alpha)) = V^{SBMM}(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$. For any state $\mathbf{s}$ of demographics and bot ratio α we have that $\lim_{\alpha \to 1} a(\alpha) = 1$, i.e., the optimal policy requires a bot ratio that also approaches 1 in order to achieve the same engagement.*

Proposition 5 delivers two important insights regarding matchmaking systems with bots. As of today, the moderate sophistication of AI-powered bots requires that α be relatively low so that players are not too frustrated. In this case, Proposition 5(a) shows that using the optimal policy with no bots can be just as good as SBMM with bots. In our baseline model, the optimal policy without any bots can offset a bot ratio of up to 16.9% under SBMM. Thus, for companies that are criticized for using high bot ratios (Gelbart 2021) and that use SBMM, optimizing the matchmaking system may significantly alleviate such problems without loss of engagement. In Section 5, our case study based on real data also shows that the optimal policy has the power to reduce the bot ratio significantly when the value of α for SBMM is moderate. On the other hand, Proposition 5(b) points out that the value of using the optimal policy is negligible as α goes to 1. Intuitively, when $\alpha = 1$, everyone only plays with bots, and all policies are functionally the same. Thus, regardless of the matchmaking policy used, developing more sophisticated AI bots can still provide value for companies.

4.3. Pay-to-win system

Building upon the baseline model in Section 3, suppose the matchmaker can offer low-skilled players a chance to purchase items or information to gain an advantage in the next match. To be specific,

we follow the practice in *Dota 2* (introduced in Section 1) and consider a subscription service that provides additional information to players. Such features are largely useless for high-skilled players, but may help low-skilled players substantially. Therefore, in the model of consideration, we only consider a pay-to-win (PTW) feature for low-skilled players in every period.[4] We assume that the subscription fee is r per period, and low-skilled players either opt-in at time zero and keep their subscription for all matches until they churn, or never pay for it. This assumption is a reasonable reflection of reality since players that are willing to pay for the subscription feature are likely those who accept the idea behind microtransactions in video games. The majority of players opposing the idea would rarely switch to a subscription in the middle of their lifespan in the system. We use $\beta \in [0, 1)$ to denote the proportion of the low-skilled players who pay for the subscription. In practice, only about 5% players pay in a freemium game, so β should be small (Seufert 2013). We leave r and β exogenous and focus on the interplay between PTW and the matchmaker.

With a pay-to-win system such as the subscription feature mentioned above, monetary elements have been added to the matching system. We assume that there is a conversion rate between players' engagement and the seller's revenue. For simplicity, we normalize a unit of player engagement translates to one unit of revenue generated for the seller.

Adopting the notation from Section 3, suppose the matchmaker faces an initial state of demographics $\mathbf{s}^0 = \{s_{1w}^0, s_{1\ell}^0, s_{2w}^0, s_{2\ell}^0\}$. By having the subscription, a β portion of low-skilled (level 1) players elevate their gaming skills to the high level (level 2), denoted by $\bar{2}$, so that they behave exactly like high-skilled players in Section 3. However, purchasing the subscription feature does not (and should not) reset a player's losing streak. Thus, instead of having 4 demographics, with the addition of the subscription feature, there are 6 demographics in each period, denoted by $s_{\bar{2}w}^t, s_{\bar{2}\ell}^t, s_{\underline{2}w}^t, s_{\underline{2}\ell}^t, s_{\underline{1}w}^t, s_{\underline{1}\ell}^t$. Note that $s_{\bar{2}w}^t, s_{\bar{2}\ell}^t$ represent players with subscriptions who just won and lost a game, respectively. To differentiate from the original demographics, we use $s_{\underline{2}w}^t, s_{\underline{2}\ell}^t$ to denote non-paying high-skilled players, and $s_{\underline{1}w}^t, s_{\underline{1}\ell}^t$ to denote non-paying low-skilled players. In the initial period $t = 0$, given β and $\mathbf{s}^0$, we have $s_{\bar{2}w}^0 = \beta s_{1w}^0$, $s_{\bar{2}\ell}^0 = \beta s_{1\ell}^0$, $s_{\underline{2}w}^0 = s_{2w}^0$, $s_{\underline{2}\ell}^0 = s_{2\ell}^0$, $s_{\underline{1}w}^0 = (1-\beta)s_{1w}^0$, $s_{\underline{1}\ell}^0 = (1-\beta)s_{1\ell}^0$. Consequently, we also need to introduce new flows between demographics accordingly. In any period t, the flow balance constraints are now

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sum_j f_{i,j}^t &= s_i^t, \, \forall i \in \bar{\mathcal{P}}, \\
\sum_i f_{i,j}^t &= s_j^t, \, \forall j \in \bar{\mathcal{P}}, \\
f_{i,j}^t &= f_{j,i}^t, \, \forall i \neq j, \, i, j \in \bar{\mathcal{P}}, \\
f_{i,j}^t &\geq 0, \, \forall i \neq j, \, i, j \in \bar{\mathcal{P}},
\end{aligned}
\tag{FB$_{\text{ptw}}$}
$$

---

[4] In practice, such membership is bundled with other perks, e.g., decorative staffs, so high-skilled players may also pay for it. However, our qualitative insights are consistent as long as high-skilled player do not improve their skill level any more.

where $\bar{\mathcal{P}} := \{\bar{2}w, \bar{2}\ell, \underline{2}w, \underline{2}\ell, \underline{1}w, \underline{1}\ell\}$, and evolution of demographics are now

$$s_{\bar{2}w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(f_{\bar{2}w,\bar{2}w}^t + f_{\bar{2}w,\bar{2}\ell}^t + f_{\bar{2}\ell,\bar{2}w}^t + f_{\bar{2}\ell,\bar{2}\ell}^t + f_{\bar{2}w,\underline{2}w}^t + f_{\bar{2}w,\underline{2}\ell}^t + f_{\bar{2}\ell,\underline{2}w}^t + f_{\bar{2}\ell,\underline{2}\ell}^t) + f_{\bar{2}w,\underline{1}w}^t + f_{\bar{2}w,\underline{1}\ell}^t + f_{\bar{2}\ell,\bar{1}w}^t + f_{\bar{2}\ell,\underline{1}\ell}^t,$$

$$s_{\bar{2}\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(f_{\bar{2}w,\bar{2}w}^t + f_{\bar{2}w,\bar{2}\ell}^t + f_{\bar{2}w,\underline{2}w}^t + f_{\bar{2}w,\underline{2}\ell}^t),$$

$$s_{\underline{2}w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(f_{\underline{2}w,\underline{2}w}^t + f_{\underline{2}w,\underline{2}\ell}^t + f_{\underline{2}\ell,\underline{2}w}^t + f_{\underline{2}\ell,\underline{2}\ell}^t + f_{\underline{2}w,\bar{2}w}^t + f_{\underline{2}w,\bar{2}\ell}^t + f_{\underline{2}\ell,\bar{2}w}^t + f_{\underline{2}\ell,\bar{2}\ell}^t) + f_{\underline{2}w,\underline{1}w}^t + f_{\underline{2}w,\underline{1}\ell}^t + f_{\underline{2}\ell,\underline{1}w}^t + f_{\underline{2}\ell,\underline{1}\ell}^t,$$

$$s_{\underline{2}\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(f_{\underline{2}w,\underline{2}w}^t + f_{\underline{2}w,\underline{2}\ell}^t + f_{\underline{2}w,\bar{2}w}^t + f_{\underline{2}w,\bar{2}\ell}^t),$$

$$s_{\underline{1}w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(f_{\underline{1}w,\underline{1}w}^t + f_{\underline{1}w,\underline{1}\ell}^t + f_{\underline{1}\ell,\underline{1}w}^t + f_{\underline{1}\ell,\underline{1}\ell}^t),$$

$$s_{\underline{1}\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(f_{\underline{1}w,\underline{1}w}^t + f_{\underline{1}w,\underline{1}\ell}^t) + f_{\underline{1}w,\underline{2}w}^t + f_{\underline{1}w,\underline{2}\ell}^t + f_{\underline{1}w,\bar{2}w}^t + f_{\underline{1}w,\bar{2}\ell}^t.$$

$$(\text{ED}_{\text{ptw}})$$

From (FB_{ptw}) and (ED_{ptw}) conditions, we can see that players in the new demographics with skill level $\bar{2}$ behave the same as those with skill level h. However, the matchmaker's objective is largely different from the one in (P). The matchmaker also needs to consider the revenue generated by paid subscriptions. Given β, r, and the initial demographics $\mathbf{s}^0 = \{s_{2w}^0, s_{2\ell}^0, s_{1w}^0, s_{1\ell}^0\}$, the matchmaker's problem is

$$V^*(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0) := \max_{\{f_{i,j}^t\}_{t=1}^\infty} \sum_{t=1}^\infty \sum_i s_i^t + \sum_{t=1}^\infty r(s_{\bar{2}w}^t + s_{\bar{2}\ell}^t) = \max_{\{f_{i,j}^t\}_{t=1}^\infty} ENG(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0) + REV(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0) \quad (\text{P}_{\text{ptw}})$$

$$\text{s.t. } s_{\bar{2}w}^0 = \beta s_{1w}^0,$$
$$s_{\bar{2}\ell}^0 = \beta s_{1\ell}^0,$$
$$s_{\underline{2}w}^0 = s_{2w}^0,$$
$$s_{\underline{2}l}^0 = s_{2l}^0,$$
$$s_{\underline{1}w}^0 = (1-\beta)s_{1w}^0,$$
$$s_{\underline{1}\ell}^0 = (1-\beta)s_{1\ell}^0,$$
$$(\text{FB}_{\text{ptw}}) \text{ and } (\text{ED}_{\text{ptw}}) \ \forall t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, \text{ and } i, j \in \bar{\mathcal{P}},$$

where the objective function is to maximize the sum of player engagement $ENG(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0)$ and revenue from paid subscription $REV(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0)$. Our focus is on the interplay between PTW and the matchmaker, as well as their aggregate value. We provide our main findings in Proposition 6 below.

PROPOSITION 6. *Consider $\beta \in [0, 1)$.*

(a) With PTW under SBMM, one unit of subscribed players is as valuable as $1 + r$ units of unsubscribed players. With PTW under the optimal policy, one unit of subscribed players is more valuable than $1 + r$ units of unsubscribed players.

(b) *Subscribed players have a higher priority compared to unsubscribed high-skilled players. That is, unsubscribed high-skilled players in $\underline{2}w$ ($\underline{2}\ell$) would only be matched with any unsubscribed low-skilled players after all the subscribed players in $\bar{2}w$ ($\bar{2}\ell$) have matched with unsubscribed low-skilled players.*

(c) *When there are more high-skilled players than low-skilled players, implementing PTW decreases engagement. However, in terms of the overall revenue (engagement plus subscription revenue) generated, implementing PTW is beneficial if and only of r is greater than a specific threshold.*

(d) *There exists states of player demographics such that implementing PTW increases engagement and subscription revenue simultaneously.*

Proposition 6(a) says that under SBMM, the value of a subscribed player in a PTW system equals $r+1$ unsubscribed high-skilled players. However, under the optimal policy the value of a subscribed player in a PTW system goes beyond replacing them with $r+1$ unsubscribed players. On the other hand, Proposition 6(b) depicts the impact of PTW on the matchmaking policy. We prove that the optimal policy gives subscribed players high priority, and would save an unsubscribed high-skilled player from churning only when all the paid players within the same engagement state are saved. Proposition 6(c) and (d) describes the influence of PTW on user engagement and the total value function. When there are more high-skilled players than the low-skilled players, Proposition 6(c) claims that the corresponding engagement inevitably falls, and it is only worth to introduce PTW when the unit profit r is high enough. This is because in this case, low-skilled players are already scarce resources, and a PTW system further increases their scarcity. On the other hand, Proposition 6(d) claims that PTW can increase engagement while providing direct revenue. This happens when there are too few high-skilled players. Intuitively, this is because now the high-skilled players are scarce resources, and a few more high-skilled players can facilitate cross-level matching significantly and thus improve the engagement. Together, Proposition 6(c) and (d) provide important managerial insights on the value of a PTW system, when taking matchmaking and player engagement into account: besides its direct revenue, it also works as a lever to change the skill distribution and may influence the total engagement positively. This happens when the majority of players are low-skilled, which is reasonable for most games. On the other hand, if the majority of players are high-skilled, PTW will hurt engagement and the seller should be careful to introduce it.

Intuitively, all the non-paying players are worse off in the presence of a PTW system, because high-skilled non-paying players are in low priority for cross-level matching, and the low-skilled non-paying players need to save more high-skilled players now. However, in Example 2 we show that it is

possible that low-skilled non-paying players may also be better off due to the redistribution effect. The intuition behind such a surprising observation is that, the optimal matchmaking strategy would utilize low-skilled non-paying players in a more sustainable way as they become more scarce in the presence of PTW. Such an observation again emphasizes the potential positive externality of PTW on user engagement, in addition to the potential increase in revenue.

EXAMPLE 2 (PTW MAY MAKE LOW-SKILLED NON-PAYING PLAYERS BETTER OFF). Suppose $\beta = 0.2$, $r = 0$, and the initial state is $\mathbf{s} = (2, 2, 1, 15)$. Without PTW system, some of the players in 1ℓ have to be matched with 2ℓ players in the first period and leave directly, leading to an average engagement of 2.27 for all the low players over the lifespan. When the PTW system is considered, we have $s^0_{2w} = 0.2$, $s^0_{2\ell} = 3$, $s^0_{2w} = 2$, $s^0_{2\ell} = 2$, $s^0_{1w} = 0.8$, $s^0_{1\ell} = 12$. Because $r = 0$, such a problem is equivalent to a problem with initial state $\mathbf{s}' = (2.2, 5, 0.8, 12)$ but without PTW system. In this case, the 1ℓ players become more scarce and would not be matched to high-skilled players in the first period, and the average engagement for the low players increases to 2.31.

5. Case Study of Lichess

In this section, we conduct a numerical case study with the Lichess Open Database (Lichess 2021) to demonstrate the power of optimal matchmaking policies in a realistic setting.

5.1. Data Description

Lichess is a free and open-source Internet chess server, and all the match data since 2013 are available to the public. For each match, the data includes the game mode, starting time, players' IDs, the outcome of the match, and the ratings of the players before and after the match. Each player has a rating for each game mode. The platform adopts the Glicko-2 rating, which is a generalization of Elo rating (Glickman 2012). We collected all the matches in the most popular mode "Rated Blitz Game" during 2013-2014, which includes 5.41 million matches and 135,073 unique players. To simplify our problem, we remove all the matches where the outcomes are draws, which represent 3.7% of the matches, and focus on the 5.23 million matches with unique winners. We say a player is churned after a match if s/he stops playing for 14 days after the match. Hence, a player may churn more than once.

We focus on players who played for at least 5 matches for three reasons. First, players who churned in less than 5 matches may largely churn due to other factors (e.g., user interface). Second, the ratings of new players change wildly after the first few matches, which makes it difficult to estimate their skill levels. Finally, we would like to test models with a range of game memory m (up to 4), which means that the players need to play at least $m + 1$ matches. In our dataset, there are 60,334 qualified players. For each player, we take at most 500 matches on their record (92% of

the 60,334 players play less than 500 matches). This is done to avoid underestimating the churn probability, since there are a few highly dedicated players who never quit under any circumstance.

Because the ratings oscillate at all time, we use the average of the ratings after the last 3 matches to estimate rating, which is then used to determine their skill level. A summary of the players' engagement and ratings is in Table 2. Based on the estimated ratings, we divide players into 13 skill levels: for the 96% of the considered players whose rating is between 1000 and 2100, we separate them into 11 levels (level 2 to 12) based on intervals of 100; for players with rating less than 1000 and greater than 2100, we group them into two new levels, level 1 and level 13, respectively. To compute the winning probability between different skill levels, we use the realized winrate when the level difference is less than or equal to 8. When the level difference is greater than 8, we have too little data for an accurate estimation, and simply assume that the player with higher skill level wins with probability 1. We show the detailed winrate in Table EC.5 in Appendix.

Table 2   **Summary of Considered Players (** $N = 60334$ **)**

	Mean	Median	Min	Max
Number of Matches	170.6	21	5	18764
Estimated Ratings	1525	1518	764	2663

5.2. Players' Churn Behavior Estimation

Recall that in Section 2, we define a Markovian engagement model where the state g is uniquely determined by the win-loss record of the last m matches. We now illustrate how to estimate P_{win}^k and P_{lose}^k through maximum log-likelihood estimation. To simplify our problem and reduce the number of parameters, we assume that the players' churn behavior is independent of skill level, and drop the superscript k. In the state transition matrix, the row that represents state g in P_{win} (P_{lose}) only has two positive entries: the probability of churning after winning (losing) the next match and the probability of moving to a certain non-churn state. Our goal is then to estimate ρ_g^{win} (ρ_g^{lose}), the churn probability of a player in state $g \in \mathcal{G}$ after winning (losing) the next match (Note that $\rho_q^{win} = \rho_q^{lose} = 1$ since we assume that a churned player will stay churned.) Let g_t^i be the state of player i reaches before playing t-th match, $\mathbb{W}_t^i$ be the indicator of whether the player wins the t-th match, $\mathbb{I}_t^i$ be the indicator of whether the player churns right after reaching g_t^i. For a player who played T^i total matches, we record his/her states and churn decisions starting from the 5th match because they only have a valid state before the 5th match if $m = 4$, and every focal player played at least 5 matches. If the state sequence is given by $(g_5^i, g_6^i, \ldots, g_{T^i}^i)$, the outcome sequence

is $(\mathbb{W}_5^i, \mathbb{W}_6^i, \ldots, \mathbb{W}_{T^i}^i)$, and churn decision sequence is $(\mathbb{I}_5^i, \mathbb{I}_6^i, \ldots, \mathbb{I}_{T^i}^i)$, then the log-likelihood (LLH) function is given by

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=5}^{T^i} \log\left(\rho_{g_t^i}^{win} \mathbb{W}_t^i \mathbb{I}_t + (1 - \rho_{g_t^i}^{win}) \mathbb{W}_t^i (1 - \mathbb{I}_t) + \rho_{g_t^i}^{lose} (1 - \mathbb{W}_t^i) \mathbb{I}_t + (1 - \rho_{g_t^i}^{lose})(1 - \mathbb{W}_t^i)(1 - \mathbb{I}_t) \right).$$

Because the state transition is exogenous, the estimation is computationally simple and usually has a closed form. Below we propose two reasonable models that use $m+2$ parameters, and shows the closed form of the parameters.

