

## F.L.A.R.E. ON 2016 Challenge

### Solution for 1<sup>st</sup> challenge

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#### Instruction

As for all step of the FLARE CTF we need to find a flag wich looks like an email address ends with @flare-on.com.

For this 1<sup>st</sup> challenge we got this file:

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads/flare-on$ md5sum challenge1.exe
2caaa4aa5923d026b17d7b38ee410918  challenge1.exe
```

#### Running the program


```
c:\samples>challenge1.exe
Enter password:
multipass
Wrong password
c:\samples>
```

It seems to be a cracking challenge.

#### File analysis

Opening the file with PE Studio.

Library imports:




The screenshot shows the PE Studio interface with the 'Library Imports' tab selected. The left sidebar shows a tree view with 'Imported libraries (2)' highlighted. The main pane displays a table of imported libraries.

Library (2)	Blacklisted (0)	Type	Symbols (68)	Description
kernel32.dll	-	Implicit	67	Windows NT BASE API Client DLL
advapi32.dll	-	Implicit	1	Advanced Windows 32 Base API

Nothing interesting.

Imported symbols:




The screenshot shows the PE Studio interface with the 'Imported Symbols' tab selected. The left sidebar shows a tree view with 'Imported symbols (40/68)' highlighted. The main pane displays a table of imported symbols.

Symbol (68)	Blacklisted (40)	Ordinal (0)	Anti-Debug (5)	Library (2)
IsDebuggerPresent	x	-	x	kernel32.dll
UnhandledException...	x	-	x	kernel32.dll
IsProcessorFeaturePr...	x	-	x	kernel32.dll
TerminateProcess	x	-	x	kernel32.dll
RaiseException	x	-	x	kernel32.dll
QueryPerformanceC...	x	-	-	kernel32.dll

Some possible anti-debug symbols imported we will take care of that. The others symbols imported are note very interesting for the moment without a better view of the program functionalities.

Looking at the strings:



The first two strings may be interesting, looks like dictionary or strings used by keyloggers.

Type	Size	Section...	Blacklisted (69)	Item (995)
ascii	95	.rdata:0...	-	!#\$%&'()*+,-./0123456789;<=>?@abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{ }~
ascii	95	.rdata:0...	-	!#\$%&'()*+,-./0123456789;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{ }~

There is also this string that looks like a hash or a password.

ascii	52	.text:0x...	-	x2dtJEomyjacxDemx2eczT5cVS9fVUGvWTuZWjuexjRqy24rV29q
-------	----	-------------	---	--


We also find these strings:

Type	Size	Section:Offset	Blacklisted (69)	Item (995)
ascii	15	.text:0xBF95	-	Enter password:
ascii	8	.text:0xBF A8	-	Correct!
ascii	14	.text:0xBF B5	x	Wrong password

It really looks like a cracking challenge.

Disassembling overview

Global call flow:



Ouch seems quite complex for a simple password challenge!

Let’s take a look on xref to interesting strings:

```

.rdata:0040D160 aX2dtjeomyjacxd db 'x2dtJE0myjacxDemx2eczT5cUS9fVUGvWTuZWjuexjRqy24rU29q',0
.rdata:0040D160 ; DATA XREF: sub_401420+1Fto
.rdata:0040D195 align 4
.rdata:0040D198 aEnterPassword db 'Enter password:',0Dh,0Ah,0 ; DATA XREF: sub_401420+2Eto
.rdata:0040D1AA align 4
.rdata:0040D1AC aCorrect db 'Correct!',0Dh,0Ah,0 ; DATA XREF: sub_401420+8Eto
.rdata:0040D1B7 align 4
.rdata:0040D1B8 aWrongPassword db 'Wrong password',0Dh,0Ah,0 ; DATA XREF: sub_401420+A7to

```


They all link to the same function sub\_401420.

