

Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games

Reference

Brocas I., C. Camerer, J. Carrillo and S. Wang “Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games”, *Review of Economic Studies*, 81, 944-970, 2014. [PDF](#)

- List of variables:

matchId	Match #	0,...,40
GroupId	Group # for each pair of players playing against each other	0, ..., 7
ClientId	Id # allocated to each player	0, ..., 14
Payoff	Total points earned by the player for a specific match #	Depends on the game and decisions (see paper)
State	A, B or C	This is the realized state
deal_decision	Whether a deal occurred	Yes, no
decisionTime	Time at which a decision was made	
player_type	Identity of player	1,2
player_info	Partition given to player	[A or B] or C for player 1 A or [B or C] for player 2
payoffGrid.0	Payoff for player left	Depends on game (see paper)
payoffGrid.1	Payoff for player middle	Depends on game (see paper)
payoffGrid.2	Payoff for player right	Depends on game (see paper)
payoffGrid.noDeal	Payoff if no deal	Depends on game (see paper)
view.k.index	Location of the k-th lookup	0, ...
view.k.time	Time into the trial the lookup started	
view.k.duration	Duration of the lookup	
questionRound.0.question.0.answer	First CRT question	
questionRound.0.question.1.answer	Second CRT question	
questionRound.0.question.2.answer	Third CRT question	
questionRound.1.question.0.answer	Gender	
questionRound.1.question.1.answer	Field of study	
questionRound.1.question.2.answer	Game theory knowledge	
questionRound.1.question.3.answer	Play games	
questionRound.1.question.4.answer	Free question	