Losing Streak Model: The losing streak model assumes that the players' churn probability depends on the length of losing streak they experience (after the next match). For a given m, players have $m+1$ possible engagement states $0, \ldots, m$, which represents the length of losing streak before the next match. In this model, ρ_g^{win} is the same for all $g = 0, \ldots, m$, because all such players have a 0 match losing streak upon wining the next game. On the other hand, ρ_g^{lose} represents the churn probability upon losing the next game given that the players has already lost g consecutive games (thus they experience a $(g+1)$-match losing streak). Our baseline model in Section 3 can be viewed as a special case of the losing streak model, with $m = 1, \rho_g^{win} = 0$, $\rho_0^{lose} = 0$, and $\rho_1^{lose} = 1$. For the losing streak model, the solution for the MLE is given by

$$\rho_g^{win} = \frac{\text{Number of churn decisions after a win}}{\text{Number of wins}}, \ g = 0, \ldots, m$$

$$\rho_g^{lose} = \frac{\text{Number of churn decisions after } g+1 \text{ consecutive losses}}{\text{Number of times that players experience } g+1 \text{ consecutive losses}}, \ g = 0, \ldots, m.$$

Winrate Model: The winrate model assumes that the players' churn probability depends on the number of wins over the last m matches plus the next match (total m+1 matches). Hence, the model can be described by $m+2$ parameters, the churn probabilities when the player has 0 to $m+1$ wins. Note that although we only need to estimate $m+2$ parameters, we still need 2^m+1 states. This is because for the LP formulation, the customer transition matrix needs the full win-loss record. Hence, a state g is a length-m binary sequence denoting the win-loss record and we use $|g|$ to denote the wins in g. The solution for the MLE is

$$\rho_g^{win} = \frac{\text{Number of churn decision when players won } |g+1| \text{ matches over last } m+1 \text{ matches}}{\text{Number of times that players won } \tilde{g} \text{ matches over last } m+1 \text{ matches}}$$

$$\rho_g^{lose} = \frac{\text{Number of churn decision when players won } |g| \text{ matches over the } m+1 \text{ matches}}{\text{Number of times that players won } \tilde{g} \text{ matches over the } m+1 \text{ matches}}$$

Table 3   Out-of-sample Negative Log-likelihood for the Candidate Models

Null Model			
144424.4			

Losing Streak Model		Winrate Model	
$m = 0$	140019.4	$m = 0$	140019.4
$m = 1$	139641.5	$m = 1$	139713.1
$m = 2$	139488.8	$m = 2$	139566.7
$m = 3$	139362.9	$m = 3$	139375.9
$m = 4$	139281.6	$m = 4$	139255.2

5.2.1.   Estimation Results We use the players who played at least 5 matches to estimate the models. We randomly sample 70% of the players to train the model, and use the rest of them to validate the model. We test both the losing streak model and the winrate model, ranging m from 0 to 4. When $m = 0$, the churn probability only depends on the outcome of the current game, and the losing streak model coincides with the winrate model. In addition, we also estimate a null model as a benchmark, which assumes a uniform churn probability regardless of the states.

In Table 3, we summarize the out-of-sample negative LLH of the candidate models. Notably, compared with the null model, even when m equals to 0 or 1, both the losing streak model and the winrate model improve the LLH by more than 4000, while increasing m from 1 to 4 only improve the LLH further by less than 500. Thus, assuming $m = 1$ does not result in much loss in the goodness-of-fit of the models. When $m = 1$, the parameter of the losing streak model is given by $\rho_g^{win} = 1.32\%$, $\rho_0^{lose} = 1.62\%$, and $\rho_1^{lose} = 2.53\%$. The surge in churn probability from one loss to two consecutive losses reflects the players' negative sentiment towards a losing streak, and our stylized model in Section 3 reasonably captures the essence of this behavioral pattern.

5.3.   Power of Optimal Matchmaking

In this section, we test the power of optimal matchmaking, and validate the insights in Section 4. We consider a scenario where in each period, all the active players join the matchmaking pool and the outcome is revealed immediately. We adopt the losing streak model since it behaves almost the same as the winrate model in terms of predictive power, and is computationally tractable for optimization. We use the realized skill levels (13 total) and the realized engagement states after the fifth match as the initial input.

We compare three policies: SBMM, the optimal policy, and the random policy where a player has a uniform chance to be matched with any other active player. To compute the total engagement under the optimal policy, we simply solve the LP formulation Eq. (2) with a large enough T. In our case, we set $T = 1000$. The discount factor is 1. We use Gurobi to solve the formulation. In Table 4, we show the power of various policies compared to SBMM. SBMM is better than the

random policy, which shows that the status quo of SBMM is better than doing nothing. Notably, the optimal policy may improve the total engagement by 4.22-6.07%, depending on the choice of m.

Table 4   Relative Power of Candidate Policies Compared to SBMM

m	1	2	3	4
Optimal	4.22%	5.89%	6.07%	5.82%
Random	-2.08%	-3.80%	-5.05%	-5.81%

Next, we check the power of optimal matchmaking with a varying number of skill levels. Recall that in Proposition 4, the maximum power of optimal matchmaking over SBMM increases linearly with the number of skill levels. To verify this insight in a realistic setting, we now compute the relative power of optimal matchmaking, when the top or bottom K skill levels are considered for $K = 2, \ldots, 13$. In Fig. 1, we show a representative example when $m = 1$. It turns out that the power of the optimal policy monotonically increases with K regardless of how we add the levels (bottom-up or top-down), which is consistent with the insight we derive on the maximum power.

Finally, we investigate scenarios with AI-powered bots. We assume that every player has an α chance to be matched with a bot, and compare the performance of the optimal policy and SBMM. In Fig. 2, we show how the total engagement changes with α when $m = 3$. Notably, when α is reasonably small ($\leq 30\%$), the optimal policy can achieve the same engagement level with SBMM but with $\sim 15\%$ less bot matches. Thus, optimizing the matchmaking system can significantly reduce the bots needed and avoid the perils of a high bot ratio. On the other hand, as α keep increasing, the difference between SBMM and the optimal policy decreases. This is because when a high bot ratio can be tolerated, most players play with a bot and transition to an ideal state, making all policies similar.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, we present a modeling framework for matchmaking in competitive video games. Through sharp characterizations of a baseline model and a numerical case study based on real data, we provide several novel insights to industry practitioners. The current standard is SBMM, which solely matches players with the same skill levels. Although SBMM is intuitive and easy to implement, it does not maximize the long-term engagement. For the engagement-optimal matchmaking rule, we show that in the special case, the optimal policy myopically maximize the short-term reward in the next period, but also adjust player distribution for the long-term reward. We also highlight the significant improvement in player engagement that can be achieved using an optimal

**Figure 1** **Power of Optimal Matchmaking with K skill levels ($m = 1$)**

Figure 2 **Total Engagement with Different Fractions of Bot Matches ($m = 3$)**

matchmaking policy over SBMM. Surprisingly, the benefit increases linearly with the number of skill levels.

In addition, we provide new perspectives on controversial topics such as having AI bots and pay-to-win systems in competitive video games. Our results show that using an optimal matchmaking policy instead of SBMM may reduce the required bot ratio significantly while maintaining the same level of engagement. By investigating the interplay between pay-to-win strategies and the optimal matchmaking policy, we provide a novel viewpoint of PTW as a lever to control the distribution over the demographics of players. Importantly, we show that PTW may not necessarily hurt engagement. When most players are low-skilled, PTW can actually increase the overall engagement, and even make the low-skilled non-paying players better off. This potential positive externality on user engagement is in contrast with the negative public image of PTW strategies. Finally, using real data from an online chess platform, we show that players do indeed churn based on recent match outcomes and the optimal policy can have significant improvement over SBMM.

Acknowledgments

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Appendix A: Omitted Proofs

A.1.   Omitted Proofs from Section 2

Proof of Proposition 1.   Denote $\mathbf{v}_k = \{v_{kg}\}_{g \in \bar{\mathcal{G}}}$ as the vector of value (engagement) that 1 unit of players in level k can create. Note that v_{kg} is the average active time starting from state g in the absorbing Markov chain M_{kk} before absorption. By Theorem 3.2.4 in Kemeny et al. (1960), we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{v}_k &= (\bar{M}_{kk} + \gamma \bar{M}_{kk}^2 + \gamma^2 \bar{M}_{kk}^3 + \cdots)\mathbf{1} \\
&= \left(\frac{1}{\gamma} \left(I + \gamma \bar{M}_{kk} + \gamma^2 \bar{M}_{kk}^2 + \cdots \right) - \frac{1}{\gamma} I \right) \mathbf{1} \\
&= \gamma^{-1} \left(\left(I - \gamma \bar{M}_{kk} \right)^{-1} - I \right) \mathbf{1}.
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that by Theorem 3.2.1 in Kemeny et al. (1960), $\left(I - \gamma \bar{M}_{kk} \right)^{-1}$ always exists. Summing up players at all levels, we have

$$
V^{\mathrm{SBMM}}(\mathbf{s}^0) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \mathbf{v}_k^\top \mathbf{s}_k^0.
$$

$\square$

Proof of Lemma 1.   The claim is obviously true for $\gamma < 1$, since the amount of active player is non-increasing over time. Hence, we only need to focus on the case when $\gamma = 1$, which we prove by induction.

For the base case, consider the engagement of level 1 players. Because their winrate is at most 0.5, a positive proportion of level 1 players would experience $m+1$ consecutive losses and quit, for every $m+1$ rounds. Let $\epsilon > 0$ be the probability that a player quits after $m+1$ consecutive losses. After $m+1$ rounds of matches, a level 1 player starting from any state has at least $2^{-(m+1)}\epsilon$ probability to quit. Hence, a player's engagement is bounded by

$$
(m+1)(1 - 2^{-(m+1)}\epsilon) + (m+1)(1 - 2^{-(m+1)}\epsilon)^2 + (m+1)(1 - 2^{-(m+1)}\epsilon)^3 + \cdots = \frac{(m+1)(1 - 2^{-(m+1)}\epsilon)}{2^{-(m+1)}\epsilon}.
\tag{EC.1}
$$

The induction hypothesis is that the engagement is finite for players of level 1 to level k. We then show that the engagement is also finite for players of level $k+1$. From the induction hypothesis, the engagement from matches with players from levels 1 to k must be finite. Thus, we only need to consider engagement generated from matches with players of level $k+1$ to K, and show it is also finite. Note that level $k+1$ players' win rate is at most 0.5 since they are matched with players with at least the same skill level. Thus, following the exact same argument of the base case with players of level 1, we can show that a player's engagement is bounded by the same expression in (EC.1), which is finite. $\square$

Proof of Lemma 2.   Our proof relies on Theorem 2.3 in Ghate (2015), which requires showing that our LP formulation (2) satisfies the following five hypotheses. Let $X \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{\mathbb{N}}$ be a linear subspace. For an infinite primal LP

$$
V(P) = \sup \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} c_j x_j
\tag{EC.2}
$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} a_{ij}x_j = b_i, \ i = 1, 2, \cdots \tag{EC.3}$$

$$x_j \geq 0, \ j = 1, 2, \cdots \tag{EC.4}$$

$$x \in X, \tag{EC.5}$$

we assume for any $x \in X$

H1. $\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} c_j x_j < \infty$.

H2. $\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} a_{ij}x_j < \infty, \ j = 1, 2, \cdots$.

Further, let $Y \subseteq \mathcal{R}^{\mathbb{N}}$ be the subset of all $y \in R^{\mathbb{N}}$ such that

H3. $\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} b_i y_i < \infty$.

H4. For every $x \in X$, $\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} |a_{ij}x_j y_i|$ converges to some limit $L_i(x, y_i)$ for $i = 1, 2, \cdots$, and

H5. The above limits $L_i(x, y_i)$ have the property that $\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} L_i(x, y_i) < \infty$.

Then consider the dual problem

$$V(D) = \inf \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} b_i y_i \tag{EC.6}$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} a_{ij} y_i \geq c_j, \ j = 1, 2, \cdots \tag{EC.7}$$

$$y \in Y. \tag{EC.8}$$

By Theorem 2.3 in Ghate (2015), suppose $x \in X$ and $y \in Y$ are feasible to the primal and dual problems and are complementary ($x_j(c_j - \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} a_{ij}y_i) = 0$ for all j). Then x and y are optimal solutions to the primal and dual problems, and $V(P) = V(D)$.

For our problem in (2), let X to be the l_1 sequence space. Because of Lemma 1, choosing X be the l_1 sequence space is without of generality. We check hypotheses H1 to H5, respectively. For dual variables, we only consider y from l_∞ space. As we will show, any y from l_∞ space satisfy H3 to H5, and we only use such y in the following proofs.

Hypothesis H1 is satisfied because X is the l_1 space. Hypothesis H2 and H4 are satisfied since we have finitely many primal variables in each constraint of problem 2 and X is the l_1 space. Hypothesis H3 is satisfied since only the constraints associate with the initial period ($t = 0$) leads to nonzero values (thus finite), and y is in l_∞ space. Finally, for hypothesis H5, let A_i be the set of nonzero columns for row i. Note that we have

$$\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} L_i(x, y_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in A_i} |a_{ij}x_j y_i| \leq \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \sup_{i \in \mathbb{N}} |y_i| \sum_{j \in A_i} x_j = \sup_{i \in \mathbb{N}} |y_i| \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in A_i} x_j \leq 2|\bar{\mathcal{G}}| \sup_{i \in \mathbb{N}} |y_i| \sum_{j \in \mathbb{N}} |x_j| < \infty,$$

where the first inequality follows the fact $a_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ and Y is l_∞ space, the second inequality follows the fact that each primal variable x_j appears in two periods, so it shows up in at most $2|\bar{\mathcal{G}}|$ constraints in problem (2), and the last inequality follows from the fact that X is the l_1 space. $\square$

A.2.   Omitted Proofs from Section 3

Before proving results in Section 3, we first present a simplified formulation to the matchmaker's problem in (P). Recall that $\mathcal{P} := \{2w, 2\ell, 1w, 1\ell\}$. To begin, in any period $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$, matching flows $f_{2w,2\ell}^t$,

$f^t_{1w,1\ell}$, $f^t_{2\ell,2w}$, and $f^t_{1\ell,1w}$ can be set to zero without loss of generality. Taking flows $f^t_{2w,2\ell} = f^t_{2\ell,2w} = a \in (0, \min\{s^t_{2w}, s^t_{2\ell}\}]$ as an example, it can be represented by $f^t_{2w,2w} = a$ and $f^t_{2\ell,2\ell} = a$, since they induce the same evolution to players' demographics $\{s^{t+1}_{2w}, s^{t+1}_{2\ell}\}$ in the next period. We also use the fact that $f^t_{i,j} = f^t_{j,i}, \forall i,j \in \mathcal{P}$ to reduce the problem to 8 flow variables for each period, which is half of the original described in (P). Thus, we can rewrite the matchmaker's problem in (P) as

$$\max_{\{\mathbf{f}^t\}^\infty_{t=0}} \sum_{t=1}^\infty \left(s^t_{2w} + s^t_{2l} + s^t_{1w} + s^t_{1l} \right)$$

$$\text{s.t. } s^0_{2w} = f^0_{2w,2w} + f^0_{2w,1w} + f^0_{2w,1\ell},$$

$$s^0_{2\ell} = f^0_{2\ell,2\ell} + f^0_{2\ell,1w} + f^0_{2\ell,1\ell},$$

$$s^0_{1w} = f^0_{1w,1w} + f^0_{2\ell,1w} + f^0_{2w,1w},$$

$$s^0_{1\ell} = f^0_{1\ell,1\ell} + f^0_{2w,1\ell} + f^0_{2\ell,1\ell},$$

$$s^t_{2w} = f^t_{2w,2w} + f^t_{2w,1w} + f^t_{2w,1\ell}, \ t=1,2,..., \tag{FB}$$

$$s^t_{2\ell} = f^t_{2\ell,2\ell} + f^t_{2\ell,1w} + f^t_{2\ell,1\ell}, \ t=1,2,...,$$

$$s^t_{1w} = f^t_{1w,1w} + f^t_{2\ell,1w} + f^t_{2w,1w}, \ t=1,2,...,$$

$$s^t_{1\ell} = f^t_{1\ell,1\ell} + f^t_{2w,1\ell} + f^t_{2\ell,1\ell}, \ t=1,2,...,$$

$$s^t_{2w} = \frac{1}{2}\left(f^{t-1}_{2w,2w} + f^{t-1}_{2\ell,2\ell}\right) + f^{t-1}_{2w,1w} + f^{t-1}_{2w,1\ell} + f^{t-1}_{2\ell,1w} + f^{t-1}_{2\ell,1\ell}, \ t=1,2,..., \tag{ED}$$

$$s^t_{2\ell} = \frac{1}{2}f^{t-1}_{2w,2w}, \ t=1,2,...,$$

$$s^t_{1w} = \frac{1}{2}\left(f^{t-1}_{1w,1w} + f^{t-1}_{1\ell,1\ell}\right), \ t=1,2,...,$$

$$s^t_{1\ell} = \frac{1}{2}f^{t-1}_{1w,1w} + f^{t-1}_{2w,1w} + f^{t-1}_{2\ell,1w}, \ t=1,2,...,$$

$$f^t_{i,j} \geq 0, \ \forall i,j,t \in \mathcal{P}.$$

By merging the flow balance and evolution of demographic constraints, we can further remove s^t_i for $t > 1$, with only 8 decision variables per period:

$$\max_{\{\mathbf{f}^t\}^\infty_{t=0}} \sum_{t=0}^\infty \left(f^t_{2w,2w} + \frac{1}{2}f^t_{2\ell,2\ell} + f^t_{1w,1w} + \frac{1}{2}f^t_{1\ell,1\ell} + 2f^t_{2w,1w} + f^t_{2\ell,1\ell} + f^t_{2w,1\ell} + 2f^t_{2\ell,1w} \right) \tag{P'}$$

s.t.

