**Pretest report**

Sample

In total, 162 subjects were divided into 4 groups: investing (n = 37, M = 20, F = 17), construction (n = 45, M = 33, F = 12), real estate (n = 42, M = 27, F = 15) and online retail (n = 38, M = 22, F = 16).

Procedure

Four different vignettes were pre-tested to ascertain how reliably they triggered judgments of greed. These vignettes refer to fictitious companies, but all are based on real-life situations. They describe investing (n = 37), construction (n = 45), real estate (n = 42), and online retailing companies (n = 38) implementing strategies to boost their profits. These strategies are hidden fees (Taylor, 2019), use of substandard construction materials (Oloyede *et al.*, 2010), increasing rents inconsiderately (The Age, 2020), and unfair competition (Khan, 2017), respectively. According to the definition of greed previously presented, our narrative includes stimuli elements to clarify that (i) at least one distributive justice principle is being violated, (ii) the companies are not implementing these strategies out of necessity, (iii) someone is being hurt, and (iv) the behavior is indicative of a pattern. See “Materials” folder for the pretest.

Results

As expected, the scenarios triggered high greed scores for the four groups: hidden fees (x̅ = 6.26), use of substandard construction materials (x̅ = 6.161), inconsiderate rent increase (x̅ = 5.497), and unfair competition (x̅ = 4.816) (maximum possible score = 7). Normality tests were performed in the following order: visual tests, particularly density plots and QQ plots, and the Shapiro–Wilk test. Data distributions were not normal for any group (p < 0.05 for each scenario); therefore, we used the Kruskal–Wallis test to establish whether there was any significant difference between the greed score means (Kruskal & Wallis, 1952; McKight & Najab, 2010). The Kruskal–Wallis test was significant (H(3) = 28.73, p = 0.00), indicating that the means were significantly different. To ascertain which means were different, a *post-hoc* Dunn’s test, employing Benjamini–Hochberg adjusted p-values (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995), was used. This last test established that the means of hidden fees (x̅ = 6.26) and the use of substandard construction materials (x̅ = 6.161) were not significantly different from each other (p = 0.71), but each was significantly different from the means of the other two scenarios (p values < 0.05)—inconsiderate rent increase (x̅ = 5.497) and unfair competition (x̅ = 4.816). Based on the analyses, we selected the substandard construction materials scenario for our study.

**References**

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