

LA AYMTAN

(TILL WHEN)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(EXCERPTS FROM SECTIONS / REFS IN ORIGINAL WORK)

The Lebanese Dilemma, from A to Z...

In all Honesty... Yet with All the Love...



Original photo in grayscale, 1976.

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A WORD ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Legally spelled the French way - Marc Achkar -, with the first name even being in Lebanon in its French version and the last name in its Arabic version, and not in their local ones, due to historical reasons, my name for English speakers is Mark Ashkar. I am married, with two kids (10 and 6), and for a living, I am a physician (cardiologist), established in Lebanon since 2013.

I grew up in a town up in the Lebanese mountain facing Beirut. I went to a semi - American system Lebanese school, to a semi - French medical school and completed my sub - specialty in Paris. Thus, also for historical reasons, we do not study scientific topics in our vernacular, or say spoken language, nor in the literary / official one, and we specialize in the “West”.

Considering that we keep on falling lower than what we every time believe is “rock bottom”, and that we, the “Lebanese People”, have become hostages of the centralized / unitary feudal system and its “legal” political and spiritual representatives (of note I am a believer, yet with agnosticism in the back of my head, an acquired right to every believer), regardless of how good or bad they are, not to mention militias as well, I have worked on a proposal taking into consideration all inquiries that I could think of in order to practically apply a federal system in Lebanon, but tackling before that all the historical considerations: sociology, genetics, history, nationalism, secularism, ethnicity, religion... As well, pacific partition also remains an option in case federalism is declined for any reason.

The job has taken 10 years of hard work, research, collecting available experts’ opinions, reflecting upon ideas... Not to mention typing in Arabic! (the exclamation mark is also linked to a historical reason), and translating into Arabic, English and French (depending on the language in which the translated section was written); thus, we are practically talking about 1700 pages for the three versions. Some sections were written twice and even trice due to reconsideration...

It is a plain “scientific” project void of any bias. And where it may seem biased, a thorough reading is strongly recommended in order to clarify that re - establishing rights does not imply bias. All available references, including the ones considered most eminent, have been analyzed for coherence with science (genetics, archaeology, linguistics, alphabets, manuscripts, geography...) as well as coherence among themselves. I have found several ideologies that have been proposed for any topic, but one of them can be, and actually was, scientifically true or closest to the truth... The myths that we consider as unshakeable truths are numerous...

And before reaching a general truth or a global depiction of the whole Lebanese dilemma, there are many topics that we have failed as Lebanese to tackle, describe, discuss and analyze.

For example:

- Country v/s homeland (balad v/s watan)
- Religion / community / confessional community / race / ethnicity (kawmiyya) / nationalism (also kawmiyya) / People - “umma” / sect - confession - denomination / creed / doctrine / firqa / rite / liturgy (definitions and translations can overlap)
- Citizenship v/s identity
- Personal identity v/s collective identity
- Basics of Christianity and of Islam
- Fusion v/s integration v/s mingling
- Place of secularism and any non - belief (atheism, agnosticism...)
- Secularism v/s Civil Society
- Political systems: Centralized - Unitary v/s Federalism v/s Partition v/s Confederalism
- Simple v/s Consociational (but not fake like in Lebanon) democracy
- “Common Life” (hereby meant as one life - aspect for all) v/s (True) “Coexistence”

- Occupation (was the Byzantine an occupation to Lebanon / Christians / (there were no Muslims yet)? Were the Abbasids an occupation to Lebanon / Christians / Muslims?)...
- Phoenician / Syriac / Aramaic / Canaanite / Greek / Rum / Byzantine / Arab / Assyrian / Syrian / Lebanese / Turkish...

And the list goes on.....

And the identity of each Lebanese is lost...

No correct data leads to wrong diagnosis, thus wrong treatment, thus catastrophes...

Should we spread the content of this research, the Lebanese will know what they want and should they wish, find a way to engage themselves for a solution, thus preserving all social entities. As said, federalism (and even (pacific) partition) is the greatest act of love that can be between pluralistic societies!

All that I have done emanates from unconditional love, to love the other as is, and from that my aim to arrive to true peace and later on, prosperity.

I have twice burst into tears in collective graveyards for martyrs from the 1975 - 1990 war, to say how sincere I am... and I have refrained from joining any political activity to avoid being restrained in my quest for the truth... I hope my endeavor pays off for a "better future" in Lebanon... or simply a "future" must I say, since "there ain't none" for the moment...

Last but not least, I have to thank my wife for having endured with me this long journey... words could not express my gratitude... at one point even my kids were complaining...

Front cover photo: my father just before he heads to Tall al - Zaatar, which, also for historical reasons, is a "battle" for some and a "massacre" for others.

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1- Old and Modern History Schools

A word about the references: the vast majority of them, as important as they are in terms of objectivity, remain today hostage to the old school of History, where the news and data that were available for the first time and which were only based on personal analysis (including analysis of archeology) remain subject to imprecision or exaggeration, and are often conflicting within themselves. I tried to rationally reconcile my references that are based on analysis, the vast majority of which are well - known books from eminent personalities; hence, the citation of information in more than one reference does not mean at all that it is more accurate. Unfortunately, even in the twentieth century, myths and speculations devoid of scientific evidence, allowing explorers to make assumptions and become famous, or used to convey political ideologies or during religious conflicts, often overcame integrity. The "reasonable" became "probable", and the "probable" became "certain".

On the other hand, the modern school of History, which emerged after 1990 (and we shall not say "set out", since archeology has been around for 150 years), based on manuscripts, scientific facts, technological development and genetics, sought to establish links with international universities such as the Universities of London, Stanford and Berkeley, the world institutes in Germany and Great Britain and other international museums such as the museums of Cairo, Istanbul, Venice, and the Vatican of which Pope John Paul II unblocked the archives after centuries, and to conduct explorations in the Qannubin Valley. And this school has created a major revolution in History because of the importance of information and documents that correct a lot of current information considered undeniable only because they are now incrustated in the minds of people based on eminent thinkers' or archaeologists' analysis and on the most eminent references worldwide. This new information was taken into consideration concerning certain critical situations when they were in conflict with the old school, although they could be sources of multiple surprises for the readers. Of note, this new information has mostly not appeared yet in the references which are accessible to most readers.

2- Country and Nation

The nation is an area where a sociologically homogeneous people (a nation) practices its cultural freedom according to its identity; it is also called a "homeland". The country grants citizenship (also called nationality, a misnomer). It can correspond geographically to the homeland. The homeland is for a people / a nation regardless of a citizenship.

3- Confessional Community / Religion / People / Sect / Creed - Doctrine / Rite / Liturgy

The use of the term "confessional community" fueled up since the Muslim conquest, first considering that Islam is a religion and a worldliness, but where said worldliness is derived from

a doctrine, thus grossly putting a religion in face of another, and second, because of, in the Levant, the schism within the Christian group. Indeed, this schism will end up in several factions: one will be known under the name of "Maronites" ~ 900 (the term existed before that for the adepts but not for the collectivity), and the other the "Rums" since 742 (the term existed politically before that year) (Greeks - as in rite - in English). This schism between said two factions will go by a liturgical character even though the dilemma was political relative to the Muslim conquest, because the decision to resist at the national but also ecclesiastical level was taken in Mount Lebanon, where the overwhelming majority were followers of Maron, and were Chalcedonian with their Maronite liturgy in Syriac language, while an opposite decision was taken outside Mount Lebanon, where the overwhelming majority were Chalcedonians of Byzantine liturgy in the Greek language.

But Maronites and Rums (as well as (local) Latins and Protestants) in Lebanon are the heirs of the Canaanite civilization, and the Muslims carry the Islam worldliness culture - in addition to (comparatively) little Canaanite culture in Lebanon as well as little Arab culture in what is called "Arab countries" (the quantity of which varies among said countries), and little of other cultures elsewhere. Thus, the conquest was not "Arab" as reported since a century ago, facing the civilizations and ethnicities of the Levant and elsewhere, but Islamic. In addition to that, Muslim sects are actually social communities because of partial differences within their worldliness. Similarly, the interference of the Church in its adepts' worldlinesses contributed to the tendency to consider Christian sects each as a social community, even when the adepts were of a same People (same worldliness). Those social communities, based on sectarian issues, or say - confessional issues, are the confessional communities.

Thus, the Canaanite cultural concept remained albeit without its proper name because of the other appellations by which it was called, and later because of the religious unification brought by Christianity. And thus the concept of "Arabism" fell in disuse (till ~ 1870) since Islam came not only with a new religion but also with a "worldliness" (a new culture), to Arabs as to all Muslims. The term "confessional community" was hence erroneously justified over time to distinguish Peoples,* or, within Christianity, to distinguish sects.** As for employing the term "confessional community" for Muslim confessions / sects, this is warranted since they do not admix together.

** For example: "Christian confessional community", instead of "Canaanite (for example) people" most of whom are followers of Christian religion (and few would be irreligious); "Muslim confessional community" instead of "Muslim people" of Muslim religion, because we do not forget that Muslims are a people, and that "people" is analogous to "nation" (Umma), and for that it is said: the Muslim nation (al - Umma).*

*** For example: "Maronite or Rum confessional community" instead of "Maronite or Rum confession / denomination / sect".*

Thus said, a "confessional community", when referring to Christians or Muslims at the social and not religious level, is equivalent, in Lebanon and the Islamic world, to a cultural or civilizational entity, which has its religion (not to mention irreligious members) but also customs,

traditions and an atmosphere that resulted not only from purely religious practices, but also from a coherent social system as a whole as a geopolitical organization. Therefore, with the integration and admixing of the Christian communities within the Lebanese idea, which is scientifically Canaanite, despite certain peculiarities mainly linked to cultural roots of minoritarian Christian confessional communities, and with the integration of Muslims within the world of Islam and Arabism, although Muslim rites basically do not admix for secondary reasons within their crucible, the term “confessional community” must be replaced by "people" when talking about the two major factions, "Christians" and "Muslims", at the social and not religious level, in order to return to a scientific description of the situation in Lebanon. Thus, there are practically two peoples in Lebanon: the Canaanites and the Muslims (of note, “(a) people” = “sha`b” in Arabic, as well as “umma”, term also used in English for the Muslim community).

