

참여자

Server : CEX 서비스 제공자(중앙 거래소), 총자산을 증명하려는 주체

Smart Contract : 거래소의 총자산과 커밋이 저장되어 있어 누구나 확인 할 수 있다.

Users : CEX 서비스 사용자

Notation

AccountList(AL): list of cc-SNARK proofs that contain Pedersen commitment of value $(\pi_{cc_0}, \dots, \pi_{cc_n})$.

Size of list can be incremental. All users of CEX can view account List

cmInfo : private database of Pedersen Commitment opening keys $\{(r_0, v_0) \dots, (r_n, v_n)\}$

$\pi_{cc} \cdot d$: cc-SNARK proof d term contain pedersen commitment of account value where $\pi_{cc} \cdot d = g^v h_r$

C_{cex} : total value commitment. Using Pedersen Commitment's homomorphic property, server can product total account commitment to get the total value commitment. $C_{cex} = g^v h^{r_{cex}}$

cc-SNARK:

setup(R) returns $\{pk, vk, pp(G, p, g, h)\}$

prove(pk, \vec{x} , \vec{w}) returns $\{\pi, c_w, r\}$: c_w 는 \vec{w} 의 vector pedersen commitment로 proof의 D term ($c_w = \prod g_i^{w_i} \cdot h^r$)

Verify(vk, π , \vec{x}) returns 1/0

$\text{LinSetup}(R_{\mathcal{Q}}) \rightarrow (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$
$\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \eta, \tau \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{F}^*$
$\sigma_1 := \left(1, \alpha, \beta, \delta, \{\tau^i\}_{i=1}^{d-1}, \left\{ \frac{\beta a_i(\tau) + \alpha b_i(\tau) + c_i(\tau)}{\gamma} \right\}_{i=1}^n, \frac{\eta}{\gamma}, \left\{ \frac{\beta a_i(\tau) + \alpha b_i(\tau) + c_i(\tau)}{\delta} \right\}_{i=n+1}^m, \left\{ \frac{1}{\delta} \tau^i t(\tau) \right\}_{i=0}^{d-2}, \frac{\eta}{\delta} \right)$
$\sigma_2 := (1, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \{\tau^i\}_{i=0}^{d-1})$
$\text{ProofMatrix}(R_{\mathcal{Q}}, \mathbf{w}) \rightarrow (\Pi_1, \Pi_2)$
Let $\mathbf{w} := (\mathbf{u}, \boldsymbol{\omega})$. Compute $h(Z)$ as in (9) ; $r, s, v \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{F}$
Let $\Pi_1 \in \mathbb{F}^{3 \times (m+2d+6)}, \Pi_2 \in \mathbb{F}^{1 \times (d+4)}$ s.t. $(A, C, D)^\top = \Pi_1 \cdot \sigma_1, B = \Pi_2 \cdot \sigma_2$ and
$A := \alpha + \sum_{k=0}^m w_k \cdot a_k(\tau) + r\delta$; $B := \beta + \sum_{k=0}^m w_k \cdot b_k(\tau) + s\delta$; $D := \sum_{k=0}^n w_k \cdot \frac{1}{\gamma} (\beta a_k(\tau) + \alpha b_k(\tau) + c_k(\tau)) + v \frac{\eta}{\gamma}$
$C := \sum_{k=n+1}^m w_k \cdot \frac{\beta a_k(\tau) + \alpha b_k(\tau) + c_k(\tau)}{\delta} - v \frac{\eta}{\delta} + \sum_{i=0}^{d-2} h_i \frac{\tau^i t(\tau)}{\delta} + As + Br - rs\delta$
$\text{Test}(R_{\mathcal{Q}}) \rightarrow T$
Define $T \in \mathbb{F}^{(m+2d+9) \times (d+5)}$ encoding the following quadratic test: $A \cdot B = \alpha \cdot \beta + C \cdot \delta + D \cdot \gamma$

Figure 22: Our NILP for an augmented QAP relation $R_{\mathcal{Q}}(\mathbf{u}, \boldsymbol{\omega})$, to be used to obtain ccGro16.

$$\text{VerCommit}(\text{ck}, [D_1], \mathbf{u}, o) := [D]_1 \stackrel{?}{=} \sum_{k=0}^n u_k \cdot \left[\frac{1}{\gamma} (\beta a_k(\tau) + \alpha b_k(\tau) + c_k(\tau)) \right]_1 + o \cdot \left[\frac{\eta}{\gamma} \right]_1$$

- 계좌 잔고의 value가 양수임을 증명하는데 cc-SNARK 사용
- Proof안에 witness의 commitment가 포함되어있음. Circuit 내부에서 commitment 체크할 필요가 없어진다.