$$s^0_{2w} = f^0_{2w,2w} + f^0_{2w,1w} + f^0_{2w,1\ell},$$

$$s^0_{2\ell} = f^0_{2\ell,2\ell} + f^0_{2\ell,1w} + f^0_{2\ell,1\ell},$$

$$s^0_{1w} = f^0_{1w,1w} + f^0_{2\ell,1w} + f^0_{2w,1w},$$

$$s^0_{1\ell} = f^0_{1\ell,1\ell} + f^0_{2w,1\ell} + f^0_{2\ell,1\ell},$$

$$f^t_{2w,2w} + f^t_{2w,1w} + f^t_{2w,1\ell} = \frac{1}{2}\left(f^{t-1}_{2w,2w} + f^{t-1}_{2\ell,2\ell}\right) + f^{t-1}_{2w,1w} + f^{t-1}_{2w,1\ell} + f^{t-1}_{2\ell,1w} + f^{t-1}_{2\ell,1\ell}, \ t=1,2,...,$$

$$f^t_{2\ell,2\ell} + f^t_{2\ell,1w} + f^t_{2\ell,1\ell} = \frac{1}{2}f^{t-1}_{2w,2w}, \ t=1,2,...,$$

$$f^t_{1w,1w} + f^t_{2\ell,1w} + f^t_{2w,1w} = \frac{1}{2}\left(f^{t-1}_{1w,1w} + f^{t-1}_{1\ell,1\ell}\right), \ t=1,2,...,$$

$$f^t_{1\ell,1\ell} + f^t_{2w,1\ell} + f^t_{2\ell,1\ell} = \frac{1}{2}f^{t-1}_{1w,1w} + f^{t-1}_{2w,1w} + f^{t-1}_{2\ell,1w}, \ t=1,2,...,$$

$$f^t_{i,j} \geq 0, \ \forall i,j,t \in \mathcal{P}.$$

Denote λ_i^t for $i \in \mathcal{P}$ as the dual variables (shadow price) for each demographic in period $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$. Then we can write the dual problem of (P') as

$$\min_{\{\lambda^t\}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{P}} s_i^0 \lambda_i^0 \qquad \text{(D')}$$

s.t.

$$1 \le \lambda_{2w}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1}, \ t = 0, 1, 2, \dots,$$

$$\frac{1}{2} \le \lambda_{2\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \ t = 0, 1, 2, \dots,$$

$$2 \le \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \ t = 0, 1, 2, \dots,$$

$$\frac{1}{2} \le \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1}, \ t = 0, 1, 2, \dots,$$

$$2 \le \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \ t = 0, 1, 2, \dots,$$

$$1 \le \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \ t = 0, 1, 2, \dots,$$

$$1 \le \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \ t = 0, 1, 2, \dots,$$

$$1 \le \lambda_{1w}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \ t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$$

Proof of Lemma 3. We work with the alternative formulation in (P') which has 8 flow variables each period.

(i) Let $f^t = (f_{2w,2w}^t, f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t, f_{1w,1w}^t, f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t, f_{2w,1w}^t, f_{2w,1\ell}^t, f_{2\ell,1w}^t, f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t)$ be the flow vector at time t. With (FB$_S$) conditions, the state $\mathbf{s}^t$ can then be expressed as $B\mathbf{f}^t$, where

$$B = \begin{array}{c} \\ s_{2w}^t \\ s_{2\ell}^t \\ s_{1w}^t \\ s_{1\ell}^t \end{array} \begin{array}{c} f_{2w,2w}^t \ f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t \ f_{1w,1w}^t \ f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t \ f_{2w,1w}^t \ f_{2w,1\ell}^t \ f_{2\ell,1w}^t \ f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t \\ \left(\begin{array}{cccccccc} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right) \end{array}.$$

Similarly, using the (ED$_S$) conditions, the state $\mathbf{s}^{t+1}$ can be expressed as $A\mathbf{f}^t$, where

$$A = \begin{array}{c} \\ s_{2w}^t \\ s_{2\ell}^t \\ s_{1w}^t \\ s_{1\ell}^t \end{array} \begin{array}{c} f_{2w,2w}^t \ f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t \ f_{1w,1w}^t \ f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t \ f_{2w,1w}^t \ f_{2w,1\ell}^t \ f_{2\ell,1w}^t \ f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t \\ \left(\begin{array}{cccccccc} 0.5 & 0.5 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0.5 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.5 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{array} \right) \end{array}.$$

If there exists a decaying steady state for some $c \in [0, 1]$, then there exists vector $\mathbf{f}^t \ge 0$ such that

$$A\mathbf{f}^t = cB\mathbf{f}^t \iff (A - cB)\mathbf{f}^t = 0.$$

Now we provide the null space of $A - cB$. When $c \ne (1 + \sqrt{5})/4$, the null space is given by

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0.5c/g(c) & (-c^2 + 0.5c + 0.5)/g(c) & -0.5c/g(c) & (-c^2 + 0.5c)/g(c) & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0.5c/g(c) & (-c^2 + 0.5c + 0.5)/g(c) & (-c^2 + 0.5)/g(c) & (0.5c - 0.5)/g(c) & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ (-c^2 + c)/g(c) & (-0.5c + 0.5)/g(c) & -0.5c/g(c) & (-c^2 + 0.5c)/g(c) & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ (-c^2 + c)/g(c) & (-0.5c + 0.5)/g(c) & (-c^2 + 0.5)/g(c) & (0.5c - 0.5)/g(c) & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \qquad \text{(EC.9)}$$

where $g(c) = c^2 - 0.5c - 0.25$. Note that $g(c) = 0$ if $c = (1 + \sqrt{5})/4$. In that case, the null space of $A - cB$ is given by

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{2} & 0 & \frac{3+\sqrt{5}}{3-\sqrt{5}} & 0 & \frac{2}{-3+\sqrt{5}} & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ \frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{2} & 0 & \frac{3+\sqrt{5}}{3-\sqrt{5}} & 0 & \frac{-5+\sqrt{5}}{3-\sqrt{5}} & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{2} & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{2} & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

If there exists a linear combination of rows in the null space resulting in all non-negative elements and at least one non-zero element, then we have found a valid flow vector $\mathbf{f}^t$ and thus a valid demographic $\mathbf{s}^t$ that decays steadily at a rate of c.

First, consider $c \in (\frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{4}, 1]$, which implies $g(c) > 0$. Then observe that elements in third column of Eq. (EC.9), representing flow $f_{1w,1w}^t$ are all negative. Hence, for any linear combination of rows in Eq. (EC.9), as long as the flow $f_{1w,1w}$ is positive, at least one of the element representing flows $f_{2w,1w}^t, f_{2w,1\ell}^t, f_{2\ell,1w}^t, f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t$ is negative. Thus, no steady state exists when $c \in (\frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{4}, 1]$.

Next, consider $c \in (0, \frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{4})$, which implies $g(c) < 0$. Note that elements in the second column of Eq. (EC.9), representing the flow $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t$ are all positive. Hence, for any linear combination of rows in Eq. (EC.9), as long as the flow $f_{2\ell,2\ell}$ is positive, then at least one of the element representing flows $f_{2w,1w}^t, f_{2w,1\ell}^t, f_{2\ell,1w}^t, f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t$ is negative. Thus, no steady state exists when $c \in (0, \frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{4})$.

Finally, consider $c = (1+\sqrt{5})/4$. In this case, we can easily find a non-negative flow vector $\mathbf{f}^t$ by summing up the third and fourth row, which gives $\left((1+\sqrt{5})/2, 1, (1+\sqrt{5})/2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0\right)$, representing SBMM, and any positive multiple of $\mathbf{s} = ((1+\sqrt{5})/2, 1, (1+\sqrt{5})/2, 1)$ can induce such flows. To see that no other policy can reach a steady state when $c = (1+\sqrt{5})/4$, note that we have to find a non-zero non-negative flow vector $\mathbf{f}^t$ with the use of the first two rows. For the first row, the sign of fifth entry is opposite with the eighth entry; for the second row, the sign of fifth entry is opposite with the sixth and seventh entry. Hence, there is no way to construct a feasible flow vector $\mathbf{f}^t$ with non-negative elements. Thus, no other policy besides SBMM can induce a decaying steady state when $c = (1+\sqrt{5})/4$. □

Proof of Lemma 4. For each flow that involves both high-skilled and low-skilled player, we can compare the outcome of one unit of such flow with SBMM flow that uses the same amount of players. A unit of $f_{2l,1w}$ uses the same amount of players as one unit of $f_{2l,2l}$ and $f_{1w,1w}$, but it leads to zero loss in the next period while SBMM loses a half unit of $2l$ players. One unit of $f_{2l,1l}$ or $f_{2w,1w}$ leads to the same losses in the next period compared to the SBMM flow of one unit of $f_{2l,2l}, f_{1l,1l}, f_{2w,2w}$, and $f_{1w,1w}$. Finally, one unit of $f_{2w,1l}$ leads to a one unit loss of $1l$ players in the next period, while the SBMM flow of one unit of $f_{1l,1l}$ and $f_{2w,2w}$ only leads only leads to a half unit loss of $1l$ players. Hence, to maximize the population in the next period, we should always maximize $f_{2l,1w}$ and set $f_{2w,1l} = 0$. For the rest of players, they can be matched arbitrarily as the outcome in the next period is the same as SBMM. □

Proof of Proposition 2. We solve the problem in (P') by considering its dual problem (D'). In each period, there are four constraints in the primal problem (P'). Thus, we assign dual variable λ_i^t, where $i \in \{1w, 1\ell, 2w, 2\ell\}$, to each constraint representing the evolution of a players' demographics group in the primal problem. We will fully characterize the transition of primal and dual sequences, and show optimality by checking primal/dual feasibility and complementary slackness.

We break down the rest of this proof into 7 steps. In each step, we analyze a scenario corresponding to a parameter regime, which is mutually exclusive to parameter regimes in other scenarios and collectively exhaustive. That is, in any period t, we have

- Scenario 1: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t$, and $s_{2w}^t \geq s_{1\ell}^t$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t$, $f_{1w,1w}^t = 0$, $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t$, and $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{1w}^t$;

- Scenario 2: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t$, and $s_{2w}^t \geq s_{1\ell}^t$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t = 0$, $f_{1w,1w}^t = s_{1w}^t - s_{2\ell}^t$, $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t$, and $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t$;

- Scenario 3: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t$, and $s_{2w}^t < s_{1\ell}^t$; The optimal matching flows are the same as those in Scenario 1;

- Scenario 4: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$ and $s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t$; The optimal matching flows are the same as those in Scenario 2;

- Scenario 5: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t$, $s_{2w}^t < s_{1\ell}^t$, and $s_{1\ell}^t \leq K_1 = \frac{18}{5}s_{2w}^t + \frac{9}{5}s_{2\ell}^t + \frac{3}{5}s_{1w}^t$; The optimal matching flows are the same as those in Scenario 1;

- Scenario 6: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t$, $s_{2w}^t < s_{1\ell}^t$, and $s_{1\ell}^t > K_2 = \frac{18}{5}s_{2w}^t + \frac{23}{5}s_{2\ell}^t - \frac{11}{5}s_{1w}^t$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{1w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t = f_{1\ell,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t$, and $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t - f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t$;

- Scenario 7: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t$, $s_{2w}^t < s_{1\ell}^t$, and $K_1 < s_{1\ell}^t \leq K_2$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{1w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t = \frac{9}{7}s_{2w}^t + \frac{23}{14}s_{2\ell}^t - \frac{11}{14}s_{1w}^t - \frac{5}{14}s_{1\ell}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t = f_{1\ell,2\ell}^t = \frac{5}{14}s_{1\ell}^t - \frac{9}{7}s_{2w}^t - \frac{9}{14}s_{2\ell}^t - \frac{3}{14}s_{1w}^t$, and $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t - f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t$.


Figure EC.1   Evolution of Players' Demographics

Note that Scenarios 1 to 5 correspond to the third row of Table 1. In such cases, the optimal policy simply maximize the matching between 2ℓ and $1w$, and do skill-based matching for the remaining players. Scenario 6 to 7 corresponds to the first two rows in Table 1. The reason we classify the aforementioned scenarios in this way is because of how the scenarios evolve over time, as shown in Figure EC.1. For example, at any period t, if we are in Scenario 1, then in the next period $t+1$, one can verify that we always stay in the parameter regime of Scenario 1 under the proposed matching policy. The dual variables for any state in Scenario 1 is constant over time. Similarly, once we reach Scenario 2 at time t, we always transfer to Scenario 1 at $t+1$.

For the rest of this proof, we show that the state evolves as Fig. EC.1, and our proposed matching policy is optimal in each scenario and its subsequent scenarios as the state demographics evolve. To be more specific, our proof goes through each scenario and shows the corresponding optimal matching flows in Table 1 are optimal. Note that by construction, the proposed matching policy in Table 1 is primal feasible, i.e., satisfying all constraints in (FB$_S$) and (ED$_S$). We establish optimality by constructing dual variables for each scenario and show that both complementary slackness and dual feasibility conditions hold (the primal feasibility can

be easily verified for our proposed policy). When possible, we write the corresponding dual variables with closed-form expressions. Our proof starts with Scenario 1 as it is at the end of all transitions (does not transition to other scenarios), then works backwards to parental scenarios. For each parental scenarios, we readily construct the dual variables for all subsequent scenarios, representing all the following time periods. For example, when the demographic state is in Scenario 2, we show it will transition to Scenario 1 in one period under the proposed matching policy. Then we only need to construct the dual variables for the current period and use the dual variables constructed in Scenario 1 for all subsequent periods, which we already have, to establish optimality.

Scenario 1: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t$, and $s_{2w}^t \geq s_{1\ell}^t$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t$, $f_{1w,1w}^t = 0$, $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t$, and $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{1w}^t$.

We first consider Scenario 1, and prove that it is the "end" of all scenarios in Figure EC.1. In other words, we shall show that once the state of players' demographics falls in Scenario 1, it will remain in Scenario 1. To see this, for some $\mathbf{s}^t = \{s_{1w}^t, s_{1\ell}^t, s_{2w}^t, s_{2\ell}^t, \}$ in Scenario 1, following the proposed policy, the state at $t+1$ is given by $s_{1w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}s_{1l}^t$, $s_{1\ell}^{t+1} = s_{1w}^t$, $s_{2w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t)$, and $s_{2\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}s_{2w}^t$. Then $s_{2l}^{t+1} \geq s_{1w}^{t+1}$ because $s_{2w}^t \geq s_{1l}^t$, and $s_{2w}^{t+1} \geq s_{1l}^{t+1}$ because $s_{2w}^{t+1} - s_{1l}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{2w}^t + s_{2l}^t - s_{1w}^t)$ and $s_{2l}^t - s_{1w}^t \geq 0$. Hence, $\mathbf{s}^{t+1}$ still belongs to Scenario 1.

Next, we show that the proposed policy in Proposition 2 is optimal for all subsequent periods once players' demographics satisfy Scenario 1. The optimal solution in Proposition 2 suggests that in Scenario 1, only 4 variables are non-zero while all other flows are zero in each period. Therefore, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
1 &= \lambda_{2w}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1}, \\
\frac{1}{2} &= \lambda_{2\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \\
2 &= \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \\
\frac{1}{2} &= \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1},
\end{aligned}
\tag{CS$_1$}
$$

as the complementary conditions corresponding to primal non-zero variables $f_{2w,2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1w}^t$, and $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t$, respectively, and have

$$
\begin{aligned}
2 &\leq \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \\
1 &\leq \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \\
1 &\leq \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \\
1 &\leq \lambda_{1w}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1},
\end{aligned}
\tag{DF$_1$}
$$

as the dual feasibility conditions corresponding to variables, $f_{2w,1w}^t$, $f_{2w,1\ell}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t$, and $f_{1w,1w}^t$, that are zero in the primal problem, respectively.