And these two terms (People / Umma) indicate a community of common culture, therefore of same ethnicity, with these three terms relating to nationalism and to patriotism. And we keep the term “Race” for the biological classification of communities. Thus, we note that the terms are intertwined and that the translations are not literal for terms of the same root.

Thus, belonging to said Peoples also concerns the irreligious who necessarily - exceptions aside - live within the atmosphere of their community and its sentimental background without necessarily adopting its religious customs, and that makes sense when we employ the term "People" (NB: The irreligious within the Muslim People need additional analysis beyond the scope of this section; please refer to the table hereunder).

As for the term "Confessional Community" in the proper sense, should we correct what belongs to the terms "people" and "confession / sect", it should be employed to refer to confessions of simultaneously a sole religion and a sole people yet which have not socially admixed but have organized themselves into social entities, such as the Muslim confessions, since they have not socially admixed in practice. We can thus socially speak of a Sunni, Shiite, Druze, Alawite... confessional community, even if these are confessions, from a religious perspective (in Arabic, from a religious and not a social point of view, "confession / sect / denomination" would be equivalent to Foqoh = Madhab = Creed, Doctrine). Another example is Catholics and Protestants in Switzerland - each of the 4 Peoples apart, whereby the adepts of said confessions have not admixed in practice neither socially and thus nor politically, and are socially considered two entities, meaning confessional communities, even if both communities are, for example, German - Swiss.

Of note, the example given here above as to Swiss confessional communities based on being Catholic or Protestant remains due to organization of the Swiss as such (ex: Catholic German Swiss and Protestant German Swiss); but again, this issue finds its roots in the interference of the Church in worldliness, which is against the core of Christianity teachings.

And as for the term "confession / sect / denomination" (note the term "sectarianism" from "sect"), it should be employed to refer to sub -groups of a sole religion which differ in their teachings, such as Christian subgroups (Chalcedonian, Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Protestant...), as well as Muslim subgroups as we have indicated, for example Sunni in general, or even specifically Hanbalite, Shafi`ite, Malikite, Hanafite...; or Shiite in general, or even specifically Jaafarite, Ishmaelite, Zaydite...; or Druze; or Alawite; this given that, as we explained in the previous paragraph, "confession / sect / denomination" is equivalent to "doctrine". However, despite the existence also of general Muslim and Christian doctrines, the term "confession / sect / denomination" (madhab) cannot be used, and the term "religion" must be employed. But "Confession" remains popularly synonym to "religion". Of note, a confession / denomination has a larger membership, a longer history and a wider acceptance than a "sect".

And we could say in Arabic "Firqa" (Group) which would be synonymous with "Madhab" (Sect), and a "Firqa" is generally used by the Shiites, in particular among the Ishmaelites (the Seveners, the Ubaydites...). Of note, in Arabic, "shia", that is "Shiite", is a synonym to "firqa".

And we still have the "rite", which is grossly synonymous with "liturgy" (a liturgy is a predetermined or prescribed set of rituals that are performed), and both are used in Christianity, where each sect has its rite / liturgy, even if sometimes in common languages (for example the Maronite rite is like the Syriac Orthodox or Catholic in terms of language, in Syriac language (currently in Arabic for the Maronites in practice)).

Finally, the terms "society" and "community" are general terms used to describe a homogeneous group with regard to a specific feature.

And let us not forget that in dictionaries the translations overlap, as do the popular uses.

4- Integration / Admixture / Mingling

We still benefit, for the following sections, to also elaborate on the concepts of integration, admixing and mingling, which we had to adopt in order to provide the requirements of the situation.

- By integration, we mean "homogeneous". When two or more peoples (defined in a social and not an administrative sense) integrate, it is no longer possible to distinguish them; pluralism no longer exists. The resulting cultural definition (which includes religions and other aspects), of the new people that results from a fusion of peoples, depends on the relative order of magnitude among them, and lies within a spectrum that is situated between their cultures; of note that integration is not said to have been achieved by usual administrative or cultural evidence but by sentimental homogeneity vis - à - vis most of the ordeals that any collectivity has gone through.

- By admixture, we mean a coexistence within the same region between two (or more) entities of a same people: for example, confessional communities (as per the definition above), or

tribal communities... or of two peoples (defined socially and not administratively) - all said disregarding admixture in the biological sense. The region whose status of a possible admixture within it to be assessed may vary from a village to a large administrative entity. Of note that the presence of an admixture between two peoples has no added value as to analysis because it cannot be peaceful (except in appearance), given the absence of integration, while an admixture between two entities of a same people can be peaceful, depending on the points of contention.

- By mingling, we mean the compulsory or spontaneous contact among individuals or small groups from two unintegrated and / or unadmixed collectivities.

Finally, the choice of these three terms can be contested, but the essential goal is to be able to describe the situation on the ground and to pass on its analysis.

5- Specificities and Non - Integration

Even if we find a total correspondence of the whole way of daily life between members of different confessional communities, a phenomenon that we very rarely see in the country as a whole, and usually within the groups called "libertarian" so how about other groups, we cannot speak of "liberalism" and therefore of sentimental integration if the individuals concerned do not give up their so - called confessional belonging and its sentimental specificities (thus including the cultural - civilizational aspect) and organize themselves within their own social framework, which actually never happened up till now.

Even more, the "liberals", whether believers or non - believers, when they are in what seems a total correspondence in daily life issues, they are being so under the umbrella of what is called the "Lebanese" culture (the extra - religious habits and customs) which is scientifically a neo - Canaanite culture (though transmogrified as to the ancient one), and not a culture proper to them, which all other strata of Christians (moderate, conservative and fundamentalists) share (the difference being in the density of religious elements that are added), whereas Islam, as per its legitimate definition, has its own culture.

As for the current non - integrative composition into confessional communities, it is a natural anthropological phenomenon that cannot be criticized. Thus, we cannot even speak of perfect correspondence (except at the level of individual exceptions, which are, scientifically, outside Islam if non - believers, or are living a dilemma, if still believers), even if it appears to us that way. It should be noted that the adoption of some Christians of Arabism is the adoption of a political and intellectual ideology to which marginal customs are added (e.g., the Keffiyeh (Kufiyyeh), drinking Mate (Matteh)...) and not the adoption of a culture, since they still live their daily life within the culture of other Christians, and there is no alternative to them since the Arab culture is scientifically the culture of the Bedouins as we explained; otherwise the choice would be the worldliness of Islam (the Muslim culture), of course, if they convert to Muslims.

And this spontaneous elaboration would not have occurred if it were not the only way to maintain a free and effective presence in relation to the geographical, historical and political frameworks that we are addressing, and which gave rise to various communities based on sectarian - cultural - civilizational specificities manifesting themselves in the details of everyday life, and in sentiments towards political events, the purpose of these sentiments and ensuing attitudes being to preserve the presence of oneself.

Thus, any statement that calls everyone to live "his religion" at home and to integrate with others into society is a waste of time and effort, especially since one wonders within whom should one integrate? Into another confession? Or in a new atmosphere that does not exist nowadays that could be imported from the West, for example? The two cultures should co - exist, and nobody should be pressured for a shift, even if a "relatively small" proportion of spontaneous shifting will exist.

6- Interconfessional Mingling

Thus, lifestyles truly meet in many points between different peoples and confessional communities, within the frame mentioned here above, and these points are common to the Lebanese as one people at the administrative and legal levels, given the chronic coexistence between the two cultures. And these points are practically, apart from the Arabic language of which we tell the details of imposition elsewhere, a certain Canaanization of the Muslims of Lebanon at the two collective and individual levels, and which differ, each one apart and within itself, according to the regions and the socio - economic level. And this Canaanization was not really significant before the Mamluk era and was accentuated since the French "mandate", and the rest occurred spontaneously with time due to concomitant presence of the communities next to one another since the conquest, not to mention the previous Canaanite heritage of the part who Islamized back then.

And even the absence of anything in common as to daily life should not be a deterrent to the establishment of fraternal relations. And this meeting of lifestyles at a supra - individual or familial level is not exceptional, but in addition is a fundamental issue in the daily life of the Lebanese. But the convergence of the ways of life, be it minimal or maximal, is not the specific criterion for the establishment of the identity of a human collectivity.

7- Socio - Economical Level and Education

On the other hand, for those who rely on raising the socio - economical level in order to remove people from what they consider to be a dreadful sectarian state, certainly the rise of the socio - economic level, including a proper educational curriculum (if accepted), can extract the majority of people from a negative extremist state, since said extremism often finds a fertile ground in areas or neighborhoods of low socio - economical level even if it excludes no other category. But this rise will never affect sentimental affiliation, which is evident in societies (and says who that one

must try to suppress that affiliation). And one of the proofs is that sentimental belonging unifies among members of any confessional community, regardless of the socio - economic level of its individuals, and we do not see any existential obsession among members of a same particular community based on the socio - economical level.

