Yonganda Camera Model: YAD-LOJ

Firmware version: V3.0.561

Device ID: 6c14ef72dc1c6b2ccdqca6

After authentication, when sending commands to a camera via the Tuya Smart APP based on the MQTT protocol through a server, as shown in Figure 1, it was found that the device on the APP would temporarily go offline. At the same time, when capturing the communication packets between the device and the server, it was discovered that the device would actively send a FIN packet to terminate the current communication connection, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. This vulnerability leads to a denial of service for a period of time. The specific implementation involves triggering the execution of any control command to generate network traffic on the app side, then performing a man-in-the-middle attack between the APP and the server to decrypt the SSL/TLS packets. By reverse engineering the encryption algorithm, the original control commands are deduced. Subsequently, the control command ID and corresponding values are modified as shown in Figure 1. Afterward, new packets are generated according to the encryption and coding rules and sent to the server. The server then forwards these packets to the device side. Upon receiving these packets, the device behaves abnormally, resulting in the device going offline.

Figure 1 The plaintext of a control command that can trigger an exception sending by App

221/ 14:13:09.6943405 10.42.0.133	121.5.96.16/	ICP	54 3/593	8883	3/593 → 8883 [ACK] Seq=1/695
2218 14:13:18.1860311 121.5.96.167	10.42.0.133	TLSv1.2	235 8883	37593	Application Data
2219 14:13:18.1912813 10.42.0.133	121.5.96.167	TCP	54 37593	8883	37593 → 8883 [ACK] Seq=17695
2220 14:13:19.1633097 10.42.0.133	121.5.96.167	TCP	54 37593	8883	37593 → 8883 [FIN, ACK] Seq=:
2221 14:13:19.1746356 121.5.96.167	10.42.0.133	TCP	54 8883	37593	8883 → 37593 [FIN, ACK] Seq=:
2222 14:13:19.1876102 10.42.0.133	121.5.96.167	TCP	54 37593	8883	37593 → 8883 [ACK] Seq=17696
2223 14:14:19.9905335 10.42.0.133	121.5.97.151	TCP	74 51933	8883	51933 - 8883 [SYN] Seq=0 Win:
2224 14:14:20.0018227 121.5.97.151	10.42.0.133	TCP	66 8883	51933	8883 → 51933 [SYN, ACK] Seq=(
2225 14:14:20.0317321 10.42.0.133	121.5.97.151	TCP	54 51933	8883	51933 → 8883 [ACK] Seg=1 Ack:
2226 14:14:20.0318078 10.42.0.133	121.5.97.151	TLSv1.2	194 51933	8883	Client Hello
2227 14:14:20.0424262 121.5.97.151	10.42.0.133	TCP	54 8883	51933	8883 → 51933 [ACK] Seg=1 Ack:
2228 14:14:20.0462039 121.5.97.151	10.42.0.133	TLSv1.2	1458 8883	51933	Server Hello

Figure 2 Communication packets between the server and the camera

```
icmp_seq=35 Destination Host
                       icmp_seq=36 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.42.0.1 icmp_seq=40 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.42.0.1 icmp_seq=41 Destination Host Unreachable From 10.42.0.1 icmp_seq=42 Destination Host Unreachable
From 10.42.0.1 icmp_seq=43 Destination Host Unreachable From 10.42.0.1 icmp_seq=44 Destination Host Unreachable 64 bytes from 10.42.0.133: icmp_seq=47 ttl=64 time=8.53 64 bytes from 10.42.0.133: icmp_seq=48 ttl=64 time=7.73
                      10.42.0.133:
                                          icmp_seq=49
                                                              ttl=64
              from
                                                                         time=6.02
    bytes
                       10.42.0.133:
                                          icmp_seq=50
                                                              ttl=64
    bytes
    bytes
              from
                      10.42.0.133: icmp_seq=51
                                                              ttl=64 time=7.66 ms
```

Figure 3 Devices within the local network will be unable to ping for a period of time after receiving a packet