Account value range proof cc-SNARK Circuit Relation(;v):

$$\text{Check } 0 \leq v < 2^{64}$$

- 스마트컨트랙트에 업데이트하기 위해서 C_{cex} 를 잘 만들었는지 확인
- 업데이트를 잘했는지도 필요할까 ? 밑에 두개 중 하나 선택

1. CEX total value update SNARK Circuit Relation($C_{cex}, v_{cex}, C_{cex}', v_{cex}'; r_{cex}, r_{cex}', c_i, c_i'$):

$$C_{cex} = g^{v_{cex}} h^{r_{cex}}$$

$$C_{cex}' = g^{v_{cex}'} h^{r_{cex}'}$$

$$C_{cex}' = C_{cex} \cdot c_i^{-1} \cdot c_i'$$

2. CEX total value update SNARK Circuit Relation($C_{cex}, v_{cex}; r_{cex}$):

$$C_{cex} = g^{v_{cex}} h^{r_{cex}}$$

Server Algorithm : setup, newAccount, updateAccount

AccountList(AL) : $\{\pi_{cc_0}, \dots, \pi_{cc_N}\}$ list of cc-snark proof

cmInfo : $\{(r_0, v_0), \dots, (r_n, v_n)\}$ list of opening key of cm

setup(R_{cc}, R) :

$pk_{cc}, vk_{cc}, pp_{ped} \leftarrow \Pi_{cc} . Setup(R_{cc})$

$pk, vk \leftarrow \Pi . setup(R)$

$C_{cex} \leftarrow 1$

Returns $(pk, vk, pk_{cc}, vk_{cc}, C_{cex})$

newAccount(pk_{cc}, pk i : index of newAccount) :

$\pi_{cc_i}, c_i, r_i \leftarrow \Pi_{cc} . Prove(pk_{cc}, ; 0)$

$C_{cex} \leftarrow C_{cex} \times c_i$ where $C_{cex} = pp_{ped} \cdot g^v pp_{ped} \cdot h^r$

$r_{cex} \leftarrow r_{cex} + r_i$

$\pi_{cex} \leftarrow \Pi . Prove(pk, C_{cex}, v_{cex}; r_{cex})$

AL.append(π_{cc_i})

cmInfo.append($(0, r_i)$)

Return $Tx_{update} = (\pi_{cex}, C_{cex}, v_{cex}), r_i$

updateAccount(pk_{cc}, pk , i : index of newAccount, v_i') :

$\pi_{cc_i}', c_i', r_i' \leftarrow \Pi_{cc} . Prove(pk_{cc}, v_i')$

Get c_i from AL and (v_i, r_j) from cmInfo

$C_{cex} \leftarrow C_{cex} c_i' c_i^{-1}$

$r_{cex} \leftarrow r_{cex} + r_i' - r_i$

$v_{cex} \leftarrow v_{cex} + v_i' - v_i$

$\pi_{cex} \leftarrow \Pi . Prove(pk, C_{cex}, v_{cex}; r_{cex})$

AL[i] $\leftarrow \pi_{cc_i}$

cmInfo[i] $\leftarrow (r_i', v_i')$

Return $Tx_{update} = (\pi_{cex}, C_{cex}, v_{cex}), r_i'$

SmartContract all users can view C_{cex}, v_{cex} to check CEX server has an asset more than v_{cex} and to make sure C_{cex} is well made.

setup(vk) :

Store zk-snark verification key vk


update($\pi_{cex}, C_{cex}, v_{cex}$) :

Assert msg.sender == contract Owner

Assert $\Pi . Verify(vk, \pi_{cex}, C_{cex}, v_{cex})$

Store C_{cex}, v_{cex} as public

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newAccount( $pk_{cc}, pk_i$  : index of newAccount) :  
   $\pi_{cc_i}, c_i, r_i \leftarrow \Pi_{cc} . Prove(pk_{cc}, ; 0)$   
   $C_{cex} \leftarrow C_{cex} \times c_i$  where  $C_{cex} = pp_{ped} \cdot g^v pp_{ped} \cdot h^r$   
   $r_{cex} \leftarrow r_{cex} + r_i$   
   $\pi_{cex} \leftarrow \Pi . Prove(pk, C_{cex}, v_{cex}; r_{cex})$   
  AL.append( $\pi_{cc_i}$ )  
  cmInfo.append((0,  $r_i$ ))  
  Return  $Tx_{update} = (\pi_{cex}, C_{cex}, v_{cex}), r_i$ 
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updateAccount(pk_{cc} , pk , i : index of newAccount, v_i') :

$$\pi_{cc_i}', c_i', r_i' \leftarrow \Pi_{cc} . Prove(pk_{cc}, v_i')$$

Get c_i from AL and (v_i, r_j) from cmInfo

$$C_{cex} \leftarrow C_{cex} c_i' c_i^{-1}$$

$$r_{cex} \leftarrow r_{cex} + r_i' - r_i$$

$$v_{cex} \leftarrow v_{cex} + v_i' - v_i$$

$$\pi_{cex} \leftarrow \Pi . Prove(pk, C_{cex}, v_{cex}; r_{cex})$$

$$AL[i] \leftarrow \pi_{cc_i}$$

$$cmInfo[i] \leftarrow (r_i', v_i')$$

$$\text{Return } Tx_{update} = (\pi_{cex}, C_{cex}, v_{cex}), r_i'$$