8- Pact and Binary Equal Sharing, Nationality, and Collective and Personal Identities

Hence was the need for the National Pact, which consecrated the Christian - Muslim duality in the exercise of governmental functions, and the Taef Agreement which introduces binary equal sharing which was approved by a Constitutional amendment. All that is due to the Lebanese citizen's most important identity remaining his social identity, to which he is more spontaneously sentimentally affiliated than to his belonging to the Lebanese Republic or Greater Lebanon via his nationality, since the communities were present well before the Republic. As for the coexistence and the mingling and the fraternal relations between members of different communities, these depend on the personal identity of the citizen _ and not on his / her collective identity which protects him / her from an unwanted integration_ which gives him a certain margin, wide or narrow, to interact with individuals or groups from other communities.¹⁹ Thus the fact remains that individuals sentimentally affiliated to a particular community despite being born and raised in another one are extremely rare.

And indeed, one of the dilemmas of sentimental affiliation is the identity of Lebanon that we are trying to identify and that does not exist scientifically, although it remains scientifically synonymous with the Canaanite identity, since the Maronite Canaanites used the name of the geographical spot to differentiate themselves from the Muslim entourage. But Lebanon itself is a geographical spot and has become a name for a republic (and thus for an administrative people), but there is no Lebanese social people. And each time a community tries to consider that Lebanon's identity is its identity, a clash occurs.

Henceforth, the membership of the Lebanese State in the League of Arab States is an affiliation to a political organization whose countries share common interests and promote cooperation in various fields because of the unity of the official language among them (which was adopted in Lebanon without any other language for several reasons), bearing in mind that the organization's name poses a dilemma since it implies an Arabism of the republic (even when the Constitution did not use to say that (1943 - 1989)) and hence of the whole Lebanese people regardless of the truth. As for its membership in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly known as the "Organization of the Islamic Conference"), the organization's name does not imply that Lebanon is an Islamic state, thus no dilemma here. And its membership in the "Organization de la Francophonie" is cultural because of past events.

Thus the affiliation of the state to the League of Arab States does not mean that the entire people is Arab or that the country is, just as Lebanon's accession to these other two organizations

does not mean that the entire people is Muslim or Francophone, nor that the country is. The fact is that part of the Lebanese people feels their natural belonging to the Arab culture (and naturally to the Muslim culture via its worldliness (Dunya)), to which they feel a sentimental comfort while remaining open to the West and to Levantine culture, but another group believes that it belongs to Levantine civilizations and basically Canaanite, which does not prevent it from opening up to Arab culture alongside Westerners.

We also recall that at the end of 2003 and early 2004, the issue of Lebanon's accession to the Islamic World Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ICESCO, formerly ISESCO) was raised, that after Lebanon's accession to the "Charter of the Arab Cultural Unity" and the "Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization" (ALECSO) was silently passed under Law No. 29 dated November 14th, 1990. The cabinet withdrew the "ICESCO" project from the House of Representatives after it had unanimously adopted it. The topic was closed "out of concern" for "national unity and coexistence".

Therefore, there is no Lebanese identity, as the communities already existed before the declaration of Lebanon as a republic, as indicated above. As far as the Arab League is concerned, Lebanon's adhesion allowed the attempt to impose an Arab identity on the ground as well as to impose Arabic political commitments on Lebanon, which succeeded in many instances and failed elsewhere because of socio - military explosions between various confessions, and one of the reasons, besides its name, was the mention of the league charter that all the states that are adhered to are Arab states, which was in controversy with the famous "not Arab but of Arabic face" that had been adopted by the Lebanese for their country during the same period.⁴ As for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, it does not mention, neither in its name or in its charter, that the adhering states are Islamic, just naming them "member states". And Lebanon as a state would rather participate in Islamic cooperation, just as in any Christian cooperation or Arab cooperation or Orthodox or Catholic cooperation or any other. This is how the Lebanese can benefit from each other without obliging each other to adopt a certain identity.

9- Christianity and Islam

1) The Belief:

Christianity is a belief that concerns the creation of the universe and its course and eschatology (e.g., the existence of a god, Jesus of Nazareth is the son of God, he is resuscitated).

Islam is a belief that concerns the creation of the universe and its course and eschatology (e.g., the existence of a god, Muhammad bin Abdullah is "The Messenger" of God).

2) The Request:

Christianity is a call to follow a behavior that promotes peace, according to Jesus of Nazareth as told in the Gospel, emanating from excessive rational love, and an invitation to preach

it alongside belief, with no obligation in case of refusal of the Word. Christianity is not "Messianic" (we will get to that): it does not consider that it is the duty of Christians to ensure the salvation of the world by carrying out the implementation of God's will. They must preach (through their daily life or devote it to proselytism), and the preached are left at ease. And every soul is to save itself.

Islam is an obligation to establish the reign of God in terms of justice as the doctrine advocates it, even if by force (Jihad). Islam is Messianic: it is the duty of Muslims to ensure the salvation of the world by carrying out the implementation of God's will, and more, reign. They must preach (through their daily lives or devote themselves to proselytizing - that they "da'wa / da3wa"), and the preached are not left at ease, but "jihad" is obligatory (when deemed feasible); there is no choice except for Islamization or death, and only the "People of the Book" are exempted, but they must comply with Dhimmism.

3) Conformity:

The conditions for the Christian to be conform as per the basic doctrine (and not as per the later ecclesiasticalness since Paul the apostle) are baptism and eucharist, and the rest is a call (that said without supporting or condoning some fundamentalist churches); that is, one cannot call a Christian by "infidel" (as long as the concerned is a baptized believer practicing communion), but he is at most considered as a "sinner" who must repent. It is thus possible for a Christian to be liberal, moderate, conservative or fundamentalist in his practice of rituals and vocation, all that not going against the basic doctrine.

The condition for the Muslim to be conform as per the basic doctrine is the five pillars: the "Testimony" (there is no god but "Allah", and Muhammad is the prophet of "Allah"), pilgrimage, fasting, zakat (help to the poor) and the 5 daily prayers. And the "Testimony" does not ask, but requires adherence to the dictates of the Quran, those of the hadiths (speeches) of Muhammad bin Abdullah and those of his biography, and so it is possible for a Muslim to label as infidel another Muslim* on the basis of a non - adherence (regardless of the correctness of doctrines and schools). Therefore, a Muslim cannot be liberal, moderate or conservative in the way he practices his religion and even more his obligation, without being at risk of being accused of being alien to the main doctrine, and therefore at risk of being called a disbeliever or an infidel. Similarly, one cannot call a fundamentalist a disbeliever / infidel, not only if fundamentalism is applied only upon oneself, but even in the case of the practice of "Jihad".

** Islam's categorical ban on Muslims' consideration of other Muslims as infidels is not as valid as most people think; please review the hadiths of Bukhari and Muslim and Ibn Baz's explanations on this.*

4) Concerning Secularism:

Secularism is at the heart of Christian doctrine. As soon as it mixes religion and state, Christianity deviates from its doctrine.

At the heart of Muslim doctrine, Islam is religion and state via a political system within a Muslim state. As soon as it separates religion and state, it deviates from its doctrine.

5) Concerning Worldliness (Imposition of a Certain Culture):

Christianity does not impose (or propose for that matter) a certain culture (a worldliness): whenever it seeks to remove a people from its nationalism or its cultural / civilizational current (thus outside the practices of rituals) or confuses religion with worldliness, it deviates from its doctrine. So a Christian remains in tune with his people / his homeland / his nation alongside atheists, pagans or followers of other religions not including any worldliness within. Of note, elaboration of Christian nationalisms are a "failure" for Christianity, just as the elaboration of Papal states before was a heavy blow to it.

There remains the question of the dealing with so - called "ethical" issues (abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, suicide etc...) alongside a number of other ecclesiastical teachings, which are issues that the Church often decides for or gives a stance upon, and which are not discussed in the main doctrine in the Gospel (belief as per Jesus and his teachings). These decisions / stances negotiable.

Islam imposes a certain culture (a worldliness): it must change the core of the people that embrace it (thus alongside the practice of rituals) by removing it from its nationalism and its cultural / civilizational current, because Islam is religion and worldliness (and state, all three), otherwise it deviates from its doctrine. This is carried out by the "Shariaa" (law) based on the Quran, the prophetic hadiths (speeches) and the biography of the prophet, to manage the world, that is to say the details of daily life and how to live it, in order to ensure peace and justice. A Muslim no longer belongs to his people / his homeland / his nationalism since Islam is a nation (people - Umma) apart (and homeland as noted above); that is, Muslims in their worldliness are a people duly established according to Humanities, and it does not include atheists, pagans or followers of other religions (having or not having a worldliness). Of note, current nationalisms within Muslim countries are a "failure - until - now" for Islam, just as the dissolution of the Islamic State in 1918 and the abolition of the Caliphate were a heavy blow to it.

There remains the question of so - called "ethical" issues (abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, suicide...); in fact, some of these issues are entirely decided upon by the religious authorities, and some are decided by the main doctrine. The decisions are not negotiable.

6) Concerning Some Difficulties:

Christianity: Consideration as to which books should be within the New Testament; explanation of some texts in the gospel that are not clear linguistically or analytically; the apocryphal gospels; the doctrinal divisions within the Church; what is considered "heresies" on the part of the Church; the difficulty (without the impossibility) of self - criticism on the part of the Church and of carrying out certain self - amendments, knowing that it should not have been

involved in taking positions that warrant criticism, the matters being ethical and thus extra - doctrinal; the duties imposed by the Church, including the other 5 sacraments.

