### **CONTACT INFORMATION**

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kyleraze.com **3** github.com/kyleraze **3** 

### EXPERIENCE

U.S. Census Bureau Suitland, MD

Economist, Center for Economic Studies May 2023 – Present

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Washington, DC

Economist, Office of General Counsel – Research & Analytic Services August 2022 – May 2023

### **EDUCATION**

University of OregonEugene, ORPh.D., EconomicsJune 2022M.S., EconomicsDecember 2017

B.A., magna cum laude, Economics and Political Science (with honors)

June 2015

### RESEARCH

## Areas of expertise

Applied microeconometrics, economics of education, labor economics, public economics

### Peer-reviewed publications

"Does the Salience of Race Mitigate Gaps in Disciplinary Outcomes? Evidence from School Fights," *Economics of Education Review*, 2024, 102:102578 (with Glen Waddell).

Racial gaps in the adjudication of student misconduct are well documented—relative to white students engaged in similar behaviors, students of color are more likely to be disciplined and the discipline they receive tends to be harsher. We show that racial disparities in the adjudication of fighting infractions depend on the racial composition of incidents. While significant disparities exist within schools, we find little if any within-incident disparities. Examining disparities across fights, we show that students of color are punished more severely, on average, as fights involving only students of color are punished more severely than fights involving only white students. Moreover, students of color in multi-race fights receive punishments that are statistically indistinguishable from those assigned to white students in fights involving only white students, suggesting that disparities arise from the differential adjudication of incidents by their racial composition rather than from the differential adjudication of students within the same incident.

"Voting Rights and the Resilience of Black Turnout," *Economic Inquiry*, 2022, 60(3):1127–1141.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 increased turnout among Black voters, which then generated economic benefits for Black communities. In *Shelby County v. Holder* (2013), the Supreme Court invalidated the enforcement mechanism responsible for these improvements, prompting concerns that states with histories of discriminatory election practices would respond by suppressing Black turnout. I estimate the effect of the *Shelby* decision on the racial composition of the electorate using triple-difference comparisons of validated turnout data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The data suggest that the *Shelby* decision did not widen the Black-white turnout gap in states subject to the ruling.

### **PRESENTATIONS**

## **Invited seminars**

U.S. Census Bureau	2023
Connecticut College	2022
Texas Christian University	2022
Gonzaga University	2022

### TEACHING

# **Principles of Microeconomics** (EC 201)

Instructor (enrollment up to 336) Winter 2019, Winter 2020
Teaching assistant Spring 2017, Spring 2018, Fall 2018, Spring 2019

## **Introduction to Econometrics (EC 320)**

Instructor (enrollment up to 55) Summer 2019, Fall 2019

# Labor Economics (EC 350)

Instructor (enrollment up to 65) Summer 2018, Spring 2021, Winter 2022

# **Contemporary Economic Issues (EC 101)**

Teaching assistant Fall 2016, Fall 2017

## **SERVICE**

## Referee

Economic Inquiry
Election Law Journal

# **Graduate Teaching Fellows Federation** (AFT 3544)

Bargaining Committee Member	2018-2019
Department Steward	2017-2021

### Awards

Kleinsorge Summer Research Award, Department of Economics, University of Oregon	2020
Graduate Teaching Award, Department of Economics, University of Oregon	2020
Graduate Teaching Fellowship, University of Oregon	2016-2022

### **SKILLS**

Statistical computing: R (preferred), Stata

Scientific communication: LaTeX, R Shiny, Markdown, Git/GitHub