The following dual solutions:

$$
\lambda_{2w}^t = 5, \ \lambda_{2\ell}^t = 3, \ \lambda_{1w}^t = 9, \text{ and } \lambda_{1\ell}^t = 5, \quad \forall t,
\tag{EC.10}
$$

satisfies complementary slackness in (CS$_1$) and feasibility conditions in (DF$_1$). Thus, the proposed policy in Proposition 2 is optimal once the players' demographics fall in scenario 1.

Scenario 2: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t$, and $s_{2w}^t \geq s_{1\ell}^t$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t = 0$, $f_{1w,1w}^t = s_{1w}^t - s_{2\ell}^t$, $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t$, and $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t$;

In the second step, we consider Scenario 2, which will transit to Scenario 1 after matching under the purposed policy as we have stated in Figure EC.1. To see that, for some $\mathbf{s}^t = \{s_{1w}^t, s_{1\ell}^t, s_{2w}^t, s_{2l}^t\}$ in Scenario 2, following the proposed policy, the state at $t+1$ is given by $s_{1w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t - s_{2\ell}^t), s_{1\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t), s_{2w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t$, and $s_{2\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}s_{2w}^t,$. Then $s_{2\ell}^{t+1} \geq s_{1w}^{t+1}$ because $s_{2\ell}^{t+1} - s_{1w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t - s_{1\ell}^t) \geq 0$. Also, $s_{2w}^{t+1} \geq s_{1\ell}^{t+1}$ because $s_{2w}^{t+1} - s_{1\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t) \geq s_{1\ell}^t \geq 0$. Hence, $\mathbf{s}^{t+1}$ belongs to Scenario 1.

Therefore, we only need to show that in any period t such that players' demographics satisfy Scenario 2, we can find solutions to dual variables, induced by the purposed policy in Proposition 2, which satisfy the complementary slackness conditions and dual feasibility conditions. Note that in period t under Scenario 2, the non-zero primal variables are $f_{2w,2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1w}^t$, $f_{1w,1w}^t$ and $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t$. Therefore, by taking out the condition for $f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t$ and replacing it with the one for $f_{1w,1w}^t$, the complementary slackness conditions in (CS$_1$) change to

$$
\begin{aligned}
1 &= \lambda_{2w}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t-1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1}, \\
2 &= \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \\
1 &= \lambda_{1w}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \\
\frac{1}{2} &= \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1},
\end{aligned}
\tag{CS$_2$}
$$

in period t. Similarly, by taking out the condition for $f_{1w,1w}^t$ and replacing with the one for $f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t$, the dual feasibility conditions in (DF$_1$) turn into

$$
\begin{aligned}
2 &\leq \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \\
1 &\leq \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \\
\frac{1}{2} &\leq \lambda_{2\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \\
1 &\leq \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1},
\end{aligned}
\tag{DF$_2$}
$$

in period t. Note that the complementary slackness conditions and the dual feasibility conditions switch back to those in (CS$_1$) and (DF$_1$), starting period $t+1$, as player's demographics transit into Scenario 1. Therefore, we have

$$
\lambda_{2w}^s = 5, \lambda_{2\ell}^s = 3, \lambda_{1w}^s = 9, \text{ and } \lambda_{1\ell}^s = 5, \quad \forall s = t+1, ..., T-1,
$$

from (EC.10) and only need to find λ_i^t, where $i \in \{2w, 2\ell, 1w, 1\ell\}$, satisfy conditions in (CS$_2$) and (DF$_2$). Indeed, such solutions exist and one can verify that

$$
\lambda_{2w}^t = 5, \lambda_{2\ell}^t = 4, \lambda_{1w}^t = 8, \text{ and } \lambda_{1\ell}^t = 5,
\tag{EC.11}
$$

are the desired solution. Therefore, the proof for Scenario 2 is completed.

Scenario 3: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t$, and $s_{2w}^t < s_{1\ell}^t$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t$, $f_{1w,1w}^t = 0$, $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t$, and $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{1w}^t$;

In the third step, we consider Scenario 3, which shall transit to Scenario 2 after matching is done under the purposed policy. To see this, for some $\mathbf{s}^t = \{s_{1w}^t, s_{1\ell}^t, s_{2w}^t, s_{2\ell}^t\}$ in Scenario 1, following the proposed policy, the state at $t+1$ is given by $s_{2w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t)$, $s_{2\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}s_{2w}^t$, $s_{1w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}^t$, and $s_{1\ell}^{t+1} = s_{1w}^t$. Then $s_{2\ell}^{t+1} < s_{1w}^{t+1}$ because $s_{2w}^t < s_{1\ell}^t$, and $s_{2w}^{t+1} \geq s_{1\ell}^{t+1}$ because $s_{2w}^{t+1} - s_{1\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t)$ and $s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t \geq 0$. Finally, $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t - s_{1\ell}^t = \frac{1}{2}(2s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t - s_{1\ell}^t) \geq 0$. Hence, $\mathbf{s}^{t+1}$ belongs to Scenario 2.

Thus, we only need to check we can find solutions to dual variables, which satisfy the complementary slackness conditions and dual feasibility conditions. According to the policy in Proposition 2, in period t under Scenario 3, primal variables $f_{2w,2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1w}^t$, and $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t$ are non-zero. Thus, in period t, the complementary slackness and dual feasibility conditions are

$$
\begin{aligned}
1 &= \lambda_{2w}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1}, \\
\frac{1}{2} &= \lambda_{2\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \\
2 &= \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \\
\frac{1}{2} &= \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1},
\end{aligned}
\tag{CS$_3$}
$$

and

$$
\begin{aligned}
2 &\leq \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \\
1 &\leq \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \\
1 &\leq \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \\
1 &\leq \lambda_{1w}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1},
\end{aligned}
\tag{DF$_3$}
$$

respectively, where

$$
\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} = 5, \ \lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1} = 4, \ \lambda_{1w}^{t+1} = 8, \text{ and } \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} = 5,
$$

are from (EC.11), since players' demographic shall transit to Scenario 2 in the next period.

Finally, one can verify that

$$
\lambda_{2w}^t = 5.5, \ \lambda_{2\ell}^t = 3, \ \lambda_{1w}^t = 9, \text{ and } \lambda_{1\ell}^t = 4.5,
\tag{EC.12}
$$

are the desired solutions we are looking for, satisfying (CS$_3$) and (DF$_3$). This completes the proof for Scenario 3.

Scenario 4: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$ and $s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t = 0$, $f_{1w,1w}^t = s_{1w}^t - s_{2\ell}^t$, $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t$, and $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t$.

In the fourth step, we consider Scenario 4. For some $\mathbf{s}^t = \{s_{1w}^t, s_{1\ell}^t, s_{2w}^t, s_{2l}^t\}$ in Scenario 4, following the proposed policy, the state at $t+1$ is given by $s_{1w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{1w}^t + s_{1l}^t - s_{2l}^t)$, $s_{1\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{2l}^t + s_{1w}^t)$, $s_{2w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}s_{2w}^t + s_{2l}^t$, and $s_{2\ell}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}s_{2w}^t$. Then $s_{2l}^{t+1} < s_{1w}^{t+1}$ because $s_{1w}^{t+1} - s_{2l}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{1w}^t + s_{1l}^t - s_{2w}^t - s_{2l}^t) > 0$. Hence, the state shall either transit to Scenario 2 or stay in Scenario 4 after a match. Suppose at time $t = s$, players' demographic is in Scenario 4. Denote $\tau := \min\{t \geq s \mid s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t\}$, representing the time period players' demographic transit to Scenario 2. First, we argue that $\tau < \infty$. Suppose otherwise, we have $\tau \rightarrow$

∞, which implies that the players' demographic stays in Scenario 4 forever. Note that as long as players' demographic belongs to Scenario 4, no high-skilled players shall depart from the matching system since there are always enough low-skilled players to be matched with. Thus, we have

$$\sum_{t=s}^{\infty} (s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t) = \sum_{t=s}^{\infty} (s_{2w}^s + s_{2\ell}^s) \to \infty,$$

which contradicts Lemma 1. Therefore, we have $\tau < \infty$.

Next, under Scenario 2, according to the optimal policy in Proposition 2, we have $\{f_{2w,2w}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau-1}$, $\{f_{2\ell,1w}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau-1}$, $\{f_{1w,1w}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau-1}$, and $\{f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau-1}$ as the sequences that contain non-zero primal variables, whereas each elements in sequences $\{f_{2w,1w}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau-1}$, $\{f_{2w,1\ell}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau-1}$, $\{f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau-1}$, and $\{f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau-1}$ are zero.

To proof the proposed policy is optimal in Scenario 4, we verify that there exists sequences $\{\lambda_{2w}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau}$, $\{\lambda_{2\ell}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau}$, $\{\lambda_{1w}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau}$, and $\{\lambda_{1\ell}^t\}_{t=s}^{\tau}$, such that

$$\lambda_{2w}^\tau = 5,\ \lambda_{2\ell}^\tau = 4,\ \lambda_{1w}^\tau = 8,\ \text{and } \lambda_{1\ell}^\tau = 5, \tag{EC.13}$$

and for all $s \leq t \leq \tau - 1$, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
1 &= \lambda_{2w}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1}, & \lambda_{2w}^t &= 1 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1} \\
2 &= \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, & \lambda_{2\ell}^t &= 1 + \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} \\
1 &= \lambda_{1w}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad & \lambda_{1w}^t &= 1 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} \\
\frac{1}{2} &= \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1}, & \lambda_{1\ell}^t &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1}
\end{aligned} \tag{CS$_4$}
$$

as complementary slackness conditions and

$$
\begin{aligned}
2 &\leq \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}, \\
1 &\leq \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \\
\frac{1}{2} &\leq \lambda_{2\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \\
1 &\leq \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1},
\end{aligned} \tag{DF$_4$}
$$

as dual feasibility conditions.

For convenience, we also rearrange (CS$_4$) forwardly:

$$\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} = \lambda_{2\ell}^t - \lambda_{1w}^t + 2\lambda_{1\ell}^t - 1, \tag{EC.14}$$

$$\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1} = 2\lambda_{2w}^t - \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - 2\lambda_{1\ell}^t - 1, \tag{EC.15}$$

$$\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} = 2\lambda_{1\ell}^t - 1, \tag{EC.16}$$

$$\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} = 2\lambda_{1w}^t - 2\lambda_{1\ell}^t - 1. \tag{EC.17}$$

Equation (EC.16) follows the third equation of (CS$_4$). Equation (EC.17) follows the last equation in (CS$_4$) and (EC.16). Equation (EC.14) follows the second equation in (CS$_4$), (EC.16), and (EC.17). Finally, (EC.15) follows the first equation in (CS$_4$) and (EC.15).

Taking (EC.14)-(EC.17) into (DF$_4$), we can rewrite the dual feasibility conditions as

$$0 \leq \lambda_{2w}^t - \lambda_{2\ell}^t, \tag{EC.18}$$

$$0 \leq \lambda_{2w}^t - \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{1\ell}^t, \tag{EC.19}$$

$$0 \leq \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - 2\lambda_{1\ell}^t, \tag{EC.20}$$

$$0 \leq \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{1\ell}^t, \tag{EC.21}$$

Note that (EC.19) is implied by summing up (EC.18) and (EC.21). For the rest of this step, we show that the updated dual feasibility conditions (EC.18), (EC.20),(EC.21) are satisfied for all $s \leq t \leq \tau$. We will prove a stronger result: (EC.18), (EC.20),(EC.21) together with the following (EC.22) are satisfied for all $s \leq t \leq \tau$.

$$0 \leq -\lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{1\ell}^t, \text{ and } -1 \leq \lambda_{2w}^t - \lambda_{1w}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t. \tag{EC.22}$$

We prove this result by backwards induction with the help of the following lemma.

LEMMA EC.1. *Consider the dual sequences* $\{\lambda_{2w}^t\}_{t=s}^\tau$, $\{\lambda_{2\ell}^t\}_{t=s}^\tau$, $\{\lambda_{1w}^t\}_{t=s}^\tau$, *and* $\{\lambda_{1\ell}^t\}_{t=s}^\tau$ *that is defined by Eq. (EC.13) and Eq. (CS$_4$). Then we have:*

(1) $\lambda_{1w}^t \geq 5$, $\lambda_{1l}^t \geq 3$, *for* $t = s, ..., \tau$.

(2) $\lambda_{1w}^t \leq \lambda_{1w}^{t+1}$, $\lambda_{1l}^t \leq \lambda_{1l}^{t+1}$, *for* $t = s, \dots, \tau-1$.

(3) $\lambda_{2w}^t \geq \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}$, $\lambda_{2l}^t \geq \lambda_{2l}^{t+1}$, *for* $t = s, \dots, \tau-1$.

For the base step, we first verify that the conditions are satisfied for both τ and $\tau - 1$. The solution for τ is given by $\lambda_{2w}^\tau = 5$, $\lambda_{2\ell}^\tau = 4$, $\lambda_{1w}^\tau = 8$, and $\lambda_{1\ell}^\tau = 5$, and the solution for $\tau - 1$ is given by $\lambda_{2w}^{\tau-1} = 5.5$, $\lambda_{2\ell}^{\tau-1} = 4.5$, $\lambda_{1w}^{\tau-1} = 7.5$, and $\lambda_{1\ell}^{\tau-1} = 4.5$, and one can easily verify that all the conditions are satisfied. As for the induction step, suppose inequalities in (EC.18), (EC.20), (EC.21) and (EC.22) hold for all periods $t = k+1, ..., \tau$. Consider period $k \leq \tau - 2$. For (EC.21), we have

$$\lambda_{1w}^k - \lambda_{1\ell}^k = (1 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{k+1} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1}) - (\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{k+1}) = \frac{1}{2}(1 + \lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1}) \geq 0,$$

where the first equality uses (CS$_4$) to expand λ_{1w}^k and λ_{1l}^k, and the inequality follows Lemma EC.1(1).

Next, we check the inequalities in (EC.18) and (EC.20). Using (CS$_4$) to expand the two conditions, we have

$$0 \leq \lambda_{2w}^k - \lambda_{2\ell}^k$$
$$\Longleftrightarrow 0 \leq (1 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{k+1} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2\ell}^{k+1}) - (1 + \lambda_{2w}^{k+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{k+1} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1})$$
$$\Longleftrightarrow 0 \leq -\lambda_{2w}^{k+1} + \lambda_{2\ell}^{k+1} + \lambda_{1w}^{k+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1},$$

and

$$0 \leq \lambda_{2\ell}^k + \lambda_{1w}^k - 2\lambda_{1\ell}^k$$
$$\Longleftrightarrow 0 \leq (1 + \lambda_{2w}^{k+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{k+1} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1}) + (1 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{k+1} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1}) - 2(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{k+1})$$
$$\Longleftrightarrow -1 \leq \lambda_{2w}^{k+1} - \lambda_{1w}^{k+1} + \lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1}.$$

Note that these two inequalities are exactly (EC.22) in period $k+1$, which hold by our assumption.

Finally, we check (EC.22) for period k. Plugging in (CS$_4$) twice for period k and $k+1$, we can express $-\lambda_{2w}^k + \lambda_{2\ell}^k + \lambda_{1w}^k - \lambda_{1\ell}^k$ with variables from $k+2$:

$$
\begin{aligned}
-\lambda_{2w}^k + \lambda_{2\ell}^k + \lambda_{1w}^k - \lambda_{1\ell}^k &= \frac{1}{2}(1 + \lambda_{2w}^{k+1} - \lambda_{2\ell}^{k+1} - \lambda_{1w}^{k+1} + 2\lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1}) \\
&= \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{4}\lambda_{2w}^{k+2} + \frac{1}{4}\lambda_{2l}^{k+2} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{k+2} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1\ell}^{k+2} \\
&= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}(-\lambda_{2w}^{k+2} + \lambda_{2\ell}^{k+2} + \lambda_{1w}^{k+2} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{k+2}) + \frac{1}{4}(\lambda_{1w}^{k+2} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{k+2}) \geq 0
\end{aligned}
$$

where the the inequality follows (EC.22) and (EC.21) in period $k+2$. Similarly, we also have

$$
\begin{aligned}
1 + \lambda_{2w}^k - \lambda_{1w}^k + \lambda_{1\ell}^k &= \frac{1}{2}\left(\lambda_{2w}^{k+1} + \lambda_{2\ell}^{k+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1}\right) + \frac{3}{2} \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2}\left(\lambda_{2w}^{\tau-1} + \lambda_{2\ell}^{\tau-1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{\tau-1}\right) + \frac{3}{2} = 4.25 > 0,
\end{aligned}
$$

where the inequality uses the decreasing property of λ_{2w}^t, $\lambda_{2\ell}^t$ and the increasing property of $\lambda_{1\ell}^t$ from Lemma EC.1. Thus, all dual feasible conditions in (EC.18), (EC.20), (EC.21), and (EC.22) are satisfied, which imply that conditions in (DF$_4$) also hold for all $s \leq t \leq \tau$. This completes the proof for Scenario 4.