Islam (with the recognition of its jurists): The interpretation of the Quran as to fundamental questions (which resulted in the interpretation of the Arabic language according to what would be "wanted" by the course of the Quranic text); the abrogating and abrogated verses (Medinan and Meccan verses respectively) (about 350 pairs of verses, where the former prevail if circumstances allow. And among the Medinan, the verses concerning Jihad, and those that define infidelity and punishment, and the punishment of apostates); the question as to the reliability of every single "hadith" (speech) of the prophet (their number being ~ 1,400,000 speeches - one million four hundred thousand); the doctrinal and political divisions within Islam; the persistence of nationalism within the Muslim world; what Islam considers heresy; the refusal of Islam to criticize itself to go towards certain amendments since any criticism means a criticism of the Word of God; the "fatwas" (advisory opinion of the Sheikhs); the "legal duties" (taklif shar3i) (religious request that is supreme to personal choices and even to the administrative laws of the country, e.g. to whom to vote).

10- Centralized Government Issue

Later, it turned out that the centralized government formula (meaning the unitary state) had exhausted all chances of solving the Lebanese dilemma and had even made things worse, which is understandable because the unitary state did not conform to the reality of the heterogeneous People. Then came the attempt to apply consensual democracy within this unitary state, which paralyzed what was still working. All that ended up with some people taking advantage of this dilemma and introducing themselves as "protectors" of their community facing the others, and becoming untouchable "masters" who consecrated corruption and disrupted all means of accountability, while at the same time continuing the spread of dependency and nepotism in order to control the country's population and capabilities. Yet most citizens still prefer the status quo since any overthrow of the leader can be costly to the interest of the whole community, and they are propelled by hatred given the fear and injustice in a system that denies them continuity except through the leader, so that all their abilities have become just limited to ensuring the daily subsistence and the minimal rights that are often obtained only with consent from the leader, and when the orders arrive, to fight militarily. And this vicious circle is currently impossible to break without external force.

11- Secularism

Secularism is a broad issue that has no strict definition. It cannot be fully explored hereunder. It can encompass several points of view and types. To start with, it is not a political order such as federalism, regionalism, confederalism and unitary governance, but a consideration as to legislation, among any of these. Its most standard "dictionary - style" definition is the "indifference to, or rejection or exclusion of, religion and religious considerations". In certain

context, the word can refer to anticlericalism, atheism, desire to exclude religion from social activities or civic affairs, banishment of religious symbols from the public sphere, state neutrality toward religion, the separation of religion from state, or disestablishment (separation of religious establishment and state, basically the principle of the separation of government institutions and persons mandated to represent the state on one side, from religious institution and religious dignitaries on the other). In disestablishment, there can still be a “state religion”.

In political terms, the attainment of secularism is termed secularity (in French “laïcité”, sometimes referred to as “laicity” in English). And if secularization is limited to disestablishment, the intellectuals of the "Islamic" world aim to moderate "secularization" by branding it "civism", or what is popularly known as a "civil constitution", but this expression is neither scientific, nor legal, nor political nor philosophical in this context. What is meant by “civil” in the West, within the framework of governance, is the majority rule in accordance with the rules of democracy versus monarchy or oligarchy, that term having emerged in England in 1689, all that now being obvious in the West.

That said, to most scholars, radical secularism means that even non - religious people are prohibited from legislation of laws that emanate from religious teaching (i.e., means “separation of religion from state” and not just “disestablishment”). To those scholars, in disestablishment, a civil representative still retains the right to legislation of a law emanating on a religious basis, and a religious representative still retains the right to hold a civil post should he be elected or nominated through the civil system.

However, according to other scholars, if laws emanating from religions should be prohibited even if being able to make it through the whole process of “pure civil” legislation, their antipodes should be also, because they are simply also beliefs. An additional point they make is that one can separate a religion from a state, but cannot separate a religion from a believer citizen. To do so, he / she must be an atheist, hence having changed his /her religion into its antipode. By that, separation of religion and state and prohibition of legislation on a religious basis should occur democratically within a society in a passive way, when said society becomes atheist in its majority.

We hereby note that if we consider secularism as simply disestablishment, Christianity core doctrinal teachings are fully compatible with that, Christianity being only a religion, whereas Islam core doctrinal teachings are fully opposed to that, Islam being in its core definition “religion and state”. And even if we consider it as a religious separation, there is no objection to the Christian religion in this, as it does not deal with worldly matters at the core of its jurisprudence, but the Church is opposed as the clergy has intervened in the worldly matters and has issued teachings in this regard and still clings to them. Of course, Islam rejects this, being religion and worldliness (meaning a whole everyday life culture and way of living the details of everyday life).

In all cases, scholars have distinguished between what can be called "friendly" and "hostile" secularisms. The friendly type limits the interference of the religion or religious establishment in

matters of the state but also limits the interference of the state in religion or religious establishment matters. The hostile variety, by contrast, seeks to confine religion purely to the home or houses of worship and limits religious education, religious rites and public displays of faith.

12- Genetics in Lebanon

The issue of genetic origins is a double - edged sword. Genes can determine some of the social behavior but do not decide it in detail. So anyone who wants to rely on the genes to determine whether a group is homogeneous or pluralist is starting incorrectly from square one. The study of genes can reinforce and ease the hypothesis of pluralism (be it old or recent), or at most not affect it, depending on whether or not differences show up (respectively) in a group already considered pluralistic; conversely, it can reinforce and ease the hypothesis of homogeneity (be it old or recent), or at most not affect it, depending on whether differences have not manifested or done so (respectively) in a group already considered homogeneous. From here, we proceed with the results of the studies that have been carried out so far, already considering the Lebanese people as being pluralistic between two large communities which are not confessional communities as always declared, but two Peoples, because the pluralism is social and cultural / civilizational. It remains to be specified that any identity is not at all determined by genetics; otherwise, it would be accompanied by a racist character by excellence!

As a summary, the Canaanites of the year 2000 BC (so after the end of the entry of the Iranian genes) are almost identical to today's Lebanese, who are clearly distinguishable from other Levantines, and that percentage is at 93%. As reported in the American Journal of Human Genetics on July 27, 2017, "Biblical Canaanites" did not disappear; they were not replaced. They transmogrified.

Yet additional studies can be performed to sort out the genetic pool of Muslims that were implemented in Lebanon since the Muslim conquest, as per reliable manuscripts. However, bearing in mind that the classification of Peoples should, at least for us, be social and not genetical, such studies are not needed to solve the Lebanese dilemma.

In the end, the genetic studies have their limitations. One of their utilities is that they can deter those who allow themselves to take historical facts out of their scientific context, to use them for brainwashing. In fact, the scientific study of History should rarely resort to genetic studies, as any person who enters with his genes and integrates within a people and a civilization in total "communion" is worthy of the persistence of this entity through him. Such should be the perspective; if not, we fall into racism.

13- Lebanon

"Greater Lebanon" (synonym to the Republic of Lebanon) is geographically almost identical to the historical "Land of Lebanon". Lebanon is a geographical region defined simultaneously

topographically and climatically: it is the region that appears elevated and white for several months of the year unlike the Levantine entourage from Egypt and the Peninsula till Iraq. There was never a social entity called "Lebanese" back then. The term "Lebanese identity" is erroneous. Lebanon was totally (up till the Muslim conquest) inhabited by Canaanites (not to mention a tiny percentage of foreigners due to occupations and cultural exchange). Thus, it must scientifically be said that "Lebanon's identity" was Canaanite.

14- Canaanites (aka Phoenicians)

Indeed, the Canaanites are a people that have existed with their civilization for 5500 years, and that was confined within Lebanon (in its historically known extension and which conforms to Greater Lebanon to 95%) since 1190 BC (in addition to Tartus), after having lost the regions of Homs to Aleppo and the Syrian coast in the north and Galilee to Gaza in the south. So in fact the land of Canaan included the north west of what will later become "Syria", and all of Palestine except the Negev. They thus formed a stable civilization which later had to deal with successive occupation, until then part of them had to enter the orbit of Islamic culture, exiting at that moment the culturo - civilizational Canaanite sphere.

They were called "Phoenicians" by the Greeks then by the Romans and thus by all current western world. And Carthaginian Canaanites were called "Punics" (same root as "Phoenicians" - Pnk). Their language was called "Aramaic" by the Hebrews, later known as "Imperial Aramaic", which ended up in labeling all the Peoples of the previous Land of Canaan by Aramaics (or Arameans), a term which included the Canaanites themselves later, when the term "Phoenician" will fall out. When the Canaanites of the coast, south and Bekaa were forced to adopt the Greek language for their liturgy, they became part of those who will be ~ 500 politically and sociologically (but not yet religiously, that since 742) known as "Rums", a Syriac then Arabic name for the Byzantines, yet originating from "Romans" (Byzantines being the eastern Romans). And when the Canaanites of Mount Lebanon adopted the Syriac language, they became known as Syriacs and as Maronites. Yet said Canaanites adopted for their nationalism as well as their Church the name "Lebanon (Lebanese / Free Church of Lebanon" after they were besieged by the Muslims, and attributed the name Lebanon to the 1920 republic that they enforced upon Muslims, hence becoming "Lebanese" from an administrative / legal point of view.

15- Arabs

The Arab issue is complicated. With regard to the scientific historical aspect, there is no Arab reference claiming an explanation of the term "Arab" in an acceptable manner for all those who claim Arabism.

- Most Muslim dogmatists consider that when the Arabic language, which is God's language and that of paradise, "was dropped" (or "was revealed"), those who spoke it at the time and all those who speak it today are called "Arabs" because to them "Arabism" is neither an element, nor a race,

nor a local or regional affiliation. So to them there is no Arab people so that their language be Arabic, but on the contrary.

