
Labyrinth SECURITY GROUP



Cyber Targeting Cycle (CTC)





Labyrinth Security Group

The Labyrinth Security Group is a consortium of passionate and dedicated cyber security professionals with a desire to contribute to the cyber security community by sharing knowledge and concepts through collaboration.

Sharing Cyber Security Knowledge & Community Collaboration


- Business Enablement
 - Strategy
 - Business Alignment
 - Architecture & Design
- Security Operations
- Risk Management
- Identity Access Management
- Legal & Regulatory
- Governance
- Research and Development
- Cyber Threat Intelligence

Red Team

Adversary Emulation & Campaign-based Testing

Purple Team

Facilitate collaboration toward a common business goal



Blue Team

Defensive and Counter
Operations



CTC Overview

The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) is part of a larger cycle – The Cyber Targeting Cycle (CTC)

CTC Slide Deck Overview

- Description of additional levels and steps which lead to cyber attack execution (e.g. rationale, desired end-state, objectives, assessment measurement criteria, planning, target development, etc.)
- Cyber security professionals should have an understanding of potential adversaries and probability in order to develop appropriate defense posture, counter measures and adequately manage risk
 - Private sector organizations are also part of the national critical infrastructure and should adequately defend themselves
- Lets pull the thread on the Cyber Targeting Cycle (CTC) using an "alleged" complex nation-state use case – Operation Olympic Games ("Stuxnet")

Cyber Targeting Cycle (CTC)

Strategic CTC Process

Operational CTC Process

Tactical
CTC Process
(aka CKC)

¹The source material used for this presentation was derived from publicly available information ²The intent is to use Stuxnet as a use-case to support the Cyber Targeting Cycle discussion





Use Case: Operation Olympic Games (Stuxnet)








Characteristics

- Alleged Actors: United States, Great Britain, Israel
- Target(s): Iran Nuclear Development Facility Centrifuge PLCs
- Objective(s):
 - Deny Iran a military nuclear capability
 - Slow down nuclear program-Buy time
 - Covert kinetic "cyber target"
 - Get Iran to negotiating table
- U.S. Cyber Authorities:
 - **POTUS** approval
 - USSTRATCOM/USCYBERCOM execution
- Cut Off Date: 1/20/2009,
- **Assessment:**
 - Coalition: Failed to meet U.S. objectives
 - Iran: Political isolation, economic sanctions, program development impeded ~1 yr, followed by exponential nuclear development growth


















Campaign Timeline





CTC Discussion

Cyber Targeting Cycle Discussion

- Complex, high stakes, offensive cyber operations require planning and resources
 - There must be a Time Sensitive Target (TST) cycle in place to support small windows of opportunity
- Robust formal/informal CTC is used to inform decision-makers (cyber criminals, hactivists, military, nation-state, etc.)
- In this discussion, I suggest the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain is the tactical level of the CTC

Cyber Targeting Cycle (CTC)


Strategic CTC Process

Operational CTC Process

Tactical
CTC Process
(aka CKC)




CTC Strategic Level





CTC Operational Level




"The ability to act at scale and speed" - Modernized, Modular, Agile, Flexible, Scalable, Orchestrated





CTC Tactical Level



"The ability to act at scale and speed" - Modernized, Modular, Agile, Flexible, Scalable, Orchestrated





- The cyber kill chain is the tactical sub-process of a broader process the Cyber Targeting Cycle
 - Cyber attacks require a network of organized actors to plan, coordinate, execute/monitor, and assess
 the operations effectiveness It is not fire and forget
 - There are many linkages between cybersecurity and intelligence disciplines
 - Target, Human, Counter-Intel, Open Source, Signal, Geospatial, Fusion, All-Source
 - Identifying the target network is a cyber intelligence target development function
 - Creating predictive capabilities will require intelligence tradecraft/methodologies and AI/ML
 - Cyber Threat Modeling and Simulation, third party intelligence reports, publicly available information, combined with internally developed reports can help with cybersecurity design and planning (*Develop and test your plans!*)
 - Verizon 2019 Data Breach Investigations Report (pdf)
 - DHS Cybersecurity Risk Determination Report May 2018 (pdf)
 - Most enterprise organizations need to modernize and redesign security architecture based on current advanced persistent threats - Consider zero trust architecture, defensible architecture, or a hybrid architecture
 - Zero Trust is a paradigm shift but you will be surprised what you can do to with existing technology platform mechanisms to potentially improving security posture, without capital expenditures – Check out the SANS webcast below for ideas
 - <u>SANS Zero Trust Architecture Webcast</u> (by Justin Henderson)
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5sFOdpMLXQg&t=1792s







- Joint Pub 5-0 Joint Planning (https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5 0 20171606.pdf
- Joint Pub 3-12 Cyber Operations (https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3 12.pdf)
- Joint Pub 3-60 Joint Targeting (https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Joint Chiefs-Joint Targeting 20130131.pdf)
- Levels of War (https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Volume 1/V1-D34-Levels-of-War.pdf)
- ZerODay (2016) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oz585G-6NBA)
- How a Secret Cyberwar Works (https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/how-a-secret-cyberwar-programworked.html)
- Iran's Nuclear Program Timeline and History (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/)
- Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay (https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html)