Scenario 5: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t$, $s_{2w}^t < s_{1\ell}^t$, and $s_{1\ell}^t \leq K_1 = \frac{18}{5}s_{2w}^t + \frac{9}{5}s_{2\ell}^t + \frac{3}{5}s_{1w}^t$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t$, $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t$, and $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{1w}^t$;

According to the proposed matching flows above, the state of demographics either goes to Scenario 2 or Scenario 4 in period $t+1$. If it goes to Scenario 4, following the proved optimal solution in Scenario 4, players' demographic eventually evolves to Scenario 2 at period $\tau \leq t+4$. That is, we summarize players' demographics in period $k = t+1, ..., \tau$ when $\tau = t+4$ in the next table. Note that in period $t+4$, we have

Table EC.1   Players' Demographics for Scenario 5

k	s_{2w}^k	$s_{2\ell}^k$	s_{1w}^k	$s_{1\ell}^k$
$t+1$	$\frac{1}{2}\left(s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t\right)$	$\frac{1}{2}s_{2w}^t$	$\frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}^t$	s_{1w}^t
$t+2$	$\frac{1}{4}\left(3s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t\right)$	$\frac{1}{4}\left(s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t\right)$	$\frac{1}{4}\left(-s_{2w}^t + 2s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t\right)$	$\frac{1}{4}\left(s_{1\ell}^t + s_{2w}^t\right)$
$t+3$	$\frac{1}{8}\left(5s_{2w}^t + 3s_{2\ell}^t + 3s_{1w}^t\right)$	$\frac{1}{8}\left(3s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t\right)$	$\frac{1}{8}\left(-s_{2w}^t - s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t + 2s_{1\ell}^t\right)$	$\frac{1}{8}\left(s_{2\ell}^t + 3s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t\right)$
$t+4$	$\frac{1}{16}\left(11s_{2w}^t + 5s_{2\ell}^t + 5s_{1w}^t\right)$	$\frac{1}{16}\left(5s_{2w}^t + 3s_{2\ell}^t + 3s_{1w}^t\right)$	$\frac{1}{16}\left(-4s_{2w}^t - s_{2\ell}^t + 3s_{1w}^t + 3s_{1\ell}^t\right)$	$\frac{1}{8}\left(s_{2w}^t + s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t\right)$

$$
s_{2w}^{t+4} + s_{2\ell}^{t+4} - s_{1w}^{t+4} - s_{1\ell}^{t+4} = \frac{1}{16}\left(18s_{2w}^t + 9s_{2\ell}^t + 3s_{1w}^t - 5s_{1\ell}^t\right) \geq 0,
$$

where the inequality follows $s_{1\ell}^t \leq \frac{18}{5}s_{2w}^t + \frac{9}{5}s_{2\ell}^t + \frac{3}{5}s_{1w}^t$. Therefore, we have $\tau \leq t+4$.

In Table EC.2, we list the dual variables when $\tau = t+1, ..., t+4$ respectively, and one can easily verify that the proposed dual variables satisfy complementary slackness and dual feasible conditions.

Scenario 6: $s_{2w}^t + s_{2\ell}^t < s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$, $s_{2\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t$, $s_{2w}^t < s_{1\ell}^t$, and $s_{1\ell}^t > K_2 = \frac{18}{5}s_{2w}^t + \frac{23}{5}s_{2\ell}^t - \frac{11}{5}s_{1w}^t$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1w}^t = f_{1w,2\ell}^t = s_{1w}^t$, $f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t = f_{1\ell,2\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t - s_{1w}^t$, and $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t = s_{1\ell}^t - f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t$.

<div align="center">

Table EC.2   Dual Variables for Scenario 5

</div>

$\tau = t+1$	$k = t$	$k = t+1$			
λ_{2w}^{k}	5.5	5			
$\lambda_{2\ell}^{k}$	3	4			
λ_{1w}^{k}	9	8			
$\lambda_{1\ell}^{k}$	4.5	5			
$\tau = t+2$	$k = t$	$k = t+1$	$k = t+2$		
λ_{2w}^{k}	6	5.5	5		
$\lambda_{2\ell}^{k}$	3.25	4.5	4		
λ_{1w}^{k}	8.75	7.5	8		
$\lambda_{1\ell}^{k}$	4.25	4.5	5		
$\tau = t+3$	$k = t$	$k = t+1$	$k = t+2$	$k = t+3$	
λ_{2w}^{k}	6.5	6	5.5	5	
$\lambda_{2\ell}^{k}$	3.5	5	4.5	4	
λ_{1w}^{k}	8.75	7	7.5	8	
$\lambda_{1\ell}^{k}$	4	4.25	4.5	5	
$\tau = t+4$	$k = t$	$k = t+1$	$k = t+2$	$k = t+3$	$k = t+4$
λ_{2w}^{k}	7.0625	6.5	6	5.5	5
$\lambda_{2\ell}^{k}$	3.75	5.625	5	4.5	4
λ_{1w}^{k}	8.75	6.625	7	7.5	8
$\lambda_{1\ell}^{k}$	3.8125	4	4.25	4.5	5

Following the policy above, the state of demographics in the next period is given by $s_{1w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{1l}^{t} - (s_{2l}^{t} - s_{1w}^{t}))$, $s_{1l}^{t+1} = s_{1w}^{t}$, $s_{2w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}s_{2w}^{t} + s_{2l}^{t}$, $s_{2l}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}s_{2w}^{t}$. This corresponds to Scenario 4 since

$$s_{2w}^{t+1} + s_{2\ell}^{t+1} - s_{1w}^{t+1} - s_{1\ell}^{t+1} = s_{2w}^{t} + \frac{3}{2}s_{2\ell}^{t} - \frac{3}{2}s_{1w}^{t} - \frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}^{t}$$
$$< s_{2w}^{t} + \frac{3}{2}s_{2\ell}^{t} - \frac{3}{2}s_{1w}^{t} - \frac{1}{2}K_2$$
$$= -\frac{4}{5}s_{2w}^{t} - \frac{4}{5}s_{2l}^{t} - \frac{2}{5}s_{1w}^{t} < 0.$$

Also, $s_{1w}^{t+1} - s_{2l}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}(s_{1w}^{t} + s_{1l}^{t} - s_{2w}^{t} - s_{2l}^{t}) < 0$.

Since $t+1$, we follow the proposed policy in Scenario 4 until we reach Scenario 2 at τ. One can verify that $\tau > t+5$, because following the proposed solution in Scenario 4, we have $s_{1w}^{t+5} = -\frac{1}{4}s_{2w}^{t} - \frac{1}{16}s_{2l}^{t} + \frac{3}{16}s_{1w}^{t} + \frac{3}{16}s_{1l}^{t}$, $s_{1l}^{t+5} = \frac{1}{8}s_{2w}^{t} + \frac{1}{8}s_{1w}^{t} + \frac{1}{8}s_{1l}^{t}$, $s_{2w}^{t+5} = \frac{11}{16}s_{2w}^{t} + \frac{5}{8}s_{2l}^{t}$, $s_{2l}^{t+5} = \frac{5}{16}s_{2w}^{t} + \frac{3}{8}s_{2l}^{t}$. To check it still belongs to Scenario 4,

$$s_{2w}^{t+5} + s_{2\ell}^{t+5} - s_{1w}^{t+5} - s_{1\ell}^{t+5} = \frac{9}{8}s_{2w}^{t} + \frac{23}{16}s_{2l}^{t} - \frac{11}{16}s_{1w}^{t} - \frac{5}{16}s_{1l}^{t}$$
$$< \frac{9}{8}s_{2w}^{t} + \frac{23}{16}s_{2l}^{t} - \frac{11}{16}s_{1w}^{t} - \frac{5}{16}K_2 = 0.$$

For period $t+1$ and forward, we use the dual variables proposed in Scenario 4, 2, and 1. Hence, we only need to show that the proposed policy as well as the corresponding dual variables at period t satisfies complementary slackness and dual feasibility in order to establish optimality. By complementary slackness, we have

$$\lambda_{2w}^{t} = 1 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1} \tag{EC.23}$$

$$\lambda_{2\ell}^{t} = \frac{1}{2} + \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1}, \tag{EC.24}$$

$$\lambda_{1w}^{t} = \frac{3}{2} + \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1}, \tag{EC.25}$$

$$\lambda_{1\ell}^{t} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^{t+1}. \tag{EC.26}$$

Then, we need to validate the dual feasibility condition corresponding to $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^{t}, f_{1w,1w}^{t}, f_{2w,1w}^{t}, f_{2w,1\ell}^{t}$, which are given by:

$$\lambda_{2\ell}^{t} - 0.5\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} \geq 0.5, \tag{EC.27}$$

$$\lambda_{1w}^{t} - 0.5\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} - 0.5\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} \geq 1, \tag{EC.28}$$

$$\lambda_{2w}^{t} + \lambda_{1w}^{t} - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} \geq 2, \tag{EC.29}$$

$$\lambda_{2w}^{t} + \lambda_{1\ell}^{t} - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} \geq 1. \tag{EC.30}$$

Taking (EC.23)-(EC.26) into the above inequalities, it is equivalent to validate

$$\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} \geq \lambda_{1w}^{t+1}, \tag{EC.31}$$

$$1.5 + \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} \geq 1, \tag{EC.32}$$

$$0.5 + 0.5\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1} + 0.5\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} \geq 0.5\lambda_{2w}^{t+1}, \tag{EC.33}$$

$$1.5 + 0.5\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1} + 0.5\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} \geq 0.5\lambda_{2w}^{t+1}. \tag{EC.34}$$

Among them, (EC.32) is trivially true, because λ_{1l}^{t+1} is in Scenario 4 and is greater than 5 by Lemma EC.1. (EC.33) and (EC.34) are directly from (EC.22). Thus, we only need to validate (EC.31). Note that in Scenario 6, we have $\tau \geq t + 5$. At $k = \tau - 4 \geq t + 1$, we have

$$\lambda_{2w}^{\tau-4} = 7.0625, \ \lambda_{2\ell}^{\tau-4} = 6.1875, \ \lambda_{1w}^{\tau-4} = 6.3125, \text{ and } \lambda_{1\ell}^{\tau-4} = 3.8125, \tag{EC.35}$$

by using the complementary slackness conditions recursively. By Lemma EC.1, we know that $\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} \geq \lambda_{2w}^{\tau-4} \geq \lambda_{1w}^{\tau-4} \geq \lambda_{1w}^{t+1}$, which completes the proof.

Scenario 7: $s_{2w}^{t} + s_{2\ell}^{t} < s_{1w}^{t} + s_{1\ell}^{t}$, $s_{2\ell}^{t} \geq s_{1w}^{t}$, $s_{2w}^{t} < s_{1\ell}^{t}$, and $K_1 < s_{1\ell}^{t} \leq K_2$; The optimal matching flows are: $f_{2w,2w}^{t} = s_{2w}^{t}$, $f_{2\ell,1w}^{t} = f_{1w,2\ell}^{t} = s_{1w}^{t}$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^{t} = \frac{9}{7}s_{2w}^{t} + \frac{23}{14}s_{2\ell}^{t} - \frac{11}{14}s_{1w}^{t} - \frac{5}{14}s_{1\ell}^{t}$, $f_{2\ell,1\ell}^{t} = f_{1\ell,2\ell}^{t} = \frac{5}{14}s_{1\ell}^{t} - \frac{9}{7}s_{2w}^{t} - \frac{9}{14}s_{2\ell}^{t} - \frac{3}{14}s_{1w}^{t}$, and $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^{t} = s_{1\ell}^{t} - f_{2\ell,1\ell}^{t}$.

In this scenario, the state of demographics will transit to Scenario 4 in the second period. Further, one can verify that the system reaches Scenario 2 in period $k = t + 4$, with $s_{2w}^{t+4} + s_{2\ell}^{t+4} = s_{1w}^{t+4} + s_{1\ell}^{t+4}$. Further, in period $k = t + 5$, the system goes to Scenario 1 with $s_{2\ell}^{t+5} = s_{1w}^{t+5}$. Hence, in period $k = t + 5$, we reach a degenerate case with $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^{t+5} = 0$. From the view of the simplex method, under the solution of Scenario 5.1, the reduced cost of $f_{2\ell,1\ell}^{t}$ is positive, so we take it in to the basic feasible solution, and move $f_{2\ell,2\ell}^{t+5}$ out of the basis. The positiveness of all the other flows remains. To see the solution is optimal, we list out the dual variables for the first $t + 6$ periods in Table EC.3, and for periods $k > t + 6$, we always have

$$\lambda_{2w}^{k} = 5, \ \lambda_{2\ell}^{k} = 3, \ \lambda_{1w}^{k} = 9, \text{ and } \lambda_{1\ell}^{k} = 5.$$

Then one can easily verify that the proposed dual variables satisfy complementary slackness and dual feasibility. $\square$

<p style="text-align:center">Table EC.3   Dual Variables for Scenario 7</p>

k	t	$t+1$	$t+2$	$t+3$	$t+4$	$t+5$	$t+6$
λ_{2w}^k	$50/7$	$737/112$	$85/14$	$39/7$	$71/14$	5	5
$\lambda_{2\ell}^k$	$849/224$	$639/112$	$285/56$	$32/7$	$57/14$	$22/7$	4
λ_{1w}^k	$1963/224$	$737/112$	$389/56$	$52/7$	$111/14$	$62/7$	8
$\lambda_{1\ell}^k$	$849/224$	$445/112$	$59/14$	$125/28$	$69/14$	5	5
Primal	Scenario 7	Scenario 4	Scenario 4	Scenario 4	Scenario 2	Scenario 1	Scenario 1

Proof of Lemma EC.1   (1) We prove the statements by backwards induction from period τ.

First, we show that $\lambda_{1w}^t \geq 5$, $\lambda_{1l}^t \geq 3$ for all $t = s,...,\tau$. This is true for τ according to (EC.13), which completes the base step.

The induction hypothesis is that $\lambda_{1w}^k \geq 5$, $\lambda_{1l}^k \geq 3$ for all $k = t,...,\tau$. Then for period $t-1$, from Eq. (CS$_4$) we have

$$\lambda_{1w}^{t-1} = 1 + 0.5\lambda_{1w}^t + 0.5\lambda_{1\ell}^t \geq 1 + 0.5 \cdot 5 + 0.5 \cdot 3 = 5,$$

$$\lambda_{1\ell}^{t-1} = 0.5 + 0.5\lambda_{1w}^t \geq 0.5 + 0.5 \cdot 5 = 3,$$

and the induction step is completed.

(2) We show that $\lambda_{1w}^t \leq \lambda_{1w}^{t+1}$, $\lambda_{1\ell}^t \leq \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}$, for $t = s,\ldots,\tau-1$. For the induction base step, we have $\lambda_{1w}^\tau = 7.5 \leq 8 = \lambda_{1w}^\tau$ and $\lambda_{1\ell}^\tau = 4.5 \leq 5 = \lambda_{1\ell}^\tau$. Our induction hypothesis it that for all $k = t,...,\tau-1$, we have $\lambda_{1w}^k \leq \lambda_{1w}^{k+1}$ and $\lambda_{1\ell}^k \leq \lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1}$. Now, consider period $t-1$. Take the difference between λ_{1w}^{t-1} and λ_{1w}^t, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\lambda_{1w}^{t-1} - \lambda_{1w}^t \\
&= 1 + 0.5\lambda_{1w}^t + 0.5\lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{1w}^t \\
&= 1 + 0.5\lambda_{1\ell}^k - 0.5\lambda_{1w}^k \\
&= 0.75 - 0.25\lambda_{1\ell}^{k+1} \\
&\leq 0.75 - 0.25 \cdot 3 = 0,
\end{aligned}
\tag{EC.36}
$$

where the first equality follows Eq. (CS$_4$), the third equality follows (EC.17), and the last inequality follows the fact that $\lambda_{1\ell}^t \geq 3$. Next, we show that $\lambda_{1\ell}^{t-1} \leq \lambda_{1\ell}^t$. Note that from the last equation in (CS$_4$), we have $\lambda_{1\ell}^{t-1} = 0.5 + 0.5\lambda_{1w}^t$. Since $\lambda_{1w}^t \leq \lambda_{1w}^{t+1}$, we have $\lambda_{1\ell}^{t-1} \leq 0.5 + 0.5\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} = \lambda_{1\ell}^t$.