- Famous Arabist Lebanese Druze (and we shall not say Druze Lebanese because we insist on sociology and not administrative categorization) feudal lord Kamal Junblat summarizes most non-scholar Muslims' point of view, which remains unclear: "Anyone who speaks the "Dad" language [a byname for Arabic language] and who is Muslim in terms of belief, or heritage only, or Bedouin without the belief, is an Arab. A Levantine for example, unless he replaces his own heritage with Arab heritage, is not an Arab even if he was a Muslim... Knowing that the moral, political and cultural heritage that this language stores and transmits to the generations in its concepts and values is an Islamic heritage imbued with the civilization and History of Islam. Because Arabism in terms of civilization is inseparable from Islam (...) And the term "nationalism" itself with its current meaning is not present in the lexicon of the Arabic language, but was created for this meaning in about the mid - nineteenth century".

What is certain is that the first time that the term "Arabs" was mentioned was in 853 BC (Philip Hitti, among many other references) during the attack of the Assyrian king Shalmaneser III on the country of Canaan and the Kingdoms of Aram and of Israel and the other regional kingdoms. And the desert tribes west of the Euphrates supported the Aramaics and their tribes east of Horan and east of the Jordan Valley and thus the whole coalition, and the Assyrians called them "Arabs" when they documented the battle. The information is confirmed by writer Yassin Abdul Rahim, with confirmation that the term "Arab" is of Aramaic origin,* and it concerned "the inhabitants of the desert west of the Euphrates", since "Arab" ("Aarboye" later in Syriac) meant "west" in Canaanite at the time - said "rb",** and meant "sunset" or even "evening" due to the position of the sun at that moment ("3ruvto" later in Syriac), hence "3rouvto" was also used to mean "Friday" as in "before the end of the week".

** He says "Aramaic", which is scientifically "Canaanite", and not as in "authentic Aramaic", since it was Canaanite that was of use in Mesopotamia for trade purposes and later as literary and diplomatic language (and it is still erroneously called "Imperial Aramaic", we discussed that and we will discuss it again) Also, the Assyrians would not use upon a word that they didn't use themselves. But also, to be honest, Canaanite influence in Mesopotamia was only at its beginnings, and it is more probable that the term common between Canaanite and Sumero - Akkadian languages, inherited from a previous common language.*

*** Which reminds of the origin of the name "Europe"; refer to the section on Canaanites, on Cadmus, in the original work.*

And these Arab tribes were characterized by nomadism (Bedouinism) in contrast to the rest of the peoples all around within the crescent who had all abandoned that character by that time. Then the Romans used this term for the first time from an administrative point of view, for the south of present - day Syria, which later extended to the whole Peninsular desert, excluding Hejaz

and Yemen / Hadhramaut (which of note is not desertic), then including those entities via the term "Arabian Peninsula".

That is why then, yet before the Arab Renaissance which started ~ 1880, the word "Arabs" referred to the nomads in the desert from the center of Syria and Anbar till the "Empty Quarter" of the south of the Arabian Peninsula, but excluding the inhabitants of the cities and oases, and excluding as well today's Yemen (meaning Yemen and Hadhramaut) and Hejaz, for example. Hence the characteristics of nomadism evoked by Junblat, independently of any direct nationalism. And from here comes the argument that "Arabism" has never been racist or ethnic.

We can say that they spread over much of the heart and east of the Arabian Peninsula through the east of Jordan to the heart of the Damascus Desert, east of the Arameans and the East of the 3 "Jordanian Valley" and Nabatean kingdoms, and till the Anbar in modern Iraq.

And Arabism became affiliated in the nationalist sense with the coming of Islam though deification of the Arabic language, although it remained in the shadow for 1300 years because the practical culture was that of Islam and of Arabism, and the latter was promoted outside its real context since the end of the 19th century (end of the 1800s) to fight "Turkification", and many Levantines adhered to it for various reasons.

Thus, most of the regions that were under the banner of the Umayyads and Abbasids became the "Arab" world, where the official language of the countries is "literary Arabic", and the dialects are called "Vernacular Arabics", and the people are considered "Arabs" instead of "Muslims" (at the ethnic level) or at least "Arab Muslims" - thus it is said "they are Arabs, of Muslim religion", and so there were so - called "Arab" Christians, especially in Lebanon, which is the only country whose Christians can influence the atmosphere and thus its constitution and politics, and therefore where any link between Christians and their true History has been erased within this identity conflict.

So Christians tried to create a common identity with Muslims in the hope that Arab secularization would drive Muslims away from radical thoughts. They did not notice that Arabism in its essence does not accept secularization and secularization does not accept the constants of Arabism, since Arabism is tightly linked to Islam.

Finally, today, social milieus spontaneously and in terms of sentimental awareness adopt Junblat's definition which insists on the heritage stored in the Arabic language, which is an Islamic heritage, which practically gives a kind of national link, whereby Arabism is related to nothing but Islam from a scientific perspective, and all efforts to link it to other entities failed. Thus it is said: "Arabism is a body, its soul being Islam", quoting Michel Aflak, one of the founders of the Baath Party (also said Ba`th, Baas), who was born Christian but died Muslim.

So from a scientific point of view, the Arabs disappeared when they all converted to Islam, and so they are now within the Muslim nation (i.e., its worldliness), and none of them remained

within Arabism (i.e., the pure worldliness / culture of the Arabs), whose religion was Christian. Of note, paganism had disappeared, and the Jews, Nazarenes and Sabaeans / Mandeans were in terms of worldliness outside Arabs and outside other peoples, each being a people / nation / ethnicity in its worldliness.

16- Lebanese Christians

Thus, nowadays, Lebanese Christians are actually Canaanites (in terms of "People"). The 11% who are of Armenian, Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac and Coptic descent (as well as part of the Latins, those Latins who came from Europe) have blended within the Lebanese Christians, even if conserving their own peculiarities, and thus they are Canaanites as well, just like any Lebanese - American, who is an American, with Lebanese peculiarities. This is additionally by supported by the adoption of a binary system in 1943 despite 18 "confessional communities", and by frequently stating "Christians, Sunnis, Shiites and Druzes". The other 89% (the Maronites, Rums, Evangelical and part of the Latins, those Maronites who converted to Latin) are furthermore of Canaanite descent, that said for clarification without any further interest. And > 99.9% of Lebanese Christians descendants of the diaspora are of Canaanite descent, albeit most now perhaps retaining no more Canaanite peculiarities at the social / cultural level. That is said "scientifically", here the conclusion of biology and social sciences. And all those Christians became Lebanese since 1920 from administrative / legal point of view.

17- Lebanese Muslims

Lebanese Muslims are actually Muslims (in terms of "People") (and who might wish for various reasons to be specifically labeled as "Arab - Muslims"). That is said "scientifically", here the conclusion of social sciences. And they became Lebanese since 1920 from administrative / legal point of view. As for the fact that they are frequently called by their "confessional communities" (Sunnis, Shiites and Druzes) compared to their Christian counterparts, it is because despite their integration all together when it comes to "Muslim v/s Christians" matters which is all the more supported by the adoption of a binary system in 1943 despite 18 "confessional communities", they have not admixed in practice. Of note they have all borrowed irreligious habits and customs from the "Christians", habits and customs which are now erroneously labeled as "Lebanese", but which are actually "Canaanite", whereby Canaanites did not disappear but have evolved into current "Lebanese Christians", who are thus still Canaanites, whereas "Lebanese Muslims" are a mix of those Canaanites who splintered and became Muslims (more than as to a religion, but as to a People) and those Muslims who were transferred to Lebanon, that said for clarification without any further interest.

18- The Maronites

They are a denomination that, due to geographical split up, organized almost (but not totally as) as a confessional community, but they are not a People by themselves. Fate wanted Maronite

monks from northwestern Syria to preach the pagan Canaanites of Mount Lebanon, so they became Maronites and exploited geography and resisted, so they were not at all subjugated to the Muslim entourage, neither Syria (Bilad el - Sham) nor more distant entities. They lived a total independence albeit with its dark days since besieged, then with autonomy after 1382, with ephemeral subjugations to some of the opportunistic Ottoman governors of the entourage during the Ottoman era and to local Muslim feudal lords.

Although "Saint Maron" is reported to have passed away in 410, and John Maron I will organize the community starting 676, said community will not be known as "Maronites" (but just disciples of Maron) before ~ 900. Of note, the Syriacs are a People from northern Mesopotamia (current north - center / north - east Syria, extreme north - west Iraq, and the Turkish regions across the borders). Their language dominated Christianity and dominated Canaanite (called back then Imperial Aramaic) and infiltrated northwestern Syria at the literary and liturgical levels. This is how "Saint Maron" and his disciples came to use the Syriac language, with which said disciples brought Christianity into Mount Lebanon.

Gradually, and for a reason that we will not hereby tackle, inhabitants of Mount Lebanon adopted the Syriac language as literary, on top of it being their liturgical language, and of course interaction with their vernacular (aka spoken) language occurred, but that language remained Canaanite, not to mention that Syriac (and even more for western Syriac, in our case here) was already heavily Canaanized. However, the language being a remarkable aspect of culture, those inhabitants would become to be labeled as "Syriacs", adding on top of that various recent (150 years old) theories of massive Syriac exodus of Maronites (whereby in reality it was a number of monks and few families who would flee some attacked monasteries on 3 occasions) from northern Syria into "back then empty" northern Mount Lebanon, to later spread southward, a story which has been proven to be erroneous. To sum it up, Maronites are not Syriacs, but Canaanites.