```

; Attributes: bp-based frame
sub_401420 proc near
    Buffer= byte ptr -94h
    var_14= dword ptr -14h
    var_10= dword ptr -10h
    var_C= dword ptr -0Ch
    hFile= dword ptr -8
    NumberOfBytesWritten= dword ptr -4

    push    ebp
    mov     ebp, esp
    sub     esp, 94h
    push    0FFFFFF5h ; nStdHandle
    call    ds:GetStdHandle
    mov     [ebp+hFile], eax
    push    0FFFFFF6h ; nStdHandle
    call    ds:GetStdHandle
    mov     [ebp+var_C], eax
    mov     [ebp+var_10], offset aX2dtjeomyjacxd ; "x2dtJE0myjacxDemx2eczT5cUS9fVUGvWTuZWju"..."
    push    0 ; lpOverlapped
    lea     eax, [ebp+NumberOfBytesWritten]
    push    eax ; lpNumberOfBytesWritten
    push    12h ; nNumberOfBytesToWrite
    push    offset aEnterPassword ; "Enter password:\r\n"
    mov     ecx, [ebp+hFile]
    push    ecx ; hFile
    call    ds:WriteFile
    push    0 ; lpOverlapped
    lea     edx, [ebp+NumberOfBytesWritten]
    push    edx ; lpNumberOfBytesRead
    push    80h ; nNumberOfBytesToRead
    lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer]
    push    eax ; lpBuffer
    mov     ecx, [ebp+var_C]
    push    ecx ; hFile
    call    ds:ReadFile
    mov     edx, [ebp+NumberOfBytesWritten]
    sub     edx, 2
    push    edx
    lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer]
    push    eax
    call    sub_401260
    add     esp, 8
    mov     [ebp+var_14], eax
    mov     ecx, [ebp+var_10]
    push    ecx
    mov     edx, [ebp+var_14]
    push    edx
    call    sub_402C30
    add     esp, 8
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     short loc_4014BF

```



Ok, quite simple in fact, password is read from user input then its pass to the function sub\_401260 and the result returns by sub\_401260 (var\_14) is passed to sub\_402C30 with the string “x2dtJE0...”.

Depending on the result of sub\_402C30 “Correct” or “Wrong password” is print on screen.

- ➔ The string “x2dtJE0...” seems to be the expected result of the call to function sub\_401260 with the right password.

Before going further on the static analysis of sub\_401260 we will debug the program to confirm the call flow from the beginning of start point.

## Debugging


Running the program with Immunity Debugger. Putting a breakpoint at beginning of the sub\_401420.

```

013B1420 . 55          PUSH EBP
013B1421 . 8BEC        MOV EBP,ESP
013B1423 . 81EC 94000000 SUB ESP,94
013B1429 . 6A F5       PUSH -0B
013B142B . FF15 10D13B01 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.GetStdHandle]
013B1431 . 8945 F8     MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8],EAX
013B1434 . 6A F6       PUSH -0A
013B1436 . FF15 10D13B01 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.GetStdHandle]
013B143C . 8945 F4     MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C],EAX
013B143F . C745 F0 60D13B01 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10],challeng.013B143F
013B1446 . 6A 00       PUSH 0
013B1448 . 8D45 FC     LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
013B144B . 50          PUSH EAX
013B144C . 6A 12       PUSH 12
013B144E . 68 98D13B01 PUSH challeng.013BD198
013B1453 . 8B4D F8     MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
013B1456 . 51          PUSH ECX
013B1457 . FF15 A0D03B01 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.WriteFile]
013B145D . 6A 00       PUSH 0
013B145F . 8D55 FC     LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
013B1462 . 52          PUSH EDX
013B1463 . 68 80000000 PUSH 80
013B1468 . 8D85 6CFFFFFF LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-94]
013B146E . 50          PUSH EAX
013B146F . 8B4D F4     MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
013B1472 . 51          PUSH ECX
013B1473 . FF15 08D03B01 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.ReadFile]
013B1479 . 8B55 FC     MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
013B147C . 83EA 02     SUB EDX,2
013B147F . 52          PUSH EDX
013B1480 . 8D85 6CFFFFFF LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-94]
013B1486 . 50          PUSH EAX
013B1487 . E8 D4FDFFFF CALL challeng.013B1260

```

No anti-debugging features seems to be active. Let's try giving "abc" on input.



Sub\_401260 is called with the password entered and is length (3).