(3) Finally, we show that $\lambda_{2w}^t \geq \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}$, $\lambda_{2l}^t \geq \lambda_{2l}^{t+1}$. For the base step, we have $\lambda_{2w}^{\tau-1} = 5.5 \geq 5 = \lambda_{2w}^\tau$ and $\lambda_{2\ell}^{\tau-1} = 4.5 \geq 4 = \lambda_{2\ell}^\tau$. The induction hypothesis is that for all $k = t,...,\tau-1$, we have $\lambda_{2w}^k \geq \lambda_{2w}^{k+1}$ and $\lambda_{2\ell}^k \geq \lambda_{2\ell}^{k+1}$. Now, consider period $t-1$. We have

$$\lambda_{2w}^{t-1} = 1 + 0.5\lambda_{2w}^t + 0.5\lambda_{2\ell}^t \geq 1 + 0.5\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} + 0.5\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1} = \lambda_{2w}^t,$$

where the equality on the two sides follows the first equation of (CS$_4$). Next, consider λ_{2l}^{t-1}. We have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\lambda_{2\ell}^{t-1} &= 1 + \lambda_{2w}^t - 0.5\lambda_{1w}^t + 0.5\lambda_{1\ell}^t \\
&= 1 + \lambda_{2w}^t - 0.5(1 + 0.5\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} + 0.5\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}) + 0.5(0.5 + 0.5\lambda_{1w}^{t+1}) \\
&= 1 + \lambda_{2w}^t - 0.25 - 0.25\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} \\
&\geq 1 + \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - 0.25 - 0.25\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+2} \\
&= \lambda_{2\ell}^t,
\end{aligned}
$$

where the first equality follows the second equation of (CS_4), the second equality follows the third and fourth equations of (CS_4), the first inequality follows the fact that $\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} \leq \lambda_{1\ell}^{t+2}$ and $\lambda_{2w}^t \geq \lambda_{2w}^{t+1}$. Thus, the induction step is completed and this completes the proof. $\qquad\square$

Proof of Proposition 3. (a) In order to prove the first statement, we consider the the linear program for the one-shot matching problem in (P_1) and use the same simplification tricks we used in Appendix A.2. Without loss of generality, we will set the engagement level of SBMM in the next period to be 1, which is equivalent to the constraint $1 = s_{2w} + \frac{1}{2}s_{2\ell} + s_{1w} + \frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}$. Thus, the following optimization problem selects the initial state of the demographics $\mathbf{s}$ to maximize the ratio of the optimal policy to SBMM for the one-period problem (we drop all the superscripts, representing time periods, since it is a one-shot problem):

$$\max_{\mathbf{f},\mathbf{s}} f_{2w,2w} + \frac{1}{2}f_{2\ell,2\ell} + f_{1w,1w} + \frac{1}{2}f_{1\ell,1\ell} + 2f_{2w,1w} + f_{2\ell,1\ell} + f_{2w,1\ell} + 2f_{2\ell,1w}$$

s.t.

$$1 = s_{2w} + \frac{1}{2}s_{2\ell} + s_{1w} + \frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}$$

$$s_{2w} = f_{2w,2w} + f_{2w,1w} + f_{2w,1\ell},$$

$$s_{2\ell} = f_{2\ell,2\ell} + f_{2\ell,1w} + f_{2\ell,1\ell},$$

$$s_{1w} = f_{1w,1w} + f_{2\ell,1w} + f_{2w,1w},$$

$$s_{1\ell} = f_{1\ell,1\ell} + f_{2w,1\ell} + f_{2\ell,1\ell}.$$

We verify that the optimal solution to the above optimization problem is $s_{2\ell} = s_{1w} = 2/3$, $f_{2\ell,1w} = 2/3$, and all other matching flows are 0. The objective value is $4/3$, which is the desired ratio. Denote λ_0 as the dual variable correspond to the constraint normalizing the engagement for SBMM to be 1. We verify the proposed solution using complementary slackness conditions:

$$0 = \frac{1}{2}\lambda_0 - \lambda_{2\ell},$$

$$0 = \lambda_0 - \lambda_{1w},$$

$$2 = \lambda_{2\ell} + \lambda_{1w},$$

where the conditions correspond to primal non-zero variables $s_{2\ell}$, s_{1w}, and $f_{2\ell,1w}$, respectively. There is a unique solution of dual variables solving the complementary slackness conditions: $\lambda_0 = 4/3$, $\lambda_{2\ell} = 2/3$, and $\lambda_{1w} = 4/3$. To complete the proof, we need to check dual feasibility conditions:

$$0 \leq \lambda_0 - \lambda_{2w}, \, 0 \leq \frac{1}{2}\lambda_0 - \lambda_{1\ell}, \, 1 \leq \lambda_{2w}, \, \frac{1}{2} \leq \lambda_{2\ell}, \, 1 \leq \lambda_{1w}, \, \frac{1}{2} \leq \lambda_{1\ell},$$

$$2 \leq \lambda_{2w} + \lambda_{1w}, \, 1 \leq \lambda_{2\ell} + \lambda_{1\ell}, \, 1 \leq \lambda_{2w} + \lambda_{1\ell}, \, 1 \leq \lambda_{2\ell} + \lambda_{1w},$$

representing zero state variables (s_{2w}, $s_{1\ell}$) and zero matching flows ($f_{2w,2w}$, $f_{2\ell,2\ell}$, $f_{1w,1w}$, $f_{1\ell,1\ell}$, $f_{2w,1w}$, $f_{2\ell,1\ell}$, $f_{2w,1\ell}$), respectively.

(b) Next, we turn our attention to the infinite horizon problem in (P'). Using a similar idea, we can solve an optimization problem to find the maximum ratio between the optimal matching policy and SBMM. Using Proposition 1, the value function of the baseline model under SBMM is

$$V^{\text{SBMM}}(\mathbf{s}^0) = 5(s_{2w}^t + s_{1w}^t) + 3(s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1\ell}^t), \quad t = 1, 2, \ldots, \tag{EC.37}$$

which we normalize to 1 without loss of generality. Thus, the following optimization problem selects the initial state of the demographics $\mathbf{s^0}$ to maximize the ratio of the optimal policy to SBMM for the infinite-horizon problem (we set $t = 0$ without loss of generality):

$$\max_{\{\mathbf{f}^t\},\{\mathbf{s}^0\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(f_{2w,2w}^t + \frac{1}{2} f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t + f_{1w,1w}^t + \frac{1}{2} f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t + 2 f_{2w,1w}^t + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t + f_{2w,1\ell}^t + 2 f_{2\ell,1w}^t \right) \tag{EC.38}$$

s.t.

$$1 = 5(s_{2w}^0 + s_{1w}^0) + 3(s_{2\ell}^0 + s_{1\ell}^0), \tag{EC.39}$$

$$0 = f_{2w,2w}^0 + f_{2w,1w}^0 + f_{2w,1\ell}^0 - s_{2w}^0,$$

$$0 = f_{2\ell,2\ell}^0 + f_{2\ell,1w}^0 + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^0 - s_{2\ell}^0,$$

$$0 = f_{1w,1w}^0 + f_{2\ell,1w}^0 + f_{2w,1w}^0 - s_{1w}^0,$$

$$0 = f_{1\ell,1\ell}^0 + f_{2w,1\ell}^0 + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^0 - s_{1\ell}^0,$$

and for all $t = 1, 2, ...,$

$$f_{2w,2w}^t + f_{2w,1w}^t + f_{2w,1\ell}^t = \frac{1}{2} \left(f_{2w,2w}^{t-1} + f_{2\ell,2\ell}^{t-1} \right) + f_{2w,1w}^{t-1} + f_{2w,1\ell}^{t-1} + f_{2\ell,1w}^{t-1} + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^{t-1},$$

$$f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t + f_{2\ell,1w}^t + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t = \frac{1}{2} f_{2w,2w}^{t-1},$$

$$f_{1w,1w}^t + f_{2\ell,1w}^t + f_{2w,1w}^t = \frac{1}{2} \left(f_{1w,1w}^{t-1} + f_{1\ell,1\ell}^{t-1} \right),$$

$$f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t + f_{2w,1\ell}^t + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t = \frac{1}{2} f_{1w,1w}^{t-1} + f_{2w,1w}^{t-1} + f_{2\ell,1w}^{t-1},$$

$$f_{i,j}^t \geq 0, \ \forall i, j \in \{2w, 2\ell, 1w, 1\ell\}.$$

Again, we use dual complementary slackness and feasibility conditions verifying the initial state $\mathbf{s}^0 = \{1/8, 0, 0, 1/8\}$, along with the optimal matching flows in Proposition 2, is the optimal solution to the above maximization problem. The objective value is $3/2$, which is the desired ratio.

With slight abuse of notation, denote the dual variable to the new constraint (EC.39) as λ_0. We show that under the optimal initial state where $s_{2\ell} = s_{1w} = 1/8$, we have $\lambda_0 = 3/2$, representing the maximum ratio. The proposed initial state is in Scenario 1. Based on the the transition in Fig. EC.1, we shall always stay in Scenario 1. We list the states in period 0, 1, and 2 in Table EC.4.

Note that in period 0, we reach a degenerate period with only one positive flow $f_{2l,1w}^0$, and in period 1 we reach a degenerate case with only two positive flows $f_{2w,2w}^1$ and $f_{1l,1l}^1$. Thus, for these two periods, we can use only part of the equations in (CS_1). To be specific, given our proposed primal solution, the complementary slackness equations are given by

$$0 = 3\lambda_0 - \lambda_{2\ell}^0,$$

$$0 = 5\lambda_0 - \lambda_{1w}^0,$$

$$2 = \lambda_{2\ell}^0 + \lambda_{1w}^0 - \lambda_{2w}^1 - \lambda_{1\ell}^1,$$

$$1 = \lambda_{2w}^1 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^2 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2\ell}^2,$$

$$\frac{1}{2} = \lambda_{1\ell}^1 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^2,$$

$$(\mathrm{CS}_1), \ t = 2, \ldots$$

and the dual feasibility constraints we need to check is

$$0 \leq 5\lambda_0 - \lambda_{2w}^0, \quad 0 \leq 3\lambda_0 - \lambda_{1w}^0, \quad 1 \leq \lambda_{2w}^0 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^1 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2\ell}^1,$$

$$\frac{1}{2} \leq \lambda_{2\ell}^0 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{2w}^1, \quad \frac{1}{2} \leq \lambda_{1\ell}^0 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^1, \quad \frac{1}{2} \leq \lambda_{1\ell}^1 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{1w}^2$$

$$2 \leq \lambda_{2\ell}^1 + \lambda_{1w}^1 - \lambda_{2w}^2 - \lambda_{1\ell}^2, \quad (\text{DF}_1) \text{ for } t = 0, \dots$$

We then list out the dual variables in period 0, 1, 2 in Table EC.4. For $t > 2$, we use $\lambda_{2w}^0 = 5$ $\lambda_{2\ell}^0 = 3$, $\lambda_{1w} = 9$, $\lambda_{1l} = 5$. Together with $\lambda_0 = 3/2$, one can verify that the proposed dual solution satisfies complementary slackness and dual feasibility constraints.

Table EC.4   Primal States and Dual Variables in Period 0, 1, and 2.

	s_{2w}^t	s_{2l}^t	s_{1w}^t	s_{1l}^t	λ_{2w}^t	λ_{2l}^t	λ_{1w}^t	λ_{1l}^t
$t=0$	0	1/8	1/8	0	11/2	9/2	15/2	9/2
$t=1$	1/8	0	0	1/8	5	4	8	5
$t=2$	1/16	1/16	1/16	0	5	3	9	5

□

A.3.   Omitted Proofs from Section 4

Before proving Proposition 4, we first show that for a set of initial demographics, denoted by $\mathcal{S}$, the optimal policy remains simple and informative. The set $\mathcal{S}$ consists of states $\mathbf{s}^t$ that satisfy

$$s_{k\ell}^t \geq s_{(k-1)w}^t, \quad \forall k = 2, \dots, K, \tag{a}$$

$$s_{Kw}^t \geq s_{(K-1)\ell}^t + s_{(K-2)w}^t, \tag{b}$$

$$s_{kw}^t \geq \frac{1}{2}\left(s_{(k-1)\ell}^t + s_{(k-2)w}^t\right), \quad \forall k = 3, \dots, K-1, \tag{c}$$

$$s_{2w}^t \geq \frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}^t, \tag{d}$$

$$\frac{1}{2}s_{Kw}^t \geq s_{(K-1)w}^t \geq \dots \geq s_{2w}^t \geq s_{1w}^t, \tag{e}$$

$$s_{K\ell}^t \geq s_{(K-1)\ell}^t \geq \dots \geq s_{2\ell}^t \geq \frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}^t, \tag{f}$$

$$s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t \geq s_{1\ell}^t. \tag{g}$$

For initial demographics in $\mathcal{S}$, the optimal matching policy (to be introduced in Proposition EC.2 below), induces the property that $s_{k\ell}^t \leq s_{(k+1)w}^t, \forall k = 1, \dots, K-1$. Lemma EC.2 characterizes the optimal matching policy and the corresponding value function. Lemma EC.2 states that as long as the initial demographics belongs to the set $\mathcal{S}$, then it is the best to maximize the matching flows between players in adjacent skill levels. In particular, the matchmaker wants to utilize players in the relatively low-skill level to save players in the relatively high-skill level. This optimality structure echoes the one in Section 3 with only two skill levels among players. Furthermore, note that the terms $4K - 4k + 5$ and $2K - 2k + 3$ in (EC.40) can be interpreted as the shadow price for demographics s_{kw} and $s_{k\ell}$, respectively, for all $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$. Since the shadow prices

are linearly decreasing with respect to k, we can conclude that the lower the skill level a player has, the more valuable they are to the matching system since they can be used to improve the engagement of players in higher skill levels. This intuition aligns with what we have observed in Section 3 with only two skill levels.

LEMMA EC.2 (**Optimal Policy when Demographics are in $\mathcal{S}$**). *If $\mathbf{s}^0 \in \mathcal{S}$, then for all $t = 0, 1, \ldots$, the optimal matching policy induces matching flows*

$$f^t_{Kw,Kw} = s^t_{Kw},$$
$$f^t_{(k+1)\ell,kw} = s^t_{kw}, \ \forall k = 1, \ldots K-1,$$
$$f^t_{k\ell,k\ell} = s^t_{k\ell} - s^t_{(k-1)w}, \ \forall k = 2, \ldots K,$$
$$f^t_{1l,1l} = s^t_{1l},$$

and the optimal value function of engagement in (1) *can be written as*

$$V^*_K(\mathbf{s}^0) = \sum_{k=1}^{K}(4K - 4k + 5)s_{kw} + \sum_{k=1}^{K}(2K - 2k + 3)s_{k\ell}, \quad \forall \mathbf{s}^0 \in \mathcal{S}. \tag{EC.40}$$

Proof of Lemma EC.2.   The proof follows in two steps. First, we show that given the proposed policy, $\mathbf{s}^t$ always stays within $\mathcal{S}$, and thus the solution is primal feasible. Second, we show that $\lambda^t_{kw} = 4(k - K + 1) + 1$ and $\lambda^t_{k\ell} = 2(k - K + 1) + 1$ satisfy dual feasibility and complementary slackness, so the policy is indeed optimal.

Step 1. If players' demographics satisfy conditions (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g), then under the proposed policy, in the next period the players' demographics will transition to

$$s^{t+1}_{Kw} = \frac{1}{2}\left(s^t_{Kw} + s^t_{(K-1)w} + s^t_{K\ell}\right),$$
$$s^{t+1}_{K\ell} = \frac{1}{2}s^t_{Kw},$$
$$s^{t+1}_{kw} = \frac{1}{2}\left(s^t_{k\ell} + s^t_{(k-1)w}\right), \quad \forall k = 2, \ldots, K-1,$$
$$s^{t+1}_{k\ell} = s^t_{kw}, \quad \forall k = 2, \ldots, K-1,$$
$$s^{t+1}_{1w} = \frac{1}{2}s^t_{1\ell},$$
$$s^{t+1}_{1\ell} = s^t_{1w},$$

since there are always less relatively "low" skilled players without losing record comparing to adjacent "high" skill players who just lost a game. Using the expressions of players' demographics in period $t+1$, we can verify that the conditions (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) all still hold in period $t+1$.

We start with condition (a). When $k = K$, we need to verify that

$$s^{t+1}_{K\ell} = \frac{1}{2}s^t_{Kw} \geq \frac{1}{2}\left(s^t_{(K-1)\ell} + s^t_{(K-2)w}\right) = s^{t+1}_{(K-1),w},$$

where the inequality follows condition (b) in period t. When $2 \leq k \leq K-1$, we need to verify that

$$s^{t+1}_{k\ell} = s^t_{kw} \geq \frac{1}{2}\left(s^t_{(k-1)\ell} + s^t_{(k-2)\ell}\right) = s^{t+1}_{(k-1)w},$$

where the inequality follows condition (c) in period t. Finally, when $k=2$, we need to verify

$$s_{2\ell}^{t+1} = s_{2w}^t \geq \frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}^t = s_{1w}^{t+1},$$

which holds according to condition (d) in period t.

For condition (b), we have

$$s_{Kw}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}\left(s_{Kw}^t + s_{K\ell}^t + s_{(K-1)\ell}^t\right) \geq \frac{1}{2}\left(s_{(K-1)\ell}^t + s_{(K-2)w}^t + 2s_{(K-1)w}^t\right) \geq s_{(K-1)w}^t + \frac{1}{2}\left(s_{(K-2)\ell}^t + s_{(K-3)w}^t\right) = s_{(K-1)\ell}^{t+1} + s_{(K-2)w}^{t+1},$$

where the first inequality follows conditions (a)- (b) and the second inequality follows (e)- (f) in period t.

Note that condition (c) in period $t+1$ is equivalent to

$$s_{kw}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}\left(s_{k\ell}^t + s_{(k-1)w}^t\right) \geq \frac{1}{4}\left(s_{(k-1)w}^t + s_{(k-2)\ell}^t + s_{(k-3)w}^t\right) = \frac{1}{2}\left(s_{(k-1)\ell}^{t+1} + s_{(k-2)w}^{t+1}\right), \quad \forall k=2,...,K-1,$$

where the inequality holds according to conditions (e) and (f) in period t.

Condition (d) is equivalent to

$$s_{2w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}\left(s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t\right) \geq \frac{1}{2}s_{1w}^t = \frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}^{t+1},$$

were the inequality follows immediately.

