


Just
In Time...



...Access?

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Permalink:
https://github.com/labyrinthinesecurity/automatedReasoning/blob/main/3_ToxLocks.pdf

How to oversee Just In Time (JIT) access to Azure PaaS control plane when:

- ☐ PIM doesn't cover your service
- ☐ You don't want to pay for PIM
- ☐ PIM doesn't fit into your corporate IAM landscape

Azure IAM product owner requirements

In a given subscription,

- A **Blue** team must make occasional, emergency changes to some sensitive assets
- A **Green** team is gatekeeping access to sensitive assets
- **Green** grants access to **Blue** after each request review
- Access is temporary, it expires after “H” hours
- **Green** has no other modification rights in the subscription
- **Blue** cannot self-approve its requests

Note that ensuring only legitimate principals belong to their respective teams (Green, Blue or other) is not the same IAM control as a JIT control.

Proposal: meet “Tox - Locks”, two controls into one

“Toxic” control: Prevent toxic combinations

In AAD RBAC roles, **Green** and **Blue** principals must have mutually exclusive role assignments scoped to the subscription.

This control is **point-in-time**, because it takes a long time to compute given the current state of the AAD Graph API.

“Locks” control: Prevent dangling locks

- Sensitive assets are grouped into dedicated “sensitive resource groups”
- Sensitive resource groups must be locked at all times
- If not, the deviation must last no longer than “H” hours

This control is **continuous**: it’s based on real-time data pulled from Azure Resource Graph API and the Authorization Resource Provider API.

Implementation

⇒ Leverage automated reasoning with a SMT solver to prove both parts of the JIT control work as expected.

“Toxic” control:

- Define two objects LOCKMASTER and CONTRIBUTOR
- Add LOCKMASTER != CONTRIBUTOR as a SMT constraint
- When a principal is granted actions `Authorizations/{Write|Delete|*}`, equate her UUID to LOCKMASTER
- When a principal is granted actions `*/{Write|Delete|*}` or `RP*/{Write|Delete|*}` equate her UUID to CONTRIBUTOR
- Check if the property is SATISFIABLE
- If not, raise an anomaly

“Locks” control:

- Define two objects SENSITIVE and NOTSENSITIVE
- Add SENSITIVE != NOTSENSITIVE as a SMT constraint
- Choose some frequency $F < H$
- At frequency F , enumerate sensitive assets and pick their Resource Group UUID
 - Equate these RG UUIDs to SENSITIVE
- At frequency F , enumerate all Resource Group UUIDs
 - Equate each UUID not equal to the above to NOTSENSITIVE
 - Equate each UUID which is not locked to NOTSENSITIVE
 - Check if the property is SATISFIABLE

Implementation (continued)

“Locks” control (continued):

- If the property is **UNSATISFIABLE**, it means a lock was removed:
 - Pull the time of modification from the Authorization RP API
 - If time is $> H$, raise an **anomaly** and disclose the SMT solution
 - Else, ignore and carry on

Note:

The dangling lock control must execute every $F > H$ or it will **miss positives**.

To ensure control continuity, we implement the SMT continuity algorithm[*]:

- define certified intervals over a compliance period (larger than F)
- build formula φ made of all excluded certified intervals I_n over the period. $\varphi := \text{And}(\varphi, \text{Not}(I_n))$
- check if $\varphi == \text{True}$ is **UNSATISFIABLE**
- If not, raise an **anomaly** and disclose all SMT solutions

[*]: https://github.com/labyrinthinesecurity/automatedReasoning/blob/main/2_ProvableCloudControls.pdf

Tox-Locks

Examples

Example #1: proving toxic combinations

Given a subscription under JIT policy:

- John is Owner
- Julia is authorizations Contributor

| | | |
|------------------|---|---------------------------|
| John=CONTRIBUTOR | } | CONTRIBUTOR == LOCKMASTER |
| John=LOCKMASTER | | |
| Julia=LOCKMASTER | | |

Hence,
CONTRIBUTOR != LOCKMASTER is **UNSATISFIABLE**.

Example #2: proving dangling locks

Say we want a JIT policy on Azure Route Tables and we have only one with ID

/sub/MySub/RGs/MyRG/provider/Microsoft.Network/RouteTables/MyTable

Suppose that **MyRG is unlocked**.

At frequency F,

1. enumerate route tables: /sub/MySub/RGs/MyRG/provider/Microsoft.Network/RouteTables/MyTable
2. pick their Resource Group: /sub/MySub/RGs/MyRG
3. equate these RGs to SENSITIVE: SENSITIVE == /sub/MySub/RGs/MyRG
4. Enumerate all Resource Groups: /sub/MySub/RGs/MyRG, /sub/MySub/RGs/AnotherRG
5. Equate each RG not equal to SENSITIVE RGs to NOTSENSITIVE:
NOTSENSITIVE == /sub/MySub/RGs/AnotherRG
6. Equate each RG which is not locked to NOTSENSITIVE:
NOTSENSITIVE == /sub/MySub/RGs/MyRG
NOTSENSITIVE == /sub/MySub/RGs/AnotherRG

SENSITIVE != NOTSENSITIVE is UNSATISFIABLE.

Depending whether the lock has been removed for longer than “H”, we may raise an anomaly.