```

013B1479 . 8B55 FC     MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
013B147C . 83EA 02     SUB EDX,2
013B147F . 52          PUSH EDX
013B1480 . 8D85 6CFFFFFF LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-94]
013B1486 . 50          PUSH EAX
013B1487 . E8 D4FDFFFF CALL challeng.013B1260

```

013B1260=challeng.013B1260

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
013C3000	5A 59 58 41 42 43 44 45	ZYXABCDE

Just step over the sub. A resulting string pointer is put in EAX ("VTGg").


```

013B1487 . E8 D4FDFFFF CALL challeng.013B1260
013B148C . 83C4 08     ADD ESP,8
013B148F . 8945 EC     MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14],EAX
013B1492 . 8B4D F0     MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10]
013B1495 . 51          PUSH ECX
013B1496 . 8B55 EC     MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]
013B1499 . 52          PUSH EDX
013B149A . E8 91170000 CALL challeng.013B2C30

```

Registers (FPU)
EAX 006F8CC8 ASCII "VTGg"
ECX 00000003
EDX 00000000
EBX 7EFDE000
ESP 003CFA8C
EBP 003CFB28
ESI 013C3D6C challeng.013C3D6C

Then the resulting string is passed with the string "x2dt..." to sub\_402C30.



Result of sub\_402C30 is pushed in EAX, in this case (0xFFFFFFFF). In this case jump is taken to 4014BF printing “Wrong password” on console.

OK so we need to understand the sub\_401260 to understand how the result is calculated to found the corresponding password i.e. the flag for the challenge.

#### Analyzing sub\_401260 with IDA

```

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub     esp, 30h
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_4] ; on move le nombre de char
add     eax, 2           ; on ajoute 2 au nombre de char
xor     edx, edx
mov     ecx, 3
div     ecx              ; on divise le nombre de char*2 par 3
lea     edx, ds:[eax*4] ; on prend le nombre obtenu * 4 + 1 -> correspond à la longueur totale du résultat soit 9 pour 6 char
mov     [ebp+var_18], edx
mov     eax, [ebp+var_18]
push    eax              ; on pousse ce nombre dans EAX
call    heap_alloc       ; on alloue la mémoire qui servira à stocker le résultat
add     esp, 4
mov     [ebp+var_C], eax
cmp     [ebp+var_C], 0
jnz     short loc_401298

```

At the beginning of the sub we can see that the length of input password is the compute to get the length of result. The result is always a multiple of 4 and a modulo 3. For a password length of 1 to 3 the result length is for 4. For a password length of 4 to 6 the result length is 8. Etc...

So we can already found that the right password has a maximum length of  $52/4*3=39$  and a minimal length of 37.

'x2dtJE0myjacxDemx2eczT5cVS9fVUGvWTuZWjuexjRqy24rV29q'

Before **loc\_401333**, the three first char are moved in some vars :

1<sup>st</sup> char → var\_28 and var\_1C

2<sup>nd</sup> char → var\_20 and var\_2C

3<sup>rd</sup> char → var\_24 and var\_30

Beginning of loc\_401333 :

```

loc_401333:                ; on met le 3ème char dans ECX
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_24]
mov     [ebp+var_30], ecx ; on met le 3ème char dans EBP-30
mov     edx, [ebp+var_28] ; on met le 1er char dans EDX
shl     edx, 10h          ; shl 10h sur le 1er char
mov     eax, [ebp+var_2C] ; 2ème char dans EAX
shl     eax, 8            ; shl 8h sur le 2ème char
add     edx, [ebp+var_30] ; on ajoute le 3ème char à EDX
add     eax, edx
mov     [ebp+var_10], eax ; contient les 3 char décalé d'1 octet chacun 00 61 62 63

```

Assuming that our password is “abc”:

- a → 61h → 0000 0000 0000 0000 0110 0001
- b → 62h → 0000 0000 0000 0000 0110 0010
- c → 62h → 0000 0000 0000 0000 0110 0011

After these first set of instructions each char is shift on the 32 bit word and we got this in **var\_10**:

0	a	b	c
0000 0000	0110 0001	0110 0010	0110 0011

Then we got these operations:

```

mov     ecx, [ebp+var_10]
shr     ecx, 12h
and     ecx, 3Fh           ; ECX contient le résultat de nos combinaisons
mov     edx, [ebp+var_C]
add     edx, [ebp+var_8] ; on ajoute 0
mov     al, byte_413000[ecx] ; on récupère le caractère en utilisant ECX + 1103000
mov     [edx], al          ; on copie le résultat dans la mémoire réservée

```

We apply an “shr 12h” on var\_10 and we keep only the last 6 bits with “and 3Fh”.

“Shr 12h” and “and 3Fh”

0	0	0	18h
0000 0000	0000 0000	0000 0000	0001 1000

→ We got the 6 higher bits of 1<sup>st</sup> char. This value is used to extract a char from a static dictionary stored at 313000 in our case. 31300 + 18 = 18h corresponding to ‘V’ char.

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00313000	5A 59 58 41 42 43 44 45	ZYXABCDE
00313008	46 47 48 49 4A 4B 4C 4D	FGHIJKLM
00313010	4E 4F 50 51 52 53 54 55	NOPQRSTU
00313018	56 57 7A 79 78 61 62 63	VWzyxabc
00313020	64 65 66 67 68 69 6A 6B	defghijk
00313028	6C 6D 6E 6F 70 71 72 73	lmnopqrs
00313030	74 75 76 77 30 31 32 33	tuvw0123
00313038	34 35 36 37 38 39 2B 2F	456789+/-

The same kind of operation is repeated 3 times more with different SHR instructions.

⇒ Second SHR

```

shr     edx, 0Ch
and     edx, 3Fh

```

“Shr 0Ch” and “with “and 3Fh”

0	0	0	16h
0000 0000	0000 0000	0000 0000	0001 0110

→ We got the 2 last bits of 1<sup>st</sup> char and 4 higher bits of 2<sup>nd</sup> char. This value is used to extract a char from a static dictionary stored at 313000 in our case. 31300 + 16 = 16h corresponding to ‘T’ char.

⇒ *Third SHR*

```
shr    eax, 6
and    eax, 3Fh
```

“Shr 06h” and “with “and 3Fh”

0	0	0	09h
0000 0000	0000 0000	0000 0000	0000 1001

➔ **We got the 4 last bits of 2<sup>nd</sup> char and 1 higher bits of 3<sup>rd</sup> char.** This value is used to extract a char from a static dictionary stored at 313000 in our case.  $31300 + 09 = 09h$  corresponding to ‘G’ char.

⇒ *Fourth SHR*

```
shr    ecx, 0
and    ecx, 3Fh
```

“Shr 00h” and “with “and 3Fh”

0	0	0	23h
0000 0000	0000 0000	0000 0000	0010 0011

➔ **We got the 6 last bits of 4<sup>th</sup> char.** This value is used to extract a char from a static dictionary stored at 313000 in our case.  $31300 + 09 = 09h$  corresponding to ‘g’ char.

### Synthesis

So we could see that the resulting string is made of shr operand used to select 4 times 6 bits of each original password char and then use a dictionary to make them match a specific char.

Knowing that we can now extract from the hardcoded string the flag:

“x2dtJE0myjacxDemx2eczT5cVS9fVUGvWTuZWjuexjRqy24rV29q”.

### Python solving script

I just make a very simple python script using the challenge dictionary to retrieve the flag. You could find at the end of the document the complete script.

```
remnux@remnux:~$ ./flare1.py
##### DECODE #####
# Hash : x2dtJE0myjacxDemx2eczT5cVS9fVUGvWTuZWjuexjRqy24rV29q
#####
Password : sh00ting_phish_in_a_barrel@flare-on.com
##### ENCODE #####
# Password : sh00ting_phish_in_a_barrel@flare-on.com
#####
Pass encoded : x2dtJE0myjacxDemx2eczT5cVS9fVUGvWTuZWjuexjRqy24rV29q
remnux@remnux:~$
```

Validating the challenge:

```
c:\samples>challenge1.exe
Enter password:
sh00ting_phish_in_a_barrel@flare-on.com
Correct!
c:\samples>
```

### Python 3 script

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
import binascii
```

```
myhash="x2dtJE0myjacxDemx2eczT5cVS9fVUGvWTuZWjuexjRqy24rV29q"
myDico="ZYXABCDEFHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"
```

```
def decode(passenc, dico):
    index = 1
    password=""
    print("##### DECODE #####")
    print("# Hash : ", passenc)
    print("#####")
    #print(password)
    for char in passenc:
        if index == 1:
            char1 = 0
            char2 = 0
            char3 = 0
            #print("##### INDEX ",index,"#####")
            #print("compute: ",char)
            tabid = dico.find(char)
            #print(char," found at index ", tabid, " soit ",
bin(tabid))

            tmp = tabid << 2
            #print("char1 avant: ", bin(char1))
            char1 = char1 | tmp
            #print("char1 apres: ", bin(char1))
        if index == 2:
            #print("##### INDEX ",index,"#####")
            #print("compute: ",char)
            tabid = dico.find(char)
            #print(char," found at index ", tabid, " soit ",
bin(tabid))

            tmp = tabid & int('0000000000110000',2)
            tmp = tmp >> 4
            #print("char1 avant: ", bin(char1))
```



```

char1 = char1 + tmp
#print("char1 apres: ", bin(char1)," soit ", chr(char1))
password = password + chr(char1)

tmp = tabid & int('00001111',2)
tmp2 = tmp << 4
#print("char2 avant: ", bin(char2))
char2 = char2 | tmp2
char2 = char2 & int('0000000011111111',2)
#print("char2 apres: ", bin(char2))
#print(char2)

if index == 3:
    #print("##### INDEX ",index,"#####")
    #print("compute: ",char)
    tabid = dico.find(char)
    #print(char," found at index ", tabid, " soit ",
bin(tabid))

    #on recupere les 4 bits de poids faible de char2
    #on fait un AND 0011 1100
    tmp = tabid & int('00111100',2)
    tmp = tmp >> 2
    #print("char2 avant: ", bin(char2))
    #on fait un ADD sur char2
    char2 = char2 + tmp
    #print("char2 apres: ", bin(char2)," soit ", chr(char2))
    password = password + chr(char2)

    #on recupere les 2 bits de poid fort de char3
    #on fait un AND 00000011
    tmp = tabid & int('00000011',2)
    #on décale de 6 vers la gauche
    tmp2 = tmp << 6
    #print("char3 avant: ", bin(char3))
    #on ajoute a char3
    char3 = char3 | tmp2
    char3 = char3 & int('0000000011111111',2)
    #print("char3 apres: ", bin(char3))
    #print(char2)

if index == 4:
    #print("##### INDEX ",index,"#####")
    #print("compute: ",char)
    tabid = dico.find(char)

```

```

        #print(char," found at index ", tabid, " soit ",
bin(tabid))

        #on recupere les 6 bits de poids faible de char3
        #on fait un AND 0011 1111
        tmp = tabid & int('00111111',2)
        #print("char3 avant: ", bin(char3))
        #on fait un ADD sur char3
        char3 = char3 + tmp
        #print("char3 apres: ", bin(char3)," soit ", chr(char3))
        password = password + chr(char3)
        index = 0
    index += 1
    print("Password : ", password)

def encode(password, dico):
    index = 0
    char1 = 0
    char2 = 0
    char3 = 0
    char4 = 0
    passenc=""
    print("##### ENCODE #####")
    print("# Password : ", password)
    print("#####")
    for char in password:
        if (index % 3) == 0:
            tmphash = 0
            char1 = int.from_bytes(char.encode('utf-8'),
byteorder='big')
            tmphash = char1 << 16
            #print("Char1 = ", bin(char1))
            #print("tmphash = ", bin(tmphash))
        if (index % 3) == 1:
            char2 = int.from_bytes(char.encode('utf-8'),
byteorder='big')
            tmphash = tmphash | (char2 << 8)
            #print("Char2 = ", bin(char2))
            #print("tmphash = ", bin(tmphash))
        if (index % 3) == 2:
            char3 = int.from_bytes(char.encode('utf-8'),
byteorder='big')
            tmphash = tmphash | char3
            #print("Char3 = ", bin(char3))
            #print("tmphash = ", bin(tmphash))
            #On peut maintenant obtenir les caracteres du hash

```

```
decode(myhash,myDico)
encode("sh00ting_phish_in_a_barrel@flare-on.com",myDico)
```