Next, consider condition (e) in period $t+1$. We break this condition into three parts. First, consider $\frac{1}{2}s_{Kw}^{t+1} \geq s_{(K-1)w}^{t+1}$, which is equivalent to

$$\frac{1}{2}s_{Kw}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{4}\left(s_{Kw}^t + s_{(K-1)w}^t + s_{K\ell}^t\right) \geq \frac{1}{4}\left(s_{(K-1)\ell}^t + s_{(K-2)w}^t + s_{(K-1)w}^t + s_{K\ell}^t\right) \geq \frac{1}{2}\left(s_{(K-1)\ell}^t + s_{(K-2)w}^t\right) = s_{(K-1)w}^{t+1},$$

where the first inequality follows from (b) and the second inequality follows from (e)-(f) in period t. Second, consider $s_{(K-1)w}^{t+1} \geq ... \geq s_{2w}^{t+1}$, which is equivalent to

$$s_{(K-1)\ell}^t + s_{(K-2)w}^t \geq ... \geq s_{3\ell}^t + s_{2w}^t,$$

where the inequality holds according to conditions (e) and (f) in period t. Third, consider $s_{2w}^{t+1} \geq s_{1w}^{t+1}$, which is equivalent to

$$s_{2w}^{t+1} = \frac{1}{2}\left(s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1w}^t\right) \geq \frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}^t = s_{1w}^{t+1}$$

which follows from condition (g).

Condition (f) in period $t+1$ can be verified using similar techniques as condition (e). The details are omitted.

Finally, condition (g) in period $t+1$ is equivalent to

$$s_{2\ell}^{t+1} + s_{1w}^{t+1} = s_{2w}^t + \frac{1}{2}s_{1\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t = s_{1\ell}^{t+1},$$

where the inequality follows from condition (e) in period t.

Step 2. Given the proposed policy, flows $f_{Kw,Kw}^t$, $f_{k\ell,(k-1)w}^t$, $f_{k\ell,k\ell}^t$, for all $k=2,...,K$, and $f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t$ are always non-negative, and be complementary slackness, so the associated dual constraints has to be tight. That is, for any t, we need

$$1 = \lambda_{Kw}^t - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{Kw}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{K\ell}^{t+1}$$

$$\frac{1}{2} = \lambda_{k\ell}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{kw}^{t+1}, \ \ k = 1,\dots,K$$

$$2 = \lambda_{k\ell}^t + \lambda_{(k-1)w}^t - \lambda_{kw}^{t+1} - \lambda_{(k-1)\ell}^{t+1}, \ \ k = 2,\dots,K.$$

Then one can verify that $\lambda_{k0}^t = 4(k - K + 1) + 1$ and $\lambda_{k0}^t = 2(k - K + 1) + 1$ is the unique dual optimal solution, and satisfies the other dual feasibility constraints that correspond to $f_{kw,kw}^t$ for $k = 1,\dots,K-1$, $f_{kw,jw}^t$, $f_{kw,jl}^t$, and $f_{kl,jl}^t$ for $k > j$, and $f_{kl,jw}^t$ for $k > j + 1$. □

Proof of Proposition 4. The lower bound of the ratio is constructed with the optimal policy in Lemma EC.2. In particular, we use initial demographics within $\mathcal{S}$ that give us the largest benefits. By Proposition 1, the value under SBMM is $5\sum_{k=1}^K s_{kw} + 3\sum_{k=1}^K s_{k\ell}$. Since we already know the shadow prices of each type of the player in this case, the problem can be reduced to a simple LP:

$$\max_{s_{kw},s_{kl}} \sum_{k=1}^K (4(K - k + 1) + 1)s_{kw} + \sum_{k=1}^K (2(K - k + 1) + 1)s_{k\ell} \tag{EC.41}$$

$$\text{s.t. } 5\sum_{k=1}^K s_{kw} + 3\sum_{k=1}^K s_{k\ell} = 1 \tag{EC.42}$$

$$\text{conditions } (a) - (g), \tag{EC.43}$$

where (EC.42) requires the value under SBMM to be 1, and the coefficients in the objective comes from Lemma EC.2. We now verify that $s_{Kw} = \frac{2}{8K+8}$, $s_{Kl} = \frac{1}{8K+8}$, $s_{1w} = \frac{1}{8K+8}$, $s_{1l} = \frac{2}{8K+8}$, and $s_{kw} = s_{kl} = \frac{1}{8K+8}$ for $k = 2,\dots,K-1$ is the optimal solution of the above LP, with objective value $\frac{3K^2+7K+6}{8K+8}$. First, note that the purposed solution is primal feasible. There are $2K$ number of primal variables, so there are $2K$ number of dual constraints. By complementary slackness, all $2K$ dual constraints are tight.

Next, we provide a set of dual variables satisfying complementary slackness conditions, which implies that the proposed solution is optimal (there is no extra dual feasibility constraints, since all the dual constraints are tight). Let λ_0 be the dual variable of constraint (EC.42). Let the dual variables of conditions (a)-(d) to be 0. Let λ_{ek}, $k = 1,\dots,K-1$, λ_{fk}, $k = 1,\dots,K-1$, and λ_g be the dual variables of conditions $(e),(f),(g)$, respectively. The following equality holds, which are derived from dual constraints:

$$2K + 1 = 3\lambda_0 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{f1} + \lambda_g,$$

$$4K + 1 = 5\lambda_0 + \lambda_{e1} - \lambda_g,$$

$$2K - 1 = 3\lambda_0 - \lambda_{f1} + \lambda_{f2} - \lambda_g,$$

$$4K - 3 = 5\lambda_0 - \lambda_{e1} + \lambda_{e2},$$

$$2(K - k + 1) + 1 = 3\lambda_0 - \lambda_{f(k-1)} + \lambda_{fk}, \forall k = 3,\dots,K-1,$$

$$4(K - k + 1) + 1 = 5\lambda_0 - \lambda_{e(k-1)} + \lambda_{ek}, \forall k = 3,\dots,K-1,$$

$$3 = 3\lambda_0 - \lambda_{f(K-1)},$$

$$5 = 5\lambda_0 - \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{e(K-1)}.$$

Then one can easily verify that the following solutions solve the system of equations above:

$$\lambda_0 = \frac{3K^2 + 7K + 6}{8K + 8}$$

$$\lambda_{ek} = 5(K - k + 1)\lambda_0 - 5 - (2K - 2k + 3)(K - k), \ k = 1, \ldots, K - 1,$$

$$\lambda_{fk} = 3(K - k)\lambda_0 - (2 + K - k)(K - k), k = 2, \ldots, K - 1,$$

$$\lambda_{f1} = -2(8 + 5K)\lambda_0 + 2(2K^2 + 5K + 6),$$

$$\lambda_g = 5(K + 1)\lambda_0 - 5 - 3K - 2K^2,$$

which proves the optimality of the proposed solution.

The upper bound follows from constructing a feasible solution to the dual problem of the linear program in (P_K) directly. With slight abuse of notation, denote λ_{kw}^t ($\lambda_{k\ell}^t$) as the dual variables of demographics with level skill level k who just won (lost) a game. One can verify that $\lambda_{kw}^t = 4(K - k + 1) + 1$ and $\lambda_{k\ell}^t = 2(K - k + 1) + 1$ is dual feasible. Hence, for any initial demographic, the value of optimal policy is at most $\sum_{k=1}^{K}(4(K - k + 1) + 1)s_{kw} + \sum_{k=1}^{K}(2(K - k + 1) + 1)s_{k\ell}$, and the ratio is

$$\frac{\sum_{k=1}^{K}(4(K - k + 1) + 1)s_{kw} + \sum_{k=1}^{K}(2(K - k + 1) + 1)s_{k\ell}}{5\sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{kw} + 3\sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{k\ell}} \le \frac{4K + 1}{5},$$

where the inequality follows by choosing the largest ratio among all the demographics.   □

Proof of Proposition 5. Before the proof, we first provide the primal problem in the presence of bots. The primal problem is slightly modified from Eq. (P'), so that every flow variable has α fraction that goes to the corresponding winning state w, and $(1 - \alpha)$ fraction that follows the original route:

$$\max_{\mathbf{f}^t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(f_{2w,2w}^t + \frac{1}{2}(1 + \alpha)f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t + f_{1w,1w}^t + \frac{1}{2}(1 + \alpha)f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t + 2f_{2w,1w}^t + (1 + \alpha)f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t + (1 + \alpha)f_{2w,1\ell}^t + 2f_{2\ell,1w}^t \right)$$

$$(\text{P}_{\text{Bot}})$$

s.t.

$$s_{2w}^0 = f_{2w,2w}^0 + f_{2w,1w}^0 + f_{2w,1\ell}^0,$$

$$s_{2\ell}^0 = f_{2\ell,2\ell}^0 + f_{2\ell,1w}^0 + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^0,$$

$$s_{1w}^0 = f_{1w,1w}^0 + f_{2\ell,1w}^0 + f_{2w,1w}^0,$$

$$s_{1\ell}^0 = f_{1\ell,1\ell}^0 + f_{2w,1\ell}^0 + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^0,$$

and for all $t = 1, 2, \ldots,$

$$f_{2w,2w}^t + f_{2w,1w}^t + f_{2w,1\ell}^t = \frac{1}{2}(1 + \alpha)\left(f_{2w,2w}^{t-1} + f_{2\ell,2\ell}^{t-1} \right) + f_{2w,1w}^{t-1} + f_{2w,1\ell}^{t-1} + f_{2\ell,1w}^{t-1} + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^{t-1},$$

$$f_{2\ell,2\ell}^t + f_{2\ell,1w}^t + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t = \frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha)f_{2w,2w}^{t-1},$$

$$f_{1w,1w}^t + f_{2\ell,1w}^t + f_{2w,1w}^t = \frac{1}{2}(1 + \alpha)\left(f_{1w,1w}^{t-1} + f_{1\ell,1\ell}^{t-1} \right) + \alpha\left(f_{2w,1w}^{t-1} + f_{2w,1\ell}^{t-1} + f_{2\ell,1w}^{t-1} + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^{t-1} \right),$$

$$f_{1\ell,1\ell}^t + f_{2w,1\ell}^t + f_{2\ell,1\ell}^t = \frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha)f_{1w,1w}^{t-1} + (1 - \alpha)\left(f_{2w,1w}^{t-1} + f_{2\ell,1w}^{t-1} \right),$$

$$f_{i,j}^t \ge 0, \forall i, j \in \{2w, 2\ell, 1w, 1\ell\}.$$

(a) First, when having α portion of bots, the SBMM value function can be derived as

$$V^{\text{SBMM}}(\mathbf{s}^t, \alpha) = \left(\frac{4}{(1 - \alpha)^2} + \frac{1 + \alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right)(s_{2w}^t + s_{1w}^t) + \left(\frac{4}{(1 - \alpha)^2} - 1 \right)(s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1\ell}^t), \qquad (\text{EC.44})$$

according to Proposition 1. Note that when $\alpha = 0$, the value function in (EC.44) reduces to the one in (EC.37) with shadow price 5 and 3 for players who have and lost the last game, respectively.

For a given α, to check whether there exists $\mathbf{s}$ such that $V^*(\mathbf{s}, 0) = V^{\text{SBMM}}(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$, one can solve Eq. (EC.38) but change Eq. (EC.39) into:

$$\left(\frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^2} + \frac{1+\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) (s_{2w}^t + s_{1w}^t) + \left(\frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^2} - 1 \right) (s_{2\ell}^t + s_{1\ell}^t) \leq 1, \tag{EC.45}$$

and see if the objective is greater than 1. Since the feasible region becomes smaller as α increases according to Eq. (EC.45), the objective is monotonically decreasing with α. Thus, using binary search, we numerically find that for $\alpha \leq 0.169$, there exists $\mathbf{s}$ such that $V^*(\mathbf{s}, 0) = V^{\text{SBMM}}(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$.

(b) The corresponding dual problem is given by:

$$\min_{\{\lambda^t\}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{P}} s_i^0 \lambda_i^0 \tag{D_{Bot}}$$

s.t.

for all $t = 0, 1, 2, ...,$

$$1 \leq \lambda_{2w}^t - \frac{1}{2}(1+\alpha)\lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}(1-\alpha)\lambda_{2\ell}^{t+1},$$

$$\frac{1}{2}(1+\alpha) \leq \lambda_{2\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}(1+\alpha)\lambda_{2w}^{t+1},$$

$$2 \leq \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - (1-\alpha)\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} - \alpha\lambda_{1w}^{t+1},$$

$$\frac{1}{2}(1+\alpha) \leq \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \frac{1}{2}(1+\alpha)\lambda_{1w}^{t+1},$$

$$2 \leq \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1w}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - (1-\alpha)\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1} - \alpha\lambda_{1w}^{t+1},$$

$$1 + \alpha \leq \lambda_{2w}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \alpha\lambda_{1w}^{t+1},$$

$$1 + \alpha \leq \lambda_{2\ell}^t + \lambda_{1\ell}^t - \lambda_{2w}^{t+1} - \alpha\lambda_{1w}^{t+1},$$

$$1 \leq \lambda_{1w}^t - \frac{1}{2}(1+\alpha)\lambda_{1w}^{t+1} - \frac{1}{2}(1-\alpha)\lambda_{1\ell}^{t+1}.$$

We first give an upper bound of $V^*(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$. Similar to the Scenario 1 in Proposition 2, we provide a feasible solution to Eq. (D_{Bot}):

$$\lambda_{2w}^t = \frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^2} + \frac{1+\alpha}{1-\alpha}$$

$$\lambda_{2l}^t = \frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^2} - 1$$

$$\lambda_{1w}^t = \frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^2} + \frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^3} + \frac{1+\alpha}{1-\alpha}$$

$$\lambda_{1l}^t = \frac{2}{(1-\alpha)^2} + \frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^3} - 1.$$

Thus, we have

$$V^*(\mathbf{s}, \alpha) \leq U(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$$

$$:= \left(\frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^2} + \frac{1+\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) s_{2w} + \left(\frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^2} - 1 \right) s_{2l} + \left(\frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^2} + \frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^3} \right) s_{1w} + \left(\frac{2}{(1-\alpha)^2} + \frac{4}{(1-\alpha)^3} - 1 \right) s_{1l}.$$

Let $a = \underline{a}(\alpha)$ be solution of $U(\mathbf{s}, a) = V^{\text{SBMM}}(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$, and $a = a(\alpha)$ be solution of $V^*(\mathbf{s}, a) = V^{\text{SBMM}}(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$. Then $a(\alpha) \geq \underline{a}(\alpha)$ because $V^*(\mathbf{s}, \alpha) \leq U(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$ for any $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ and function $V^*(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$ is increasing in α. Since $V^{\text{SBMM}}(\mathbf{s}, \alpha)$ goes to infinity as α goes to 1, we must have $\underline{a}(\alpha)$ as well. Hence, taking the limit on both sides of $\underline{a}(\alpha) \leq a(\alpha) \leq \alpha$, we have $\lim_{\alpha \to 1} a(\alpha) = 1$.   □

Proof of Proposition 6.   We prove the four parts separately.

(a) Consider two initial states, $\mathbf{s}_1 = (s_{2w}, s_{2\ell}, s_{1w}, s_{1\ell})$ and $\mathbf{s}_2 = (s_{2w} + (r+1)\beta s_{1w}, s_{2\ell} + (r+1)\beta s_{1\ell}, (1-\beta)s_{1w}, (1-\beta)s_{1\ell})$. We show that $V^{SBMM}(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}_1) = V^{SBMM}(0, 0, \mathbf{s}_2)$ and $V^*(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}_1) \geq V^*(0, 0, \mathbf{s}_2)$.

Note that one can easily verify $V^{SBMM}(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}_1) = V^{SBMM}(0, 0, \mathbf{s}_2)$ using the closed-form expression of V^{SBMM} in Proposition 1. Thus, we omit the details and only focused on the value functions under the optimal matching policy.

Consider the optimal trajectory when the initial state of demographics is $\mathbf{s}_2 = (s_{2w} + (r+1)\beta s_{1w}, s_{2\ell} + (r+1)\beta s_{1\ell}, (1-\beta)s_{1w}, (1-\beta)s_{1\ell})$ and there is no PTW system (referred as non-PTW problem). Let $f_{i,j}^t$ be the optimal flow between $i, j \in \{1w, 1\ell, 2w, 2\ell\}$ at time t, and s_i^t be the population at time t. From Proposition 2, we know that it may involve cross-level matching between 2ℓ and $1w$, as well as 2ℓ and 1ℓ (only happens when $t = 0$ in Scenario 6 and 7, after which the states transit to Scenario 1-4). We now show that we can collect at least the same value with demographic $\mathbf{s}_1 = (s_{2w}, s_{2\ell}, s_{1w}, s_{1\ell})$ and PTW (referred as PTW problem). Note that with PTW, the reward of 1 unit flow between $\bar{2}\ell$ and level 1 players are the same as $r+1$ units of flow between 2ℓ and level 1 players without PTW, due to the extra r unit of revenue. However, such flow use less amount of low players, which makes the level 1 players better off. This observation provides a natural way to construct a feasible flow for the PTW problem. To distinguish from the state of demographics s_i^t and the matching flows $f_{i,g}^t$ in the system without PTW, where $i, j \in (s_{2w}, s_{2\ell}, s_{1w}, s_{1\ell})$, we denote σ_i^t and $g_{i,j}^t$ as the state of demographics and matching flow in the PTW problem, respectively, where $i, j \in (s_{\bar{2}w}^t, s_{\bar{2}\ell}^t, s_{\underline{2}w}^t, s_{\underline{2}\ell}^t, s_{\underline{1}w}^t, s_{\underline{1}\ell}^t)$.