19- The Rums

They are a denomination that, due to geographical split up, organized almost (but not totally as) as a confessional community, but they are not a People by themselves. Fate wanted that the apostles and disciples of Jesus of Nazareth preach directly the pagan Canaanites of the Coast, the South and the Bekaa, and they then followed the Greek liturgy, and eventually became Rums (we hereby mean religiously, since 742). Their regions were subjugated to the Muslim conquest given the accessible geography, and thus those who remained Christians were subjugated to the entourage and co - existed with it through mandatory Dhimmism, but they remained socially integrated at the sentimental level and even more so, admixed at the civilizational, communitarian and social levels, with the Maronites, as per what we see today on the ground (it is from here that it is always said, when one names the main confessional communities of Lebanon: Christians, Sunnis, Shiites and Druzes).

20- The Main Personal Identities in Lebanon and the Coherence of Each

Legally (Administratively)	The Lived Worldliness (Collective Identity)	Believer or Atheist	Compatibility / Confusion / Contradiction
Muslim	Muslim Worldliness (with a strand of Arabism)	Believer in Islam	Compatibility
Muslim	Muslim Worldliness Atmosphere but sprinkled with an external strand (specifically in Lebanon a Canaanite strand [^]) (with a strand of Arabism)	Believer in Islam	Religious Confusion [#]
Muslim	Muslim Worldliness Atmosphere but sprinkled (more than here above) with an external strand, specifically in Lebanon a Canaanite strand [^]) (with a strand of Arabism)	Atheist or religion not coupled to a worldliness	Practical Identitarian Confusion [*]
Muslim	Canaanite	Atheist or religion not coupled to a worldliness	Compatibility
Muslim	Canaanite	Believer in Islam	Contradiction [#]
Christian	Canaanite ^{**}	Atheist or religion not coupled to a worldliness ⁺⁺	Compatibility

[^] Canaanite worldliness has a lot in common with many (non - Muslim and non - Jewish) peoples (be it at the level of basic social issues (foundations of society) or with regard to “simple” habits (e.g., pork consumption)); and other issues are purely Canaanite (be it at the level of basic social issues (perception as to the Cedar) or as to “simple” habits (the “Dabkeh” dance or the “Zajal”, of which the “Dal3ouna” and the “3ataba” emanated))

[#] So anyone who is legally (administratively) Muslim and truly a believer in Islam and living the atmosphere of Muslim worldliness, or even living pure Canaanite worldliness, cannot consider oneself as currently “Muslim Canaanite”: “Canaanite” and “Muslim” do not come together.

^{*} The reason is the loss of the Canaanite worldliness and its replacement by the Muslim one upon the conquest, and currently atheism which causes the loss of a lot of the Muslim worldliness, thus keeping practically a penumbra of Muslim worldliness to which is grafted a Canaanite remarkable strand (next to the Arab strand, and considers oneself “Arab” but not Muslim).

^{**} Legally (administratively) Christian + of Canaanite worldliness + considering oneself Arab implies a “theoretical identitarian confusion”; does not socially join, at the collective level, “practically identitarianly confused” Muslims.

⁺⁺ Bearing in mind that in general the atheists of Canaanite worldliness are "liberal", the categorization "liberal / moderate / conservative / extremist" of the followers of any religion not coupled to a worldliness (including Christianity) as to their religion and who are of Canaanite worldliness remains within said worldliness similarly to the rest of peoples who are followers of

said religions as to their respective “worldlinesses” (French, American, Chinese, Russian, Japanese, Ethiopian...).

The conclusion is that the coherent collective identities remain within one of the two collective identities, that is to say one of the two “worldlinesses”: the Canaanite or the Muslim. Hence the famous saying: "The Muslim in Mauritania is the 'brother' of the Muslim in Indonesia", and not even: "the Muslim Mauritanian / the Muslim Indonesian" or "the Mauritanian Muslim / the Indonesian Muslim", because a true Muslim is not but a Muslim and nothing more in terms of ethnicity. And this does not spare Lebanon.

21- The Lebanese Vernacular

(Spoken) "Lebanese" is not a language. It is a variety of the Canaanite language, in its current evolved form, which also includes Syrian and Palestinian varieties. And the "Lebanese Canaanite" variety is actually two varieties: "Ordinary Lebanese Canaanite" variety, mainly spoken by the "Christians", and "Arabized Lebanese Canaanite" variety, mainly spoken by the Muslims, each englobing different regional and communitarian dialects.

22- The Canaanite Alphabet

It fell in disuse after Arabic and Syriac replaced Canaanite as literary languages (again, not as spoken languages) among the Lebanese Christians. It can be easily updated for vowels, as well as for lacking consonants. We have proposed such an update, as well as a keyboard and a font to that aim, and typed a paragraph on MS Word that we will include below as an image because there is still the limitation of the font having to be installed to view said paragraph as text.

Sample of the translation of the notice into Canaanite language (with a reminder of the adoption of the Lebanese variety) using its (proposed updated) Canaanite script / alphabet:

The sample is inserted as an image rather than a text because without the proper font the letters will be unintelligible as to software. The resolution remains much inferior to directly typing.

אֵלֶּה הַדְּבָרִים

.תִּפְתָּח לִּי שַׁעַר הַחַיָּת וְאֶתְּנֵנִי מִן הַשָּׁעַר הַזֶּה לְעָלֹת מִן הַשָּׁעַר הַזֶּה לְעָלֹת
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בְּ) מִן הַשָּׁעַר הַזֶּה לְעָלֹת מִן הַשָּׁעַר הַזֶּה לְעָלֹת מִן הַשָּׁעַר הַזֶּה לְעָלֹת מִן הַשָּׁעַר הַזֶּה לְעָלֹת
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23- Criticizing Far - Fetched Approaches which Lead to Surreal Solutions for the Lebanese Dilemma

A- Settling for Administrative Decentralization as a Unique Concept for the Solution, since the decision remains in the hands of the central authority, as long as the decentralized departments are technically submitted to the former, especially since the proposed administrative departments will remain completely devoid of the necessary constitutional powers which protect them from being subject to the legislation of the Central Parliament, decisions of the Central Cabinet, and considerations of the judicial system of the central authority. In addition, the "administrative decentralization" does not include any conception of a solution to the methodological political massacre when it comes to major national decisions. Indeed, this conflict manifests itself in its political, legislative, executive, security, economic, legal, cultural and administrative aspects, and constitutes the main issue of the dilemma and the main cause of

differences, and administrative decentralization only resolves administrative problems and those in relation to the development of regions, and nothing more.

B- Settling for a Modification of the Electoral Law as a Unique Concept for the Solution, since federalism is a complete political system, in which electoral reforms of proportionality or others can be applied, both at the level of cantons and federal government. Moreover, the electoral laws have proved that they would never be fair for all, even in the "orthodox" law (where each confession elects its deputies), since the deputies remain restricted by the formula of centralization and where the citizens are taken as hostages, as mentioned before. And in the case of proportional elections within a unitary state, there will inevitably be a parliament that will be subject to a majority, even if only by a slight difference... in other words, it remains subject to the rule of the "stronger counterpart". And already, under any electoral law, confessional belonging will remain the main source of inspiration for voters, and this will produce the same parliamentary structure as is today.

C- Abolition of the Confessional Political System, because in fact, there is a confusion between "sectarianism" and "sectarian political system", which made things ambiguous.

Indeed, according to the opinion of the promoters of the said abolition, the state of law and institutions will be based on citizenship only, in the complete equality of the rights and the duties between the Lebanese. This is awesome, just as in federalism. But any suggestion of secularism in a unitary state will counterbalance the popular sentimental background and produce either a breakup of the state, or will give a chance allowing the largest community to "legitimately" control the entire power of the government by itself via simple majority. Thus, within this system, the ruling community will have all the time and room for maneuver to work in the aim of integration and dilution of other confessional groups into its own cultural perspective under its own authority, spontaneously, if not with premeditation (or with the aim of pushing them to emigrate), with a military conflict that will be on the verge. And this will at least be carried out spontaneously, should the confessional community not strive to do that actively.

The explanation is that the persistence of habits and customs and manners and atmospheres specific to the most powerful confession (as for the others) will be the source of the conduct of everyday life in almost all its aspects (i.e., the elimination of sectarianism in the texts through the abolition of the confessional political system, without having eliminated it from the souls of the citizens - which is not required anyway), which will spontaneously drive the members of this community to actions, and its deputies to legislations, going into that sense, be it actively or passively.

Of course, in a federal system, the secularization of central administrations and an optional "civil / non - religious" law for civil status in the country pose no problem should the Lebanese aspire to that; in the provinces, secularization may or may not be applied, depending on local will. On the other hand, the federal system has the necessary flexibility to allow people to spread the

concept of secularism within their confessional societies should they want to, because the federal system will have succeeded in abolishing sectarian conflicts between its communities through the transfer of conflicts from being intercommunal to intracommunal, so that each confession thinks to self - improve, and that the interconfessional rivalry becomes based on advancement and motivation of concepts in parallel with knowledge and development.

In short, those who accept the abolition of political sectarianism would have therefore adopted the merger of Lebanese communities into one, and are therefore condemned to accept, in the name of Lebanese citizenship, the restoration of nationality to as many people as possible of the 10 million descendants at all costs, and then to agree to annex Lebanon to Syria and later to any larger entity that would include them, in the name of Arab citizenship, since if the Christian Lebanese is assimilated into the Muslim Lebanese, he would therefore have assimilated into the Arab nation, and through it at least not having a problem with a Muslim majority with him being a Dhimmi.