Next, we construct a specific set of matching flows in the PTW problem. In each period, consider the following proposed flows: $g_{\bar{2}\ell, \underline{1}w}^t = \min\{f_{2\ell, 1w}^t/(1+r), \sigma_{\bar{2}\ell}^t\}$ and $g_{\underline{2}\ell, \underline{1}w}^t = f_{2\ell, 1w}^t - (1+r)g_{\bar{2}\ell, \underline{1}w}^t$. Furthermore, at $t = 0$, if the matching system without PTW has non-zero flows between players in 2ℓ and 1ℓ, i.e., $f_{2\ell, 1\ell}^0 > 0$, then we set $g_{\bar{2}\ell, \underline{1}\ell}^0 = \min\{\sigma_{\bar{2}\ell}^0 - g_{\bar{2}\ell, \underline{1}w}^0, f_{2\ell, 1\ell}^0/(1+r)\}$ and $g_{\underline{2}\ell, \underline{1}\ell}^0 = f_{2\ell, 1\ell}^0 - (1+r)g_{\bar{2}\ell, \underline{1}\ell}^0$. In other words, we prioritize cross-level matching flows between $\bar{2}\ell$ players and level 1 players, and only after which is exhausted, we then use players in $\underline{2}\ell$ to match with level 1 players. For all the remaining players, we simply match them with other players in the same state.

Next, we show that with the initial state of demographics $\mathbf{s}_1$ the proposed flows $g_{i,j}^t$, where $i, j \in (s_{\bar{2}w}^t, s_{\bar{2}\ell}^t, s_{\underline{2}w}^t, s_{\underline{2}\ell}^t, s_{\underline{1}w}^t, s_{\underline{1}\ell}^t)$ is not only feasible, but also collect at least the same rewards as the non-PTW problem with initial state of demographics $\mathbf{s}_2$ and optimal flows $f_{i,g}^t$, where $i, j \in (s_{2w}, s_{2\ell}, s_{1w}, s_{1\ell})$.

To show the statement above, we prove that in the PTW problem, we must have $\sigma_{\underline{2}w}^t + (1+r)\sigma_{\bar{2}w}^t = s_{2w}^t$, $\sigma_{\underline{2}\ell}^t + (1+r)\sigma_{\bar{2}\ell}^t = s_{2\ell}^t$, $\sigma_{\underline{1}w}^t \geq s_{1w}^t$, and $\sigma_{\underline{1}w}^t + \sigma_{\underline{1}\ell}^t \geq s_{1w}^t + s_{1\ell}^t$ for any $t \geq 0$.

It is trivially true for $t = 0$ by construction. Now consider $t = 1$. First, recall that one unit of subscribed (level $\bar{2}$) player in the PTW problem correspond to $1 + r$ units of high-skilled (level 2) players in the non-PTW problem, due to the extra unit of revenue r generated by subscription fee. Thus, we must have $\sigma_{\underline{2}w}^1 + (1+r)\sigma_{\bar{2}w}^1 = s_{2w}^1$ and $\sigma_{\underline{2}\ell}^1 + (1+r)\sigma_{\bar{2}\ell}^1 = s_{2\ell}^1$. Second, in the non-PTW problem, if $f_{2\ell, 1\ell}^0 > 0$, then $f_{2\ell, 1\ell}^0$ unit of level 1 players will lose in the upcoming game and leave the system permanently. However, in a corresponding PTW problem, we have $g_{\bar{2}\ell, \underline{1}\ell}^0 \leq f_{2w, 1\ell}^0/(1+r)$ according to the proposed policy. Thus, instead of matched with high-skill players and leaving the system permanently in a non-PTW problem, we have $f_{2\ell, 1\ell}^0 - g_{\bar{2}\ell, \underline{1}\ell}^0$ unit of players in state $\underline{1}\ell$ are matched to other players in the same state in the PTW problem

and half of them can survive to period $t = 1$. Thus, we must have $\sigma^1_{\underline{1}w} \geq s^1_{1w}$, and $\sigma^1_{\underline{1}w} + \sigma^1_{\underline{1}\ell} \geq s^1_{1w} + s^1_{1\ell}$. Third, in a non-PTW problem, if we have $f^0_{2\ell,1w} > 0$, then we have $f^0_{2\ell,1w}$ unit of players in state $1w$ transfer to state 1ℓ just prior to period $t = 1$. However, in a corresponding PTW problem, we have $g^0_{2\ell,\underline{1}w} \leq f^0_{2\ell,1w}/(1+r)$ according to the proposed policy. Thus, instead of matching with high-skilled players, we have $f^0_{2\ell,1w} - g^0_{2\ell,\underline{1}w}$ unit of $\underline{1}w$ players matched with other players in the same state. As a result, just prior to period $t = 1$, we have half of the players in the aforementioned flow with size $f^0_{2\ell,1w} - g^0_{2\ell,\underline{1}w}$ remain in $\underline{1}w$ and half of them transfer to $\underline{1}\ell$. Hence, we still have $\sigma^1_{\underline{1}w} \geq s^1_{1w}$, and $\sigma^1_{\underline{1}w} + \sigma^1_{\underline{1}\ell} \geq s^1_{1w} + s^1_{1\ell}$.

For $t \geq 1$, we only need to consider the matching flow between $1w$ and 2ℓ (since Scenario 5-7 in the proof of Proposition 2, which involves other cross-skill matching, only occurs in period $t = 0$). At $t + 1$, $\sigma^1_{\underline{2}w} + (1+r)\sigma^1_{\overline{2}w} = s^1_{2w}$ and $\sigma^1_{\underline{2}\ell} + (1+r)\sigma^1_{\overline{2}\ell} = s^1_{2\ell}$ still hold for the same reason as in $t = 1$. If in a non-PTW problem, we have $f^{t-1}_{2\ell,1w} > 0$. Then using the exact same third argument in the proof for period $t = 1$, we can show that we still have $\sigma^1_{\underline{1}w} \geq s^1_{1w}$, and $\sigma^1_{\underline{1}w} + \sigma^1_{\underline{1}\ell} \geq s^1_{1w} + s^1_{1\ell}$. The reason is the same as before: some of the low-skill players who are matched with high-skilled players in a non-PTW problem shall be matched to other low-skill players in a PTW problem, which leads to less players transferring to state $\underline{1}\ell$ and more to $\underline{1}w$ instead.

Since we have $\sigma^t_{\underline{2}l} + (1+r)\sigma^t_{\overline{2}l} = s^t_{2l}$ and $\sigma^t_{\underline{1}w} \geq s^t_{1w}$, the proposed flow is feasible because for any $t \geq 1$ all matching flows are either skill-based or between $\overline{2}\ell$, $\underline{2}\ell$, and $\underline{1}w$ players, which are determined by $f^t_{2l,1w}$ in a corresponding non-PTW problem. Also, in every period we collect reward no less than the non-PTW problem because the reward we collect from high-skilled players is $\sum_{i=w,l}(\sigma^t_{\underline{2}i} + (1+r)\sigma^t_{\overline{2}i}) = s^t_{2w} + s^t_{2l}$, and the reward from low-skilled problem is $\sigma^t_{\underline{1}w} + \sigma^t_{\underline{1}\ell}$ which we have shown is no less than $s^t_{1w} + s^t_{1\ell}$.

(b) We show that unsubscribed high-skilled players in $\underline{2}w$ ($\underline{2}\ell$) would only be matched with any unsubscribed low-skilled players after all the subscribed players in $\overline{2}w$ ($\overline{2}\ell$) have matched with unsubscribed low-skilled players.

We prove the statement above by contradiction. Suppose on the optimal trajectory, the flow between high-skilled non-paying players in $\underline{2}i$ and low-skilled unsubscribed players $\underline{1}j$ are positive for some $i, j = w, \ell$, while there exists subscribed players $\overline{2}i$ who are matched by skill levels. Then by matching $\overline{2}i$ with $\underline{1}j$, we can collect strictly more rewards in the current period, and a player in $\overline{2}i$ would replace a player $\underline{2}i$ in all the subsequent periods. Hence, the solution cannot be optimal.

(c) We show that if $s^0_{2w} + s^0_{2\ell} \geq s^0_{1w} + s^0_{1\ell}$, then $ENG(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0) < V^*(0, 0, \mathbf{s}^0)$. Furthermore, there exists a threshold $\bar{r}$ such that $V^*(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0) \geq V^*(0, 0, \mathbf{s}^0)$ if and only if $r \geq \bar{r}$.

We first show that $ENG(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0) \leq V^*(0, 0, \mathbf{s}^0)$. The engagement $ENG(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0)$ is at most $V^*(\beta, 0, \mathbf{s}^0)$, which is the optimal engagement with the same demographic but without revenue. We now show that $V^*(\beta, 0, \mathbf{s}^0) \leq V^*(0, 0, \mathbf{s}^0)$, and the equality only holds when we do not have low players at all.

When the high-skilled players are more than low-skilled players in a non-PTW system, we are in Scenario 1-3 in the proof of Proposition 2. Note that for these scenarios we have explicit shadow prices for each type of players. We now discuss the three scenarios separately.

Consider Scenario 1: $s^0_{2w} + s^0_{2\ell} \geq s^0_{1w} + s^0_{1\ell}$, $s^0_{2\ell} \geq s^0_{1w}$, and $s^0_{2w} \geq s^0_{1\ell}$. The shadow price in this case is 5,3,9,5, respectively. The PTW system shift $1w$ (1ℓ) player to $2w$ (2ℓ), so with PTW the initial demographic is still

in scenario 1. The total value change will be $(5-9)\beta s_{1w}^0 + (3-5)s_{1\ell}^0 \le 0$, where the equality only holds when $s_{1w}^0 = s_{1\ell}^0 = 0$.

Consider Scenario 2: $s_{2w}^0 + s_{2\ell}^0 \ge s_{1w}^0 + s_{1\ell}^0$, $s_{2\ell}^0 < s_{1w}^0$, and $s_{2w}^0 \ge s_{1\ell}^0$; The shadow price in this case is 5,4,8,5, respectively. The PTW system shift $1w$ (1ℓ) player to $2w$ (2ℓ), so with PTW the initial demographic is either in Scenario 1 or Scenario 2. If it remains in Scenario 2, then the total value change will be $(5-8)\beta s_{1w}^0 + (4-5)s_{1\ell}^0 < 0$ because now we have $s_{1w}^0 > s_{2\ell}^0 \ge 0$. If the state of demographics transits to Scenario 1, the total value change would be

$$5(s_{2w}^0 + \beta s_{1w}^0) + 3(s_{2\ell}^0 + \beta s_{1\ell}^0) + 9(1-\beta)s_{1w}^0 + 5(1-\beta)s_{1\ell}^0 - 5s_{2w}^0 - 4s_{2\ell}^0 - 8s_{1w}^0 - 5s_{1\ell}^0$$

$$= -s_{2\ell}^0 + (1-4\beta)s_{1w}^0 - 2\beta s_{1\ell}^0$$

$$\le -s_{2\ell}^0 + (1-4\beta)\frac{s_{2\ell}^0 + \beta s_{1\ell}^0}{1-\beta} - 2\beta s_{1\ell}^0 \tag{EC.46}$$

$$= \left(-1 + \frac{1-4\beta}{1-\beta}\right)s_{2\ell}^0 + \left(-2\beta + \frac{1-4\beta}{1-\beta}\right)s_{1\ell}^0 < 0, \tag{EC.47}$$

where Eq. (EC.46) comes from the fact that if the demographic transfer to Scenario 1, we must have $s_{2\ell}^0 + \beta s_{1\ell}^0 \ge (1-\beta)s_{1w}^0$. Eq. (EC.47) comes from the fact that $-1 + \frac{1-4\beta}{1-\beta}$ and $-2\beta + \frac{1-4\beta}{1-\beta\beta}$ are both negative when $\beta \in (0,1)$, and to make $s_{2\ell}^0 + \beta s_{1\ell}^0 \ge (1-\beta)s_{1w}^0$, one of $s_{2\ell}^0$ and $s_{1\ell}^0$ has to be positive.

Finally, consider Scenario 3: $s_{2w}^0 + s_{2\ell}^0 \ge s_{1w}^0 + s_{1\ell}^0$, $s_{2\ell}^0 \ge s_{1w}^0$, and $s_{2w}^0 < s_{1\ell}^0$. The shadow prices in this scenario is 5.5,3,9,4.5. The PTW system shift $1w$ (1ℓ) player to $2w$ (2ℓ), so with PTW the initial demographic is either in Scenario 1 or Scenario 3. If it remains in Scenario 3, then the total value change will be $(5.5-9)\beta s_{1w}^0 + (3-4.5)s_{1\ell}^0 < 0$ we cause now $s_{1\ell}^0 > s_{2w}^0 \ge 0$. If the demographic transfer to Scenario 1, to total value change would be

$$5(s_{2w}^0 + \beta s_{1w}^0) + 3(s_{2\ell}^0 + \beta s_{1\ell}^0) + 9(1-\beta)s_{1w}^0 + 5(1-\beta)s_{1\ell}^0 - 5.5s_{2w}^0 - 3s_{2\ell}^0 - 9s_{1w}^0 - 4.5s_{1\ell}^0$$

$$= -0.5s_{2w}^0 - 4\beta s_{1w}^0 + (0.5-2\beta)s_{1\ell}^0$$

$$\le -0.5s_{2w}^0 - 4\beta s_{1w}^0 + (0.5-2\beta)\frac{s_{2w}^0 + \beta s_{1w}^0}{1-\beta} \tag{EC.48}$$

$$= \left(-0.5 + \frac{0.5-2\beta}{1-\beta}\right)s_{2w}^0 + \left(-4\beta + \frac{(0.5-2\beta)\beta}{1-\beta}\right)s_{1w}^0 < 0, \tag{EC.49}$$

where Eq. (EC.48) comes from the fact that if the demographic transfer to Scenario 1, we must have $s_{2w}^0 + \beta s_{1w}^0 \ge (1-\beta)s_{1\ell}^0$. The inequality in Eq. (EC.47) comes from the fact that $-0.5 + \frac{0.5-2\beta}{1-\beta}$ and $-4\beta + \frac{(0.5-2\beta)\beta}{1-\beta}$ are both negative when $\beta \in (0,1)$, and to make $s_{2w}^0 + \beta s_{1w}^0 \ge (1-\beta)s_{1\ell}^0$, one of s_{2w}^0 and s_{1w}^0 has to be positive.

We have shown that $V^*(\beta, 0, \mathbf{s}^0) < V^*(0, 0, \mathbf{s}^0)$ when there are positive amount of low players. It is easy to see that $V^*(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0)$ increases monotonically with r, and goes to infinity as r goes to infinity. Hence, there exists a threshold $\bar{r} > 0$ such that $V^*(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0) > V^*(0, 0, \mathbf{s}^0)$ if and only if $r > \bar{r}$.

(d) Fix $s_{2w}^0/s_{2\ell}^0$ and $s_{1w}^0/s_{1\ell}^0$ and vary $(s_{2w}^0 + s_{2\ell}^0)/(s_{1w}^0 + s_{1\ell}^0)$. We show that if the ratio of high- over low-skilled players is sufficiently small, there is $V^*(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0) \ge V^*(0, 0, \mathbf{s}^0)$ even if $r = 0$.

Consider $\mathbf{s}^0$ such that $(s_{2w}^0 + s_{2\ell}^0)/(s_{1w}^0 + s_{1\ell}^0) = 0$, i.e., there are only low players. Then the optimal matching is simply SBMM. In presence of PTW system, some of the low player now becomes high player, which enables cross-level matchmaking, and we must have $V^*(\beta, 0, \mathbf{s}^0) > V^*(0, 0, \mathbf{s}^0)$. That said, even there is no revenue, the engagement is still higher thanks to the change in demographic distribution. For $r \ge 0$, we must have $V^*(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0) \ge V^*(\beta, 0, \mathbf{s}^0) > V^*(0, 0, \mathbf{s}^0)$. Finally, note that when $r = 0$, we have $V^*(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0) = ENG(\beta, r, \mathbf{s}^0)$, i.e., the value of matchmaking is solely made by player engagement.

Appendix B: Possible Extensions

We point out that our framework is flexible enough to allow for various extensions that still result in a nice LP formulation. We discuss a few assumptions that can be easily relaxed for industry practitioners below.

1. A draw/tie outcome can be easily added, since our model only depends on the aggregate transition matrix M_{kk}.

2. If in each period, only α fraction of the idle players want to play, then we can simply multiply α on the right-hand-side of (FB) and add $(1-\alpha)\mathbf{s}_k^{t+1}$ on the right-hand-side of (ED).

3. If the match duration is not one period, we can modify (ED) so that the match flow returns to the demographics after a positive and random delay.

4. New players whose amount are linear functions of past history can be introduced easily by modifying (ED).

5. Changes of player skill levels over time can be considered by modifying (ED).

Appendix C: Omitted Table

Table EC.5   Winrate Used in Section 5

Level Difference	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Winrate	0.500	0.596	0.690	0.776	0.844	0.893	0.924	0.936	0.948	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000