24- Answers to FAQs Concerning the Practical Aspect of a Federal Order

A- Lebanon's Area Unable to Sustain a Federal Order

The federal system is a system applied in many countries, including countries much smaller than Lebanon, such as Comoros (2034 km²), Micronesia (702 km²), and "Saint Kitts and Nevis" (261 km²). But also, when some countries such as Austria, Belgium and Switzerland on one side, and Russia, Canada and the United States on the other, are federated states, with the first countries close to Lebanon in terms of area (between 30,000 and 80,000 km², versus 10 million km², or even 17 million km² for Russia), this means that the area is not a criterion to consider. Let us add the fact that the Swiss federation has assimilated small cantons as long as they retain a vital characteristic and include communities that try to preserve their specificities; thus the canton of Appenzell - Innerrhoden), which has 15,000 inhabitants, and the canton of Basel - Stadt (Basel - City), with an area of 37 km² (only 37).

B- Possibility of War between Cantons

The cantons have no way of waging offensive wars. In addition, there is a single central federal army that preserves security (constituted on the basis of binary equality for each group, category and hierarchy, as well as other conditions), which would constitute a safety valve among all communities. So there is no possibility for internal wars except by dividing the army, which is possible regardless of the political system.

C- The need to Go Through Administrative Decentralization

There is no reason to pass by other systems or mechanisms in order to implement

a federal system. Administrative decentralization may even fail in achieving its own expected goals if it is adopted as a gateway to federalism because of the remaining aspects of governance that will remain centralized.

D- The Fact that Federalism Promotes Isolationism and Prevents Confessions from Mingling

Federalism prevents the attempt to integrate the other within oneself by force, whether directly or indirectly. On the other hand, it does not constitute a barrier for citizens who wish to diffuse the cultural, ideological and intellectual diversity in broad daylight, regardless of the differences. Contrary to what is promoted, federalism is more flexible than other regimes to implement the best way to activate cultural openness, civilizational cooperation and the mixing within diversity, because of the protection offered by the system to individuals and groups, and this is why the situation will be better than today as to these aspects.

E- Federalism Will Oblige Minorities to Migrate to Regions of Concentration of their Own Confessions

The migration of human groups has been the dominant feature of the course of Humanity since the dawn of History. In Lebanon's recent History, the centralized state system has not prevented continuous changes in terms of residence and relocations. Recognition of the everyday reality of the Lebanese People requires recognition of the automatic adoption by the two peoples' populations as well as by confession members of the process of gathering in areas of concentration of their communities, which reflect their environment and way of life. But on the other side, one has always observed the attempts of powerful communities to develop at the expense of other communities throughout History, and here resides the vitality of the federal system which offers a firm guarantee against attempts to invasion, forceful integration and geographical and demographic occupation of communities, regardless of the perpetrator.

Besides, cultural / confessional agglomerations appear in several Lebanese regions, amongst another cultural / confessional majority. If these agglomerations and their geographic extension do not permit the establishment of a canton, the proposed federal system may assume autonomous sub - cantons subordinate to the nearest canton of same community.

In this perspective, concerning individuals of different communities from those around them, and unlike popular theories, it is not the theoretical law established by the current centralized state that guarantees their thrive in these regions, but only the social tolerance of their environment which ensures that they reside there, along with concessions and sacrifices on the part of these individuals with regard to their way of living their religious and cultural convictions and the manner in which they live and apply their political affiliations and their individual liberties in order to achieve an apparent integration with their environment, so as to "go with the flow".

It must be admitted, however, that changing a state's system of government to federalism will not change the current system of tolerance, as long as this system of tolerance is not imposed by law but comes from self - awareness of Lebanese citizens, who, to tell the truth, seem to be different from the citizens of the surrounding countries as to that point, but not to such an extent as to overcome the priority of belonging in the first place to the community identity.

However, the proposed federal system for Lebanon aims to provide the necessary guarantees against any negative discrimination against citizens of any group, whether sectarian, racial, ethnic or otherwise, by establishing a system of mutual protection between the cantons with regard to the minorities concerned. On the other hand, the most important aspect of minorities' protection is setting up the Ombudsman's Court, which is actually an institution with all the necessary administrative and judicial mechanisms. It should be emphasized that the proposed system considers this modernist structure as one of the most important pillars of Lebanese federalism.

Thus, any fear on the part of the minorities would be eliminated by applying the guarantees necessary so that they persist in their regions to the utmost. And worst - case scenario, wouldn't it be better for minorities to move within their stable country, than instead of emigrating to the 4 corners of the world?

F- Federalism Will Lead to Partition

Nowadays, in Lebanon, as in 1920 and well before, it is now clear that "sorting" is established in terms of cultural and confessional regions, given the non - integrated communities struggling to govern the country. And this sorting is only the consequence of the historical events that occurred, knowing that some towns are minoritarian within a regional majority, and that about 10% of the ~ 1400 towns are mixed, however with most of them divided into communitarian neighborhoods.

In 1920, a geographical area known as "Greater Lebanon" was traced and it corresponds almost perfectly to historical Lebanon. The cultural / confessional regions in this area have been legally unified by the central Constitution that the French put in place by (almost) copying their own Constitution. This placed the communities face to face to control the one and only power as in any unitary state, and the leaders began to exploit this conflict.

Scientifically, solving this clash passes either by the consecration of the sorting according to the option of independent states (states which can find common grounds to form a confederation, such as the European Union), or by the maintenance of the unification of these regions which occurred in 1920 within the same state, but in a legally valid way through a federal system, so that the Constitution goes with pluralism and sponsors it, and this also solves the clash issue, since the conflict on the centralized unitary government is eliminated by the holistic decentralization that will take place.

And it is known that the Lebanese people would generally morally ashamed to suggest the path of partition because of the acceptance of the other that has occurred over time and good relations between communities at the social level. Likewise, its cost would be a wave of migration as a minimum, besides other essential issues. But it remains a valid option: as pointed above, better a close displacement after partition than a distant migration before it. And so, scientifically, federalism cannot divide what was sorted by History, and which is bound only by an inappropriate political centralization badly formulated in 1926. And the current state of affairs is in itself pushing towards partition. And those who want to go for partition can do so immediately, because it is not necessary to go through federalism. One last point: pacific partition (by mutual agreement) also implies a will for coexistence, but within independent states. The refusal of coexistence by any means implies eternal war, regardless of the administrative solution.

The definitions are hence the following:

Partition: consecration of the sorting of regions (in Lebanon, through a legitimate division of the wrong union), by declaring the independence of each region and establishing independent states.

Confederalism: a union of independent states under the dome of a specific title (or more) (e.g., currency, economic affairs, etc...).

Federalism: union of divisions under the dome of a single state with its own currency, its army and its foreign policy, and which can allow certain freedoms even in matters of central governance (loose federalism), such as in Belgium. In Lebanon, the divisions are already united but in a wrong way; only a Constitutional change is needed to shift from unitary / centralized to federal system.

Regionalism: it is as unitarism / centralization, thus it does not concern plurality, but gives some administrative powers to the regions, which however remain deprived of basic political rights, yet offers more than administrative decentralization, discussed above in paragraph H - 1.

Unitary / Centralization: the state groups all possible powers in the capital. And should it include divisions, it does not recognize them and thus denies pluralism. The state can apply the "non - exclusivity system" to facilitate citizens' affairs by establishing satellite branches of its central institutions, across the country.

Confederation and partition do not therefore include the recognition of pluralism within a single state but throughout several ones. Federalism does recognize it, but within one state. The last two systems do not recognize pluralism at all.

Note that these definitions are somewhat loose between references, so that specialists may disagree with the classification of some systems adopted by states, but the most important is the course of events in the country concerned.

A fundamental question then arises: which system is the most appropriate for Lebanon, federalism or partition?

Advantages of Partition and Disadvantages of Federalism:

- Partition is the purely scientific solution to the Canaanite - Muslim conflict (should we ignore exceptions).

- Partition allows the Muslims to choose to govern by the "Islamic Laws" and to comply to the letter to the "Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam", even within the central government (option available in the cantons within federalism under some conditions of respect for minorities, a secular Constitution with at least a touch of secularism and the "United Nations Charter of Human Rights" and its other complementary texts being adopted in the central government).

- Partition exempts communities from mandatory sharing of taxes and revenues through a centralized government.

- Federalism demands concessions from Muslims in terms of some convictions considered as being of the foundation of Muslim doctrine.

Advantages of Federalism and Disadvantages of Partition:

- Partition requires a final displacement of minorities with cutting links with original regions, or the minorities accepting the principle of Dhimmism (for Christians as for Muslims, be it religious or civil, since no constitutional protection for minorities).

- Hostile partition by the Christians will lead to them being besieged (or Christians and Druze if they create a federal state) geographically and economically, and will oppress the Druze if these join the Muslim state (unless this state is established on a federal basis).

- The success of fraternal relations imposed by time and circumstances, between the members of the communities, with the desire to mingle despite the civilizational distinction between the duo members and the social distinction among the Muslim confessions, constitutes one of the solid foundations for federalism preference.

- Federalism maintains Lebanon as a unique state with all its advantages.

- Federalism strengthens communities against foreigners by creating bonds of solidarity.

- Federalism ensures the benefits via the cultural and economic links of the communities (with the West as well as with the Islamic countries, including the Arab world) and this point is very important.

The final decision is not purely scientific, but is based on a complete analysis of the data that preceded, and the tendency towards federalism is obvious. And this section aims to show the good intentions of this federal project presented hereunder. Of course, if federalism is forced despite the desire of one or more components to divide despite the inconveniences, its future is then doomed. And if the coexistence experience is positive, then federalism will be a long - term guarantee. Finally, let us point out again that pacific partition is likewise an excellent solution in its essence (apart from the disadvantages) for coexistence, and is not difficult to establish from a technical point of view (it is simply implementing independent states), in view of the absence of

the issues due to links established between communities within a single state in the case of federalism.

Dr. Marc Achkar

Conclusion

We demonstrate to readers that in Lebanon, Canaanites (byname Phoenicians, and later totally or partially included within various appellations such as Aramaics, Syrians, Byzantines, Rums, Arabs and Lebanese) still sociologically exist and are current "Lebanese Christians". On the other hand, we demonstrate that Muslims of Lebanon are part of the worldwide Islamic nation of which a portion considers itself Arab - Muslim, the latter of which a portion lives on the historical land of Lebanon, which is quasi - synonymous to "the Republic of Lebanon" since 1920.

Thus, Lebanon is a country that administratively encompasses two Peoples. As a land, it has been essentially divided since the Muslim conquest, and it was administratively unified into a country in 1920 through a centralized system of governance (a unitary state) that does not take pluralism into account, after the attempts of the Emirate, the Caimacamates and the Mutasarrifate (within the mountain).

The Christians tried to Lebanonize the Muslims, and the Muslims tried to (at least) Arabize the Canaanites, if not to culturally Islamize them, while awaiting any chance for complete religious conversion, or complete emigration.

Hence, a federation of present - day Lebanon would not be a division, but a union of its two components in a way that would manage pluralism. Lebanon had been split into these two components since 634, and that until 1920, when they were administratively united through a centralized unitary political system instead of being united through a decentralized federal system. This is the correction that should be carried out.

And if the relatively mild concessions that both Peoples must accept, in order to maintain the Republic of Lebanon as an administrative entity, is unbearable to any of the two factions, they can also go for peaceful partition, as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. New states can then go for some confederation. Each choice has its advantages and its inconveniences that we detail in our work.

Epilogue

A unitary political system through a centralized Constitution set up in 1926, rendering diversity - protecting laws secondary to the main generalized laws:

→ Each law, whether concerning major or minor or even trivial issues, having to be applicable on all Lebanese soil.

→ A 1943 Pact stating Lebanon to be "of Arab face", considered by Christians a victory since not [strictly] stating "Arab", and considered by Muslims a victory because [at least] stating "Arab".

→ A 1958 truce stating "no winner, no loser".

→ A 1990 call for binary equality, yet never truly respected. Of note, Lebanon "becomes" "of Arab identity and belonging" as per the Constitutional amendment.

→ Almost all cultural, sociological and political events antagonistically interpreted by Christians and Muslims, and, on a secondary level, by Sunnis and Shiites, as well as by Druzes.

→ Thus said factions fighting for seizing power, as the sole means for each to preserve itself within said unitary system.

→ Other factions calling upon external "sponsors" to rescue them and help them seize power (and nothing is for free).

→ Here the feudal / confessional lords step - up on stage: each presents himself as the savior of his own community, and "corruption is a must for the good of our community": "If I am strong, so are you" (plural form), which implies: "If you (singular form) call upon holding me accountable, you will be hurting our whole community": self - flogging of the citizen by his own feeling of guilt. Despotism is the law, nepotism on the go.

The lord thus replaces the state as to social services. He (most of them at least) has his militia. And in the back stage, there is always a deal among the lords to perpetuate the issue into an endless loop, and this has been successfully achieved. Kings may fall, but not them. As has been said, each country has a mafia but only one mafia has a country: welcome to Lebanon. Here are the Lebanese, retained as hostages: no community can hold its leaders accountable, nor can it hold other communities' leaders accountable.

History has been concealed, hence no data, thus no diagnosis, and eventually no plan for peace: and why a plan when a change could jeopardize said lords?

No revolution will take place. The proof: being buried under tons of garbage, the Beirut 2020 explosion, a government having robbed its citizens, and failed manifestations in 2019... what other explanation for the so - called "Lebanese people's inertia"? The main answer: two intertwined Peoples cannot undertake one sole revolution.

The Proposal for Implementation of a Federal Order in Lebanon in Practice

- It resolves both Peoples' fears, in their believers and irreligious, in their seculars and theocrats,
- It is the system that slows the most any internal displacement,
- It tackles change of circumscription, inter - communitarian marriages and nationalization,
- It allows for a quota for ownership, rent, residency and work, promoting mingling while prohibiting isolationism but also prohibiting demographic sweeping,
- It solves social clashes such as week - ends and holidays,
- It distributes taxes and revenues in an appropriate manner,
- It solves the clashes as to Lebanon's identity as a republic and all internal as well as foreign policies attached to that issue and it implements neutrality,
- It achieves binary equality (and proportionality within Muslims), with rotation as to unique posts,
- It adopts a presidential council instead of a president, as well as the Ombudsman tribunal for Human Rights cases, for protection of minorities from any distinctive abuse of their right, be it at the individual or at collective level, and for cases of administrative corruption,
- It proposes an "escape friendly" secularism in the federal government only (which is necessary for the Republic's existence), leaving the choice for cantons,
- It proposes a general optional secular civil status law,
- It achieves administrative decentralization,
 - It thus promotes democracy while protecting regional minorities ,
- And it allows a national reconciliation, which can lead to:
 - demarcation of all borders,
 - completion foreign occupation withdrawals,
 - returning of detainees and deportees, as well as solving the issue of "the disappeared" inside the country,
 - descendants of the diaspora regaining their citizenship and the right to vote, and reducing the voting age to 18, as well as women passing citizenship to their children,
 - and writing Lebanon's History in a progressive, non - classical fashion.

Main References

Notice:

- The reference numbers are placed in the text as precisely as possible, according to the reference from which we drew the information, although sometimes the information may be present in other references.
- The number concerns all of the above upstream to the beginning of a paragraph at most, and the entire section when it appears in a title. Of course, some details have sometimes been added even if they do not necessarily come from the reference mentioned.
- Sometimes the existence of more than one number may mean that the information was combined rather than the two references mentioning all the information each by itself.
- For cards, any additional number means that the card has been changed according to the additional reference, and any number in brackets means that the card was drawn up according to that reference.
- Finally, some information may arise directly from the authors without being specifically present in said references.

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- 25 - Dr. Abdel Majid Tayyeb Omar, English Professor at Omm el Qora University
- 26 - Elias Sarkis diary, by Raji Achkouty, First Edition, 1985, حقائق في خدمة وطني -
- 27 - Writings of M. Mickel Mhanna
- 28 - Dr. Marc Achkar, 2017, مشروع اتحادية لبنانية -
- 29 - <https://www.ancient.eu/article/881/trade-in-the-phoenician-world/>
- 30 - <https://www.elnashra.com/news/show/977028/-لبنان-١٩٤٨-حتى-الإعتداءات-الإسرائيلية-على-لبنان-١٩٤٨-حتى->
[١٩٧٨?amp=1](https://www.elnashra.com/news/show/977028/-لبنان-١٩٤٨-حتى-الإعتداءات-الإسرائيلية-على-لبنان-١٩٤٨-حتى-)
- 31 - <http://www.lebanonrenaissance.org/assets/Uploads/LSB-2011-AW.pdf>
- 32 - La Vie Religieuse au Liban sous l'Empire Romain, Julien Aliquot, 2009

33 - Tabnit Phoenician Inscription (KAI 13), Attempt at Vocalization, Jean - Claude Haelewyck, FNRS, Université Catholique de Louvain

34 - lebarmy.gov.lb/ar/content/نحو-قراءة-جديدة-لرحلة-البحث-عن-الحدود-الجنوبية-للبنان

¹ Among his references are the Vatican archives, the archives of the museums of Istanbul, Cairo, Venice and Tbilisi, the archives of the Maronite Patriarchate, the manuscripts of Qannubin, the University of London, Stanford University, "Laurence Austin Waddell - Royal Institute of Anthropology", "West Point Military Academy, USA", University of Berkeley, California, German Institute of Archaeology, National Geographic.

² Holder of an approval from the "Lebanese Army Directorate for Geographical Affairs".

³ Please copy the link as is and paste it on the browser to view the article.

⁴ We have to salute Wikipedia, founder, managers and contributors, in all linguistic versions, for the tremendous job that they have achieved. Long story short, this note is to elaborate on one point: it is well known that Wikipedia, as a reference, provokes contradictory feelings as to readers. Since any person can contribute to it, it has attracted criticism on that point, putting in doubt reliability. After going through numerous articles on same topics, I can ensure that I have noted that Wikipedia does not neglect any possibilities or suggestions relevant to a topic; it also mentions the original reference; it also criticizes publicly by inserting comments like "citation needed" or "dubious". These actions can on one side dismantle monopolism of diverging information to a certain ideology, should we take History as an example, or at least counter - balance information that one would take for granted should the source be a classical encyclopedia on a bookshelf. Moreover, when we note information "praising" a social faction that had faded or is considered to have faded and is unable to defend its History, without any incentive but spreading a Historical truth from writers foreign to said faction, we can be sure that the probability of "truth" is extremely high. Examples are numerous, but will not be discussed here. Doubt begins when "praising" information about a social faction is entered by members of said faction. Of course, we have noted several contradictions between pages; they remain few relative to the compatibility of articles. In that, we conclude by saying that the "downside" of Wikipedia is negligible as to not only its absolute plus as for information it brings in, but also as to credibility of said information. At last, even scholars who have written classical encyclopedias might be criticized from ordinary readers as to bias, based on their name or nationality as an example. It is up to the reader to wrap up the information we have adopted to link the whole matter, note the suggestions that exist and that we have decided to note but not to adopt, go back to Wikipedia and search in its pages for the references of matters, and decide as to whether our analysis is coherent or not. In the end, our ethical duty is to note the primary source from which we got the piece of information.